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INTER-UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROGRAM
IN
INSTITUTION BUILDING
**THE THAI INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
THE CASE STUDY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING**

by

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**THE THAI INSTITUTE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

**A CASE STUDY IN
INSTITUTION BUILDING**

**Prepared under the
Auspices of the
Interuniversity Program on
Institution Building Research**

**Graduate School of Public and International Affairs
University of Pittsburgh**

Preface

This study was conducted during 1965 and 1966 by a team whose participants have included William J. Siffin, Professor of Government and Director, Political and Administrative Development Program, Indiana University; Associate Professor Woodworth G. Thrombly of the Department of Government, Indiana University (currently on leave as Resident Advisor, National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok); Dr. Arsa Meksawan, former lecturer, Academic Division, Institute of Public Administration, Bangkok; and Dr. Amara Raksasataya, acting chief, Research Division, Institute of Public Administration, Bangkok (until absorption of the Institute into the National Institute of Development Administration). Mr. Titaya Suvanajata of the Research Division of the IPA served as a major member of the field research team, giving untold hours to this study plus an endless patience, impressive intelligence, and delightful good humor. Various members of the staff of the Institute of Public Administration also made valuable contributions. Mr. Robert Gage, graduate student in the Department of Government, made contributions to this study which cannot be adequately described. He contributed his vast quantitative analytical skills, and found solutions to a variety of critical data problems. The problems he could not solve remain insoluble.

Dr. Malai Huvanandana, Dean of the Institute throughout its entire history, was extraordinarily helpful in furthering the efforts of the study team, and we are indeed grateful. The Institute of Public Administration was in many ways the product of his own talent; its problems were in many ways his problems; its expansion into a new and larger edifice could only have occurred as a result of circumstances he made possible.

William J. Siffin
Bloomington, Indiana
March, 1967

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | Page |
|---|------|
| I. THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION | 1 |
| The Evolution of the IPA | 7 |
| Motives and Expectations | 10 |
| Phase II of the Development of the Institute | 20 |
| Some Comments | 25 |
| II. THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION | 30 |
| The Institute Staff--General Characteristics | 42 |
| The IPA Professional Staff's Perceptions of the Thai Bureaucracy | 50 |
| The IPA Environment | 58 |
| Staff Identification with the IPA | 67 |
| Staff Perceptions of the Impact of IPA Programs | 70 |
| III. LEADERSHIP IN THE IPA: FACTORS AND ACTORS | 78 |
| Factors | 79 |
| Actors | 84 |
| Conclusion | 90 |
| IV. THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM | 97 |
| The IPA Academic Program and Its Clientele | 104 |
| Student Attitudes toward the Bureaucracy: A Semantic Differential Analysis | 122 |

| | |
|---|------------|
| Student Perceptions of the Thai Bureaucracy | 130 |
| Student Attitudes toward the IPA | 133 |
| Student Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change | 135 |
| Former Students of the IPA | 149 |
| Relations of Perceptions and Attitudes to Participation in the IPA Academic Program--An Exploration | 172 |
| V. IN-SERVICE TRAINING AND THE EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM | 194 |
| In-Service Training and the Institutional Qualities of the IPA: The Executive Development Program | 196 |
| The IPA and Bureaucratic Executives | 205 |
| VI. CONCLUSIONS | 244 |
| The Basic Conclusion | 244 |
| The Complicated Questions | 246 |
| VII. METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX | 270 |

I

THE CREATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

On May 3, 1955, a contract was signed which contemplated the creation of an Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University in Bangkok, Thailand.

The primary parties to the agreement were Indiana University and Thammasat University. Indiana, through its Department of Government, was to provide the technical assistance necessary to the venture. Thammasat was to cooperate in a variety of ways, providing the Institute with a mandate, and furnishing certain staff and facilities. The Thais would provide a director for the enterprise and acquire the skills and resources enabling them to replace the Americans and the foreign aid financing as the Institute evolved. They would continue the operation of what was to be a going concern. The International Cooperation Administration of the U.S. Department of State was also a party to the arrangement, along with the Thai government. The United States government would underwrite a major portion of the initial cost of the venture.

The first contract ran for three years, from 1955 to 1958. This time period was a function of limits upon ICA authority, rather than a reflection of any assumption that the Institute of Public Administration (IPA) would be a going concern by that time. All parties implicitly assumed that the contract would be extended, if the initial efforts proved promising, and if other circumstances permitted.

With some revisions the contract was extended for two years in 1958, and at declining levels of U.S. support was again renewed in 1960, 1961, and 1963. It terminated on October 31, 1964, when full responsibility for the Institute and its program was assumed by the government of Thailand. Eighteen months later, on April 1, 1966, the IPA was absorbed into a new, more comprehensive organization, the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA).

For slightly more than ten years the effort to build and operate the IPA went forward; and its absorption into a new enterprise did not mark its total demise. NIDA was in a substantial sense an outgrowth of the IPA. The proposal for creating a new, more comprehensive Institute was shaped within IPA; much of the planning that led to the establishment of NIDA took place within the IPA; and the core of the New NIDA staff came from the IPA.

In the new enterprise the established public administration program would continue, although parts of it would be merged with activities in such fields as business administration, statistics, and economic development.

The IPA academic program would continue as one faculty of NIDA. The IPA research activities would be absorbed into a larger research enterprise. The well-established IPA library would become the core of the new NIDA library. And the whole enterprise would now exist as a unit of the office of the Prime Minister, rather than as a faculty of Thammasat University.

Financial support for the NIDA development would come from the Thai government and the Ford Foundation, and technical and professional support would be derived not from one university alone, but from a consortium-- the Midwest Universities' Consortium for International Activities (MUCIA),

but with Indiana University's School of Business acting as the consortium's agent.

Under these circumstances the IPA as a discreet organization did, of course, vanish--a victim not of failure but of growth. The institutional identity of the IPA was lost but not entirely so. Established activities and relationships in public administration would continue. Established doctrine would continue to be promulgated through the instruments which emerged during the development of the IPA. In the public administration sector of the new enterprise, there were many things that promised to remain substantially unchanged, at least in the short run.

This study concerns the IPA. In the broadest sense we seek answers to two questions: To what extent did the efforts that began in 1955 succeed in creating an Institute that was also an institution? And what were the distinguishing normative characteristics of the enterprise that grew out of the contract first signed in 1955?

Of course, other questions are linked with these. The basic object of the effort that began in 1955 was "normative" rather than merely "technical"--at least in the minds of strategic participants in the undertaking. The justification for the effort and the expenditure was the promise and the hope that an institution might be created whose own norms and value orientation were somewhat different from those of the Thai bureaucracy, and that this organization might exercise some influence and effect upon the bureaucracy, thus contributing to changes not only in technical performance capabilities but in actual patterns of behavior. The IPA was to be a change agent for the Thai bureaucracy. One of our objectives is to determine the extent to which this aim appears to have been fulfilled. Another is to examine how.

Thus some of the questions that concern us here relate to the strategy followed in the effort to create the IPA. In part this strategy was conscious, deliberate, explicit; but in part it was--for a variety of reasons--inadvertant. Unintended and unexpected consequences resulted from some of the efforts connected with the building of the enterprise. By looking at both the explicit and implicit aspects of strategy it may be possible to make some tentative statements about institution-building strategies.

We must also explore certain questions concerning the relationship between institutional qualities of the enterprise itself and the patterns of its relations with its environment. Presumably there must be some interdependence between these; qualities of the immediate organization both affect and are affected by qualities of the relationships between the organization and significant elements in its environment. To cite a gross example, a "radical" organization openly and avowedly bent upon attacking certain valued features of its environment is not likely to get substantial support from the entities it threatened.

There are other less obvious characteristics of the possible relationships between an organization and its environment. In fact, an organization can only exist as an "institution" through some kinds of linkages with its environment. The essence of institutionality is "meaningfulness." An entity is an institution to the extent that it is meaningful to its participants--to those directly involved in it, and those who perceive themselves as being affected by it.

"Meaningfulness" is not itself a highly meaningful term. In a broad manner of speaking, a meaningful entity confers something upon its participants and it is valued as a source of value. An institution may grant

status. More basically, it may interpret existence and grant identities which have status components. It may articulate and enforce acceptable rules by which to regularize conduct and premises by which to perceive and interpret phenomena. An institution may confer competence upon participants who may value it for its personal effects upon themselves--their personalities and their abilities to attain fulfillment. It may be a prime means for the assertion of values cherished by participants particularly those with important roles within the institution. To the extent, however, that an organization is merely perceived as one of a series of alternative instruments by which values may be asserted and conferred, and to the extent that the particular instrument is seen as having few distinguishing attributes that make it more desirable or preferable to equally available means for the enhancement of value--to the extent that this circumstance attains, prospects for distinctive institutionalization are limited.

The ability of an organization to confer value upon participants is never fully within its own control. Environmental factors--social system characteristics--play a vast part in determining what may be valued. Thus the work of Christian missionaries in Thailand has been distinguished by lack of success converting Thais--missionaries have little of value to confer upon the members of an abidingly Buddhist society. In fact, one finds a stark--though interesting and significant--discrepancy in certain valuational aspects of missionary efforts. The prime actors, the missionaries, see themselves as proselytizing a faith. Thy myriad facets of their roles are made meaningful and coherent by this goal. Many of the other participants--the customers or clients in particular--also value the missionary enterprises, seeing them, for example, as distinctive instruments of

education, or in some cases as preferred sources of medical assistance. Discrepant valuations of this sort by participants in a given enterprise are potentially unstable. Functions perceived by the institutional leadership as instrumental to prime purposes are perceived as valued ends by other participants. They may tolerate the proselytistic aspects of the institution exactly so long as these are not perceived to be inconsistent with, or threatening to values that are inconsistent with missionary goals. From such circumstances arise many opportunities for stress, conflict, and failure of institutional efforts. But in such circumstances, too, exist potential opportunities for induced changes--for indirectly attacking (seeking, if you will, to subvert) existing institutionalized values through collateral attack. In purely speculative terms, it seems that the efficacy of such strategies of collateral attack are likely to be determined not by the attack per se, but rather by a concentration of circumstances: If environmental conditions erode the relevance and potency of established institutions, then--and perhaps then alone--an emerging entity which is valued for disparate reasons may capture the game. It may move farther into the realm of institutionalization; its substantive goals may come to be increasingly valued by a widening range of participants. But this value disparity, which seems an inherent characteristic of any emerging institution that aims to capture a clientele that is not "inside" the organization, also implies that the institutional organization is likely to be in an unstable, precarious condition. It may not be able to induce enough clientele acceptance and support. The commitment of its own prime participants may erode or shift.

It is always possible that an institution may be valued for various and even disparate reasons. This premise has certain strategic and tactical

implications for those who would build institutions. And it is a matter of utmost importance for those who would seek to understand them.

The Evolution of the IPA

The Indiana-Thammasat contract of 1955 was an outgrowth of subtle and complex circumstances which defy unravelling.

In 1952, the U.S. Mutual Security Agency had, with the approval of the Thai government, contracted with the Public Administration Service of Chicago for a survey of public administration in Thailand. About the same time, the late Dr. Rufus B. Smith, Chancellor of New York University, came to Thailand under the auspices of the Fulbright program to work at Chulalongkorn University. With Dean Dasem Udhayanin of the Chulalongkorn political science faculty, Smith made a study of public administration training needs.

Subsequently the Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshal P. Philbulsonggram, expressed an interest in doing something about the nation's public administration training facilities. Discussions took place within the Thai government, and between it and the U.S. Operations Mission in Thailand. One participant in them was Dr. Malai Huvanandana, Dean of Political Science at Thammasat University.

Dean Malai happened to meet Dr. Walter H. C. Laves in the winter of 1953-54 at a UNESCO-sponsored conference at Rangoon. The possibilities of expanding public administration training in Thailand became the subject of a discussion between the two. At this time Dr. Laves knew that he would soon be joining the faculty of Indiana University as Chairman of the Department of Government. When he did so in the fall of 1954 he began to explore the prospects of a contract under which Indiana University's Department of Government would assist the Thais in expanding their public administration faculties.

In March 1955, after various preliminaries had been completed, Professor Laves went to Bangkok under the auspices of the International Cooperation Administration to negotiate a possible contract.

It quickly became apparent that the U.S. Operations Mission in Thailand, while quite interested in the prospect, had given little thought to the specifics of a prospective arrangement, although there was a general assumption that a venture should involve the creation of a public administration training facility that would serve as a source of expertise in Thailand. The previously-established Manila institute undoubtedly influenced the thinking of ICA and its Thailand mission.

As for Thai expectations and desires, it appears that these too were relatively general, and congruent with those of USOM-Thailand.

Previous planning in Bloomington by an ad hoc committee by Chairman Laves had centered on the idea of creating an Institute of Public Administration modeled after the sort of organization that had developed within the United States--a multi-purpose agency, located within a university, and engaged in academic activities, research, and training. In Bangkok this vision seemed plausible, and it ran counter to no other perspectives. The immediate question was: where should such an entity be located?

There were two choices, Thammasat University and Chulalongkorn. Thammasat had no program or faculty in the field of public administration. For all practical purposes it granted no graduate degrees. It did have accounting, law, and political science faculties. And the university produced most of the nation's college graduate civil servants. Yet the student body had a reputation for strong anti-government views and this was reflected in a continuing emphasis on governmental control of the university.

Partly for this reason the rectorship was held by the Prime Minister.

The only alternative to Thammasat was Chulalongkorn University, with its royalist tradition. Chulalongkorn had evolved in the early decades of the Twentieth Century, during the last phase of the absolute monarchy, largely for the purpose of producing trained cadres of civil officials. Following the Revolution of 1932, when the absolutism of the monarchy was brought to an end, Thammasat was created to produce a newer breed of officials, free of the taint of royalist identification. In 1955 it was generally agreed that Chulalongkorn was a much stronger institution, with higher academic standards and better students than Thammasat. Its Dean of Political Science had manifested an interest in public administration and even co-authored a small monograph on Thai public administration. But the Prime Minister, whose concurrence and support were essential to the undertaking, was identified with Thammasat University. This no doubt was an implicitly influential factor in the choice of a Thai base.

Another factor came into play: a somewhat competitive relationship between the deans of political science at Thammasat (Malai) and Chulalongkorn (Kasem). Dean Malai had occupied a central role in the preliminary explorations that occurred before and during March, 1955; he was the Dean of Political Science at Thammasat. Holder of a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan, Malai indicated some preference for his old alma mater as the supporting university. But Michigan was already engaged in a contract in the Phillipines, and American foreign aid officials were unwilling to consider Michigan as a contracting party because of the university's prior commitment. With Michigan unavailable, Dean Malai had no personal objections to Indiana

University, and Dr. Laves was on hand.

Another key individual on the scene in Bangkok supported the contemplated arrangement, i.e., the Laves proposal. This was Dr. Edgar B. Cale, Chief of the USOM Education Division in Thailand. He was prepared to select Indiana for the contract, partly on the basis of his past acquaintance with Dr. Laves and his apparently favorable opinion of the University (where he later sent a daughter and a son to school). Preliminary discussions between Laves and Cale also opened up the prospect that Cale might become the Chief of Party of the Indiana University Public Administration Team when the contract was negotiated. This prospect, seriously considered at Indiana University, was soon precluded by a legal objection from ICA. According to agency attorneys, Cale's appointment would have constituted a conflict of interest.

Dr. Laves left Bangkok at the end of March, after having helped write a memorandum of agreement which looked forward to the establishment of a contractual relationship between Thammasat University and Indiana University. The Prime Minister of Thailand had agreed to the arrangement and had promised that substantial cooperation would be forthcoming from Thammasat. It was also understood at this point that Dr. Malai would become the head of the new organization. In a little more than a month, in May, 1955, the contract was signed.

Motives and Expectations

The Indiana-Thammasat contract symbolized the concatenation of a set of interests, reciprocal and interacting, if not mutual. It is impossible to specify the nature of these interests and the underlying

motives and expectations except in a most incomplete and impressionistic manner. For that matter, it is not so much these motives that count, but rather the consequences of the efforts which grew out of them.

Yet the motives and expectations are not entirely irrelevant. Commitments were embedded in them, and these commitments were bound to affect the perceptions and actions of contributors to the development of the IPA.

The fullest statement of expectations was made by Dr. Laves, in a report to the principal administrative officers of Indiana University in April, 1955. He saw the pending contract as enriching the University and its larger community by relating the institution to the great revolution of rising expectations--economic, political, social, and cultural--he saw as occurring in Southeast Asia. He perceived the University as deriving benefits to its research, instructional and service activities. Finally, he believed that through this contract the University would "share in the nation's responsibility for helping develop institutions and opportunities that in turn would contribute to the emergence and strengthening of free government."

The Chairman of the Government Department undoubtedly also saw opportunities and benefits for his own unit of the University--"free-floating resources" that would contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the department, activities that would link the academic aspects of the department with practitioner concerns; and, undoubtedly, an increment of stature and prestige both for the department and himself as chairman.

U.S. aid authorities both in Washington and in Bangkok undoubtedly

perceived the contract as a relevant and worthwhile facet of American foreign aid to Thailand. Southeast Asia was an abiding object of concern to American policymakers at the time. The Thai government showed every sign of being an ally of the United States in a part of the world full of portents of trouble. Activities that contributed to the strength of the Thai bureaucracy were generally viewed as inherently beneficial. The use of a contract arrangement for such a purpose in the field of public administration education, training, and research was not unprecedented. And a technical assistance arrangement in which the indigenous government would demonstrate its support for the project and agree to absorb it over a rather short period of time was intrinsically desirable. There would be a limited investment of U.S. resources and, hopefully, a growing, deepening host country commitment to the enterprise and its objectives.

As for the Thais, one can only suggest plausible objectives of Thai government participation. In the first years of the contract venture, extensive discussions between Indiana's chief advisor and the Thai Prime Minister and Minister of Interior indicated to him that these two strategically situated individuals did have an earnest conscious commitment to improving and strengthening the bureaucracy. They did not see this as involving fundamental changes in the character of Thai government, or as involving any penetrating challenge to the values of the regime.

Parenthetically, their generalized reformistic posture was by no means novel. Great and lasting bureaucratic reforms had occurred in the latter part of the Nineteenth Century. At that time extensive use was made of foreign advisors. Among the apparent consequences of this

earlier effort at bureaucratic reconstruction had been the preservation of Thailand's independence in the face of threats from France and England. Certainly the broad, general idea of bureaucratic improvement was not beyond the comprehension or appreciation of the Thai government leaders.

Yet many of the implications of such an effort may well have escaped them. The inconsistency between a sometimes capricious, oligarchic authoritarian regime structure and a Western-style dedication to responsible, law-based, performance-oriented bureaucracy is an example. But national leaders almost inevitably must deal with generalities a large part of the time, and there were plausible bases for assuming that an Institute of Public Administration was likely to be beneficial and not perceivably threatening of the status quo to which these political leaders were committed.

In addition there had been representations from the foreigners concerning the need for bureaucratic improvement. Some of these have been cited above. Others took place in the context of various aid programs in fields ranging the military to public health and education. The Thai leadership probably appreciated the significance imputed by the Americans to public administration reform; if so, this must have enhanced their receptivity for the proposals reflected in the Indiana-Thammasat contract.

Also within the Thai context there was Dean Malai. His motives are not by any means fully known. He also served as Deputy Director General of the Department of Public Welfare in the Ministry of Interior. Throughout his career in the post-war era he had avoided any full commitment to academic affairs. Rather, these were a substantial and

suitable sideline for the holder of the first American Ph.D. in political science to be achieved by a Thai.

Undoubtedly the Dean, too, perceived of the IPA as a useful instrument of service to the bureaucracy. No doubt he also saw in it an opportunity for advancement in status--or at least for the expansion of the realm in which he possessed relatively high status. If the highest level of the government supported the establishment of an IPA the Dean as the head of that organization would probably benefit in his relations with the nation's political leadership.

Finally the Dean had extensive experience in dealing effectively with the "farang," the Westerners with whom he had worked as a student and as an official. He had proved graceful and effective in these relations. He saw no great threat or heroic difficulties in the prospective relationship with a staff of Western University advisors. On the contrary, he may have looked forward to it, partly as an opportunity for his own continuing involvement in academic affairs.

Out of these perspectives an agreement was reached on a contract. Behind this agreement was no broad and substantial perception of the full nature of the commitment inherent in the enterprise.

The American contractors, for example, knew nothing of Thailand. And neither the Thais nor the Americans consciously perceived the depth and significance of the normative variance between long-established characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy and the central doctrine so unquestioningly assumed to be relevant and appropriate for the Institute of Public Administration. Thus was a venture established on the basis of a series of visions--visions whose congruence was essentially a function of their limited depth, as well as the extent to which the

parties to the agreement were able to avoid articulating conflicting premises.

For instance, some persons within Indiana University perceived of the contract in part as an indirect instrument for Thai political development, something that would have been regarded with less than enthusiasm by some of the Thais who agreed to the venture. At most, the Thais who contributed to the decision to establish the IPA perceived of it as a limited instrument: it might increase the performance capabilities of bureaucrats without much affecting the socio-political status quo. To the extent that this status quo included norms and patterns inconsistent with the perspectives and fundamental attitudes of the foreign professional advisors, there were potentialities for dissonance in the venture.

This was the situation into which the Americans, most of them wondrously innocent, moved in 1955.

Official Objectives

The 1955 Indiana-Thammasat contract specified a set of objectives: "To assist the University of Thammasat in improving, establishing, and expanding:

1. its academic program in public administration at undergraduate and graduate levels;
2. its facilities for in-service training programs for government officials;
3. its facilities for research;
4. its facilities for providing technical consultative service to the government;

5. teaching methods;
6. library and reference facilities in public administration."

These objectives contemplated not only the development of academic courses and research programs, but also a direct working relationship with government officials in the field of training. The stated aims were direct outgrowths of the planning which had taken place in Bloomington prior to the March, 1955, negotiations. The basic idea was simply to establish a general purpose institute of public administration, drawing on established models, and assuming that such an enterprise would in various ways be beneficial in Thailand, just as such enterprises had proved beneficial in other places.

From the American viewpoint there was implicit in these statements of objectives the underlying aim of developing an enterprise which would promote productivity, rationality, efficiency, and "responsibility" viewed more or less in Western terms. This would be done by inculcating into the Thais the kinds of technical competence and professionalism characteristic of Western bureaucracies. (And in the minds of a few people, at least, this might in various ways contribute to the prospective growth of "free government.")

Substantial difficulties in the enterprise were, of course, perceived--problems of staffing a contract by a Government Department which in 1955 contained no more than 15 members, only two or three of whom worked in the field of public administration, was one such problem.

Another was language. Nobody in the Indiana milieu spoke or read Thai, although the first chief advisor on the contract rapidly acquired a speaking proficiency in the language.

Most of the other problems were perceived to be technical-- matters of support, procurement, record-keeping, finance, etc. There would be, of course, political problems in dealing with the Thais, to be handled on a situation-by-situation basis, mostly in Bangkok. Basically, it was assumed that a substantial amount of unquestioning cooperation would be forthcoming from the recipients.

The Effort Begins

The first phase of the institution-building effort might be defined as May, 1955 - February, 1958, the period of the initial contract.

In these two years and nine months a very substantial set of activities occurred. The first group of 14 participants to be sent to Indiana for training was selected by a committee composed of Dean Malai, Dean Kasem of Chulalongkorn University, Luang Sukhum Nayaprudit, Secretary General of the Thai Civil Service Commission, and Dr. Edgar B. Cale. They arrived in Bloomington, Indiana, on September 14, 1955. (The first of them, Khun Bunchana Atthakor, was back in Bangkok by the end of 1956 with his M.A.)

About the same time (September, 1955) the first contingent of the Indiana University advisory staff arrived in Bangkok: Dr. Joseph L. Sutton, Chief Advisor, Dr. Joseph B. Kingsbury, visiting professor of public administration, Mr. Walter B. Johnson, visiting professor of public welfare, and Mr. John W. Ryan, research associate and doctorate candidate in government at Indiana.

By May of 1956 the academic program of the Institute had been officially announced. The work of preparing certain teaching materials in English had begun. The research division, headed by Dr. Adul-- Wichiencharoen--a relatively young Thai with a Ph.D. in political science from

American University, Washington, D.C., (international relations)--had drawn up an ambitious program. It had also prepared the first comprehensive organization charts of the Thai government. First steps were being taken to prepare a manual of government organization (a project finished some seven years later) and at least seven other projects had been planned. Meanwhile the IPA was building a staff. A library was developed. By 1958 it contained more than 6200 volumes and 140 periodicals and was being managed by a Thai staff member with professional library training.

By 1958, too, brief draft textbooks in public administration and personnel administration had been completed by Professor Kingsbury, and brief monographs had been written on several subjects, including local government in Thailand, the administration of Bangkok municipality, and the administration of public social welfare services in Thailand.

The training division of the Institute was in the early stages of implementing a vast program calling for the development of 200 training directors who would have prime responsibility for in-service training in the ministries, departments, and other major agencies of Thai government. By the beginning of 1958 the division had conducted its first training directors course for 18 officials. A Government Advisory Board for in-service training had also been formed with the prime minister as chairman and with the undersecretaries of the various ministries of Thai government as other members. At its meeting (perhaps its sole meeting) in May, 1957, it had "approved" the IPA training directors program proposal.

By 1958 more than 100 students were enrolled in the Institute's courses. (The recruit of these students is discussed elsewhere.) Additional textbooks were being prepared, on comparative local government

and administration, and on organization and management.

At this point, when the first Indiana-Thammasat contract came to an end, the Institute had a Thai staff of sixteen professional members, including six returned participants, plus another sixteen administrative, clerical and miscellaneous employees. The Indiana advisory staff resident in Bangkok included ten professional and one administrative staff members. The Institute's fourteen courses were being taught by Americans, assisted in some cases by Thai counterparts. The in-service training program was being managed by Americans, aided by the newly designated chief of the division, Khun Chan Smitawet, a returned participant with an M.A. in public administration, who died suddenly on May 30, 1958. The research division was engaged in a substantial set of service activities, in particular assisting the Ministry of Interior's Board on Legal Problems of Labor Relations. A comprehensive study of the organization of Thammasat University was about to begin, under the direction of Professor Douglas Ellison, one of the advisory staff members. Another advisor, Mr. Henry Graham and his wife were engaged in a study of the Thai family life. Mr. Frederick J. Horrigan, a doctoral candidate and research associate, had completed a draft study on provincial and district administration, which was to serve as his dissertation. And John Ryan, another graduate student, had finished a report and dissertation draft on municipal government in Thailand. There was, in short, a sizeable amount of activity in the research division, although most of the research was actually being performed by the American advisors.

The IPA was in a relatively early stage of development. The formal plan, which had been drawn up in outline even before the Indiana-Thammasat contract was signed, was being implemented. The

Institute was largely being run by the American advisors. A substantial Thai staff had not yet appeared on the scene. This was the stage of affairs that attained when the negotiations of a contract extension occurred.

Phase II of the Development of the Institute

In 1958 the contract was extended for two years. The new arrangement, the stated objectives of which did not vary substantially from those contained in the first agreement, anticipated a relatively short period of time during which the Thai contributions to the operation of the IPA would grow substantially.

Under the original contract the Thai government had provided quarters for the IPA at Thammasat University, but Thai expenditures for the operation were funded out of the counterpart funds available for such purposes. Few regularly appropriated funds had been made available, and an official table of approved civil service positions for the IPA remained to be created.

This last circumstance had caused an acute problem, the difficulty of absorbing returned participants--a matter discussed more extensively in the section on the Thai staff.

During the second contract period a series of official positions was created. The Thai government accepted responsibility for paying the salaries of incumbants of those positions out of appropriated funds. And by June 30, 1960, it also accepted responsibility for funding the continued development of the IPA library, as well as for buying any other supplies and equipment needed in the Institute. By that time the library collection had grown to 12,000 volumes and 200 periodicals.

1960 was a watershed year for the IPA. The contract which expired on June 30 of that year was extended for 12 months "with the possibility

of further extension beyond this period."

During the first half of 1960 the job of organizing the IPA continued. In February, heads of divisions were named. Doctor Choop Karnjanaprakorn became head of the academic division. Doctor Sukdi Pasuknirunt was made director of research. (Both were returned participants with Ph.D.'s in government from Indiana University. Choop was an experienced former official of the Ministry of Interior, where he had been a protege of Dean Malai.) Mr. Bunchana Atthakor, a man of about forty with prior experience in the Ministry of Finance and in private business, became head of in-service training. The library was made a separate division under the directorship of Miss Nayanitaya Rojanasena, another returned participant with a library science degree. An Institute executive committee was also organized, and Dr. Choop was designated Associate Dean, with responsibilities for "assisting the Dean in program planning and administrative supervision. This post was created in response to a long felt need for full-time leadership in the Institute."*

By the year's end the Thai staff had grown to 18 professional and 10 administrative members, including 12 returned participants. The Indiana staff had declined to five professional and one administrative member. 39 participants had been sent abroad for training (including two short-term training tours for bureaucratic officials engaged in in-service training activities). 32 of them had returned to Thailand by the fall of 1960. After 1960 only three participants would be sent abroad for training, and nine would return. Of these nine, four would acquire Ph.D.'s; and at the end of 1965 none of them would remain on the staff of the IPA, although two would be teaching at the Institute on a part-time basis.

*Tenth Semi-Annual Progress Report on Establishment of an Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1960, p. 3.

By September, 1960, 342 students had been enrolled in the M.A. program. At least 70 percent of them had come to the IPA of their own volition, while another 30 percent had been nominated by government ministries. 85 students had completed their course work and become thesis-writing degree candidates; 29 others had completed theses and obtained an MPA degree.

Yet there was no "full-time" Thai instructor in the academic division. The Associate Dean and director of the division was being assisted by two other members of his division who also had research responsibilities. The teaching staff was made up largely of part-time instructors, nearly all of them former participants in the Indiana University training program. The American staff was declining in size, and the Institute was planning to build its academic staff over the next four years to a minimum of seven instructors with Ph.D. level training--including four participants then in the United States studying toward the Ph.D.

Plans were being made to produce textual materials in Thai, although not much of this had yet occurred. A public administration journal was also being planned, and a small contribution had been obtained from Thammasat University to help finance the initial stages of the venture (\$1,000,000).

Eleven research projects were reported as "in progress," five of them being conducted by Americans. (Three or four were eventually completed) In November, 1960, Dr. Sukdi, head of the research division, resigned to accept a post in the Political Science faculty of Thammasat University.

The in-service training division was continuing to operate a variety of technical training programs for government officials, in supervision, office management, and other fields. But in May, 1960, first steps were

taken toward the establishment of the executive development program which became the major feature of in-service training in the IPA during the years from 1960. Meanwhile the initial vision of creating a network of training directors throughout the ministries and departments of Thai government was fading away, and the Thai director of the division also faded away--he resigned in July, 1960, to take a more responsible post in the bureaucracy. By the end of 1959, 84 men and women had been designated by their ministries or departments and trained to function as training directors; but in 1960 only two were actually engaged in training as their primary function within particular bureaucratic organizations.

Developments After 1960

In 1961 the Indiana-Thammasat contract was extended for two more years, to October 31, 1963. During the first of these years the American advisory staff was reduced to a total of three plus secretary and in the second year of the contract the American staff was reduced to a chief advisor and an in-service training advisor. There was also some use of short term consultants. By the end of 1961 the Thai staff had risen to 22 professional members with civil service status, including 13 returned participants. 24 additional staff members were being carried out of the special University budget and--in six cases--out of the counterpart project budget. The Thai government had assumed almost full financial responsibility for the Institute's operation, furnishing an operating budget for fiscal year 1962 of baht 1,330,000 (\$66,500). The Thai Journal of Public Administration had come into existence with the publication of the first issue in July, 1960. Publication was primarily in Thai but with some articles and summaries in English. Publication for the first two years was being subsidized by a grant of baht 110,700 (\$5,535) from

In 1962 the Thai professional staff grew by a net figure of 1. The Institute gained two and lost two staff members who had received overseas participant training. The General Assembly of EROPA (Eastern Regional Organization for Public Administration) was held in Bangkok under the sponsorship of the IPA. And the last course in the MPA program being taught with assistance from an American was taken over the Thais.

In the next year the Thai professional staff grew by two members. A new chief of the in-service training division assumed substantial responsibility for the work of that division, which ran or participated in 44 training programs during the year, including several executive development programs.

By now it was obvious that foreign aid support for the IPA was about to end (although a one-year extension of the contract to October 31, 1964, was obtained). The American chief advisor and a few members of the Thai staff began to explore the possibility of obtaining Ford Foundation support for an enterprise which would be an outgrowth of the IPA. And in November, 1963, a three-man survey team came to Bangkok and recommended that a National Institute of Development Administration be established.

By 1964, when the last Americans were withdrawn, the Thai staff had risen to 35 professional members including 16 returned participants. The academic program continued to move along with a new enrollment of 40 students in the first semester of that year. A total of 80 students had completed the thesis and obtained the MPA. The library had grown to almost 20,000 volumes, approximately one-fourth of them in Thai. And the Thai government passed an act authorizing the establishment of NIDA subject to negotiations with the Ford Foundation for support during the Organization's formative years.

Before the end of 1965, these negotiations were completed, the last of the Indiana University chief advisors returned to Bangkok to work with the IPA staff in the development of NIDA, and on April 1, 1966, the Institute of Public Administration ceased to exist and a new National Institute of Development Administration came into being.

Some Comments

This thumb-nail sketch does not begin to portray the substance of the sometimes strenuous and often confusing activities involved in the effort to establish an Institute of Public Administration in Bangkok. It does suggest a few things, however.

In the first place, the vision of the venture was substantially articulated in formal fashion by the time the venture began; and this formal statement of the vision was never formally changed in any substantial fashion. The academic program continued to be in 1965--in formal structure--what it was contemplated to be in 1955. The research division led at best an uneven existence. Much of the actual research was done by Americans in the earlier years of the venture, and the efforts of the Thais who followed them made no vast contribution to the range of knowledge available in Thailand. The Ministry organization charts, the organization manual series, a "Who's Who in Thailand" and a survey of the incomes and expenditures of the civil servants were completed. A variety of "service research" projects were also undertaken. A hundred master's theses were produced, many of them in Thai, and some quite informative. The Journal of Public Administration had achieved a total of almost 1200 subscribers, and contained a variety of apparently useful information and commentary on matters administrative. Topical articles included descriptions of various governmental programs

and activities, historical statements, summaries of theses, descriptive essays on such matters as policy making and the use of staff, and book reviews. The object of the Journal was "to disseminate knowledge of and increase the understanding and importance of public administration in Thailand." No one could say that the Journal had not by 1965 begun to make a worthwhile contribution to these purposes.

In the second half of the time period covered in this study the in-service training division of the Institute penetrated the upper reaches of the Thai bureaucracy with a seemingly successful executive development program, while continuing to run a variety of "nuts-and-bolts" training activities for lower level officials. The efforts to promote the establishment of training directors within Thai government agencies had been abandoned as a substantial failure, and the IPA itself moved into the center of the arena of administrative and managerial training within many of the civilian sectors of the Thai government.

It is worth noting that: the Indiana University vision of the IPA had stipulated a training facet, but the content of this aspect of the program was essentially undefined in the original plan for the Institute. The planners were essentially oriented toward the expression of their own teaching-research perspectives, and had little substantive knowledge of training matters and strategies. The first American training advisor was imported from the Philippines, bringing with him the professional perspective of the training expert and the strategic perspective that had evolved in his previous tour of duty. These became the bases for the effort to build a training enterprise--an effort which ran afoul of intrinsic qualities of the Thai bureaucracy, with its limited capability for absorbing and using ancillary technical staff. And after five years the strategy was shifted: the IPA accepted

the role of direct training agency (a role which had already evolved to some extent) and with new Western leadership sought to exert a substantial impact upon upper echelon and top echelon bureaucratic personnel, through its executive development program.

Beyond any doubt a novel enterprise had been established within Thailand. At the end of the last contract the IPA was being funded entirely out of regularly appropriated funds of the government (and drawing small supplemental funds from such sources as the Asia Foundation and oil companies for special projects). The IPA had discovered the Ford Foundation and shaped a successful strategy for capturing support for another round of development.

Within the bureaucracy, too, a concept of "public administration" had undoubtedly evolved into a level of meaningfulness which had not previously existed. When the IPA was first established one of the early vexatious problems concerning the staff was the creation of a suitable rubric for expressing the Thai equivalent of the phrase "public administration." Learned scholars were consulted and disagreements were eventually resolved in arriving at a Thai equivalent, which established a linguistic basis for differentiating public administration from "political science" and "law."

A thriving library was being operated; a host of "service activities" were being performed--most of them involving the preparation of informational memoranda for government officials, and a steady flow of students was moving into and through the academic program. The IPA had become an established faculty of Thammasat University and might well have continued as such.

Indirectly the Institute had exercised a substantial impact upon the University itself. The Ellison survey had been influential in laying

the groundwork for a number of modernizing innovations within the University. The first director of research of the IPA, who later as Secretary General of the University arranged for the Ellison survey, had created a new faculty, startlingly modern in character--the liberal arts faculty of the University in which all first-year students were now enrolled before moving on to the more traditional other faculties.

Yet there were grievous problems, and by no means all of them had been solved at the end of the last contract in 1964. And there were also lurking questions regarding the intrinsic institutional qualities of the organization which beyond all doubt had indeed been established in Thailand.

Only in the field of in-service training had any significant innovations occurred following the initial planning of the IPA. And after 1960 the whole emphasis in the contractual relationship between Indiana and Thammasat Universities was focused upon phasing out the relationship. Periodic program review sessions both before and after 1960 dealt with immediate problems of organizational maintenance and support--leadership and staffing, and the transfer of financial obligations to the Thai government--rather than with anything more broad or basic. And the leadership of the IPA itself, faced with very substantial difficulties in establishing positions and capturing staff, never fully succeeded in such matters as the creation of a full-fledged academic staff.

In the 1960's the response within the IPA to the problems that faced it was essentially a collateral response--a successful quest for a shift to a new bigger scene of action. The questions that confront us here, however, concern the time immediately before NIDA. Our object is to explain the outcome of the efforts sketched above and to discern as fully as

possible the institutional qualities of the IPA as it existed in 1965.

In doing so we shall examine certain seemingly significant characteristics of the IPA staff, and the relationships between the IPA and strategic elements of its environment.

II

THE PROFESSIONAL STAFF OF THE INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

When one considers the Institute of Public Administration from an institutional perspective, the staff of the IPA lies at the center of the examination.

