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9. ABSTRACT

The authors recognize that local organization is not the only factor possibly accounting for rural development. Resources and technology are certainly also independent variables affecting the extent and pace of rural development. But for purposes of analysis they focused on local organization, examining its relation to rural development performance, measured in terms of agricultural productivity and various dimensions of rural welfare: health, nutrition, education, security, employment, participation and equity.

The 16 cases were analyzed in terms of local organizational linkage--the extent and effectiveness of communication and interaction between different levels of organization down to the local level--and relevance to rural development functions (see Tables 2 and 3). This analysis revealed a rather clear division between the "more organized" and the "less organized" cases, and our subsequent analysis of rural development performance compared the two sets of cases.

In analyzing rural development performance, in terms of agricultural productivity and various aspects of rural welfare, sharp and consistent differences were found between the two groups, though variations within the groups were not always so clearly associated with differences in degree of organization.

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

Special Series on Rural Local Government

LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS OF ASIAN EXPERIENCE

Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman

RLG No. 19

LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

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FOREWORD

This monograph was written as part of a comparative study of Rural Local Government organized by the Rural Development Committee of Cornell University. The study aimed at clarifying the role of rural local institutions in the rural development process, with special reference to agricultural productivity, income, local participation and rural welfare. An interdisciplinary working group set up under the Rural Development Committee established a comparative framework for research and analysis of these relationships.[1] A series of monographs, based in most cases on original field research, has been written by members of the working group and by scholars at other institutions and has been published by the Rural Development Committee. This volume analyzes and summarizes the project's findings.

This study of Rural Local Government is part of the overall program of teaching and research by members of the Rural Development Committee, which functions under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at Cornell and is chaired by Norman Uphoff. The main focuses of Committee concern are alternative strategies and institutions for promoting rural development, especially with respect to the situation of small farmers, rural laborers and their families. This particular study was financed in large part by a grant from the Asia Bureau of the U.S. Agency for International Development. The views expressed by participating scholars in this

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[1]The members of the working group were Ron Aqua, Douglas Ashford, John Blackton, Harry Blair, Milton Esman, Mohinder Mudahar, Norman Nicholson, David Robinson, Benedict Stavis, and Norman Uphoff.

study are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of USAID or Cornell University.

Special Series on Rural Local Government

1. THE ELUSIVENESS OF EQUITY: INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH, by Harry W. Blair, Department of Political Science, Bucknell University, and Visiting Fellow, Rural Development Committee, Cornell, 1972-73.

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10. BASIC DEMOCRACIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN, by Norman K. Nicholson, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University, and Visiting Professor, Department of Government, Cornell, 1972-73; and Dilawar Ali Khan, Department of Cooperation and Credit, Pakistan Agricultural University, Lyallpur.

11. AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN, by S. Javed Burki, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

12. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, by Santiago S. Simpas, Ledivina Cariño, and Arturo G. Pacho, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

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18. LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA, by Zdravko Mlinar, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism, University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

19. LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA, by Norman T. Uphoff and Milton J. Esman, Department of Government and Center for International Studies, Cornell.

SUMMARY

Summarizing in a single monograph the findings and conclusions of 18 case studies, based on fieldwork and subsequent analysis over an 18-month period, is an exacting undertaking. Yet we realize that even this should be further summarized into a few pages as a guide to readers, especially for those who cannot read the entire monograph. The findings and conclusions presented here are drawn directly from the analysis which follows. We hope that they will be considered in their more extended and documented form, as this summary can only sketch the scope and significance of our project's results.

From our case studies and analysis we find there is a strong empirical basis for concluding that local organization is a necessary if not sufficient condition for accelerated rural development, especially development which emphasizes improvement in the productivity and welfare of the majority of rural people. Those cases in which there was more organization reaching down to the local level, accountable to the local people, and involved with rural development functions--cases which we subsequently refer to as "more organized"--have accomplished rural development objectives more successfully with respect to the available resource base than have those with less rural organization. Specific data are given below.

Organization for rural development must be seen as a <u>system</u> of institutions performing various functions in the rural sector of a particular country. We found no case where only one institution was carrying the full responsibility for rural development or where <u>complementarities</u> among institutions

were not as important as what the institutions themselves did. Of key significance was the extent and effectiveness of linkages between and among institutions, horizontally with other organizations at the same level and especially vertically between local organizations and structures at the center of government which set policy and allocate resources essential to success in rural development.

Local institutions which are separated and isolated from other levels are likely to be impotent developmentally. Local autonomy by itself provides little leverage for development. What makes the most difference are systems or networks of organization that make local development more than an enclave phenomenon. Thus, we found linkage to be a more significant variable than autonomy when it comes to promoting rural development.

This finding did not suggest, however, that local organization should be no more than an extension or appendage of central government. Effective local organization requires considerable investment of resources, authority and information and must have power deriving from local initiative and resource mobilization. Central strength based on anemic rural institutions is an illusion. Insofar as the strength of the center derives from the weakness of the periphery, this is a hollow power for all but the narrowest of aims, for control but not development. At the same time, it is unlikely that there can be effective rural institutions in the absence of strong central support.

Two approaches appear to have dominated thinking about rural institutions, and both are unfortunately fallacious. The paternalistic approach assumes that rural people are passive and fatalistic, uninterested in improving their lives and incapable of initiative in making improvements. Consequently, everything must be done for them (or to them) in a top-down, bureaucratic manner.

An opposing view is the populistic approach which assumes that rural people are vitally interested in change and completely capable of transforming their communities if only the politicians and bureaucrats would leave them alone. Both approaches derive from unreal stereotypes of rural people, who are neither as inert and ignorant as the first assumes, nor as virtuous and wise as assumed in the second.

On the whole, rural people are more capable and responsive than the paternalistic model of social change suggests, but less able to change their lives autonomously than the populistic model presumes. There is a deep-rooted contradiction in the paternalistic approach to rural development, which expects that passive "recipients" will become active cultivators and responsible citizens. On the other hand, the populistic approach neglects the common fact that entrenched local interests can dominate organizations at the community level unless there are some rules and even controls from higher levels. What should be developed is an institutionalized system which is neither just top-down nor bottom-up nor exclusively governmental.

* * * * * * * *

We recognize that local organization is not the only factor possibly accounting for rural development. Resources and technology are certainly also independent variables affecting the extent and pace of rural development. But for purposes of analysis we focused on local organization, examining its relation to rural development performance, measured in terms of agricultural productivity and various dimensions of rural welfare: health, nutrition, education, security, employment, participation and equity.

The 16 cases were analyzed in terms of local organizational linkage--the extent and effectiveness of communication

and interaction between different levels of organization down to the local level--and relevance to rural development functions (see Tables 2 and 3). This analysis revealed a rather clear division between the "more organized" and the "less organized" cases, and our subsequent analysis of rural development performance compared the two sets of cases.

More Organized		Less Organized	
China	Korea	Bangladesh	Pakistan
Egypt	Sri Lanka	India	Philippines
Israel	Taiwan	Indonesia	Thailand
Japan	Yugoslavia	Malaysia	Turkey

In analyzing rural development performance, in terms of agricultural productivity and various aspects of rural welfare, sharp and consistent differences were found between the two groups, though variations within the groups were not always so clearly associated with differences in degree of organization. It should be noted that several of the less organized cases have made structural changes recently in the direction of having more local organization. However, since the contribution, if any, of these changes to rural development in these countries cannot be evaluated yet, we must consider the cases in the period prior to organizational changes.

Agricultural Productivity

We considered three measures of agricultural productivity to get a more rounded assessment of agricultural performance: (a) absolute comparisons in terms of average cereal yields per hectare; (b) relative comparisons of increases in average cereal yields over a 20-year period; and (c) comprehensive comparisons of increase in per capita total agricultural production over that period. We found the more organized cases very clearly ahead on all three criteria, and moreover, the more organized cases generally achieved much higher percentage increases from their already high level of production.

	Average Yields for Cereals (1970-72) (kg/ha)	Index of Increase in Cereal Yields (1952-56=100)	Index of Per Capita Total Agr. Production (1952-56 = 100)
More organized cases	3,097	166	135
Less organized cases	1,677	138	108

Improved Technology

The differences in productivity performance are certainly attributable in large measure to the use of improved agricultural technologies, but we find some clear relationships with the extent of rural local organization. The more organized cases were using 8.5 times more fertilizer per hectare in 1961-65 (34 compared to 4 kilograms per hectare) and still more than four times more in 1971 (65 compared to 15). The differences in irrigated area are less striking but still substantial. The more organized cases have 45 percent more of their cultivated area under irrigation (32 percent compared to 22 percent). When it comes to adoption of new high-yielding varieties of cereals, we find that almost all the countries using the recently-developed HYVs are among the less organized cases, because the more organized cases have been experimenting with and extending their own improved varieties for decades. It is clear from the yields attained in the more organized cases that they have been more progressive in technological innovation and adoption.

Rural Welfare

Using standard measures for nutrition, health and education, we found higher attainments in the more organized cases. This finding has to be qualified to take respective income levels into account, since richer countries should be able to provide more welfare services. Per capita income

levels are considerably higher in the more organized cases now, though they were not higher 20 years ago.

	1953	1970
More organized cases	$ 74	$352
Less organized cases	$ 78	$119

When we compared rank-orderings with respect to 1970 income levels we found that the differences were largely in the direction of the more organized cases ranking higher in welfare terms than their income level would determine, with less organized cases ranking somewhat lower.

Rural Security

A much stronger correlation was found when we constructed indicators of rural security, in terms of protection from natural disaster, protection from violence, and access to justice for rural people. On a five-point scale, it turned out that only more organized cases scored an average of 4 or 5, and only less organized cases scored an average of 1 or 2 (see Table 10). The scores reflect the informed judgments by members of the working group based on experience and research in the countries concerned. Put in human terms, the scores reflect our judgments about how safe and dignified is life as an average member of a rural community in the respective countries.

Employment

With a few exceptions, the more organized cases have less unemployment and underemployment in their rural sectors. There can be various explanations for this, not the least of which are lower population growth in the more organized cases --hence a slower growth of the rural labor force--and more rapid agricultural growth--thereby generating more job opportunities both on the farm and in non-farm rural employment.

levels are considerably higher in the more organized cases. The more organized cases have had substantially lower population growth over the last decade, 1.9 percent compared to 2.6 percent for the less organized cases. When levels of per capita income are controlled for, the more organized cases still have lower population growth than have the less organized cases with comparable levels of income.

Political Participation

We compared rural participation in the respective cases according to voting, control over bureaucratic performance, influence on rural development policy, and involvement in resource allocations in rural areas. We did not find a strong association between participation and agricultural productivity, though in some cases such as Israel and Yugoslavia, participation has contributed substantially to their productivity gains. We conclude that participation may make a positive contribution to raising productivity and we found no evidence of its impact being negative, but it does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient condition for agricultural improvement. The relationship between participation and welfare performance was, not surprisingly, greater, a correlation of .6.

Equity in Income Distribution

We found a nearly perfect association between greater equality of incomes and more extensive and developmental rural organization. All of the more organized cases had a ratio of no more than 6:1 between the income accruing to the top 20 percent of the population and that going to the bottom 20 percent. With only one exception, the less organized cases had ratios of 8:1, 10:1, 12:1 and even greater. (see Table 11). The relationship of cause and effect is, however, a complex one, and while local organization can support the implementation of policies for achieving greater equity, local

organization cannot achieve this on its own. Moreover, relative equity in the ownership of assets, particularly land, appears to be a precondition for successful local organization, so that such structures are not dominated by privileged local interests who generally can and will divert resources to their own benefit and thus thwart widespread rural development.

* * * * * * * *

Knowing that there is a relationship between local organization and rural development does not tell us what kind of local organization will make the most effective contribution. We have examined the cases to determine what features appear to be most salient and have delineated the following:

(1) Local institutions should have more than one level of organization, probably a two-tier pattern, in which the lower tier performs functions at the neighborhood or small group level, while the other undertakes more complex business and governmental activities that require relatively large-scale operations. A multi-tiered approach to local organization can combine the benefits of solidarity and scale, both for mobilizing resources and for organizing and implementing development projects.

(2) Local communities should be linked to higher level decision centers by multiple channels, both to achieve the benefits of specialization in communication and to enjoy alternative avenues of influence. Because any single channel may at any time be blocked or monopolized, may fail to function, or may yield unsatisfactory results, it is important to have multiple channels which local leaders can resort to singly or in concert to meet their needs. At the same time, central governments do well to rely on more than a single channel for reaching down to the village.

(3) As a rule, local institutions should be vested each with several functions to insure their viability and capacity to integrate diverse services, but not so many functions as to overload them or risk a monopoly of local power in a few hands. There are benefits in specialization, but excessive proliferation of specialized local organizations produces ineffective and poorly coordinated services.

(4) The more successful cases had engaged much more extensively in decentralization of operating decisions as well as local level planning. Decentralization is usually more effective if it is controlled rather than complete. It is not an all-or-nothing proposition, but rather a matter of kinds and degrees. Decentralization is best seen and implemented in terms of specific functions, depending on the techlologies involved and on the capacity of subordinate levels of administration and organization to perform the functions. Two patterns of decentralizition should be distinguished: (a) deconcentration of authority for decisions and action within an administrative structure, and (b) devolution, which involves transferring functions and the resources to carry them out from agencies of the center to lower-level organizations not administratively responsible to the central government.

(5) Politics--the competition and conflict among groups for influence and resources--must be accepted as unavoidable and legitimate in rural local organizations. The surfacing and settling of conflicts is one of the leading functions of local institutions, invoking some combination of legal procedures and community sanctioned norms. By forging some necessary measure of agreement based on overarching values, politics and the attendant strife serve a constructive purpose by and large. At the same time, it is recognized that factionalism, corruption and patronage can undermine the confidence of rural people in their local institutions and make these organizations incapable of performing developmental tasks.

While units of local government must include all groups, it is dangerous to attempt to contain within the same associational organizations such as cooperatives, groups like owner-cultivators and landless laborers whose interests are basically in conflict.

(6) Leadership is perhaps the most critical variable for establishing and maintaining local organizations. Sanctions to control the acts of leaders of local organizations should be available from above and from below to get the best performance. Leaders should be required to be accountable to their constituencies through elections, participation in rural projects, public meetings and similar activities. They should also be subject to centrally determined guidelines and standards enforced by auditing, inspection and regular informational controls. Controls only from above or below are unlikely to produce leadership which actively bridges the institutional gap between locality and higher levels of organization. Also, attention should be given to establishing recruitment procedures and rewards which institutionalize leadership performance, assuring that high minimum standards of work, initiative and oversight are maintained.

(7) Distribution of assets and income poses a serious political issue whenever raised, but our studies indicate the importance of this issue. More equitable--though not necessarily equal--distribution appears to be a necessary if not sufficient condition for extensive rural development. We found no successful case of rural development in the absence both of effective local organization and reasonably widespread distribution of the ownership of assets--in the Asian context, land, with its resulting distribution of income. The data do not indicate that the most equal distributions are necessarily the most productive, but some degree of relative equity seems critical to success, both of local organizations and of rural development. This finding goes beyond the scope

of our studies and warrants more analysis, as it cannot be neglected.

The burden of decision and action falls primarily on Asian governments. They can attach high or low priority in resource allocation to rural development; their policies and practices can be more or less egalitarian; their administration can be more or less centralized; local institutions which they sponsor can be more or less participatory. Within this range of options, many ideologies are consistent with development. Regimes as ideologically divergent as mainland China and Taiwan, as Sri Lanka and Korea, as Israel and Egypt, have committed themselves to promoting rural development through the fostering of local organization. Such a developmental strategy requires substantial reallocation of central resources and authority. Organizing rural people is such a difficult task, vulnerable to many kinds of public or private sabotage, that we see some central commitment to its success as essential. What is clear, however, is that the essential elements of such a strategy--relative equity, local organization, and systems of linkage--are realizable within a spectrum of regimes and ideologies.

The role of foreign governments and of international agencies interested in fostering rural development through this strategy is necessarily restricted, as institutions which organize the lieves of large and vital domestic constituencies are extremely sensitive and usually unamenable to external involvement. But governments realize they are often venturing into uncharted seas and some are likely to welcome assistance in action research. The community of scholars in industrialized and in development countries who are intellectually and normatively committed to rural development can make vital contributions to a more precise appreciation of the local institutional dimensions of rural development.

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Our greatest gratitude goes to our fellow members of the working group on Rural Local Government: Ronald Aqua, Douglas Ashford, John Blackton, Harry Blair, Mohinder Mudahar, Norman Nicholson, David Robinson and Benedict Stavis, whose participation in the design of this research project and whose criticisms and suggestions throughout were most helpful. Of course, their case studies on Korea and Japan, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Indian Punjab, Pakistan, and China and Taiwan, were major and more visible contributions to the project.

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The participants in our workshops during February, March and April 1974 are too numerous to name here, but they are listed in Appendix E and they have our deep appreciation. They helped to make these workshops some of the most stimulating and productive intellectual exchanges it has ever been our privilege to participate in.

Administering this far-flung research project has been a very complex undertaking, and we wish to acknowledge the great and good help of Mrs. Elisabeth Thorn, Administrative Supervisor, and Mrs. Reneé Pierce, Senior Administrative Secretary, and other members of the Center for International Studies staff for their tireless and thoughtful work in support of this project.

Finally, we would like to express our appreciation for the ideas and encouragement of Mr. Edgar (Ted) Owens of the U.S. Agency for International Development, who worked with us as the USAID project officer and was a great source of stimulation. We hope that the outcome of this project is of sufficient value to justify further uses of the flexible mode of operation which this project enjoyed.

N.T.U.

M.J.E.

LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Of Asia's 2.25 billion people, almost three-fourths live in the countryside and nearly all of them depend on farming for their livelihoods. Notwithstanding considerable variation among and within countries, the annual growth of Asia's population is estimated at 2.3 percent, which means that its population and its labor force will nearly double before the end of this century. Asian countries are urbanizing rapidly as the population pressures in rural areas and the opportunities of city life combine to draw people toward the cities. But job opportunities in the city are scarce and cannot meet the demand for employment because insufficient capital can be mobilized for industry and modern manufacturing creates relatively few jobs per unit of investment.

This means, simply, that the great majority of Asians must continue to live and work on the land and that, for the predictable future, rural areas must accommodate and provide livelihoods for more, not fewer people. It means that the Western model of agricultural development cannot be replicated in most Asian countries. In this Western model, workers are drawn from farming into higher productivity employment in rapidly-expanding manufacturing and service industries, the average size of farm holdings increases, farming becomes highly capitalized, and per capita labor productivity in agriculture increases to match urban industrial levels. Instead, the requirement for Asia is to intensify production

per unit of land so that its limited and finite land resources can productively employ a growing rural labor force for whom there will be no alternative job opportunities in other sectors. In most Asian countries rural policy must be oriented to providing more adequate livelihoods for larger populations who will have no alternative but to remain on the land. This conclusion is based on no developmental orthodoxy but on realities becoming ever more evident.

The tasks of rural development in contemporary Asia--the process of making life more satisfying and fulfilling for the hundreds of millions of farm families who will continue to live in rural areas--will present numerous policy and institutional challenges. In our judgment, strategies of rural development must aim simultaneously at (1) augmenting economic productivity per acre and per worker, (2) increasing disposable income per family, and (3) expanding public services which enhance the welfare and security of rural people. We see as important also providing more opportunities for participation by rural people in decisions which govern their lives, but this cannot be specified simply as a dependent variable--an objective--since in some respects it may be an independent variable--a means to other rural development ends. Rural development is certainly an integrated process with social and political, as well as economic and administrative dimensions. Our particular concern, reinforced by a growing international consensus, is with small holders, tenants and landless laborers, since they represent the great majority of rural people and their needs have not, for the most part, been effectively served. There is, moreover, growing evidence that small-scale intensive agriculture can achieve high levels of productivity and that this productivity, if equitably distributed, can provide the economic base for decent, dignified and improving livelihoods. We see no viable alternative strategy for most Asian societies. Without substantial and

steadily increasing productivity per acre, Asia faces the prospect of massive famine and any policy that condones the displacement of labor by mechanization or other means will produce intolerable human misery.

In this context our task has been to examine and assess the contribution of local organization to rural development, and in particular, organizations which have some accountability to a local constituency, which represent local interests, and in which local people enjoy opportunities to participate. In Asia, local organizations have many concrete expressions. They range from traditional local authorities to modern village councils, from single-purpose cooperatives to multipurpose farmers' associations, from offices of local administrators to complex units of local administration such as Chinese communes. Thus local government bodies are not the only local institutions to be considered, though they are the local organizations most commonly responsible to a local constituency. Branches of central government administrative agencies operating at the local level are not considered as local institutions because they are not locally accountable but are controlled and guided by higher levels of government.

The various organizations operating at the local level contribute to what can be considered local governance, which includes but involves more than the formal institutions of local government. Local governance is a process of decision-making at many levels, including the farm level and is affected by decisions within public as well as private organizations. The process entails allocation and regulation, mobilization and conflict resolution, orienting efforts toward productive goals that are widely shared. With respect to rural development, local governance includes the provision of services needed for agricultural production and enhancement of rural welfare.

It is abundantly clear that local institutions in isolation and without external support cannot contribute signifi-

cantly to the productivity and welfare of their constituents. Thus any consideration of the role of local institutions in rural development must focus on the relations--or linkages--between local institutions and other structures which provide services, allocate resources and exert influence. This includes departments and agencies of central government, national political parties, and even the private sector.

Most research and writing has concentrated on two strategies for promoting rural development. The first has focused on economic resources examining levels and kinds of investment, public expenditures and policy instruments for influencing private economic behavior, such as price incentives. This "resource gap" approach implies that the critical bottleneck to agricultural development is the availability and efficient deployment of economic resources. The second strategy has emphasized advanced technologies and argues that the main gap is technological, the absence of reliable knowledge that may be applied to increasing the productivity and efficiency of the land, labor and capital devoted to agricultural production. This has led to the expansion of agricultural research facilities, national and international, and to increased emphasis on agricultural extension and similar methods of diffusing technological information. Both the resource gap and the technology gap positions assume that the necessary organizations and institutions would be created or would adapt sufficiently to accommodate whatever economic or technological policies would be found suitable to problem-solving in rural areas.

