

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT WASHINGTON, D. C. 20523 <b>BIBLIOGRAPHIC INPUT SHEET</b>	<b>FOR AID USE ONLY</b>
---	-------------------------

1. SUBJECT CLASSIFICATION	A. PRIMARY	Social Science
	B. SECONDARY	Development Planning

2. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
 Agricultural Growth and Local Government in Punjab, Pakistan

3. AUTHOR(S)  
 Burki, S. Javed

4. DOCUMENT DATE November 1974	5. NUMBER OF PAGES 74p.	6. ARC NUMBER ARC PK-301-35-B-959
-----------------------------------	----------------------------	--------------------------------------

7. REFERENCE ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS  
 Cornell University  
 Center for International Studies  
 Ithaca, New York 14853

8. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES (Sponsoring Organization, Publishers, Availability)


9. ABSTRACT

In this paper the author has attempted to trace the relationship between political and economic factors, using the rates of agricultural growth in the districts of Pakistan as a dependent economic variable. For the purpose of this analysis, the role of independent variable was assigned to constituency building activity of the regime. He started out by differentiating between three regions. The first region was made up of eleven districts in the province of Sind. In these districts high rates of agricultural growth were produced almost entirely by expansion of land under cultivation. In the second region, with seven Punjab districts, the high rate of growth was produced almost entirely by increase in land yields. In the third region, made up of the remaining 12 districts of the Punjab, there was an insignificant increase in agricultural output.

10. CONTROL NUMBER PN-AAB- 200	11. PRICE OF DOCUMENT
12. DESCRIPTORS Political, Economic Factors, Agricultural Growth, Land Yields, Economic Variable, Agricultural Output	13. PROJECT NUMBER 298-11-995-037
	14. CONTRACT NUMBER AID/ASIA-C-1102
	15. TYPE OF DOCUMENT Research Study

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

RURAL DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE



*Special Series on Rural Local Government*

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND LOCAL  
GOVERNMENT IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN

S. Javed Burki

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT  
IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN

S. Javed Burki  
International Bank for  
Reconstruction and Development  
Washington DC

Rural Development Committee  
Center for International Studies  
Cornell University  
Ithaca, New York 14853

Published by the Rural Development Committee, Center for International Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. November 1974.

\ Copies may be obtained by writing to the Rural Development Committee. A charge will be made for the cost of reproduction.

## FOREWORD

This monograph was written as part of a comparative study of Rural Local Government organized by the Rural Development Committee of Cornell University. The study aimed at clarifying the role of rural local institutions in the rural development process, with special reference to agricultural productivity, income, local participation and rural welfare. An interdisciplinary working group set up under the Rural Development Committee established a comparative framework for research and analysis of these relationships.<sup>1</sup> A series of monographs, based in most cases on original field research, has been written by members of the working group and by scholars at other institutions and has been published by the Rural Development Committee. An analysis and summary of the study's findings has been written for the working group by Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman and has been published separately.

This study of Rural Local Government is part of the overall program of teaching and research by members of the Rural Development Committee, which functions under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at Cornell and is chaired by Norman Uphoff. The main focuses of Committee concern are alternative strategies and institutions for promoting rural development, especially with respect to the situation of small farmers, rural laborers and their families. This particular study was financed in large part by a grant from the Asia Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The views expressed by participating scholars in this study are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of USAID or Cornell University.

### Special Series on Rural Local Government

1. THE ELUSIVENESS OF EQUITY: INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH, by Harry W. Blair, Department of Political Science, Bucknell University, and Visiting Fellow, Rural Development Committee, Cornell, 1972-73.
2. PEOPLE'S COMMUNISM AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, by Benedict Stavis, China-Japan Program and Rural Development Committee, Cornell.
3. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND EGYPTIAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT, by James B. Mayfield, Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
4. PANCHAYATI RAJ AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANDHRA PRADESH, INDIA, by G. Ram Reddy, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad, India.
5. THE DYNAMICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB, INDIA, by S.S. Johl, Department of Economics and Sociology, Punjab

---

<sup>1</sup>The members of the working group were Ron Aqua, Douglas Ashford, John Blackton, Harry Blair, Milton Esman, Mohinder Mudahar, Norman Nicholson, David Robinson, Benedict Stavis, and Norman Uphoff.

Agricultural University, Ludhiana, India, and Mohinder S. Mudahar,  
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell.

6. RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING IN RAJASTHAN, INDIA, by Susan G. Hadden, Department of Political Science, Oakland University.
7. RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAVA, INDONESIA, by Gary E. Hansen, East-West Technology and Development Institute, University of Hawaii.
8. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN, by Ronald Aqua, Department of Government, Cornell.
9. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA, by Stephen Chee, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya.
10. BASIC DEMOCRACIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN, by Norman K. Nicholson, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, and Visiting Professor, Department of Government, Cornell, 1972-73; and Dilawar Ali Khan, Department of Cooperation and Credit, Pakistan Agricultural University, Lyallpur.
11. AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN, by S. Javed Burki, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
12. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, by Santiago S. Simpas, Ledivina Carino, and Arturo G. Pacho, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.
13. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA, by Ronald Aqua, Department of Government, Cornell.
14. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA, by John S. Blackton, Department of Government, Cornell.
15. RURAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN, by Benedict Stavis, China-Japan Program and Rural Development Committee, Cornell.
16. LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND, by Marcus Ingle, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
17. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY, by Douglas E. Ashford, Department of Government, Cornell.
18. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA, by Zdravko Mlinar, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.
19. LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS OF ASIAN EXPERIENCE, by Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Isman, Department of Government and Center for International Studies, Cornell.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. THE ROLE OF THE PUNJAB IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT.....	11
III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS DURING THE AYUB ERA.....	30
A. Land Reform of 1959.....	30
B. The System of Basic Democracies.....	33
C. Centralization of Economic Planning.....	41
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE FARMER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR.....	45
V. CONCLUSION.....	60

TABLE OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
1	Average Level and Rates of Growth in Crop Output by Region and Time Period.....	6
2	Growth in Rural Population.....	12
3	Provincial Shares in Agricultural Output.....	14
4	Provincial Shares in Cultivated Area.....	15
5	Provincial Shares in Tubewells in Operation.....	18
6	Size Distribution of Farms in Two Punjab Regions, 1960.....	23
7	Proportion of Farm Area Operated by Owner in the Two Punjab Regions.....	27
8	Changes in the Size Distribution of Holdings in 15 Villages of Punjab.....	34
9	Distribution of Urban and Rural Population in the Two Punjab Regions.....	48
10	Socio-Economic Background of the Basic Democrats Elected in West Pakistan in 1959 and 1964.....	49
11	Size Distribution of Land Holdings of Farmers Elected to Basic Democracies in 1959 and 1964.....	51
12	Representation of Various Groups in the Constituent Assembly (1955) and National and Provincial Assemblies in 1962.....	53

## I. INTRODUCTION

When in the 'forties the demand for the creation of an independent Muslim State in the Indian subcontinent picked up great momentum, the leadership of the Indian National Congress countered by proclaiming Pakistan an economically absurd idea.<sup>1</sup> The Congress argument was based not so much on the fact that the Muslim League demanded a country to be created in two parts, separated by a thousand miles and bound only by the somewhat tenuous links of Islam, but on the fact that the areas that were to be taken out of British India to form the new State of Pakistan were desperately poor. The provinces of the Punjab, Sind, Frontier and Baluchistan in the northwest and Bengal and Assam in the northeast had no known mineral resources. They had no industrial base whatsoever and largely because of the Muslim suspicion of western education, had also the least literate population of British India. The Muslim

---

<sup>1</sup>The economic arguments against the creation of an independent Muslim state are best summarized in C. N. Vakil, Economic Consequences of Divided India (Bombay: Bora and Company, 1965).

Also, see V. P. Menon, The Transfer of Power in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957) passim and Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) pp. 332-355.

rejoinder to this argument was not normally on pure economic terms. They pointed to the backwardness of the Muslim majority provinces as sufficient reason for separating from "Hindu India" rather than for perpetuating the union.<sup>1</sup> However, when confronted with their solution to the economic problems that an independent Pakistan would face, the Muslim leadership invariably pointed to the "enormous agricultural potential of the Punjab and Bengal."<sup>2</sup> If the Muslim League had an economic plan, it must have been based on the ability of the Punjab to adequately feed the entire population and that of Bengal to earn, through jute exports, the capital needed for economic growth.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>The same argument was to be used later by the Bengali national leadership against Pakistan. See the "Report of the Panel of Economists" in Government of Pakistan, Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-1975, Volume I. (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970).

<sup>2</sup>The only systematic attempt to evaluate the economic potential of the future state of Pakistan was made by Professor Ashfaq Ali Khan who, writing under the pseudonym of Al Hamza assembled some information and data to show the "enormous agricultural potential of the Punjab and Bengal." See his contribution to Dawn in 1946.

<sup>3</sup>Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, pp. 332-355.

While there was considerable basis for the pessimism shown by Congress leadership in the economic future of Pakistan, there was some justification for the guarded optimism of the Muslim League. After all, the western district of the Punjab had been surplus in food ever since the British, with the help of an extensive system of perennial canals, opened up and "colonized" the rich alluvial doabs of Cis, Chaj and Rachna.<sup>1</sup> Also, the eastern districts of Bengal produced the bulk of India's jute. Properly husbanded, the agricultural sector could sustain the development effort of the new State of Pakistan.

However, agriculture made little contribution to the growth of Pakistan's economy in the first post-independence decade. The agricultural output increased at a disappointing rate of 1.4 percent per annum or nearly one-half of a percentage point less than the average for 1900-1947. For the first time in the history of the Punjab and Sind, per capita availability of food grains actually declined. It decreased from 0.17 ton in 1949-50 to 0.15 ton in 1959-60.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, in the early fifties, Pakistan became a net importer of food grains.

---

<sup>1</sup>For a description of the introduction of irrigation in the provinces of Punjab and Sind, see Aloys A. Michel, The Indus River: A Study of the Effects of Partition. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967).

