

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523 BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET	FOR AID USE ONLY
---	-------------------------

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY Social Science
	B. SECONDARY Development Planning

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

The political economy of peasant family farming: some anthropological perspectives on rationality and adaptation

3. AUTHOR(S)

Greenwood, D.J.

4. DOCUMENT DATE 1973	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 100 p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC
--------------------------	------------------------------	----------------------

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS

Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies
 Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (*Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability*)

(In Rural development occasional paper no. 2)

9. ABSTRACT

An examination of peasant family farming groups in the context of super-ordinate community and national organizations. First, some major approaches to the study of peasant family farming are sketched and certain aspects of that literature are coordinated. Then in Part II peasant family farming is analyzed, beginning with the peasant domestic groups and tracing their interactions with the community and the state. Peasant family farming is viewed from the perspective of peasant family farming and the state and community's interactions with the farmer render understanding impossible (sic). Finally, to understand peasant family farming, ecological, economic, social, and political dimensions are studied and assessed, showing also how they interact.

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAC-185	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS	13. PROJECT NUMBER
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER AID/asia-C-1102
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT

**The Political Economy
of Peasant Family Farming:
Some Anthropological Perspectives on
Rationality and Adaptation**

Davydd J. Greenwood

Department of Anthropology
Cornell University

RURAL DEVELOPMENT OCCASIONAL PAPER NO. 2

Published by the Rural Development Committee
Center for International Studies
Cornell University, 1973

Copyright 1973, Cornell University, Center for International
Studies, Rural Development Committee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION	1
	A. Aims and Caveats	1
	B. Past Approaches to the Study of Peasants	7
	1. Anthropology	7
	2. Development Theory	11
	3. Social and Economic History	15
II.	TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEASANT FAMILY FARMING	19
	A. The Contributions of Different Fields	20
	1. Economic Anthropology	20
	2. Human Ecology	27
	3. Political Economy	29
	4. Social and Economic History	31
	B. The Peasant-State as an Analytical Framework	33
	C. Understanding Peasant Behavior in the Peasant-State Context	44
III.	IMPLICATIONS OF THE PEASANT-STATE ANALYSIS	49
	A. Issues in Rural Development and Research	49
	1. Ecology	50
	2. Economics	55
	3. Politics	65
	B. Issues in the Study of Peasantries	73
	1. The Theory of Peasant Societies	74
	2. The Theory of Peasant Development	80
	REFERENCES	

INTRODUCTION¹

A. Aims and Caveats

Over the forty years since anthropologists began the study of peasants, they have repeatedly attempted to formulate a general view of peasant society (Redfield 1960, Geertz 1961, Halpern and Brode 1967, Wolf 1966, Potter, Diaz and Foster 1967).² These views contribute, though often only implicitly, to the Western philosophical tradition which sharply contrasts urban and rural life (Caro Baroja 1963, Benet 1963). This writing consistently employs dualisms: little communities and the big city, folk culture and civilization, traditionalism and modernity, gemeinschaft and gesellschaft.

Despite their attractiveness, these dualisms leave dissatisfaction among many students of peasant society. Too general to be useful, they mask the influence of differing ecologies, population densities, technologies, social and economic organizations, and superordinate political systems. These differences, however, are key elements in understanding any particular peasant society. Individual case studies of peasant societies on the other hand, with no theoretical pretensions, are so particularistic that they lead away from synthesis and conclusions. They provide a wealth of data not easily related to general understanding of peasantry as a social type.

Anthropologists' involvement in the study of contemporary peasants is no longer unique to them. Political scientists, agronomists, agricultural economists, agricultural engineers, plant geneticists, soil scientists, communications specialists, rural sociologists, extension experts, planners and development administrators have in various times and places become involved with peasants and many have become preoccupied with peasant behavior and beliefs. They too face unresolved conceptual problems of concept. The relationship between peasant economy and social organization, rates of innovation and acceptance of new technologies, the viability of peasant ecosystems, the role of village elites in development, and the different relations between peasants and their governments are only partially understood.

The development experience since 1945 has itself raised very bothersome questions. The difficulties in articulating community-oriented development efforts with national planning and the widespread failures of government programs to ameliorate much the conditions under which peasants live are now fully evident. To be sure, other fashionable approaches in development theory have also brought their disappointments. Land reform is either stalemated in the bureaucracy or resisted by elites; capital formation strategies seem to benefit only the wealthy; the technology of the Green Revolution generally fails to better the lot of the small farmer (Frankel 1971, Epstein 1973). There is a wide belief that the small farmer is worse off now than ten years ago. Thus

approaches that do not increase the maldistribution of wealth are hard to find; even revolutions have not necessarily brought relief to the peasantry. With all these approaches we end up having to take a hard look at the structure and dynamics of the local community and it's relations to the state to see where development efforts are short-circuited or bogged down.

This situation may parallel that found during the Industrial Revolution when improvements in productive technology and increases in the wealth produced were accompanied by unprecedented deprivation and social dislocation of the masses (Polanyi 1944). During the Industrial Revolution the paradox of simultaneous increases in wealth and poverty called forth the theories of political economy to account for this apparent contradiction. I believe we are in a parallel situation now in regard to developing nations: increasing industrialization along with ever more impoverished peasants. An improved conceptualization of the political economy of states with large peasantries (peasant-states, I will call them) may help us understand this and to fashion more appropriate development measures.

To assert that this essay presents entirely new ideas would be wrong. Rather it suggests some new ways of looking at known materials. My aim is to provide a frame of reference useful in the analysis of peasant family farming at the farm, community, and national levels. The approach is intended to be general enough to permit analysis of the political economy of peasant family farming as a broad social type and yet specific enough to raise

questions of direct relevance to individual case studies. This balance of generality and specificity is crucial to the understanding of peasants given the commonality of their structural position within economy, society and polity under varying ecological, cultural, technological and other conditions. I call this a frame of reference intentionally, since I am not proposing a model in the strict sense of bounded and interrelated variables capable of generating testable hypotheses. The literature and my work so far do not yet permit this, but the elaboration of a frame of reference hopefully moves us in this direction. The reader is invited to examine the framework in terms of the problems it addresses and to consider the cogency of the implications drawn from it.

Several assumptions inform my treatment of peasant family farming. (1) The complexity of human behavior must be reflected in our framework. Unidimensional renderings of peasant behavior as traditional or conservative as contrasted to modern or progressive are quite unacceptable. (2) Any adequate analysis must view peasant family farming and its surrounding community and state both as a system of structured social relations and as a field of elements open to manipulation by individuals. We must analyze the system as a system but also must see it from the point of view of the actors within it. Ultimately these must be combined in a single view of peasant family farming in the context of national states. (3) Peasant family farming is unintelligible outside of its proper historical context. Ignorance of the history

of peasant family farming and the state and community's interactions with the farmer render understanding impossible. (4) Finally, to understand peasant family farming, ecological, economic, social and political dimensions must be viewed and assessed, showing also how they interact.

This project omits a number of important dimensions of the subject, and these should be taken note of at the outset. I am aware of, but unprepared to deal with the literature on the demography of peasant society. This complex field of inquiry centers around the writings of Boserup (1965), Laslett (1965), Wrigley (1966) and recently Spooner (1972). Ultimately it must be incorporated into our view of peasants.

I also omit consideration of peasant culture, defined as systems of meaning found in peasant societies. This is important, as shown by writings on the Great and Little Traditions of India (Marriot 1955, Singer 1958). Certainly peasants are not isolated tillers of the soil but are recipients from, and contributors to large and elaborate cultural systems. The degree to which the Basque peasant feels "Spanish" and the Mysore peasant feels "Indian" is greater than often recognized by social theorists and change agents. While involvement in national culture has significant consequences for peasant behavior, I find the literature extremely refractory and leave the much-needed synthesis for someone else.

Finally I do not devote much attention to peasant marketing, concentrating instead on the peasant family farm more as a production unit. Peasant marketing has begun to receive systematic

treatment from a variety of perspectives, and by comparison to what is known about production, the literature on marketing is rich. Useful examples are Mintz (1959), Dewey (1962), Nash (1961), Cook (1970) and Forman and Riegelhaupt (1970).

To restate the concern of this essay, I am not dealing with peasant society as an undifferentiated whole, but with a particular kind of peasant society, namely peasant family farming groups, in the context of superordinate community and national organizations. Peasant family farming emerges as a social type where (1) agriculture is practiced within domestic groups, with minimal involvement of outside labor, (2) where subsistence is supplied by the domestic group's own production or by the local community, and (3) where some part of the family's product is appropriated by the local community and by the state for their activities. This definition eliminates cultivators who provide their own subsistence but do not surrender their surplus to a non-local and non-agricultural population, and it specifically eliminates consideration of rural proletarians in latifundio-type or large-scale irrigated agricultural systems. Shepherding, rural collectives and fully-commercialized farming are also omitted.

The plan of this paper is to sketch first some major approaches to the study of peasant family farming and to bring certain aspects of that literature together. Then in Part II, peasant family farming will be analyzed, beginning with the peasant domestic groups and tracing their interactions with the community and the state. We will look at peasant family farming from the perspective

of community organization, the community being viewed first as a collection of peasant domestic groups and then as a small, constituent unit within the larger context of the state. Then we will look from the top down, seeing how the state interacts with local communities and with peasant domestic groups in pursuit of support for its national and international activities. The latter part of this monograph (Part III) considers various implications of this view of peasant family farming which are relevant to theorists and practitioners of rural development.

B. Past Approaches to the Study of Peasants

1. Anthropology

Anthropological concern with the study of peasant society dates from the 1930's, although a precursor or two can be found before then. For useful discussions of the anthropological literature and extensive bibliographies, Geertz (1961) and Halpern and Brode (1967) are excellent. The early anthropological interest in peasants centered on the studies and theories of Robert Redfield (1930, 1934, 1941, 1960). He still exercises considerable influence on peasant studies both because his books continue to be read and because he influenced the thinking of Oscar Lewis (1951, 1964) and George Foster (1948, 1953, 1965), who have been leading figures in this field.

The most important aspect of Redfield's approach is his view of peasant society as a cultural type, to be contrasted with tribal society. While he did discuss life in the city and compared

it with the "folk culture" of the peasants, he was writing to an anthropological audience then heavily involved in the study of primitive societies. Thus he tried to show how peasants differ from tribal peoples. Now, to be sure, we tend to contrast peasants with industrial farmers or with laborers in the city and not with tribal peoples.

Redfield's peasants formed a cultural unit within a national cultural tradition, but socially they were rather isolated. He took the boundaries of the local community as the limits of his social analysis, except where elements of culture were involved. He would examine the social stratification in these communities but not the articulation of these communities with the state political system, or how that system influenced their stratification. His concern lay with the moral unity of the community, with its solidarity. This led him to stress the high degree of overlap of common cultural ideas within peasant communities and to play down social conflict (Lewis 1951, Goldkind 1965).

His approach was ahistorical, expressing in a pure form the Western notion that social dynamism emanates from cities. For him the countryside was either changeless or changeful only in ways not transcendently significant. The economic activity of peasants was viewed in this light, casting peasant society in the mold of economic traditionalism. In economics as in all else, the community was the dominant influence in peasant life. The community and its moral unity were seen as the basis for all activities. The state was nowhere to be seen.

It has been argued that Redfield ignored social stratification and community conflict, giving a romanticized picture of peasant life (Lewis 1951, Goldkind 1965). Certainly Redfield is within the tradition of Western thought that attributes a comprehensive moral tone to the rustic life. Still, I think his lack of attention to social structure and power relations is a sin of omission rather than of commission.

There are many omissions. From Redfield one cannot get a clear picture of peasant ecology, economic organization and productivity, social structure and stratification, or manipulation of power in the community or state. But to blame for others' attraction to the idea of peasant traditionalism, changelessness, rusticity, and economic irrationality is ridiculous. This mode of thought began before Plato and has persisted after Redfield (Caro Baroja 1963). Other approaches to the study of peasants contemporary with Redfield's never attained his broad popularity. I would call attention briefly to the work of Julian Steward, Raymond Firth, and Julian Pitt-Rivers. Because A.V. Chayanov was not easily available in English until 1966, I will discuss his contributions later.

Steward developed, as part of a multilinear model of cultural evolution, a materialist view of peasantry based on a combined study of cultural ecology, demography and social organization. The results can be examined in his collected essays, The Theory of Culture Change (1955). He did not focus specifically on peasants but instead concentrated on identifying levels of socio-

cultural evolution and the similarity of evolutionary sequences in different areas of the world. Steward's ideas did not receive the attention they merited, partly because of anthropologists' preference for "idealist" theories (this argument is advanced by Harris, 1968). The broader cause was anthropology's overt rejection of all evolutionary approaches to the study of culture, in response to the excesses of the unilinear form of evolutionary thinking during the 19th century (Stocking 1968).³ From the start of the present century there was a generalized rejection of such approaches in all branches of cultural anthropology. Ironically, such a unilinear evolutionary model subsisted even in Redfield's work. Peasants were an intermediate stage between primitive and modern society to be drawn into the Industrial Revolution by the dynamism of the city. But acceptance of these covert evolutionist ideas did not lend to acceptance of Steward's more explicit approach

Raymond Firth, perhaps one of the most perceptive writers on peasants, provided an economic definition of peasant society and applied it to the analysis of a Malay fishing economy (Firth [1944], 1966). This remarkable work stood for years as the single major study of peasant economics, but it failed to stimulate much research. Partly his unconventional inclusion of fishermen under the rubric of peasants is to blame, but the failure is perhaps largely rooted in a generalized conviction that peasant economics were not terribly significant. Whatever the reason, the work did not gain popularity until much later.

