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APPENDIX B  
to  
A Study of Some Key USAID Jobs

THE PROGRAM OFFICER

American Institute for Research  
Washington, D.C.

JUNE 1964



## PROGRAM OFFICER

### Outline of Functions

#### I. DETERMINES PROGRAM

##### A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people
2. Selects and reads documents
3. Observes host country conditions
4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information
5. Evaluates information
  - a. considers reliability of sources
  - b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
  - c. verifies data
  - d. judges relevance of data
6. Generates (new) information
  - a. conducts or initiates empirical research or surveys
  - b. makes estimates
  - c. analyzes data
    - 1) calculates
    - 2) weights data
    - 3) interprets verbal material

##### B. Develops and Revises Programs

1. Makes decisions concerning program content, costs, and funding methods
  - a. reviews, and approves project plans
  - b. establishes priorities
  - c. integrates plans with host development program
  - d. anticipates AID/W information when delays occur
  - e. works out compromises

2. Provides guidelines, assistance, and information to other mission personnel
    - a. suggests project ideas
    - b. advises others on plans, policies, and procedures
    - c. provides assistance of subordinates
  3. Coordinates with other agencies
    - a. explains USAID position to other agencies
      - 1) Embassy, USIS, other U. S. agencies
      - 2) third-country, multilateral, and private groups
    - b. participates in developing coordinated plans
      - 1) confers on joint problems
      - 2) reviews and edits reports
      - 3) writes portions of reports
    - c. arranges for other-agency assistance to AID and vice versa
  4. Obtains approval for new and revised programs
    - a. follows routine procedures
    - b. expedites approvals
    - c. defends and justifies
      - 1) prepares briefs
      - 2) gives formal presentations
      - 3) gives informal presentations
      - 4) provides routine and requested justifications to AID/W
- C. Prepares Documentation
1. Writes or rewrites portions of CAP, LAS, or other documents
    - a. selects or revises relevant portions of previous documents
    - b. formulates project descriptions in required terms

2. Prepares numerical charts and tables
    - a. checks for consistency and accuracy
    - b. prepares explanatory material
  3. Coordinates and supervises the work of others
    - a. schedules and assigns work to subordinates and technical personnel
      - 1) monitors progress
      - 2) pressures as needed
    - b. reviews, edits, and evaluates
    - c. requests revisions
    - d. rewrites work of others
    - e. requests review by others
  4. Supervises mechanical production documents
  5. Directs forwarding procedures for documents
- D. Integrates Development Plans with World-Wide Programs (e.g. Food for Peace)

## II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

- A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects
  1. Confers with staff
  2. Reviews documents
  3. Obtains clarification as necessary
- B. Reviews and Approves Details of Project Plans
  1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations
    - a. reviews and edits documentation for grant projects
    - b. reviews loan applications
  2. Institutes revisions of project plans

### C. Conducts Negotiations

1. Negotiates with host country officials
2. Negotiates with contractors
3. Negotiates details of loan application
4. Obtains necessary signatures

## III. MANAGES PROGRAM

### A. Monitors and Guides Projects

1. Obtains information on project status and host contributions
  - a. confers with U. S. personnel
  - b. confers with third country or multilateral personnel
  - c. confers with host government personnel
  - d. reviews project status documents
  - e. visits project sites
  - f. assigns others to observe field operations
2. Evaluates projects
3. Corrects project deficiencies
  - a. advises on changes
    - 1) in personnel
    - 2) in equipment
  - b. presses host government to honor commitments if necessary
  - c. coordinates division activities
  - d. coordinates division and host agency efforts
  - e. coordinates division and other U. S. agency efforts
  - f. presses USAID personnel as required
  - g. explores solutions with technical staff

4. Advises on routine project administration
    - a. reviews staffing and requests for personnel
    - b. recommends procurement procedures
    - c. assists in planning cost reductions
    - d. approves use of local currency
    - e. interprets project documents
  5. Manages phase-outs
    - a. negotiates with host government officials
    - b. prepares completion reports
- B. Revises Projects and Adjusts Program Budget as Necessary
1. Advises on fund transfer and budget revisions
  2. Reviews and approves requests for supplemental funds
  3. Explains or justifies project and budget changes
    - a. to USAID personnel
    - b. to AID/W
    - c. to host government personnel
  4. Advises on handling contingencies
    - a. provides information on relevant regulations
    - b. recommends funding procedures
- C. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions
1. Reads, reviews, prepares correspondence
  2. Reads, reviews, prepares project reports
  3. Keeps others informed about project status
  4. Acts as Division Chief as required

#### IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

##### A. Directs Program Office

###### 1. Supervises subordinates

- a. provides information
- b. monitors and evaluates performance
  - 1) prepares Efficiency Reports
  - 2) serves on Efficiency Report review panel
- c. develops skills, counsels
- d. settles disputes
- e. recommends recognition of superior performance

###### 2. Manages Operations

- a. assigns and adjusts duties and responsibilities
- b. establishes work schedules and priorities
- c. requests additional personnel as needed
- d. interprets policies, regulations, and Manual Orders
- e. reads incoming materials
- f. maintains files on host country information, AID/W correspondence, directives, etc.
- g. edits written materials
- h. insures effective working relations between the Program Office and divisions

##### B. Participates in Personnel Matters

###### 1. Assists in recruiting staff

- a. gathers information
- b. prepares documentation as required
- c. corresponds with friends or professional associates
- d. evaluates and selects personnel

###### 2. Orients new staff members

C. Handles Public Relations

1. Handles publicity

- a. advises or develops publicity policies and procedures
- b. prepares or approves news releases
- c. arranges and conducts press conferences, public ceremonies, etc.
- d. arranges for production of information and publicity materials

2. Coordinates efforts with USIS

3. Receives non-official visitors (as assigned)

D. Accomplishes Other Management Activities

1. Consults on organizational matters

- a. advises on mission structure
- b. advises on staff behavior problems

2. Provides advice and assistance in executive office functions

3. Substitutes for other administrative officers

4. Receives visitors as assigned

- a. gives briefings
- b. schedules meetings and trips

5. Answers special information requests as required

6. Socializes with other U. S. agencies, other donor agencies, and the diplomatic community

V. MAINTAINS WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOST PERSONNEL

A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host Officials

- 1. Adapts to local usage in negotiations
- 2. Cultivates friendships with hosts
- 3. Uses appropriate means for handling project rejections or curtailment
- 4. Makes speeches to host groups

**B. Represents Mission at Social Events**

1. Attends luncheons, parties, etc.
2. Entertains host officials at home -- as appropriate
3. Attends or participates in ceremonies

**C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host Officials**

1. Provides information on AID policy and procedure
2. Advises host government on their operations
3. Assists hosts in dealing with other donors

**D. Uses Conduct Appropriate to Position**

## USAID PROGRAM OFFICER

### I N T R O D U C T I O N

In broad outline, the Program Officer's job consists of functions and tasks found in many middle-level executive positions. He is responsible for collecting information, analyzing written materials, providing others with information, considering the suitability of plans, deciding between alternative courses of action, reviewing and writing documents, and similar activities. The specific job description describes the major functions in detail, and indicates the essential tasks and subtasks involved in each major function. It also indicates the problems or obstacles commonly reported to impede or complicate the accomplishment of these tasks. There are, however, certain considerations, problems or obstacles which cut across all job functions that are worth discussing before taking up the specific descriptions of each function.

Certain aspects of the Program Officer's job that lead to problems result from the context within which he must work. Some are common to any bureaucratic establishment, such as delays because of requirements for multiple clearances or approvals, slow or faulty communication systems, confusions and ambiguities regarding the chain of command, and conflicts in policy between different operating levels, to cite a few of the more salient difficulties. For the Program Officer working in a foreign country, however, these factors become exaggerated because the mission exists as a minor bureaucratic system operating within and governed by a larger bureaucratic system distantly removed, while at the same time operating in conjunction with several other relatively independent

bureaucracies. The latter include other United States Government agencies, academic institutions, the host government, and sometimes other aid-donating agencies. In addition, the mission functions within a developing nation, with its characteristic deficiencies in resources, manpower, and institutions. All of these aspects of the job situation interact to complicate accomplishing assigned duties and discharging responsibilities, so that ordinary problems frequently balloon to unusual proportions and unusual problems develop. The following discussion describes some of these problem areas which were commonly reported by Program Officers interviewed in the study.

In all of the Program Officer's job functions, he is required to interpret Manual Orders, planning directives, and special instructions from AID/W, explain them to others, and insure that they conform to them. Many difficulties occur because these regulations and directives are conflicting, unclear, too voluminous for easy reference, and are constantly being revised. The time required to keep up to date on Manual Orders is viewed as an obstacle by many of the Program Officers. In addition, they report that changes are forwarded so unsystematically that they can be easily overlooked. Another time problem arises in clarifying directives. Apparently it is not uncommon to spend two or more hours searching for specific items mentioned in cables, airgrams, or other sources. In instances of conflicting or ambiguous directives or instructions, procedures call for requesting clarification from AID/W. Because Washington frequently delays in answering these requests, or occasionally fails to answer them entirely, activities or decisions affecting many aspects of the job may have to be postponed, or undertaken with the risk of incurring official criticism or disapproval.

Further complications develop when the Director, or at times the Ambassador, holds views opposing or conflicting with AID/W's regulations, especially at the policy level. Since any important action requires approval by both local higher officers and Washington, the Program Officer may risk disapproval at either level unless he can phrase requests or plans in terms agreeable to both. In some cases he may be able to convince the local higher officer to modify his views, but in others he may have to act according to an approach which he knows will be rejected by Washington. When the latter occurs, he usually must completely redo significant portions of work.

Most Program Officers report a major obstacle to be the time pressure on all their work, created by workload, as well as by required deadlines. This appears to result from a variety of causes.

In some missions, the Director depends so heavily upon the advice and assistance of the Program Officer that he consults him about nearly all decisions whether or not these are related in any way to program operations or development. As a result, the Program Officer may spend a large portion of each day in the Director's office working on non-program aspects of managing the mission. In addition, some Directors require the Program Officer to accompany them to many meetings, both inside and outside the mission. This requirement, added to other meetings which the Program Officer feels he must attend with Program Office or Division personnel, brings complaints from many incumbents that there are entirely too many meetings and that most of them accomplish nothing useful.

A related problem is the tendency of many Directors to assign miscellaneous tasks to the Program Officer. Again, these matters may have little, if any, relation to the program. In the opinion of most incumbents, this is a complete mis-utilization of their time.

Certain time pressures are created by AID/W. The delays in answering requests for clarification, discussed above, are one set of factors. Another factor, perhaps the most serious, is AID/W's failure to allocate enough time for the mission to complete program documents between the arrival of final instructions or approvals and the deadlines scheduled for submitting required documents. This means that most of the work involved in developing, planning and implementing the program must be performed at a hectic pace. Frequent requests from Washington for information or special reports on a crash basis are a third factor. These requests not only have to be answered hurriedly, but attending to them disrupts the schedules for completing routine work which may, in turn, have to be rushed to meet deadlines.

All of the Program Officers interviewed attributed a certain portion of their problems with time pressure to the fact that they frequently had to rewrite the work prepared by others. Since this tends to occur during the periods of peak workload--the documentation phases of program development and program implementation--they regard it as extremely troublesome.

The result of these factors is that most Program Officers find it necessary to work overtime, if not regularly, then during the documentation phases of program work and for occasional special reports. Most find it necessary to put in an extra hour or two of work every day, or to devote part of each weekend, to catch up with their less urgent routine work or to find time to read and think without interruption. Some incumbents resent having to work overtime so frequently and report that this, added to their work-related social obligations, leaves them insufficient time with their families or for recreation.

Field observations indicate that some incumbents created a portion of the time pressures themselves in one or more ways. Some seemed uncertain about particular tasks to the point that they spend apparently unnecessary time in reviewing and reworking written materials. A few seemed unable to delegate work to subordinates and either did it all themselves or thoroughly reworked everything produced by their subordinates. A very common failing was their lack of control over the flow of people into their offices. They would allow anyone to interrupt at almost any time, no matter how trivial the visitor's question or how important the interrupted task. Similarly, some incumbents did not utilize their secretaries to screen telephone calls, but answered themselves each time the telephone rang. The importance of these observations should not be exaggerated, however. Interviewers generally agreed that there is a great volume of work assigned to Program Officers and in many cases complaints against the requirement that they work extensive overtime to complete their tasks seem completely justified.

Some of the most important job problems for the Program Officer result from the discrepancy between his authority and his responsibilities. In all of his program functions, he schedules and reviews work performed by division personnel. However, in most missions, he possesses no clearly defined authority to insure that his requests or instructions will be carried out correctly and expeditiously.

Mission Directors rarely attempt to correct the situation by explicitly defining the scope and limitations of authority delegated to the Program Officer. Further, the Director frequently takes inconsistent action regarding decisions or recommendations made by the Program Officer. On one occasion the Director may support the Program

Officer's position in a matter concerning a Division Chief, and subsequently, in an ostensibly identical situation he may fail to do so. As a result, the Division Chief realizes that his interests are served by circumventing the Program Officer and dealing with the Director, or by forcing the Program Officer to refer disputed decisions to the Director. Conversely, the Program Officer may be discouraged or resentful of the Director's lack of confidence in his capability.

To some extent the Director may be utilizing the ambiguity of the Program Officer's status in relation to division personnel as a buffer between the front office and the divisions. Whether deliberately or inadvertently, the Program Officer frequently becomes the Director's "hatchet man", charged with informing technicians of plan rejections, fund cuts, and similar unpleasant decisions. As a result, nearly all Program Officers interviewed consider that their jobs are the most unpopular in the mission. Many corroborative comments by other mission officers confirmed this point.

Another source of confusion created by the Director is his tendency to assign miscellaneous non-program tasks to the Program Officer, which was mentioned above. Fellow staff officers often regard these assignments as infringing upon their domains and resent the Program Officer's undertaking them. Accordingly, they fail to cooperate if their assistance is required, making the Program Officer's task more difficult.

The position of the Program Officer in the mission organization is also complicated by the failure of division personnel to understand the reasons for even having a Program Office. They see it as a bottleneck, serving only to create extra work for them and rejections of or delays in their projects. The Program Officer is regarded as a "paperpusher" who obstructs rather than facilitates project activities and infringes

on technical areas in which he has no competence. In conjunction with their failure to recognize the status of the Program Officer, technicians also fail to recognize the status of the Assistant Program Officers or Deputy Program Officers. If they deal with anyone in the Program Office, they insist that it be the Program Officer.

A few comments by interviewers may be illuminating here. The responsibilities of the Program Officer require more information than he can possibly obtain about all aspects of the program. As a result, he constantly seeks out additional sources of information or means of verifying information. The technical personnel see this as an attempt to aggrandize his position and encroach upon their control of their projects. In a few cases, interviewers were inclined to agree with technicians that, consciously or not, the Program Officer was striving for greater authority and control of certain projects. The crux of the conflict is, of course, that the Program Officer must assert his authority and establish his position vis-a-vis the Division Chiefs in order to perform his duties effectively. What is required is that he clothe an aggressive pursuit of his necessary demands upon others in very subtle and diplomatic terms to diminish any feelings of resentment or threats to their status which these demands may generate. He must be aware that Division Chiefs feel that they do not have sufficiently important roles, particularly in the determining and planning phases of programming, and plan his strategies accordingly. Or he may make decisions as he considers appropriate, insuring that the Director will support his stand, and accept disputes and personal enmities as part of his job.

Further complicating the status area is the problem of rank and professional standing. Rarely is the Program Officer of higher rank

than the Division Chiefs. He is usually of an equivalent, or in some cases, lower rank. This contributes to the technician's reluctance to take orders, however subtly phrased, from the Program Officer. In addition, length of service with AID may be involved. This cuts two ways. New personnel tend to ignore channels and procedures, feeling that they have been hired as specialists in particular areas and that they should be left free to operate as they see fit. Conversely, old AID hands frequently feel that they have far more experience and knowledge in AID operations than the Program Officer, especially if he is younger and fairly new to the post. Further, both new and old technical personnel tend to hold higher academic degrees than many Program Officers,<sup>1/</sup> which sometimes serves to reinforce their feelings or beliefs that the Program Officer is not qualified to advise or direct them concerning "technical" matters.

One of the most important considerations involved in the Program Officer's performance of his job is his understanding of the views and working premises of the Director.<sup>2/</sup> Since sufficient latitude exists within the policies and regulations prescribed by AID/W for each

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<sup>1/</sup> Among the 12 Program Officers interviewed, 3 held doctoral degrees, 7 masters, 1 bachelors, 1 non-degree. Eight of the 13 Division Chiefs held doctoral degrees. Of course, the size of the study does not permit firm generalizations from this information because there is no way of knowing whether the sample is representative of the total population of Program Officers and Division Chiefs.

<sup>2/</sup> In certain missions the division of responsibilities between the Director and Deputy Director results in many operational matters and decisions being handled by the Deputy. In those cases, many of these remarks pertain to the Deputy.

Director to modify significantly some elements of the program and some operations within the mission, and, in addition, higher control is ordinarily thousands of miles away, the effectiveness of the Program Officer depends in part on the extent to which he and the Director agree on substantive matters and working methods.

Nominally, the Director runs the mission. Actually, this varies considerably from virtually ignoring the Program Officer on policy matters to consulting the Program Officer on almost any decision. Where there is disagreement, the degree to which the Program Officer accommodates to the Director's position or attempts to counter-balance it also varies considerably. (Some Program Officers are apparently not aware of basic disagreements and complain that it is "difficult to work with the Director.") The appropriate adjustments required of the Program Officer in dealing with a Director who habitually or occasionally pursues questionable policies and courses of action is beyond the scope of this study.

A series of problems commonly encountered by Program Officers are credited to the failure of other staff officers, either supervisors or colleagues, to perform their jobs effectively. When the Director, or sometimes the Deputy Director, fails to command and control the activities of mission personnel, serious obstacles in handling program matters result unless the Program Officer is forceful enough himself to push people to meet schedules. Equally disruptive are situations where higher officers become so deeply involved in minor operating decisions that they block program work and fail to attend to broader or longer-range decisions. Similar difficulties occur when the Director (or Deputy) becomes enmeshed in "pet projects". These may be regular portions of the program especially interesting to the Director, or, more frequently, they may be the result of his

or someone else's ideas of areas where AID can be especially helpful. They tend in either case to be relatively minor in relation to the total program and usually have a high potential for favorable publicity. These situations generally have two unfortunate results for the Program Officer. First, it becomes almost impossible to get any other work accomplished by the people involved in the current "pet project". Technicians neglect their regular responsibilities, and higher officers let papers requiring approval or review accumulate on their desks. Secondly, if one of these projects is pushed through and made a part of the program, it usually doesn't fit into any on-going projects and, therefore, has administrative costs greatly out of proportion with its probable results.

When colleagues of roughly equivalent rank with the Program Officer give ineffective job performances, there are also unfortunate results for the Program Officer. Ordinarily he simply takes over and either handles neglected matters personally or delegates them to a subordinate. In view of the discussion of the workload in the Program Office given above, it is to be understood that taking over is not, in fact, a simple matter since considerable interpersonal problems may result. When colleagues resent the Program Officer's actions or develop animosities toward him, they may in turn try to block activities which are important for the Program Office.

The job of the Program Officer can best be summarized by citing the variety of conflicting pressures or demands that an incumbent is required to resolve. The following list indicates some of the types of judgments required; no significance is to be attached to order of presentation.

### Types of Conflicting Pressures

U. S. policy A vs. U. S. policy B  
U. S. policies vs. Host Government policies  
U. S. goals vs. demands of local situation  
Host Government request A vs. Host Government request B  
Economic vs. social vs. political considerations  
Procedure A vs. Procedure B  
Division A's views on budget vs. Division B's views on budget  
Short-term gains vs. long-term gains  
Work demands vs. interpersonal relations  
Quality of work vs. time and money considerations  
Views of U. S. agency A vs. views of U. S. agency B  
Personal and family needs vs. job demands

Judgments such as these must be made with inadequate information in the context of difficult communications and fluid organizational factors, while living and working in an underdeveloped country and dealing with untrained or ineffective personnel. Details follow.



## F U N C T I O N S

### I. DETERMINES PROGRAM

This major function includes deciding what specific projects or changes in projects will be recommended, "selling" these ideas if necessary, and preparing the formal and informal documentation needed to obtain Agency for International Development/Washington (AID/W) approval. While this function is nominally the crux of the job, relatively few details or examples are available. This may be due to such factors as: a) the fact that most of the yearly programs are basically continuations of projects decided upon and approved in the past, b) the difficulty of verbalizing the process of making complex judgments, and c) the occasional necessity to make program decisions on the basis of sensitive considerations.

The major problem cutting across all of the activities included in this function, and affecting those in other functions as well, is the lack of accurate information pertaining to all aspects of the host country. It is characteristic of assistance-receiving nations that they lack the facilities and personnel to provide such information. When the host government can provide information, it is frequently unreliable and can be used only as an estimate of actual conditions.

#### A. Obtains Information Relevant to Program Development

Information is gathered throughout the year, although special more systematic efforts tend to be made during the period in which the Country Assistance Plan (CAP) is prepared.

The types of information potentially needed may be categorized as follows:

- host country goals, policies, and expectations
- host country needs, resources, laws, and traditions
- host country politics
- U.S. goals, policies, and expectations
- U.S. resources, laws, and public opinion
- U.S. Congressional views
- third country and multilateral programs, resources, and intentions
- progress and experience of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and other projects
- views of USAID and other overseas American personnel
- sources of information

1. Confers with potentially knowledgeable people

Many types of people may be consulted for relevant information, including representatives of both the government and private sectors of the U.S., the host country, and third countries. While the data do not permit charting a systematic linkage between the type of source and the type of information obtainable, the evidence indicates that U.S. personnel may at times be the best source for host country information, and that host nationals may at times be the best source for third-country information.

For a number of reasons gaining information from other people is frequently difficult. Representatives of host or other governments sometimes are restrained from speaking freely by political or commercial considerations. U.S. policy may prohibit the exchange of information with representatives of certain "unfriendly" nations; and other U.S. personnel, in the mission or in other agencies, may fail to cooperate because of organizational or personal conflicts. Conferring ranges from a quick meeting or a telephone call to regional conferences and trips to the United States.

When I first got here I learned that the Embassy Economic Officer had been here for quite some time. I felt that he would be able to give me an excellent orientation about the country on the basis of his experience here. I also found I had no time to do outside orientation reading after I got here. So to get as complete and current a picture as possible about the situation here I went to the Embassy and spoke to the Economic Officer at length about host conditions.

\* \* \* \*

When I sent some preliminary economic status sheets to AID/W, the Desk Officer requested additional data on the plans of a third country. In order to "tease" the information from the third-country government, I requested permission from AID/W to release some classified data. When I got the permission, I sent the data to the AID Liaison Officer in that country. I have not yet heard from him.

\* \* \* \*

While attending a public ceremony I talked with the United Nations representative who explained their budget for the coming year.

\* \* \* \*

(From observer) I was with the Program Officer in a hotel cocktail lounge. On the way out he met a staff member of an international bank. The Program Officer spoke to him about a commodity produced and imported by the host country. The Program Officer got information about the volume of the commodity available.

\* \* \* \*

Since an international agency is a big donor I have built up a good relationship between myself and their principal representative here. I did this, in part, because it helps me get information as well as for purposes of social contact. In this case, I called him and made an appointment to see him. I told him over the phone I was interested in his projects, especially their implementation rates, growth rates, expenditure rates and status.

When I went to see him the next day, he had this information on his desk. I had a social visit with him first and then asked about this information. He simply gave me the documents and let me read them.

I got the information I wanted and even got some pertinent statistics about a section of the Country Assistance Plan.

At the time I got this information "unofficially" it was due to be published in 3-4 months. However, getting it that much later would make it much less valuable than having it so far in advance of its publication.

\* \* \* \*

A staff member of an international organization was leaving the country. I went over and had lunch with him. I wanted to find out what people to contact for certain types of information and what channels of communication were most efficient and reliable in providing information after he left. He had always been extremely helpful but since he was now leaving a new "system" had to be developed for procuring information about host financial matters.

\* \* \* \*

I met a third-country representative at a party, and, at his insistence, agreed to introduce him to the AID Director. I arranged the meeting but he did not appear, nor did he notify anyone of the cancellation. Later I met him again and agreed to arrange another meeting. This time the meeting occurred, and I participated. He asked for some information, which I agreed to provide. I tried to reach him via telephone, at the appointed time, but found that he was unavailable. I have now decided to stop contacts with this group in order to determine if they will be more cooperative with a less aggressive AID. This group tends to be secretive, and that their program is closely allied with commercial interests, so their effort is on a different basis than AID.

\* \* \* \*

When the AID/W official was visiting, I arranged appointments for him, and accompanied him to meetings with representatives of other donor agencies.