Granted that the staff is not the institution. Granted, too, that the full institutional quality of the IPA cannot be ascertained unless one looks beyond the organization, into its environment and into the patterns of perception and interaction that characterize organization-environment relations. Granted even that the staff does not equal the Institute -- that there are other features of the entity which can and must be dealt with apart from a portrait of the staff. Grant all these things and it remains true that the attitudes, perceptions, and activities of the IPA staff are essential features of the organization as institution.

In 1965, shortly after Indiana University's contractual relationship with the Institute of Public Administration came to an end, the full staff of the IPA consisted of fifty-one officials with regular bureaucratic status and thirty-six "temporary," or non-status employees. At least eleven established positions were not being filled on a regular basis (i.e., they were either vacant or were staffed by "acting" incumbents). At the head of the Institute was a Dean, serving on a part-time basis, and devoting a larger share of his efforts to a more substantial position, that of Deputy Undersecretary of the important Ministry of Interior.

The Professional Staff

Of the 87 staff members of the IPA at the end of 1965, 29 occupied professional positions. These were the chiefs of division, the instructors, the research associates, the training officers, and the librarians. With perhaps 7 exceptions (translators, assistant librarians, research assistants, and an audio-visual officer) the full-time non-civil service employees were in clerical, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor positions. So are half of the civil service officials. The remaining 29 members of the IPA professional staff are the prime objects of our interest and concern. They headed the divisions, taught some of the courses, planned, conducted, and directed the research, and carried out the training activities which comprise the IPA program. Some of the also operated the IPA library which is essentially a tool of the rest of the organization. They occupied the special grade, first grade, and second grade positions in the Institute.

Much of the "meaning" of the IPA inhere in these people. To a considerable degree the organization is what they perceive it to be. If it evolves, they exercise the perceptions and set the directions. If it has coherence, they give it much of that coherence. These, then, are the objects of our attention as we study the perceptions and attitudes of the IPA staff.

On page__ of this chapter an organization chart indicates how the staff is divided among the various divisions of the Institute. There is the usual neat pattern of the formal chart, but it is somewhat misleading. The academic, research, and inservice training divisions are, in practice, not so sharply or clearly delineated as the chart implies. Thus, members of the research and training divisions both participate in the academic

program, and members of research and academic divisions at times participate in inservice training activities. A group of personnel scattered through the academic, research, library, and training divisions tend to identify with the Associate Dean who is also head of the academic division. There are subtle and complex networks of orientations and relations within and among the various divisions of the IPA, significant aspects of which are discussed later in this study. At this point we assume merely that (1) there is a professional staff, and (2) that its perceptions and attitudes are a significant feature of the overall entity. We shall proceed to examine certain basic characteristics of the professional staff of the IPA.

Background: The Recruitment of the Staff

Data in following sections of this report will show that the professional staff was a rather heterogeneous group. They varied in academic backgrounds (at least three are graduates of the IPA itself). Some have foreign degrees; others do not. They varied in length of service. A few were with the IPA practically since its inception. The Dean for example, served for more than ten years, from the creation of the Institute in 1955 until its absorption into the National Institute of Development Administration in April, 1966. A few other participants also became involved with the IPA soon after the contract was signed between Indiana and Thammasat Universities, in May 1955. They were among the earliest participants selected for the foreign graduate training that was to be the basis for building a Thai staff.

Members of the early participant training groups formed the nucleus of the IPA professional staff in the years following their return

to Bangkok. This is by no means the only important premise that characterizes the recruitment of the IPA professional staff, but it is among the most significant.

Other staff members were added over the years, some of them later participants in overseas training activities financed under the Indiana-Thammasat contract, and others recruited within Thailand. Perhaps the most important of this last group was the Director of the Training Division, Mr. Pathom Jarnson. Khun Pathom came to the IPA from the Ministry of Cooperatives, where he had served as training director--one of a few such officials who came into existence as a result of the efforts of the IPA in the latter 1950's to promote training as a recognized function within the agencies of Thai government.

One of the fundamental premises in the effort to build the IPA had been the assumption that a group of promising and willing individuals would be recruited jointly by the Dean of the Institute and the American advisors who first went to Thailand in 1955. They would be sent abroad for graduate training, most at the M.A. level and a few carefully selected students at the Ph.D. level. They would return, take over the work, and constitute the staff.

To some extent this strategy failed. In January, 1963, 16 of 40 returned participants were on the IPA staff. Two had died. Within the coming two years at least three more would leave. More than half had "opted out"--failed to join the staff upon their return to Thailand, or had not been offered positions by the IPA.

To achieve one staff member, almost three participants had to be trained abroad. Of seven individuals who acquired foreign Ph.D. degrees, in 1965 only three were on the staff, and one left to join the bureaucracy at the end of the calendar year. The attrition rate for participants was high. Only two failed to complete their training, but only about 37 percent of them ended up on the IPA staff.

Yet in a fortuitous fashion the reliance upon participant selection and training as a key means of staffing the IPA succeeded. A core group was built, in a significant but unintended fashion, a group that has included a critically important internal leader for the IPA. In addition, certain subtly significant environmental linkages were established, as a result of the continuing relations between the IPA staff and participants who entered the bureaucracy upon their return to Thailand.

Staff Turnover

At lofty levels of perspective, some of those involved in the building of the IPA were sometimes prone to refer to it enthusiastically as "the great experiment." For individuals confronted with the question: should I join the IPA staff if I have an alternative career possibility in the

bureaucracy, anxiety and dissonance rather than hope and enthusiasm were often the dominant sentiments.

The problems of IPA staffing were exquisitely complex. They may be discussed from several perspectives, of which at least two are quite relevant here: from a technical perspective, and in terms of underlying normative themes.

The essential technical premises are these:

(1) For a person to be appointed to the staff there must be a position. The IPA was established in 1955, but not until four years had passed, and only after long negotiations with the Government of Thailand, was a substantial slate of official positions approved for the IPA. In 1959, 26 posts were authorized apart from the existing position of Dean. Three of these carried special grade rank. There were also 8 first grade, 8 second grade, 3 third grade, and 4 fourth grade positions. By this time, 28 participants had already returned from abroad. Eleven were working full-time in the IPA. Nine were "part-time," meaning that they held official posts elsewhere. Five were unconnected with the IPA. Two were dead; and an effort was being made to "borrow" one participant from the ministry where he was employed.

(2) Participants selected for training abroad were in a goodly number of cases already the incumbents of bureaucratic positions. When they went to the United States to study they did not relinquish these positions, but rather were placed on leave. They continued to draw their

*Ninth Semi-Annual Progress Report on Establishment of an Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University, Indiana University, Department of Government, Bloomington, January, 1960, pp. 3-5.

regular salaries, and retained their bureaucratic statuses. When they returned to Thailand they were faced with the question of resigning from their positions. Until 1959 there were no official posts in the IPA -- i.e., no positions with full official status. The IPA could, and in a few cases, did "borrow" these returned participants. They remained on their ministry rolls but worked in the IPA. Naturally, it was easier to do this on a part-time than on a full-time basis. Position-wise, the IPA was not fully prepared to absorb participants when they returned -- especially those with bureaucratic alternatives.

The reasons are complex. There had been a major governmental upheaval in 1957, which was followed by a lively and fluid period during which the new regime of Marshal Sarit Dhanarat consolidated its control and shaped its thrust. Thammasat University, of which the IPA was a part, and the IPA itself, were not in a position to press their claims. By 1959, after the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and Civil Service Commission over Thammasat was replaced, and the University was made responsible to a Council in the Prime Minister's office (along with four other universities), some of the returned participants -- and some of the best of them -- were irretrievably lost.

Perhaps it is possible to explain the early staffing problems of the IPA in technical terms -- in terms of the inability to absorb returned participants. But there was another aspect of the situation, essentially normative, sometimes subtle and sometimes highly visible in manifestation.

Returned participants were faced with the question: where are the greater rewards, the greater opportunities, the more satisfying identities, the better prospects for security and meaningfulness -- in the bureaucracy, or in the IPA?

Some returned participants wrestled mightily with this question. Faced with the prospect of relinquishing an established bureaucratic position, and with a sense of obligation to fulfill the commitment implicit in becoming a participant-trainee, they were torn. The bureaucracy represented the established route to improved status, to success, and to fulfillment. The IPA was an unknown quantity, new, and perhaps faced with a dubious future. It was small, and there would not be many opportunities for movement. Its Dean had himself kept one foot planted firmly within the bureaucracy (he was in the late 1950's Deputy Director General of one of the departments of the Ministry of Interior). For some of these individuals the decision to opt for the bureaucracy was facilitated by technical conditions: "There is no position at the IPA for me." But in practically every case this choice was sustained and reinforced by an underlying attitude: the bureaucracy is preferable.

Ratio of Professional Staff* to Returned Participants
1957 through 1964

| <u>Year</u> | <u>Prof. Staff</u> | <u># Returned Participants</u> |
|-------------|--------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1957 | 14 | 4 |
| 1958 | 16 | 6 |
| 1959 | 17 | 11 |
| 1960 | 18 | 12 |
| 1961 | 22 | 13 |
| 1962 | 23 | 13 |
| 1963 | 25 | 14 |
| 1964 | 35 | 16 |

*The Definition of "professional staff" used in this table is that applied in contract reports. It included some personnel -- such as assistant secretaries and research assistants -- not treated as professional staff in this study; and it includes a few non-civil service employees.

In later years, even when positions did exist for returned participants, some were lost, essentially because (a) they had an alternative in the form of a bureaucratic position to which to return, and (b) they preferred the bureaucratic position, for some mix of two essential reasons: (1) a general pro-bureaucratic bias, and (2) a particular judgment that the available bureaucratic option was preferable to joining the IPA in some specific capacity. (Thus, for example, in 1965 one of the most promising IPA participant trainees was lost. He returned to Bangkok with a foreign M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics and decided to retain his identification with the bureaucracy, even though a position with a special grade rank had been reserved for him in the IPA.)

The most obvious way to have met this situation would have been to have attacked the normative problem through technical means: in other words, by (a) having positions available to which participants could be assigned before being sent abroad, and (b) requiring that they move into these IPA posts before leaving. Thus they would have severed their bureaucratic identifications. The IPA would have had to pay their salaries while they were on leave. It would also have been completely obligated to accept the participants upon their return to Thailand, thus betting in advance upon the success and suitability of those selected for foreign training. This last requirement would probably have served as a strong argument against full implementation of this collateral attack on the normative problem. But in the absence of any opportunity to take this line of approach, questions of its risk and acceptability are irrelevant. So is another important question: would it have been possible to get good participants on these terms?

An alternate line of attack, which was taken in a number of instances, was to select for foreign training individuals with no bureaucratic affiliation. But this was at best a partial solution. It meant limiting selection to young and inexperienced persons. In Thailand, most of the best prospects for the IPA staff were already in the bureaucracy.

Essentially, the normative problem of bureaucratic vs. IPA identification was never met with full success. Yet a few did, in the face of stress, opt for the IPA -- especially in the period when the organization was being built. As a result of the normative context of their decisions, they manifested a strong identification with the Institute.

Some participants had no bureaucratic options, and for them the question of joining the IPA staff was not fraught with much stress. But some individuals who joined the IPA professional staff did not do so lightly. And at least one of those who chose became a key figure in the IPA leadership structure.

Staff Losses. A later section of this statement contains certain statistical information regarding the "stability" of the IPA staff (indicating that a large part of the professional staff has been connected with the institute for a rather short period of time). Here we are concerned with certain particulars regarding staff turnover, which shed some light upon the IPA's problem of maintaining a sense of identification and commitment in a relatively threatening environment.

Three factors have come into play in causing the loss of professional staff: alternative academic opportunities in an expanding academic context; the lure of bureaucratic positions; and dissatisfaction with conditions in the IPA. The internal variable and the external variables interact, of

course, and fully precise statements about the causes of losses cannot be made.

One key staff member, Dr. Sudki Pasukmirunt, was lost in less than two years after his return from the United States, because of the comparative attractiveness of academic alternatives. By 1965 he was a Dean in another institution.

His predecessor as Director of Research, Dr. Adul Wichiencharoen, brought to the IPA by Dean Malai in 1955, moved on to become Secretary General of Thammasat University and Dean of a new faculty, leaving about 1959. He recruited at least two staff members away from the IPA. Mrs. Chittra Pranj, a librarian, and Dr. Thawatt Mekarapong, a Ph.D. in political science.

At the end of 1965 Dr. Arsa Mekawan, who had been a member of the professional staff since 1961, entered the Ministry of Interior's Department of Local Government as a district officer, to acquire his first full taste of practical bureaucratic experience.

Other staff also left the IPA for the bureaucracy, including Dr. Bunchana Atthakor, Director of Inservice Training until about 1961, and now Director General of a department in the Ministry of National Development, of which he is also the Deputy Minister. At least three others have left the staff since 1960 to take bureaucratic posts.

Professional staff losses over a period of six years or less equaled about 36 percent of the total professional staff in 1965. This endless attrition inevitably threatens the organization -- if not its existence, then its quality and its character.

In rough terms, the maintenance of the organization seems to require the acquisition of one, and sometimes two, professional staff persons

per year, and about half the additions might have to be Ph.D's. To produce one M.A. degree holder requires up to two years. A Ph.D. may require three or four. Experience shows that many are chosen as participants, but fewer feel called to serve in the IPA. Thus, over the long run, an organization of this type must do one or all of three things: (a) provide the training and educational opportunities which will assure it of a continuing supply of staff; (b) capture staff from other faculties, or from other training and educational efforts; or (c) undergo a change in quality. In the IPA in the 1960's, all of these things seemed to be happening.

The challenge to leadership inherent in these circumstances is substantial, and obvious. The environment of the IPA has at least two abiding characteristics: (a) limited proximate facilities for producing a continuing supply of professional staff resources, and (b) persistent and powerful attritional pressures.

The concrete consequences of these environmental forces have been indicated. Perhaps the most compelling result of the difficulties encountered in recruiting and holding staff is seen in the academic program. An adequate academic staff has never been built. And while the problems of the Academic Division can be discussed in extensio as technical problems of recruitment and staffing, they have potent normative dimensions as well. There are the normative characteristics inherent in the kind of academic program which is largely conducted by outsiders. There are also broader, more subtle and complex normative questions: what kind or kinds of commitment can the IPA mobilize; what accommodations is it likely to make with its environment; what kinds of meaningfulness can the organization assert, to its own individual staff members, to participants in its programs, and to others with whom it engages in transactions?

The Institute Staff -- General Characteristics

The following materials are a portrait of certain central characteristics which are found in and among the members of the staff of the Institute of Public Administration (IPA).

In examining an organization in terms of its institutional characteristics one central concern is with the body of people who are the prime staff element of the organization. In the case of the IPA this consists of the professional staff members. The behaviors, attitudes, and expectations of these people are vitally relevant aspects of the institutional qualities of the organization.

The following information is based upon an extensive schedule which was completed by 25 of the 29 members of professional staff of the Institute during the period of December, 1965--February, 1966.

The following tables summarize some of the characteristics of the staff sample:

Professional Staff: Rank and Sex

| | Male | Female | Totals |
|---------------|------|--------|--------|
| Special Grade | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| First Grade | 6 | 4 | 10 |
| Second Grade | 7 | 6 | 13 |
| Totals | 15 | 10 | 25 |

Recruitment: By Sex and Grade

| | <u>Sex</u> | | | <u>Grade</u> | | | |
|--------------------------------|------------|--------|-------|--------------|-----|-----|-------|
| | Male | Female | Total | Special | 1st | 2nd | Total |
| Transferred from Ministry | 11 | 3 | 14 | 2 | 6 | 6 | 14 |
| Did not transfer from Ministry | 4 | 7 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 7 | 11 |
| Totals | 15 | 10 | 25 | 2 | 10 | 13 | 25 |

Institutions

Highest Degree Attained

| <u>Thai</u> | diploma | Bachelors | Masters | Ph.D. | Total |
|-----------------|---------|-----------|---------|-------|-------|
| Thammasat | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 6 |
| Chulalongkorn | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Other | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Thai Total | 1 | 3 | 4 | 0 | 8 |
| <u>American</u> | | | 12 | 3 | 15 |
| | 1 | 3 | 16 | 3 | 23 |

Staff Characteristics

The 25 responding staff members occupy positions in the bureau-
cracy ranging from the second grade to the special grade (in a system
where the lowest grade is the fourth grade and college graduate normally
enter at the third grade). They consist of 15 males and 10 females. All
but 4 of the males are married, and 6 of the 10 women are married.

Two staff members occupy special grade positions -- the highest
level in the bureaucracy. Both are men. Of 10 first grade positions,
6 are held by men and 4 by women. More than half of the male population
of the professional staff are at the first and special grade, but slight-
ly more than half of the females are the second grade. The data are much
too few to support any sweeping generalizations, but the pattern is at
least clear. The women tend to occupy the lower level professional posi-
tions through a greater extent than the men.

All respondents to the schedule indicated that they are full-time
members of the staff.

Staff Recruitment

Fourteen of the 25 professional staff members in the sample
transferred to the institute from professional civil service positions
in ministries. Eleven of the 15 males had prior experience in a govern-
mental ministry. Only 4 did not have such experience at the time of the
survey (and one of these since resigned from the IPA staff to begin to
serve as a district officer in the department of local government, feel-
ing that such experience was essential to his long run career).

Of the women professional staff members only 3 had prior ministerial experience; 7 did not.


Eight of the twelve individuals at the first and special grade in the institute have prior experience in the bureaucracy. Among the lower level members of the professional staff -- those at the second grade -- 6 have and 7 have not had ministerial experience prior to entering the institute.

Distribution of Staff Within the Institute

INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

ORGANIZATION CHART

1965



The female members of the staff tend to be concentrated in the library of the institute, where half of the female professional staff members are found.

The high ranking positions in the institute tended to cluster in the research and in-service training divisions, where 8 of the 12 first and special grade jobs are found.

But the assignments within the institute are not limited to work within the boundaries of a particular division. Thus, individuals in the in-service training and research divisions also participate in teaching academic courses. At least one member of the library staff participates in teaching a course in the academic program. Again, members of the academic division staff participate in programs operated by the in-service training division. In short, the distribution of staff among the divisions is not clear-cut evidence of functional responsibilities. Thus, the academic division in 1965 had only three permanent instructors, and none of them was exclusively occupied with teaching the 13 courses offered and supervising the more than 70 theses presumably being written. Ten part-time lecturers, most with advanced degrees from abroad, help with the teaching. Some of these part-time instructors were educated abroad under the Indiana-Thammasat contract, but entered the bureaucracy instead of the IPA after their return to Thailand.

Educational Characteristics of Professional Staff

Of 23 responses to a question on number of degrees held, 20 indicated possession of at least 2 degrees, and 9 indicated that they held 3 or more academic degrees. One staff member claimed 5:

Approximately two-thirds of the highest degrees held by members of the professional staff were obtained from American universities. Only 4 staff members claimed an M.A. from a Thai university.

To what extent do the data suggest that the professional staff of the institute is "saturated" or at least substantially steeped in the intellectual postures and processes of Western higher education? This is essentially a matter of judgment, but in view of the fact that about two-thirds of the professional staff have finished their higher educations in American universities, it seems appropriate to say that there is within the institute a very substantial familiarity with the educational orientation of Western higher education.

What did these people study?

Field of Highest Degrees: Thai/American Institutions

| Institution | Liberal Arts | Library Science | Political Science | Public Admin. | Bus. Admin. | LAW | Sociology-Social Work | Other | Total |
|-------------|--------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------|-------------|-----|-----------------------|-------|-------|
| Thai | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 8 |
| American | 0 | 3 | 5 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 15 |
| | 1 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 23 |

Of the 25 staff members, 9 have advanced degrees from American universities in political science or public administration. At least two others have advanced training in the social sciences, and one has a business administration degree. Twelve of the staff members -- about half -- have successfully completed advanced education in the United States in

fields with substantial social science orientation. The evidence suggests that there is within the IPA a substantial capability for manifesting the orientations or competencies commonly identified with social science in the West.

At the time of the survey the IPA had been in existence for approximately 10 years. Five of the 25 staff members had been with the institute for 9 years or longer -- in other words, since the beginning of the organization. But another 5 had served for 2 years or less, and 10 of the staff members had served for 3 to 5 years. Three-fifths of the staff had served for 5 years or less at the beginning of 1966.

The staff of the institute has not been stable over a long period of time. It has grown over the years, as participants have returned from abroad, and as such programs as in-service training and research have developed. Length-of-service data present a picture of an organization not marked by a high degree of the kind of stability which is reflected in long-term staff continuity.

What this means is indeterminate at this point. It could be a matter of continuing infusions of new blood which reinforce and enrich a posture alien to tradition. It could mean, too, a still-shaping entity whose institutional quality is not readily discernible because of the briefness of the identifications of a sizeable part of the staff.

The IPA Professional Staff's Perceptions of the Thai Bureaucracy

An effort was made to probe the attitudes of members of the IPA professional staff toward the Thai bureaucracy. The bureaucracy is the prime element in the IPA environment; IPA students are presumably being trained for career positions in the bureaucracy, and IPA training programs are directed toward such objects as management improvement in the bureaucracy. In addition, IPA research and service activities are bureaucracy-oriented. Finally, attitudes toward and perceptions of the bureaucracy on the part of the professional staff are immediately significant for at least two reasons:

(a) One important part of the staff's job is to interpret the bureaucracy and to act on the basis of such interpretations, in the course of training, teaching, and research;

(b) the normative perspective of the IPA professional staff toward the bureaucracy should be capable of being related to the staff's perception of the IPA mission.


If the bureaucracy is regarded as having certain needs and problems, and if the IPA is considered by its professional staff membership as having objectives which amount to an attack on these perceived needs and problems, this would be important evidence of an innovative, and possibly modernizing, value orientation. On the other hand, if perceptions of the normative character of the bureaucracy are not linked with any evident perceptions of a strategy for attacking bureaucratic problems from an innovative or modernizing approach, then a significant question is raised concerning the normative set of the IPA.

The following data deal only with the first element of the projected analysis -- the perceptions of normative characteristics of the bureauoracy held by (i.e., expressed by) the professional staff of the IPA.

In an effort to probe this area, a simple set of scales was used. Respondents were asked to rate the Thai bureauoracy on 9 characteristics. They were asked first to portray the bureauoracy as they perceived it to have been before World War II. Then they were asked to rate the contemporary bureauoracy. By using a "then-and-now" approach we hoped to see if the staff had any thematic perception of qualitative changes in bureauoratic characteristics, or if they regarded the Thai bureauoracy as a more or less unchanging institutional complex. Antioipating that they would perceive change, we hoped also to learn whether their perceptions showed an "awareness" of improvements or declines in bureauoratic quality.

The results of the probe are shown on the attached chart. The general findings can be summed as follows:

Attitudes Toward Thai Bureaucracy
--IPA Staff--



The bureaucracy continues, as in the past, to be a mechanism of great power. Its goals tend to be vague and indefinite, but the bureaucracy has changed: before the war it tended to be honest; now it tends to be corrupt. Before the war, too, the bureaucracy was relatively "traditional;" not it is much less traditional, although it is by no means "modern." The bureaucracy is more wasteful than it used to be, somewhat more prone to act on the basis of informal relations and personal orders, and somewhat less rational than before the war.

(These last perceptions do indeed raise a question: just what do the respondents mean by the distinction they draw between "traditional" and "modern"? Whatever the explanation might be, it would seem that they do not equate "modern" with "better" and "traditional" with "worse." The old bureaucracy is, in fact, seen as somewhat "better" than the present-day, less traditional bureaucracy.)

Essentially, the perceptions we get are: (1) appreciation of bureaucratic power and importance; (2) a clearly critical posture toward the way in which the bureaucracy is perceived to operate; and (3) a perception of the bureaucracy as worse than it was in the good old days.

An effort was made to probe for the impact of western education upon the evaluative set of the professional staff. The attitudes of those staff members with American degrees were plotted against the attitudes of staff members wholly educated in Thailand. Only two notable differences in attitude appear: (a) fourteen American-educated staff members portrayed the goals of the Thai bureaucracy as vague and diffuse--much more so than the small group of Thai-educated staff members who responded; yet (b) the American-educated group rated the bureaucracy relatively high on the item of goal accomplishment. They expressed a positive opinion that the bureaucracy accomplishes its objectives. Together these two evaluations seem to

say that while the bureaucracy's objectives are not very clear out, they are achieved. It is possible that one effect of foreign education has been to sensitize members of the professional staff to the bureaucratic value of goal attainment, and cause them to be critical of the goal orientation of the Thai bureaucracy.

In an effort to see if bureaucratic attitudes were to any discernible extent sex-linked we separated responses according to the sex of staff members. With only two exceptions, the females were more negative in their attitudes toward the bureaucracy, although not strikingly so. The female staff members as a group rated the bureaucracy in general as mildly good, while the males found it neither good nor bad. The females were a bit less sanguine about the bureaucracy's general ability to accomplish its purposes, and felt more intensely than the men that the bureaucracy acts on the basis of personal relations rather than rules and regulation.

Bureaucratic attitudes were correlated with length of service in the Institute (table 4). Two statistically significant findings were obtained, along with a general impression: the longer the span of service in the Institute, the greater the appreciation of the power of the bureaucracy. In other words, the older staff members (in years of service) express a greater awareness of the power of the bureaucracy than do the younger staff members. Interestingly, the older staff members express a greater conviction that bureaucratic behavior is based upon feelings and emotions rather than detached rationality. In general the staff members with greater periods of service in the Institute have more negative attitudes toward the bureaucracy than do the younger staff members.

The implications of this rather abiding and coherent perspective remain to be explored. Does the declining quality of the bureaucratic perspective stimulate an interest in reform? Does a relatively negative attitude toward the bureaucracy minimize the apparent attractiveness of bureaucratic alternatives to careers in the IPA? Are these perceptions reflected--or not reflected--in the IPA's doctrine and strategy, and in the attitudes about the IPA and its mission held by the professional staff?

In a sharply separated probe, IPA professional staff members were asked to volunteer comments on "the most important problems of Thai public administration." A sizeable number of questions intervened between the above discussed rating scale and this question on problems, the aim being to avoid any conscious carry-over from one set of responses to the next effort to elicit information on problem perceptions and normative characteristics of the bureaucracy.

The second set of questions was open-ended. Respondents were merely asked to list what they considered to be the most important problems. Seven of the staff declined to answer the question.

Speculating on the basis of the above-discussed attitude responses, one might expect that the problem of corruption would appear in many responses, and that other asserted problems might be those of "efficiency," "rationality," and "responsibility." Here is what the replies showed:

Institute Staff Perceptions of Bureaucratic Problems

The Most Important Problems of Thai Administration

| Problems Mentioned | Number of Persons Mentioning |
|---|------------------------------|
| 1. Corruption -- in various forms | 9 |
| 2. Technical Problems; control; co-ordination, planning | 8 |
| 3. Morale and Enthusiasm of Personnel | 7 |
| 4. Traditional Obstacles to Modern Administration | 6 |
| 5. Staffing Problems; Lack of trained personnel and good leadership | 5 |

(N equals 18, 7 did not complete the item)

The professional staff was asked to list and rank problems of the contemporary Thai bureaucracy. Two findings of significance appear to emerge from the responses.

1. In the first place there seems to be no highly intense, shared concern with a given set of problems. Of 25 respondents, 7 did not complete the item. For the other 18, responses were scattered rather widely.

2. The responses did not indicate that the problem perceptions of the professional staff serve as a basis for any kind of problem-solving strategy or orientation in the Institute. The most commonly cited problem -- corruption -- is one that can hardly be considered actionable for the Institute in any direct sense. Secondly the types of "administrative" problems likely to be actionable were mentioned relatively infrequently.

Corruption in its various forms was mentioned as a problem more often than any other -- but only nine of 18 respondents mentioned it. "Actionable" problems likely to be germane to an Institute strategy were mentioned in 13 instances (technical problems and staffing problems). Only 6 respondents mentioned traditional values and practices as obstacles to modern administration, suggesting that while the Thai bureaucracy is regarded as relatively traditional, "tradition" is not generally regarded a serious problem.

The problem orientation of Institute staff members was related to participation by those staff members in in-service training programs. Such participation involves substantial contact with members of the bureaucracy; it might therefore have some differential affect on the problem perception of the participants. But very little thematic difference was noted. None of those who participate frequently in in-service training programs mention traditional obstacles to modern administration as an important problem; nor do they mention external interference (political and military) in the bureaucracy as an important problem. Staff members who participate in in-service training programs tend to mention corruption somewhat more frequently as a problem than do those who do not participate.

Again, when the problem orientation of the staff is related to the hierarchical level of the staff members few clear patterns emerge. Of fifteen special and first grade staff members six mention corruption as a problem. Five mention technical and staffing problems. Five mentioned morale and lack of enthusiasm on the part of bureaucrats as a problem. Four mentioned external interference in the bureaucracy; none of the second grade staff members mentioned this factor.

The general impression is one of an absence of any sharp focus on a particular set of problems. There is within the IPA staff no intense, coherent "problem perspective" on the bureaucratic environment. This suggests, but by no means proves, that there is little sense of "normative apartheid" from the bureaucracy. No clear evidence of alienation from the bureaucracy exists, nor any abiding evaluative posture of a kind that might be reflected in a program strategy designed to attack central problems and meet important needs of the bureaucracy.

The IPA Environment

Perceptions of support. The IPA as a government organization draws upon governmental funds for its operations, and depends upon a legal mandate in the form of a statutory charter and various rules, regulations, and authorizations. In a Western context the professional staff's perceptions of support sources would probably be quite clear. We assume there would be an awareness of the importance of appropriations support, support from the larger University environment, and perhaps support from the various components of the agency's clientele. We would assume that sensitivity concerning support would not only be explicit, but would be an important source of premises for shaping the agency's action strategy.

The Thai context is quite different. An organization, once established, tends to continue with relatively little need for justifying itself in the absence of extraordinary environmental developments which might render the organization obsolete (as in the case of the former Ministry of Culture) or otherwise pose a threat, usually in the form of absorption, as in the case of the former Ministry of Cooperatives. Support sensitivities

tend to be personalized -- thought of in terms of relationships with individuals, and regarded from a perspective of concern with particular activities, particular claims (as for a rule in a given case), and the particular aims and desires of individuals in a position to negotiate for or make claims for support.

This at any rate is what an impressionistic assessment suggests. If there is relevance in this general premise regarding the attitude towards support one might expect to find in an established Thai government organization, then the attitudes of IPA professional staff could be significantly different from those one would likely encounter in a Western organization. Also, if in the IPA there is high sensitivity to "external support" in the form of foreign aid then one would assume, too, that the organization is not in the minds of its prime participants substantially built into the Thai context.

Staff Perceptions of Sources of IPA Support

| <u>Perceived Source of Support</u> | <u>Number of Individuals</u> | <u>Number of times a particular kind of source was mentioned</u> |
|--|------------------------------|--|
| 1. <u>Political Sources</u> (incl. prime minister, cabinet, council of ministers, individual ministries, etc.) | 14 | 24 |
| 2. <u>Bureaucratic Sources</u> (incl. fiscal and personnel, organs). | 14 | 18 |
| 3. <u>Mixed Sources</u> (incl. foundations, foreign agencies, foreign government, foreign corporations, Indiana University). | 6 | 11 |
| 4. <u>Generalized Clientele Support</u> (incl. trainees, exec. development trainees, former students). | 7 | 10 |
| 5. <u>Technical and Professional Sources</u> | 2 | 2 |

(N equals 17)

In general, nearly all of the respondents perceived the support for the Institute as deriving from Thai political and bureaucratic sources. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of their expressed perceptions was the extent to which these focused upon individual officials rather than impersonal elements of governmental organization. About half the references to political support mentioned individuals rather than organizations.

Clientele support received relatively small emphasis. Only 7 of 17 respondents mentioned it. This particularly interesting, in view of the fact that the Institute's clientele includes a sizeable number of relatively upper-level executives who have participated in executive development training programs. It is possible that clientele are regarded as occupying a relationship of lesser status, just as it is possible that a pervasive status sensitivity explains the emphatic orientation toward the upper reaches of the government in a perception of support sources. It is quite likely, too, that the expressed perceptions reflect a pragmatic, realistic viewpoint.

A probe was made to see the extent to which the staff regarded non-governmental, non-clientele elements in its environment as support sources. This included foundations, foreign agencies, foreign governments, Indiana University, and other possible sources -- sources of monetary support and professional assistance of one sort or another. Only 6 of 17 respondents mentioned such sources as important supporting elements for the IPA. The absence of any extensive feeling of dependency upon foreign support sources may be regarded as evidence of the extent to which the IPA is -- in the minds of its professional staff -- an accepted, established component of the Thai governmental system.

The relationship between hierarchical level and sensitivity to bureaucratic and political support sources is about what one would expect. Three of the first class members of the staff, however, made no mention of bureaucratic support sources, and one made no reference to political support. All of the second class staff members mentioned bureaucratic support sources, but two of them made no mention of political support. In a mild way, this suggests that the lower level members of the staff may be a little more oriented toward an awareness of bureaucratic rather than political support.

It is interesting to note, too, that the higher ranking members of the staff mentioned mixed sources of support (non-Thai government) much more frequently than the lower level staff members. Only 2 of the special and first class officials made no reference to such support. Only one second class member of the staff made any mention of it.

But at the upper levels of the institute staff there is no abiding awareness of clientele support. Neither of the special grade, and less than half of the first grade members of the staff mentioned clientele as an important source of institute support.

This matter of environmental support was examined elsewhere in the research schedule under the context of a discussion of the problems of the Institute of Public Administration. When asked about the three most serious problems of the IPA, six staff members specifically mentioned the reluctance of higher authorities to make desired financial allocations to the IPA. In other words, about a third of the staff considered the problems of financial claim-making directed toward the bureaucratic-political milieu as an important problem.

The dominant response to open-ended questions about IPA problems were, however, focused upon characteristics of the organization itself, and not its relations with its environment. There seems to be no clear-cut widely shared perspective which perceives of (a) environmental support relationships on one hand, and (b) unmet--or insufficiently met--needs for environmental support, on the other. Some concern with the adequacy of resources and perhaps mandates, but nothing intense and highly coherent. The IPA staff, as a group, seems rather satisfied with its supportive linkages. These do not, at any rate, loom large in the minds of the professional staff group as "problems". Rather, the problems are other things; and even dissatisfactions--with such matters as fringe benefits--are not articulated as "problems" to be attacked through the mobilization of environmental support. Apparently the allocative relations between the IPA and its environment were regarded as more or less fixed and determined, and not subject to challenge and change.

Perceptions of Prestige by IPA Professional Staff

One important feature of the IPA--environmental relationships consists of the status ascribed to the IPA by environmental factors. One dimension of this relationship consists of the IPA staff's assumptions or perceptions of such status ascription: this is significant as an index of the meaningfulness which the IPA possesses in the minds of its participants, as compared to perceivable--and perhaps available--alternatives. If IPA staff assume that significant observers in the environment regard the IPA as prestigious, then this reflects the imputation of a relatively high value to the organization by its participants.

In examining this question, respondents were asked how officials and students would rate the prestige of the IPA in comparison with the

prestige of the bureaucracy. The comparison focused on "an IPA position" versus a "bureaucratic position." These particular groups of "observers" were chosen, not because they constituted important support elements in the IPA environment, but because (1) officials occupied positions which are commonly regarded as alternatives to IPA positions and (2) because IPA students are in most cases committed to bureaucratic careers.

Staff Perceptions of What Officials And Students Think of IPA,
(N equals 17) As Opposed To A Ministry Position

| | <u>Frequency</u> | |
|---|------------------|-----------------|
| | <u>Officials</u> | <u>Students</u> |
| a. An IPA position has much more prestige than an equal rank ministry position. | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> |
| b. An IPA position has a little more prestige. | <u>11</u> | <u>9</u> |
| c. An IPA and ministry position have about equal prestige. | <u>3</u> | <u>2</u> |
| d. A ministry position has much more prestige. | <u>1</u> | <u>4</u> |
| e. (don't know) | <u>1</u> | <u>0</u> |

The central tendency in these responses is quite clear. The staff assumes that both officials and students regard an IPA position as having a little more prestige than a bureaucratic position in one of the ministries. It is interesting to note that 4 of 17 responding IPA staff members expressed the opinion that students consider a ministry position to have much more prestige than an IPA position. Presumably this reflects recognition of the fact that the students are committed to bureaucratic

careers. (One wonders, however, if it also reflects an awareness that the students have a substantial familiarity with members of the IPA staff and their work.)

The importance of this self-held sense of prestige is reflected in voluntary responses to a separate question elsewhere in the schedule, a question asking respondents to state "the best qualities" of the IPA. In this response 8 of 18 staff members mentioned the IPA's prestige and popularity in Thai government circles. Only one other factor was mentioned with more frequency: "high academic standards," which appeared in 9 responses.

The self-perceived prestigiousness of the IPA appears to loom large in the orientation of long-term staff members. Four out of six individuals with more than seven years of IPA service mentioned prestige as a best quality. Interestingly -- and perhaps significantly -- only one of six staff members with less than 4 years of service mentioned this factor. This raises an implicit question: does the awareness of prestigiousness grow with the passage of time? Do the newer staff members have a less intense identification with the IPA because of other factors than the duration of their affiliation? In other words, does the IPA become more meaningful, in terms of its prestige, as the length of service in the IPA grows -- is this sense of prestige related to some other variables?

Slightly more than half the female members mentioned prestige as a "best quality" of the IPA, while only 4 of 11 males mentioned prestige in this context. However, since the most important positions in the IPA -- in terms of rank, and responsibility -- are held by males, it would appear that an abiding sense of superior prestige does not dominate the upper reaches of the organization.

A number of members of the professional staff have rather frequent contact with representatives of the Thai bureaucracy through participation in in-service training programs. Among this group of 5 individuals, only one mentioned the prestigiousness of the IPA as one of its best qualities, while the other 4 in this category make no mention of the factor. Among those members of the staff who participate infrequently, if at all, in in-service training programs, a greater proportionate mention of prestige is made. This statement about exposure to the bureaucracy and a sense of prestigiousness is not based upon uncontaminated variables, but it does suggest to some extent that the portion of the staff in frequent contact with bureaucratic officials is not highly self-conscious of the superior prestige of the IPA, or at least these members of the staff do not regard the IPA as highly prestigious in comparison with the sectors of the bureaucracy with which they have contact.

Staff Identification with the IPA

In various responses members of the IPA professional staff showed a substantial willingness to be explicit in their criticism of various features of the IPA. They criticised favoritism. Most feel that performance criteria are essential factors in promotions within the IPA, yet half the respondents mention "politics" as a factor as well. A third of the members of the professional staff see promotional opportunities as relatively limited, and most believe that prospects for reaching the special grade--the top rank of the government service--are better elsewhere (in other academic settings). (Yet every member of the staff--though not necessarily a grade promotion--received at least one salary promotion during the period 1962-1965, and most had received at least 3.)

