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9. ABSTRACT

This guidebook contains descriptions of incidents drawn from actual cases of development; comments on those cases written from the perspective of institution-building; and checklists of items the reader might consider in institution-building situations. Appendices present important findings from ten years of research in institution-building, and a bibliography that includes a reference to the basic Source Book of Institution Building.

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


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The Source Book, the edited volume of core essays and a few other selected items that will start you off in any direction you want to go in the maze of Institution Building literature.		

A. INTRODUCTION

Which we ask you to read first. It explains the purposes, outlines the model we will use, suggests ways in which you can use the volume for reading and guidance in the time you have available and suggests a few cautions to observe.

A Note on Purposes

This Guidebook is dedicated to several propositions. First, that the development process is not dull—Barbara Ward says that it has taken genius to make most writing about it uninteresting. Second, that social science research results can be made intelligible to any development practitioner in a manner useful to his decision-making problems. Social scientists sometimes do misunderstand the need for clear and useful guidelines about today's problems; but often practitioners do not see the importance the social scientist rightfully places on definition, measurement and the long-term contribution to the scientific process. Therefore, the Guidebook will attempt to tread the slippery ground between excessive academic rigor and vapid oversimplification.

Do not let the use of some academic terminology, or some writing in a light vein obscure the importance we attach to greater communication, cooperation and common effort between practitioners and social scientists. In that direction lies the best hope for dealing with the increasingly complex problems of national and international development.

This Guidebook is designed for busy people. This short section is the only one that should be read first and in order. The Table of Contents is designed to help you browse, read or study other parts in whatever order you wish within the time you have available. Use it to locate what interests you.

What the Guidebook Contains

Essentially the Guidebook is composed of incidents drawn from actual cases of development put together in the form of composite cases; institution building perspectives on those cases; and checklists of items that you might want to consider in institution building situations. Appendix I contains short statements about some of the important things that we have learned from institution building research conducted over the past ten years. These are divided according to the different variables in the model. Finally Appendix II has a short bibliography which contains some basic references. In particular there is a reference to a carefully organized *Source Book of Institution Building* which can lead you to almost anything that has been written on the subject that is of interest.

How to Use the Guidebook

The institution building process has been arbitrarily divided into four parts: initiation (institutional midwifery, if you will), consolidating early gains, maturity (however you want to define it), and that oft forgotten stage of rejuvenation. In each part there is a composite case illustrating the institution building process in that stage. That is followed by a perspective, which is simply one way an analyst using this model would look at that case. If you think other ways are important, you can use the appendix. Finally, there is a checklist of items that you may want to consider if you are presently involved in that stage of the process.

You may want to start by reading one section through, or you may just want to look at the cases to get a feel for actual situations. You can combine cases and perspectives, cases and sections of the appendix, or you can use the checklists independently of the other elements.

2 In order to have this kind of flexibility and to be able to use the Guidebook in discontinuous segments, you should read the following brief description of the Institution Building Model. It is the glue that holds the Guidebook together. A few minutes spent looking at and understanding this model will make the rest of the Guidebook easy to read and more useful to you.

It is called a model because it attempts to abstract reality and divide it up into some pieces that can be examined individually and in their relation to each other. Alas, the world is complicated and models cannot take into account everything. However, they give us some systematic examination of the same factors in different situations over a period of ten years. It is more important that you have the results of carefully accumulated experience rather than try the impossible job of prescribing what you should do in your particular situation. The model is a guide that should add knowledge and perspective to your work.

Why Do We Need A Model?

In the early days of development, even though the history of most countries demonstrates otherwise, we thought that introducing new ideas, particularly ones which had an apparently obvious logic and simple technology, was an easy task. We were deceived by the apparent ease of change in developed countries and the success of such programs as the Marshall Plan in Europe under very special conditions). The complex reality which we face emerged gradually from experience.

Do these situations sound familiar to you?

- 1) A farm machinery advisor returns to a less developed country in which he had worked a few years before to find that the centers for loaning farm machinery are abandoned and the machinery is rusting.
- 2) A pathologist finds that after the foreign advisors leave, he is unable to obtain any more support for the new department of plant pathology, in spite of the prevalence of plant disease in a country which badly needs to increase food production.
- 3) A fisheries expert returns to the fish harbor which he thought was failing, only to find that it is a major foreign exchange earner for the country.
- 4) A former visiting professor finds that the School of Economics which he helped create has a full-fledged faculty and has become a prestigious part of the national university, through the combined efforts of local faculty and his own university.

The persistent quest of development has been to determine why some projects blossom and influence national growth and change in the environment and others die aborning, fail to develop roots, or blossom briefly and fade into oblivion.

The problem has had too many answers rather than not enough. There always seemed to be some new nostrum that was the key to promoting self-sustaining development only to be found wanting in the face of some new proposed magic solution. Exhortation, demonstration, building an infrastructure of dams and power plants, complex economic formulas for breaking out of low raw material prices, developing entrepreneurs motivated for change, and many other approaches were tried. Sometimes little cells of modernization were created that functioned in isolation and occasionally influenced the larger society.

After a decade or so we began to look more closely at our experience and found that the development process is much more complex than we had ever imagined. Touch anything in society and everything else begins to be affected. Some practitioners and scholars came away muttering that we had best leave things alone; others retired to devise new and more complex magic solutions. One group decided that the careful examination of experience, using a systematic framework and a longer time period, might give us some useful clues for the future. They began to develop models that were broad enough to be applicable to many cultural and administrative environments, yet susceptible to providing guidelines for planning and action. Institution building theory grew out of this search.

Institution building theory was developed by academicians who had extensive practical experience. The original concepts of Professor Milton Esman, now at Cornell, involved the collaboration of colleagues at many universities who were also experienced and action-oriented. Seminars were held in a number of different countries to explore the relationship of institution building to the problems of development. Extensive field research was carried on to refine and modify the approach. There is still much that needs to be done but the results of the research lead to some practical conclusions. Some of these seem to confirm common sense (though in very diverse cultures), others seem to offer alternatives that can be adapted to a wide variety of situations.

Institution building occupies a middle group between complex and sophisticated political and economic theories on the one hand and simple trial and error on the other. It aspires to be a theory in that it attempts to explain what happens under certain circumstances and predict what will happen if certain actions are taken.


It is not a complex or mathematical model since it tries to deal with important factors that usually cannot be reduced to numbers. It is unashamedly oriented toward using social science for practical application as well as theory building. In short, it condenses ten years of experience into some propositions that should be useful to you in deciding what needs to be done in the infinitely varied circumstances of planned change.

The Institution Building Model

The model shown in Figure 1 is essentially self-explanatory. Note, however, that this model considers each of the variables as dynamic. The internal variables focus on the problems of the organization itself. The linkages are concerned with the external environment. Transactions are specific actions by the organization to build its linkages or strengthen its internal elements. The model relates to an organization which proposes to introduce change into the environment. We are trying to find clues to the dynamic process by which a new organization becomes institutionalized.

What do we mean by "institutionalized"? For the social scientist it is not enough to say we mean that it is accepted, valued and influential in the environment. We are not referring to the institution of the family, for example, but rather to the introduction or modification of a valued organization in a society. We need more accurate measures of when it has become accepted and valued and influential. Unfortunately, it is difficult to generalize about the precise measurements that we would like to have when new or rejuvenated organizations are so varied and the specific situations of the environment and cultures are different in each case.

Figure 1. The Institution Building Model



For the GUIDEBOOK we will use some intermediate criteria from which measurements may be devised for each case, but are general enough for application to most cases. An organization is considered to be institutionalized when there is reasonable evidence that:

a) it has survived over a period of time, that is continues to do what it was designed to do;

b) it has achieved a degree of autonomy in deciding on its program—this can be budgetary or through the influence of its leadership;

c) it is accepted and valued by its clientele, by the public and by its cooperators and competitors as a part of the environment;

d) it has some impact on the environment—the changes it sponsors are tolerated, if not applauded and possibly even copied.

These are not hard and fast requirements, but in any specific case, some informed judgments about the state of institutionalization can be made using them. In the process of designing a new or changed institution it would be wise to try to specify these items in more detail in advance for use as future evaluative measurements.

Some Comments on Culture

The attempt to show the applicability of elements of the Institution Building Model in a wide variety of situations may cause you to miss some of the cultural factors that are important to any institution building activities. However, if you look closely, they are there. People use their godfathers to get decisions made; people get jobs because of the village they come from; and a wide variety of other things happen because of personalistic values and ways of thinking about problems that differ from what you will find in many developed countries.

The doctrine factor of the internal variables and the normative linkages variable are particularly influenced by the cultural factors of each situation. For that reason there are no easy formulas about how new ideas which imply different doctrines can be introduced into developing countries.

The perspectives and the checklist emphasize elements that cultural factors will influence significantly. Since this guidebook is essentially concerned with institution building, it is assumed that you have either learned about or experienced the multitude of cultural problems about which the anthropologists have been talking for years. What is important to note here is that the institution building research has exposed some new dimensions to the cultural problem which are little discussed and illustrate both the significance of culture and the stresses and permutations that occur under the impact of the introduction of new ideas.

In earlier times the cultural factors were more or less homogenous. Now they are not. There are many variations of modern and traditional cultures which exist side by side. People may have a veneer of modern culture which they show to foreigners and actually still be strongly influenced by the traditional values of their culture. It is not unusual to discuss computer programming in the morning and nepotism in the afternoon. There may be a symbolic modernism of only using the most modern equipment but a continual reliance on traditional personalism to obtain the decisions that make the equipment meaningful to the institution building process. Cooperatives may not work because people feel that institutions are not people and therefore don't have to be paid back. New curriculum or teaching methods may violate traditional concepts of authority. Any institution builder has to be alert to the cultural elements that may lie under the surface of the rational arguments presented by everyone, from farmers to the most sophisticated officers of the government.

However, there are two other factors that appear to have emerged from our research that should be kept in mind.

First, some common elements in the culture of bureaucracy have emerged. The research results which are illustrated here emphasize those elements which cut across cultures. Examples include the closeness of family, school, or tribal ties; the significance of political relationships to development decisions; and an open or covert resentment to outside interference on the bureaucratic process. These show up in many ways and there are differences in their cultural manifestations, but they tend to be common elements that can be expected in most situations.

Second, there has grown up in developing countries a development culture with an interest and a stake in change and modernization processes. The people in this culture are often critical in the institution building processes. If they have not become alienated from their own culture, they can be the key persons in the adaptation of new ideas and new doctrines into the patterns of the organization and to the clientele which gives the organization meaning and value in the society. It is extremely important, however, to distinguish between what we might call the symbolic modernist—briefly mentioned above, who believes that every change, or every tool of developed society should be incorporated—and the development professional. The latter understands the need for change, but also the need for its careful adaptation to the cultural values of his own environment. This is not always an easy distinction. In the cases in this volume, effective development professionals in the country itself tend to stand out as critical, although they differ in each case.

In summary, this guidebook assumes that you know the basic elements of the cultural problem either from learning or experience. If you look closely you will find many illustrations of cultural problems and the way in which they can hinder or help the development process. You should be aware that the research results emphasize those elements that seem to have worked across cultural variations in different countries. Your own awareness of traditional cultures and the different effects of the overlay of modernism which has occurred in most countries will provide you with important clues to the use of institution building techniques for successful development activities.

Some Cautions (A Note from the Author)

The GUIDEBOOK does not provide you with easy answers. There are none. We have not yet figured out how to plan for projects for which the vagaries of human action and human organization are constantly changing the signals. We are always dealing with activities in which the money is late to arrive, many people do not understand, or are not comfortable with the goals that are agreed upon. Change is not easy and the introduction of new ideas is almost always painful in application. That is the clear testimony of practitioners, social scientists, villagers and political leaders, even when everyone has the best of intentions. When there are economic or national or political factors intervening, gracious and patient persistence and the capacity to innovate when the problems are most difficult, or to laugh when nothing can be done, is priceless.

The capacity to prepare for opportunity, to think big, to take risks, to be open and humble, to act boldly and to be patient at the right times is one that comes from observation, study and experience. It cannot be transmitted with good stories, wise principles or neat checklists. It certainly cannot be done by preaching.

If you think that development should be neat and orderly and without frustration, this is not your kind of volume.

It is true that there is much more here than meets the eye. It is worth discussion with your colleagues, counterparts and companions in the development process. You may well discover ideas, approaches, new alternatives and possible solutions through the interaction of this volume and your own experience. On the other hand, if it helps you describe your problems, clarify your presentations, or complete your reports, it may be worth the time you spend on it.

There are some who have said that it should only be used as the basis for a course with an experienced teacher. That may be. We would prefer to think that anyone who has had even a limited connection with any kind of development activity could translate these stories into his own experience and use the perspectives to build upon these research results. Many of them now sound like common sense after having been successful. They were not thought so when they were first tried. Many of them are also easily stated and difficult to apply. Don't despair.

In these stories you are privy to some attitudes, feelings and facts which, in the field, you will have to sense. The timing that seems so obvious was sometimes natural skill, sometimes carefully reasoned analysis and sometimes well-learned experience.

In the end the most important caution is to not expect too much. The incidents related here are designed to assist you to find some approaches and to correct them along the way. If the spirit of science is to build on the critical analysis of failure as well as success, then development, at its best, is that tradition.

PHASE I STARTING OUT IN TANTLA

In which discontinuous leadership, bureaucratic maneuvering and the trials and tribulations of getting a planning board established lead us to some perspectives and questions about the problems of introducing complex new ideas into equally complex governmental structures.

The Uneven Beginnings of the Planning Board in Tantla

The story that everyone likes to tell about the Planning Board is the way in which Ali, with a combination of audacity and organization, had the Policy Staff offices physically transplanted into the Prime Minister's building. It was a national holiday and everybody was down listening to the Prime Minister and the other dignitaries give their speeches. Through a conspiracy with the Chief of the National Guard, one floor of the building was completely rearranged and a suite of offices for the National Planning Board complete with nameplates, office equipment and furniture was installed in one day.

The Prime Minister must have thought that someone else authorized it, because, unlike most of his predecessors, he paid little attention to this type of detail. Everyone else assumed that the Prime Minister himself had authorized it. Ali made the most of the opportunity the move provided and said nothing.

Later as the Board earned the respect of the Prime Minister, he would leave his office and walk downstairs to Ali's office and discuss policies and problems. Eventually the Prime Minister decided to locate the entire Planning Board Staff in the palace. All of these things raised the stature of the Board. Ministries paid more attention to the Planning Board's proposals and their analyses. But, we are ahead of our story.

The idea of having a Planning Board had been discussed and proposed for years. Foreign aid agencies had urged any number of Ministers and the Prime Ministers before this one to organize a Planning Board. The new Prime Minister on one of his early trips abroad saw planning bodies in India, Pakistan and Iran. On his return

discussed the matter with his close associates and with several of his Ministers. The Minister of Finance was vehemently and openly opposed to the idea and stated that the Finance Ministry performed the planning function through the budget process. Other Ministers wanted to make sure of their access to the Prime Minister, but did not oppose the idea.

The Prime Minister's senior advisors urged that he make the Planning Board a staff arm of his own office so it could perform some badly needed coordinating functions and provide him with analyses and recommendations on broad policies.

The World Bank representative stated that a Planning Board could be of assistance in obtaining loans. Other assistance agencies agreed to provide technical assistance and training to support the Board.

After several months, the Prime Minister had a bill prepared and sent it to the legislature. He did not use his decree power because he believed that he would need all the support and cooperation that he could mobilize for something as new as this in Tantla.

In the legislature there was extensive debate and some modification of the role of the Planning Board, but, with the Prime Minister's support, the bill was passed and the National Planning Board was created as a part of his office. It was given the authority to coordinate the development of a national plan, advise on plans and policies and assist Ministries in developing complementary sector plans.

The Prime Minister decided to ask a foundation for technical assistance and depend on some short-term consultants from the U.S. and the World Bank. Each of the agencies agreed in principle to do this, but working out a specific agreement took time.

The Prime Minister appointed Ali as head of the Board. Ali was a well-known economist in the country and had just returned from a responsible position at the United Nations. He was a graduate of the London School of Economics, charming, from an important family, and respected in both government and business circles.

Ali attracted competent subordinates and began to build a small but diversified staff. He ironed out many of the difficulties in the agreements between the foreign agencies and the government. His rapport with the Ministries was excellent. He put the Board to work gathering the basic information needed for a national plan.

Ali was not only competent; he had a remarkable sense of when to play by the rules and when to cut corners and use informal or unorthodox means to reach his objective. He was often seen with the Prime Minister at inaugurations and rapidly became one of his close associates. It was about this time that Ali pulled his famous (or infamous) maneuver of moving his offices from several blocks away into the Prime Minister's office. No one knows to this day if he had talked to the Prime Minister about it, but the conjecture is that it was a brash move that was so well planned that it worked.

Among the other things that Ali did was to initiate a large program of training, sending young graduates abroad on the commitment that they return and work for the Board. He also sent senior and middle-level people to short courses, seminars and initiated some training courses in the Planning Board itself using whatever national or foreign experts he could find. He had hoped that the advisors from the foundation would be a major source of training, but unfortunately, it took a long time to find the caliber of people that he asked for.

Ali was a very demanding man. He paid little attention to the internal organization problems dipping down into the organization to use whatever talent there was. With a small start this was not a problem. Indeed there was a sense of pioneering new ideas and a feeling of pride and confidence

among the Planning Board staff. They worked long hours and produced important analyses for Ali to take to the Prime Minister.

The organization seemed to be growing well until the troubles which had been brewing between the Finance Minister and the Prime Minister came to a head, partially due to the work being done by the Planning Board. As a result of this, the Finance Minister was made an Ambassador and Ali became Finance Minister. Ali also took two of the best people on the Planning Board with him.

After a period in which the Planning Board floundered without adequate leadership and lost some of its status, the Prime Minister appointed Ayub, a distinguished professor and close political associate as the director. It is said that Ali supported the appointment because he thought he could control the Planning Board from the Finance Ministry and Ayub was not a strong leader. This did not prove to be the case. Ayub was not totally committed to national planning, but neither was he about to be dominated by the Finance Minister. He was a shrewd and ambitious politician, well-connected and capable of using the Board for his own political purposes. However, the training program was continued as were the efforts to build the image of the Board and of Ayub as its head. Ayub was a lawyer, not an economist, but he knew the functioning of government well and he improved the internal organization. Ayub was not as persuasive as Ali had been and not as knowledgeable about the economic factors. In time, the Planning Board became a place where the smaller issue of policy had to pass through another step before approval while the major issues were taken directly to the Prime Minister by the Ministers and approved by him. Ali wanted the Planning Board to function as an arm of the Finance Ministry. However, Ayub was jealous of his prerogatives, and politically astute in maintaining them. This rivalry did not help the Planning Board become more powerful or more acceptable in the eyes of the other Ministers.

Indeed, the Planning Board might well have disintegrated had it not had agreements with the foundation, the multilateral and the bilateral agencies. It was a time of considerable difficulty inside the Planning Board, many of the best people wanted to leave. However, the generous program of scholarships and the arrival of some high level foreign advisors kept most of the senior staff intact. One thing can be said for Ayub. He was able to persuade the foreign assistance agencies that the Planning Board was on the verge of becoming a powerful force in national affairs. In reality, Ayub barely managed to hold the Board together. He also retained his professorship at the Law School and the Board was really a part-time occupation for him. When the Deanship of the Law School became vacant, Ayub was elected to that position and once again the Board was without a top leader.

Had the Prime Minister not met with the members of the Planning Board regularly and used them occasionally as a personal economic staff, the Board would have disintegrated. Ali approached the Prime Minister to have the Board placed in the Finance Ministry, but after consulting with the staff and senior advisors, the Prime Minister decided against the transfer.

The Planning Board was not three years old and several of the junior members had returned from training and some senior members had been to seminars and meetings with planning groups in other countries. The staff had a series of discussions, some of which included some foreign advisors. They convinced one of the senior foundation advisors that he should go to the Prime Minister and propose that he take some specific action to revitalize the Board including installing a new Chairman who would have the necessary stature. The advisor pointed out that it would be necessary to wait for the right occasion. In the meantime, they should put together some briefing papers on just how the Board should be reorganized and what should be done.

The opportunity came when a famous Swedish Planner was invited to lecture at the University. The foundation advisor knew him and invited him to the Board to meet the staff. Everything was prepared and the visitor was duly impressed with the quality of the staff and the need for some action.

At a dinner in his honor The Planner brought up the matter with the Prime Minister. He agreed that he was more convinced than ever of the value of coordinated planning but the jealousy of his ministers was a factor and he saw no outstanding leadership available in the government or out of it. The Planner suggested a young Tantla economist who was working with him in Sweden by the name of Ahmed. The Prime Minister agreed that Ahmed had potential. He had worked with him when he was Minister of Interior. He agreed to think about it and talk to the young man on his return from Sweden.

Several months later Ahmed returned with a letter to the Prime Minister from the Swedish Planner. The P.M. was impressed with his background and with the fact that he was experienced, but young enough not to be too much of a threat to the other Ministers. In addition, his father was an influential lawyer in a provincial capital from which the P.M. could use support. Nevertheless, it took two months to get all of the arrangements made. Ahmed was then duly appointed Chairman of the Planning Board and the Prime Minister made a point of expressing confidence in his capacity to do the job.

