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9. ABSTRACT

Since Zaire's adoption of the policy of authenticity, the structure of the universities has been changed completely, the institutions have been nationalized, the students have been co-opted into either a supportive or neutralized position, the university faculty and administration have cooperated with the new organization, and the churches largely have been moved out of post-secondary education. A major justification for applying this policy to education has been the demand for economy in education -- for cost effectiveness in the system. Too, since the government now controls the entire country, demonstrating its presence through the one-party political apparatus, army, police, and bureaucracy, the school ceases to be the unique or most significant representative of the government. The educational structure now is being considered in more natural, normal, national context. Education must not take a disproportionate share of the national budget, it must serve national socialization purposes, its student output must justify the funds invested in human resources development, and it must be subordinate to overall national needs. It would appear certain that authenticity will continue to be a cornerstone of governmental policy for the foreseeable future and that it inevitably will have a profound impact on the educational system.

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THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL PLANNING:

THE CASE OF ZAIRE

PART II

by

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THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL
PLANNING: THE CASE OF ZAIRE

PART II

Philip Coombs has pointed out that "educational planning deals with the future, drawing enlightenment from the past."¹ Certainly part of the problem Zaire has experienced in educational planning efforts has been a result of this "enlightenment from the past"--that is of the inherited colonial models and practices.

Zairians may have acquired, vicariously prior to independence but perhaps more directly through Belgian advisors afterwards, Belgian proclivities toward educational planning which have above all been characterized as being empirical and practical.² Each major component of the colonial structure, religious, business and governmental, was fundamentally concerned with satisfying its own educational needs. Planning was generally based on rather opportunistic and short-term considerations although each major entity was guided by immutable long-term objectives, e.g., harvesting souls, increasing profits, and protecting Belgium's position and investment. In such a context there was available (or potentially available) a continuous flow of outside personnel and funding, especially from religious institutions

and businesses, which augmented government contributions to education. These additive inputs mitigated against serious planning or prioritization by government; a way might always be found to increase funds available for education even if the government had deliberately and intentionally refused to provide for such expenditures. The educational field was a central arena of competition between major factions in the colonial structure for influence over the Africans. Many of these pre-independence circumstances, attitudes, practices and procedures continued after 1960, including a lack of governmental control, the continued presence of the major business and missionary entities (in many cases with even the same actors in influential roles), and the continued availability of outside funding in support of education from new as well as old sources. These factors will be discussed in somewhat greater detail.

Although the budget was the major mechanism of the colonial government for controlling education, its impact was blunted by the magnitude of other funding. During the last year of colonial rule, the Bureau of Catholic Education (BEC) notified the government that its contributions represent, "according to the nature of the expense, only 50% .. (to)..80% of the educational cost carried by the mission."³ With regard to new schools, the colonial government had after World War II issued a regulation stating that "the

government can only make a maximum subvention of 50% of the cost of construction and furnishings" to those central subsidizable schools approved by the colonial administration. Rural schools were excluded from such subsidies. Insofar as per capita student costs were concerned, BEC claimed, as substantiated by the figures presented in Table I, that the government subsidy covered no more than half of the costs. Nevertheless the rate of educational growth was extremely impressive. The colony had reported in 1959 a 10% annual increase in primary school enrollment (achieving a level of 56% of the age cohort group enrolled in primary school) which put Zaire in first or second place in the world in terms of percentage increase achieved in the annual growth rate of enrollment in primary schools.⁴

Even if one were to allow for some inaccuracies in the figures presented by BEC on its educational costs, it is still obvious that the contribution being made by the missions to education was very substantial. It should also be added that since the Protestant education system was only authorized for subsidization after 1948, its contribution had been and continued until independence to be heavily supported by non-governmental sources. With the Official system constituting only 5% of the national educational enrollment (all students subsidized) the Catholic system 68% of enrollment (of which 75% were subsidized), and the Protestant

TABLE I

Comparative Cost and Enrollment Figures for
Subsidized Mission Schools and Official Schools
for 1959/60

	Subsidized Mission Schools	Official Schools
<u>Primary</u>		
Number of Students	1,471,443	60,409
Cost per Student per year	914 F	5,030 F
<u>Secondary</u>		
Number of Students	8,649	3,715
Cost per Student per year	17,343 F	52,818 F
<u>University</u>		
Number of Students	551	278
Cost per Student per year	163,604 F	351,118 F
<u>Technical and Agricultural Education</u>		
Number of Students	10,256	4,033
Cost per Student per year	6,175 F	36,718 F

Source: Bureau de l'Enseignement Catholique, Où en est l'Enseignement
au Congo? (Leopoldville: BEC, 1960).

system 23% of enrollment (of which 8% were subsidized), educational administration and decision-making rested with the missions rather than with the government.⁵ In fact the Bureau de l'Enseignement Catholique was the de facto Ministry of Education, both pre- and post-independence. By soliciting or inducing such substantial missionary support for the educational system the government obviously reduced costs, but it also reduced its control of the systems and their outputs. This was and is the basic structure of the educational system in Zaire.

