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9. ABSTRACT

This paper outlines the approaches taken by the governments of Kenya and Tanzania during the 1960s to increase agricultural output and change the institutional structure of the agricultural sector established before the countries became independent nations. Upon obtaining independence, both countries succeeded in involving African peasants in increased cash crop production, especially for export, and both nations confronted problems of falling world prices for their major export crops. In Kenya, about a fifth of the highlands was turned over to relatively small farmers, another fifth to large private African farm owners, and other lands were consolidated into holdings in the former "reserve" areas. While overall agricultural output did improve, the policy produced large numbers of landless peasants who had little choice but to work for large farmers for relatively low wages, or to drift into the city slums. The Tanzanian government and TANU, noting those effects of an initial policy, sought to avoid the growth of a society of "haves" defending the status quo against the "have nots" by stimulating the organization of ujamaa villages on a broad front throughout the country. Whether Tanzania's policies will be successful seems to depend partly on whether the government and TANU can build the necessary political and economic institutional framework involving the peasants.

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SEMINAR ON SMALL FARMER DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES

Comparative Agricultural Policies In Post-Independence East Africa

by

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COMPARATIVE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN POST-INDEPENDENCE EAST AFRICA

by

Ann Seidman

I. Introduction: The necessity of reshaping the inherited economy:

The vast majority of the population and the known resources of East Africa are engaged in agricultural production. This agricultural output has been shaped by more than half a century of colonial rule in two relatively disparate directions, maintained and perpetuated by the inherited institutional framework. On the one hand, a relatively modern export enclave consists of large, privately-owned (mainly by European settlers) estates which employ low-cost hired labor to produce export crops--mainly tea, coffee, sisal, pyrethrum and some beef--for the limited and uncertain world markets. As independence neared, increasing numbers of African peasant farmers were drawn into growing export crops, particularly coffee and cotton. The higher income groups in the export enclave import most of the manufactured consumer and capital goods available in the economy. An interlinked complex of foreign-owned trading firms, financial institutions and the limited industrial sector function to perpetuate and expand this relatively modern but externally dependent enclave pattern of development.

On the other hand, much of the African population, engaged for the most part in traditional shifting agriculture, produces most of their own food and housing, and even some of their own clothing. Levels of living are low, with per capita incomes on the order of £25* for the entire population. After the much higher incomes of the tiny fraction of non-African settlers, traders and businessmen working in the export enclave are subtracted, the per capita income of the Africans is in a range of £7 to £10.

*An East African £ is equal to U.S. $2.80.

The over-riding problem confronting the newly independent African governments has been to create an integrated balanced economy capable of attaining increased productivity and higher levels of living for their entire populations.[1] This has necessitated planning, not only to increase agricultural and industrial productivity, but also to reshape the inherited institutional structure so that attainment of greater productivity would simultaneously contribute to growing specialization and exchange throughout the economy, hence reducing national dependence on uncertain world markets and foreign decision makers.

Both the Kenyan and Tanzanian Governments planned to increase agricultural output as a fundamental feature of overall development. In this, both were, to a considerable degree, successful. They sought, also, to change the inherited institutional structure in the agricultural sector to increase the number of African farmers engaged in cash crop production. The institutional policies adopted by each government tend to reflect both their desires to introduce modern farming techniques, particularly mechanization; and, increasingly, the different political-economic options adopted by the governing parties.

This paper aims to outline the approaches towards small farmers adopted by the two governments within the context of their national development strategies; and to indicate the kinds of evidence so far available as to the consequences in terms of reshaping their inherited dual economies and increasing the levels of living of the broad masses of their populations. It needs to be emphasized that, since neither country has been independent for as much as a decade, these policies are relatively new, so the available evidence as to the consequences of the alternative approaches is far from conclusive.

II. Kenya: Building up the 'progressive' farmers:

In Kenya, the new Government has pursued the policy of changing the pattern of land ownership which was initiated in the last decade of the colonial regime. This policy should be viewed within the context of Kenya's overall development strategy which has primarily aimed to replace expatriates and Asians by Africans at all levels, rather than alter the set of inherited institutions which had shaped the national economy in the past.* State intervention, where it has taken place, has been directed primarily to facilitating this replacement process, providing loans for would-be African entrepreneurs and restricting Asian middleman activities which had previously been fostered by the colonial regime. Government investment in directly productive activities has tended to be limited to the few cases where private entrepreneurs--domestic or foreign--have been unwilling to create essential projects. Wherever possible, government participation has been in partnership with private entrepreneurs, almost always foreign firms since African businessmen lack both capital and knowhow. The assumption has typically been that, as rapidly as possible, the government would turn over its shares in these businesses to the private sector.

In this context the new government's policy in the sphere of agriculture aimed to increase the individual African peasant's participation in the production of cash crops primarily for export. By 1966, of the major export crops, small

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*This policy appears to accord with that advocated by Sir Michael Blundell, settler-turned-Kenyan, who had come to support Kenyan independence since, as he bluntly declared, unless Great Britain was prepared to support continued settler rule, "white domination was impossible... I was trying to make our position safe by other means."[2] He concluded, "the only possible policy was a liberal one which attracted the best of the new African thought which was now coming to the fore, allied with measures which created a wider economic sphere for the African generally."[3] He outlined the probable consequences quite explicitly: "As African political thought becomes more experienced in the actual practice of government, there will be a re-grouping on economic lines... in Kenya; one party will be socialist and revolutionary in concept, looking to the landless and lower paid workers for support, while the other will increasingly be a progressive evolutionary alliance of property owners and 'haves' as distinct from the 'have nots.'"[4]

holders produced about half the coffee, less than ten percent of the tea, about two-thirds of the pyrethrum, and almost none of the sisal. Of the crops marketed for domestic consumption, small holders produced roughly half the maize, the little rice that was locally grown, about a third of the dairy products and livestock, and most of the fruit and miscellaneous crops.[5]

These shifts towards small holder production were achieved in the framework of two major categories of policies towards land ownership: settlement schemes and land consolidation and registration.

A. Settlement Schemes

By 1962, the Government had evolved what has become loosely known as the "Million Acres Settlement Scheme."[6] About £10.8 million, more than a fourth of the total of £38.4 million projected for Central Government expenditure in the 1964-1970 Plan, was to be devoted to the transfer of land from non-Africans to Africans and associated settlement scheme activities.* This expenditure was not expected to lead to substantial increases in production, but rather to change the pattern of land ownership. About £2 million was to be spent on transferring large scale farms intact to wealthy Africans, and 8.7 million was to be spent on African settlement farms.** By 1967, about 1.5 million acres--about half of the formerly mixed farming areas, but only 20 percent of the former "White Highlands"--had been transferred to peasant farmers for relatively small scale operations.

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*At the turn of the century, British Colonial policy had in Kenya centered on alienating some seven million acres of the best lands on the Kenya highlands, turning them over to European settlers for production of export crops. By the time of independence, the main export crops were coffee and tea, although meat and dairy products, sisal and pyrethrum were also produced. Maize and wheat were also grown for local consumption and export to neighboring East African countries.

**Actually, the first development plan had projected considerably more settlement.[7]

Between 1961-65, the Government bought 1,094 European farms containing 1,421,257 acres at a cost of £12.5 million. The average payment was about £9 per acre. The British Government granted a third of this sum to the Kenyan Government as a gift, the rest as 30-year loan repayable with 6.5 percent interest.* The prices were set on the basis of 1959 prices which reflected the prevailing artificial prices structured by settler-controlled marketing boards for most of the settlers' marketed products.[8] Some of the land purchased appears to have been unsuitable to small-holder types of farming, and was purchased against the technical advice of officers in the Departments of Settlement and Agriculture.

The Government disposed of the land thus acquired to African farmers at about two-thirds of the cost, plus surveying and legal charges; thereby it passed along to the new African owners most of the British grant for the purchase of land.[9] The farmers' debts for the land purchased were to be repayable in 30 years at 6.5 percent interest to cover the cost of the British Government loans. Farmers also received development loans repayable in 5 to 15 years with 6.5 percent interest. The Kenya authorities obtained some £8 million for these loans from the British Government, the World Bank, the Commonwealth Development Corporation and the West German Government.

Initially the planning of the settlement program was carried out with little involvement of economists, agricultural economists or planning technicians. It was apparently assumed that satisfactory budgeting for each farm would lead to adequate overall results.[10] One serious consequence appears to have been that some of the crops grown failed to prosper because of the state of the world market. In particular, when the world price of sisal fell in the early sixties, those schemes which had been based on growth of that crop were in difficult straits.

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*Most of this rather large amount of 'aid' never reached Africa, but was simply transferred via the Kenya Government to overseas settlers' accounts.