Ahmed's style turned out to be different and disarming. He changed the morale of the staff by asking them to put together a history and analysis of the situation. He had them prepare both economic and administrative strategies for his review.

The staff meetings of the Board became seminars in the nature and function of planning boards and the selection of priorities and strategies to build their own image and use the resources they could muster. He had members meeting with second level officials in business, government and universities putting together data that was much more than just economic analysis.

Foreign advisors were asked to give training seminars to the staff. Ahmed sat in as a participant on some of them. Meanwhile, he made courtesy calls on all senior officials and Ministers to offer his cooperation in whatever problems they had with the executive office of the Prime Minister. He also used his family and personal connections with the P.M. to be seen regularly with him and to talk with him about how he viewed the function of the Planning Board.

When he thought the Board was ready, he asked for a comprehensive briefing paper for the Minister of Finance. Then he went to Ali with the briefing paper, asked his advice and proposed some meetings of the senior staff of the Ministry with the Planning Board. He explained to Ali that the Board needed his advice and should work closely with the Finance Ministry in the planning process. Ali was struck with the fact that the briefing paper covered a number of administrative problems and suggestions that his staff knew little about. He agreed to the meetings and even said that he would chair them.

These meetings brought into the open some of the differences of view between the Planning and the Finance people. The results of the meetings were constructive. Ali went with Ahmed to the Prime Minister to support his request for meetings of a similar nature with each of the other ministries. The Prime Minister had to be persuaded as he did not want to build barriers between himself and the Ministers. Finally, he agreed to the meetings and promised to participate if he had time. He also asked to be provided with summaries of the results of each meeting.

Senior Planning Board members then went to the foreign assistance agencies and asked them what they were willing to do to assist new government programs and what projects they were willing to support.

Armed with the recommendations which came from the meetings with other Ministries and the foreign assistance Agencies, Ahmed sponsored a reorganization plan prepared by the Board Staff. This plan was oriented toward promoting sectoral planning by the ministries toward utilizing national and foreign credits more effectively.

His plan also called for some short-term experts in financial management, project development, foreign trade and information systems. In addition, the reorganization called for a periodic review in which the Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance and the Planning Board Chief would participate. The Prime Minister was favorably impressed with the plan, but wanted to discuss it with other Ministers before approving it.

Working closely with the staff, Ahmed also gave a number of talks supporting national planning. He spoke with business groups in particular, discussing planning as a necessary means of setting national priorities and rebutted conservative comments that planning was socialism. Planning Board members informally sought out the leaders of industry and commerce and asked their assistance in the collection of information.

The Prime Minister eventually approved the reorganization with some changes. He stated he was concerned about the conflicts that could occur between the Planning Board and the Ministries. He, therefore, limited some of the scope of the Planning Board's functions in monitoring implementation.

Ahmed and the senior staff of the Board were upset with this limitation as they believed that the monitoring of implementation was an integral part of the planning process. However, they worked cautiously and began with areas in which they could be of assistance to Ministers in developing plans and projects.

The first big breakthrough came when a new Minister of Agriculture was appointed. Ahmed knew in advance who he would be, so the entire staff worked long hours preparing a complete briefing for the new Minister. Ahmed arranged to be in the Prime Minister's office during the first discussion after the Minister had been sworn in. As they left the office Ahmed presented the briefing to the Minister. The next morning the Minister called Ahmed and asked him to come to his home that evening. Ahmed spent most of the night explaining the problem of agriculture and the need for coordinated planning. Ahmed also provided the new Minister with background information on continuing projects of the Ministry and about key people and relationships with other Ministries. The new Minister realized that the Planning Board was a source of important information as well as a possible ally in the project approval process. He was persuaded to set up a small staff in his office that would be the liaison with the Planning Board. The Minister assured Ahmed that he would support him in the planning effort.

Ahmed returned to the office sleepy-eyed the following morning and gathered the staff and the advisors together to tell them of the agreements with the Minister of Agriculture. He also announced that the Chamber of Industry and Commerce had invited him to talk to their Board of Directors about closer cooperation with the Planning Board.

"Colleagues," he said, "I think the Planning Board has the beginnings of a foothold in this country if we can take advantage of these opportunities."

Perspectives on the Tantla Case

The foregoing story can be looked at in many ways. The institution builder looks for evidence of that process which we call institutionalization. Economists want to see a plan and determine its soundness and its feasibility. Agriculture specialists want to know production expectations and allocations of money to achieve them. The institution builder is interested in how the Planning Board builds its own capacity to influence a planning process and become an accepted catalyst in that process. He sees a stable planning group in the Prime Minister's office as a coordinator and power-broker which make economic and agricultural plans more than sterile paper, but represent the agreed upon goals of diverse elements who have to work together to make the country grow.

There are many indicators of institution building practice in this case. A few of them will be discussed below.

Powerful people have to be convinced that a new organization is a good thing before they will support it. The Prime Minister went to several countries where there was an already established planning board and saw its value to policy making. Throughout the story the Prime Minister's authority is used both to protect and to move the Board toward acceptance. The Prime Minister's role is clearly that of an *enabling linkage* who not only grants power and authority to the Board, but protects it from the subordination of the Finance Ministry. The Prime Minister in this case is perhaps the ideal enabling linkage. He has power. He is committed to the goals of the organization. He is wise enough to delegate authority to it and use the Board in ways that are useful and give it prestige.

Institution builders have found that discontinuity of leadership can create important problems with new organizations. In this case, we see why. Ali started out with a program of training and began the job of building prestige and turning out analyses that were important to the Prime Minister. He attracted competent people. He had a creative flair. He took advantage of opportunities to demonstrate his association with the powerful and the policy makers. This was a necessary step if the Planning Board's dealings with the other Ministers were to be significant. By providing the Prime Minister with analyses and plans, he emphasized program output which frequently holds a new organization together until it develops people with the capacity and experience to function effectively.

Ali knew the kind of linkages he had to have to be effective. In the important human resources area he was able to attract the quality of people required. However, by leaving the Board and taking two of the best people with him he effectively destroyed the *internal structure*. Ayub did not have the interest or the skill to restore it. This might have been the end of the Planning Board if the Prime Minister had not kept on supporting the Board and protecting it from being absorbed into the Finance Ministry.

Ali's training program paid off at an unusually early date when one of the returnees was made director of the Planning Board and began using the whole board to restore its image and influence.

It is clear from the story that one of the most important leadership roles is to incorporate as many elements of the environment as possible. The meeting with the Ministries were designed to strengthen *functional linkages*, as these are the organizations from whom information for planning comes and who implement the plans as well.

The *doctrine* is implicit, but it is there. Among the many elements of doctrine are the significance of national planning; the need to coordinate sectoral plans; the idea that planning and implementation cannot be separate (on this the Board was defeated); and the idea that the Board was not to come between the Ministers and the Prime Minister but rather to facilitate their incorporation into the policy process.

Physical resources were not a problem in this case, even though office space in the palace was obtained in an unusual way. The move that Ali engineered was designed to associate the Board with the power and prestige of the Prime Minister. In the area of human resources, Ali was able to find good people and to start a training program that was important to the future of the Board. However, during Ayub's period it looked as though those resources would leave the Board and, therefore, its chances of continuing to grow would be minimal. This was the point at which other *enabling linkages* were important. The presence of foreign advisors and foreign money involved a commitment that made it difficult for the Board to be ignored, even though, under Ayub, it was bypassed a great deal.

Ahmed incorporated the staff by asking them to design the reorganization process. This process influenced the *internal structure* and the capacity to obtain information and turn out analyses for the Prime Minister.

There was still some problem about the program or outputs of the Board. The Planning Board supported the position that its outputs should include developing plans and monitoring results. The Prime Minister, on the other hand, saw the Board's output as plans and programs which make policy decisions easier. In this view implementation should be taken care of completely by the Ministries. How that question is resolved will probably depend on how well the Ministries monitor themselves in the future.

As far as other linkages are concerned, Ahmed's approach to Ali to gain his support for the Planning Board was a good way to bring problems out in the open and turn competitive *functional linkages* into cooperating ones. It is not always that easy. When the Prime Minister did not approve the transfer of the Board to Ministry of Finance it was clear that Ahmed had to find some way to incorporate the Finance Minister. Fortunately, this became a pattern for meeting the other ministries sanctioned by the Prime Minister. Institution builders would call this developing *positive functional linkages*. These meetings helped establish Ahmed's leadership role and provided the information that was necessary for an effective reorganization. With limited experience to guide him, Ahmed was feeling his way and accepting the norms about how he should operate from his staff, the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister. He was also creating some new norms by consulting with the business community on planning problems. He was at the same time gathering support from groups who are not going to change with the political parties. He was developing *diffuse linkages* with different segments of the society by talking with them, consulting them and attempting to persuade them that planning is a "good" and useful thing for the government to do.

Note to the reader:

If this is the first Phase you have read, you now have several choices. You may continue on to the checklist if that will help you; you may turn to the appendixes if you are interested in a particular problem or feel that a specific variable needs clarification or more discussion; or you may look at the table of contents and see if some other Phase is of more interest to you.

A Checklist for Institutional Midwives

A. Preliminary Comments

A checklist such as this one cannot provide sure answers. There are far too many different circumstances for there to be any short cuts or quick formulas to success. However, we have found some factors that should be considered whenever the institution building process is attempted. Rather than suggest general and vague precepts like importance of training and continuous leadership; acceptable doctrine and the importance of program output, the checklist is a series of questions which will help you to focus on those things the institution builder thinks are important. You can use the checklist to raise issues that should be considered before starting a new institution (Phase I) or use the other checklists at other phases in the process. The checklist should help you focus on those things that seem to be most important in the particular case on which you are working.

1. What are the special circumstances that make new organization necessary and feasible in this case? (Can national planning be developed with a central board under the President?)

2. Can established organizations be rejuvenated or reorganized to assume the functions which will achieve the goals? (Could the Finance Ministry have done the job?)

3. Can a new division in an old organization be created that will achieve the same goals as those intended?

B. Leadership

1. What kind of a leader is needed at this time? Energetic? Charismatic? Tenacious? Unobtrusive? Strong on External Relationships? What combinations of these would be most important? What qualities can be sacrificed or compensated for by the rest of the leadership structure? (Were the styles of Ali or Ahmed appropriate to the situation?)

2. How much technical skill is required in the leadership as compared with administrative or public relations skills?

3. How well connected does the leader need to be with top-level people in business and government?

4. Can the leader be imaginative and take risks through the introduction of new ideas, or should the leader be a cautious person who can hold the organization together until it is better established?

C. Doctrine

1. Can the doctrine of the organization be expressed in broad enough terms to attract support from a wide range of people and institutions? (Were the benefits of planning made clear?)

2. Can the doctrine be easily translated into meaningful goals and policies that will guide the specific actions of people in the organization. (Was sectoral planning a good idea in this case?)

3. What specific actions can be taken to ensure that everyone in the organization understands the doctrine and becomes committed to it? (Were the meetings with different ministries an approach to this?)

D. Program

1. What should be the initial approach of the program? Pilot projects? A heavy emphasis on small areas, target groups, etc., or extended coverage of a large area with less products or services?

2. How can the program be made to reflect the goals of the organization?

3. Is immediate impact of the program more important to achieve the goals of the organization or is a small beginning which does not appear to threaten other organizations better?

4. How can the results of the program in the environment be used to build support among the clientele and other support groups?

E. Resources

1. Are the categories of human resources which are needed in the initial stages identified? Can they be obtained from other institutions? Will it be necessary to seek external resources temporarily? (Were foreign planning advisors necessary in this case?)

2. Is there a need to establish a training program before the organization is started? What are the relative merits of a local training program which brings in experts versus sending people to other countries for training? Which other countries? (Did training pay off in this case?)

3. What are the physical and operational resource needs and who will supply them? (e.g., buildings, equipment, supplies, etc.)

F. Internal Structure

1. What degree of centralization or decentralization is needed at this stage to permit effective functioning?

2. Is the planned structure realistic in terms of the needs of the program and the availability of resources?

3. Is the internal structure flexible enough to allow for effective communication upwards and downwards?

G. *Enabling Linkages*

1. From whom will major support for the organization come? Can these sources be expanded or diversified?
2. How can support groups become involved with the organization enough so that they will provide the protection which is needed during the early stages of operation?
3. How can support be generated from groups that are not directly affected by political changes? (The Chamber of Industry and Commerce for example?)

H. *Functional Linkages*

1. What organizations provide the critical element of cooperation in the initial stages of the organization?
2. Who are the major competitors and how can they be dealt with, or turned into cooperators? (e.g., The Agriculture and Finance Ministries)
3. What kind of relationships have to be developed with clientele groups to meet their needs and get their support?

I. *Normative Linkages*

1. What are the traditional ways of doing things that can be used by the organization to support the innovations it intends to introduce?
2. What are the traditional barriers to the organization's goals and operating techniques? Are there ways to mitigate these through reinterpretation, circumvention, or adapting present techniques and objectives?
3. What organization or groups will provide standards or guidelines for operation? Will these standards assist or hinder the achievement of goals?

J. *Diffuse Linkages*

1. What other groups in the society are committed to change? Will it be beneficial to develop relationships with them?
2. What kind of publicity, public relations, education and training activities need to be initiated to build support for the organization to promote public understanding of the goals and objectives of the organization?

PHASE II CONSOLIDATING EARLY GAINS IN CARLOVINGIA

In which it becomes clear how difficult it is to expand small programs and how important time and patience can be in building resources and linkages. Institution Building is not wizardry for political salvation, it is people committed to innovative doctrine. But it takes much more than that if failure is to be averted and small successes are to be expanded on a national scale. Institution building gives you one lens to look at Jorge's problems and at Carlovingia's.

Crisis in the Rural Cooperative Program in Carlovingia

The crisis began when a boy arrived with a note saying that Jorge should call the Minister of Agriculture at once. Jorge remembers thinking then that just when everything seems to be progressing well, something always happens to make one go back again and rebuild. The saving grace was a trained staff at the Center which believed in the program and could respond well to crises.

Actually, the Rural Cooperative Training Center in Huertas and the program in Miranda Province was doing well. Its discovery by international agencies had helped promote its national reputation. Now there was additional foreign support and the training program had been expanded to include village coordinators as well as supervisors and technical experts. Moving slowly in its initial stages, building on experience and incorporating the villager and his problems at every stage, the Cooperative Program had lurched erratically toward significant increases in production. Higher income had resulted for the small farmer, using cooperatives backed by the joint funding that had come out of agreements between the government and the foreign mission. The program had been fortunate to acquire some foreigners who provided technical support, (e.g., locating a rust-resistant strain of plants in Morocco) and who were also willing to lend prestige and support to the approach. The project had formed villagers into self-governing groups. These groups had brought about important changes in farming practices which had spread throughout the province over the years.

Both municipal and provincial agricultural officers had been incorporated through seminars and through assisting with the courses given technical people and supervisors.

After two years of work, money was obtained for the new Training Center site outside the town of Huertas and the Governor came to the inauguration ceremonies. When he saw the enthusiasm of the staff, the field workers and the villagers themselves, he realized the political, as well as the agricultural potential of the program. He promptly invited the Minister of Agriculture to Huertas, who agreed to increase the Ministry's support. However, it was not until the Minister's deputy became the third Minister of Agriculture in the past five years that the idea of expanding the program to four other provinces was seriously planned. This delay had given the Miranda project precious time to train and experiment with its approach.

Jorge had been called to the capital to work on the expansion plan. The plan called for the creation of a National Council of Rural Development Cooperatives which was to be directly responsible for the expansion of the program. New Provincial Training Centers were to be the source of trained people to promote village cooperatives.

The Executive Secretary of the National Council was directly attached to the Minister's office—the Council consisting of Chiefs of Extension and Research and several representatives of the major agricultural schools.

The program was to begin in four of the provinces. The training centers were to be the central element in the development of the program. The Director of the Training Center was automatically accorded the position that had taken Jorge a long time to win—a member of the powerful Provincial Agricultural Council. The provincial program was to be modeled on the one in Miranda Province and would draw on that experience for guidance.

Jorge declined to accept the position of Secretary of the National Council, but recommended Armando, one of the brightest young agronomists from Huertas who had recently returned from study abroad. Jorge returned home to the people he loved, but followed the new programs through reports. He also set up training programs at Huertas for different levels of provincial officials. It looked as though the new programs were making inroads on agricultural patterns through the gradual awareness of the villagers of their power through cooperative effort.

Now almost two years later, Jorge had a premonition that today was not going to be a good day as he rode to the post office to use the telephone. The Minister was in a controlled rage and asked Jorge to come to an emergency meeting of the National Council the following day. Armando had been moved to the experiment station. Two of the provincial training centers had become a political embarrassment to the Minister and the growth of the cooperatives was well behind schedule. Production targets had been set and not met, and the President was holding the Minister responsible.

Jorge knew what was coming. He would be asked to go out to the field and diagnose the problems and come up with the recommendations as to what should be done.

There was danger that the program would be watered down, or that the bottom-up approach, to which Jorge was committed, would be eliminated. How could he explain to the Minister that the Huertas experiment should have been a twenty year process and that they had been lucky to make this progress in five years? Now the Minister wanted the same things with new programs in two years. "No time for philosophizing," he muttered. He went back to tell the staff that they should review the reports and begin to think about some specific steps that he could recommend to the Minister after he had a better idea of the problems. He also asked them to talk to the students from other provinces to get as much information as possible on the actual situation.

Next, he called Marty, the foreign advisor, affectionately known as "El Viejo" (the old timer). He told Marty what he knew and asked him if he was willing to take his car and drive them up to the capital right away so that they could get a better feeling for the problem. He wanted to find out how the different groups, including assistance agencies, saw the problem and wanted to mobilize whatever political support and supplementary aid might be necessary.

Marty said that he could not be involved in political battles, but he realized that the success of the expanded program hung in the balance, so he agreed to go to help out within his own mission.

Jorge and Marty talked to fertilizer dealers, the Cooperative Association, AID people, Ministry staff, and some of the National Council members. The two managed to get enough information to help out with the meeting the following day. Young Armando was bitter at having been shunted off, but it was clear that the program had simply been moved too fast, and the training programs had not been able to turn out people with both enlightened attitudes and the technical knowledge needed to provide a solid base.

The next morning at the Minister's meeting, Jorge had organized his material and with quiet determination defeated the effort to put the provincial agricultural agents in direct charge of the program. The movement to cut down the training programs and concentrate solely on production targets was modified. He produced information showing that the Ministry itself had been far behind schedule in providing fertilizer and pesticides. He pointed out that almost no coordination with the Irrigation Authority existed, yet several of the provinces had much more serious irrigation problems than Miranda. This was a new factor which had not been adequately incorporated.

The facts that came out as a result of the meeting, demonstrated the problems of moving out of a pilot project where intensive resources have been used. There are rarely enough competent people or sufficient leadership or pioneering spirit to keep an expanded program together when initial problems have to be faced.

The Minister listened and then instructed Jorge to form a task force, visit the four provinces and come up with suggestions for immediate remedial action.

Jorge knew that the Minister had made this program a political priority almost to the point of offering it as a new magic solution to rural problems. The Minister had obviously been over-sold on its transferability. He did not realize that successful programs are based on long-term intensive efforts of community organization, the incorporation of political officials, the convincing of landlords, the cooperation of fertilizer companies, and most important, the intensive training of village leaders, supervisors, district officials, and even provincial authorities.

This was certainly no time to try to explain the nature of the problem to the Minister. What was needed now was some quick and concerted action to protect him and get things moving. Jorge reflected momentarily and gratefully on the competence of the staff at Huertas and the good relations they had carefully built up with the constantly changing array of foreign assistance officials.

He had some business to do in the capital before returning to work out task-force guidelines with his staff. He called Marty and set up a meeting with the AID Agricultural Chief and the Mission Director for the late afternoon.

The visit to the U.N. Resident Representative yielded sympathetic conversation. They were in the middle of the programming preparation and FAO was planning to work on some irrigation programs. There seemed to be no way he could get their immediate support because of a variety of procedural problems. However, FAO would be an important help with irrigation activities and could develop a rural works program if he could exert more leverage at the Division of Hydraulic Resources than he now had.

Robert E. Lee at Rockefeller had a small but important contribution that might pay a big dividend. They had been bringing Dr. George Stegmeier, one of the world's leading authorities on rural cooperatives, to Latin America for at least fifteen years. He knew Carlovingia and the Huertas project well, and had trained some Huertas people in his university programs. Lee thought he could arrange Stegmeier's first stop this year to be in Carlovingia, which would be within two months. Here was a man to whom the Minister and the President would listen. Lee also agreed to release this fact to the press soon.

The Rector of the Central Agricultural University, a former professor of Jorge's and a close friend of two of the Governors, agreed to join the task force. The Minister also agreed that Marty could serve as its technical advisor.

Geraldo Borges, Jorge's godfather, owned a large insurance company. He was also a leading literary figure in the country, distinguished and with good connections. He was a close friend of the director of the Hemisphere Agricultural Institute, who had talked to Jorge about holding the first International Seminar in Agricultural Cooperatives and Development at Huerta. At Jorge's request, Geraldo called the Director on the phone. He agreed to cable his decision to hold the Seminar to the local representative. The cable would say that Carlovíngia had been chosen because of its special achievements in this field and that key figures from all over the hemisphere would participate. This would provide some needed favorable publicity.