Almost all of the staff feel that the courses in the academic program should be revised and the program should be further developed.

Most members of the staff believe that fringe benefits are better in the bureaucracy than in the IPA, and many of them make specific reference to the fact that upper ranking bureaucrats have the use of government-owned automobiles, while practically none of the IPA staff has. They also believe, most of them, that the workload in the IPA is a little larger than in the typical ministry (especially those without prior ministry experience).

Many members of the staff seemed acutely aware of staffing problems. And almost half the respondents volunteered that the IPA suffered from inadequate leadership and poorly defined authority. Finally, most of the staff believed that the most important reason students come to the IPA is to increase their prospects of getting salary increases and promotions, which is hardly an elevated reason.

Noting all these critical elements of the staff's perspective one wonders: to what extent, if at all, does the staff identify with the IPA? And on what basis?

Somewhat surprisingly, when polled on their aspirations, fifteen of twenty-five respondents indicated that their first preference for the position they would like to hold five years hence is as a member of the professional staff of the IPA or its successor organization, NIDA. Only five expressed a definite preference to be somewhere else. The others were unsure of their future expectations.

Most of the professional staff members, incidentally, would like to resume their studies within the next five years--either to pursue an advanced degree or to obtain refresher training of some kind.

The staff respondents do mention several specific perceived advantages of an IPA professional position, compared with any alternatives. Half of them, in an open-ended response, referred to academic freedom, or independence of action as a major value. A third mentioned pleasant and stimulating colleagues. Relatively few mentioned opportunities for promotion as an advantage of the IPA (6 of 22 respondents). And exactly three referred to the opportunity to teach, to train, to diffuse ideas. More important was the opportunity to continue to learn and study, which five respondents mentioned.

In reviewing these responses one is reminded of an old Thai saying: "If you go by land you may encounter the tiger; if you go by water you may encounter the crocodile." The evident satisfaction with a place on the IPA staff seems not so much linked with any intensely, coherently held attitudes toward the substance of the organization or what it stands for. Granted that

the respondents generally see the IPA as a bit more prestigious than a bureaucratic posts--and in other ways less rewarding. Yet the articulated benefits and desirable features that seemingly link the staff to the organization do not stand out with any vivid coherence. Certainly there is little expressed sense of identification with substantive purposes of consequence, although this may be too simple a derivation. Elsewhere staff members do opine that the students do come to learn about public administration as well as to seek advancement and prestige. They perceive, too, that the IPA has high standards, compared with other organizations (probably other Thammasat faculties, the most proximate objects for comparison). And one-fifth of the respondents see the IPA as an agent for stimulating and promoting modern ideas and skills.

Staff Perceptions of the Impact
of IPA Programs

What does the IPA professional staff see as its impact upon its environment? What perceptions of purposiveness are held by the staff? Efforts were made to get answers to these questions in 1965, both through interviews and questionnaires. Interview responses tend to substantiate the following data obtained from a schedule in which responses were obtained from 21 members of the professional staff, with one exception noted below.

Effect of the Academic Program

| | Raw frequency of response to items on a schedule (n = 21) |
|--|---|
| Overtime has some effects, but these are impossible to measure | 15 |
| Makes students more critical of Thai administration | 14 |
| Increases competence | 12 |
| Increases understanding of how administration actually works | 11 |
| Creates friendships among students useful in future government work | 11 |
| Establishes a relation between IPA and students; when officials they will return for help and consultation | 10 |
| Increases their English language ability | 5 |
| Very little effect | 1 |

Three-fourths of the staff feel that the academic program has some effects over time but they are not sure what these effects are. Only six respondents were willing to reject the statement that the effects are impossible to measure. One of them believed that the academic program had very little effect. Four potential respondents from the library and in-service training divisions did not respond at all.

The IPA professional staff does not perceive the academic program as having a set of clear, focal targets, whose achievement can be determined. There is nothing particularly surprising about this; perhaps the most interesting feature of the response is the high degree of agreement that a major effect of the academic program is to make students more critical of Thai administration. Also noteworthy is the ascription of value to the program as a means of fostering personal relations among future governmental officials, in a bureaucratic system which is intensely personal in its operation.

In short, the academic program is "good" for a diffuse set of reasons-- and they are impossible to measure. (Whether or not the development of critical attitudes on the part of students is considered to be good is not known; the impression is that the staff believes that there is much in the bureaucracy that merits criticism.)

Effects of Inservice Training

| | Frequency of response (n = 21) |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| Dissemination of skills and techniques to high executives, thus improving administrative performance | 20 |
| Changes attitudes toward administrative techniques in favor of new ways of doing things | 16 |
| Improves understanding--increases communication between officials of equal and different ranks | 15 |
| Stimulates the spread of training programs within government agencies | 9 |
| Links the academic world and the practitioners | 5 |

The benefits of the inservice training programs are seen as practical--especially the spread and acceptance of new administrative skills and methods among high-level executives. Inservice training at the executive level, like academic training, is seen as expanding personal communication networks among officials.

Effects of IPA Research

| | Frequency of Response (n = 21) |
|---|-----------------------------------|
| Useful studies of practical problems of Thai government and administration are bound to be valuable | 17 |
| Research provides information of use to Thai ministries and departments | 16 |

| | |
|---|----|
| Research projects will lead to improvements in IPA programs | 12 |
| Research projects will provide information for IPA courses | 7 |
| Research is useful as a source of supplemental income for staff | 4 |

The interesting thing here is the apparent perception of research as something more valuable to the IPA's environment than for its own activities. There is little perception of research as a means for the improvement of IPA course-content; and even as a tool for improving IPA programs generally, research is not rated highly--only about half the respondent perceived this potential utility in research.

These responses suggest the limited extent to which the IPA professional staff sees itself as having an innovative quality in its own activities. The importance of continuing search and study as a basis for adaptation and improvement is not evidenced by these responses.

Effects of the IPA Journal

The IPA had been publishing a quarterly Journal for about four years when this study was made. The perceived utilities of the journal were stated as follows, by 19 respondents on the Institute's professional staff:

| | |
|---|----|
| A reference source for classroom use | 16 |
| An outlet for publishing, to encourage the pursuit of research work | 5 |
| A means of promoting the IPA's prestige | 3 |

| | |
|---|---|
| A means of disseminating current information--news of governmental organizations and activities | 3 |
| A linkage mechanism between the academic world and practitioners | 1 |

When one considers the countless hours of sometimes frantic effort that have gone into the production of the Journal, these replies are surprising.

In 1964 and 1965 the Thai Journal of Public Administration, published quarterly, was reaching about 1,200 subscribers. Each issue contained about 200 pages of material, largely in Thai. It was being supported entirely from subscriptions, advertisements, and Institute funds. The production of the Journal was a major claim upon the time of the research division staff. Articles were contributed by the staff, culled from theses, and obtained from various Thai government officials--most of them descriptive statements of one kind or another, and a few of them essentially exhortations or preachments about "good" administrative practice. There were also some book reviews and editorials. Yet, if credence can be placed in these responses, the major perceived value of the Journal lay in its use in IPA courses. All of this suggests that the staff as a whole really sees little compelling value in the IPA Journal.

The initial impetus to the establishment of the publication came from the American advisors. The staff generally are aware that most Institutes of Public Administration do publish journals. And perhaps these are sufficient seeds of an explanation of why the IPA Journal continues--inertia, plus the loss of prestige that would be seen as resulting from its cessation, plus the fact that the Journal does have some value as a tool.

an assessment. Yet the IPA's staff does not seem permeated with a perception of the IPA as a thrusting instrument of bureaucratic change of some relatively specific sort. The perceived impacts of the IPA are, excepting inservice training and a tendency to develop a critical attitude toward the bureaucracy among students, seen as relatively diffuse. And a widespread concern within the IPA for continuing innovation and adaptation in its own activities is rather clearly lacking.

Conclusion

This examination of evident characteristics of the professional staff of the IPA is more suggestive than informative. It is a sketch of a staff whose members meet the necessary but not at all sufficient condition of substantial exposure to norms and orientations compatible with the requisites of a modernizing institution. It is a portrait, too, of a staff which does not seem to be dominated by an abiding, incisive, focus upon the bureaucracy which is likely to sustain a clear-cut strategy for challenging established bureaucratic characteristics, even though there does seem to be a rather coherently critical view of the Thai bureaucratic process. It is a staff that by and large perceives of its environmental linkages in terms of "support" viewed in narrow terms. And it is a staff which apparently considers itself distinguished from the bureaucracy by slightly greater prestige, although this perception is by no means uniformly present in the staff. It identifies with the IPA, generally, but not in terms of an abiding view of the IPA as an instrument of change and development.

Question: is this a staff which can manifest and assert a doctrine that is to some significant extent at odds with the normative characteristics of its bureaucratic environment? To consider this matter we must look into the leadership of the IPA, and to the nature of its academic program.

. III
LEADERSHIP IN THE IPA:
FACTORS AND ACTORS

Some of the prime contributors to the building of the IPA saw the object in these terms: to create an entity to promote significant change and improvement in Thai public administration. From this perspective, the Institute was intended to be "different" from the bureaucracy; it was to nurture and promote norms not particularly evident within the bureaucracy. The meaningfulness of the IPA was to be found in manifestations of value other than those characteristic of the bureaucracy.

A vital requisite for fulfilling this vision was leadership-- institutional leadership of a kind that could articulate the central values of the enterprise, and bring them into play in the course of shaping goals, allocating resources, and evaluating efforts and achievements. Leadership, in short, was a requisite for attaining the desired institutional qualities. And in any event, the actual institutional qualities of the IPA would be substantially determined by the nature of the leadership that evolved.

The strategy of organizational development included certain basic assumptions concerning leadership:

1. The Dean, with his extraordinary background and intelligence, would contribute much to the leadership of the IPA from its very inception.
2. For a time--until the participants had finished their overseas training and had been integrated into the IPA staff--foreign advisors and assistants would contribute substantially to leadership. They would help define the patterns and programs of the enterprise in its early stages, so that the participants would return to a "going concern," which they could then take over and run.

3. As indicated in the previous point, significant elements of IPA leadership would come from the Thais who would make up the core of the professional staff, once they had been trained.

Factors Affecting Leadership

As noted, much of the impetus to create the IPA came out of a widely shared conviction that great needs and opportunities existed for bureaucratic change and development. Certain long-established and substantial bureaucratic qualities appeared to have a diminishing compatibility with the expanding objectives of contemporary Thai government.

These bureaucratic characteristics can be treated as factors affecting leadership within the IPA:^x

1. Perhaps first in importance was a persisting generalized tendency for the Thai bureaucracy to be regarded as the major means of access to social status, to power, and to an acceptable level of material rewards for most Thais outside the peasantry or the Buddhist priesthood. Most Thais seeking to move into the middle or upper levels of Thai society viewed the bureaucracy as the route. Implicit in this widely held perspective was the premise that bureaucratic status is "better" than the status inherent in an academic position. This norm was reinforced by arrangements, particularly at Thammasat University, whereby most of the teaching was handled as a sideline by bureaucrats.

2. Second was the bundle of traditional norms and value orientations which have been thematic characteristics of the bureaucracy.

^x For an extended discussion of normative characteristics of the contemporary Thai bureaucracy, see: W. J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development, East-West Center Press, Honolulu, 1966, Ch. 8, 9.

Authority is largely a function of hierarchical status. Roles are most sharply defined with respect to the personal rights and obligations inherent in superior-subordinate relations. Here deference and ostensible respect are important.

The "functional" component of roles--in the sense of substantive organizational goal-oriented performance responsibilities and obligations--is often vague, and seldom linked with productivity norms of the sort one tends to find in Western organizations. Thus an individual may find a great deal of fluidity and flexibility in the duties of his position; the desires and expectations of his superior, rather than any pervasive rationale of performance-oriented organization, are likely to be determining.

Both sets of bureaucratic characteristics were substantially inconsistent with the averred qualities of the IPA. It could not be regarded as inferior to the bureaucracy by its key participants. And it could not merely manifest the normative orientation of the bureaucracy, if it was to pursue the kinds of goals perceived for it by those who gave impetus to its development. The IPA was implicitly dedicated to rationality, efficiency, and purposiveness. It could hardly attack the bureaucratic status quo--however gently, deftly, or relatively--if it were totally adherent to bureaucratic norms.

Yet all the bureaucratic characteristics which seemed to justify the effort to create the IPA were constantly impinging upon it. One might say that there was a substantial bureaucratic value penetration of the institute from its beginning.

3. Relations among IPA participants affected leadership in the IPA. A total of forty-one participants were trained abroad for the IPA, but two of these were engaged in short-term "observation tours." Of the other thirty-nine, 70 per cent (i.e., twenty-seven individuals) were in the first two groups of participants. They came to Indiana University in two roughly equal batches, in September, 1955, and July, 1956.

Of these twenty-seven individuals:

- (1) Eleven did not accept (or were not offered) positions with the IPA upon their return to Thailand,
- (2) Six accepted positions and later left for other posts, and two died while serving on the IPA staff,
- (3) Eight accepted IPA positions and continued on the IPA staff through the remainder of its existence.

Each of these twenty-seven persons received all or most of its academic training at Indiana University in Bloomington. The residence periods of the two groups overlapped substantially, so that there was really one substantial group of Thais living in Bloomington, working together in courses, eating together, and to a considerable extent living together.

Out of the group emerged two actors who achieved important posts within the IPA--Dr. Choop Karnjansprakorn, who became associate dean and head of the academic division, and Dr. Amara Raksasataya, who came to be the acting head of the research division during the 1960's. Between these two a rather close relation emerged at Bloomington, to continue in Bangkok. They became rather highly committed to non-traditional orientations.

Among the second group of participants there was also a group of five girls, each of whom also joined the IPA staff and remained on it, serving in research, in-service training, and in the library. While it is not correct to describe them as "a cadre of loyal followers of Dr. Choop," it is quite clear that they do not tend to identify with traditional bureaucratic norms and perspectives, and there appears to be a congruence of the perspective of these women and the posture of Dr. Choop. There is also considerable respect for him among the group, although he is not personally "close" to these staff members.

Among the first group participants was one man who went on to obtain a Ph.D., developed a rather close relationship with Dr. Choop (who was regarded as a patron, advisor, and in general a hierarchical senior by this man), and gradually withdrew from the relationship during the 1960's, finally leaving to pursue a bureaucratic career.

Within the first group of participants were two other prospective leaders. One was Sukdi Pasuknirunt, who achieved a Ph.D., considered himself the unrecognized equal of Dr. Choop in the IPA, and left for another academic post within about a year after returning to Bangkok. The other was Bunchana Atthakor, an experienced official, upward-oriented, and highly intelligent. He was the first to finish an M.A. and return to Bangkok, in November, 1956. He did not consolidate a position as a leader among the participant trainees at Bloomington, largely because he was not on the scene for a long enough time.

As time passed, it became apparent that Choop possessed a set of qualities that caused him to emerge as a leader among this set of participants. He was older than most, experienced, wise and earnest, helpful, and trustworthy. He fitted a Thai leadership image very well.

And there was no significant potential competitor for the leadership role among the Thais in residence in Bloomington.

Dr. Choop returned to Bangkok about the end of 1959, and many of the developments that occurred in the IPA academic program from 1960 are undoubtedly linked with his presence. Dr. Anava returned about the end of 1960, and the two began to work together, with little or no problem of competition affecting their relationship. Dr. Arsa did not return to Bangkok until 1961, to remain in the IPA for about three years. Dr. Sukdi, the first of the Ph.D's to return (near the end of 1959), left the IPA in less than a year after Dr. Choop's return. Bunchana, who became head of the In-service Training Division following the death of the first director, Chan Smitawet, became involved in the affairs of the Sarit regime shortly after his return to Bangkok, and much of his activities were directed to other tasks than the leadership of the IPA, which he then left (except for part-time teaching) for a set of high-ranking posts in the government. In 1965 he returned to the scene as part-time Rector of the new National Institute of Development Administration, with Dr. Choop serving under him as Associate.

The fuller implications of this set of experiences for the institutional development of the IPA is discussed later, in a section of this chapter on leadership.

Actors

The Dean. Throughout the history of the IPA, the Dean quite understandably manifested a substantial appreciation of prevailing bureaucratic values. Much of his own personal commitment was to a bureaucratic career. He saw the IPA not as an instrument of radical reform, but as a useful service enterprise, a bureaucratic adjunct that would help produce officials for the government agencies--officials who would be more literate and articulate and useful than might be the case without the IPA. He felt quite earnestly that this would be a substantial and sufficient contribution. He felt too that desirable adjustments and developments within the Thai bureaucracy could be promoted through the IPA without any sharp discrepancy between established bureaucratic values and those (a) manifested by and (b) promoted within the IPA.

This was the sincere position of an exceptionally able and intelligent man. The Dean was an experienced official--a former provincial governor, special grade deputy director general, previous dean of another faculty, holder of a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Michigan. He was a man equally graceful and effective in a Thai or Western setting, a man who could comprehend perhaps better than any other person in Thailand in 1955 what the IPA could mean, and a man willing to give support to the enterprise in return for a modicum of incremental prestige and moderate supplemental pay.

The Dean manifested many of the normative qualities of the established bureaucracy. He was kindly and considerate toward the staff; he sought their loyalty; he was pleased to respond to their requests, and reluctant to impose sanctions. In return, he expected and desired loyalty, and he saw little real need for an endless abiding emphasis upon program development and functional specificity.

Neither did he really accept the premise of collegiality as a basis for making decisions affecting the substance of the IPA enterprise. In general, he was permissive. He supported individuals on his staff. He was not prone to give thrust to an IPA program as such, but within limits was willing to support proposals originating within the organization. He tolerated and generally cooperated with a series of American chief advisors, sometimes suffering from what he considered their heroic insensitivity to Thai ways and Thai values and their equal inability to appreciate the limits of the feasible in a Thai context. And in the minds of the staff, or many of them, he manifested at least two vital premises: the bureaucracy is more important than the Institute; and the patterns of authority and operating norms characteristic of the bureaucracy are applicable in the IPA. The Dean was always a part-time dean. Like practically all high-ranking Thai bureaucrats, he held a number of different assignments at the same time. When the National Constituent Assembly was created during the Sarit regime, the Dean was a member. He served on various governmental committees. He represented the government at various international meetings. During most of the period of his deanship he was also the incumbent of an important line position in the bureaucracy. The demand on his abilities was enormous; at times the Institute was more of a troublesome obligation for him than anything else.

The Dean gave much of his available time to the IPA; but he was, during the period of the Indiana contract, under persistent pressure to give more. Indiana University representatives and the U.S. Operations Mission both felt that the head of the IPA should be a full-time Dean, or substantially so. The Dean, on the other hand, felt clearly and

strongly that in the Thai setting a full-time dean would be a man of small stature and influence vis-a-vis the bureaucracy with which effective relations were important. He felt, too, that he could never himself accept a full-time Institute post. In Thailand this would have meant withdrawing from the most important, most rewarding, most promising, and most prestigious of his activities. So he served as best he could, officiating on various occasions, deciding the questions that came to him, conferring with various staff members on a personal basis, and intervening within the IPA, or on behalf of it, from time to time.

Burdened with many tasks, he sought help from his staff. He also made that staff available to undertake various service assignments for sectors of the government. He operated upon the basis of personal relations, and promoted the interests of those staff members whom he found loyal and effective. He honored the obligations he saw inherent in the reciprocal relations of persons of differing status. And the occasional clash of his norms and the different value orientations of some of his own IPA staff irritated him. More than that, it hurt. The Dean, after all, was the head of the organization. Without him there would have been no IPA. Through him the various staff members acquired their positions, and participants were sent abroad. Yet in the last years of his tenure he found important subordinates in conflict with him. Meanwhile, more and more of his attention was occupied with the important post of Deputy Undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior.

The Americans. The Americans made a substantial, if transitory, contribution to IPA leadership. In consultation with the Dean they designed the organization and formulated its initial program. The 1965 academic program was spelled out in the meetings of 1955; in broad form

it remained ever unchanged. Throughout the IPA's history the main thrust of innovative leadership in the training program came from the Americans--some of it abortive and some of it, notably the executive development program mentioned elsewhere at length, apparently viable. The Americans pushed research in a context alien to research, and alien, too, to reliance upon empirical analysis as a prime basis for decision-making. The Americans pressed for a rational plan of staffing and organization, and for the selection of participants to be sent abroad on the basis of the fullest possible effort to predict success. They also wrote some textbooks, defining the content of some of the courses. And they performed various service functions, as requests came to the IPA.

With as many as ten American advisors active in the IPA during the latter 1950's, the Americans did much to "spell out" what was meant by the IPA. For a time, they were a dominant feature of the Institute, and they gave much influence to the formal articulation of its doctrine.

Other Americans also served as the instructors of participants overseas, helping shape their perceptions and expanding the scope of their skills and knowledge. When these participants returned, those who entered the IPA worked for a time with American advisors, who sought to reinforce what had been learned abroad. Beginning in 1957, for instance, and extending into 1960, Thais and Americans worked together as counterparts in teaching courses within the IPA. The impact of relationship, however, was inevitably blunted by the fact that the Thai academic staff was so limited; there was no substantial cadre of IPA academicians with whom to work.

By 1961 all the Americans were gone, save for a chief advisor and a consultant in training. At least one American remained at the

IPA, however, until the termination of the final contract with Indiana University, on October 31, 1964. The training consultant served until July, 1963, when he was shifted to a "direct hire" position in the U.S. Operations Mission, AID, Bangkok. He had made a distinguished contribution since joining the IPA in July, 1960, and to some extent continued to be available to the Thai staff for counsel and assistance after leaving the Institute.

In general, the contribution of the Americans was to delineate the structure of the IPA enterprise. With the concurrence of the Dean and within the limits imposed by environmental factors, they defined the broad form of the enterprise, and began the operation of a series of activities which added up to the IPA Program. They were the architects and masons; yet their object was not to build something like a house that would remain permanently fixed, but rather to establish a set of self-sustaining, adaptive processes--processes that would contribute to the broad goals of bureaucratic improvement. For this venture to succeed, however, it would be essential for Thais to take it over. The Americans created commitments; Thais would either fulfill them, modify them, or reject them.

The Associate Dean. In 1960 the office of Associate Dean was created and filled by the chief of the IPA's academic division (who continued in the latter position as well). The Associate Dean-Director was one of three IPA staff members in special grade positions--the others being the head of the training division and the Dean. The position of director, research division, also carries special grade rank, but it has not been filled by a special grade incumbent.

The creation of the post of associate dean by the Thammasat

University Council at the behest of the Dean of the IPA was an acknowledgment of a vital fact: the incumbent had become a key element of the IPA leadership. In this post the Dean himself saw the best possible response to the persistent pressure for full-time leadership in the Institute.

The Associate Dean was a protege of the Dean, brought into the IPA through selection as a member of the first group of participants sent abroad for study in September, 1955. Previously he had served in various capacities in the Ministry of Interior. He was an experienced and respected official in his latter 30's when he joined the program. In 1959 Dr. Choop Karnjanaprakorn finished his Ph.D. in political science and returned to Thailand. By the time of his return Dr. Choop was, as noted, the acknowledged leader of a group of the participants who had worked together at Indiana University.

Wise in the ways of bureaucratic reality, Choop proved to be a dedicated pragmatist who saw the IPA as a significant enterprise, intrinsically meaningful, a means for making a substantial and worthwhile contribution to public administration in Thailand. An "evolutionary" rather than "revolutionary," Dr. Choop nonetheless proved himself to be broad of vision, almost infinitely patient, and sturdy of character. By 1960 it was clear that Dr. Choop commanded the loyalty and support of an important portion of the IPA professional staff--those in particular who tended to support the idea of the IPA as an instrument of bureaucratic change, and who believed that the IPA should function in accord with different norms than those characteristic of the contemporary bureaucracy.

At the same time Choop mounted no broad attack upon such problems as the basic state of the academic division. Rather, he moved from situation to situation, shoring, propping, encouraging, and quietly supporting academic values. He was the Dean's mainstay, and held a deep-felt loyalty

to the Dean. He did not, however, fully share the Dean's perspective on the IPA, nor the Dean's identification with established bureaucratic norms.

In the last year of Indiana's participation in the development of the IPA, a clash occurred which illustrated both the differing value-orientations of the Dean and the Associate Dean, and the underlying incompatibility or prevalent bureaucratic norms with an otherwise-oriented IPA.

Under the Thammasat University Act of 1952, each faculty, including the IPA, had an executive committee. In the Institute it was composed of seven members: the Dean, the heads of the five divisions--administrative, academic, research, training, and library, and one member chosen at large from the Institute. The Committee was legally authorized to issue regulations for the faculty; to "fix the syllabus" or prescribe the academic program; to regulate examinations; to advise the Dean; and to prepare the budget.

At an Executive Committee session the Dean announced the appointment of a new member of the academic staff--his younger brother-in-law, a graduate of the IPA with a year of foreign study and some experience in the bureaucracy, who was the husband of the assistant secretary of the Institute, the Dean's sister.

The acting head of the research division, an able but sometimes tactless man, criticized this decision in the meeting, saying he understood that such decisions would be made collegially. Such behavior was, of course, utterly out of keeping with Thai bureaucratic patterns; the Dean was understandably incensed. As for the appointment, it was fait accompli; the open criticism required an apology--which was not forthcoming. This rift was exacerbated by other events--an anonymous critical letter received by the Dean, apparent innuendo in an article written by the acting research director, and other things.

The Dean sought to exercise sanctions against the acting research director, who remained adamant in his unwillingness to apologize and make peace with the Dean. When it became clear that the breach was not about to be healed and that the Dean was quite relentless in his posture toward his subordinate, Dr. Choop broke off contact with the Dean. For 100 days not a word was spoken between them, and Dr. Choop refused to go to the Dean's office in response to either invitations or summons. With his career at stake, the acting research director did eventually make an apology to the Dean, who accepted it gracefully and withdrew his objection to a proposed regular salary step increase for the offender. But the underlying sentiments, once revealed, could not be entirely put aside. The number two man in the organization, the most significant internal leader, with followers in all divisions of the IPA save perhaps two--the administrative division and the training division--had, in effect, manifested his sympathy for a posture which was quite inconsistent with that of the Dean--namely, that important staffing decisions should be made collegially, and that the superior position of the Dean did not entitle him to impose unchallenged an undesired addition to the staff.

By the time of this clash, however, the IPA was in its last days. The cleavage within the staff led to no major adjustments in the structure of authority and leadership within the IPA. By the time it occurred, the IPA game was nearing an end, and NIDA was on the horizon. The conflict between the Dean and his subordinates did indicate that, within the IPA, there had evolved a substantial cleavage of value orientations. Part of the Professional staff, at least, identified with norms that

were alien to the bureaucratic tradition. The Dean as a manifestor of that tradition was not acceptable to this group as a leader. On the other hand, his key subordinate, the Associate Dean, was for the time being not in a position to mobilize the resources or make the claims that had to be made if a "reformist orientation" were to be effectively asserted by the IPA in its academic and research activities. And while the Associate Dean could and did exercise sanctions against the Dean (and undergo much anguish and stress in doing so), he could not capture the game, and extend greatly his control over the norms that would be asserted in the continuing operations of the IPA. For the IPA was about to disappear as an entity, and a new game would soon begin....

This sketch, based upon extensive interviews and discussions, portrays what appears to be the most essential feature of the leadership structures that emerged within the IPA. Had the IPA continued, a struggle would also have continued, without much doubt. Perhaps a coherent leadership might have emerged, either through the departure of the anti-traditionals, or through the departure of the Dean. At the end of ten years, however, such a leadership pattern had not evolved. In regard to leaders and their values, the IPA was bifurcated; partly as a result, the whole organization lacked coherence. Interaction between inconsistent sets of norms generally took place in the form of individual accommodative decisions--with occasional eruptions, the most vivid of which has been noted. But the innovatively oriented elements of the staff and their leader were never in a position to control the major claims for resources, and to determine the major allocative decisions. These were the program-oriented people; given

their position, a developmental programmatic orientation in the academic and research sectors of the IIA was at best limited in scope and effectiveness.

Within the IPA there were other elements of leadership. The training division, for instance, was headed by a relatively autonomous individual, effective in his relations with the Dean, and persistent in the operation of a program that seemed both effective and prestigious. Interaction between the associate dean and the training director was essentially pleasant and limited. Cooperative arrangements for the use of staff for both training and teaching were worked out with little difficulty. The last American training advisor had helped evolve the main features of the work of the training division--notably the executive development program--and there were few important allocative decisions to be made. In general, the training division, located in a separate building and occupied with its own schedule of work, engaged in only limited interaction with the rest of the IPA. The characteristics of its major enterprise, and their significance to the Institute, is noted elsewhere.

Conclusion

This examination of leadership in the IPA, largely based upon extensive interviews and discussions with members of the professional staff, leads to the following conclusions:

1. The obvious observation that ~~within the IPA there were two~~ rather sharply differentiated leadership nexuses, one essentially traditional in institutional orientation, and the other in important respects in conflict with elements of the Thai bureaucratic tradition and the norms embedded in it.

2. An accommodation was more or less maintained between these two facets of leadership during most of the period in which the anti-traditional leadership structure was emerging, but a rupture did occur in 1964-65. No real resolution of this manifest split took place; instead, the IPA was dissolved into a new and different entity, although not because of this split.

3. During most of the time when the IPA was being developed, two patterns of leadership operated. One was that exercised by the Dean; the other consisted of the activities of the American advisors, whose normative orientation was largely consistent with that later asserted by the Thai leadership faction emerging within the IPA in the early 1960's.

4. This leadership faction, whose posture was generally anti-traditional, given out of a group of individuals who had shared in extensive and relatively stressful set of experiences as participant-trainees in the United States.

5. In the initial efforts to establish the IPA, the selection of the top official of the IPA had a decisive influence upon the leadership structure of the organization throughout its history. The Dean brought

legitimacy to the Institute. He enabled it to establish and maintain linkages with the governmental environment through which it became possible to recruit trainees for prospective staff positions, to obtain mandates and eventual allocations of resources, and in all probability to recruit students more readily than would have otherwise been possible. Without the Dean it might not have been possible to build the organization; certainly the experience would have been much different, and probably much more difficult.

Yet, ironically, the Dean's own goals, values, and perspectives came to clash, first with American advisors, and later -- and much more significantly -- with a group of Thai leaders whose existence and emergence was to a large degree a consequence of the Dean's own efforts.

The differences with the Americans were viewed and handled in a case-by-case manner. In general, they involved differences over patterns of resource allocation and IPA objectives. (Is this man qualified to be an instructor? Should this person be selected as a participant trainee? Should the Dean function as a "full-time leader" of the IPA?) Such questions were handled individually as they arose, save for the "full-time" issue. Here the Dean's position was clear and consistent: in the Thai context a full-time Dean is likely to be a relatively weak person, not possessed of status sufficient to establish and maintain the linkages the IPA must have to survive and operate. The official hand of the IPA should not, in the Dean's view, be a full-time incumbent, but rather should, in the best Thai fashion, have a wide network of involvements and relations within the government and a suitably high status.

There was much in this argument that was compelling. The Americans, however, continually pressed for "full-time leadership" of the IPA. The results were two: a certain amount of continuing stress between the

Dean and his American counterparts over a fairly long period of time, and a decision to create the position of Associate Dean, to provide the managerial resources the Americans saw as necessary. The effect was to add legitimacy to another leadership faction within the IPA. The subdued conflict between the Dean and the Americans was transferred; a latent difference in the normative orientations of the Thai leadership elements led to a sharp clash between the Dean and his own proteges in the last months of the IPA's independent existence.

6. One can only wonder: was there any feasible alternative that might have led to the emergence of a coherent Thai leadership structure? The failure to develop this was, of course, an unresolved problem in this effort at institution-building.

IV

THE ACADEMIC PROGRAM

The academic program of the IPA is in a sense the core of the enterprise. Officially, this is, of course, not the case. Formally separate divisions possessing equal status are charged with responsibility for research, for in-service training, and for the academic program.

In all three of these divisions one finds manifestations of the institutional qualities of the IPA. But the in-service training division is regarded as having at least in part the role of serving as "the show window of the IPA" -- of maintaining linkages with elements of the environment which will in general contribute to the acceptability and perceived relevance of the over-all organization. And to some extent the substantive content of its activities reflects this element of its purposes. They are, in short, considered to be at least partially supportive of an entity whose central doctrinal posture is not necessarily highly manifest in the division's work.

The research division also has a relatively mixed collection of functions and purposes. One of them is presumably the generation of data and materials for the academic program. Others include service research and the dissemination to an outside audience of information about the IPA and about public administration, chiefly through the Institute's Journal.

In the academic division, with its Master's degree program in public administration (M.P.A. program) one would expect to find the most focal and most visible manifestations of the IPA's doctrines, as well as evidence of the organization's institutional qualities. These are presumably reflected in such things as the pattern of resource allocation found in the academic program; the nature of the meaningfulness

apparently imputed to an identification with this program; and the substantive content of the program.

The Course Program

The first semester's work involves four courses: Principles of Public Administration, Personnel Administration, Finance Administration, and Research Methodology. The first of these courses reflects the abiding efforts of the head of the academic division to apply social science concepts to the Thai bureaucratic milieu -- in other words to interpret and analyze key aspects of the Thai bureaucracy in terms of such concepts as rationality, efficiency, responsibility, and systematic models of administration taking account of authority and communications processes. A course in research methodology, also being taught by a member of the IPA staff (Research Division) in 1965 reflected an analytic perspective based upon the use of sociological methodology -- in other words, it focused upon ways and means of systematically describing systems and subsystems, and to some extent dealt with the analysis of problems. But the course was not well received and student reactions indicated that there was little feed-in of the perspectives of this course into the larger academic program. A course in personnel administration grew largely from materials prepared ten years earlier by a visiting professor; and a course labeled "Finance Administration" was a rather curious mixture of descriptions of American and Thai budgetary, taxation, and fiscal control, organizations and procedures, nominally taught by a high-status official formerly connected with the IPA, and in practice to a substantial extent by a member of his ministry staff.

Second-semester courses are, as they were ten years earlier: Social Welfare Administration, Labor Administration, Comparative Local Government and Administration, and Organization and Management. Of these, in 1965 the O & M course was being taught by a member of the in-service training division of the Institute staff, who had served as a counterpart in 1958 and 1959 for the American professor who wrote an English language text still being used for the subject in 1965. The Labor Administration course was the result of a no longer very relevant concern of the mid 1950's in labor organization. The Comparative Local Government course, taught by a visitor, drew upon materials prepared in the latter 1950's by a foreign advisor; and the Social Welfare Administration course, also taught by an outsider, reflected an interest of the Dean at the time he had been Deputy Director General of the Public Welfare Department of the Ministry of Interior back in the 1950's and was at best a hodgepodge treatment of social welfare problems and organizational arrangements in Thailand.

The third semester, consisting of a series of seminars in Finance Administration, Personnel Administration, Comparative Administration, Social Welfare Administration, and Comparative Local Government and Administration once again reflects no real coherence or doctrinal posture. And the IPA's resource situation never enabled the following:

- (1) the careful and conscious examination and assessment of the content of the academic program in terms of an explicit doctrinal posture;
- (2) the development of a coherent strategy reflected in three semesters of course work which would implement such a posture; and (3) the continuing flow of materials into the collection of courses which would reflect a basic doctrinal posture and the adaptation of the instruments for manifesting that posture as competence and knowledge grew.

In 1965 the IPA, with eighty-seven employees, approximately thirty of them in professional positions, more than half of these with foreign degrees, conducted an academic program based directly upon a plan made ten years earlier and did not possess the resources necessary for the operation of a coherent academic program designed to thematically manifest a doctrine that could be described as "modernizing."

Resource Allocations in the Academic Program

In 1965 the academic division of the IPA included a Director who also functioned as Associate Dean, responsible for much of the continuing work of administering the Institute, plus two permanent instructors whose assignments also included duties in other divisions of the IPA. Finally, there were ten part-time lecturers, employed on an hourly basis and paid out of Thammasat University funds. (The number of these lecturers had grown from two in 1956 to ten by 1959, and following that year had varied from seven to ten.) Most of these lecturers were government officials, some with extraordinary qualifications. A few were individuals who were sent abroad for graduate training under the Indiana University contract, but who did not join the IPA staff upon their return to Thailand.

The significance and the contribution of these part-time instructors have varied. Some occupy high-status positions, and to an extent enhance the IPA by participating in its academic program. Some are men of impressive competence in their fields of specialization. In general, they help link the IPA with its bureaucratic context. On the other hand, most have a nominal commitment to the IPA. It serves as a convenient and useful vehicle, an instrument enabling them to contribute something of themselves to present and prospective bureaucrats, and a means of gaining, in some cases, a bit of the prestige that can come from being a part-time instructor in a Thai institution, particularly Thammasat University, which over the years has relied heavily upon such instructional staff.

These people have come-- have been recruited -- to teach a course. In some cases they have done more; but it is often difficult for them to

do much more; they have other obligations, often enormous ones. (For example, Dr. Puey Ungphakorn, who taught in 1964, was Governor of the Bank of Thailand.)

Perhaps most important from an institutional perspective, these part-time instructors are manifestations that the IPA is an entity whose intrinsic resources are insufficient to its obligations. It is a degree-granting enterprise, but most of the instruction--as much as ten of thirteen courses--is actually conducted by other than its own staff. Thus, to a substantial extent, the IPA staff has not been in a position to assess and evolve its academic program on the basis of continuing experience with its detailed substance. The IPA staff is not in a position to continually refresh and enrich that program with a continuing infusion of new knowledge and new insights coming out of other aspects of the work of the staff members--at least, to the extent that they do not teach the courses. When from fifty to seventy-five percent of the courses are taught by non-staff members, the continuing influence of the IPA staff over the content of the academic program is at best limited. Such was the case in 1964 and 1965, and earlier.

This situation has in part been transitory. In 1965 two teaching posts were being held by participants studying abroad. One academic staff member was on leave of absence for a year, at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii. Also, the post of Chief, Research Division, was being held in 1964 for a man completing his Ph.D. at the University of Michigan (who shortly returned and decided against joining the IPA staff).