Pyrethrum, by far the most important crop produced on the settlement schemes, also appeared to be confronting serious marketing problems by the end of the plan period.[11]

The size of holdings in the schemes varied considerably. The "high density" schemes were originally designed to provide subsistence for each family and enough cash income to meet the interest and principal payments on the loans, leaving £25 to £70 annually in cash for each. The plots were supposed to range in size from 11 to 54 acres depending on the quality of soil and type of output that would yield the target income. This was not always the case; in Ol Kalou Salient, for example, about 3,000 squatters had settled on the land before it was divided. In the crash settlement program that was finally implemented, some settlers are reported to have received as little as 3 acres.[12]

Settlement charges for the land ran from £80 to £345 and development loans amounted to £55 to £200 per plot on the high density schemes. The peasants were supposed to have been selected from the landless and the unemployed, and therefore were only expected to pay £4 to £6 for legal fees--still a prohibitive cost for some--but there was not enough land to satisfy all that were eligible.[13]

Political factors were also reported to have influenced the selection of participants for the high density schemes. Although the laborers on the farms had originally been expected to receive priority, the final approach was apparently to remove all those who were not members of the tribe to which the settlement was to belong. From those remaining, only those who had worked there for four years were permitted to stay. This is estimated to have provided land for about forty percent of the total number of former laborers. Not a few of the remainder moved 'squat' on neighboring large farms from which they had to be removed, in some cases by policy action.[14] *

Efforts to introduce farm machinery confronted difficulties in the high density schemes. Many of the plots were too small to justify its use. Productivity was further limited by lack of peasant knowledge which was not adequately supplemented by government extension efforts. Evidence cited in the 1966 Development Plan indicated that the gross cash output of the high density schemes was about £2.3 per acre compared to the former gross output of £3.5 per acre [illegible] the European farms. The African owners tended to grow a portion of their crops for their own subsistence, however, whereas the European farms had to pay their [illegible] out of the gross cash income; in other words, the reported difference may reflect in part the African peasants' reported reluctance to risk production for the unfamiliar cash market.[16] Furthermore, the fact that world prices for crops like sisal had declined sharply could have been expected to reduce the cash returns for the new owners.**

The second Major type of settlement was the 'low density' scheme. The World Bank, which financed a significant share of the development costs of this scheme, took steps to ensure selection of better land areas, particularly for the more promising outputs: tea, pyrethrum and dairying. The size of the plots ranged from 12 to 56 acres, averaging somewhat over 35. The land costs ranged from £185 to £425 and development loans amounted to £135 to £325. The new owners were required to have an education,

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*Shortly after independence, the Government developed a "squatters settlement" programme on low cost acreage acquired by clearing forest, taking over mismanaged farms, and from donated lands. The aim of this program was merely to provide landless peasants with subsistence levels of living. The number of "squatters" actually registered totalled 45,[illegible] including [illegible]2,000 living in urban areas. Of these, only about 13,000 were reported to have been settled by 19[illegible] under the "squatters settlement" program.[15] The costs of the program were to be recovered from the peasants over a period of years.

**Unfortunately, the Plan data does not indicate the bases upon which the actual comparison has been made; these would need to be examined in full before hypotheses as to possible causes could be verified.

to provide 10 percent of the purchase price in addition to paying cash for legal fees and stamp duties, and, in some cases, to deposit £50 to £250 as working capital. Their target income was expected to be higher than that of the 'high density' schemes: £100 in addition to subsistence and loan repayments.* The 1966 Development Plan reported that the 'low density' schemes showed a gross output of £5.4 per acre, compared to £3.5 per acre produced by the former European owners. These farmers appeared to be using the land more efficiently in the production of cash crops for which there was a known market.

Non-repayment of loans emerged as a serious problem on the Million Acre Scheme. The loan repayment record for all settlers for the first five year period was 58.13 percent.[18] This repayment was considered low, even though it was the record of 34,651 families, some of whom had not been on their plots very long.

Behind these repayment figures appeared to be a political issue: Some Kenyans[19] questioned the necessity of paying those debts--roughly half the total--incurred to repay the British for purchasing land from the former expatriate owners. In their view, the British Government was, on its own initiative, paying the foreigners for land which it had seized unlawfully from the Africans in the early 20th Century; since for the most part the money was merely repatriated back to the United Kingdom, it simply constituted a transfer of funds between British citizens. They argued that there was no reason why the Africans, upon recovering their land, should be required to repay the British.

A third type of settlement promoted by the Government was the so-called 'co-operative' farm, established where economic and ecological factors led to the conclusion that it would be unwise to fragment the land. This was the case for

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*Some of the new farm owners who had funds and education enough to apply reportedly remained only 'weekend farmers,' living in town, visiting the plots only once or twice a month, and leaving the farms to someone else's care.[17]

several coffee plantations and ranches, particularly in Machakos. By 1966, 15 of these 'co-operative' farms had been organized. They ranged in size from a 130 acre coffee co-operative with 50 members to a 41,257 acre beef cattle ranch with 90 members.

Available evidence suggested that these were not in any real sense producer co-operatives.[20] One co-operative in Machakos, for example, was a former European-owned farm with 2,672 acres, 160 in coffee and another 180 arable. The rest was used for grazing 200 milking cows and 100 heifers. The European owner had been making an annual profit of £40 per acre of coffee (about a 20 percent return). The government paid the owner £64,000 for his farm and £10,000 for his moveable property, livestock and machinery. When the time came to select 200 members for the new co-operative, many influential people were eager to invest without either having worked on the farm in the past or expecting to work on it in the future. Originally, it was assumed that each member would contribute a down payment of £100. None of the original labor force could afford to participate at this cost even though many had worked on the same farm for 15 to 20 years and one had been employed for 51 years. Eventually, however, after fierce opposition to this initial approach, the plan was altered so that 140 of the original 160 employees were permitted to become working members. Another 60 non-working investing members were admitted. The down payment was decreased to a little over £50, but since none of the workers had even this large a sum of money, they were permitted to acquire 'shadow' partners who advanced the money and shared in the profits.

The members of the co-operative elected a committee that selected the farm manager subject to the final approval of the Ministry of Lands and Settlements. The worker members continued to receive the same wages and fringe benefits as previously: In 1964, dairy workers received about £6 1/2 a month; coffee workers, £4 1/2; tractor drivers, £5 1/2; masons and mechanics £10-£13. Each worker and his family also received a hut and three acres of land for their personal use. Previously they had received a bonus of £5-£10, but as co-operative members, they received a share of the profits remaining (if any) after the payment of their shadow partners. The manager had power to dismiss co-operative worker-members, in which case the member could send a substitute worker from his household, be paid off for his investment, or become a non-working member. Casual coffee pickers, mostly women, working from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m., received an average of three shillings a day in 1965 without fringe benefits.*

In reality this form of 'producer co-operative' appears to have provided a means by which members of the urban elite could, with government assistance, buy shares of profitable formerly settler-owned agricultural businesses. By 1968, some of the absentee members were said to be requesting that these co-operatives should be transformed directly into corporations for tax reasons.

Outside the settlement schemes, which covered only a little over a fifth of the total land area on the Highlands, the pattern of land ownership appeared to have become if anything more concentrated than previously. There is evidence to suggest that the average size of the remaining large farms--the majority of them still foreign company or European settler-owned--actually increased. The 1964 agricultural census,[21] taken when the Government had already acquired about three-fourths of all the acreage it intended to take over from the Europeans, showed that 2,958 of the large farms remained, holding a total of 6,797,900 acres or an average of 2,298 acres each; this compared to 3,609 large farms with an average of 2,142 acres each which had existed in 1960. Of the large farms left in 1964, 8.4 percent (249 farms with over 5,000 acres each) held 60.3 percent of the land in the large farms. Their average size was 25.7 square miles.

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*An East African shilling is equal to fourteen cents U.S.

In the case of tea, 33 tea estates, each with 200 or more acres of tea, held 69,214 acres out of a total of 114,137 licensed for tea growing. The largest single estate, owned by the African Highlands Produce Company Ltd., of Kericho District, held almost a fourth of all the tea acreage held by the 33 largest growers, about 20 percent of all the tea acreage in the country.