<sup>2</sup>Government of Pakistan, The Fourth Five Year Plan, 1970-1975 (Islamabad: Planning Commission, 1970) Tables 3 and 6, pp. 3-5.

Despite the failure of the agriculture sector to live up to expectations, an unprecedented increase in population during the fifties,<sup>1</sup> and enormous confusion caused by the partition of 1947, Pakistan survived as an economic entity independent of India. What produced the Pakistan miracle was the very rapid growth of the manufacturing sector. While agriculture was stagnating, the large-scale manufacturing sector in the fifties increased at the annual rate of 13.2 percent. Consequently, by 1969-70, some two decades after independence, the share of the agriculture sector in gross national produce dropped to 45 percent from 60 percent in 1949-50 while that of manufacturing increased from 6 to 12 percent.<sup>2</sup>

After very poor performance during most of the fifties, the agricultural sector picked up considerable momentum during the early sixties. This was Pakistan's second "economic miracle" and it occurred mostly in the western wing. In west Pakistan, the output of all major crops increased from 2.3 percent per annum in the period 1949-50 to 1959-60 to 5.4 percent in 1959-60 to 1968-69. In the same periods, the output in East Pakistan went up from 0.5 to 2.7 percent. (See Table 1).

---

<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of Pakistan's demographic history, see Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Demographic Report (Washington, D.C.: Population Reference Bureau, 1973).

<sup>2</sup>Government of Pakistan, The Fourth Five Year Plan, Table 2, p. 2.

The performance of Pakistan's agricultural sector during the sixties has received considerable academic attention. Several efforts have been made in the last few years to identify the factors responsible for the "agricultural revolution" in West Pakistan. The first and perhaps the most influential was that of Ghulam Mohammed, who in a series of articles attributed the good performance of agriculture to the development of ground water resources by the private sector.<sup>1</sup> This analysis is important because it set the pattern that was followed by several other scholars. Implicit in Ghulam Mohammed's work are the following assumptions. First, water being the major constraint, the growth of the agricultural sector can be attributed almost entirely to the availability of additional water. In support of this hypothesis, one can point to the performance of the agricultural sector after the British extended the irrigation network in the Punjab and Sind. Second, since the bulk of ground water exploitation took place in the Punjab, that province made the most significant contribution to the growth of the agricultural sector. Third, this type of investment took place in the Punjab not only because there was a reservoir of sweet water to be tapped

---

<sup>1</sup>Ghulam Mohammed, "Private Tubewell Development and Cropping Patterns in West Pakistan," Pakistan Development Review, V, Spring 1965, pp. 1-53.

AVERAGE LEVEL AND RATES OF GROWTH IN CROP

OUTPUT BY REGION AND TIME PERIOD

	<u>1949-50 to 1959-60</u>		<u>1959-60 to 1968-69</u>	
	<u>Rate of Growth<sup>a</sup> (Percent)</u>	<u>Average Production (thousand tons)</u>	<u>Rate of Growth<sup>a</sup> (Percent)</u>	<u>Average Production (thousand tons)</u>
<b>West Pakistan</b>				
Rice	1.9	853.6	6.5	1,279.8
Wheat	1.1	3,449.2	5.2	4,521.9
Barley	2.1	126.4	-4.0	108.6
Coarse Grains <sup>b</sup>	0.5	993.0	3.4	1,164.1
Gram	1.8	583.9	-2.6	578.8
Oilseeds <sup>c</sup>	5.0	207.6	N.T. <sup>e</sup>	227.1
Sugarcane	6.6	8,564.2	7.7	17,207.0
Cotton	2.3	273.0	6.5	391.1
Tobacco	9.0	44.8	10.1	91.1
All Major Crops <sup>d</sup>	2.3	----	5.4	----
<b>East Pakistan</b>				
Rice	0.3	7,437.8	2.4	9,890.9
Wheat	1.6	23.7	5.7	45.6
Coarse Grains <sup>b</sup>	6.6	2.4	N.T. <sup>e</sup>	4.3
Gram	-5.5	45.6	5.9	39.0
Oilseeds <sup>c</sup>	0.6	121.2	2.8	127.2
Sugarcane	1.6	3,652.8	9.4	5,883.3
Jute	2.2	997.2	1.8	1,070.9
Tobacco	-3.4	42.2	4.3	30.9
Tea	3.0	22.0	3.8	26.3
All Major Crops <sup>d</sup>	0.5	----	2.7	----

a The least-squares estimate of "b" in the equation:  $\text{Log } Y = a + b(\text{Time})$ .

b Includes maize, jowar and bajra.

c Includes rape, mustard and sesamum.

d Calculated in 1959/60 prices.

e N.T. means No Trend.

SOURCE: J. J. Stern and W. P. Falcon, Growth and Development in Pakistan, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University Press, April 1970), p. 37.

but also because it was here that the constraint of water was felt most acutely. As we shall see below, not all of these assumptions are strictly correct.

Falcon and Gotsch extended Ghulam Mohammed's analysis to include other inputs. According to them, 55.1 percent of the growth in output could be attributed to increase in water supplies while 28.6 and 4.3 percent respectively could be assigned to increase in the supply of chemicals and better seeds.<sup>1</sup> The data for this study were obtained before the advent of the Green Revolution, which is why improved seeds accounted for so little of the increase in output. This was rectified by a post-Green Revolution study in which Leslie Nulty placed considerable emphasis on the introduction of high-yielding seed variety (HYV) technology as a determinant of growth.<sup>2</sup>

This brief account of the way rapid agricultural growth was viewed in Pakistan is meant to underscore the little attention that non-economic determinants received. This was unusual since somewhat more macro studies of Pakistan's economic development had emphasized the role

---

<sup>1</sup>Walter Falcon and Carl Gotsch, "Lessons in Agricultural Development--Pakistan" in Gustav F. Papanek, (ed.) *Development Policy: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968) pp. 269-315.

<sup>2</sup>Leslie Nulty, *The Green Revolution in Pakistan: Implication of Technological Change* (New York: Praeger, 1972), passim.

of entrepreneurship. In Gustav Papanek's work "robber barons" and "gentlemen at work" were treated as prime movers of change<sup>1</sup> and in Hanna Papanek's study of entrepreneurial behavior in Pakistan, we were provided with a sociological explanation for the emergence of a few powerful industrial families.<sup>2</sup> Why is it then that a similar look was not taken at the development of the agricultural sector? Why is it that questions such as, "Why a certain class of landlords invested at a certain time?" never got asked?

We are not suggesting here that studies dealing with Pakistan's agricultural development are totally barren of analyses of entrepreneurial behavior. Rural sociologists have long specialized in studies of "adoption behavior" in the agricultural sector and we can point to a number of interesting works relating to Pakistan. However, these studies used the village as the focus of attention. They were therefore as micro in emphasis as the economists' determinants of growth

---

<sup>1</sup>Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 27-55.

<sup>2</sup>Hanna Papanek, "Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship and Partial Modernization," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 21:1, October 1972, pp. 1-32.

were macro. The gap between these two approaches can be bridged by a study of the politics of economic change. In this paper, we attempt to take one very modest step in that direction.<sup>1</sup>

In bridging this gap, we will be interested not so much in how things happened but in why they happened. In applying this approach to an analysis of rural development in the Pakistan province of the Punjab, we will not be concerned with evaluating the precise impact on output of a marginal increase in the supply of irrigation water or of the introduction of HYV technology. Instead, we will focus our attention on why certain farmers choose to increase the supply of inputs at a given time.

This introduction is followed by a section that lays out the place of the Punjab in Pakistan in terms of a number of demographic, economic and social variables. The data and information to be used in this section will also demonstrate the important role played by the province of Sind in Pakistan's economic growth. A comparison of the experiences of the two provinces in rural development would serve to underscore the main theme of this paper: that the political environment plays an important role in determining the direction of economic change.

---

<sup>1</sup>I will discuss below the principal findings of another recent work on the politics of the Green Revolution. See Francine R. Frankel and Karl von Vorzy, The Political Challenge of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan (Princeton: Princeton University, 1972).

In the third section we will describe and then evaluate the impact of some of the important reforms instituted in the early sixties by the regime of Ayub Khan. Three measures--the Land Reform of 1959, the system of Basic Democracies and the adoption of centralized planning--would be singled out for this purpose. In the fourth section, we will turn our attention to the principal concern of this analysis. In this section we will argue that the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies and some of the associated reforms prepared the Punjab for rapid agricultural growth during most of the sixties. The fifth section will conclude our argument by relating the various social, political and economic changes in rural Punjab into one conceptual framework.

## II. THE ROLE OF THE PUNJAB IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The Punjab is by far the most populous of Pakistan's four provinces, although over the years its share in population has declined. In 1951, at the time of Pakistan's first post-independence census, the Punjab had 61.2 percent of the population. By the time of the second census in 1961, it accounted for only 59.7 percent. This trend continued into the sixties when the province, because of the very large investment in the agricultural sector, contributed significantly to Pakistan's economic growth. The Census of 1972 shows Punjab's share at 58.2 percent.<sup>1</sup>

As the data of Table 2 show, the decline in the Punjab's relative share of Pakistan's population is not due entirely to the more rapid urbanization of the province of Sind. While the share in rural population decreased from 67.7 percent in 1951 to 64.2 percent in 1972, the Punjab's share in total urban population declined from 59.8 to 56.5 percent in these same years. The reduced total share of population can be partly explained in terms of lower fertility rates in the Punjab, accompanying the accelerated economic growth there, but

---

<sup>1</sup>Population data are from Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan: A Demographic Report, op.cit.

Table 2

GROWTH IN RURAL POPULATION

<u>Province</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Growth 1951-61 (%)</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Growth 1961-72 (%)</u>
Northwest Frontier	2837	11.3	3398	11.4	19.8	3534	12.6	62.8
Punjab	17053	67.7	20106	67.4	17.9	28277	64.2	40.6
Sind	4364	17.3	5297	17.8	21.4	8252	18.7	55.8
Baluchistan	951	3.8	1028	3.4	8.1	1999	4.5	94.5
TOTAL	25205	100.1	29829	100.0	18.3	44062	100.0	47.7

NOTE: The table does not include the data for the Centrally Administered Tribal Areas.