Yet there was a clear shortage of instructors. In part this was a consequence of the University Classification System, under which the

IPA, a unit of Thammasat University, necessarily operated. In this system non-academic posts are in most cases classified no higher than the second grade of the civil service, while academic (instructor) positions may be allocated to the first grade, or even the special grade in some cases. Librarians, training specialists, and research specialists can be appointed to first grade positions only if these are "instructional" posts. Result: instructional positions were distributed among the upper-ranking specialists in the Library, Research, and Training divisions of the IPA, "to provide the status, incentives, and salary level appropriate for these positions. This in turn has created a shortage of instructional positions available to the Academic Division."*

* A Final Report on the Establishment of the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University. Published jointly by the Bangkok IPA and the Department of Government, Indiana University, Bloomington, July, 1965, p. 16

The IPA Academic Program and Its Clientele

An extensive portion of this study of institution-building focuses upon the IPA students, past and present. They are the prime consumers of a major product of the Institute. Through its academic program the IPA seeks to disseminate a doctrine, essentially a perspective upon public administration as a kind of activity, ideally guided by certain norms and conforming to certain kinds of desirable characteristics. The IPA also seeks to develop certain skills presumed to be relevant and useful to administration. And it seeks to enhance the "value free" understanding of administrative phenomena, by presenting students with a set of concepts and theory elements in terms of which they can examine and interpret administrative phenomena as forms of social behavior.

In this effort the IPA deliberately includes no systematic analytic approach to politics per se. It does offer a course in comparative local government, in which the emphasis is largely upon formal structures. And it does include seminars where certain substantive programs and policies of Thai government are examined. The essential premise underlying the academic program is diffuse and largely inarticulate: "Successful completion of this program will increase capabilities for effective bureaucratic performance, and this is intrinsically good."

Here we shall not examine in detail the doctrinal content of the academic program. Rather, we shall attempt to examine the "meaningfulness" of the program, by looking at characteristics of the student participants, including their perspectives and attitudes concerning the program, and on the Thai bureaucracy, and the ways in which and extent to which these appear to be affected by participation.

Student Recruitment

The opening of the Institute's M.A. program was set for May, 1956. The first semester program was announced in the spring, with extensive publicity. Applications were received from 166 individuals--most of them already enrolled at Thammasat. A qualifying examination was held on May 16--a hundred short-answer questions on government, law, economics, administration, and world affairs, plus an essay to be written in English. Of the 166 applicants, 147 appeared for the examination. The sixty with the highest scores were selected and notified to report for classes on May 22. About forty showed up. Approximately half of them failed to complete the first semester of course work successfully.

During 1956 steps were taken to change the recruitment process in order to raise the quality of the student body.

The second group of students entered the academic program in May of 1957. Forty-five of the sixty were selected through Ministerial recommendations. In response to a request from the Institute, the Prime Minister had asked each ministry to nominate at least three students who appeared to meet certain specified qualifications, including English language competence. Thirteen other students were admitted through competitive examination. Of this second group, about 20 continued in residence during the semester, and about ten passed the examinations at the end of it. Meanwhile, about 20 of the first group continued through the second semester of their work, about half of them passing the examinations for their courses. Of these, nearly all went on to finish the third term of work.*

*On March 31, 1955, when the contract between Thammasat and Indiana universities was being negotiated, the then-Prime Minister, Field Marshal Pibulsonggram "state that the full cooperation of all Ministeries would be provided, both in the selection of candidtes for training and in the placement of those who have completed their studies at the InSTITUTE." (Memorandum of Meeting, prepared jointly by Dr. Edgar B. Cale, USOM, and W.H.C.Laves, Indiana, after conference with the Prime Minister.) This agreement was the

The third group, 65 new students, was taken in in September, 1957. Only about ten dropped out during the semester, and half of the group passed the course examinations at the term's end. By this time the recruitment pattern was becoming stabilized in a relatively successful fashion. Both ministerial nominations and entrance through competitive examination were now showing signs of producing an adequate student body. Gradually, over the years after 1958 reliance upon ministerial nomination declined and by 1965 most students were entering the IPA on the basis of direct application.

Over time, something of an image of the IPA and its academic program appears to have evolved within the population of prospective students. As the program continued to operate information about it spread, present and former students could "tell their friends" and advise them about what could be expected. In this way and otherwise, an element of self-selection could and did evolve in the student recruitment process.

The "Full-time Student" Issue. In the case of individual applicants already holding bureaucratic positions, a problem did arise with some frequency: the problem of "full-time students." This problem had in fact arisen in connection with the first groups of ministerial nominees.

From the viewpoint of Western advisors it was essential that the students assigned to the IPA be permitted to function as true students. In other words, they must be relieved from their ministerial obligations. This arrangement was diametrically at variance from a widespread custom at Thammasat University of which the IPA was a part.

basis for later memoranda from the Prime Minister to the Ministries instructing them to nominate student participants, beginning in 1956. Between 1956 and 1965 a total of 173 students entered the IPA by nomination, compared with about five hundred admitted by competitive examinations. The failure rate for both groups proved to be about 15% of all courses taken, over the period of 1956-64, and the rate of degree completion was about 12% for both groups. These facts do not sustain an assertion that the ministry nominees have been inferior to the students selected competitively. But perhaps half of the ministerial nominees quickly dropped out of the program in the early years; in this sense many of them were unsuitable.

Thammasat, being organized on "the European plan." had no attendance requirements whatsoever; the successful student was one who paid his enrollment fees and then passed the annual examination(s) given during the long period (January-May) when school was not in session. Indeed, many of the Thammasat classrooms (other than those of the IPA) were completely incapable of accomodating the number of students enrolled in the classes that met within them. One found "active" Thammasat University students in the farthest reaches of the kingdom, in the northern mountains, on the borders of the Mekong River, and in the Muslim provinces of the south. They studied when they could--they studied lecture notes prepared by instructors or prepared by enterprising students who sold those notes--and hopefully returned to Bangkok to compete on the annual examination. Thammasat University in those days had approximately 20,000 students, most of whom seldom, if ever, appeared on the campus.

The Institute was to be different. Its students were to put through a program of graduate training comparable in broad outline to that which one might expect to find in an American university. Fulfilling this arrangement involved a series of genteel skirmishes between the Thai directorate of the IPA and the American advisors. In substance, they had for all practical purposes won the argument by the end of 1958; Ministry nominees who were not actually released from all or most of their duties quickly found that it would be impossible for them to succeed as students. Ministry officials were asked to indicate whether in fact those assigned to the Institute were substantially or entirely free from bureaucratic duties.

Because in Thailand there is an established basis for granting educational leave to officials it was often possible for individual student applicants to obtain leave from their jobs. In some cases these leaves were "informal." In such cases the official went to his office in the morning, "signed the book" indicating his attendance, and went off to class. Officials

did have varying amounts of work to do, but in many instances this did not intrude upon the ability to function as students. In other instances students were granted outright leave from their positions.

Quite often, however, students preferred not to be totally separated from their positions; by being on "informal" leave it was possible for an official to be a student but also to continue to be eligible for annual pay increases. A student of official leave was not eligible. At any rate, the survey conducted in 1965 indicated that approximately 90% of the students at the IPA considered themselves to be "full-time." By this some meant only that they carried a full course load (as required by the Institute), but practically all of them meant, too, that their work at the IPA was not merely a sideline.

The Informal and Personal Basis of Recruitment. Only 3% of the students in residence in 1965 reported that they had come to the IPA on the basis of the recommendations or orders of their superiors. All of the others were recruited through other channels.

Not surprisingly in the Thai context where communication is so emphatically personal, 43% of the students covered in the 1965 survey had learned about the IPA from friends, through personal contacts and word-of-mouth communications. 20% heard of the IPA program while they were engaged in training in their own bureaucratic organization, or studying at another academic institution. Slightly more than 10% heard of the IPA by encountering the organization's own publicity, and about 8% learned of the academic program through radio announcements on government broadcasting stations or through other mass media. The other students were recruited in a variety of ways, by their parents, by other IPA students, by IPA personnel, or by encountering government circulars mentioning the IPA program.

This evidence confirms impressions directly based upon systematic information: The IPA has become well-linked with its bureaucratic context, so far as student recruitment is concerned. It evidently need not rely upon systematic publicity or positive recruitment efforts of any substantial size. It does not require a "olientele subsidy" in the form of ministerial nominations. The IPA is there, and students come. All of this, of course, begs one important question: how good are the students who come to the IPA? Does the organization, in other words, draw a high proportion of top calibre students?

To this important question there are no determinate answers. Fifty percent of the IPA professional staff rates the students as "somewhat better than average" in comparison with other Thai faculties. A third of the staff rate the students as "among the best." All but two of the staff see the quality of the student body as stable or improving. The "flunk rate" or rate of failures to passes in courses is relatively low -- 15% -- and has been more or less constant over the years.

But in terms of other, broader criteria it is difficult to judge the relative quality of the IPA students. They are not selected from only the cream of baccalaureate degree-holders. They do not come out of academic backgrounds which facilitate evaluation of intellectual capabilities. In view of the testing methods of the IPA on one hand, and the bureaucracy on the other, little can be said about general aptitude and intelligence levels.

Who Comes?

Most of the students who come are already bureaucrats. Two-thirds of the respondents to the 1965 survey were in government agencies,

including 4 in quasi-bureaucratic organizations, 7 military officers, and 1 police official. The others reported that they held no bureaucratic posts; most of these were young prospective bureaucrats. Over the period 1956 through 1964, 70 percent of the incoming students held governmental posts.

Almost 40% of the 1965 student body consisted of officials normally engaged in what might be best called "line administration." The others scatter rather widely across such fields as education, scientific and technical work, accounting and finance, inspection and control, public welfare, and judicial, legal, or diplomatic work. 24% of the 1965 students are civilian officials of the Ministry of Interior, engaged in general domestic governmental work. Nearly 20% hold military or police assignments or work in the intelligence apparatus of the government. Some persons have described the IPA as a service agency of the Ministry of Interior, and the distribution of students helps one understand why. (Yet between 1956 and 1964 the Ministry of Defense nominated many more students -- 43, compared with 16 by Interior -- and the Prime Minister's office nominated 27.)

This perceived relationship between Interior and the IPA is explained by a complex set of factors. First, the Ministry is the largest of the civilian ministries apart from Education; even if students were distributed proportionately among the ministries, Interior would still loom large in numbers. Second, a small number of key officials within the Interior Ministry have been particularly supportive of the IPA; they have regarded it as valuable and have encouraged officials to participate in its training and academic programs. The Ministry of Interior has a

long-standing tradition of training, as well as an impressive range of responsibilities in the centralized government of Thailand. Third, personal associations have linked the Ministry and the IPA; the part-time dean of the Institute through the 10 years of its existence was also a high-ranking official in the Ministry, and a number of other members of the professional staff, including the associate dean, had prior connections with the Ministry.

It cannot be said that the IPA has been dominated by the Ministry of Interior, nor that it has discriminated in favor of students from that Ministry to the exclusion of others. Rather, in the absence of any conscious, systematic persistent effort within the Institute to extend the base of student participation, various factors have tended to produce a substantial representation of Interior officials among the IPA student body. In view of the communications process involved in student recruitment, this pattern tends to be self-maintaining.

The second and third largest groups of current students come from political, military and intelligence organizations on one hand and commercial and economic organizations on the other. The Thai military has been distinguished by its emphasis upon training; among the very first groups of IPA students were a number of relatively high-ranking military officials, including one brigadier general. These early, relatively fortuitous associations have legitimized the IPA academic program as a source of administrative training for various kinds of military personnel. Military students, however, have never numerically dominated the IPA student body.

In 1964 a major ministry was established in Thailand, the Ministry of National Development. An amalgam of a number of departments

transferred from other ministries, plus the entire Ministry of Cooperatives which became a unit of the organization, MND, has as its deputy ministry a former member of the IPA staff -- the ex-director of in-service training, and a man who obtained a master's degree in the United States in connection with the efforts to establish the IPA. His association with both the Institute and the new ministry also affect the pattern of student recruitment to some extent.

The Student Clientele--1965-66

We have studied the IPA students, past and present, to determine how they perceive the organization and how the organization affects its academic clientele. We consider such questions as these:

Who are the students? How do they get into the Institute? What draws or brings them to it? What expectations have they? How do they evaluate the IPA in comparison with certain alternatives such as graduate study abroad? How do their attitudes and opinions change as they move through the IPA and beyond it? How do these students of the IPA compare with other university-level Thai students in their attitudes toward the bureaucracy and the IPA?

The students are "customers" of the Institute. They are among the major users of its services. The meaningfulness of the IPA to this group is, therefore, a significant aspect of the institutional quality of the enterprise. The students also stand in an instrumental relationship to the IPA. The ways in which they are changed or affected by the organization is a substantial manifestation of the IPA's institutional quality--to the extent, that is, that such changes are normative, including substantial changes in perspective, or interpretive outlook.

With these objectives in mind, the entire current student body of the IPA was interrogated. An effort was also made to reach the entire group of former IPA students--an effort which proved less than successful, although it did produce relatively substantial information concerning past students. Finally, in order to make a

number of comparisons between the IPA group and Thai university students more generally, random samples of senior students in five faculties at two major universities were surveyed.

The Current Group of IPA Students. 123 students in residence at the IPA during the winter of 1965-1966 responded to a questionnaire, out of a total of 139. In age they ranged from 20-49 years, although nearly all were under the age of 35.

TABLE

| <u>AGE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|---------------|---------------|
| 20 - 24 years | 24 |
| 25 - 29 years | 59 |
| 30 - 34 years | 27 |
| 35 - 49 years | 13 |

90 percent of the group are males. About 14 percent came to the IPA on the basis of ministerial nominations. They were selected by top-ranking officials in their ministries and assigned to the Institute in response to an annual invitation to each ministry to send selected students for graduate training. The greatest part of the student body, however, came to the Institute by direct application, in response to information about opportunities at the IPA obtained from friends and associates.

All of these students have baccalaureate degrees, as the following table shows:

UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION OF PRESENT IPA STUDENTS

Chulalongkorn University

| | |
|-------------------------|----|
| Political Science | 29 |
| Fine Arts or Education | 16 |
| Commerce and Accounting | 2 |
| Other | 2 |
| TOTAL | 49 |

Thammasat University

| | |
|------------------------------------|----|
| Political Science or Law | 19 |
| Commerce, Accounting, or Economics | 11 |
| Social Administration | 7 |
| TOTAL | 37 |

College of Education 20

Medical School 3

University of Agriculture 1

Information on the undergraduate training of other students was not reported. Some, it is known, have graduated from the military or police academies. Interestingly, practically none of the graduate students at the IPA have been trained in natural science fields. Many are products of political science faculties; the political science they have studied is largely descriptive, traditional, and mildly prescriptive. It has not included any systematic study of political behavior. It may have included some examination of Thai governmental history and Thai political arrangements.

Only seven of these students were born in Bangkok, or in the urban hinterland of Dhonburi across the river. Somewhat less than half of them were born in the central provinces immediately surrounding the nation's capital. The following table shows the distribution of

the current group of students by region of birth.

| <u>BIRTH PLACE</u> | <u>NUMBER</u> |
|------------------------|---------------|
| Central Provinces | 55 |
| Northeastern Provinces | 23 |
| Southern Provinces | 21 |
| Northern Provinces | 10 |
| Eastern Provinces | 7 |
| Bangkok-Dhonburi | 7 |

The distribution of students does not parallel the distribution of the nation's population. The relatively prosperous areas of the nation's center, well-linked with the capital, have furnished a substantial share, but it is less than 45 percent of the total. In any case, this is not a narrow group with metropolitan backgrounds in a country where 90 percent of the population lives outside the metropolitan capital region. The evidence, which is not complete for the group, suggests that about 44 percent of these students were born in rural areas or villages, the remainder coming from provincial capitals--urban areas ranging from 15,000 to 60,000 or more persons. The proportion of students claiming rural backgrounds is strikingly high, given the relatively simple agricultural character of rural areas, plus the fact that in the recent past access to school facilities has been uneven and often limited outside the urban centers.

Equally interesting, these students are, more often than not, out of families with non-bureaucratic backgrounds. Information on

the father's occupation was obtained from 111 students. In only 30 cases was the parent a civil servant. In another six instances the father was reported to be a military official. 50 of the group are the offspring of private business owners or employees, and 25 come from families engaged in agriculture.

This information on birthplace and parental occupation strongly indicates the relative openness of the bureaucracy (most of these students are bureaucrats) and illustrates, too, the substantial mobility evident in Thai society. More to the point of immediate concern, it tells us that these students have been drawn to the bureaucracy, or attracted by prospective bureaucratic careers, for reasons other than their fathers' occupation. Of course, the Thai bureaucracy has been growing substantially and persistently and is, therefore, relatively incapable of being staffed by the offspring of past bureaucrats alone (assuming that these past bureaucrats typically had no more than one or two male children living to maturity.)

What about bureaucratic connections other than parents? Two-thirds of the students indicated that they had no relatives in Thai government positions. But 62 students, about half the sample, report that they or their family have friends holding high governmental posts. All but 16 of them are officials. In most cases, the high-ranking "friends" of the IPA students are upper-ranking officials with whom they may have come in contact in the course of their employment.

47 students do not report that they are in the bureaucracy.

These, by and large, are the hopefuls, for whom the IPA is an intended means of access to the bureaucracy. For the bureaucrat-students, we may assume that the IPA is regarded as a prospective means of advancement or improvement in the conditions of existence. Most of these bureaucrat-students hold positions at the third-grade level of the bureaucracy, the lowest level normally occupied by college graduate entrants. There are three clerks, in fourth-grade positions, at the bottom of the hierarchy. 19 students occupy second-class positions, equivalent to section chief (or in the case of the military, to company commander.) Only three students claim to occupy positions at the first-grade level of the bureaucracy.

Educational Backgrounds-- pre-University

These students have come from various parts of the country, but to a substantial extent they appear to have obtained their education in the capital metropolitan area. Eighty-five responded to a question on the locale in which they had studied before entering the university. Of these, 68 were educated in the Bangkok area and only 17 outside it. Thus mobility has, in the recent past, required movement to the Bangkok area at a rather early age in order to take advantage of educational facilities, and coming to Bangkok usually means having friends or relatives with whom to live. It also means having a certain amount of financial assistance from one's family. The mobility reflected by movement toward or into the bureaucracy is not available to the lowest strata of society outside the metropolitan center. Almost a third of the students who studied in the capital city attended private schools (21 of 68). This, too, costs money, thus reducing the range of access to the educational prerequisites of bureaucratic careers.

Time of Enrollment at IPA

All but three of the respondents to the IPA student questionnaire indicated when they had first enrolled at the Institute. On the basis of this information the students can be divided into 3 broad groups-- the first year students who enrolled in 1965, numbering 64; the 34 second-year students who began their studies in 1964; and the stragglers who enrolled initially at some time between 1960 and 1963 but continue to be in residence. These people have either been part-time students, or have failed courses and found it necessary to re-take them.

Marital Status

Of the 123 IPA students, 91, or about three fourths, were married, compared with 32 single students. Ninety-nine of the 123 students are above the age of 24. Most of them are employed. In these respects they differ with the comparison groups in other faculties of the Thai universities.

Aims of Analysis

Our study of IPA students covers the following: (1) attitudes toward the bureaucracy and expectations and judgments concerning bureaucratic change; (2) attitudes toward the IPA as compared with the alternative of study abroad; and (3) expectations concerning benefits to be obtained from study at the IPA.

Two devices were used in obtaining information from the IPA students: (1) a close-ended questionnaire containing about 80 attitude items, and (2) a series of scales based on the semantic differential idea, which involved students in the evaluation of various qualities of the Thai bureaucracy.

The approach enabled a number of comparative analyses. First, it is possible to compare the response patterns of students over time, as they progress from the first semester of work in the IPA through the second year of their studies. Further comparisons with a limited number of former students are also possible, through responses obtained from those who have completed the MPA thesis requirement, those who have finished course work but not yet completed the thesis, and a small number of former students who dropped out without completing their course work.

Some of the most interesting findings are concerned with changes in student perceptions and attitudes over time. The specific objectives of this particular analysis are the following: (1) to discover what "meaning" the bureaucracy has in the minds of students at the IPA, and the extent to which and ways in which such meaningfulness varies from the perceptions of attitudes of more or less comparable groups of non-IPA students; (2) to determine how IPA student--and former student--attitudes toward the bureaucracy change over time--and particularly how student attitudes and perceptions change in the course of their exposure to the doctrine of the IPA; (3) to determine how student perceptions and attitudes compare with those of the professional staff of the IPA responsible for disseminating the Institute's doctrine; and (4) to determine the manner in which and the extent to which the IPA is "valued" by its students and former students.

Along with this, an effort has been made to ascertain whether--and to what, if any extent--other variables than involvement with the IPA appear to explain the perceptions and attitudes of students and former students. For this purpose responses have been linked with each of several separate variables, such as age, sex, place of birth, civil service rank, manner of recruitment, and type and place of undergraduate education.

Fundamentally, we are trying to probe the impact of the IPA upon a cognitive orientation (or if you prefer, cognitive-evaluative set) of those exposed to its academic program. We also want to know how the participants regard the IPA and its doctrines. We want to know how student exposure affects attitudes toward the IPA and its objectives.

Student Attitudes toward the Bureaucracy:

A Semantic Differential Analysis


How do IPA students perceive the bureaucracy generally, and what factors appear to affect their perceptions and attitudes (more precisely how do differences in perspectives appear to be related to other factors?).

To probe this matter students were presented with a set of 9 scales and asked to indicate the most appropriate point on each of the scales. The attitudinal topics, with their polar positions, are:

- | | | |
|--|---|--|
| (1) The bureaucracy is | (a) very bad | (b) excellent |
| (2) The bureaucracy is | (a) traditional | (b) modern |
| (3) Thai administration is | (a) corrupt | (b) honest |
| (4) The bureaucracy has | (a) no power | (b) great power |
| (5) In the bureaucracy organizational goals are | (a) vague and indefinite | (b) specific or concrete |
| (6) The bureaucracy | (a) never accomplishes its purposes | (b) always accomplishes its purposes |
| (7) The bureaucracy | (a) wastes resources | (b) uses resources carefully |
| (8) The bureaucracy acts | (a) on the basis of informal and personal orders | (b) on the basis of rules and laws |
| (9) Bureaucratic behavior is based on | (a) feelings and emotions | (b) rationality |

Students were asked to indicate where they rated the bureaucracy on a continuum on which 5 points were indicated--2 extreme measures, 2 moderate measures, and a dead-center measure. Students were also asked to compare the "pre-war" bureaucracy with the present-day bureaucracy on separate scales, the object being to obtain evidence of perceptions of shifts in bureaucratic characteristics over time.

Attitudes Toward Thai Bureaucracy
--Students--



Total Student Group Response. The responses obtained are quite interesting. The students as a group see the present-day bureaucracy as a little bit on the "bad" side of neutral; yet they see it as slightly more modern than traditional. They regard it as mildly dishonest. They are emphatically convinced that it is powerful. Its goals are mildly vague and indefinite--yet it tends to accomplish its purposes, at least to some extent. In doing so, the bureaucracy wastes resources; in fact, the students rate the bureaucracy as somewhat more wasteful than corrupt. They regard the bureaucracy as tending--lightly--to operate on the basis of informal relations and personal orders rather than rules and laws, and they see bureaucratic behavior as being more based upon feelings and emotions than upon rational considerations.

In several respects the students see the contemporary bureaucracy as significantly different from the pre-war administrative service. The pre-war bureaucracy was a little better--in general; it was much more traditional, and also much more honest. The older bureaucracy was perhaps a slight bit more powerful than today's. Its goals were only a little more vague and indefinite. It was somewhat more effective in accomplishing its purposes, less wasteful, at least as rule-based as the present bureaucracy, and equally inclined to act on a basis of feelings and emotions rather than rational analysis.

In short, one finds a moderate tendency towards the idealization of the past. Today's bureaucracy is regarded as more modern, but "modern" in the minds of these students does not equal "better," to judge from other judgments.


Attitudinal Changes Over Time. How have these attitudes changed in accordance with exposure to the Institute's doctrine? A fully sufficient answer is not available, as this information was obtained at a given point in time. It has been possible to compare the attitudes of first-semester, second-semester, and second-year students as shown by their responses to the scale. It also seems plausible to assume that changes in attitudes are substantially related to exposure to the work of the IPA.

Students came into the Institute feeling that the bureaucracy is "mildly bad"; three semesters of exposure produced no significant change in this attitude (despite the fact that IPA instructors assume that one impact of the academic program is to make students more critical of the bureaucracy).

Students come in regarding the bureaucracy as mildly modern and go out, evidently, seeing it in much the same light.

Second-year students regard the bureaucracy as slightly less corrupt than those who have just entered the IPA. Attitudes toward the power of the bureaucracy seem to shift not at all. In fact, the only significant perceivable differences in bureaucratic attitudes over time are these: new students see the bureaucracy as mildly oriented towards operation on the basis of rules and regulations; second-year students have a substantially different attitude: they see the bureaucracy as inclined to act on the basis of informal relations. On the other hand, first-semester students are rather emphatically convinced of the wastefulness of the bureaucracy, an attitude which tends to diminish somewhat over time, with the second-year students holding a somewhat milder conviction to the effect that the bureaucracy is wasteful.

Date of Enrollment at Institute
compared with
Attitudes Toward Present-Day Thai Bureaucracy



- - - - - 1st semester students
 2nd semester students
 - - - - - 2nd year students

Attitudinal Homogeneity. In these assessments there is an impressive homogeneity. Looking, for example, at attitudes toward the present-day bureaucracy, and relating these to the area in which the students were born, one finds that the non-Bangkok students, born in the central provinces, the north, the northeast, or the south, present substantially similar attitude profiles, although the students from the central provinces tend to regard bureaucratic behavior as less emphatically based upon feelings and emotions than do the students born in areas more remote from the nation's center.

As for students born outside the capital metropolitan area, their sentiments follow the same profile regardless of whether they were born in a provincial capital or in a village, with one minor exception: village-born students see the bureaucracy as more prone to act on the basis of informal relations and personal orders.

The relatively small group of students born in the metropolitan area regard the bureaucracy as "worse" than any of the others; they also see it as slightly more modern than any of their colleagues. They believe that goals are less specific and concrete than do the non-metropolitan students. They vary emphatically from the others in evaluating the effectiveness of the bureaucracy in accomplishing its purposes--they don't think it does do so to any impressive extent. They see the bureaucracy as more wasteful than do the other students. Yet they see it acting on the basis of rules and laws, at least to a mild extent, although they claim that behavior within it is based on feelings and emotions rather than rationality.

The sentiments of students do not seem to vary significantly with the official civil service grades they hold. Students who are second-grade officials, or above, credit the bureaucracy with being slightly more powerful than do students at the third grade or below, but both groups are emphatic in agreeing that the bureaucracy is, indeed, powerful.

Implications. What generalizations might one derive from these details? Certainly exposure to the IPA programs does not intensify critical attitudes of the student body to any great extent. Perhaps the perception of bureaucratic operation on a basis of informal relationships is a result of exposure to material concerning the "human relations" aspect of administration more than anything else. The students are only slightly less sanguine in their assumptions about bureaucratic efficacy. Their attitude toward bureaucratic rationality has not changed much. At the broadest level of highly contingent generalization, one can only say that no ranging shift in cognition seems related to the extent of exposure to the IPA's academic program. If this is, indeed, the case, then it is not possible to claim that the meaningfulness of the IPA to its students lies in their own perceptions of the Institute as a vehicle for significantly modifying their comprehension of the bureaucracy to which practically all of them are committed for careers.

In short, to the extent that the instrument used has produced meaningful results, and to the extent that a simultaneous examination of three subgroups at three different stages of progress through the IPA academic program is equivalent to examining one group at three different time periods, exposure to the IPA program does not produce any broad shifts in generalized perceptions of the bureaucracy. The one exception: students apparently become more sensitized to the informal aspects of the bureaucratic process; their perceptions appear to shift--and to come to resemble the perceptions of the IPA professional staff, which show a substantial sensitivity to the asserted personalistic and non-rationalistic characteristics of the bureaucracy.

On this point it is possible to argue, at least, that the academic program may have produced a degree of attitudinal change.

Student Perceptions of the Thai Bureaucracy

Scattered through the dozen of attitude items given to the student body of the IPA were a series of statements concerning possible advantages and disadvantages of bureaucratic careers. Students were simply asked whether they agreed or disagreed with each of the statements, and were also given the opportunity to indicate that they "didn't know or had no clearly formed opinion." The evident emphasis on advantages and disadvantages perceived by IPA students is interesting.

Advantages of Being a Bureaucrat

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequency*</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|-------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | <u>A</u> | <u>DN</u> | <u>D</u> | <u>N</u> |
| One advantage of being an official is this: in Thailand most people respect officials. | .38 | 110 | 9 | 3 | 122 |
| One advantage in being an official is the security of one's position. An official does not have to worry about losing his position. | .76 | 104 | 7 | 11 | 122 |
| One advantage of being an official is that the work is not as hard in jobs outside the government. | .62 | 93 | 12 | 17 | 122 |
| One advantage of being an official: the work of officials--much of it--is for the benefit of the country. In private business the purpose of the work is usually the benefit of some person or small group of persons. | .57 | 92 | 7 | 22 | 121 |
| One advantage of being an official: in government organizations persons are treated more fairly and considerately <u>than in most business firms.</u> | .43 | 76 | 22 | 24 | 122 |

*Legend: A: Agree
 DN: Don't Know
 D: Disagree
 N: Number of respondents

*These scores are computed by weighing all three possible responses by the frequency of their occurrence, giving an "Agree" response a weight of +1, a "Don't Know" response a weight of zero, and a "Disagree" response a weight of -1.

Advantages of Being a Bureaucrat, Con't.

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | | | <u>N</u> |
|--|--------------|------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | <u>A</u> | <u>DN</u> | <u>D</u> | |
| One advantage of being an official: officials in the second grade and above have good incomes when one includes fringe benefits as well as the salary. | .13 | 58 | 21 | 42 | 121 |
| One advantage of being an official: in government service a man who is able can advance. In business personal connections are more important. | .01 | 45 | 33 | 44 | 122 |
| One advantage of being an official: officials above the lowest grade have opportunities to go abroad. | -.04 | 48 | 21 | 53 | 122 |

Disadvantages of Being a Bureaucrat

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | | | <u>N</u> |
|--|--------------|------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | <u>A</u> | <u>DN</u> | <u>D</u> | |
| Few Thai government officials can live on their salaries. They must have some additional income. | .75 | 101 | 11 | 10 | 122 |
| One disadvantage of being an official is that a person's skills and abilities may not be used. | .73 | 100 | 11 | 11 | 122 |
| One disadvantage to being an official: much of the work is poorly organized, and it is often hard to get a job done. | .58 | 85 | 22 | 14 | 121 |
| One disadvantage of being an official: there are not enough high-ranking positions, so some worthy officials cannot advance. | .16 | 64 | 12 | 45 | 121 |

The three greatest benefits perceived in bureaucratic status --respect, security, and easy work--are not exactly "public values." Yet the perception that bureaucrats serve the country does come in fairly strong.

These students have no illusions about the monetary rewards of officialdom: the most emphasized disadvantage of a bureaucratic career is salaries. Students also recognize rather emphatically that there are substantial prospects that skills and abilities may not be used--an attitude which looms large in its significance for the meaningfulness likely to be ascribed to graduate training in the IPA. The students tend to see bureaucratic work as often poorly organized and unproductive. But they are relatively sanguine about opportunities for personal advancement within this system.

In short, these are students who see the prime rewards of the bureaucracy as security and prestige. They do not see the bureaucracy as highly productivity oriented. They recognize that they will have to pay in monetary terms for the rewards the system offers, but they are relatively optimistic about their prospects for capturing the game.

Student Attitudes toward the IPA

The student group was asked to evaluate ten statements concerned with the benefits of studying at the IPA, and comparing the benefit of such study with studies abroad. Here is how they appeared to rank the advantages of the Institute:

| <u>Statement</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | <u>A</u> | <u>DN</u> | <u>D</u> | <u>N</u> |
| 1. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is learning how to analyze and solve problems. | .95 | 114 | 6 | 0 | 120 |
| 2. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is the development of skill in writing reports. | .79 | 104 | 7 | 9 | 120 |
| 3. If a young man or woman has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a master's degree abroad, it would be better to go abroad because the foreign degree will have more prestige. | .76 | 101 | 9 | 10 | 120 |
| 4. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is learning how to make good use of foreign language materials. | .73 | 101 | 6 | 13 | 120 |
| 5. Successful study at the IPA increases a person's chances of going abroad for further study. | .62 | 84 | 26 | 10 | 120 |
| 6. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is getting acquainted with other students who are officials or who will become officials. | .59 | 90 | 11 | 19 | 120 |
| 7. The ability to speak and read English has become important to the person who wants to reach a high rank in the Thai bureaucracy. | .59 | 90 | 14 | 19 | 123 |

| <u>Statement</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequency</u> | | | |
|--|-------------------|------------------|-----------|----------|----------|
| | | <u>A</u> | <u>DN</u> | <u>D</u> | <u>N</u> |
| 8. If a young man or woman has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a master's degree abroad, he would get one important advantage by studying at the IPA: he could make friendships which would be useful in his career. | .50 | 78 | 22 | 19 | 119 |
| 9. In the Thai bureaucracy it is now necessary to have post-graduate professional training in order to reach a high rank. | .12 | 59 | 20 | 44 | 123 |
| 10. If a young man or woman has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a master's degree abroad, it would be better to go abroad because the quality of education would be somewhat better. | -.10 ^x | 36 | 36 | 48 | 120 |

x. These scores are computed by weighing all three possible responses by the frequency of their occurrence, giving an "Agree" response a weight of +1, a "Don't Know" response a weight of zero, and a "Disagree" response a weight of -1.

Evaluation. What does the pattern of response suggest? First, IPA students are verbally sensitized to the objectives of analyzing and solving problems; they are evidently aware of this element of the IPA doctrine. They also have some skill sensitivities; they believe they grow in ability to write reports, and to make use of foreign language materials.

But they also recognize quite emphatically that a foreign master's degree is more prestigious than an IPA degree. Note, however, how sharp is the distinction between perceptions of prestige and assertions of quality of education in the assessments of the relative merit of an IPA degree versus a foreign degree. These students are saying, in effect, that while they consider the IPA degree of high quality, they also recognize--being realists--that the prestige of a foreign degree is higher.

In addition, they clearly believe that the IPA may be a valuable instrument for increasing chances to study abroad. This, in fact, is the fourth ranking value imputed to IPA study. The students also tend to recognize that the IPA can be a valuable means of establishing associations with other officials or prospective officials. They are a little bit more willing to admit that this is a benefit "in general" than to admit specifically to the making of friendships which would be useful in the advancement of careers.

In short, the students do identify rather strongly with the IPA, and ascribe to the organization certain utilitarian values. These include "competence values," but also an array of "non-competence/ personal advancement" values.

Student Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change

The students of the IPA were asked to assess changes perceived in the bureaucracy since the pre-war period, and to indicate anticipated changes likely to occur over the next 5 years. The following table summarizes the aggregate perceptions of the changes which have occurred to distinguish the pre-war from the present-day

Thai bureaucracy. The items are presented in order of agreement.

Perceptions of Change, Pre-War and Present

| <u>Item</u> | <u>Rank Order</u> (Degree of agreement) |
|---|--|
| Women hold many more important positions in the civil service today than before the war. | .98 |
| Before the war official salaries were actually better than they are today, taking into account the change in the way of living. | .91 |
| Before the war, the highest status an ordinary person could hope for was to be a high-ranking official. Today there are many ways to gain high status without becoming an official. | .90 |
| Before the war officials were treated with more respect than they receive from the public today. | .86 |
| Before the war officials were usually more respectful of their superiors. | .82 |
| Today government agencies pay more attention to the needs of people than before the war. | .75 |
| Today an ordinary citizen has a better chance to become an official than he did before the war. | .69 |
| Today the civil service is more competent and productive than it was before the war. | .42 |
| Before the war most officials were more polite than they are today. | .08 |
| Before the war persons were promoted on the basis of their personal status. Today promotions are based more on how well officials do their work. | .04 |
| Today the civil service is more just and fair in dealing with the public than before the war. | -.05 |
| Today the civil service follows the law and regulations more strictly than before the war. | -.36 |

(table, perceptions of change, pre-war and present, continued)

Future Expectations

| <u>Items</u> | <u>Rank Order</u> |
|--|-------------------|
| In the next five years I expect more young people will seek careers in private business or outside the government service. | .84 |
| In the next five years I expect that official salaries will be increased. | .56 |
| In the next five years I expect that government agencies will become more efficient. | .49 |
| In the next five years the prestige of being an official will probably decline. | .28 |
| In the next five years I expect that government agencies will not change very much. | .04 |

Commentary. These patterns of perception and expectation, held by a group of graduate students who in most cases already hold bureaucratic positions and in others look forward to such positions, is intrinsically interesting. There are clear-cut perceptions of change in the position and significance of the bureaucracy in Thai society; it used to be better than it is. Salaries once were higher, and at one time--but no longer--the bureaucracy was the key to upward movement in the society. Officials used to be treated with more respect.

The bureaucracy has changed in other ways, one of them being a greater sensitivity to public needs, and--to a lesser degree in the minds of these judges--an increase in emphasis upon productivity.

But there are also perceptions of stability, including the absence of any stark shift in the apparent basis for personal advancement within the bureaucracy, and the absence of any great change in the quality of relations between bureaucrats and public.

*These scores are computed by weighing all three possible responses by the frequency of their occurrence, giving an "Agree" response a weight of +1, a "Don't Know" response a weight of zero, and a "Disagree" response a weight of -1.

The students expect that changes will continue into the future, and one of the most significant of those changes will be the opening up of increased alternatives to bureaucratic careers.

Impact of the Academic Program on Perceptions

Is there any evidence that participation in the academic program of the IPA influences these patterns of perception? A survey of the 3 groups of IPA students--first, second, and third semester--produce no evidence of thematic shifts. There are, however, a few differences worth noting. First, the longer one is a student at the IPA, the more he appears to appreciate the place of law and regulation in the bureaucracy. New students disagree with the statement that the contemporary civil service follows law and regulations more strictly than before the war. Third-semester students are almost evenly split; about half of them indicate an opinion that the present-day bureaucracy is more rule and law-oriented than the pre-war bureaucracy. Student attitudes toward bureaucratic tradition appear also to shift somewhat. First-semester students disagree emphatically with the statement that before the war subordinate officials were usually more respectful of their superiors; but third-semester students tend to agree with this statement. Perceptions of the fairness of the bureaucracy in its dealings with the public also tend to shift, negatively. For new students the ratio of agreement-disagreement with the statement that "the contemporary bureaucracy is more just and fair than the pre-war bureaucracy" is 1:2. For third-semester students the ratio is 1:3. As students move through the IPA they tend to have less regard for the fairness and justness of the bureaucracy.