\* \* \* \*

(from interviewer) I was invited to dinner by the Program Officer. Other guests were representatives from a world-wide financial organization who had arrived to have discussions with host officials.

The next morning the Program Officer gave a brief explanation to the Country Team (at the weekly meeting) about the visitors, why they were here, and what they were going to do. Obviously his source of information was his pre-arranged dinner the preceding evening.

\* \* \* \*

I discussed AID assistance to a local industry with a host national businessman who was concerned about proposed changes in the project. He explained why the proposed changes were potentially harmful to the industry and suggested another approach. I agreed to consider his suggestion.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Selects and reads documents

Reading for information about AID regulations, orders, and directives, as well as for substantive information is included in this entry. The written sources are as diverse as the human sources, ranging from classified State Department cables to local newspapers.

Several types of problems arise in using documentary sources. One of the commonest problems reported is insufficient time for all kinds of reading, both routine program documents and various background materials. Acquiring source materials is complicated by the lack of a centralized clearing system within AID/W to insure that publications prepared by other donor agencies and economic or financial institutions are forwarded to the field. There may be difficulty in gaining access to classified materials in missions where classified files are maintained by the Embassy which is located at a distance from the mission. Understanding certain types of technical reports written in "jargon almost unintelligible to outsiders" is another problem. By far the major problem reported concerns the inaccuracy and unreliability of information published by host government agencies.

I also asked to go through his chronological files for the past two years and also the Embassy Economic files. For orientation purposes I wanted to see the types of things he had done, what his sources were and who his contacts were. This gave me a good starting point while I built up my own personal contacts.

\* \* \* \*

In going through the Embassy files I found a copy of the agreement between a third country and the host government which set up the relations between them. It gave me basic information on how that country's aid was to be carried out. I felt that this document was extremely valuable, so I classified it in order that its use would be restricted and that it wouldn't leave the Embassy files. It is now a constant source of information.

\* \* \* \*

I discovered that the Embassy Economic Officer had received a useful report by the International Development Bank. It contained a great deal of information that should have been made available to the Program Officer. I immediately notified AID/W that the mission should have its own copies of this report, and also requested that a system be set up to send such things to us routinely.

\* \* \* \*

The host government published a report about former bank assets of neighboring countries. I skimmed the document lightly, but missed the point of the very significant information it contained. I did not realize it until I received a memorandum from a representative of an international agency calling my attention to the information.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Observes host country conditions

Although it seems an obvious method for investigating assistance opportunities, few Program Officers perform this function. Program Officers rarely leave the city where the mission is located. This may be partially explained by the demands on their time for completing paper work and attending meetings within the mission. Another partial explanation may be that this method has not been institutionalized, that is to say, it is not recognized as a standard procedure. It is, therefore, given a low priority and rarely accomplished. Still another reason may be that some

Program Officers do not know the systematic procedures which would make such observations most meaningful and therefore don't believe that much useful information can be gotten this way. Finally, it should be recognized that, whereas personal observation can be an excellent source of ideas for needed projects, it rarely can provide the type of data that must be written into the formal AID documents.

4. Assigns USAID personnel to obtain information

This task refers to activities that range from instructing a subordinate to gather some routinely available data to asking the Mission Director to confer with host officials about sensitive matters. A problem arises when the Program Office staff is too small to permit placing personnel within various host agencies on an extended or continuing basis to gather necessary information. Also, the staff time allotted to this task interferes with their completing other duties, and sometimes makes it necessary for the Program Officer to take on some of their work.

The host asked the Director if we could help them finance the purchase of equipment from a company that had completed a large project. Much of the equipment was available for purchase at low cost because it would be very expensive to transport away. The Director bucked it to me for analysis.

I asked our engineer if the host government needed this equipment, if it could afford the cost and maintenance, and if it had skilled personnel to operate it. The engineer added other data to the answers to my inquiries. Based upon his report, I turned down the request.

\* \* \* \*

5. Evaluates information

- a. considers the reliability of sources
- b. deduces or infers errors or inconsistencies
- c. verifies data
- d. judges relevance of data

While this task consists of routine steps, it becomes complex in the overseas situation because of the inadequacy and inaccuracy of basic information which was discussed above. In many countries statistics published by the government conflict with those published by the private sector and the Program Officer may have no means of reconciling discrepancies among sources other than his own experience and judgment (which, particularly if he is new, may be pointless).

Other problems concern mission records of past projects. The descriptions of why projects were initiated and the results accomplished are frequently so poor that no useful information can be gained from them. Similarly, current reports may be so slanted to conceal deficiencies in the projects that they are nearly useless. These same difficulties are encountered in using the reports published by other donor agencies.

Another problem arises out of the need to evaluate technical information in specialties in which most Program Officers have no qualifications, and where there is no technical expert on whom to rely for advice, either because no such experts are available or because their qualifications or judgments are questioned by the Program Officer.

The summary comments prepared by Division Chiefs on host self-help deficiencies were very mild. These reports were typed by host secretaries. The Assistant Program Officer and I talked to Division Chiefs informally and found that their views were much less mild. I asked for pencil-draft rewrites and arranged for typing by a U.S. secretary.

\* \* \* \*

Project analyses and documentation have to be pieced together by us. We have to dig up and evaluate. We get very little help from the host government. There are few experienced government workers who know how to gather and present valid statistics and information. The information we get from various ministries is just a starting point. It has to be qualified in light of all the other data we get.

\* \* \* \*

The rate of population growth in Latin America is conservatively calculated to be 3% by U. S. scholars. Data provided by host sources, however, utilized another figure. Many of their other projections were based on this figure. I discussed this difference with a USAID colleague. We decided that the host figure could easily be wrong. He subsequently checked with the source and found they really didn't know if their figure was correct or not. I decided to use the U. S. estimate because I felt it more accurate. I then had to watch carefully other data from the host source. This factor of general unreliability, of course, consumed a good bit of my time.

\* \* \* \*

#### 6. Generates (new) information

Planning requirements frequently include types of information which are totally lacking in some host countries. To fulfill these requirements, Program Officers have to develop "new" data by some of the following procedures.

##### a. conducts or initiates empirical research or surveys

AID's research efforts are sometimes the first systematic collections of information about some aspects of the host country. The

task may range from simply assigning a subordinate to analyze some sector of the host economy to systematically collecting opinions from well-informed people. It may also include arranging for extensive surveys by TDY specialists or contract teams. Disagreements with AID/W on the scope and operations of such teams is sometimes a problem. More general problems encountered are poor performance by subordinates and inadequate time to do thorough studies.

Because the host government lacks adequate staff, it is difficult to learn what types of project they desire. They have formulated a general development plan, but have few plans for specific projects. Therefore, it is difficult to list potential projects in the CAP. To help solve this problem, I sent a letter to provincial officials stating that USAID had money to lend, and would be happy to consider any capital projects which the region might be planning. This is not done as a rule, dealings with the National Ministry are more appropriate, but I made the exception in order to try to build up a shelf of projects. This effort has really provided no concrete response, but it did demonstrate that the U. S. was willing to cooperate, and willing to listen to host government plans. This frame of mind then makes them more receptive to U. S. suggestions.

\* \* \* \*

As part of my responsibilities to inform Washington of investment possibilities related to the development program, I participated in an investment feasibility survey of a factory. I accompanied the Mission Director, the Embassy Economic Officer, and the head of the plant on a tour of its facilities. I lagged behind the other three men and questioned a plant engineer to get the details of its operating procedures and capabilities, taking copious notes. I had previously

accompanied an AID/W engineer on surveys of two plants in another country and had listened carefully to the detailed and persistent questioning by the engineer. So I knew what to ask about although I was quite aware of my inability to evaluate the information from an engineering standpoint. My memo was dictated from my notes and circulated to the regional capital project officer, the regional chief engineer (both personal friends) the desk officer for the region and the latter's advisor on capital development and private industry.

The project "suggests itself" as an important one and was one of the first ones listed in the first program book. However, I feel that no one in Washington is sufficiently aggressive to buttonhole prospective investors for the project, and I plan to push it at higher levels myself on a trip to Washington which I am planning for the near future.

\* \* \* \*

b. makes estimates

Because of the scanty information available about economic, financial, demographic, or resource aspects of the host country, the PO is constantly required to develop estimates in fulfilling many of his functions.

A technician dropped in for assistance in preparing a report which involved describing host plans which were not clear and detailed. I suggested that host plans for applying for outside agency funds would have to include plans for manpower in order to get approved. I suggested that host lack of cost data be reported and U. S. experience-based figures included with a summary description of the on-going project. I suggested supplying bracketed figures for estimates of proposed costs.

\* \* \* \*

To tease out data on the contributions of other countries to the host development plan, I prepared some estimates for a speech to be made by the Mission Director. Members of the host planning agency corrected the estimates and I thereby got the data I wanted.

\* \* \* \*

c. analyzes data

1) calculates

2) weights data

3) interprets verbal material

Simple arithmetic accounting to sophisticated statistical analyses may be performed in this task. Comprehensive analyses and comparison of documentary materials may also be required. General problems of time and staff performance, as mentioned in 6a, also pertain here. In some missions there are difficulties in allocating personnel to this task because of differences of opinion between the Program Officer and Director regarding the importance of data analysis.

Evaluation or interpretation of some economic data presents difficulties. The host government publishes a number of statistical documents, but their categories are broad and not easily broken down. Some are actually misleading, e.g., the host government budget shows transfers of money from certain treasury funds to the development fund as an expenditure. This

is a substantial amount of money and handling it this way makes the balance sheet look as though the difference between revenue and expenditures is much smaller than it actually is. I discovered this only after very detailed examination of the budget, including a reworking of the figures.

\* \* \* \*

#### B. Develops and Revises Programs

The Program Officer is responsible for directing and coordinating the work of all other line and staff personnel who participate in the planning stages of program development. All aspects of this function are affected to some extent by problems arising from the ambiguity of his authority in relation to these personnel. See the discussion presented in the introduction.

Other problems also affect all aspects of the function. AID/W frequently fails to allow adequate time for planning between the time the mission receives instructions and the deadline date, often creating tremendous time-pressure in getting out the work and requiring much strenuous overtime effort. Instructions and policy may be so unclear that much time is wasted in getting clarification before work can begin. In some missions the Director may disagree with AID/W policy or directives, so that the Program Officer must manipulate plans so that they are acceptable to both the Director and AID/W. Regulations requiring that classified materials be locked in central files create delays in using them and sometimes prohibit working with them after regular office hours.

When an AID/W official visited the mission, he argued that every project should include a particular technical aspect. When he visited a host minister who was responsible for that specialty he told him that he would see that he would have anything that he wanted. The only way to contend with pressures like this is to send messages back to Washington directly quoting the irresponsible statement.

\* \* \* \*

1. Makes decisions concerning program content, costs, and funding methods

The freedom accorded the Program Officer in making program decisions varies greatly among missions because the Director defines the task in accordance with his own opinions. It may carry great responsibility for deciding program content or it may consist merely of advising about regulations and expediting paperwork.

The Director wanted to get a development loan for a project. I argued that AID/!! would take too long to process a loan and recommended a direct grant instead. I failed to persuade him at first. But a month or so later I tried again and succeeded.

\* \* \* \*

We had arranged with the host government and another donor agency to do a certain type of project in a particular section of the country. It was my task to develop the master plan covering all projects. Fortunately I knew a host national engineer who was qualified to do most of the basic technical planning. He has been hired to assist me in this task.

\* \* \* \*

a. reviews, and approves project plans

Proposals are weighed in terms of how they conform to AID and mission goals and policies, their suitability to current conditions in the host country or to host government expectations, their value compared to other projects competing for funds, and other relevant factors. Reviewing can consist of a range of actions from a casual conversation to a detailed study of formal project documents and to detailed formal presentations by Technical Divisions.

Determining if specific project activities conform to mission and AID/W goals sometimes is difficult because the statements of these goals are often unclear and disagreements regarding interpretations arise.

Because project funding must be decided long before there is any firm knowledge of the amounts that AID/W will approve, and the action that Congress will take, the whole area of estimating future budgets is regarded as a problem. This also makes it difficult to settle other project details both within the mission and with host government agencies.

Developing an integrated program is difficult for several reasons. One major reason is that most projects continue over fairly long periods of time and are hard to alter once in operation. This reduces the flexibility of the mission in planning to meet changes in external circumstances or in AID policy. Another reason is that Division Chiefs fail to understand the broad aspects of the total mission program and fight to prevent changes or reductions in their projects.

Another set of problems arises because technical personnel either will not or cannot conform to planning directives. Program Officers generally agree that however able he may be in technical operations, the average technician is simply incompetent in presenting adequate program proposals. The Program Officer therefore comes to be regarded as a "bottleneck" or "hatchet man" because he must constantly reject plans or send them back for revision.

Yesterday a Division proposed a small project. They said the host government could not afford this so we should do it since it would have a far-reaching effect. I disagreed with this and explained that this is not the kind of thing we wanted to do. Because it is such a small amount of money, if it were really that important the host government would either pay for it or pay for part of it. At the very same meeting the proposal was brought up to build institutions which would cost the host government thousands of dollars to run and will turn out technical people whose salaries will have to be paid by the host government. And yet, the Division said the host government could not afford the small project. If a job is worth doing they should put up their share of the costs.

\* \* \* \*

An officer of the Embassy interested the Deputy Director in a small project. I disapproved of it because it would not do enough good to justify the time spent on it. AID/W also disapproved. However, later political pressure was exerted on AID/W to approved the project. Now I must find a way to administer it because there is no on-going project into which it can be fitted. This is wasting my time on a not very useful project.

\* \* \* \*

An incident involving policy conflict: The host government wanted to use some heavy equipment which it had purchased under a loan on a project sponsored by another donor. The Ambassador and Director approved of the idea for political reasons. The Director drafted a message for Washington, and asked me to review it. I, however, was opposed to the idea since I felt that such a violation of policy would provide Congress with ammunition to attack AID as ineffective in carrying out its programs, and thus would undermine AID's position. I drafted an alternate message, and when I was reviewing it with the Deputy Director, who characteristically took no firm position, the Director walked in, saw my draft and "hit the ceiling." Washington did not agree with the Director and told the mission to keep the equipment off the project. When the Director finally reported this to the Ambassador, he gave full credit for good judgment to me.

\* \* \* \*

I had gotten policy information on major program emphasis at a regional meeting. The Director disagreed with me and the plan was written up with the kind of emphasis he wanted. AID/W disapproved it.

\* \* \* \*

b. establishes priorities

The fundamental difficulty in this task is the lack of criteria or guidelines with which to judge the various priorities. While broad guidelines may be provided by AID/W, the application of these guidelines in the context of both the specific country situation and the specific projects possible in the various technical areas, represents an intellectual task of considerable magnitude.

Changes in policy at either the mission or AID/W level, or the existence of new factors affecting the host government may necessitate revising priorities from year to year even though the content of the program remains substantially the same.

Complicating the task is the problem of satisfying all of those concerned with the program. Technical personnel frequently feel that they are being deprived of their "fair share" of program funds if their areas are not high on the list of priorities. AID/W desk personnel disagree with mission-established priorities and attempt to have changes made. Visiting dignitaries, AID/W officials, and host personnel concerned with particular specialities all believe that their particular areas are of prime importance and bring pressure on the mission to do more projects in these areas. Pressure may also exist for doing less in certain areas. For example, some incumbents feel that assisting local industry may bring about Congressional pressures because of potential competition with U. S. businesses.

In the last programming cycle, I substantially cut the funds for a certain segment of the program. One person objected violently and we had to go to the Director to settle the dispute. The Director upheld my decision after I went through the details of funding the entire program and showed that in accordance with directives covering the scheduling of funds committed by the mission, this was the only area where the cut in the funds by AID/W could be taken.

\* \* \* \*

c. integrates plans with host development program

Few program officers can perform this function because few host governments have adequate planning capability. In practice, it usually means various attempts to teach planning concepts to host officials and to encourage them in establishing and using planning agencies.

Where there are host planning agencies, various problems arise. One is the tendency for these agencies to be staffed by poorly qualified personnel who plan very unrealistically. This adds the task of re-orienting their thinking to that of developing workable plans. Another problem arises when host government ministries refuse to cooperate with their government planning agencies. This may mean that the Program Officer has to pay lip-service to the planners, while real planning takes place with ministry personnel. Sometimes the planners could do an adequate job but their programs are so dependent upon AID support that they cannot make long-range decisions without knowing the amounts and conditions regulating future funding. As noted above, AID does not have and therefore cannot provide this information. The organization of host planning pertaining to certain areas may be split among different agencies, so that deciding upon agricultural projects, for example, may involve dealing with several different groups. This can create serious time problems during the final, rushed planning stages. There are also problems because these different groups do not agree with each other, or do not agree with AID about the goals or procedures appropriate for a project.

Still another problem in integrating planning with the host government programs grows out of the instability of economic and political conditions in many aid-receiving nations. It frequently is impossible for anyone to predict to any satisfactory extent what projects will be most useful and what their costs will be.

I try to build up the power of the host planning group by channeling all requests through them and insisting on their presence during negotiations with the ministries. I doubt if this has been of any great help, but I feel that the situation may improve because of a recent host reorganization.

\* \* \* \*

I was trying to reach agreement with the host planning group concerning a project. At an earlier meeting, which I had not attended, the Director, the planning group, and other host government officials had not been able to reach an agreement. They could not decide how to set up authority for controlling the project. I asked an engineer, who is a friend of mine and who was present at that meeting, if anyone had ulterior motives for blocking the project. He explained that there were none and suggested that we go on with making preparations which did not depend upon the point at issue. I bought this interpretation and preliminary steps are underway.

\* \* \* \*

Different host officials took different positions on the advisability of a feasibility study that had been suggested. In questioning them to get them to state a unified position, I was unable to make them understand that I wasn't pushing for or against the project, only that AID would do it if, and only if, they really wanted it.

\* \* \* \*

The political forces opposed to the President of this country have done everything they could to oppose the establishment of a planning body. We are trying to get the religious leadership to rally public support for us and maybe in that way public opinion will have an effect on the opposition.

\* \* \* \*

(See also the relevant example under IAGa above.)

d. anticipates AID/W information when delays occur

This task arises because of the frequent delays in communication between AID/W and the mission. In order to meet deadlines set by AID/W on various aspects of programming, work may have to be started before approvals, instructions, or clarification of instructions have been received. Problems of delays appear to be more serious in the distant missions where the Program Officers hesitate to make frequent telephone calls to Washington.

e. works out compromises

Conflicting points of view about program content or priorities frequently arise among mission personnel. In order to prevent these differences from affecting peoples' attitudes toward their work or creating disputes among personnel in various segments of the mission, the Program Officer often has to assume the role of conciliator and attempt to evolve amicable settlements. This task overlaps with advising others on plans, policy, and procedures (discussed below).

2. Provides guidelines, assistance and information to other mission personnel

The steps in this function are closely integrated with those described above under the decision-making function, and in practice the two usually occur concurrently.

a. suggests project ideas

The Program Officer may devote considerable attention and effort to this task or he may do very little depending upon his interpretation of its importance. The ideas may range in form

from a casual remark to a documented project outline. Failure on the part of superiors or technical personnel to accept the Program Officer's ideas is sometimes reported as an irritating aspect of this task. One of the complications of this task arises out of the need to make suggestions about technical matters without having technical qualifications. These suggestions must be made to people who are technical specialists, some of whom may consider the Program Officer not only unqualified technically but also unnecessary to effective mission functioning.

With new road building programs there has come increased need for transportation. The host government needs a large number of vehicles. If they get them, maintenance becomes a problem. For each project for which vehicles are requested spare parts requests are being made. There is no coordination. The host government does not have the concept of fleet maintenance. I proposed fleet maintenance so that there will not be spare parts requests project by project. If this is set up, there will have to be a project to teach management of stock and inventorying of parts. I suggested this to one of the technical divisions and to the host government. The first step will be to do a formal survey.

\* \* \* \*

The worst mistake in advising the Director to press for expansion of the program occurred last year. I had been considering a new project. I persuaded the Director to request approval in Washington late in the fiscal year. Washington strongly disapproved, asserting that the Director was just trying to use up funds on new projects.

\* \* \* \*

b. advises others on plans, policies, and procedures

There are two principal aspects to this task. The first consists of insuring that appropriate information is communicated to the mission staff and line personnel. It requires that the Program Officer be aware of all project plans and the opinions toward these plans of significant policy-making personnel. Frequently division personnel will have biases toward the program which are contrary to mission policy and the Program Officer must make them aware of the correct emphasis and try to persuade them to change their approach.

The second aspect of this task is providing advice and clarification to other personnel about the orders, directives, and regulations that pertain to programming. This requires that the Program Officer be thoroughly familiar with this information and have it easily accessible for reference. Some Program Officers write summaries of these materials and distribute them to the technical divisions. This task has two major problems. The first is interpreting what AID instructions really mean when directives are phrased in unclear terms or frequent changes are made. The second is the questioning of some Program Officers' interpretations by other personnel.

In meeting the problem of the technicians' inability to plan, I must consider the technicians and evaluate their competency. I have tried a variety of methods of indoctrination and education: holding meetings, hearings, exhortation, and having my subordinates press for good planning. There has been some improvement in some of the technicians, and as new people come in I have been successful in indoctrinating them.

\* \* \* \*

An Acting Division Chief dropped in for assistance in the preparation of a report which involved detailing host plans which were neither clear nor detailed. I suggested that host plans for applying for outside agency funds would have to include plans for manpower in order to get approval. I suggested that host lack of cost data be reported and U. S. experience-based figures included with a summary description of the on-going project. I suggested supplying bracketing figures for estimates of proposed costs.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief wanted to use prior year unobligated funds for a research team. In this case I was able to convince him that this was an invalid use of the funds by citing appropriate directives. The project will be covered by current year funds.

\* \* \* \*

The Director liked the idea of having a special fund for useful projects that come up, but which would be too small for a loan or grant aid. The Director wanted a sort of "large" petty cash fund for this. I listened to the idea, then told the Director that the idea was nice, but that AID/W would never allocate money on such a basis. This was effective in that it saved time, saved being turned down by AID/W, and saved the Director from making a foolish request. I knew from my work in AID/W that such a request, however meritorious, would have no chance of approval.

\* \* \* \*

An airgram was received from AID/W with a series of questions about a contract technician whose activities were covered by a Project Implementation Order/Technician for this fiscal '.

year but for whom funds were not included in the next fiscal year CAP. The mission wanted to keep him beyond this fiscal year, but the acting Director had decided that the project on which he was working must be closed out and no funds would be obligated for it for the next fiscal year. The technician was on loan from another government agency, so the Chief of the Division and Acting Director drafted an airgram telling AID/W that the man would still be here at the end of the fiscal year but no funds would be available and asking AID/W to request his agency to pick up his payroll from that point on. A subordinate knew this was wrong, but refused to buck the Acting Director. I refused to concur on the airgram, and sent it back to the Acting Director giving the reasons why I refused to sign it. The Acting Director then called a meeting with the Division Chief and me. In about 14 minutes I convinced them that AID/W would just laugh at this request as the procedure they were suggesting was illegal in a very basic manner and the mission would appear foolish and incompetent. I won my point and the airgram was changed.

\* \* \* \*

In another instance, I saw a cable to Washington from the Ambassador reporting a request from a host Minister for assistance to a government ministry. I advised AID/W of the political sensitivity of the matter at the present time. I pointed out that the local press was already misconstruing the Director's suggestions about the host needs in this area. I felt that if the U. S. provided the assistance we would be plunged into the middle of a very thorny political problem involving conflicting factions among the host nationals.

\* \* \* \*

In one instance, the instructions ask what the U. S. could do to help the host government politically. In my report, I suggested that the U. S. assist them in getting into an

international organization. I was criticized four months later by the desk officer who said this was absurd, and that the U. S. couldn't interfere in such affairs. I knew this at the time and assumed that the desk knew I knew it. I assumed that the desk wanted some sort of a suggestion no matter how absurd it was. I know now that they are not "serious" about some of their requests.

\* \* \* \*

c. provides assistance of subordinates

Preceding sections have described the common failure of technical divisions to provide well-executed plans for future or continuing projects or to respond adequately to special requests from AID/W. In order to meet deadlines, Program Officers frequently assign subordinates from the Program Office to assist division personnel in completing assignments. The assistance provided may range from simply drafting a cable to developing an extensive background analysis for project justification.

A technical division was assigned the task of developing a plan for a costly project. Their plan was poorly done; it was inaccurate and proposed "dream world" facilities. Their planning required a full year, with me occasionally participating in their meetings and encouraging them to be practical, advising about what AID/W would approve, and even making suggestions, e.g., starting with a small facility capable of being expanded. My efforts were to no avail, so I finally asked the Division Chief if a Program Office employee could be assigned to help on the plan. The Division Chief agreed, so I assigned a subordinate to work on the plan who has experience in putting research together, and knowledge of economic matters. Now, an adequate plan is almost ready for presentation.