The main difference in land ownership outside the settlement schemes appeared to be that a few African owners had become owners of the smaller 'large' farms, apparently implementing Blundell's proposal of including a few Africans among the 'haves.' (See Footnote, p. 3, above) Many of the African's who bought these large farms were businessmen who had made money in trade or transportation. Others were high level government personnel. In some cases they had deposited 50 percent of the purchase price from their own resources and borrowed the rest from the Government. By 1966, it was estimated that Africans owned some 750 large-scale farms averaging about 800 acres in size--considerably smaller than the overall average of the remaining large farms. The Development Plan reported that many of these African farms had run into difficulties because, having used up most of their savings to purchase the farms, the owners had little working capital to operate them efficiently. Few of them had the skills and experience for the complex task of running a modern mixed farm. As a result, many had deteriorated. Therefore, the Government planned to establish a school to train African managers for African-owned large-scale farms as well as a new extension service to assist them. Some £600,000 in credit was to be channeled to them through the Agricultural Finance Corporation in addition to a substantial part of the AFC's supplementary resources (which included an estimated £1.5 million in current loan repayments). By 1969, the largest share of the Government's training expenditures was reported to be directed to carrying out this program for training large farmers.

In mid-1966, the Government officially endorsed a policy of inviting applications for alienation of 1.4 million acres (2,187 square miles) outside of the Highlands for European development of controlled game cropping, cattle ranching, and tourism, for 45 years at an annual rent of less than 5 cents U.S. per 20 acres. An American firm, the California Packing Corporation, for example, acquired 20,000 acres on a long term lease from the Government in order to grow and pack pineapples for local and European markets. It reportedly expected to process 165,000 tons of pineapples a year, buying about a fourth from African growers and growing the rest on its own plantations.[24]

B. Land Consolidation and Registration

Kenya's ruling political party, KANU, also adopted as its own and extended the land consolidation and registration program initiated by the British during the Emergency.* The Kenya Government paper on African Socialism treated the original small holder settlement schemes as a self-interested device of the outgoing colonial regime to buy out British farmers who wanted to leave. It apparently did not consider that, judged by economic criteria, the settlement schemes might constitute an efficient policy for agricultural growth.[26] It appeared to suggest that development capital spent on settlement schemes was relatively wastefully used in rehabilitating the landless, rather than in augmenting the productivity of those who already had land.[27] At least one of Kenya's chief agricultural planners, however, apparently did not believe that there was enough data by 1967 to make this decision on sound economic grounds.[28]

*The original proponents of this plan explicitly declared, prior to independence, that it might be expected to ensure the position of large African landholders, while leaving a number of peasants altogether landless:

> "Able, energetic, or rich Africans will be able to acquire more land, and bad or poor farms less, creating a landed and landless class. This is a normal step in the evolution of a country."[25]

From 1961 to the beginning of 1967, the number of acres with registered titles was somewhat more than doubled to over 2 million,[29] still only a small portion of the estimated 30 million registerable acres in the country. In arguing their consolidation had contributed significantly to development one study[30] emphasized that the value of known sales of major agricultural products in consolidated districts had approximately doubled in the decade. This in itself is not very convincing, however, since the value of known sales from the non-consolidated districts also multiplied rapidly, more than doubling in Central Nyanza and increasing almost four times over in Machakos. The same report reports that more credit was granted to farmers in the consolidated areas, presumably made possible by registration of titles.* This appears to assume what is to be proven: one argument for consolidation and registration is that the private banks would only extend credit when land titles provided security; but little effort was made to explore other ways of extending credit.

The report admitted that landless groups were 'uncovered' by consolidation. It argued, however, that consolidation increased employment opportunities. Assuming certain employment coefficients for given crops it concluded that as the output of these crops increased in consolidated areas, employment must have also increased. This appears to be somewhat circular reasoning, since it appears that the same increase in crop production might have occurred in any event, hence--if the coefficients were accurate--leading to increased employment even without consolidation.

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*Apparently in contrast, Tanzania's early Land Bank experience with loans (primarily to larger farms and, in practice, the settler population), using property titles as security, was not satisfactory, for when settlers left the schemes the Land Bank's successor, the Agricultural Credit Agency, was left holding titles covering land and the permanent improvements thereon of a number of farms. This suggests that this type of security is not of itself adequate unless there is a real market for such assets.[31]

On the basis of a report drawn up by a British Mission, the Kenya Government planned to continue and expand the land adjudication and registration program. Financial assistance totalling some £3.4 million was obtained from the British Government to meet the costs of a four year program which went into operation in July, 1967. The program envisaged adjudication and registration of about 5.8 million acres of arable land at a cost of about 12 shillings per acre.[32] In the 1970-74 Plan period, over 7.4 million hectares more land was to be adjudicated and registered, including 4.9 million hectares in the range areas, at an additional estimated cost of about £6.3 million.[33]

C. <u>Marketing and Credit for Small Farmers</u>:

The cooperative movement among small farmers in Kenya, as in other African countries, has had a checkered history.[34] Participation in marketing cooperatives has been made compulsory for small farmers acquiring land in the highlands settlement schemes, and small farmers engaged in cash crop production in the former reserves are encouraged to join. By 1968, there were about 570 agricultural marketing cooperatives. These have encountered problems in obtaining adequate management and bookkeeping services. The Department of Co-operative Development has been handicapped in assisting them because of shortages of personnel and the inadequacy of cooperative records. In 1966, the Commissioner for Co-operative Development was given considerably increased regulatory powers, including powers to insure that funds were controlled and to amalgamate small single-purpose societies into multi-purpose units. The Cooperative College of Kenya was established to provide eight week courses for 35 participants at one time in administration, bookkeeping and management. Co-operative training is also provided at the Kenya Institute of Administration and at Farmers' Training Centers. In 1968, a Co-operative Bank was established to hold member societies' accounts, and to make advances to co-operative societies.

The Government has made credit available to small farmers through various agencies, initially primarily through the Agricultural Finance Corporation, and increasingly through the Cooperative Bank.[35] In the 1966-70 Plan, about £4.3 million was to be provided in loans for some 30,000 farmers (three percent of all small farmers), mostly in high potential areas--i.e., the "relatively progressive smallholders who are by definition already much better off than the rest."[36] In the 1970-74 Plan, the amount of credit available for small farmers was to be about £2.3 million. The Agricultural Finance Corporation, which had distributed most of the credit in the past, reported that about half of the loans had not been repaid. The AFC proposed to improve its own staff to ensure loans to better credit risks in the future, but a serious shortage of qualified personnel rendered this difficult. The AFC held that short term loans to individual small farmers were not feasible in view of the cost of assessing the risks, even if personnel were available; so that a preferable way to provide credit was through the cooperatives. Hence, the 1970-74 Plan proposed to direct credit to small farmers primarily through cooperatives, deducting repayments from the value of farm produce sold through them. Unfortunately, however, at the time that the Plan was drawn up, only 120 out of 570 agricultural marketing cooperatives were considered sufficiently well-managed to permit the newly established Cooperative Bank to issue loans to them without incurring undue risk. It was hoped that increased training of cooperative personnel would improve this situation in the future. The AFC was to continue providing credit to individual small farmers associated with specific projects, like tea or pineapple production.

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In sum, the post-independence Kenya program for small farmers concentrated on a limited resettlement program in the Highlands and a land consolidation and registration program designed to individualize land ownership in the former African reserves. An effort was made to facilitate these programs by encouragement of cooperative marketing and a limited degree of government credit, although these encountered the problems of shortages of skilled personnel and membership participation typical in many African countries.

The Kenyan policies were relatively successful in expanding output, especially for export crops, by both large and small farms--particularly the larger of the 'small farms.' In 1969, the Kenyan Economic Survey[36] reported that the previously employed distinction between 'large' and 'small' farms was becoming increasingly meaningless as more and more large farms emerged with development of the former African reserve lands as well as within the 'low density' settlement schemes. These were actually alleged to be becoming larger than some farms in the former 'scheduled' areas.* This appeared to be in keeping with the Swynnerton Plan proponents' argument, that modern agricultural development required the growth of larger production units along with growing numbers of landless peasants, presumably to provide a cheap labor force to work for large farm owners. (See Footnote, p. 12, above) The program also neglected the famine areas, primarily the marginal agricultural areas which are heavily populated. The complete lack of any program for these areas suggests either a surprising oversight, or an extreme pessimism about the ability to do anything to overcome the problems of famine.[37]

This approach appears consonant with the industrial strategy adopted in Kenya which, leaving key investment decisions mainly to foreign private entrepreneurs

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*Nevertheless, the previous division between large and small farms, based on 'scheduled' vs. 'trust' areas, continued to be used in reporting the output of each sector.

tended to contribute to further concentration of the limited industrial sector in the relatively developed export enclave, producing items primarily to meet the needs of the higher income groups. It undoubtedly contributed to the continued influx of landless laborers to the cities, aggravating the problems of unemployment which plagued Kenya's independent Government from the outset.

III. Tanzania: A Shifting Emphasis

Tanzania, with its vast land areas and relatively thinly scattered population, confronted quite different problems in developing agricultural production than Kenya. Its relatively modern estate sector* was never as extensive as Kenya's. Given the scattered nature of Tanzanian subsistence farmer settlements, the colonial Government had formulated the point of view, initially adopted also by the independent Government, that the problem of increasing specialization and exchange among peasant farmers to increase agricultural productivity and improve the quality of rural life was, at least in large part, one of 'villagization.'