Again, for third-semester students the ratio of agreement-disagreement with the statement that "the bureaucracy today pays more attention to the needs of the people than before the war" is about 2:1. For first-term students it is slightly more than 10:1. These 2 shifts in perception tend to bear out the shared judgment of the IPA professional staff that one effect of the academic program is to "make students more critical of the bureaucracy."

These shifts in critical perspectives seem linked with shifts in future expectations. All 3 student groups agree that government agencies will change in the next 5 years. They agree that more young people will seek careers outside the government service. They agree that bureaucratic salaries will probably be increased, although second-year students as a group are less optimistic on this point than are new students. The most interesting difference in expectations is a heightened conviction that the bureaucracy will become more efficient. Agreement on this trend is three times as strong among second-year students as it is among the first-semester group.

The full cause and meaning of this shift cannot be known, but part of the explanation is certainly a heightened sensitivity to the idea of efficiency, as a result of exposure to the IPA's academic program. To some extent, this aspect of IPA doctrine is transmitted into students, to be reflected in the form of expectations.

Advanced students are also more sanguine about the future prestige of officials than are new students. Half of the latter are willing to agree that prestige will decline; less than a fourth of the second-year students agree. Why the shift?

Again, mixed factors obscure an explanation. The second-year students are closer to time when they will enter or re-enter the bureaucracy; they probably identify more intensely with it. They are also more hopeful that specific bureaucratic improvement will occur.

Conclusion

There is a large degree of continuing coherence in student perceptions of the bureaucracy, but there is also some evidence of shifts in elements of these perceptions as students move through the academic program. Unquestioning acceptance of the idea that the bureaucracy is "fair" declines somewhat. Perhaps new premises about the criterion of "fairness" have been internalized in some of the students.

There seems to be a significant change in attitudes concerning the extent to which the bureaucracy is service-oriented. The implication is that among students a new and different perception of the appropriate relation between the bureaucracy and "the needs of the people" has emerged as students move from the first, through the second, and into the third semester of the program.

Finally, there is some evidence that students become sensitized to the norm of "efficiency" as they move through the academic program.

Yet they are certainly not alienated from the bureaucracy as a result of their participation in the IPA's academic program.

Student Expectations

Expressed expectations, IPA students, 1965

| | |
|---|-----|
| to improve my work ability | 84% |
| to improve my chances for advancement | 83% |
| to study and learn | 79% |
| to prepare for study abroad | 60% |
| to make important friends and contacts | 53% |
| to increase my salary | 51% |
| because my superior asked or advised me to enroll | 13% |
| miscellaneous reasons: | 13% |

("to improve my personality," to get a job easily after graduation," "because I want to change my occupation," "to understand administration and politics of foreign countries," "because of a feeling of adventure," etc.)

These students are looking for concrete payoffs. They are not in the IPA because they have been urged or encouraged to go there by their superiors. They wish to improve their personal proficiency; they want to get ahead. Quite a few would like to study abroad. And, in general, these people see themselves as positively enjoying studying and learning.

Interestingly, these responses reflect a somewhat more intense attainment-orientation than the replies of successful former students to the same question. Almost 90% of the former students surveyed said they came to the IPA because they wanted to study and learn; and only

70% said their objects had included the improvement of chances for advancement. A moderate shift in perception appears to occur as persons move from student to successful former student status. (Successful meaning having completed the MPA degree and moved into, or laterally within, or upward in the bureaucracy.) The meaningfulness of the IPA to former students is perhaps mildly less as an instrument of personal advancement than it is to current students.

Student Evaluations

How do the students assess what they are getting? 60 percent say that their IPA studies are "definitely" relevant to their job needs. Another 17 percent indicate that they see their studies as "generally" relevant. 3 percent, however, see no utility, and the balance of the students decline to answer the question.

Students were asked to evaluate their individual courses, identifying the best and worse ones. Fully 50 percent ranked their course in "Principles of Public Administration" as one of two best courses. Why? Because they saw it as increasing their personal knowledge and ability and as relevant to their work. Only a few said that the course was relevant to the improvement of Thai administration.

Other highly rated courses included personnel administration, and a course in research methods. More than 15 percent of the respondents rated courses in labor administration and finance administration as among the worst courses in the curriculum. They found these courses irrelevant, unduly difficult, or "too highly specialized."

Yet three-fourths of this student group judged the overall curriculum to be "very good" while another 23 percent described it as "fairly good." In general, one finds a student body that is quite willing to "go along" with the academic program, but also inclined to claim to evaluate the contents of that program in terms of two of the focal elements of their own expectations: "personal knowledge and ability" and "relevance to work." To some degree the "experience base" of the students seems to come into play in their evaluation of their program. So do other factors, including a willingness to evaluate the program as good, in general -- probably because of generalized assumptions about the utility of the overall effort. In short, overall evaluations may well be relaxed to overall aims and expectations; it is not necessary to assume that the "general" assessment of the quality of the IPA academic program amounts to the aggregation of a set of single-course evaluations. (For instance, the value imputed to the overall academic program may be influenced by perceptions of the benefit of associations emerging from being in the program.) Yet, in part, the individual courses are evaluated in terms of some perceptions of relevance and prospective utility.

A favorable general bias appears to carry over into the evaluation of IPA instructors. 70% of the students rated these as "good" while another 20 percent admitted that the instructors are "fairly good." Only one respondent was willing to say that he considered the instructors to be poor.

At the same time, when the evaluation shifts to specifics, almost 10 percent of the students felt that some of the instructors at least were

too young and too inexperienced; another 5 percent found the instructors too abstract and theoretical, and still 5 percent more found the instructors both unduly inexperienced and theoretical. (This pattern of evaluation generally parallels that of the former students who were asked the same questions.)

Granted that there is a generalized favorable bias toward the academic program and the instructors, the critical prospective of students is not completely dominated by it. They are not entirely unwilling to criticize what they see as functional limitations and inadequacies.

This propensity for critical evaluation was clearly revealed in the final section of the schedule which the students were asked to complete -- a simple request for "any additional comments about the Institute or its course offerings." 79 percent of the students accepted this invitation. The surprisingly high number is itself interesting. These people felt free to comment; they trusted the statement that their comments would be treated in confidence. They felt, too, that they had something to say.

25 percent of the respondents commented on the instructional process and the instructors, suggesting needs for improvement or noting sensed inadequacies. Half of these respondents called for closer relationships between professors and students, particularly in the planning and supervision of theses, in the conduct of seminars, and in dealing with other student problems. About half of these responses contained observations indicating a felt need for improvement in the quality of instruction. Thus it was said that newly returning instructors from some training before being placed in charge of classes. It was said that some instructors would benefit from additional experience.

Related to those comments are some highly relevant facts about the IPA. In 1966, for example, every individual engaged in instruction also carried other responsibilities, for research, for in-service training, or for administration. In effect, there simply were no full-time instructors -- and only three professional members of the staff designated as permanent instructors. Not even these were fully free from a multitude of competing chores and able to give much attention to academic work.

Students engaged in writing -- or planning to write -- the thesis required for the degree were in particular disadvantaged by these circumstances; the faculty time available for helping students with theses was almost non-existent. This job had to be squeezed in whenever and however it might be.

17 percent of the students suggested improvements in the administration of the IPA. In detail these covered quite a bit of ground, ranging from a suggestion of autonomy or separation from Thammasat University to freedom from political influence, and the need for running the Institute in such a fashion as to provide an example for the bureaucracy of good administration. Some of these particular criticisms were reactions to University rules and regulations, such as the payment of fees for examinations. Others were rather sensitive appreciations of particular characteristics of the IPA, which they saw as an organization responsible for preaching good administration, and therefore one that should also be exemplary in its practice.

Another 17 percent of the total group made explicit and coherent comments about needs for improvement in the IPA library. In particular,

they felt disadvantaged by limitations in the number of reserve books available for use. Many of these materials are in English; reading them takes time; quite a few students expressed the opinion that additional copies of reserve materials should be had, and that the rules regulating the amount of time the student can keep a reserve item should be extended.

A wide variety of other scattered comments were made. About 7 percent of the students suggested that more use be made of experts as lecturers. An equal number suggested that the course offerings of the Institute be expanded to include seminars in such fields as organization and management and courses in politics. Several respondents felt the academic services available from the IPA should be expanded -- made available to the public, made available through courses during the relatively long intersession period, enlarged to include the teaching of English, and expanded to include financial assistance for students.

Three -- and only three -- students proposed the establishment of a management association or association of administrators. A few people complained about such features of the IPA as "female instructors," grading practices, and class workloads, but there were very few critical observations of this sort.

Rather, the dominant theme in all of these open-ended responses was directed to a clearly serious problem in the IPA academic program -- the problem of available resources. The perspectives of the students on this problem was essentially performance- and effectivity-oriented, and focused on rather immediate concerns. They saw a need for improving the substantive character of the enterprise in a fashion which would

contribute to the pursuit of the purpose of better doing the job-at-hand. Only to a very small degree did they as a group evaluate the situation in broader terms. They did not -- save in seven percent of their responses -- articulate any perceived need for expanding the substantive scope of the academic program, to cover some topics in more breadth and depth, and to deal with matters not focally covered at all, such as politics. There was, in short, little evidence of evaluative premises being called into play other than those manifesting the idea of "to better what is being done -- especially as this affects our ability to function in the program."

This perspective, manifested voluntarily by a sizeable number of students and reflected in a large number of explicit, specific statements, is quite probably a sincere reflection of cognitive set. It reflects little of an inclination toward change and innovation; it focuses rather upon technical qualities of the immediate system -- and it probably reflects the general posture of the students toward the bureaucracy, the society, and the world, granted of course that this is a substantial extrapolation from the immediate evidence.

The students do appear to value the IPA as more than a formalistic degree conferring organization. They regard it as an educational enterprise, and the major deficiencies they see are those which impede its ability to fulfill its immediate substantive purpose. These students are no innocent idealists, merely seeking knowledge for its own sake; they have concrete and even hedonistic objectives in mind. They are also "available" -- willing to learn. But they are likewise quite willing to let the Institute define the academic terrain in which they will work. Criticize dull or irrelevant courses -- they will go that far; but not

much farther. These, after all, are bureaucrats, not visionaries. And the values they generally impute to the academic program are not inconsistent with bureaucratic roles or expectations. But in studying these assessments one feels that the academic program has not stimulated the participants to look much beyond what it offers. They say they "like to study and learn," and they seem to mean they seek instrumental skills and knowledge.

Former Students of the IPA

Introduction

One important sector of this study concerns the perceptions and evaluations of persons who have been through all or part of the IPA program. In Thailand it can be assumed with little or no question that all or practically all former students are within the bureaucracy. In broad terms, the IPA academic program cannot be measured by the relative or absolute degree of success of program participants in entering the bureaucracy. Most of the IPA's students are already bureaucrats, whether or not the non-bureaucrat students achieve the desired status of a bureaucrat is not demonstrably or discernibly linked with their participation in the IPA program. Bureaucratic access may be facilitated by such participation--through friendships, access to information about openings, etc.--but it remains true that access to the bureaucracy is essentially a function of factors other than participation in the IPA's academic program.

Within the bureaucracy, however, differential status can in some cases be achieved through the acquisition of an MPA degree from the IPA.

The Thai Civil Service Commission has "evaluated" IPA degrees for salary purposes.* Thus a degreeholder can become eligible to receive the same salary to which he might be entitled if he held a master's degree from

* By memorandum no. 4775/2501 (1958), the Secretary-General of the Thai Civil Service Commission reported that the Commission had resolved "that the holder of the M.B.A. degree /from the Institute/ can be instated at the level not higher than the third class official grade 2, salary step 160 baht, with a monthly supplement not more than 20 baht." In effect, the MPA degree establishes eligibility for appointment to a position with a pay level of 1,400 baht per month. It was further agreed that a graduate "with honors" from the IPA (i.e., with an average grade of at least 85 percent) are eligible for instatement at a salary level of not more than 1,600 baht. (One baht equals about five cents, U.S.)

an American university.* Thus the IPA does potentially--and often in practice--confer a substantial benefit upon those who have successfully survived its academic program. The benefit consists of a salary increase for those bureaucrats at the third-and second-class levels of the bureaucracy whose pay does not already exceed the levels at which they can claim increments for graduate study. But the greater conceivable benefit--that of enhancing access to the bureaucracy itself--is not in any systematic and substantial fashion a function of successful participation in the IPA academic program.

Former students may have obtained monetary benefits in their bureaucratic careers through participation in the IPA academic program. But given the nature of the bureaucratic intake process and promotion processes in Thailand there will be few, if any, cases in which individuals will be prone to credit the IPA with more than a marginal contribution to status and remuneration. In short, the evaluation of the IPA by former students is not likely to be conditioned by a vast feeling of obligation--particularly since most of the former students were already bureaucrats at the time they became students.

Between June, 1955, when the first students entered the IPA and December, 1965, 115 students received the MPA degree. As of December, 1965, 90 former students had passed the comprehensive examination required at the completion of course work and prior to embarking on a dissertation. Another 194 students had enrolled and then dropped out of the IPA academic program without taking the comprehensive examination. Of these, 30 had formally

* For a full discussion of the complexities of the Thai bureaucratic pay system and its "technical position" concept see: W. J. Siffin, The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development, Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1966, pp. 231-233..

withdrawn, and the others either failed to complete their course work within the required five years following initial registration or failed to continue to register as students after having enrolled for a least one semester.

The relationship between the IPA and its former students is interesting and significant. Of 399 former students it was possible to locate only 117 in December, 1965 and the following months. In a survey conducted during the summer of 1965 it had proved possible to reach only 47 IPA graduates for direct interviews. By an arduous search-and-advertising process including the use of newspapers, the IPA journal, the government radio, and word-of-mouth communications, 77 of the 115 MPA graduates were located between December, 1965 and February, 1966. The Institute had no current addresses for most of these people, and no arrangements for keeping track of them.

Of 77 MPA degreeholders located in 1965-1966, 30 were willing to complete research schedules. Of the 90 IPA students who had passed the comprehensive examination and were presumably at work upon the theses, the addresses of only 48 were known. 23 of them completed research schedules. The IPA obtained presumably current addresses for 64 dropouts, sent them a questionnaire, and received responses from 17--or about 25 percent of the discovered members of the group, and only about 9 percent of the total population of dropouts.

The difficulty in locating former IPA students is suggestive of the relationship between the group and the organization; it is unstructured and unstressed. Some former students subscribe to the IPA Journal, but there is no separate mailing list, nor any identifying symbol in the mailing list which enables their identification. There is no alumni organization

of the kind typical of Western educational institutions. In general, the IPA staff does not perceive of former students as significant supporters, and the students see no need for any systematically structured continuing relationship with the Institute.

On the other hand, it should be noted that various members of particular classes of former students at the IPA do maintain personal relationships established during the student period, and appear to value these friendships as intrinsically meaningful and bureaucratically useful. A few former students continue to make occasional use of the IPA library, almost invariably in connection with work assignments. There simply is no intense, conscious action-oriented bond between the former students and the present organization. At one time or another in the past foreign advisors suggested the possible value of an alumni association or "old students association," but this idea was received with no enthusiasm. In the Thai context it seemed inconceivable that such an arrangement would be of any substantial benefit to the IPA, or for that matter be capable of establishment at all.

At the same time it is undoubtedly true that the former students are in a number of ways beneficial to the IPA. To the extent that they are perceived as competent and attractive officials they reflect favorably on the Institute. They also "spread the word," and both by their posture and their achievements reflect upon the IPA in the minds of others, including prospective students. If, for example, it is perceived by a number of young officials that former IPA students do well in the competition for overseas scholarships, credit naturally adheres to the IPA. If officials perceive that IPA graduates are favored and advanced within their departments and ministries, credit also redounds to the IPA.

Thus in one sector of its environment--the sector comprised of potential student clientele and lower to middle ranking officials--former students inevitably represent the IPA and furnish the basis for assessing and evaluating it. Yet in the Thai context there are no substantial perceived payoffs in this phenomenon. What has happened to former students is not considered significant in its effect upon the IPA's resource claim-making, or in the maintenance of its normative posture. At least, former students are not considered to be potentially "useful" to the IPA in ways that might cause the Institute to maintain relations with them.

In the course of this study efforts were made to determine how products of the IPA's academic program are received in the departments and ministries of the Thai government. Efforts at systematic measurement were abandoned, however, after these efforts made it clear that substantial quantities of reliable, meaningful data would not be forthcoming. The general impression obtained from unstructured interviews, however, was simply: "The IPA graduates are generally not as good as the products of overseas graduate study, particularly in the United States."

In some cases, of course, the respondents, themselves holders of foreign degrees, had a vested interest in asserting the superiority of foreign degrees. In most instances, however, officials from the level of Minister to the lower level of Director General and Deputy Director General preferred to talk about individuals, rather than "products in general." And as a usual case their remarks centered upon references to a few promising younger persons, as examples of first-rate personnel. A few of these had gone to the IPA, but more had studied abroad.

In general, it seems clear that at high levels in the bureaucracy the IPA has not replaced foreign professional study as a perceived source

of high-class personnel, nor is an IPA degree generally regarded as equal to a foreign degree as evidence of prospective personal superiority within the bureaucracy.

Post-graduate Career Experience.

What happens to former IPA students? 47 former students were asked various questions about their expectations of the IPA at the time they enrolled, about the values they perceived in their IPA education experience, and about their general assessment of the merit and utility of the experience. The post-degree records of these students were also examined. The evidence indicates that one abiding expectation of the former students has been personal advancement within the bureaucracy. It further suggests that former students have moved upward within the bureaucracy at a rate which is apparently not starkly inconsistent with general expectations.

Career Expectations. Former students were asked why they had decided to enroll at the IPA and given a series of response-choices. For 47 respondents here are the items chosen, with the frequency of choice:

| | |
|--|----|
| to study and learn | 42 |
| to improve my work ability | 36 |
| to improve my chances for advancement | 33 |
| to prepare to study abroad | 23 |
| to make important friends and contacts | 21 |
| to increase my salary | 18 |
| because my superior asked or advised me to | 7 |

The respondents were given an opportunity to add supplemental reasons. They might have said such things as "to help improve the quality of

the government service," "to serve my country better," "to become a better administrator," or anything else they desired. Only 4 voluntary responses were obtained. Two of these were essentially "to better myself;" one respondent was attracted by the novelty of the program; and a fourth indicated that she enrolled because her friend had done so.

It is probably true that most of the former students do like to study and learn, although this is a very diffuse "motive." Most of them also expected some increase in personal competence, but again, "work ability" is a broad phrase capable of more than one interpretation. Almost half of the former students say they perceived of the academic program as a means for establishing useful contacts. And more than a third indicated that they had enrolled with the intention of increasing their salaries through the acquisition of a degree.

In a separate inquiry the same respondents were asked to state how the IPA degree program had actually helped them in their careers. 41 of 47 MPA and degree-holding respondents indicated that they felt the degree program had contributed to getting a better job, a better salary, a promotion, or some combination of these. In this question the respondent was free to list as many benefits as he wished, and 9 other categories of response were obtained; 7 individuals attributed to the IPA program the benefit of increased personal prestige. 4 mentioned increased knowledge and understanding. 3 referred to the program as beneficial preparation for study abroad. 2 individuals said it was valuable for its contribution to the development of analytical and problem-solving ability. 2 mentioned the emergence of increased self-confidence through success in the program. 2 also said they had established beneficial contacts and

friendships. 1 respondent said that he had improved his supervisory ability through the program, and 1 individual said that a major benefit was the ability to innovate and establish new methods in his work.

In other words, while the former students responded effortlessly to "clued" responses concerning their expectations at the time of enrollment, acknowledging the broad desire to study and improve themselves as intrinsically valuable, when asked to state the actual benefits perceived, this group responded almost entirely in terms of improvement in bureaucratic position.*

*The professional staff of the IPA was also asked why students came to study, in an open-ended question allowing multiple responses. Twenty-one respondents gave the following replies:

| | |
|---|--------------|
| To increase salary or rank | 19 responses |
| To increase knowledge of public administration | 15 " |
| To acquire the prestige of a master's degree | 11 " |
| To fill up idle time ("they have nothing else to do") | 6 " |
| To obtain social benefits -- friends, contacts | 3 " |

The perceptions of former students and of the IPA professional staff are not wholly congruent, but there is substantial agreement on one thing: the IPA academic program is substantially perceived as a vehicle of personal advancement in the bureaucracy and the professional staff recognizes this.

In summary, 30 of the 46 respondents to this question did receive significant promotions following their study at the IPA. Only 13 received no promotions during roughly the same variable period of time (ranging from 1959 through 1965). Two others entered the bureaucracy for the first time and one remained a private person before and after acquiring his degree.

Of the 13, however, 5 moved laterally to what they considered to be better positions (possibly positions with higher salary ceilings within a given grade-level of the bureaucracy). Of the non-mobile group, 6 members consisted of individuals who, in 1965, were in their 40's, and who had been for a relatively long period of years in the same general assignment. These individuals appeared to have "gotten stuck" in the bureaucracy before they ever entered the IPA, most of them at the second-class level.

What does this information suggest? While an IPA degree is no automatic guarantee of advancement, there is nonetheless a substantial relationship between possession of a degree and upward movement within the bureaucracy for these particular respondents. An important perception of the "meaningfulness" of the IPA's academic program is not inconsistent with empirical referents. Certainly there is enough evidence of advancement to sustain a perception of the MPA degree from the IPA as a useful instrument for upward movement within the bureaucracy. Thus, the IPA has tended to fulfill the expectations and desires of its most successful former student clients. 41 former students said that they would be willing to go through the program again; 2 said "probably," 1 failed to respond, and only 3 said no.

Former Student Evaluations of the IPA Academic Program

41 degree-holding former students agreed with a statement that the IPA academic program was very different from their previous instruction. The 4 who disagreed had previously been exposed to foreign education (2 others did not respond).

What "main" differences were perceived? In a free-response, the following differences were most frequently mentioned: emphasis upon "research" (28 respondents); use of foreign language materials and instruction (18); use of the seminar technique (16); emphasis on personal development and self-reliance (10); a heavy work load (9); stress on analysis and problem solving (7); and extensive availability of study materials and teaching aids (4). The "research" aspect of the IPA academic program, represented by a course in "research methodology" and by the requirement in third-semester (and some other) courses that the students write papers, clearly made an impact. Whether this impact was carried over in the form of an orientation toward the use of empirical analysis in a bureaucratic setting is another question. Noting, however, that only 7 of 41 respondents mentioned the emphasis upon analysis and problem-solving techniques. One is inclined to wonder.

Students were asked to evaluate their courses, indicating which they most liked and least liked. The most popular courses were personnel administration, principles of public administration, the course in research methods, and the course in organization and management. None of the seminars was rated highly, and 2 of them -- labor administration and social welfare administration -- were rated by more than half of the respondents as among the poorest courses.

The reasons behind the evaluations did not come clear in the survey. In a few cases courses were rated as poor because they were "too specialized or difficult," or "not of any significance," but in many instances individuals simply did not say. General statements concerning relevance were made in support of favorable ratings of courses.

The overall course program was rated as very good by 21 respondents, fairly good by 24, and not very good by 2. About all this means is that the former students have a generalized favorable disposition toward the academic program in which they were successful.

The instructors were likewise rated favorably. Only 3 former students characterized them as generally poor. 28 respondents rated them as generally good, and 5 found them superior. The rest said the instructors were "fairly good." Asked to make specific criticisms, 8 respondents remarked that some of the instructors were too young or inexperienced, and 4 indicated that they were "too theoretical."

A final section of the schedule asked former students to evaluate "what you think the IPA has done for Thai public administration." Open responses were sought, and they contained the following patterns:

1. General injection of new knowledge and ideas into the bureaucracy 18
2. Produce better officials for the bureaucracy 10
3. Generate an interest in an awareness of the need for improving administration 7
4. Increase the rationality and efficiency of the bureaucracy 7
5. Increase capability for problem analysis and use of research 7
6. Spread an interest in an awareness of the need for improving administration through in-service training 7

- | | |
|---|---|
| 7. Improve the attitudes and methods of administrators | 4 |
| 8. More, specifically, improve supervision and the use of personnel | 4 |
| 9. Improve coordination within the bureaucracy | 2 |
| 10. Contribute to national development | 1 |
| 11. Increase the sense of responsibility within the bureaucracy to the public | 1 |

Five individuals also volunteered the observation that the IPA's potential contribution to Thai public administration is affected by a lack of interest and appreciation at higher levels in the bureaucracy for the ideas and doctrine of the academic program. Less than one fourth of the respondents were willing to articulate the premise that the academic program contributes to the bureaucracy by providing good or improved officials.

The tendency to see concrete specific benefits is impressively limited. The perception of a prospective increase in public responsibility is interesting in its substantial absence. To the extent that this particular non-response reflects a continuation of a long-established commitment to superiority of status for officials and a lack of a sense of "public service," the IPA academic program shows -- in these responses -- no impact upon a traditional value of central importance.

Summary

What net impressionistic effect can be derived from this ranging collection of data? In the most general terms, the former students appear to perceive of the IPA as an instrument of substantial significance for

personal advancement, to be relatively satisfied as a group with the extent to which their expectations have been fulfilled, and to see the IPA, in a vague, general fashion more often than not, as beneficial for the Thai bureaucracy. A limited number of volunteered responses suggests a substantial feeling that change in the bureaucracy is not likely to come directly through such vehicles as the academic program of the IPA, at least unless other things are done also: namely, a lack of interest and appreciation in change at high levels in the bureaucracy must be overcome. Some respondents also perceive of in-service training as a means of helping meet this need. Perhaps one can conclude that the former students are not unaware of change and improvement; they are not opposed to it; they see some contributions to it from experiences such as their own; but there is nothing grossly at variance from established patterns in their perceptions and perspectives. These successful products of the IPA academic program create the impression of being self-interest oriented to a substantial degree. They are not unaware of the need for changes and modifications in the bureaucracy; but they do not see themselves as important instruments of change. Basically, the IPA academic program is a useful means of their own advancement within a bureaucratic system which is not unacceptable.

The Value of the IPA To Students and Former Students

The extensive battery of items to which both students and former students responded included an array of questions intended to elicit attitudes towards the IPA, and through this some perceptions of the kind of value placed upon the IPA by participants in its academic program. The findings set forth in the above table include both some substantive information on the manner in which the IPA is valued and some interesting material concerning shifts in these values, presumably as students move outside the Institute and back fully into the bureaucracy.

Again we find that the IPA is valued in part because of its perceived contribution to the personal capabilities of its participants. They profess to become sensitive to problem analysis and to assume competence in this work. Report writing skill is also acknowledged as "one important benefit." In view of the great importance of personal communications within the Thai bureaucracy, however, one wonders how important this particular skill is really considered to be. The use of foreign language materials, another tool skill, is professedly valued.

A sharp distinction is drawn between the prestigiousness of the IPA and the quality imputed to IPA education. A substantial portion of the current students have been relatively critical of various aspects of the academic program of the IPA. Thus it is probably sound to assume that rejection of the statement that foreign education is likely to be better reflects a generalized identification with the IPA, and not necessarily much more. This evident identification is weaker among the graduates, and weakest among those who have dropped out of the IPA program.

An interesting evaluative shift takes place in relation to one of the items on the above table. Former students perceive with a high degree of coherence and intensity a value in the IPA academic program which is not so sharply perceived by current students -- the value of acquaintances.* In a broad sense this, too, is also a "personal utility value," like others mentioned above. Both students and former students are saying implicitly that the IPA is valued because "it benefits us as persons by increasing our ability to perform and to advance in the bureaucracy."

*Interestingly, a group of successful former students surveyed in 1965 tended to minimize the making of connections as a reason why they came to study at the IPA. Yet, looking back, they tend to place a substantial value upon this aspect of their IPA experience.

M.A. Theses in the IPA

The M.A. program of the Institute included from the outset a requirement that a thesis be submitted as part of the requirements for the degree. Between 1957 and 1965 almost 100 theses had been completed. They are interesting for a variety of reasons, and they are significant as indicators of the kind of output being produced in the academic program.

In the aggregate, these documents should be suggestive evidence of the content of the doctrine transmitted by the IPA to the most successful of its academic clients. Answers to the question: "What have they looked at?" should tell us what they consider relevant and appropriate. Answers to the question: "In what manner have they looked?" should indicate what kinds of descriptive and analytic skills have been acquired in the academic program (or at least possessed and used by successful participants in that program).

Admittedly, this examination of theses merely casts some light on questions concerning doctrine transmitted. It can stimulate hypotheses which can be examined in terms of the loose but relevant criterion of plausibility.

By the end of 1964, eight-seven M.A. theses had been submitted to the IPA and approved (almost an equal number of others were in some stage of preparation at the time). Thirty-three of the completed theses were written in English; the others were in Thai with English-language summaries. All of these theses have been examined in accordance with a two-dimensional classification plan; i.e., in terms of subject-matter and methodology. (For a description of the plan, see Methodological Appendix)

Here are the findings:

Analysis of 87 M.A. Theses Written by IPA Students
1957-1965

Subjects of Study

| | |
|--|----|
| Activities and programs of Thai government | 42 |
| Formal structures of Thai government | 15 |
| Bureaucratic processes of Thai government | 14 |
| Descriptions of Thai governmental policies and problems | 7 |
| Studies of aspects of the economy and of economic development efforts | 3 |
| Analysis of a problem and a decision-making response (Vietnamese refugees in Thailand) | 1 |
| Descriptions and analysis of voting behavior in one district in the December, 1957, election | 1 |
| Description of relations between Thai government and Thai Buddhist religious institution | 1 |
| Administrative biography | 1 |
| "Basic Issues in Government Relationship to Private Schools: An Opinion Survey of Selected Sample" | 1 |
| "Survey Study of Food, Health, Behavior and Belief of the People in Cha Choengsao Province" | 1 |

Method of Approach

| | |
|---|----|
| Static description | 65 |
| Historical description | 11 |
| Deliberate use of some kind of explicit analytic approach | 7 |
| Comparative description | 4 |

Primary Types of Data Sources

| | |
|--|----|
| Government documents and reports and/or unstructured interviews, and reliance on personal knowledge and experience | 67 |
| Secondary sources | 13 |
| Sample surveys or systematically planned questionnaire surveys | 4 |
| "Loose analysis," involving the statement of a problem, ordering of selected evidence, and derivation of impressionistic conclusions | 3 |

The M.A. theses of students in the IPA have generated a vast amount of information--more than 12,000 pages of thesis material--most of it descriptions of programs, activities, and units of organization of Thai government. Nearly all of the studies have been based upon laws, rules and regulations, official reports, and data collected from personal experience, or from talking with governmental officials. A few theses have been based largely upon library research, involving the use of secondary sources. Four were comparative, involving parallel descriptions of more or less similar activities. (One of these was a comparative study of two sequential national mayors' conferences in Thailand; the others compared Thai and Burmese social security schemes, the administration of agricultural cooperatives in the United States and Thailand, and TVA and plans and arrangements for the development of the Chao Phya River.) Ten of the theses were labelled "case studies"; actually, dozens of them are case-type descriptions.

What do these data mean? What, if anything, do they say or suggest concerning institutional qualities of the IPA? Do they offer meaningful evidence of the doctrinal impact of the Institute upon a major facet of its clientele?

First, it is clear that the most successful of the IPA students have the ability to undertake bounded, focused descriptions of relatively visible administrative phenomena. They can describe programs, activities, units of organization, and bureaucratic processes, using a variety of terms and concepts which have apparently been acquired during studies at the IPA. By and large, their studies have been "practical" descriptions, involving no high level of abstraction, and--impressionistically speaking--no profound deviation from the relatively pragmatic perception of

of immediate matters which appears to be a widespread trait among Thai bureaucrats.

Second, the level of analysis in nearly all of these studies is quite low. Using the admittedly imprecise, but not unfruitful distinction between "description" and "analysis," one finds that all but a very few of these studies fall in the former category. They answer the question: "What is it," rather than such questions as "Why is it," or "How did it come about," or "What implications does it have."

The methods used in these studies are generally simple and straight-forward. They are loose, simple, and artistic, rather than rigorous and sophisticated. Only seven of eighty-seven theses--8 per cent--involved the conscious use of an explicit analytic framework--either the systematic exploration of a question, or a description at a fairly high level of abstraction (based on systematic sampling techniques, for example).

In general, the methods used were aptly applied. There is considerable variation in the quality of these studies as well as in their scope. A few of the best of them are probably as good as some Ph.D. dissertations which have been accepted in the United States from foreign students. None seems to be indefensible.

In the aggregate, the theses are notable for their singular lack of a problem-definition-and-analysis orientation and for the absence of relatively rigorous methods of description and analysis.

From this one might make a plausible case that the substance of the doctrine transmitted to successful students in the IPA academic program was one that enabled them to get a sharpened descriptive fix on the entities and elements of the Thai bureaucracy. That, in short, the doctrine that came across included little of an analytic perspective

or an objective problem finding-and-solving orientation of the kind probably congruent with modernization and not particularly consistent with a bureaucratic tradition in which hierarchical status and the authority linked with it are the legitimate bases for officially articulating problems and specifying solutions.

This case can be buttressed by an examination of the IPA curriculum and the pattern of resource allocation into the academic program. Only in the last two years of the IPA's existence was there much evidence of a relevant and reasonably effective course in "research methodology," although efforts to this end had been made throughout the IPA's history. By 1965 a young man with an American M.A. in sociology and an appointment in the research division of the IPA was teaching the research methodology course and attempting to inculcate in students a degree of methodological competence. By this time, too, some teaching materials had been developed and were being used in the course, although no full solution to the problem of texts had been reached.

One might make another argument about this matter of doctrine and its transmission: that it takes time--more time than had passed by the end of 1964--to move from an essentially traditional perspective, through a relatively simple descriptive orientation, into a relatively coherent analytical outlook.

There is, in fact, some thoroughly fragmentary evidence of such movement. An examination of the theses "in process" in 1965 (approximately seventy of them) suggests a higher proportion that is analytically oriented. A crude classification based only on titles and brief statements of intention, shows the following:

| | |
|--|----|
| Simple descriptive studies of narrow topics-- a department or unit thereof, or a small-scale activity | 28 |
| Simple descriptive studies of relatively broad topics--a program or a complex bureaucratic process (of these, one deals with a non-Thai topic, and two are comparative studies) | 15 |
| Historical studies | 2 |
| Systematic descriptions and analyses of changes--such as changes in economic patterns, major evolutions within the bureaucracy, and similar | 12 |
| Efforts to state and analyze a problem of governmental policy | 11 |
| Miscellaneous studies on non-governmental topics | 3 |

About 30 per cent of these projected studies might be considered as "analytical," compared with less than 10 per cent of the theses completed by 1965. This implies an evolution or development in the content of the doctrine transmitted within the academic program, in spite of the inadequacies and limitations of that program. Interestingly, too, this development--if indeed that is what it was--occurred in the period when the academic program was almost entirely in Thai hands.

This effort to look for evidence of IPA doctrine in the theses produced by the most successful of the IPA's students is by no means conclusive, but it is suggestive. That the IPA's academic program has reflected an abidingly descriptive orientation seems clear enough. That such an orientation is not highly dissonant with the value-orientation of the IPA's environment can be asserted. That some movement beyond simple description was occurring in the last period of the IPA's independent existence also seems evident.

In retrospect, it seems that it might have been possible to nurture and promote a problem-perception-and-analysis perspective from the outset of the effort to create the IPA. This did not really occur for a host of reasons, most of them capable of being classified under three headings: leadership characteristics; perceptions of the nature of the enterprise that was to be institutionalized in the Thai context; and the inability to maintain a sustained long-term view of the venture, given an unending host of immediate needs and problems to be dealt with and the sequence of relatively "short-term" efforts to establish the IPA.

It is impossible to explain the apparent "doctrinal shift" of the last few years of the IPA's autonomous existence. There was no discernible shift in the characteristics of the students who came into the IPA academic program. In some respects, the resources available for the program actually declined, while the workload of the IPA staff members engaged in the academic program rose (as a result of the need to supervise a growing number of theses, the loss of staff members, and the disappearance of American helpers).

On the other hand, a coherent leadership structure seems to have been coming more and more into play within the IPA, a structure committed to a "modernizing" approach in the academic program and able to mobilize support for its posture. This development, discussed elsewhere at some length, may be the key factor in explaining what appears to have happened to IPA doctrine, and may explain the apparent development of a more analytic orientation within the IPA academic program. Along with this, the efforts made from the late 1950's to devise a meaningful and relevant course in research methodology may help explain what occurred.

It must be admitted, however, that this is a doubly-speculative effort--a speculation about effects more apparent than demonstrable, and a speculation about their probable causes. Other evidence collected in systematic surveys does not sharply indicate the emergence of a keen analytic outlook on the part of IPA students. And the only evidence that supports our speculation about causation is drawn from extended interviews with members of the IPA staff plus knowledge of the efforts to develop a course in research methodology.

We can look back, however, and say with the assurance that retrospect provides that some modifications in the IPA-building strategy, based upon a more acute knowledge of the normative features of the IPA's bureaucratic context, might have resulted in a different effective doctrine in the academic sphere than the simple descriptive perspective which seems to be a major component of the doctrine transmitted to the most successful of the IPA's students.

Relations of Perceptions and Attitudes to
Participation in the IPA Academic Program - An Exploration

In the preceding section we have loaded very extensive interpretations upon a thoroughly limited data base. There might, in fact, be significant impacts of the IPA academic program upon those who participate in it. Whatever the students and former students may be like, they may still be different from those who are not, and have not been students. Also, in some sectors of cognition there may be differences between past and present students which call for explanation. Thus, at this point the question under consideration is: what differences in perception concerning the bureaucracy seem related to past or present participation in the IPA academic program?

In examining this question it is neither necessary nor possible to assume that these changes in perception are a determinate function of the impact of the IPA. Effective participation in the IPA may itself reflect certain underlying factors which explain attitudes toward the bureaucracy.

In plain language, the participants in the IPA

(a) share in a cognitive set common to all college graduate bureaucrats and would-be bureaucrats, a posture not much affected by participation in the IPA.

Alternately, (b) the participants in the IPA may be participants because they already possess a certain cognitive set, particular to only a sub-group of all bureaucrats and would-be bureaucrats, but one which is not much modified by the experiences of the academic program. In other words, some form of selectivity may be reflected in the decisions of persons to participate effectively in the IPA academic program.

(o) But it is also possible that the IPA does shape and modify the cognitive set of those who participate in its academic program, to produce, for example, different perceptions of bureaucratic characteristics, of requisites for bureaucratic success, etc., than those held by non-participants. Such changes, if identifiable, would amount to significant normative shifts via the impact of the IPA academic program.