The USAID meeting got down to the hard problems of substance. "El Viejo" had been busy and effective. The AID provincial advisors from the four provinces in which the program had been started were there in the Mission Director's office when he arrived. There was some skirmishing about who had been responsible for what and whether the approach was the correct one. Obviously, everyone was trying to defend his actions in a program which was in serious trouble.

When everyone had finished making explanations, Jorge explained the Minister's problem and the stake that AID had in the program's continuing move forward, in view of the investment up to now. He stated that the task force would consist of experienced top national figures, many of whom were knowledgeable about the Huertas Program. He asked the Chief of Agriculture if he would participate. When he declined, Jorge stated that he might be able to get the Minister to include Marty (a small and diplomatic deception). He also stated that the task force report would require quick action. He mentioned that AID would probably be asked for new training courses and short-term expert advice.

He also informed them that Rockefeller was bringing Stegmeier to assist in the analysis of the problem and to convince key officials of the importance of a long-term view of the problem.

The Mission Director agreed to Marty's participation in the task force and requested a direct report on the results. On the basis of that, the Mission would determine the short-term training or consulting activities it could provide. The ensuing quiet gave Jorge confidence that the Mission Director had defined the AID response, and that some direct assistance might be forthcoming.

Jorge and Marty left for Huertas that night. Fortunately the Center had just finished a training course, and staff members and village coordinators were available for a Saturday meeting.

The meeting lasted all day. The entire group worked intensely, considering all the elements of technical agriculture, cooperative organization and loan policies and the function of village committees. At the end of the day the task force members from Huertas had been selected and the guidelines for the visits to the provinces were completed. It remained only to circulate them to the senior task force members.

Trained village boys, young agronomists and provincial bureaucrats and teachers, with Jorge and Marty acting only as consultants, had worked together, combining their skills and viewpoints and molding them into a set of short-term objectives. The years of labor and frustration at least had these satisfactions to offer.

However, there was still cause for some concern. The task force had to promote the notion of the village as an organic whole and to obtain commitment of key people to develop the villager's capacity to understand and to teach the villagers to deal with their problems. This intangible factor had to be injected into the expanded activities of the new provinces. Simple problem-solving was not enough; there must be a continuing concern with the whole process. Jorge's prologue to the task force was to encourage them to articulate that spirit.

It took several weeks to visit all the four provinces and meet with all the people. There were many long evenings of discussion, as well as a series of meetings in the capital putting together and reviewing all of the items that each of them had distilled from talking to governors and villagers, training directors, school teachers and extension agents. In the end, they did not have to extend their deadlines more than a day or two, due to herculean efforts by most of the task force.

Meanwhile the Minister's position had been strengthened by the announcement of the international training course and the visit of Stegmeier as well as the actions taken by the fertilizer companies to improve distribution in the new provinces. Some time had been bought. Now, could the Minister and the other organizations, as well as the foreign assistance agencies, be persuaded to take the actions that would provide additional resources for implementing the recommendations?

The report was delivered ceremonially with the whole task force and senior officials, complete press coverage, and elaborate complimentary speeches by the Rector of the University and the Minister.

The report was shorter than most in Carlovingia. It had a series of specific recommendations and some persuasive statements relating the recommendations to the findings and the priorities that the Ministers had set forth in the decree authorizing the task force.

Jorge sent an early draft to Stegmeier and solicited his comments. He was sure that the Minister would consult with him as soon as he arrived.

The Minister called Jorge to his house the evening of the day the report was delivered. He complimented Jorge on his success in getting such a varied group to come up with specific recommendations. However, he wanted to discuss some items in the report before instructing the National Council. The items he asked about were the following ones:

1) That AID be requested to bring in a short-term consultant to assist extension agents with a fertilizer distribution program;

2) that the presently available FAO irrigation specialist be requested to do a special study on the problems of irrigation in the villages of the demonstration provinces;

3) that a series of short courses for village coordinators be given. These would emphasize the importance of broadening cooperative effort and provide the techniques and materials to develop a broadly-based village committee to be the board of directors of the cooperatives;

4) that the concept of the task force be retained, and that Huertas be given the funds to set up a group to visit any province that was having a specific problem and work with them on solving it;

5) that the universities be given funds to produce small bulletins on varieties of crops, planting techniques and plant diseases, etc., that would be distributed through the training centers to all of the village coordinators;

6) that AID be asked to provide the funds for a new training center which would draw people from all four provinces and prepare them to teach in the village training academies in each province;

7) that the Minister go to the President with a proposal for a new tax on all agricultural sales. Half of the money would be retained by the provinces to maintain the training centers and the village programs. The other half would be distributed by the Ministry on a project basis to those activities that were determined to be of particular value in accelerating the program. This would give the Governors a stake in the program and allow for greater financial security and less dependence on foreign funds. (The Minister was concerned about the overall implications of this, but Jorge defended it as critical).

There were a number of other specific recommendations about the incorporation of field people from other ministries: the development of advisory councils in which the farmers themselves had some voice.

As for answering the Minister's questions, he emphasized the final paragraph of the report. It was devoted to the most persuasive statement that the task force would accept on the village as a long-term central focus, the unity of training, research and action, the importance of developing village leadership and responsibility and the support of the village objectives as important priorities within national economic policies.

At that point the Minister put the report aside and spoke personally to Jorge. "You are now a recognized apostle of these views nationally and internationally. You can no longer stay to comfortably preside over the success in Huertas. If you are dedicated to this idea, you must become Executive Secretary of the National Council and enter the fray of national rural development."

Jorge's protests about the shark-infested waters of the political arena brought a smile to the Minister's face. He said he had discussed the matter with the President, who had almost four years left in office. Jorge's present performance indicated that he had the political tools required. The question now was whether Jorge would join the Minister in a battle for a national network of village institutions, for which his own province had provided the pattern.

Jorge had always thought of the Minister as an expert politician. His obvious commitment and his authoritative manner without being overbearing, completely disarmed Jorge. He had underestimated the man.

Jorge promised the Minister an answer the next day. He decided to walk back to his father-in-law's house where he was staying. Curiously enough, he did not think so much about the report or the Minister's offer, but about the problems of leaving Huertas. The question in his mind was whether it would be possible to handle the crises of the national program long enough so that the villagers themselves could develop as they had in Miranda. He couldn't answer it.

Perspectives on the Carlovingia Case

Most project activities of this kind do not have heroes and, if they do, they are usually unsung. Now and then, either a national or a foreign figure may become so identified with an approach or successful activity that he becomes famous. Any old-timer in the business can reel off the names of pioneers in community development in India, rural reconstruction in Taiwan, village development in Bangladesh or agricultural research in Mexico. The same can be done for institutions in Costa Rica, Brazil, Peru, Iran, India and Thailand. What has this to do with institution building? First, it shows some of the contradictions which you will face in dealing with institution building problems (e.g., that leadership should not depend on one person). Second, it shows how *leadership*, when committed to an innovative *doctrine*, can become the vehicle for the broader aspects of institution building.

We know that lasting institutions are not just focused around building a staff, or a program, they are vehicles for ideas which can mobilize people toward innovative change. New ideas can become realities only if they grow from a network of organizational relationships, though only one may provide the innovative thrust.

This case shows how ideas, organizations, programs and people are molded into changes that can be important for the whole society. Failure, now, may be a price of future success. We are still not sure.

Usually, the process begins with an organization which becomes the catalyst for changes in a society, promotes greater production, greater participation of the people, and general improvement in human conditions.

By looking more closely at this case through the eyes of the institution builder, the factors become clear, though not necessarily less complex. We need to look at the layers of organizational structure which impinge on the process of institutionalization and the manifestations of the different institution building variables as they influence that process. You should recognize many of these problems if you have been involved in development projects which are not unlike the one described.

The core of this organizational structure is the training centers which are designed to train both villagers and the people who deal with them in the *programs* of rural cooperatives and village development. Jorge was the original director of the training center at Huertas, but his presence has been projected on to the Provincial and national scale because of his commitment to a particular *doctrine*—the cooperative as a device by which the villager attacks his own problems and uses government and private resources available to him for his own and his village's benefit.

In years of institution building studies, we have found that the *commitment of a leader to a doctrine* of the organization can be a significant force for institutionalization. In the province of Miranda, Jorge's skills as a leader and an institution builder seem to have resulted in making the training center a force for implanting this *doctrine*. This has involved training human resources and promoting programs of village improvement. The Training Center has *linkages* with the villagers, provincial officials, private organizations, national organizations, foreign aid agencies, and even internationally prominent people.

The institution building process has gone very well in the province, though it has taken many years to do so. The success and acceptance of it in the province has captured the interest of the Minister of Agriculture, who has begun to try to reproduce the process on a broader scale. The crisis turns out to be not with the reasonably well-institutionalized organization and program in Miranda, but with the attempt to expand the program to other areas in too short a time.

Jorge has guided a complex organizational growth process, in which the leadership of the training center and the program are diffused among the different groups involved in the programs. He remains as a prestigious advisor, consultant and supporting force in the province. On the national level, however, Jorge prescribed the pattern, but did not assume leadership; rather he named one of his promising proteges as the leader of the expanded program.

A pilot project has extra resources lavished on it. The special conditions of the area which caused it to be selected, and intensified efforts made within the area combine to promote a favorable climate for success. Rarely are we willing to take the worst possible situation for a pilot project, to show that if it can be done there, it can be done anywhere. Rarely do we restrict the resources of a pilot project to those we could make available to a nationwide program. In fact, new ideas are hard enough to get accepted without adding other unnecessary burdens. Therefore, when it comes time to expand the program, we underestimate the time and the resources necessary to achieve similar results on a larger scale.

This is what happened in Carlovingia. It has taken five years of careful institution building to *diffuse doctrine*, develop trained resources, extend the program into the environment, incorporate the clientele, and develop *linkages* with different elements of the environment.

Now that it has been successful, the national leadership is convinced that the lessons have been learned, and the program can easily be transferred to a larger area consisting of four provinces.

Alas, we have learned over the years just what Jorge seems always to be muttering about—that time is the crucial element, and that the success in the province was the product of a skillful blending of institution building skills, taking advantage of opportunities, assured resources, and the time needed for people, especially villagers, to absorb the *doctrine* and make it their own.

The crisis of the larger project in the other four provinces gives us a glimpse of the fragile nature of the elements of institution building which Jorge and his staff tried with such success in Miranda Province. That is another lesson that we have learned. Good institution building techniques will often assist us out of crises and provide us with time for growth and change, but they do not insure the internal development or the external institutional acceptance that goes with it.

In this case, Jorge immediately turns to his own *trained human resources* for assistance; he demonstrates his own and their commitment to the *doctrine* of village development through cooperatives. He uses the flexible *internal structure* of the training center. He incorporates prestigious groups, including foreign agencies who can not only provide *enabling support* but also *resources* which will help re-orient the program once the decisions about its direction are made. Jorge uses traditional relationships, such as his godfather, his professor and his classmate to achieve the quite modern objectives of support and prestige. He talks with fertilizer companies (*functional linkages*) and individual villagers (*diffuse linkages*) to obtain their cooperation. His basic commitment is to the *doctrine* of a village-oriented program, but he has to be concerned with the problems of increasing production, training *human resources*, and obtaining changes in the structure of the program so that training is related to the needs of the people.

The task force report is also filled with items which strengthen *linkages*—that which ties the program to the needs of the environment. The tax funds, for example, provide the means for obtaining Provincial Governors' support (*enabling linkages*) and their *functional cooperation* through the distribution of funds. This is a shrewd political move if it works, but the institution builder sees it simply as another *linkage*.

The report also deals with *internal variables*—the training of *human resources* at the village level, and the infusion of the cooperative *doctrine* through bottom-up participation by the villager.

What Jorge forgets and fortunately, what the Minister remembers is that institution building on this scale requires wise and experienced strategists at the top who can "put it all together" and who can deal with the diverse elements of the bureaucracy, the *varied linkages*, both national and international, and still maintain the dedication to the staff and the *doctrine* of the villager as a participant in his own improvement.

Success in one province has simply opened up the challenge of how the program can become a national one. It poses the problem of what new innovative strategies will be required to build the *internal structure* and the *linkages* so that the institution building process can *diffuse the doctrine* to villagers in a larger environment.

One lesson of our research is that institution building provides a lens that does not reduce the complexity to simply formulas, but gives us instruments of analysis which allow us to decide what we can do in different situations that will affect the success of development projects.

Jorge was successful, skillful and committed to a *change oriented doctrine* that he knew had worked, but he was still finding problems that had to be solved and institution building was a useful, but far from sure, tool of success in the new situation he was facing. Fortunately, he had learned what it has taken us years to study in diverse cultures to confirm—that new ideas have to mature, as well as be skillfully introduced.

Note to the reader:

If this is the first Phase that you have read, you now have several choices. You may continue on to the Checklist if that will help you in your work; you may refer to the discussion of any one of the variables that interests you by turning to the appendixes; or you may look at the Table of Contents to see if some other Phase is of more interest to you.

A Checklist for Consolidators

A. Preliminary Notes

The arbitrary nature of these phases should not hide the reality that institution building is a constant transitional process. The checklist provides a group of questions which will help you pinpoint the priorities—areas that need attention in a given institution building project.

We have found several common situations that may occupy your attention at this phase. One of them is the transition illustrated in this case: the transition from a small area to a larger one. This will entail enlarging and broadening internal resources and reaching out for new linkages in the society.

Another is the situation in which the internal elements of the institution have now come into their own, and concentration must be given to the business of developing the relationships or linkages with the rest of the society so that the program and the doctrine can be projected into the environment. There are many cases of business schools, planning bodies, training organizations, clinics, etc., that need to be protected until they have built up a competent staff and have the capacity to provide their services. Then they must build closer relations with a larger environment, or remain capsulized.

Another of the more common situations is the transition from dependence on artificial support to the available normal resources which requires many adjustments in the internal and external elements. The withdrawal of foreign aid is one example of a time of considerable stress and transition. Support for funding and relationships with enabling groups have to be strengthened.

Still another example is the transition from planning to involvement with implementation—the creation of regional offices, or the development of extension activities by an experiment station.

Each of these represents periods when the basic internal preparation has been completed and the capacity to serve and survive in the outside world must be tested. However there is no clear cut division from one phase to another, so it is often necessary to consider these questions as early as possible. It is for these transitional situations that the present checklist is designed to help you find the particular elements that need most attention.

B. Leadership

1. Has the leadership structure enough depth so that the absence of one or two people will not undermine continuing innovation and program development? (Will the program survive without Jorge?)

2. What is being done at the middle levels of the hierarchy to incorporate people into the decision-making process and to encourage their development of leadership skills? (Remember how important the center staff was to the task force effort.)

C. Doctrine

1. What is being done to broaden the scope of the elements of doctrine so that a greater proportion of the public identifies with some part of the goals of the organization? (An example is the growth of village councils.)

2. What is the depth of the understanding of the principal elements of doctrine within the organization? (How ingrained was the cooperative philosophy?)

3. Are the doctrinal elements internally made specific for the staff to incorporate them as part of their objectives? (Did the staff translate cooperation into specific actions?)

4. To what degree are the program and the activities a reflection of the doctrine of the organization?

D. Program

1. Does the program have an innovative impact on a significant number of the clientele in areas they consider important? (e.g. new ways to solve village-determined problems)

2. Are the target groups clearly defined? Have priorities been established about their importance in building support for the organization?

E. Resources

1. Is training a permanent part of organizational practice? Does it include foreign, national and internal training? (For example, regional training centers that drew on foreign-trained people and the villagers themselves)

2. What measures are being taken to develop resources to replace temporary experts or foreign advisors or others who may leave the organization in the near future?

3. What is being done to develop new sources of human or financial resources that will be permanent? (e.g., income, budget sources, promoting schools which produced trained people)

F. Enabling Linkages

1. Does leadership have financial autonomy or does it have to make special appeals to higher authority for funds to support the organization?

2. Has the organization a niche in the hierarchy, budget, or other policy forums that makes it an accepted part of the administrative structure?

3. Is the organization reviewing its present structure in light of the changes that will be forthcoming when there is less assured support from foreign aid agencies and other special resources?

4. Is the present structure capable of taking on expanded functions as it grows?

G. Functional Linkages

1. What would happen in the case of conflict (e.g. if its programs or functions were attacked by another organization)?

2. Does the organization have reciprocal relationships with other change-oriented organizations that might give it significant support when needed? (e.g. The Division of Hydraulic Resources, FAO, etc.)

3. To what degree have other organizations in the environment begun to cooperate with the organization or its program?

4. To what degree is the organization in competition with others for the same clientele? What is its competitive condition? What are the opportunities for changing competitors to cooperators through programs of mutual benefit?

H. Normative Linkages

1. Who provides the operating standards (personnel, budget, procedures, etc.)?

2. Does the organization have special or different procedures of operation? Are these procedures accepted or copied by others?

I. Diffuse Linkages

1. To what degree are the values of the clientele and the society taken into account in the development of the program?

2. How do the innovatable products or approaches of the organization have to be modified to make them acceptable to the clientele?

3. Has the program's impact contributed to the public image of the organization? (Are the cooperatives identified with the small farmer?)

4. Has there been an attempt to identify the organization in all of its activities with the broader needs of the society?

PHASE III MATURITY IN LONGARIA

In which the years of struggle, crisis, war, politics and administrative change lead us to a situation which looks like success but on examination opens up some new problems and expectations that offer challenge for the future. Institution building notions are useful in telling us something about how and why we have arrived and may help us in the road ahead.

The Challenge of Emerging Success in Longaria

It was a joy to be back, as much to see old friends as to represent my university at the official incorporation of the Faculty of Management and Public Affairs into the National University. Also, Oboya, one of the students whom I had selected years ago to come back and study in the U.S., had been made Dean of the School.

The image of winning has a magnetic capacity to consolidate diverse elements and gather support from former enemies, to make things appear to be all mangoes and cool breezes, as the tribal saying goes. There was a certain satisfaction in seeing the President cutting the ribbon on the new building and that old fox, the Chancellor, philosophizing hypocritically on his own mighty efforts to incorporate "the first school of its kind on this continent into the warm embrace of the whole University".

Azi, who had been there when no one, national or foreign, was willing to support the vision of a school, smiled his toothy smile in his turn, said a few pungent phrases of challenge and encouragement to the faculty and students and emphasized the importance of continued community support. Azi had moved out of the political arena now and could afford to be gracious. However, his intense dedication to the purposes of education was apparent. I remembered how often we had been surprised by his boldness and persuasive capacity. At the official reception the talk of the "good old days" got to the point that you would almost think that there hadn't been a war, that the first project hadn't been closed out and this one almost strangled.

At one time the problems of getting either management or public affairs started had seemed almost insurmountable.

Azi knew and hadn't forgotten. He had the scars to show for it. They included disappointment, frustration, and the patient and careful mobilization of forces from the village tradesman, to the international business community to get the support needed for an educational institution to meet the needs of the country.

Even now that the School has a solid footing, there are still ways in which Azi's wisdom, experience and knowledge of the inner workings of the affairs of Longaria can be of great help to the new Dean.

Therefore, when Oboya suggested that I stay on a week, I agreed to prepare some background and recommendations if he would review them with both Azi and me.

Oboya had not been Azi's candidate for Dean, but he was bright, young and energetic and had been a good Acting Dean. This would be an excellent opportunity to bring the younger and the older man together informally. A good relationship between these two would be tremendously beneficial in navigating the shoals ahead now that the school had gained entry into the secure, but politically charged atmosphere of the National University.

The recommendations will be easy as the present needs are as apparent as the successes. The graduates have already developed a reputation; the school seems now to have adequate support from both business and public organizations; and the professors have developed prestige as teachers and consultants. The morale and potential dynamic impetus of the school under a shiny new faculty is clear.

However, there are a number of areas yet to be dealt with to which I plan to recommend:

a) the development of a case program based on national situations so that those returning from foreign training and the students will have to adapt their knowledge to the local circumstances—the powerful tribal influences, the power of the civil service, the special needs of small business, etc.

b) the implementation of the long discussed professional journal to raise the academic image within the university and among the scholarly community.

c) the conduct with the planning board of an up-to-date survey of manpower needs to help them with their curriculum planning and begin to build some information sources for study and research.

d) the promotion of a decree which will make training at the staff college a prerequisite for holding senior civil service posts. The college has the prestige and the support that might make this possible, and it would increase the demand for attendance. The Faculty-Staff College relationship is now good enough so that the decree will benefit them both.

e) the building of closer relationships with the Schools of Law and Political Science, the way they have begun with Economics.

f) a request to the Board of Directors of the National Educational Foundation to commission a review of the present goals in terms of the needs of the people who will employ the graduates. This may involve curriculum and other revisions.

In effect, I will propose that they widen their relationships with other Schools, and review their roles in the society as a whole. They need to learn that once one set of barriers has been broken another set pops up. If these are dealt with, ossification will ensue.

Oboya is the man who will begin the process because he is riding the crest of the wave. However, he seems concerned about smoothing out the internal problems that are left over from when the former Establishment Secretary was Dean. I hope he doesn't choose to limit himself to internal problems when he has a chance at broader things. Hopefully, Azi will convince him.

There is, of course, much Oboya and his young Faculty can be proud of. Certainly the decision by the National Council of Education that provides official approval to the curriculum made it clear that the school had gained acceptance at the highest levels of the educational hierarchy. The forthcoming meeting of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences in Longaria and the presence of increasing numbers of students from all over the continent are all significant indicators of the degree to which the school has become, at least, a qualified success.