Finally, in 1954, Julian Pitt-Rivers published an unusual peasant study called People of the Sierra. This book dealt with the inherent conflict between the claims of the community and the claims of the state in a Spanish town. For years it stood alone as an analysis of the peasant-state relationship. But again, as in Firth's case, it failed to create a school of similar scholarship. As we see, peasant studies have emerged slowly.

2. Development Theory

None of these anthropological approaches dealt with the problem of underdevelopment, although Redfield's work was relevant to some of the leading literature on development published in the last two decades. These writings held that underdevelopment is largely a cultural problem. Peasant society was seen inherently static by certain social scientists because of its "traditional," non-achievement oriented culture. Peasants do not adopt new practices either because they cannot see their own economic self-interest in these or are penalized by the community for pursuing it. The difference between underdeveloped societies and developed ones was deemed to arise from the difference between a traditional and modern cultural orientation.

The corresponding prescription for economic development is one emphasizing the need to uproot tradition, whether by breaking the sanctioning power of the community, by educating the people to their new-found economic self-interest, by introducing demonstration effects or aspiration effects, or even by instilling the

"need for achievement." Why? Peasants are poor because they do not "think" like industrial people do. One could multiply references endlessly in a bibliography covering an unbroken series of works over the last 20 years. Some well-known examples are McClelland (1961), Hoselitz (1960) and Banfield (1958).

To attribute this line of thought to Redfield would be to overestimate anthropology's role in the recent history of social thought. Redfield's view is consistent with this orientation and thus did nothing to dissuade people from accepting it. Both Redfield and the development theorists in this group share a view of peasants as traditionalists. They express a similar view of history, in which the city and industrial technology are the dynamic forces in social evolution. Yet Redfield did not try to draw such implications from his approach for development theory.

Criticism of this theory has been mounting and comes from many sides. The Marxist critique has been the most trenchant. Widely articulated, it is most eloquently expressed in Andre Gunder Frank's "Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology" (1967). He specifically criticizes a range of development theories including those described above. He argues that by focusing on a cultural basis of underdevelopment, these theories ignore the exploitation and oppression found in underdeveloped societies. Frank argues further that if peasants are conservative and traditional, it is because they are subject to such exploitation that their only rational behavior is to attempt to protect themselves from outsiders by closing their community to

outside interference. Figuratively speaking, the peasant may be lying on his back not because he is lazy but someone has a foot planted on his throat. Cultural theories of underdevelopment tend to ignore or minimize the maldistribution of power and wealth and to concentrate on making peasants progressive by changing the way they think. They do not challenge the existing power structure and thus are conveniently non-threatening to all governments (see Uphoff and Ilchman, 1972, on "intellectual neo-colonialism" for a non-Marxist analysis on this subject).

Another aspect of the Marxist critique, which can be traced to Marx, is the international dimension of underdevelopment. The argument is that existing underdevelopment is a result of the despoilment of Third World natural and human resources by industrialized-capitalist countries (Gunder Frank 1967, Baran 1957). Thus underdevelopment is a product of capitalism and not of any inherent backwardness of the people of the Third World. These views, and their interpretation of recent history, have been gaining ground and are being fleshed out empirically in studies such as Gunder Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (1969) and Celso Furtado's Obstacles to Development in Latin America (1970).

Whether one accepts in toto this interpretation with its implications for future revolution or not, it has made a significant contributions to our thinking. By arguing that peasants are oppressed rather than basically backwards, it becomes possible that their behaviors, described as tradition-bound or retrograde,

are in fact realistic adaptations to the harsh conditions of exploitation and poverty. In this view, peasants are not different kinds of human beings from the rest of us, but rather are human beings operating under extremely difficult circumstances.

This view corresponds with the common anthropological premise that all men are basically similar and that perceived differences among them stem from vastly different social and cultural environments. This is the essence of "cultural relativism" and is the pillar upon which modern anthropology was built. The burden for understanding why human beings behave so differently under the conditions of peasant societies rests squarely on the observer.

To assert that the peasant is a rational man is to argue that he attempts to maximize his gains and minimize his losses just as men in industrial societies are supposed to, recognizing that their respective estimation of what is a gain and what is a loss may differ. The ecological, economic, social and political constraints under which the peasant operates make his behavior characteristically different from that of other men in other kinds of societies, over and above what may well be less significant differences in values. Explanations of peasant behavior in terms of traditionalism or backwardness which rests essentially on values are non sequiturs. One should instead characterize peasant behavior in a way that one can see whether or not it represents a reasonable response to the conditions under which peasants must operate.

This is the emergent trend in the anthropological literature on peasants and one which I fully support. To argue that a man is irrational because he defines his self-interest in an unfamiliar way is blatant ethnocentrism. Once the emerging view of the peasant as a rational is accepted, it opens up new lines of investigation. The student of development must attempt to examine with precision the ecological, economic, social and political constraints under which peasants live, work and choose. Peasants' behavior must be judged relative to these conditions. In Part II, we examine some of the constraints on peasant behavior and the situations in which peasants make decisions.

3. Social and Economic History

Another trend in the peasant literature has developed independently of anthropological and developmental concerns. This view abandons the notion that the city is the only dynamic, historical part of nation-states and asserts that peasants have a significant history of their own. Accordingly, to ignore peasant history is to make much of the behavior of peasants unintelligible or subject to gross misinterpretation.

Though one can find proponents of this historical view already in the 19th century, Marc Bloch (1965, 1966) and the school of French social history following from his work have given it substance. Other proponents of such views more closely related to anthropology are Julio Caro Baroja (1959, 1963, 1969) and Lawrence Wylie (1964, 1966). Finally, the Cambridge Group for the History

of Population and Social Structure, associated with the names of Peter Laslett (1965) and E.A. Wrigley (1966), has carried this approach into a concerted plan of historical research rapidly winning acclaim from historians, sociologists, and anthropologists.

The most important consequence of this view is to complicate our notion of peasant society by emphasizing the time dimension. If each group of peasants, each peasant community, and each nation-state has a significant history formed partly through interactions with other states and partly through internal dynamics, then an understanding of peasants must be based on research into their history and the history of their relationships to the rest of society.

To this must be added the works of two scholars, an agricultural economist and a geographer, separated in time but closely related in theoretical orientation. The first is the famous Russian agricultural economist, A.V. Chayanov. His Theory of Peasant Economy, based on his research and writings in the early decades of this century but not available in English until 1966, is perhaps the most impressive political economy synthesis of peasant family farming ever done. The implications of his view are only now being incorporated into our understanding of peasants and a great deal more needs to be done with his ideas.

In developing an empirically-grounded theory of peasant economy, he proposed it as a particular type of socio-economic system, different from feudal, capitalist and socialist systems.

He held that peasants were rational actors, explaining their behavior in terms of the peasant's dual roles as a family head and as an entrepreneur and in terms of his notion of the drudgery as labor. He generated hypotheses and tested them with the monumental zemstvo statistics collected on the Russian peasantry, elaborating perhaps the most sophisticated analysis yet of peasant economic behavior and its consequences for the state.

The second is S.H. Franklin who applies Chayanov's view to an analysis of the last stages of peasant economy in contemporary Europe. While the case studies are not as detailed as those Chayanov uses, Franklin (1969) succeeds in setting forth the utility of Chayanov's perspective. For a fascinating application of Chayanov, also see Sahlins Stone Age Economics (1972).

Finally there is the approach set forth by Eric Wolf in his book Peasants (1966). Though flawed by excessive resort to typology which tends to obscure its sophistication, this brief book enunciates a view of peasants that represents a major step forward. Wolf defines peasants as:

"...rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn." (Wolf 1966: 3-4)

He thus stresses that peasants must be understood in terms of the relations between themselves and the national political systems of which they are a part. Though this relationship is complex, containing economic, social, political and cultural

elements, it is characterized by a constant competition over resources and services. When the state is strong, peasants are systematically taxed and are integrated into the national system. When the state is weak, they retain a higher degree of autonomy and a greater share of their produce. The peasantry cycles back and forth between the poles of autonomy and integration, according to the vagaries of nation-state political fortunes and local economic conditions.

This view emphasizes that peasant activities take place within a larger arena and asserts that the vicissitudes of the peasant-state relationship over time are as important as the character of that relationship at any one time. He makes comparative analysis possible by contrasting the different ways and degrees of state impingement upon the peasantry and by detailing the various strategies used by peasants and governments to control and allocate the results of the peasants' productive activities. Parts of this view have been taken up by Forman and Riegelhaupt (1970) and it should gain wide acceptance. At the end of Part II, I will elaborate on this view as part of my frame of reference.

These are some of the major views current in the literature on peasants. Most authors in the field take one of these positions or combine several to form an electric model of peasants. Over time there has been a tendency to view peasant farming as more complex and differentiated than previously thought, to study peas-

ants in their specific economic and political contexts, and to attribute more importance to the history of peasants' involvement with the state. I regard these trends as quite constructive.

As yet these views lack the sophistication and integration required for a satisfactory theory of peasant family farming. We have discovered the immense variety of ecological, demographic, technological, economic, social, political and historical circumstances characteristic of different peasantries. Building all these dimensions into a specific case study unfortunately seems to negate the possibility of comparing that case with any other, thus frustrating attempts at meaningful generalization. The result is a split-level literature. On the one hand, there are very general and vague models of peasant society and, on the other, myriad case studies. In between yawns a considerable gap.

The desire both to generalize and yet not sacrifice the detailed understanding of individual cases is a dilemma common to all social science endeavors. We can move tentatively toward that goal by integrating a few of the trends in the literature and by adding to these the specific results of recent work in the fields of economic anthropology and ecology. This has been a long introduction but it brings us to the point of offering a synthetic framework for understanding the role and development of peasants in a broader context.

II. TOWARDS A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PEASANT FAMILY FARMING

To summarize the general trends seen in the literature on

peasants: (1) their behavior must be seen in domestic, community and national contexts and must be evaluated in terms of the situational constraints these contexts impose; (2) these contexts encompass economic, social and political relationships, each of which must be considered in order to understand the peasants' situation; and (3) there is an ever stronger trend toward considering peasants in an historical context, emphasizing the history of the local community relations with the state. But general trends do not necessarily result in a synthetic view; this case being no exception. Certain critical elements are lacking and can only be supplied by appropriating additional materials from several fields.

A. The Contributions of Different Fields

1. Economic Anthropology

Though it has long been peripheral to the analysis of peasant society and the study of development (with the exception of Raymond Firth's works [1944] 1966, 1969), economic anthropology has some important contributions to make. Perhaps the core theoretical concern of economic anthropology has been whether or not concepts of "economy" and "economizing" and the formal analytical models of Western economics can be validly employed in the analysis of non-industrial economies.

Though such a line of inquiry sounds hopelessly academic, there is good reason to pay serious attention to it. There is no question that Western economic analysis can be used to analyze the

economies of non-industrial societies, in the sense that anyone willing to make certain assumptions about human behavior and to operationalize them can apply the techniques. But there is a real reason to question whether or not Western economic models should be so used. The question is not one of morality, in the sense of what is ethically right; rather it is a matter of valid analytical procedure.

Western economic models rest firmly on a set of ceteris paribus assumptions that allow one to ignore the institutional matrix of economic activity and to analyze simply the phenomena of supply, demand and price. But as Firth pointed out years ago ([1951], 1966), the institutional matrix of economic activity in peasant and primitive societies is so different that it has to be analyzed before it is possible to employ these tools of Western economics. It makes a world of difference if factors of production and products are supplied and utilized in kinship-based production units rather than in impersonalized markets fully controlled by prices without interpersonal loyalties or obligations. If the institutional patterns dictate vastly different maximization pathways then we must first look at the institutions themselves instead of fastening immediately on behavior. The most extensive demonstration of this is provided by Chayanov (1966), with perhaps the best case study being Sutti Ortiz's Uncertainties in Peasant Farming (1973).

Within economic anthropology, opinion on the transferability of Western economic analysis is divided. One quasi-group, called

"substantivists," takes its lead from the writings of Karl Polanyi (1944, 1957) and from institutional economics. It argues that Western concepts of "economics" and "economizing" and the tools used to analyze them must not be applied to societies in which the price-making does not serve to organize all economic activity. Formal economics is seen as distorting the study of marketless economics and societies in which only a small portion of goods and services produced are distributed through a market mechanism. This group concludes that a new, non-market economics is needed to deal with primitive and some peasant economic systems. A typical proponent of this position is George Dalton (1967, 1969) and relevant citations to supporting literature can be found in his articles.

Another quasi-group, called "formalists," takes its orientation directly from formal economics. These scholars feel that "economics" and "economizing" are universals in human societies. Once the appropriate modifications are made in the assumptions about the institutional matrix of economic activity, they feel that at least some tools of formal economic analysis can be applied quite legitimately. They usually argue that the differences between industrial and non-industrial economies are those of degree, not kind. Explanation of this point of view can be found in LeClair (1962), Firth ([1944], 1966), and Cook (1966, 1969). The best statement of this position for the study of peasant economics is Firth's essay, "Social Structure and Peasant Economy: The Influence of Social Structure Upon Peasant Economies" (1969). While

most of the emotionalism of this debate between substantivists and formalists is gratuitous, the question at hand is most significant. It is clear already that I side with the formalists in emphasizing the rationality of peasant economic activity once the institutional conditions are known. But I think the substantivists have done us a service of making us more cautious about cross-cultural extrapolations. Specifically they have emphasized the importance of understanding how the actors themselves conceptualize the goals of their activities, how they think about economic activity. This is to say that peasants themselves must be consulted if we are to avoid distortions in our interpretations. The substantivists make it necessary for us also to be more explicit about the institutional contexts of economic activity.