\* \* \* \*

A Division is constantly delaying. This may be a tactic to get their program into the CAP without change, because no one has time to review it. Last year, they were again late, so I tried telephoning them to remind them of the deadline. This didn't work, so I asked if I would assign a Program Office subordinate to the Division temporarily to help produce the paperwork. It worked. The Division accepted the Program Office subordinate and he successfully turned out their documents.

\* \* \* \*

There is to be a conference between the mission and the host government on a project that is being planned. AID/W had warned the mission to be careful to limit the scope of assistance to specific target areas and to learn a third government's interest in participating. A technician drafted a reply to AID/W, telling them in effect that the mission was capable of handling the situation. The reply was also inadequate in that it did not describe how the scope was to be limited, or other information required. My subordinate cleared this message routing it to me. The Director read the message and realized its inadequacy so he bounced it back to me. I took the disapproved message to the subordinate who had cleared it, and instructed him to meet with the technician to work out a more appropriate reply.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Coordinates with other agencies

This function involves maintaining contact and working out coordinated plans with all United States Government agencies and with other assistance groups -- third-country, multilateral, or private -- which are cooperating with the host government.

#### a. explains USAID position to other agencies

- 1) Embassy, USIS, other U.S. agencies
- 2) Third-country, multilateral, and private groups

In order to develop cooperation and coordination with other agencies, it is frequently necessary to define or clarify the general philosophy and purpose underlying the AID program and any particular interpretations developed within the mission from special emphases chosen by the Director. It requires an ability to state explicitly these mission views on various topics and its position vis-a-vis other agencies. The extent of the Program Officer's responsibility varies considerably from mission to mission. In relations with other United States groups, he may have regularly assigned liaison duties or he may function solely as an advisor to other personnel. His contacts with non-United States groups may be tangential and intermittent or they may be close and regularly scheduled.

A problem frequently reported in working with the Embassy concerns the "superior attitude" of its personnel toward AID personnel.

In dealing with other groups, there is a feeling among some Program Officers that the lack of communication between the United States and other donors at higher levels creates a situation of "near-competition" in the field. A problem that may arise in part because

of this is a tendency for representatives of other agencies to be aloof or cool toward mission personnel.

I am trying to improve Embassy relations by considering the role of the Embassy and trying to put my arguments in their terms. I cannot judge whether I have been effective or not.

\* \* \* \*

b. participates in developing coordinated plans

- 1) Confers on joint problems
- 2) Reviews and edits reports
- 3) Writes portions of reports

Coordinating plans usually means working with United States agencies, particularly the Embassy, more than the other types of agencies mentioned above. In some missions, the Program Officer or one of his subordinates constantly consults with counterparts in the Embassy, military groups, or USIS. One of the obstacles in developing mutually acceptable plans is the difference in objectives among the various United States agencies. It particularly affects the progress of work on preparing reports because each agency tries to slant the contents to support its own interests.

Another difficulty is the reluctance of these agencies to consult knowledgeable AID personnel about special information, but to rely upon their own staff members, with the result that Washington receives conflicting reports.

In working out project plans, incumbents report that Embassy officers "try to order AID around and impose political decisions over economic wisdom," or want to expand projects beyond what AID considers to be appropriate levels of operations, content, scope, or goals.

The Embassy sometimes creates difficulties for the mission in negotiating with host officials by supporting the host's views in opposition to AID's.

Both the Embassy and the mission received a joint message from State/AID urgently requesting certain economic data. I prepared my part immediately and turned it over to the Embassy Economic Officer, who hadn't quite finished his part, and assumed that the Economic Officer would reply with a joint message. Joint messages are credited to both sources, but I learned later that the Economic Officer had sent the reply in the State message series, thus precluding any credit for the USAID contribution. There was nothing I could do about it.

\* \* \* \*

The Long-Range Assistance Strategy was well-coordinated. I sent lots of copies to all of the United States team, gave them plenty of time for perusal, and spent a good bit of time discussing it with each agency. I know they were well-informed and had ample opportunity to object if there was any conflict between AID's position and theirs. In spite of this excellent coordination, one agency filed an objection with Washington, without apprising the mission, after appearing to agree with the Long-Range Assistance Strategy as it had been discussed and revised.

\* \* \* \*

Coordination with non-United States agencies depends upon several factors: the size and extent of other assistance programs, the personal rapport between mission personnel and other-agency representatives, and the location of projects or offices. One source of difficulty encountered here is the poor internal coordination of some

host governments. There frequently is no central point where information on assistance programs can be obtained. Also, if a country has multiple teams working within any one area of development it is very difficult to avoid some duplication of programs. The problem of secrecy about program plans for political or commercial reasons discussed in section I A, also applies to this function.

A third-country Ambassador (who is a personal friend also) came here to find out how our aid program was working out. I gave him a report on the status of our projects. At the same time, I asked him what they were financing for the host and what types of aid they were giving. I specifically wanted to know whether they were considering reducing a certain project because host officials had made unofficial queries to find out whether we would provide some assistance. If this third-country withdrew, we might get a formal request. If this were to come about, it would be best for us to have looked at the situation in detail before a request was made. It would also mean that there would be a potential chance to expand our program and influence.

\* \* \* \*

A private agency is distributing food and goods in this country. They have a very large program of their own and they also have been implementing some of our PL 480 projects. However, they have been getting very little cooperation from the local government and the public and are considering pulling out. The representative for the area came to meet with me yesterday. The meeting was mutually desired. We exchanged policy views. We discussed his problems and alternatives. During our discussion, I was trying to get some background on what they had been doing so that I would have some information on which to anticipate new PL 480 proposals which we most certainly would receive if they pulled

out. At the same time we were discussing possible means of improving the level of cooperation and assistance which they were being given in an effort to possibly save the program. So, in effect, the entire meeting with him served a dual purpose -- I was able to gather information with which I could prepare for one eventuality, and at the same time was exchanging points-of-view and information which I could utilize to recommend possible solutions to the problems at hand.

\* \* \* \*

Another important consideration which has to be made here is that of other countries or agencies who are operating in the same area as the proposal under study. For example: The United Nations is also interested in agriculture extension and in agriculture programs in general. In trying to meet our objectives in this area, we try to coordinate our activities with theirs so as not to duplicate or contradict theirs but rather to supplement them. In view of this, we cannot use host country "needs" as our sole criterion for evaluating new proposals.

\* \* \* \*

I found out that a third-country was interested in a project. This allowed me to eliminate a proposal that AID should support a similar project.

\* \* \* \*

It is difficult for the mission to find out what the U.N. is doing here since the nearest U.N. representative is in another country. AID/W has a U.N. coordinating office, but it has never been very effective, probably due to understaffing. When I was in Washington,

one man was responsible for coordinating all U.N. activities for this region. I sent three messages of complaint about the lack of information to AID/W. I feel that this must have been effective as AID/W sent two U.N. project proposals to the mission for comment.

\* \* \* \*

c. arranges for other-agency assistance to AID and vice versa

This task usually pertains to arrangements with other U.S. agencies. It includes obtaining permission from the Embassy as required, and arranging for borrowing or lending personnel and equipment. A special instance of this task, arranging assistance from USIS for publicity is discussed below in section IV C.

One obstacle is the reluctance on the part of some agencies to provide personnel when AID requests assistance. This reluctance may result from policy laid down in Washington, from policy made by local officers, or from a shortage of personnel. At times when personnel are loaned to AID, they may want to pursue objectives held by their own agencies rather than those of AID. Bottlenecks sometimes develop because other-agency personnel ignore AID deadlines in completing their tasks.

Arrangements with non-United States agencies are made most frequently in connection with world-wide programs, such as Food for Peace, which are discussed in section I D below. A common problem reported is that the agencies involved tend to be religious organizations who may be in conflict with certain segments of the host population. This creates the risk of engendering anti-AID attitudes among these host groups.

Another problem arises when AID develops joint programs with other agencies and cannot fulfill its obligations because AID/W delays in approving the plan or recruiting personnel.

I requested permission from the Embassy Administrative Officer to use the Ambassador's diplomatic privilege to import a shipment of goods donated to the children of the country by a private United States group. Use of the Ambassador's privilege would avoid the payment of customs fees for which there were no official funds available. The Administrative Officer got the Ambassador's permission and so informed me.

\* \* \* \*

4. Obtains approval for new and revised programs

This function includes obtaining approval for programs at several levels -- mission superiors, the Ambassador, or AID/W. Disagreements between AID/W and the Mission Director regarding program goals or policy create problems for the Program Officer in accomplishing this function. (See the discussion contained in the introduction to Section B.)

a. follows routine procedures

Formal channels for obtaining approvals are specified in the Manual Orders and other regulations, and under usual circumstances approvals are requested through these channels. Failure to answer requests for approval or long delays in forwarding their decisions by AID/W are the major problems reported.

AID/W sent out a team of experts who met with various Ministers to set up a joint committee and develop a program for reviewing projects. The program was submitted to Washington where it languished. Then AID/W proposed sending out a consultant. I approved of this, but only on the

condition that AID/W approve a commitment to get the project going. AID/W did not reply, but a consultant came out later -- without a commitment. The project died because Washington never got around to it. I believe this is the fault of the Desk Officer, a key man, who should be sensitive to country priorities as well as regional ones. Urgency should be his business.

\* \* \* \*

b. expedites approvals

To overcome delays in obtaining program approvals, non-routine procedures are frequently employed. These include seeking the intervention of a "friend" in AID/W to facilitate action, going to Washington personally to "walk a document through channels," by-passing someone in the chain of command, or other similar measures. There are risks involved in some of these actions since they may lead to difficult working relationships in the future.

c. defends and justifies:

- 1) prepares briefs
- 2) gives formal presentations
- 3) gives informal presentations
- 4) provides routine and requested justification to AID/W

The task refers to both the routine procedures of providing oral or written background summaries to demonstrate the purposes of a program, and the extra efforts required to overcome questioning or disapproval of a program. It also includes the preparation and presentation of visual displays, statistical information, and briefings. It may require traveling to AID/W.

The major problem relating to this task is the amount of detail which AID/W requires to justify projects. Program Officers report that completing the work involved is a serious drain on their time.

There are frequent reports that communicating the rationale of a project to AID/W is a very difficult task, often complicated by a requirement to "justify political aid on economic grounds."

A technician wanted to send participants to the United States. The Director was against it. I thought it was a good idea. I went to the Director and pointed out how integral a part of all our projects this area was and thought that the United States should get in on the ground floor before somebody else does. I convinced him to change his mind. It hasn't gotten off the ground yet, however. There is a risk in that, if the program failed and more harm than good were done, the United States' position here would be seriously affected and a great part of it would be my fault for having supported the idea so strongly.

\* \* \* \*

I had arranged for a TDY specialist to do a survey to provide justification for a project which AID/W had rejected. The Technical Chief agreed, but the Director objected. Later I learned that a high official from AID/W was planning a tour of the area. As an alternative to the TDY specialist, I suggested that the Technical Chief arrange for the official to come to the mission. The Director agreed to this. During his visit the justification was provided, and AID/W approved the project.

\* \* \* \*

AID is interested in certain projects in the host country and has contributed to this type of effort with host national financial support. One host national Minister advised one of our Division Chiefs that they were interested in additional projects of the same type, which would likely be under the auspices of another Ministry. However, as planning progressed, additional host national funds were not available. Since regulations require contributions from both host national and United States sources, I had to develop a justification for United States unilateral contribution. I emphasized the Director's approval of the procedural deviation, the one-shot nature of the request, the high return in terms of benefits to the host economy, and host national commodity contributions. The proposal was approved.

\* \* \* \*

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### C. Prepares Documentation

For this function, as for I B, the Program Office is ordinarily the center for directing and coordinating the efforts of all personnel concerned with completing program documentation.

Problems reported are also similar to those described for I B -- inadequate time, unclear instructions, undefined authority, and the need to redo the work of others. Other problems are discussed in connection with the detailed tasks of this function.

#### 1. Writes or rewrites portions of CAP, IAS, or other documents

- a. selects or revises relevant portions of previous documents
- b. formulates project descriptions in required terms

A large proportion of the Program Officer's time is devoted to this function. It is generally his responsibility to

provide some, if not all, of the narrative sections of program documents. Frequently the standard periodic reports required by AID/W can be prepared largely by updating former reports and revising them in accordance with any changes of instructions. However, special reports, and at times standard reports, may require writing extensive narratives.

AID/W requests for special reports tend to disrupt the usual activities of the mission. Also, these reports frequently request information which has already been forwarded in other documents, making the Program Officers feel that they waste their time writing materials which are never read. The necessity for providing irrelevant detail (in the Program Officer's view) in reports also brings comments from Program Officers about wasting their time. In the words of one interviewee, "There are too many curious clerks in Washington."

Problems in deciding upon appropriate materials to be included in reports arise because of the frequent changes in format and content instructions and a general lack of clarity of these instructions. Many Program Officers feel that the writing tasks would be simplified, especially for the CAP, if repetitive presentations of the same materials were eliminated.

I wrote the first draft of the strategy statement. I looked up the instruction for preparation, former copies of strategy statements, read a summary of the economic situation, political analyses and self-help reports, and sat with my head in my hands. Final writing was done over a period including Saturday afternoon and evening, and Sunday morning. On Monday morning, the Director showed me his version of the statement and then I realized that the Director's version was going to be the official version. I had spent 15 hours on it.

\* \* \* \*

The Director had told me that he thought the CAP was a silly exercise and that there was not much to be said in it. Director felt that the only significance of the CAP was for cutting up the AID pie, and that claims were already staked out. I felt that I was slaving to do a conscientious job without support from the Director and that the Director didn't care whether it was done well or on time. I also knew that no matter how good my product was it wouldn't be good enough for my backstop at the desk in Washington. In view of all this, I felt compelled to push. I submitted a draft of the CAP to the Director who reviewed it conscientiously. But he rejected one fundamental point. This point was that USAID should seek some modifications (not changes) in the host government's development effort. The Director knocked this out, and told me that the United States posture is to build political relationships and USAID shouldn't rock the boat. I felt the Mission Director showed inadequate concern. He brushed off further discussions of the point with a brusque rebuttal. The upshot of all this was that we compromised and did it his way.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W is forever asking the mission for additional details, even when the mission is at peak work load, e.g., when CAP is being produced. Last year, during CAP preparation, AID/W asked the mission to submit project work plans to AID/W. I knew that to do so would take much time. Therefore, I sent a single cable to AID/W saying that work plans would not be submitted because they would not be useful to AID/W. AID/W didn't press for the work plans.

\* \* \* \*

. . .

The principal time pressures are those which come from Washington. Last year, when I had understood that the CAP would be due in December, I was informed in September that it would be due in October. Since I was new on the job, had never prepared one before, and the old one was full of errors, I worked day and night for three weeks to get it done. I do not think it would be much of a job to update it this year, and I have been keeping files of materials which will help me do it. In April I learned that the new CAP would be due in June, but this did not bother me.

\* \* \* \*

While working full time trying to get out the CAP and to meet AID/W deadline, AID/W still continued to send other work with early deadlines. Right in the middle of CAP work, I received a request from AID/W to submit a report on what other countries were doing to aid the host. I solved this problem by letting the non-CAP work pile up. I simply didn't do it until the CAP work was finished.

\* \* \* \*

2. Prepares numerical charts and tables
  - a. checks for consistency and accuracy
  - b. prepares explanatory material

The Program Officer's task usually consists of reviewing the work of subordinates (see below). However, in small missions, he may have to calculate the data and compile the charts and tables himself.

Many of the same problems affect this task as were reported above concerning narrative writing, and in section I A concerning evaluating information. The requirement that the same figures

be broken down into numerous categories is considered inappropriate by many Program Officers because of the unreliability of much of their information. It also is very time-consuming.

For the last volume 1 of the CAP, the Economic Advisor and I disagreed whether summary tables (E-4's) were required by Washington. CAP instructions were not clear. I decided to go ahead and send the CAP without them, figuring Washington would ask for them if they were needed. No word from Washington yet, so I assume it was O.K.

\* \* \* \*

The tables for the CAP are not done yet. Deputy Director told me to go to the Program Economist and simply tell him to get it done, now. I hesitate to do that, however, because I have gone to him several times in the past and asked about things he was doing and when he could have them finished. I always get a big reaction from him like "what do you expect me to do, I'm only human and I have no one to help me." Because of his attitude I just don't bother him anymore. I guess he'll finish sooner or later. Perhaps this is very inefficient of me, but I don't know what else to do about him.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Coordinates and supervises the work of others

In many ways this is the most difficult task for a Program Officer because his lack of authority over the technical staff means that he must resort to persuasion or appeal to higher authority to get his "orders" carried out.

Delays in clearing drafts with all of the people involved in document preparation also create problems in accomplishing this task.

a. schedules and assigns work to subordinates and technical personnel

1) monitors progress

2) pressures as needed

The task involves establishing procedural guidelines, interpreting directives from AID/W, and setting internal deadlines. Classification of certain portions of documents produced sometimes slows work progress because it inhibits the free flow of information among staff members who need to work with or review these materials. Another problem frequently reported is that technical divisions ignore memoranda sent to them advising or inquiring about work progress so that the Program Officer (or a subordinate) must spend a great deal of time in visiting their offices to give and get information. At times technicians refuse to conform to mission deadlines and will not turn in reports until shortly before the AID/W deadline, creating great difficulty for the Program Office in its attempt to develop unified presentations.

We got a directive from AID/W which included a timetable for presenting the various areas of our E-1's and suggestions for their improvement. They were broad guidelines describing targets and goals. I had copies of the directives distributed to the technical divisions. There were no questions; the instructions were very clear. I was very pleased because a couple of weeks earlier I had drafted a directive myself which included many of AID/W's suggestions for improving our E-1's and CAP preparation. I had anticipated Washington very well, I thought.

\* \* \* \*

I handle the tight deadlines from AID/W by setting internal deadlines well in advance of the AID/W deadlines. This worked well on the last CAP which was in AID/W early.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

b. reviews, edits and evaluates

Ordinarily, responsibility for developing good program documents is given to the Program Officer. He must examine all document inputs produced by other people for both substance and style to insure that they meet requirements and are clearly written.

The low quality of other people's writing is the major difficulty. According to many Program Officers, most technical personnel and some Program Office subordinates simply don't know how to write, and occasionally competent technical personnel dash off their work hurriedly, knowing that the Program Office will "fix it up." An ancillary problem arises because some technicians resent the Program Officer suggesting or making improvements in their documents. This resentment occasionally develops into permanent interpersonal conflicts.

During the CAP preparation, I was assisted by a subordinate who had never done a CAP before. I worked with him as closely as I could, but my time was limited by the "hurly-burly." I did not realize that the subordinate wouldn't produce until the last minute, so there was no time for me to review his material which went from rough draft to final copy and then out into the pouch, with the rest of the CAP. Then there was a short period of "let down" and I forgot about that subordinate's contribution. I then prepared to review the strategy section in Washington, but when I got to Washington the first criticism I heard concerned the section of the CAP which the subordinate had prepared. AID/W asked whether it couldn't have been done better.

\* \* \* \*  
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c. requests revisions

These actions may range from a suggestion for a few changes given by telephone to an extensive written outline detailing additional substantive materials needed or major stylistic rewrites. Some Program Officers arrange a meeting with the drafter and go over the document point by point. The problems cited regarding the preceding task also pertain to this one. Another problem is that division personnel often regard the Program Office as delaying unnecessarily long in acting upon materials submitted and requiring too many petty changes.

The specialists in a division wrote a report. These people were the ones who were attaching themselves to a host Ministry and so their report consisted of all the great good that was going to come from one type of aid. When I read this, I called in the Division Chief and discussed the report with him. We agreed to have the technicians rewrite the report. It has been rewritten but they have still not pinned down the exact aim of the project. It was my function here to analyze this report and ask for further data. My background in this area stood me in good stead.

\* \* \* \*

d. rewrites work of others

Many Program Officers consider this task a problem in itself. It adds an extra burden to their workload during the last and busiest phases of getting out reports, and it creates personal animosities (see above). The task ranges from correcting the grammatical constructions to completely reformulating the content of a report.

A subordinate wrote a section of the CAP. It was oratorical and verbose. He wrote things for which there was little evidence. This was very confusing and I had to cut and revise this considerably.

\* \* \* \*

When I arrived, a first draft of a document had been written. It contained lots of repetition, rambled. I did not have time to do anything with it, but later AID/W said a revision of it should be prepared. They offered a man to help with it. I accepted, since I thought the man could edit and revise it, but it needed a lot more than just editing, and the man from AID/W was unfamiliar with local conditions. I decided I had to do it, and asked the Director to give me the time, and to let the Assistant Program Officer take over. I worked day and night for six weeks. Then it took more time to clear with the Embassy. AID/W reviewed it and decided that it should include other information which had not been in their original guidelines.

\* \* \* \*

I consulted the Director about his feeling that a division report contained too much irrelevant data. The Director agreed and sketched an outline of appropriate topics. I took the report home and rewrote it. The next day I showed it to the Division Chief who made a few minor changes and approved it.

\* \* \* \*

I reviewed a proposal from a Division Chief. I felt that the text of the proposal was not presented in such a way as to get the best possible response from AID/W. The benefits and advantages of the proposal were not spelled out clearly at the beginning. So I rewrote the introduction with the Director's approval, and this was accepted by the Division Chief.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

e. requests review by others

Most documents prepared in the Program Office are regularly reviewed by higher officers. If a technical report has been extensively altered, the Division Chief is usually given an opportunity to "approve" the final draft. Occasionally the Program Officer may call upon various line or staff personnel to read documents to insure that they are accurate and in accordance with mission policy. When all personnel are very busy, it may be difficult to persuade others to devote time to an adequate review.

I routinely had subordinates check data in reports. They questioned the baseline for data in one report. I advised the originator of the problem and my subordinate and the originator worked out the problem.

\* \* \* \*

4. Supervises mechanical production of documents

This task involves instructing secretaries in following format directives, providing assistance if drafts are not clear, supervising proof-reading, and monitoring document assembly. It also includes making administrative arrangements for borrowing extra personnel if needed.

The necessity of asking secretaries and subordinates to work overtime, especially common in producing the CAP, is considered a problem by many Program Officers.

Another problem we have is that we are far away from anything. It takes a long time to send and receive communications with Washington. We got into the last stage of drafting all the pages making up the final form of the CAP, and discovered that we were short of the proper forms

on which to make our drafts. We requested more from Washington. The request was days in getting there. When the actual materials got here they were the wrong kind and they arrived past our deadline. We had to do the final draft without the correct forms, so we simply used what we had.

\* \* \* \*

(from interviewer) At the morning meeting, the Director indicated that a "working paper" about a program should be prepared to hand-carry to Washington, and a smooth, final document would be mailed to AID/W later. This was to enable them to get something into the mill early, and better thought out ideas would be submitted later. The Program Officer, instead, turned out as smooth and final a document as possible, not only correcting minute typing errors, but also cancelling any reference to a future final document. I have observed other Program Officers having documents typed up smoothly when it appears that they don't need to be. In this case, it meant that both he and his secretary had to work three hours overtime.

\* \* \* \*

(from interviewer) Getting the CAP typed up properly is a problem. There are many drafts and revisions by Program Officers and Assistant Program Officers. The CAP is thick, running to a few hundred pages with detailed tables, graphs, tabular presentations, etc. The Program Officer's time was consumed merely being available to typists, proofreading, and assisting borrowed secretaries who did not know the procedures. The Program Officer and Assistant Program Officer helped to prolong the typing of the CAP. They would frequently have a typist redo an entire page to change one or two words.

\* \* \* \*

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5. Directs forwarding procedures for documents

This refers to all of the tasks performed in clearing and sending a finished document, obtaining approvals and signatures, writing cover letters, and other routine processes. It also may call for hand-carrying a document to Washington in order to meet a deadline.

We submitted our first phase (as called for by Washington's schedule) with a request for comments, criticism and suggestions in the event that we should need to revise our second phase. We got no response from AID/W so we got no benefit from any errors we may have made in the first phase. We had to do phase two without any comment or specific guidance from AID/W. The result was that it took us longer to finish the CAP book (waiting for AID/W to respond) and we would have submitted it late if I had not been going to Washington on consultation which allowed me to hand-carry it. If AID/W doesn't respond to our requests for timely guidance there is nothing we can do.

\* \* \* \*

The United States Ambassador must approve the CAP, but he was taking a long time to clear it. Therefore, I was forced to wait for the Ambassador to write my transmittal letter. With the deadline for submission at hand, I sent the CAP to AID/W with a notation that the Ambassador's approval and cover letter would be forwarded later.