Considering what Oboya has been able to do about the salary problem, maybe my fears are unjustified. It was he, as Acting Dean who encouraged the professors to start consulting in order to earn extra money to supplement their meager salaries. The Americans and most of the other foreigners, as well as a good body of the returning professors, were of the view that all professors should be full-time and that they should be paid well.

In this society, however, everybody has three jobs. Probably a government one in the morning, a professional practice in the afternoon, and a teaching job at night. The professors at the school, even those who were well-trained, were no exception.

Oboya has been gradually able to replace this "taxi" professor idea, which did little for the professional development of the school, and provide the professors with a legitimate means of earning outside funds to support themselves and at the same time provide themselves with valuable experience to bring back to the School. The results are already beginning to show. Until now, the notion of consulting in Longaria at least by nationals, in either government or private industry, was unheard of.

With the help of Oboya's major backer on the board of the National Educational Foundation, the President of the Chamber of Industries, a man from Oboya's village, he had used the Americans and the newly returned graduates to develop a consulting service that was available to both government and business.

The faculty has agreed to strict rules about how much time would be permitted for such activity. There were many problems in the School about the responsibilities to research and teaching. So far the prestige of the school had increased with its consulting activities and seems to be continuing even after the "free" services of some of the foreign professors, used as a device to give initial prestige, have been discontinued.

Now that they have been incorporated within the University the salaries would be raised a little and Oboya can insist on more research and teaching, while allowing the consulting to be an important link with the community.

We have come a long way from those days when I first came out as a consultant and the idea of a professional school of administration, rather than economics or accounting, was a gleam in Azi's eyes, and could only occupy a minute amount of his time in the larger labor of running a new independent government. At that point, there were not enough trained people to teach in the high schools to go to the villages for simple programs of development.

With all this progress, I hope Azi will use my report to articulate what I hope are our common fears—that it is easy to rest on your laurels and not continue the innovative process that is so important.

There is a tendency to say that those were the good old days, but I am not so sure. They were exciting, demanding, filled with problems and concerns as to whether the school would open on time, have any students, or continue to survive. There were tremendous pressures on all of us from our own University, AID mission and the Longarians with whom we were work-

ing, since they identified it with the need to build new things as a result of independence. For the Americans it was also a time of miserable living conditions, disease we were not used to and most of all, of frustration and isolation.

The typical jealousies and misunderstandings, across cultures and within them abounded. There were severe differences of professional style among all of us. The only saving grace was humor and some perspective which came with the job of building something new in a new society. In spite of administrative differences, mountains of what seemed like useless paperwork, interminable discussions over organization, curriculum, admission criteria and a hundred other things, there were enough great small ideas which emerged from the daily interaction between Americans and Longarians to give us a sense that bigger accomplishments and satisfactions were coming.

In those days Azi showed up frequently to see how plans were developing. After all, this was his second venture and he wanted to see it work. Azi had gone to the U.S., worked there and finally studied and received his degree there. Most of his compatriots, who had been to England, were derisive of his attempts to bring American-style education to Longaria.

In fact, a few years before he had been instrumental in getting a U.S. foundation to support the development of a Department of Administration in the School of Economics by a large and prestigious U.S. University. The project failed for a variety of complex reasons. Among them were the lack of understanding by the faculty of what was intended, the pretentiousness of the visiting faculty, the lack of cultivation of the business community, and the attempt to develop a program in accord with strict U.S. standards. The reaction was not long in coming. The foundation representative, after long deliberations with university officials, community leaders and the visiting professors decided that there was no way to resolve the problem and closed out the entire contract.

This left everyone suspicious of university contracts and the capacity of the National University for change. The business community and the civil service now had a scapegoat to throw up to any further proposals by Azi, who was not yet Chief Minister but Establishment Secretary.

When a new AID Mission Director arrived and Azi, himself, had become Chief Minister, he tried again in spite of the skepticism surrounding the venture.

This time he organized a conference including senior civil servants, the business leaders, representatives of the AID Mission, the U.N., and a selected group of British and American universities. He finally obtained a foreign grant to support the conference.

Since we were one of the universities invited, the President asked the Dean and me to attend. Several things happened at the meeting. Azi had picked a few people who were willing to take the risk of starting over. The different foreign groups received the hospitality and persuasive attention of Azi and these key people. As a result, the AID Mission was persuaded to send off a number of people to a special management program at our university during the forthcoming summer. UNESCO agreed to do a study of higher education. The British agreed to finance some top country officials to visit major commonwealth staff colleges and training centers.

Azi had rigged the whole meeting. We not only worked day and night producing recommendations but we were asked to participate in their implementation. Fortunately, AID wanted to start some new programs and the Public Administration advisor was a shrewd and effective bureaucrat. He was willing to try to obtain funds for a new program based on the recommendations of the conference. The National Planning Board was able to convince the Ford Foundation from which it was receiving support, to sponsor the study of management needs.

As it turned out, the new international center at our university needed some sizeable projects to launch its activities. The AID Mission had funds that it had not been able to obligate and, therefore, would lose on June 30.

The recommendations of the conference were comprehensive and carried the stamp of major national and international figures. They were relatively easy to convert into a project proposal.

Our university president was at that time well-connected in Washington, and he has always been dedicated to the idea that improvements in public and business administration are a key to progress in underdeveloped countries. The combination of prestige, timing, the vision of a few people and a good deal of luck set the process in motion. However, we were all racing against the calendar.

The project was signed on June 29 and the negotiations for the contract began after only a preliminary report on management training needs by the Longarian Planning Board and before the overall UNESCO study was even underway.

A team of professors from our university spent the summer in Longaria working with varied groups there laying out a long-term program and working out the details of the initial stages. The President of the Chamber of Industries, the Establishment Secretary and even the Chancellor of the university designated competent people to work on the project. Behind the scenes Azi was using his influence to mobilize people and support. The winning over of the Chancellor was a remarkable feat and the project would have progressed much faster if he had not had a heart attack later in the year.

As it was, we were much too busy with the few groups that were interested to notice the ominous silence which emanated from the Faculties of Economics, Political Science and Law—all of which were direct competitors in the fields we were working.

In the end, a ten year program was outlined, a National Educational Foundation was created on whose board were the Minister of Education, the Establishment Secretary, the Planning Board chief in the President's office, the President of the Chamber of Industries and the Chancellor of the University and one or two other prominent persons.

A group of bright young economics and law graduates were selected for advanced training. The summer management program at our university had isolated some persons who could provide support to the school. At the same time, a number of the professors on the team from our university had become sufficiently involved to decide to come out as visiting professors.

Azi's final coup was yet to come. He went to the U.S. and convinced the President of the University that our Dean of Management and Public Affairs was the only man who could get the school off to a good start. There was considerable division of opinion both in AID and in the university as to whether an American should be the first Dean, but the tradition of expatriate administrators after independence was common in Longaria. The Dean had professional, as well as personal reservations, but in the end Azi's remarkable capacity for persuasion won everybody over. It was to prove to be an important decision. The combination of the Dean's and Azi's skills were to be a critical factor in the survival of the school during its early years.

As the school year began, there was some reason to be optimistic. The legal structure of the National Educational Foundation was set up, the contract had been negotiated, and professors recruited from our university. In addition, there were several part-time professors, both expatriate and national who lived in Longaria and who were qualified to take over some of the courses of the first year curriculum.

The Establishment Secretary had provided some buildings which, while hardly satisfactory, were at least adaptable to use as classrooms. The equipment would be a long time in coming; so people made do with what they could improvise in the way of chairs, blackboards, and materials.

The Dean arrived, set about the business of mobilizing the students and the faculty into a tightly-knit pioneering group.

Now that the school had started, Azi had become involved in other aspects of politics, but he could always be depended on in a crisis. Meanwhile, the Establishment Secretary, in his own stuffy way, was knowledgeable and unperturbed by the preoccupation of the Americans with rapid progress. He and the U.S. Dean hit it off reasonably well and that kept many of the small problems from becoming big ones.

All in all it looked like a remarkable start, considering the pressures, the timing and the innovative character of the undertaking. Many of the problems that continued to be a source of our preoccupation now seem small, but they did not seem so at the time. Longarians and Americans alike felt strongly about teaching methods, curriculum development, building a seriousness of purpose in the students. Actually some of the stickiest points of contention had to do with encrusted British tradition that was no longer true in Britain, but had been sanctified during the colonial period.

Some little things were not without their humor and helped everybody maintain some perspective. For example, since students were often late to class, one of the American professors put a bell in the courtyard to be rung at the beginning of classes. However, any time any student passed through the courtyard he rang the bell. Finally the Dean had it removed. That was just one of the little ways in which we learned that change is a slow process and that we had brought a lot of cultural baggage with us that had to be reconsidered.

However, major problems were beginning to loom on the horizon. We were all vaguely aware of them, but with the exception of the Dean, we did not take them seriously. After the Chancellor of the University died from a heart attack, the barriers holding back the resentment of the university faculties were removed. Economics students led a strike against the "imperialist" school which caused classes to be suspended. Azi told the American professors to stay home or take a short vacation for a week or two, but several of them stayed on in order to work in their offices and were roughed up by University students. The Ambassador made a formal protest to the government and a good deal of bad feeling was created.

At the same time, the Dean of Economics and other senior university officials were actively campaigning within the National Council of Education to deny the petition for accrediting a course of study in administration. Without this, the school would have no educational standing in the community.

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The business community, steeped in the tradition of family enterprise, was not coming forward with the financial support and the Chamber of Industries was the scene of several stormy sessions questioning the leadership's support of the school, arguing that the courses at the University in economics and administrative law were quite satisfactory for the needs of the country.

The Civil Service with a tradition which had become more elitist than the English Colonial Service saw the possibility of young upstarts moving into important positions, so they were doing little to cooperate with the school or to protect it from its enemies.

The ultimate blow which precipitated the major crisis in the early years of the school was the arrival of a new AID Mission Director. After a review of programs he announced that the emphasis of AID programs would henceforth be agriculture.

Shortly thereafter he proposed the cancellation of the contract with the university at the end of its three year period and abandonment of the ten year plan. In its place he offered only occasional consulting services to the school as requested.

The combined events cast a pall of gloom over the school from which it might have never recovered had it not been for the indomitable spirit of Azi and the quiet continuous efforts the Dean had been making in the community, the university and the AID Mission. The Public Administration Chief of the AID Mission was one of the few experienced overseamen who had been there long enough to have a perspective on the problem. He knew the inner workings of AID and was well-connected in both Longaria and Washington. The Dean had cultivated him as a friend and often discussed problems with him informally because of his long experience in the area.

Officially the Dean had always maintained that we were independent from AID and the contract was a set of goals from which the university should devise strategies for achievement with the Longarians. However, his personal as well as his reporting relationship to the Public Administration Chief was close enough so that they could work together on a strategy to head off the precipitate withdrawal of AID support.

The Public Administration Division maneuvered the convening of another conference of distinguished national and international authorities to revise the long-range plans of the school and scale down its objectives in an effort to save the school and the contract.

Faced with the new set of recommendations, the Mission Director agreed to reconsider. While he was doing so, Azi came out with the blunt announcement in the legislature that the government was going to significantly increase its own financial commitment to the school.

The political opposition was caught by surprise. No one thought, now that Azi had entered the national political arena—possibly to run for the Presidency—that he would have the courage (some said stupidity) to make such a public statement. The University students renewed their strike, but they had no effective influence on the budget. Some of the members of the National Council fumed, but theirs was a role of approving credentials, not money. The Civil Service which was officially neutral about policy probably thought they could undermine it later.

For a while, none of us knew what was going to happen, but the Dean continued to talk to people in different areas of Longarian industry, commerce and government. He asked us all to pitch in and prepare two short courses for the summer recess—one on industrial management and the other on agricultural administration. Shortly thereafter the Chamber of Industries announced that it was giving a course for its members using school facilities. The Ministry of Agriculture also announced a seminar for its provincial directors in administrative problems of rural areas.

Azi got his budget. The school received some additional equipment and raised the salaries of local professors. Furthermore, the Dean and Azi designed a campaign to raise money for a building for the school. They had convinced a large international business firm to put up money for the initial planning and the fund raising campaign. Once again this approach was unheard of in Longaria. However, it served the purpose of focusing public attention on the dynamic nature of the school.

The business community also began to have some second thoughts. First the management course given by the Chamber of Industries using school faculty had been designed to fit business needs, and many came away from it with some new conceptions. Second, a prestigious international company was providing some support. Therefore, the study of management must have something to it.

The President of our university had not been idle in Washington either, and the

Mission Director was informed that AID Washington supported the acceptance of the new less ambitious plan for the school.

Some of us at the school felt that our vision of the school had been unjustly narrowed and there was grumbling among the faculty. However, everybody had been so busy with the short courses and determining the means to incorporate the new professors returning from their training that there was little time to complain.

Finally, we agreed that one American and one Longarian should jointly conduct the course for one year and then the Longarian professor would take over the class and call on a reduced staff of foreigners as he needed their assistance.

Looking back on the crisis which probably was at least six months in resolution, it is clear that a number of people took calculated steps that were critical to its resolution. These actions were immediately followed by positive efforts. The Dean's understanding of power centers and the way in which he had courted certain members of the National Council on Education, the university, AID and the business community was key to his capacity to act when crises arose. This was no mean achievement for a foreigner.

The Dean had used the Board of Directors of the National Educational Foundation as close advisors and incorporated many of the changes they recommended. However, in one case where they had proposed hiring a mediocre registrar who was a personal relation of one of the directors and the faculty had opposed it, he stood firm with the faculty. From then on there was no question but that this quiet man had the courage of his convictions.

Azi on the other hand used his political flair, and his unshakeable conviction. The combination of charm and disarming questions, the capacity to persuade, the instinct for the unusual and the bold were capacities that are rare in any society. The key, I suppose, was his obvious and intense dedication to education and change. Yet there was this warm and easy way in which he used his political skills.

When the military took over just before the war, he was pushed into the background. This was another crisis for the school. However, when the war came, they needed his indefatigable capacity to deal with complex problems and mobilize people to accomplishment. He became an advisor to the general staff.

This is no place to review the many events in the war nor its effect on the society. It has been covered at length in the press. We were, of course, caught in a number of ways because the relationships between the U.S. and Longaria deteriorated seriously. We were often criticized by AID and embassy people as being too partial to Longaria, and by our Longarian colleagues as if we were responsible for U.S. policy.

The Dean had completed two tours and though he had been asked to stay on, he left, just after the military takeover and just before the war. Before he left, he and Azi and the Board of National Educational Foundation agreed on the new Dean.

We all would have preferred one of the new professors trained abroad, but with uncanny premonition Azi promoted the candidacy of the Establishment Secretary. He was appointed and somehow held things together during the war. He was also responsible for the formation of a government staff college as an independent entity, but housed together with the school and drawing on its faculty. The staff college was run by senior officers in the Civil Service and the professors of the school served when requested as academic advisors. The Establishment Secretary had the standing to begin the program and get the support and acceptance of the Civil Service. This added significant prestige to the school in government circles.

More important, when the war came, he was in a position to use the faculty to assist the different ministries in the urgent logistics problems that were suddenly thrust upon them. He also did his best during that period to avoid American professors' involvement in any personal or official way that would embarrass the embassy and AID. However, we did in fact help our fellow faculty members informally with many of the administrative problems that they were working on during the war.

Fortunately, the conflict did not last long and the interregnum that it created did not erase all the gains the school had made. In one sense it won over the Civil Service through its work with them. Dean Oboya is now using this same tactic to win over the business community with the consulting services the school is providing.

After the war ended and the country began to put the pieces of its national life back together, the school experienced another crisis. What had saved the school on any number of occasions was not just the quality of trained resources and the capacity to obtain funds, but the capacity of the Dean to keep the internal resources of the school mobilized so that they could meet the urgent needs of ministries and businesses, particularly those which were providing the backing of the school.

The Establishment Secretary was a tradition civil servant—competent, honest and impeccable in manner. However, he had neither the smooth political skill of Azi or the calm relation-building capacity of our Dean. He was one of the original British-trained civil servants who had held the country together in the early days of independence. He demanded and received respect and obedience. He was much more accustomed to being obeyed than to finding reasonable positions which he could convince superiors and subordinates alike to accept and act on. After the spirit of cooperation during the war, the reimposition of traditional discipline on a faculty that had come to take innovative initiatives was a factor which began to create internal dissension.

Azi, who had been moved by the military to the head of the National Industrial Development Corporation, was still a key member of the Foundation Board. He recognized the problem and waited for a chance to intervene.

In the meantime, the former Establishment Secretary made a contribution no one expected. He was a classmate of the Dean of the School of Economics, one of the people who had opposed the school from the beginning. Through this friendship, the School of Economics and the School of Management and Public Affairs began to combine course offerings and share faculty because of the shortage of good professors. The Dean of Economics, trained in England, began to see the complementary roles that the schools could play in professional education. When he was later made Chancellor of the university, he did not oppose the incorporation of the school into the university—which finally took place—though this position involved some political risk.

When the Director of the staff college was promoted to a permanent secretary post, Azi maneuvered the Board of Directors into offering the former Establishment Secretary to move from Dean of our school to the Director of the Staff College. Azi persuaded him to accept the post as one in which he could make more of an impact on the Civil Service.

In order to get approval for this, Azi had to make a deal with the President of the Chamber of Industries that Oboya (who is from the President's village) he made Dean. Oboya was one of my best students during the little time I spent on campus during those years. However, he was young and was not a senior man in his department, so he was made acting Dean for a period of a year. His confirmation is the result of some very innovative ideas, a good deal of courage in implementing the consulting idea and the restoration of an open atmosphere in which faculty members feel comfortable.

Now if he can develop a relationship with Azi that will give him the support, and if he learns the political skills he needs, the difficult days ahead for the new University School of Management and Public Affairs will be made easier.

If my week's work can bring these two together into lasting and productive relationship, it may be more valuable than the years I spent struggling with my Hungarian colleagues on curriculum development, teaching, and wondering whether the school would continue to exist.

Perspectives on the Longaria Case

Why do we call this example a case of "maturity" in institution building? The other cases were in some intermediate stage of development. In this case the school has been made a part of the prestigious National University. Its funds seem assured by the additional support which is now forthcoming from the business community and the Civil Service. The consulting activities of the professors also provide them with prestige and income to allow them to dedicate more time to the profession. The national faculty has taken over from the foreign one and the new Dean appears to be developing the professional quality and the morale of the school.

There are, therefore, many components here of the institutionalization we seek when building new institutions. However, there are still questions and concerns about continued capacity to innovate and the extension of its influence through graduates in order to effect changes in the society.

Maturity is not a static condition. If it becomes so, then the institution ossifies and the problems of rejuvenation, which are covered in the next section, apply. We have, however, been able to generalize about some indicators. The basic issues of existence and acceptance have been overcome. The organization has some protective capacity of its own; it commands some respect for what it is rather from those who support it; it has begun to be thought of as belonging; and it has a clientele who would act in whatever ways they thought necessary to ensure its continued services.

The failure of the first contract is an oversimplified example of what happens when it is assumed that "superior" technology will be accepted because it is either modern or more efficient.

The initial activities of the second contract are a mixture of mobilizing resources and support through meeting the interests of diverse groups. Early staff training is common to most successful institution building projects. In this case, there is not only a continuous training program, but the returned professors are gradually incorporated directly into the faculty.

During the early stages, the threats of denying resources to the school are the most critical ones it has to face. The AID shift in priorities is not an uncommon situation in which the usually guaranteed external resources are threatened. However, another important threat was that of denying recognition to its graduates by the National Council of Education. This would have destroyed the legal base and the public image of its program by denying legitimacy to its product. The student strike, the problems of nationalism, institutional competition, the rejection of modern method are also part of the change and adaptation process of most developing countries.

The Dean and Azi typify the two different kinds of leadership that have proven successful in institution building studies. One is dynamic, persuasive, bold and charming; the other is calm, perceptive and confidence inspiring. The common element of the two types is their commitment to the institution, its doctrine and its program. However, it was the "stuffy" former Establishment Secretary who had the prestige and the personal relationships to develop an important functional linkage with the Civil Service from which he had come and with the Dean of Economics at the University. No specific leadership type will always be successful. There is no doubt, however, that leaders need to assure that the organization obtains active support from its friends and nullifies the attacks of its enemies, if it is to make an impact and obtain acceptance.

Another common indicator of institution building success running through the story is the capacity to mobilize the *internal resources* of the organization. This may be to develop new courses for the Chamber of Industries or the Ministry of Agriculture or to absorb returned scholars, or to share faculty with the School of Economics. The mobilization of that internal capacity to build a clientele is critical to taking advantage of opportunities as they arise. This capacity has been shown to be a critical determinant in getting acceptance and institutionalization. There are cases of schools which have been held together capsule-like for several years while building up their internal capacity and then when the opportunity finally came to make an impact on the environment, they were able to do so effectively and obtain rapid acceptance.

When threat of withdrawal of enabling funds by the AID Mission occurred, Azi had developed enough support that critical groups were unwilling to openly fight against his bold position to increase the country's own investment in the school. The importance of finding local target groups who can provide authority and resources at the earliest possible time has often been a critical factor in the institution building process.