In all, the debate has dramatized the difficulties in the study of economic behavior in different institutional settings, a study fraught with pitfalls and that requires our most self-conscious analytical efforts. Not only when comparing industrial and peasant societies but in comparing one peasant group with another we must pay close attention to institutional differences. We should discourage facile generalities about "the peasants," the "low marginal productivity of peasant labor," and the like. The debate itself should be sobering.

Though it is unfair to say that all students of development need this corrective, I think that the difficulties in comparing peasant economies are often glossed over in the development literature. A reading of the formalist-substantivist controversy

supplies a valuable corrective by fostering a strong sense of the complexity and variety of human social systems around us.

Another theoretical development emerging at least partly from economic anthropology is the distinction between "actor rationality" and "system rationality." This differentiation has existed for a long time but has been articulated masterfully by the Marxist economic anthropologist Maurice Godelier in his pathbreaking book, Rationalite et irrationalite en economie ([1966], 1967). Godelier attempts to provide the basis for the comparative study of economic systems by distinguishing two meanings of rationality. One refers to goal-orientated action based on the application of alternative means to hierarchically-preferred ends--"actor rationality." The other is rationality in the sense of the structure, the modes of operation, the orderliness and outcomes of the economic system as a whole. This he calls the "system rationality," which must be viewed at any one time or over time, from synchronic or diachronic perspective.

This viewpoint is widely useful and demonstrates that the conclusions drawn about the goal-orientated behavior of individuals in a system do not necessarily lead to similar conclusions about the operation of the system itself. An actor's behavior may employ perfectly reasonable means for achieving his ends--and even be successful for himself--and yet produce changes in or maladaptation in the system as a whole. (This is often referred to in economics as "the fallacy of composition.") It should be clear that the poor performance of an economic system may be

due to elements in its structure rather than to the irrationality of the people who compose it and act in it.

While this distinction has clear validity theoretically, some of the lessons it suggests have had to be learned empirically in the development field. The distributional effects of the new agricultural technologies are a case in point. The introduction of the new varieties of improved seeds--the Green Revolution--was conceived as a means of "closing the food gap" in the Third World. Insofar as significant production increases have resulted in some countries, the technology has achieved its goal at the national level. But many of the poorer rural families are worse off than before, their hunger unalleviated because they lack purchasing power (Poleman and Freebairn 1973). For them the "food gap" is not closing.

It appears that only peasants with a certain amount of land were in a position to take advantage of the new technology, and when using it--rationally--they rapidly began to improve their standard of living. But they were usually not the ones who were short of food anyway. The very poor farmers lacking the land or other resources to employ the new technology profitably made a "rational" decision not to use it. Indeed, if the increased production of "progressive" farmers lowered the food grain price, poorer peasants earned even less from what little they produced. Thus the middle peasants have outstripped their poorer neighbors, often even buying them out (Epstein 1973, Frankel 1971). Neither the "actor rationality" of the middle or poor peasants is at

fault. Both made rational choices based on their goals and available resources, yet the systemic outcome of these decisions is a continuing impoverishment of the rural poor, who cannot afford the fruits of the Green Revolution and cannot benefit from it. These dramatic problems show the need to clearly separate "actor" and "system" rationality and to take both into account in planning and development efforts, especially when dealing with peasant economies.

Finally there is an ample, though relatively recent literature dealing specifically with peasant economies which supports the view that peasants' behavior makes perfectly good sense once its institutional context is understood. Among the economic anthropology studies that could be cited in this regard are Barth (1963, 1967), Belshaw (1964), Cancian (1965), Cook (1970), Dewey (1962), Epstein (1962), Firth ([1944]), 1966), Greenwood (n.d.), Hill (1970), Ortiz (1973), Nash (1961), Sahlins (1972), Salisbury (1970), and Tax (1953). In agricultural economics, the works of Chayanov (1966), Franklin (1969) and Mellor (1966) point in this same direction.

The major procedural lesson to be drawn from this literature is that students and practitioners of development need to have more specific and extensive knowledge "from the field." If the observer does not understand the behavior of peasants, then it is his or her duty to examine more closely the context in which the peasants operate. It is possible that there is some "action irrationality" involved in certain cases, but it should not be

prejudged by abstract norms or ethnocentric standards. It will not do to bracket incomprehensible behaviors under the rubric of traditionalism, lack of aspiration or static world-view. The investigator has an obligation to dig beneath superficial observations.

2. Human Ecology

A relatively new area of research, only slightly incorporated into the study of peasant economics, is human ecology. This field has developed rapidly in the last ten years and has come up with some startling findings about the degree to which various types of economic systems ecologically well-adapted to their respective environments. This is not the place to review the literature in detail (for such reviews, see Anderson, n.d., *Scientific American* 1971, and Cook 1973). Unfortunately for our purposes, some of the best ecological studies have been done in primitive rather than peasant economies, but what data there are suggest we may soon have much more respect for the adaptiveness of peasant ecosystems. Conklin's studies of shifting cultivation (1961) and Rappaport's monograph on New Guinea tribesmen (1968) show that this particular form of cultivation, previously deprecated, is ecologically adaptive and perhaps even optimal for the particular environments (given soil and climatic conditions and the relative man: land ratios). Jurion's study of agriculture in the then-Belgian Congo (1969), Thomas' study of energy flows in the high Andean ecosystems (1972), and Murra's conceptualization of the Inca Empire as a combination of ecosystems (1972),

support to the notion that such systems may be good adaptations to their ecological circumstances.

A fascinating debate on the hitherto favorite example of peasant irrationality and traditionalism--the sacred cows of India--has sharpened our understanding of ecological adaptations. These cows have always been presented as a conclusive demonstration of the improvidence and stubbornness of traditional peasants in the underdeveloped world. But research now suggests that the cows are a crucial link in the food chain that sustains a large population under relatively barren circumstances. Harris more or less started the debate in 1966, arguing that the sacred cows were a highly important and productive part of the ecosystem, but he was countered by others (see particularly Heston 1971). Recently, Harris' view has received impressive empirical and quantitative support from Odend'hal's study of the gross energetic efficiency of the cattle in their ecosystem (1972). The sacred cows are not only important in the food chain but productive as well; they were found to be over 17% efficient in converting solar and plant energy into useful outputs--draught power, calves, milk, dung, leather, etc. By contrast, the genetically-refined and carefully-husbanded beef cattle on America's Great Plains are only 4% efficient (Odend'hal 1972).

I do not suggest that we are going to discover that all peasant ecologies are perfectly rational adaptations, but I would urge skepticism toward much of our received wisdom about peasant ecosystems. If the sacred cow of India can be ecolog-

ically maladaptive without first developing the necessary evidence. Because of the longstanding assumption that peasant economies rested on suboptimal ecosystems, little evidence has been developed on the subject. It may well be that in many or even most cases, peasants economies are rather sensitively adapted to local ecological circumstances and that attempts to alter the economies and ecosystems without prior analysis of their modes of adaption would be disastrous.

Of course we know that under some circumstances, peasant adaptations may result in the suboptimal use of their environment or even in ecological degradation. But we also now know that under other circumstances, the adaptations are ecologically sound. The literature makes clear that we should keep our minds open and encourage ecologists to continue investigations at the microlevel. It is no longer permissible simply to assume that any technical innovation provided by the West automatically results in an improvement in the exploitation of the local environment; this is Western conceit. The peasant system may be a good adaptation--even the optimal adaptation possible under local conditions--or it may be a marginally good adaptation or even frankly maladaptive. Only empirical investigation can determine this, and such investigation must precede attempted interventions in an existing set of adaptations.

3. Political Economy

From the discussion of Wolf and Godelier, it is clear that I find merit in political economy perspectives on the study of

peasant communities, since peasants stand in definite political and economic relations to a larger national community, or state. The total system of which peasants are a part is fundamentally important, though I will limit myself, as before, to an outline of the major literature on this subject. One related aspect of this literature which I will not discuss relates to studies of peasant marketing. Marketing systems are both economic and political and undergird the peasant-state, I will not go into them here, noting that some excellent work has been done on them, especially Mintz (1959, 1960); Dewey (1962) and Ortiz (1973). They provide some unique insights for understanding the political economy of peasant-states in terms of their exchange and distribution systems. I have clearly been influenced by their work and reflect it in my discussion.

Wolf's analysis of the peasant-state relationship has been noted already and is consistent with what has been said so far. It proceeds from the notion that peasant economic behavior is reasonable and cannot be evaluated until the institutional constraints under which peasants operate are known. As Wolf argues, the state is a creator of significant institutional constraints, and thus the impingement of the state on peasant economies is a crucial part of any analysis. Peasants are inextricably part of a larger system which they support with their production of food and their manpower and from which they receive some state services, a degree of territorial protection, and other guarantees. To study them as if they were

isolated violates the very essence of the peasant condition. This view of the political economy of peasantry has its origins in the writings of Marx and is made contemporary by Wolf, Godelier, Gunder Frank and Baran.

Yet in most peasant studies, this perspective has found little place. There are valuable exceptions to this generalization, however. I have already cited the perspectives of Chayanov (1966) and Franklin (1969), and would note here especially the work of Schultz (1964), Hobsbawm (1959), Malefakis (1970), Tarrow (1967), Wylie (1964, 1966) and of course Wolf (1966, 1969). In the next section of this monograph, I will develop the analysis of this peasant-state relationship in detail as it provides the basis for the approach presented here.

4. Social and Economic History

Finally, the historicity and changefulness of peasant economic systems must be considered. In a way, the historical view of peasantries grows directly out of acceptance of peasant behavior as related to its context of ecological, social and political constraints. I have already argued that peasants are responsive to these constraints and adapt their behavior to them insofar as it is possible. Then if one recognizes that these constraints change over time, history enters. Even supporters of the widely popular view that peasant societies lack any internally generally dynamics can admit that changes in the constraints in peasant behavior necessitate changes in

the behaviors themselves. Changes in population (Boxerup 1965), in ecology (Slicher von Bath 1963), in social structure (Caro Baroja 1959, Franklin 1969), in cultigens (Slicher von Bath 1963), in political regimes (Wylie 1964, 1966, Tilly 1964) all alter the context in which peasants operate and necessitate new behavioral and organizational responses.

Accepting only the notion that peasant behavior is adapted to the situational constraints under which it operates forces one to consider peasants as living a history of change and adaptation to a variety of different circumstances. The history of changing constraints and of peasant adaptations to them, even if lacking the grandeur of "high history," is as significant for understanding peasant behavior as is any synchronic analysis of behavior. The history may show the limits of peasant adaptability or at least the range of circumstances under which they were capable of surviving.

I prefer to go a step further and argue that peasant society has its own history, in addition to the history of its adaptation to external forces. This makes the picture of course more complex. For me, there is local history interacting with national history through many accommodations and conflicts. There are bound to be patterns of interaction between peasants and the state that allow at least some of the requirements of both to be met, but all human beings live in time. They originate things, attempt to meet goals, and live with some knowledge of the past. Present behavior is based on an awareness of what has happened and, by

extrapolation, what is likely to happen. To see peasants in this light seems only to define them as human.

Such a view, though philosophically exciting, is operationally exacting. An historical view of peasants which includes the dynamics of their behavior and community organization and then relates this to regional, national and international history is a terribly demanding task. It is one gradually being carried out in Europe, but it is a long-term project and probably much more difficult in most non-industrial societies. Though it will eventually make for major improvements in our understanding of peasants, the historical view can be of immediate value by requiring us to gain a sense of complexity and changefulness of peasant life. It is the appreciation of this historical complexity that lies at the root of an understanding of peasant life. It should unequivocally replace the unilateral invocation of "traditionalism" or some surrogate wastebasket into which the unsophisticated observer throws his ignorance, thinking he has somehow made a point.

B. The Peasant-State as an Analytical Framework

The elements of the synthesis I propose are now at hand. We see peasant behavior as a rational response to the situations in which they operate. We analyze peasant family farming in terms of the ecological constraints and adaptations peasants improvise, the economic conditions and strategies peasant use to cope with them, the social structural context of farming at

the community level, and the nature and history of state impingements. Along with cultural ideas and population dynamics, these form an interlocking whole--an integrated, complex, generally adaptive system--with special characteristics of its own. Lacking a more elegant term we may call this the "peasant-state," a designation which attempts to call attention to the uniqueness of this societal type whose distribution has been historically nearly worldwide.

Once all of these elements are studied and their interactions examined, it becomes apparent that the peasant-state is a particular kind of a large-scale social adaptation, an evolutionary type if you will. As a "system," it includes characteristic interactions between ecological, economic, social and political factors over time. It emerged at a certain point in human history when technological and organizational conditions were favorable for creating a centralized state authority which could capture and utilize--culturally, politically and militarily--the peasants' incipient surplus.⁴ This form of macro-social organization underwent a rapid adaptive radiation and has survived in various forms for thousands of years, though it is now collapsing under the pressures of industrialization. The peasant-state, as a context for peasant actors, establishes particular constraints under which characteristic peasant behavior results, creating a particular "actor rationality" under the circumstances.

In this view, the peasant-state can be regarded as a successful social evolutionary adaptation to a range of internal

and external conditions and as having certain systemic properties that typify it. If it is so regarded, we ought to be more respectful of it when thinking about how to change it. Without idealizing the peasant-state, we should appreciate that its survival capability indicates it worked well, though not necessarily by enriching peasantry. Development efforts should certainly not be seen as the creation of a new systemic adaptation but rather as the alteration of an existing one. Accordingly, they should be undertaken only with full awareness of the history and implications of the existing adaptation, lest the subsistence of the population be endangered.