Though academics have paid little attention to organizations, this cannot be said of political and administrative leaders in Asian countries, for as men of affairs they have recognized that organizations indeed make a difference, cannot be taken for granted, will not emerge spontaneously in response to economic policy or technological imperatives, and

are indeed indispensable to the implementation of any kind of public policy. During the past two decades Asia has been an active laboratory of experiments, administrative and associational, central and local, designed to promote rural development. These men of affairs have been as much concerned with an "institutional gap" as with any resource or technological gap. They have attempted to build institutional infrastructure and bridge the institutional gap through experiments which we attempt to describe and analyze comparatively in this report. While sufficient and appropriate resources and technologies are essential to rural development, so are requisite organizational structures which mobilize, channel and regulate their flow and use.

It is our purpose in this report to summarize, analyze and draw lessons from recent Asian experience in building and guiding organizations oriented toward rural development. Since organizations are an integral part of society they must be studied not in the abstract but directly in the context of that society. Important values may be at stake, including the political and ideological commitments of national elites. This can be a sensitive area of inquiry: data beyond formal expressions of policy and official reports of progress may be hard to gather, verify, or to evaluate. Researchers must therefore be well acquainted with the society, its institutions and its policies. While sensitive, however, the subject cannot be considered taboo because structures are essential to action, and the problems of comprehending and sustaining appropriate structures are too important to strategies of rural development to permit neglect.

We regard organizations and institutions essentially as variables in any strategy of rural development, similar to resources and technologies. Even where they set parameters on action, they are amenable to public policy choices and policy intervention, to governmentally sponsored experimentation

and action. Local organization for rural development is a subject that governments can do something about. But policy must be based on a refined understanding. The operative questions which we seek to illuminate by this comparative empirical study are: what kinds of institutions, under what conditions, for what sets of purposes, contribute to rural development?

When considering the organizational infrastructure supporting rural development, it becomes clear that whether or not there is an "organizational gap" affecting rural development performance, there is a "knowledge gap" about rural local institutions. Most studies of these are primarily descriptive and within the framework of a single discipline. Seldom are they comparable enough to draw conclusions beyond the case at hand. An assessment of the performance consequences of different local institutional arrangements with respect to rural development requires viewing agricultural, economic, political and social factors together.

Accordingly, the Rural Development Committee at Cornell University in connection with its overall interdisciplinary studies of strategies and institutions for rural development, undertook a comparative study of rural local government, with financial assistance in the form of a grant from the Asia Bureau of USAID. A series of case studies, listed in the Foreword, was commissioned to determine how rural local organizations operate in specific countries and to analyze their role in rural development.[1] These studies in turn have been

[1]There are problems of terminology and diplomacy in designating these studies, some of which are country studies and others of which are not. Since agriculture is a state (not central) government responsibility in India, separate studies were commissioned for Punjab (the most progressive state agriculturally), Andhra Pradesh (a more modal state) and Rajasthan (a more backward state agriculturally where innovative decentralization has been introduced for rural electrification). Also, we commissioned studies on local organization

analyzed to reach conclusions about that role and are presented in this volume. Readers interested in the organization and methodology employed in this project will find this discussed in an appendix on pages 107-110. Some basic demographic, economic and agricultural data on the country cases are presented in Table 1. As is evident from even casual inspection of the table, there is great variation among the cases to be considered.

From the outset, we appreciated the importance of context when assessing our data and material. Issues, relationships, and outcomes take on different meanings according to the circumstances and objectives that prevail. As the modes and structures of local organization varied widely across our set of cases, we knew we would be examining general principles of organization rather than searching for some ideal model of organization. Best models are bound to be country-specific or even regionally-specific and not general.

In making our comparisons and evaluations, we used quantitative measures as much as we thought reasonable, being aware of the limitations inherent in such analysis and trying to avoid mistaken or misleading inferences. The sources of error in interpreting data on rural development and local institutions are several. First, the cases though drawn from the same part of the world do not represent a single universe, since they include great cultural and economic variation. Present progress in rural development cannot be attributed

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and rural development on the mainland of China and the island of Taiwan. Both the Peking and Taipei governments agree that Taiwan is legally a province of China though they dispute which of them is the legitimate government of China. Thus, the Taiwan case study is not, properly speaking, a country study. Since the outer islands of Indonesia and Malaysia have such different agricultures and development problems, we have restricted the focus of these country-case studies to Java and Malaya, respectively.

Table 1. Basic Data on Country-Cases

	Population (millions) (1971)	Population Growth Rate	Per Capita Income ($) (1970)	Agricultural Product as % of GDP (1970)	Agricultural Labor Force as % (1970)	Rural Population as % (1970)
Bangladesh	77.5	3.1	103	80	71	93
China (mainland)	787.2	1.9	153	28	67	75
Egypt	34.1	2.5	199	30	55	57
India	550.4	2.4	98	45	68	79
Punjab	13.5	2.1	133	50	63	76
Indonesia	124.9	2.6	92	48	70	83
Israel	3.0	2.8	1,782	5	11	21
Japan	104.7	1.1	1,825	7	21	47
Korea	31.9	2.4	248	28	58	62
Malaysia (W.)	10.0	2.8	353	23	57	55
Pakistan	64.1	2.9	128	38	70	83
Philippines	37.9	3.2	224	30	70	66
Sri Lanka	12.8	2.3	145	33	52	80
Taiwan	14.9	2.6	392	16	42	41
Thailand	35.3	3.1	186	29	77	85
Turkey	36.1	2.5	302	28	69	63
Yugoslavia	20.6	1.0	835	19	53	64

Sources: Population: UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 19; Taiwan population extrapolated from FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1971. Population Growth Rate: different sources give a surprising range of figures for this, so the mean growth rate from five sources is shown here: World Bank, TRENDS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1973), Table 1.2 for 1960-70; UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 19 for 1963-71 rate and Table 21 for rate of "natural increase"; FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1972, Table 3 for 1961-71; U.S. Dept. of State publication for 1970 rate. Per Capita Income: mean per capita income from three sources: World Bank, TRENDS, op. cit., Table 1.4 for 1970; UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 187 for 1970: U. S. Dept. of State, op. cit., for 1970. Agricultural Product: UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 183, plus sources from monographs. Agricultural Labor Force: FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1972, Table 5; Taiwan from FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1971. Rural Population: UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, Table 20. Punjab sources from our case study monograph.

Table 1. Continued

	Cultivated Area[a] (000 ha)	Land:Man Ratio (cult. ha. per capita)	Average Farm Size (ha)	Irrigated Area as % Cultivated Area	Fertilizer Nutrients Use (1971) (kg/ha)	Cereal Yields 1970-72 (kg/ha)
Bangladesh	9,069	.117	1.3	8	6	1,557
China (mainland)	111,200	.141	1.0[b]	31	40	1,789
Egypt	2,852	.083	1.6	100	140	3,935
India	164,610	.299	2.5	18	16	1,130
Punjab	5,724	.425	5.8	71	158	2,142
Indonesia	18,000	.144	1.1	38	12	2,062
Israel	417	.138	6.0[b]	41	145	1,873
Japan	5,446	.052	1.2	48	390	5,179
Korea	2,311	.072	0.9	33	259	3,392
Malaysia (W.)	2,856	.318	4.3	40[c]	59	2,842
Pakistan	19,235	.300	2.4	65	9	1,232
Philippines	11,145	.294	3.6	10[d]	16	1,261
Sri Lanka	1,979	.155	1.6	52[c]	43	2,288
Taiwan	545	.037	1.1	58	296	3,686[e]
Thailand	11,415	.323	3.5	28[f]	8	1,939
Turkey	27,378	.758	5.0	6	17	1,393
Yugoslavia	8,173	.398	3.8	2	82	2,635

[a]Includes area in permanent crops as well as arable area.

[b]China and Israel have collective agriculture, so these figures are calculated based on estimated family size to arrive at somewhat comparable figures.

[c]For arable area only; Malaysia has 73% of cultivated area in permanent crops; Sri Lanka has 55%.

[d]For irrigated rice area only. [e]1970-71. [f]Potential of existing systems, not fully utilized.

Sources: Cultivated Area: FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1972, Table 1. Land:Man Ratio: Cultivated Area divided by 1971 Population. Average Farm Size: FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1972, Table 2, except Bangladesh, China, Israel and Taiwan calculated according to family size. Irrigated Area and Fertilizer Use: From Table 7 below. Cereal Yields: From Table 5 below. Punjab sources from our case study monograph.

unambiguously to any one cause given the heterogeneity of cases. These represent only a sub-set of underdeveloped countries, and while we think our conclusions have general application, we appreciate that some modifications must be made to apply to any specific country or locality.

A second and related limitation is the number of cases considered. Though this is one of the most extensive empirical projects undertaken in development studies, it was designed for depth. With a sample of 16, controlling for variables such as opportunity for trade or ethnic homogeneity would lead to sub-samples too small for meaningful statistical generalization. Given the depth of our case studies, however, augmented by careful aggregate data analysis, we think comparative analysis of the material can yield conclusions having validity and some general applicability.

Third, the cases are marked by different policy contexts, and have different objectives to be met. Comparisons of performance must take this into account. If, for example, we look at rates of increase in grain yields over the decade of the 1960s, Japan ranks relatively low among the cases because of its previous success in achieving the highest absolute yield levels in the world and because of its present diversification of production out of grains and indeed out of agriculture. A low rate of increase is usually a sign of poor performance, but not in this case, so analysis must take this into account. If food self-sufficiency is taken as a criterion of performance, one of the poorest cases is Sri Lanka (Ceylon). But this overlooks the fact that the British colonial authorities planned Ceylon's economy for the export of tea and rubber with rice to be imported. During the period 1955-1970, rice self-sufficiency increased rapidly, from 53 to 73 percent, yet in absolute terms, through little fault of the Sri Lanka government, the record looks mediocre. Apart from this, Sri Lankan governments over the last 20 years have put great emphasis on increased welfare and

equity within their society. On production grounds, Sri Lankan performance has in some respects been satisfactory and in others not very good. Yet by welfare criteria, Sri Lanka has made some remarkable progress in terms of health, literacy and income redistribution. We can and do report performance according to these various criteria, all of which must be seen in terms of the policy objectives sought. Most cases can be judged as successful according to at least one or two criteria. Thus evaluation depends on the standards chosen, not on the quantitative measures alone.

Fourth, even if conceptual and policy issues can be sorted out, the data themselves are in many ways deficient. Having compared numerous sets of data, we find that sources such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the U.S. government do not agree on such standard figures as per capita income or rate of population growth for a given year (1970). We have chosen what appear to be the best available sets of data, but have employed no elaborate analytical techniques, relying instead on the straightforward measurement of means and correlations together with graphs and scattergrams to facilitate visual examination of the relationships described.

Having stated these qualifications, we feel that we can draw some useful conclusions about the role of local organization in rural devleopment and can suggest some principles of organization which have general applicability. We have not been looking for a model which can be implanted or transplanted. Rather, to use the metaphor of agricultural scientists, we have been trying to evaluate the experience with rural local institutions in such a way as to aid in "varietal selection and improvement," understanding that one starts best with local varieties and seeks, by introducing new characteristics through cross-breeding, to arrive at more productive structures.

CHAPTER II

THE FUNCTIONS OF LOCAL ORGANIZATION IN RURAL DEVELOPMENT

How Do Local Organizations Relate to Rural Development?

While most analyses and perceptions of local organization focus on institutions individually and separately, our studies make clear that organization must be seen in terms of a system of institutions performaing various functions in the rural sector of a particular country. We found no case where only one institution was carrying the full responsibility for rural development or where complementarities among institutions were not as important as what each institution itself did. We must look at farmers' associations and townships government in Taiwan, or village councils and land reform cooperatives and the local branches of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, plus their interactions with the state administration.

At the same time that our focus must encompass vertical connections, so local organizations are seen in the context of their linkages to levels of organization above the village community, all the way up to and including national institutions. We have found that local institutions which are separated and isolated from other levels are likely to be impotent developmentally. Local autonomy which has long been a central concern of students and some political leaders, by itself provides little leverage for development. While there are isolated instances of local organizations taking initiative, mobilizing resources and accomplishing certain development objectives, in most of the countries considered, the cumulative effect of such efforts has been negligible. What count are systems or networks of organization both vertically

and horizontally, that make local development more than an enclave phenomenon.

The central government in all countries controls essential resources for rural development. Thus the problem is how to match up central and local resources for effecting improved production practices and standards of living. Local organizations facilitate, and in many cases are required for effective use of central resources and sufficient mobilization of local resources. It is also true that the central government can exploit, inhibit and even repress local initiative, so there must be some reciprocity for the relationship to be productive in more than narrow centrist terms.

Following other students of local government, we had expected to find local autonomy to be an independent variable supporting development. But however clear the relationship in principle, we do not find local autonomy by itself as an "autonomous" determinant in practice. We find more relevance in variables relating to linkage between and among organizations, both vertically and horizontally.

A further reason for viewing local organizations as part of a system of government effort in rural development is that local institutions have important implications for the center, and these should be the object of study as well as any "self-contained" consequences of local institutions. It is common to regard power as a fixed quantity, so that an increase in one person's power can only come at the expense of someone else. Central-local power relations are not, however, or at least need not be, "zero-sum" relations; the gain of one is not necessarily the loss of the other. It all depends on the objectives sought. If the rural development objectives of the center are consonant with the interests of local people, the ability of the center to achieve its aims will depend in large part upon the "power" of localities. And vice versa, the capability of local communities to accelerate

their development is enhanced by central government capabilities in this area. Thus, as long as their developmental aims are compatible, the levels of government are interdependent and mutually supportive.

It may be thought that where the central government is strong and local institutions are weak, this makes it easier for the former to pursue its policies. Yet insofar as the strength of the center derives from the weakness of the periphery, this is a hollow power for all but the narrowest of aims. For developmental purposes, it is possible and necessary to have strong, active organization at both central and local levels, indeed at intermediate levels as well, mobilizing resources and putting them to work as part of an overall plan of action cooperatively determined.

The study of local institutions abounds with ideological and extreme positions, in particular, two positions based on antithetical and dubious views of the rural populace. The paternalistic approach assumes that rural people are passive and fatalistic, uninterested in improvement of their lives and incapable of initiative in making improvements. They are therefore thought to be incapable of maintaining local organizations for self-improvement. The implication of this view is that all useful initiatives must come from the central government and its administration. The consequence is a top-down pattern of development activity, in which rural people are always the objects or "recipients" of central ideas, plans, schemes and services. Local communities are expected to respond appreciatively and need only do as they are told.

An opposing view is the populistic approach which assumes that rural people are vitally interested in change and can transform their communities if only the politicians and bureaucrats would leave them alone. The people know best, according to this view, and should not be interfered with. The proposed mode of rural development thus is to be from the

bottom up. If it is acknowledged that the central government has any role to play, it is to be in keeping with a strict division of labor; the spheres of central and local action should be kept separate. This approach stresses local autonomy, which we have already discounted as sufficient in itself, however attractive is the principle of self-reliance.

Both approaches are fallacious. First, they derive from unreal stereotypes of rural people, who are neither as inert and ignorant as the first assumes, nor as virtuous and wise as assumed in the second. Each community is likely to be heterogeneous. Perhaps many members are uninterested or unavailable to contribute to local organization and development efforts, but probably some can provide leadership, given the opportunity and some support. Our studies indicate that on the whole, rural people are considerably more capable and responsive than the paternalistic model of social change suggests, but generally less able to change their lives autonomously than the populistic model presumes.

There is a deep-rooted contradiction in the paternalistic approach to rural development, which expects that passive "recipients" will become active cultivators and responsible citizens. On the other hand, the populistic approach neglects the common fact that entrenched local interests can dominate organizations at the community level. Unless there are some rules and even controls from higher levels, local organizations are likely to serve minority rather than majority needs. In subsequent chapters, we will be considering the sharing of functions and of authority among levels of government and among channels of organization. Here we only want to make it clear why we must look at local organizations in terms of an institutionalized system which is neither top-down nor bottom-up, nor exclusively "governmental." What appears to make the difference in promoting rural development is the network of decision-making with resulting communication, co-

operation and follow-up, to mobilize and coordinate available resources toward mutually agreed-on changes in the rural sector.

How Do Systems of Local Organization Activate Rural Development?

Rural Development Functions. We find it useful to consider six functions or sets of activities that rural institutional systems can perform and that do in fact contribute to rural development. Our studies confirmed these functions as relevant and reasonably comprehensive categories of analysis. How they are performed, and by what specific organizations, varies from case to case, but analyzing these variations gives insight into the role of local organization in rural development.

1. Planning and Goal Setting: any deliberate effort at promoting rural development--one that does not rely entirely on private market activities or on autonomous changes--involves some goal setting and choices about the allocation of limited resources to alternative purposes. Local organizations can provide more detailed information on local conditions and possibilities than central agencies can acquire or handle. They can also adapt general priorities and policies to specific circumstances and needs. Hence, the effectiveness of planning and the efficiency with which available resources can be utilized are seen as related to the involvement of local organizations in rural development planning and goal setting.

2. Resource mobilization: any purposeful and [illegible]ded action requires the mobilization of resources--funds, materials, labor, intellectual creativity, information and authority--which are then deployed toward the various goals and priorities established for rural development programs. Resource mobilization on a substantial scale requires the efforts of local

institutions. Local institutions by knowing the availability of local resources and the terms on which these can be secured are in a position to mobilize them for rural development efforts in ways that central governments cannot. Thus, while central governments can mobilize significant resources by their own efforts, any maximization of resources for rural development will entail organized local efforts as well.

3. Provision of services: perhaps the most critical set of activities performed by the institutional infrastructure is to get needed materials and services--water for irrigation, fertilizer, credit, extension information, marketing assistance--to the farmer. These provide essential inputs to agricultural production which must be made available from off-farm sources to mix with the farmers' own land and labor if production is to be increased. Each service needs to be considered separately because there can be different ways of distributing it. Getting adequate services down to the farm level requires some form of organization, whether it be a government agency, a cooperative, a local council or private marketing channels.

4. Integration of services: inputs to farm production can be made available through a variety of channels, but they must arrive for the farmer in the right quantities and at the right time. The process of coordinating at the farm level the multiple materials and services which come from different channels in the institutional system is a major problem in the administration of rural development. To get consistent integration of inputs there must be channels for farmers to communicate requirements and to voice complaints effectively, which is to say there must be "feedback" and enough "clout" to get private and public sector response. Local institutions can play a significant role in this function, which is poorly performed in most developing countries.

5. Control of administration: many of the services

required by farmers are channeled and delivered by administrative agencies of government. Bureaucratic administration, especially when directed to weak and dispersed clients, is frequently impaired by rigidities and political influences which combine to disadvantage the small farmer. Thus the means by which administration is held accountable are important to rural development performance. The political system and the administration itself may seek to enforce such accountability, but local organization can provide one of the critical means for keeping a check on rural administration.

6. Making claims: the needs and demands of farmers who are the intended beneficiaries of rural development must be expressed so that the goals, priorities and operations of rural development programs can be responsive to or at least take account of their requirements. Farmers are not a monolithic group with a single set of interests and, in any case, they are competing for scarce resources with other groups in society. Thus the institutions through which demands are articulated and processed, and in particular local institutions, are important elements of the infrastructure for rural development.

Organizational Channels. These several functions can be performed, more or less well, by various organizational channels which serve to link the farming community and the national institutions controlling resources and policies. We have considered five alternative kinds of institutional channels which can perform different rural development functions, separately or in combination (see Figure 1). The specific forms or name of a channel can vary from country to country, but in all cases, for example, there is some state administration performing some linking functions. Also, in all cases, there is private sector activity, even within socialist economic systems. Of special interest in this study are local governments and associated organizations as alternative

Figure 1: Alternative Channels for Rural Development Activity



and complementary channels. Of possible relevance and interest also are political organizations, which may or may not exist in a particular country. If they do they may or may not contribute to rural development there. The case studies have permitted us to analyze how and how well the several rural development functions are discharged by (or within) the respective channels. These channels are:

1. State administration: this refers to agents of the state, whether national, regional or provincial, who are appointed by these authorities, are responsible to them and perform activities under their guidance and authority. They are usually organized through bureaucratic procedures in functionally specialized departments or agencies, such as extension services, irrigation departments or credit institutions. Thus multiple state administrative agencies are likely to be operating in any local area and to be involved in rural development. Unless responsible to local government bodies, state administration has no direct accountability to the clients it serves except through political and policy direction from on high.

2. Local government: the form and function of these local institutions will vary from country to country, and even sometimes within countries. Basically, these are public bodies endowed with some legal authority, which provide some public services (though not necessarily relating to agriculture as such), have some accountability to a local constituency, and do not depend solely on the state administration for the conduct of their affairs. It is possible that there is no local government organization in a particular case, that no local authorities can command or allocate resources on behalf of local needs, that development activities are handled entirely through bureaucratic or private sector initiative. It is also possible that local governments where they exist undertake no rural development responsibilities.

Our case studies have assessed whether and to what extent such local organizations are engaged in such developmental efforts.

3. Associational organizations: these are membership bodies which, in the context of Asian rural development, are likely to be sponsored and supported by government, but which permit and even foster participation by members in decisions affecting the progress of their farming and their community. In particular, cooperatives or farmers' associations may be designated by government to perform rural development functions such as the retailing of credit, the storage and sale of fertilizer and pesticides, and the initial processing of crops for marketing. Associational groups are usually federated from local to regional and national structures to perform more effectively as rural development channels. These organizations may or may not be connected with local government bodies.

4. Political organizations: this refers primarily to political party structures which may be organized and active at the local level and thus provide a channel for performing some rural development functions, especially linking the locality to provincial and national centers of power. In a similar fashion, locally-based members of provincial or national legislatures representing local interests to higher decision centers also can provide political channels for rural development promotion and oversight.