Upon attainment of independence, Tanzania's Government at first made few changes in the set of inherited institutions which dominated its export enclave. Its first plan, drawn up with World Bank advice, was founded on the argument that Tanzania could expect to attract little capital for investment in industry, especially given Kenya's advantages in the East Africian common market. Its main emphasis was on expansion of export crop production on the assumption that the multiplier effects would eventually spread development throughout the rural areas. This approach was reflected in governmental efforts to stimulate agricultural production for export. The primary change was to further accentuate efforts to involve the small peasants and to involve them in marketing cooperatives to facilitate their entry into cash crop production.

*Estates, mostly sisal estates, covered less than 2% of the arable land although they accounted for major shares of sisal, coffee and tea exports. About one-half of Tanzania's coffee and most of its cotton is grown by small farmers.

A. Smallholder production

After independence, the Government passed legislation assuming ownership of all land in Tanzania. From a legal standpoint, users of land were henceforth to be granted rights of occupancy, but not the right to sell or rent it. This constituted a necessary first step in giving Government powers to initiate desirable land policy changes--but thus far these have only been introduced gradually. In practice, almost all the land, except for the relatively small fraction which had been formerly alienated to estate holdings, continued to be held and used by individual peasants in accordance with various customary systems or modified versions of them. In areas where cash crop production had prevailed for some time and land had become scarce, a virtual private freehold system of land tenure with rentals and free sales has emerged despite the often-declared policy that this should be avoided.[38]

Small holder production continued to increase after independence. The output of cotton and coffee nearly doubled from 1962 to 1967. Tobacco output quadrupled in the same period. Sugar production, partly grown by peasants on outgrower schemes associated with estates, roughly doubled, although the estates, associated with existing sugar factories as well as a new one built in the remote Kilombero Valley, continued to produce a major share of the output. Tea output, which nearly doubled, was almost entirely grown on estates, but small holder output increased from nil to about five percent by the end of the first Plan period. Government-supported efforts to expand small holder production of sisal mostly failed as world sisal prices plummeted, rendering the future viability of large parts of the entire industry questionable.*

*Given the growth of synthetic substitutes, one study[39] argues that the existing world market for sisal will be sharply limited within the next two decades, so that the future of the industry depended on the development of alternative uses.

B. 'Villagization' schemes

The Government, in line with colonial policy and the advice of the World Bank, initially planned to pour considerable amounts of government investment funds into 'transformation' schemes--as opposed to the more gradual 'improvement' approach fostered by extension programs among small farmers living where they were. A high proportion of Tanzanian inhabitants--estimated to be as many as eleven out of twelve million on the mainland--live in scattered settlements. The 'transformation' approach aimed to group scattered peasants into residential clusters to facilitate the introduction of modern agricultural techniques as well as social services.

Essentially two broad sets of government-supported village settlement programs were undertaken in Tanzania over the fifteen years prior to the Arusha Declaration:[40] "supervised settlements schemes," that is, projects specially set up by government agencies, almost always on newly opened-up land in which production was carried out through some form of direct control over the individual settlers; and "co-operative farming settlements" which, while often stemming from external, even government prompting, and receiving continuing advice, represented a more voluntary coming-together, often in an existing community on new or already occupied land, to share some production functions.

The history of these two categories, including the earlier colonial initiatives in the post-war period, is briefly outlined here to indicate the background of experience which led to the approach incorporated in the post-Arusha Declaration policies.

1. Supervised settlement schemes

The Tanganyika Agricultural Corporation (T.A.C.) was established in 1953 to take over from the U.K. Overseas Food Corporation three major development areas which had been sites for the ill-fated Groundnut Scheme initiated by the British in an effort to alleviate vegetable oil shortages after World War II. Tenant farmers, most of whom were Africans, had already been settled in these areas. TAC also set up several ranches and some irrigation projects.

The ideology[41] behind these colonial government-sponsored settlements was the promotion of "a healthy, prosperous yeoman farmer class, firmly established on the land, appreciative of its fruits, jealous of its inherent wealth, and dedicated to maintaining the family unit...." The creation of a class of individual African land-holders was conceived in Tanzania as in Kenya as "one of the most stabilizing influences in an African community."

TAC was only partially successful in attaining its goals. In Nachingwea, where cash returns were disappointing, the annual turnover of settlers was 50 percent. In "Master Grower" tobacco scheme at Urambo, however, where the Government provided supervision and credit for fertilizers, spray and hired labor, a handful of African farmers succeeded in growing up to 40 acres and more of tobacco a piece. It has been estimated that nearly [illegible] percent of the workers on the larger farms constituted hired labor. The largest farmers reportedly made as much as 80,000 shillings in 1966. Given a profitable cash crop with an expanding world market like tobacco and sufficient government assistance, the Urambo experience proved that a few private farmers could and did acquire the necessary new agricultural skills, purchase large tracts of land and hire other laborers, becoming fairly large-scale farmers. Some of these had accumulated capital in other activities, such as trade, careful study is needed to identify precisely why only a limited few so successfully emerged as large-scale commercial farmers. The majority of the farmers in the area--several thousands of peasant families--barely eked out enough to live on from holdings of one to three acres

The Village Settlement Agency (VSA) was formed after independence in 1962 to initiate a number of pilot settlements to implement the more explicit policy of "transformation" recommended by the World Bank Mission.

The VSA was a government body responsible to a Rural Settlement Commission composed of five Ministers and the head of TAC under the Chairmanship of the Vice-President. The Rural Settlement Commission only actually met once in late 1964; it folded in 1965. In 1966, the Office of the Commissioner for Village Settlement became a Division of the new Ministry of Lands, Settlement and Water Development. One unfortunate effect of separating the VSA from the Ministry of Agriculture was the tendency to siphon off funds and services from the normal agriclutural extension work dedicated to the 'improvement' approach--assistance given to the agricultural activities of the vast majority of peasants not involved in villagization schemes.

The first Pilot Village Settlement Schemes initiated by VSA between 1963 and 1965 were designed to settle [illegible] families in each settlement at an investment of £150,000 per settlement. Each family working under supervision of a qualified manager was expected to earn £150 a year. In the first Five Year Plan, the program was to be expanded rapidly to include 34 schemes for a planned cost of £6.1 million; extension of tobacco schemes in four areas at a cost of £277,000; and creation of five irrigated schemes for £650,000. By 1969, 70 settlement schemes were to be established. Over £12 million, about 13 1/2 percent of the total central government development budget, was to be devoted to the planned settlement of about half a million people.

These schemes were notably unsuccessful, however. In part, it was apparent that the initial costs, including expensive housing for supervisory personnel, were far too high; at best only a tiny fraction of Tanzania's 12 million population could be served by the program, given Tanzania's limited funds. Furthermore, conflicts between villagers and supervisors arose, fostered by socio-economic and cultural differences, as well as the failure of the supervisors to create the necessary institutions to involve villager participation in decision-making, so they failed to participate effectively in developing the projects.

In 1966, official policy was drastically altered. Instead of seventy schemes, probably fewer more than a dozen settlements had actually been really started on the original 'pilot' pattern, and in 1968, only about seven were still functioning. Only five of them, based on tobacco, were still promising.

A careful comparison of the Kiwere supervised tobacco scheme with neighboring unsupervised peasants who farmed tobacco in Iringa[42] showed that yields and quality tended to be higher in the highly supervised circumstances imposed in the former; but that the less supervised approach effected a more rapid expansion of output at lower costs and, as the farmers acquired experience, quality improved over time. In terms of careful economic analysis of overall cost-benefits, the more expensive supervised scheme appeared less successful in terms both of farmer income and national output goals.

Block farms. These farms were started in 1964 with a view to rapid mechanization of cotton farming in the Lake Victoria area. The 'blocks' consisted of areas of between 20 and 400 acres of reorganized or unoccupied land which were mechanically ploughed and sometimes sprayed. Hand operations such as planting, weeding and picking of cotton were to be done by individuals on plots to which they were assigned within the 'block.' The tractors, imported by the Government, were bought by the Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions. Technical supervision of the schemes was the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture.

By 1965, there was estimated to be 37 block farms in the Lake Region, while others had sprung up elsewhere. After that, the number dwindled rapidly, as it was found that mechanized operations only paid (and then only just) if they were well organized and there was a high standard of husbandry.[42] Apparently, many of the plots had been acquired by local shop-keepers, traders and occassionally local party officials who then had much of their cultivation done by hired labor. By 1968, there were virtually no Block Farms left except in Kahama District. The Victoria Federation of Co-operative Unions, which had been taken over by the Government and reorganized, was trying to sell all the tractors it had acquired as part of the scheme.