For sound reasons, Zaire has been and is heralded as a veritable treasure trove--its potential is immense. Its economic promise has made external funding and investment much more readily available than it has been for the vast majority of developing countries. In a sense Belgium's small contribution to the colonial budget in 1959, the first since World War II, was a harbinger of the colony's ability to attract international assistance. Foreign assistance (since 1960) has been available when the Government of Zaire clearly demonstrated the need and satisfactorily identified how the funds would be administered and spent. This assistance has been provided on a project rather than on a plan basis in spite of the fact that many of the donors involved have elsewhere made the availability of funding contingent upon the establishment of a national or sectoral

development plan. Such project assistance has been extended to education on institutional, sub-sector (e.g., teacher training institutes), or regional (the Northeast, Kinshasa, etc.) bases.

About the only planning model to which the Zairians had been exposed prior to independence was the impressive list of developmental targets adopted by the Belgians during the 1950's and designated as the Ten Year Plan. However, the Zairians played little part in either the development or the direction of those schemes. The plan itself was badly disfigured by the post-Korean War economic slump and by the growing political awareness and agitation of the Zairians after 1956, which exacerbated the economic slowdown and contributed to the capital flight beginning in 1958.

Given no active role in planning, little administrative exposure to it, and little evidence that it was either desirable or effective, it is somewhat surprising that all governments which assumed power in Kinshasa from 1960 to 1966 included in their cabinets portfolios for planning. Following President Mobutu's return to power in November, 1965, a High Commissariat of Planning for National Reconstruction was established, only to disappear after less than a year of ineffective existence. Two years later a portfolio of planning was reinstated in the government in conjunction with the Ordinance of March

5, 1969, but it again failed to survive.⁶ An office for planning which was then established in the Presidency had hardly made a start when the core of French planning technicians staffing it were given 24 hours to cross to Brazzaville because of their "diplomatic indiscretions." Based upon pre - and post - independence experiences, Zaire might understandably have little incentive to make a significant commitment to the establishment of national educational planning. It appears, however, there is increasing recognition by members of the growing Zairian bureaucratic technocracy that educational planning has not been given a fair try--that it has probably even been a misnomer to classify their previous practices and processes as educational planning--at least insofar as the term is used internationally.

Consistently, however, the independent government sought to meet the popular demand for education, in spite of an ineffective governmental planning structure, simply by adhering to a policy of "more of everything." Since the educational base was already so broad and since the two, and then three, universities were underutilized, an extra developmental emphasis was in fact placed on the grossly inadequate secondary education system. Even though the economy suffered terribly during the 1960-67 period, the amount committed to the total educational sector climbed to over 25% of the ordinary

budget. In actual application this expansionist policy became an attempt to fashion the African educational system after the small elitist model which had been established in Zaire to serve the Europeans. Often with nothing more than a change in title, a school which had previously been a four year African post-secondary vocational institution became, at least nominally, a six year secondary school with a European curriculum focusing on a general education option leading to university admission. Understandably quantity was achieved partially at the cost of quality.

The United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) with its UNESCO contingent made a substantial contribution toward the planning of a more adequate and appropriate secondary school structure. What UN personnel could not do effectively was to assist with the crucial problem of staffing the expanding secondary system nor could they make the kind of long term commitment in financial or manpower terms which the reforms required to succeed. When UNOC was rapidly disbanded in 1964 it was essentially bankrupt, and the UN was forced to try to reduce its continuing programs to a level which could be justified as normal. As was inevitable, it was basically the missionary systems with their African and European personnel which helped to keep the educational structure functioning and, insofar as possible, expanding; it was essentially only from Belgium that

the number of qualified French-speaking expatriate teachers could be hired to fill Zaire's growing needs at the secondary and university levels; and it was, in the final analysis, those who had long-term commitments in the country, and who were acceptable to Zairians, who implemented the educational programs.