5. Private sector: networks of private business firms ranging from national and international corporations to local shop keepers and money lenders may be active in the countryside. By providing services such as furnishing of credit and fertilizers and processing and marketing crops, private organizations may perform many functions essential to the agricultural economy. They are distinctive from other channels in that they are not accountable to local or national authorities, though some attempt may be made to regulate them.

Private sector organizations can have an interest in promoting rural development insofar as their profitability is increased thereby, but development as such and the advancement of smallholders and laborers is not their prime objective. Within the range of private sector organizations we include also special interest groups or lobbies which take initiative to influence rural development policy at least in certain directions.

In each country, then, there is a complex of institutions and organization that, with varying degrees of success, can relate local communities to intermediate and national centers in coping with the tasks of rural development. Considering exclusively only one channel of organization will ignore the critical interactions among them. As stated already, we are particularly concerned with the role of those organizations having some local participation and some local accountability, linking farmers and their families to systems of activity and innovation beyond the locality. Our research on local governance and rural development permits comparison, both descriptively and quantitatively, among countries on the extent to which local institutions perform essential rural development functions. In Appendix C (pp. 115-143) we present summary tables for each of the cases studied, showing the involvement of the respective channels in discharging these functions. These descriptions have provided the basis for estimating in numerical terms the relative importance of the respective channels in each case for rural development.

CHAPTER III

EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN LOCAL ORGANIZATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

The relationships between local organization and rural development are, not surprisingly, diverse, intricate and involved. First, rural development is not one-dimensional but rather encompasses a range of productivity and welfare achievements. Second, local organization, as indicated in the previous chapter, is usually a complex system, encompassing various structures. Its value depends on the quality as well as the extent of its functioning. Further, the relationship between local organization and rural development is interactive; improvements in each appear to strengthen the other. Not only does the effective operation of local organization appear to promote rural development, but the latter provides resources and impetus for better and more extensive organization. In the preceding section we identified a number of functions critical for rural development which local organizations can and do perform. Thus despite the recursiveness of the relationship, we feel justified in analyzing it in terms of local organization being at least one of the "independent variables" affecting the "dependent variable" of rural development.

The Objectives of Rural Development

In our analysis, we identified three central dimensions of rural development, which encompass more than agricultural development though this is a major dimension. We are concerned with rural development as a process leading to improvements in (1) agricultural productivity, (2) rural incomes, and (3) rural welfare, in terms of health, nutrition, education and

other features of a satisfactory life, such as security and equity. These are generally correlated with one another but there can be exceptions. Agricultural productivity can rise without raising incomes, if input costs mount or land tenancy arrangements do not benefit the cultivators themselves. Also, increased incomes may not lead to greater welfare if, for example, public services are not expanded to provide better health and education opportunities or if income distribution becomes more unequal.

We see each of these dimensions as important for assessing rural development: productivity because it increases the supply of food and other products available for consumption or export; incomes because they enhance the range of alternatives which rural people can choose from; and welfare because it represents the ultimate justification for any policy. It is unfortunate that data on rural incomes are much harder to get and evaluate than figures on agricultural productivity, though we have been able to find reasonably comparable data on income distribution. The level and distribution aspects of income are, fortunately, reflected in productivity and welfare data, so we feel that focusing on these other two dimensions is satisfactory for purposes of evaluating rural development.

Comparing Performance of Local Organization

Local organization is more difficult to measure as a variable. We are dealing with structures as diverse as the panchayat in India, the kabupaten and kecamaten in Indonesia, the barrio in the Philippines, townships in Korea and Taiwan, communes in China and Yugoslavia, village councils in Egypt and Sri Lanka, etc., plus cooperatives or farmers' associations in these and other countries. Also, as noted already, organization is not the only factor affecting or determining rural development. Resources and technology, among other factors, play important roles so we are trying to ascertain

an "other-things-being-equal" effect. To do this, we look at overall relationships, making aggregate comparisons and drawing some conclusions in this chapter, with more detailed analysis drawing out policy implications in the succeeding chapters.

Because local organization has many aspects, we find that it cannot be readily reduced to a single numerical value for each of the cases. After consideration of the cases, we concluded that organizational linkage reaching down to--and up from--the various levels of sub-national organizations, and the relevance of these organizations to rural development, constituted the most significant aspects of local organization for analytical purposes. Two separate analyses were devised for getting at these variables, putting the knowledge gained from the case studies into some comparable and quantified form. The methods of scoring the cases are discussed in the appendix. After the cases had been scored on these two variables it was apparent that they could be grouped into two categories--the more organized and the less organized--and analyzed accordingly. The comparison of inter-group differences is chosen as a method of analysis because it allows for some margin of error in scoring, which is always possible given the complexity of the variables and the cases.

We would note also that in a number of the less organized cases there have been organizational changes in recent years which would, if the new local organizations become institutionalized, change the classification. Our scoring and evaluation do not try to take these recent changes into account, e.g., the Integrated Rural Development Programs now set up or being established in Pakistan and Bangladesh in the post-Ayub period, the revitalized Farmers' Association in Malaysia or the new samahang nayon cooperatives in the Philippines. It is as yet too early to tell what the impact of these organizations will be, though they embody many of the

organizational principles we delineate in Chapter IV. With this proviso, that only institutions with some period of operation were being considered, we analyzed the linkage and relevance of local organizations for rural development.

(a) Linkage between and among different levels of organization results from interaction and exchange--of information and other resources--on a regular and reliable basis. To make estimates of linkage, drawing on the documentation of the case studies, we considered the extent and effectiveness of communication and influence, both downwards to and upwards from four levels of government below the national center. The size and names of sub-national units differ from case to case, but generally speaking, the following levels of organization--and the connections among them--can be analyzed:

(I) the local level, with population units usually in the range of 500 to 5,000. Sometimes a single "natural village" and sometimes several "villages." Examples are barrios in the Philippines, brigades and production teams in China, desas in Indonesia, hamlets in Japan and Korea, kampongs in Malaysis, kibbutzim and moshavim in Israel, "local communities"in Yugoslavia, panchayats in India.

(II) the next level, with population generally in the range of 20,000 to 50,000, though possibly between 10,000 and 100,000. Examples are amphoe in Thailand, blocks in India, communes in China and Yugoslavia, divisions in Sri Lanka, kecemetan in Indonesia, mukim in Malaysia, mura in Japan, townships in Korea and Taiwan, or unions in Bangladesh and Pakistan. This is often seen as the sub-district level.

(III) above this is the level usually known as the district level, with population of one or more hundred thousand. Other designations besides "district" are changwat in Thailand, counties in China, Korea and Taiwan,

kabupaten in Indonesia, sub-province in Turkey, thanas in Bangladesh, and tehsils in Pakistan.

(IV) the largest sub-national level will have population generally in the millions and the common designation is province, though we find governorates in Egypt, prefectures in Japan, states in Malaysia, or districts in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Provinces in China and states in India go up to 100 million in population.

There was no point in trying to compare simply the "amount" of organization at sub-national levels, since we were concerned with functional relations. Rather we tried to indicate how much downward and upward linkage there was in each case, considering connections between as many as four levels of sub-national organization, scored on a scale of 0 to 5 and summing them for a total linkage score. We were especially interested in comparing the linkage down to and up from the local level of organization, though this could be evaluated only with some reference to linkage with higher levels. The direction of linkage was viewed in terms of whether the initiative came from above or from below, and the extent of linkage varied according to the reliability with which upper--or lower-levels of organization could expect that their requests or demands would be complied with, that information would be passed on as needed, that cooperative efforts could be expected. (See Table 2 for the case scores and Appendix B for further explanation.)

(b) Relevance for rural development needed also to be considered. A second way of comparing the cases was to analyze which channels perform which rural development functions, independently by the case study authors, matrixes were constructed, apportioning a total of 100 points--10 points for each activity--among the respective channels.

Table 2. Relative Strength of Organizational Linkages

	Total Score	Downward Linkage	Upward Linkage	Local/ Village Linkage
Yugoslavia	32	18	14	7
Israel	32	18	14	7
China	29	19	10	6
Sri Lanka	28	16	12	6
Japan (1960)	26	17	9	6
Taiwan	26	17	9	6
Egypt	24	16	8	4
Punjab (India)	23	15	8	3
Japan (1920)	23	16	7	5
Turkey	22	14	8	2
Philippines	21	14	7	3
Korea	20	16	4	3
Malaysia	19	14	5	1
India	18	12	6	2
Bangladesh	17	12	5	1
Pakistan	17	13	4	1
Thailand	15	10	5	1
Indonesia	13	9	4	1

These functions are:

(a) planning and goal setting [10]
(b) resource mobilization [10]
(c) provision of services [50]
  (1) water [10]
  (2) fertilizer [10]
  (3) credit [10]
  (4) extension information [10]
  (5) marketing [10]
(d) integration of services [10]
(e) control over bureaucracy serving rural development [10]
(f) making claims for more and better support of rural development [10]

The total for each channel represented its respective contribution to the performance of rural development functions. This gave a reasonably reliable estimate of the relative importance of local government and associated organizations which we took to be the key local organizations of interest. In some cases political organization could be considered as well, but we judged it better to limit the analysis to these two channels

which are more comparable on an inter-case basis and which are more central to rural development functions in any case. The numbers for each channel are shown in Table 3 and can be read as percentages. The matrixes for each case and the methods of calculation are presented in Appendix C (pp. 115-143.

Table 3. Relative Importance of Organizational Channels for Rural Development

	Local Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Polit. Org's.
Yugoslavia	57	13	16	14
Japan (1960)	56	23	15	6
Israel	54	34	6	6
Egypt	43	45	8	4
Taiwan	43	40	12	5
China	42	41	3	14
Japan (1920)	42	31	26	1
Sri Lanka	42	34	11	13
Korea	32	52	16	0
Punjab (India)	27	32	36	5
India	22	41	29	8
Indonesia	22	55	22	1
Philippines	20	45	32	3
Bangladesh	18	44	35	3
Thailand	17	50	33	0
Turkey	15	44	33	8
Pakistan	12	48	37	4
Malaysia	6	62	27	5

(c) Grouping the cases appeared rather obvious once these two comparative analyses had been done and evaluated. It is rather clear which are the "more organized" and which the "less organized" cases in terms of local organization with respect to rural development activity. The gross difference can best be seen by combining the linkage and local organization scores shown in Tables 2 and 3. The classification of cases is as follows, with the combined score for each case shown in brackets:

More Organized	Less Organized
China [71]	Bangladesh [35]
Egypt [67]	India [40]
Israel [86]	Indonesia [34]
Japan: 1920 [65]; 1960 [82]	Malaysia [25]
Korea [52]	Pakistan [27]
Sri Lanka [70]	Philippines [41]
Taiwan [69]	Thailand [32]
Yugoslavia [89]	Turkey [37]
Punjab (India) [50]	

Korea and Turkey are the most ambiguous of the cases between the two groups, but are classified as they are for these reasons. The "linkage" score for Korea is lowered by the limited upward communication and influence from lower levels of government, but its downard linkage is quite high, and there is more local linkage. Also, owing to its well-structured cooperatives, the importance of local organization for rural development is considerable. In the case of Turkey, on the other hand, such importance of local organization is rather low. Much of Turkey's linkage is electoral rather than through local government, party or cooperative linkages. This can be seen from its low "local linkage" score.

The "more organized" cases all score 3 or above on this latter indicator, and all score, with the exception of Turkey, more than 20 points for total linkage. The state of Punjab in India is treated here as a special case because its pattern is different from that in the rest of India. Its linkage is such that it ranks well above the modal state in India, and while the relevance of formal local organization is only somewhat greater for the Punjab, the role played by cooperatives and political organization there is more like that of the more organized cases. Punjab is shown with them in tables of inter-group comparisons though it is not figured in with them in calculations of statistical differences.

The "more organized" cases are not a homogeneous group, their per capita incomes ranging from about $150 to $1,800

in 1970 and their geographic spread from East to West Asia. Cultural factors by themselves cannot explain this grouping. In almost all cases, the extent of local organization involved in rural development tasks is a consequence of policies and investments made by national leadership over a period of years. The mura (administrative village) in Japan and the commune in China, the village councils set up by colonial authorities in Sri Lanka (Ceylon) and by military authorities in Egypt, the Farmers' Associations in Taiwan and the cooperatives in Korea, the kibbutz in Israel and the neighborhood associations in Yugoslavia all were created to meet more effectively the economic, social and political needs in each place.

Before we proceed to show the associations found between local organization (viewed in independent variable terms) and rural development (seen as the dependent variable), some discussion of causal inferences is in order. Given the complexity of the variables and the existence of other variables, no simple relationship is to be expected. Further, there are surely some ways in which rural development itself ought to contribute to more and better local organization, as the resource base expands, and there are more requirements of communication and cooperation among levels of government. By analyzing local organization in terms of its functional contributions to rural development, we think the direction of causation is more clearly that of organization contributing to development. But even the reverse inference would suggest the importance of local organization being developed as a concomitant if not a cause of rural change. Development itself requires many alterations in the social and political structure of a country, as new demands and new power balances emerge, as the population is more capable of participating in the processes and direction of rural change. Expanded local organization with upward linkages in particular, as well as horizontal linkages among organizations, seems more important as development proceeds, though downward linkages may be more significant in the earlier stages.

Agricultural Productivity

Agricultural productivity is basic to rural development by any definition. Without high and/or increasing yields and production, rural income and nutrition, which are associated with other aspects of welfare, cannot be maintained in the face of rising population. Generating a surplus of resources which can be put into developmental investment also depends in large part on a dynamic agricultural base. No single criterion of agricultural productivity will suffice, however, since different aspects are represented by different measures. We have focused on three measures. First, yields of cereal crops (in kilograms per sown hectare) as these average yields reflect absolute levels of productivity in the most comparable manner. Yields represent the extent and intensity of use of land and labor resources, augmented by water and capital inputs. Second, we look at the increase in yields of cereal crops to compare relative improvements in productivity, using 1952-56 as the base period since it is reasonably "normal" and gives a 20-year perspective. Division of the period around 1962-64 gives us an opportunity to examine the differences, if any, between pre- and post-"Green Revolution" changes in agricultural production. Third, the increase in total agricultural production per capita (in value terms) indicates growth in non-food as well as food commodities relative to growth in population. From this we can assess the overall sufficiency of agricultural performance. A composite ranking of the cases is shown in Table 4, with rankings on individual indicators shown in parentheses. The data summarized in this table are presented in more detail in Tables 5 and 6 which follow.

The inter-group differences are consistent and large, though there are some exceptions to the rule. Malaysia, which is lowest in local organization concerned with rural development, though about mid-range for downward linkage, ranks about fifth in overall agricultural performance. This country has

Table 4. Summary Indicators of Agricultural Productivity (rank in parentheses)

	Average Yields for Cereals (1970-72) (kg/ha)	Index of Increase in Cereal Yields (1952-56=100)	Index of Per Capita Total Agr. Production (1952-56=100)
*Yugoslavia	2,635 (6)	233 (1)	152 (2)
*Korea	3,392 (4)	198 (2)	140 (3)
*Japan	5,179 (1)	147 (8)	124 (5)
*Israel	1,873 (10)	165 (4)	217 (1)
Malaysia	2,842 (5)	149 (7)	134 (4)
*Egypt	3,935 (2)	156 (6)	111 (10)
*Taiwan	3,686 (3)	141 (10)	122 (6)
Thailand	1.939 (9)	143 (9)	119 (7)
*Sri Lanka	2,288 (7)	159 (5)	100 (14)
Pakistan	1,232 (15)	166 (3)	116 (9)
*China	1,789 (11)	131 (14)	117 (8)
Indonesia	2,062 (8)	136 (12)	96 (15)
Turkey	1,393 (13)	129 (13)	109 (11)
India	1,130 (16)	140 (11)	104 (12)
Philippines	1,261 (14)	127 (15)	101 (13)
Bangladesh	1,557 (12)	110 (16)	86 (16)
*Punjab	2,135	196	248**
*More organized Cases--Average (N = 8)	3,097	166	135
Less organized Cases--Average (N = 8)	1,677	138	108

** Per capita total food production.

Sources: See Tables 5 and 6.

Table 5. Increase in Average Cereals Yields and Index of Yields for Two Periods

	Average Yields of All Cereals (kg/ha)			Index of Average Yields	
	1970-72	1962-64	1952-56	1962-64	1970-72
*Japan	5,179	4,221	3,503	120	147
*Egypt	3,935	3,301	2,509	132	156
*Taiwan	3,686#	3,581	2,609	137	141#
*Korea	3,392	2,679	1,706	157	198
*Yugoslavia	2,635	1,970	1,128	175	233
*Sri Lanka	2,288	1,878	1,431	131	159
*Israel	1,873	1,420	1,103	129	165
*China	1,789	1,560	1,356	115	131
(*Punjab)	(2,135)	(1,180)	(1,089)	(108)	(196)
Malaysia	2,842	2,433	1,986	123	149
Indonesia	2,062	1,523	1,506	101	136
Thailand	1,939	1,799	1,352	133	143
Bangladesh	1,557	1,657	1,404**	118	110
Turkey	1,393	1,199	1,073	112	129
Pakistan	1,232	875	742**	118	166
India	1,130	963	805	120	140
Philippines	1,261	1,030	989	104	127
*More organized cases (N = 8)	3,097	2,576	1,918	137	166
Less organized cases (N = 8)	1,677	1,436	1,232	116	138
World Average	1,803	1,473	1,230	120	147

#1970-71 instead of 1970-72 yields, as FAO ceased publishing separate Taiwan data in 1972.

**Separate Bangladesh and Pakistan figures for 1952-56 are extrapolated according to respective 1962-64 yields levels to account for combined average yield of 1,089 kg/ha in 1952-56, as no separate yield levels are given for this first period in FAO sources

Sources: FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK, 1966, Tables 24 and 25; 1971, Tables 24 and 25; 1972, Table 12.

Table 6. Index of Increase in Food and Agricultural Production for Two Periods (1952-56=100)

	Food Production per Capita		Total Agricultural Production		Agricultural Production per Capita	
	1962-64	1970-72	1962-64	1970-72	1962-64	1970-72
*Egypt	113	113	139	170	112	111
*Israel	159	205	231	381	165	217
*Japan	120	127	130	148	119	124
*Korea	131	140	160	214	127	140
*Sri Lanka	111	104	133	153	106	100
*Taiwan	106	121#	146	206#	107	122#
*Yugoslavia	136	155	149	181	135	152
(*Punjab) (1951=100)	(1961=143)	(1971=248)	(1960-62=100)	(216)	(*China)	(117)
Bangladesh	103**	84	125**	139	101**	86
India	104	105	127	149	105	104
Indonesia	94	96	113	145	94	96
Malaysia	115	148	138	219	105	134
Pakistan	103**	117	125**	184	101**	116
Philippines	101	100	137	175	103	101
Thailand	113	114	151	200	116	119
Turkey	105	107	138	176	106	109
*More organized cases	125	138	155	208	124	135
(N = 7)	125	138	155	208	124	135
Less organized cases	105	109	132	173	104	108
(N = 8)	105	109	132	173	104	108
World Average	109	115	129	157	108	113

#1970-71 instead of 1970-72, as FAO ceased publishing separate indexes for Taiwan in 1972.

**Separate Bangladesh and Pakistan index numbers not available for 1952-56, so 1962-64 index numbers are shown as the same, but 1970-72 index numbers are calculated based on separate 1962-64 base; as the two wings of Pakistan were agriculturally approximately the same size, showing a common index number for 1962-64 will not affect inter-group comparisons.

Sources: FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1966 Tables 7,8, 10, 11 and 12; 1971, Tables 10, 11 and 12; 1972, Tables 8, 9 and 10. 1952-56 data for China not sufficient to calculate all index numbers, but index number for change in agricultural production per capita 1952-56 to 1970-72 is estimated at 117.

one of the more effective civil service organizations and has had few resource constraints over the past few decades. China, on the other hand, having been near the limits of its production under traditional technology, has not done as well as other well organized countries. Sri Lanka's standing is greatly lowered by the stagnation of its tea and rubber plantation success. In terms of increasing yield, which reflects improved small farmer cultivation, Sri Lanka tops Malaysia. We should note also that the poor showing of Japan and Taiwan in terms of increased yield reflects these countries' past achievement of very high yields and their recent deployment of agricultural resources into non-cereal and even non-agricultural production. Pakistan has shown a phenomenal increase in yield from its low cereal production base, as did Israel. What is interesting is that the more organized cases generally achieved much higher percentage increases from their already high base relative to the less organized cases. For the latter cases, we would have expected a greater relative increase in yields since their gains should have been easier from their rather lower base.

The differences between the two groups are still greater when per capita production is considered. This is due in part to the fact that the more organized cases have lower population growth than the others, as discussed and analyzed on pages 51-53 below. Whether or not organization has something to do with rates of population increase is a separate question which we need not address here. But different population growth rates do not fully explain the disparity in agricultural production per capita. True, the population in the more organized cases increased only about 70 per cent as much as in the other cases, but its per capita production more than tripled relative to the less organized cases.

Agricultural Technology

The differences in yields and production are not necessarily directly attributable only to the degree of rural organization, to be sure. The use of modern agricultural technology makes a critical contribution, but we find that this use is itself associated with rural organization. Table 7 shows fertilizer use in the cases considered. We look at a ten-year period, from 1961-65 (as a base year) to 1971 (after which world market shortages interfered with utilization). Calculating average use on the basis of total amounts and total cultivated area for the two groups, we find the more organized cases using 8.5 times more fertilizer per hectare in 1961-65 and still more than four times more in 1971. Some of the less organized countries, such as India, Pakistan and Turkey, achieved huge relative increases over the decade, tripling and even quadrupling rates of application, but from an abysmally low base, only three or four kilograms per hectare. The differential between the two groups has been narrowed but is still large. An explanation of this must go beyond simply the logistical capacity to deliver fertilizer to farmers, which depends very much on local organization, to consider the extent to which farmers in a more organized rural sector are more mobilized politically and thus can pressure officials and political representatives to make foreign exchange available to inputs or to build fertilizer factories.