Where does this view of the peasant-state lead us? Hopefully to an appreciation of how best we can use several existing bodies of knowledge. The anthropological and historical literature emphasizes the complexity, adaptiveness and historicity of peasant family farming. The development literature emphasizes the need for more generalized understanding of peasant economies and the development process. Viewing peasant-states as an evolutionary type moves us toward the sort of useful generalizations that developers and social theorists want, at the same time pointing out the role of specific adaptations to ecology, economy society and polity. An understanding of peasant-states must be at once general and specific, as the framework proposed here should permit.

In this discussion, we need to maintain three perspectives for examining the peasant-state: the peasant family farm; the

the local community made up of peasants and non-peasants; and the state made up of subordinate communities and family farms and controlled by central elites endowed with authority, wealth, status, education and coercive power (on these political resources of the state, see Ilchman and Uphoff 1969). Our discussion could be made much more complicated, including varieties of subcommunity organization above the domestic group level and regional organization interposed between the state and the local community. This would however obscure the essential points to be presented here in a simple, schematic form.

These three viewpoints provide us with different kinds of information but all are complementary and necessary if we are to view the peasant-state as an adaptive socio-economic system. The peasant family farm level is often called the domestic group level in the anthropological literature because non-family members may be included in it. In this context we must examine the reasonableness of an individual domestic group's behavior in terms of the requirements it must meet, the factors of production at its disposal, and the goals toward which it strives. Our goal is to understand the behavioral strategies peasants work out to deal with these conditions.

Chayanov, Franklin and much of the anthropological case literature are helpful here because they show people acting and choosing, attempting to meet their own material requirements and those imposed upon them by the local community and by the state in the form of taxes, levies, contributions, etc. The

production process and the movement of products through the community and up to the state level constitute main focuses of attention. One must assess how hard-pressed peasants are in meeting their several obligations and what services or protection they receive for the "surplus" they have surrendered (seldom altogether voluntarily).

At the level of the local community, the questions change. While the community is rarely a closed or a unitary system, it is often a group of peasants and non-peasants sharing a relatively similar relationship to the state. The community may also have a degree of control over its internal affairs, as long as it fulfills its obligations to the state. Typically it contains some individuals who fill intercalary roles, i.e., those who are of the community but represent the state's interests, such as village leaders, or who are of the state but represent the community's interests, like stewards.

There is always a modicum of conflict in this kind of community. The dual nature of its constitution, individual domestic groups protecting their individual self-interest, and the community's treatment as a unit by the outside, all make the maintenance of a balance of internal and external relationships a matter for constant vigilance. Pushed too hard by the state, the community may unite against the state's influence and even rebel (almost never successfully, though it can raise greatly the cost to the state of extracting its "due"). If rent apart by too much conflict, on the other hand, the nucleus of the

community or a dissident faction may call in the state to resolve conflicts or punish certain individuals or groups.


The state is seen as the originator of taxation, some services, legal codes, modes of economic integration; lines of communication the organizer of territorial defense; and the initiator of national and international action. The state is interested in monopolizing authority, in appropriating surplus, in integrating the economy (to its advantage), and in controlling the use of force within its territory. It dispenses services primarily in furtherance of these ends.

Taking the three levels together, we have an arena in which each element--state, community, domestic group--stands in relation to the others and is attempting to advance or protect its own interests. The domestic groups attempt to retain what autonomy they can and to retain or invest as much of the wealth they produce as possible. The community as a whole generally facilitates the domestic groups in achieving these ends, though it does have social functions and roles requiring significant disbursements of local resources, e.g., leveling mechanisms (Cancian 1965, Foster 1965) and local administration. Over against the requirements of the state, the community tries to protect itself by meeting the state's tax and manpower needs at the minimum level that will not bring about state reprisals. The state attempts to maximize the amount of surplus it appropriates and the authority in its own hands, while trying to minimize the kinds and amounts of services it must provide in return to ensure its power.

The relationship between peasant domestic groups, local communities and the state is seen as one of constant trade-offs: autonomy for protection, wealth for services, state authority for voluntary community support. By implication, any alterations in the conditions affecting any one of the three--land depletion, foreign wars, factional strife, drought, new trade routes, dynastic feuds--result in changes in the balance of trade-offs between them. In this way, ecology, economics, social organization, politics and history all enter in, and changes at the top can be felt at the bottom--and vice versa. This conceptualization can be represented graphically to show the peasant-state in historical perspective, as it in the following diagram.

DIAGRAM OF THE PEASANT - STATE

04



△ = state

↕ = peasant-state interactions

T_{1, 2} = time periods

P = peasant domestic groups

△₃ = peasant community

→ = history

L = landlord domestic groups

The diagram only represents the relationship between a state, one local community, and its constituent domestic groups. It does not attempt to include the complexity of all community relationships or the variety of inter-community and international relationships that exist. The four time periods represented stand for different relationships among the three elements. The time path indicated is hypothetical, one of many possible paths. It is much abbreviated in comparison to the recurrent changes--ups and downs, so to speak--in the linkage of historical peasant-state centers to their constituent sub-units.

At T_1 the state is siphoning off a minimum amount of local production, holds a modicum of authority over the people, and provides minimal services. The local community largely fends for itself, though it relies on the state for some services--perhaps courts or maintenance of major roads. The domestic groups are tied together in relationships of reciprocity and kinship to some extent but most try to be self-sufficient in food.

At T_2 the state has entered a period of severe political conflict at the center. Authority breaks down, as does the collection of taxes and mobilization of manpower. Perhaps there has been a dynastic struggle, or involvement in foreign political conflicts. In any event, the community is thrown back on its own resources. The state ceases to appropriate food and labor, and also ceases to provide services to the community. The subsistence farmers fend for themselves and the community ties of reciprocity, kinship and patronage are mobilized to provide subsistence for the population

and to keep the peace in the community, in effect filling the "vacuum" left by the deterioration of the center. Perhaps a few transactions with the state or with one party to the national conflict may take place, but certainly the quality of the relationship between the state and community has altered.⁵

At T_3 the state has not only reorganized itself, but it has succeeded in monopolizing authority and in organizing collection of peasant surplus more effectively than at T_1 . Now the local community is more tightly tied into the state. It gives up more of its local production in taxes, engages in more trade within regions or within the nation, and supplies more manpower for the state's projects. The state has extended its presence deeper into the local community, probably with the aid of a regular bureaucracy. Peasant domestic groups still provide most of their own subsistence, though probably not all now. They do retain, however, the ability to fall back on their own resources.

At T_4 the state has increased its authority and is in the process of strongly centralizing the political structure of the nation. This point on the diagram is intended to represent a country like Spain during the 19th century when extensive land reforms were implemented. The peasants still provide some of their own subsistence but are probably quite reliant now on other communities and the state for many kinds of goods and services and probably for many food items. They retain a marginal capability to return to subsistence agriculture, though to do so would be difficult and take time for adjustment and perhaps re-learning.

We do not show a hypothetical T_5 when the peasant-state has become transformed into what might be called a nation-state. In such a transformation, rural people would move from the peasant socio-political status to that of farmer-citizens, having become fully integrated into the state, the market, and the national social structure. The gulf between the more powerful, wealthy and prestigious city dwellers and the politically-unfranchised, economically-exploited, and socially-disdained peasantry would have for most practical purposes vanished. While rural living might not be prestigious, full political rights and an opportunity for economic prosperity matching or surpassing that of urbanites would have been achieved.

While we have not suggested any straight-line evolutionary progression from one time period to the next--indeed, explicitly showing disintegration between T_1 and T_2 --it appears that movement from T_4 and T_5 , passing out of the era of the peasant-state, is well-nigh irreversible. One of the principle features, and advantages, of the peasant-state is the independent subsistence of the peasantry. Given the capacity of the peasantry, organized as it is in relatively autonomous and self-sufficient domestic groups and communities, to maintain itself free of dependence for subsistence on the state or others, the system as a whole can withstand the collapse of the center. Life may not be pleasant when famine or war or other disasters strike--indeed, it may not be very pleasant under any circumstances--but institutionally the peasant-state is less vulnerable than the interdependent nation-state which is its historical successor.

Modified or vestigial peasant-states persist in much of Asia and Latin America (seldom in Africa), though their appearance is often masked by the institutional overlay of colonization. A clear example of this is India, where the British indeed simply stepped into the central ruling shoes of the Mogul emperors and continued to extract peasants' surplus in return for some services and for "maintaining law and order." The peasant domestic group and peasant community persist as entities even now, though the Lok Sabha (parliament) and the Indian Administrative Service at the center, mirrored institutionally in each of the Indian states, are typical nation-state organizations.

C. Understanding Peasant Behavior in the Peasant-State Context

From this conceptualization of the peasant-state we can derive various implications for the analysis of peasants' behavior, most centering on the variability and change in relations between state and local interests and on the major differences between rational behavior of actors in the system and the character of the system as a whole. While the producers within the domestic group are each pursuing their self-interest--attempting to retain disposition over as much of their production as possible and attempting to take advantage of state-provided services--the state is trying to gain control over peasant domestic groups in both economic and political terms--insofar as this does not require provision of too many expensive services. The local community either mediates this relationship, or is the locus of conflict between peasant and state interests.

Out of the competition over resources and services is born the peasant-state, based on a delicate balance. The peasants must provide most of their subsistence and yet they must not be allowed total autonomy. The state must tax but not tax so much that it makes the populace entirely dependent on the state's distribution system for subsistence. Over time this complex balance shifts, as Wolf (1966) noted when writing of the cyclical quality of peasant-state relationships. The peasant-state as a system represents a complex socio-cultural adaptation that arose in the process of cultural evolution, and having been initially successful, it underwent an adaptive radiation into a wide variety of ecological zones. It supports a higher population density than most preceding socio-cultural systems, and it presently supports well over half the world's population in spite of the presence of a more materially productive, alternative system.

Given the importance of balancing local and state demands, anything altering conditions at the local or the state level changes the balance. Ecological changes can have very widespread effects, e.g., fertility increases or declines, famines or pests, or the introduction of new crops. Increases in population may initially decrease the amount of disposable surplus produced on a peasant family farm and then later be translated into increased labor power. Famine may cut productivity and make even subsistence a problem. Then the state appropriates next to nothing and the peasants either fend for themselves entirely or rely on food-

stuffs provided by the state. New crops that change patterns of land use, labor employment, capital requirements, and yields ultimately translate themselves into changes in the disposable surplus--and probably in state power. In the economy, the balance can be altered by changes in local economic organization, new values attached to factors of production or new means for gaining access to them, increases in demand for surplus production, or changes in consumption patterns.

At all times, and in all situations, as Chayanov showed, the peasant as head of a domestic group must satisfy dual obligations. Using Franklin's terms (1969). In one role he is chef de'enterprise, operating a business to gain the greatest return from available land and labor resources, using scarce capital as best he can. In the other role he is chef de famille, being responsible for the well being of all in his group, not only economically but socially and spiritually as well. Often, tradeoffs must be made in satisfying the respective obligations. The main point is that the peasant cannot, because of his dual roles, make all choices in production and marketing as a profit-maximizer. Indeed, he cannot even use a straightforward minimax strategy, maximizing output subject to the constraint of ensuring a minimum for family subsistence. The minimum must be met or the group goes under (though community charity may sustain it for a while) but considerations of kinship loyalty, and community participation enter into production decisions, making the peasant's calculus immensely complicated. Added to this are the often changing conditions.

The community in the peasant-state is also changeful. In response to pressures from the state, it may close ranks against the outsiders to protect its interests. It may enlist community patrons or outside mediators to lessen the demands of the state on local resources. When the state's pressure lightens, domestic groups may become more competitive or possibly more reciprocally cooperative, i.e., the quality of their relations is likely to change. Patterns of patronage will alter and of course the structure of the community itself will probably change. The community may become more stratified or more egalitarian; it may get along with local representatives of state authority or more readily engage in conflict with them.

Politically, the local community in the diagram at T_3 is much more a part of the state than at T_1 . The mode of the state's impingement may well alter, taking the form of a civil service, legal codes and courts, or other infrastructural investments. The state can work through tax farmers, local nobility, elected representatives, churchmen, or a rural bourgeoisie. It may deal only with official representatives of the local community or may deal with individuals. Each and every one of these patterns has different effects on the community and hence on the structure of the peasant-state as a whole.

The history of these relations critically affects subsequent peasant behavior. We can imagine a peasant community at T_4 being under great pressure from the state, having previously enjoyed considerable autonomy, and resisting this pressure as best it

can. If an anthropologist observed this community without knowing about T_2 or T_3 , he would be likely to conclude that the peasants are extremely conservative, even reactionary, as they try to close themselves off from outside influences, to oppose state-originated initiatives, and as they are suspicious of outsiders, and slow to change. Is this not the much-touted image of the "traditional" peasant? I believe that the stereotype of the traditional "peasant" is derived largely from observations of peasants under extreme pressures from the state, particularly in some parts of 19th century Europe and in 20th century Mexico.

It is alternatively possible at T_4 that the peasant has become the beneficiary of a state taking a more positive attitude toward its rural sector, promoting land reforms, opening up real opportunities in an expanding national economy and involving the peasant as a farmer in commercial production. This is the peasant found fairly commonly on the European scene during the 19th century. For such reasons he could also appear conservative to the outside observer who did not appreciate how and why peasants had come to identify their self-interest with the interests of the state and were unreceptive to radical political appeals (Malefakis 1970). To generalize either set of observations to a universal attribution of peasant conservatism is an error, as the 20th century has shown (Malefakis 1970, Wolf 1969).