UNOC began as an emergency operation attempting to respond to critical demands. As the organization stabilized into an on-going bureaucratized activity there was probably not enough consideration given to what functions UNOC and its specialized agencies could and should undertake based on their strengths and capabilities and, conversely, what they could not and should not attempt. An immediate problem, one certainly felt by non-francophone nations attempting to respond to Zaire's requests, was that of securing French-speaking technicians to staff positions formerly filled by Belgians who had fled the country. Although unintentionally assisted by the return of many skilled Belgians, the United Nations managed to locate and employ the technicians needed to prevent a breakdown in vital services. The assumption then grew that the UN could overcome the "language problem" inherent in personnel recruitment for Zaire whereas non-francophone binational assistance efforts simply could not. Contrary to expectations, therefore, it was difficult to understand why the UN was only

able to recruit some 80 teachers when up to 1,500 were requested by the Government of Zaire for academic year 1960-61. True, the number requested dwindled but this occurred because the continuing lack of teachers drove Zairian officials to by-pass the UN and do their own recruiting, largely through familiar Belgian channels. For the UN recruiting a diversified range of skilled technicians was obviously more easily accomplished than was extensive recruitment within one profession. Under these circumstances not even the UN could overcome the "language problem" posed by the demand for professionals who not only spoke French, but spoke it well. Probably only a national directive by a francophone state could have made qualified personnel available in the numbers required, but this, of course, was something the UN, lacking such sovereign jurisdiction, could not do.

Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be learned from UNOC experiences in Zaire has been that international organizations can be as subject to the practical realities and limitations of educational planning and implementation as are national and binational organizations. Multinational organizations which play dominant roles in a nation's educational development efforts run many of the same risks as binational or regional entities; they can also be just as resented. While UN personnel may have avoided the persona

non grata stigmatization in Zaire, a number of them departed the country on very short notice. Multinational assistance, while free of some of the characteristics associated with binational assistance, has some unique, and not necessarily desirable, characteristics of its own. As the advantages and disadvantages of multinational assistance became increasingly apparent to the Government of Zaire, the earlier tendency to assume that multinational assistance was, ipso facto, always preferable ceased to prevail in Kinshasa.

Furthermore, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations or its agencies either to initiate or maintain a position of preponderance in any given member country over an extended period of time. By its very nature the United Nations and its agencies are expected to treat member states, i.e. most nations in the world, equally and impartially. Given the present level of resources available to multinational organizations, and there is little promise at present that these resources will be substantially increased, it is extremely difficult for the United Nations to do more than maintain a constructive presence in the developing world. The extraordinary commitment made by the United Nations to Zaire from mid-1960 to mid-1964 was maintained probably as long as it could have been without causing major disaffections by the other member nations. With regard to educational development, which must of necessity generally be of long-term duration,

this means that the United Nations and its agencies are usually limited in both scope and types of activities they can undertake. Extensive foreign assistance in education, that is assistance which is sectorial and programmatic rather than simply project oriented, almost invariably requires major binational contributions to supplement multinational inputs.

Moreover, binational assistance contributions must be identified as such, for if such funds were incorporated into the United Nations' budgets they would again be subject to the demands for parity by all UN member states. Unless new ground rules are made for the allocation of United Nations' resources, it is highly unlikely that a commitment of personnel and funds as extraordinary as the one made to Zaire could be repeated again. After 1964 the United Nations of necessity reverted to the position of being another, rather than the most influential, donor in Zaire.

In retrospect it is astonishing that so much was accomplished in the implementation of the "more education" policy, given Zaire's travails during the first six years of independence. The continuing political dispute over federation, confederation or centralization was not finally settled until General Mobutu assumed power for the second time in November, 1965. The potential influence which the adoption of any one of these various models of government might have had on education was

obviously a critical matter in terms of which level of government, provincial or central, was to control and support which levels of the educational structure. With such a crucial question unanswered, any long-term planning seemed futile. At the same time it was also becoming increasingly clear that regardless of the political structure, only the federal government in fact had funds.

The adoption of a decentralization policy prior to Mobutu's return to power, resulted in the establishment of the 21 "provincettes" which produced an immediate educational surge. Following the model of the original six provincial capitals, the new capital cities promptly created secondary schools which were intended to match those in the old provincial capitals--but never did. This democratization process, while it made secondary education nominally much more available throughout the nation, further exacerbated the rapidly falling educational standards. It also finalized the collapse of the government's policy, adopted in 1961, to limit the growth of secondary enrollment for the next six years (1961-67) to 30,000 students because of the lack of space, materials, qualified teachers, etc. By 1967, however, over 60,000 secondary students were actually enrolled. The political risk involved in the implementation of a policy designed to limit educational growth was simply too great for any relatively weak central government to take.