The differences in irrigated area, also shown in Table 7, are less striking but still substantial. In relative terms, the more organized cases have 45 percent more of their cultivated area under irrigation. Comparisons need qualification in that neither Turkey nor Yugoslavia, as temperate zone countries, rely on irrigation. But since one is in each grouping, this does not affect the comparison. Bangladesh has a great deal of water for agriculture, indeed during flood season much too much; yet only 8 percent of its cultivated

Table 7. Fertilizer Use and Irrigation

	1961-1965 metric tons	1971 metric tons	1961-1965 kg/hectare	1971 kg/hectare	Irrigated Area as per cent of Cultivated Area
Bangladesh	39,360	41,200	4	6	8
*China	1,451,580	4,404,900	13	40	31
*Egypt	279,929	399,700	93	140	100
India	599,600	2,629,000	4	16	18
Indonesia	121,226	224,104	7	12	38
*Israel	36,197	60,570	87	145	41
*Japan	1,798,404	2,122,500	330	390	48
*Korea	334,825	598,200	145	259	33
Malaysia	47,461	168,634	17	59	40
Pakistan	60,960	263,000	3	9	65
Philippines	90,986	175,690	8	16	10
*Sri Lanka	70,956	84,290	36	43	52
*Taiwan	196,900	250,600	227	296	58
Thailand	27,600	95,277	2	8	28
Turkey	100,689	474,500	4	17	6
*Yugoslavia	389,467	669,310	48	82	2
		*More organized cases (weighted average)	34	65	32%
		*Less organized cases (weighted average)	4	15	22%

Sources: Columns 1 and 2 from FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1972, Table 115; 1971 for Taiwan. Columns 3 and 4 calculated from Columns 1 and 2 using data on cultivated area from ibid., Table 1, Column 5 from ibid., Table 1.

area has controlled water supply, and it has to cope also with a severe dry season. The differences in irrigated area reflect organizational differences in two respects; first, the organized capacity to establish irrigation systems, raising the revenue and labor to build them, which may be a task of central administration rather than local organizations, and second, the organizational capacity to operate them, which must usually be a local capacity.

Some of the more organized cases have had hundreds of years of experience with irrigation; indeed, in the cases of Egypt and China even thousands. A techno-cultural explanation of organizational capacity fails, however, to account for the cases of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh which have also had experience and opportunity for similar irrigation and cultural development. Differences in yields are surely influenced by irrigation facilities, as we see particularly with the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia which have about 40 percent irrigation and the highest cereals yields of the less organized countries. But then Pakistan ought to have nearly the highest yields, yet it ranks next to last. Irrigation clearly is of great importance in agricultural production, and it appears to be fairly closely associated with local organization, albeit possibly in both cause and effect relationships.

Adoption of new, improved varieties of cereals has been the most heralded improvement in agricultural technology during the last decade. Table 8 shows figures on the adoption of high-yielding varieties (HYVs) of rice and wheat developed by the international plant breeding institutions (IRRI and CIMMYT). Unfortunately for our purposes of comparison, almost all the countries using IRRI and CIMMYT varieties are among the less organized cases. This is itself of importance. Most of the more organized countries have been developing and extending improved cereal varieties for some years. We note that Sri Lanka had only 2.5 per cent of its rice land planted to IRRI HYVs in 1972/73, having reached 4.4 per cent two years

Table 8. Extension of High-Yielding Varieties

	1965/66	1966/67	1967/68	1968/69	1969/70	1970/71	1971/72	1972/73
		Proportion of Total Rice Area Planted to IRRI HYVs						
Bangladesh	--	negl.	0.7	1.6	2.6	4.6	6.7	11.1
India	negl.	2.5	4.9	7.3	11.5	14.9	19.9	24.7
Indonesia	--	--	--	2.4	10.3	11.2	15.9	18.0
Korea	--	--	--	--	--	--	0.2	15.6
Malaysia	10.0	14.7	20.6	20.1	26.4	30.9	35.7	38.0
Pakistan	--	negl.	0.3	19.8	29.9	36.6	50.0	43.4
Philippines	--	2.7	19.8	30.4	43.5	50.3	56.3	56.3
Sri Lanka	--	--	--	1.0	3.9	4.4	4.2	2.5
Thailand	--	--	--	--	0.1	1.5	4.0	4.9
Punjab	negl.	1.5	5.3	7.6	20.1	33.3	69.1	76.1
		Proportion of Total Wheat Area Planted to IRRI HYVs						
Bangladesh	--	--	--	7.2	7.6	11.3	11.8	17.7
India	negl.	4.2	19.6	30.0	29.6	35.5	41.1	51.5
Pakistan	0.1	1.9	16.0	38.0	43.0	52.3	56.7	55.9
Turkey	--	negl.	2.1	7.0	7.6	7.8	8.0	8.0
Punjab	negl.	3.5	37.9	57.2	69.3	69.1	72.6	78.6

Source: Dana G. Dalrymple, Imports and Plantings of High-Yielding Varieties of Wheat and Rice in the Less Developed Nations (Washington: USDA, Foreign Economic Development Service, 1974), and data supplied by Mohinder S. Mudahar.

before. Ceylonese plant scientists have been developing and diffusing higher-yielding varieties for some 30 years and these have been better suited to Sri Lankan conditions than the imported seed from IRRI, and by 1974 more than 80 per cent of the rice area was in HYVs. Sri Lanka has the scientific capacity to cross IRRI and its own HYVs now to get better indigenous strains, which do not appear in the international statistics. As reported in the case study, Japan pioneered research on rice varieties from the beginning of this century and extended them to Korea and Taiwan beginning in the 1920s. China's scientists were doing similar plant breeding research at the same time as those at IRRI, and in a quite parallel manner.[1] Already in 1965, 13 per cent of China's rice land was sown to HYVs and perhaps 30 per cent is so planted now. Adoption of improved wheat has been considerably slower, apparently due to constrained water supplies. Israel, not shown in Table 8, has made spectacular gains in cerals yields, about 9 per cent per annum, so it must have been using improved varieties rather extensively. Although not apparent from Table 8, it is clear from the yields attained in the more organized countries that they have been more progressive in technological innovation and extension over long periods of time, i.e., decades.

Rural Welfare

The available data on respective average rural income levels are not sufficient or satisfactory for comparison, so we have not been able to make a direct analysis of rural incomes, which are however reasonably well reflected in produc-

[1] On the development and extension of China's high-yielding varieties, see Benedict Stavis, Making Green Revolution: The Politics of Agricultural Development in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, 1974); also his monograph in this series, People's Communes and Rural Development in China (Ithaca, N.Y.: Rural Development Committee, 1974).

tivity and welfare measures. Among the latter we explicitly deal with income distribution on a comparative basis. Also, in the case studies themselves, we report data on rural incomes, showing trends over time. With regard to welfare indicators, data are not available for the rural population in all cases, so national measures must be used to indicate rural welfare. Where rural population constitutes the overwhelming majority of national population, as in most of our cases, these measures reflect reasonably well the relative levels of welfare of rural people. In our analysis, we restrict ourselves to rank-order comparisons, appreciating that here as in most other studies of developing countries, our measures of welfare are only approximate, containing always some margin of error. In our analysis we also compare welfare indicators with levels of per capita income, so that the welfare provided is viewed relative to overall availability of resources. As is to be expected, welfare correlates generally quite highly with per capita income; in our cases the composite ranking of welfare correlates .88 with GNP per capita. But there are some exceptions to the rule and they are mostly associated with differences in mode of local organization.

1. Nutrition. Much effort has previously gone into constructing indexes of "welfare" but none have been generally accepted. For our purposes, a simple comparison of measures of nutrition, health and education will be used to rank-order the cases, and from that ordering (giving equal weight to all three), a composite rank-ordering can be constructed. The first variable, nutrition is analyzed using two measures, average number of calories available per capita per day, and average number of grams of protein consumed per capita per day. Caloric consumption is generally taken as a measure of nutritional sufficiency, and protein consumption as a measure of nutritional quality. The figures shown in Table 9 are the most recent ones available from the Food and Agriculture Organization, but even so, some are questionable, in particular

Table 9. Summary Indicators of Population Welfare (Rank in Parentheses)

	NUTRITION		HEALTH		EDUCATION	
	Average Caloric Consumption (daily p/c)	Average Protein Consumption (grams p/c)	Life Expectancy at birth (years)	Infant Mortality (deaths/ 1,000)	Adult Literacy (% over 15 yrs.)	School Enrollment (% of pop. age 15-19)
*Israel	2,960(2)	92(1)	71.8(1)	20(3)	88(2)	82(3)
*Japan	2,500(7)	76(4)	71.7(2)	12(1)	99(1)	93(1)
*Yugoslavia	3,180(1)	92(1)	66.5(5)	43(4)	80(4)	79(5)
*Taiwan	2,620(4)	68(5)	68.1(4)	18(2)	85(2)	77(6)
*Sri Lanka	2,170(10)	50(13)	70.4(3)	48(5)	75(5)	81(4)
*Korea	2,520(6)	65(7)	61.9(7)	60(6)	71(7)	72(7)
Turkey	2,770(3)	78(3)	53.7(10)	119(12)	45(10)	54(10)
Philippines	1,940(14)	45(14)	58.5(8)	62(7)	72(6)	83(2)
Malaysia	2,460(9)	52(11)	65.3(6)	75(9)	43(11)	59(8)
Thailand	2,560(5)	52(11)	56.2(9)	68(8)	50(9)	44(13)
*China	2,170(10)	63(8)	53.4(11)	105(10)	57(8)	58(9)
*Egypt	2,500(8)	66(6)	52.7(12)	116(11)	30(13)	53(11)
India	2,070(13)	53(10)	52.6(13)	128(15)	29(14)	44(13)
Pakistan	2,160(12)	59(9)	51.3(14)	142(16)	16(16)	27(16)
Indonesia	1,790(16)	43(15)	47.5(16)	125(13)	43(11)	47(12)
Bangladesh	1,840(15)	39(16)	50.0(15) est.	125(13)	20(15) est.	35(15) est.
(Punjab)	N.A.	N.A.	(59.5)	N.A.	(33)	(68)

Sources: Nutrition: 1969-71 average caloric consumption per capita, and 1970 average consumption of protein, from Food and Agriculture Organization (New York Times, [illegible] 26, 1974, and personal communication from FAO Statistics Unit); Taiwan from FAO PRODUCTION YEARBOOK 1971, T. 136-137. Health: Life expectancy from UN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1972, T. 21, supplemented by data from country studies where more recent; China figure from "Some Projections of the population of the People's Republic of China," Community and Family Study Center, University of Chicago, 1974; Infant mortality data from R.L. Sivard, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1974 (New York: Institute of World Order, 1974). Education: Adult literacy from 1972 publication of U.S. Department of State, supplemented by data from country studies where more recent. The literacy rate officially given for Thailand is 70 percent, but this is based on attendance of temple schools, which does not assure literacy. A rural survey in the Northeast put the figure at 41 percent, and we believe that 50 percent is a reasonable national estimate. See EDUCATION IN THAILAND: A SECTOR STUDY (Bangkok: USAID/USOM/Thailand, 1971), p. 51. School Enrollment data are from Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, WORLD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL INDICATORS (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 225-227.

onsumption for Japan and Thailand, the one probably too he other too high. Otherwise, the more organized cases ank in caloric consumption at or slightly above their capita income, while the less organized cases a bit elow their ranking in income terms, with Malaysia and ppines well below their income level. In these two is may be a consequence of their relatively unequal in- ribution, discussed below. By the same token, it should hat although Egypt, China and Sri Lanka rank between tenth in caloric levels, their relative equal distri- f income raises the modal nutrition for their rural population. For the whole set of cases, caloric consumption correlates .80 and protein consumption .76 with per capita income.

2. Health. The second variable, health, is represented by measures of life expectancy at birth and infant mortality. These are proxy indicators for the quality and extent of health care. Life expectancy correlates .81 with per capita income, with only two significant exceptions: Turkey, which is four ranks below, and Sri Lanka, which is nine ranks above respective income levels. The latter Country has an effective island-wide medical system staffed in part by paramedical personnel, with almost all births supervised by professional or paraprofessional personnel, and two-thirds of births in hospitals.[1] Despite, or perhaps because of this, Sri Lanka's population growth rate is lower (2.3) than for any of the less organized cases (at $145 p/c income). Infant mortality correlates closely with life expectancy (.93), but the data reflect the spread of medical services in the countryside.

3. Education. Our measures of the third variable, education, are adult literacy and proportion of school-age population enrolled in schools. Some would argue that adult

[1] Corresponding figures for some other countries are: Taiwan 75% and 25%; Egypt 35% and 10%; Malaysia 28% and 28%; Philippines 23% and 20%; Thailand 16% and 9%. Data are for 1966 and are from the Population Council office in Colombo.

literacy be viewed as an input into the production process--literate farmers can follow written instructions and are more likely to be open to new knowledge and practices. But here we view it as a good, as something to be enjoyed for the dignity, enlightenment and security that can be derived from it. As would be expected, Israel, Japan, Taiwan and Yugoslavia as the richest countries also show very high literacy rates, but three less affluent countries, with per capita income ranging from $145 to $248, have 70 percent or more adult literacy, and two of these are cases with relatively high organization at the local level. Which is cause and effect becomes somewhat tenuous in describing the relationship. The exception--the Philippines--has made an extraordinary investment in public education, especially post-secondary, given its level of economic resources. The most exceptional performance is Sri Lanka's, ranking fifth in literacy though twelfth in income. The Islamic countries generally have a low ranking in literacy, particularly Malaysia, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, because female illiteracy is relatively high, but Indonesia ranks five places above its income level and is an exception to this statement. The same general picture holds for school enrollment, with Sri Lanka remarkably above its income level and the Philippines and Indonesia also doing better than expected according to income per capita. Turkey does less well relative to income. Overall, adult literacy correlates .75 and school enrollment .73 with per capita GNP.

We find with all these welfare measures that income level is the most important factor. The three measures of welfare taken together do not show marked departures from the ranking that might have been predicted on the basis of GNP per capita. But <u>what differences there are, are largely in the direction of more organized cases ranking higher in welfare terms than their income level would determine, and with less organized cases ranking somewhat lower.</u>

	Welfare Rank >Income Rank		Welfare Rank = Income Rank		Income Rank> Welfare Rank	
	No. of Cases	No. of Ranks	No. of Cases	No. of Ranks	No. of Cases	No. of Ranks
More Organized	3	10	3	0	2	5
Less Organized	2	4	2	0	4	8

Per capita income levels are themselves strongly associated with the extent of organization. Taking the populations of the two groups of cases to get a weighted mean average income, we find that in 1953, per capita GNP in the more organized cases was $74 and in the less organized cases $78. In 1970, the per capita incomes were $352 and $119 respectively. Thus, the greater provision of nutrition, health and education in the more organized cases even if directly attributable mostly to increased income levels is also related to the factor of organization.

4. Security. The differences in rural welfare between the two sets of cases show up more clearly when we consider other, less common, but no less salient indicators, the security which rural people enjoy in their daily lives, and the distribution of income between upper and lower groups within society. There are no aggregate statistics which adequately reflect the security or insecurity of rural people, an important aspect of rural welfare and development. We scored the cases along three dimensions of security, ranking each on a scale of 1 to 5 so that some comparisons would be possible, if only ordinal comparisons. No absolute distances between cases can be inferred from this method, but by grouping like cases and separating dissimilar cases, relative ranking is possible, and we have grouped the cases in five ranked divisions, shown in Table 11. The three dimensions were: (a) protection from natural disaster, (b) protection against violence, and (c) access to justice.

The first dimension was judged by the extent and effectiveness of government and private capacity and measures to assist rural people in the event of flood, drought, crop failure, typhoon, etc. This requires some combination of control over resources (e.g., food reserves), logistical capabilities, and government intention of responding adequately, viewed over a 20-year perspective. (Present government intentions were not the only ones considered, e.g., in Bangladesh.) Protection against violence involves the extent and effectiveness of government constraints on violence (including possibly its own) against rural people. Periods or regions of banditry, anarchy, civil war affecting the rural population, organized repression against rural people, random violence in rural areas, feuds, etc. lower this score, again viewed over a 20-year perspective. (The circumstances of Arab-Israeli warfare and "Cultural Revolution" though intermittent, lower scores for Israel and China, for example.) Finally, access to justice pertains to the extent and effectiveness of government or community institutions for ensuring equitable and speedy dispensation of justice for rural people whenever disputes arise. This is judged important because the security of rural people is enhanced if justice is meted out fairly and reliably, as well as promptly, without bribery or political favoritism and with provision of legal representation as needed. Without reliable access to institutionalized justice rural people are at the mercy of their "betters." Our hypothetical question was how quickly and assuredly would sanctions be enforced if a peasant's wife was sold adulterated flour in the market or if a landowner's son raped a peasant's daughter. Would the offending merchant or youth be called to account and punished appropriately or not? These three different dimensions do not necessarily encompass all aspects of security for rural people, but they are definitely salient to rural people and are tangible enough that cases can be compared in terms of "more" or "less" protection or "more" or "less" access to legal redress.

Table 10. Indicators of Rural Security

Group		Protection from Natural Disaster	Protection from Violence	Access to Justice
I	*Yugoslavia	5	5	5
Ave.	*Israel	5	4	5
= 5	*Taiwan	5	5	4
	*Japan (1960)	5	5	4
II	*China	5	4	4
Ave.	*Sri Lanka	5	4	4
= 4	*Egypt	4	4	3
	*Korea	3	5	3
III	*Punjab	3	4	3
Ave.	*Japan (1920)	3	3	3
= 3	Turkey	3	3	3
	Malaysia	3	3	2
IV	India	2	2	2
Ave.	Thailand	2	3	2
= 2	Pakistan	1	2	2
	Philippines	2	1	2
V	Bangladesh	1	1	2
Ave.	Indonesia (Java)	1	1	1
= 1				

The rankings reflect the informed judgments by members of the working group based on experience and research in the countries concerned. They probably reflect also subjective judgments about how ready we would be to live as an average member of a rural community in the respective countries. That the more organized cases should rank so high is not very surprising, considering that it is rural organization which permits rural people to communicate needs upward to the center and to wield some political "clout." Where rural communities are isolated from the center or are not mobilized sufficiently to demand food relief or police protection or fair treatment, it is not likely that these needs will be met. The correlation

between organization and security is strong enough that it may be suspected of circularity, and we are aware that given the judgmental quality of these data there may be some "halo effect." Nevertheless, the overall differences are real and striking and should not be ignored in an overall assessment of rural welfare in the different cases.

5. Income Distribution. In analyzing income distribution, we have more objective data to work from, but the quality of the statistics may not be much better. The biases in any collection of income data are multiple. Lower-income households may hide income gained by illegal means, while upper-income ones may not report income to avoid taxation. Imputing value to goods and services produced and consumed by the same household is a tricky business, but it must be attempted. Calculating incomes on a per capita basis, when they are not earned or reported that way, is tenuous, so figuring income on a household basis is preferred, though there are some problems due to variations in size of household. (Depending on the circumstances, poorer or richer households may be the larger ones.)

We have found data on income distribution difficult to come by and often more difficult to compare. Nevertheless, we present in Table 11 what we have found and think to be the most valid statistics obtainable at present. Comparison is made in terms of the ratio of income accruing to the top 20 percent of households vis-a-vis that accruing to the bottom 20 percent. We think this statistic is more illuminating than the most common Gini coefficient of inequality, which is much less sensitive to differences in income distribution between the top and bottom groups. Because this is a ratio, of course, it tends to magnify extreme differences. The distributional data and the details of data sources are therefore given in Appendix D (pages 145-149). Recognizing that there can be some errors in the published data, we use the ratios only to group the cases into four ranked divisions,

Table 11. Ratios Indicating Income Distribution

Group		Ratio of Income Top 20%:Bottom 20%	Source of Statistics
I	*China	2.3 personal 4.6 household	1961 survey of rural households in rural village (LiuLing)
Less than 5:1	*Egypt	2.3 personal	1966-67 survey of personal income; rural household income ratio 4-5
	*Sri Lanka	4.8 household	1969-70 rural survey (excluding estate sector)
	*Korea	4.7 household	1971 rural survey (6.3 national)
II	*Taiwan	5.1 household	1964 national survey
5:1 to 6:1	*Japan	5.2 household	1963 national survey
	*Israel	5.3 household	1968/69 and 1970 urban surveys averaged
	*Punjab	5.4 household	1969-70 farm income data (ratio probably higher since landless household not included)
	Bangladesh	5.4 household	1963-64 rural survey (6.4 national; data for East Pakistan in latter 1960s not accepted as reliable)
	*Yugoslavia	5.6 household	1968 agricultural sector survey
III	Pakistan	6.3 household	1963-64 rural survey (more recent surveys too different from India to be accepted as valid)
between 6:1 and 12:1	India	8.3 household	1964-65 and 1967-68 rural surveys averaged (many different sets of data give different figures but all in III range)
	Indonesia	5.6 household consumption	1964-65 rural survey; ratio for household income would be considerably higher than 5.6:1
IV	Philippines	12.3 household	1971 rural survey (national 14.6)
over 12:1	Malaysia	12.9 household	1970 rural survey (national 16.5)
	Thailand	14.0 household	1968-69 and 1970 rural surveys averaged
	Turkey	16.2 household	1968 national survey averaged with 1963 farm income survey

Sources: Various sources for these data, and explanations are given in Appendix D, pp. 145-149.

again putting more similar cases together and separating those more unlike each other.

It is quite apparent that the more organized cases have more equal distributions of income. There is only one exception to this, Bangladesh, where land reform following the East Bengal Land Acquisition Act in 1951, and great population pressure on the land combined to make for relatively uniform (and small) landholdings. One can ask quite reasonably whether the association is more that of effect than cause. Viable local organization may require relatively equal holdings of wealth so that it is not dominated by a few to the exclusion or subordination of the many. At the same time, we see that with active and effective local organization, central policies intended to spread more widely the benefits of development can be better implemented, and less advantaged groups can use the channels of organization to improve their situation. Indeed, the relationship may be a three-cornered one among organization, equality and productivity, each interacting with the other two. We need not entirely resolve the question of whether local organization is responsible for more equal income distribution since this was not established as a criterion of rural development. The association with local organization is quite consistent and convincing.