If it had happened that an anthropologist approached the same peasant community at T_1 and T_2 without any historical perspective he would probably have been impressed by the degree to which

peasants were independent and untouched by the outside world. Community life would appear rich and complex, with manipulation of local social relationships the peasant's most important skill. Under these circumstances, openness to innovation would probably be considerable, as must have been the case in Europe from the 16th to the 18th centuries when many new crops and farming practices were adopted. The observer would think the people sharp-witted and innovative, and might even evolve in his mind that other stereotype of the peasant as sly, self-interested and shrewd--the kluger Hans of German folklore. The same community observed at T_1 and at T_4 could appear open and innovative at one time and then closed and traditional later on, in response to the larger political-economic context in which it operated. To ignore the effects of historical change is to be forced back to stereotypes of sly or reactionary peasants.

III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PEASANT-STATE ANALYSIS

A. Issues in Rural Development and Research

In peasant societies as in all others, the present is judged and lived in relation to a known past and an expected future. The character of the present is relative to the immediate past and is indeed unintelligible without knowledge of that past. The study of peasant-states is historical or it is nothing. The implications of this view for development theory and practice are multiple. So far I have presented very broad notions, in need of refinement. But it is possible already to indicate through

this framework, which itself draws on a considerable body of literature, what are the lacunae in our knowledge and what cautions are called for in approaching rural development.

1. Ecology

While it can be argued that all past views of peasant society have contained an implicit view of peasants' ecological adaptation, this matter has only recently begun to receive systematic attention. The burgeoning literature on human ecology and the interest spurred by the Green Revolution promise to add new dimensions to our understanding on peasant ecology, (which is remarkably limited considering the number of peasant micro-studies previously done). This lack of information is a direct result of the assumption that "traditional" societies, by definition, cannot be well adapted to their environment. This essence of the idea of "traditionality" is that such people are unable to adapt rationally and empirically to their circumstances. There seemed little point in studying the ecological adaptation in peasant economies because they were believed, a priori, to be inefficient.

Yet it is clearly important to know in fact how inefficient or efficient these economies when reviewed as ecological adaptations. Thus detailed and extensive field research is called for. Should these ecosystems be found generally inefficient, rural developers will feel free to intervene and to improve them in any way they can, hopefully utilizing the newly-acquired

knowledge of exactly how existing peasant practices are maladaptive. If, on the other hand, these turn out to be reasonable efficient adaptations, then intervention becomes problematic and if pursued in disregard of the ecological knowledge gained, amounts to forced cultural change and high risks of worsening conditions. If, as I expect, the evidence turns out to be mixed, some peasant ecosystems being well adapted and others rather poorly so, then in each case, investigators and rural developers will have to assess the ecological relations carefully before drawing conclusions about what changes would in fact be beneficial.

Ecological relations can be studied at the same three levels we have been talking about. To study the relationships between domestic groups and their energy sources, ecologists and ecology-oriented researchers have begun to use a number of "risk" models. These are useful because they take the perspective of the peasant as a decision-maker faced with a set of environmental conditions, a specific technology, and a limited labor force. He is seen as a minimax strategist seeking to increase output subject to the constraint that some subsistence minimum must not be endangered. Focusing on decision-making under these conditions, ecology adds an important dimension to the study of peasant-states by showing the constraints that operate at the interface between the domestic groups and the physical conditions of their survival. This is critical knowledge for outside agents seeking to change production practices. Approaches focused on this are appearing rapidly, good examples being Wharton (1971) and Zinkin (1971).

There are some difficulties in using this approach. First, ecological adaptation or maladaptation is not easily definable. The problems are similar to those in defining social "equilibrium" or the "functionality" of a certain practice. If the people die or the society falls apart, then we know the practice was not adaptive or functional. But that would have become obvious without much research; short of that drastic outcome, measures are hard to agree on. There is also confusion about the definition of "risk." Should it be defined as the peasant sees it or as the investigator does. A preference for the latter may result in ethnocentrism, while a preference for the former results in models built on the people's ideologies alone.

I expect research will show that most peasant practices are reasonable successful adaptations under the circumstances, and that changes in behavior can and should come only after some change in the circumstances. This is to say that I suspect ecological studies will show that rural developers need not start out by attempting to change peasants' attitudes and beliefs. The peasant as chef de famille bears a heavy burden, being responsible for the subsistence of a domestic group. A failure of judgment in agriculture have dire consequences--starvation or at least a perhaps irreversible dependence on others. Every decision is made against risks of weather, crop failure, market fluctuations, and often political uncertainty. Yearly, the peasant makes many decisions, all weighed carefully

against the risks and consequences of failure. This would suggest that selective pressures are constantly exerted on peasant decision-making strategies. Without taking an orthodox Darwinian view, it seems that these pressures, as long as they are not too acute will lead to a constant perfecting of peasants' ecological adjustment--to a reasonable reliable body of agricultural wisdom. What are most lacking are longitudinal studies of the rate of adaptive change in peasant ecological systems. We also need to know what kinds of conditions can be expected to give rise to a successful peasant adaptation and what circumstances prevent peasants from being successful.

At the community level, the ecological perspective is different. If, for purposes of analysis, the community is taken to be the unit of ecological adaptation, we should look at its social mechanisms for coping with an uncertain and not always generous physical environment. What are the ways the community spreads risk among its members? Social ties between domestic groups serve constitute a distribution mechanism. Kinship exchanges of food items; leases and contracts; feasts and festivals at which food is shared and resources are distributed; and local markets all serve to lessen the probability that any single domestic group will consistently fail to meet its subsistence requirements. There are a number of case studies relevant to this point: Thomas (1972), Rappaport (1968), and Johnson (1970). For the moment it appears to be most useful simply to examine what are the energetic consequences of different kinds of

transactions that go on within a community and how they might contribute to the total adaptation of the community. In this connection, Sahlin's views are particularly important (1972).

Treating the state as an ecosystem is risky because its scale and complexity far outstrips our empirical capacities for measurement and comparison, yet there are a number of reasons why this should be attempted. One characteristic of the state is that, through its access to resources of geographically-dispersed populations, it actually controls a variety of ecologies. It is a higher-order ecosystem, combining the products of a variety of zones and is able to shift resources from one ecological zone to another via the distribution mechanisms at its disposal, thereby offsetting problems arising in any particular zone. Murra, in his pathbreaking work on the Inca Empire, has argued that the essence of that system was the control of non-contiguous ecological zones ranging from the low to the high Andes. Once the Empire is seen as a kind of ecosystem, many of the riddles of Inca territorial organization, systems of corvee, distribution of goods, and so on appear to resolve themselves (Murra 1960, 1962, 1965, 1972; Thompson and Murra 1966). A contemporary example of this is seen in India, where food zones have been created administratively to control the flow of food and permit the direction of food from surplus to deficit areas (Nicholson 1966, 1968).

Ecological analyses will not in themselves provide complete insights or prescriptions. Social and political organization

as well as economic conditions need to be taken into account, but they in turn will not be fully understood without data on the energetic relationships in their environment. We do not presently know whether peasant-states in general have produced viable or poor overall ecological adaptations to their respective environments. This would be well worth knowing for development policy purposes. We cannot specify the conditions in which to expect a viable adaptation to exist nor those where failure is to be expected. Until more is known, the burden of proof would seem to be on those who believe that peasant-state ecosystems are faulty (and should be altered forthwith) to show that this is indeed true.

2. Economics

Probably the most important recent shift in the literature on peasants is in economic studies. Whereas earlier writings emphasized traditionality, otherworldliness and a lack of pecuniary concern, we increasingly appreciate the economic rationality of peasant actors. It must be noted, however, that this premise of rationality is accepted more at the individual level than the systems level. Most writers who acknowledge peasant rationality continue to view peasant economic systems as distinguished by conditions of low productivity and under-employment of labor. Now, however, these conditions are not thought to derive so much from the traditionality of peasants as from the institutional and technical conditions under which

peasants operate. The importance of this shift cannot be over-estimated. The working assumption is that peasants attempt to maximize their satisfactions, but in situations which require behavior different from that required of farmers in industrialized systems. The earlier view of peasant "irrationality" as the cause of their poverty recedes and is replaced by an appreciation of peasant behavior as a rational response to complex and difficult problems as livelihood. Examples of this view are: Cook (1970), Dewey (1962), Epstein (1962, 1973), Firth ([1944] 1966), Firth and Yamey (1963), Hill (1970), Ortiz (1973) and Salisbury (1970).

This emerging consensus places stringent requirements on the investigators or developers. When peasants' observed behavior is at odds with our expectations, it is our obligation to pursue the analysis and discover if there is some good reason for their behavior. No longer can investment in a fiesta be taken as ipso facto proof of peasant prodigality or short-sightedness (Cancian 1965). Basic to this approach is an attempt to understand peasant economic behavior from the peasant's vantage point, to treat him as a decision-maker, therefore to lessen the chances that the behavior will be judged by irrelevant standards.

But this approach is not without its problems. Rationality is a notoriously difficult concept to use. What is rational depends on how ends and means are defined, a very complex matter. For example, is the observer to take as ends those goals which the peasant articulates? If so, different members of the same

community or even domestic group have different goals, making a comprehensive definition of situational rationality impossible. Listening to peasants talk about what they want, one finds most peasant behavior rational. In my research, one peasant wanted to educate his children; another wanted to get rich so his children would never have to farm; and another wanted to farm the rest of his life to assure his personal salvation. Each pursued his goals consistently (rationally?). But while such information is important, it also leads to theoretical triviality for it says little more than the following: peasants want some things more than others and they work the hardest for what they want most.

Similar problems arise with respect to means. If a peasant knows about some new technique which others judge to be more productive than his own but which requires more physical labor, and he rejects it because it is "too much work" (relative to the return he anticipates from it), is this irrational or not? Is not the peasant entitled to some preference for leisure or for keeping his drudgery to some physical quantum? The norm of producer and consumer "sovereignty" accepted for Western economic behavior is by some double standard often denied in peasant studies.

The matter of rationality in peasant economic systems is easily lost sight of. Yet when addressing it directly there is still some difficulty because who is to specify the ends of the system. To move from peasants' statements of their goals to a consideration of the institutions within which they work is to

conceptualize the social system as social scientists do. Such views are often unintelligible or uninteresting to the peasants themselves. What will appear to be rational behavior to the observer will then depend on the kind of social theory he employs; for example, how much value he imputes to laboring itself or to the welfare of future rather than present generations. Even if one takes such a general objective of peasant economies as the feeding, defense and reproduction of the local peasant population, it is still difficult to judge the exact contribution of each peasant behavior to such a goal. The lesson is that one cannot build a model of peasant rationality out of an unvarnished set of primary data. Theory is theory, and rational decision-making models are no more empirical ultimately than any others. The disjunction between the analyst and the peasant is unavoidable, unless we restrict social theory to peasants' ideologies about themselves (and perhaps the problem persists even then).

In our economic analysis of peasant-states, we must (again) work at three levels. For dealing with the peasant family farm, the key to understanding economic behavior is Chayanov's conception of the "labor farm," as both an enterprise and a domestic group, with all decisions serving the requirements of business and of family (Chayanov 1966). The calculus of maximization on the peasant farm must include considerations of subsistence requirements, "rents" (Wolf 1966), the farming cycle, and markets for both subsistence and cash crops, not to mention various domestic group

obligations. Dowries may be provided to daughters to ensure them a proper marriage. Boys may be apprenticed or otherwise given a start in life to permit them a self-sufficient adulthood. Care for the aged and sick must be provided out of farm resources. Apart from this there are community obligations to be satisfied, by providing work, paying levies, and otherwise supporting common activities. Ceremonial obligations must also be met for the good of the family and the community as a whole. (For a discussion of these obligations which he categorizes under the concept of "rents," see Wolf, 1966).

The family farm must maintain sufficient capital, land and labor to carry forward the production process in order to meet the family's subsistence needs and all its "rents." That these are rather large fixed needs and obligations is clear. The peasant decision-maker must satisfy them year-in, year-out with relatively little control over the physical environment and without where being able to risk large investments in future production schemes. A miscalculation might cause the loss of the farm or the loss of social status now or in future generations (Zinkin 1971). The peasant's only defense under these conditions is to make good decisions, that is, decisions which minimize risk. Conservative decision-making under such conditions is probably the most rational strategy.

However, we cannot and should not over-generalize. Detailed, quantitative studies of peasant economic decision-making are needed, employing a risk model such as elaborated by Wharton (1971).

Production figures and consumption requirements need to be known specifically; real and anticipated risks need to be calculated or at least estimated. In most case studies so far, however, we lack precise enough information to simulate optimal decisions to compare against actual peasant decisions. This is regrettable. The gathering of such data is tedious and difficult, especially because decision-making is so decentralized and few items are transacted in terms of prices (Hill 1970). But we are now in a position to employ such data meaningfully and the difficulty of this type of research will be rewarded by the results obtained. Examples of such work can be found in Cancian (1972), Greenwood (n.d.), Ortiz (1973), and Tax (1953).

The crucial question, which cannot be answered without such studies, is how compatible or incompatible are the dual responsibilities of the peasant farmer? Until recently, the literature on social organization has argued that domestic group obligations are inherently at odds with economic maximization. And yet this is not self-evident, since domestic groups' general interest often lies in increasing income (as most peasants will point out). Recently, anthropologists have begun to argue for the economic effectiveness of so-called "traditional" social institutions (for example, Epstein 1973), but to reach clear conclusions, more economic performance data are required.