The exploitation of crisis to build acceptance and mobilize internal action and public support is another technique that is not restricted to institution building but can be a conscious strategy to take advantage of the situation to strengthen both internal elements and *linkages* with the environment. In this case intelligent leadership and careful nurturing of linkages allowed the Faculty to take advantage of every crisis, including the war, which could have been devastating.

Maturity brings new problems. Oboya, the new Dean, has to begin the process of adapting the innovations in education that have been imported from developed countries to the local problems and conditions. The Faculty now has the opportunity to use the newly gained acceptance in the university to build relationships with other faculties that will influence the entire higher education system.

The school now needs to initiate the training of its own faculty and develop its leadership elements so that it can continue to grow without outside help.

In the final analysis maturity removes threats to the organization's existence, provides autonomy, and a budget which allows it to project its program into the society, benefiting its clientele and possibly influencing change in the larger society.

If that challenge is not met, institutionalization will be an ivory-towered monastery whose innovations will be isolated from the rest of the society. Then, all of the techniques of getting the school accepted up to now may have been wasted.

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Note to the reader:

If this is the first Phase you have read, you now have several choices. You may continue on to the checklist, if that will help you with your work; you may refer to the discussion of any of the variables that interests you but turning to the appendixes; or you may look at the Table of Contents to see if some other Phase is of more interest to you.

Have You, In Fact Arrived? A Checklist on Maturity

A. Preliminary Notes

This checklist is focused on the questions that are appropriate for an organization relatively well-accepted in its environment, whose clientele values its services, and whose place is established in the hierarchy of organizations with which it is associated. It should have managed to introduce new and innovative approaches to solving problems among its clientele without alienating the major groups which hold power and mold opinion in the society. If all of these things were completely satisfied, we could say that within our terms of reference the institutionalization process had taken place.

In reality, of course, new organizations gradually fulfill many of these requirements as their impact grows over the years but never all of them or even any one perfectly.

What has been emphasized in this phase is that ideally the process of innovation, the quest for broader support and acceptance never ends. The mature organization provides program outputs to the society and in return the society exercises influence that provides it the authority and the resources to continue to innovate.

This checklist can be used to determine the appropriateness of the withdrawal of outside assistance, the need for rejuvenation, or to assess the degree to which the institution building process has been most successful.

B. Leadership

1. Is the leadership of the organization self-generating? (e.g. The Foundation seems capable of selecting a new Dean without major problem)

2. Is there a pattern of leadership development in the organization?

3. Does a change in top leader alter the basic purposes of the organization? (e.g. Oboya's role as Dean seems to be pretty well circumscribed)

4. Does the leadership generate the review and renewal of programs, doctrine and the analysis of the linkage relationships?

5. Are the styles of leadership or the organization copied by other organizations?

C. Doctrine

1. Are the activities of the organization considered "the best way" or the "right way" to do things? (Note the progress the Faculty has made in management education among its clientele)

2. Does the organization have an image and a role that is widely understood? Does it fulfill a need of at least a significant group in the society? (The Faculty has clear legal and financial indicators of this.)

3. Does the staff now accept and translate the doctrine of the organization easily into specific goals and programs?

4. Are important questions beginning to be raised about the renewal of doctrine in the light of program accomplishments?

D. Resources

1. Is the organization an integral and accepted part of the process of the distribution of resources for the hierarchy within which it operates?

2. Is there a decreasing dependence on external or supplementary resources, or a plan by which the organization will become completely self-sufficient in the near future? Are supplementary funds only used for special projects, not for operating resources?

3. Have efforts been made to specify the human resource needs to other organizations that might provide them? (We don't know, for example, the degree to which the Faculty will accept other University professors, except Economics)

4. Are incentives such as scholarship programs, internship programs, and other activities which encourage human resource development, built into the organization's activities?

E. Program

1. Does the program project into the environment and is it providing continued benefits to the clientele? Are these benefits recognized?

2. Is the clientele powerful enough to continue the program or are there powerful elements in the society that will support clientele demands?

3. Is there feedback from the environment about the program that allows the program to be better adapted to the needs of the clientele? (Time will tell if Faculty graduates do well in the local environment.)

F. Internal Structure

1. Has the internal structure been adapted to the needs of the resource availability and the program needs?

2. Have the major problems of the distribution of authority and responsibility within the organization been resolved?

3. Has some stable balance of centralization and decentralization been achieved?

4. Have patterns of formal and informal communication developed which meet the needs of the organization?

G. Enabling Linkages

1. Is the relationship with the enabling organizations now a two-way one in which they get prestige and benefits from supporting the program?

2. Has an effective means of communication been developed between the beneficiaries of the program and the enabling groups that support the program?

3. Is the enabling support for the program diversified and not dependent on one group or person? (How much is the Faculty still dependent on "Azi"?)

H. Normative Linkages

1. Are the organizational innovations in the internal functioning and the conduct of the program now accepted (e.g., budgeting, management, technologies, etc.)?

2. Has the organization found a synthesis between the innovative approaches that it uses and the established values of its clientele?

I. Functional Linkages

1. Are the relations with cooperating and competing organizations now on a two-way basis? Do competing organizations accept boundaries within which the organization is considered the appropriate one to carry out its program?

2. Is the organization in a strong competitive position in cases of conflict over resources, personnel, or program activities?

3. Is there an attempt by other institutions to develop cooperative relationships in the achievement of program goals in the environment?

J. Diffuse Linkages

1. Are many of the techniques introduced by the organization being copied?

2. Is there a positive public image of the organization with the public at large?

3. Is the organization identified with popular causes, national goals and the broader welfare of the nation?

4. Is the public relations program essentially one of disseminating the results of the program rather than finding ways to promote it?

5. Is the organization identified with change? Is it still in both its image and its activities committed to continuing innovations?

PHASE IV REJUVENATION IN KESHVAR

In which we find that new organizations don't always succeed and that major changes in old organizations can take place if the circumstances are right and the institution building skills are adapted to the problems. Triumph and tragedy in the Ministry of Education bring the problem to focus as not whether the institution is old or new, but whether the analytical tools we have developed help organizations deal with the problems of the society.

Reforming the Department of Basic Education

The Ministry of Education in Keshvar is a different place than it was a few years ago. There are still political hustlers in the lobby near the Minister's office, the filing system is still atrocious and the stilted language of the reports has not disappeared. Meetings are not better managed, but people are talking about more important things. There is more of a sense of urgency and of dedication. Younger people are in more important positions. The increase in technical over traditional political approaches is not hard to find.

In the Department of Basic Education, you can see the reports and sense the pressure that people are under, as well as feel the interest and enthusiasm for what is going on. There is a great deal of travel to the states and there are almost always some state officials around the Department working with people on a problem. The results in the states vary greatly, but the process is continuing.

In the few years since the reform, the progress has not been what everybody hoped for, but there is a dynamic and continuing quality about it. Even with a change in the government, the Minister, or the Director, the staff would be so involved with the states and the teacher training schools that I doubt if it would be possible to turn back the clock. What is more important is that among themselves, but never to an outsider, they admit they have only begun and that progress has been pretty slow.

There have been incidents that everybody remembers, but the process of the

change has never been described. It probably never will be. Everybody is too busy.

At present, if the Deputy Director's recommendations are carried out, the Department will begin a new administrative revolution in the states to help them get out to the cities and villages. The recommendations were developed in a very unorthodox way. The Deputy Director simply took off his administrative hat, put on his sociological one and disappeared into the villages for six weeks. Only the Minister and the Director have seen his report so far, but there are new task forces and discussions, and the gossip indicates that another set of changes is coming.

That was just one of a series of "happenings" that have caught everybody's attention and interest, but they don't tell the story. There was the battle with the Planning Ministry that erupted within the Education Ministry as well. There was the reorganization and the implementation of the new law. At the same time the Minister accepted a proposal of one of the foreign advisors to hire a bus and take the planning staff and other senior department people for a three week trip to the rural teacher training institutes. Before that, there was the politically inspired collapse of one planning group, the withering away of another and the incorporation into the department of a third. These events were accompanied by tension, gossip, surprise and lots of hard work, but they really need to be put into some perspective. A brief sketch of some of the events of the past few years might sort out some of the key factors and possibly give us more clues as to why all this has happened.

Originally, the Education Ministry departments were such a bureaucratic morass that, in order to get technical assistance, three separate planning groups working under the Minister were created: One for higher education, one for secondary and one for primary education. The previous Minister was involved in the politics of his own state as well as that of the nation. He saw individual planning teams as a way to promote change outside the entrenched bureaucracy, and as a device to strengthen his political position.

For many complex reasons the Secondary Planning Group was the only one which lasted. It would be very difficult to untangle this history. There were, however, some critical events which, most would agree, were central to what happened.

The university level planning group made some useful contributions, but found itself in the middle of the conflict between the universities and the government over University autonomy. The military had intervened in demonstrations and had taken a hard line on student demands for more academic freedom and more participation in university affairs. The Planning Group was a fitting target for attack as an imperialist plot by the Americans to support the government. The Group did not have enough support in the university hierarchies, or the Ministry, and the Minister suddenly found the Group a political liability. From that point on, it was doomed. The disbanding was anguished but mercifully rapid. In fairness, however, it should be said that the internal changes that have taken place in the universities since then owe many of their origins to the efforts of the original Planning Group.

The Primary Level Planning Group was working in an area where there was little activity within the Ministry itself. However, states, regional organizations and a number of other autonomous agencies were carrying on different types of programs of research, teacher training and curriculum

development. The Group consisted of competent and experienced teachers and supervisors buttressed by some advisors from foreign universities. They saw their task as getting out into the countryside and finding problems, developing solutions and finding pilot groups who would apply them. They were determined not to become a group of ivory tower planners and just sit and gather data, though they published much worthwhile information.

What they did not realize was that they were stepping on everybody's toes without giving enough attention to what was already being done. It was true that the other organizations were lethargic by comparison, but that was all the more reason for them to feel threatened. The Group could find a state secretariat, or a teacher training center, or a regional research group or a university that was interested in cooperating in any given state. However, most established organizations saw them as intervening in things that were not their affairs. They were not given or did not take the time and the patience that it requires in a country this size to incorporate enough support prior to taking action. The AID Mission also saw the American advisors as being too much involved in action and not enough in advising and planning.

Gradually the Primary Level Planning Group withered away, mostly by attrition as new developments with the Ministry began to take place and the Mission responded to other initiatives.

The Secondary Level Planning Group looked as though it were doing less than either of the other two. There was serious criticism on occasion about the lack of leadership and the lack of tangible results. However, whenever the question arose about its continuation, the Ministry always seemed to take a position to keep it going until finally it was directly incorporated into the new Department of Basic Education when the new law was passed.

What appears to have happened is that the five respected professors had been pulled out of their positions in different parts of the educational system and given five foreign counterparts—most of whom had been deans of education in their own country. They were given an office and the opportunity to go to the states to promote educational planning. They gathered data and helped out with problems that arose, designed guidelines for getting money from the Federal Government and foreign agencies. They also turned out enough studies on conditions of the educational system to keep AID and the Ministry happy.

What they really did was listen. It did not surprise them to find little interest in planning. After all, planning meant change and nobody in the states was very interested in taking the risks of change. Gradually they accepted their role as respected professors removed from the stream of everyday problems of the Ministry and given the opportunity to promote the notion of planning among their colleagues in the national and state governments. They had the added prestige of some foreign professors who could help with problems and speak authoritatively on the glories of modern educational planning whenever necessary.

In spite of all the criticism about their lack of tangible results, they had, in a small way, accelerated the already growing realization that educational planning was indispensable if the country was to improve the quality of its education. We do not know whether it was the shrewd instinct for survival or that perceptive understanding that the diffusion of the concepts of educational planning required more time than everybody thought.

We do not know that the Americans kept telling the AID Mission that if it would just hang on, they could eventually get some plans that would provide the basis for a loan. The professors kept telling the Minister that if he would just hold on, he would be able to get more money out of the Americans. The planning group itself came up with some loan documents, but their important contribution was the diffusion of attitudes and knowledge by which the loan program was eventually formulated.

When a new Minister was appointed, nobody really knew what to expect. He was a former governor and politically ambitious. He brought some people in from his own state to work with him. At first he listened carefully to everyone connected with education and asked a lot of questions. The questions ranged from what should be done about a curriculum for the graduate of ten years hence, to why he had to personally sign the lease for the house of an educational inspector in a remote state.

It did not take the Minister long to determine that what he wanted was a complete reorganization of the Ministry and a new education law. The net effect of them would be to centralize the information-gathering and policy-making and decentralize the execution by reinforcing the states' capacity to implement educational programs according to their needs.

The President gave him the authority to carry out the reorganization without much delay, but the business of getting the support to change the law was a struggle which required all of the administrative, legislative, persuasive and political skills he could muster.

During the whole process of planning for the new law and to some extent in the reorganization, the Minister listened to the members of the Secondary Planning Group. He used the information they had and the contacts they had developed. He put them to work on a variety of suggestions for inclusion into the new law. He asked them to make some recommendations about obtaining loans. They were among the important contributors to both the new law and the reorganization.

However, the Minister was dealing with the whole Ministry and the entire gamut of educational problems. In the end, as soon as the law was passed, he appointed a Director of Basic Education from his own state and the planning team was duly incorporated into it. So in the end, the last of the three planning groups disappeared and the Ministry took over the functions of national educational planning and of laying out the guidelines for implementation by the states. Several members of the team became powerful in the Ministry and group members were influential in doubling the amount for technical assistance to the Department of Basic Education almost immediately.

The new Department of Basic Education was in charge of the areas of primary and junior high school programs under the new law. It was the Department which approved state plans, provided federal money to support state programs and gave specific assistance in building up the capacity of the states to plan and accomplish their programs.

The new Director was an experienced educator and administrator from the secretariat of the Minister's state. He started with members of the old division of secondary education, incorporated some members of the Planning Group, and hired new people who would fill out the complement of the department. He set about the reorganization task with a series of meetings at which the former members of the Planning Group played an important part.

On one of the occasional short visits by the Minister to the meetings, one of the American advisors casually proposed the idea of hiring a bus and taking the planning staff to visit a variety of rural schools and teacher training institutes for several weeks. No one expected the Minister to take the idea seriously, but he did. He told the American that he wanted him to come to his office with the Director and talk some more about it. He asked specifically if the American could obtain the money from the AID Mission to do so. The American stated brashly that he thought he could.

To everyone's surprise, the American obtained approval for chartering a bus for three weeks and the funds to finance the trip. The Director was concerned about the loss of a good portion of his key staff during a critical period if he was to meet the deadlines the Minister had set for him.

However, at the meeting with the Minister, the Deputy Director, who was a trained sociologist raised in a rural state, spoke up in the first of many of his surprise statements that were to influence the department. He argued that the trip would increase the capacity to accomplish the reorganization and would improve the communication with the states and the communities. He said that it might convince some of the officials that the Ministry was serious in its expectations of changes in the way programs were to be formulated. He also pointed out that the staff would be directly exposed to problems rather than through filtered reports. He offered to assist in mobilizing the remaining staff so that a minimum of time would be lost in the present plans for reorganizing the department.

The Minister listened to all the comments. Then he called in his secretary and dictated a memo authorizing the trip. He also asked the Director to send the highest level people he could including the entire planning section. He suggested that those who were to take the trip should meet with their staffs and decide how the work was to be divided while they were gone. He also offered assistance from other departments if it was needed.

The trip became the talk of the Ministry. Some scoffed and called it a junket typical of the Americans. Others suggested that their department do the same thing.

There were many problems in deciding who should go and combining that with who wanted to go, but these were worked out. The standard joke was that the trip was really so that the Americans could get to know the school situation. The Director and the Minister, however, had made clear the trip's relationship to the Department's reorganization. The group's job was to promote the cooperation of the states in the reform.

Departure and arrival were done with the typical national dramatic flare, including cheering colleagues and a farewell toast. The Director had appointed group leaders and the trip proved to be an arduous one. There were visits during the day, and meetings reviewing problems at night crammed in between the ubiquitous hospitality that marks a federal visit of any kind.

Each group submitted a report, and these were discussed and edited and sent on to the Minister with recommendations for policies, organizational structure, and implementation procedures in accord with the new law. The documents came back, the Minister's initials on those recommendations he approved.

Over many months the reorganization moved ahead, the Department of Basic Education put more people into the field, held more meetings, gave more assistance and developed more relationships with the states than any other part of the Ministry. Its participation in the state secretariat meetings was active and instrumental in the states' becoming partners in educational reform. It had clearly begun to build positive relationships with state organizations.

In the year following, there was limited stability and a good deal of conflict, but things managed to get done. The Planning, Technical Assistance, Evaluation and Financial Divisions had serious differences over plans, programs, monitoring, evaluation, relations with other agencies, etc.

The foreign advisors recommended some internal seminars. The Director approved the proposal. These seminars were sometimes led by members of the staff, sometimes by American advisors, and sometimes by well-known educators or state officials.

There was also a regular selection of staff members to go abroad under U.N., AID, foundations and whatever other auspices could be found. A yearly group of senior people from the states was sent to the U.S. to observe educational programs.

Programs were planned with other departments and with other organizations for meetings on curriculum, administration, planning, evaluation and other topics. These were not always held in the capital, and many were informal in nature. The relationships developed by the bus trip turned out to be most useful. Progress by any reasonable standard of past performance was significant.

However, the Minister was not satisfied with the planning documents. They were not yet of the quality needed to qualify for large loans. The interministerial group administering the pilot loan was much more efficient and more demanding, though more authoritarian. They were working on a special kind of technical school, but they were getting the job done. Furthermore, the Planning Ministry was critical of both the plans and the information system. Planning wanted a much more sophisticated system of educational statistics. The Minister listened patiently to explanations about the need for gradual growth of state capacity. Then he made his position clear: if the Ministry of Education didn't control the information system, it could not control educational policy.

A crash program had to be developed for an improved information program. The Department of Basic Education was one of the Departments ordered to develop ways to provide more effective data for the overall system being designed by the Department of Statistics and Information. Planning documents had to be revised and reporting and monitoring systems reviewed. There were new pressures put on everyone to assist the states in developing a continuing flow of statistics.

Basic Education, which had been trudging forward toward a healthy relationship with the states, was caught between the needs for data and the limited capacity of the states to gather and process it. The Department itself was split between those who wanted a small compatible system that could grow and be easily expanded and later computerized.

Internal strains were beginning to show with the combined pressures of planning and implementing a program and providing the quality of data expected.

The Statistics Division in the Ministry wanted more sophisticated data. The Department people were concerned that this would lead to the filling in of boxes rather than the limited continuing data gathering they wanted.

At this point, for some reason, the Planning Ministry offered the Deputy Director of the Department a senior position. In an unusual turn of events, the Deputy Director went to the Director and the Minister to tell them of the offer. When asked what it would take to keep him in the Ministry, he said that he wanted a six weeks assignment to do a study of the program of the Department of Basic Education in the villages and the teacher training schools. He stated that he wanted to do the study as a sociologist, not as a member of the Department. He would, however, provide a personal report to the Minister and the Director with the expectation that his recommendations would be discussed in the Department and later used as a basis for recommendations to the states and the teacher training schools. He agreed to pay particular attention to the information problem.

Skeptical at first, the Minister finally approved, on the condition that the study be given directly to him and that he and the Director would control its use inside and outside the Ministry. He assured the Deputy Director that he was as interested in getting the unvarnished facts directly from their source, but that his political and administrative objectives for the Ministry were not achieved by the indiscriminate use of facts. He agreed that the more knowledge he had, the better able he would be to achieve the kind of grass roots effects the Deputy had in mind. After more discussion, the three men then agreed on the details of the release of the Deputy Director to do the study.

The study had both the Director and the staff somewhat worried, but the Deputy came in to discuss his approach and they found that he was not going to deal with anybody in the state secretariats or the governmental agencies except teacher training schools. He had chosen representative areas and used a random sampling procedure for selection of villages and schools. Several areas were ones he knew and was conversant with the languages involved. One of the states to be visited was more advanced, but some others were among the poorest.

The Deputy Director literally disappeared from sight. The work of the Department went on. The internal seminars were temporarily discontinued by the pressure of the work and the problems of internal organization were acute, but the states came up with better plans than was expected, and the Director and the division heads were able to begin working with the Department of Statistics and make reasonable progress.

The Deputy Director returned on a Thursday during a typical torrential downpour of the season. He was laden down with village handicrafts and distributed small presents to the entire staff. He presented the Director with a beautiful batik and showed him the magnificent one he had bought for the Minister.

He presented a hand-typed copy of the report to the Minister the same day between appointments. The Minister was enchanted with the present, though he probably had many batiks. He said that he would read the report over the weekend and wanted to talk to the Director and his Deputy at 7:00 a.m. Monday morning when he arrived so they would not be disturbed until his first appointment at nine.

The Deputy gave a carbon copy to the Director, spent the next day cleaning up his desk and taking care of minor details. The Director said little to him on Friday, but it was clear he was disturbed, so he had at least started the report.

