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Attempts to assess whether DASP, a Brazilian civil service agency, meets three general tests of institutionalization and their subsets developed by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution-Building. Concludes that it does not meet some of the criteria associated with the tests of survival, valuation by the environment, and normativeness.

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DASP AND THE GENERAL TESTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

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DASP AND THE GENERAL TESTS OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The "Guiding Concepts" document of the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building suggests three general categories of tests or conditions for judging the quality of institutionalization of a social entity: "survival," "valuation by the environment," and "normativeness" of patterns. Each of these conditions may be categorized into further subsets. The institution building process is considered completed when these can be demonstrated to exist sufficiently. Because it is acknowledged that institutionality is a matter of degree the three tests of institutionalization and their subcategories can be demonstrated on continuua. The more an organization approaches the right end of a continuum, the closer it is to being fully institutionalized in terms of that particular category. A total profile represented by relative position on all continuua approximates the overall measure of institutionalization. The following are the continuua, accompanied by a discussion of DASP in terms of the extent of its institutionalization.

Non-Institutionalized	Fully Institutionalized
1. Survival	
a. Sacrifice of all innovative elements	Sacrifice of no innovative elements

In so far as survival *per se* is a critierion of institutionalization DASP is more institutionalized than not. Its control powers were severely curtailed after the fall of Vargas' Dictatorship in 1945. Especially cut back were

"coordinating" powers through which DASP maintained a hegemony of so-called administrative "means" (in contrast to "ends" or line functions) such as budget, personnel, and other auxiliary staff activities. By 1966, when the staff agency was finally dismembered, it had gained back most of these powers and even added additional ones. The critical thing, however, is that many of these new and reacquired functions became formalistic; either they were not carried out or they were significantly vitiated. This was nothing new, for, because of Vargas' priorities some functions of the Dictatorship era DASP became formalistic as well. Following the Dictatorship, formalism increased for two reasons: First, sufficient personnel were not available to carry out official tasks; Second, functional emphasis frequently changed because of the needs of particular Presidents; other times the leadership of DASP modified functional emphasis as well. Invariably, as shifts in the allocations of resources among Vargas priorities occurred, and the ability of the staff agency to recruit and retain qualified personnel diminished, formalism increased. Of course, as was often the case, restraint of certain functions such as the competitive examinations also produced formalism.

While the history of DASP shows a great deal of functional growth and branching to many new endeavors, there has been a basic thread of emphasis that has survived since the nineteen thirties--civil service reform, personnel system innovations, controls, and most of all, the selection of personnel by competitive examinations, have comprised the main thrust of

civil service reforms. The results have not been distinguished, and, again, formalism has resulted; considering the political circumstances however, there has not been a total sacrifice of innovative elements. These circumstances were described in the historical introduction to this analysis, but a significant factor that should be acknowledged here is that much of the economic and social growth in Brazil since 1930 has taken place under conditions of openness in the political system which makes survival of civil service reforms at any level quite amazing. Openness in the political system is characterized by access of the masses to centers of public decision-making, usually quite directly, and without intervening structures of interest articulation and aggregation. Among the demands of the masses have been a clamor for public jobs and personal favors. At times public personnel reforms have been held in abeyance--almost in a chrysalis state--during regimes that were unsympathetic to reforms. Further, the approach to reforms has changed somewhat. Thus, the personnel classification scheme that reflected the difficulties and the consensus of the nineteen thirties gave way to position classification in the nineteen fifties. Position classification itself became formalistic as well, through the impact of congressmen providing for political clients. The important point about developments in classification, however, is that changes in technology were incorporated into on-going reform attempts, even when reforms were restricted and subverted. Therefore developments in level and sophistication of technology progressed.