Shifting our perspective from domestic groups to the community as a whole brings other economic relationships into view. Within

the community there will be some division of labor, usually including nonfood producing roles. There will be differential access to the factors of production, particularly land, according to the degree of social hierarchy. The observer should make an inventory of the kinds and frequencies of economic transactions between domestic groups. If a barter sphere for subsistence items exists separately from a market sphere for other types of goods, the articulation of these spheres and their regional and national implications are critical areas of information. For example, one should know about community celebrations, the percentage of total resources consumed and the beneficiaries of this kind of activity in order to determine what reallocations if any of goods and services follow therefrom. The cost and methods of community care for the indigent, aged, sick, and minors of age, and the ways domestic groups keep from falling below the minimum subsistence standard, all must be documented before statements about the peasant economy can be meaningfully made.

These questions are not new, but their importance is increased by an understanding of the political economy of the peasant-state, in which the community is a significant locus in balancing the demands of the state for peasant "surplus" against the determination of domestic groups to retain a considerable portion of their production. The state rarely deals with domestic groups, but rather with the community. Indeed, despite the image of the community as a primordial solidary group, in many instances

communities have actually been created by state action and law out of aggregations of domestic groups with important implications for state access to peasant resources (Malefakis, 1970). In peasant-states generally, the community is collectively responsible to the state for meeting tax and other obligations to it. The structure and atmosphere of community life are unavoidably affected by this relationship. If the community officials are held responsible for actions of the community's members, as in Mexico, a particular style of community organization and conflict appears. If noblemen with large estates mediate the relations of the community with the political center, as was often the case in France, then a different form of organization emerges (Wylie 1966).

Thus, in community studies, we must see that what the community is depends on the economic conditions of the moment, its role as an economic intermediary between peasant and state, and the amount of pressure exerted upon it from above and below. While the importance of the peasant community has been stressed in most peasant studies thus far, its broader functions in the peasant-state have been generally ignored. The desire to find in the peasants, comunitas and traditional values led to an emphasis on community studies, but those same motives tended to minimize the practical significance of the community in relationships beyond local boundaries. Particular exceptions of importance are Pitt-Rivers (1954), Wylie (1966) and Tilly (1964) as well as articles by Silverman (1965) and Wolf (1955, 1956, 1957).

From the vantage point of the state, the peasantry is a dispersed congeries of producers of food and labor to be tapped as needed and as possible. The state's main economic objective is to marshal peasant-produced resources by means of markets, direct administration, or taxes for distribution among non-food producers and for pursuit of state politico-military aims. Since a state without resources is no state at all, most of the state's activities depend on the quantity and quality of the peasant surplus that is appropriated. But the state's interests do not include total incorporation of the peasantry. The state wants to control certain resources, but to leave the peasantry's ability to provide its own subsistence relatively intact. Extracting too much creates a population dependent on the state for its very subsistence, thereby increasing the cost and complexity of state operations. Thus the state adjusts its demands so that a balance is struck between the maximum appropriation of surplus and a level of exploitation that does not impair the peasants' ability to subsist without much state aid.

There are a number of important and researchable questions here. How efficient and effective have been various collection and distribution mechanisms in peasant-states? How is the taxable limit beyond which it is not advisable to go determined? What percentage of total production is appropriated, both in terms the average appropriation and its extremes? We should know whether the closed corporate peasant communities widely observed

are really typical of places where the state's economic interventions are particularly strong (Wolf 1957). Also, of special contemporary importance, under what conditions did the relation between peasants and the state evolve from one of adversaries contesting the surplus to one of collaboration in allocating surplus and services?

Because of the range and complexity of quantitative and qualitative evidence needed, these problems are difficult, but answers are required. Here anthropologists have been particularly remiss for having drawn the boundaries of their studies at the perimeter of the peasant community. The rich information on internal community organization usually fails to illuminate the problems of the integration and articulation of communities with the state.

In sum, our present understanding of the economics of peasant family farming lacks, on the one hand, theoretical integration commensurate with the richness of certain kinds of information available and, on the other, data adequate to answer known questions of theory. The complexity of peasant economic activity and their real problems of risk; the community as a redistributor of resources and as an economic link between domestic groups and the state, and the state as an agent of taxation and services, these are all matters that must be taken up in tandem. Economic studies at only one level will be incomplete and probably misleading, hence the value of this peasant-state framework for such studies.

3. Politics

Because economic and political relations overlap in a political-economy approach, there is some repetition in what follows, but I will concentrate specifically on political implications of my analysis as it raises additional points. The peasant-state approach makes sense of the widespread observation that peasant domestic groups' relations with the state are largely defensive ones, even today. If the state is--or is seen as--attempting to wrest surplus production above some subsistence minimum away from the peasants, then the state is their enemy. This is not always true and must not be carried too far. If, for example, local community officials are themselves acting in an oppressive way, the domestic group may enlist the aid of the state against them. During periods of war, the domestic group may be happy to rely on state protection of its claims to local resources. Thus the relationship between peasants and state is not necessarily or invariable exploitative but depends on their respective needs at any particular time.

The central arena unity, seen as the product of political organization in the peasant-state, is the community. It mediates between two often incompatible constituencies, being a dual creation of both the peasantry and the state. It must balance dual responsibilities much as the peasant serves both his enterprise and his family. On one hand, the community must protect its constituent domestic groups, but it must also act

as the state's legitimate representative at the local level. As an extension of the state, it must assist in the application of certain codes, collect certain taxes, and perform other duties imposed by the state. It is essential to the maintenance of the community that its dual obligation not be resolved wholly in favor of either constituency. Thus its service to the respective constituencies will cycle between serving the interests of one more than the other, depending on the pressures from each side and the actual administrative organization of the community.

Examined in terms of system rationality, the community ensures that the state does not overdraw the resources of the local people, so that the "golden eggs" do not stop coming, while it also provides the state with a reliable flow of local resources. The ways in which this dual role may be performed are only imperfectly understood from a political and administrative standpoint and deserve detailed research.

Looking from the political apex down to the communities and domestic groups, the state employs various means to ensure its continued political power vis-a-vis its constituents and external enemies. The state's position is always enhanced by control over some kind of organized force, often made up of peasant recruits. In negotiating with communities over surplus, the state can offer us--as a "negative" service--to guarantee non-intervention by the state's armed force in local community affairs. It thus provides the service of protection against

a threat that it has itself created. This is often cheaper in resource terms than getting surplus through provision of services desired by the peasantry.

It would be a mistake to see this political relationship between peasants and the state only as a coercive one, however. To a surprising extent, peasants seem to feel themselves part of the state or the cultural tradition it represents. In the service of this larger identification--"for king and country"--they occasionally commit selfless acts of economic and even personal sacrifice. While the state does coerce peasants to serve in the army, for example, no amount of coercion can adequately explain the extensive participation of peasants in wars made by urban elites. Without peasants according the regime considerable legitimacy as a political resource (Ilchman and Uphoff 1969), the state could not operate. This dimension of peasant relationships to the state has been very little studied and yet should prove most revealing. Why a 16th century Basque peasant considered himself, in a significant sense, to be "Spanish or French"--perhaps more so than he does today--is a question which we cannot now answer.

There are a variety of writings about the peasants as a political force. Marx felt that peasants were unable to organize themselves beyond the community level against their exploiters and thus passed them off as "sacks of potatoes" politically (Marx [1869] 1957). Others have also referred to the inability of peasants to pursue real political aims with any degree of

success (Banfield 1958, Hobsbawm 1959). In part, the 20th century has changed that view because of the violence of some agrarian movements (Malefakis 1970, Wolf 1969), but I think this argument obscures an interesting point. The very lack of political organization among the peasants may be the most crucial aspect of the operation of peasant-states. Peasants largely provide their own subsistence; they use only community-level organization for resisting excessive state demands. This makes the political structure of the peasant-state entirely unique.

We must remember that until quite recently, the West European states were peasant-states, and even now, some still have a substantial peasantry. These states successfully carried out the control of legitimate force, defense of territory, foreign policy, internal politics, survived a multitude of national and international crises and even built overseas empires. They did so for centuries, with all these activities underwritten by peasant production.

One feature of these states deserves special attention. The histories of Spain, France and Italy are marked by successive centralizations of the state; the onset of internal crises or international wars; the collapse of the political center; and later the repetition of the cycle. What should impress us is not so much the fragility of these states as their resiliency. No collapse of the political center was fatal, and the cycle of centralization appeared again after each crisis. This could be

only be possible if much of the basic productive organization in the state remained intact during these crises at the center. Were this not the case, neither the frequency of collapse nor the apparent ease of reorganization seems possible.

I suggest that these states survived the major--even endemic--crises precisely because they were based on peasant agriculture. During the periods of centralization, the peasant economy underwrote the activities of the state, and when the center collapsed, the peasants took care of themselves, keeping the productive apparatus viable until the next cycle of centralization. The peasants were the perfect constituency. They provided agricultural surplus, manpower for the army, and required few services in return. During crises they fended for themselves. West European politics from the 16th to 19th century is not fully intelligible without understanding this role of the peasant economy. Because the state never destroyed the ability of the peasants to subsist, they survived when the state's center collapsed.

By contrast, industrial-state governments have extensive and costly obligations to rural populations who no longer produce their own subsistence. Such states cannot undergo crises at the center so freely and be able to expect the rural population to take care of itself and keep production going. The famine that followed Spain's most recent civil war and the problems of post-war West European agriculture are cases in point. The whole population is now so intimately tied to the state by market

and administrative relations that disorder at any level produces disorder at all levels. Although the evolution from peasant-state to industrial-state in Europe has undoubtedly raised living standards and total productivity, it has also increased the fragility of the adaptation, transforming the rules of national and international politics in its wake. Thus the European peasant has probably been the prime source of long-term political stability, economic development and insurance against serious internal insurrection when central policies failed in pre-20th century Europe.

The extent to which this argument holds elsewhere is difficult to assess without more extensive non-European knowledge, but I think it deserves research in Europe and elsewhere. It is important to explore this argument particularly because of the current vogues in development theory. Rural developers often see peasant agriculture as the problem in underdeveloped countries because what they see is its low economic productivity. They bend their efforts toward transforming peasants into commercial farmers, dependent on and producing for markets. Peasants are constantly encouraged to purchase food, take credit, and devote their efforts to the production for cash.

While no one would deny the need for more food or for export receipts, my analysis of the political role of the peasantry raises some serious questions about this. When dismembering the peasant economy, one is not simply replacing an inefficient agriculture with an efficient one; rather, one is transforming domestic, community

and national relationships into a totally new system with new rules and requirements. In return for the farmers' greater articulation with the center, the government must provide more services to them. It must maintain peace at all costs to assure the smooth functioning of the market; it must regularize the collection of revenues and food for the ever-growing non-agricultural population and see to their distribution; it must administer laws, education, transport and an infinity of social services. These are costly and complex activities, often beyond the financial and administrative capability of Third World governments.

Such centralizing development policys remove the peasant community's ability to fall back on its own resources during times of crisis and force the rural population to look to the state to fulfill its needs. Under these conditions, a crisis at the political center can easily become a civil war. The center cannot fall apart during a crisis without creating huge social dislocations of a sort that would not necessarily appear in a peasant-state.

There are serious implications here for rural development efforts, though again, systematic research is still needed to validate and refine them satisfactorily. Unless secure alternatives to the peasant-state economic and political system are clearly available, and until the administrative structure needed to deal with a more mutually interdependent population in the rural areas is created, the peasant economy should be treated as

one of a country's sources of strength, not of weakness. It may be a reservoir of political stability as well as a source of goods and services. I am not ignoring problems of low productivity, high population and poor marketing organization, but I think that to dismember or undermine a flexibly functioning system without a clear sense of the gravity of the reforms undertaken is a serious mistake. A marginally-viable peasantry is considerably better than unemployed urban and rural proletariats, for the state and for the population at large. A rural development policy which sees its task essentially as that of raising agricultural production is bound to have economic, social and political repercussions, some of which will be unmanageable and irreversible.

To sum up, I submit that the spread and success of peasant-states in and outside of Europe argues for a more positive evaluation of this type of political system. I have suggested that the peasantry's production of their own food supply is a critical characteristic of such a system because it allows the national political system to go through a great many vicissitudes without endangering the basic productive apparatus. Further, I suggest that developers consider more seriously the basic viability of the systems in which they intervene. They have a responsibility not to foment piecemeal change which results in the destruction of an existing system without having first established much of the structure of the industrial-state system, at a minimum it's considerable administrative capability. Otherwise,

there cannot be improvement in the conditions for life for the people, most of whom live and work in the rural areas.

B. Issues in the Study of Peasantries

The main theme throughout this analysis has been that we can only understand peasantries in the context of history. As portrayed in the diagram between page 39 and 40, peasant domestic groups, their communities and the state within which they live, all have a series of relationships that are significantly historical. Their explanation is not contained in the present but is to be found in the shifting adaptation worked out between environment, people, communities, and state. Yet to date, most writings on peasants are a historical, and this will continue until the notion of the "timeless" peasant is banished.

The peasant-state is historical in another sense as well. It is an evolutionary type, a socio-economic system different in structure from those that came before and those that are supplanting it. Emerging at a particular point in time through the improvement of agriculture and the growth of population, it also was adopted in and adapted to a wide range of environments. It was a marked evolutionary success by any of the usual standards: population density, level of political organization, energy production, and the range of ecosystems involved. In this sense, the conditions leading to the emergence of the peasant-state and its spread into new areas are crucial subjects of study. But so are the conditions under which it is transformed, when peasant-

subjects become farmer-citizens. Clearly the need and scope for peasant studies is greater than previously apprehended.

1. The Theory of Peasant Societies

Numerous implications for a theoretical understanding of peasant societies have been suggested throughout my discussion. Here I would underscore the most general theoretical implications following from acceptance of the peasant-state framework proposed.