Monday morning came and the Minister was relaxed and polite. He complimented the Deputy Director on the quality of the report and particularly on the perspective that he had added at the end highlighting the significance of the findings and the proposals for action. Then he proceeded to spend the next two hours in the most penetrating questioning the Deputy had ever been subjected to in either his academic or administrative life. He had underestimated the Minister's capacity to grasp the core of a problem and question the critical supporting assumptions, the facts and the conclusions which were drawn from them. In spite of the Minister's legal training, it was clear that he had carefully studied the education system including its social components and implications. He also asked knowledgeable questions about the methodology and the techniques of sampling. The Deputy had to check his notes and several tables on one or two occasions. He also had to withdraw one or two conclusions that were open to other interpretations. Nevertheless, he was able to defend almost all of the study on the basis of the facts gathered and the logic of the conclusions. He also made clear that he had added the perspective as a means for translating the report into practical objectives for the Ministry and the Department.

At 9:30, the Minister's waiting room was bulging with everyone from rural teachers from his home state to important politicians. The Minister abruptly broke off the conversation and asked them both back to the office the following morning at the same time. The Director and the Deputy Director spent two more hours going over the report in detail and considering its implications for the Department.

Among other things, the report documented the hypotheses that education reform had not arrived at the villages or the small towns, that the number of trained teachers in rural areas had not increased, that the data coming out of the villages were grossly inaccurate, that neither states nor municipalities were meeting the pay scales even when federal supplements were added, that teacher training schools were poorly supervised, that trained teachers were staying in capital cities and that states were not contributing their share of the funds to rural areas or small towns for the development of schools or for the reorganization of teacher training schools. There were a number of other devastating conclusions about the role of the school, including attitudes of teachers, of teacher trainers, and of villagers themselves.

The perspective pointed out that the Department of Basic Education seemed to have done a good job of mobilizing state groups—though he had not gathered data at this level—but that the link between the states and the communities and the people was critical and little was known about it. It showed that little was being done to change the attitudes of local teachers and their normal school professors.

The Deputy's study made a series of recommendations about the restructuring of the Department of Basic Education, about subsidizing rural programs in states, about monitoring the use of federal funds, about the restructuring of teacher training schools, and about curriculum changes to meet the needs of rural and village children.

It proposed an integrated literacy and pamphlet production program using rural schools at night and teaching simple technical skills. It also proposed a simplification of the Ministry's information program, which would make basic data available immediately and gradually add more information as systems could be developed to generate it accurately.

The Director agreed with many of the conclusions, but he was sure that the Department of Basic Education would end up with the blame for situations with which it alone could not deal. Much damage would be done to internal morale and to the progress made up to now with the states.

The following morning, however, the Minister was in a less inquisitorial mood. He stated that he had talked to the Ministers of Agriculture and Health and they had agreed to commission sample studies of their own at the village level. He was gathering ammunition to get the President to agree to a more decentralized information system. Under such a system the Planning Ministry would provide guidance and assistance rather than centralizing all the information services within its organization. The Minister indicated that the study had been of assistance in convincing the Ministers to review their own data on which they based policy. It was obvious that the Minister intended to use data from the report to show inaccuracies in the present system.

The Minister expressed surprise that in the one advanced state the rural and village schools were little better than in the others. He requested that in the future summaries of all visits to the states by members of the Department be sent to him and a special file maintained on each state so that when the governors came in for money he could have the summary information at his fingertips.

He agreed with the Director that this was no time to open up the report to the whole Department and create internal problems. He suggested task forces to go to states to study ways to deal with specific actions recommended on several critical problems. He ordered an increase in monitoring of state use of federal funds. He said he proposed to set up a prestigious National Committee on Teacher Training Schools with a mandate to recommend changes and review their implementation. He asked the Director to chair the committee and raise the specific issues contained in the study.

The Minister vetoed the granting of funds directly to rural areas and municipalities on both policy and political grounds, but agreed to a more careful monitoring of state contributions. He suggested financing state-sponsored meetings of municipal education councils, and of training courses by the state secretariats during vacation periods which were specifically addressed to rural and village needs and attended by rural teachers.

He then went through each of the recommendations one by one, either assigning the Director or some other person to take some action, rejecting some giving his reasons, or suggesting longer term actions than the Department itself should develop in detail.

The last thing he suggested came as a surprise. He said he had talked to the Rector of the University in the capital and set up an appointment for the Deputy Director to discuss the use of interns during vacation periods who would go out to the villages and make on-site studies of schools and programs. As they went out the door, the Minister clasped the Director on the shoulder and said, "With the problems that lie ahead of us I won't be able to spare either of you for six weeks, so students will just have to do in the future!" Then he turned to the Deputy and said, "I hope you can teach them a little about administration in Keshvar before you send them out."

Perspectives on the Keshvarian Case

This case is designed to show that creating new organizations to introduce change does not always work. Reorganization is an alternative that usually needs serious consideration before deciding that the new problems of a society need a new institution.

The mythology among some foreign aid officials, university professors and top-level country officials is that the established bureaucracy can never change and that it is always better to start fresh. However, in many cases a new organization starts out with great expectations, but with the departure of an ambitious leader, or the onset of complex problems which develop whenever change is initiated, the organization becomes another fiefdom rather than a shining model of change. New organizations rarely die, but they often continue to exist permanently withered.

Institution building is not about creating new organizations or rejuvenating old ones. It is the process of combining the internal variables and the linkages into an organizational structure which becomes recognized as the industrial means for continuing change. Therefore, the choice is how to create change in a given context rather than using a preconceived means.

In this case, even the one autonomous organization that was successful in its initial efforts was incorporated with the Ministerial reorganization. The failure of the autonomous organizations to prosper cannot be attributed to a lack of institution building approach, but attention to the external relationships (*linkages*) might have made a difference.

The Secondary Planning Group did make an important contribution to creating an awareness of the need for educational planning. However, when the process of changing the entire education system was to be undertaken, it was simply not feasible to have disparate autonomous organizations launching such a massive effort. The Minister therefore had the skill as well as the political support to get the President to agree to reorganization and to support an educational reform law.

The Ministry of Education itself becomes a key protective device (*enabling linkage*) because it already has legitimacy in the society. However, to make the changes envisioned in the reorganization and under the new law, the Department of Basic Education had to practice the strategies of institutional building. New *leadership* is brought in; new *doctrine* is inculcated; a new group of *resources* is utilized, both human and financial; a new *program* is designed; and a new *internal structure* is created.

The bus trip indicated how important knowledge of and relationships with the external clients are to the development of an *internal structure* and the design of a *program*. The continuous building of *external linkages* paid off in the outward-looking approach of the Department and in the projection of its *program* into the environment.

At the same time, we see an emphasis on training human *resources* at all levels which is common to successful projects. The internal seminars include outsiders as well as insiders. Sending personnel from the states abroad assisted *program* accomplishment, reinforced important *linkages* with the Department.

The Department put itself in a strong competitive position with other groups within the Ministry by both building its *linkages* and strengthening its internal structure. The dramaturgy of the bus trip was just one of the many ways used to build a reputation as innovators and inculcating a new *doctrine* among the staff as well.

However, the Department was not isolated from the pressures and demands of the Minister, the Statistics Department or the Planning Ministry. The internal effects of these pressures were threatening at different points during the organization continuing conduct of the program.

An established organization usually is better protected against external predators. It may require less autonomy, but encounters more difficulty in getting change accepted. The case illustrates a successful combination of building *linkages*, inculcating *doctrine* and projecting the organization's program.

The pressures of the Planning Ministry precipitates another process which is applicable to institution building, but particularly useful in cases of rejuvenation. The process has been called "End Product Analysis". This happened when the Deputy Director went to the people at the end of the chain of change-oriented programs and examined the reality of the situation.

The results of this kind of examination of what is happening far from headquarters can be disturbing, as they were in this case. However, they are an important check on the very real danger of both inadequate reporting and inward-looking institution building. Institution building does not mean the survival of the institution alone; it means that the external changes it promotes actually take place.

It is at this point that the *leadership* capacity of the Minister becomes most evident. He is a severe critic of all the information he receives. He is aware that the Department staff has done a good job with the states, but needs to take the next step in projecting the program outward. Therefore, he decides to move slowly toward the change which will deal with problems raised in the end product analysis.

He also uses the Deputy's analysis to improve his own position with relation to the other Ministries, the President, and to gain ground in his conflict with the Planning Ministry. What he demonstrates is that it is important to know the external reality and deal with it, but that it is also important to act in ways that will preserve present *linkages* while reaching out to larger groups in the environment.

In summary, then, the case shows us some of the reasons why autonomous agencies fail, why sometimes the rejuvenation of established agencies is a better decision and some of the different emphases that have to be placed on the elements of the institution building process when we concern ourselves with rejuvenation. As in most cases, the use of such things as "end product analysis", the emphasis on new *doctrine* and on developing strong external relationships take on special importance. However, the imperatives of massive training of human *resources*, competent *leadership* and the continuous adaptation of *program* to the needs of the clientele remain critical factors that have been with us throughout all phases.

Note to the Reader:

If this is the first Phase you have read, you now have several choices. You may continue on to the checklist, if that will help you with your work; you may refer to any of the variables that interest you by turning to the Appendixes; or you may look at the Table of Contents to see if some other phase is of more interest to you.

Looking for the Rusty Elements: A Checklist on Rejuvenation

A. Preliminary Notes

These are questions you might want to consider if the decision has been made to try to rejuvenate an old organization rather than start a new one. They may also be of some help in the decision of rejuvenation vs. starting anew if they are taken together with the checklist from Phase I.

There are, of course, two critical elements in the rejuvenation approach: taking best advantage of what already exists, and finding ways that will introduce innovation with a minimum of friction and a maximum of support. There are usually a good many compromises involved depending on the context in which you are working.

There are delicate determinations about whether the deadwood in the old organization is really dead, or just unmotivated, incorrectly placed, underpaid, or uninvolved. There are determinations about the relative importance of a leadership which is well-connected and able to obtain support and a leadership that provides a dynamic impetus toward both internal change and an external program. The obvious answer in many cases has been to bring in new leadership at the top, because it has more power and flexibility to make changes as they are required or possible. However, there are cases in which the second level of leadership has been trained intensively in order to influence changes using the prestige of established leaders or to take over as they retire or as political change presents the opportunity.

These, and many other approaches to organizational reform are more often influenced by a capacity to take proper advantage of the context of the situation than by taking independent and decisive actions on the basis of knowledge or conviction. The critical skill is to be able to have the different institution building goals in mind and be able to fit them into place as the opportunity arises.

B. Leadership

1. What is the background of the leadership structure of the organization?

2. Can the present leadership be trained, motivated and assisted in the rejuvenation process, or is there a need for new leadership?

3. Are there special problems in changing, recruiting, orienting, or inculcating new leadership with the intended doctrine of the organization?

4. Will a change in leadership make it easier to modify or introduce new doctrine? (In our case the change in Ministers was critical)

C. Doctrine

1. Is the present doctrine deeply entrenched in the organization?

2. What degree of modification of doctrine will be required to introduce the changes in the programs and relationships of the organization?

3. Should the emphasis of new doctrine be on broadening out the present one to cover larger groups of society or on making it more easily translated into goals and programs for the organization?

D. Program

1. Does the present program project into the environment? To those groups for whom the results are intended? (The Deputy Directors study showed that the target had to be broadened)

2. What changes in the present program are necessary to give it innovative content and/or impact?

3. What is the nature and status of the financial support of the organization? Are large or special funds needed to launch the new program? (e.g. it may be easier to increase funds to the Ministry that establish a new body.)

4. Is the present support from regular or special sources? Is there a need to change this?

E. Resources

1. Is the human resource problem one of finding new people, training present staff, or some combination of these?
2. Are there trained people available in the environment that can be incorporated into the organization? Is there a need to train them additionally?
3. Is there a need to convince some educational or other institutions to develop the human resources needed? (What about the use of interns to do village studies—that might become a source of staff)

F. Internal Structure

1. Does the present structure allow for the changes envisioned? Are new laws, authorizations, or external approvals needed to accomplish these changes?
2. Is the internal reorganization a major requirement in order to create the internal or external changes intended?
3. Is the present structure flexible enough to allow for changes? Is it efficient in terms of converting resources into a program?
4. Is the organization well enough established to survive the kinds of changes that are envisioned?

G. Enabling Linkages

1. Is there a need to look for new or additional sources of support and protection during the change?
2. Is there a need to look for new sources of authority and power to act in the manner which is intended?
3. What are the principal changes in the kind, number and quality of the enabling relationships that are needed?

H. Functional Linkages

1. What is the present relationship with the major cooperators, competitors, suppliers and clients? (The Ministry's of Planning Agriculture, etc. in our case)
2. Does the change intended involve developing new relationships with groups working in the environment or reinforcing old ones?
3. How will the changes planned for the way in which the organization itself functions affect its relationship with other groups with whom it competes, cooperates or depends on?

I. Normative Linkages

1. What changes will be required with the organizations which set the standards and guidelines for the activities which are intended?
2. Can the changes be made in a way that will be consonant with what the community, the bureaucracy and other important groups consider important and valuable?
3. What changes can be affected in the organization's approach that will induce other organizations to react favorably or support the introduction of innovations?

J. Diffuse Linkages

1. What is the public image of the organization at present?
2. Is changing that image a critical problem to the successful impact of the program or the introduction of innovation?
3. What should be the initial approach to the general public about the proposed changes? A low profile until there is some program impact? A dramatic demonstration designed to attract support, or some combination of these?

APPENDIX 1(a)
INTERNAL VARIABLES

LEADERSHIP

The requirements for leadership of an organization are usually different when the goals are to promote the acceptance of new ideas. The following is a brief summary of some of our findings about it in institution building studies. The *Source Book* (see bibliography) has more detail on definitions, its relationship to other variables, an annotated bibliography and selected references. The Checklists in each stage also raise specific practical questions you may want to consider.

Defining leadership has been the subject of a great deal of literature, but there is general agreement in the development field that it contains both art and science. The key problem for institution building is the need for depth, continuity and commitment to broad goals (doctrine). Ideally, when the top leader leaves the organization, the decision-making process should continue to be carried on in accordance with the innovative principles the organization is attempting to promote in the society.

Here the original Esman definition of leadership (see items A and B of the bibliography) has been used—"the group of persons who direct the institution's internal operations and manage its relations with the environment." Some research has broken it down into technical competence, political competence, administrative competence, continuity and succession. The statements below are intended to clarify these definitions and indicate some practical conclusions of the studies done so far.

Leadership as Vision

Trite as it sounds, successful leadership in institution building has involved a vision of the institution and its future role in the society. Outstanding leaders have radiated this vision and optimism in its possibility of achievement. Regardless of their technical or managerial skills or special talents, the common thread has been for leaders to view a new institution as serving a special and unique need in a particular society. Institution builders refer to it as commitment to a doctrine, an understanding of the means of change, or a response to a challenge. Successful leadership groups have been able to combine their skills toward a broad vision of a new and different condition which vitalizes the internal organizational environment and gives clientele both hope and the promise of benefits.

Leadership as Mobilization

Leaders mobilize the people and the organization they are directing. Internally they command, moderate, incorporate and sometimes even inspire the people around them. Successful leaders hold the organizations together even when threats from the outside are severe. They mobilize people to the idea of the goals of the organization, they focus attention on the problems, and opportunities, rather than internal difficulties. They may do this in democratic or authoritarian ways, depending on their own style, or the society in which they are working, but they manage to get the people in the organization to share their concept of the problems and direct their energies toward the objective of the organization. With a few exceptions, they appear to have been more concerned with the organizational objectives than with their own personal ones. Externally, leadership sets a style in the environment, mobilizes support from the people who have the money and authority to facilitate the work of the organization.

Leadership seeks and mobilizes support from any place that it can be obtained, and pays careful attention to criticism of any kind, especially in early stages. However, leadership in new and innovative organizations insists that the organization speak with a single voice and develops an identifying style that attracts attention among those from whom it seeks support.

Even when there are important inconsistencies in the environment and strong competitors, leaders try to turn them into cooperators if they cannot nullify their effect. The compromises necessary here are often delicate and an organization can lose its innovative capacity if it becomes too closely associated with traditional competitors.

Leaders try to obtain decisions which support their approach, try to persuade other leaders to change, or to find combinations of action that would be beneficial to both their own and the other organizations.

The more hostile the environment, the more the leader tends to develop protection among powerful elements of the society and mobilizes the organization to provide products or services that have impact.

Successful leadership associates the objectives of the organization with the aspirations of as large a portion of the society as possible. It attempts to make obvious the relationship between what it is doing and the expressed needs of powerful groups. Even if those needs are complex or conflicting, successful leaders appear to make everyone think that the new organization will benefit them in some way.

Leadership as Growth-Promoting

Organizations which become institutionalized nurture their own leadership and waste little time beginning the task. The process may involve external or internal training, sharing leadership responsibilities internally, attracting high caliber people. It also involves trying to keep good people in the organization and sometimes even trying to get them back from more developed countries where they have been trained. The reverse brain drain approach has been successful in a number of cases. Leaders often sacrifice depth, use foreigners, search for extra funds and take the risks of doing more rather than less in order to promote internal and external growth.

Successful leaders promote the growth of the organization faster than the staff is able to comfortably handle it. This, in itself, often becomes a means of promoting the growth of the leadership qualities of the staff. Since good leaders are in demand in the society, extensive efforts to develop leadership reduces the effect of losing good people.

Effective leaders advance the notion that their organization is a key to the growth process in the country and they promote their organizations' product or service as basic to change, modernization, growth, independence, or whatever values are thought of as important by the power groups of that society.

Leadership as Mediator

Successful leadership mediates within the organization in order to promote cohesive commitment to the goals and the specific objectives which have been set. It mediates with competing groups in the environment. It mediates with clientele groups to find ways to make its innovations acceptable. It mediates with the power and authority providing groups to assure resources for the organization.

There are a few things that do not emerge clearly from the studies. Dynamic leadership has on occasion made the difference in getting a new and innovative organization institutionalized. However, on other occasions, calm, tenacious and inconspicuous leadership has held the organization together until its products were recognized and accepted.

Discontinuity of leadership has usually been damaging to the process of becoming accepted and eventually institutionalized.

On other occasions, shifts in style and periods which have been characterized by political or administrative upheaval have sometimes allowed new leadership to start fresh and build on internal strength to create new relationships with the environment.

One approach which has provided indications of effectiveness has a sequence of a dynamic leader for initial impact, followed by an organization-minded leader who builds a leadership group which is then able to survive the changes in top leadership that may continue.

When the organization has become institutionalized, leadership has found ways to protect itself against political changes through depth, commitment to a goal, significant output, a position in the power structure and acceptance by a clientele, as directing an important activity for the society.

In summary:

• LEADERSHIP DELIVERS RESOURCES • LEADERSHIP PROMOTES THE DOCTRINE INTERNALLY AND EXTERNALLY • LEADERSHIP KEEPS THE INTERNAL STRUCTURE FUNCTIONING • LEADERSHIP MOBILIZES THE ORGANIZATION TO ACCOMPLISH THE PROGRAM • LEADERSHIP ESTABLISHES AND CEMENTS LINKAGES WITH EXTERNAL GROUPS • LEADERSHIP IS ALERT TO OPPORTUNITIES TO INCORPORATE NEW GROUPS FOR SUPPORT, OUTPUT AND ACCEPTANCE •

DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the most difficult concept to understand in the institution building model. It is not easy to describe in meaningful abstract terms. It is better illustrated in the cases and perspectives. Little is written about it and yet innovative doctrine is the heart of the institution building process. It is often essential ingredient to the incorporation of new ideas and actions to achieve people's objectives. We are dealing with people's values. These values are historically and culturally embedded in the society and play an important part in people's attitudes and behavior. When we encourage people to discover that other approaches are "right" or "best" to achieve specific goals, we are dealing with delicate problems that have repercussions throughout the society that are difficult to anticipate. The *Source Book* in the Bibliography discusses these problems and suggests some useful further reading.

Organizations, to become institutionalized in societies, have to represent objectives that important groups in the society think are important and correct. This means that the new ideas—e.g., planning, serving small farmers, non-formal education, rural health clinics—have to be consciously promoted by a new organization. They must not only generate results, but win approval for those results and the way they were achieved. Ideally, people will gradually expect things to continue to be done that way and change their own activities and expectations.

All this takes planning, patience, luck and time. That is why we talk about institution building being a long-term process. People do not make changes just because someone with some money and authority comes along and says that they ought to, or shows them how to change. All our knowledge so far demonstrates the gradual nature of change under the best of conditions.

Doctrine, even more than the other internal elements of the institution builder's approach, has to be gradually embedded in all of the other activities of the new organization if it is to be accepted. Ephemeral as it is, here are some of the things that we know about it, and how it can be consciously used to assist the change process.

The checklists in the different stages will help you with special items and the bibliography includes material that explores the ideas surrounding doctrine in more detail.

In abstract terms, doctrine is "an expression of what the organization stands for, what it hopes to achieve and the styles of action it intends to use." Each of these can be specified in individual cases. The general statement of doctrine should be significant enough to command resources and attention. It should be formulated simply and clearly; it should be convertible into a program of action; it should be magnetic; it should fit into the environment; and it should seem like an intelligent and "right" thing to do. It must also be innovative and promote efficiency.

Alas, doctrine just does not come packaged that way, nor does it naturally grow that way. What is even more difficult, it is often a slippery idea. Doctrine grows from feeling as well as facts, from needs as well as borrowings. It is like the yeast in a cake, you can't see it, but it is there doing its job. Without it, you have a soggy institution that survives and does not innovate, does not promote change, and uses up materials. We have all seen such organizations. Furthermore the cake has to be baked with too many cooks. Everybody has to feel that he or she participated in the baking, and there have to be enough slices to go around.