Finally, the rebellions, which witnessed the occupation (in many instances repeatedly) of large areas of the country by anti-government forces for substantial periods of time, resulted in the extensive destruction and looting of schools over more than one-third of Zaire. These recurring upheavals also dispersed teachers, staff and administrators and not only deprived students of education but in some regions the rebels persecuted students because of their education. Stability was not restored until November, 1967, when rebel elements of the National Congolese Army which had occupied Kisangani withdrew into Rwanda and were disarmed. At last the central government was in control of the entire country.

Five months after assuming power for the second time Mobutu began to recentralize the country. In April, 1966, he reduced the number of provinces from 21 to 12, and several months later he further reduced the number to 8 plus the federal district of Kinshasa. Shortly thereafter, on May 5, 1966, the first step of a new policy, an Africanization policy, was taken with the promulgation of the "decolonization" decree proclaiming that several major cities in Zaire were to adopt indigenous in place of European names. In May of 1967, this policy was further elaborated in a major speech delivered at N'Sele (near Kinshasa) which set forth the program of Mobutu's Popular Revolutionary Movement (MPR) and

emphasized that "national authenticity would be the main goal of the new regime."⁷

As political and military powers were increasingly concentrated in Mobutu's hands, a running battle developed between the President and the university students. In January, 1968, Mobutu accused students at Lovanium University of distributing subversive materials and of organizing demonstrations against Vice-President Humphrey during his official visit to Zaire. Some students were arrested, and all were warned that if they did not attend to their studies instead of to politics the President would personally intervene against them. In February it became clear that the President was not making idle threats--the Executive Committee of the General Union of Congolese Students (UGEC) was dissolved for allegedly plotting the President's assassination.

In a sense the students threwdown the glove when they engaged in open criticism and derision of the President's decision to declare three days of national mourning when his mother died on May 18, 1971. On June 4th when the students staged a protest march through Kinshasa to demand higher student scholarships, the troops were called out to turn the students back. A melee ensued, and by the time order was restored several students were dead and many more were wound-

ed. The President immediately closed Lovanium University and within three days ordered all students (including pregnant women) into the army. In spite of the dire consequences predicted as inevitable results of the President's act, in fact there have been no student strikes or demonstrations since.

As the students were being inducted into the army, the MPR's Political Bureau formed a Commission for the Reform of Higher Education which met on June 6, 1971, to begin discussing the modification of Zaire's post-secondary system. Actually the procedure for applying the policy of authenticity to higher education was being formulated which, as a consequence, was also to end the previous "more of everything" policy. A second meeting, a congress at N'Sele from July 27 to 31, brought together professors from higher educational institutions who were also to offer advice on the reforms under consideration. The timing of the meeting, while perhaps coincidental, meant that most foreign academicians in the system would be in Europe on vacation and would not, therefore, be in a position to influence directly the deliberations. On August 6, President Mobutu, "at the request of the Ministry of National Education, and after deliberations on the matter by the Political Bureau and Council of Ministers," signed Ordinance Law No. 71/075 which, in 56 arti-

cles, created the National University of Zaire (l'Université Nationale du Zaire) or UNAZA.⁸

Shortly after the proclamation of the presidential ordinance another commission was appointed which worked through the remainder of August and September to finalize the new program of courses. Starting in October, 1971, these new programs were phased into the curricula, beginning with the first year students at each of UNAZA's institutions.⁹

Thus with the beginning of academic year 1971/72, the most sweeping educational reorganization since independence was initiated. Furthermore, it was a uniquely Zairian undertaking. All subsidized post-secondary institutions were nationalized and placed under the direction of the UNAZA Rectorate in Kinshasa. UNAZA was divided into two major components, one including the three university campuses and the other the higher institutes. The latter were in turn divided into higher institutes of pedagogy and higher institutes of technology. The three former universities were reconstituted as campuses of the national university, headed by vice-rectors, and renamed after the cities in which they were located: Lovanium University (formerly Catholic) is now the Kinshasa Campus; The Official University of Zaire, the Lubumbashi Campus; and the Free University of Zaire (formerly Protestant), the Kisangani Campus. As indicated on the map of the campuses and institutes of

UNAZA, 6 of the 8 higher institutes of technology and 2 of the 11 higher institutes of pedagogy are located in Kinshasa, as are approximately 41% of the students enrolled on the campuses. The remaining components of UNAZA have been quite evenly dispersed throughout the rest of the country. Total growth of enrollments at the campuses and institutes from 1960/61 to 1973/74 appears in Table II.