\* \* \* \*

D. Integrates Development Plans With World-Wide Programs (e.g., Food for Peace)

The involvement of the Program Officer in accomplishing this function varies considerably from mission to mission. This results partly from differences in mission staffing and partly from differences

in scope of these programs as a consequence of conditions in the host nations or of acceptance by the host governments. In most cases, the Program Officer performs tasks similar to those cited previously, e.g., obtaining information, guiding others, making decisions, and preparing documentation, as well as those to be discussed below in implementation and program management.

This function is cited as a separate "content" area because (a) some programs generate funds which are to be utilized in other sectors of the program, necessitating additional administrative procedures; (b) the integration of a program with other sectors of the mission program may be complicated by the involvement of non-AID administrative agencies located outside the host country; and (c) the actual implementation of a program may be carried out by a non-AID agency over which the mission can exercise little control. These factors create additional and perhaps unusual tasks in coordinating with other groups which may become the responsibility of the Program Officer.

Most of the problems described above and below regarding regular programs also are encountered in these programs -- unclear regulations and directives, undefined authority, policy conflicts, lack of qualified staff, lack of host acceptance, and so forth. A problem peculiar to these special programs is the issue raised by using religious organizations for distributing food. This generates opposition not only among sectors of the host population who are hostile toward certain religious groups but also among people in the United States. The former may extend their negative attitudes to AID, while the latter may contribute to public or Congressional opposition to AID at home.

I obtained approval from the Director and Ambassador to recruit a Food for Peace Officer for the mission. I discussed the matter informally and met several prospects informally. I called AID/W asking if my preferred candidate was available. AID/W approved the candidate on TDY basis. I drafted an acceptance cable after reviewing fiscal data and checking with the Controller to see how to get the candidate's permanent mission to pay as much of his travel expense as possible. I could have submitted a routine request, but in that case I would expect no results due to a shortage of Food for Peace Officers.

\* \* \* \*

Since AID provides the commodities for the CARE program, I have some responsibilities for the coordination of it. I decided what is to be done and prepared a program for the coming year. Washington was pushing two commodities, but I noted an item in the local newspaper reporting a ban on one of them, apparently to protect the local producers. I thought it would not be right for the United States to export it for the CARE program, so I restricted the CARE imports to the other commodity.

\* \* \* \*

During a period of serious riots, I was distressed by the "bad press" that the U.S. was getting. I felt that some of the rather large amounts of money that had been accumulating from PI, 480 sales could be used for some conspicuous project aimed at the urban, politically conscious segment of the population. (I think the political impact of food gifts is lost in the complex processes of distribution.) I decided to "make a pitch" for a project, and proposed this to AID/W. This gave rise to a flap at AID/W. They said that they could not approve the project for political reasons. However, I argued successfully against their objections.

\* \* \* \*

The host country has never had a PL 480 program. It would be an inexpensive way to give aid and would facilitate our operations and influence. It would be an entirely new idea here. However, I have not succeeded in creating any interest within the host government. I haven't been able to get them to understand the program and its benefits. I had legislation and other documents translated and sent to an appropriate Minister. I met with several different officials and explained how PL 480 would work here. I finally had a larger meeting with several Ministry representatives, the Director, the Controller, the Assistant Program Officer, and myself to get some ruling or idea about their impressions. We discussed it in full and they said they would study it further. The last I heard, they gave the action to their Minister for decision. I think the principal reason for my lack of success is that I haven't had enough time to personally explain the program to them. As a result, they will not formally propose it. In the future, perhaps, I'll get some time.

\* \* \* \*

A cultural difference which makes headaches for one of the programs is that the host nationals have no concept of a government welfare program. All of the welfare is usually handled intra-family. This makes it very difficult for the PL 480 program where we are attempting to get across the concept of government welfare. I try to explain this concept to the host government officials.

\* \* \* \*

I want the host government to propose a PL 480 program. It would be to both our countries' advantage. I have been arranging meetings with a Minister -- whenever I can spare the time -- to explain such a program to him. I'm trying to point out all the advantages to him. I'm doing this in a very concrete manner so that he realizes that I mean what I say and will

take immediate action if and when they make such a proposal. I am in hopes that once I get to spend a little more time with him he will see my point and take the lead himself.

\* \* \* \*

I assumed that a host Minister knew I didn't have an organization capable of distributing PL 480 commodities and, consequently, I assumed that they would be willing to hire an organization such as CARE to take charge of it. The Minister did not have this attitude and would not sign the agreement in spite of the fact that I and everyone else assumed that there would be no delay in signing. Just why this happened nobody knows.

\* \* \* \*

A religious agency prepared posters for the program as per regulations. The posters highlighted the agency and free food and mentioned U.S. contributions in small print. I instructed the Communications Media Division to make up another poster without emphasis on free food because I knew that it wasn't going to be free much longer. I tried to increase emphasis on our contribution without making it too prominent due to the publicity restriction. I am going to have the posters printed in the mission and insure that the distribution is monitored by internal auditors.

\* \* \* \*



## II. PARTICIPATES IN PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

The Program Officer usually has responsibility for directing and supervising the processes involved in completing the final arrangements and documentation for all projects. Many of the tasks performed are similar to those described in the preceding section regarding review of plans and documents.

Many of the problems encountered are also similar to those commented upon above: ambiguous directives from AID/W, policy conflicts between the mission and AID/W, and undefined authority.

The greatest problem reported concerns the need to accomplish these tasks under extremely severe time pressure. Ordinarily preparation of project plans occurs after the start of the fiscal year. Once plans have been submitted, only tentative arrangements may be made pending AID/W approval and fund allocation, and AID/W cannot make commitments until Congress acts on AID appropriations. When the cycle is delayed, the implementation of projects on the mission level takes place hurriedly. Many Program Officers attribute the inadequacies of documents to the extreme haste with which they are prepared in order to meet the deadlines for obligating funds.

A less pressing problem, but one that irritates many Program Officers, is Washington's "second-guessing" the mission concerning the details of particular projects. It not only holds up implementation, but also discourages the efforts of field personnel who feel that AID/W lacks confidence in them.

Another problem arises from the practice of encouraging other agencies to take over AID-generated projects. After mission personnel have devoted considerable effort to planning a project, they experience a psychological let-down when another donor steps in and assumes the responsibility for operating it.

Sometimes when the Mission Director or other personnel are new, the Program Officer has a problem in keeping them from starting work on projects before all of the necessary formalities have been completed.

A. Reviews Background Information Relevant to Projects

In order to insure that all requirements have been met, the Program Officer must be familiar with the details of regulations, mission and AID/W policy, and funding procedures, as well as with the substantive aspects of project plans set forth in the CAP. A review of the CAP is almost always required because of the usual time lag between submission of the CAP and the onset of the implementation phase.

1. Confers with staff

As indicated in earlier sections, conferring refers to discussions which may range from short telephone conversations to formal meetings. Conferees may include anyone within the mission or technical divisions who has information pertaining to this function. In general, the persons most frequently consulted will be the Technical Chiefs, Program Office subordinates, the Director and Deputy Director.

Washington sent approval for a project and an agreement for the host to sign. Although the agreement had been formulated in Washington, certain sections were negotiable. I had to prepare myself to understand everything in the agreement so as to be able to answer questions from host officials. The Director also had to be familiar with the agreement. With the Director I went over the agreement point by point in detail. We checked with the Controller on points we did not understand. The intense preparation was required because the agreement was in English, and few host government officials know English.

\* \* \* \*

2. Reviews documents

The Program Officer consults a variety of documents in addition to the CAP for information relevant to developing final details of approved projects. These documents include various AID/W directives or special instructions, project reports, or other materials.

We are spending a million dollars in setting up a project. It will be completed shortly. We have a private agency representative here who has been working in this area with the host government. He has apparently impressed the Ambassador with his ideas on what could be done to improve the services. The Director has asked me for my comments about his proposals. I told the Director I couldn't comment until I had evaluated the results of the last project done in this area.

We had a technician here for 2 years who was doing just the type of work that had been suggested. I got the former technician's end-of-tour report and studied it. It was obvious from this report that he received no cooperation from the government here and that their organization in this area was tenuous and loose. To me, it seemed that the steps we should be taking were to assure and assist in establishing a proper organization rather than to concern ourselves, as the representative suggested, with improvement of services at such an early stage.

\* \* \* \*

I was talking to the AID/W Desk Officer via telephone. The Desk Officer said that there had been a delay in signing a contract for a project. Therefore, the Project Implementation Order/Technician (PIO/T) and Project Agreement had to be amended to change commencement and termination dates to comply with the new dates made necessary by the contract delay in Washington. I didn't think there would be a problem, so I told the Desk Officer that the amendments would be made. However, when I tried to accomplish this, the Controller said that amendments to PIO's and Project Agreements could not extend termination dates beyond 3 years from the original date of the signing of the contract. He was firm about this, even though AID/W had given the order. I then went through manual orders for 1-1/2 to 2 hours in order to find a ruling on the matter. I found a sentence which said

that extensions beyond three years could be made if the PIO/T and Project Agreement were both changed. The Controller then complied. The Controller apparently had not known of this particular rule.

\* \* \* \*

3. Obtains clarification as necessary

In order to provide guidelines to other personnel, the Program Officer must interpret rules and directives. Since these are frequently ambiguous, he may need to contact AID/W to obtain clarification. He may go through channels or resort to contacting personal friends in Washington to expedite answers to his requests. He may also need to clarify points in various project documents prepared in AID/W. Similarly, he may request advice from AID/W concerning issues which apparently are not covered by existing policy.

I wrote the first draft of a cable to Washington to get clarification on a program loan agreement. I sent the draft to Division Chiefs for clearance and comment. One Chief pointed out an error in the draft agreement which I had not mentioned in my cable. I should have noticed the error but simply did not. I had been present when this matter was discussed and agreed upon by the host government and would have known it was wrong in the agreement if I had paid attention to the wording.

\* \* \* \*

I wrote a very clear cable to AID/W questioning an approval they had made of the wrong figures. It was not effective, however, since AID/W did not respond to the questions raised by the cable.

\* \* \* \*

At a meeting with a host Minister, the Director, Controller and I made a point-by-point explanation of a Project Agreement. We could not agree among ourselves about the meaning of one point. We told the host Minister that we would cable AID/W requesting clarification on that point. Since the Project Agreement was written in AID/W, this action could prevent future problems arising from a misinterpretation.

\* \* \* \*

Five weeks of a 2-month stay by a team of advisors were in the current fiscal year, the rest in the next. AID regulations do not allow saving or carrying over funds from one fiscal year to pay salaries in the next fiscal year. The APO and I spent 2 hours searching for regulations enabling payment of this team totally out of this fiscal year funds. None was found. It happened that the Controller was ill and could not be consulted. We eventually decided to cable AID/W for advice. Payment would have been simple if I had elected to pay the team for their work in funds from both of the fiscal years. However, this would require two separate signatures from the appropriate local national officials. Local signatures were hard to get because of the current election situation which made officials hesitate to put their names on anything. In addition, I felt silly asking an official to sign two papers on the same subject.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W authorized loans to the host government to purchase certain types of products. The conditions of this loan, even though agreed upon by Washington and host, may create a problem for importers. They discussed the issue with the Director and me. Since we are not well-enough versed in the legal aspects, we had to forward the substance of our discussion to AID/W for an answer.

\* \* \* \*

Importers seeking a loan called the mission and asked to meet with the Controller and me. They pointed out that if their products could be purchased from a neighboring country problems concerning the loan would be solved. The Controller and I both felt that there would be no objections on AID/W's part because the agreement did authorize these arrangements if necessary. We insured that they knew our assurance was contingent upon approval by AID/W. We then drafted a cable stating the facts and relaying our discussion to Washington.

\* \* \* \*

## B. Reviews and Approvals: Details of Project Plans

The steps involved in accomplishing this task are similar to those described in sections IB3 and IC3. Many of the same problems in working with technical personnel are also encountered, so that frequently the Program Officer and his subordinates have to do the technicians' planning and paperwork. The chief difficulty in this function lies in judging the adequacy of the plan for achieving the approved goals, since all too often the incumbents believe the Division Chiefs' judgments are questionable.

### 1. Checks plans for conformance to goals and regulations

This task involves insuring that plans fill the goals of the mission and AID/W regarding the host country. Difficulty sometimes arises because these goals are not always explicitly stated and it is hard to determine whether or not specific projects are applicable.

A Division Chief came in with a new proposal from the host government requesting funds for certain equipment. The Director and the Deputy Director thought it a good sound proposal and wanted to do it in the new FY which meant we would have to do the Project Agreement within a week, in addition to getting all the others signed. They gave it to me for analysis and recommendation. It sounded good to me but I couldn't fund it with unobligated funds -- there weren't enough. So I thought that we should write to AID/W requesting the additional funds. From my AID/W experience I thought it was the kind of project and amount they would approve. The Director and Deputy agreed and okayed going to Washington. I then talked to everyone concerned about the proposal to make sure I understood all its aspects. I got information from the host Ministry, the Division Chief, etc., and asked such things as who would use the equipment, were qualified personnel available, was better equipment available, etc. I was satisfied about these ramifications, drafted the request and sent it to Washington. As it turned out I committed a gross error. The equipment was produced only by a firm in another country, a direct violation of our "buy American" policy. It took all kinds of negotiations to "get us off the hook" here. This obviously reflected on my judgment. AID/W is aware of this big mistake. It's embarrassing to me. I felt personally and professionally guilty and sheepish.

\* \* \* \*

An approved project which I inherited involved the construction of roads. I approved plans for these roads to meet certain construction standards. AID/W questioned this. By this time, the mission had committed itself, and could not talk the host government into changing the standards to what AID/W considered appropriate. I did not focus soon enough on what was really important in the project.

\* \* \* \*

The host proposed a participant to go to the U.S. This nominee was not very qualified to begin with and his English was not very good. He was also rather lazy. However, he had political connections which made the situation more ticklish. I certainly felt that he shouldn't go and so did the Director. Due to his connections I just let it drag without making a decision. I also did not keep in close contact with the nominee to let him know there was some doubt about his approval. Finally it got to the point where I had to make a statement and I had to refuse the applicant. This made a bad impression with the government. I should have taken a firm stand and gotten it over with. I knew that I couldn't justify this participant so I should have taken action immediately.

\* \* \* \*

I felt that a particular participant selected was so unqualified that the objectives of the program could not be fulfilled by sending him. I called in the Technical Division Chief and the Training Officer and told them that the Program Office would withdraw approval of that segment of the project unless someone else was selected.

\* \* \* \*

I tried to solve the problem of interpreting Manual Orders by hammering at people to produce good documents, and pushing them to find a way to accomplish aims within regulations. This has been fairly successful.

\* \* \* \*

A relative of a high host official was going to the U. S. as a participant. We knew this was to be something of a honeymoon for him and we knew unofficially that he did not intend to work in the area of his training when he got back. We therefore wrote a memo to his Ministry saying that if the returned participant was not utilized for his intended purpose when he returned, the host government would have to repay to the U. S. government the cost of his training. The Minister balked but it was finally agreed upon. I talked to several

people about this and came to the conclusion that it was AID policy to get these assurances. The statement of intended use is written into commodity agreements and I proposed writing it into participant agreements to give us more insurance that our projects were achieving their desired ends. I talked to the Controller about it and he said they did have such a written understanding about participants in other posts. So I asked that we include this stipulation in the project agreement for participants for the coming fiscal year. It was adopted and written into the agreement. At first the host Minister refused to sign it, but we got him to agree after a series of negotiations. I think our training program is now much more effective because of this clause.

\* \* \* \*

- a. reviews and edits documentation for grant projects
- b. reviews loan applications

These tasks parallel those described in section IC3, and are affected by similar problems and obstacles. In some missions the Program Officer may act as an advisor to a Loan Officer, rather than having direct responsibility for the task himself.

## 2. Institutes revisions of project plans

In the event that project plans as presented do not meet the requirements, the Program Officer may advise the originator of appropriate changes to be made, may request a Program Office subordinate to make changes, or may accomplish replanning and rewriting himself. Extensive substantive changes will usually be cleared with the Director or Deputy Director and with the technical division.

A project from technicians planned a large job requiring host nationals. I had visited the area and noticed a dearth of laborers. The job couldn't be done with the available laborers. I cut off the plan which would have forced a later distortion of the program.

\* \* \* \*

A division chief requested some equipment. I sent the request back saying that no specific plans were given for using the equipment and there was no planning for training host nationals to operate the equipment.

\* \* \* \*

### C. Conducts Negotiations

The Program Officer sometimes conducts negotiations himself and at other times acts as an advisor to other personnel. Because of the restrictions on making commitments at the mission level prior to AID/W approvals, considerable skill may be required in developing strategies for preliminary discussions which do not create the impression that binding promises are being made. Misunderstandings of this sort frequently create difficulties in concluding final agreements later.

A problem which can have major repercussions involves insuring that all mission negotiators understand and present unified statements of the mission's position on various matters. Technical Chiefs, because of their tendency to think primarily in terms of their own projects, may require careful instructions on this point. In some countries where there is a tradition of sharp bargaining and a deliberate use of "divide and conquer" tactics, this problem becomes important in all types of negotiations.

### 1. Negotiates with host country officials

Negotiations are very often time-consuming and may become more so if conferences must be conducted through interpreters. The Program Officer who cannot speak the host language frequently finds that he must call upon other mission personnel to speak for him, with possible loss of respect of the host officials and almost certain loss in communication. In some cases, the Program Officer must perform the negotiations for technical officers because they cannot speak the language, thus increasing his own workload during the rush to complete project implementation documents.

Even in cases where there is no language barrier, communicating with host officials can be difficult. In certain areas of the world, cultural practices involved elaborately circuitous discussions and it is hard to obtain a clear statement of the host's position or opinion. It may occur that mission personnel misinterpret politeness for acceptance of their statements, or the hosts may make the same mistake. A related difficulty pertains to the meaning of terms. For example, one report cites a case in which the term "project" was used by the host to mean "idea", while the U. S. negotiators were thinking of bags of cement, man-hours, and so on.

Other problems relate to the confusion of authority among various agencies of the host government. Conflicts and power struggles between central government agencies and provincial governments, or among central agencies, may necessitate conducting multiple negotiations for the same project, or expending considerable effort to rework plans in developing compromises acceptable to competing factions. There is also a risk that some influential official may be overlooked initially because it is not obvious that he should be involved, and he may be so offended that he scuttles the project entirely. Frequent

changes of personnel in host agencies also require duplication of negotiations while the new incumbent learns about the projects.

Difficulties also arise because many host governments are new and staffed by inexperienced personnel who are not willing to accept responsibility for making decisions. This creates delays while arranging to see higher officials, who frequently are extremely busy and hard to see.

Some of the problems associated with AID's inability to supply full project information to host officials have been mentioned above (see IB1c) and also apply here. Another problem created by this curtailment of information is that hosts may reverse prior commitments upon seeing fuller project details and bring about complicated and prolonged negotiations. Reversals also occur as a result of political changes in the host government.

AID/W's preference for Project Agreements that are not stringently binding upon USAID may raise the suspicions among the host government officials that they are entering into a bargain slanted in AID's favor, and they may become more difficult to negotiate with on these grounds. Similar problems may arise when AID regulations change or a new Program Officer conforms to procedures that his predecessor ignored, resulting in increased costs to the host government in fulfilling its share of a project.

A project director discovered that the local costs had been underestimated and that additional host funds would be needed. I asked the project director to determine how much the host agency would benefit from the completion of the project. I negotiated with the host government including the budget group, and frankly presented the problem. I persuaded the host government to contribute half the additional funds needed and put up half the funds from counterpart funds. I was successful because I was able to convince the hosts that the problem was serious and that they shared the responsibility for it. [The Assistant Program Officer commented that this was successful because the Program Officer had treated the host officials as full partners and as serious and responsible officials.]

\* \* \* \*

A plan called for a large joint AID/Local project. AID/W approved one way of carrying out the project. The local government preferred another way, partly for political reasons. I talked with two Ministers and the Chief of State and finally convinced them to pass legislation enabling the project to conform to AID/W's approved method.

\* \* \* \*

I have tried to lick the AID/W delays in approvals by trying to anticipate their approval. This year we are preparing Project Agreements and negotiated preliminary agreements with the host government to get some of the work done before the approval comes in. I must make sure the hosts understand that it really is tentative. Whether or not this will work, I don't know.

\* \* \* \*

A routine specification in a Project Agreement is that in the case where there are differences in translation between English and the host language versions, the English language version will be the official version. A host official objected strongly to the wording of a project agreement, saying that \_\_\_\_\_ is the official language of the country and that it was impossible for English to be the "official" language. I amended the document to read...."the English language version will apply."

\* \* \* \*

The Director and the host Chief of State agreed on AID support for a local industry. I asked for a later session between myself and the Chief of State alone to discuss details, so that the Director would not disrupt the plan and would not have to devote time to details.

\* \* \* \*

In arranging terms for a survey team, the host officials were supposed to collect and supply data to the team before they arrived. They never gathered the data, and USOM people had to collect it after the teams' arrival. This was a failure on my part to realize that they had not been clearly pinned down, and a lack of follow-through on the part of the Technical Division.

\* \* \* \*

A host Minister met with me to sound out a project. I told him generally what AID could do. I made a later appointment to discuss details and specific problems. I explained that recruiting \_\_\_\_\_-speaking instructors would be a problem. I told the Minister that local administrative costs could not be admitted because of the balance of payments problem. I reviewed the whole idea between meetings, also checked CAP, other projects, and priorities, AID/W guidelines, etc. At a third meeting I informed the Minister that the project seemed sound. Specific points were discussed further at several later meetings, some attended by the technical team's chief so that he could provide additional information or suggestions.

The USAID position was clearly and unambiguously presented; the discussions were carried out smoothly and purposefully, and the negotiations did not cover a long period of time.

\* \* \* \*

A commodity request was prepared for a project for assisting an industry. The host Minister refused to approve it on the grounds that the industry would be competing with existing industries.

Another Minister was angry and said he's tired of the first Minister sticking his nose into this area all the time.

I was in a dilemma. Should I go to defense of the second Minister with whom I agreed, or should I try to mediate since the first Minister is powerful and is AID's best friend here.

My decision was to mediate and substitute different items in place of the controversial commodities.

\* \* \* \*

The problem of dual negotiations with the planning agency and the Ministries was acutely exemplified in one project. The Director and I were anxious to expedite approval of the project and obtained a preliminary outline from the USAID Division Chief who had been working on it with members of the host Ministry. I took the outline to the planning agency and after much hassling obtained an approval. When I took this back to the Division Chief he "blew-up" because of the changes made. He was particularly angry because I had taken these steps without his knowledge or approval, and I frankly confessed that it was a mistake. The Division Chief refused to accept the changes and I had to withdraw it while the Division Chief and the host Minister drew up another outline.

When the outline was submitted to the planning agency the latter requested that I be present at the meeting and the Minister asked the Division Chief to come also. The Minister did not attend, but the head of the appropriate Department (within the Ministry) did attend and nearly destroyed the whole thing again. At the beginning of the meeting the planning agency called on the USAID Division Chief to justify the outline. This he did eloquently. Then the host Department head denied ever having approved the matter. When the Division Chief produced paper evidence of their having gone over the details together several times, the Department head said he didn't think they could fulfill their part of the bargain.

The planning agency called a halt at this point and said they would take the matter under consideration. I felt that a letter should be sent to the planning agency explaining the situation and pointing out that the USAID had indeed made prior agreements with the Minister, in spite of what the Department head had said.

But the Director suggested that I simply phone the Secretary of the planning agency. The latter said the members of the committee were well aware of what was going on and what the Department was trying to do.

I agreed with the Division Chief that the details and priorities of the project should be determined by him and the officials of the Ministry and not by the planning agency. I also know that the Division Chief would like to deal only with the Ministry and that their agreements should be sufficient and final. But the planning agency is "a fact of life". The Division Chief should accept the fact that the government is new and its people will ask questions well beyond the scope of their authority. The Division Chief should adjust his program to it, and not fight it so hard.

\* \* \* \*

2. Negotiates with contractors

3. Negotiates details of loan applications

Some missions have Contract Officers and Loan Officers who have primary responsibility for these tasks and the Program Officer then acts in an advisory role. Many contracts and loan agreements are prepared in Washington, where the negotiations take place, and the Program Officer need only review the documents. In some cases, however, he may conduct these negotiations and would require knowledge of procedures pertaining to loans and contracts and the relevant AID regulations.

Problems regarding contract and loan negotiations often duplicate those indicated immediately above. Other problems arise for Program Officers who lack knowledge of legal details, especially when there is no Legal Advisor attached to the mission staff. When

documents are prepared in AID/W, the Program Officer may find he has problems understanding the reasoning behind certain details and interpreting these to host officials.

In the implementation of a construction project, it was not clearly specified whether a host contractor would have to pay a host government business tax. Arguments over this have delayed the project and taken much of my time. I should have negotiated this point before the Project Agreement was signed. [The Deputy Program Officer feels that it was time-pressure which caused the Program Officer and the rest of the Program Office to overlook it.]