One major implication is that whether the investigator's interest is peasant domestic groups, peasant communities or the state, the minimal context in which studies must be carried out is the peasant-state conceptualized as an overall framework. Domestic groups cannot be understood without the context of the communities and state of which they are part and to which their behavior is responsive. Community actions are not intelligible unless the constraints imposed by their constituent domestic groups and their relations with the superordinate state are known. Likewise, the activities of the state make no sense without an awareness of the resources and constraints its constituent units create.

Studies may, indeed must, emphasize one of these aspects more than another; that is, after all the nature of the problem-oriented research which is most likely to lead to viable theory. But for any specific study, more needs to be known about all aspects of the peasant-state's structure than is presently recognized. We must set higher and more inclusive minimal

standards for information about any aspect of the peasant-state. Much of what may be held constant while undertaking specific analysis--a valid and necessary ceteris paribus procedure--does need separate examination, e.g. the effective rate of state taxation of communities over time, or the real productivity of certain agricultural technology for growing rice. This is to say that we need to increase the range of data and the degree of their integration when dealing with any aspect of the peasant-state.

A second implication involves comparative generalizations. The peasant literature abounds with phrases like "Peasants are...", "The traditional societies of the world...", "The peasants of the Third World..." The analytical approach proposed here does deal with the peasant-state as a specific type of social system, permitting generalizations about what are crucial relationships. But it also argues that the form and internal dynamics of any individual case will be quite unique, depending on the specifics of ecology, population, economic, social and political organization, and the particular history of relations between the state, local communities and domestic groups.

It is useful to take the results of individual researches into a particular aspect of a peasant-state, such as level of conflict in peasant communities, and to attempt to generalize about causal factors from them. But certain procedures must be followed, especially the development of reasonably complete knowledge of the peasant-state context and the formulation of clear descriptions of the full effects of the behavior in question.

Foster's "image of the limited good" (1965) and Redfield's "folk-urban continuum" (1941) are examples of ideas derived from specific cases that have been over-generalized to the peasants of the world, with misleading results.

The political economy of the peasant-state suggests that a typology of peasant-states must be elaborated based on the major varieties of domestic group-community-state interaction and structures before the results of specific cases can be fully understood. This is little more than a reassertion of the direction Wolf mapped out years ago in looking at peasant communities in Latin America and Java (1955, 1957) and in his book Peasants (1966).

For example, the "image of the limited good" and the "closed corporate community" appear in a variety of peasant-states. The logical step is to compare the peasant-states in which they appear to determine whether the similarities arise from attempts to solve similar problems. In this particular case, my expectation is that the behavior of peasants and the organization of the communities heavily exploited by the state will be broadly similar. I also expect that peasants operating without much state interference will be somewhat similar in the openness of behavior and social organization. The error to avoid is abstraction of a complex of behaviors or social forms from the study of one type of peasant-state and application of it generally to all peasant-states. Wolf's attempt at typology in dealing with peasant-states (1966) is not particularly successful, in my

judgment, but it is a step in the right direction. The large number of examples of such as widespread and diverse social type cannot be loosely compared, as the very essence of the peasant-state is adaptation to specific local conditions.

A third lesson drawn from the political economy of peasant-states is that we need to revise our interpretations of the role of peasants in history. Despite the evidence that the peasant-state is one of the most successful and stable social types in human history and despite the fact that it supported the populations of the states that created the socio-cultural world we live in and continues to provide subsistence to over half the world's population, most historical literature ignores the peasant. It stresses instead the low productivity of technology, land and labor, the lack of political integration and the "static" quality of peasant systems as a whole. If one were to believe such models, then the evolutionary success of peasant-states would be inexplicable. What one reads about peasants is so much at variance with their performance over time that one is led to question the observational capacities of social scientists and historians.

Why should this be the case? There are three basic reasons, all needing systematic consideration. The first is the folk history of the Western world. The Western conception of Christian history as progress (White 1968) and our notion that all dynamism in history comes from the city (Caro Baroja 1963) led us to misinterpret our own peasant past. We viewed the Industrial

Revolution as a total reorganization of society, breaking the bonds of traditionalism and setting modern history in motion. Yet such a view is at variance with recent research on the European peasantry which shows much more technological dynamism and political activity than our historical stereotype allows. The results are filtering into historical writing only slowly (Laslett 1965, Tilly 1964, Wrigley 1966, Wylie 1966).

The second reason has to do with world history. The 19th and 20th centuries are certainly the age of the industrial state. It has spread, usually at the expense of peasant-states, first in Europe and then in the era of colonialism and neo-colonialism, it supplanted peasant-states in the optimal temperate zones of the world. It is no accident that the major peasant-states remaining are in the world areas where elements of industrial technology are not yet well adapted.

The most dynamic and productive examples of peasant-states either became industrialized or were supplanted by industrial-states. What we now observe are the marginal survivors, those with few desirable resources or already pillaged of resources by the industrialized countries. Thus most social science work on peasants has been done in the most marginal examples of the peasant-state social type. Perhaps the rather low esteem in which such systems are held is merely an accurate reflection of their present condition. But if so, that condition is itself a product of history and should be recognized as such by historians and social scientists.

The final reason is related to the first two. Basically the social sciences that have produced the literature on peasants originated in the industrial states. These states control the world's resources and the distribution of power. Countless times, industrial states have raided the resources of peasant-states, further broadening the gap between their standard of living and our own. To believe that peasants are inherently "traditional," that they are poor because they are lazy or stupid, or that their leaders are unwise or insufficiently educated is convenient. To the cynics, this is a matter of Westerners believing what is self-justifying. To more sympathetic observers, it is a means of avoiding confrontation with the wholesale economic exploitation and cultural demolition to be found in the Third World. To say that peasant-states are passing away because they are backwards is to comfort oneself in the face of events that are not easily comprehended or accepted.

But beyond this, there are many people who are not in the least cynical or hypersensitive but who subscribe to the idea that peasants are inherently backward. Liberals and Marxists often agree on this. Recent history is full of industrial triumph over peasant organization and practice. The invincibility of the industrial-state so far, lends weight to the sense of its inherent superiority. What works is best. Probably only when severe problems crop up in the industrial-state will a serious re-evaluation of the peasant-state be undertaken. From our

perspective at the apex of world power, it is extremely difficult to conceive of other systems of social relations as being viable or as having been satisfactory. The peasant-state has suffered from invidious comparisons, just as the hunters have been scorned previously by what Sahlins (1972) calls "neolithic prejudice."

2. The Theory of Peasant Development

Central implications of my analysis for development in peasant-societies are the following. First, the presumption must be that peasants are rational unless there is clear evidence to the contrary. The trend toward studying peasant behavior from the peasant decision-maker's point of view is a very positive one. Rather than permitting reliance on discussions of the inherent character of peasants, as if they were not really homo sapiens, this approach requires the investigator to understand all aspects of the situations in which peasants make decisions.

Because these situations include ecological, technical and institutional variables--and their histories--the investigator must master a wide variety of data or be able to collaborate in team research with other experts. The general result of this is an increasing sense of the complexity of peasant life and a consequent agnosticism about facile solutions to peasant problems.

A second and related point is that the evidence, spotty though it may be, is sufficient to require that development agents assume the peasant systems they deal with to be well-organized and well-adapted. Through research one can find out

that such an assumption is wrong, but it is not permissible to argue as, in the past, that simply because people are peasants, development agents have the right and obligation to change their way of life. To argue that peasants are "traditionalists" or are "backwards" has been a charter for all sorts of interventions in their lives. To assert, on the other hand, that peasant systems may be well-adapted solutions to a particular set of problems puts the development agent in a much more complicated position. For if the peasant-state is a system of interrelated units, the manipulation of any of them can only be worked out in the context of the whole system, the context of the political economy of peasant family farming. The agent is faced with assessing the positive and negative features of a system of interrelated structures and behaviors and attempting to bring about improvements without destroying the whole system. His obligation is to learn a great deal about the system before undertaking any course of action, to appreciate the complexity of the systems he is dealing with. Piecemeal schemes will defeat the objective of beneficial development for rural people.

A third point is the need to be skeptical of the received wisdom about peasants. I have argued repeatedly that past conceptions of peasants do not square with the adaptive successes of the peasant-state in history. I also pointed out that our image of peasant society is formed around what is probably a false view of the role of peasants in European history, having

to do more with Western myths than with historical events. The multitude of failed development programs in the Third World further attests to the complexity of peasant systems. I suggest that, for the future, few assumptions about peasants are better than many, and those assumptions held must be held tentatively. Commonsense knowledge about peasants has been a terrible guide for policy.

We need to emphasize the specificity of peasant-state adaptations to local conditions of ecology, population, technology and so on. While each peasant-state represents the playing out of the general social structure outlined, it is clear that each one is quite unique. They are similar in that the same general dynamic of adaptation to a set of problems is involved, but the exact problems and strategies are as numerous as the peasant-states themselves. While development theory is free to treat the theme of industrialization in peasant societies generally, development practice must deal in specifics. There can be no pan-peasant development policies; the very nature of peasant societies precludes them. Policy must be specifically tailored to the state organization, community organization, and domestic groups, allowing for factors of history, ecology, technology and regional variety. The obligation of developers is to gather much more primary data about the country for which policy is being made. To make policy out of ignorance is wrong.

While many people in the development field are sympathetic to this and carry it into practice as far as time and resource

constraints allow, such suggestions are occasionally met with scornful allusions about the impracticality of "ivory tower" academics or are answered with the standard phrase, "That is all very well, but the problems of poverty and degradation won't wait for that primary research." The string of failed development projects, however, is long enough to suggest that the absence of such basic research may ultimately cause the peasants to wait out the rest of this century in poverty, or take up the guns so many people want to put in their hands. It is about time we spoke critically of "ivory tower" developers, who themselves do not face up to facts. The problems of development are inordinately complicated and a political economy of the peasant-state requires that more of that complexity be brought into development policy-making.

The final point is a repetition of my argument about the role of peasants in sustaining the state. If this view is even partially correct, then developers ought to try to ensure the viability of peasant economies until such time as economic alternatives, with their necessary institutional and administrative structures, are clearly thought through and their groundwork fully laid. To squander the reservoir of flexibility contained in the peasantry simply because of preconceived notions about its "backwardness" is to waste a nation's most precious economic and political resource: a large, self-reliant population.

The implications traced above represent the conclusions to be drawn from this analysis though it is not yet a proven theory or even a formalized model. I have stressed that much more research remains to be done before we can be certain about them. But enough evidence, in the literature and in day-to-day work, has accumulated that we can conclude some new, and perhaps regrettably, more complicated conception of peasants is needed. I have drawn together and high-lighted a variety of trends becoming evident in the literature on peasants, from which a picture of the peasant-state emerges. For all its resort to ideal-type reasoning, for all the absent data and oversimplification, the approach is justified, I believe, if it yields some new orientations in research and some greater realism in development efforts.

FOOTNOTES

1. This paper exists largely because of the supportive environment provided me by the Rural Development Committee of Cornell University's Center for International Studies and the Center's director, Milton Esman. The Director of the Committee, Norman T. Uphoff, requested that I address the Committee on the subject of peasants. He subsequently encouraged me to write my thoughts down and the Committee supported me while I wrote the first draft. In 1972, Gilbert Levine, Norman Uphoff and I co-taught an interdisciplinary course on peasants for the Center for International Studies and our discussions led me to revise and expand my thinking on the subject. The Committee also provided the able assistance of Cynthia Gillette who worked on the bibliography and organization of the manuscript. Finally Norman Uphoff subjected the result to a rigorous final editing. I am most grateful for this abundance of support and interest for what turned out to be a most difficult undertaking. The ideas and opinions expressed in this paper are my own and should not be taken to represent the thinking of the Rural Development Committee as a whole.
2. A recent collection of writings which departs from this tradition is one edited by Teodor Shanin (1971). His is eclectic in the disciplines represented and is oriented around a sophisticated conception of the problems involved in the study of peasants. It is a most useful collection for students of peasantry to examine.
3. Unilineal evolutionism is the doctrine that all societies pass through the same fixed stages in their evolution from savagery to civilization. By implication, primitive and peasant societies, being at lower stages in the process, are considered inherently inferior to the so-called civilized societies. This inferiority is often attributed to the people themselves, by arguing that they are inherently incapable of certain kinds of technical or intellectual activities.
4. Peasant-states were not possible prior to the first agricultural "revolution", when cereal grains were developed in the Middle East and Far East, South Asia, and Mesoamerica. These grains were non-perishable and produced, especially with irrigation, significant yields. None of the ancient empires, which were precursors of the peasant-states of more recent history, could have been founded without this first set of developments. For relevant literature, see Struever (1971).

FOOTNOTES (cont.)

5. The reader familiar with peasant studies will have noted my omission thus far of the subject of patronage, which deservedly has received a great deal of attention in the past. It is a prime mechanism in the articulation of domestic groups with the community and state and as such is important to the functioning of the peasant-state. I have omitted it here because it is widely discussed in the literature and because synthetic treatments are available. For useful discussions, the reader is directed to Potter, Diaz, and Foster (1966), Shanin (1971), Landé (1964), Lemarchand (1972), Scott (1972), and Gillette and Uphoff (n.d.).