One of the most intriguing elements of the reorganization has been the "rationalization" of faculties among the former universities.

"While Ordinance Law No. 71/075 did not specify that Faculties (or disciplines) would be redistributed (or that Faculties would be consolidated to avoid duplication) among the three campuses, this trend was indicated when the National School of Administration (ENA) was abolished and transferred to the Faculty of Social, Political and Administrative Sciences at Lubumbashi, except for the small economics component which went to the Kinshasa Campus. By the beginning of academic year 1971/72, the plan for redistributing the Faculties had been determined, and planes were chartered to move professors and students to their new Faculty sites (Table III).¹⁰

While the academic year opened late, it was an incredible feat that the campuses were able to open at all.

"During the first year of the reform additional changes were made: the National School of Mines at Bukavu was transferred to the Lubumbashi Campus; the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences was placed at Lubumbashi instead of being located with the Faculty of Agriculture at Kisangani; and the Institute of Industrial Psychology was moved from Lubumbashi to the Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogy at Kisangani. Nevertheless, by the end of the first year of the

TABLE II

EVOLUTION OF ENROLLMENTS AT THE UNIVERSITIES AND
SUPERIOR INSTITUTES, 1960/61 TO 1973/74

Years	Universities		Institutions		Total
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
1960/61	567	74.3	196	25.7	763
1961/62	868	69.3	385	30.7	1253
1962/63	1198	59.8	806	40.2	2004
1963/64	1542	64.6	845	35.4	2387
1964/65	1734	55.3	1402	44.7	3136
1965/66	2148	55.1	1751	44.9	3899
1966/67	3038	63.7	1726	36.3	4764
1967/68	3476	59.6	2351	40.4	5827
1968/69	5846	67.0	2882	33.0	8728
1969/70	6153	60.2	4059	39.8	10218
1970/71	7565	62.5	4546	37.5	12111
1971/72	10448	66.8	5186	33.2	15634
1972/73	11143	69.4	4911	30.6	16054
1973/74 *	12350	65.6	6478	34.4	18828

*Predicted enrollment

Source: Annuaire statistique, Ministère de l'Éducation Nationale 4^{ème} Direction des Services Pédagogiques et Division de la Planification de l'Éducation; UNAZA, Rectorat, Statistiques des étudiants 1972-1973, and estimated enrollments for 1973-1974.

Table III. Redistribution of Faculties Among the Three
Campuses of the National University of Zaire
(1973-74)

<u>FACULTY</u>	<u>PRE-REFORM</u>	<u>UNAZA SYSTEM</u>	
Law	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi ¹	Kinshasa Only	
Education and Psychology	All Three Universities	Kisangani Only	
Philosophy and Letters	All Three Universities	Lubumbashi Only	
Social Sciences			
Economics and Commerce	All Three Universities	Kinshasa Only	
Pol./Adm. Sciences, and			
Sociology/Anthropology	All Three Universities	Lubumbashi Only	
Engineering	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi	Kinshasa (Electrical/Mechanical) Lubumbashi (Mining/Metalurgy)	
Theology	Kinshasa (Catholic) Kisangani (Protestant)	Kinshasa (Catholic, Protestant, Kimbanguist)	
Medicine	All Three Universities	Kinshasa	
Agriculture	All Three Universities	Kisangani (Yangambi)*	1
Veterinary Science	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi	Lubumbashi	21
Sciences			
Physics/Mathematics	All Three Universities	Kinshasa/Lubumbashi**	1
and Chemistry			
Biological Sciences	All Three Universities	Kisangani*	

*To be accomplished usually by annual increments.

**Industrial Chemistry to be at Lubumbashi, with the remainder at Kinshasa.

1

Only Lubumbashi and Kinshasa had separate and fully functioning Faculties of Law. Kisangani did, however, have a Department of Law and Political Science within the Faculty of Humanities. While law per se might have developed as a separate entity, it had not done so by 1971.

reform relatively few modifications had been made in the inter-campus distribution of the various Faculties."¹¹

In many ways, perhaps the most important modification made since the original campus faculty assignments was the decision to abolish the Faculties of Protestant Theology at Kisangani and Catholic Theology at Kinshasa and to create one non-denominational Faculty of Theology at Kinshasa for Protestants, Catholics and Kimbanguists.¹² The move in effect further promoted the effort to make the universities more authentic and open to national policy. It was assumed that by removing such pervasive influencing and identifying forces from each campus their special relationships based on religious and missionary associations would cease.