Thus, two factors tend to place the DASP more or less at the center on the scale of "sacrifice of innovative elements," in spite of acute formalism. Obviously, calibration of these continuua is impossible, therefore "center" or "right of center" is but an approximation which probably demonstrates more institutionalization having taken place than not. First, is the character of a system that permits innovations to be safeguarded until inhospitable environmental conditions pass. Accordingly, a look at institutional development at a given point in time in Brazil might give the impression of a total sacrifice of innovative elements. This is not necessarily so, for example, it is clear that 12 per cent of an estimated five hundred thousand employees (as of 1961) entering the classified service via open competitive examinations is an unspectacular record for a central personnel agency officially charged with the conduct of these examiniations since 1936. Therefore a look at the record at any given time is disappointing. However, the continued performance of this function in 1966 is meaningful. One cannot judge the persistence of innovations solely in terms of raw quantitativeness. Persistence by itself at some level of performance is significant as well, especially when ecological problems make the implanting of innovations difficult.

A second factor which places DASP more towards the center or "no sacrifice" end of the ("sacrific of innovative elements") scale has been the factor of learning during the periods of agency restraint, resulting in technical improvement of reforms after environmental conditions again permitted. An example of such learning was the plan to introduce in-service training on a

massive scale as an instrument of bureaucratic reform during the short-lived Janio Quadros Administration. The training collapsed with Quadros' resignation, but organizational learning had taken place--broad-scale training was to be substituted for the elite corps-"administrative means" monopoly strategy which had had undesirable consequences.

b. Innovations independent of founding structure or lodged in other institutions	Innovations lodged in original or descendant institution

Survival of specific innovations is not dependent necessarily upon the continued existence of a given organization. Obviously, a function can be taken over by other agencies, it can grow to be accepted as normative for numerous groups, and in general it can become diffused throughout a social system or subsystems. However, when a function ceases to be associated with a specific organization it really leaves the realm of "institution" as we are concerned with the subject here. Perhaps the ultimate outcome aspiration for the goals of an institution is general diffusion and widespread internalization. This is to say that the environment would be thoroughly socialized to such goals. Then, perhaps the reason for organizational existence would cease. However, at this point goals have assumed the characteristics of ideas. If we choose to think of ideas as institutions, such as the idea of "capitalism," then it is possible not to be concerned with the problem of organizational persistence. However, ideas *per se*, aside from the question of organizational immortality, are not of primary interest in this

study unless they relate to the dynamics of the persistence of structure. This is not to say that descendant structures are not of interest, for organizations sometimes pass through several incarnations. What is important is that the essence of goals, means and structure persist discretely enough to determine that there has been organizational immortality.

There is a confusing element in the application of this organizational structure persistence ("dependence upon founding structure") scale in the case of Brazil; this is the general tendency for Brazilian organizations not to die even when functional performance has ceased. Further, a lasting cessation of functional performance often is difficult to distinguish because, as described for DASP under the preceeding, "sacrifice of innovative elements" scale, there has been a quality of functional quiescence, followed by reassertion of activities and updated technology when favorable environmental conditions were again present. At least, in the case of DASP we have concluded that insofar as civil service reforms are concerned there has been organizational and functional persistence. Beginning with the Nabuco report on civil service pay and status in 1935, followed by the Law of Readjustment and the establishment of the Federal Civil Service Council in 1936, the DASP in 1937 and ultimately the central personnel agency that will remain from the dismemberment of DASP in 1965, we see a linear development in functions and an ancestral relationship among organizations.

It can be argued that in many cases the growth of functions, other than those related to civil service reforms as originally envisaged by reformers,

developed out of a desire to cope with environment. Originally civil service reform was seen as being primarily limited (1) to reducing the proliferation of titles in the civil service and the disparity between titles, duties and pay to some extent, (2) to establishing a civil service law, especially to be concerned with the rights and duties of functionaries, and (3) to adopt the competitive examination for personnel selection. However, it was not long before reformers discovered that circumstances induced other kinds of controls. For example, personnel reforms were being vitiated through the budget; eventually, this led to involvement in the process of budgetary control. Other kinds of "beat the system" attempts under the Law of the Public Functionary prompted the tightening of personnel controls and the tendency towards controlism in general. It is interesting to note that with the founding of the Federal Civil Service Council in 1936 some attention was given to organizational studies. This function was assigned primarily to the efficiency commissions in the ministries. Great difficulty was experienced in achieving performance of the function because the efficiency commissions devoted practically all available time to the review of classification and other personnel appeals regarding the status of functionaries.