Leaders have a delicate job of building a core of believers and expanding the idea in ways that make the organization work and maintain its support. They must also incorporate ideas from the environment and make them part of the doctrine.

To people on the outside of the institution, the doctrine must be broad and vague enough so that they can all support it. To those who provide authority and money, the new organization's leadership peddles that part of the doctrine which emphasizes their roles as modernizers, creators, leaders, innovators and men of vision and purpose. They also draw on the power of these elements to obtain resources and support, and to obtain their protection.

To the clientele, that part of doctrine is dispensed which promises them services and opportunities and support for their activities. To planners the emphasis is on the efficiency of new ways. To other organizations in the same field, there are promises of support and cooperation in problems which are cast as mutually beneficial. Conflicts and threats have to be minimized and common purpose emphasized. Doctrine has to be vague enough to represent the unchallengeable good, help the small farmer, educate children, build a better and healthier life—but not so vague as to give the impression that the organization does not stand for a special role which it can perform without threatening anyone else.

It is a difficult and complicated task, yet if done well and all the opportunities are grasped, the new organization can find a foothold in the administrative landscape that will give it a claim to existence as useful and allow it to begin to function in the society.

Doctrine is dispersed to obtain external support and to some degree internally serves a similar purpose. However, the internal emphasis is on cohesion. Doctrine has to be molded into a program through goals and policies and a supporting internal structure. The insiders all have to belong to that special club which owns the doctrine and turns it into a mission to change something and make it better. People have to identify with the doctrine so that it can be used to minimize internal conflict and depersonalize the leadership role.

Here again the delicacy of doctrine is important. It must grow and draw on as many traditional things from the environment as it can. It must be made into a dynamic and innovative process by which things are done, examined and changed and then done better or with more impact. Outsiders then begin to see the style and the innovation embodied in the organization.

When the teacher gets a salary raise, has a better school to teach in, gets help in critical problems she feels are important; when the farmer finds the credit bank helps him; when the graduate gets a better job; when the clerk has more confidence in his skills; and when the mother has more help for her sick children; each begins to believe the doctrine was not just smooth talk.

Doctrine about change or modernization now begins to come alive in the attitudes of the staff, in the clientele and in the supporters of the organization. Others are threatened by this upstart which is, or may become powerful and invade territories which were once considered property of others.

Once again, doctrine wisely used can help define the lines of competition and cooperation. Doctrine can combine the idea of change with noble purpose, with needs, or with the demands of supporters. It can isolate the organization from the charge of simply grasping power while it consolidates whatever power it needs for accomplishment and become at least tolerated, if not accepted.

Doctrine can serve to guide the compromises that must be made with other powerful groups in order to survive and continue to innovate. Doctrine can grow and incorporate additional elements in the society that are already acceptable. It can hold the staff together under a common set of goals and attract and promote the efforts of good leaders. It can increase the power and prestige of supporters and the clientele.

Prestigious leaders—both foreign and domestic—can be brought in to help build the organization's image and pronounce the "rightness" of its cause. They can support its roles and functions and help solve the problems that multiply as the organization grows.

The staff can be trained to specify the doctrine as a guide to policy and action. Mass media can be used to proclaim the purposes and benefits that are accruing. Supporters and clients can be mobilized. If the benefits of the program are attractive, other organizations will want to emphasize that they share these goals and are doing similar things in their programs.

The setbacks and the threats and the problems will remain. However, institutionalization of the organization in the society will depend on how meaningful that doctrine can be made to an ever larger number of people and how much the program of the organization is identified with the doctrine and the goals that it generates.

In this context, then, doctrine is one of the most fragile elements of institution building, often the most useful and surely one of the most difficult ideas to manage in the process of introducing new ideas and new ways of doing things in any society. Without it, innovation and change can easily get lost in the fight for survival and power:

In summary then:

DOCTRINE DRAMATIZES THE NEW IDEA, AS WELL AS INNOVATION AND CHANGE.

DOCTRINE HELPS TO SELL A PROGRAM AND THE ORGANIZATION WITH IT.

DOCTRINE DEFINES THE GOALS.

DOCTRINE CAN GENERATE SUPPORT.

DOCTRINE HELPS TO DEFINE AND LIMIT INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONFLICT.

**DOCTRINE ABSORBS IDEAS AND NEEDS AND COMBINES THEM WITH THE NEW
ONES TO MAKE THE ORGANIZATION ACCEPTABLE IN THE SOCIETY.**

PROGRAM

The Program is usually both obvious and important. However there are subtle connections between program and the success of the institution building process. You may be interested in problems of program development, its impact or why institution builders do not consider program as the most important element in the process.

The checklists for each phase have something to say about the factors you may want to consider regarding program during the institution building process and the bibliography provides some material on program and references to cases where it was important. Now let's look at some of the things we think we have learned about program from years of examination.

Program is what an organization does, what it is set up to do for the society, and more specifically for a particular clientele—farmers, students, scientists, industries, policy-makers, etc. It is the output or the product of the organization. If the organization is to be successful and to become institutionalized, people have to come to accept the product and identify it with the organization.

However, the product that we are talking about is an innovative one by definition. It is usually something new or a new way of delivering it, or it is for a different group of people. Therefore, people not only have to accept the service, which is difficult enough when they are not accustomed to it, they have to come to support the organization which dispenses it. To become institutionalized people not only have to want the product, they have to take action if it is discontinued.

We have found that at least in the early stages, there is much about an organization that will be forgiven if the product is forthcoming. Dramatic increases in farm production, in student enrollment, in planning activities and in medical services have an immediate impact, particularly if the need has been recognized and the new ways are identified with the change. Certainly, in a negative sense, if the program does not begin to have an impact soon on some clientele groups, the organization may not survive.

Impact is important. This may mean that an organization has to deal with the problems of the environment that it finds, take advantage of crises, work on problems that arise rather than the ones that it would prefer to tackle. An interim solution to a plant disease of a basic crop may provide just the impact that will allow a research institute to establish itself as import and worth of support for longer term, more important things. Helping solve some accounting problems for small business organizations provide an opportunity to promote confidence in the value of a professionally-oriented business school.

Impact is also ephemeral, after a crisis or an immediate problem, people tend to return to old ways and old cliches. There is a balance between incorporating people's real needs into the objective of an organization and ultimately its doctrine and using the program to promote changes. The ultimate objective of the institutionalized organization is not to fight the fires of crises, but to prevent the crises by introducing a system of action which provides the researchers, extension agents, financial managers, the planners that minimize the number of crises. It also has the objectives of getting the public it serves to see those needs in the larger context and support their existence in the society over time.

Program is a conduit through which the doctrine, the resources, and the impetus toward change flow to the clientele to influence their actions and obtain their support. In the other direction program is the way needs and problems of the environment flow into the institution and cause it to adapt its activities, its doctrine and its other internal elements to make sure that the organization is progressing toward acceptance.

At the same time, the organization must pay attention to another flow—one of support to the power structure that provides the budget and the grants of authority that allow the institution to continue to function. The sooner that flow begins to take effect, the sooner artificial support from sponsors, protectors and leaders can be less restricting and an autonomy can grow which is based on the needs of the clientele. The program conduit is a key element in the development of the relationships that will promote need satisfaction, change and support.

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We have found some pitfalls here that are worth keeping in mind for the future. One of them is the desire to plan the program so carefully, train everybody so thoroughly in advance and work out all the details of internal operations so that the program is delayed in getting started. Few things are more sure of impeding the process of institutionalization. It is true that there are a few situations in which the environment was so hostile to the change and the supporters in the power structure were so adept that they held the organization together until it was ready to emerge full-blown with competence and a fanfare of trumpets and then proceeded to conquer the environment. However, generally the organization does not survive without early output which reaches the environment. Alternatively it may become one of those "monasteries of modernism" which has little effect on changing the society outside its small circle. In most countries, it is better to proceed cautiously with as much program output as you can and take advantage of every opportunity to train, and learn and expand your activities.

Another more serious problem is the tendency to think of the program as an exercise, a value in itself that everybody should recognize as good. This sounds like an exaggeration, but the number of cases is significant. The amount of fervor, publicity and persuasiveness that can be put into science for science' sake, the perfection of achievement tests in the laboratory, and planning as a set of documents is truly extraordinary. Scientists, in particular, have had to be convinced that program results can also be helpful to their research efforts in situations of institutional growth. Those of us in the development business seem to be just as susceptible to these charms as others.

A third problem is conceiving of the program too narrowly. In the early stages it is enough that the farmer or teacher or villager conceive of the program output as an end resulting in better crops, better teaching or more cooperation. As the organization moves toward acceptance and institutionalization, the members of the organization have to project their own conviction that the program is a means to change, to support, to influence the community and the organizations in it.

If the organization's staff is convinced that the program is a way to attract the attention of other institutions, build cooperation at levels which affect people's lives, promote innovation as an objective, build relationships with the community and particularly to build support, the program output becomes a tangible base on which can be built the more intangible factors of changes in the way people think about things and solve problems.

A fourth problem is the other side of the impact coin. Change is difficult and often indigestible. There are many cases when the program has to be allowed to sink in, to be digested by the clientele. They have to get used to it, adapt to it, literally get comfortable with the new approaches that are being tried.

This reality creates conflict, because what provides the most obvious support is impact. How do you accomplish a program that has impact, yet provides it in small enough spoonfuls so that it can be digested and integrated into functioning organisms of the society you are serving? Many an organization has foundered on the misjudgment of emphasis on the elements of that conflict.

One of the ways to deal with the conflict is to publicize the visible signs of success whenever they appear, but create an image of identification with the problems of the clientele.

Another technique is to move into the environment boldly with an innovative program, retreat when it is attacked and adapt it to the environment by compromise, cooperation and then renew the efforts to maintain the innovative thrust—one agriculturalist calls it the "sow stagger, stumble, ripen and reap approach", but there is more there than meets the eye.

Program output is therefore more complex than it appears. It shows results, builds support, helps understand the environment, mobilize staff, informs leadership of the problems that need attention and many other things that a simpler view of program does not reveal.

In summary then:

PROGRAM PROVIDES IMPACT IN THE ENVIRONMENT.

PROGRAM PROVIDES VISIBILITY.

PROGRAM PROVIDES VITAL CONTACT WITH THE ENVIRONMENT.

PROGRAM IS THE ULTIMATE TESTING GROUND FOR OUTPUT.

PROGRAM PROMOTES SUPPORT BY THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION.

PROGRAM PROVIDES A SPECIFIC FOCUS FOR CHANGE-ORIENTED ACTIVITIES.

PROGRAM PROVIDES AN IDENTITY FOR CLIENTELE AND STAFF AND ULTIMATELY FOR THE SOCIETY.

RESOURCES

Every organization needs resources to function and they are usually divided into financial and human resources. More recently, technology and information are considered resources or ways in which resources could be used more efficiently.

In the bibliography, you will find some material and cases which directly relate to the special problems of resources in institution building. In the checklist in each phase there are some items regarding resources that you may want to consider.

However, we are not considering the resources of the ordinary organization in which budget processes, staff training and the other aspects of the problem are already established. We are, in most cases, talking about an organization which is either new, or reorganized and which proposes to convert this new set of resources into an innovative product in the environment. Frequently the new organization does not have a regular budget, a trained staff, or an accepted place in the institutional hierarchy which defines its role. Not only that, but the organization is created to promote a change in the way in which it and other people do things. It is therefore subject to a special series of problems. Here are some of the things that we have found out about those situations.

A new organization is usually in response to an urgent need, to powerful supporters, or to external financing and assistance. Powerful leadership elements in the society sometimes see the new organization as a way out of the typical bureaucratic inefficiency that characterizes regular organizations. There is usually the belief that newness means modernization; that the old cobwebs and faults of previous organization can be swept away and that a fresh start can be made on existing problems.

The leadership of the new organization can take advantage of this special support and protection to acquire the volume of resources which are necessary to get off to a good start. However, leaders have created problems by promising more than an organization can deliver due to the natural enthusiasm that often accompanies the launching of a new organization. Change-oriented activities have many unexpected difficulties.

On the other hand, there are some important disadvantages to being a new organization. It is a competitor for scarce resources, it is not accepted in the bureaucratic hierarchy, and it is a threat to some of the other programs that are competitors or feel that they should be. New organizations are vulnerable to raiding of their new leadership, to having their programs undermined, and to having general inexperience in the bureaucratic struggle exploited. The innovative character of the new organization makes it a poor competitor in the short run. There is an important need for powerful support and a widely shared understanding of the goals, resource needs and the special problems of new organizations at high levels in the power structure.

There are a few critical resource problems which emerge from institution building studies. How can the organization obtain resources which will hold together until it can develop experienced leadership, trained staff, learn to protect itself in the bureaucratic environment, and make some impact on the external environment which will generate support for its program? Just as important, but sometimes forgotten in the struggle, is how the innovations which it is promoting become part of the accepted way of doing things in the society. The problem clearly is more than just resources, but resources are the major tangible input to the organization. If it continues to obtain resources and is given some autonomy and recognition by the bureaucracy and if its program projects into the environment, it approaches the objectives of institutionalization.

There are no sure formulas by which organizations have been able to get resources large enough to gain the momentum required by a new institution to get started. However, we have learned the importance of building internal capacity in order to seize whatever opportunities arise that will promote early acceptance by key elements in the society.

Successful organizations have begged, borrowed and stolen competent leadership wherever they could find it. They have used foreign advisors and even foreigners as operating leaders, drawing on their prestige and their skill until local leaders could be trained. They have, usually, begun intensive programs of training staff and nurturing leadership, often on a massive scale, and at the earliest possible time. They have created an image of competence and integrity, however those values are measured in the clientele which it intends to serve.

One of the strategies to attract competent people has been to lure their own trained people back from other countries. Another has been to establish salary scales and working conditions that attract dynamic and competent people. However, there is one extreme case which illustrates the dangers of relying too heavily on resources. One new university, with ample financial resources, simply hired the best men in the country in each field by offering them large salaries. For a variety of reasons, having to do with the innovative nature of the undertaking, the approach failed disastrously and the university had to begin the slow process of building its own resources through advanced training of young graduates. After a much longer period than they had expected, they have achieved the prominence as an innovator that they had been seeking. They found what most others have found. There are few shortcuts. The combinations of prestigious outsiders and concentrated efforts to train and inculcate young human resources with the innovative approaches is a critical factor in the institutionalization process.

Successful organizations have used innovative methods to obtain human and financial resources and technologies in order to mount programs large enough to make an impact on the environment and survive the growing pains of the implanting of innovative approaches. Many have failed because too few resources were received too late, or through the incapacity to survive after the short-term foreign resources were terminated.

Two of the ways that work are the diversification of funding and the use of foreign grants and loans to support the organization in the initial period. In the case of complex organizations, this may be many years. Another way to guarantee support has been to obtain legislation for a special tax drawn from its clientele or the public (e.g. production or specific exports) which is earmarked for the organization, and, therefore, assures it of continuing support.

However, guaranteed financial support does not mean institutionalization, though in many countries that is what the word means. Resources are important in the institution building approach, not just for their obvious and intrinsic value to an organization, but for their relationships to other objectives.

The shoestring operation of a new organization is always precarious, but the organization with assured resources is also in danger of assuming that it will become institutionalized because of its financial position. Money alone buys only short-term superficial change. Frequently, the battle for financial survival of the new institution requires that it cooperate, mediate, incorporate, and resolve conflicts with other organizations who not only become financial supporters, but also influence other factors that are critical to producing change in the society.

It is also possible to sacrifice autonomy in order to innovate if an established institution can provide protection. However, the institution builder is wary of sacrificing innovative capacity for money and is quick to grasp the support that will allow autonomy and creative development.

Flexibility in the use of resources and the capacity to meet the changing needs of the groups served are frequently as important as the amounts of money or power the organization can mobilize. Shrewd institution building depends on its support from varied power elements in the bureaucratic structure only as long as it is unable to consolidate a clientele with whom its innovatable impetus will have a broader base for support.

This transition from protected to independent is one of the many dilemmas of resource use in the institution building process. Do you concentrate the conversion of resources into programs in a small area to make a larger impact and get more visibility? Do you spread the resources thinly to enlarge the clientele and obtain their support early in the change process? How do you combine the effects of short-term

impact and the long-term impetus for change that requires sustained effort? None of these questions is fully answered by our studies and each depends on the situation.

We have found some important general guidelines, however. They include: (1) taking advantage of initial support to mobilize the resources needed to make a program impact that helps get support in the environment; (2) training and development of staff at the earliest possible time; (3) taking best advantage of available technological and information resources; and; (4) expressing resource needs and program accomplishments in terms which will impress those who control the funds to obtain continued support.

In summary then:

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION INVOLVES USING OLD AND NEW SOURCES.

RESOURCE MOBILIZATION INVOLVES A WIDE VARIETY OF ELEMENTS, MONEY, PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY, ETC.

RESOURCES HOLD THE ORGANIZATION TOGETHER UNTIL IT CAN BECOME ACCEPTED.

RESOURCES PROVIDE INTERNAL STRENGTH AND COHESION IN THE ORGANIZATION.

RESOURCES CONTRIBUTE TO AUTONOMY.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE

Internal structure involves the division of labor, the channels of communication, the distribution of authority in the organization and the way its work is accomplished.

There is extensive literature on comparative administration which attempts to examine these problems in developing countries. The bibliography contains a few of these items that are pertinent to institution building problems and a few references to case histories that will be of assistance. The checklist for each phase also contains some items about internal structure that usually require some consideration.

What we have learned about internal structure is often underestimated because of the powerful influence of leadership doctrine and resources in the thinking of institution building. However, like all of the other parts of the model, if the knowledge we have gained about internal structure is not applied, it can profoundly affect the growth of the organization into an institution.

Nowhere is the statement that when one impediment to change is removed, another quickly appears to take its place more true than in the attempt to design and work with internal structure of new organizations. This is why the emphasis of institution building has to be ultimately on the interrelationship among the different elements in the model, even though each one should be examined separately.

Imitation is an example of the kind of problem that is most obvious in dealing with internal structure and it has important repercussions through the whole system. It was often thought of as the process by which an administrative structure from a developed country is superimposed on a new project in a developing country. At present, however, we need to guard against the attempt by foreigners or nationals to implant administrative structures that have been successful in other developing coun-

tries on the assumption that the problems are the same. If the structure worked well in India or Paraguay, the argument runs, it should work well here. An engineer is often convinced that the administrative approach that was used in the north of the country for highway construction will work in the south for the construction of schools. There have been enough failures in this approach to make us wary. The delicate human and organizational relationships required in innovative structures cannot be transferred across the street without great care.

Even with the cautions noted in the example above, there are some things that we know about internal structure that will be helpful to future institution builders.

We know that a good internal structure is one that works in the given situation no matter how it looks on paper or how it has developed. When sources are rapidly converted into program; when leaders learn about problems soon; and when field people know what policies have been made; these are healthy signs. The tendency to introduce what appears to be a more rational structure has to be carefully considered. The best approach is usually to try to improve the way the organization is presently functioning and only gradually apply something new.

There is a time early in the functioning of an organization when the staff is small and versatile and dedicated, and morale is high. At this time, the sense of adventure and pioneering spirit run high. People share their ideas, communicate freely and cooperate in crises. There is a tendency to want to maintain that spirit as the organization grows and its program expands. What we know is that an organization cannot run on a high pitch of emotional energy for a long period of time. Certain things have to be routinized and priorities have to be established so that people are not spending their time on crises, or details.

We also know that the introduction of technology, organization structures and effective procedures need not alter the special interpersonal relationships that are so common in developing countries. Good leaders and their staffs experiment with their internal structures so that important personal contacts are maintained. They try to design new structures that will promote natural communication channels instead of impeding them.

Without getting into the ageless controversy about centralization and decentralization or democratic and authoritarian patterns of authority, we have found that delegation of authority does specifically focus responsibility on people in organizations. We have found that whether paternalistic or democratic, the promotion of direct contact of leaders with clientele and with field staff tends to increase the flow of information in the organization. We have found that when there are both formal, and informal means for resolving conflicts in the organization, it develops the internal cohesion necessary to take advantage of the opportunities for growth and acceptance that often occur at unexpected times.

We have found that there is always a lag between the volume of requirements and the available staff to do the job. The internal structure that contributes to institutionalization is the one that is flexible enough to allow for the mobilization of all resources when crises, new opportunities, or important changes in political or admin-

istrative conditions occur. This is too easily said and hard to do. Nevertheless, growing organizations struggle with these ideas rather than traditional bureaucratic maneuvering.

We have also found that there is a tendency to concentrate on certain parts of the internal structure that seem to be most easily attended. The development of a training program is of little value if the environment to which the trained person returns is not conducive to applying his knowledge, or the recruiting system does not bring people into the organization who can respond to the training.

Internal structure can be experimented with if the willingness to correct mistakes is inculcated. Internal structure is in fact a demonstration technique to show the clientele and the supporters that the institution believes in innovation, because it practices what it preaches. Planners have hired a bus and gone out to experience the problems of the school teachers; architects have gone out to build schools; training courses have been given for both staff and clientele at the same time. Experiments in decentralization have been tried with the cooperation of other organizations who could help train people in the field of new responsibilities. Regional and national meetings have been tried with the intent of making internal structure reflect the goals of the organization, promoting the unity of the different groups which carry out its program and increasing their identification with the clients whom they serve.