There is little doubt that nationalization of the post-secondary system, and especially of the former universities, was in direct keeping with the movement toward authenticity. An editor of Zaire, a popular weekly news magazine, explained:

"The troubles which have broken out on the campuses were the result in large part of the malaise which has pervaded them for some time. Inspired by foreign principles, the university finds itself a foreign body in the national community. Young students profoundly resent that subtle form of 'neo-colonialism'. Another (foreign) subtlety was (the effort) to make the former universities neutral zones where the authority of the government meant nothing."¹³

Certainly the foreign presence at the campuses had continued since Mobutu's return to power. While the number of Zairian teachers had increased from 3,951 in 1967/68 to

7,287 in 1971/72, the number of foreign faculty members had also increased from 2,771 in 1967/68 to 4,537 in 1971/72. Thus, while these figures indicate substantial progress in increasing the proportion of Zairians, it is also true that the foreign faculty continued to be very influential since of those faculty who had the highest qualifications, including degrees at the Regence (normal school graduates), Licence, and doctoral levels, 3,233, or 71.3%, were foreigners.¹⁴ Zaire after 14 years of independence thus continues to be heavily dependent upon foreign university faculty.

However, it is not the foreigners per se (still numbering 4,537 out of 11,824) at the universities who concern the government--it is that the universities have, in effect, been foreign institutions and furthermore that there has been little indication that they were "Zairizing." As noted above, the objectionable foreign influences range from such transplanted European traditions as the effort to keep the universities as "neutral zones," to questions of academic freedom which could be considered as creating a threat to the "authority of the government." Obviously there is some feeling that concepts such as these need not, and perhaps should not, be the same in Zaire as they are in Western Europe.

Perhaps even more important, more at the heart of

all these university problem areas, is that, as Vice-Rector Koli put it, "the university should be closer to the masses. The university ought to feel as if it emanated from the people who created it, and it (the university) should place itself at their service."¹⁵ When universities do not adapt and integrate, or make relevant, to the nation the products of the professional and intellectual world to which universities belong, then quite logically the people who are sponsoring the institution might well charge it with being "neo-colonial." Moreover, in keeping with authenticity, universities should also be defining their nation and its people and reflecting their unique contributions to the world and not simply receiving, repeating and transmitting the output of foreign universities.

In summary then, since the adoption of the policy of authenticity the structure of the universities has been completely changed, the institutions have been nationalized, the students have been co-opted into either a supportive or neutralized position, the university faculty and administration have cooperated with the new organization (though often with substantial misgivings), and the churches have to a considerable degree been moved out of post-secondary education except in those religious institutions which exist for the training of priests and pastors.

One additional major justification for applying the policy of authenticity to the educational sector has been the demand for economy in education--for cost effectiveness in the system. Nevertheless, while the reorganization and rationalization of the higher education system were to result in significant savings to the government, former Minister of Education Mafema acknowledged in 1972 that initially the expenditures had in fact been substantially higher.¹⁸ It is difficult at present to determine from information available if savings are in fact being accomplished as a result of the reorganization. If, however, the government is following through on its announced determination to evaluate the results of reorganization, then careful consideration will have to be given to the cost factors.

Interestingly, the reorganization indicates a rather distinct change in education's role. Until 1966 the overriding national concern was simply self-preservation--attempting to maintain the country. In this context the school was often the only, or the most significant, evidence of the government's presence and it was imperative that this presence be positive. In so far as possible the schools had to illustrate the government's willingness to respond to the popular demand for education. Admission, or quantity, was obviously more important politically than quality, at least as a short-term political expedient. No government was in power long enough

to have to worry about the long-term repercussions of such a policy. After 1966, however, a stable government was faced with the long-term implications of constant growth of the educational budget plus the irrelevant and low-quality output of the educational system.

Since the government is now in control of the entire country and can demonstrate its presence through the pervasive one-party political apparatus, the army, the police, and the bureaucracy, the school ceases to be the unique or most significant representative of the government. In being placed in a more "integrated," or "balanced," perspective it also becomes less of a "sacred cow." In fact, the educational system may have become even less important than it was prior to independence, where, as a major institutional component of the colonial missionary structure, the bulk of which was operated by the national Catholic mission, it had direct and powerful influence in government in demanding privileged consideration for education for ecclesiastical as well as secular reasons.

In terms of the policy of authenticity, which Dr. Mafema defined as "...adopting to the real needs of the country, of integrating the...school into the milieu,"¹⁹ the educational structure now is being considered in a more natural, normal, national context. Education must not take a disproportionate share of the national budget, it must serve national

socialization purposes, its student output must justify the funds invested in human resources development, and it must in short, be subordinate to, or seen in the context of, overall national needs.)