In the discussion that follows of the dimension concerned with the "autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system" test of institutions it will be seen that a difficulty experienced by DASP has been the problem of selective control over inputs to the organization in the form of new functions. Further, maintenance of performance of many of these functions has not always been

possible. For example, the supervision of, and the setting of standards for purchasing and materiel systems for federal government was transferred to the Ministry of Finance at the time of DASP's reform in 1945 and never regained by the staff agency. Again, in the case of purchasing and materiel, reforms were originally independent of and in the case, proceeded concerns with the civil service. Purchasing and personnel were related in the same organization under the doctrine and structure of the DASP. Leaders who emerged from the civil service reform side dominated the power structure of DASP, however.

Thus, overall, it must be said that if the criterion of survival of functions in original or descendant organizations ("dependent upon founding structure") includes all functions ever assigned DASP, the agency must be placed far towards the left, or non-institutionalized end of the scale. If, on the other hand, we view the presistence of the personnel function as primary to the development of DASP as an institution, the agency tends towards right of center--more institution-like.

2. Extent of valuation by environment

a. Non-autonomous	Autonomous
(1) Cannot formally deviate from parent system	Can formally deviate from parent system

This second category of tests relates to the extent to which an institution is viewed by its environment as having intrinsic value. Two general paramenters of this institutional character have been developed--

"autonomy" and "influence." First, under "autonomy," is the ability of the institution to establish rules and procedures which "deviate from the (parent) larger system" of which it is a part. Presumably, the more it can deviate from the parent system, the more likely is it to be independently institutionalized.

As suggested previously, one important difficulty experienced by DASP has been an inability to control its inputs in the form of functions. Much of the functional growth in the staff agency has resulted from attempts to gird the personnel system against practices that would have nullified reforms. To some extent agency leadership was responsible for accretion of new functions as well. More than anything else, however, the relationship of DASP to Getulio Vargas has produced the functional growth in the agency.

More important than growth in formal functions was the subtle process of expansion of informal activitives. Growth in unoffical functions particulary was related to the needs of the Dictator. On the one hand, such informal inputs were based upon Vargas' appreciation of the competence of DASP's personnel. Accordingly, the agency ventured into such fields as economic development planning. On the other hand, DASP was Vargas' handmaiden in maintaining the Dictatorship's power structure. Accordingly, the President of DASP, Luis Simoes Lopes, served on the State's Affairs Commission which controlled the former federal subdivisions of the centralized "New State." DASP often conducted studies for this agency. More important, however, were the services provided the Dictator by DASP related to the personnel function since personnel was of fundamental interest to the staff agency. Part of

Vargas' power base was urban labor; therefore it was difficult for him to oppose such things as the obtaining of public jobs through influence and the granting of bonuses and salary increases to public functionaries. It was DASP's responsibility to study such matters, and because of the agency's commitment to the Dictator, DASP usually took the brunt of labor's hostility (particularly from the civil service) following whatwere interpreted as unfavorable decisions. DASP became Vargas' "whipping boy" as part of his general strategy of the "trial balloon" for testing receptivity of the political environment to particular actions and policies. Because DASP was committed to protecting the Dictator's power base it crippled its capacity to carry out fundamental reforms. This followed from the expenditure of agency resources on non-reform activities, many of which, in turn, produced a negative public image.