Population and Employment

As noted already, the more organized cases have a substantially lower rate of population growth, at least through the 1960's. The mean differences, 1.9 compared to 2.6 per cent, can to some extent be explained by disparities in per capita income for the two groups, noted above. But a rank-order correlation between per capita income and population growth rate for the 16 cases is only -.23, suggesting that per capita income alone would explain only about 5 per cent of the variation.

The specific growth rates for the cases, averaging figures from U.S., World Bank and USAID sources--which unfortunately are not identical, are as follows:

*China	1.9%	Bangladesh	3.1%
*Egypt	2.5	India	2.4
*Israel	2.8	Indonesia	2.6
*Japan	1.1	Malaysia	2.8
*Korea	2.4	Pakistan	2.9
*Sri Lanka	2.3	Philippines	3.2
*Taiwan	2.6	Thailand	3.1
*Yugoslavia	1.0	Turkey	2.5
Average (N=8)	2.1	Average (N=8)	2.8
Average weighted by population	1.9	Average weighted by population	2.6

To examine the relation between income level and population growth, we plotted the two variables in Figure 2. Note the cases between $100 and $400 in income, for which the rank-order correlation of the 13 cases (not considering Israel, Japan and Yugoslavia) is .07, insignificantly positive. As seen from Figure 2, the more organized cases (circled) are in almost all cases lower in population growth than are the less organized cases with comparable levels of income. This at least suggests, though we did not undertake to prove, a positive association between organization and lower population growth rates. The lower rates of population growth affect the rates of increase in per capita agricultural production (see Table 6 above) and also rural employment and unemployment, which themselves bear upon rural development.[1]

The data available on rural unemployment and underemployment are fragmentary and uncomparable, but it is possible to use nominal descriptive classifications to distinguish

[1] Numerous factors influence the lower population growth rate among the more organized cases, where organization is a factor related to the development strategy being pursued. See discussion of these cases in monographs by James E. Kocher, Rural Development, Income Distribution and Fertility Decline (New York: Population Council, 1973); and William Rich, Smaller Families Through Social and Economic Justice (Washington: Overseas Development Council, 1973).

Figure 2: PER CAPITA INCOME AND POPULATION GROWTH



Sources: See Table 1.

Table 12. Estimated Levels of Rural Unemployment and Underemployment

	Rural Unemployment	Rural Underemployment	Comments
Bangladesh	High	High	Very high seasonal unemployment, year-round, 25% of available man-days not utilized for gainful work.
*Egypt	Moderate	Moderate	Level of unemployment might be higher; data not good.
*China	Low	Low	Economic organization creates universal employment.
India	Moderate	High	9.7% rural unemployment; 17.7% idle or working less than 28 hours; 41% of rural employed worked less than 43 hours per week in 1961-62.
*India/Punjab	Low	Moderate	There is full employment of native Punjabis, but there has been an influx of labor from neighboring states, not all fully employed.
Indonesia	High	High	1971 Census had special category for dry season unemployment which was very high.
*Israel	Low	Low	
*Japan	Low	Low	Farming increasingly a part-time occupation, supplementing urban or rural non-farm employment.
*Korea	Low	High	3.1% rural unemployment in 1965; but December work only 40% of June level in rural areas.
Malaysia	Low	High	Substantial dry season unemployment.
Pakistan	Moderate	High	
Philippines	Moderate	High	High dry season unemployment; 28% of rural employed wanted additional work in 1965.
*Sri Lanka	High	High	10.4% rural unemployment in 1963; 11% of employed rural males (18% of females) worked less than 20 hours/week in 1968.
*Taiwan	Low	Low	1.4% rural unemployment in 1966; 5% of employed rural males (19% of females) worked less than 42 hours/week in 1966.
Thailand	Moderate	High	High seasonal unemployment (40% during March 20-25, 1970, according to census).
Turkey	Low	Moderate	Excess rural labor force migrating and working in Western Europe.
*Yugoslavia	Low	Low	Excess rural labor force migrating and working in Western Europe.

Sources: David Turnham, The Employment Problem in Less Developed Countries: A Review of Evidence (OECD: Paris, 1971); Harry Oshima, "Seasonality and Underemployment in Monsoon Asia," Philippine Economic Journal (1971)., pp. 66, 76-82; M. Habibullah, The Pattern of Agricultural Unemployment,,Dacca University, Bureau of Economic Research, 1962; Raj Krishna, "Unemployment in India," Presidential Address to Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, December 1972, reprinted by Agricultural Development Council, No. 38, March 1974.

among gross levels of unemployment and underemployment, as is done in Table 12. Roughly 5 percent or less unemployment of the rural labor force is described as Low, between 5 and 10 percent is Moderate, and over 10 percent is High; for rural underemployment, the approximate ranges are double these--under 10 percent, 10 to 20 percent, and over 20 percent. Table 12 shows with some exceptions, the more organized cases have less unemployment and underemployment in their rural sector.

There can be various explanations for this, not the least of which are lower population growth--and hence a slower growth of the rural labor force--and more rapid agricultural growth--thereby generating more employment. More persons relative to total population can be productively employed in agriculture, and those working are able to utilize their available labor more fully in agriculture and in jobs off the farm in neighboring communities. In the case of China, rural local organization has enabled communities to put to work in public service and infrastructure construction projects those people whose labor is not needed in direct agricultural production at a particular season. There appears to be an overall association between rural organization and rural employment growth, but the empirical base is too weak to present this as a conclusion.

Political-Administrative Participation

The case studies and the aggregate data on performance suggest only a weak association between political participation and agricultural productivity or rural welfare. We rated the cases according to four criteria of political participation; electoral participation, control of bureaucracy, influence on rural development policy, and allocation of public services and resources. The comparative estimates for the respective cases, scored on scales of zero to 5, are shown in Table 13. Note that we did not consider what economists currently call "participation," which means sharing in

Table 13. Indicators of Rural Political-Administration Participation

	Total Score	Electoral Participation	Control of Bureaucracy	RD Policy Influence	Resource Allocation
*Israel	19	5	5	5	4
*Yugoslavia	15	4	4	2	5
*Sri Lanka	15	5	3	3	4
*India/Punjab	14	4	3	4	3
Turkey	12	4	2	3	3
*Japan (1960)	11	4	2	3	2
*Taiwan	11	3	3	2	3
*China	10	1	4	2	3
India	9	3	2	2	2
*Japan (1920)	7	2	1	2	2
Pakistan	7	3	1	1	2
Philippines	7	3	1	1	2
Bangladesh	7	3	1	1	2
*Egypt	6	1	2	1	2
Malaysia	5	2	0	2	1
*Korea	3	1	1	0	1
Thailand	2	0	1	0	1
Indonesia	2	0	1	0	1

the benefits of development, in an ex post sense, but instead in the ex ante sense of involvement or influence in decision making.

Electoral participation was judged with respect to the extent and effectiveness of electoral activity by rural people, with the maximum score representing high turnout in regular elections for offices at both local and national levels with effective party competition and opposition. Only Israel and Sri Lanka received the full score for this. Control of bureaucracy pertained to the extent and effectiveness of control by rural people over the government officials with whom they come in contact at the local level--teachers, health workers, police, administrators, etc. This is an important functional form of participation since these officials affect rural lives more surely than elections or policies per se ever can. The maximum score represented predictably effective sanctions invoked or activated against bureaucrats who are negligent or exploitative. This requires some combination of local organizational channels such as local government, political party or interest groups, and personal skills and sense of efficacy such as derive from literacy, a tradition of local control, etc. Influence on rural development policy varies according to the extent and effectiveness of efforts by rural epople to make central policy affecting their areas meet their needs, e.g., land reform, farm prices, mechanization, social services, etc. The maximum score represents predictably affective influence on central policy-makers on matters affecting rural communities and requires functioning organizational channels from the local level upwards. Only Israel was scored the maximum on these two criteria. The fourth criterion bears not on policy decisions as such but on concrete allocations of public services and resources within rural communities; what is the extent and effectiveness of participation by rural people in deciding what, where and how these things will be provided: roads, water, electricity,

schools, sanitation, agricultural inputs, etc. Only Yugoslavia, with its comprehensive system of organized "local communities" below the commune level to handle such questions received the top score on this.

Evaluating the composite rankings of political-administrative participation by rural people is more difficult than previous assessments made in this study because the patterns are more mixed. While most of the more organized cases cluster toward the top of the participation scale--note in particular Punjab--there are exceptions such as Egypt and Korea which rank low, while Turkey ranks rather high. (We might note that Egypt and Korea ranked lowest on political-administrative linkage among those cases subsequently designated as "more organized," and Turkey scored highest on linkage among those then classified as "less organized.") Overall, the rank-order correlation between participation and linkage is .84, reasonably large but not enough that the variables can be treated as one.

With respect to agricultural productivity, we find little correlation with political-administrative participation, the top agricultural performers ranging from the top (Israel and Yugoslavia) to the bottom (Egypt, Malaysia and Korea). The rank-order correlation between the two variables is an insignificant .12. On the basis of our data, we would conclude the following: that participation does not appear to be a necessary or sufficient condition for agricultural improvement. In some cases, such as Israel and Yugoslavia, political participation probably contributed substantially to productivity gains. We find that participation may make a positive contribution to raising productivity and we found no evidence of its impact being negative. The association between participation and rural welfare is, not surprisingly, greater. But the rank-order correlation of .59 does not suggest that more than one-third of the variance can be

explained by participation (or vice versa). As noted already, the major contributing factor to welfare seems to be income level--the volume of goods and services available to the population.

If rural participation is viewed as an objective of rural development, rather than as a means to achieving it, our perspective changes considerably. Participation may be an effective means of promoting rural development in the more participatory cases (Israel, Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, the Indian Punjab, Japan, Taiwan and China), but in any case it could be regarded as an accomplishment of the approach taken to rural development, in these cases that of local organization. Lack of participation presumably limits the satisfaction which rural residents in Egypt or Korea, for example, can take from the achievements of their rural sector. This makes the analysis of participation rather inexact, especially as it remains in some contexts a means as well as an end. But this is not unique, as health or nutrition which we treat as dependent variables, can reasonably be viewed as contributing to agricultural productivity through the strength and morale of rural labor. The instrumental as well as consummatory nature of participation need not obscure our interest in it as a factor in rural development.

Comparisons with GNP Levels

In making this analysis and the various comparisons involved, we have been mindful that not all cases can be regarded as having the same possibilities or as having started from the same position. One gross way of allowing for this fact when making comparisons is to consider performance variables against the ordering according to GNP per capita. This represents approximately the resource base against which productivity is to be achieved in agriculture and welfare objectives are to be met. Table 14 summarizes the main indicators of agricultural productivity and rural welfare for the

Table 14. Summary Comparison on Local Organization and Rural Development Indicators

	GNP per Capita	GNP p/c Rank	Rank on Agr. Productivity	Rank on Pop. Welfare	Rural Security	Income Distribution
*Japan	$1,825	1	3	2	I	II
*Israel	1,782		4	1	I	II
*Yugoslavia	835		1	3	I	II
*Taiwan			[illegible]	4	I	II
Malaysia			[illegible]	8	III	IV
Turkey			13	7	III	III
*Korea			1	6	II	II
Philippines	[illegible]		15	9	IV	IV
*Egypt	19[illegible]	9	6	12	II	I
Thailand	186	10	8	11	IV	IV
*China	153	11	11	10	II	I
*Sri Lanka	145	12	9	5	II	I
Pakistan	128	13	10	14	IV	III
Bangladesh	103	14	16	16	V	II
India	98	15	14	13	IV	III
Indonesia	92	16	12	15	V	III

respective cases. The more organized cases are denoted with an asterisk, and as can be seen, they have often accomplished rural developmental objectives more successfully with respect to the resource base available than have the less organized cases. Bearing in mind that the statistics available may contain some margin of error we do not regard differences in rank-order of only several places to be particularly significant, but Sri Lanka's performance on both productivity and welfare grounds is impressive while the record of the Philippines and Turkey is poor in agriculture and that of Malaysia is not so good in welfare. The ranking of China according to available data is low compared to what we should have expected on the basis of the extent and integration of its local organization. The reports of objective observers coming out of China after trips into the countryside suggest to us that our data may underestimate at least the welfare performance of that country and possibly its productivity gains. Any cross-national analysis relying on published data sources is bound to have some deficiencies, but we are satisfied that the overall pattern of performance is represented by the data and estimates produced by our research.

The relationship between aspects of rural development and the extent and effectiveness of rural local organization is complex and not all one-directional. Many factors influence rural development and it in turns affects the need for and capacity of local organization. Nevertheless, we think there is a strong empirical basis for concluding that local organization is in many respects and in most cases a necessary if not sufficient condition for accelerated rural development, especially development of a sort which improves the productivity and welfare of the majority of rural people. Both of the alternative explanations commonly given for progress in rural development--resources and technology--are themselves contingent to a great extent on local organization for their efficient use and application. These are, however, only

general conclusions pointing toward the importance of local organization for rural development. Our case studies and analysis go beyond this and from them we can suggest more specific ways in which local organization can be developed and can contribute more to progress in the rural areas.

CHAPTER IV

REQUIREMENTS OF SUCCESSFUL LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

For practical purposes any consideration of the role of organization turns on how it can be made more effective for developmental ends. From our case studies and our analysis, we have identified what appear to be five basic structural conditions for successful local organization. These are supplemented by consideration of some supporting conditions for institutional development which if less unequivocal are still very important. Our comparative study of local organization and rural development did not concentrate primarily on aggregate statistics of the sort compared in the previous section but rather on the functioning and performance of specific systems of organization. As noted at the outset, we were interested ultimately in principles rather than models of organization, and it is principles which we examine and elaborate on in this chapter.

Basic Structural Conditions

The main reason for trying to distinguish among conditions in this analysis is to avoid the "laundry list" approach which is all too easy and not very helpful. From the various country experiences, we have tried to distill the most essential elements, which are largely structural in content. This means that they pertain to the patterns of distribution and flow of resources--economic resources to be sure but also authority and information as these are part of decision making and implementation. Patterns of resource distribution and flow are not necessarily easy to change,

because many people are familiar with and benefit from any existing pattern; but they are subject to government policy, and hence can be altered if governments understand the benefits to be derived therefrom.

1. Distribution of economic assets. The first condition for developing effective local initiative seems to be the relatively equitable distribution of assets, which in the Asian rural context means primarily land. Since data on land distribution are even more liable to gaps and subterfuge, we have examined the statistics on income distribution, which certainly reflect, to a large degree, land ownership patterns. We found a nearly perfect association between greater equality in incomes and more extensive and developmental rural organization (see Table 11, page 50). While we believe that organization makes some contribution toward equalization of income, the most basic contributing factor is the distribution of land, which is a matter of national government policy and enforcement. Local government or other institutions at the local level cannot initiate or implement redistributive programs on their own. At the same time, it is quite clear on the basis of cross-national research, that the implementation of national land reform policies is greatly dependent on local organization for its effectiveness.[1]

Equity in this context should not be confused with equality. We regard as relatively equitable a difference of as much as 5 to 1 in the average income of members of the top 20 percent and the lowest 20 percent of farm households. This is approximately the situation in such places as Israel, Japan, Korea, Taiwan and Yugoslavia, in contrast with ratios of more than 10 to 1 in India and even more in Malaysia, the

[1]On this, see John D. Montgomery, "The Allocation of Authority in Land Reform Programs: A Comparative Study of Administrative Processes and Outputs," Administrative Science Quarterly (March 1972), pp. 62-75.

Philippines and Thailand. As seen from Table 14, the countries with highest rural welfare and top agricultural performance are in the second rank of cases (II) in terms of income equality, not the first rank. Countries with the most equal distribution of incomes, such as China, Egypt and Sri Lanka, have many things to commend their pattern of rural development, but the most equal distributions do not appear to be necessary for rural development. All of the countries with more equal income distributions (I and II) stand out in performance relative to their resource base, and some such as Japan, Israel and Yugoslavia had had very rapid rates of overall economic growth without giving up relative income equality, contrary to some beliefs of development economists. What most distinguishes these cases with greater income equality is that they have had serious and effective land reforms, not just breaking up some big estates but systematically getting land to small and landless farmers within some framework of rural local organization.

Why should relative equity in land ownership be associated with successful local institutions? Because in rural Asia, land ownership is a fairly reliable source and indicator of social and political power. Where this power is skewed in favor of a small minority, that minority will use its power to preempt for its own use the bulk of the scarce and valuable resources provided by central government for agricultural development. This includes not only the scarce (subsidized) credit, fertilizer, processing and marketing facilities provided by government, but also the attention of the limited number of extension agents who bear knowledge of improved practices. They will also tend to dominate whatever organizations function in the countryside and convert them to their own purposes. Seldom will such organizations mobilize resources and organize projects which raise the productive potential of the less-productive members of the community; rather, what is done will be directed toward improvements

benefiting the more powerful members. The rural public works programs in Pakistan under Ayub Khan gave clear evidence of this, with roads, irrigation ditches, drainage channels, etc. being built mostly for the use of larger landowners. The more powerful members effectively deny or severely limit access by small farmers, not to mention tenants and landless laborers, to the resources and public services provided by the state. Under these conditions, smaller farmers will not find it worth their time or effort to participate in local organizations which have little of value to distribute to them and cannot facilitate their access to goods and services needed to raise their productivity and income. If such organizations become institutionalized, they would be as instruments of the large and middle farmers, while small farmers would be thrown back on traditional links of dependency on patrons or be compelled to rely wholly on their own meager resources.

Any Asian government which is interested in rural development, defined as increasing productivity, increasing per capita incomes, and improved welfare conditions for farm families is likely to find its efforts thwarted by local power structures based on radically inequitable ownership of land. Where access to scarce but essential resources is limited to the upper 20 percent of larger and more "progressive" farmers, the conditions of the great majority--who cannot escape to the cities but must remain on the land--will deteriorate. Inertia, fear and coercion may succeed in preserving order in the countryside, but insufficient resources will trickle down to the majority of producers to permit any substantial improvement in the quality of their lives.

One institutional method for equalizing access to land is collective ownership of land, as practiced in China and in the kibbutzim in Israel. The incentive and ownership system in China is described in some detail in our case study

for that country, and it suggests that with certain organization and incentives, collective production can have some advantages for productivity and distribution. (See Stavis monograph, pages 150-157.) There is not now sufficient clear evidence to draw a firm conclusion and we need not draw such a conclusion, but certainly the Chinese case is one to watch in the future as more becomes known about it.

We are not certain what optimum equity should be in the contemporary Asian rural context, and it will vary according to the country. But our data show that relative extremes in inequality inhibit the development of viable local institutions and thus indirectly as well as directly impede efforts to promote rural development.

2. Multi-level organization. The importance of effective local organization has been the principal focus of our concern in this study. The individual smallholder, tenant or laborer is powerless without organizations to provide essential services, to express his needs, and to have his grievances attended to. Through organization the scarce administrative capabilities of the state can be multiplied as local structures retail through their channels the information, credit, fertilizer and other inputs provided by the state. In performing these allocative functions, in regulating conflicts, and in providing feedback to governmentally-initiated activities, local organization can bring specific local knowledge to bear on problems and can tap the latent managerial abilities of local people. In sum, they can activate the energies of rural people, afford them entry into the system or network of services and exchanges provided by government, and gain for them a measure of collective influence over their own destinies.

But this leaves open questions of the design of local organization, which we wish to address in terms of basic structural features. The more successful systems of local

organization function with several levels of organization, most commonly as two-tier structures, though three or four tiers may be practicable. The primary level of organization tends to be the hamlet, the neighborhood or some other group of from 30 to 100 families. Organizations on this scale can be effective for pooling labor, regulating irrigation water at the field level, controlling pests and weeds, harmonizing planting, weeding and harvesting schedules, and performing some common services. The clearest examples of such organizations are the small agricultural units within the Farmers' Associations in Taiwan and the production teams on the mainland of China. We find similar functions performed by the kibbutzim and moshavim in Israel, the neighborhood associations in Yugoslavia, the cultivation committees in Sri Lanka, and the hamlets in Japan and Korea. Egypt is the only one of the more organized cases which is not so well organized at this basic level. Certainly, within other systems of organization having larger basic units, such as the Indian panchayat, the Indonesian desa, the Philippine barrio or the Turkish municipality, there is potential for organized local activity within wards or kampongs but it is seldom tapped.

What characterizes the more successful small basic units is a shared common identity and common interest. The membership is small enough that all persons can know each other and feel some solidarity with one another. In collective ventures, everyone will know who contributes well and who poorly, with the former rewarded by local esteem and the latter sanctioned by social pressure. There is enough knowledge of individual circumstances to make reasonable judgments about how benefits and costs of local activity should be apportioned. If the most basic unit of local organization is much larger than this, these operational advantages are lost. With sufficient solidarity and organizational skill, somewhat larger units can be effective as with the larger kibbutzim and moshavim in Israel. But the principle of neighborhood organizations as

the building blocks for rural development seems essential.

These organizations need in turn to be knit into some larger organization which can provide the benefits of scale--1,000 families or 5,000 persons as a minimum--to afford the managerial cadres and the physical facilities necessary to operate complex structures handling large sums of money as well as physical inputs, storage and even processing activities. The village of one to three thousand persons is not the appropriate level for either the primary or the more sophisticated activities to be performed by local organizations. It is too large for the former and too small for the latter. The advocacy of the community development movement of the 1950s, that the traditional village be made the effective unit for rural development efforts is not confirmed by our research. A two-tiered approach to local organization, on the other hand, can combine the benefits of solidarity and scale, both for mobilizing resources and for organizing and implementing development projects.