If the establishment of the policy of authenticity is if not a return to normalcy then the establishment of normalcy in the educational sector, will this policy be extended to the primary and secondary level? Dr. Mafema, in responding to the question in 1972, pointed out that the educational system was a single component and that the government was indeed considering the extension of the new "principles" to the primary and secondary levels. He added, however,

"One ought not have a reform without preparation, with insufficient thought and reflection.....Therefore, let us prepare the primary and secondary reform with prudence in order to adapt it to the new structure that we have just given to higher education. But in this pre-university domain the problems are much more complex given the structure itself and the number of students concerned."²⁰

Illustrative of the differences in magnitude and complexity between higher education on one hand and primary and secondary education on the other are the enrollment figures by educational network contained in Table IV.

In addition to the ramifications which would follow any major reform of primary and secondary education based on the reorganization of higher education, i.e., including nationalization and secularization, there is the additional

TABLE IV

PRIMARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN ZAIRE

BY NETWORK FOR 1970/71*

<u>Network</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Official	361,614	12
Official Congregationalist	15,058	1
Catholic	1,869,007	63
Protestant	573,923	19
Kimbanguist and other Local Churches	<u>150,437</u>	<u>5</u>
Totals	2,970,039	100

*Estimated enrollment in non-subsidized schools: 130,000

Source: Bureau du Président de la République du Zaire, Zaire (Kinshasa: 1972), p. 412.

SECONDARY SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN ZAIRE

BY NETWORK FOR 1969/70*

<u>Network</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Official	78,028	38
Official Congregationalist	7,808	4
Catholic	78,373	38
Protestant	26,918	13
Kimbanguist and other Local Churches	<u>13,640</u>	<u>7</u>
	204,767	100

*Enrollment in non-subsidized secondary schools: 26,603

Source: Ministère de l'Education Nationale, Annuaire Statistique de l'Education (Kinshasa: Direction Générale de la Planification, Fascicule STA 23, 1969/70), pp. 122-125.

problem of attempting to implement the President's 1970 declaration that "...the harmonious development of the Republic demands that there be an equal geographical distribution of schools of all types."²¹ The extent of the present imbalance is illustrated by Table V, and serious corrective action has not yet been undertaken.

A further complicating factor which relates to either nationalization of the entire system or to equal geographical distribution is the national shortage of bureaucratic or administrative competencies. The educational networks, excluding the official network, are, as noted earlier, directed by the individual religious organizations--the Catholics, Protestants, and Kimbanguists. The importance of the administrative, as distinct from pedagogical, service they render to the educational sector is more profoundly appreciated in the context of a continuing nationwide shortage of such skills and capabilities. This has been forcefully put in terms of Zaire's economic policies by Jean-Claude Willame's assertion that "the threat of nationalization has never been effective, for it has been obvious from the very start that the (country) lacks the kind of administrative apparatus that would allow her to institute a planned economy."²² At this point the problems inherent in displacing the trained personnel associated with

TABLE V

Percentage Figures of Student Enrollment
Compared to Population, by Province, 1968/69

Province	Percentage of Students	Percentage of National Population
Kinshasa	20.50	6.10
Bandundu	11.00	12.00
Bas Zaire	14.50	6.95
Equateur	5.20	11.25
Haut Zaire (Orientale)	7.90	15.50
Kasai-Occidental	8.40	11.25
Kasai-Oriental	14.60	8.65
Kivu	7.60	15.55
Shaba (Katanga)	10.30	12.75
	100.00	100.00

Source: Ministère de l'Education Nationale, Annuaire Statistique de l'éducation, 1968/69. (Kinshasa: Imprimerie St. Paul, September, 1971.)

the missionary administrative structure would appear to be at least as difficult and complicated as would nationalization of foreign enterprises. The religious educational systems are, furthermore, known for their initiative and dynamism--so much so that the government has in recent years been involved with restraining rather than encouraging their growth.