DASP remained in the ambit of the Presidency after Vargas. While subsequent growth in formal functions might indicate agency modification of its programs, this was not the case because formalism through non-performance characterized much of the new formal responsibility. As under Vargas, the needs of Presidents of the Republic foreshadowed the performance of many agency functions. Presidential needs continued to be inimical to the good image of DASP.

Thus, the following conclusion seems inescapable: because of inability to control its inputs DASP must be considered to be non-institutional in character as related on the scale of "autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system."

(2) Cannot acquire resources based upon intrinsic value without harassment	Can acquire resources based upon intrinsic value without harassment

One measure of the degree to which an institution is valued is the extent of resource supply by organizations in its environment. ("Autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value"). Similarly, an institution has autonomous stature when potential blockers of resources lack freedom to limit the institution and its values by denying resources of all kinds. Resulting from the binary relationship that resources suppliers have to an organization--the ability to turn it "on" and "off"--perhaps it is one of the most important tests of institutionality; it clearly affects an organization's box score on other such tests like survival.

Because of the life and death relationship between an institution and its resource suppliers it is important that we consider the on-going situation of the institutional planner and his political calculations regarding resources. The analysis of the future in this respect is no simple problem, however, One reason is that the choice of resource connections must be made in relation to the kinds of institutional goals that are to be served and to the impact of future goal accomplishment. The foresight required for such planning is often further obscured by the uncomfortable situation of having to benefit one source of organizational support at the expense of another. Thus, one usually is confronted with what is by now the organization theorist's classical "satisficing" situation in which the accomplishment of objective A with

means B results in gaining somewhat less of consequence X than Y or Z than would have come about if other objectives and means were selected. These planning difficulties suggest some ground rules for support building. First is that there should be a broad base of support and influence. The ultimate aspiration is for such diffused internalization of organization values that they and the organization become sacrosanct in the society; accordingly it would be extremely difficult to deny such an organization resources. In the narrower focus of legislative bodies, executives, clientele and other organizational control groups that impinge on the allocation of resources, it behooves the incipient institution to diversify in the development of its supporters. The idea of multiple organizational resource suppliers leads to the second rule of institutional support seeking--that of the orientation of supporters toward the values of the institution. At the very least, such supporting organizations should not be constrained by contrary values. More than the absence of incompatibility, however, organizations with values that in some sense are related must be sought out. Finally, the third rule of institution support seeking is based upon the assumption that regardless of value compatibility, all political support has its price. Therefore, in the progess of institution building the give and take of political trading must be girded by judicious decision-making.. Obviously, the price of support of an organization with values which are antithetical might be the sacrifice of the raison d'etre of the institution. More commonly, however, a tangle of commitments

force incompatibility among supporters to the surface which can result in negative consequences for the developing institution.

DASP's orientation towards the left, or non-institutionalized end of the acquisition of resources scale ("autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value"), is classical in light of what has been said about planning for future resource support and the intrinsic valuation of an organization by its environment. Pre-DASPian reforms--the study commissions and the Federal Civil Service Council--were favored with some support in Congress as well as from the President. Under the Dictatorship, of course, the source of financial and authority resources was the President of the Republic himself. This pattern continued subsequent to Vargas as well. The principle difference between Vargas and others, however, was that he favored DASP's activities, and therefore ensured the flow of resources; many other Presidents either have had little interest in, or have looked with disfavor upon the agency's higher values and program goals. Presidents have neutralized the staff agency (1) by placing men of mediocre ability in the top leadership position of DASP, (2) by assigning important functions that might have been carried out by the agency to other organizations, and (3) by restraining the holding of competitive examinations and thereby lessening the agency's influence over the bureaucracy. The latter restraint has had the secondary effect of diminishing the quality of DASP's personnel resources as well. Not holding the competitive examinations has tended to discourage candidates from taking preparatory courses at the School of the Public Service; this has

resulted in lessened resource development, which ultimately affected the DASP's ability to carry out its mission because of a shortage of trained technicians. Mediocrity of leadership has had the secondary effect of precluding agency connections outside the ambit of the presidency which might have enabled it to gain needed resources.