SOURCES: Computed from Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961, Volume 3. (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1965) Table 2 and Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, 1972 (Islamabad: Census Organization, 1974), Table 2.

there is also indication of rural-urban migration. The Green Revolution notwithstanding, Punjab lost some of its rural population to Sind and Baluchistan, where additional land became available at the same time many parts of the Punjab attained very high man/land ratios during this period.

This rural-to-rural movement of population points to the increased importance of Sind in Pakistan's agricultural sector. As we see from the data of Table 3, the Green Revolution in the Punjab notwithstanding, Sind's share in total agricultural output increased by nearly two percentage points, from 26.0 percent in 1959-60 to 27.8 percent a decade later. This happened because of a very rapid expansion of irrigation. By 1969-70, 49.2 percent of Sind's total area was under cultivation compared with only 25.4 percent ten years earlier. As we see from the data of Table 4, the share of Sind in total cultivated area increased from 21.0 percent in 1959-60 to 32.8 percent in 1969-70. (See Table 4).

We are now in a position to say something about the different patterns of agricultural development in the Punjab and Sind. We can estimate from Tables 1-4 that in the sixties in the Punjab, agricultural output increased by 60 percent while the cultivated area and

Table 3

PROVINCIAL SHARES IN AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT

(Rs million at 1959-60 constant factor cost)

<u>Province</u>	1949-1950		1959-1960		1969-1970	
	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Northwest Frontier	696	11.1	871	11.3	1294	10.3
Punjab	3727	59.5	4688	60.8	7507	59.7
Sind	1722	27.5	2005	26.0	3496	27.8
Baluchistan	119	1.9	147	1.9	277	2.2
TOTAL	6264	100.0	7711	100.0	12574	100.0

SOURCE: Author's computations using crop output and national income data from Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey, 1972-73, (Islamabad: Finance Division, 1973) and Government of Pakistan, Year Book of Agricultural Statistics, 1971-72, (Islamabad: Ministry of Agriculture, 1972).

Table 4

PROVINCIAL SHARES IN CULTIVATED AREA

(thousand acres)

	<u>1959-60</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1969-70</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Northwest Frontier	2872	7.7	3193	6.9
Punjab	23353	62.7	25858	55.9
Sind	7822	21.0	15155	32.8
Baluchistan	3197	8.6	2027	4.4
TOTAL	37244	100.0	46233	100.0

SOURCES: Computed from Government of Pakistan, 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, West Pakistan, Volume I, (Lahore: Agriculture Census Organization, 1962) Table 24 and Government of Pakistan, Second Census of Agriculture, Volume IV, Part 3 (Lahore: Agriculture Census Organization, 1972), Tables A4, B4, C4, and D4.

agricultural population<sup>1</sup> increased respectively by 11 and 41 percent. In Sind the corresponding rates of growth were 74 percent (output), 94 percent (cultivated land) and 56 percent (agricultural population). These sharply different trends show, interestingly enough, one similarity--a greater than unity elasticity of labor output.<sup>2</sup> This implies availability of complementary inputs to more than balance the additional supply of agricultural labor. In the Punjab this took the form mostly of non-land inputs while the bulk of the increase in output in Sind was due to a large increase in cultivated land. In other words, while agricultural output increased substantially in both Punjab and Sind, it was due to the increased availability of high quality non-land inputs in the Punjab. This development has been generally described as the Green Revolution.<sup>3</sup> At the

---

<sup>1</sup>Since we do not have data available for the supply of agricultural labor in 1969-70, we are using agricultural population as a surrogate statistic. This is not totally unrealistic as there are no sharp differences in participation rates in labor force between the two provinces.

<sup>2</sup>The elasticity figures for the Punjab and Sind are 1.46 and 1.32 respectively.

<sup>3</sup>For instance, Leslie Nulty, The Green Revolution in Pakistan, op.cit.

same time another type of agricultural revolution was taking place in Sind. This was produced by the rapid expansion of land under cultivation mostly by newcomers from the Punjab.<sup>1</sup>

The Green Revolution in the Punjab did not begin with the introduction of high yielding Mexican wheat in 1966. It began in the early sixties when a certain class of farmers started to invest in the development of ground water resources. By 1963, West Pakistan farmers had installed more than 16000 tubewells of which 94.2 percent were in the Punjab. Three years later the number of tubewells was nearly four fold greater, with the Punjab still accounting for well over ninety percent of the total. Therefore, much of the infrastructure for the adoption of the Green Revolution technology was created before the technology became available or was even known to exist. The decision to invest in ground water development was taken by the farmers on the basis of old technological coefficients. (See Table 5).

Ethnically, linguistically, geographically and economically the Punjab is perhaps the least homogeneous of Pakistan's four provinces. This lack of homogeneity is reflected in the development of the agricultural

---

<sup>1</sup>The subject of inter-provincial population transfers has received little attention in Pakistan. It is an important but politically sensitive subject. In the winter of 1971-72, there was a sharp and bloody conflict in Sind between the "local" and "settler" populations.

Table 5

PROVINCIAL SHARES IN TUBEWELLS IN OPERATION


	<u>1963</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>% of Total</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>% of Total</u>
Northwest Frontier	180	1.1	1680	2.6	2752	2.9
Punjab	15535	94.2	59010	92.9	86996	92.2
Sind	515	3.2	1785	2.8	3508	3.7
Baluchistan	250	1.5	1030	1.6	1106	1.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	16280	100.0	63505	99.9	94362	100.0

NOTE: The data are for private tubewells only.

SOURCES: Computed from Leslie Nulty, West Pakistan Engineering University, A Study of the Contribution of Private Tubewells in the Development of Water Potential in Pakistan (Lahore, 1971) and Government of Pakistan, Second Census of Agriculture, Volume IV, Part 3 (Lahore: Agriculture Census Organization, 1972).

PAKISTAN

CODE	DIVISION/DISTRICT	CODE	DIVISION/DISTRICT
10	BALUCHISTAN DIVISION	101	QUETTA DIVISION
11	BENAZIR NAGAR	102	CHAGAI
12	BANASALPUR	74	MUZAFFARGARH
13	RAHWAR	80	ELI ZAHRADIVISION
20	MIRAPUR	81	MUZAFFAR
21	BATANI	82	MIRAPUR AGENCY
22	DEHRAKOT	83	MIRAPUR
23	KASHMIR	84	MIRAPUR AGENCY
24	KASHMIR	85	MIRAPUR AGENCY
25	KASHMIR	86	MIRAPUR
26	KASHMIR	87	MIRAPUR AGENCY
27	KASHMIR	88	MIRAPUR
28	KASHMIR	89	MIRAPUR
29	KASHMIR	90	MIRAPUR
30	KASHMIR	91	MIRAPUR
31	KASHMIR	92	MIRAPUR
32	KASHMIR	93	MIRAPUR
33	KASHMIR	94	MIRAPUR
34	KASHMIR	95	MIRAPUR
35	KASHMIR	96	MIRAPUR
36	KASHMIR	97	MIRAPUR
37	KASHMIR	98	MIRAPUR
38	KASHMIR	99	MIRAPUR
40	KASHMIR	100	MIRAPUR
41	KASHMIR	101	MIRAPUR
42	KASHMIR	102	MIRAPUR
43	KASHMIR	103	MIRAPUR
44	KASHMIR	104	MIRAPUR
45	KASHMIR	105	MIRAPUR
46	KASHMIR	106	MIRAPUR
47	KASHMIR	107	MIRAPUR
48	KASHMIR	108	MIRAPUR
49	KASHMIR	109	MIRAPUR
50	KASHMIR	110	MIRAPUR
51	KASHMIR	111	MIRAPUR
52	KASHMIR	112	MIRAPUR
53	KASHMIR	113	MIRAPUR
54	KASHMIR	114	MIRAPUR
55	KASHMIR	115	MIRAPUR
56	KASHMIR	116	MIRAPUR
57	KASHMIR	117	MIRAPUR
58	KASHMIR	118	MIRAPUR
59	KASHMIR	119	MIRAPUR
60	KASHMIR	120	MIRAPUR
61	KASHMIR	121	MIRAPUR
62	KASHMIR	122	MIRAPUR
63	KASHMIR	123	MIRAPUR
64	KASHMIR	124	MIRAPUR
65	KASHMIR	125	MIRAPUR
66	KASHMIR	126	MIRAPUR
67	KASHMIR	127	MIRAPUR
68	KASHMIR	128	MIRAPUR
69	KASHMIR	129	MIRAPUR
70	KASHMIR	130	MIRAPUR
71	KASHMIR	131	MIRAPUR
72	KASHMIR	132	MIRAPUR
73	KASHMIR	133	MIRAPUR
74	KASHMIR	134	MIRAPUR
75	KASHMIR	135	MIRAPUR
76	KASHMIR	136	MIRAPUR
77	KASHMIR	137	MIRAPUR
78	KASHMIR	138	MIRAPUR
79	KASHMIR	139	MIRAPUR
80	KASHMIR	140	MIRAPUR
81	KASHMIR	141	MIRAPUR
82	KASHMIR	142	MIRAPUR
83	KASHMIR	143	MIRAPUR
84	KASHMIR	144	MIRAPUR
85	KASHMIR	145	MIRAPUR
86	KASHMIR	146	MIRAPUR
87	KASHMIR	147	MIRAPUR
88	KASHMIR	148	MIRAPUR
89	KASHMIR	149	MIRAPUR
90	KASHMIR	150	MIRAPUR
91	KASHMIR	151	MIRAPUR
92	KASHMIR	152	MIRAPUR
93	KASHMIR	153	MIRAPUR
94	KASHMIR	154	MIRAPUR
95	KASHMIR	155	MIRAPUR
96	KASHMIR	156	MIRAPUR
97	KASHMIR	157	MIRAPUR
98	KASHMIR	158	MIRAPUR
99	KASHMIR	159	MIRAPUR
100	KASHMIR	160	MIRAPUR
101	KASHMIR	161	MIRAPUR
102	KASHMIR	162	MIRAPUR
103	KASHMIR	163	MIRAPUR
104	KASHMIR	164	MIRAPUR
105	KASHMIR	165	MIRAPUR
106	KASHMIR	166	MIRAPUR
107	KASHMIR	167	MIRAPUR
108	KASHMIR	168	MIRAPUR
109	KASHMIR	169	MIRAPUR
110	KASHMIR	170	MIRAPUR
111	KASHMIR	171	MIRAPUR
112	KASHMIR	172	MIRAPUR
113	KASHMIR	173	MIRAPUR
114	KASHMIR	174	MIRAPUR
115	KASHMIR	175	MIRAPUR
116	KASHMIR	176	MIRAPUR
117	KASHMIR	177	MIRAPUR
118	KASHMIR	178	MIRAPUR
119	KASHMIR	179	MIRAPUR
120	KASHMIR	180	MIRAPUR
121	KASHMIR	181	MIRAPUR
122	KASHMIR	182	MIRAPUR
123	KASHMIR	183	MIRAPUR
124	KASHMIR	184	MIRAPUR
125	KASHMIR	185	MIRAPUR
126	KASHMIR	186	MIRAPUR
127	KASHMIR	187	MIRAPUR
128	KASHMIR	188	MIRAPUR
129	KASHMIR	189	MIRAPUR
130	KASHMIR	190	MIRAPUR
131	KASHMIR	191	MIRAPUR
132	KASHMIR	192	MIRAPUR
133	KASHMIR	193	MIRAPUR
134	KASHMIR	194	MIRAPUR
135	KASHMIR	195	MIRAPUR
136	KASHMIR	196	MIRAPUR
137	KASHMIR	197	MIRAPUR
138	KASHMIR	198	MIRAPUR
139	KASHMIR	199	MIRAPUR
140	KASHMIR	200	MIRAPUR