Another factor relevant to the extension of the higher educational reform to the primary and secondary school levels is that the schools in the religious networks are not only the most numerous, but generally they are also the best in terms of quality. Given the continuous deterioration already noted in the quality of education since 1960, serious consideration certainly should be given not only to stemming the erosion but to reversing it. While there are many variables contributing to the statistic that only 20 students complete higher education out of every 1,000 who enter primary school, very clearly the quality of education is a major determinant of this level of wastage within the system.²³

It would appear certain that authenticity will continue to be a cornerstone of governmental policy for the foreseeable future and that it will inevitably have a profound impact on the educational system. The reorganization of the higher education in Zaire represents a move by the government to

incorporate, to harness, education more completely to the formation of a new (revolutionary) national identity and cohesion. National needs and goals are being established in human as well as material terms, and the effort to mobilize and control more effectively the contribution of the higher education sector has led the government to develop a unique organizational structure which may serve as a potential or alternate model for the rest of the world--developed as well as developing.

However, the system in Zaire must, as Dr. Mafema pointed out, be carefully analyzed to determine that it is a viable model indigenously, that the goals defined as being part of education's contribution to the nation and its policy of authenticity are in fact better achieved as a result of the reform. For while the reorganization has changed the structure within which the higher educational system may contribute to authenticity, a great deal remains to be done to achieve the goals sought by national leaders. As the First General Report of the Work of the Congress of National Professors reported,

"The goals, methods and philosophy of education have not been re-thought with regard to the givens and realities of our situation and in relation to our desire for authenticity. For a new society one must have new aptitudes, methods and knowledge....Education... is in reality foreign education, not at all adapted to our system of values, to our milieu, to our problems, to our culture. Moreover, there is not

sufficient connection between the themes of research and teaching and our national sectors of activity, nor between the results of that research and their practical utilization."²⁴

To date what has been accomplished might be termed educational policy implementation largely by fiat. However, if answers are to be found to the problems listed above and mentioned in this paper, and if the higher education model is to be perfected and its "principles" extended to the primary and secondary systems, then to achieve the maximum results with the least loss, Zaire may in the process develop an educational planning structure which will fit the needs of the national educational sector. It appears highly likely that the future success of authenticity in education will be correlated with authentic educational planning.

FOOTNOTES

1. Philip H. Coombs, What Is Educational Planning? (Paris: UNESCO, IIEP, 1970), p. 14.
2. Guy Malengreau, "La politique coloniale de la Belgique", Principles and Methods of Colonial Administration (London: Butterworths Scientific Publications, 1950).
3. Bureau de l'Enseignement Catholique, Où en est l'Enseignement au Congo? (Leopoldville: BEC, 1960), p. 11.
4. UNESCO, l'Education dans le Monde (Paris: UNESCO, T.II, 1960).
5. L'Office de l'Information et des Relations Publiques pour le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi, Le Congo Belge (Bruxelles: Imprimeries Dewarichet, 1958), Vol. II, pp. 152-153.
6. From November, 1965, to September, 1970, there were eight cabinets. In these eight there were two Ministers of Planning and Coordination, Kititwa from November, 1965, to September, 1966, and Tshisekedi from March, 1969, to August, 1969.
7. Text of the Manifesto of the Popular Revolutionary Movement.
8. Ibid.
9. William M. Rideout, Jr., The Reorganization of Higher Education in Zaire (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Liaison Committee, American Council on Education), OLC Paper No. 5, March, 1974, pp. 11-12.
10. Ibid., p. 18.
11. Ibid.
12. The Kimbanguists (The Church of Jesus Christ on Earth by the Prophet Simon Kimbangu) is an indigenous religious sect which became a member of the World Council of Churches in 1970.
13. Mabiála ma Vangu, "L'ère de l'université démarre", Zaire, (Kinshasa: Imprimerie Concordia, No. 186, 28 February, 1972), p. 12.

14. Patrick V. Dias, Situation et Perspectives de la Faculté des Sciences de l'Éducation à l'Université Nationale du Zaïre (Freiburg i. Br., Germany: Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, 1973), p. 33.
15. Kolonga Molei, "Les pionniers de l'UNAZA," Zaïre (Kinshasa: Imprimerie Concordia, No. 186, 28 February, 1972), p. 5.
16. Jean-Claude Willame, Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), p. 153
17. Ibid.
18. Momote Kabange, "Dossier université, Nos conclusions," Zaïre (Kinshasa: Imprimerie Concordia, No. 188, 13 March, 1972), p. 33.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Bureau du Président de la République du Zaïre, Zaïre (Kinshasa: 1972), p. 406.
22. Willame, op. cit., p. 157
23. Momote Kabange, op.cit., p. 32
24. Rapport Général des Travaux du 1er Congrès des Professeurs Nationaux de l'Enseignement Supérieur et Universitaire, (Presses Universitaires du Zaïre, Kinshasa, 1971), pp. 18-19. Quoted in Dias, op. cit., p. 8.