What is presented here must be seen as a principle rather than as a model of organization, as two levels of local organization may not be found ideal in all circumstances. The Japanese reformers in the 1880s had such a model in mind when they established administrative villages (mura) over the myriad hamlets (buraku) dotting the countryside. The Yugoslav commune with its constituent neighborhood associations corresponds closely to this model, as do the Korean and Taiwanese township organizations vis-a-vis their smaller residential units. On the other hand, in Israel, with a population of only 3 million, "regional" organizations constitute the level above the kibbutzim and moshavim, and in China there is a more complex but apparently quite successful three-tiered system, with brigade organization intermediate between the team and the commune, which itself links up to county (hsien) organization. The Village Council in Sri Lanka

is not directly linked to the smaller cultivation committees but is organized along "ward" lines which are not contiguous with the committees; in recent years, however, ward organizations are functioning more and more in the area of agricultural development, and Agricultural Productivity Committees now also populate the complex landscape of organizations in that country. All these cases point to the need for distinct but linked organizations specializing respectively in meeting the solidarity and scale requirements of local organization for rural development.

3. Multiple channels. Our analysis of local organization leads to the conclusion that not only should organization be differentiated vertically, i.e., with several tiers, but also horizontally, i.e., that there be parallel local organizations performing collectively the linkage functions which are so crucial to rural development. We have indicated previously that local organizations in isolation are futile, because many of the resources essential to rural development are controlled outside the local area by organs of the state or by the private sector and can only be obtained through state activity. Every function of rural development--planning and goal setting, resource mobilization, provision of services, integration of services, control of administration, and claim-making--must be shared by local organizations with central institutions, whether cabinets, ministries, departments, parliaments, parties or corporations Without local organizations, it is extremely difficult, and often impossible for the administrative organs of the state to work effectively with their rural populations. Yet at the same time, local institutions must interact with higher level structures if the flows of information and resources controlled outside the local area are to be facilitated and if the mutual exchanges and influences which are essential to rural development are to take place. This is the logic of a system or network of institutions to promote rural development, and for these

reasons, linkages are an essential factor in successful local institutions concerned with rural development.

We have identified in Chapter II the numerous alternative channels for linking national centers with local communities--state administration, local (and regional) government, associations, political parties and private sector or market institutions. We find that effective linkage, for a variety of reasons, requires the operation of a number of channels concurrently. It is through the skillful use of various channels that local leadership on behalf of their communities can enhance their access to resources not available locally and participate in the networks through which information, resources and influence are exchanged. Because any single channel may at any time be blocked or monopolized, may fail to function, or may yield unsatisfactory results, it is important to have multiple channels which local leaders use either singly or in combination, to meet their needs. Conversely, central governments do well to rely on more than a single channel for reaching down to the village. While normally a single channel will be used for a specific purpose--the irrigation department and irrigation associations for matters involving water supply, the extension service and cooperatives for spread of technological information--the availability and the use of alternative channels increases the bargaining power of local leaders, their prospects for exerting influence on important decision centers, and their capacity to use the institutional system for local advantage. At the same time, a range of institutional channels extends the center's range of potential influence and control.

Our case studies show that a vital set of local institutions linking in their several ways to the center contributes to more extensive and rapid rural change. Not all possible channels are needed, but from the plurality of connections, more "carrying capacity" in both directions is established.

In China, we find that the local branches of the Communist Party are essential to the effective functioning of the team-brigade-commune-township organization and both political and governmental-administrative channels work better for the existence of the other. In Taiwan, the governmental structure from the township level up is paralleled by the Farmers' Associations, beginning with the small agricultural unit and going up to the provincial level. Alongside these is the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) structure, which though less involved in agriculture and rural development problems, provides a valuable alternative for communicating upwards and downwards. We have already referred to the richness of organizational channels in Sri Lanka--Village Councils, cultivation committees, rural development centers, agricultural production committees, irrigation associations, state administration, cooperatives, etc. In Egypt, though less organized at the lowest levels, the Village Councils, the Arab Socialist Union and the land reform cooperatives provide interacting and complementary channels for rural development action.

The role of political channels can vary considerably. They have little or no role in Japan and Korea, but there, extensive federated networks of cooperative organization parallel the governmental-administrative structure which reaches down to the hamlet level in these two countries. Political channels are very important mechanisms of linkage in Israel and Yugoslavia, on the other hand, extending down to the local level. They have considerable local identity owing to the conditions under which the two present political systems were established; the Israeli parties grew up with the Jewish settlement of that country, preceding the power of the center, and the Yugoslav Communist Party led a guerilla war of "partisans" against Fascist occupation, so both have an authenticity in rural areas uncommon in most other places. In these two countries, communities are organized with considerable autonomy at the same time they link thoroughly

into regional organizations, demonstrating in these cases that there is no necessary contradiction between considerable degrees of autonomy and linkage.

4. Multiple Functions. Another structural issue is the choice between single purpose and comprehensive local organizations. A number of arguments can be made on a priori grounds for organizational specialization, but they fail if taken very far into the domain of rural development. Reasonably comprehensive structures such as the Farmers' Associations in Taiwan or the team-brigade-commune system on the mainland of China have been very successful in Asia. They permit larger scale operations which may be necessary for economic efficiency and provide one center where the farmer can obtain most of the services he needs. By performing various functions, the local organizations do not depend entirely on any one for their support from rural people and they are less affected by seasonal fluctuations of activity which are an enduring feature of rural life.

There are serious risks in attempting to encompass too many interests or functions in a single organization. It is then vulnerable to immobilization through factional strife, corruption or leadership inertia. To have a great many functions committed to a single local organization may overload its limited capacities, concentrate excessive power in a few hands, or lead to the neglect of some activities. Opportunities for developing membership participation and local managerial capabilities and leadership may be limited. Yet the risks inherent in having a large number of small, specialized single-purpose organizations are more severe. They are likely to be too small in scale for efficient operations and unable to integrate with other specialized activities, thus imposing an unnecessary and unwelcome burden on farmers. The ebb and flow of different rural activities will extract a greater toll from idleness and excess of work.

Multifunctional organizations, then, have definite advantages in scale and in capacity to integrate services, but this principle should not be pressed to the point that a single organization is given a monopoly of functions in any rural area. In none of our cases have all the functions of local governance been committed to a single structure.

Two considerations qualify the argument for multiple functions. First, as a rule, business or commercial functions should be separate, or at least insulated from partisan or political activities. Where the latter are able to dominate the former, farmers have little grounds for confidence, for example, that cooperatives' distribution of fertilizer will be made fairly or that savings deposits in a credit union will be secure. Such lack of confidence is deadly for local economic organizations. At the same time, total insulation is probably not desirable. The presence or possibility of parallel organizations "gingering up" a cooperative or credit union if it is lethargic or unfair has a salutary effect on performance.

A second consideration is that organizations not be limited to a single channel of communication or linkage to higher level structures. While a local organization may have one organization above it with which it has the most extensive and concentrated interaction (e.g., a cooperative would deal mostly with a regional or national cooperative federation, or a village panchayat would interact most with the block and district panchayats above it), a multifunctional organization should have a number of connections to higher-level structures, with no monopolization of communication or linkage. Even single-purpose organizations can and should cultivate and take advantage of parallel channels as their interests require.

The extent to which functions should be separated or combined in local organizations cannot be determined in the

abstract, but there are definite disadvantages to either extreme. Some pluralism of local institutions is clearly desirable, but excessive pluralism leads to destructive competition, dissipation of energy and resources, and poor coordination. In structuring a system of rural local organization, it is evident that some solution should be arrived at according to the conditions of the country other than monopolizing all activities in a single comprehensive multipurpose organization or proliferating specialized organizations which will be weak and ineffective.

5. Decentralization. A further basic structural principle of organization pertains to the distribution of authority among levels of government. For many reasons, Asian governments have been biased toward highly bureaucratized and centralized patterns of authority and administration. Rural development, however, must be location-specific, because problems vary with people, soil, climate, settlement patterns, ethnic traditions, and similar factors which inhibit uniform prescriptions except at high levels of policy generalization. Though the pattern varies with each function of government, the more successful cases reflect the willingness of governments to decentralize specific decision-making to structures close to local areas and local clients.

There are at least three rules of decentralization that seem to apply uniformly. (1) It is more likely that centralized operations will be required the more complex and powerful is the technology, the more capital-intensive it is, the slower the payoff or return, and the more specialized and scarce the technical and managerial skills required for the job. On the other hand, the more commonplace the technology, the more people involved, the simpler the management skills required, the more quickly results can be achieved, and the more "feedback" is required to guide operations, the stronger is the case for decentralization since this facilitates the adaptation of general policy to local conditions.

(2) In the Asian rural context, decentralization usually is more effective if it is controlled rather than complete. Since a substantial share of critical resources is usually provided by the center and since rural people are neither all-wise nor all-virtuous--they too may abuse power and misappropriate resources as well as make honest mistakes --effective decentralization is usually best constrained by firm policy guidelines and centrally established standards enforced by regular inspections and other forms of audit and control, while leaving operations in the hands of locally based personnel. The case study of rural electrification in the Indian state of Rajasthan written for this project by Susan G. Hadden provides extensive evidence and support for this rule, showing that controlled decentralization can be productive in both economic and political terms.

(3) Decentralization is not an all-or-nothing proposition but rather a matter of kinds and degrees. Put more generally, decentralization is best seen and implemented in terms of specific functions. Different rural development tasks are better handled at higher or at lower levels of decision-making, separately or in combination with other tasks. This means that the units of local organization may themselves have to be flexible in certain respects. A clear example of this is found in Taiwan, where Irrigation Associations and Farmers' Associations are organized over different areas. The former vary tremendously in size and scale, from 632 to 334,000 members and from 2,457 to 150,674 hectares, according to the size of the catchment area involved. Quite pragmatically, Irrigation Associations cross township lines if this is dictated by topography or engineering systems. Farmers' Associations, on the other hand, providing complementary inputs of fertilizer, seeds and credit do not necessarily correspond to Irrigation Association boundaries, as these would often lead to organizational sizes inefficient for managing these inputs. Most governmental units at lower

levels have been established more for the administrative convenience of higher levels of government than for any reasons intrinsic to the best functioning of the regional or local units. Hence, none should be regarded as sacrosanct or receive blanket authority over all tasks within its boundaries. Rather, the productivity of decentralization should be assessed in each case with respect to whether or not certain tasks--planning, resource mobilization, etc.--could be better performed or not by delegating authority over it to the particular unit.

A good example of controlled decentralization is the extension service work with "minikits" in Sri Lanka. Crop research designs are centrally developed to test certain varieties under various conditions, and "minikits" are prepared with the seed, fertilizer, planting and cultivation instructions, etc. Implementation of the experiments is overseen by district level authorities, but actual data are produced on the farm by individual farmers, voluntarily participating in the experiment. Each aspect of the program is managed at the level which is functionally suitable and the consequence is a set of research findings which are internally consistent because of central control over design but locally applicable because of district and individual level involvement in the implementation. The results of such research are not only appropriate but very easily disseminable because farmers have been doing the experiments under field conditions and with a definite demonstration effect. Sri Lanka ranked fifth among the cases in increased yields of cereals over the past 20-year period, based almost entirely on smallholder cultivation under conditions of relative resource scarcity.

There are two patterns of decentralization that should be distinguished, because they have quite different consequences though too little attention is usually paid to the distinction. (1) Deconcentration of authority for decisions and action can be made within an administrative structure.

Either administrative personnel can be transferred from the center to some regional or district office, but still maintain their same authority and approach in decision-making; or the authority to allocate credit, for example, could be transferred from a central or provincial to a local office of the same department. Physically or functionally, the decision-making would be moved from above to some lower level, but the responsibilities and sanctions would not be changed. The creation of the Changwat provincial offices in Thailand or the establishment of the governorates in Egypt represented deconcentration within otherwise highly centralized political-administrative systems. There was no transfer of authority out of the hands of the Ministry of Interior or the National Revolutionary Council, but the decision-makers came into closer physical proximity to those affected by their decisions. Though this may seem like a minor step in decentralization, there are more opportunities to get local information and demands to the center's decision-makers, and even bureaucratic government can be made more responsive to local needs thereby.

(2) The alternative is <u>devolution</u>, which involves transferring functions and the resources to carry them out from agencies of the center to local authorities or associations which are independent of, i.e., not administratively responsible to the central government. Devolution is thus a more profound form of decentralization, for though the central government may retain residual controls, both decision-making and operations are in the hands of local institutions where locally accountable persons manage activities and will be more responsive to local conditions. There is the danger here where large farmer interests are strong or central controls weak, that devolution will lead to still greater dominance of local affairs by privileged groups. This underscores the importance, stated already, of having a relatively equitable distribution of land or income so that local organizations can operate in a more developmental manner. The decentralization

of decisions in Rajasthan concerning which villages would be electrified, described by Hadden in her case study, is a clear example of effective devolution, with the District Agricultural Production Committees making choices--within guidelines--which had previously been made by the Rajasthan State Electricity Board, and achieving better developmental results.

While it is dangerous or fruitless to devolve substantial operations to local organizations before they are technically and managerially equipped to take on new responsibilities or when they are dominated by a rural elite, the more successful Asian countries have relied on a large measure of devolution in their rural development activities. This devolution, to be sure, has been circumscribed by central controls over policies and standards to which we have already referred. In some circumstances where devolution seems inappropriate or too risky to the central authorities, administrative deconcentration may be indicated. It permits local influences and local circumstances to be brought to bear more readily on specific decisions than is possible where decisions remain highly centralized in provincial or national headquarters. The case study on Egypt cites considerable improvements in decision-making efficiency simply from giving substantial authority, previously exercised in Cairo, to governors at the provincial level.

As noted already, we have no evidence to support the commonsense notion that power relations between central and local authorities are necessarily conflictual or "zero sum," so that a gain in the power of the latter must diminish that of the center. Strong, effective local institutions do not necessarily weaken the authority of the central government, and indeed as a rule extend it. In some countries, both central and local authorities are weak and ineffective. In such cases there may be little authority to decentralize as

little in fact exists. A more common pattern, however, is for the center to derive what strength it has mainly by dominating and domineering local institutions. This is essentially a negative power, good for preventing things from happening. In such a situation, the center will be incapable of accomplishing positive development. This contrasts with the situation in a few countries, including our "more organized" cases, where both the center and periphery are strong, in that both have the capacity to organize and carry out action programs effectively.

Central strength based on anemic rural institutions is an illusion; and it is also unlikely that there can be effective rural institutions in the absence of strong central support. The critical factor is whether the goals of central authorities and local organizations are compatible. It is true that where center and periphery have different objectives, their power will be "zero sum." But as long as the central government seeks rural development objectives that are consistent with the needs and aspirations of rural people, strong rural local organization can only enhance the power of the center.

If the aims of central authorities and local organizations are consistent, central authorities should foster, promote and welcome effective local institutions, devolving authority to them, even though these institutions will inevitably be sources of pressure that will complicate their political and administrative lives. If on the other hand, the central authorities fear the effects of an organized and active rural populace as a threat to the regime or a source of unwelcome pressure, they will discourage local organization except organizations which the central authorities and reliable local allies can control. This will give the center negative but not positive power. There will always be some tension between local institutions claiming resources and central authorities allocating scarcities, between the latter

promoting regime objectives and the former protecting local interests. But where their goals are reasonably compatible, the tensions can be lived with. Under these circumstances, decentralization in the form of devolution or deconcentration is a rational policy for the central authorities because it helps them at no great costs to build greater capacities in pursuit of their rural development goals.

Supporting Behavioral Conditions

Organizational structures represent opportunities for action, but no more than that. To have effect and contribute to society, they need to be infused with human activity and aspirations. Thus, the pattern of institutional structures provides a framework for the pursuit of ends. From our consideration of the case study materials, we have focused on participation, leadership, politics and institutionalization as behavioral factors making for more vital local organization supporting rural development.

1. Participation. In understanding the performance of local organizations, one key consideration is the opportunity they offer members for participation in decisions and programs that affect their interests. We do not mean "participation" in the ex post facto sense that some economists use the term, to describe the distribution of benefits from growth. Rather we refer to ex ante, before-the-fact involvement in the choices and efforts producing growth, which in fact has great influence on who will benefit from the fruits of growth. Local participation can bring useful, locally-based information and local interests into decision processes, and it can reveal and tap previously unrecognized managerial and leadership talents. The opportunity to participate, even when it is taken up by relatively few local people, enhances the legitimacy of local institutions and also of national government, provides a ready outlet for the ex-

pression of grievances, and can generate local cooperative and self-help activities for development.

Like all good things, participation can be overdone and become unproductive for the welfare of most members of the community. Local organizations can become overpoliticized, immobilized by factionalism, with rural development objectives displaced by struggles for local power and control. Unfortunately, this extreme is often accepted stereotypically as the likely consequence of participation, especially by administrators who stand to benefit or at least have their lives made simpler by deprecating and eliminating any significant popular participation. Because of the possible outcome of wayward participation, there is utility in maintaining some central power of inspection and enforcement of standards, already mentioned above. There is an equally real danger, that inspection and controls will be used to throttle participation, as seen from the case study on panchayat raj in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. The challenge for central government is to encourage and tolerate, even promote, a significant range of participation at various levels of organization, without having it deflect effort from the urgent needs of rural development.

Our case studies reveal a considerable range of modes of local participation. At one extreme, participation may be manipulated by the central authorities and controlled within narrow regime-determined parameters, while at the other extreme, there can be freedom of farmers to determine how much they as individuals want to participate in the governance of local institutions and on what issues they should attempt to make their voices heard. There can indeed be much or little participation at either extreme, depending on people's response to the pressures, on one hand, or the opportunities, on the other. Observers must guard against culture-bound interpretations of participation which judge farmers' meeting for long hours in China or Korea simply as ritualistic or

coerced because it is government-sponsored and even ordered, while regarding the same extent of participation in Sri Lanka or Israel as "real" because it corresponds more to Western ideas of "democratic" participation. We think it is important whether or not rural people can, by their own decisions, affect the course of government activity, local and/or central, and we consider such participation to be of great value to farmers and their families. But we also recognize the function of less empowered participation, where there can be considerable communication, venting of grievances, solicitation of suggestions, and winning of agreement on what is to be done. Rural China today seems alive and even sometimes adrift with participation, as often thousands of cadres from many communities meet for days on end; put up in schools and shops, using sleeping bags and open fires to sustain themselves, while issues, directives and evaluations are thrashed out. At the same time, we find Village Councils in Sri Lanka debating and passing resolutions on the Allende regime in Chile and on the international energy crisis, passing these up to the center, with every expectation that they will be considered seriously. In either case, the morale and enthusiasm of rural people can be heightened by such opportunities, however vicarious in substance and however effective or ineffective in outcome, for involvement in efforts beyond their own private sphere.

Our analysis of participation, summarized in the previous chapter, showed an association, though not a perfect one, between participation and rural development. On the other hand, some success in rural development, as registered in Malaysia, can be achieved without much popular participation providing two conditions are met: (a) there is an effective administrative system capable of top-down action to influence rural areas, and (b) the center has sufficient resources not

to need local contributions. These conditions are met in Malaysia, but very seldom are both satisfied elsewhere. Where administration is not so effective and where local resources must be mobilized for rural development, fairly extensive local participation becomes a requirement for effecting and maintaining change.[1]

2. Leadership. Another major consideration in comprehending the effectiveness of organization is the leadership it recruits and follows. There is common sentiment that the most effective leadership is chosen democratically by those subject to its decisions, and there is probably merit in this as a general proposition since it builds in the principle of accountability. But we can hardly test this as a proposition inasmuch as leadership recruitment in a manner which Americans would consider "democratic" is not common among our cases, perhaps only in Israel and Sri Lanka. Factors of caste, class or ideology impinge on most other local leadership selection in Asia. This does not necessarily mean, however, that local leadership is therefore unrepresentative or ineffective for rural development.

As seen from the studies of local leadership in China, Korea and Taiwan, quite different selection processes produce leaders who are close to the local population and can help solve rural problems. In the first case, the Communist Party plays a dominant role in leadership selection; in the second,

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[1]It may be suggested that there is a further alternative to popular participation for achieving rural development: a dynamic private sector, as found in the Punjab state of India. In this, one of the most successful cases of contemporary rural development, private linkages from the farm to the center are very effective, but they do not function without complementary modes of participation. In scoring the cases on the various dimensions of participation--electoral activity, influence on RD policy, control of bureaucracy and resource allocation--the author of that case study placed Punjab among the most participatory situations. Hence, we identify only the two exceptional conditions above.

a headman is selected by the administrative structure though in practice he is more confirmed than picked since he is the person agreed from above and below to be the best qualified intermediary; in the third, faction and sometimes even clan politics surrounded by manipulation of nominations and vote-buying result nevertheless in reasonably effective local leadership of township government and Farmers' Associations. What the three cases have in common is that leaders are drawn from the local community, have strong personal and family ties there, and feel an obligation to serve what is consensually decided upon as the community interest.

When it comes to recruitment of leadership for rural development, the question often arises whether "traditional" leadership can serve these ends effectively. This depends on a variety of factors: how complex and demanding in terms of education and "modern" skills are the tasks of local institutions, how qualified in these terms are "traditional" leaders, how enmeshed are they in local interest groups which have reason to resist rural development efforts, how prepared is the bureaucracy to work with such leadership both patiently and conscientiously. Given the reservoir of legitimacy and support which much "traditional" leadership enjoys, working with and through it offers certain advantages provided that the kinds of conditions mentioned above are satisfied.

Several problems arise in trying to promote rural development through "traditional" leadership. Such leadership is often already overburdened by present duties, as indicated, for example, in several of the Southeast Asian case studies, so new roles would seem necessary at the local level to undertake new activities. Moreover, the experience and skills suited to handling present problems may be a poor match for new rural development programs. Beyond this, the "traditional" leadership is limited by the scope of its "traditional" jurisdiction from working on "big" efforts. The conclusion

is that it can be effective at the lowest tier of the organization, but much less so at higher levels.