A separate examination elsewhere in this study of apparent shifts in the cognitive-evaluative set of participants in the academic program indicates that attitudes and perceptions seem to change relatively little during the course of study at the IPA. But to what extent are these attitudes and perceptions significantly different from those of the universe out of which IPA participants are drawn? The ideal line of inquiry would be comparison with a sample identical with the IPA students in all respects save one -- namely, participation in the academic program. It proved impossible to construct such a sample. Therefore, two somewhat less satisfactory approaches were taken: (a) systematic samples were constructed of senior students in five faculties of the two major universities which are the largest sources of college-graduate bureaucrats; and (b) an effort was made to study the attitudes and perceptions of former IPA students, including the "dropouts" which we might assume to be a group exposed to the organization but rejecting it for some reason or another (or rejected by it through inability to meet its performance requirements).

In this line of analysis serious problems have been encountered:

There is a substantial gap between the comparison groups of senior level students and the typical qualities of students at the IPA.

Thus, 87.5 percent of the students in the comparison group fall into the age range of 20-24 years. Slightly less than 30 percent of the IPA students fall into this age bracket, most of them being between the ages of 25 and 30. Most IPA students are males -- only 10 percent of them at present being women. About three-fourths of the IPA students are married, and only one student in the comparison group is married. These factors, comprising major differences between the IPA group and the comparison group, are bound to be reflected in perceptions and attitudes. In addition, there is the essential fact that a large portion of the IPA student group consists of bureaucrats, whereas the comparison group is, for the most part, made up of students who have not yet entered the labor force.

Granting all these limitations, however, a "comparative static analysis" may be worthwhile, if only to show what differences -- if any -- must be accounted for. If the cognitive set of IPA students is (a) quite coherent -- as it is, and (b) significantly at variance from that found running generally through the universe out of which the IPA students came, then modification occurs in the cognitive set of perhaps many persons, including those recruited, after departure from college but before participation in the IPA program.

It is possible that such changes in attitudes and perceptions are not homogeneous. In other words, the bureaucratic attitudes and perceptions may be changed for some persons but not others during the interval between completion of undergraduate collegiate studies and entrance into the IPA. And such modifications may be reflected in selectivity in the recruitment process.

If there is any merit in this assumption, then it is at least possible that IPA dropouts are not only different -- in their attitudes and perceptions -- than IPA students and successful graduates; they may resemble the college senior group more than they resemble the IPA students.

Of course, this line of speculation is quite presumptuous. In fact, an examination of IPA academic records indicates that, as a group, the dropouts who completed at least one semester tend to be marginal and sub-marginal students. Their grade performance is often quite low. Yet the explanation of this fact is not self-evident. Poor grade performance may be a function of motivation as well as capacity, and -- as a group -- the dropouts were drawn from the same general backgrounds as those who have succeeded in the IPA program.

The broad line of inquiry here is not irrelevant to institution-building analysis, but it does raise more questions than it can answer. Certainly there is no reason why an institution cannot manifest its value-orientation through a selective appeal to elements in its environment that are favorably disposed toward its doctrine as they perceive it. In such case, an effect of participation in the Institute should be to reinforce and refine the predispositions of the participants, and to build some kinds of support for the organization and what it stands for. Alternately, the Institute may merely cast wide its net, and influence the attitudes and perceptions of all or part of its participants. And there might be some discoverable relationship between the backgrounds of participants and their tendencies to accept or reject the Institute's precepts. A full analysis of these assumptions has not been possible, but information has been obtained. Let us turn to its examination.

Through parallel schedules certain information was obtained from a student comparison group, IPA students, successful graduates, IPA students who have successfully completed course work but not yet completed the thesis requirement, and IPA dropouts. The data consisted of almost fifty attitude items capable of being grouped under the following headings: (1) evaluations of normative attributes of the bureaucracy; (2) perceptions of requisites of bureaucratic success; (3) perceptions of the benefits and disadvantages of bureaucratic positions; and (4) perceptions of bureaucratic change.

(table, evaluations of some normative attributes of the bureaucracy, continued)

-173-

| Attitude Items | IPA Students | | Student Comparison Group** | | Grads | | Former IPA Students Non-Thesis | | Drop-outs | |
|--|--------------|------|----------------------------|------|--------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| 1. Without the support and help of powerful friends it is difficult to reach a high rank in the bureaucracy (to become a first-grade official, for example). | .54 | 7 | .46 | 7 | .34 | 6 | .65 | 5-6 | .53 | 6 |

* Score:

The figure here indicates a degree of group coherence of response, or degree of acceptance or agreement. A maximum score would be 1.0 or -1.0. A score of 0 would indicate the absence of any coherent pattern of response and a dispersion of individual answers among the three admitted categories of response: agree, don't know, and disagree. The table itself shows, in descending rank order of concurrence, the responses of IPA students and then compares these with both the intensity and rank order of response for the other groups covered.

** Student Comparison Group:

A sample of 217 senior students was constructed using the random sample table contained in H. M. Blalock's Social Statistics (McGraw Hill, New York, 1960, pp. 437-440). The population was defined as five senior students at five faculties, economics, political science, and liberal arts at Thammasat University and political science and science at Chulalongkorn University. The actual sample varies to some extent from the ideal. It contains 199 students drawn from the five departments largely as a result of the inability to get access to the entire designed sample in the economics faculty at Thammasat University. The sample itself amounted to 22.2% of the total population of senior students in the five faculties

There is a rather impressive homogeneity in the above-noted perceptions of normative attributes of the Thai bureaucracy. In general, the intensity of coherence of the comparison group response is a bit lower than that of the IPA students and former students. But the difference in coherence is surprisingly small, considering the fact that the comparison group members have had no direct experience in the bureaucracy.

The major difference between the cognitive set of the comparison groups and that of the students and graduates seems to be sharpening rather than a shifting of perspectives.

Some of the specific variations in perceptions are impossible to explain. For instance, both the students and graduates perceive "too much emphasis" upon rules and regulations. But these perceptions differ from those of both the comparison group and the other former students who have been in contact with the IPA academic program.

Between the IPA students and the IPA graduates there is a rather impressive similarity of response pattern. The IPA graduates, however, are much less intense in their agreement with the statement that "there is often too much emphasis upon 'personal decision making,'" and the intensity of agreement with a statement about the importance of powerful friends to success is lowest among the graduates. Perhaps they take their associations for granted, or are more aware that the value of connections can be overstated.

All the groups tend to agree that both competence and support are important to advancement, and seem to perceive, also, that competence is a requisite of upward movement to the first class of the bureaucracy.

All the groups perceive the significance of status and of status barriers to communications within the Thai bureaucracy.

There is perhaps more consistent focus in the array of evaluations made by the graduate students than by any other group. The graduates criticize undue emphasis upon rules and regulations with more intensity than the other respondent groups; but the graduates also criticize undue emphasis upon personal decision making to a lesser extent than any other group save the small, scattered collection of dropouts. As there is a possible inconsistency between these two characteristics -- following the rules versus personal decision making -- one might argue that emphasis upon one should be linked with minimization of the other criticism. This is more true in the case of the graduates than any other group.

Perceptions of the Requisites of Bureaucratic Success

| Attitude Item | IPA STUDENTS | | STUDENT COMPARISON GROUPS** | | GRADS | | FORMER IPA STUDENTS NON-THESIS | | DRGP-OUTS | |
|--|--------------|------|-----------------------------|------|--------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| 1. In the Thai bureaucracy friends and associates enable you to get information through "informal organization." | .98 | 1 | .52 | 3-4 | .89 | 1 | .92 | 1 | .82 | 2-3 |
| 2. In the Thai bureaucracy friends and associates are important sources of information about what is going on. | .84 | 2 | .64 | 1 | .81 | 2 | .88 | 2 | .82 | 2-3 |
| 3. The ability to speak and read English has become important to the person who wants to reach a high rank in the Thai bureaucracy. | .59 | 3 | .61 | 2 | .69 | 3 | .58 | 5 | .94 | 1 |
| 4. Without the support and help of powerful friends, it is difficult to reach a high rank in the bureaucracy (to become a first grade official, for example.). | .54 | 4 | .46 | 5 | .34 | 5 | .65 | 4 | .53 | 5 |
| 5. If a young man or woman has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a master's degree abroad, he would get one important advantage by studying at the IPA: he could make friendships which would be useful in his career. | .50 | 5 | .52 | 3-4 | .50 | 4 | .85 | 3 | .71 | 4 |
| 6. In the Thai bureaucracy, it is now necessary to have post-graduate professional training in order to reach a high rank. | .12 | 6 | .14 | 6 | .17 | 6 | .12 | 6 | -.12 | 6 |

* Score: for explanation see previous table

**Student Comparison Groups: for explanation see previous table

The pattern visible in the above table is quite similar to that in the table that preceded it. In general, the inexperienced group of comparison students seem to share the same perceptual orientations as do the IPA students and graduates, but with a lower level of intensity.

A significant and suggestive item is found in this table: evidence of an impressively low valuation placed upon the importance of post-graduate training as a basis for advancement to the upper levels of the bureaucracy. Not even the most successful former IPA student placed much emphasis upon the importance of graduate professional training as a basis for advancement.

The IPA dropouts down-rate this item most of all, as one might expect. Perhaps they are also highly sensitized to the importance of English as a requisite of advancement, judging from their replies. It is possible, too, that these dropouts withdrew from the IPA because of language problems; at any rate, they stress the importance of English as a requisite of success more than any other groups. Along with the others, however, they pay high homage to the importance of informal associations as a means of advancement.

The general weight of evidence contained in the above table suggests a propensity for viewing the IPA as an instrument of achievement because of its contribution to the development of fruitful associations and perhaps increased English language competence.

Perceptions of Benefits and Disadvantages of Bureaucratic Positions

| Attitude Item | IPA Students | | Student Comparison Groups** | | Grads | | Former IPA Students | | Drop-outs | |
|---|--------------|------|-----------------------------|------|--------|------|---------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Non-thesis Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| BENEFITS | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. One advantage of being an official is this: in Thailand, most people respect officials | .88 | 1 | .63 | 1 | .64 | 1 | .73 | 2 | .59 | 1 |
| 2. One advantage of being an official is the security of one's own position. An official does not have to worry about losing his position. | .76 | 2 | .26 | 4-5 | .56 | 2 | .77 | 1 | .41 | 3 |
| 3. One advantage of being an official is that the work is not as hard as in jobs outside the government. | .62 | 3 | .40 | 3 | .39 | 4 | .58 | 4 | .29 | 5 |
| 4. One advantage of being an official is this: the work of officials--much of it--is for the benefit of the country. In private businesses the purpose of the work is usually the benefit of some person or small group of persons. | .57 | 4 | .54 | 2 | .49 | 3 | .62 | 3 | .53 | 2 |
| 5. One advantage of being an official is this: in government organizations persons are treated more fairly and considerately than in most business firms. | .43 | 5 | -.04 | 8 | .27 | 5-6 | .46 | 5 | .00 | 6 |
| 6. One advantage of being an official is this: officials in the second grade and above have good incomes when one includes fringe benefits as well as salaries. | .13 | 6 | .26 | 4-5 | -.33 | 8 | .00 | 6-7 | .35 | 4 |

(table, Perceptions of Benefits and Disadvantages of Bureaucratic Positions continued)

-184-

| Attitude Item | IPA Students | | Student Comparison Groups** | | Grads | | Former IPA Students Non-thesis | | Drop-outs | |
|--|--------------|------|-----------------------------|------|--------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| BENEFITS (continued) | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. One advantage of being a government official is this: in government service a man who is able can advance. In business personal connections are more important. | .01 | 7 | .01 | 7 | -.25 | 7 | -.08 | 8 | -.06 | 7 |
| 8. One advantage of being an official is this: officials above the lowest grades have opportunities to go abroad. | -.04 | 8 | .16 | 6 | .27 | 5-6 | .00 | 6-7 | -.29 | 8 |
| DISADVANTAGES | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9. Few Thai Government officials can live on their salaries. They must have some additional income. | .75 | 1 | .77 | 1 | .53 | 2 | .77 | 1 | .41 | 3 |
| 10. One disadvantage of being an official is that a person's skills and ability may not be used. | .73 | 2 | .65 | 2 | .66 | 1 | .73 | 2 | .47 | 2 |
| 11. One disadvantage of being an official is this: much of the work is poorly organized, and it is often hard to get the job done. | .58 | 3 | .35 | 3 | .50 | 3 | .54 | 3 | .24 | 4 |
| 12. One disadvantage of being an official is this: there are not enough high ranking positions so some worthy officials cannot advance. | .16 | 4 | .24 | 4 | .19 | 4 | .31 | 4 | .59 | 1 |

*Score: for explanation see first table in this section

**Student Comparison Group; for explanation see first table in this section

When it comes to perceptions of the advantages of bureaucratic positions, IPA students are more sanguine than any of the other groups concerning the amount of respect which officials receive. This may be related to the fact that a substantial portion of the IPA students are line bureaucrats. To the extent that they have served in such organizations as the Ministry of Interior's Department of Local Administration, dealing with the public in authoritative relationships, they may be a bit hyper-sensitized to this matter of respect.

There are some notable differences in particular attitudes held by the different groups. The comparison group students are mildly in disagreement with the observation that persons are treated more fairly and considerately in the bureaucracy than in private business. (Note, however, that the dropouts also reject this item.) Unlike the IPA students and former students, the comparison group members are not necessarily committed to bureaucratic careers, and they do not need to rationalize concerning the advantages of bureaucratic careers.

On the other hand, the comparison group is more sanguine than any of the other groups save the dropouts concerning the income prospects of bureaucratic careers -- and the dropouts may have comparatively low levels of income expectation. The successful graduates, on the other hand, tend to occupy middle to upper level bureaucratic positions and have no illusions about the remunerativeness of bureaucratic careers. It further appears that the comparison group members have not become very sensitized to the appeal of security as a bureaucratic advantage.

In the perception of possible disadvantages of bureaucratic posts there is a very substantial concurrence among the IPA students, the

comparison groups, and the former IPA students. The graduates have no illusions about the levels of remuneration, but they are slightly less inclined to agree with the idea that "few Thai government officials can live on their salaries " than are any of the other respondent groups except the dropouts.

None of the groups have strong illusions about the prospect that their skills and abilities will be used effectively in the bureaucracy. Perhaps this relates to their assessment of the small importance of graduate professional training as a requisite of bureaucratic advancement. Perhaps, too, this is a critical clue to understanding why IPA students do not seem to demand as much of the IPA academic program as one might expect. There is certainly no high congruence between the attitude expressed here and a strong desire for increased professional competence.

When it comes to considering prospects for advancement the respondents appear to be impressively optimistic -- all except the dropouts, who may be a trifle inclined toward a "sour-grapes" outlook.

Given the sanguine attitude toward advancement potentials one notes in these assessments of the bureaucracy, along with a rather acute and coherent perspective concerning the importance of personal associations as well as personal competence (probably using this last word in a very broad sense) as requisites of success, one gets another impressionistic basis for perceiving the fashion in which the IPA is likely to be regarded by its student clientele. The IPA, it would appear, is not likely to be valued for its doctrine so much as for other benefits perceived as being connected with participation in its academic program.

Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change

| Attitude Item | IPA Students | | Student Comparison Groups** | | Grads | | Former IPA Students Non-thesis | | Drop-outs | |
|--|--------------|------|-----------------------------|------|--------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| 1. Women hold many more important positions in the Civil Service today than they did before the war. | .98 | 1 | .98 | 1 | .92 | 2-3 | .96 | 1 | 1.00 | 1-2 |
| 2. Before the war, official salaries were actually better than they are today, taking into account the change of the cost of living. | .91 | 2 | .74 | 4-5 | .92 | 2-3 | .92 | 2 | .76 | 4 |
| 3. Before the war, the highest status an ordinary person could hope for was to be a high-ranking official. Today there are many ways to gain high status without becoming an official. | .90 | 3 | .89 | 2 | .97 | 1 | .58 | 5 | 1.00 | 1-2 |
| 4. Before the war, officials were treated with more respect than they receive from the public today. | .86 | 4 | .76 | 3 | .81 | 4 | .77 | 3-4 | .94 | 3 |
| 5. Today, government agencies pay more attention to the needs of the people than before the war. | .75 | 5 | .74 | 4-5 | .69 | 5 | .77 | 3-4 | .71 | 5 |
| 6. Today the Civil Service is more competent and productive than before the war. | .42 | 6 | .25 | 7 | .36 | 6 | .50 | 6 | .24 | 6 |
| 7. Today the Civil Service follows the law and regulations more strictly than before the war. | .36 | 7 | .27 | 6 | -.27 | 9 | .19 | 7 | -.47 | 8 |
| 8. Before the war, persons were promoted on the basis of their personal status. Today promotions are based on how well officials do their work. | .04 | 8 | -.01 | 8 | .03 | 7 | .08 | 9 | .06 | 7 |

(table, Perceptions of Bureaucratic Change, continued)

-187-

| Attitude Item | IPA Students | | Student Comparison Groups** | | Former IPA Students | | Non-thesis | | Drop-outs | |
|--|--------------|------|-----------------------------|------|---------------------|------|------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| 9. Today the Civil Service is more just and fair in dealing with the public than before the war. | -.05 | 9 | -.31 | 9 | -.11 | 8 | .15 | 8 | -.59 | 9 |

* Score: for explanation see first table in this section

** Student Comparison Groups: for explanation see first table in this section

The general impression sustained by the above data is one of great homogeneity. IPA students, former students, and the college senior group out of which the bureaucrats are drawn have a strikingly similar set of attitudes toward changes in the bureaucracy.

The dropouts are more emphatic than any other groups in seeing a decline in the legality and justice of the civil service. All groups make a sharp distinction between the perception of an increase in the substantive service orientation of government programs and the absence of any significant increase in the fairness or justice of the methods used by government agencies. (Perhaps the processes are, as before, acceptably fair and just.)

From the perspective of our analytic concern, the main point here is simply this: it is impossible to perceive any significant relationship between participation in the IPA academic program and a shift in perceptions of Thai bureaucratic change. Students and former students (excepting the dropouts) may be somewhat less critical of the bureaucracy's justice and fairness, or lack thereof, than are the comparison group. Students and former students may be a bit more convinced of the increased competence and productivity of the post-war bureaucracy than are the comparison group students, but not much.

The IPA students are apparently a bit more optimistic in their expectations of unspecified future bureaucratic changes than either the comparison group or the most successful former IPA students. But not even the students are willing to express a strong and coherent conviction that bureaucratic agencies will change substantially within the next 5 years. They do believe more intensely and coherently than the other

groups in the prospect of a shift in the career expectations of an increased number of young people, from government career objectives to careers outside the bureaucracy. To a much lesser extent, the students perceive the prospect of decline in official prestige, a logical concomitant of the previously mentioned perception.

The above data do not cast any clear light on perceptible or attitudinal differences which seem clearly linked with participation in the academic program of the IPA.

This of course is not to say that the IPA has no normative effect upon the students who come to it and go through its program. In fact, other sectors of this study do contain evidence of some shifts in the cognitive-evaluative set of IPA students. But here stability is much more evident than shift.

In the case of the executives with whom the IPA works it might be expected that an effective relationship would necessarily involve a substantial appeal to established attitudes and perceptions. The same strategic requisite for a meaningful relationship with graduate students does not seem necessary. Perhaps it can even be regarded as appropriate. Short-run executive development programs have limited objectives. An academic program spanning two years of interaction between the students and faculty, intendedly at the graduate level, might be assumed to have among its objectives both the development of increased technical competence and shifts in perceptions and attitudes. So far as the latter of these objectives is concerned, the weight of the evidence is relatively clear: The IPA has had a very small perceivable impact upon the cognitive-evaluative set of those of its academic clients whom we have studied.

Attitudes Toward the IPA: Students and Former Students

| Attitude Items | IPA Students | | Former Grade | | IPA Students Non-thesis | | Drop-outs | |
|---|--------------|------|--------------|------|-------------------------|------|-----------|------|
| | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank | Score* | Rank |
| 1. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is learning how to analyze and solve problems | .95 | 1 | .89 | 2 | 1.00 | 1 | .94 | 1-2 |
| 2. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is the development of skill in writing reports. | .79 | 2 | .86 | 3 | .81 | 4-5 | .82 | 3-4 |
| 3. If a young man or woman has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a masters degree abroad, it would be better to go abroad because the foreign degree will have more prestige. | .76 | 3 | .66 | 5 | .81 | 4-5 | .82 | 3-4 |
| 4. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is learning how to make good use of foreign language materials. | .73 | 4 | .83 | 4 | .88 | 3 | .94 | 1-2 |
| 5. Successful study at the IPA increases a person's chances of going abroad for further study. | .62 | 5 | .64 | 6 | .54 | 6 | .53 | 6 |
| 6. One important benefit of studying at the IPA is getting acquainted with other students who are officials (or who will become officials) | .59 | 6 | .92 | 1 | .92 | 2 | .76 | 5 |
| 7. If a young man has a choice between studying at the IPA and studying for a masters degree abroad, it would be better to go abroad because the quality of education will be somewhat better. | -.10 | 7 | .08 | 7 | -.23 | 7 | .24 | 7 |

*Score: The figure here indicates a degree of group coherence of response, or degree of acceptance or agreement. A

(table, Attitudes Toward the IPA: Students and former Students, continued)

-191

*Score (continued)

maximum score would be 1.0 or -1.0. A score of 0 would indicate the absence of any coherent pattern of response and a dispersion of individual answers among the three admitted categories of response: agree, don't know, and disagree. The table itself shows, in descending rank order of concurrence, the responses of IPA students and then compares these with both the intensity and rank order of response for the other groups covered.

Conclusions

The IPA academic program is generally regarded as quite "meaningful" by most student participants. The withdrawal or drop-out rate is relatively low; the students are motivated to perform.

They are willing to ascribe certain values to the IPA program and its degree "problem-solving ability," certain increases in skills, and the making of friendships that will later be useful. Their loyalty is indicated by a mild disagreement with a statement that the quality of foreign education would be higher than that obtained in the IPA. But their conviction that post-graduate education is important to bureaucratic advancement is weak.

Whatever explanations might lie behind this last opinion, there is no escaping this conclusion: the students do not perceive graduate education of the kind offered the the IPA as a sure guarantee of bureaucratic advancement. And, as other responses indicate, they do not see the IPA degree as having a prestige value comparable to that of a foreign degree.

In short, the IPA academic program is valued, but only in a relative sort of way: it is not the absolute key to success; it is not totally preferable to certain perceived alternatives.

The program, with all of its limitations, does have some impact upon the perceptions of students. To some degree it makes them more consciously aware of the bureaucracy in which they are, or seek to become, involved. The most successful students learn to describe various features of the bureaucracy by reference to fairly general administrative concepts. In general, too, the students develop certain new elements in their perspective on the bureaucracy, or heightened sensitivities concerning certain bureaucratic attributes. They become more critical, although they do not by any means reject the bureaucracy as a source of desired career objectives.

Interestingly, there is some evidence to suggest the emergence of an increasingly analytical perspective on the part of the most successful IPA students, in the later years of the Institute's operations--if an apparent shift in thesis topics can be taken as meaningful.

In conclusion, it is impossible to make any radical assertions about the doctrinal impact of the IPA academic program upon its clients. By and large they do not differ strikingly from non-clients in their attitudes and perceptions, to the extent that the evidence is indicative. They do not emerge from the IPA program disenchanted, or imbued with reformistic zeal. They see themselves as somewhat more able to function and thrive in the bureaucratic milieu--somewhat more skilled, more perceptive, and perhaps more critical. They are aware of the prospects of change, and probably inclined to accept and even favor the kinds of change they perceive in the future, although they do not perceive themselves as major vehicles of these changes.

IN-SERVICE TRAINING AND THE EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

Over the years the training division of the IPA has run dozens of programs for literally thousands of participants. It has trained people in filing and records management, in "supervision," in office methods, in reporting, and in various other fields of technical specialization. Much of its work has been conducted in cooperation with various ministries and departments, on the basis of a ready, often casual acceptance of proposals from the IPA that a training program would be a useful thing. Yet one gets the impression that there is not really any widely-held substantial conviction within the bureaucracy that such training is a vital requisite of effective bureaucratic activity.

The absence of any extensive establishment of training as a discrete, legitimate specialization within the bureaucracy is rather compelling evidence in support for this contention. So are studies of apparent normative characteristics of the bureaucracy itself, although these are beyond the scope of our immediate concerns. It should be noted, however, that training per se is hardly a novelty in the Thai bureaucracy--training of many kinds was an intrinsic feature of the bureaucratic reforms of more than a half a century ago. The substantial impetus to the growth of higher education in Thailand was, in fact, inseparably linked with the needs of the bureaucracy for trained personnel. Thammasat University, the seat of the IPA, was quickly established following the Revolution of 1932 in order to train bureaucrats more suitable to the post-monarchic regime than the older royalist institution, Chulalongkorn.

So, in a sense, reference to "the absence of any extensive establishment of training" is a statement much in need of qualification. And the essence of the qualification is this: there has not been within the post-war

bureaucracy a widely-held conscious appreciation of "training" per se--of "training" as a discrete functional specialization, germane because of its systemic significance, and particularly its systemic relevance to an abiding performance orientation. Rather, (a) that performance orientation is itself rather obscurely blended with other goal-orientations within the bureaucracy, and (b) "training" is "something we do--more or less in an ad hoc fashion--if and when particular needs and problems arise."

It is against this background that the IPA training enterprise must be understood. The initial failures in the training program have been noted. But in 1960 the IPA training strategy was shifted. The main thrust of the program was now directed at the bureaucratic executives, and over the next five years the executive development training programs became the prime activity of the training division, and, in the words of the IPA Associate Dean, "our showcase window."

This training facet is relevant for at least two reasons. First, it involves a relationship with a sector of the IPA environment that should be fraught with significance. The upper-level bureaucrats can affect the IPA in many ways. Second, responses of these executives to their involvement with the IPA, and to the content of the IPA doctrine set forth in the training itself, are prime indices of the "meaningfulness" of the organization in one sector of its environment. These are the reasons behind the following extensive analysis.

In-service Training and the Institutional Qualities of the IPA:

The Executive Development Program

The development of in-service training competence was one of the initial objectives of the IPA, and efforts in this field began as early as 1956, when a training consultant joined the staff of American advisors at the Institute.

The first round of efforts in this field were largely abortive. The initial strategy aimed at building training into the Thai bureaucracy by the creation of the position of Training Director, and thus creating a series of reference points within the ministries and departments through which the IPA could penetrate the bureaucracy with its in-service training effort. A variety of logical and congruent activities were undertaken. A Government Advisory Board for in-service training was created, with the prime minister as chairman and the other members composed of undersecretaries of ministers. This entity, formally set up in 1956 approved a plan established in the IPA for training about 200 training directors. Trainees were nominated for this program, and beginning in 1956 85 of them were trained-- to return to their ministries and their regular positions. Only two became full time training directors.

During the latter 1950's the in-service training programs of the IPA continued, more or less on an ad hoc basis. Specific training programs were run, a ranging set of discussions with high-ranking line administrators took place, and the rather diffuse work of laying a groundwork for a focused training program went on, with leadership coming from foreign advisors.

In 1960, a new advisor arrived to take over responsibility for helping develop in-service training as a facet of the IPA program. From 1960 the

IPA concentrated on three lines of activity in the field of in-service training:

(1) "To establish and conduct on a continuing basis Executive Development Programs for all special-grade officials in the Thai government."

(2) To firmly establish and develop training officers in each ministry.

(3) "To develop the In-service Training staff into their proper role of 'advisors' on training to the Thai government."

Along with these major targets, the Institute continued to conduct a variety of training programs, such as supervisory training and work simplification, at the request of various departments and ministries, training between three and four hundred participants per year in ten to fifteen programs sponsored directly, and assisting ministries and departments in the conduct of from thirty to fifty training programs per year in which as many as 2,000 to 4,000 persons participated annually.

Perhaps the most significant facet of the IPA training operations from 1960 has consisted of its executive development seminars. In straight numerical terms these do not loom large in the statistical record of IPA activity--fourteen seminars involving less than 300 officials.

These officials, however, are members of the top-ranking stratum of the bureaucracy. Their status and--in many cases--their influence are substantial. These trainees are members of the group responsible for managing the entire bureaucracy. Finally, these are the persons who control the IPA access to lower levels of the bureaucracy in the field of training (as well as, to some extent, in the recruitment of students). If training officers are established as recognized and useful components of the bureaucracy, this is likely to occur on the basis of the

acceptability of experience by top-ranking executives in IPA seminars. In short, not only is the meaningfulness and perceived utility of training in broad general terms closely linked with the perceptions of participants in the IPA's executive development program; but, more generally, the meaningfulness of the IPA to the bureaucracy, viewed both as a clientele group and as a source of support, is likely to be significantly linked with the consequences of participation in the IPA's executive development seminar.

The following sections of this study are an examination and analysis of the IPA's executive development activities. The focus is upon: (1) the "doctrine" or content of the programs as these have been presented by the IPA, and (2) upon the perceptions of meaningfulness and utility which have emerged among the participants in the program. (3) The third perspective involved in the analysis concerns the cognitive set of the participants themselves. The aims of this facet of the study are (a) to seek to determine the content of the "poscure" of the executives--their perceptions of themselves, of their relationship with superiors, peers, and subordinates, and of their own problems; (b) to seek to determine the nature of their expectations and desires as these are related to participation in IPA executive development seminars; and (c) to learn how the executives evaluate their seminar experiences. In a broad and basic sense, the object of inquiry is to determine two things: (1) the nature of the "meaningfulness" imputed to the IPA by these key participants--including, as much as possible, some index of the intensity of their feelings; and (2) the manner in which and extent to which this facet of the IPA represents the transmission of a doctrine which is innovative, and at variance with

bureaucratic norms.

IPA Doctrine in Executive Development

"The objectives of the Executive Development Seminars are:

- (1) to provide practical opportunities to all special-grade government officials to improve themselves on their present job and to develop their potential for the future.
- (2) To increase coordination between various ministries through friendships established between government officials from each ministry.
- (3) To create a desire among these government officials to provide training for their subordinates--resulting in an Institute objective of the establishment of training offices in each ministry.
- (4) To lay the groundwork for a continuous executive development program by encouraging the formation of alumnae groups to meet periodically to discuss administration and personnel problems in Thailand."

("Summary of Progress," May 1955-January 1963, Bangkok: Institute of Public Administration, p. 45.)

The doctrine reflected in the executive development training programs is manifest in the content of those programs. The seminar scheme was designed on the basis of two kinds of factors: the specialized competence and management development training perspectives inherent in the foreign advisors responsible for the development of this activity, and specific premises generated through interviews and discussions with top-ranking bureaucrats, in the course of program planning aimed at the identification of problems which might be the object of the seminar enterprise. In short, the venture reflects combinations of Western perspectives plus intended determination of Thai needs.

In content, the executive seminars have generally followed the pattern characteristic of Western efforts in this area. For example, these topics have been covered in a number of representative programs: human relations, delegations, executive planning, communications, coordination, decision-making, and review of the management process. The techniques of presentation used have included lectures, the discussion of "problem situations," efforts at role-playing, and lecture-discussion sessions. The programs have been legitimized through participation of some of the highest ranking officials in the kingdom. For example, the then-deputy prime minister, who later became prime minister, served as a seminar leader on "government policy and in-service training" at a 1961 training seminar. In general, an aura of cabinet-level approval has been established, along with the clear impression that this type of activity is an intrinsic aspect of management in bureaucracies of developed nations such as the United States.

In their operation, the seminars have focused on two types of approach: transmission of premises of various kinds to the participants, which then serve as a basis for discussions concerning meaning, relevance, utility, etc., and "problem-analysis" where the focus is upon some situation and the object of the exercise is to analyze, to prescribe solutions, and to evaluate the prescriptions.

It is not possible to say with full accuracy or determinateness what norms underlie these programs. But in a broad, general sense it is clear that the executive seminars are based on certain assumptions concerning the nature of executive roles. It is premised that the executive is an organizational leader, responsible for shaping and asserting the direction of the enterprise--a type of activity which involves problem-analysis and innovation. To some degree it is assumed that the executive is a shaper of policy. And it is assumed that the executive is an "energizer," responsible for organizational achievement and the motivation of participants. Finally, it is assumed that in all these sectors of responsibility the executive is confronted with problems toward which he functions as a solver or resolver. The model, in short, is essentially a Western model, although the strategy built in to the programs is not necessarily alien to the Thai milieu. (Note, for example, the emphasis on associational objectives.) In this model, there is a strong implicit underlying thematic assumption of purposiveness and organizational effectiveness. The object of training is enhanced competence through increased sensitivity of perception and increased competence in the resolution of problems on the part of people involved in making policy decisions.

Certainly one aspect of this executive development program is its

strategic significance to the IPA. In the perception of the Inservice Training Division,

"The executive development program has contributed more to the progress of the Division than any other single program. It is the 'door-opener' to top-level government officials in the Institute's efforts to establish training programs in other departments and ministries." *

The establishment of training programs in the departments and ministries has not proceeded along the lines envisioned in the 1950's. By 1965, there were a few "training directors" or other officials scattered through the bureaucracy with substantial responsibilities for directly conducting training activities. There was also, however, a substantial continuation of a variety of long-established training-type activities, for the Thai bureaucracy established a variety of efforts of this type in the course of its reconstruction in the late 19th- early 20th Century. But explicitly performance-oriented training in various types of administrative process activities were not a major or significant feature of these earlier ventures, most of them being directed toward programmatic and technical competence. In plain language, office management, office procedures, work simplification, "modern" supervision, and other support-and productivity oriented training efforts were not a part of the pre-IPA bureaucracy.

Nor has any large-scale development of this kind occurred, to this point. Instead, the IPA itself became an important training center.

* Fourteenth Semi-Annual Report, January 1, 1962 to June 30, 1962,

It has continued to "train the trainers;" but it has also acquired major responsibilities for conducting, or participating in a wide variety of training efforts. By 1963, for example, it had operated eight work simplification training programs for 169 trainees and was continuing to engage in such work. It had run 65 supervisory training courses for 2,567 supervisor-level officials. It was engaged in efforts to encourage the long-run transfer of training activities of this sort to the bureaucracy.

The IPA had also conducted special training programs, in conjunction with the Ministry of Interior, for non-official village and commune leaders. Sixteen "programs" reached 3,327 commune leaders by 1963, and another 25 programs were presented for 1,400 village headmen. The general purpose of these programs was the orientation of these rural leaders, as part of a program for strengthening and improving relations between official government and the rural populace.

These programs reflected the high receptivity of the Ministry of Interior, and in particular its Department of Interior (lately renamed the Department of Local Administration) to training as a tool of effectiveness. To some extent, in its other than executive development activities, the IPA's Inservice Training Division had become an important service center for this important civilian ministry, charged as it is with broad responsibility for general domestic government. The Ministry, and particularly its Department of Local Administration, also developed specialized training competence of its own, establishing a Training Division headed by an experienced official who also holds an MPA degree from Indiana University, and was regarded as one of the outstanding participants sent abroad for training in connection with

the establishment of the IPA.

As a vehicle for facilitating and nurturing these other training activities, the executive development program has beyond a doubt, been of great strategic significance. Without this program the IPA's training activities might be of small consequence, or they might not exist at all. This, at any rate, is the perception of the top level of the IPA staff, and it is impossible to disprove the assumption.

But is the executive development program anything--or at least much--more than a strategically significant entering wedge? One essential question: how well and to what extent does this executive development training model appear to fit the Thai context? In the minds of the executive participants how is the training perceived? Is it considered innovative? Does it transmit new norms? Does it appear to produce some tendency toward shifts in executive self-perception? Or does the training essentially--at least in the immediate case--sustain and enhance the status quo?

The IPA and Bureaucratic Executives

The bureaucratic executives occupy the upper reaches of the civil service as provincial governors, directors and assistant directors of departments, and ministerial under-secretaries of state. There are also a few bureau chiefs and directors of divisions who occupy the special class--the top of five broad strata into which the bureaucracy is divided.

The significance of this group is complex. These officials are among the important clientele of the IPA--consumers of its services in service training. For a time, too, a major portion of the IPA student body was recruited through nomination by the major administrative officers of individual departments and ministries. Although this is no longer true in most cases, as most students apply for entrance of their own volition, students must still in many cases obtain leave from their employing agencies. Beyond this, in various and subtle fashions the attractiveness of graduate study at the IPA is likely to be a function of the attitudes of executives toward the IPA. If an IPA degree is an important means of access to recognition and advancement then the IPA's ability to draw students is enhanced.

Finally it is probably that the image and meaningfulness of the IPA' in such places as the office of the prime minister and in the cabinet is shaped in part by the perceptions and expressed opinions

of executives (as they deal with their ministers, for example). Thus, in a sense, the "meaning" of the IPA at the political level of the government is influenced by the perceptions of executives, a substantial number of whom have participated in IPA executive development programs.

The full range of information on the cognitive and evaluative orientations of Thai executives toward the IPA is not available. Substantial evidence indicates that a high percentage of all Thai executives at the special grade level are familiar with the organization, however, as approximately 330 of them have participated in training programs run by the Institute between 1961 and the end of 1966. A systematic survey of 156 of those executives has been made in the course of this study. Questionnaires were sent to 287 executives who had participated in two-week long executive development seminars during the period February 6, 1961 to July 29, 1964. Within 60 days replies were received from 113 (39.4%) of the group. In addition 43 participants in executive seminars conducted in 1965 and 1966 were asked to complete the same schedule at the end of the two-week seminar period. The total number of executives surveyed represents at least twenty percent of the special class of the civil service, and at least thirty percent of the civilian special class executives engaged in civic administration. The group surveyed does not constitute a probability "sample," however, and it cannot be shown that the executive group is clearly representative of the population from which it is drawn. To the extent that the data obtained are valid, however, they may be more representative than statistical measures will allow us to claim;

there is a surprising coherence in the pattern of responses obtained to questions concerning executive attitudes and opinions. This absence of any great variance in the attitudes and perceptions of a major portion of the top grade of the bureaucracy at least implies a coherence which may characterize all or most of the population.

Much of the survey instrument used was ostensibly concerned with perceived benefits of the training program in which the executives had participated. But the primary object in this study of executives was not to determine differential normative impact of a brief training experience. It would be presumptuous to assume that a limited exposure of this sort would produce an important and measurable "normative shift" within members of an elite group of executives who can be assumed to have come to the program with highly structured attitudes--attitudes sanctioned and sustained by success in attaining the highest rank available in the Thai bureaucracy.

Changes in information held by executives could, of course, be measured. So could gross attitudes--say an intense disapproval of the IPA resulting from dissatisfaction with the training program. But we cannot assume any broad, determinate, measurable modification in the cognitive-evaluative set of executives as a result of two weeks of training, short of such gross shifts.