REFERENCES

- Anderson, James N.
1958 "Ecological Anthropology and Anthropological Ecology" in John J. Honigmann, ed., Handbook of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Rand McNally and Company, Chicago, forthcoming.
- Banfield, Edward C., & L. F. Banfield
1958 Moral Basis of a Backward Society, Free Press, New York.
- Baran, Paul
1957 The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press, New York.
- Barth, Fredrik
1963 "Capital Investment and the Social Structure of a Pastoral Nomad Group in South Persia," Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies, R. Firth and B. Yamey, eds., Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago, pp. 69-81.
- 1967 "Economic Spheres in Darfur," Themes in Economic Anthropology, R. Firth, ed., Tavistock Publications, London, pp. 149-174.
- Barth, Fredrik, ed.
1963 The Role of the Entrepreneur in Social Change in Northern Norway, Norwegian University Press, Oslo.
- Belshaw, Cyril S.
1964 Under the Ivi Tree, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London.
- Benet, Francisco
1963 "Sociology Uncertain: The Ideology of the Rural-Urban Continuum," Comparative Studies in Society and History VI: 1-23.
- Bloch, Marc
1965 Feudal Society, L. A. Manyon, translator, two volumes, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, (Original English translation, 1961).
- 1966 French Rural History: An Essay on Its Basic Characteristics, translator Janet Sondheimer, University of California Press: Berkeley.

- Boserup, Ester
 1965 The Conditions of Agricultural Growth, Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago.
- Cancian, Frank
 1965 Economics and Prestige in a Maya Community, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
 1972 Change and Uncertainty in a Peasant Economy, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Caro Baroja, Julio
 1959 Los Vascos, 2nd edition revised, Ediciones Minotauro, Madrid.
 1963 "The City and the Country: Reflexions [sic] on Some Ancient Commonplaces," in Julian Pitt-Rivers, ed., Mediterranean Countrymen, Mouton and Company, The Hague, pp. 27-40.
 1969 "Las bases históricas de una economía 'tradicional'," Cuadernos de etnografía y etnología navarra 1"7-33.
- Chayanov, A.V.
 1966 "Peasant Farm Organization," in Thorner et al., A. V. Chayanov: The Theory of Peasant Economy, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Homewood, Illinois.
- Conklin, Harold
 1961 "The Study of Shifting Cultivation," Current Anthropology 2"27-61.
- Cook, Scott
 1966 "The Obsolete 'Anti-market' Mentality: A Critique of the Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology." American Anthropologist 68:323-345.
 1969 "The 'Anti-market' Mentality Re-examined: A Further Critique of the Substantive Approach to Economic Anthropology." Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 25:378-406.
 1970 "Price and Output Variability in a Peasant-artisan Stoneworking Industry in Oaxaca, Mexico: An Analytical Essay in Economic Anthropology." American Anthropologist 72:776-801.
 1973 "Production, Ecology, and Economic Anthropology: Notes Toward an Integrated Frame of Reference" Social Science Information 12:25-52.

- Dalton, George
1969 "Theoretical Problems in Economic Anthropology,"
Current Anthropology 10:63-102.
- Dalton, George, ed.
1967 Tribal and Peasant Economies, Natural History Press,
Garden City, New York.
- Dewey, Alice
1962 Peasant Marketing in Java, The Free Press of Glencoe,
Inc., New York.
- Epstein, T. Scarlett
1962 Economic Development and Social Change in South India,
Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- 1973 South India: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, Macmillan,
London.
- Firth, Raymond
1966 Elements of Social Organization, Beacon Press, Boston,
(originally published in 1951).
- 1966 Malay Fishermen: Their Peasant Economy, 2nd edition,
revised Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut (originally
published in 1944).
- 1969 "Social Structure and Peasant Economy: The Influence
of Social Structure Upon Peasant Economies," in
Clifton Wharton, Jr., ed., Subsistence Agriculture
and Economic Development, Aldine Publishing Company,
Chicago, pp. 23-37.
- Firth, Raymond & B. S. Ramey, eds.
1963 Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasants Societies,
Aldine Publishing Company, Chicago.
- Forman, Shepard and Joyce Riegelhaupt
1970 "Market Place and Marketing System: Toward a Theory of
Peasant Economic Integration," Comparative Studies in
Society and History 12:188-212.
- Foster, George M.
1948 Empire's Children: The People of Tzintzuntzan, Institute
of Social Anthropology Publication No. 6, Smithsonian
Institute, Washington, D.C.
- 1953 "What is Folk Culture?" American Anthropologist
55:159-173.
- 1965 "Peasant Society and the Image of Limited Good"
American Anthropologist 67:293-315.

- Frank, Andre Gunder
 1967 "The Sociology of Development and the Underdevelopment of Sociology," Catalyst, summer:20-73.
- 1969 Capitalism & Underdevelopment in Latin America, Rev. Ed., Monthly Review Press: New York.
- Frankel, Francine R.
 1971 India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs, Princeton University Press: Princeton, New Jersey.
- Franklin, S. H.
 1969 The European Peasantry: The Final Phase, Methuen and Co., Ltd., London.
- Furtado, Celso
 1970 Obstacles to Development in Latin America, Charles Ekker, translator, Anchor Books, Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York.
- Geertz, Clifford
 1961 "Studies in Peasant Life," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., Biennial Review of Anthropology.
- Gillette, Cynthia and Norman Uphoff
 n.d. "The Credit Connection: Cultural And Social Factors Affecting Small Farmer Participation in Credit Programs," m.s. distributed by the Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.
- Godelier, Maurice
 1967 Racionalidad e irracionalidad en la economía, translation by Nicole Blanc, Siglo Veintiuno, Editores, S.A., Mexico, D.F. (Originally published as Rationalité et irrationalité en économie, Maspero, Paris, 1966 and available in English as Rationality and Irrationality in Economics, New Left Books, 1972).
- Goldkind, Victor
 1965 "Social Stratification in the Peasant Community: Redfield's Chan Kom Reinterpreted," American Anthropologist 67, 863-884.
- Greenwood, Davydd
 n.d. Unrewarding Wealth: The Commercialization and Collapse of Agriculture in a Spanish Basque Town, unpublished manuscript.
- Halpern, Joel, and John Brode
 1967 "Peasant Society: Economic Changes and Revolutionary Transformations," in Bernard J. Siegel, ed., Biennial Review of Anthropology. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1967, pp. 46-139.

- Harris, Marvin
1966 "The Cultural Ecology of India's Sacred Cattle," Current Anthropology 7:51-60.
1968 The Rise of Anthropological Theory, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York.
- Heston, Alan
1971 "An Approach to the Sacred Cow of India," Current Anthropology 12:191-209.
- Hill, Polly
1970 Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa, Cambridge at the University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J.
1959 Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th centuries. Manchester University Press, Manchester.
- Hoselitz, Bert
1960 Sociological Factors in Economic Development, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- Ilchman, Warren and Norman Uphoff
1969 The Political Economy of Change, The University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Johnson, Allen
1970 Sharecroppers of the Seras, Stanford University Press, Stanford.
- Jurion, F., and J. Henry
1969 Can Primitive Farming be Modernized? Publications de l'Institut national pour l'étude agronomique du Congo (I.N.E.A.C.) Hors serie 1969. Brussels. Translated from the French by AGRA Europe (London).
- Landé, C.
1964 Leaders, Factions, and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics, Monograph Series No. 4 Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut.
- Laslett, Peter
1965 The World We Have Lost, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
- LeClair, Edward, Jr.
1962 "Economic Theory and Economic Anthropology," American Anthropologist 64:1179-1203.

- Lemarchand, R. and K. Legg
1972 "Political Clientelism and Development", Comparative Politics IV 149-178.
- Lewis, Oscar
1951 Life in A Mexican Village: Tepoztlán Restudied, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
1964 Pedro Martinez: A Mexican Peasant and His Family, Random House, New York.
- McClelland, David
1961 The Achieving Society, Van Nostrand, Princeton.
- Malefakis, Edward
1970 Agrarian Reform and Peasant Revolution in Spain: Origins of the Civil War, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Marriot, McKim
1955 Village India: Studies in the Little Community, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Marx, Karl
1967 The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, International Publishers, New York (Originally published in 1869).
- Mellor, John
1966 The Economics of Agricultural Development, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York.
- Mintz, Sidney
1959 "Internal Market Systems as Mechanisms of Social Articulation," Proceedings of the 1959 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society, University of Washington Press, Seattle, pp. 20-30.
1960 "Peasant Markets," Scientific American 203:112-118, 120, 122.
- Murra, John
1960 "Rite and Crop in the Inca State" S. Diamond, ed. Culture and History, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 393-407.
1962 "Cloth and Its Function in the Inca State" American Anthropologist 64:710-728.
1965 "Herds and Herders in the Inca State" in Man, Culture and Animals, American Association for the Advancement of Science Publications 78, Washington:185-216.

- 1972 "El 'control vertical' de un maximo de pisos ecologicos en la economia de las sociedades andinas," en Visita de la Provincia de Leon de Huanuco (1562), Inigo Ortiz de Zuniga, visitador, Universidad Hermilio Valdizan, Huanuco, Peru.
- Nash, Manning
 1961 "The Social Context of Economic Choice in a Small Society," Man LXI:186-191.
- 1966 Primitive and Peasant Economic Systems, Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco.
- Nicholson, Norman
 1966 The Politics of Food Policy in India, Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University.
- 1968 "The Political Aspects of Indian Food Policy", Pacific Affairs, XLI:34-49.
- Odend'hal, Stewart
 1972 "Energetics of Indian Cattle in Their Environment" Human Ecology, Vol 1. No. 1:3-22.
- Ortiz, Sutti R. de
 1973 Uncertainties in Peasant Farming: A Colombian Case, London School of Economics, Monographs on Social Anthropology, No. 46, The University of London, The Athlone Press, London.
- Pitt-Rivers, Julian
 1954 People of the Sierra, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London.
- Polanyi, Karl
 1944 The Great Transformation, Rinehart and Company, New York.
- Polanyi, Karl, Conrad Arensberg, and Harry Pearson, eds.
 1957 Trade and Market in the Early Empires, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois.
- Poleman, Thomas and Donald Freebairn, eds.
 1973 Food, Population, and Employment: The Impact of the Green Revolution, Praeger Publishers, New York.
- Potter, Jack M., May N. Diaz, and George M. Foster, eds.
 1967 Peasant Society: A Reader, Little, Brown and Company, Boston.
- Rappaport, Roy A.
 1968 Pigs for the Ancestors, Yale University Press, New Haven.

Redfield, Robert

1930 Tepoztlán: A Mexican Village, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

1934 Chan Kom: A Maya Village, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Publication No. 448, Washington, D.C.

1941 The Folk Culture of Yucatan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

1960 The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Sahlins, Marshall D.

1972 Stone Age Economics, Aldine-Atherton, Chicago.

Salisbury, Richard

1970 Vunamami, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Schultz, Theodore

1964 Transforming Traditional Agriculture, Yale University Press, New Haven, Connecticut.

Scientific American

1971 "Energy and Power," Vol. 224.

Scott, J.C.

1972 "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia", American Political Science Review LXIV 91-113.

Shanin, Teodor, ed.

1971 Peasants and Peasant Societies, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England.

Silverman, Sydel

1965 "Patronage and Community-Nation Relationships in Central Italy," Ethnology IV:172-189.

Singer, Milton, ed.

1958 "Traditional India: Structure and Change," Journal of American Folklore 71:191-518.

Slicher van Bath, B.H.

1963 The Agrarian History of Western Europe A.D. 500-1850, Olive Ordish, translator. Edward Arnold, Ltd., London.

Spooner, Brian, ed.

1972 Population Growth: Anthropological Implications, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge.

- Steward, Julian
 1955 The Theory of Culture Change, University of Illinois Press, Urbana.
- Struever, Stuart, ed.
 1971 Prehistoric Agriculture, Natural History Press, Garden City, New York.
- Stocking, George W., Jr.
 1968 Race, Culture, and Evolution, The Free Press, New York.
- Tarrow, Sidney
 1967 Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, (Yale Studies in Political Science, 21) Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Tax, Sol
 1953 Penny Capitalism, Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 16, Washington, D.C.
- Thomas, R. Brooke
 1972 Human Adaptation to a High Andean Energy Flow System, Ph.D. Thesis, Pennsylvania State University: University Park, Pennsylvania.
- Thompson, Donald and John Murra
 1966 "The Inca Bridges in the Huanuco Region," American Antiquity 31:632-639.
- Tilly, Charles
 1964 The Vendee, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
- Uphoff, Norman and Warren Ilchman, eds.
 1972 The Political Economy of Development, University of California Press, Berkeley.
- Wharton, Clifton R., Jr.
 1971 "Risk, Uncertainty, and the Subsistence Farmer: Technological Innovation and Resistance to Change in the Context of Survival," in George Dalton, ed., Studies in Economic Anthropology, Anthropological Studies Number 7, American Anthropological Association, Washington, D.C., pp. 151-178.
- White, Lynn, Jr.
 1968 Dynamo and Virgin Reconsidered, Machina ex Deo, M.I.T. Press, Boston.
- Wolf, Eric
 1955 "Types of Latin American Peasantry: A Preliminary Discussion," American Anthropologist 57:452-471.

- 1956 "Aspects of Group Relations in a Complex Society:
Mexico," American Anthropologist 58:1065-78.
- 1957 "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica
and Central Java," Southwestern Journal of Anthropology,
13:1-18.
- 1966 Peasants, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey.
- 1969 Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, Harper & Row
Publishers, New York.

Wrigley, E. A. ed.

- 1966 An Introduction to English Historical Demography From
the Sixteenth to the Nineteenth Century, Weidenfeld
and Nicolson, London.

Wylie, Lawrence

- 1964 Village in the Vaucluse, Harper & Row, Publishers,
New York.

Wylie, Lawrence ed.

- 1966 Chanzeaux, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Zinkin, Maurice

- 1971 "Risk in the Peasant's Lot," Ceres :24-27.