\* \* \* \*

The host officials had selected a contractor to do some work on an AID project. We objected to the choice, on the basis that the contractor was unqualified, so another was selected. The unsuccessful contractor protested to AID/W, telling them the host specifically wanted his company and insisting on their reverting to the original choice. AID/W sent us a cable instructing that the original contractor be used. I recommended to the Director that I be allowed to discuss the situation with the host government. He agreed. I learned that host government was in agreement with us and had made no statement about reverting to the original contractor, nor had they any desire to do so. I reported this to the Director, presenting him a cable to go out to AID/W containing the facts of the situation. The Director cleared the cable and AID/W upheld the mission.

\* \* \* \*

I recall one incident in which my memory saved trouble. A contractor had submitted a contract for approval which contained a clause referring to a 1954 agreement for its justification. The contract had been approved by all the other offices in the mission, but when it came to me, I remembered that the 1954 agreement had been declared illegal. So the contractor had to change the clause.

\* \* \* \*

In order to insure that host government officials thoroughly understand the terms of a project agreement for a loan the Director and I took the Controller to a meeting with us to handle questions on the mechanics of the loan. At the meeting we read the agreement point by point, word for word, in the host's language, and explained each passage to them because few of them are fluent in English. At this first meeting we covered ten pages, and plan to finish the remainder at another meeting tomorrow.

\* \* \* \*

#### 4. Obtains necessary signatures

Frequently this task is an easily accomplished routine procedure in concluding formal negotiations. In some instances, however, host ministers delay signing documents that have been fully agreed upon, so that it 's difficult to forward them to AID/W by scheduled deadlines. It may also be hard to arrange appointments with high officials. Sometimes host officials will sign agreements without reading them, and this can lead to later misunderstanding of what each side has agreed to do.

A contract had expired and staff salaries were being paid out of the contractor's own funds. They required a firm financial commitment from AID in order to plan for the next year. The Division Chief concerned was new to the job, couldn't speak the host language. A major new agreement involving host reforms had to be worked out. There was not enough time to work out a complete Project Agreement before the obligating deadline.

I suggested to the Director that efforts be directed to completion and host signature of the necessary PIO/P and other documents rather than the complete Project Agreement. These signed documents become legal dollar-obligating

documents for the U. S. and the host government where the Project Agreement has not been signed.

My suggestion was accepted and the money was successfully obligated two days before the deadline.

\* \* \* \*

The Mission needed to sign more Project Agreements, in order to meet obligation deadlines. But a law says the Director cannot sign any agreement for over \$100,000 if more or additional money will be needed for which plans are not already spelled out. A huge construction project is involved. My solution was to sign the agreements for segments of the project since no one costs more than \$100,000.

\* \* \* \*



### III. MANAGES PROGRAM

The Program Officer ordinarily serves as a high-level general manager for the total mission program, although in certain missions portions of this work will be handled by the Director or Deputy Director. There are three important aspects to this managerial function: insuring proper and efficient operation of projects, monitoring program budgets, and providing for the distribution of information.

#### A. Monitors and Guides Projects

1. Obtains information on project status and host contributions
  - a. confers with U.S. personnel
  - b. confers with third-country or multilateral personnel
  - c. confers with host government personnel
  - d. reviews project status documents
  - e. visits project sites
  - f. assigns others to observe field operations

The methods of carrying out the tasks involved in this function have been described in earlier sections. There are some additional comments to be noted, however. It frequently happens that the United States and cooperating host government personnel try to conceal deficiencies in projects, or overstate their effectiveness. In these cases, third-country or multilateral personnel can sometimes provide the most accurate reports about project operations. The consensus of people interviewed in the study is that field observations are the best sources of accurate project information. As reported in section I A 3, the majority of Program Officers maintain that the volume of work within the mission prevents them or their subordinates from making field trips.

Monitoring certain types of technical projects, by whatever method, may be difficult for the Program Officer who has no special knowledge in those areas. Often, the only expert available is the Division Chief whose project is in question. When host national experts are available for consultation, they may be reluctant to criticize U.S. operations or personnel.

As an example of conflicting information, a Division Chief was informed by his counterpart in another country that a new serious disease was spreading very rapidly through the area and that it was highly contagious. The host government was informed about this and an urgent Ministers' meeting was held to decide to buy the vaccine necessary to fight the disease. Then, when the Mission Director was on a trip, he met the Mission Director of the other country by chance, and the latter told him the situation was really not so urgent. Thus I still do not feel that I really know how urgent the problem is. I think the risk of the disease justified the measures we took, but concluded this primarily from logical rather than technical considerations.

\* \* \* \*

The inadequate information problem has not really been solved. I hold meetings and discussions, and feel the problem is getting better because, with experience, I am getting able to analyze the information better.

\* \* \* \*

I am frustrated by repeated defensive action on the part of some of the Division Chiefs. For example, when rumors of the inadequacy of a program reached me, I asked for a report from the Division Chief. After a long interval, I finally got an ambiguous reply. I kept hammering at the Division Chief. I finally called a meeting of the whole division to see if I could get a clear statement. They did not speak up. I kept on gathering evidence of its relative ineffectiveness, until I convinced the Director that I was right.

\* \* \* \*

The Division Chiefs are not prone to report lack of success if they think a project is a good one. I have to probe, question, and get opinions from host officials to try to determine its worth.

\* \* \* \*

An outlying provincial project was equipped with radio for contacts to the other branches. When I arrived, I learned that the radio would only contact one other station. The radio had receptacles for five crystals but had only one crystal. I sent the extra crystals.

\* \* \* \*

When I arrived here I figured that the mission had done without a Program Officer for a long time so they could do without one for 6 weeks more. So I got out and saw the projects we were doing. I gained very much from that experience and I want to do more of it in the near future. There is still one project I haven't seen. It gives a better background for evaluating reports and requests from project personnel, and from getting out to see the projects right away I got a realistic understanding of the program as it is working.

\* \* \* \*

One way that I do get out is when I am assigned the task of escorting visitors from Washington. For example, two high-level visitors are expected and I will travel with them for 3 days, visiting the various projects that they select to visit. While on such trips, I am able to make subjective judgments about project operations. I average one field trip every 8 months.

\* \* \* \*

A report came in from one province that they planned to do certain work soon. On an earlier field trip, I had noticed certain aspects of the project. By

chance I made a quick calculation of how my observations compared with this report. I found that their report was greatly exaggerated. I was able to save money and to prevent false reporting to Washington.

\* \* \* \*

Technicians planned a large job on a project. I had visited the project and noticed the dearth of laborers. The job couldn't be done with the available laborers. I cut off the plan which would have forced a later distortion of the program. If I had time to visit the field, I would probably catch many more errors.

\* \* \* \*

We have a project in one of the provinces which is almost finished. The provincial government wants to continue it because they think it is advantageous to them. But we won't do this until we know the effect the program has had in the past so that we have some idea of its desirability in the future. We also want the request for a continued program to come through the central government, not the provincial government, because it has to be important and effective enough to stimulate nation-wide concern. This would indicate to me the amount of success the program has had or not had.

Yesterday I met with a technician in that province. As a result of our discussion I have concluded, that the best way to evaluate the program is to send a certain Division Chief to the province with a representative of the host Minister to inspect the project sites, talk to the people involved, and make a subjective, on-the-spot estimate of the program's worth. When they get back, we will have something concrete, on paper, on which to base our decisions about the continuation or elimination of the program.

\* \* \* \*

In a construction project, a host architectural firm contracted has produced very poor plans, completely unacceptable by U.S. standards. No one was aware that the plans were so bad. I heard that it was a problem, but didn't have enough staff to investigate. The division made no reports of the difficulty. When rumors got stronger, the Director assigned USOM personnel from another division to evaluate the design and they discovered the truth. Painfully difficult negotiations are now being conducted and no one can see a good way out.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Evaluates projects

Very few Program Officers report that they perform this function in any formal sense. It is done implicitly to a certain extent in the programming function, but because there is little urgency for systematic evaluation, it tends to be ignored under the pressure or more urgent demands on staff time. The tasks of examining and analyzing project operations and results are difficult in that there are no systematic criteria or procedures established. For example, one Program Officer reports that while it is possible to determine the number of secondary teachers being trained, it is impossible to determine if they are being adequately trained, quickly enough, and if they are really needed. In areas where evaluation is possible, a competent, objective, evaluation may be provided best by outside contract teams, but there are usually no funds to hire such teams.

The evaluation questionnaires sent out by AID/W requesting quantitative data are considered by some a waste of time because they ask for information which is frequently irrelevant to project goals.

## 3. Corrects project deficiencies

Effective operation of mission projects may be prevented by many things. It is the task of the Program Officer to become aware of

any difficulties which arise and to provide advice to technical personnel in correcting them.

There are certain circumstances affecting project operations over which the mission has little control and which may necessitate the devising of stopgap measures to cope with them. For example, political or economic crises in the host country may stop all projects, so that program schedules cannot possibly be met. Projects requiring seasonal timing for certain steps, may have to be substantially revised and objectives reduced.

Work stoppages also occur because AID/W fails to take prompt action on requests for commodities or personnel. This may result in the enforced idleness of highly-paid technicians for long periods of time, creating an unnecessary drain on project budgets and a morale program for the personnel.

a. advises on changes

1) In personnel. When personnel fail to perform adequately, from lack of skill, misassignment, or other reasons, the Program Officer may be consulted by the Division Chiefs in deciding whether to admonish, reassign, or terminate them. He may also assist in locating and recruiting permanent or temporary specialists, either locally or from the United States. A problem in doing the latter arises from the obsolescence and lack of clarity of the AID Staffing Pattern.

"A job title in the Staffing Pattern may reflect what the incumbent is currently doing, but gives no information about his experience or capabilities. Good information would be very valuable for a small mission which could use a lot of technical help on a TDY basis."

There is a processing project which was started some years before I came here. It should have been finished years ago. AID brought in a consultant who was in conflict with the host counterpart. Nothing was getting accomplished. Something should have been done at that time. The consultant's contract ran out and they brought in a new consultant. AID/W sent another man to investigate. At this point I had arrived at the post and accompanied the AID/W man to field. I interrogated the manager who was a host national and determined that the man could not manage. In fact, if the man knew anything about management and the conditions which were to be imposed, he would not have taken the job. The manager had three former Participant Trainees working with him who were good but, could do nothing because of the manager. I recommended that a new manager be brought in. This suggestion was adopted but, the way top management is handling this project it is still impossible to do a decent job. The setup is such that a manager takes orders from two sources. I am suggesting this be changed. At least now they are processing some material (after 10 years).

\* \* \* \*

I was present at a discussion of a problem concerning an accusation of incompetency of a USOM technician by an outside contractor. I suggested to the Director that the technician be removed from the project. The Director got more information and discovered that the feud between the two parties had already been settled. I believe I gave bad advice because of a lack of information.

\* \* \* \*

2) In equipment. The Program Officer may have information not available to some of the technical staff about equipment. He may advise about equipment modifications or special devices required to adapt to local electric power, altitude, climate, or other factors.

- b. presses host government to honor commitments if necessary

One of the most common complaints of Program Officers all over the world regarding the operation of projects is the failure of host governments to meet their commitments for funds, material, or personnel. Certain of these governments seem to expect AID "to pull their chestnuts out of the fire," if, for any reason, they cannot make the contributions agreed upon. The actions taken by Program Officers range from subtly discussing the situation to threatening to cut off AID funds. It is very difficult, and at times impossible, to develop a genuine understanding among host officials of the reasons why United States personnel salaries and other expenses are high; why the mission cannot solve more of their problems; and why they gain from self-help projects.

We never can be sure that the host government will finance things that they say they will. It was to provide equipment for a team of contract people coming in. At the last minute we found that they were not taking steps to do this and were not planning to do so. USAID had to start a crash program of equipment procurement.

\* \* \* \*

- c. coordinates division activities

This task may range from assisting in the allocation of scarce equipment among divisions to insuring that the projects of different divisions are integrated when two or more operate in the same area. For example, if both the Agriculture and Education Divisions were conducting extension projects in training farm workers, the Program

Officers would attempt to coordinate their efforts to avoid the duplication of courses offered. A problem that arises in such circumstances is the deliberate encroachment of one division into areas nominally under the jurisdiction of another in order to increase the size of the division, the scope of its activities, and its importance in relation to other divisions.

Facilitating any required exchanges of services between divisions and the mission staff offices is also included in this task, since the Program Office serves as a communications link between the field and staff personnel. Difficulties most frequently arise because division personnel fail to observe regular procedures, or try to bypass low-level personnel and deal directly with the Chiefs of staff offices. For example, a Division Chief may refuse to provide information requested by an Assistant Program Officer and insist upon talking with the Program Officer. Often when important decisions are an issue they circumvent the Program Office entirely and demand to consult the Director. Other problems occur because the Executive Officer, Controller, or other administrative officer may give only secondary attention to assisting division personnel and ignore or delay fulfilling requests. Then the Program Officer will be called upon either to handle the matter or to insure that it is handled by an appropriate person.

Further difficulties regarding administrative services arise when other staff offices are ineptly directed. The Program Officer may find that the only way to fulfill division needs is to assign the task to a subordinate in the Program Office.

Close friendships between the Program Officer and technical personnel may also create coordinating obstacles. For example, when two divisions are in conflict or competition for some reason, the Program Officer's personal relations with members of one division may arouse suspicions within the other that the Program Office shows favoritism.

The greatest obstacle to fulfilling this task is the failure of Program Office personnel to make field observation, which has been discussed in earlier sections.

Two divisions are both involved in working on the reorganization of a host Ministry. Independent reports submitted by the divisions did not concur regarding the state of the Ministry. I asked the Assistant Program Officer to see the Chiefs involved and to ask them to get together. If conflicting reports reaching AID/W it could: a) reflect badly on the Director's awareness of Division activities, b) reflect on programing and raise doubts in minds of the program review staff about program needs, and c) lead to Congressional repercussions.

\* \* \* \*

d. coordinates division and host agency efforts

The Program Officer's task of insuring that host governments honor their commitments in joint projects with AID has been discussed above (IIIA3b). He is also responsible for renegotiating and approving any changes in project operations which may be necessitated after work begins. It occasionally happens that host officials lose patience when AID is delayed in meeting its commitments, and they sometimes simply order equipment or recruit personnel from other sources without giving any notification. This may mean that the mission has had funds and staff members devoted to plans which subsequently have to be scrapped. It may also mean that the mission loses control over major aspects of the project.

Another coordinating task arises when AID schedules projects which overlap with those of host agencies having no formal agreements

with the mission. It can be difficult to arrange complementary operations because officials have not had earlier contacts with AID and do not understand its procedures, or because they do not want to reveal their plans for political reasons.

Technical personnel who become closely identified with some one host agency also create problems for the Program Officer, especially if that agency has conflicts with other host agencies who are planning development projects in the same general area. This can result in overemphasis of certain factors, when a more generalized approach encompassing a broader range of the whole area would be of greater long-run value.

A number of problems beset the establishment of a host agency. First, the host officials decided that it could have no directors who were also directors of business concerns. Two men who had been working on the planning committee resigned when they learned of this. Second, the chairman of the board of directors is a political appointee who is held in contempt by the business community. Third, there has been great difficulty in getting the necessary legislation. Although I feel that the establishment of this agency is one of the most important steps for developing the country, I wonder how the people can be motivated to take advantage of the opportunities it offers. Instead of taking real investment risks, they deposit their money in Swiss banks or put it into nonproductive items such as houses or automobiles.

\* \* \* \*

An AID contract called for the purchase of special equipment. This, of course, was to be purchased in the U.S. When the time came to buy the articles they were not available in the U.S., but were available locally from a European firm. The local official involved suggested he pay for the equipment, so that the European-made products could be purchased. AID was to spend the money originally obligated for equipment to renovate a building to house the equipment. My subordinate brought this problem to me for a decision. Realizing that the project must be started and that a substantial delay would occur by waiting for U.S. equipment, I authorized the swap.

\* \* \* \*

I wanted to get a host department to work with one of our divisions. I tried to get members of other host departments to arrange the contact. When they failed to do it, I worked with another host agency and they were able to set up a committee. It was effective because I found the people with the desire and power to accomplish what I wanted.

\* \* \* \*

- e. coordinates division and other United States agency efforts

Many of the same tasks and problems are involved in coordinating project operations as were described in coordinating plans (see section IB3).

Frequently the efforts of other U.S. agencies in fulfilling their part of joint projects will be delayed for the same reasons that the mission's efforts are delayed--lack of funds, insufficient personnel, or bureaucratic tangles. In these situations the Program Officer may find himself subject to conflicting pressures. Mission personnel and some host officials may press him to expedite a project by placing it under the sole management of AID, while personnel from the cooperating agency, and perhaps other host officials, want to maintain the existing arrangement. He has to make a decision, which others may find hard to understand, that weighs possible long-run considerations against the more immediate project goals.

- f. presses USAID personnel as required

The major obstacle in this task, as in so many others, is the lack of definition of the Program Officer's authority. His efforts to pressure project personnel to meet their schedules may be construed as interfering in technical areas beyond his competence or jurisdiction, and result in personal conflicts. At other times division personnel may complain to the Director, who may or may not support the Program Officer.

Failure on the part of Division Chiefs to monitor contract teams employed by their divisions appears to be a prevalent problem. The Chiefs feel that they have hired experts and that little supervision is required. However, contract teams usually need guidance in conforming to AID regulations or in dealing with host agencies. In addition, some contractors try to "build empires" to insure that their services will be required by the mission in the future. Work groups from other United States Government agencies tend to be particularly difficult to manage in this respect. The Program Officer frequently has to decide between "hounding" the Division Chief to provide supervision or taking over the job himself and running the risk of offending the Division Chief.

Some Program Officers report that they feel very constrained in developing social contacts because it then becomes difficult to correct or pressure people with whom they have close informal relationships. Others admit that they require less stringent regard for procedures from their friends than from other people, sometimes leading to charges of favoritism.

Many problems are created by the reluctance of Division Chiefs to fulfill the requirements of division administration. The following critical incidents illustrate typical examples of the kinds of situations which arise.

One of the most difficult feats of persuasion is to impel the technicians to make their own decisions. For example, one Chief insisted upon two participants for his plan. I finally conceded. Then the Chief wanted me to select the participants. I refused. Finally he began to make his own decisions.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W sent the mission a cable instructing that they be informed which positions in a division should be cut in order to conform to an economy drive. The Division Chief was supposed to decide which positions were to be deleted, but he not only refused to decide, he also refused to discuss the situation with me. Finally, after much delay, the Division Chief gave me a cable for clearance which informed AID/W that personnel cuts were impossible. I knew that the cuts had to be made, and also that the Division Chief would never make the cuts, so suggested that both he and I meet with the Deputy Director to discuss the situation. As a result of this meeting, under the Deputy Director's influence, the Division Chief not only agreed to the cuts, but also designated which positions. Thus, the message to AID/W was able to go out.

\* \* \* \*

One Chief Technician sometimes overlooks some of the political aspects of his projects. He also has been here long enough to be fed up with the host nationals. This presents a problem for me. What seem to be good ideas to people who have been here a short time do not seem so to him. He has worked with these people a very long time and knows them well. He has gotten blunt in his thinking toward them and in his written messages. Because of these things I feel I should check what he does in order to represent our broader interests and because we certainly don't want him to antagonize the Embassy. I would like to let him go on but for the above reasons I shouldn't. The difficulty is, I have to establish a different relationship with him since he is quite old enough to be my father and he has been around here a long time so I can't issue orders to him and hover over his desk when he is working.

\* \* \* \*

g. explores solutions with technical staff

While the Program Officer lacks many types of specialized knowledge, he frequently has more experience than technical personnel in meeting problems typically encountered in underdeveloped countries. For example, technicians may not understand that host national counterparts fear loss of face if they ask questions. The Program Officer may be able to assist other United States personnel in developing strategies for insuring that instructions are thoroughly understood and thus avoid the waste of time and material resulting from mistakes. He may also be able to recommend methods for overcoming problems that he has observed to work successfully in past projects.

In large missions with scattered projects, division personnel may be unaware of the total resources in trained personnel or special equipment available to the mission. The Program Officer can frequently arrange interdivision consultations or equipment loans to solve specific problems. In some instances, he may arrange for assistance from TDY specialists, host agencies, or other groups.

I heard that difficulty was being encountered in a project for training host nationals. I assigned my senior analyst to discuss it with division personnel. They were quite cooperative and interested in investigating. The problems were resolved.

\* \* \* \*

4. Advises on routine project administration

As the mission officer with the greatest knowledge of Manual Orders, regulations, and policies pertaining to program matters, the Program Officer provides advice, guidance, and information.

to the technical divisions and staff officers in all aspects of project administration. The problems encountered because of confusing AID/W directives, delayed approvals of requests to AID/W, and unclear authority, previously described, also interfere with the effective performance of the tasks involved here.

Another major problem is the tendency for field personnel to bypass the normal channels for handling the details of project administration. It may occur on any level, from refusing to deal with Program Office subordinates to bypassing mission officers and contacting AID/W directly. It nearly always means extra work for the Program Office staff, and perhaps other staff offices, to find out what has gone on and to take appropriate remedial measures.

At times, there may be difficulties because technical personnel and the Program Officer do not communicate easily with each other. These may range from minor verbal misunderstandings to basic conflicts in interpreting policy and procedural requirements. Conversely, some Program Officers report that technicians impose upon their time by "crying on my shoulder" whenever they get the opportunity.

a. reviews staffing and requests for personnel

This task may range from routine processing of staffing documents to extensive collaboration with Division Chiefs in deciding upon the assignment or recruitment of personnel.

One problem concerns differences in opinion between the Program Officer and Division Chiefs regarding the best allocation of the project staff. Program Officers frequently feel that the technician has a short-range view, narrowly restricted to the goals of his particular specialty or project, which dictates emphasis upon aspects other than those relevant to the longer-ranged, total-program goals.

The problems reported above in section I C 3 regarding report writing also pertain to getting technicians to conform to the requirements and to meet the deadlines for documenting personnel requests.

The host government has a short training program. The Division Chief did not want to invest much in assisting this training program, but wanted to invest the majority of his staff and funds in a program giving longer training. With the help of the Deputy Director I convinced the Division Chief to put more technicians into the short training program. They finally assigned \_\_\_ to the long program and \_\_\_ to the short program.

\* \* \* \*

I disagreed with the Chief of a Division on a PIO for a research team. The Division Chief had written looser specifications than I wanted and had omitted some points. We discussed these differences but could not come to any agreement due to differing ideas of what the Director wanted. Therefore, we took this conflict to the Deputy Director who made a decision.

\* \* \* \*

b. recommends procurement procedures

The "buy American" policy creates some of the greatest difficulties in this task. Technicians frequently argue strongly for foreign-made equipment or commodities which they like or are accustomed to using when the Program Office requests that they substitute American-made items.

Problems also arise in missions where the Executive Office does not fulfill its part in providing administrative services to the divisions. The Program Office then has an additional task

in researching and advising on methods for handling transport or storage of commodities of equipment.

A technician wanted a new office building. We said no. He knew the host President who forced us to approve. The technician picked and paid for his building but now he can't get occupancy because it is an apartment house occupied by mistresses of the party officials. We can't solve this problem.

\* \* \* \*

In the past there has been no policy of describing what commodities were ordered. There never were records as to the specific items purchased. The Director and I were both horrified when we found out, so I issued a directive from the Director stating that commodity purchases had to be specified and justified.

\* \* \* \*

Crisis developed in an assisted industry. Expensive new equipment was needed to avoid a shut-down and strike. I was Acting Director. I loaned money to buy the equipment. It was European equipment and the money should have been used only to "buy American." I got away with it.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Officer told me that a technician in a division was requesting a European tape recorder for one of his projects. The Executive Officer asked me what I thought about this. I knew that this was the third request for foreign-made commodities which came from the technicians in a very short time. I wrote a memo to the technician telling him if he wanted a tape recorder it would have to be American-made.

This violation of AID policy should not be this prevalent so when the mission Director gets back I will recommend to him that we explained to the technicians the reasons why we are so adamant on this "buy American" policy. We will cite our balance of payments problems, gold outflow problems, offshore procurement problems, etc., so they can see the rationale of the policy and know that it can't be waived unless it is in the interest of our overall U.S. policy.

\* \* \* \*

The host government requested food-processing equipment producing higher quality products, therefore, higher prices. The request was for a project which we sponsor. The machine only costs \$\_\_,so the Division Chief and Director thought that the fact that it cost so little should override the fact that it was a local product,not American. The goodwill and efficiency which it would bring would make it justifiable. I argued against it, my point being that since it is not a U.S. product and since it does cost so little, the host government should buy it. We asked AID/W for advice. They refused the request, so I felt justified in my judgment.