Our assumptions are more elemental:

(1) The executive clientele of the IPA, which is roughly representative of the top-ranking bureaucratic executive group, has more or less patterned attitudes and cognitions which can be determined.

(2) Some of these pertain directly--and others indirectly--to the meaningfulness of the IPA.

(a) Some attitudes and informations are directly linked to participation in executive development training;

(b) others reflect expectations and propensities for response to various kinds of doctrine which may be contained in IPA training programs, or otherwise indicate the kind of "meaning" which may be imputed to the IPA by executives.

In short, we are not trying to determine the way in which the IPA has (or has not) modified the cognitive and evaluative set of executive participants in training programs. We are trying to do the much less presumptuous--but hardly irrelevant--job of determining the kind of "meaningfulness" the IPA has in a sector of its environment which has substantial functional significance to the organization.

For this reason we have not sought to create a "control group" of executives not involved in IPA executive training. In any event, construction of an appropriate "control group" seemed practically impossible, as well as less than essential, given our objective.

Characteristics of Executive Clientele

Practically all Thai bureaucratic executives at the special grade are males; only three females participated in fourteen executive seminars run by the IPA, 1961-1966. Most top-level public executives are at least 45 years of age; two-thirds of our group fell into the age range, 50-59 years. Only two were younger than 40, and only seven were above the age of 59.

Birthplace. Thai executives come from rather varied backgrounds, although in practically every case these are urban. Of 103 respondents who indicated their place of birth, only 14 have come from villages or small rural settlements. Only 22 were born in the Bangkok metropolitan area, although another 46 came from the central basin provinces, the Thai heartland which surrounds the capital. In short, about two-thirds of the respondents are from the central region of the country and have urban or metropolitan backgrounds.

Parental Occupation. 139 respondents indicated the occupation of their fathers; 54 of these were civil servants and another 17 were military officials--slightly over 50% of the executives, in other words, come from families with bureaucratic occupational backgrounds. Only 10% come from agricultural families. About one-third (48) of these top-ranking officials are the offspring of fathers engaged in private business activities. The general evidence suggests that these officials

come from strata of the Thai society which for a substantial period of time has had access to urban amenities including advanced education, yet this is not a completely inbred group of second or third generation bureaucrats. Half of these officials come from non-bureaucratic backgrounds.

Bureaucratic Connections. The 156 executives were asked whether they had any relatives in high-ranking government positions. Only 39 answered affirmatively, and in ten of these cases the relative mentioned is the wife. Ten other officials referred to brothers or sisters as occupants of high-ranking government positions. In the questionnaire the term "high ranking" was not defined with any precision, the intention being to let the respondent use his own judgment in deciding what the term meant (in general nothing below the level of first-class official would be likely to be considered "high ranking.") The assumption has sometimes been made that Thai officialdom is characterized by elaborate familial networks. Whatever the pattern of connections may be among officials, there is not much evidence here that these officials are parts of family cliques. At least, three-fourths of the group do not assert that other members of their families occupy high-ranking positions.

Education. The evidence, although it is not complete, suggests that this group of officials is relatively well educated. Ninety-five reported on their pre-university education. Of them, 76--more than three-fourths--were educated in public schools in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Ten others studied in private schools. 106 completed undergraduate college-level work, 94 of them at Thai

institutions. Thirty-nine percent of those reporting on their undergraduate college education have degrees from Thammasat University, which was created following the Revolution of 1932 to serve in large measures as a source of bureaucratic personnel; but an equal number hold degrees from the nation's other major university, Chulalongkorn. Fifteen of these top-ranking officials are graduates of the military academy (23 members of the group of 156 officials hold high positions in the military or national police service).

Almost 50% of the college-educated group that reported on the subjects studied in college majored in law. Approximately half of the executive group--77 members--have engaged in post-graduate studies, 37 of them in Thai institutions, 31 in the United States, 5 in England, and 3 elsewhere in Europe. Their graduate education scatters across a wide range of fields, including MA level work in political science and law, as well as study in various social science and professional disciplines. In other words, the content of advanced education for this group ranges, but: (a) the amount of it is substantial, and (b) the proportion of these officials who have spent some time in study overseas is quite high--39 of 156, or exactly one quarter of the entire group.

These officials have also traveled widely; all but seven of them indicated that they had traveled abroad at least once; 15% of the group have made from 5 to 9 trips overseas, and 122 of them have made at least 2 trips abroad.

Homogeneity of the Group. Executive responses to a list of attitudinal items was analyzed in an effort to learn as much as possible about the homogeneity of the group. Some executives had participated in previous executive training programs; others had not. The extent to which participants in past programs were favorably disposed toward their previous experiences varied to some extent--some were "highly favorable" and others only "generally favorable."

The executives also varied according to region of birth, and--as noted above--a few of them came from rural backgrounds which distinguished them from most of the subjects of the survey. Finally, the executives varied in age and length of governmental service. Some variances in the pattern of attitudinal responses appeared related to the above-mentioned categories into which the executive group could be divided. But the striking thing, generally speaking, about this group of high ranking officials is its homogeneity. The only variable which seemed related to some significant differential patterns of opinion is years of government service. To some extent there is variance among the attitude of younger and older executives.

Executive Positions Held. The range of specific positions held by the executives who responded to this survey is substantial. In a gross and admittedly impressionistic fashion it appears that the "sample" represents substantially the full range of top-level bureaucratic positions.

POSITIONS HELD BY EXECUTIVES RESPONDING

| <u>Title of present position</u> | <u>Number of executives holding such positions</u> |
|--|--|
| Under-secretary of state | 1 |
| Deputy under-secretary of state | 7 |
| Director general of department | 18 |
| Secretary general or deputy secretary general | 4 |
| Director of a bureau | 21 |
| Director of a division | 21 |
| Provincial governor | 18 |
| Deputy director, bureau or department | 3 |
| Inspecting commissioner, ministry, department, or bureau | 12 |
| Divisional officer | 3 |
| Educational position | 10 |
| Judge or legal position | 6 |
| Military or police | 23 |

Multiple Positions. It has sometimes been noted that top-ranking officialdom in the Thai bureaucracy is "spread thin." Some individuals have been found to hold more than one important position along with a variety of insular assignments such as committee posts. The executives were asked how many positions they occupy. Twenty-six of them admitted to only one position; 14 claimed 2; 13 claimed 3 or 4;

19 admitted to the occupancy of 5 or 6 governmental posts; and 7 stated that they occupy more than 6. In other words, for the 79 respondents to this question all but 26--or about two-thirds--hold at least 2 governmental positions simultaneously, and half of the responding groups hold 3 or more positions. In addition, 29 members of the group--nearly 20%--indicated that they hold non-governmental or semi-governmental positions (i.e., positions in government corporations and enterprises outside the regular bureaucracy).

Even if it is assumed that the non-respondents to this question did not reply because they hold only one position, and therefore that for the total "sample" the percentages just mentioned should be replaced, it appears that there is some basis for the assertion that many top-ranking Thai public executives hold multiple posts.

Upward Mobility. 151 of the respondents reported the grade of the position occupied prior to the present post. Of the group, 83 were previously in first-grade positions. They are, in other words, occupying their first post at the top level of the bureaucracy. Sixty-three, however, have previously held special grade positions. Five report having moved to the special grade from a second-grade position; it is likely that these are educational officials promoted to special class professorships following the achievement of a doctorate.

Type of Responsibilities. The evidence indicates that most of the persons in this group are engaged in line administration. Only 10 academicians and 6 judicial or legal officials are included. In short, we have here a substantial collection of the special class executives responsible for the management of the bureaucracy of a

quarter of a million people in a highly centralized governmental system. A quarter of the nation's important provincial governors are among them; so are at least 20% of the directors general of departments in the various ministries. The upper levels of the police and military are likewise well represented.

Executive Orientation. What are these people like as executives? Are they problem oriented? If so, what kinds of problems do they see and what relationships appear to exist between these perceptions and their executive development training? How do they see their roles? Do the discernible characteristics of this group of executives suggest anything, or indicate anything about the relevance, the utility, the meaningfulness of the Institute of Public Administration, an agency which seeks to serve and influence the group? Is there evidence of desires or receptivities on the part of these executives which might serve as a basis for a training strategy on the part of the IPA, and how does, in fact, the IPA training strategy appear to relate to such receptivities? Finally, just how do these people feel about their experience in the executive development program, to the extent that their statements can be taken as valid?

The respondents were asked to indicate their opinion concerning many specific statements. Twenty-eight of these dealt with executive problems and needs. Twenty-one were ostensible requests for indications of preference regarding the conduct of training programs plus a series of items expressing opinions about possible benefits that might be obtained from executive development programs. Five items expressed opinions concerning the instruction and the content of the

programs in which the executives had participated.

The remaining items sought to explore opinions about the expectations of executives concerning the programs. These last items are capable of being related to the initial group of "problem" statements, the hopeful object of this probe being to see whether any discernible relationship could be found between the articulations of executive problems and the expectations of executives as participants in training programs. What have we learned?

PROBLEMS OF EXECUTIVES:

RELATIONS WITH SUPERIORS, EQUALS, AND SUBORDINATES

| <u>Problems</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | | <u>S</u> | <u>M</u> | <u>NP</u> | <u>n</u> |
| (r) <u>Relations with superiors</u> | | | | | |
| Getting my superiors to understand my work and my problems. | .86 | 32 | 70 | 53 | 155 |
| Finding out what my superiors really think. | .92 | 30 | 83 | 42 | 155 |
| Getting enough support from my superiors. | .98 | 45 | 62 | 48 | 155 |
| Getting my superiors to give me more authority. | .65 | 23 | 54 | 78 | 155 |
| Getting my superior to inform me regularly about the work of our organization so that I am appraised of our overall goals and progress. | .68 | 28 | 48 | 78 | 154 |

Legend

S---significant problem, receiving a score of 2
M---sometimes a problem, with a score of 1
NP--no problem, with a score of 0
n---number of responses

(table, problems of executives, continued)

| (b) <u>Relations with officials of the same rank</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|--------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | | <u>S</u> | <u>M</u> | <u>NP</u> | <u>n</u> |
| Obtaining cooperation from the officials of the same rank as mine. | .83 | 26 | 76 | 53 | 155 |
| (c) <u>Relations with subordinates</u> | | | | | |
| Closely supervising subordinates so they will carry out specific orders promptly and correctly. | 1.07 | 36 | 94 | 25 | 155 |
| Using rewards and punishments to cause subordinates to have the proper attitude toward the work. | .92 | 41 | 62 | 53 | 156 |
| Making sure the laws and regulations are followed properly by my subordinates. | .85 | 37 | 59 | 60 | 156 |
| Getting my subordinates to assume responsibility for work. | 1.05 | 32 | 40 | 54 | 156 |
| Getting my subordinates to make good decisions without always asking me first. | 1.08 | 51 | 67 | 38 | 156 |
| Seeing that my subordinates have enough information so that they can use good judgment when they act. | .97 | 38 | 76 | 42 | 156 |
| Getting good suggestions and recommendations from my subordinates. | .82 | 36 | 54 | 64 | 154 |
| Gaining the respect and recognition from my subordinates that my post warrants. | .60 | 33 | 27 | 95 | 155 |
| Getting my subordinates to show more enthusiasm and genuine interest in accomplishing the tasks assigned to our department division. | 1.17 | 60 | 62 | 33 | 155 |
| Correcting the mistakes of subordinates. | 1.00 | 46 | 63 | 46 | 155 |
| Resolving conflict among subordinates. | .91 | 33 | 74 | 47 | 154 |
| Handling grievances from subordinates. | .94 | 44 | 57 | 53 | 154 |

Relations with Superiors. At least two interesting items emerge: these executives are not questing after more authority; half of them state specifically that getting superiors to delegate more authority is not a problem, and only 23 of 155 respondents consider this to be a serious problem. Similarly these executives are not concerned about the inadequacy of the information they obtain from their superiors; they do not need information from above about what is going on. To some extent, however, they do have a problem of getting their superiors to accept some kinds of information.

About 20% of the group feel that their superiors do not understand their work and their problems. Nearly three-fourths of the group feel that they have some problem--and in some cases a serious problem--in finding out what their superiors "really think." The attitudes of superiors--rather than the adequacy of authority--concern these executives. They feel that they have a problem in maintaining appropriate and sufficient access to and rapport with their superiors. This shows up in another response: nearly 30% of these high ranking officials feel that a significant problem is "getting enough support from my superiors." This was designated as a significant problem twice as frequently as inadequate authority.

To a considerable extent the type of "support" which these officials seek is not additional authority nor is it additional information. What is it then? The evidence does not tell us, but does suggest that a prime concern of these executives is with personal acceptance by superiors rather than a concern over obtaining the tools for action from superiors.

Question: do these officials look toward executive development programs as instruments for improving the efficacy of their relationships with their superiors? The answer, to the extent that evidence furnished later in this section affords an answer, is not clearly affirmative. Rather much of the utility of the program seems to be perceived as contributing to the effectiveness of lateral cooperation, something which these executives tend to regard as a moderate problem.

Relations with Subordinates. If executives are concerned about some generalized aspects of their relationships with superiors, they are also concerned about aspects of their relationships with subordinates, although the pattern of this concern is by no means entirely clear. These executives do not have a widespread, abiding confidence in their own subordinates. On one hand, one of their important problems is "closely supervising subordinates" so they will behave properly and not make mistakes. At the same time, they say that they have problems getting subordinates to assume responsibility and to make good decisions without prior consultation. The most serious problem of all in the field of relations with subordinates is getting the latter to show more enthusiasm and interest in the work. Only about 20% of the executives say that this is not a problem.

Perhaps there is some inconsistency here: on one hand a felt need for close supervision and on the other hand a feeling that subordinates should show more enthusiasm and interest in the work. But note, too, that one significant problem perceived by the executive group is correcting the mistakes of subordinates. More than two-thirds

also indicate some lack of confidence in the competence of subordinates. For nearly 30% of the group this is a significant problem. Yet it is also a problem to get subordinates to make good decisions without checking with the boss.

These problem perceptions seem more linked with a control orientation than with a desire for a more effective set of inducements of another variety. At any rate, the use of punishments and rewards, and the provision of employees with information, are regarded as less serious problems than the problem of closely supervising subordinates.

Getting suggestions from subordinates is not a problem, at least not a primary problem, perhaps because subordinates are not regarded as a vital source of suggestions.

At the same time, these executives are "status secure" in their relations with subordinates. They get respect and recognition. They do not feel equally certain that they get desired performance.

Given the concerns manifested and the apparent problem perceptions of executives, it would seem that this area of superior-subordinate relations would offer a ripe guide to the content of executive development training. Yet in a list of 15 benefits of executive development training programs ranked by the executives themselves, the perceived utility of the programs in improving superior-subordinate relationships was ranked ninth and tenth--that is, the two items dealing with the possible benefits were ranked ninth and tenth.

Executive Problems. The survey sought to probe other dimensions of the executive function, as perceived by respondents, by asking about problems. Information was sought about attitudes toward "work" problems, toward problems of external relationships, and toward problems of the executive as a leader and discussant in group efforts. The results are shown in the following table:

PROBLEMS OF EXECUTIVES

| <u>Attitude item</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|--------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | | <u>S</u> | <u>M</u> | <u>NP</u> | <u>n</u> |
| Finding better ways to check up on work. | 1.19 | 61 | 63 | 31 | 155 |
| Getting enough information so I can make the best possible decisions. | 1.17 | 62 | 58 | 36 | 156 |
| Getting enough support from other organizations (such as other departments, the civil service commission, etc.). | 1.12 | 49 | 75 | 31 | 155 |
| Discovering better ways to do the work. | 1.10 | 50 | 58 | 48 | 156 |
| Planning the work so it will go smoothly. | 1.06 | 51 | 63 | 42 | 156 |
| Discovering mistakes before it is too late. | 1.01 | 50 | 58 | 48 | 156 |
| Maintaining good relations with the public. | .72 | 42 | 28 | 85 | 155 |
| Participating in group discussions and meetings effectively. | .71 | 35 | 40 | 79 | 154 |

Legend

S---significant problem, receiving a score of 2
M---sometimes a problem, with a score of 1
NP---no problem, with a score of 0
n---number of responses

(table, problems of executives, continued)

| <u>Attitude item</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------------|----------|-----------|----------|
| | | <u>S</u> | <u>M</u> | <u>NP</u> | <u>n</u> |
| Leading group discussions; acting as chairman of a committee. | .58 | 20 | 50 | 84 | 154 |
| Writing reports. | .55 | 29 | 26 | 99 | 154 |

Writing reports is clearly the least consequential problem perceived by these executives--probably because, in the first place, the executives themselves do not write many reports, but rely upon subordinates for this work, and because, in the second place, significant communication at the upper level of the bureaucracy appears to be handled orally to a very substantial extent.

Second only to report writing as a non-problem is relations with the public. Many of these officials have little or no direct working relation with sectors of the public.* They operate in a bureaucracy which has only the smallest and most indirect dependence upon "public support" for efforts to claim resources and mandates. They exist in a setting which is abidingly hierarchical, and in which the public is regarded as occupying a lower stratum in the hierarchy of society than do officials--and these officials hold positions near the top of the hierarchy. Yet some of them, perhaps in police work or in other fields where efforts are made to mobilize public cooperation in particular programs, are concerned about public relations.

* For a discussion of this tendency and for general terms within the Thai culture, see James N. Mosel in Pye, Communications in Political Development, Princeton University Press, 1964.

Group leadership does not loom large as a perceived problem. These officials have no conscious difficulty in working as members of groups or in leading groups. In this respect, their aplomb is enviable; it is probably a function of their perception of status.

Decisions and Control. The problems lie elsewhere. They involve the sensed inadequacy of information for decision-making. Apparently some of this information concerns the way in which work is proceeding, for "finding better ways to check up on work" is at least as serious a problem in the minds of these executives as "getting enough information for decision-making." The two items probably cover the same general posture and suggest a substantial concern with control.

Work planning and improvements in work methods are considered to be somewhat less serious problems, although the responses to items concerning these subjects are not sharply different. The information obtained from this section of the survey gives an impression of executives aware of the need for information for decision-making purposes, equally aware of problems of controlling what goes on in their organization, and almost as much concerned with the way in which work is organized. One cannot know, however, the extent to which this concern with work organization and planning is essentially a concern with "checking up" and controlling. In any event, the "decisional" orientation of these Thai managers need not be regarded as similar to that manifested by Western executives; one would expect that Thai decisional concerns are to a large degree concerns with subordinates and their actual or anticipated behavior.

Lateral Relations. The Thai executives indicate that they have substantial problems in their external relations--in relations that involve the mobilization of support from other organizations. Nearly a third of the group rate this as a severe or significant problem; another half of them admit to having at least moderate difficulties in obtaining sufficient support. In this emphatically hierarchical, "line-oriented" bureaucracy, the upper-level executives seem secure in their sense of power within their own organization, considerably less secure in their generalized relationships with superiors, status-secure in relations with subordinates, much less sanguine about the performance propensities and competence of those subordinates, and engaged in less than satisfactory lateral relationships with other bureaucratic units. The system in which they exist is not designed to enhance and promote effective lateral inter-organizational relationships.

Perceived Utilities of Executive Development Training. If there is verity in the evidence that lateral external relations are a problem, and if the IPA's executive development programs are perceived by participants as having substantial utilities, the perceived benefits of training should include contributions to the resolution of problems of lateral relationships. This assumption tends to be borne out.

148 of the 155 respondents agreed that "executive training programs are best if there is a mixture of officials from different ministries." 116 of them disagreed with the statement that such programs "are best if all or most of the officials come from the

same ministry." The participants also believe that executive development programs should include "only officials of one rank." (111 agreed, 18 disagreed, and 26 "didn't know.") Yet 60 participants did assert that "it would be good to include their important subordinates" in executive development training programs, another 52 disagreeing with this statement.

In the Thai bureaucracy it is possible for an executive and his important subordinates to occupy positions of the same general rank, such as special grade; hence, there is no full inconsistency between these two responses, and the general evidence suggests that training programs are valued in part as devices for facilitating informal lateral relationships among executives of the same rank but not necessarily of the same organization. In fact, 116 of 154 respondents disagreed with the statement that executive training programs "are best if all or most of the officials come from the same ministry." To a very substantial extent these participants do perceive the utility of executive development programs with mixed participation as a means of dealing with at least one of the problems they sense.

The following table ranks in order of declining significance the benefits of executive development training perceived by participating executives.

PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

| <u>Benefits</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|---|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|
| | | <u>Agree</u> | <u>Don't Know</u> | <u>Disagree</u> | <u>No.</u> |
| A good executive training program encourages participants to exchange ideas. | + .99 | 152 | 1 | 0 | 153 |
| One of the most important benefits...is to teach officials better ways to do their work. | + .95 | 149 | 7 | 0 | 156 |
| Enables an official to become better acquainted with other officials; then he can sometimes deal directly with them instead of following formal channels. | + .94 | 149 | 2 | 4 | 155 |
| Perhaps the most important benefit of an executive training program is the friendships and good relations it produces among officials. | + .92 | 145 | 7 | 3 | 155 |
| A major value...is to make executives more aware of the nature of problems of administration. | + .92 | 142 | 11 | 1 | 154 |
| A major value...: it makes the participants discover new ideas for themselves. | + .91 | 142 | 9 | 2 | 153 |
| A chance to get rid of the problems of being an executive by talking them over with others is also an important benefit. | + .90 | 141 | 14 | 1 | 156 |
| Executive training saves time because it teaches officials to work faster. | + .87 | 138 | 14 | 3 | 155 |

Legend concerning scores:

A positive response was given a weight of +1; a "don't know" response was given a weight of 0; and a disagreeing response was given a weight of -1. Therefore, the range of possible scores is from +1 to -1.

(table, perceived benefits of executive development program, continued)

| <u>Benefits</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Frequencies</u> | | | |
|--|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|------------|
| | | <u>Agree</u> | <u>Don't Know</u> | <u>Disagree</u> | <u>No.</u> |
| It helps an executive learn how to make better use of his subordinates. | + .85 | 138 | 14 | 3 | 155 |
| It causes better understanding between subordinates and their superiors. | + .75 | 124 | 25 | 7 | 156 |
| One important effect of executive training: it helps an official advance his own career. | + .74 | 121 | 30 | 4 | 155 |
| It enables busy executives to escape from their offices for a few days to think and exchange ideas with other executives. | + .72 | 117 | 25 | 4 | 156 |
| Executive training is important to the political development of Thailand; it enables executives to help the government make better policy decisions. | + .69 | 116 | 31 | 9 | 156 |
| It can help increase the prestige of an official by making him known to other officials. | + .66 | 10 | | | |
| Participating in an executive training program can increase the prestige of an official; those who participate gain respect in their ministries and departments. | + .36 | 72 | 68 | 16 | 156 |

The responses to these statements show a rather consistently high positive orientation. In general, the executives tend to agree with the statements concerning the benefits one might find in executive training programs of the kind in which they have been participating under the auspices of the IPA. (Of course, no effort was made to

create a situation in which the "ideal" or median response would produce a score of zero for the collection of items--nor would there have been any particular utility in such an effort.) At the same time it is reassuring to note that there is a perceivable variance within the pattern of response. The respondents did not merely go through the schedule and check "agree" for every item; therefore, it seems logical to derive certain assumptions from the differentials noted in the responses to the individual items in this table.

There was a considerable variation in the specificity of the opinion statements: in some cases more than one factor was clearly incorporated within a given item, making it impossible to determine precisely whether one factor or another was the primary basis for the elicited response. Within these limitations, however, the evaluation of the executive development program does cast some light on the meaningfulness of the experience.

Four of the five top-ranking items dealt specifically with relations and interaction among executives. This is clearly where a substantial benefit is perceived to lie. And this is interesting for two reasons:

- (1) In order to produce this type of benefit, an executive development program does not have to rely upon a high level of specialized professional input of any particular sort. All that is necessary is a sufficient contentual justification for holding the program, so that it may serve as a vehicle for its important perceived purpose.

(2) This particular value perception does not readily classify as either "traditional" or "modernizing." If modern be equated with performance-oriented, then undoubtedly, there is something of a modernizing posture in the perceptions of values noted by participants. Yet the Thai bureaucracy has been long characterized by its traditional reliance upon personalism as a basis for action. "Training" experiences which enhance and contribute to the establishment and maintenance of effective personal relationships may help sustain traditional modes-- particularly in the face of problems of mobilizing support across organizational lines in a system which has consistently grown larger and more complex than it once was. All in all, this is a matter capable only of speculative treatment.

Yet the utility and meaningfulness of IPA executive development efforts does come clear. A substantial range of benefits is explicitly perceived, and the ITA receives a relatively high positive "rating" for its executive development training from those who have participated. It cannot be said that the most valued benefits of that training is clearly linked with a modernizing, anti-traditional thrust. This, of course, is hardly a criticism. An institute of public administration visibly and intensely dedicated to revolutionary goals might not be able to mobilize a substantial amount of participation on the part of high-ranking officials with massive

commitments to the status quo.

The executives have also found some diffuse benefits from their training venture. They are "more aware of the nature of problems of administration." They exchange ideas. They also perceive some specific functional pay-offs--training helps an executive learn how to make better use of his subordinates. And, to a statistically significant lesser extent, executive training promotes better understanding between subordinates and superiors. To some degree, these executives see themselves "making better use" of subordinates by more effectively controlling and manipulating them--not by more egalitarian relationships or by greater rapport.

More than two-thirds of the participating executives assert that their training improves the quality of policy decisions. This is, of course, impressive, although the precise significance of the finding is by no means clear. More to the point perhaps is the fact that the decision-making benefit is perceived as less important than other qualities mentioned above.

An effort to probe perceptions of training benefits was made by including items professing to identify personal benefits at three different levels of specificity. About seventy-five percent of the group was willing to agree that executive development training helps an official to advance his own career in general. Only about two-thirds were willing to agree that executive training can enhance the prestige of an official "by making him known to other officials." But when the question deals with a personal pay-off in the form of increased respect within one's own ministry or department, the responses are much less

hesitatingly affirmative. Sixty-eight of the 156 officials didn't know whether this was a benefit, and 16 had the boldness to disagree with the statement--the largest number of disagreements obtained in this group of questions. The IPA is not seen as enhancing the prestige of participants in their own territory.

In an admittedly impressionistic fashion it would appear that the IPA serves as a vehicle, enabling high-ranking officials to engage in mutually beneficial activities. It does not "confer" anything upon these executives. Their status and prestige are not greatly affected by the participation; hence the IPA is not in the position of an "allocator" when it comes to the status of executives. Yet it is not a "resistant" organization. The participants find the IPA's service worth their while.

The Executive Role, Self Perceived. The executives see themselves as decision makers. 149 of the 155 of them agreed with this statement. "The part of an executive's job that is more important than any other part is making decisions."

Decisions about what? Apparently, about "how to get more work accomplished," and "how to discover new and better ways to get the work done." (Previous statement on executive expectations might well fit here.)

As noted earlier, the executives do not appear to have a "policy-making" orientation. At least, as a group, they are much more sensitized to the "work" perspective on their jobs than to a "policy-making" perspective. While practically all of them agree that they have major responsibility concerning the work; 40 of them either did not know, or did not agree with, a statement that "executive development training enables participants to help make better policy decisions." This of course does not mean that executives are not engaged in making policy. (116 respondents did, for that matter, agree that executive development training should help them make better policy decisions); it means only that there is a more abiding thematic self-perception of executive responsibility for the work than a self-perception of executive responsibility for the policy.

If "the work" is so important, how do the executives feel about their role as supervisors, and what expectations do they have concerning superior-subordinate relations in which they are involved as superiors?

First, they agree strongly that "the most important part of supervising officials is to divide the work fairly." 139 of 153

respondents agreed with this statement. The norms of "fairness" may, of course, be particular to the culture. The executives don't feel that they must dominate their subordinates by demonstrating superior competence and efficiency. Only 99 of 153 respondents agreed that the best way to control subordinates is to manifest superior proficiency. In fact, the level of agreement with this statement seems extraordinarily high for a bureaucratic system in which status tends to be largely self-justifying.

The Thai bureaucracy is, of course, a complex system. With all its "personalism" and emphasis upon status differentiation, there is still a strong productivity theme within it. This orientation is reflected by the fact that 118 of 156 executives agreed with the following statement: "loyalty to the superior is not so important as other qualities in a subordinate. So long as the subordinate is not disloyal, it is more important that he be able to do the work." Only 13 of the executive respondents--less than 10 per cent--explicitly disagreed with this statement. On the other hand, 33 disagreed with the statement that "loyalty to the superior is the most important quality in a good subordinate," while 61 of 156 respondents agreed with this statement. Another 62 executives, finding themselves pulled in more than one direction as they sought to respond to this latter statement, indicated that they didn't know if the statement is correct. Clearly the expectation of personal loyalty is a powerful theme in the bureaucracy, although the executives recognize, many of them, that it is not legitimate or admissible as a paramount theme. The ideal must be the loyal employee who also can do what is expected of him.

The "competency expectation" toward subordinates is manifested in the response made by executives to the following statement: "the best kinds of subordinates are officials who can work well under any kind of superior." 139 of 155 respondents agreed, and only 8 disagreed with this statement. Whatever the agreement may mean, it clearly indicates verbal acknowledgment of a norm other than personal loyalty as the prime attribute of a desirable subordinate.

The executive development programs of the IPA include substantial attention to the Western-derived subject of "human relations." The programs also incorporate discussions of "democratic supervision." These ideas have been brought into the program from a cultural context in which egalitarianism is a significant norm and in which the organizational roles of individuals are not the sole--or necessarily prime--sources of their status. The Thai bureaucracy on the other hand, is emphatically stratified, and the broadly viewed status of a high ranking official is essentially, if not entirely, a function of his bureaucratic position. Democratic supervision, with its emphasis upon consultation and upon a respect for an appreciation of the large scope of the personality of subordinates, is in some way alien to the Thai tradition. In this tradition, respect for individuals--including subordinates--is real, but so are the rights of superior status and authority. With these ideas in mind, an effort has been made to probe for the possible normative impact of the content of a central element of executive development training power to see how the Thai executives "handle" the premises which have been fed to them. Here are some of the results:

Attitudes Toward Democratic Supervision

| <u>Attitude Items</u> | <u>Score</u> | <u>Agree</u> | <u>Don't Know</u> | <u>Disagree</u> | <u>Number</u> |
|--|--------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|---------------|
| 1. Democratic supervision is a good idea; it is the best kind of supervision. | + .75 | 120 | 33 | 3 | 156 |
| 2. There are many cases where democratic supervision simply does not work-- because subordinates cannot understand it or do not believe in it. | + .43 | 89 | 43 | 23 | 155 |
| 3. Democratic supervision is a good idea; but it is quite inconsistent with Thai tradition. | + .22 | 68 | 44 | 43 | 155 |
| 4. Democratic supervision may make a superior look weak in the eyes of his subordinates. | + .06 | 53 | 38 | 64 | 156 |

What meaning may be inferred from this interesting distribution of responses? First, although there is some clear resistance, the executives evidence a tendency to feel they should agree with the broad, general idea that democratic supervision is good--"the best kind of supervision." But they are also quite strongly inclined to agree with the statement that substantially qualifies their position. Nearly 60 percent of the group believe that there are many cases where this approach will not work. More than 40 percent of the group agree that democratic supervision is inconsistent with Thai traditions. Less than 30 percent assert that democratic supervision is not inconsistent with these traditions. In fact, more than a third of the group believe that there is danger in this form of supervision--it may make a superior look weak.

Thus we have an interesting set of circumstances: 77 percent of the group are willing to come out in favor of democratic supervision as

a good idea in general. But some of this 77 percent must be among the 33 percent of the group feeling that, in practice, there are real dangers in democratic supervision. An even greater part of the "supporters in principle" must also be included in the 57 percent of the respondents who believe that, in practice, there are many cases when democratic supervision does not work.

In conclusion it would seem that the impact of the substance of the IPA's executive development training must include an element of dissonance. It carries the respondents to the point where they are willing to agree verbally with an espoused principle, but it also leaves them at a point where they perceive conflict between that principle and other established values. From here one may argue in either of two ways: (a) that this constitutes "movement toward modernity;" the minds of the executives are being opened up, and they are made aware of norms and styles, and this is a requisite for transcending that which was previously unconsciously accepted; or (b) that there really is no substantial behavioral impact of the principle espoused in this facet of the training program, and that the generalized preaching is rejected in the face of abiding institutional characteristics which are to some extent manifested in the pattern of responses shown above.

Acceptability of the IPA Executive Development Program. The pattern which has been established and followed for 14 programs over a period of five years is, by and large, thoroughly acceptable. Under that pattern participants come together at some comfortable spot relatively remote from Bangkok to work and talk and live together for approximately two weeks. Nearly half of those executives would be willing to participate

in such a program once a year (67 out of 154, compared with 54 who would not desire to do so.)

About a third of the participants, however, agreed with this statement: "After a person has participated...there is no need to do it again, except when some important knowledge can be given to the participant by the trainer." The substantial majority find that the benefits of the program do not lie in "important new knowledge." They do not object to being taken away from their work (103 of 153 responded disagreeing with the statement: "The greatest cost of an executive training program is time. It takes the executive away from his work.") An even greater number rejected the idea of holding the programs in Bangkok "where officials can keep in touch with their offices." Only 25 persons favored such an arrangement. Even fewer favored the idea of holding training courses in late afternoon or weekend sessions. And while 114 of the 154 respondents agreed with the opinion that "each department or ministry should conduct its own executive training program," 148 favored the idea that "executive training programs are best if there is a mixture of officials from different ministries."

All of these responses sustain the interpretation that a prime benefit of the programs is associational.

Of course, these participants were willing to agree with a diffuse statement of this sort: "The chief responsibility of the trainers is to give us new and better information." Only 4 of 153 respondents disagreed with this, while another 13 didn't know. There is, however, some basis for assuming that the executives are not irresistably impressed by the content of the training program. Many were willing to agree

with a statement that was at least implicitly critical of the trainers --a statement that "the trainers do not always understand the way the civil service works." Fifty respondents agreed with this statement; 60 didn't know, and 45 of 155 disagreed. There was no clear concurrence with the premise that the trainers are highly knowledgeable concerning the civil service system and the way it works.

This is not to be taken as unmitigated criticism. The evidence does not tell us anything of the expectations of the executives concerning the needs of the trainers to have such knowledge in order to perform their jobs well. Yet if the object of the program is to enhance executive effectiveness in a particular bureaucracy, it is plausible to assume that the trainer ought not to demonstrate a substantial lack of knowledge of how the system works. In the eyes of the executive development program participants, however, they have rather clearly done so.

This perception that the trainers have a limited understanding of the bureaucracy is congruent with a perception expressed by members of the IPA staff--a general feeling that the staff is somewhat lacking in bureaucratic experience, and that this lack constitutes a weakness or limitation when it comes to conducting executive development training.

Executive Perceptions of Training Needs and Utilities

Perceptions of the bureaucracy: Executives were asked to evaluate the following statement: "... customary ways in the

bureaucracy⁷ are sometimes inefficient." 118 of 155 agreed with this statement, although 17 did not agree and 20 did not know. On a scale in which the highest agreement would be measured by a score of 1.00, the executives scored .65. They were exposed to another item: "The work of the civil service is changing and new ideas are needed." Here the level of agreement was lower; 100 of the 154 participants agreed; 32 didn't know, and 22 disagreed. The score for their responses was .51.

Executive Expectations. What did the executives "want" or hope to get from participation in executive development training? They were invited to respond to a series of items, each clued by such language as "an important thing I want to learn is," or "the chief purpose of executive training should be." Using a scoring arrangement under which 100 percent affirmative response to an item would produce a score of plus 1.00 and a complete rejection of a statement, a score of minus 1.00, the following responses were obtained: x

x Responses were scored in the following manner:

1. Each respondent was permitted a choice from among three responses: "Agree," "Don't Know," and "Disagree." These responses were given numerical values. Thus:

| | | |
|----------|------------|-------|
| Disagree | Don't Know | Agree |
| (-1) | (0) | (+1) |

Given a set of distributed responses, the group's "aggregate" response to an item can be specified numerically. Thus: Disagree: 20; Don't Know: 15; Agree: 30.

$$\text{Score} = \frac{(f d) + (f dn) + (f a)}{N}$$

The chief purpose should be "to increase efficiency by showing officials how to get more work accomplished." Score: .96.* 150 of 156 responded affirmatively.

147 agreed that they wanted to learn "how to discover new and better ways to get work done." The score for this item: .94.

An important result of a successful executive training program "will be less waste and delay in the work of departments and ministries." Score: .93. 145 of 156 respondents agreed--and none disagreed--with this statement. (Eleven "didn't know.")

143 of the group felt that they wanted to learn "how to reduce mistakes in the way the work is done." Only five respondents rejected this statement, and the item obtained a score of .88.

Next in rank was an expressed desire to "learn...how to analyze my problems as an executive." 141 respondents averred that this was an important object of the exercise for them, and only seven disagreed with the statement. Score for the item: .86.

Next in rank was an expressed desire to "learn...how to get along with officials of the same rank as mine." 140 of 156 respondents

$$*Score = \frac{1(-1.20) + (0.15) + (1.30)7}{65}$$

$$+ \frac{10}{65}$$

$$= +.15$$

Each score manifesting group attitude is a composite of three factors, in which all three possible responses are weighted by the frequency of their occurrence.

agreed with the statement, and 7 disagreed. Score for the item: .85.

To a markedly lesser extent, the executives "want to learn... how to be as effective as possible in relations with my superiors." 130 said they had this objective, and only 6 disagreed with this item. Score: .79.

112 respondents agreed that "an important thing I want to learn... is how to control my subordinates." Twenty-two respondents, however, disagreed with this statement, which received a score of .58.

It is rather interesting to note the dominance of a productivity orientation in these responses. Increased efficiency, better ways to do work, ways to cut down on waste and delay--these are the averred benefits ranked highest in the asserted expectations of executives who have participated in the programs. They want to know how to analyze their problems, but these problems appear to be articulated in terms that could be characterized by the label "achievement" or "productivity" oriented.

Yet better productivity does not necessarily mean the "productivity-rational" organization of work. It does not mean learning how to control subordinates according to the response elicited to a statement concerning this. More important than the control of subordinates is learning how to improve relations with superiors, at least according to these particular responses.