The question also arises concerning the extent to which literacy and formal education should be viewed as requirements for local office. This depends heavily on the attitudes and orientation of the bureaucracy, whether or not it will be supportive of non-literate local leadership and use its educated skills to make this leadership effective; or whether it will undermine and take advantage of such leadership. We found that in China, for example, a concerted effort has been made to buttress illiterate but knowledgeable and dedicated local leadership with educated personnel, and to structure the higher levels of bureaucracy to be able to work with local leaders with little formal education. In many other countries, on the other hand, educated bureaucrats seem for a variety of reasons indisposed to rendering such service. The "problem" rests essentially with the educated rather than the uneducated. Although our study did not provide concrete answers, it did raise the question of how local organizations could be better designed to incorporate non-literates in leadership positions, to draw on their practical knowledge and experience and on the confidence which those with natural leadership skills enjoy from the rest of the rural population.

In recruitment of leadership at the local level, a special problem presents itself if a government is seeking to break away from large farmer domination. It is probably true that this group will continue to dominate local institutions as long as it remains basically intact and endowed with its resources in the rural community. It is difficult if not impossible to move directly to having small farmers and agricultural laborers play the dominate leadership role. In many communities we found that "middle"farmers" or "kulak farmers"--those earning certainly more than a subsistence income though they were not major landlords living primarily

off others' labor--were the ascendent group. In Egypt, for example, despite the land reform and socialist policies of the central government, the local leadership group is comprised mainly of persons cultivating 20 or more feddans (about 20 acres). In China, in fact, after the revolution and land reform much of the local leadership came from "middle peasants" and it has taken a persistent, concerted effort to shift authority into the hands of "poor and lower middle peasants" at the local level. Short of extreme measures it appears unlikely that this "middle" group (really "upper middle" will be represented only in proportion to its numbers. What will count more than reducing its numbers in leadership positions will be its orientation, whether it identifies and assists, say, the lower 40 percent, or rather aspires to join the ranks of the top 10 percent and makes political decisions accordingly.

This brings us to the question of accountability and sanctions. The best way to identify the source of accountability for local officials is to see whether they look "down" or "up" for cues and guidance when making decisions. The watershed in local government is where eyes are fixed in both directions. We found that in Turkey, for example, the government official at the sub-district level, the kaymakam, looked "up" while the village headman looked "down." There was a clear disjunction which reduced to a trickle the effective flow of communication both up and down the line. A similar but somewhat different situation was found in Indonesia where the official, the bupati, definitely looked "up" but so did the village headman. The lurah in practice is more subject to sanctions from above then from below because he is installed practically for life in his position, unless he runs afoul of district administrators. The flow of communication and activity between levels is similarly undermined by this disjunction though it occurs differently.

The system of organization in rural China seems to have struck a fruitful balance, with leadership at each level--the production team, the brigade and the commune--each looking both up and down. It may be argued that the hierarchical structure of governmental and party organization causes leaders to stay quite attuned to directions and cues from their superiors. At the same time, the ethos of mass mobilization and the institutionalization of "criticism" keep eyes peeled for discontent and for practical suggestions that can be implemented as a demonstration of faith in the masses. Further, the practice of sending officials to live in the countryside periodically and of requiring officials to participate in manual labor helps assure that their eyes are pointed downward sometimes.

Probably the most important systematic way of holding leaders accountable both upward and downward is to have a multiplicity of channels, as discussed above, so that communication cannot be blocked or consistently distorted by those in local leadership positions. Apart from this, there is the possibility of fashioning a system so that leadership at all levels is subject to sanctions from both above and below--sanctions being construed here to include the giving or withholding of rewards as well as the imposition of penalties. In a well-linked system of organization there will be relative balance between the upward and downward sanctions at each level of leadership.

To make the total system of leadership at various levels more effective, a multiple incentive system of rewards and penalties should be constructed since not all inducements or exactions are equally important to all persons. Economic resources are more important to some than others, as would be status or authority or other resources. Perhaps one of the strongest incentives that can be provided is to structure the system so that local-level officials have some prospect

of rising in the system. This possibility not only will attract more qualified persons into lower positions and draw out their best efforts, but it strengthens the local institutions as their "alumni" move into higher office. This is most visibly demonstrated in Sri Lanka where about half the members of parliament have previously been chairmen of Village Councils. In Taiwan, farmers' association general managers sometimes become members of the Provincial Assembly. Many local government personnel systems, however, are practically hermetically sealed from higher levels, which works to their mutual detriment.

3. Politics and conflict resolution. One notion of effective local government is that it be "free from politics," functioning in a non-partisan manner to promote the common interest. Our studies put to rest any lingering romantic or ideological ideas about inherent harmony within rural society. In any regime of scarcity--and acute scarcity is the norm in rural areas in Asia--there will be "politics" as individuals and groups compete for very limited resources, status and authority. In some regimes the competition and the dynamic of politics may be repressed to present a formal and outward appearance of harmony. Or some groups may be too weak or lack the channels to express their interests, but underneath the surface, the pressures of competition and politics surge.

Where there are local institutions, these institutions will be arenas for the assertion and promotion of competitive claims and for the regulation and resolution of conflict. Attempts to establish and enforce rules of unanimity in situations which harbor conflicting interests are likely to ensure the dominance of a minority, to alienate much of the constituency, or simply to fail. The case study on panchayat raj in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh gave clear evidence of this. There, higher level authorities sought to compel

the submergence of local differences--some due admittedly to pernicious factionalism--by favoring panchayats with a high degree of unanimity in making allocations. This led, however, to real distortions of the decision-making process as coercion replaced consensus, and as voluntarism in efforts at community improvement dried up. Local institutions make a major contribution to rural development and welfare by surfacing and settling conflicts, invoking some combination of legal procedures and communally sanctioned norms. By forging some necessary measure of agreement based on overarching values--if only those of curbing strife--politics serves a constructive purpose. This has been the pattern among the more successful local organizational arrangements in our survey.

Not all politics needs to be electoral, though this is the most common and in principle the most effective, as it decides who from within the community shall receive and exercise authority on behalf of the group. We find in the cases of China and Korea that "criticism" and "self-criticism" serve as significant modes of politics. Grievances are expressed, objections are raised, new collective actions are proposed, and by giving vent to such ideas the consequent policies have greater realism d support though not determined by vote, except formalistica' after consensus has been shaped. Conflict can be brou . out into the open with such forums, whether mass or not, and from the clash of views can come new, more appropriate courses of action.

If criticism and suggestions are purely formalistic, no really "political" purpose is served, to be sure. But institutional processes whereby objectives can be presented and explained, support mobilized for specific programs, and opposition reduced by pacific means, perform important functions in local organization and for the community. Nothing is gained by assuming or requiring harmony among what must be basically divergent interests. Institutions of decision-making which engage people's interest and involvement, even

if not giving them full control, do not eliminate conflict. But they make it amenable to limitation and to the evolution of norms and procedures for regulating conflict and achieving cooperation in the name of more overarching interests.

As we have stated previously, too much politics or patronage can immobilize or destroy local institutions. Governmental institutions must at least formally include the full range of local interests and find ways to maintain limits on partisanship. Yet other local organizations can perhaps function more effectively for avoiding inclusion of inherently conflictual interest groups in the same membership organization. Our studies paid relatively little attention to the problems of landless laborers, concentrating as has most academic scholarship and governmental policy, on smallholders. But in many of the countries surveyed, landless laborers represent a very large portion of rural households (e.g., 47 percent in Egypt, and 45 percent in Java, Indonesia). These are the poorest of the poor, and they benefit only minimally from governmental solicitude of services. Their interests on most matters are at sharp variance with those of landowners who are no longer traditional patrons but mere employers in an increasingly commercialized countryside. There is not much more community of interest between the landless and owner-cultivators who have secure title to land, for they must cling to their land even more jealously than the landowners. Under these circumstances, it is a mistake to attempt to include owner cultivators and landowners with landless laborers in cooperatives or farmers' associations. They need their own organization.

We found no evidence of organization among the landless or of governmental efforts to promote such organization.[1]

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[1]The collective ownership system of China, which gives all residents of a locality an interest in productive resources, is one way of eliminating the class of landless laborers who have no resources.

Without organization, these poorest of the poor have no bargaining power and no capacity to claim public services. If they should become effectively organized, conflict levels in the rural areas would certainly increase with the landless demanding a larger share of the scarce income and public services that characterize the countryside in contemporary Asia. To acquiesce in the continued powerlessness of the landless, because the alternatives seem more threatening, is to lend futility to tragedy. We can understand the political reasons why the landless have not been organized (or allowed to organize), but for lack of their organization, the political processes in local organization will be less fruitful than they could be in requiring community steps to meet the basic claims of those without land and security. The solution to mitigating potential conflict is more rather than less politics.

4. Institutionalization. While this term may seem abstract to some, it denotes the extent to which people's activities and performance with respect to local organizations are regularized and predictable. How well established an organization becomes for performing certain functions depends on persons in leadership positions and on members sharing an understanding of how the institution should operate and what their proper role in it is. It also involves a definite if not total commitment to the aims of the institution. It takes time for members and leaders to learn how to work within a complex structure, hence the process of institutionalization is not one to be culminated quickly. It also takes time for an organization to establish reliable and predictable linkages with other organizations on which its activities depend. This suggests that the development of viable local organizations, whether governmental or associational, must be guided within an institution building perspective such that local organizational capabilities are deliberately established.

Frequent and unpredictable changes in structures or in procedures are likely to delay or thwart the institutionalization of local organizations. Thus, central elites interested in rural development must be prepared to invest over an extended period of time in building local capabilities and must avoid the temptation to indulge in frequent and sharp structural changes or to require too much of them too quickly. This does not, of course, preclude experimentation and learning or continuous efforts to make structures more effective. Indeed, the more successful local institutions in our study have demonstrated the capacity to innovate and adapt. But they do this within a consistent set of purposes and procedures which impart predictability to members and to the external organizations with which they interact. Institutions are not or need not be static, but their innovation proceeds from a base of understanding and commitment on the part of their members, who accord them sufficient legitimacy and allegiance to make the innovation part of a larger purpose which they support.

Institutionalization, then, involves achieving the kind of understanding and commitment which knits members and leaders together for certain accepted objectives, such as community improvement. This does not mean there is no conflict or competition. But it is encompassed within accepted procedures and does not become an impediment to programmatic action. Members and leaders know what is expected of them and, with relative consistency, act accordingly. This aspect of behavior greatly affects the performance of organizational structures.

In comparing the leadership performance of different local government systems, what stands out most is the difference in the degrees to which leadership roles are institutionalized in support of rural development. In India, for example, the performance of panchayat chairmen at the village

or block level can vary tremendously. Some are energetic, imaginative, effective; others are plodding, cautious, dampening in their effect. There are no clear, uniform expectations, held by incumbents or citizens, of what "good" performance would be, and there are no easy means for "correcting" a mistake in recruitment. If a chairman has the necessary political backing he need not show initiative, energy, or competence; the backing only need come from "influentials" as the majority are not important politically. The best chairmen will compare favorably with the best local leadership anywhere, but the worst can be both incompetent and venal.

Contrast this to leadership expectations in China. This is not to say that there is no ineffective local leadership but the standards are much higher. It is expected that ineffective leaders will be replaced, and leaders who are not performing up to the mark can expect to be challenged, by Party cadres or by spokesmen from the rank-and-file. It strikes us as critically important that thought be given not simply to how leaders should be selected but more importantly how standards of performance can be reliably maintained. Even average persons may perform leadership tasks reasonably well in roles that are well defined and clearly structured, where others are continually called on to judge performance and where procedures for replacement are clear.

The result of successful institutionalization can be to create a cadre of local leadership in the proper sense of the term--a numerous set of persons with common expectations and aspirations, who can be relied on to perform tasks in a predictable and competent fashion. Ayub Khan hoped for this outcome with his creation of Basic Democracies, thinking that the 80,000 some Basic Democrats would share his vision of a prosperous and progressive Pakistan and would magnify many times his power to remake economic and social relations in the rural areas. That this group would pursue agricultural development as self-centeredly as it did was perhaps not fully

anticipated nor that social and political relations would become severely strained as economic participation in the Green Revolution took an inequitable turn. The Basic Democracies experiment was relatively short-lived and is now discredited. Whether it would have succeeded in conferring developmental benefits beyond the rural middle class cannot be known now, but it shows how quickly a rural local government system can be put in place and as our two Pakistan case studies show, there were some positive changes registered in even a short period of time.

For rural organizations to succeed in making a real impact on their communities, quite apart from the roles created as part of the structure, there must be a nationwide or at least a region-wide, network of local leaders who share a vision of a more developed future and are persistent in pursuing this end, whether they be like brigade leaders in China, Farmers Association general managers in Taiwan, kibbutz leaders in Israel or party cadres in Egypt or Yugoslavia. The origin and development of such a cadre is complex, but it is closely related to general activities of the national political elite and to the ideology which integrates the entire political system.

Underlying the process of institutionalization is the growing confidence of members that the local institution and its leadership are indeed serving their interests. This is the key to their legitimacy. Once this confidence is breached, the organization may still survive if pumped up from outside, but it cannot become an effective institution in the eyes of its constituents. Another aspect of institutionalization is its effectiveness. While farmers do not expect miracles from local organizations, they will not continue to participate unless they see that the organizations command enough resources to make a difference in their lives and allocate these resources for uses that seem productive. Thus, any national

government seeking to promote local organization must take steps to insure the legitimacy and effectiveness of these organizations in rural eyes. With these accomplishments, local organizations can achieve a consistency and predictability of performance, both vis-a-vis their membership and in terms of members' activity in the organization, which will make them useful instruments on behalf of agricultural productivity and rural welfare.

CHAPTER V

OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTIVATING RURAL DEVELOPMENT

Our case studies have demonstrated that, in the Asian context and probably elsewhere, rural development measured in terms of agricultural productivity, income distribution, and composite welfare criteria is hard to achieve without active and effective local institutions. It is equally unlikely that rural development can be achieved without at least moderate equity in the ownership of assets. We found no successful case of rural development in the absence both of effective local organization and reasonably widespread distribution of the ownership of assets. Effective local organization for rural development requires involvement in developmental functions such as provision and integration of services and also having effective linkages, between levels of organization at the local level and through various channels between center and locality. The system of organizations engaged in rural development must include opportunities for rural people to affect decisions governing development policy and the flow of essential services and resources.

Most probably rural development would be facilitated by a combination of strong local institutions, equitable asset distribution, and effective vertical linkages through multiple channels. This is indeed the combination we find in most of the successful cases--Taiwan, Israel, Yugoslavia, Japan, China--but it is possible to compensate for weaknesses in one of these factors by other means. In the Indian Punjab, for example, the panchayat system is not very effective or oriented to rural development problems, though the cooperatives do provide marketing and credit rather broadly in the rural community. The

private sector in agriculture is itself well-organized and dynamic, providing a series of linkages with the state government which get action and responsiveness in policy and in administration. A purely private sector approach to rural development seems not very productive, on the other hand, as we see from Table 3 that most of the more successful cases have a smaller proportion of rural development functions performed by private sector institutions, and some of the least dynamic cases have the largest relative private role. This is due, to be sure, in part to the lack of effective governmental or associational organizations extending into the rural communities. What characterizes the Punjab case is a relatively high rate of participation by farmers in activities that affect governmental performance and somewhat equal distribution of resources. Though the private sector is in some sense the "leading" sector, its activities are complemented by efforts in the public realm.

Our data indicate that experimentation and innovation in local organization are possible, that organization need not be regarded as fixed or given. Rather, it should be seen as a variable, amenable to influence by deliberate intervention. The communes in China and in Yugoslavia, the Farmers' Associations in Taiwan, the cooperatives in Egypt did not evolve spontaneously, nor are they modern manifestations of traditional structures. These great institutional creations have been designed and built in recent times by deliberate efforts. These institutions have changed their rural environment, while they simultaneously experiment and innovate in response to changing environmental conditions. Some will argue rural areas inherently lack the stimuli and possibilities for development that urban or peri-urban areas enjoy, but we find that organization can itself provide equivalent conditions for change, as seen particularly in China, Israel and Taiwan.

Having stated the case for deliberate design and establishment of organization, we would add a concern that

policy makers appreciate the need for an extended time horizon. The creation of institutions, almost by definition, takes time, often a minimum of a decade before both members of an organization and the persons with whom it interacts accept it fully and make its actions predictable and fruitful. As stated above, some experimentation is necessary and advisable, but some regularity must also be achieved and maintained, to redirect the activities and attitudes of persons consistent with the program of the organization. Thus, we do not want to suggest that development of rural local organization offers a "quick fix" for rural development problems. Rather it must be seen as part of a strategy, which aims not only at solving given problems but at forming greater capacity for solving and identifying problems in rural development as they emerge.

When it comes to establishing or improving local institutions, we find some principles of organization, derived from the experience assessed in the case studies, of central importance. Most of these have already been introduced in the preceding chapters, but we want to summarize them here. It is noteworthy that all follow the rule of optimization, which involves the balancing of conflicting values and the avoidance of extremes in fashioning workable courses of action for the real world.

1. Local institutions should have more than one level of organization, probably a two-tier pattern, in which the lower tier performs functions at the neighborhood or small group level, while the other undertakes more complex business activities that require relatively large scale operations. The primary units, performing tasks where social cohesion and group discipline are important, should cover between 30 and 100 households, something of a "natural" unit with its face-to-face interaction and responsibilities. The secondary units, on the other hand, would encompass perhaps a minimum of 1,000 households. One level of organization is not enough

to combine the advantages of solidarity and scale, while many levels make for too much complexity and would sap energy. Thus generally, two tiers will provide the best base for the system of rural development organization, though three tiers as in China may still fall within the optimum. It is often helpful if the higher tier corresponds to an existing pattern of social organization, such as a marketing region. In China the commune is now based on the previous township, which was frequently a marketing region. In Taiwan too, townships had a similar basis.

2. Local communities should be linked to higher level decision centers by multiple channels, both to achieve the benefits of specialization in communication and to enjoy alternative avenues of influence. One composite channel appears quite inadequate, being liable to overload or blockage or interruption if all village-center interaction must be carried by it. At the other extreme, there could be a superfluity of channels, say more than half a dozen, which make coordination more difficult in geometric proportion to their number and which dissipate human resources in redundant activity. A system which relies too much on any one kind of channel, whether administrative, local governmental, associational, political or private, is unlikely to be able to mobilize fully the local resources and initiative available, to gain adequate central attention and response, or to develop extensive leadership and executive capacity for local development. The actual number of organizational channels can vary widely, e.g., there may be many administrative channels in a particular case. What is important is that there be different kinds in any case. As few as two kinds seem to function fairly well in China--the governmental-administrative and the party-political, though these are being augmented now by Associations of Poor and Lower Middle Peasants.

3. Though specialization may be indicated for some activities, local institutions should ordinarily be vested

with multiple functions in order to achieve benefits of scale and to facilitate the local integration of services. There is danger, of course, in overloading local organizations or in giving any organization a monopoly of functions of local governance. Since local organizations should neither be comprehensive nor fragmented into numerous specialized structures, there is a desirable range of variation between the extremes. Yet we found no basis for proposing a general principle for the allocation of functions among local organizations. Local organizations should avail themselves of parallel channels for maintaining linkages with higher level structures in pursuit of their members' interests. The organizational design for successful rural development is likely to be a limited number of local institutions which are multilevel and multifunctional and which communicate through multiple channels.

4. Politics, the competition among groups for influence and resources, must be accepted as inevitable and legitimate in rural local organization. We must recognize that there will always be politics and that it can distort and corrupt instead of reconcile and uplift. The basic objective should be that local organizations assure that all people be included in a share of benefits, whether these be fertilizer, schooling for children, or local prestige, and that these be determined by rules, not by caprice or sheer power. It is not required that all benefit equally--nowhere is this achieved. What must be avoided is the politics of exclusion or monopoly, where practices of patronage cut certain persons or groups off from the benefits of government. This is devastating to an organization's legitimacy and ultimately to its effectiveness. Politics to be constructive must transcend purely partisan distributive functions and contribute to problem-solving capabilities through resource mobilization, conflict resolution and knowledgeable implementation.

5. Sanctions to control the acts of leaders of local organizations should be applied both from above and from below to get best performance. Leaders should be required to be accountable to their constituencies through elections, participation in rural projects, public hearings and similar activities. They should also be subject to centrally determined guidelines and standards enforced by auditing, inspection and regular informational controls. We find again the problem of optimization, in that controls only from one direction are unlikely to produce leadership which actively bridges the institutional gap between locality and higher levels of organization. Too often we found local leaders preoccupied with demands from above, whereas in the more successful cases of rural development, leaders were looking both upward and downward for cues and for evaluations of their rural development performance.

6. Decentralization of operating decisions within a system of centrally determined policies provides the best way of combining authority with the most relevant information and most informed judgment. The appropriate degree of decentralization--and it is a matter of degree--depends on the technologies involved and on the capacity of subordinate levels of administration and organization to perform certain functions. It must be decided on a function by function basis, rather than by blanket decentralization. The validity of decisions to delegate or not to delegate certain authority should be reviewed periodically because capacity can change even if the technologies involved do not. Devolution of authority to local institutions is a more fundamental form of decentralization than administrative deconcentration. It is generally preferred (a) where local institutions can be vested with the necessary operational capabilities, and (b) for functions which depend heavily on local information resources and managerial skills. We have here as previously a problem in optimization, balancing the respective strengths

and weaknesses of centralized and decentralized decision-making and administration. In most of the cases, too many decisions--particularly operational ones--were reserved for persons with authority far removed from the actual situation to be dealt with. In the more successful cases, however, local leaders and officials had the requisite authority--and the confidence and support to use it.

7. Distribution of assets and income poses a serious political issue whenever raised, but our studies indicate the importance of this issue and the need to address it in shaping rural development strategies and institutions. More equitable distribution appears to be a necessary if not sufficient condition for extensive rural development, though enclave development can occur in its absence. The rule of optimization applies here in that the cases with the most equitable distributions were not necessarily the most progressive on all developmental indicators. On welfare grounds they compared most favorably, but not so much on agricultural productivity indicators. Since the achievement of increased welfare depends so heavily on the provision of goods and services, over and above their distribution, no unequivocal judgment can be reached in favor of equal distribution as an absolute rule. At the same time, relatively unequal distribution did not serve productivity ends consistently and was quite negatively related to welfare considerations. Achieving more equal distribution of assets and income involves questions beyond the scope of our research, but we cannot avoid raising the issue in any consideration of how to promote rural development.