<u>Licensed producer schemes</u>: In licensed producer schemes peasants cultivate their own plots in their home area under the supervision of an appointed scheme management. One of these was initiated in 1954 by the British American Tobacco Company in Tabora District; by 1964, there were over 1,000 licensed tobacco growers there, with some also registered in nearby Mpanda district. Similar licensed small holder schemes were started in the Usambara Mountains, Rungwe and Bukoba districts. Pyrethrum is also produced in several districts under licensing arrangements. These schemes are quite loosely supervised; essentially the individual producer receives assistance in acquiring new farming techniques for the new crop. His incentive for taking the advice appears to be his anticipation of increased cash income.

With the exception of tobacco farming and the licensing schemes built primarily on individual incentives deriving from the sale of valuable cash crops, few of the supervised schemes were successful, despite the considerable amount of capital invested in them. The supervision was provided from government agencies, often by expatriate personnel; the management 'elite'--including managers, assistants, school teachers, and community development personnel--tended to become isolated in terms of their life style and attitudes from the majority of peasants. The peasants' incentive to participate effectively was reduced, and in some cases antagonisms became overt. The enormous expenditure on mechanization and irrigation was seldom covered by the sale of the crops. Low settler morale on block farms was illustrated by the fact that tractor drivers used tractors for private plowing, and cotton was smuggled for sale outside the settlement to avoid payment of settlement dues. In sum, supervised settlement schemes, imposed from the top down, proved extremely expensive, and failed to set off the essential trend to modernization even for the relatively small group of farmers involved.

2. Co-operative Settlements

This second category of schemes included those in which the peasants were to be encouraged to come together on a voluntary basis in an effort to co-operate to increase output. Some of these were established on Government and party initiative, some grew up spontaneously.

In an effort to involve African farmers in sisal production in Tanzania, as in Kenya, the Government and TANU encouraged the establishment of some 416 co-operative plots by 1964. Some were divided into individual plots, many were jointly owned. Small 'raspidor' machines were designed which, it was hoped, would enable them to process their own output. The obstacles encountered by these schemes included the long time taken for sisal to reach maturity (three years); poor management; and the failure of the small decorticating machines to produce good quality fibre. The overriding problem in Tanzania as in Kenya, however, was the drastic fall in sisal prices, which rendered any expansion in sisal output uneconomic. Some of the larger settlements initiated by TANU based on sisal still exist, and have been found to be fairly successful. The main ones are Mbambara and Kwamangugu in Tanga Region.[43] The critical variable in these instances appears to have been an effective devoted management cadre who successfully involved the farmer-members in decision-making and active support of the projects.

In Iringa,[44] the Government sought to encourage farmers to form co-operatives to make initial capital investments in land and the construction of tobacco-curing barns. There seemed to be a tendency, however, for the co-operatives to break up after the first year or two. Significant factors contributing to this tendency appear to have included: the lack of dispute-settling machinery within the co-operatives; inadequate solution of problems of division of labor in relation to traditional cultivating patterns; and the provision of credit by government agencies which enabled individual larger farmers to hire labor for seasonal requirements--thus, eliminating the necessity of relying on co-operative effort. As a result, some farmers expanded rapidly into relatively large capitalist entrepreneurs, while increasing numbers of migrants to the area remained landless, working for wages as low as 30 shillings a month.

Throughout Tanzania after 1959, a large number of settlements were initiated through TANU, the ruling political party, by willing young people and sometimes elders going out to clear new land and cultivate together in answer to TANU's call to build the nation. These projects were, by 1968, estimated to have run into the hundreds and to have involved several thousand people, but most had a brief existence; the hardships that had to be faced by members of an unplanned and unassisted scheme were often too great for many of the settlers or their leaders.

Among the reasons cited for failure of these schemes were:[45]

1) Participants were often urban unemployed and therefore not the best possible settlers;

2) The site chosen often demanded skills and capital beyond those available to make the project viable;

3) The long distance from the market and the inadequacy of marketing institutions;

4) The lack of a cash-crop with quick visible success in the first difficult years;

5) Lack of real interest and know-how on the part of political leaders who started the schemes in the first place;

6) Fake promises and false hopes which were soon shattered;

7) A critical shortage of capital and managerial skills.

In addition to voluntary organized settlements, new communities sprang up on an ad-hoc basis, usually as a result of migration into areas newly opened up, perhaps by construction of a road or an irrigation project. Typically, most production was carried out on an individual basis, but where some facility was to be shared, such as an irrigation project or domestic water supply, they created their own co-operative institutions. There emerged a fairly common pattern of such migration away from overcrowded mountainous areas to the surrounding dry lowlands.[46]

After 1960 at least fifteen settlements were started in the remote and poor Ruvuma Region in Southern Tanzania and joined together in the Ruvuma Development Association. This was essentially a subsistence farming area with very little cash crop farming. The settlements were started under TANU-TYL leadership like the voluntary schemes described above, but, where most of the others appear to have failed, they succeeded. Apparently the main ingredients contributing to their success were a high level of ideological commitment by the leadership, coupled with careful attention to concrete tecaniques required to increase labor efficiency. Initially, technical assistance was provided by an outside agency, but as rapidly as possible, interested participants were encouraged to acquire skills and to impart them to others. Some outside funds were available, but the biggest source of investment funds was obtained from the sale of agricultural surpluses made possible through increased attention to modern production techniques and cooperative arrangement for sales in national markets.

Each scheme elected its own manager and management committee. The members gradually gave up their separate holdings and housing and moved to build villages. Eventually most cash crops were grown communally, and often food crops as well. All members participated in cultivation, including women and children. Different teams worked on different crops, machinery, building, accounting, teaching, etc. Members of the teams were paid in accordance with the number and quality of "work days" each had done. This specialization made greater output possible through expansion of a range of activities: In addition to cultivating a wide range of crops and tending some of the first grade cattle to be introduced in the region, other activities included wool spinning and weaving, brick-making, flour milling, a saw mill, and, on some schemes, provision of services like piped water and self-help schools.

It is argued that the improvements made possible by the Ruvuma settlement activity should not be measured by increased cash incomes alone, but by an overall enhancement of the style of life. The villagers ate a full, balanced diet. They probably had as much or more cash in their pockets as their neighbors, they had provided themselves with a high level of services, and, through the establishment of their villages, had created for themselves a more varied and interesting social life. While they received outside technical assistance, they did not obtain extensive financial help. The leaders were reportedly consciously pioneering a "pattern of development which can allow for continuous growth."

A group of younger, more educated members from different schemes--called the "Social and Economic Revolutionary Army"--divided their time between the various villages, giving technical and managerial advice and acting as a catalyst for the whole movement.

The Ruvuma Development Association, with representatives from the villages, was established as a "co-operative of producers' co-operatives." It provided services such as the milling business and the school and a marketing outlet for the whole movement.

A coherent set of values was reported to underpin the Ruvuma experiment. There was a great deal of emphasis on education in the ideology and practice of ujamaa, i.e., producer-cooperation, based on an on-going analysis of their own experience. The education in the primary school was geared to trying to end the usual divorce between the life of the community and the new approaches being developed.

3. Tentative conclusions

In sum, Tanzania's experience with settlement schemes, up until 1967, suggested that the closely supervised villigization schemes were very expensive, requiring levels of cash returns which were unlikely to be obtained, given the existing market for most cash crops. Furthermore, such schemes fostered undemocratic bureaucratic tendencies, leading at times to open antagonism by peasant participants. The most successful of the supervised schemes tended to be those involving the licensing of production of a profitable export crop like pyrethrum, tea or tobacco, with technical assistance and credit provided by an outside agency.

The more spontaneous co-operative schemes apparently generally tended to suffer from the lack of the skilled technical leadership and ideological commitment which could ensure an on-going perspective of increasing co-operative utilization of existing local resources leading to gradual but continuously improved levels of living for all participants. Even in these cases, there appeared in some to be a greater degree of success than in the more closely supervised schemes. In a few, given a combination of a profitable crop, and government assistance, including credit for hiring labor, some individual peasants were successful in establishing large-scale private commercial projects on their own after getting a start from initial compulsory participation in co-operatives.

In Ruvuma, where both technological expertise and ideological commitment to the idea of producer co-operation appeared to have been consciously and consistently developed, a considerable degree of success seemed to have been attained, in terms of increased community productivity and enhanced conditions of life for all participants.