\* \* \* \*

There was a crash program to buy equipment for a training project. No one paid much attention to what type of electrical equipment was being bought,and whether it would run on 220 volts. Further, no provisions were made for taking inventory of the equipment. A technician was put in charge of this,and I do not blame him for these deficiencies since it was all done in a hurry. However, after hearing reports from men in the Program Office, I am recommending to Director that he talk to another U.S. agency who,in turn,will talk to a host agency to set up an appropriate procedure for handling this phase of the program.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief wanted some equipment and proposed this to the Director. They didn't mention it to me. I happened to be in the Director's office when it was brought up. As Program Officer, I wanted to know why the host Minister should be given this equipment. It seemed to me that the equipment would not be entirely adequate for their purposes. I came to the conclusion that I was not informed of this proposal, and, as a result, it might have been approved by the Director, which would have been a mistake. If we can't be advised of what is going on we can't be of any help to the program.

\* \* \* \*

When I first came here, I was very critical of some details of one division's projects. Some equipment was wanted for a project which I felt was not justified. At least the justification for it was not specific. I disagreed with the request until I came to learn that it was time to present the host Minister with a little "sugar." And it was done through this particular project. It was a political consideration which was operating here--not economic. Our program changed in nature. We are interested in promoting the self-help concept and in order to stimulate it, we sometimes have to give something in return.

\* \* \* \*

A letter of credit expired before some commodities had arrived because I had applied incorrectly to AID/W, not realizing these particular orders had been superseded.

\* \* \* \*

c. assists in planning cost reductions

In fulfilling this task the Program Officer must be fully informed on cost factors in all aspects of the program, from the price of making mud bricks to international shipping charges. He frequently works very closely with the Executive Officer in working out cost reduction strategies.

Many technicians may lack experience in handling large-scale procurement. For this reason the Program Officer has to be alert in detecting deficiencies in orders submitted and to educating the technicians in economical purchasing methods.

A Division submitted commodity purchase estimates based on local small-lot purchases. I encouraged thinking through general requirements and submitting bulk purchase orders in the U.S. This was effective in insuring observance of balance of payments directives.

\* \* \* \*

I picked up a paper at a conference. It contained information about equipment which could be used for AID projects and which was stored in procurement depots in U. S. I suggested that a Division Chief visit depots while on home leave. A message was received from him that he had been refused permission to go to depots. I sent an airgram to Transportation and Equipment and Procurement Offices telling them this mission's needs were far in excess of supply so that it was important to get maximum mileage out of every dollar. The program would suffer if the Chief was denied permission. Permission was granted.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Officer was advised by cable that equipment was available at reduced cost. He mentioned it to the Director who mentioned it to me. I encouraged the Director to authorize purchase of the equipment after checking available funds and finding that they would cover these costs.

\* \* \* \*

d. approves the use of local currency

In many missions, the Program Officer is responsible for administering local currencies generated by P L 480 programs or other sources. The task involves knowledge of regulations and restrictions on the use of these funds. When it is necessary to reject a request for local currency, the Program Officer may find it difficult to make technical personnel understand why these limitations apply to their projects.

A Division Chief had requested a large amount of local currency for a project. He made a mistake (he needed 4 times as much) which he did not discover until funds were needed. It was too late, there was no way to help; people had to be laid off. Closer attention to what was planned and how little was asked for the job might have allowed me to catch the error myself during the planning stage.

\* \* \* \*

e. interprets project documents

After a project has been started, differences in opinion may arise regarding the meaning of some points in the project plans. It may be the responsibility of the Program Officer to interpret these documents and settle any disputes.

My problems with contractors are largely concerned with interpretation of questions of management. For example, the one contractor needed an extension of time because the host government was moving so slowly. The contract, however, did not permit an extension without AID/W approval. I cabled Washington three or four times with no result. The problem was finally resolved by the Mission Director during his visit to Washington, and the contract was extended.

\* \* \* \*

A Division Chief and the Controller were arguing over the interpretation of a Project Agreement for paying host staff on a project. The Division Chief came to me to gain program support. I asked to be allowed to bow out of the argument. (I had not been in on drawing up the Project Agreement). The Division Chief phoned the Director for an appointment to arbitrate the dispute. [Interviewer's note: the Division Chief felt that the Program Officer should have handled it.]

5. Manages phase-outs

Many of the same types of information gathering, conferring, planning, and advising described in project planning occur during project

phase-outs. Problems arise when AID technicians or contract personnel do not fully agree with the mission's view and refuse to cooperate in phase-out procedures.

Another difficulty may occur in determining appropriate administrative responsibility for a small portion of a project retained after the phase-out of the major part of it. Failure to place definite control of such projects under a technical division may result in their being seriously mismanaged.

(From subordinate) A memorandum came around yesterday concerning the phasing out of Americans on a project. The way it was written it just did not make sense to me. Phasing in and out is very pertinent to training and this is an area of concern for me so I called the Division Chief. He gave me some answers which still did not completely satisfy me. And then he told me that the phase-out was gone into in detail the day before by the Director, Deputy Director, Program Officer, and himself. The Program Officer should have called me in on the meeting since it was so pertinent to training. Now, if I cannot get this thing straight in my own mind, it will take another meeting between the Program Officer and me which could and should have been avoided. Since I was not informed about the meeting, the Program Officer should at least have told me the substance of what went on by a memo or phone call or even a personal visit.

\* \* \* \*

Due to Congressional pressure we are due to phase-out a project as soon as possible. We were getting nowhere with the project personnel in working out a sensible phase-out program. Because of this, the Director suggested to me

that we should tell them we are going to arbitrarily reduce their budget. This would force a phase-out. I said I strongly disagreed. I said we are all Americans and if we cannot come to a sensible solution, there is something wrong with us. I was called to Washington on TDY to discuss this. Washington was completely against an arbitrary budget reduction. They thought serious damage would be done to our whole program if we did this. They wanted us to continue these negotiations and to supply them concurrently with all developing facts and issues. I felt my stand was supported. We are in the process of negotiating a phase-out now.

\* \* \* \*

a. negotiates with host government officials

Much of the discussion of negotiations in section II C 1 applies to this task also. Frequently the Program Officer must "sell" the host officials on accepting a phase-out and must reassure them about their own capabilities to carry on in the area and of AID's future assistance in other areas.

b. prepare completion reports

This task includes the same types of writing, editing, and revising tasks described in preceding sections.

B. Revises Projects and Adjusts Program Budget as Necessary

Project or budget revisions may be necessitated for a variety of reasons: changes in AID or mission policy or funding, similar changes by the host government, unpredicated extra expenses or savings in a project, or natural disasters.

It is commonly agreed among Program Officers that project requirements are always different than had been anticipated. Therefore it is necessary to know the status of all funds and the availability of excesses to transfer as needed. Aside from the basic difficulties in deciding what changes to make, the main problem in revising projects or funds is keeping people happy. Technical chiefs fight to avoid any decreases in project activities or funds, and frequently insist that project needs are already being served at minimum levels.

I observed that an on-going project was employing a number of technicians scattered all over the country. Its goals were not clearly defined, its accomplishments were not particularly impressive and the host officials were not excited about it. The division proposed expanding the program and encouraging the hosts to expand their effort in this direction. I did not believe that the project would help the hosts. I reviewed the project, questioned the division and recipients, and established a low priority for it. It is being phased out. With the money which would have been spent, the mission was able to finance a contract team survey to determine what the priorities are for development plans. This was effective because I was able to reshape the project to host needs.

\* \* \* \*

1. Advises on fund transfers and budget revisions

This task may become of major importance in the Program Office toward the end of the fiscal year in order to avoid the loss of

uncommitted funds. It may range from routinely reviewing a budget revision prepared by someone else, to developing a detailed analysis of the program budget and re-allocating substantial proportions of available funds.

During the Deputy Program Officer's absence it was necessary to readjust the budget downward. I thought the Assistant Program Officer could handle this, but after looking at the start he had made, I realized that I would have to do it myself. Working with Division Chiefs, division by division, I set up a table indicating where the cuts could be made. In these individual negotiations I worked out the data to meet the requirements of the new budget.

\* \* \* \*

A division had a request for \$\_\_\_\_\_ for a project which was being proposed by the host government. The Project Agreement was taking much time to be discussed. The host officials were dragging their feet for some reason. They also did not want to provide the same services and counterpart funds which they originally had said they would. The result was no signed Project Agreement, but \$\_\_\_\_\_ tied up which could not be utilized and which could not even be returned to the United States Treasury. It was just "frozen" because of the host government delays. I told the Division Chief to inform the host officials that we were going to release the funds back to Washington. But he did not want to do it. He said that it was money earmarked for his division and they would use it somewhere else if they could not get the host government to cooperate. Negotiations dragged on further and again I asked him to sign a release for this money, but he wanted to keep it in the division for other things. With this, I asked the Assistant Program Officer to find out why the division signature was required at all on such a release. I found out that it was not required. It was preferred that authorization be given by the

Division Chief, but not necessary. So I simply de-obligated the funds and notified the division and host government that the move was taken. In this case I felt as though I had to take action. I do not like to write these kinds of letters summarily, but in this case I thought it was necessary.

\* \* \* \*

2. Reviews and approves requests for supplemental funds

Supplemental funds are occasionally required when projects exceed budgets. Ordinarily the Program Officer attempts to fill these requests by reallocating existing funds before applying to AID/W, unless he feels quite sure that they are for purposes that AID/W will readily approve. The task also includes advising how to phase the justification for funds in terms most likely to be accepted in Washington.

The difficulties of getting adequate justifications for funds from Division Chiefs create problems similar to those discussed with reference to other paperwork.

Two other major problems exist regarding this task. One is the reluctance and often resentment of Division Chiefs to accept the Program Officer's rejection of their requests because he foresees rejection by AID/W which is in keeping with the unwritten rule in all missions nev. to make requests to AID/W that are likely to be turned down.

The second problem is, of course, delay by AID/W in acting upon such requests. Projects sometimes have to stop completely in these circumstances.

A division was allowed \$\_\_\_\_\_ for a construction project. Some of these funds were diverted for purchasing equipment, covering a host pay raise that could not have been anticipated, and repairing storm damage to facilities. Remaining funds were inadequate to cover the construction planned. The Division Chief wanted to submit a supplemental fund request. I persuaded him that AID/W would not grant supplemental funds. I am always in continuing discussion with the Director about division needs and available funds. Memos kept coming in from the Division Chief about the need for more money over a period of months. Finally I authorized additional funds supplied by drawing from the Director's reserve, reducing other aspects of the project, using funds available because of unexpected delay in the arrival of a technician, and savings on equipment purchased.

\* \* \* \*

A construction program was approved by AID/W on a two-year basis. Construction proceeded ahead of the funding pattern. Money was obligated, but next year's money was actually needed in this year in order to keep construction going. I asked AID/W if some contingency money was available for immediate use and chargeable against next year's money when it becomes available. AID/W replied that the mission must have changed plans. I accounted for changes in rate of expenditure, e.g., bricks made in rural areas of poor facility, good bricks had to be hauled from city, etc., need to complete the project before next year. The request was disapproved. Construction was curtailed.

\* \* \* \*

3. Explains or justifies project and budget changes

a. to USAID personnel

The task of convincing other mission personnel that the changes he proposes are appropriate is one of the most difficult in

the Program Officer's job. As described above, the technicians fight to protect or expand their projects. In addition, officers superior to the Program Officer may have "pet projects" or favored technicians that they try to defend. It is much easier to obtain agreement if the Program Officer has the confidence of the Director and can announce changes in his name, but, even if this is the case, unpleasant reactions may be encountered that can develop into long-term feuds.

A Division Chief told me and the Director that another United States agency was going to assign personnel to host facilities. He thought this would give us an opportunity to increase American staff in these facilities and proposed the establishment of an administrative office, with a top specialist to direct. It would be of primary importance because it would create the machinery for the host government to take over providing these services. The Director did not like the proposal because he would have to bring in and budget for more high-salaried people. I disagreed and argued that we could phase out an earlier project and phase in this one (because I considered it a good proposal in the long run). The Director changed his mind, we sent it to Washington, and they approved it. I think this will pay off for us in the future. We have a big stake in this country, and this work will be an important social reform. On the other hand,                      is very ticklish. It has to be brought along very carefully. It is dangerous for us to move too quickly, and just as dangerous to move too slowly. If the timing proves to be a mistake, I have a great responsibility for it. We cannot afford mistakes in this area, even more so because host resources will be involved as much as United States dollars.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

b. to AID/W

Ordinarily routine procedures are followed in preparing notifications of changes for AID/W. It may be necessary to answer several requests for additional information or to send repeated follow-up messages before Washington takes any action.

AID/W has ordered termination of certain projects and specified an effective date. Planning for an orderly transition to host operation has not been done. Effective administration of a significant contract is based on continuing operation of these projects until transition arrangements are completed. The specific problem is the method for paying United States staff if these projects are transferred to the host government. The Director, the Division Chief, and I sent a special appeal to AID/W to gain permission to operate the projects for a short time. Permission was granted.

\* \* \* \*

c. to host government personnel.

See the discussion of negotiations above in section II C 1.

Support for a host industry has kept a large proportion of AID's available local currency for country development tied up. I persuaded the host Minister to accept lower support amounts by reasoning that in the long run it would help the country by putting pressure on the industry to try to sell their products at home and abroad. In exchange the Director and I agreed to support import restrictions if they could be worked out in general terms.

\* \* \* \*

4. Advises on handling contingencies

The term contingencies means all types of unpredictable emergencies or events which may call for extraordinary procedures or additional funds.

- a. provides information on relevant regulations
- b. recommends funding procedures

These tasks involve advising higher mission officers or host government officials upon what courses of action the mission is permitted to follow in assisting the host government to recover from natural disasters, or in handling emergencies within the mission. In the latter case, the Program Officer would usually cooperate with the Executive Officer. The Program Officer needs to know what funds can be devoted to these ends and how much may be spent without AID/W approval.

A recent natural disaster destroyed virtually an entire town. The United States Ambassador felt obligated to aid the town and was asked to do so by host officials. He consulted the Mission Director regarding what could be done and how. The Director consulted me. I had previously worked during an epidemic at another post so I knew that a United States Ambassador is allowed to spend up to \$10,000 on emergency or humanitarian relief without reference to Washington. I also knew where to find the authority for this and did so. The Ambassador was thus able to provide the immediately needed relief for the stricken area. If a delay had resulted because of seeking Washington permission, the aid would not have been as effective.

\* \* \* \*

C. Accomplishes Other Program Management Functions

1. Reads, reviews, prepares correspondence

The amount of attention given to this task by the Program Officer usually depends upon the size of the mission. In the larger, a subordinate usually handles routine correspondence. In all missions, the Program Officer tends to be called upon to prepare or edit important cables or letters. Many of the activities and problems described in discussing reports also apply to this task.

The greatest difficulties pertain to the brevity of messages required in writing cables or airgrams. They are often so cryptic that they cannot be fully understood and disagreements arise over interpreting them. It may result in delaying some crucial action until clarification can be obtained from the sender. Since this happens at both ends of the system--in the mission and in Washington--it is not an insignificant problem.

We received AID/W approval of a host government loan application. Our copies were all in English. It is my understanding that it is permissible to transmit such documents to the host government in English with an explanation that we would be available for clarification if they wished. I thought the transmittal letter should be in both \_\_\_\_\_ and English so host officials would know what the document was and not be confused in any way about what it meant. The Director would not go along with me and sent only an English transmittal letter. I'm sure they'll have trouble reading it and may misunderstand some things.

\* \* \* \*

Interpersonal problems among Americans in the mission--yes, this is a definite problem, especially between

Division Chiefs and me. The reason for this is that I am not superior in the mission organization to Division Chiefs, but everyone realizes that I have the most influence with the Director. This creates the situation of Division Chiefs' having to win the approval of someone on the same level. The result is friction. For example, a Division Chief once drafted a cable to AID/W asking for several new personnel. My subordinate was clearing the cable and mentioned the contents to me. The subordinate informed me that he intended to try to obtain additional details about the need for these new personnel. When meeting with the Division Chief, my subordinate found the technician absolutely non-communicative so he gave up. Moments later the Division Chief called me and asked why I was questioning the cable. I replied that I was merely interested in what the additional personnel were to do. The Division Chief's response was to say in an angry tone, "O.K., then we will not ask for anyone," and he hung up.

\* \* \* \*

(from subordinate) We are building facilities for a host agency. We have known all along that there would be certain problems. The host officials have made known that they now want a specific building configuration. I drafted a memo telling them that the building desired is impractical because of the problems. The Program Officer changed the word impractical and told me he thought it would be better to say expensive. As a result they are going to have their type of building, but they are going to do it at their own expense. I think the change of wording also changed the substance of the letter.

\* \* \* \*

2. Reads, reviews, prepares project reports

See section I C 3 for discussions of the tasks and problems applying to reports.

I have had cases where technicians have not responded to requests from AID/W and in one case from myself for specific information concerning a project. These happened at about the same time so I went to the Director and gave him the circumstances. He stated that it was my job to get them to do their jobs. I then drew up a memo to each one which stated, "Will you please submit by (date) the report requested from you to (the Program Officer or AID/W). Refer to the memorandum to you from the Program Officer dated \_\_\_\_\_ which requested this information earlier."

\* \* \* \*

A division submitted a report required by AID/W on the past activities of the division. The report stressed accomplishments made by certain projects. I returned the report to the Division Chief and suggested that stress be laid on the United States' investment in the projects and upon the projects to be implemented in future in order to try to insure continuation of these projects. The report was rewritten. The man who wrote the original report did not speak to me for three months. I took it as part of the job.

\* \* \* \*

"Crummy reports" are a big problem, for example, a Division Chief sent in incomplete reports. I sent the Assistant Program Officer to see him and to get information to fill in gaps. It gave the Division Chief a chance to sound off about reports and for us to get the necessary data.

\* \* \* \*

I took a report to the Director, saying that it was too bad to do anything with. The Director passed it back to the Division Chief, which is the procedure he prefers to follow. The Division Chief passed it on to the technician who wrote it with a word

regarding who had criticized it. The technician was offended and would not speak to me for some time.

\* \* \* \*

The mission has been dissatisfied with a contract, and wants to terminate it. A problem is created by pressures for contract continuation. The Division Chief submitted a routine division report to be sent to AID/W, and it came to me for routine clearance. I noted this report was inconsistent with mission policy because, while it stressed the undesirable aspects of the contract, it also referred to contract continuation. I brought the matter to the attention of the Director, who issued instructions for modifying the report. I carried the Director's instructions to the Chief and the report was changed.

\* \* \* \*

Technicians, being more technically oriented naturally, do not see the necessity for regular and specific reporting. They always seem to find some excuse to get out of reporting (too much work, too much time required). The requirements for technicians' reporting are spelled out in the Manual Orders so there should be no need to oversee this part of their jobs. The Manual Orders spell out work plans that they should periodically submit with a check list of items, factors and topics which should be covered by them. These Manual Orders call for monthly reports regarding their work progress. Since these reports were not forthcoming, I issued a directive referring all technicians to the appropriate Manual Orders and describing the supplementary reports which were expected of them with deadlines assigned to each report to be submitted.

\* \* \* \*

3. Keeps others informed about project status

This task is a continuous activity for the Program Officer. He usually presents regular reports on projects at staff meetings and may be called upon at any time for information about specific facts about any project. In some cases he maintains personal files in order to be able to answer quickly any questions which arise. The Director frequently relies almost solely upon the Program Officer for project information. Host officials may also maintain regular contacts with the Program Officer as their source of information.

Difficulty in obtaining accurate reports from the field (discussed in III A 1) creates the greatest obstacle in performing this task.

As an example of United States' delays which are embarrassing: A Project Agreement was signed with the host government along with the appropriate PIO/T to provide for the training of local technicians by a United States firm. AID/W did not get out an invitation for bids from United States contractors until seven months later. The contractor was not selected for five more months. The contractor then decided that he needed some special clauses in his contract because it would otherwise jeopardize other contracts which he had with the host government. These additional negotiations lasted for months and at one time were actually broken off. The contract was finally signed by all parties two years after the original Project Agreement was signed. It would still be several weeks, if not months, before the people actually arrive at the post. I had to explain to the host officials that the United States Government and the contractor "were all fouled up."

\* \* \* \*

I have mentioned all the difficulties with the Division Chief and with his division. I think one cause of all these difficulties is that he simply has too much to do. He does not have confidence in his assistant so he tries to do it all himself. I am sure that this is one reason why a contract team has been left to itself, why the evaluation regarding their projects is so hard to do, i.e., to get information on, etc. A list of all the responsibilities he has would generate some genuine sympathy for the man. It is just too much to ask of one man. I'm very aware of this and I have proposed to the Director that this Division Chief be relieved of certain projects. This would give him time to keep on top of things. It is really his job to go to the Director and tell him he has too much work to do, but he has not, so I have, and the Director is coming around to my point of view.

\* \* \* \*

4. Acts as Division Chief as required

The Program Officer may be required to take on the tasks and responsibilities of a Division Chief when the mission cannot recruit a qualified technical person to fill the job or when a proposed project cannot be readily handled by one of the existing technical divisions. Under these circumstances, the Program Officer may be required to direct technical operations, as well as to perform the administrative work. Some of these duties may be shared with an Assistant Program Officer or Deputy Program Officer. The main problem is that attending to these tasks interferes with accomplishing Program Office work.

#### IV. CONTRIBUTES TO MISSION MANAGEMENT

Ordinarily the Program Officer's superiors consult him about many aspects of managing the mission. These management tasks fall into three categories.

The first category contains the tasks involved in directing the Program Office. These tasks are directly interwoven with the functions of determining, implementing, and managing the program.

The second category consists of tasks such as handling publicity and assisting in recruiting personnel-- tasks which entail decisions based upon knowledge of many aspects of the program. While primary responsibility for performing tasks like these may be delegated to other officers, the Program Officer generally contributes a great deal of time and effort to them.

The third category tends to vary more from mission to mission than the other two. It includes tasks delegated to the Program Officer either routinely or sporadically by higher officers for which almost no program knowledge is necessary. Examples appear among the incidents cited in section IV D 2, below. At times, being brought into non-program matters creates difficulties for the Program Officer in his relationships with colleagues because they may feel they have been bypassed and resent his infringing upon their jobs. They may also disagree with the Program Officer regarding the appropriate course of action for deciding something within their jurisdictions, and interpret his opinion as implying doubt of their competence.

##### A. Directs Program Office

Directing the Program Office is the major management function of the Program Officer. There is considerable variability in how this task is accomplished. In some missions, particularly the smaller, the Program Officer may deal personally with very minor tasks; in

other missions he may delegate substantial responsibilities to subordinates and be concerned with the details of only the most important matters.

1. Supervises subordinates

While the duties involved in this task -- informing, monitoring, and counselling subordinates -- are fairly consistent from mission to mission, the amount of emphasis for any one of them will depend upon the size and capabilities of the Program Office staff. For example, with a large, well-trained group of subordinates, the Program Officer may spend only little time in developing skills, but perhaps a great deal in insuring that information reaches appropriate personnel, and in monitoring and evaluating their performance. If the same staff consists of relatively new personnel, he may be required to spend extensive amounts of time training them in correct procedures.

a. provides information

Usually the Program Officer holds staff meetings to keep his subordinates informed of any relevant information regarding policy, project plans, operations, or decisions made at higher levels in the mission. For especially important and detailed matters, he may also write and distribute memoranda or directives. In addition, he insures that documents of various types coming into the Program Office are routed to appropriate subordinates.

The only problem I have, which is not actually a problem, but it does take time and effort, is keeping the Assistant Program Officer and all other Program Office staff advised in general about what is going on. It takes a bit more time with the Assistant Program Officer because I am trying to teach him more substantive things about the Program Office.

\* \* \* \*

A subordinate was writing a letter in response to a request for information on host development activities. I read the draft and it was apparent that the letter would lead one to the wrong conclusions concerning certain sectors. I knew enough about this from having read the Embassy report on these matters. I gave the Embassy airgram to the subordinate to read and asked him to revise his letter.

\* \* \* \*

b. monitors and evaluates performance

This task involves both day-to-day observation and guidance of subordinates' work and completion of formal evaluation procedures. In accomplishing the former, difficulties sometimes arise because there is a lack of rapport between the Program Officer and a subordinate. This may be the result of differences in background, of different interpretations of what a task requires, or of personal relations involving other members of the mission staff, as illustrated in the first of the following incidents.

One of my subordinates is on especially friendly terms with the Mission Director, which creates problems for me. This subordinate feels free to ignore instructions and generally does inadequate work. In one case, he wrote a very unsatisfactory airgram to AID/W which was routed through me. I sent it back to him for correction, noting its deficiencies. The subordinate, however, came into my office and told me harshly that I had missed the entire point of the message. Because of the personal relationship involved, it was necessary to use diplomacy in handling the situation. Although angry, I forced myself to remain calm and agreed to re-read the message. Frequently I have to redo this subordinate's work, which is an additional burden on my time.