Thus, we see that in terms of some rather fundamental rules of support seeking which were described above, DASP has not been able to develop more than one source of support and influence. Its ability to garner resources has diminished accordingly.

(3) Cannot rely on intrinsic value in defense against attacks and encroachment	Can rely on intrinsic value in defense against attacks and encroachment

Again, as was the case with the previous scale ("autonomy-ability to acquire resources based upon untrinsic value"), autonomy is based upon being valued by the environment. Ideally, institutional support should be based upon diverse groups which have thoroughly internalized the agency's value system. When such ideal conditions are not possible, quid pro quo relationships and situations of interdependence with other organizations and groups are useful. Thus, supporting groups have a stake in the viability of the developing institution, and to some extent, they can be counted upon as allies in defense situations. The problem with quid pro quo arrangements is that shifting coalitions sometimes promote transitory relationships in the absence of a durable binder. In the final analysis, nothing is really as

durable as "gut" level linkage--support based upon internalized values.

Returning to a previous theme--personnel, especially selection as the basic program of DASP--we see some use being made of the quid pro quo tactic in defense. This was demonstrated in 1961 when former President Goulart restricted the competitive examinations while engineering tenure by act of Congress for political followers, whom he had appointed to temporary positions in the civil service as a means of circumventing merit system requirments. He made many of these appointments during a previous administration where he served as Vice President. His immediate predecessor, Janio Quadros, was sympathetic to the goals of DASP and wanted to rearm the staff agency. DASP's Director of Selection and Training convinced President Quadros that the lingering problem of the temporaries should be eliminated by holding open competitive examinations. In the mean time, Quadros resigned the presidency, but by the time of Goulart's action many examiniations already had been given. President Goulart halted examinations, certification of eligibles and appointments. The Director of Selection and Training managed to generate a great deal of sentiment in opposition to the President's action among professional associations and ad hoc groups of examinees by resigning and other tactics. Ultimately, the President abandoned the attempt to circumvent the system.

The significance of the foregoing is that it is an example of a quid pro quo alliance. There was no well internalized basis of support that could be counted upon generally for institutional defense. To the extent of

the temporary alliance between DASP and employee groups, DASP was able to preserve the integrity of the selection process. Unfortunately, after this incident the support group evaporated; employees who were qualified by examination ceased to be concerned with DASP and its problems. The lack of more enduring forms of support linkage can be traced to DASP itself, for potential sources of such support exist in Brazilian society. Perhaps businessmen and industrialists could have been systematically coopted around the rubric of optimizing values--economy, efficiency and rationality --which both they and DASP share. This would have required planned effort to involve such supporters in advisory and similar relationships. Other groups demonstrated related values. For example, the so-called "Middle Sectors" of Latin America espouse values such as governmental reform and modernization; these are not inimical to those of DASP. Modern military establishments also have a certain commonality with DASP on issues such as professionalism and bureaucracy. Thus, because of an inability or unwillingness to build support among groups in society favorably disposed to its values, DASP must be placed on the left side of the "autonomy-ability to rely on intrinsic value for defense against attacks and encroachment scale." To the extent that it was able to promote transitory identification with its goals, it generated defense support, fleeting, but effective for the moment.

b.	Non-influential	Influential
(1)	Not able to influence decisions in its functional area	Able to influence decisions in its functional area
(2)	Cannot enlarge sphere of action outside organization	Can enlarge sphere of action outside organization

The second parameter for judging the extent to which an institution is viewed by its environment has having intrinsic value is its influence. The two scales which comprise this dimension are discussed together inasmuch as most relevant information from the DASP experience already has been discussed. Further, what remains of the influence of the staff agency and its descendants can be understood better within the context of the remaining general test of institutionalization which follows--"normativeness."