C. Post-Arusha Declaration Agricultural Policies

In 1967, as world sisal prices plumeted and Tanzania's inability to attract foreign capital to development projects became increasingly evident, the Party and Government leaders declared a new policy at Arusha for the attainment of what they termed a self-reliant socialist development perspective. The Government proceeded to take actions to attain control of the 'commanding heights,' identified as export-import and internal wholesale trade, the banks and financial institutions, and basic industries--insofar as they existed. The stated aim was to end the drain of investible surpluses out of the country through government control of these crucial institutions dominating the export enclave; and to reinvest the funds thus retained in productive sectors in accord with a national strategy to restructure the economy in order to increase productivity and raise the levels of living of the broadest masses of the population, particularly in remote rural areas. Industry and agricultural development were to be planned to complement each other, contributing to increased internal specialization and exchange in the framework of an increasingly integrated, balanced national economy. Foreign trade patterns were to be redirected to implement these plans.

The Government began to reshape the nation's agricultural policies in line with the strategy of socialism and self-reliance enunciated in the Arusha Declaration. On the one hand, agricultural advance was recognized as an essential foundation of structural change. On the other hand, it was emphasized that increased agricultural output attained through creation of an entrenched group of well-to-do farmers, simultaneously with growing numbers of landless hired labourers, would hinder attainment of an integrated economy capable of achieving higher levels of living for the entire population. This new insight, emerging from analysis of the post-independence experience with agricultural 'transformation' schemes as well as more spontaneous expansion of cash crop production, led to the conclusion that first, crop targets must be reshaped to meet the needs of economic reconstruction; and, secondly, the institutional changes devised to attain those targets must contribute to income distribution patterns so that the essential restructuring of the economy would, in fact, take place.

1. The estate sector

The Arusha Declaration incorporated the beginnings of a new approach to the estate sector. The new approach was undoubtedly undertaken in part due to the serious economic problems confronting the sisal estates, which had previously employed by far the largest numbers of wage laborers in the nation, as a result of the disasterous collapse of world sisal prices.

President Nyerere held[47] that public or private-public investment might be directed to production of crops grown solely for export or urban consumption on a mechanized large-scale basis requiring expertise and capital. This might be true in the case of sisal or beef ranches, for example. Given adequate public control within the overall development program, workers on such projects would then know that "proceeds from the farm go to the community in general or are being used for further investment."

The Government took over a major share of the ownership of about 60 percent of the sisal estates. These assets were held by an autonomous government corporation--which thus acquired a 60 percent interest in about 30 subsidiaries. Initially the National Development Corporation controlled a 51 percent of the ownership of the Ralli Estates which continued to be run by German, English and Dutch managers; in 1969, the Sisal Corporation took over the NDC shares although the management continued as before. The sisal output quotas, in line with the informal international agreement arranged through the UN Food and Agricultural Organization,[48] were to be distributed among the estates so as to increase the efficiency of the industry. Efforts were made to increase productivity per worker on all the sisal estates, public and private.*

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*One private estate reportedly had covered its current costs by reducing the number of labor days a ton from 132 in 1962-3 to 57 in 1967-8; as a result they had reduced the number of permanent employees from 8,250 to 3,262 during the period while increasing output.[49] Most workers received 185 shillings a month for cutting 100 bundles of sisal a day; a few could earn 205 shillings a month by cutting 110 bundles a day; if they could sustain the effort to cut 128 bundles a day, they could earn 228 shillings a month. By 1969, total sisal employment had been reduced to about 30,000, less than a third of the 1962 level.[50]

Outside of the sisal industry, the existing commercial estates were for the most part left in private hands. In theory, however, the new approach might be expected to be extended to the entire estate sector as adequate managerial manpower and capital become available.*

2. State Farms

The Government proposed in the Second Five Year Plan to devote a major share of public investment in agriculture to planting 250,000 acres under State Farm auspices. Almost half of the proposed area was to be cultivated to produce wheat which was considered particularly susceptible to large-scale mechanized farming. An unspecified number of acres was to be allocated to nine ranches to improve beef cattle production. Four partially irrigated state farms were to increase the national output of rice to contribute to attainment of self-sufficiency and perhaps to export rice. Four state owned dairy farms were to contribute to ending the current situation in which dairy products (mainly from Kenya) constituted the nation's primary food import.

The arguments in support of this relatively heavy investment in the state farm program were: First, state farms were expected to be particularly effective as a means of accelerating the output of certain crops to speed implementation of the national program of agricultural diversification. Secondly, state farms were expected to provide further government experience with directly productive agricultural activity. In this respect, they could provide trained personnel who could contribute to extension work in the peasant sector. Third,

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*One large tea estate in the Usambara Mountains was turned over to the Government when it took over the sisal estates belonging to the same owner. The Government began replacing the expatriate management by Africans and planned to continue operation as a state project. Another tea estate was purchased by a co-operative in Njombe, primarily to acquire the tea factory for use by the outgrowers.

state farms were expected to provide workshop and transport services for the peasant sector, thus supporting the development and spread of modern agricultural techniques and facilitating specialization and exchange throughout the entire rural economy. The Plan emphasized the necessity for discipline by both management and workers if these potential gains were to be realized.*

3. Extension of 'ujamaa' villages

Despite the proposed heavy investment in state farms, the public sector was envisaged as a relatively minor part of Tanzania's agricultural program. As President Nyerere had declared,[51] for most Tanzanian farmers,

> To make our socialism and our democracy a reality we should.... adapt to modern needs the traditional structure of African society. We must, in other words, aim at creating a nation in which ujamaa farms and communities dominate the rural economy and set the social pattern for the country as a whole.

The TANU leadership sought to utilize the lessons of past efforts to build settlements to bring the majority of peasants--still in the subsistence or semi-subsistence sector--into modern cash crop production. At the top levels, this policy was increasingly consciously directed to avoiding the class differentiations which in the past had emerged among peasants as they became engaged in expanding private cash crop production. President Nyerere asserted that farmers, working as individuals in competition, had abandoned the old traditions of living and working together, and sharing the proceeds. On the one hand this contributed to increased production in the nation, accompanied by still larger increases in the wealth of the man who owned, managed and initiated a larger farm. On the other hand,

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*About £4 million--about four fifths of the anticipated Government investment specified for productive projects in agriculture--was to be spent to establish state farms.

> the moment such a man extends his farm to the point where it is necessary for him to employ laborers in order to plant or harvest the full acreage, then the traditional system of ujamaa has been killed. For he is not sharing with other people according to the work they do, but simply paying them in accordance with a laid-out minimum wage....the result is that the spirit of equality between all the people working on the farm has gone--for the employees are the servants of the man who employs them. Thus we have the beginnings of a class system in the rural area.[52]

As larger farmers accumulated more and more capital by reaping the profits produced by their hired labor, Nyerere argued, particularly as land became scarce--as it already had in some areas--"we shall find ourselves with a farmers' class and a laborers' class, with the latter being unable either to work for themselves or to receive a full return for the contribution they are making to the total output." The result will be that,

> They will become a 'rural proletariat' depending on the decisions of other men for their existence, and subject in consequence to all the subservience, social and economic inequality, and insecurity, which such a position involves.[53]

To counteract this tendency, which would inevitably undermine the whole perspective of building a socialist community devoted to raising the levels of living of all, President Nyerere called for formation of Ujamaa Vijijini "where a group of families will live together in a village and will work together on a communal farm for their common benefit." Basically, these villages were to operate on the principles of the extended family, but modern techniques were to be applied to increase productivity. Co-operation among the villages similar to that achieved in Ruvuma was to lead to greater specialization and exchange on village, district and national levels.

Beyond asserting that new communities should be created on a voluntary basis and that their members should have charge of their own affairs, Nyerere refrained from spelling out the details of the organization of Ujamaa Villages. It became evident, however, that the existing institutions for stimulating farmers to augment agricultural productivity would need to be fundamentally revamped if the program was to succeed. Attempts of the Central Government to inject large amounts of funds and outside management into a transformation program had been both too expensive and inadequate to reorient the farmers' outlook. Voluntary co-operation had tended to fail, primarily due to the lack of both adequate technical assistance and established principles of operation based on a firm ideology of producer cooperation.

In 1968, one of the original organizers of the Ruvuma Development Association, Mr. Millinga, was appointed to work in TANU headquarters to give leadership to the development of the national Ujamaa Vijijini program, the building of socialist villages along the lines of those in Ruvuma. His initial perspective was to develop an educational program for village organizers, and to establish several pilot projects throughout the country.[54] As in Ruvuma, increases in on-the-farm productivity were to be linked to growing regional specialization and exchange. Small scale industries were to be built to process local raw materials to meet local and eventually, perhaps, national needs.