sector. For instance, of the nineteen districts in the Punjab, seven have more than 80 percent of all operating tubewells. These seven (Multan, Sahiwal, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Lyallpur, Sheikhupura, and Lahore) understandably are the richest agricultural districts. The rate of growth of output in these districts are nearly twice that of the provincial average, 9.8 percent as against 5.2 percent.<sup>1</sup> This area (shaded portion on the map) is where the Green Revolution occurred and, as we shall see in a later section of this paper, this is also the area where the reforms instituted by the regime of Ayub Khan produced a massive social and political change.

Why is it that these seven districts in the Punjab adopted first the tubewell technology and then went on to apply the technology associated with the Green Revolution? There are economic, social and political answers to this question. Let us attempt to provide the economic answer first, leaving the political and social ones to the two following sections.

---

<sup>1</sup>Carl H. Gotsch has also identified the rapidly developing agricultural areas in what is now Pakistan. His list of seven rapidly growing districts is different from mine. It does not include the district of Sialkot but includes that of Jhang. The reason for this difference is that Gotsch did not have the post-Green Revolution data when he formulated his list. See Carl H. Gotsch, "Regional Agricultural Growth: The Case of West Pakistan," Asian Survey, VIII:3, March 1968, Table 6, p. 199.

It is now widely accepted that the pattern of land ownership determines to a considerable extent the pattern of entrepreneurship behavior in the agriculture sector.<sup>1</sup> Disaggregating the data for the Punjab according to "growing" and "stagnating" districts, we find some interesting differences in their pattern of land ownership.

As we see from Figure 1, distribution of farm land was somewhat less skewed in the seven Punjab districts that witnessed rapid growth in the output of the agricultural sector than the remaining 12 districts. The Gini coefficient of land distribution in the seven districts was .39 as against .45 in the other 12 districts of the Punjab.

As we can see from the data of Table 6, there is greater concentration of farms at the two ends of distribution in the 12 Punjab districts than in the seven Punjab districts. Thus the very small farms (areas less than 2.5 acres) have 5.1 percent of total land in the 12 districts but only 4.1 percent in the seven districts. The difference in the two distributions

---

<sup>1</sup>For a recent study of entrepreneurship in the agricultural sector of a developing country, see C. H. Hanumantha Rao, "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship and Sharecropping in India," Journal of Political Economy, 79:3, May/June 1971, pp. 578-595. See also Steven N. S. Cheung The Theory of Share Tenancy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) and W. A. Leginsky, A Study on Tenorial Conditions in Package Districts (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 1965).

Figure 1.

Size Distribution of Farms in two Punjab Regions




Table 6

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN TWO PUNJAB REGIONS, 1960

	Seven Punjab Districts		Twelve Punjab Districts		Punjab	
	No. (%)	Acres (%)	No. (%)	Acres (%)	No. (%)	Acres (%)
Less than 1 acre	11.8	0.7	18.6	1.1	16.0	0.9
1.0 - 2.5 acres	19.0	3.4	19.5	4.0	19.3	3.7
2.5 - 5.0 acres	17.0	7.2	16.0	7.2	16.4	7.2
5.0 - 7.5 acres	13.0	9.3	10.9	7.8	11.7	8.5
7.5 - 12.5 acres	17.5	19.8	13.6	14.7	15.1	17.1
12.5 - 25.0 acres	15.7	31.1	14.0	25.6	14.6	28.1
25.0 - 50.0 acres	5.0	18.8	5.7	19.4	5.4	19.1
50.0 - 75.0 acres	0.7	5.2	0.9	4.5	0.8	4.8
75.0 - 150 acres	0.2	2.4	0.2	7.6	0.5	5.3
More than 150 acres	0.1	2.4	0.2	7.6	0.1	5.2
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>99.9</b>	<b>99.9</b>

-23-

NOTES: Total Punjab Acres = 24.6 million acres.

Total Seven Punjab District Acres = 11.3 million acres (45.9%).

Total Twelve Punjab District Acres = 13.3 million acres (54.1%).

Total number of farms in Punjab = 3.325 million.

Total number of Seven Punjab District farms = 1.322 million (39.8%).

Total number of Twelve Punjab District farms = 2.003 million (60.2%).

SOURCE: Pakistan Agriculture Census Organization.

is much sharper at the other end. In the 12 Punjab districts the large farms (more than 75.0 acres) have 15.6 percent of the land compared with only 4.6 percent in the more advanced region. While the ratio of land cultivated by the very small and large farms is nearly 1:1 in the seven Punjab districts, it is 1:3 in the 12 Punjab districts. What is perhaps more significant, of the 4625 very large farms in the province (more than 150 acres), 3715 or 80.3 percent were in the relatively backward region.

The above description of the size distribution of agricultural farms in the two Punjab regions suggests a much larger weight of the middle-sized landholdings in the seven Punjab districts than in the 12 Punjab districts. That this is in fact the case can be seen from the data of Table 6. However, by identifying small farms as those cultivating less than 2.5 acres and large farms as those with more than 75.0 acres, we have left the middle ground to a very large number of farmers (63.2 percent for all of Punjab; 61.7 percent in the case of the 12 districts and 68.9 percent in the case of the seven Punjab districts). This is a very diverse group and it is useful for our purpose to identify within it the class of middle class entrepreneurs that helped reshape Punjab's agriculture sector.

In another study,<sup>1</sup> I have identified the progressive farmers in Pakistan as belonging to a class of middle landholders. The size of the middle holdings differed from area to area. In the Punjab this class of farmers can be said to own or cultivate between 25 and 75 acres. According to the 1960 census of Agriculture, the seven Punjab districts had over 75,000 farms belonging to this category cultivating 2,712 million acres of land. The average size of the farm was just over 36 acres. In the 12 Punjab districts, 132,000 middle farms cultivated 3,986 million acres. In this case the average size of the farm was 30 acres.<sup>2</sup> We know now from a number of village studies carried out in the last few years that it was farms of this size that the bulk of investments in developing ground

---

<sup>1</sup>Shahid Javed Burki, "The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation" in Robert Stevens, Hamza Alavi and Peter Bertocci (eds.) Rural Development in Bangladesh and Pakistan, (Honolulu, Hawaii: The University Press of Hawaii, 1974).

<sup>2</sup>The data are from unpublished material made available by the Pakistan Agricultural Census Organization. The published census reports do not have the 25 to 75 acre category in the data on farm size distribution.

water resources actually took place.<sup>1</sup> However, a comparison of investments in medium-sized farms in the two regions reveals a tremendous difference. Whereas this type of farm became very progressive in the seven Punjab districts, it remained almost as underdeveloped as farms of larger and smaller size in the less advanced region of the province.

The Agricultural Census of 1960 provides some interesting information about the pattern of landholdings in what we may call the pre-modern agricultural growth period. For instance, the Census found the proportion of land farmed by owners to be considerably less in the seven Punjab districts than in the rest of the Punjab. (See Table 7). Also, the proportion of land rented out to tenants (rather than sharecropped) was higher in the first category of districts than in the second. The fact that there was a higher ration of tenant-farmed land in the more progressive districts seems at first to challenge the long held and oft repeated view that owner-operation of land is one of the main prerequisites

---

<sup>1</sup>For data on changes in land rents for different farm sizes see, Shahid Javed Burki, "The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation," op.cit. Times series data provided in this study shows an 87.9 percent increase in rents for farms of size 25 to 50 acres in the period 1948-49 to 1968-69. For the very large farms (250-500 acres) rents increased by 37.5 percent while for the small farms (less than 10 acres) they went up by 24.4 percent.

Table 7

PROPORTION OF FARM AREA OPERATED BY OWNER IN THE TWO PUNJAB REGIONS

<u>Farm Size</u>	<u>Seven Punjab Districts (% of Total)</u>	<u>Twelve Punjab Districts (% of Total)</u>	<u>Punjab (% of Total)</u>
0 - 1 acre	50.0	72.4	64.9
1 - 2.5	46.5	68.0	58.9
2.5 - 5.0	50.0	68.6	60.1
5.0 - 7.5	48.4	68.0	60.3
7.5 - 12.5	43.4	69.7	55.7
12.5 - 25.0	40.7	72.0	56.0
25.0 - 50.0	42.1	91.8	60.7
50.0 - 75.0	50.8	91.1	78.6
75.0 - 150.0	60.7	95.4	89.4
more than 150.0	80.9	99.4	97.8
TOTAL	45.1	76.4	62.0

NOTE: Percentages are for land in the region in the farm size category operated by owner farmers.