In summary:

INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS A KEY TO CONVERTING RESOURCES TO PROGRAM.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS A BASE FOR ORGANIZATION MOBILIZATION.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS A DEVICE FOR DEMONSTRATING INNOVATIVE CAPACITY.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE PROVIDES A MEANS FOR RESOLVING INTERNAL CONFLICT.

INTERNAL STRUCTURE IS A MEANS FOR REFLECTING GOALS AND DOCTRINE.

APPENDIX 1(b)

LINKAGES

ENABLING LINKAGES

Linkages are the relationships that the organization has with all other groups in the environment. Transactions are the specific contacts and actions which establish and maintain those relationships. The *Source Book* and other items in the bibliography have more detailed discussions and references to linkages in general as well as specifically.

Enabling linkages are those relationships which deal with obtaining authority, power, resources and support which make it possible to operate and pursue its objectives. Ideally, the program of an institution converts its resources into services and products for a particular clientele, and that group, in turn, influences the power structure in the society to provide elements that make it possible to continue operation. However, in a new and innovatable organization, the process, is by no means automatic. The clientele may not understand the benefits it is to receive, it may not be powerful enough to obtain the resources for the new organization, there may be other competitors for the support of that clientele, and there may be other problems—technology, communication, etc. How then, does the process begin?

What we have found is that the decision to create a new institution means the idea has some powerful backing. This may result from long-term efforts of some clientele which finally convinced the president to take some action, it may result from support by a foreign aid industry, or, it may result from a variety of other reasons. But the decision to take action creating the new organization usually means that the ideas have gained support at a high level.

The decision may be based on a number of premises: that the traditional bureaucracy will be by-passed; that the direct interest of powerful people is involved; that modernization or accelerated growth will result; that new problems will be solved; and that new resources will be employed. Important people are brought together to determine the objectives and organization. The inauguration is planned for a symbolic national holiday with the participation of national and foreign dignitaries.

Such is the glow with which many an organization is launched. It would appear that the organization so launched can call its own tune and proceed to mobilize its staff and the society for an assault on the problem. Alas, all too frequently this is an illusion. Initial support has to be remobilized. Powerful people are busy with many things. There are always enemies of the new organization who will try to emasculate, take over, or discredit the noble intent that was contained in the initial charter and opening speeches.

Some organizations capitalize on their initial support, use all the power that they can temporarily amass to get a program launched and to make an impact on the environment immediately. They publicize that impact, however, small, to show that they are making important progress. Since it is easier to get support in the beginning, they are often able to short-circuit the normal procedures, to obtain a good staff, additional money, foreign assistance, public cooperation and to have an immediate effect on the environment. This is a good technique when there is a popular and rapidly visible product—fertilizer distribution for example. However, it is risky if the other aspects of the organization are not developed at the same time. Many organizations have carried out crash programs only to find that they have not built the structure to sustain the organization after the first big effort. It is, nevertheless, a point to remember. Enabling linkages within the power structure in the early days can be very helpful in getting the program going and making an impact, and they should be taken advantage of whenever possible.

Another way to use enabling linkages is to become identified with an established organization that has the power to protect the new program during its initial stages of formation and development. The "parent" organization uses its legitimacy to protect and develop the new program and hopes to renew its own image as an innovator in the eyes of country leadership and the environment.

This approach can lead to serious problems in autonomy and deprive the new organization of its flexibility and its capacity to deal with the problem that it perceives as important. The question here is a simple one, but very difficult to answer. How much autonomy is this kind of protection worth? Can the autonomy gradually be regained as the new program gains momentum? In each situation the question has to be posed and answered according to the special circumstances which exist.

Another way to build enabling linkages is to incorporate the power structure directly into some aspect of the leadership support. The president as the head of the board of directors, the minister as the titular head of the organization, the head of the cattle growers association as the chairman of the advisory board are a few of the ways in which powerful people have been directly incorporated for the longer terms during the growth of the organization. The present government must be courted, of course, but also the next government (if we can guess who they might be), permanent civil servants, powerful and interested people from the public and private sectors who will be available to help out when the bureaucratic battles begin. Protection is the name of the game when the need is for innovation and change in an environment that is accustomed to traditional activities.

Another important approach is to become identified with the image of power. The leaders should be seen with the president, the mayor or the powerful and present the image that the organization is favored by those who control things. The staff may think that the boss is being pretentious, when what he is really doing is getting himself and the organization identified with the power that will protect. The image of power can also build prestige among both friends and enemies in the environment. It can help to mobilize the staff, assist in launching the program and create an acceptability among important groups of clientele for ideas that are new or different. This initial image becomes a basis for forging more permanent relationships with other groups which are needed for long-term success.

Enabling linkages have to become a two-way process. The budget bureau, the president's office, the medical association, which provide initial protection also have to be educated to the doctrine and the long-term nature of the commitments that they must make. There is often a tendency to think that after the long struggle to get the legislation or the decree creating the organization, the road to institutionalization is paved. In the process of introducing innovation and change, there are always setbacks, conflicts, unanticipated problems that try the patience of everyone involved. Taking advantage of the initial acceptance to educate the powerful in the doctrine of the organization and acquaint them with the complex and intricate problems that must be solved may pay off in the long-term support.

There are, then, two sides to the enabling linkages which promote the growth of the organization until it is institutionalized enough for the clientele to assume important responsibilities in protecting its program. The first is to use the initial impetus which promoted the creation of the organization to blaze the trail for the program and organizational growth. The second is to become an effective lobby for the doctrine and the program with the very people who provide protection. These early efforts should result in the power structure trusting organizational leadership, under-

standing of the purpose of the program and recognizing the importance of the change goals over a longer term.

The courting of the power structure to ensure the grants of authority and resources to continue to innovate never ceases. The organization, as it becomes institutionalized, gains friends in court, power to influence and support from the environment. Because there are changes in governments, conditions and circumstances, the effort to assure a niche in the pantheon or accepted institutions must continue.

In summary:

ENABLING LINKAGES PROVIDE POWER TO ACT.

ENABLING LINKAGES PROVIDE PROTECTION.

ENABLING LINKAGES PROVIDE INITIAL RESOURCES.

ENABLING LINKAGES SUPPORT A NEW PUBLIC IMAGE.

NORMATIVE LINKAGES

The values of a country or a group can greatly influence whether the innovations are accepted or not. Those who support activities also expect the organization to behave in certain accepted ways. It is necessary to determine early in an organization's life whether these expectations will help or hinder the introduction of innovation. The relationship with the organizations who establish these values or promote them is called Normative Linkages. Therefore, in institution building, the definition of normative linkages "is the relationships to the organizations who share an interest in the social purposes of the organization."

What are we to do about a merit system if one's first duty in the society is to protect one's family—including cousins, in-laws, godsons, etc.—and to try to prevent other families from getting a foothold in an organization? What are we to do about competence when political determinations are the time-honored way of appointing people to any government position? What are we to do about promoting hospitalization of serious illness if hospitals are places to which one only goes to die? There are of course many more examples in all societies and changing them is difficult, if not impossible, in any short-range period of time.

Fortunately, if we are sensitive to the values that communities and people have, we can sometimes adjust programs to meet them. Incorporating the mullah or the priest may very well make a lot of difference about the implementation of a program. There are frequently accepted organizations whose values are shared by the new organization which is attempting to innovate. Sometimes these organizations are already effective and it is possible to join in the crusade with them. For example, if there is a civil service commission and it is possible to use an efficient personnel policy which reinforces the commission's policies, the new institution will not only be conforming to an ongoing change process, but assuring the support of another institution whose values are gradually being introduced into the society.

The same situation may exist with the budgetary process and the institution which oversees that function. National banks tend to be citadels of modern administrative and financial practice. Both private and public organizations can work with them for the purposes of identifying with accepted norms and for assuring support in the environment in the pursuit of program effectiveness.

Conversely, there are established institutions whose traditions are sacrosanct and even though their approach may be traditional, they must be given appropriate attention. A new institution must adapt its values and patterns of action so that it does not conflict with the approach of such institutions until there are opportunities and adequate support for change.

No matter how important decentralized action may be to the success of a program, if the presidential secretariat is powerful and demands certain types of centralized controls or certain traditional patterns of authority, adjustments will have to be made to that pattern in ways that will not seriously impede the development of the new decentralized agency.

There are delicate combinations of introducing new values through the assistance and support of other institutions in the society, or through the reinterpretation of traditional values that are supported by institutions which set values. Sometimes the values enshrined by old organizations are subject to reinterpretation or modification without clear violation of the ways things have been done. It is possible, for

example, to maintain that the new approaches to schooling are proudly national and free from foreign influence, thereby supporting the nationalist aspirations of a variety of organizations who may actually have traditional orientations.

Many of the values of any society are in conflict with one another, especially in a rapidly changing world. This allows for compromises with established institutions, whose values are accepted, in order to introduce innovative approaches without confronting these organizations in what would surely be a losing battle. There are many ways in which reciprocal advantage can be negotiated which will either negate the traditional concept of the old values or modify them in constructive ways.

Also, it is important to remember that traditional values provide important social underpinnings in any society. The institutions and organizations which support these values must be taken into account, not only because they are powerful, but because they represent a stability that is essential to the gradual introduction of change. Abrupt breaks in tradition leave people with too few value guideposts on which to depend. The adaptation of the operating values of the new organization to the traditional values of older ones may be vital to success in the long run.

Normative linkages can be ephemeral, but their effect can be critical to the beginning of a program and its gradual acceptance by the people and the other organizations in the environment.

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In summary:

NORMATIVE LINKAGES SHOW WHAT VALUES MUST BE OBSERVED.

NORMATIVE LINKAGES CAN PROVIDE SUPPORT IN MAKING NEW IDEAS FIT PRESENT VALUES.

NORMATIVE LINKAGES DEFINE RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS.

NORMATIVE LINKAGES CAN HELP LEGITIMIZE ACTIVITIES.

NORMATIVE LINKAGES PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR DEFINING OBJECTIVES IN THE NATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE.

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES

These linkages are relationships the organization has with both people and organizations, including those with supplies, consumers, competitors and cooperators, groups who provide inputs and those which use or process outputs. The bibliography has references which discuss these linkages in some depth and detail.

When a new type of high school meets with the lower school officials from which its students come, it is building functional relationships. When a university abandons a foreign concept of combining research and extension and begins to work with rural credit organization which is already providing extension services, it is converting a competitor into a cooperator and building a functional linkage. When a fertilizer program begins to work closely with the village agricultural committee in order to gain its understanding and use its members to educate the community it is building functional linkages. When a maternal and child health program helps train local doctors in the special problems of mothers and children, it is also attempting to gain their support, enlist their assistance and build functional relationships which will provide acceptance by an important segment of the population. When a university turns out graduates that are in demand by employers, it is successfully competing with other schools and establishing functional relationships with the consumers of its product.

What we have found is that these relationships are more important than we had first realized. Getting money and delivering the goods (enabling linkages and program outputs) are important elements in getting started, but most organizations who wish to promote change have to obtain acceptance by many established groups who deal in the same or similar activities.

More important, in the beginning the competitors may have much stronger ties with the people the new organization is trying to serve and with the organizations that provide the resources and authority to function. Occasionally, competitors can

be easily discredited because they are not doing what they say they are doing; occasionally, the new organizations can get protection from powerful groups until they can build a clientele and compete for funds and program acceptance.

When there is no clear-cut competition, the organization has a better chance of growing and becoming accepted. However, the notion of change and the introduction of innovation is not an easy job under any circumstances, and it is important to begin building cooperative relationships with related organizations which will buttress the program as soon as possible.

It is important to distinguish between those groups which are willing to be supportive, those who have to be persuaded and those who recognize only power. There are many examples of each of these in the studies we have made. Often doctors or extension agents, teachers and officials are waiting for the opportunity to be more effective in their work, and they will gain prestige and satisfaction from cooperating with a new program. Sometimes village organizations, professional associations, and department heads can be convinced that new techniques will give them more power, more influence and enhance their image with colleagues and superiors. Sometimes established schools, local officials and program directors have to be shown that, if they do not go along with the new approach, they will be left out, by-passed, and made ineffective by the dynamic impetus, the funds and the support which the new program carries.

Successful institutionalization of a new organization means dealing with all of these groups, resolving conflicts with them and incorporating them into the category

of those who either support the organization or do not oppose it.

It is also important not to be too rigid in your concept of what your program is if you are to break through the barriers to initiating functional relationships. The search for mutually beneficial actions with other groups is crucial to the maintenance of those relationships. Equally important is locating some reasonable boundary lines which allow cooperation without invading each others territory.

Using its own people and organization to provide a course in poultry management sponsored by the ministry of agriculture gained support for an aspiring agricultural school. Providing money to support programs of extension agents with credit or assisting with access to research results will help incorporate the agriculture ministry into a rural credit program. Including the personnel of other organizations in training programs will help promote respect and acceptance for the activities being undertaken. Involving villagers and village committees in the development of local programs has often been crucial to initiating any activity in the village. Sometimes using local people to carry out the program may mean a sacrifice in efficiency, but it brings with it much needed employment and commitments to the new activities. Developing a professional association can enhance the prestige of a product as well as an organization. Many other activities will arise that will provide the opportunity to promote functional linkages.

All such activities lead to continued acceptance if they are reinforced and continued. It is important to recognize the needs, the threats and the opportunities for getting acceptance that functional linkages provide.

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In summary:

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES PROVIDE INPUTS THE ORGANIZATION NEEDS TO FUNCTION.

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES PROMOTE THE USE OF WHAT THE ORGANIZATION DOES.

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES HELP DEFINE PROGRAM BOUNDARIES.

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES PROVIDE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL SUPPORT IN THE ENVIRONMENT.

FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES REINFORCE THE EFFECT ON ORGANIZATIONAL CLIENTELE.

DIFFUSE LINKAGES

Diffuse linkages are difficult to pin down because they can vary a great deal with the organization and the context. They are generally defined as relationships with individuals and groups who are not directly or formally related to the organization.

Ideally the objective of institutionalization should be that everybody in the society be aware of the activities of the organization and think of them as important and of the organization as the right body to do such activities. A rural credit bank, for example, should become the "best" place to go for a farm loan. People who have nothing to do with farming might not know how it operates, but they should know that it exists, think it is important and when anybody brings up the subject of agriculture, that the rural credit bank should be one of the institutions they mention as having positive value.

The initial emphasis of an organization must be on the groups which directly support the organization and the clientele which it serves. However, it is important to take every advantage of the support of other groups insofar as possible. Sometimes this is possible by combining activities with other groups which influence diffuse linkages, but usually it is through reputation and good public relations.

The identification with a diversity of groups—public, private, professional and cultural—are all helpful in increasing public stature.

Usually there are many more change forces in the external environment than within the organization. Developing alliances, reciprocal obligations, cooperation and support from these sources can promote the public image of the new organization as an important new entity.

In general, publicity, public education, seminars, and image-building are necessary. An organization must capitalize on any opportunities that identify it with positive values in the society and with prestigious other organizations. This builds the diffuse linkages needed for institutionalization. Ideally, an organization moves from favorable publicity in the environment to an image of being significant to its general acceptance as an institution of value in the society. In practice the path is neither short nor easy.

The continuous identification of the organization with the community or the clientele that it serves in as broad a context as possible is one of the ways that the vagaries of political administrative changes can be minimized. If politicians, or top administrators are convinced that the curtailment of the new organization or the decrease in its services would make the cattlemen, the teachers, the medical profession or any significant group of people who exercise some power, act in its behalf, they will often not take the risk of interfering with it. If there are other groups who may not be direct clientele, but who favor change and modernization in their fields, who will support the organization and know that it will support them; effective influence can be generated through diffuse linkages to consolidate this support.

Frequently, the time spent making speeches at professional clubs, visits to universities, providing information for newspapers and sending information and publicity to diverse groups will pay off in critical periods when the organization is threatened.

Even when they have been cultivated, there are times when they must be con-

sciously mobilized. When there are problems, it is frequently possible to call community leaders and explain the position and problems of the organization so that they may be properly informed and can either take supporting action or refuse to be misled by the opposition.

The effective leader and the alert organization is always looking for some event which will demonstrate dramatically what the organization stands for and how successful its new approach has become. The capacity to exaggerate or at least emphasize critical incidents of success often helps build the linkages to the whole society. However, this should be weighed against the need for credibility and making sure that the staff does not become complacent with a few initial successes. Building and maintaining the linkages with broader elements of the society is a long and continuous effort.

Priorities have to be established and the principal supporters and the main clientele have to receive most of the attention. However, acceptance is more often achieved if there is a conscious understanding by all members of the organization that there are many other groups in the environment who are change-oriented and can be supportive; that influential people should have a favorable image of the organization; and that everyone should understand the goals of the organization.

Broadly based, positive attitudes can be generated and these can be gradually converted to acceptance and then to the belief that the organization is of value. Gradually its program and doctrine will be incorporated into the realm of activities which society considers natural, correct and important to its goals.

In summary:

DIFFUSE LINKAGES BROADEN THE BASE OF SUPPORT.

DIFFUSE LINKAGES STRENGTHEN THE PUBLIC IMAGE OF THE ORGANIZATION.

DIFFUSE LINKAGES PROVIDE ALLIANCES WITH OTHER CHANGE-ORIENTED GROUPS.

DIFFUSE LINKAGES PROMOTE AN UNDERSTANDING IN THE SOCIETY OF THE GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION.

DIFFUSE LINKAGES HELP REINFORCE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOCIETY.

APPENDIX 2

... BIBLIOGRAPHY

Items A and B are comprehensive volumes that will give you an overall view of the ideas of institution building. The *Source Book* is the most comprehensive reference volume available and provides annotations and notes that will lead you to whatever may interest you.

Items 1-8 are articles, conference proceedings, reports and books that provide particularly interesting or special reading on various aspects of institution building.

A. Blase, Melvin G. *Institution Building: A Source Book*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Press, 1974

This is the first key work and the single most important item which the reader of this Guidebook should be aware of. It is a description bibliography of almost everything that has been written on institution building, and it is organized in a way that will let you briefly review case studies, theories, models, criticism or any other aspect of institution building that interests you.

B. Eaton, Joseph W. ed. *Institution Building and Development: From Concepts to Application*. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972

This is the second key work that you may want to consult. The major contributors to the original model lay out the concept in a variety of ways and there are also some chapters on experiences with application and techniques which can be used.

1. Axinn, George H., "A Strategy of Institution Building," Proceedings: Seminar of Institution Building and Development, June 26 to June 30, 1971, p. 140-55. Centre for Economic Development and Administration, Kirtipur, Kathmandu, Nepal.

This is one of several of Axinn's short pieces which describe the institution building approach in clear and concise terms that are a helpful introduction to the ideas and concepts.

2. Bohnhort, Ben A., Case, Harry L. and Neff, Kenneth L. *Final Report on the Michigan State University Turkey Project in National Education Research and Planning—1968-1974*. A report to the United States Agency for International Development, August, 1973.

A reasonably short and frank statement of the development of the project using the interesting approach of describing a series of turning points. See Chapter 6 on lessons from the experience and the appendices on dissertation summaries and the setting up of an educational information system.

3. Bureau of Technical Assistance, Agency of International Development. *A Guide for Team Leaders in Technical Assistance Projects*. Washington, D.C.: Department of State. January 1973.

See chapter 2 (pages 11-27) for the section on institution building. It is short, clear and useful for the foreign advisor.

4. Jones, Garth N. "Pakistan's National Institutes of Public Administration: A Note on Institution Building". *NIPA Journal*. Karachi, Pakistan. December 1969, pp. 137-144.

This article summarizes succinctly the development of the institutes using institution building criteria. A copy can be obtained from the AID Reference Center.

5. Siegel, Gilbert B. "DASP and the General Tests of Institutionalization". School of Public Administration. University of Southern California, April 1966. mimeographed.

An arbitrary example of many short studies which use simple models, traces the history of organizations and provides interesting results and conclusions. It is clear and well-written and has useful conclusions. Available through the AID Reference Center.

6. Smart, Lyman F. ed. *Proceedings of the Regional Conference on Institution Building*. Logan, Utah: Utah International Education Consortium, Utah State University and the United States Agency for International Development, 1970.

A combination of committee reports and short articles, case studies and interpretive material that gives examples in different fields, ideas and experiences and a general potpourri of items that vary in both their academic depth and practical orientation.

7. Technical Assistance Bureau, Agency for International Development. "The Role of Institutions and Joint Organizations in Less Developed Countries as Program Intermediaries for Foreign Assistance." Washington, D.C.: Agency for International Development, Technical Assistance Bureau, Office of Development Administration. 1971. xerox.

Note particularly Case 1. The Servicios of Latin America, 1942-1965 prepared by E. G. Alderfer; Case 3. The Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (PARD), Comilla, East Pakistan by E. G. Alderfer; and Case 5. The Philippines Rice and Corn Production Coordinating Council, by Jerome French. All of these cases are informative and well-written. They are reasonably interesting and provide some excellent examples of problems which are enriched by an institution building point of view. Available at the AID Reference Center.

8. Zerby, Lewis and Zerby, Margaret. *If I Should Die Before I Wake*. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University, 1971.

An interesting, human and colorful story of the development of the University of Nigeria. If you have read this document on institution building, here is a real case for you to look at through that perspective.