In short, the meaningfulness or significance of these responses is quite difficult to assess. Elsewhere the participants have indicated that the benefits they perceive from participation in the programs is the improvement of associations with their peer group, and these are

evidently regarded as important to "success" in whatever terms this may be defined by the respondents. Perhaps the participants want to learn "how to be a better executive" in a sense of how better to perform the roles they visualize themselves as occupying--but without linking this vision in any sharp, comprehensive fashion to their functions as supervisors needing to better control subordinates, or as managers needing to know how to more effectively organize complex processes. They are willing to verbalize against the "bad things," and they have expectations regarding the improvement of their lateral relations and relations with superiors. 140 of the group hope to improve lateral relations; only 130 have an equal concern with upward relations; and only 112 are willing to express a perceived need for how to better control subordinates. Perhaps an assertion of need here would be tantamount to an admission of the inadequacies of superior status.

An Assessment of Institutionalization in this Sector

Speculation about the significance of these findings seems in order here: The evidence suggests that an accommodation has been achieved in an important sector of the IPA program, between the content (and doctrine) of that program and the normative-cognitive set of the customers or participants.

Interestingly, this has not been the consequence of a fully deliberate strategy. Rather, the impetus to the effort grew out of more or less stipulated assumptions concerning germaneness and utility--assumptions transferred over from a Western context--plus what might be called, somewhat loosely but suggestively, an "entrepreneurial posture" on the part of those in the IPA responsible for the development of the

training enterprise, including its executive development sector.

The accommodation consisted of the establishment of a viable process, or a merchandisable product--one which is not conceived in the IPA as inconsistent with doctrine and broad goals; and one which is perceived by the customers as meaningful and useful, although not necessarily in terms of the substantive norms or doctrine presumably held by the IPA Inservice Training Division management and the top-level of the IPA.

This accommodation evolved some time after the IPA was established; executive development training did not begin to flourish until about 1961. The key to its initiation was the impetus provided by foreign advisors who sought to come to terms with the training situation in a way different from their predecessors. But the ground had been prepared. There was a latent basis for response to the impetus. A training division existed; a series of activities had more or less established a precedent and a diffuse acceptance; the legitimacy of the activity did not have to be asserted.

(The fact that the impetus came so much from the foreign side is undoubtedly related to the fact that the participant training facet of the effort to create the IPA included no deliberate, systematic effort to establish a core group of training specialists. In fact, the only Thai sent overseas in connection with the development of the IPA who wrote a dissertation in the field of management development serves as director of research, and has no substantial involvement in training activities or executive development.)

VI

CONCLUSIONS

"...institution building has been defined as: The planning, structuring and guidance of new or reconstituted organizations which (a) embody changes in values, functions, physical and/or social technologies, (b) establish, foster and protect new normative relationship and action patterns, and (c) attain support and complementarity in the environment."

An organization "...is an 'institution' insofar as it reaches into the environment, setting performance standards and process patterns which are guidelines for other organizations in the society." *

Was an "institution" created in the course of the efforts to establish the Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University, in Bangkok, Thailand? If so, what sort of institution? What can be said about the strategy of institution-building in this case, and about the problems of institution-building that were encountered? Was the strategy sound? Were the problems met? And are there any utterly tentative generalizations that might be derived from this decade-long effort at institutional development?

The Basic Conclusion

Between 1955 and 1965 the Institute of Public Administration did become established--"established" in the sense that it was a going concern, with a program, a staff, a set of clients, an acceptable identity, and a stable supply of resources sufficient to enable it to continue.

* "Inter-University Research Program in Institution-Building," Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, n.d., n.p.

It could and did induce a flow of contributions from those who participated in its activities sufficient to keep it in existence. The IPA was "meaningful" enough to its leaders, its staff, its students, its trainees, and others in its environment--meaningful enough to assure the likelihood of its continuation.

The absorption of the IPA into a new, bigger entity was evidence of success rather than anything else--the successful effort to present the IPA as the resource core for an expanded organization to engage in an enlarged set of activities in Thailand.

The IPA represented a new departure in Thailand. The graduate program in public administration was the first of its kind in the country, and the stature of that program was officially recognized in a Civil Service Commission regulation setting the value of the IPA degree, for pay purposes, as equal to that of a foreign degree.

The inservice training program was also a new departure--not in the sense that training was a new activity in Thailand, for it was not. But executive development training was new, as was the establishment of an "administrative training center" for the Thai bureaucracy.

Finally, the effort to establish a service research unit concerned with public administration was new. After a variety of vicissitudes, the unit was in fact brought into productive existence, and at the end of the period covered by this study it was conducting some research studies and disseminating the results.

So, in short, one basic conclusion is indisputable: the decade-long effort to establish an Institute of Public Administration at Thammasat University succeeded.

The Complicated Questions

To what extent was the IPA a new "institution," in the sense that the term has been defined at the beginning of this chapter? To answer this question we must briefly consider for one final time the facts that have emerged concerning the doctrine and program, the leadership, the resources, and the internal structure of the organization.

We must also inquire into the institutional implications of the IPA's relations with its environment--the enabling, functional, normative, and other linkages by which the IPA has interacted with its setting, and possibly had a normative effect upon that setting.

Even assuming that a sufficient supply of relevant and reliable data have been obtained, there is a challenging problem involved in trying to determine the institutional quality of a particular entity such as the IPA--the problem of judgment. A real-life organization is a unique and particular entity with a subtle and complex mixture of characteristics. Statements about the essential characteristics of doctrine and leadership, for instance, in such an organization are inevitably based upon an element of judgment. With this caveat, then, let us proceed.

Doctrine

So far as internal characteristics of the IPA are concerned, the central question is simply this: what doctrine or doctrines were embodied in the organization and its program? What values and goals were built into the IPA and regarded as meaningful by the internal participants in the IPA?

The answer is by no means simple, for the doctrine of the IPA was diffuse and complex and not clearly articulated.

The asserted objectives of those who helped create the IPA cannot be taken as the organization's doctrine. These were essentially visions or anticipations, and we are interested in outcomes. The basic doctrinal characteristics of the IPA as it finally developed, however, seem to have included a mixture of logically disparate elements, or three distinguishable postures toward the Thai bureaucracy: attack, adjust, accept, and explain.

The IPA's doctrine did include some elements of an attack upon characteristics of the milieu toward which the organization's efforts were directed--attack in the sense of advancing values and goals inconsistent with normative characteristics of the bureaucracy. Other elements of doctrine were essentially "adjustive;" they did not advance normative premises fundamentally inconsistent with bureaucratic orientations, but rather sought the increased efficacy of performance, given the status quo. And to some extent the IPA's doctrine included elements of an unquestioning acceptance of the status quo. This was reflected both in the IPA's modus operandi and in some of the content of its program. Along with this one finds a truly diffuse element of doctrine, essentially an assumption of the value of developing awareness and understanding as an intrinsic, self-justifying goal.

In the academic program, for example, one finds manifestations of a belief in the utility of the conscious description of administrative processes and organizations, to some extent from perspectives which are not prescriptive, but rather aimed merely at the development of awareness. Thus, a variety of administrative concepts have been brought into play in courses on the principles of public administration, personnel administration, and organization and management. The objects--awareness and understanding,

and the enlargement of the intellectual horizons of students--are quite real. And, incidentally, some of these aims appear to have been relatively well fulfilled.

Similar goals are found in the executive development program, and to some extent perhaps in other training activities as well. Likewise, to the extent that the research program functioned, it has appeared to be oriented toward this sort of goal.

The academic program sought, however, to incorporate another type of goal: to assert certain kinds of norms, goal-orientations, and operational methods inconsistent with the Thai bureaucratic tradition. Thus, the ideas of rationality and functional specificity, efficiency, and certain other norms such as "responsibility" in a different-from-the-traditional-sense, were advanced. Achievement criteria were put forth as "good."

These normative orientations, embedded in some of the courses offered in the academic program, represented an attack on the system. Not a highly visible, highly critical attack that would alienate students from either the IPA or the bureaucracy, but non-the-less an attack perceived by some members of the staff is likely to make the students more critical of the bureaucracy. To some extent, the problem-definition-and-analysis-orientation manifested in the IPA--in some elements of its academic program and in some facets of its training activities--also amounted to a diffuse, implicit, limited attack on the bureaucratic status quo.

Yet much of the effort of the IPA seemed to be directed toward the increased efficacy of the existing system--toward accepting the system and "trying to make it work better." Certainly this was the main thrust of the executive development program, many other training activities, and in part

the academic program as well. Thus: individuals who are made more skilled and perceptive in the academic program will contribute to the efficacy of the bureaucracy.

Finally, along with all of this one finds a substantial acceptance of much of the bureaucratic status quo. The norms of the environment were also well-represented within the Institute--not only in the allocation of resources, but in what might call the "residual doctrine" of the IPA. To some extent, and to a substantial extent in the minds of some of its internal participants, the Institute existed to exist--its was a self-justifying existence, and thus in part its purposes were not really to attempt to manipulate or modify the normative elements of its environment. This inevitably obscure feature of IPA doctrine is evident in the continuance over the years of program elements whose meaningfulness in other terms was practically nil.

Given this mixed bag of doctrine, can we say that the IPA was an innovative institution, at least so far as its internal posture was concerned?

The answer is "Yes--if only to some extent." Whether the doctrinal quality achieved in the IPA was sufficient to justify the efforts and resources that went into the creation of the organization is another question, one that can only be answered by the individual judge.

Two important points remain to be made concerning the IPA's doctrine:

(1) The ability to innovate and evolve doctrine in a program of activities is probably the key indicator of the institutionalization of a doctrine.

(2) In the last analysis, doctrine cannot be viewed from a perspective that takes account only of the internal organization; the meaningfulness of

doctrine depends upon the way in which an organization reaches into the environment with it.

The evidence is by no means conclusive, but it suggests that the IPA developed a very limited ability to shape and adapt innovative doctrine within its programs. Witness the large elements of obsolescence in the academic program, plus the fact that innovations in inservice training appear to have come from outsiders. On the other hand, note some tendency for the IPA's students to move in the direction of analytical theses in the period after the foreign academic advisors had left, and recall the developments that occurred in the research methodology course. There was some institutionalization of doctrine that transcended acceptance of the status quo, although hardly an overwhelming amount of it. In fact, the limited extent of programmatic innovation within the IPA is rather convincing evidence of the mixed quality of the organization's doctrine.

As for the transfer of doctrine into the IPA's environment--the evidence is again mixed, as one might expect. One finds no signs of a radical transformation occurring among the IPA students and former students, and no evidence of changes in the managerial norms of the Thai bureaucracy. The executive development program had at best a subtle, limited sensitizing effect upon some of its participants. In part it was valued by participants for its contribution to the traditional pattern of bureaucratic behavior. Certainly resources were not allocated to the IPA on the basis of perceptions that it was producing substantial changes in the normative dimension of the Thai bureaucracy.

The easiest conclusion to reach is this: that element of IPA doctrine which asserted the value of developing understanding and awareness was accepted.

without challenge in the organization's environment. Adjustment-oriented facets of doctrine were also accepted. They were seen as enhancing the efficacy of the existing system--as through training programs for administrative technicians and the development of personal skills in the academic program. But the IPA did not come to be valued highly and granted prestige for these contributions.

In general, the IPA was accepted, rather than highly valued, by its environment. Participation in its activities did not, for instance, confer significant increments of status. The implications for the acceptance of the IPA's doctrine should be clear: On one hand, the reception of the organization's doctrine did not cause the organization to achieve a position of influence and prestige; and on the other hand, the perceived status of the organization and its limited ability to confer something of value upon those who participated in its efforts tended to minimize or limit the authoritativeness of its perceived doctrine.

The IPA operated in a setting where power, status, and even to some extent preferred personal identity are bureaucratic. The bureaucracy is emphatically hierarchical, and "staff functions" in the Western sense of that term are ultimately inconsistent with the prime norms governing authority. As an academic organization, and one engaged in purveying certain kinds of staff-type services to the bureaucracy, the IPA inevitably had a limited ability to exercise substantial direct influence over its environment. In considering the doctrinal impact of the Institute this fact must be considered, for it helps explain two things: the limited direct impact of IPA doctrine, and the inherent logic of a "diffuse doctrinal strategy," in which the IPA did not, and could not assert a focused posture of attack upon bureaucratic

attributes. Granted that this posture was essentially unconscious and unpremeditated--and even inconsistent with the thinking of some of the IPA's founders--it is understandable.

It boils down to this: over a fairly substantial number of years, an organization like the IPA might have a rather substantial, if indirect, impact upon its environment, given a doctrine not fundamentally different from what one found in the IPA, and given sufficient resources and leadership.

But not even ten years were enough to produce conditions of which it could be said with much emphasis that the IPA "reaches into the environment, setting performance standards and process patterns which are guidelines for other organizations in the society."

Leadership

The leadership problems of the IPA were never entirely resolved; rather, they were swept away by the absorption of the IPA into a new enterprise.

At the time of its establishment the IPA was coopted by its environment, through the selection of an initial leader who was politically acceptable, possessed of suitable professional status, and able to procure resources and to mobilize participation in the emerging enterprise. Later, another leadership structure developed within the IPA. The chief members of this group were convinced of the importance of applying within the IPA (and to some extent asserting as matters of doctrine) norms inconsistent with established bureaucratic tradition.

In effect, when it was created, the environment penetrated the Institute to a considerable extent. Relationships that might have been conceived of as "linkages"--i.e., transactions with the environment--became internal relationships, and environmental norms were internalized within the IPA. What might have been normative linkages became instead features of the IPA's norm structure, and the IPA's doctrines were rather pervasively affected as well. Yet the situation contained at least the seeds of change. The initial leadership helped bring into existence an entity capable of asserting other norms, and conceivably of modifying the IPA's doctrine as well.

The story of leadership in the IPA is a vivid illustration of a central problem of building institutions. Effective leadership must relate the organization to its environment in a way that will enable survival and appropriate growth. It must procure and maintain mandates, get resources, and allocate them within the enterprise in ways that will largely determine

its nature. It must produce an effective adjustment between the needs of the organization and the environmental norms and values that are reflected in such things as operating rules and regulations. Ultimately the leadership must claim and establish the legitimacy of the organization. The initial leadership of the IPA did these things, the organization became a going concern. At a price, of course. That price was essentially a doctrinal orientation less than wholly compatible with the intended aims of certain other parties to the institution-building effort.

A number of interesting and relevant questions are raised by the leadership experience of the IPA. In considering them, one must always be aware of the acute difference between abstract questions and concrete realities. In the case of the IPA there were probably no viable alternatives to what did occur.

In principle, however, one can ask: in an institution-building effort which includes an attempt to produce a leadership structure committed to a certain sort of doctrinal posture, might it be preferable to defer the establishment of the organization involved until the leadership structure has evolved, or might it be possible to provide for a transitional leadership that would establish an organization and then be supplanted by another set of leaders? (This, in effect, was done many times in Thailand during the bureaucratic reconstruction of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Foreigners were brought in to establish organizations, and to select and train their own successors. We are, of course, no longer in the late 19th or early 20th centuries, and it is quite doubtful whether the old Thai pattern of innovation could be applied in many contemporary cases.)

The effects of the leadership structure upon the character of the IPA as it developed were numerous. Resource allocations, discussed at length in various sections of this study, were much affected by the value orientation brought into play by the leadership. This in turn affected the levels of competence within the organization, perceptions of appropriate behavior, and assumptions about organizational purpose.

Of course, a variety of other factors came into play in determining resource allocations, including fortuity itself: the fall in 1957 of the Phibul regime under which the IPA was begun, and the unsettled character of the environment for more than a year following this, made it practically impossible for the IPA to obtain certain important allocations from its environment. In plain language, participants were returning from abroad, and there were no positions for some of them.

Environmental norms also affected resource allocations within the IPA. Witness: the inability to obtain first grade classifications for non-academic positions, and the consequent usurpation of academic slots in order to provide appropriate rank for personnel. Whether under different leadership a different pattern of resource allocation might have been achieved is a matter about which one can only speculate.

One can only wonder, too, if different leadership would have significantly altered the IPA's doctrinal content and the IPA's doctrinal impact on its environment. It is quite possible; but this is only speculation. It is fairly easy to envision an ideal situation. Given the circumstances that really did exist one can only surmise and note that in the real world with all of its relativism there is usually a considerable gap between visions and ventures. One final point:

protecting and maintaining an institutional leadership structure--plus a supporting cadre-- in a hostile environment may be more difficult than establishing it in the first place.

Two factors seem to account for this, and both are rather obvious. One is simply attrition. In an environment marked by expanding opportunities people may be lured from the organization faster than they can be replaced. This can break down the leadership structure and the whole cadre of committed personnel, for that matter. The second factor is subversion, or the gradual erosion of commitment to a doctrine which is inconsistent with important norms and values of the immediate environment.

In the Thai case two lines of attack appeared to help meet the latter threat. One was partial insulation of the core staff from the corrosive influence of the environment by an effective requirement that they occupy substantially "full-time" positions. The other was to periodically remove them from the Thai setting for reindoctrination and "normative reinforcement," through sabbatical-type arrangements. This was part of a general objective of keeping the professional staff, and particularly the leadership, imbued with a sense of professionalism in which the intended doctrinal values are embedded.

Yet, in the Thai case the problems of attrition and subversion were never fully resolved. Some attrition--the loss of extensively and expensively trained participants--resulted from administrative failure to have positions waiting for them when they returned from abroad. In other instances the indoctrination effort simply did not succeed, and trainees were lost for this reason. In still other instances commitments appear to have eroded, and staff members left the Institute for better posts elsewhere.

In this effort at institution-building, there was no sufficient or systematic effort to assess and deal with the problems of attrition and erosion or subversion. The envisioned professional cadre was never fully established. And in the teaching sector, the intended doctrinal orientation of the IPA was to a considerable extent compromised, as a result of the need to make extensive use of part-time instructors who did not substantially identify with the IPA.

Resources

"Resources" has been listed as one of the variables in the institution-building perspective, and much has already been said about the resource situation of the IPA. Resources are in a very real sense dependent variables. They depend upon such things as leadership, perceptions of doctrine and program, and effectiveness in engaging in transactions.

In the IPA resources were allocated on the basis of a variety of norms, some of them inconsistent with each other, and some of them inconsistent with a particular form of doctrine.

But the greatest resource problems of the IPA were probably the inadequacy of professional staff resources to the effective implementation of some elements of the IPA's ostensible doctrine. The instructional staff was never sufficient. The ability to commandeer resources was never commensurate with the organization's needs, given certain doctrinal assumptions, and given, too, certain compelling qualities of the IPA's environment--notably the powerful forces that drew off IPA resources.

The most obvious lesson of the IPA experience concerning resources is this: it is almost impossible to overestimate the resources

needed in an institution-building effort if this kind. Just as many small businesses founder for the failure to anticipate capital needs, many institution-building efforts undoubtedly fail or are attenuated from insufficient resources. Perhaps the general rule for initial planning might be: figure out all that's needed and multiply by three.

Another resource problem was practically ignored in the IPA case: the need for reinforcing and sustaining professional personnel operating in a highly corrosive environment--one, in other words, which quickly uses up professional capital and draws personnel off into a variety of non-professional activities in the quest for income, status, and identity. At least three members of the IPA professional staff did manage to obtain sabbatical-type leaves during the period 1962-1965, and to a small extent others were able to participate in stimulating and reinforcing scholarly activities outside of their immediate jobs. But no provision was made in the institution-building effort for protecting and reinforcing scholarly commitment and competence, and the staff who went on leave did so at the expense of presumably important organizational obligations. This is almost beyond any doubt one of the resource requirements for the building and maintenance of an institution whose doctrine depends upon scholarly or other professional commitment and competence.

The IPA and the Environment

IPA-environmental relations of many kinds took place at many different levels over the years of the organization's existence. Mandates were claimed--initially as an almost automatic consequence of the negotiations that led to the decision to create the Institute. Resources were procured--initially from the foreign aid program and eventually from Thai government funds contained in the Thammasat University budget. Students were recruited, training programs were established, and the IPA had by the 1960's established a stable set of relationships with its environment.

The Institute was environmentally perceived as "meaningful" enough to enable it to recruit students. Its executive development programs were never without participants. And the IPA budget was an established, practically tradition-sanctioned component of the university budget.

In the set of transactional relations between the Institute and its environment there seems to be one suggestive lesson: Environmental support depends upon the ability to appeal to premises which induce support--and not necessarily upon doctrine. Undoubtedly there are instances in which an emerging institution's manifest doctrine is sharply at odds with the value orientation of one or more allocative forces in the environment. The result is likely to be an impasse that will wreck the organization. Nothing like this happened in the Thai case.

The IPA was initially legitimized by manifestations of support from the top level of Thai government. This legitimacy was reinforced in the appointment of a high-ranking official with an elaborate network

of governmental contacts as Dean. To some extent, too, the organization was given an aura of acceptability as well as an identity by being designated as a faculty of an established university--an arrangement whose potential benefit was enhanced by the vast autonomy possessed by each of the faculties of this university.

The IPA was subject to a very small amount of substantive control by the top level of the university. It could, for all practical purposes, formulate its own program subject to no need for ratification. On the other hand, it had either to fit the organizational pattern of the university or to secure authorizations to vary from this pattern--to obtain a large number of relatively high-level permanent positions, etc.

In the first years (to about 1960), the IPA did not have to press Thai elements of its environment for resources; but by the time it had clearly become a "going concern" no great difficulty was encountered in transferring support for the Institute from foreign aid and counterpart funds to the regular Thai budget. In the interim the IPA had become an accepted entity. And, of course, it had not done anything that challenged or threatened the allocative mechanisms in its environment.

It is possible that the IPA might have foundered with the collapse of the Phibul government in 1957, for the effort to create the Institute was closely identified with Marshal Phibulsongkram and General Phao, both of whom fled at the time of Marshal Sarit's take-over. But the IPA was at that time also an element of the American foreign aid program, and this may have helped protect it from attack. Also, the Institute's general aims were not construed as "political," nor uniquely linked to the Phibul regime: Sarit, in fact, was in some ways more dedicated to bureaucratic effectiveness than

his predecessor. The Dean, who had been to a moderate extent identified as a member of the Phibul-Phao "camp," adroitly and successfully established himself within the new regime as an acceptable and unthreatening man, and this did the Institute no harm.

Rather quickly the IPA's M.A. program built up a clientele, and to some extent clientele support was enhanced by the monetarization of the M.A. degree. Thus IPA academic training promised to enhance the rewards available from the bureaucracy, while access to students at least afforded the IPA an opportunity to disseminate a doctrine that did not have to be fully compatible with environmental norms and values.

Meanwhile, an executive development program developed which produced acceptance and some continuing support for the IPA, and other training services spread.

In the program area of training, great initial resistance was overcome. It was in this area, that the IPA encountered, for a time, a massive inability to engage the environment in real transactions. A large and visionary training program development was designed, and formalistically ratified by a training council headed by the Prime Minister (Phibul). But the scheme was essentially inconsistent with important normative features of the Thai bureaucracy. As a consequence, the proposal was handled in the best Thai fashion: there was no argument, for a council headed by the Prime Minister had ratified the American-devised plan, but neither was there any action. Departments and ministries simply failed to create the contemplated organizations, and the IPA as a consequence had no bureaucratic entities with which to relate in training activities.

IPA doctrine that was essentially acceptive of the status quo, or oriented toward self-justifying existence, and that the IPA was not able to evolve and adapt much of the innovative element of its doctrine--these were an inevitable result of limited resources. On the other hand, the resource position of the IPA was certainly to some extent a result of the orientation of its leadership. Environmental norms--the appropriateness and acceptability of part-time teaching staff--rather readily penetrated the IPA. Perhaps there was no real alternative. The only point is that enabling linkages were maintained which allowed organizational survival, but not full institutional development.

The IPA developed functional linkages adequate enough to enable it to continue to exist. Through these relationships it projected itself and its doctrine into its environment. It faced no problems of competition with other similar organizations on the scene. Its effectiveness in functional relations with the environment was, however, affected by the position or stature granted the IPA vis-a-vis foreign graduate training programs, a point to which we shall return.

In the area of normative linkages the IPA's position was complex. As noted, some established environmental norms, quite at variance from the envisioned IPA doctrine were actually internalized within the organization. The IPA dealt with the entities in a position to impose norms and values upon it--particularly through control over the creation and classification of positions--with mixed results. The ability to shape, assert, and adapt an innovative doctrine was clearly impaired by the impact of some system norms on the IPA.

Some of the most significant normative linkages affecting the IPA were

not organized working relationships. Rather, there were certain abiding value orientations in the IPA's environment which had a real impact on the organization. In addition the IPA was probably affected by an apparent need for certain kinds of normative linkages to maintain desired institutional qualities.

Regarding the first of these matters: in the Thai context bureaucratic careers are in many ways more meaningful and attractive than nearly any of the alternatives available to an educated Thai male. Bureaucratic status is preferred status. Bureaucratic advancement has prestige value. Bureaucratic positions above the third grade offer variable but often substantial fringe benefits. On the other hand, purely academic careers lack comparable status, prestige, and remuneration. A teacher is, as a common practice, highly respected by his own particular students, and he does, for that matter, have a bureaucratic grade or rank. But he is not really a bureaucrat, in many senses of that word. And the consequences of this difference between the bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic has been noted. It was normative linkages in part, rather than functional linkages, which produced critical staffing problems in the IPA--the lure of the bureaucratic alternative (a lure, incidentally, which was made manifest within the IPA itself, in the organization's leadership structure).

The IPA never fully succeeded in dealing with this problem of normative linkages. Some of the most promising prespective members of the staff were lost to the bureaucracy. And no conscious, systematic effort was made to deal with this problem, in part because at the outset of the effort, when it might have been possible to anticipate the effects of environmental values, they were not adequately appreciated.

The other problem of normative linkages was this; To maintain and nurture an institution in an environment that is in some ways hostile and in others indifferent requires dedicated, indoctrinated personnel. It also requires the continuing reinforcement of these people--in other words, supportive normative linkages to offset countervailing environmental pressures.

For a time, some such reinforcement was provided by foreign advisors. In a few cases, as noted above, staff members were enabled to "come out" and to participate in a scholarly enterprise in a remote setting. In 1965 six members of the IPA staff claimed membership in an international professional organization; in two years--1964-65--fourteen staff members claimed to have attended international professional meetings (actually the EROPA conference, in most cases), and four staff members travelled abroad, to Europe or the United States. Whether this was a sufficient amount of reinforcing involvement in a community of scholars simply cannot be said. The only point made here is the importance of such associational activity--as a source of intellectual reinforcement, doctrinal commitment, and personal status.

By the 1960's a new pattern of normative linkages appeared to be emerging in Bangkok, which promised to help sustain professional orientations. The number of trained social scientists in Thailand has grown, and among some of the faculties at Thammasat and Chulalongkorn universities one found bright and intellectually lively younger scholars, committed to academic careers. A tendency for some of them to come together informally, or in occasional meetings to hear a speaker, was beginning to appear. And this development may presage a significant change in the normative context of

non-bureaucratic professionalism in Thailand. A few members of the professional staff of the IPA were more or less regular participants in such relationships in 1965.

The IPA and its Environment -- Transactions

It is possible to conceive of the entire process of organization -- environment relations in terms of "transactions" -- exchanges of goods and services, and of power and influence. From an organization viewpoint, transactions are the relational activities through which resources and mandates are procured and purposes are pursued. Transactions are the substance of an entity's linkages with its environment; they may lead to organizational growth or attenuation; and they shape as well as manifest institutional qualities.

Much has already been said about the transactions between the IPA and its environment. Here we wish to consider only the "currency" which the IPA had for use in certain of its transactions.

The ability of an entity to induce contributions is based on the expectation that the entity will in turn confer certain kinds of "value" upon the contributor. There are many possible such "values": access to monetary rewards, increased personal effectiveness as something inherently valued, a sense of identity, and heightened status.

Part of the currency at the command of an institution is its ability to favorably affect the status of those who successfully or appropriately participate in its activities. This ability is a function of the "value" or meaningfulness inherent in the institution. To some extent the IPA was able to induce continuing contributions from certain professional staff members because it offered them the psychic rewards of valued status and meaningful identity. Its ability to do so was,

however, severely limited for a number of reasons, including normative qualities of its environment. But it did offer sufficient inducements of this kind to maintain at least the core of a professional staff. Yet, ironically, there was never sufficient coherence in the psychic rewards it offered to internal participants to sustain a coherent institutional leadership structure. Among the leaders, the rewards offered by the IPA were different -- the Institute was valued for different reasons by different leaders, and the differences were normatively great.

To some extent the IPA was able to induce participation by students on the basis of its ability to confer valued status upon them, plus the promise of access to improved status, which is quite a different thing. The expressed opinions of students and former students suggest that the IPA was never primarily valued by its academic clientele because of its perceived direct effects upon their status. But to some extent it was valued as the source of inherently meaningful benefits -- "education" -- although it was fortunately never necessary to measure the strength of this value by withdrawing other inducements to participate -- such as the prospect of increased pay for some, and the possibility of increased personal effectiveness in bureaucratic roles.

Turning to the executive clientele of the IPA, it appears that the Institute was essentially unable to confer status increments upon the participants in its programs. It was by this clientele regarded as essentially a convenient mechanism for doing something worthwhile. The activity was valued in terms of perceived personal benefits, but the organization conducting the activity was not seen as conferring

any special benefits upon those who participated in the executive development program.

In an utterly vague, general fashion, it appears that the IPA was valued in some sectors of its environment because its existence did confer a degree of status upon the government of Thailand. Phibul, Prime Minister Sarit, and Deputy Prime Minister General Thanom Kittikachorn, who succeeded to the premiership upon the death of Marshal Sarit, at one time or another made statements indicating that they considered the IPA a meaningful manifestation of a commitment to bureaucratic modernity and competence. These perceptions, nurtured and reinforced in the course of the Thai government's diplomatic and foreign aid relations, in turn became part of the IPA's currency, enabling it to claim mandates and resources from the allocative mechanisms in its environment. It should be noted, of course, that this element of status (really the source of the IPA's legitimacy) was not linked with any specific IPA programmatic or doctrinal posture; it was a function of the existence of an organization which was an evidentially appropriate symbol.

Had the IPA achieved the full institutional quality some people envisioned for it, it would undoubtedly have had a greater amount of psychic currency. The prestige of its academic program, in particular, would have been greater, and the status of its successful students would have been enhanced more than it was in practice.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that such psychic currency could have been used for claiming resources from the environment. For psychic currency can be blocked currency. And the IPA's ability to obtain resources did not depend upon the particular inducements offered to its clients.

By 1965 a relatively stable transactional pattern had been established, quite sufficient to assure the continuance of the organization. In a sense, the IPA had become "institutionalized." It had acquired sufficient acceptance and meaningfulness in its setting to be relatively free from threats. But its meaningfulness did not lie in its perceived value as a significant innovative institution, nor was it a function of its ability to confer important changes in status upon its clients. Internally, the IPA was faced with a sharp split in the structure of its leadership.

In short, and in conclusion, the outcome of the effort to build the IPA was mixed. The aim had been to create an organization embodying new values, functions, and technologies, which would stimulate tendencies toward normative change in its bureaucratic environment. It was a bold vision, marked by hope and the innocence that often attends such ventures. That it was never fully achieved is no indictment: there are vast gaps between visions and ventures. If a study of its failures as well as its successes contributes to the effectiveness of other efforts at institution-building, then even the IPA's failures will to some extent be justified.

VII

APPENDIX

Method and Methodology

Key Concept (1): Leadership, as related to the IPA

Empirical referents:

Persons in roles of official authority within the organization

Persons in "advisory" roles demonstrably capable of influencing or making decisions affecting resource allocations and organizational program

Persons in other roles (inside or outside the IPA) able to assert norms or goals and to impose sanctions and/or mobilize support for their assertions

Data collection methods:

Depth interviews with approximately 30 persons within the IPA, the university aiding in its establishment, and within the Thai government environment of the IPA (including former IPA staff and participants)

Examination of records, including official contract progress reports, files, and related documents

Information from professional IPA staff members obtained from omnibus questionnaire

Method of analysis:

Description, plus case involving a critical incident. Subjective interpretation of findings. Sociogram might have added range and verification; an effort was made to form an impressionistic quasi-sociogrammatic portrait of internal relations on the basis of interviews and informal discussions.

Key Concept (2): Doctrine of the IPA

Empirical referents:

Program plans and activities, including the actual content of materials used therein

Perceptions of organizational aims, activities, and problems, by
(1) internal participants, and
(2) external participants, or clients

Data collection methods:

Examination of relevant records and reports, including contract party reports and files, progress reports, program plans, program statements

Examination of textual and training materials, in terms of their content (including examination of changes in content over time)

Examination of IPA publications and theses produced by IPA students

Interviews with selected members of professional staff; also with selected students; informal interviews with participants in executive development training programs

Information from questionnaires directed to students, former students, participants in training programs; also information from questionnaire directed to IPA professional staff members

Information from comparison groups of non-IPA students, via questionnaire

Information on normative characteristics of the Thai bureaucracy from secondary sources

Method of analysis:

Attempt to determine content of doctrine from the examination of written materials presumed to be "carriers" of doctrine, through examination and classification of content

Explore extent to which such doctrinal materials are formalistic or more than formalistic by determining the extent to which such materials are adapted and modified in terms of various criteria of relevance brought into play by members of the professional staff

Assess the doctrinal premises reflected in decisions concerning resource allocations

Examine what is actually transmitted as doctrine through study of IPA clients, particularly students and executive development training program participants (include examination of student theses as evidence of doctrinal intake)

Determine, insofar as possible, whether doctrine is reflected in differences between the attitudes and perceptions of IPA students and selected comparison groups

Compare apparent elements of IPA doctrine with apparently relevant characteristics of the organization's environment -- i.e., the bureaucracy.

Comment:

Various experiments were undertaken in an effort to get at manifestations of doctrine. Underlying the whole approach were certain assumptions: (1) Doctrine need not be coherent, or logically integrated. In practice, an entity may have a variety of doctrines and they may even be inconsistent. (2) Evidence of doctrine is to be found in the "working materials" of an organization, but such evidence is inevitably incomplete. The doctrinal content of working materials may be formalistic. Important doctrine may not be stated in such materials. And some doctrine may be most clearly manifest in the way in which such materials are used. Thus, the rote memorization of various concepts and premises may be significant evidence of doctrine -- but not necessarily of the "doctrine" ostensibly set forth in the materials used in this fashion. (3) In part, doctrine is manifest in the activities of those engaged in disseminating it. Some of these activities may be unconscious or not highly specific and yet significant. To take an oversimple example: The doctrine put forth might be, in essence, that "the organizational and managerial processes of the Thai bureaucracy are enormously inept, inefficient, and traditional." The messages might be presented indirectly, through the use of textual material on organization, management, and administrative methods, tendered as a set of ideal arrangements, and presented with a flow of premises about specific variations from these ideals found or known to exist in Thai public administration. (4) Finally, doctrine involves reception as well as generation and transmission. To the entity's clients, doctrine is what they perceive it to be, and this may be different from what transmitters say it is. It is possible for an entity to "preach" doctrine with little or no impact; its clients may perceive it to be meaningful for other reasons than its intended doctrine.

An implicit premise in our efforts to study doctrine is this: the ability to perceive the environment in meaningful terms is an essential requirement of effective institution-building. This does not mean that normative qualities of the environment must be accepted (nor totally rejected, for that matter); but perceptions of the environment are the basis for a strategy of relating to and impacting upon the environment

a strategy whose substance is reflected in doctrine. Therefore to make judgments about institutionalization it is necessary to explore the relation between doctrine and perceptions of the environment held by those who formulate and transmit doctrine.

In an effort to probe the doctrinal quality of the IPA, we sought, among other things, to determine how the professional staff -- the presumed articulators and purveyors of doctrine -- perceived the environment toward which their efforts were directed. By a simple semantic differential device we attempted to see how they regarded the bureaucracy, in terms of certain of its qualities. Then we sought to see what sorts of "bureaucratic problems" they perceived. We sought to consider how these perceptions and attitudes were related to doctrine, and ostensible doctrine. The impression emerged that doctrine did not seem to be clearly or with more coherence directed against the kinds of problems perceived in the environment. Similar probes of the environmental perceptions of students were also made. The instruments we used in efforts to probe for aspects of doctrine now seem to have been rather crude and not highly focused. Our findings were more suggestive than certain.

Key Concept (3): Program

In effect, "program" and "doctrine" are largely inseparable, for "the actions which are related to the performance of functions and services constituting the output of the institution" are the manifestations of doctrine which is held by and asserted by the entity.

Empirical referents:

See "doctrine"

Method of analysis:

We did not attempt to analyze "program" per se, although extensive descriptions of the IPA program are included. Various characteristics of the IPA program were examined and described. Program data were analyzed primarily to try to determine effective doctrine, and the meaningfulness imputed to the IPA.

Key Concept (4): Resources

Empirical referents:

Staff, physical facilities, funds, rules and procedures governing allocations. Budget.

Data collection methods:

Budgetary data

Interviews with staff and with University and Budget Bureau personnel

Method of analysis:

Resources were analyzed in terms of the relationship determined to exist between inputs and goals, asserted and/or actual, by comparing allocations with stated intentions and evident needs, given certain assumptions concerning goals. The basis upon which resource claims were made and granted was also examined.

Key Concept (5): Internal Structure

Empirical referents:

Organization structures, including delegations and mandates, personnel assignments, supervision and control arrangements

Perceptions of identification with the entity

Data collection:

Reports detailing organization, including personnel shifts

Interviews with staff concerning assignments and working relations

Questionnaire probe to determine attitudes and expectations indicative of identification

Depth interviews to supplement and check on questionnaire data

Collection on data on former staff and participants not joining staff

Method of analysis:

Descriptions of structure

Determination of perceptions of identification and factors appearing to affect identification with or rejection of the IPA

Key Variables (6): Institute-Environment Relations (Linkages and Transactions)

Empirical referents:

Transactions, or perceived interactions between the IPA and its environment

Environmental characteristics which appear to affect the IPA's ability to obtain and maintain resources

Data collection methods:

Official information on authorizations and allocations of resources to the IPA

Interviews within the IPA to determine the manner in which claims are made, and interviews with external officials to determine the apparent basis of action on the part of allocating mechanisms; also interviews and questionnaires with IPA staff to determine how the environment is perceived

Study of rules and regulations applied to the IPA by external entities

Study of the IPA environment to discover norms and values affecting the feasibility of resource claim-making efforts, program design, and the assertion of doctrine, through interviews, use of secondary sources

Questionnaires and interviews with IPA clientele to ascertain the nature of inducements offered and perceived benefits conferred in transactions with the IPA

Interviews in the IPA environment to determine how the IPA is perceived by representatives of organizations in a position to grant support or otherwise engage in relations

Note: in this phase of the study, much emphasis was devoted to an effort to determine just what the IPA was perceived as conferring upon the clients who were induced to participate in its activities. It was assumed that the meaningfulness of linkages was manifest in transactions. Our examination of transactions was selective and less than complete.