SOURCE: Computed from 1960 Pakistan Census of Agriculture, West Pakistan, Volume III, Table 9, pp. 134-145.

played by the non-cultivating, medium-sized landholder. The emergence of this class of landholders was in many ways due to a series of institutional reforms undertaken by the regime of Ayub Khan.

### III. INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS DURING THE AYUB ERA

The discussion of institutional reforms that favored a particular class of landholders should begin with the Land Reform of 1959. It was the first of the three reforms to be considered here and the one that set the stage for rapid social and economic change in the rural areas of Pakistan.

#### A. Land Reform of 1959

One of the first acts of the military regime that assumed power in 1958 under the leadership of General Ayub Khan was to set up a Land Reform Commission charged with ushering in an egalitarian order in rural Pakistan.<sup>1</sup> The Commission's recommendations were generally regarded as less than radical. Two members of the Commission wrote a dissenting note arguing that the proposed ceiling would not make much land available for redistribution. In effect, a single landlord household could retain as much as 900 acres of irrigated land.<sup>2</sup> However, the majority view prevailed and the

---

<sup>1</sup> Editorial, The Pakistan Times, November 1, 1950.

<sup>2</sup> Herbert Feldman, Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) p. 58.

Commission's recommendations were incorporated into a Martial Law Regulation.<sup>1</sup>

According to one evaluation, carried out four years after the land reform regulation went into effect, some 2,547 million acres were surrounded by 902 landowning families.<sup>2</sup> In other words, the reform affected only 6.5 percent of the big landlords (with farms of more than 150 acres) and 6.8 percent of the total cultivated land. It has been suggested that the reforms were even less radical in implementation than in conception<sup>3</sup> and were, accordingly, "far less effective in their scope than insistent publicity had claimed."<sup>4</sup>

The area surrendered by the large landlords as a result of the reform of 1959 was indeed less than had been expected. For instance, one estimate made shortly after the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation

---

<sup>1</sup>Published in the Gazette of Pakistan (Extraordinary), March 3, 1959 as Martial Law Regulation No. 64.

<sup>2</sup>Government of Pakistan, Economic Survey 1962-63, (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Finance, 1963), p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op.cit., p. 167.

<sup>4</sup>Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962-1969 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 5.

64 put the number of affected landlords at 5000 and the area to be redistributed at more than 7.5 million acres.<sup>1</sup> While the immediate impact of the reform was marginal,<sup>2</sup> it produced some very significant long-term effects. The most important of these was that beginning with 1959, the large landlords voluntarily began to reduce the size of their holdings. This was so even in the case of those who were not immediately affected by the reform of 1959. This was done by the sale of land to landholders who did not possess very large holdings.

We see from the data of Table 8 that the average size of the farms belonging to our progressive category (25-75 acres) increased by 33.6 percent from 34.8 acres in 1959 to 46.5 acres ten years later. The total land cultivated by the progressive farmers increased by 32.8 percent. In the pre-reform period the farms of this size accounted for 24.3 percent of the total area. In the period after the reform and after the Green Revolution, the area under these farms increased to 30.1 percent. However, the proportion of this category of farms remained unchanged.

---

<sup>1</sup>Mushtaq Ahmed, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1959), p. 218.

<sup>2</sup>According to a more recent evaluation of the 2.5 million acres surrendered as much as 0.93 million acres consisted of "uncultivated lands, hills and riverbeds." See Nimal Sandertane, "Pakistan's Land Reform of 1972" in Land Tenure Center Newsletter (Wisconsin, October-November 1973), p. 17.

While the data of Table 8 do not provide any direct evidence for the conclusion underscored above that the land reform of 1959 motivated the large farmers to reduce the size of their holdings, what it shows quite vividly is the phenomenon of the middle farmer growing rapidly by acquiring land from both the large and the small landholders. The motivation behind the sale or transfer of land by large owners was indeed fear of another effort by the Government at reducing the ceiling on landholdings. Ayub Khan's reform of 1959 demonstrated quite clearly to the landed aristocracy the fact that the focus of political power had shifted away from them. It moved toward a coalition of social groups to which the landed aristocrats were accepted after Ayub Khan had consolidated his power base. One important step in this process of consolidation was the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies.

#### B. The System of Basic Democracies<sup>1</sup>

Exactly one year after his coup d'etat and seven months after promulgating the Land Reform Order, Ayub Khan

---

<sup>1</sup> I do not intend to provide here a detailed account of the system. My description will be limited to those aspects that are considered to be relevant for the analysis presented in this paper. For a detailed account, see L. F. Rushbrook Williams, The State of Pakistan (London: Faber) 1962 and Lawrence Ziring's chapter in G. S. Birkhead, Administrative Problems in Pakistan, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1962).

Table 8

CHANGES IN THE SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS IN 15 VILLAGES OF PUNJAB

	1959			1969		
	<u>No. of Farms</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Percent of Total Area</u>	<u>No. of Farms</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Percent of Total Area</u>
0 - 1 acre	341	194	0.8	359	197	0.8
1 - 2.5	496	799	3.3	469	742	2.9
2.5 - 5.0	497	1815	7.5	502	1759	6.8
5.0 - 7.5	328	2227	9.2	331	2234	8.6
7.5 - 12.5	479	4696	19.4	472	4689	18.1
12.5 - 25.0	483	7624	31.5	481	7748	29.9
25.0 - 50.0	147	4575	18.9	148	5941	22.9
50.0 - 75.0	22	1307	5.4	20	1871	7.2
75.0 - 150.0	8	702	2.9	9	717	2.8
More than 150.0	1	266	1.1	--	--	0.0
TOTAL	2802	24205	100.0	2791	25898	100.0

SOURCE: Shahid Javed Burki, Social Groups and Development: A Case Study of Pakistan, (forthcoming).

launched his system of Basic Democracies. The system sought to create representative local bodies at four different levels. At the bottom was the Union Council, made up of about ten Councillors, elected directly by the people on the basis of adult franchise. The directly elected "Basic Democrats" (BDs) chose from amongst themselves a Chairman. All Chairmen of Union Councils in a Tehsil<sup>1</sup>--a subdistrict unit comprising on the average about 25 Union Councils--would in turn constitute the representative section of the Tehsil Council. The other section, which would have about ten members, drew its membership from amongst the officials working at the Tehsil level. The Subdivisional Officer (administrative head of a Tehsil) also functioned as the Chairman of the Tehsil Council. Some of the elected members of the Tehsil Councils were chosen to represent them on the District Councils. The number of elected BDs represented on the District Councils was not to be less than one-third of the total membership. The Deputy Commissioner was the ex-officio Chairman of the District Council. At the next level, elected representation was

---

<sup>1</sup>For administrative purposes the then province of West Pakistan was divided into 11 divisions, each under the charge of a Commissioner. Each division was further divided into districts with the Deputy Commissioner as the administrative head. In 1959, West Pakistan had 45 districts. Each district had 4-5 tehsils under the charge of a Subdivisional Officer. In 1959 there were 202 tehsils in West Pakistan.

reduced to one-fourth of total membership. The Commissioner functioned as the Chairman of the Divisional Council, the highest ten in the system. In other words, some BDs functioned at all the four levels, as members of the Union, Tehsil, District and Divisional Councils, though in diminishing proportions--100 percent, 70 percent, 33 percent and 25 percent. This system of interlocking membership was designed to let "the voice of the village be heard at all levels of bureaucratic decision-making."<sup>1</sup>

A careful reading of the speeches and writings of Ayub Khan reveals four functions that he expected the Basic Democrats to perform in order to lend viability to his new system.<sup>2</sup> Two of these functions were political,

---

<sup>1</sup>Government of Pakistan, Search for Stability (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Information, 1962) p. 13.

<sup>2</sup>I should mention here that the system of Ayub Khan won a number of admirers in the early sixties. Basic Democracies was one feature of the system that seemed to please most observers. Herbert Feldman in his Revolution in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) considered Basic Democracies to be the basis of revolutionary change in Pakistan. The pendulum of opinion, academic and otherwise, has now swung in the other direction. Ayub Khan and the various reforms introduced by him (including the system of Basic Democracies) are now considered to be partly responsible for the break-up of Pakistan. See Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis, op.cit., Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: The Disintegration of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971) and Damodar P. Singhal, Pakistan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972).

one social and one economic. Ayub Khan assumed power in Pakistan at the time when the single party systems developed by some other countries were still in their nascent state. Like them, he too was dissatisfied with the multi-party system that the country had inherited from its colonial masters. Unlike them he did not have at his command the apparatus of one party that could be used to supplant that of all others. Accordingly, he opted for a partly bureaucratic, partly political mechanism for distributing resources, aggregating interests and cultivating constituencies.<sup>1</sup> In the period between 1959 and 1963, the Basic Democracies functioned as a quasi-political party. But, much to Ayub Khan's surprise, the political infrastructure inherited by Pakistan from British India proved to be die-hard. Accordingly, when Ayub Khan was persuaded to revive the Muslim League, some of the power and considerable amount of prestige got transferred from the Basic Democracies to the party.

The second political function assigned to the Basic Democracies was to dilute the political power of the landed aristocracy. Largely because of their

---

<sup>1</sup>For a description of the apolitical system established by Ayub Khan see, S. M. M. Qureshi, "Party Politics in the Second Republic of Pakistan," The Middle East Journal, 20, Autumn, 1966.

opposition to the Pakistan movement, the big landlord families of the Punjab had been ostracized in the immediate post-independence period. The leadership was in the hands of the refugee community--a community of some seven million people that migrated from the northern provinces of India to what is now Pakistan. The bulk of the migrants went and settled in the urban areas.<sup>1</sup> Being urban they could not possibly control a country that was predominantly rural. Moreover, with the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 and the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951, the Muslim League lost two of its prominent leaders. Soon after Liaquat's death, the focus of political power began to move back to the traditional leadership.<sup>2</sup> The principal beneficiaries of this shift were the landed aristocracy. By 1958, when Ayub Khan assumed control

---

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed description of the demographic consequences of the very large scale movement of population following the grant of independence to India and Pakistan see Shahid Javed Burki, "Rapid Population Growth and Urbanization: The Case of Pakistan," Pakistan Economic and Social Review, XI:3, Autumn 1973, pp. 239-276.