As described, DASP achieved optimum influence over decisions in its functional area under the Dictatorship. Its power was parlayed through performance of two principle roles. First it was the offical controller and reformer of the bureaucracy; in this respect it was also the confidant of the Dictator. Second, it was one of the few interfaces in the bureacuracy where systematic study and problem solving techniques were applied to decision-making. Subsequent to the Dictatorship, the DASP remained as an influence tool of the President; most Presidents other than Vargas did not choose to use DASP in this way, however. Exceptions to the rule have been chief executives who have had difficulty in relating to Congress. With the exception of the Dutra administration, most of these were short-lived incumbencies such as those of Presidents Cafe Filho and Quadros. Perhaps it can be said that DASP was most like an institution on the "influence on decisions" criterion under President Dutra. Dutra allowed DASP's Director-General to develop linkage with Congress by trading political support of

Presidential measures for subventions and other allocations of resources controlled by the Executive Branch. Also, DASP was somewhat valued by legislators at this time (1946-1950) because staff services were supplied them by the agency. This opportunity to expand its support base was withdrawn with the return of Vargas to the Presidency in 1951, however.

The foregoing experience also relates to DASP's "ability to enlarge its sphere of action." The ability of the agency to expand functionally beyond the limitations of its formal organization have been described elsewhere in this paper. Functional growth invariably has been accompanied by formalism, usually because resources were not available. Further, and especially during the Dictatorship, the agency performed numerous tasks that had little to do with formal functions such as studying currency reforms and economic development planning.

The DASP experience suggests that a most significant aspect of institutional influence lies in the area of expertise, especially where it can be traded as political currency in the process of institution building. Viewed from this perspective the return of Getulio Vargas to the Presidency in 1951 perhaps was unfortunate for DASP, for the agency may have been able to perpetuate its incipient power position that was developing under President Dutra. While the agency was trading financial and other resources for political support, it was also transacting with legislators by supplying research assistance. Thus, while DASP must be located towards the non-influential ends of the ("influence-ability to influence decisions in functional

area and to enlarge sphere of action") continuua, its development clearly points out the significance of expertise as a tool of influence in the institution building process.

3. Normativeness

Relationships and action patterns of organization non-normative for other social units	Relationships and action patterns of organization normative for other social units

"Normativeness" is a measure of the impact of an institution on its environment. When an organization is normative it patterns the values and behaviors of other social units. It is possible for normative patterns to survive long after the physical artifacts of the institution have disappeared. However, without organization the phenomenon is more related to the concept of belief system. Belief system is operative at the societal or major societal subsystem levels where many structures perpetuate values. Accordingly, DASP is moribund; however, its action patterns are normative for a number of social units. The staff agency pioneered in the fields of government reorganization studies and budgetary controls. Some form of these activities survive today in Brazil. Former DASPians such as Professor Benedicto Silva have continued to give leadership to governmental reorganizations, as in the 1965-1966 reorganization study of public finances. While it cannot be aruged that DASP has been perpetuated in entities such as the Brazilian School of Public Administration, this School and its parent organization, the Getulio Vargas Foundation, are dedicated to government improvement in Brazil.

Many "old guard" DASPians have been associated with the Brazilian School since its inception in 1951. Professor Silva was its first Director, Luis Simoes Lopes, the first President of DASP and head of the Foundation, since its inception, has continued in the role of President of the latter organization. Therefore, we see third generation organizations such as the Brazilian School and the Brazilian Institute of Municipal Administration which are not descendants of DASP but which are of related lineage. The latter agency provides consulting services to local government and was launched with the support of the Getulio Vargas Foundation.

The foregoing demonstrates the "spread effect"; here values and practices of an organization are normative for other entities in the environment even though the organization has not achieved immortality. DASP no longer exists as a discrete structure. We have argued that normativeness without existential form is not institutionalization. However, as developed previously, the main thrust of DASP has been in the area of public personnel administration. If a central personnel agency is established as planned, it can be substantiated that DASP has achieved immortality to some degree because of the ancestral relationship between the new agency and DASP.