\* \* \* \*

I have a very independent-minded secretary who has her own ways of doing things. At times she doesn't correspond to our ways. One subordinate did his work in a very disjointed manner. He would ask her for little things and give her last minute typing -- both of which she refused to do. I find that by giving her a great deal of latitude she does her best work so I don't tell her how to do things -- I let her go about her job with a minimum of supervision.

\* \* \* \*

I occasionally discuss work progress with my subordinate to insure that implementation work is going forward. When work first begins, immediately after receipt of the Implementation Approval Document, I check with him weekly to learn of progress. Then, as work progresses, and the end of the FY approaches, I check with him daily.

\* \* \* \*

A research team had gathered data concerning a specific type of program and had made some recommendations concerning smoother operations. Since these recommendations were not fully appropriate for this mission's program, I assigned a subordinate the task of modifying the material in order to meet local needs. He objected to the assignment on the basis that he had no time, but I suspect that the real reason for his reluctance was that he didn't know how to modify and use the materials. I wanted him to try in order to gain experience, perhaps to improve the program, and to provide a basis for judging his ability. I occasionally ask him what has been accomplished, but the answer is always negative. I prefer not to force him to do this task, and there is insufficient time to persuade or to explain in detail what is to be done. Also, his work is satisfactory in other respects, so I decided not to push this issue.

\* \* \* \*

Some tables for a report are not done yet. The Deputy Director told me to go to the subordinate and simply tell him to "get it done, now." I hesitate to do that, however, because when I have asked him about things he was doing in the past I always got a big reaction from him like "what do you expect me to do, I'm only human and I have no one to help me." Because of his attitude I just don't bother him anymore. I guess he'll finish sooner or later. Perhaps this is very inefficient of me but I don't know what else to do about him.

\* \* \* \*

With regard to the Training Office, I feel it is very effective not to stick my nose into the Training Officer's job. The Training Officer is very effective. If I tried to assert my authority I might upset a smooth operation.

\* \* \* \*

I had a local assistant who spent most of his time chatting with other locals in the mission. He was the highest paid local, and the others were distressed by this. However, no amount of assignment would get this man to work. I finally told him that "things would have to change," but it didn't work, and I finally dismissed him. The man already had a part-time job, and simply went to it full-time. I think the job itself is a mistake, and I have not tried to refill the position.

\* \* \* \*

1) Prepares efficiency reports. Many Program Officers regard the task of completing efficiency reports as a difficult and rather meaningless chore. They consider that some of the judgments called for about subordinates cannot be made realistically, and that the five-point rating scale, because any rating below a four has come to be considered as unsatisfactory, cannot be used meaningfully.

The requirement to review ratings with subordinates and, if necessary, justify them, is often viewed as unpleasant. Subordinates sometimes feel that low ratings reflect personal biases against them rather than objective evaluations of their work. On occasion, the work of the Program Office may be disrupted because these subordinates feel that their efforts are not appreciated and therefore perform their tasks negligently. This, in turn, may distract or demoralize their fellow workers.

2) Serves on Efficiency Report review panel. Serving on review panels can also be an unpleasant task. Disputes sometimes arise among panel members regarding the fairness of ratings and the advisability of requesting that these ratings be sent back for revision. The panel meetings may require an extensive amount of time and are therefore considered an interference with the more important, major work of the Program Office.

c. develops skills, counsels

Some Program Officers regard training their subordinates and helping them to develop the skills necessary for promotion as an important aspect of the job. Others regard training as a waste of their time and report that they sometimes do work themselves rather than take the time to explain tasks to a subordinate and check his work.

The counselling function is most often reported in relation to actual job performance. It includes encouraging subordinates to take on more varied or more difficult tasks if they seem to lack the confidence to do so, as well as instructing them in how to avoid difficulties of various types in dealing with division or other mission personnel. Most incumbents tend to avoid counselling staff members with regard to personal problems, preferring to pass this type of task to the Executive Officer.

As part of my effort to train subordinates I give them a minimum of instructions. I usually just toss them a job and tell them to go ahead and do it, but let them know that I am available for advice and consultation if they feel that they need it. I prefer to have them follow their own style and develop their own position and discuss it with me later.

\* \* \* \*

I sometimes have to consider personalities in dealing with my staff and division personnel. Where I do know about a personal animosity however I do not make any changes in normal procedure. Trying to revise assignments to adjust to personality differences will only cause more problems. What I do is to counsel my subordinates, for example, telling them to be careful not to let their personal feelings interfere with a discussion coming up with such and such a technician.

\* \* \* \*

One young man's drive and enthusiasm were irritating the division he worked with. He was going too fast for them. When I learned of this from the Division Chief, I had a chat with the young man and told him to take it easy. He has improved greatly and his relations with the division are better.

\* \* \* \*

I have started a long-range activity which should alleviate the problem of one subordinate's slowness in completing his work. I have asked the Assistant Program Officer to take a hand in these tasks. I want him to learn more about this work. This way he can take up the slack left by the other subordinate. However I personally don't think he is capable of this. In certain respects he is really a genius. He does a great deal of work, but I don't think he will do well in this other work. But, I'll give him a try.

\* \* \* \*

I was never able to supervise an older man I inherited. I found him crotchety and staid. I could never work up enough sympathy for the man so that he felt close enough to bring me his problems. I was glad when he retired.

\* \* \* \*

Correcting host national subordinates is an extremely delicate matter as they are very sensitive to any kind of criticism. In a situation where I would simply give an American employee hell and really chew him out, I would very delicately hint to a host national employee that I was not entirely satisfied with his performance.

\* \* \* \*

d. settles disputes

Disputes may arise among Program Office personnel because someone feels that work is inequitably apportioned, because personal conflicts develop, or for other reasons. The Program Officer may be required to investigate and adjudicate these differences so that the work of the office will not be disrupted. For example, he may have to justify assigning a particular task to one subordinate, if someone else ordinarily does this task, by pointing out the time considerations, or the special skills involved in his decision regarding the work.

e. recommends recognition of superior performance

The Program Officer may feel that certain subordinates deserve special recognition for their superior job performance. In some missions there are incentive award programs, and he may nominate them for this type of recognition. In other cases, he may try to assist a subordinate in gaining a promotion or a pay increase when he feels that these may be warranted.

A subordinate took the job at too low a level. I have been trying to do something about this, but once you get classified you have to move along through the ranks. There is no court of equity, which I think there should be.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Manages operations

Like the preceding tasks of supervising subordinates, the Program Officer's managing activities depend to some extent upon the size and capabilities of his staff. With adequately trained and experienced personnel, many of the tasks described here fall into smooth routines that are quickly accomplished.

Personal preferences will also influence managing operations. Because they bear the responsibility for the work of the Program Office, some Program Officers find it extremely difficult to delegate tasks and overburden themselves checking the details of subordinates' work. When the staff happens to be large, a Program Officer of this type becomes a bottleneck, holding up the work of his staff and frequently that of project personnel dependent upon his office for information or approvals. Occasionally some higher mission officer obstructs work in this way by insisting upon unnecessary involvement in Program Office procedures.

### a. assigns and adjusts duties and responsibilities

Problems related to this task result from two major factors. The first is the chronic shortage of trained personnel. Lacking professional assistants with AID experience means that the Program Officer is often required to take over fairly routine, but time-consuming tasks. The shortage of U.S. secretaries results in delays

and inconveniences in handling classified materials. In countries where there are few trained host national secretaries, it may also mean trying to accomplish a large volume of paper work with inadequate stenographic, typing, and filing service.

The second factor is the attitude of subordinates toward their assignments. Some highly trained professionals who find their duties uninteresting or trivial may express their resentment by doing negligent work. In a few cases they may simply substitute something they prefer for the assigned task. In either event, the Program Officer may have to do the work himself in order to meet a deadline.

I have tried to share the load of training with the Program Office staff. However, now one replacement has not been made and another subordinate is leaving at the end of this month. His replacement will have to do either training or economic work. One or the other will suffer. In the \_\_\_ months I have been here the Program Office staff has been complete for only one third of the time.

\* \* \* \*

My primary motivation problem is with the host national employees. They have little enthusiasm for group cohesiveness and cooperation as a means of achieving a goal, but rather tend to develop intense personal loyalties. Every American who has been here for more than a few months has at least one host national subordinate who will blindly and devotedly do anything for him but not for any one else. As a result if a host national employee is asked to do some work for another section, even if it is another section within the Program Office, he will not be highly motivated to do it and will probably try to get out of it or do a poor job.

\* \* \* \*

On one occasion when the Assistant Program Officer was not here I had to assign work which was properly his to another subordinate. He said it wasn't his responsibility and that it would take up a lot of his time. He said he would do it only if I ordered him to by putting it in writing. Since the work had to be done I did write an official memo to him requesting that he do the assignment. Nothing more was said, and he did it.

\* \* \* \*

When I arrived, the Program Office was divided into two sections -- planning and operations. I did not believe this was efficient since there was limited communication between the two sections, and a project might be planned in such a way that it was difficult to implement, or the implementation might not carry out the true objectives of the planning. I reorganized it on the present sector responsibility system, and so far it has worked quite well.

\* \* \* \*

A host national employee told his host national supervisor about a health problem, and then I heard about it indirectly through the supervisor. I arranged to lighten the employee's work load until the health problem cleared up.

\* \* \* \*

In one instance I wanted a chart showing the names of people and how long their contracts run. I told the Assistant Program Officer this and he gave the job to a secretary. When I got the chart from the secretary, all of the bars indicating contract duration ended at the same place. It was neat but useless. Obviously I did not explain what I wanted clearly enough to the Assistant Program Officer, or the Assistant Program Officer didn't explain it to the secretary.

\* \* \* \*

b. establishes work schedules and priorities

The chief problem in scheduling work in the Program Office is created by the great number of requests from AID/W for various information and reports. Very frequently these requests have to be clarified by checking back with AID/W before work can actually begin. This, coupled with the short time ordinarily given for submitting the information, usually results in a complete disruption of routine work while the whole staff cooperates in the special task. In the meantime, other deadlines crop up, so that most work has to be accomplished under crash conditions.

I told a subordinate what I wanted him to do, and gave him 6 weeks. At the end of this time he submitted a memo showing the sluggish growth rate of the agricultural sector instead of a general draft of the economic situation and development progress -- essentially an updating of about 6 months from the last CAP. I told him that I knew he had some other things to do, but that he had not even taken advantage of the contacts that I had provided. A month later the material was still not ready, and I had to tell the Director that it was not. Then I had to "jump in" and do it myself. I think he should have taken his deadlines more seriously, working overtime if necessary. I will simply have to supervise his work more diligently.

\* \* \* \*

c. requests additional personnel as needed

Decisions to increase the Program Office staff are subject to the limitations of staffing and budget allowances. The most frequent problem, once approval of the Director and AID/W have been obtained, is the delay in recruiting qualified personnel by AID/W. This is discussed more fully in section IV B 1, below.

I have just "ordered" a new secretary who will be a pool secretary. However, she won't stay there long. She will be snatched up by someone who has very much to do and be tied up there all the time. I think in order to solve the problem of the request for a private secretary, I will move one Division Chief into this building and give him the use of any of the pool secretaries. As for the constant shorthandedness, I think we should always keep "ordering" one more secretary than we need so that we will alleviate the problem of her being needed very badly in some division by the time she gets here. This way maybe we can have some kind of a secretary pool.

\* \* \* \*

I am too heavily loaded with office tasks to get out to field projects more than about once in \_\_\_ months. To do something about evaluation, I recommended to the Director that a new employee be added to the Program Office staff. He agreed, and I found a man who appeared qualified working in the \_\_\_ office. The man had good technical and personal qualifications and was happy to leave the office. The transfer was arranged.

\* \* \* \*

d. interprets policies, regulations and Manual Orders

This task frequently occupies a great amount of the Program Officer's attention, especially when his staff has had little prior AID experience. The various problems encountered because AID/W directives, policies, etc., are unclear or confusing have been described in earlier sections.

(See the relevant incident in section III A 3 d.)

c. reads incoming materials

Since the Program Office is the central clearing point for all program matters, a great volume of documents, directives, and other materials must be read and acted upon. A major problem is the time required for reading all of these materials. This task also includes insuring that materials are routed to appropriate people within the office or in the field. Certain documents may be abstracted and circulated for general information.

f. maintains files on host country information, AID/W correspondence, directives, etc.

The shortage of trained secretarial personnel, discussed above, sometimes makes it necessary for the Program Officer to set up and maintain his own files. This takes valuable time away from his more important responsibilities, but frequently it is the only way to avoid delays in referring to information needed for writing reports, answering questions, or other purposes.

I have set up and maintained my own limited "official use" locked files in my office. I did all the work myself because there is no available staff with the necessary security clearance and free time.

\* \* \* \*

I arrived after the mission had been without a Program Officer for several months. Program files were quite inadequate and out of date. I arranged to have the secretary bring the files up to date by obtaining copies of messages and having messages reproduced when no extra copies were available.

\* \* \* \*

My host secretary is responsible for maintaining project files. She lacks a "feel for papers" so that I am not able to find documents while I am working on weekends and have to telephone her to find out where to find things.

\* \* \* \*

g. edits written materials

The written materials considered here are prepared by subordinates within the Program Office. With this difference, the same types of problems arise that were discussed in section I C 3 in the descriptions of reviewing and editing program documents.

(From observer) The Program Officer stressed the Assistant Program Officer's poor writing and lack of formal education in economics. Consequently all of his work must be edited carefully and at times returned to him for rewriting. The Assistant Program Officer seems to resent the Program Officer, expresses a lack of respect for the Program Officer's intelligence, and says that he has no ideas. The Program Officer suspects that the Assistant Program Officer may resent corrections.

\* \* \* \*

The Assistant Program Officer is tactless and offends people. The job depends on good relations within AID, so I must edit everything that the Assistant Program Officer sends out.

\* \* \* \*

I am waging a campaign to reduce documents by asking subordinates to justify documents given to me for signature. In several cases they have been unable to do so. This is primarily a cultural problem. Locals keep several sets of books and document everything.

I suspect that part of this is due to the high rate of unemployment here, since they tend to create work to maintain their job security.

\* \* \* \*

I got several reports from a subordinate, all of which used an incorrect format. This just isn't the way we do things here. I asked him in a very jokingly way about the deviation from standard format. That's all I had to say. He got very indignant and said it was better his way. I didn't know what to say at the time because I never expected that kind of reaction. All I could do since there was no reasoning with him was to tell the secretary not to type his reports like that but to follow the usual format.

\* \* \* \*

- h. insures effective working relations between the Program Office and divisions

Most Program Officers consider that careful maintenance of good relations between the Program Office and the divisions is a prerequisite to accomplishing their work effectively. Therefore, they take great care to instruct subordinates in appropriate methods for contacting and making requests of division personnel.

The Assistant Program Officer must be managed carefully in his personal relations because his personality "rubs" people the wrong way. I can't risk offending people because our job success depends upon people working well together.

\* \* \* \*

This incident started with an accusation by the Deputy Chief of a division against the Assistant Program Officer. He accused the Assistant Program Officer of altering a report. I checked the report with the Assistant and found that there was no basis for the accusation. I told the Deputy this, but he would not give up and continued to misinterpret other data reported by the Assistant Program Officer. I finally told the Chief of the division and asked him to get his Deputy to apologize to the Assistant Program Officer. The Chief explained that his Deputy was under an emotional strain and to take this into consideration. I agreed but still thought the Deputy should apologize to the Assistant Program Officer. The Deputy finally did come up to the Program Office and they straightened the thing out. I may have been too stern with the Deputy, but it all worked out, so I feel my sternness was justified.

\* \* \* \*

For the Deputy Program Officer and Assistant Program Officer, the greatest problem is working with Division Chiefs and having to say no. This is difficult to do without seeming negative toward a particular program. I check to see that memos sent out by these people are tactful and that division people's feelings aren't needlessly hurt.

\* \* \* \*

Relations between the Program Office and technical divisions are generally good, except with one Division Chief. For example, after a subordinate and I decided how, what, when, and why concerning briefings and trips for visiting Congressional investigators, he called some people in the \_\_\_\_\_ Division and asked them to provide briefing materials about their projects. Within about two days the Division Chief called my subordinate and told him to stop telling his people what to do. Therefore, my subordinate had to explain this to me. I, in turn, explained to the Division Chief, asking him to assure that his division personnel provided the appropriate briefing materials.

\* \* \* \*

(From a colleague) When the Deputy Director held his weekly meeting with the Division Chief a minor point of disagreement arose about the way the Chief made his reports to the Program Officer (who was also present in the meeting). The Program Officer responded in anger saying "This is what I want!" The Deputy Director had to change the subject to keep the peace.

\* \* \* \*

During my first 6 weeks I had meetings with all the technical people, but I went to their offices. That was a very good thing to do. It prompted cooperation and I got some good insights about their abilities, dedication, etc. by meeting them on their home grounds.

\* \* \* \*

#### B. Participates in Personnel Matters

In addition to handling the personnel needs for his own office, the Program Officer may be called upon to assist in personnel matters pertaining to field projects or other administrative offices. In most cases, his role would be to advise other personnel or assist in completing paperwork. For example, he might explain Agency leave policy.

##### 1. Assists in recruiting staff

The Program Officer may be consulted about any aspect of recruiting new personnel: to advise in specifying qualifications, to handle paperwork, or to evaluate candidates. The greatest problem encountered is the slowness with which AID/W personnel takes action. It is not uncommon for a year or more to elapse between the filing of a request and the arrival of a new man on the job. To circumvent these delays, the Program Officer may suggest contacting people in business, government, or academic circles to obtain recommendations for job candidates, particularly when technical people are being sought.

Major problems also occur in recruiting personnel among host nationals. The mission may lack dependable sources for referring job applicants to them, in some countries being forced to rely on the advice of present employees who may try to obtain jobs for friends or relatives with poor skills or little training. At times, when the pool of trained personnel is limited, the mission may be competing with host companies, the host government, and international corporations who have higher pay scales or other benefits which the mission cannot meet.

Some problems stem from the newness of the mission. For example, there are no precedents for the salaries of locals, or for the cost of any other operation. This makes budgeting very difficult. Nor are there any well known sources of employment. The mission has had to rely on the Embassy and word-of-mouth.

\* \* \* \*

We have an opportunity to employ one of our contract employees as a direct hire. The contractor is willing, and he is one of the best men in the mission. But AID/W personnel can't cope with the problem. They don't even answer correspondence, despite pressure.

\* \* \* \*

Another problem is that the mission has not been able to recruit some people we need for our program. We want to get more Loan Officers and a management consultant team, for instance, but Washington says they are unable to recruit them. I feel that good people are available but that Washington is doing a poor job of recruiting.

\* \* \* \*

(from a technical chief) I am being phased out and AID can't find contractors to replace me. I have \_\_\_\_\_ projects in progress right now. They have been running (or in preparation) for approximately a year on the average. No inexperienced team can take my place now, especially in the field of building human resources.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

a. gathers information

The actions employed in gathering information for personnel purposes are similar to those described for gathering other types of information: conferring with other persons -- staff members, AID/W, or host nationals -- reviewing documents, requesting clarifications from AID/W, and so forth.

The problem mentioned earlier concerning the ambiguity and obsolescence of AID staffing documents and biographic information also applies here. It may also be difficult for someone who is not himself an expert in a specialized field to interpret descriptions of the qualifications of technical personnel.

AID/W advised that a nominee was available to fill a request for a technical chief. I knew of the AID/W nominee and heard that he had served in another country. I sent a message to a technician I knew in that post asking him to send information about the nominee. My original information about the nominee being difficult to work with was verified. I informed the Director, who rejected the nominee.

\* \* \* \*

. . . .

b. prepares documentation as required

The Program Officer may write or review job descriptions, SPARS, or other personnel documents. The same types of procedures and problems are involved as in preparing program documents.

c. corresponds with friends or professional associates

Frequently when AID/W delays are lengthy or it is known that persons in certain special fields are hard to recruit, the Program Officer may correspond with friends or professional associates who can do a better job of recruiting for him than AID/W. The Program Officer may also correspond with friends in Washington or in other missions if he knows of appropriate personnel who are nearing the end of a tour and may be interested in coming to the mission.

d. evaluates and selects personnel

The Program Officer considers all of the information he has available and decides or advises others upon the acceptability of a potential recruit. This may involve conferring with other staff members or writing AID/W or other sources for additional information with which to make a decision. He tries to judge the suitability of a nominee's training for the position open, the likelihood of personality or emotional problems serious enough to affect work performance, and other relevant factors. In some missions, the Program Officer may help determine salaries for certain classes of personnel, and he may also handle salary negotiations with job applicants.

I feel that the host government needs some assistance and they had initially requested a \_\_\_\_\_ before I arrived. The first nominee provided by Washington was too inexperienced and the host government declined to accept him.

Washington nominated a second one whom the host had accepted, but the man felt that the assignment was too short and dropped out. Washington nominated a third man whom the Mission Director hastily approved when he was in Washington on business, but I was disturbed about his qualifications. The candidate was an expert in \_\_\_\_\_, and I felt that the requirements called for a different type of specialist. I passed the candidate on to the host government, as I had to do, but I tried not to convey any personal judgments to them. I was relieved that the host government did not feel he was qualified either. Washington delayed several months before finding another candidate, but this man has certain problems that made him unacceptable, because the Embassy will not assume responsibility for him. This means that another candidate must be found, and if he is, it will probably have been a year from the initial request before he can be assigned.

\* \* \* \*

The Director persuaded a technician to come to work for AID. They started to discuss pay. I stopped the discussion so that the technician and I could discuss the details later. I feared the Director would throw the pay scale off for the mission and upset or demoralize other technicians.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Orients new staff members

The Program Officer is frequently assigned the task of briefing new personnel in AID regulations, program matters, or the host country. It is sometimes difficult to communicate the operations of the mission -- relationships between offices, responsibilities, duties, or lines of authority -- to new personnel who are unfamiliar with bureaucratic

agencies in general and AID in particular. These briefing sessions may involve arranging meetings, providing reading materials, or arranging field trips.

In meeting the problem of the technicians' inability to plan, I must consider the technicians and evaluate their competency. I have tried a variety of methods of indoctrination and education: holding meetings, hearings, exhortation, having my subordinates press for good planning. There has been some improvement in some of the technicians' work, and as new people come in, I have been successful in indoctrinating them.

\* \* \* \*

I am strongly recommending to the Deputy Director (who is relatively new) to drop everything he is doing and go out to visit the field projects. It would stand him in good stead.

\* \* \* \*

### C. Handles Public Relations

In many missions the Program Officer is assigned responsibility for the mission's public relations. This may involve developing publicity policies and procedures, holding press conferences, receiving non-official visitors, and arranging public ceremonies.

#### 1. Handles publicity

##### a. advises or develops publicity policies and procedure

The Program Officer may be charged with determining how much publicity the mission should attempt, and what methods and media are most suitable for these purposes. This is another area where confusing AID/W policy directives may make it difficult to decide whether

or not certain actions are appropriate. Another source of problems is the tendency of technical people to criticize the mission or aid projects to host nationals or other non-AID persons. Technicians may not be aware of the sensitive nature of their remarks or the difficulties they may create in the mission's relationships with the host government. The Program Officer must warn people of the ramifications of their remarks and try to convince them to be more cautious in the future.

An important Project Agreement was signed with the hosts during a "cool" period in host-U.S. relations when the Ambassador forbade local publicity. The contractor involved wanted publicity in the United States. I learned informally that the contract chief intended to release news in the United States through private channels. AID/W regulations require that releases be sent through AID/W, which is a slow procedure. I called the contract chief for more information, checked with other personnel, took the problem to the Director and pointed out the need for local orders on news releases. I also checked with USIS and found that they cannot operate outside the host country. The contract chief released the news to the United States via private channels. He was not subject to AID regulations. I suggested that the mission release the news via AID channels and send an airgram to AID/W detailing the action of the contract chief.

\* \* \* \*

b. prepares or approves news releases

The preparation of news releases may be accomplished by a subordinate rather than the Program Officer himself, but he ordinarily carefully checks the work of others to insure that it conforms to the policies and restrictions established by AID/W or the mission, and that it will not offend host officials, the United States public or Congress.

The clearance of news releases may require consulting the higher mission officers, the Ambassador, the host government, or AID/W, and can be very time-consuming.

A subordinate wrote a news release which was not shown to me. I resented being bypassed although there were no adverse consequences. I think that bypassing me might have been accidental because there were several people involved who each may have thought that someone else had cleared the matter.

\* \* \* \*

- c. arranges and conducts press conferences, public ceremonies, etc.

The Program Officer may hold press conferences himself or arrange them for other members of the mission staff. He may also arrange various types of public ceremonies for publicity purposes. The major problem with this task, as with the whole publicity function, is the amount of time taken from major Program Office duties in attending to details and obtaining necessary approvals.