For a discussion of political consequences see Shahid Javed Burki, Social Groups and Development: The Case of Pakistan (forthcoming) and Theodore Wright, "Indian Muslim Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan," Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, (forthcoming).

<sup>2</sup>For instance, in 1956 Dr. Khan Sahib whose cabinet in the Northwest Frontier Province was dismissed by Jinnah in 1947, was appointed the Chief Minister of the province of West Pakistan.

of the country's administration, the landlords were politically entrenched.<sup>1</sup> Convinced that he would not be able to bring about the type of political and economic change he considered vital for the country unless the power of the landed aristocracy was considerably diluted, Ayub Khan set about cultivating for himself a new kind of political constituency. By carving up Punjab into more than 17,000 Basic Democratic constituencies, the military regime brought political power closer to the middle farmer. In 1960, less than 500 families each owning more than 750 acres of agricultural land formed the landed aristocracy of the Punjab, exercising almost total economic and political control over the countryside. Where landholding was too unequal, the land reform of 1959 and the system of Basic Democracies changed this regressive structure, by creating a new clan of rural elites who were able to challenge successfully the landed aristocracy.

Where the distribution of land was somewhat more egalitarian, there was still the influence of the biraderi system to be contended with. It is seldom realized that this system performed somewhat the same political function as skewed distribution of land. In the districts where land was more evenly divided, several not-so-large

---

<sup>1</sup>In fact, Ayub Khan came to power after removing Prime Minister Sir Feroze Khan Noon from office. Noon was the first Punjab landlord to be appointed to that position.

landowners belonging to the same biraderi would almost always come together and collectively exercise the influence that the large landlords did in other parts of the province.<sup>1</sup> The social function of the Basic Democracies was to loosen the hold of this system. Having very small constituencies (on an average there was one BD for every 1000) effectively cut into the biraderis and reduced considerably their political power. The real impact of this output of the Basic Democracies system was felt in the election when, for the first time in Punjab's political history, outsiders were elected from the areas with strong biraderis.

Finally, the Basic Democracies system was meant to serve an important economic function. The information flowing through the system was to serve as an important input into the planning process. In this respect it was very much a part of the economic planning apparatus established by Ayub Khan.

---

<sup>1</sup>My view of the biraderi system differs from that of Hamza Alavi's. For instance, "Biraderi solidarity is the strongest in the case of independent peasant proprietors; in their case, the rules of endogamy and the rituals of biraderi are practiced most rigorously and the biraderis are constituted into corporate groups... Biraderis organization is also rather weak in the case of landlords, who are often in competition with each for power and status in local political arenas," Hamza Alavi, "Peasant Classes and Primordial Loyalties," The Journal of Peasant Studies, 1:1, October 1973, p. 55.

C. Centralization of Economic Planning

Dismantling a number of bureaucratic controls has often been regarded as perhaps the most important economic reform instituted by the regime of Ayub Khan.<sup>1</sup> The removal of a large number of government controls on economic activity is supposed to have been responsible for the remarkable performance of the private sector in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Not constrained by the heavy hand of the bureaucracy, the Pakistani entrepreneur took the busy bee route to development; he accumulated large profits and, having saved a substantial proportion, reinvested them in economic activities.<sup>2</sup> I would argue here that Ayub Khan's reforms did not lift bureaucratic controls from the economy. Instead, they worked in the opposite direction. Ayub Khan was able to bring about a great improvement in the delivery system of the government. What appears as easing of controls was in fact the phenomenon of an efficient bureaucratic machine reaching a large number of entrepreneurs in all sectors of the economy. It was the

---

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed account of the type of controls that existed at the time when Ayub Khan assumed power and the impact on the economy of their eventual removal, see Gustav Papanek, Pakistan's Development, op.cit., pp. 106-145.

<sup>2</sup>See article by Timothy and Leslie Nulty, "Pakistan: The Busy Bee Route to Development." Trans-Action, February 1971.

relatively large number of recipients of government controlled resources that appears to have given the impression of easing of controls. In the economic system of the fifties, the government allocated the scarce resources at its disposal to a handful of individuals. The government functionaries, using their monopoly over allocation, were able to extract a high price for whatever they distributed (industrial licenses, industrial raw material, construction contracts). This was a corrupt system in the conventional meaning of the term and Ayub Khan proclaimed it as such. In the system established by the new regime, the resources at government's disposal were made available in return for political support. In other words, in place of its functionaries receiving an economic price for the scarce resources, the regime itself put a political value on them. How did the system function?

Under Ayub Khan Pakistan adopted the model of centralized planning developed in India in the early fifties. The Planning Commission was made responsible for drawing up a consistency plan based on a fine and delicate balancing of the input requirements and output projections of the various sectors of the economy. All investment decisions, be they in the public or in the private sector and no matter how small, at least in theory, were subject to the discretion of the Planning Commission. Without a "no objection certificate" from

the government to invest in a textile mill or in a tubewell, the entrepreneur could hope to achieve little. The availability of industrial raw material without government licenses was therefore of little use to him. It was not only in theory that the Planning Commission exercised control over economic activity. By delegating the task of plan implementation to such line departments as Industries, Mineral Development, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, it was able to extend its reach to a considerable part of the country's economy.

What the established government departments could not control was handed over to a number of development corporations. Thus the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) became the developer and distributor of energy while the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was made responsible for distributing seed and fertilizer. The Planning Commission along with a number of line departments and such development corporations as WAPDA and ADC were able to direct the resources at the disposal of the government to a new clan of entrepreneur. In doing so they were able to build a new constituency for the central regime. In exchange for economic benefits, these agencies of the government marshalled political resources for the regime. This two-way relationship worked with considerable success in the agriculture sector. The land reforms of 1959 having set the stage,

the system of Basic Democracies and a new system of economic planning and resource distribution was brought into being to expand the support base for the regime. After diluting the power of the large landlords, the regime nurtured a new rural elite; the middle farmer. In what way did the power of the middle farmer manifest itself, in what way was it directed in support of the regime and in what way did it contribute to the development of the agricultural sector? These questions find some answers in the following discussion.

#### IV. THE EMERGENCE OF THE MIDDLE FARMER AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR

While a very small proportion of the land under cultivation by the large landlords was immediately surrendered as a result of the land reforms of 1959, Ayub Khan's political message to the landed aristocracy was passed on loud and clear. Their claim to rural leadership on which they had based their opposition to Pakistan movement in the forties and on the basis of which they had reemerged as the single most powerful political group in the fifties was no longer tenable. The new regime accepted the premise that wealth implied political power. But the large landlords (with farms of more than 150 acres) cultivated only five percent of the land; the not-so-small (with farms between 25 and 150 acres) cultivated another 31 percent. Could the resources of the numerous middle farmers be "collectivized" and used to challenge the power wielded by a few large landlords. The system of Basic Democracies seemed to suggest one way of bringing this about.

The first elections to the Basic Democracies were held in December 1959. Punjab with a population of 25.6 million was allocated 24,332 Basic Democracies

constituencies. In other words, in the Punjab one Basic Democrat represented on an average 1051 persons. Of the total Basic Democracies constituencies in the Punjab, 18,179 or 74.7 percent went to the rural areas. This meant some under-representation of the villages since in 1961 rural population still accounted for 78.6 percent of the total. There were two reasons for this. First, determination of constituencies was undertaken on the basis of the 1951 census and preliminary estimates of rate of growth of urban and rural population during the fifties. These estimates put the rate of urbanization in the Punjab well above that revealed by the census of 1961. (See Table 9). Second, and perhaps more important, a number of villages, contiguous to urban centers, were treated as parts of towns and cities. This was done to meet the residency requirement for contesting elections to the Basic Democracies. It would be recalled from the analysis of Section III above, that in the seven more progressive districts the proportion of farms leased to tenants was considerably higher than in the rest of the Punjab. In these districts, there was somewhat greater incidence of what can only be loosely defined as "absentee landlords." Loosely speaking, these landlords provided the very important managerial input into the production process, leaving actual cultivation to tenants. Since a large number of these farmers were occupied in other economic activities as well (for

example, as grain merchants, money-lenders, etc.) they found it convenient not to live in the villages. They usually resided in small towns not too distant from the villages in which they owned land. In delimiting constituencies for the election of 1959, therefore, these villages were treated as urban so as to make it possible for the non-resident farmers to represent them in the system of Basic Democracies. It is interesting to note from the data of Tables 9 and 11 that the proportion of rural Basic Democrats was much lower for the seven districts than for the remaining 12 districts of the Punjab. In the seven districts, 34.8 percent of the Basic Democrats were from non-rural areas as compared with only 13.0 percent for the other 12 districts. To put this in perspective, we find that the proportion of urban population in the two regions of rural Punjab was 25.7 and 16.2 percent respectively. (See Table 9). We see therefore that in delimiting the Basic Democracies constituencies, some attention appears to have been paid to the interests of the non-resident farmers.

The actual performance of this class of farmers in the 1959 elections can be gauged from the data of Tables 10 and 11. We see from Table 10 that 87.4 percent of all elected Basic Democrats in West Pakistan described themselves as farmers. Considering that some 22.5 percent

Table 9

DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION  
IN THE TWO PUNJAB REGIONS

	7P Districts		12P Districts	
	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percent</u>
<b>1951</b>				
Rural Population	9102	79.6	7951	86.1
Urban Population	<u>2314</u>	<u>20.3</u>	<u>1285</u>	<u>13.9</u>
TOTAL	11416	99.9	9236	100.0
<b>1961</b>				
Rural Population	10378	74.3	9728	83.8
Urban Population	<u>3590</u>	<u>25.7</u>	<u>1885</u>	<u>16.2</u>
TOTAL	13968	100.0	11613	100.0
<b>1972</b>				
Rural Population	14731	71.1	13546	80.2
Urban Population	<u>5993</u>	<u>28.9</u>	<u>3339</u>	<u>19.8</u>
TOTAL	20724	100.0	16885	100.0

---

**SOURCE:** Computed from Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan, 1961 Volume 3, (Karachi: Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, 1965) Table 2 and Government of Pakistan, Population Census of Pakistan, 1972 (Islamabad: Census Organization, 1974) Table 2.