Returning to the "normativeness" scale, DASP can be located at center or to the right of center. Clearly it is normative for several living organizations, subgroups and many individuals; their actions and values have been patterned by DASP. However, the factor of "normativeness" alone weakly indicates institutionalization.

Concluding Observations

An attempt has been made to synthesize the DASP experience through the frame work of the three general tests of institutionalization and their subsets developed by the Inter-University Research Program in Institution Building. The following paradigm summarizes the principle findings.

Institutionalization general tests	Institutionalization subtest continuua	Findings about DASP
1. Survival	a. Sacrifice of innovative elements	1. The chrysalis effect 2. Ability to learn and update technology while quiescent.
	b. Dependence upon founding structure	1. Importance of discrete structure; not ideas or functions alone. 2. Concept of the ancestor relationship or organizational descendant
2. Valuation by the the environment	a. Autonomy--ability to deviate from parent system	1. Ability to control inputs from environment
	b. Autonomy--ability to acquire resources based upon intrinsic value	1. Breadth of support base 2. Orientation of resource suppliers toward values
	c. Autonomy--ability to rely on intrinsic value for defense against attacks and encroachment	1. Need to seek support from societal sectors that share values.
	d. Influence--ability to influence decisions in functional area and to enlarge sphere of action	1. Significance of expertise as tool of influence 2. The problem of formalism

Institutional-izational general tests	Institutionalization subtest continuua	Findings about DASP
3. Normativeness	a. Relations and action patterns normative for other social units	1. Normativeness without structure not institutional-ization

It is important to note that the above "Findings about DASP" do not represent judgments of the degree to which it qualifies as an institution. Rather they are observations about the mechanism of institution building based upon DASP. Because the data on this agency was not gathered in an institution building frame work, it is not possible to critically judge it as an institution. It can be said, however, that on the "survival" and "normativeness" tests DASP exhibits many institution-like characteristics.

It should be clear that only the fully developed institution could possibly score highly on each test and subtest of institutionalization. Therefore, in studying this process we are describing either fully developed institutions or degrees of <u>semi-institutions</u>. Accordingly, an examination of several organizations would reveal entities in various stages of institutional development. When semi-institutions cross the median to the developed side of each test continuum they can be considered more institutionalized than not. As long as an organization exists, however, it is institutionalized to some degree. Perhaps a descriptive trichotomy of institutional development would be: death-survival-immortality.

"Survival" is importantly related to other variables as well. Thus, it is necessary for an organization to survive in order that the other tests of

institutionalization be fulfilled in the future. While an organization certainly may not be patterning values and behaviors, by continuing to exist it could be normative for its environment at some future time. One difficulty, however, is the problem of diagnosing organizational death. For example Brazil abounds with public organizations which remain as juridical-organizational entities, but which are non-functional--formalism results. DASP has demonstrated formalism as well. However, from time to time it has been reactivated and technologically updated (the chrysalis effect) to energize civil service reforms --environmental conditions permitting, of course. Also, the personnel function has survived for over thirty years although the organizational entity has changed twice before and will probably change again (ancestor relationship effect). Thus, the test of survival is the performance of some life-like function. As is the case with all living organisms, there must be a hint of a metabolic process in order for life to persist.

We have seen that "normativeness" without a structural referent is not institutionalization. Thus, DASP still patterns the values of various individuals and groups in the sense of ideas and practices, but these entities have not inherited the agency's functions. Probably the ultimate test of institutionalization lies in the "valuation by the environment" set of tests. "Survival" and "normativeness" are more fundamental because (1) existence must preceed any essential meaning we give to an organization, and (2) some social entities must prize the incipient institution's action patterns and values.

However, the real constraints on immortality (the critical difference between the semi-institution and the fully developed instititon) are found in the "autonomy" and "influence" tests. These clearly separate the semi-institution from its fully developed relative.