In 1969, the Second Five Year Plan declared that a "frontal" approach--in contra-distinction to a "selective" policy--was to be advanced, "mobilizing the full range of governmental and political institutions behind the principles of Ujamaa."[55] Leadership training programs, outlined in the Plan, were subsequently reported almost daily in the press for leaders at all levels from top ministerial personnel down to the villages. In September, 1969, it was announced that TANU was to assume full control of all ujamaa willages; no longer with 'private' organizations to be allowed to operate ujamaa villages on their own.[56] *

*As one aspect of this policy, the Ruvuma Development Association was dissolved and its assets turned over to the Regional District Commissioner.[57]

These measures suggested that the TANU leadership had decided to take over the entire task of organizing Ujamaa villages at all levels. The attainment of success in evolving both the technological skills and the ideological commitment--including a more precise definition of Ujamaa principles--on a grass-roots basis throughout the nation now rested squarely in the hands of TANU leadership at all levels. The task was viewed as a critical aspect of the entire program to restructure the economy; its successful fulfillment was vital; how successfully TANU could meet the challenge remained for the future to answer.

President Nyerere and most Regional Commissioners are reported to have put a major emphasis on the development of Ujamaa projects. An Ujamaa Village Division has been established in the Ministry of Regional Administration and Rural Development which includes two senior officers in each of Tanzania's seventeen regions who are directly responsible for the promotion and supervision of Ujamaa Villages. This is not to say that entrenched rural interests, including larger farmers and African traders who have accumulated wealth through hired labor and/or control of local marketing channels, have not attempted to thwart implementation of ujamaa projects.[58] But at least the Government is attempting to create the necessary institutions to implement the program at the local levels.

Among the ingredients identified by Government personnel as essential to successful ujamaa oragnization are:

1) Social and Economic planning of Ujamaa Village development to ensure that the potential of development through cooperation is realized and the policy does not lead to greater equity at the cost of a serious decline in growth. This requires careful consideration of the objective resource constraints affecting each Ujamaa project as well as formulation of working rules to ensure the participation of members as well as technologically-competent

2) Integration of plans for ujamaa projects within the district, regional and national plans to ensure adequate markets and sources of farm inputs required to increase participants' production and income within the framework of planned expansion of regional and national specialization and exchange designed to increase production and incomes throughout the economy.

3) Availability of necessary government resources should be allocated in areas where they will be productively used and in such a way that they will contribute to self-reliance rather than dependence.

4) Political education and mobilization of both farmer participants and leaders to understand the relationship of ujamaa to national and local development perspectives.

5) Technological training at all levels for skills required to enable all participants to cooperate in implementing proposals for increased productivity as well as to ensure that all benefit from the resulting increases in output.

6) Research into all practical, social and economic aspects of ujamaa development.

The Government and Party continue to emphasize[59] that organization of Ujamaa Villages must be carried out on a voluntary basis, on the assumption that peasants can be convinced that a more collective solution to their problems will benefit them as individuals. Government officials have been cautious about even attempting to start Ujamaa Villages in areas of successful production of export crops such as tea or coffee due to anticipated resistence. As a result the record of Ujamaa Village development varies considerably from region to region. Mtwara Region alone has about half of the estimated 1200 existing Ujamaa Villages (as of November, 1970), in part because of the organization of peasants there into "Defence and Ujamaa Villages" along the Ruvuma River which borders Portugese Mozambique.*

The actual process of starting an Ujamaa Village varies considerably from place to place. Apparently the most important influencing variable is the existing socio-econmoic organization of the peasants: Existing production relationships-the existing social structure, relations between the party, the government's field staff, and the peasant cultivators-all play a crucial role in shaping the strategy to be used in organizing Ujamaa Villages in a particular area. For example, as noted above, where peasants are already growing successful export crops, little effort has been made to resettle them in Ujamaa Villages. But on the edge of cultivated areas--what might be termed 'frontier areas'--the government is trying to organize new settlements of young, landless peasants whose parents are still cultivating in a traditional manner.

Another example would be settlement schemes like those in tobacco started before the Ujamaa approach was seriously initiated. An existing tobacco settlement may simply be renamed, registered as an Ujamaa Village, and reshaped by the government and party with a view to gradually introducing a greater degree of collectivity. It is much too early to say what the results of this kind of activity will be. In the case of tobacco schemes, however, it seems evident from past experience (see above, p.25) that a critical ingredient will be the extent to which institutions providing for markets and credit are redirected to support *Ujamaa* development.

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*Guerilla warfare in Mozambique has led to the need for collective defence against possible Portugese military forays across the border in retaliation for suspected Tanzanian support for the guerillas.

Starting an Ujamaa Village is said to involve the following steps:

1) A suitable target population is selected by political or government leader. They may be selected because they are already settled in some sort of nucleated, supervised scheme or because they express an interest in the Ujamaa concept, or because the peasant cultivators feel that they will gain materially from the process.

2) Meetings are generally called by the party in which party and government officials will explain, as well as they are able, the Ujamaa Village concept and what it offers the villagers.

3) In some cases in 1970, the organization of new villages were preceded by an interministerial planning operation in which a physical layout was drawn up and a farm plan established in consultations between government officials and the prospective village members.

4) Moving onto the site and building homes is a lengthier process, usually including a long period when the Ujamaa Village member keeps his traditional farm productive. Probably for some considerable period, his wife or wives may remain on the traditional farm, and he may only spend a few days a week living and working in the Ujamaa Village.

In late 1970, the majority of the reported Ujamaa Villages were still in one or another of the stages listed above. Few had become completely collective, and not many peasants had committed themselves completely to the Ujamaa Village to which they belonged. A rough guesstimate was that only about 100 out of the several hundred villages started had really progressed to the stage of developing collective cultivation of all crops with a strong village government and a real commitment to Ujamaa. Whether the essential ingredients required to bring about the most advanced stages of development for the remainder could in fact be provided by the government and the party remained to be seen. Far more research is needed to determine precisely how the existing more successful projects have been carried out.

A list of reported Ujamaa Village projects in one or another of the va stages outlined above suggests the very pragmatic approach being adopted by the party and the government in implementing the frontal efforts to build them:

Large-scale settlements: In Rufiji Delta, a whole tribe--reportedly about 100,000 people--was moved in 1968 out of a flood-prone valley onto higher ground nearby and resettled into about 20 large Ujamaa Villages. There have been considerable expenditures of money and manpower on these villages, although on a per capita basis, the expenditure is relatively small. The largest amounts of funds have gone to provide water supplies.

High-value crop villages: In return for permission, and the inputs needed to grow certain high-value crops like tea and tobacco, a number of peasants have embarked on building Ujamaa Villages. Government provides the seeds or nursery stock, the extension advice, and the marketing facilities. In return, the peasants promise to make visible progress in the direction of greater collectivity.

Former settlement schemes: About 30 of the remaining settlement schemes started under the aegis of the Village Settlement Agency have all become Ujamaa Villages as have former Youth League Settlements. Some have achieved a high degree of collectivity as had the Ruvuma schemes mentioned above.

Defence Communities: There are several hundred "Defence and Ujamaa Villages" along the Mozambique border. These are moving slowly in the direction of greater collectivity and greater productivity in an otherwise poor region.

Dodoma Ujamaa Village: In the famine of 1970, President Nyerere led a campaign to encourage some 750,000 people on the high, dry, famine-prone plateau of Dodoma into Ujamaa Villages. At this stage, the planning is well advanced, and some people are beginning to move onto new Ujamaa Village sites. In 1971, it is hoped to start a similar process in Kigoma Region.

Ujamaa Farms: In areas where peasants' commitment to single family farms and some cash crops appears strong, an approach has been adopted of encouraging peasants to spend a few days each week with his neighbors on a collective farm. Meanwhile, they may maintain their traditioanl shamba for food and cash crops. This is said to be a common approach, but no data is available as to the extent of involvement of individual peasants.

Nomad Resettlement: Various attempts are being made to settle some of the nomadic tribes, especially but not exclusively the nomadic cattle herders. Little information is available on the success of these efforts.

Along with the emphasis on Ujamaa Villages, the government and party have been directing attention to the re-shaping of essential supporting institutions. These include institutions providing marketing, finance, and extension assistance.

Marketing in Tanzania has since independence been carried on by a complex complementary system of marketing cooperatives and marketing boards, supplemented by private traders operating at the margins. Marketing cooperatives are supposed to be compulsory for all major cash crops, including those domestically consumed. As in other countries, the marketing cooperatives have encountered serious difficulties with personnel and membership commitment and participation. These have, if anything, been aggravated in the case of foodcrops. The Government, on investigation of these problems, has been making major efforts to overcome them. It appears evident that they must be overcome if marketing cooperatives are to play the essential supporting role of providing market outlets for Ujamaa Villages.