One problem concerning publicity is the United States Ambassador. When he is involved, he annoys me by checking and rechecking details. This creates more work for me because when the Ambassador is worrying, I must stop what I am doing and provide clarification.

\* \* \* \*

d. arrange for production of information and publicity materials

I decided that an illustrated pamphlet describing AID work in this country would be useful to inform the host nationals at all levels about AID and its efforts to help the country. I told a subordinate what I wanted and he produced a booklet which I reviewed for technical correctness, taste, appropriateness, etc. Then the booklet was given to USIS to reproduce and distribute. I plan to have this booklet updated periodically.

\* \* \* \*

(See also the relevant example in section I.D.)

\* \* \* \*

2. Coordinates efforts with USIS

While USIS is nominally responsible for assisting the mission with publicity, many missions cannot depend upon their support. In many cases requests for assistance or materials forwarded to USIS for publication are ignored, or answered with excuses explaining why no action can be taken on the mission's work at present. Some Program Officers report that it is easier in the long run to handle the work within the mission rather than to spar for a while with USIS and get no results.

USIS is supposed to handle AID publicity, and at one time they promised to assign one man, full-time, to AID work. However, once their staff was increased by the one man, they failed to allow him to work with AID. When asked about this, the USIS reply was that AID would benefit more by having a whole team of USIS specialists

available and each USIS person would work a small amount of time on AID work. Now, when I ask for USIS assistance, they don't refuse, but they just won't do what is asked. For example, I asked for a photographer, and the reply was that the photographer was sick. Or they don't appear at a function which they have been requested to cover. Or they might reply that there is no USIS money to allow participation in a certain activity. Rather than waste time and energy trying to get USIS to act, I assumed responsibility for publicity. I get involved with publicity "when the spirit moves me." Earlier I worked out a program for publicity, compiling a checklist of events that were to occur, e.g., a building completed, a school to be opened, a loan agreement signed, etc., and decided on a logical type of publicity to be used, i.e., a news story, a speech, etc. I assigned a subordinate the task of performing the details of this task. This subordinate at one time turned out three or four news stories per week which I reviewed. He sent them to the appropriate host government Ministry for approval, then the articles would be given to USIS to arrange for publication in the local newspapers.

\* \* \* \*

The USIS made a documentary film based on USCM contributions in this country. I knew nothing about it until it was in the final stages. I should have been in on the planning of the film.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Receives non-official visitors (as assigned)

Despite his heavy workload, the Program Officer in many missions is assigned the responsibility of receiving non-official visitors. These may be host nationals, United States citizens, or

third-country nationals who may drop into the mission at any time seeking information. The Program Officer presents briefings on USAID and the host country, as appropriate, or distributes publications explaining AID's policy and work in the host country. This task is difficult because these visitors may arrive without warning and the Program Officer has to drop his work and talk with them.

D. Accomplishes Other Management Activities

Most of the tasks described under this topic fall into the third category described in the introduction to this section. While the Program Officer generally takes some part in nearly all of them, whether he becomes deeply involved depends to a large extent upon the capabilities of other mission officers and the type of working relationships that exist among them. Broad problems affecting these tasks are the uncertainty of AID/W policy, the difficulty of keeping informed of activities within the mission, and the lack of time for attending to these matters.

1. Consults on organizational matters

a. advises on mission structure

As it is used here, the term mission structure refers to both formal organizational matters and informal operating practices. Regarding the former, the Program Officer may be consulted to assist in carrying out reorganizations either on a major level as directed by AID/W, or on a minor level in areas left to the Director's discretion. Considerations pertaining to the latter are usually necessitated by conflicts between staff members or between sections of the organization, or by the failure of someone to carry out his work effectively. In dealing with either type of situation, the Program Officer may take the initiative and present solutions he has developed to the Director and other staff members for evaluation, or he may become involved only as requested.

(from interviewer) The Program Officer explained that in view of the morale and personnel problems in the mission, he felt that the position of Personnel Officer should be filled again. Presently, a secretary is doing much of the work of a Personnel Officer but there is much more that should and must be done which requires a full-time Personnel Officer. The Program Officer had brought this up at a staff meeting, but the Director dismissed the idea saying that a decision was made several months ago to abolish the position and that the issue was closed. The Program Officer stated that the need was great and the issue was not closed with him. He had, therefore, invited the secretary to provide her opinions on the subject. When she arrived, they discussed the needs, advantages, and problems of having or not having a Personnel Officer. The secretary felt the needs were very great. When she left, the Program Officer explained that he was trying to get tangible evidence so that he could speak intelligently and in an informed manner the next time he brought up the problem. He felt this to be the only way to sway the Director's opinion on the matter.

\* \* \* \*

An earlier problem was the multitude of people giving advice to the Director. There was a question as to who had prime responsibility to render advice, the Chiefs of Technical Divisions, or me. Because of the confusion, the Director was considering a reorganization that would require a new high-level officer. I advised against this, using the reasoning that it would take a few months for any new person at this level to learn enough of the local situation to be effective, and that it would add another staff member, which, because of economy drives, was against AID policy. As an alternative, I suggested that I be given clear status over the Chiefs of the Technical Divisions. The Mission Director agreed to this,

and the system was effected. This has strengthened my role, erased the confusion, and has freed me from detail so that I may now concentrate on broad policy and thus be a more effective adviser to the Director.

\* \* \* \*

(from a Division Chief) Since the present Program Officer came, the Program Office has changed for the better. Before he came project agreements were made, drafted, and signed by the Program Office. We, the Technical Divisions, were then told to implement them. We had no say about feasibility, cost estimates, needs, etc. In addition, we often got mixed up in things that were no concern of ours, such as PL 480 projects. We found ourselves doing projects that we thought were unsound and unfeasible and in which we didn't believe. It created many problems for the Technical Divisions. A further result of this policy was that many government Ministers and financial organizations had built direct pipe lines to Washington. They could practically tell Washington what they wanted and the direction would come from AID/W. We would not have anything to say about it. All these requests should go to Washington, but through the mission first. The present Program Officer realized this and changed this policy. He knew it was causing problems for us. He sent Washington a strict telegram telling them that this procedure was making our positions (Technical Advisors) untenable. Now it is much better since he has given us our proper voice in matters concerning our technical fields of specialization.

\* \* \* \*

b. advises on staff behavior problems

From time to time, incidents occur as the result of unusual or disturbed behavior on the part of some mission staff member. Sometimes it is immediately obvious upon their arrival that they will

create problems. At other times, circumstances of their work or family situation put stresses on individuals with which they are unable to cope. In either case, they may act in ways that impede the fulfillment of their work or that threaten to damage the mission's standing in the eyes of the host government or private citizens. The Executive Officer generally acts as a counsellor to mission personnel and handles problems caused by behavioral difficulties. However, because in serious cases a career officer's future may be in the balance, it is not unusual for conferences to be called, including the Program Officer, to consider alternative courses of action to deal with these problems.

2. Provides advice and assistance in Executive Office functions

The Executive Officer manages the administrative services for the mission and provides many services affecting the living conditions for American personnel. The Program Officer may become involved in advising or assisting in these functions if he and the Executive Officer happen to find each other congenial working associates and consult each other informally about problems or decisions between alternative courses of action. The Program Officer may also become involved if the Executive Officer handles his work so inefficiently that many problems arise or requests for services go unanswered. He may step in on his own initiative or at the request of the Director. The areas dealt with may include morale problems, provision of project or personal services, coping with environmental difficulties, and so on. The chief problems encountered are the personal frictions which sometimes result between the Program Officer and the Executive Officer, and the imposition which these extra responsibilities make on the Program Officer's time.

I wrote a memorandum to the Director concerning a suggestion for a subordinate of the Executive Officer to do something, without clearing the memorandum with the subordinate or the Executive Officer. The subordinate was very angry. I did not see that it was necessary or desirable to clear the message with anyone.

\* \* \* \*

The Director asked me to prepare a report on mission housing. I asked the Executive Officer for the basic data, i.e., number of houses, their locations, houses to be leased, etc., and used the data to write my report to the Director.

\* \* \* \*

I have had considerable experience in setting up and managing filing systems, and was annoyed with the way the Communications and Records office was set up. I found the files set up to accommodate a file retirement system rather than a subject matter system oriented to users' needs. I also found classified and unclassified materials on the same subject filed separately in spite of the fact that there were no locals handling the files. I argued with the Communications and Records clerk about this and she got quite upset. I did not realize how sensitive she was, and have since used a much more friendly approach.

\* \* \* \*

The Executive Office should be more precise and organized. I had an argument with the Executive Officer yesterday because he called and told me he had to be informed about everyone coming here and their purpose before they arrived. He stated it was in the Mission orders, but I can't find anything like that. He says they have to be officially registered somehow. I think any USAID policy order like this should be drafted by the Executive Officer and circulated for our clearance. Then if there are any disagreements we can get together and straighten them out. This area is a definite irritant to me.

\* \* \* \*

At one of our review meetings, a Division Chief said that he would maintain his office in the host Ministry and therefore only use his office here for picking up his mail and dictating letters. The Program Office was very crowded so I asked the Division Chief whether he would mind if someone else were given the space he would not use and he said it would not matter to him. I immediately moved another Division Chief who was in our cramped offices into the unoccupied one because he wanted an office alone. I brought our other secretary into the Program Office so that the two secretaries could work together. Everyone was happy with this change, and I'm sure it increased everyone's efficiency and added to their morale.

\* \* \* \*

I am contracting officer for a certain project. As such I have to serve as an intermediary between the Executive Officer and the team chief because they don't get along. The Executive Officer should be the contracting officer but under these circumstances I have to be the officer. But if it has to be done this way, there is nothing to do because someone has to take care of it.

\* \* \* \*

The workload in the mission is not fairly distributed among the secretaries. This is a morale factor. Some girls are always overworked, others are usually not given anything to do. I asked the Executive Officer to help alleviate this situation once and he was all for my idea, which was for all secretaries with too much work to do to give their excess work to their supervisors, who in turn would give it to the Executive Officer. He would parcel it out to the secretaries who were not busy. In this way no resentment would be caused by secretaries giving work to other secretaries.

\* \* \* \*

I went to the Director in April and told him of the secretary problems. (This particular post is particularly hard on them for many reasons-- there is no social life for them, the climate makes it difficult for them, living conditions are not the best, there are not many recreational facilities available, etc.). I suggested that we have them all meet with him and ask them to discuss their problems openly. I thought this way they would get a lot of these things off their minds. Also under these circumstances, they could present their problems in a less emotional and more realistic manner than otherwise. The Director said it was a good idea and would do it, but he never did. I feel that if he did we would not have had all these requests for transfers now and their morale would be higher.

\* \* \* \*

### 3. Substitutes for other Administrative Officers

When other staff officers take leave or delays occur in the arrival of new incumbents, the Program Officer frequently assumes the role of Acting Deputy Director or Acting Director. He may occasionally substitute for other officers, but not usually. In order to perform the functions involved in these positions, the Program Officer must be familiar with the details of the job and with relevant policy and regulations. In circumstances where the regular incumbent is to return, the Program Officer has to be sufficiently familiar with that officer's working premises and procedures so that any decisions or arrangements he may be called upon to make will not disrupt normal operations. When he is filling in during a period of transition between two incumbents, he may have to be very cautious to avoid committing the mission to agreements which conceivably will not be acceptable to the new incumbent.

4. Receives visitors as assigned

- a. gives briefings
- b. schedules meetings and trips

In addition to receiving unofficial visitors, discussed above in section C 3, the Program Officer may also be responsible for receiving official visitors. They may include high AID or other government officials, non-government people traveling with AID's approval for special purposes, or high-ranking non-government host nationals. The Program Officer may be called upon to prepare and give briefings about specific projects or the total mission program, to arrange meetings with appropriate mission technicians, host nationals, or other persons, and to plan appropriate field trips. AID/W, or occasionally other missions, create problems in accomplishing this task when they either do not give sufficient advance notice of a visitor's arrival or do not give adequate information about his purpose in visiting the mission. Since traveling and communications in many underdeveloped nations are slow, the Program Officer may not be able to make the best arrangements to fill the visitor's purposes without adequate advance information. This task is viewed by many Program Officers as a problem because the "constant stream of visitors" disrupts their routine work.

A private United States professional organization had proposed sending some of its members to donate their services to the host government. Two representatives of the organization visited to learn how their colleagues could best contribute to the host development program. I was assigned the task of caring for them. When I first learned of the assignment, I cabled AID/W and asked to be informed of the visitors' arrival in sufficient time to plan a schedule for them. Nevertheless, they arrived one day without

AID/W warning. I solved the problem by introducing them to a staff member of another United States agency who has local contacts and experience in their special field. He was a logical person to help these visitors. My substantive involvement was slight, but my time was consumed in reading and answering cables, contacting the other United States agency, and making introductions. Also, the task was not one which could be evaded, because if I had left them to shift for themselves, they would have gone back to AID/W and complained of the poor treatment given them by the mission.

\* \* \* \*

5. Answers special information requests as required

Occasionally special requests for information of various types are received by the mission. The Program Officer may be called upon to write or edit answers to these requests. The problems of unclear instructions, of editing and revising other people's work, and of obtaining appropriate information discussed in preceding sections would also apply to this task.

Special reports, e.g., a request from Congress for reports on help to religious institutions, take precedence over routine reports. No solution is available.

\* \* \* \*

6. Socializes with other U.S. agencies, other donor agencies, the diplomatic community

The extent to which the Program Officer is formally required to attend social activities appears to vary from mission to mission. However, in most missions there will be some requirements of this type. Some Program Officers entertain or attend parties, dinners, etc., beyond those required. They view such activities as efforts to establish rapport

with non-mission personnel who can assist them by providing information or by arranging coordinated project plans.

I have a friend who is with a multi-lateral delegation here. He informed me that some people from the International Bank were coming to town. I knew that they would want to learn the details of the host government's financial situation -- something that we also want to know more about. I asked my friend to invite them to dinner at my home on the night of their arrival. When they came he did invite them and they readily accepted. Since I speak fluent \_\_\_\_\_ there was no communication problem. After dinner we sat and talked about the host country. It was a very rewarding evening because the conversation naturally swung to their job here and what they were trying to learn. We traded information and I got some new and valuable information about the country's financial situation. When they complete their study here, I will try to have them over again and perhaps I can learn something about their findings.

\* \* \* \*

(See also the relevant examples in section IA1.)

## V. MAINTAINS WORKING RELATIONS WITH HOST PERSONNEL

Specific types of interactions with host officials have been mentioned in preceding sections as they influence the accomplishment of various functions, e.g., negotiating, obtaining information, and so on. Here, the discussion concerns interacting with host officials as a goal in itself, because so many other aspects of successful work depend upon cordial relationships and the free flow of information and opinions between the mission and the host government. In other words, it appears that other functions can be more effectively performed if a groundwork of pleasant working relations has been developed.

### A. Develops "Good" Relations with Host Officials

The specific definitions of "good" relations vary considerably from one country to another. In general, host definitions of appropriate relations with their American counterparts tend toward a greater degree of formality than is usual in the United States. Therefore, an important part of this function consists of understanding and conforming to these definitions. Reportedly, another important aspect is determining with whom, among host government officials, it is expedient to develop "good" relations. The power structures of the host government and the interrelationships of various significant persons within it can be difficult to discern in countries where titles are proliferated or elected or appointed officials serve as ceremonial leaders while real decisions are made by less obvious government personnel. Such considerations are necessary for various reasons, e.g., to avoid becoming a pawn in an internal power struggle; and to avoid offending a person with the power to assist or block AID's efforts.

1. Adapts to local usage in negotiations

The officials of many countries may expect AID personnel to conform to local usage in conducting negotiations, or at least they appear to react more positively to those who do so. This may mean that the Program Officer has to accept a certain amount of seemingly time-wasting formality or trivial conversation before reaching the point under discussion. He may also have to adjust to very subtle and indirect use of language, dictated by host concepts of politeness.

The hosts will not ask questions if they don't understand something which I have presented to them. If I suspect a lack of comprehension on their part, I repeat what I said later in the conversation in different and simple terms. I have also adopted a policy of forthrightly asking for clarification from them when I don't understand something which they are trying to tell me, thus trying in this way to let them know that it is acceptable to ask questions in their dealings with me.

\* \* \* \*

2. Cultivates friendships with hosts

Few Program Officers report success in making friends with host officials and most admit that they give up after a few attempts. Many report that local nationals, in general, are "cold," "aloof," or "indifferent" to overtures of friendship. Since the concepts of friendship tend to vary among different cultures, it would appear that an important aspect of this task is learning what reactions to expect from the host officials. With this knowledge Program Officers might find that they had accomplished more than they realized, and be less discouraged about the matter.

In at least one mission, higher officers refused to recognize the necessity for the Program Officer to associate with host officials, and obstructed his efforts to meet appropriate people. In other missions, the departure of a predecessor before the arrival of a new incumbent may mean that introductions to helpful contacts become difficult to arrange.

Another difficulty sometimes arises in countries where the official government policy discourages host personnel from developing close contacts with foreign-government representatives.

Of course, some Program Officers are simply disinclined to be friendly with the hosts and make little or no effort to establish friendships.

I find some lower-level government sources more candid and revealing than upper-level types who are more cagey, e.g., a third-country had offered a loan to start a project. The Mission Director and I tried to learn from the Minister and another official how much money was involved and what the terms were. They were reluctant to say, but a subordinate, who is a good friend of mine, gave me the hard figures. These were confirmed later at a confrontation with the Minister.

\* \* \* \*

3. Uses appropriate means for handling project rejections or curtailment

This refers to the necessity to provide host officials with an opportunity to "save face." For example, it may be useful to develop a technique of saying no indirectly and subtly, or to provide informal advance notification of rejection or curtailment of projects before formal procedures are followed. Some Program Officers have found it helpful to phrase discussions in terms which provide the host officials with ready-made explanations to their superiors or colleagues.

I was at a luncheon with a host government official who had just come from a meeting in which a major new project had been proposed. The host government official mentioned it to me, asking if AID would be willing to provide aid for such a project. I knew that other projects were more necessary, but I didn't want to be unresponsive. Therefore, I replied that AID might be interested, but that many details would be necessary, including need for the project. This type of response was better than saying "no," and tends to smoke out bad features, i.e., once the local national learns that it is hard to justify another project of this type in view of other needs, he will simply not submit details to AID. Ninety-nine per cent (99%) of project "turn downs" are at the informal stage, such as this one, so no ill-will is created, but it is necessary to be tactful.

\* \* \* \*

4. Makes speeches to host groups

This task may range from saying a few words of greeting to spelling out in detail the position of the mission, a proposal for a project, or other kinds of information. The Program Officer may make speeches himself or be called upon to prepare them for other mission personnel. In either case it is advantageous to be aware of and employ, as appropriate, the customary phrases and techniques of the host country.

B. Represents Mission at Social Events

1. Attends luncheons, parties, etc.

The extent to which the Program Officer may be obligated to attend mission functions varies from mission to mission, partly as a result of mission size and partly as a result of his relationship with the Director. Ordinarily there are certain formal occasions when he is required to attend social events, and he may also be required to

assist in making arrangements for them. This entry also includes instances of arranging and attending informal luncheons, or parties.

An Embassy Officer and I were at a luncheon with a group of host government officials. All conversation was in the host language. This wears you down after about an hour but we were doing all right. Then toward time for dessert, an important subject came up. It created a near riot of interest. The hosts talked more rapidly as the conversation progressed. We couldn't keep up. Thus we missed a good opportunity to learn what these people were really thinking on this matter.

\* \* \* \*

2. Entertains host officials at home -- as appropriate

In some missions it is agreed that the Director will entertain top host government officials and the Program Officer will entertain those in positions comparable to his own. In other missions there may be no definite requirement for the Program Officer to fulfill this function and some do not take it upon themselves to do so. Others may feel that it is an important aspect of their jobs. At times it may be unrewarding because host personnel will accept invitations to parties or dinners and then fail to appear.

3. Attends or participates in ceremonies

Ceremonies of various types are frequently held to mark the beginning or significant accomplishments of a project. The Program Officer may be involved in arranging for these ceremonies and occasionally is required to attend.

C. Provides Information, Advice and Assistance to Host Officials

This entry pertains to a wide variety of situations in which the Program Officer may be of assistance to host officials regarding matters that are not connected with specific AID projects. It includes both instances where the host may request specific information, and where the Program Officer may volunteer information or advice he thinks may be useful. However, it appears that Program Officers do not provide such advice frequently.

1. Provides information on AID policy and procedure

This refers to keeping communication channels open to host officials and giving them an opportunity to learn informally of changes in policy or procedures which will have an effect upon their dealings with the mission. The task includes the range of activities from a casual chat to a formal conference.

In some cases it may be difficult to communicate to host officials that, while AID wants to help in their development efforts, it is not simply going to do whatever they ask, and that there may be some broader considerations reflected in rejecting some of their proposals.

Explaining AID's policy to the host country may be a problem in itself when that policy is ambiguously defined, or in transition. Under these circumstances, the Program Officer may be able to make only vague statements to avoid having to explain conflicting policy at some later date.

Another problem is that I must be continuously alert to host government criticism and misunderstandings. For example, in a speech a Minister discussed the high cost of United States technicians and alluded to monetary

figures which were incorrect. When I learned this, I prepared a paper, describing realistic figures, supported by details of costs that tend to raise the total price, e.g., international travel and the high degree of professional experience of the American technicians. I submitted the paper to the Mission Director, who in turn discussed the topic, based on my presentation, with the Minister at a luncheon.

\* \* \* \*

AID/W informed the mission, via cable, what AID policy would be about financing a major joint host-AID project. I was responsible for action on the AID/W message. I attempted to discuss the matter with the Director, but failed because he was not available. I discussed the issue with the Embassy Economic Officer, his subordinate in charge of capital projects, and the Deputy Mission Director. After collecting their views, I visited officials of the host Ministry explaining the United States position, but without mentioning the maximum United States commitment. At this meeting the project was discussed at length, and I encouraged the official to solicit other aid. I even provided advice about what kinds of data to have available for other potential donors (cost in detail, materials, time scheduling, use after completion, etc.) Upon returning to my own office, I wrote a memorandum of the conversation to send to the Mission Director and sent a cable to AID/W to report what had transpired.

\* \* \* \*

## 2. Advices host government on their operations

In most aid-receiving nations, the government procedures and practices warrant improvement. The Program Officer may volunteer advice or be asked for it. It may range from dropping a hint to spelling out systems for solving organizational or procedural problems.

One problem is that the host government ministries do not have competent personnel, thus their planning is slow and frequently inadequate. All Ministries are feebly staffed, but the two most important for economic development seem to be the worst of all. I have tried hinting to various people, e.g., at a dinner party I expressed concern over weak staffs to a high host official, but so far I have achieved no results.

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One problem is that host government officials are not informed on events in their own country. They do not have the necessary staff, and because of work being dispersed around the country, their coordination and news exchange is poor. AID, on the other hand, knows what is going on all over the country in specialized fields. At a party I learned that the government was planning to sponsor some work in an area where AID was active. The government was probably aware that some work was being done, but they were probably not aware of specific work efforts. Therefore, I wrote a letter to a host national official in the appropriate Ministry explaining precisely what was being done.

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The host wanted some equipment. Three firms sent in bids. The host would ignore low bids and order some of each kind of item. The concept of minimizing cost did not enter into decisions. I pushed the idea of the advantage of standardization and of taking low bids. As bidders realized that the game had changed, all the bids became lower.

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### 3. Assists hosts in dealing with other donors

Host governments frequently do not avail themselves of assistance from other donors because they lack information on what help is available or how to apply for it. The Program Officer may advise host officials on which organizations to approach and the kinds of information to append to applications to facilitate their being approved.

The host government recently announced that they were applying for membership in the International Monetary Fund. I know that many people who should, don't know much about IMF. The same is true of people within the mission. I remember having a lecture on IMF during a course at a university before I came out. Tonight I'll pull it out and bring it tomorrow, have it reproduced and sent to the appropriate host officials and to all the officers in the mission.

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### D. Uses Conduct Appropriate to Position

As an officer in an agency of the United States Government stationed in another country, the Program Officer must maintain conduct appropriate to his position. It includes both working and non-working situations and extends to the guidance of his family in fulfilling their obligations as representatives of the United States.

I think it is very undesirable for a Program Officer or any American in the mission to dress in such a way as to present a poor appearance of United States personnel, i.e., during non-working hours such as weekends, evenings, etc. Whenever I go to town I always wear coat and tie. I do so any time I leave the house because I think it is expected of Americans to dress well at all times. I feel that, abroad, it is expected that

Americans are always well-dressed. I learned this in my first overseas post. The general American tendency is to get into awful clothes when the working day is over. I don't think this is a good policy for Americans to follow. I am convinced that people who already know you won't think any less of you because of your dress, but those who don't will think less of you.

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