Table 10

SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE BASIC DEMOCRATS ELECTED  
IN WEST PAKISTAN IN 1959 AND 1964

	<u>1959</u>	<u>1964</u>
<u>Age</u>		
Below 30 years	8.5	7.6
30-45 years	52.9	45.2
Above 45 years	37.4	46.5
Not known	1.2	0.8
<u>Education</u>		
Illiterate	30.3	24.4
1-10 years	64.0	60.1
More than 10 years	5.1	7.5
Not known	0.6	8.0
<u>Occupation</u>		
Farmers	87.4	82.2
Business	10.6	14.7
Professional	1.1	2.1
Not known	0.9	1.0
<u>Income</u>		
Up to Rs. 2000	23.2	27.7
Rs. 2000-4000	35.9	26.7
Rs. 4000 and above	39.2	43.7
Not known	1.7	1.9

---

SOURCE: (a) For 1959, Government of West Pakistan, A Look at West Pakistan's Basic Democrats (Lahore: Basic Democracies Department, 1962), pp. 14-51.

(b) For 1964, Government of West Pakistan, Analytical Report on the Members Election [sic] to the Basic Democracies During 1964 (Lahore: Basic Democracies Department, 1967), pp. 2-6.

of the population at that time lived in the urban areas (9.7 million out of 42.9 million according to the population census of 1961)<sup>1</sup> agriculturalists--including to be sure, absentee landowners in this category--were over-represented in the Basic Democracies system. This statistic clearly reflects the heavy rural bias in the Ayubian political structure of the early 1960's.

Table 11 provides some indication of the size distribution of the farms owned and/or cultivated by the elected Basic Democracies members from the province of the Punjab. More than one-half of the elected Basic Democrats in the Punjab belonged to what we have described as the middle farmer category. Since the data of Table 11 are for the rural areas only and since a number of farmers were elected from urban constituencies, their representation in the Basic Democracies system as shown in the table is therefore understated. Nevertheless we see that in the Punjab some 80.2 percent of the rural seats went to farmers owning or cultivating between 25 and 75 acres of land. In the 7P districts, their proportion was even higher--85.1 percent as against 75.0 percent in the 12P districts.

Another way of underscoring the very large representation secured by the middle farmer in the Basic

---

<sup>1</sup>Government of Pakistan, Census of Pakistan (West Pakistan: Population, Volume 3) (Rawalpindi: Ministry of Home, 1965), Table 1, pp. II-58 to II-77.

Table 11

SIZE DISTRIBUTION OF LAND HOLDINGS OF FARMERS ELECTED TO  
THE BASIC DEMOCRACIES IN 1959 AND 1964

	Number				Percent			
	1959		1964		1959		1964	
	<u>7P</u>	<u>12P</u>	<u>7P</u>	<u>12P</u>	<u>7P</u>	<u>12P</u>	<u>7P</u>	<u>12P</u>
0 - 1 acre	--	3	--	--	--	--	--	--
1 - 2.5	--	--	1	40	--	--	--	0.5
2.5 - 5.0	--	103	13	--	--	1.3	0.2	--
5.0 - 7.5	24	91	14	62	0.3	1.2	0.2	0.8
7.5 - 12.5	92	142	100	147	1.1	1.9	1.2	1.9
12.5 - 25.0	941	213	872	511	11.7	3.0	10.7	6.7
25.0 - 50.0	5371	4217	4818	3897	66.6	55.1	59.1	51.4
50.0 - 75.0	1492	1524	1503	1614	18.5	19.9	18.4	21.3
75.0 - 150.0	113	879	763	914	1.4	11.5	8.3	12.0
More than 150.0	27	458	154	406	0.3	6.0	1.9	5.3
	8060	7648	8148	7591	99.9	99.9	100.0	99.9

-51-

Total number of Basic Democrats from 7P districts 13744 and from rural areas 8965.

Total number of Basic Democrats from 12P districts 10588 and from rural areas 9214.

SOURCE: Data compiled by the author from the information collected by the Department of Basic Democracies and Local Government, Government of Pakistan in 1960 and 1965.

Democracies system is to compare it with their place in the rural hierarchy. We know from our previous discussion that the middle farmers accounted for only 6.2 percent of the landowning population of the Punjab while another 0.6 percent belonged to the large landlord category. Despite their small numbers the middle farmers had an overwhelming presence in the Basic Democracies system; 80.2 percent as against 19.8 percent from among the small and large landlord categories.

The Basic Democrats also functioned as an electoral college for the selection of a President and members of the National and Provincial Assemblies. The first election to the Assemblies was held in April 1962. By and large the landed aristocracy found its presence reduced by a considerable margin in both the West Pakistan contingent to the National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly of West Pakistan. There was a marked change from the situation in the fifties. Thus among the 40 members elected to the Second Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1955) the landlord group comprised 28 members, or 70 percent.<sup>44</sup> Of these 22 belonged to our category of large landlords. In 1962 the representation of landlords in the National and Provincial Assembly was reduced to 37 and 42 percent respectively (See Table 12).

---

<sup>1</sup>Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963), p. 115

Table 12

REPRESENTATION OF VARIOUS GROUPS IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY  
(1955) AND NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLIES IN 1962

	Constituent <sup>1</sup> Assembly <u>(percentage)</u>	National <sup>2</sup> Assembly <u>(percentage)</u>	Provincial <sup>2</sup> Assembly <u>(percentage)</u>
Landlords	70	37	42
Lawyers	8	24	22
Industry	10	17	18
Commerce & Other Professionals	--	9	4
Retired Officials	13	8	11
Miscellaneous	<u>--</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>
	99	100	100

---

SOURCES: <sup>1</sup> Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963), p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," Public Policy, XIX:1 (Winter 1971), p. 189.

Therefore the landlord as an interest group lost considerable amount of power as a result of the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies.<sup>1</sup> The System of Basic Democracies did not only bring about a social and political change at the village and the union level. It also brought about a significant change at the provincial and national levels. The full impact of this development was to be felt in the 1970's.<sup>2</sup>

In what way did the middle farmer help the regime of Ayub Khan? At least in two ways: first, the emergence of the middle farmer as a powerful political and economic group made it easier for Ayub Khan to deal with the landed aristocracy. He was no longer totally dependent on the

---

<sup>1</sup>For a detailed description of the impact of the land reforms on the political power of the large landlords, see Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," Public Policy XIX:1, Winter 1971, pp. 167-206.

<sup>2</sup>In a detailed, on-going study of electoral behavior in the Punjab, Craig Baxter and I have argued that the reforms instituted by Ayub Khan contributed to some extent to the success of social and economic forces that came to dominate Pakistan in the seventies. Preliminary results from our study are to be found in Shahid Javed Burki and Craig Baxter, "Social and Economic Causes of the Electoral Success of the People's Party," mimeo, Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University, April, 1974.

large landlords for rural support. The fact that there was a large turnout in his favor in the Presidential elections of 1965 from the rural areas is one indication of the success of this strategy.<sup>1</sup> This election was held at a time when the large landlords had not fully reconciled themselves to this reduced political status and were, by and large, still opposed to the new regime. Second, the middle farmer helped the regime in implementing its ambitious economic program. This program was used by Ayub Khan as a way for legitimizing his rule. In his case this was the "ruler's imperative."<sup>2</sup> There were two important economic consequences of Ayub Khan's political strategy: Green Revolution in rural Punjab and the rapid development of small-scale, mainly agro-based industry in a large number of small towns.

The advent of the Green Revolution brought about a fundamental change in the relationship between farmers and the Government. This change was the by-product of the introduction of a new production function in which chemical fertilizer appeared as the principal constraint. In the early years of the Green Revolution, the government in Pakistan retained full control over the allocation and

---

<sup>1</sup>For details, see Shahid Javed Burki, "Interest Group Involvement in West Pakistan's Rural Works Program," op.cit., pp. 181-185.

<sup>2</sup>For an excellent treatment of this subject, see Howard Wriggins' treatment of Ayub Khan in The Ruler's Imperative (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).

distribution of this vital input. The government used the Agricultural Development Corporation, its fertilizer distributing agency, for producing economic and political results.

Although the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC) was created in part to limit the Basic Democracies' scheme to develop a "grass roots democracy" with no responsibility for agricultural purposes,<sup>1</sup> in actual fact the ADC, lacking an extension arm of its own, was to become heavily dependent on the Basic Democracies system. For instance, the Rural Works Program, executed by the union councils, spent a considerable amount of resources on constructing storage go-downs for seed and fertilizers. This space was then rented out to the ADC by the union councils. Moreover, the ADC officials stationed in the districts were made members of district councils and thus became responsive to the elected Basic Democracies membership.

The most important function of the system of Basic Democracies was to provide points of contact between the elected members and the powerful government bureaucracy. It was from this link that the middle farmer, with such a visible presence in the Basic Democracies system, benefited a great deal.

---

<sup>1</sup>Ralph Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1966), p. 206.

One evidence of the impact of the Basic Democracies system on the rate of growth of agriculture is provided by the data collected by the author from 27 villages in the Punjab, 15 of which belong to the seven districts that were identified above as agriculturally prosperous. The data reveal a statistically significant correlation between the rates of growth and the proportion of land in farms that correspond roughly to our middle category. In fact, a regression equation using the rate of agricultural growth as a dependent variable and the proportion of total land in the middle category as the only explanatory variable accounts for more than 80 percent of the variance.<sup>1</sup> For the purpose of this analysis, we constructed a "scale of representation" in which the villages were given a score for having a Basic Democracies chairman, Basic Democracies members, etc. belonging to the system. The villages were then ranked according to their performance in agriculture and according to their place in the scale of representation. These two rankings produce a Spearman coefficient of correlation of 0.83 suggesting a powerful association between representation in the Basic Democracies system and the rate of growth of agriculture.