As for funds, the financing of Ujamaa Village development has not involved large sums. To date, the record expenditure on one village has totalled only £7,900, far less than the £150,000 planned for the earlier village settlement schemes supported by the World Bank advisors. Inputs for Ujamaa Village development generally include such items as seed, fertilizers, insecticides and hand tools. Occasionally a tractor, small warehouse or go-down water supply, school, dispensary, or access road may require more funds, but the labor is usually provided by the village participants. The actual finance for most of this comes from the Regional Development Fund, a fund created in 1967 to provide untied funds to be spent on development projects by regional officials as a small element of decentralization in the development process. Most RDF funds in the current year (1970-71) are directed to Ujamaa Village development. Each district has been allocated Shs.1 million, with an extra Shs. 6.7 million available for distribution to those regions showing a special need for an additional allocation. In the case of village water supplies, schools, and health centers, funds usually come from the central government's allocation to the relevant executing ministry. In addition, the National Commercial Bank* has been directed to give special consideration to requests for credit for Ujamaa Village projects.

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*After nationalization of the then-existing foreign-owned commercial banks after the Arusha Declaration, all commercial banking has been carried out either directly through the National Commercial Bank which took over the former banks' assets and business, or in cooperation with the previously existing National Cooperative Bank.

The Government and the party have initiated efforts to restructure the existing extension program and develop other institutions to contribute effectively to mobilizing peasant cultivators into Ujamaa Villages. Careful analysis of prevailing extension work as a possible vehicle for building ujamaa villages and increasing agricultural productivity revealed two primary weaknesses.[60] * First, the number of extension workers was too few to enable them to provide attention to individual farmers. In 1968, in one district, Kisarawe, there were approximately thirteen agricultural extension workers (only four of them with certificates) stationed at the ward level. This meant that a peasant might be up to twenty miles away from the nearest agricultural extension worker in areas where there were no all-weather roads. The Rural Development Assistant might be as much as thirty miles away.

The Ministry of Agriculture had proposed ambitious and expensive plans for training extension workers to provide one certificate-trained Assistant Field Officer--Grade II--for every 500 farmers by 1980. But it has been argued that this long range plan "does not really satisfy the sense of urgency which exists today, particularly in relation to 'ujamaa vijijini'" and instead a crash training program for local Standard VIII school leavers at Farmer Training Centers has been proposed.[63]

The second feature of the existing extension program which had tended to warp the distribution effect of cash crop production was the emphasis on

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*Although inadequate analyses have been made of extension work associated with the improvement approach, as compared to larger scale, usually more capital intensive 'transformation' approaches, available evidence suggests that the former is more successful in terms of considerably higher outputs per shilling invested.[61] There appears to be considerable agreement, however, that success of specific extension schemes has to date depended in large part of the prices and hence profitability of the crops produced.[62]

assisting so-called 'progressive' farmers, initially formulated by the British and later advocated by the World Bank Missions to East Africa. Frequently, the so-called 'progressive' farmer was in reality the one with more capital and/or land, perhaps with more political pull, who could use additional government assistance to acquire more land and hire more labor. His own advanced position, especially as land shortages developed, was likely to be attained at the expense of his less fortunate neighbors. In light of experience, the Second Five Year Plan[64] emphasized that the expanded extension workers' training program should place major emphasis on the new alternative ideology of ujamaa vijijini.

For an extension worker to contribute to building ujamaa villages, he (or she) would need to acquire an entirely new type of approach to working with the farmers to alter the traditional methods of farming, contributing to changes in the farmers' total way of life.[65] A great deal of self-sustaining enthusiasm would need to be generated to extend family communal activities to broader groups of families working together. This could not be done by the old extension methods of periodically exhorting farmers to "plant and spray," "use fertilizers," "cultivate in ridges"--according to typical seasonal messages of the past. Extension workers would need to get to the grass-roots level, to live in the villages for a period of time, listening to the grumbles of the people and genuinely discussing the ideas of ujamaa vijijini from the viewpoint of local customs, resources, fears and potentials for higher living standards. It has been argued that there could be no single national plan for such an approach; each community would have to work out its own program within the national perspective.

At the time of the Arusha Declaration, two institutions reached down into the village more directly than the existing extension worker program.[66] One consisted of Village Executive Officers whose main duties were to collect taxes and carry on subsidiary development functions on the Village Development Committee. They usually had little of the information or background necessary to help much with developing co-operative on-the-farm production techniques; nor is it likely that they had much of an ideological commitment to building <u>ujamaa vijijini</u>. At the time of the promulgation of the Second Five Year Plan, the total rural tax collection burden was shifted to the Central Government.[67] Simulataneously the separate Village Development Committees were consolidated into the District level committees, thus probably reducing their contact with the individual villagers' activities.*

Even before the consolidation of the Village Development Committees, however, TANU was the "only national organization that can be said to reach down, however tentatively, from the center to the Branches.Wards to the Cell Units organized in the villages."[69] TANU, with its effectively organized ten-cell leaders in every village, had the greatest potential for creating a grass-roots extension service. The biggest drawback here, of course, was the fact that few ten-cell leaders had the technical expertise for stimulating the introduction of modern productive techniques. The evidence suggests that their major role was to take over dispute settlement functions previously carried out by traditional leaders. (In not a few of the areas, especially those relatively unaffected by cash crop growth or other factors stimulating development, they appear to have been the traditional leaders themselves). It does not appear clear, either, that they had a great deal

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*Harris argues that this was unfortunate in that it tended to reduce the channels of communication between the centers and the villages, despite the widely proclaimed emphasis on decentralization.[68]

of ideological clarity about the perspectives of ujamaa; insofar as the concept was considered, the emphasis appears to have been on its potential service features, rather than its productive aspects.[70]*

In sum, the Ujamaa Village program launched in a 'frontal' way in the context of the Second Five Year Plan is very new. Experience with past efforts to mobilize Tanzanian small farmers to produce more suggests that careful attention needs to be given to associated institutions to ensure that they provide the necessary and desirable direction for Ujamaa development. At the same time, contributing to the ingredients successful Ujamaa Villages need to be researched continually to ensure that useful socio-economic inputs are supplied to the hundreds of new projects being developed.

IV. A comparative Summary

Both Kenya and Tanzania, upon attaining independence, sought to develop agriculture as the foundation for further development. Both succeeded in involving African peasants in increasing cash crop production especially for export, and both confronted problems of falling world prices for their major export crops. As the first plan periods drew to a close, their policies began to diverge in respect to institutional changes designed to augment productivity and distribute the resulting increased income.

To attain the proposed targets, the first plans of both countries emphasized involving African peasant farmers in expanded cash crop output essentially to

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*This may have been a carry-over from the earlier transformation approach which used as primary argument the notion that 'villagization' was essential for attainment of social services, while production was expected to be carried on primarily by individuals with increased government inputs.

supplement, rather than replace, the estate sectors. In Kenya, about a fifth of the highlands was turned over to relatively small farmers, another fifth to quite large private African farm owners; and land consolidation and registration was rapidly extended with the consequence that it appeared to strengthen the position of the rather more well-to-do 'progressive' African peasants in the former 'reserve areas.' While overall output of African farmers did increase, this policy appears to have contributed simultaneously to the growth of the numbers of landless peasants who had little alternative but to work for the larger farmers for relatively low wages, or to drift into the city slums in a frustrating attempt to escape rural poverty.

The Tanzanian Government and TANU, noting that similar trends accompanied the successful expansion of cash crop production in their country, concluded that a major shift of institutional policy was essential to prevent the growth of a society of well-to-do 'haves' defending the status quo against growing numbers of landless 'have nots.' The Arusha Declaration introduced a new approach to agriculture in the framework of greater national control of the critical institutions dominating the export enclave: On the one hand, the Government planned a growing state sector of large modern farms, while on the other it sought, under the guidance of TANU leadership, to stimulate the organization of ujamaa villages on a broad front throughout the country.

There seems to be considerable need for further analysis of the problems confronting the East African Governments and the consequences of the alternative sets of policies and institutions they have adopted. Attention needs to be directed, not only to the technical problems of increasing productivity by introducing scientific methods of agriculture and taking advantage of econmies of scale over time; but also to how to attain these goals in the context of institutional control directed to restructuring the entire economy. Policies and institutions which entrench a limited number of large private farmers in power, producing primarily for export markets--whether they are European or African--while the majority of African peasants barely subsist or seek to earn a little cash as hired laborers, appear unlikely to contribute much to an integrated national economy. The resulting growth of the economic and political gap between 'haves' and 'have nots' would appear more likely to contribute to increasing economic distortions and political instability. Whether Tanzania's policies of ujamaa will provide a successful alternative, however, appears to depend at least in part on whether the Government and TANU can build the necessary political and economic institutional framework to involve the peasants carrying them out on the grass roots level within the context of a national strategy to attain a more balanced self-reliant economy.

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