I will now use the conclusions that I have drawn above to describe what is perhaps a reasonable scenario

---

<sup>1</sup>For details, see Shahid Javed Burki, "The Development of Pakistan's Agriculture: An Interdisciplinary Explanation," op.cit.

to explain why certain parts of Pakistan produced very high rates of agricultural growth during the sixties. In October 1958 Ayub Khan overthrew the civilian government of Feroze Khan Noon and proclaimed himself the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan. The transfer of leadership from Noon to Ayub meant, in fact, transfer of political power from landed oligarchy to the middle classes. Ayub Khan, the son of a small landholder from the Northwest Frontier Province, had prepared himself for this confrontation-- a number of reforms that he was to institute in the early 1960's were spelled out in considerable detail in 1954.<sup>1</sup> The Land Reforms of 1959, the introduction of the system of Basic Democracies later in the same year and the strengthening of bureaucratic controls over the allocation and distribution of economic resources all helped to weaken the landed aristocracy.

To build a rural constituency for his regime, Ayub Khan used the Basic Democracies system and the allocative mechanisms at the disposal of his government to build the middle farmers into a powerful economic and political class. He succeeded in doing this in the areas in which somewhat less skewed distribution of land had already elevated the middle farmer to some prominence.

---

<sup>1</sup>For the full text of the memorandum, see Mohammad Ayub Khan, Friends nor Masters: A Political Biography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 53-62.

This was particularly so in seven districts of the Punjab. Allocation of scarce resources (credit as well as equipment) made it possible for the middle farmer in these districts to undertake massive investment in the exploitation of groundwater resources. This investment prepared these districts for the Green Revolution. When the revolution came, the farmers in these districts were quick to exploit the new technology. The success of the high yielding varieties was dependent on the timely availability of adequate supplies of fertilizer. For a period the task of distributing fertilizer was kept as a government monopoly. For distributing fertilizer the government used a new public corporate device--the Agricultural Development Corporation--as well as the local bodies that belonged to the Basic Democracies system. The villages that were well represented in the Basic Democracies system therefore produced high rates of agricultural growth.

The principal conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that the Basic Democracies system played a positive role in agricultural growth. In explaining the variance in performance, the Basic Democracies system and the political and social changes introduced by it serve a very useful purpose.

## V. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have attempted to trace the relationship between political and economic factors, using the rates of agricultural growth in the districts of Pakistan as a dependent economic variable. For the purpose of this analysis, the role of independent variable was assigned to constituency building activity of the regime. I started out by differentiating between three regions. The first region was made up of eleven districts in the province of Sind. In these districts high rates of agricultural growth were produced almost entirely by expansion of land under cultivation. In the second region, with seven Punjab districts, the high rate of growth was produced almost entirely by increase in land yields. In the third region, made up of the remaining 12 districts of the Punjab, there was an insignificant increase in agricultural output.

This delineation of two types of rapidly growing areas and one stagnating region set the stage for an argument in which political factors were assigned a high explanatory weight. I have argued that the type of agricultural growth experienced by the seven Punjab districts became largely possible because the farmers

that could have performed important entrepreneurial functions were also those who belonged to the class which was cultivated by the regime as its principal rural constituency. In other words, the rapid growth of agriculture in one region of the Punjab was made possible by the attention a class of farmers received from the government. This class was able to exploit this situation to its advantage because it was in a position to do so thanks to the introduction of the Basic Democracies system. Social, economic and political factors, therefore, interacted to produce an environment for nurturing rapid growth.

We can identify the political factors that were responsible for the rapid growth of agriculture in Sind and for the economic stagnation of the rural areas of 12 Punjab districts. In either case, the system of local government played an insignificant role. Since in this paper I was specifically concerned with the role of local government as a determinant of change, I have not included here a discussion of agricultural development of these regions. This notwithstanding, it may be useful to briefly discuss the political causes of rapid agricultural growth in Sind and stagnation in the northern areas of the Punjab (our 12 Punjab districts). This brief discussion should help to underscore the conclusions that I have drawn for the rapidly growing districts of the Punjab.

In the early sixties, when Ayub Khan's system of Basic Democracies brought about significant political change in the Punjab, Sind was still dominated by the landed aristocracy. Through the Basic Democracies, the new regime was able to redistribute some of the political, economic and social power that the big landlords had possessed in the Punjab. A large number of middle farmers were the principal beneficiaries of this process of change. Sind, because of a highly skewed pattern of land distribution did not then have a sizeable middle class in the countryside. The enormous power wielded by the landed aristocracy therefore could not be passed on to the middle farmers. In Sind, Ayub Khan continued to use old style of politics, setting one faction against another. Because of the nature of the social and economic system, he could not develop a new constituency of the type that was created in the Punjab.

What political institution building could not accomplish was partly achieved by a series of seemingly unconnected administrative decisions. In the sixties, agriculture in Sind was developed by a new class of entrepreneurs. This class was introduced into the province by the government not so much to cultivate a counterelite a la Punjab, but to reward loyal civil and military officers with land grants. A sizeable portion of the land brought under cultivation in the

Ghulam Mohammad and Guddu barrage areas was given to some 1500 civil and military officers. These grantees, with excellent bureaucratic contacts, were able to secure scarce inputs that were not easily available to the local farmers. Estimates differ, but it seems that two fifths of Sind's newly irrigated land is owned by this class of farmers who have, over the years, become model cultivators with land yields paralleling those in the Punjab.

The success of the agricultural sector in the seven Punjab districts was in large measure due to the creation of a system of local government that provided points of contact between the middle farmers and various government agencies. Sind's success was largely due to the grant of newly irrigated areas to the people who, because of their position, possessed excellent links with the administration. The stagnation of the twelve Punjab districts was due to the fact that the Ayub regime, like so many of its predecessors, sought to solve the problem of this resource-poor area by recruiting a very large proportion of the male labor force to the rapidly expanding armed forces. The northern Punjab districts remained the principal recruiting areas for the Pakistan army as they had for the British Indian army. This is the principal reason why these districts

have a lower male-female ratio. Thus deprived of a significant portion of their work force, the rural areas of these districts continue to rely heavily upon remittances rather than on agricultural incomes. Land there continues to be poorly farmed.

The political consequences of rapid agricultural change, it should be noted, have received some attention in recent years. The fear has been voiced that the Green Revolution was turning "red"<sup>1</sup> when it became obvious that associated with rapid agricultural growth were some very undesirable consequences, including unemployment, displacement of laborers and social strife. In the case of Pakistan, it has been argued that the introduction of high-yielding variety technology simultaneously "increases economic disparities between the dominant landowning groups, on the one hand, and the majority of subsistence cultivators, sharecroppers, and landless laborers, on the other" and it is argued that the predisposition of large landowners to adopt profit-maximizing criteria in their relations with the landless serves to undermine these relations, so that the latter are open to radical appeals.<sup>2</sup> What

---

<sup>1</sup>Harold Munthe-Kaas, "Green and Red Revolution," Far Eastern Economic Review, 68, March 19, 1970, pp. 21-24.

<sup>2</sup>Francine R. Frankel and Karl von Vorys, The Political Change of the Green Revolution: Shifting Patterns of Peasant Participation in India and Pakistan (Princeton, New Jersey: Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, March 1972, p. 2.

is called for is "development planning directed toward a new social and political synthesis. In rural areas, where the vast majority of the people still live, this means an imaginative program of social reconstruction with a new system of mutual obligations as its focus."<sup>1</sup>

The essential point this analysis misses is that in most cases the Green Revolution is the product of a new social and political synthesis. It is a consequence of a fundamental change in social relationships in the rural areas. These social relationships have replaced the old order but would in turn resist change toward anything more radical. It is therefore imperative to understand the nature of the dynamic that has produced change in the rural areas of countries such as Pakistan before recommending solutions for the problems generated by this change itself. The solution will have to be as "revolutionary" as the one that produced the Green Revolution in the first place.

We may conclude from the above analysis that given the right set of political and social circumstances, a representative system of local government is a necessary instrument for bringing about economic change. Given that economic conditions were favorable, what helped the Punjab was the presence of a large number of middle farmers who moved quickly on both the economic and political

---

<sup>1</sup>Ibid., p. 39.

fronts once they were provided with an opportunity to act for their collective interest. The system of local government played a crucial role in bringing about this change. Without this system, the middle farmers would not have been able to challenge the rural landed aristocracy.

The change brought about by the Basic Democracies proved to be irreversible. A reaction set in when Ayub Khan sought to curtail some of the power that the middle classes had acquired during the early fifties. This reaction contributed to his downfall in 1969<sup>1</sup> and to the emergence of the People's Party (PPP) as a political force in the Punjab.<sup>2</sup> The PPP is now engaged in carrying forward the revolution in the Punjab by transferring some of the power from the middle farmers to the small peasants. The BD system was not a neutral vehicle for bringing about the initiation of rural change. It catered to a certain group by its very structure and rules of representation. As long as it existed, it could be as obstructive to further change as were the political

---

<sup>1</sup>Shahid Javed Burki, "Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation," Asian Survey, XII:3, March 1972, pp. 201-212.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid. See also Baxter, "Socio-Economic Indicators of the People's Party in the Punjab," mimeo. (Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University, April 1974).

parties of the fifties which favored by their structure and composition the interests of the landed oligarchy. New organizational forms are being introduced to bring still a different political sector into action. The cell structure that is being developed within the PPP will succeed, however, only if it can bypass the middle farmers and build a new constituency out of the small peasants and landless agricultural workers. If that happens, the party will have replaced the Basic Democracies system as an instrument of change and may, eventually, result in the emergency of a much more decentralized and representative form of local government.

Local representative institutions are indispensable for bringing about broad-based rural development. There is no one type of institution that would succeed, however. The system of Basic Democracies succeeded in fostering rural change in that part of Pakistan in which the economic environment was prepared to receive and nurture it. Now the political environment has changed, in part as a result of the demands growing out of changes in the latter sixties, and now there is demand for a new type of institution. Only a different set of rural local structures, involving new sets of rural participants, would further now the process that was initiated by the Basic Democracies system set up in the late fifties. This would suggest that there is no optimum organization of

local government but that the most productive arrangements depend on what the economic and technical possibilities are and what groups need to be or are sought to be represented in decision-making at the local level.