Rural development is a dynamic phenomenon. New crops, new production technologies, population movements, price changes, are among the many factors that produce the inevitable changes in an increasingly commercialized rural society. We were not able in this project to study rural development over sufficient time to arrive at conclusions about the dynamics

of rural development in Asian countries. We recognize, however, that as the path of rural development is influenced by local institutions, institutions in turn are affected by changes in the rural environment. With the commercialization of agriculture, for example, the private sector may supplement or even displace certain public services; local institutions may become more numerous and more specialized as managerial capabilities increase and cropping and livestock become more diversified; as modes of production change, institutions must change to accommodate new needs. For example, as landless laborers increase in absolute numbers and as a proportion of rural households, institutions will have to be built through which their interests can be articulated and served, unless their needs are to be completely ignored.

The burden of decision and action falls primarily on Asian governments. They enjoy both institutional options and choices of strategies. They can attach high or low priority in resource allocation to rural development; their policies and practices can be more or less egalitarian; their administration can be more or less centralized; local institutions which they sponsor can be more or less participatory. Within this range of options, many ideologies are consistent with development. Regimes as ideologically divergent as mainland China and Taiwan, as Sri Lanka and Korea, as Israel and Egypt have committed themselves to promoting rural development through the fostering of local organization. The determinant appears not so much the hue of ideology as the commitment of the regime to popular participation in the rural development process. We are not suggesting that governments are monolithic, or that sections of government may not be able to promote local organization in the absence of a strong commitment at the highest levels. But since a developmental strategy involving local organization requires substantial reallocation of central resources and authority and organizing rural people is such a difficult task, vulnerable to many

kinds of public or private sabotage, we see some central commitment to its success as essential. What is clear, however, is that the essential elements of such a strategy--relative equity, local organization, and systems of linkage--are realizable within a spectrum of regimes and ideologies.

The role of foreign governments and of international agencies interested in fostering rural development is necessarily restricted in institutional choice and in institution building. Institutions which organize the lives of large and vital domestic constituencies are extremely sensitive and usually unamenable to external involvement. But governments realize that they are often venturing into uncharted seas where there is little firm knowledge to guide them. Some of them are likely to welcome assistance in action research by well trained and sympathetic social scientists who can work with local associates to plan, organize, carry out and to bring to bear on these experiments the experience of other countries. The funds which are needed to build and sustain local institutions are not likely to come from foreign aid sources, but financial support for experimental research and for the interchange of experience may be both available and welcome. There is, to be sure, a danger that reliance on foreign aid and experts can inhibit the development of popular involvement and responsibility and of linkages to lower levels which are so important.

The community of scholars in industrialized and in developing countries who are intellectually and normatively committed to rural development can make vital contributions to a more precise appreciation of the local institutional dimensions of rural development. By focusing on institutions, they can help to rectify the serious imbalance in academic literature which has emphasized resources and technologies to the virtual exclusion of institutions as variables affecting rural development. By sustained attention to institutional

networks they can help to close the current intellectual gap on this subject. They also embody the human and intellectual resources that international development agencies will have available to assist governments in the research, evaluation and exchange of experience which we have already discussed. In these roles they can contribute to the development of more relevant and policy serving social science.

APPENDIX A

BACKGROUND ON STUDY OF RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN ASIA

The Rural Development Committee is an interdisciplinary group of faculty and graduate students working under the auspices of the Center for International Studies at Cornell. Its membership includes persons from disciplines as diverse as agricultural engineering, plant pathology, anthropology and public administration. Since its organization in 1971, its activities have centered around strategies and institutional arrangements for promoting development of small farmers and others in rural communities who have not previously participated fully in the gains from growth.

A working group of political scientists, public administrationists and agricultural economists began in the spring of 1973 to consider the role of rural local organization in rural development, focusing on local governing institutions in particular. With a grant from the Asia Bureau of USAID it was possible to commission as many as 18 case studies. Based on their foreign language competence and field research experience, members of the working group undertook to do about half the case studies themselves, inviting other Asian and American scholars with experience on this subject to do the other studies. Members of the working group and participating scholars are listed in the Foreword.

The plan of work ensured that there would be an intensive core of knowledge about rural local organization within the working group at Cornell to strengthen our comparative analysis. At the same time, the knowledge and perspectives of other social scientists could also be incorporated into the project. During April and May 1973, the working group developed an outline for the case studies so these would illuminate a common set of concerns and provide data required for comparative study. Then during the summer of 1973, original fieldwork was conducted for most of the cases: Bangladesh, India (Punjab), Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Taiwan and Turkey, with other studies drawing on previous research.*

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*Stavis visited mainland China during April 1972 having written a thesis on the politics and organization of agricultural mechanization there; he also did interviewing in Hong Kong during September 1973 to supplement his knowledge of rural organization in China. Mayfield had done research in rural Egypt during 1966-67 and had written Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt (Austin, 1972); after completing a first draft of his monograph, he spent March-May 1974 in Egypt updating his knowledge of rural organization and development there.

Reddy had previously studied and co-authored a book on Panchayati Raj in Andhra Pradesh (Hyderabad, 1967) so he was in a good position to address the issues covered in our study, while Hadden had written a dissertation

When drafts of the case studies had been completed, a series of workshops was held at Cornell analyzing and comparing country experiences with local organization and rural development. For each workshop, participants with specific country experience and knowledge were invited as outside consultants to join with members of the working group, who contributed comparative perspectives on the particular cases being discussed. A list of workshop participants is given in Appendix E (pages 000-000). On the basis of comments and criticisms at the workshops, the drafts of the case studies were revised and expanded for publication as the empirical basis of this project.

The case studies address a common set of issues and relationships in rural development though they are not identical in format. The original design for the case studies laid out an outline for them, but they were not forced into a common mold, since it was even more evident once the fieldwork was done, that each case offered different lessons and the relevance of issues and relationships varied from case to case. This underscored the importance of context, which we appreciated from the outset. Issues, relationships and outcomes take on different meanings according to the circumstances and objectives that prevail. As the modes and structures of local organization varied widely across our set of cases, we knew we would be examining general principles of organization rather than searching for some optimal model of organization.

The cases selected are reasonably inclusive for Asia, though the plan was to have four cases for each of the sub-regions: East Asia (China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan); Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand); South Asia (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka); and

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on the politics and economics of rural electrification in Rajasthan based on fieldwork there in 1969-70. Burki, while heading a program of public works in West Pakistan, working with and through Basic Democracies, had gathered data on that system and on rural development outcomes particularly in the Province of Punjab, so he drew on this knowledge for his monograph. Ingle had previously worked with local government in Thailand for 2½ years and was writing a doctoral thesis in this area. Mlinar is one of the leading scholars in Yugoslavia on local government there, and he extended his work to address specifically the role of rural commune's in that country's rural development.

Dov Weintraub, chairman of the Sociology Department at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is one of the top authorities on rural local institutions in Israel, and co-author of the book, Moshava, Kibbutz and Moshav (Ithaca, 1969). He had previously been associated with Cornell as a visiting professor and planned to update his work to contribute a monograph to the series. Fieldwork was in progress when the October 1973 war broke out, and he and his research assistant were both drafted. The work could not be resumed subsequently, but Dr. Weintraub did contribute the necessary matrixes to permit us to include Israel in our comparative analysis. He visited Cornell in February 1974 while in the U.S. on other business and discussed the Israeli case at some length with the working group.

West Asia and the Mediterranean (Egypt, Israel, Turkey and Yugoslavia). The major cases omitted are Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, Nepal and other Arab countries of West Asia. The diversity of experience on the sub-continent of South Asia was explored by special sub-national case studies for India and Pakistan.

After workshops on the individual case studies were completed, Uphoff and Esman wrote a draft analysis, which was circulated among the working group and critiqued also at an informal seminar held in Washington in June 1974. The draft was thoroughly rewritten and extended over the next six months while the case studies were also being revised for publication in the monograph series.

The original study design focused primarily on "local government" (including cooperatives and other associational organizations where they were operative) as an independent variable affecting the dependent variable of rural development. Since we recognized that other factors would be accounting for rural development also, we were trying to ascertain the contribution of local government ceteris paribus. We identified five aspects of local government to examine: autonomy of local institutions vis-á-vis higher levels of government/organization; linkage of local institutions with higher levels of government/organization; participation of local people in the operation of local institutions; scope of functions undertaken by local institutions; and scale of local units in terms of jurisdictional area.

In principle, each of these variables could be relatively independent of the others. A system of local government could have high autonomy (relatively great control over personnel, budgets, personnel, etc.) and high linkage (frequent and effective communication and interaction with higher levels); it could also have high or low participation, with great or narrow scope, over a large or small area. But in practice, when analyzing the cases after the workshops, we concluded that autonomy was not only difficult to measure but apparently closely (and usually inversely) related to linkage. This latter variable was quite clearly associated with our measures of rural development, while the relationship with participation was less consistent. Scale and scope appeared of secondary importance. Consequently, we took linkage related to rural development functions as the major independent variable.

Our dependent variable, rural development, was defined in terms of agricultural productivity, rural income and rural welfare. Unfortunately, satisfactory comparative data on rural incomes were not available for enough cases to justify analysis, so we had to depend on measures of productivity and welfare. We did find reasonably comparable data on income distribution and have considered it along with other measures of rural welfare. (Income distribution data are discussed and given in Appendix D.) To take a more comprehensive view of welfare, we also devised through the construction of scales and simple scoring, measures of the security and participation which rural people enjoy or lack.

The major development in conceptualization between the beginning of the study and its conclusion was our understanding of the importance of seeing local institutions as a system of organization for rural development. We moved fairly quickly from our initial structural definition of "local government" to the more functional idea of "local governance." But even this was not comprehensive enough, so we focused on "local organization" for rural development, with two or more levels of organization at the local level, performing often multiple functions and linked vertically and horizontally with other organizations. The idea of channels through which local communities could be linked with the center, with communication upwards and downwards, was elaborated in our initial design and proved useful in subsequent analysis of the cases.

The main methodological innovation was in transforming configurational knowledge of local organizational systems into some quantitative measures for purposes of comparison. Our goal was to be able to put in some ranking the characteristics of different experiences. We described for each case the role of the various channels in dealing with the several identified rural development functions. From these, numerical matrixes were constructed which yielded in percentage terms, estimates of the relative importance of each channel in the respective cases. These matrixes are shown, with explanations, in Appendix C.

At the same time, we developed quantitative estimates of linkage in the respective cases. By identifying the several levels of organization, from the village upward, drawing on the case study materials which had been analyzed, numbers were assigned on a scale of 0 to 5 for the extent and effectiveness of communication and interaction upwards from and downwards to the different levels of sub-national organization. The best linked case or cases for the particular level (e.g., district) was/were given a 5, and the others were grouped ordinally from 4 down to 1 or 0. The assignment of numbers was discussed, even debated, collectively to ensure that similar cases had the same number for that level, and dissimilar cases had appropriately higher or lower numbers. The figures arrived at from this analysis are shown in Appendix B.

With these two sets of measures estimating local organizational linkage and relevance to rural development, we grouped the cases into two sets, shown on page 30 above. Data on the dependent variable of rural development had been compiled separately from standard international sources for the 16 cases: cereal grain yields, nutritional levels, literacy, etc. An analysis was then done comparing the performance of these two sets of cases, the more organized and the less organized, according to these standardized data. The inter-group comparisons were almost all in the same direction, indicating that the more organized cases had performed markedly better on a variety of criteria than had the less organized cases. Beyond this, Uphoff and Esman drew out from the cases and the workshop discussions, basic principles of organization relevant to the design and establishment of a system of local organization for rural development.

APPENDIX B

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE LINKAGE

The concept of linkage is by now well-established in social science to describe exchange relationships of goods, services, information, demands and supports, in international and domestic politics as well as within economics, as with "forward and backward linkages" (Hirschman). From our initial analysis of the role of rural local institutions in rural development, we concluded that linkage would be one of the important variables addressed in our field studies, and this view was reinforced by the drafts of the case studies and by the workshops.

We considered linkage to mean the extent and effectiveness of communication and influence between levels of organization (such as district and sub-district). The content of linkages may include policy matters as well as the performance of services. A downward linkage means that communication and influence are initiated and sustained by the higher level unit in the system (e.g., a district office interacting with a village), while an upward linkage denotes interaction initiated and maintained by the lower level unit (e.g., a village cooperative dealing with a district cooperative federation).

Because we were concerned with the quality as well as the amount of interaction, no simple frequency data would suffice. We decided to identify the various levels of local government and associational organization in each of the cases, usually four levels from the provincial or state level down to the village. (The levels are defined on pages 26-27.) The working group scored each of the cases with respect to each level, both for linkage downward to that level and upward from that level, on a scale of 0 to 5. Zero represented negligible effective, regular communication and influence, and five represented continuous, effective communication and influence. In the table below, the first number in each pair represents linkage downward to that level, and the second is for linkage upward.

To try to ensure that the numbers assigned were comparable, all scorings by level and direction were cross-checked against each other, to that similar cases with respect, say, to linkage down to the sub-district level had the same score, and those with more or with less frequent and reliable interaction were scored appropriately higher or lower. Thus, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia and Pakistan were judged comparable with respect to communication and influence down to the sub-district (union, block or mukim) level, and they are all given a score of 3 for this. Thailand and Indonesia were thought to have considerably less linkage down to the kamnan or kecemetan levels, while other cases were found to have more linkage to the sub-district level. Only China, Israel and Yugoslavia were regarded as having sufficiently continuous, effective, regular interaction to warrant a score of 5 in this category.

One problem in totalling scores was that some cases had only two or three instead of four levels of organization within the range of our analysis. In India, for example, below the state level there is only the district, block and panchayat levels of organization. (The Indian state functions equivalent to a central government in smaller nations and is in no way "local" government, so we could not and did not put it in the same category with provinces, prefectures, etc.)* We did not want to penalize such cases in our total scoring simply for this reason, especially since we were concerned with the quality and intensity of linkage. Consequently, where only two or three sets of downward/upward linkage scores had been given, to represent the average score for quality of inter-level linkage irrespective of the number of levels involved, we added the average of the scored levels to compensate. Thus, Egypt, with scores for the governorate, markaz and "village" levels (the Village Councils cover a number of "natural" villages) of 12 points downward and 6 points upward, was given 4 more points downward and 2 more upward to make its total score comparable to the score of cases with four levels.

This method of deriving quantitative measures for comparisons among cases having complex patterns and variable degrees of interaction still does not encompass all the factors and variations involved. But when the scores were separately estimated and collectively compared, they seemed to represent quite well, at least ordinally, the differences among cases we observed in terms of the quality and quantity of political-administrative linkage. We recognize that other persons may disagree with some of the scorings, wanting to add or subtract a point or two here or there, since the data are essentially judgmental. We could do no more than reflect the case study materials as best we could. In fact, changes of a few points here or there would not alter the ordering of cases significantly.

The scores assigned in each case by level are shown in the table below, with the name of the organizational unit to which we were primarily referring. (The score for linkage down to and up from the panchayat level in India includes the linkage for cooperatives as well as the panchayat local government, for example.) As noted above, the first number in each pair represents the extent and effectiveness of interaction down to that level from above, and the second number stands for the interaction initiated up from that level to higher levels of organization. The total linkage score is shown for each case, divided into downward and upward linkage scores.

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*Similarly, the provincial government in Taiwan is for all practical purposes the central government, and the governments of the "republics" in Yugoslavia possess such powers that they are best not regarded as "local." In Korea, the province is only an administrative extension of the central government and is therefore not scored. The size of provinces in Java (Indonesia) is such as to put them above our category. Israel and Sri Lanka, on the other hand, are so small that they have no sub-national organization at this level.

	PROVINCIAL LEVEL (1,000,000-5,000,000)	DISTRICT LEVEL (100,000-500,000	SUB-DISTRICT LEVEL (20,000-50,000)	VILLAGE LEVEL (500-5,000)
BANGLADESH [12/5 = 17]	5 / 3 [District]	3 / 1 [Thana]	3 / 1 [Union]	1 / 0 [Village]
CHINA [19/10 = 29]	5 / 3 [Province]	5 / 3 [County]	5 / 2 [Commune]	4 / 2 [Team]
EGYPT [16/8 = 24]	5 / 3 [Governorate]	4 / 2 [Markaz]	3 / 1 [Village]	
INDIA [12/6 = 18]	----- [State]	5 / 3 [District]	3 / 1 [Block]	1 / 1 [Panchayat]
PUNJAB [15/8 = 23]	----- [State]	5 / 3 [District]	4 / 2 [Block]	2 / 1 [Panchayat]
INDONESIA [9/4 = 13]	----- [Province]	4 / 2 [Kabupaten]	2 / 1 [Kecemetan]	1 / 0 [Desa]
ISRAEL [18/14 = 32]		5 / 4 [Region]		4 / 3 [Moshav-Kibbutz]
JAPAN(1920)[16/7 = 23]	5 / 2 [Prefecture]		4 / 1 [Mura]	3 / 2 [Hamlet]
(1960)[17/9 = 26]	5 / 3		4 / 2	4 / 2
KOREA [16/4 = 20]	----- [Province]	5 / 2 [County]	4 / 1 [Township]	3 / 0 [Hamlet]
MALAYSIA [14/5 = 19]	5 / 2 [State]	5 / 3 [District]	3 / 0 [Mukim]	1 / 0 [Kampong]
PAKISTAN [13/4 = 17]	5 / 3 [District]	4 / 0 [Tehsil]	3 / 1 [Union]	1 / 0 [Village]
PHILIPPINES[14/7 = 21]	5 / 2 [Province]	4 / 2 [Municipality]		2 / 1 [Barrio]
SRI LANKA [16/12 = 28]		5 / 4 [District]	4 / 2 [Division]	3 / 3 [Village]
TAIWAN [17/9 = 26]	----- [Province]	5 / 3 [County]	4 / 2 [Township]	4 / 2 [Village-SAU]
THAILAND [10/5 = 15]	5 / 3 [Changwat]	3 / 1 [Amphoe]	1 / 1 [Tambon]	1 / 0 [Muban]
TURKEY [14/8 = 22]	5 / 3 [Province]	4 / 2 [Sub-province]	4 / 2 [Municipality]	1 / 1 [Village]
YUGOSLAVIA [18/14 = 32]	----- [Republic]	5 / 4 [County]	5 / 4 [Commune]	4 / 3 [Neighborhood Communities]

APPENDIX C

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANNELS FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT

To assess the relative importance of the different organizational channels in performing rural development functions, the authors of the respective case studies were asked to complete two matrixes. One described the role played by the different channels in performing the several functions discussed in Chapter II: planning and goal setting, resource mobilization, etc. Then they estimated in numerical terms the relative share which each channel had in the performance of each function (provision of services being broken down into water, fertilizer, credit, extension and marketing). The quantitative matrix attempted to give some comparable measures of the configuration of activities described in words.

The summary measures are presented in Table 3 (page 29). Since the total number of points distributed among the channels in each case was 100, the total for each channel can be read as an estimate of the percentage of rural development functions performed by each channel in the particular case. Because the total rural development activity is greater in some cases than in others, we stress that these represent proportions and not measures of absolute activity. Twenty per cent of rural development functions performed in one case may represent more activity than 40 per cent in another case.

The quantified tables are presented first since they are simpler and it is from them that we took one of our two criteria for determining the extent of local organization for rural development. In each case we specify the period for which the analysis applies, since in some cases there have been recent changes. Also, we state how the channels were defined for making these estimates.

Working from the descriptions of the activity carried on within the respective channels, a set of definitions and guidelines were also used in allocating 10 points for each function among the channels. (Five of the functions are really sub-functions of the provision of services; since this bulks so large in rural development efforts, apportioning half the points under this heading seemed reasonable.) Upon examination, this assignment of points, function by function, represented quite well in quantitative--and comparable--terms the qualitative differences we found between and among the cases.

It might be argued that the functions we assessed are not equally important in all cases, as implied by assigning ten points to each, e.g., water is more essential to an Egyptian farmer than to a Yugoslav farmer, or there may be very little control of bureaucracy in some cases. Initially we also asked the authors to do a second quantitative matrix, assigning the 100 points first among the functions in terms of their relative importance to rural development in that case, and then distributing the points by function among the channels. This yielded scores only differing by several points here and there from the channel totals when equal points were given all functions so we felt on firmer ground using the more standard matrix for comparisons.

BANGLADESH These figures refer to Bangladesh during the 1960s when it was East Pakistan and are intended to reflect the modal rural situation, certainly not the situation in Kotwali Thana where the Academy for Rural Development at Comilla set up or activated extensive and effective local institutions, particularly cooperatives and Union Councils connected with thana-level organization. During the 1960s, the Basic Democracies system of local government operated throughout Pakistan and there were no effective political organizations operating on a national scale and down to the local level. We have scored the Comilla system of local organization operating in Kotwali Thana separately to show the relative importance of local institutions in this experiment during the 1960s.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	9	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	0	1	3	6	0	10
Provision of Services	1	8	19	22	0	50
Water	1	3	6	0	0	10
Fertilizer	0	2	3	5	0	10
Credit	0	1	2	7	0	10
Extension	0	2	8	0	0	10
Marketing	0	0	0	10	0	10
Integration of Services	3	1	6	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	1	0	5	3	1	10
Claim Making	1	1	2	4	2	10
	7	11	44	35	3	100
	18					

KOTWALI THANA (Comilla)

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	3	5	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	2	3	4	0	10
Provision of Services	4	21	9	16	0	50
Water	2	4	4	0	0	10
Fertilizer	1	3	2	4	0	10
Credit	0	4	2	4	0	10
Extension	1	8	1	0	0	10
Marketing	0	2	0	8	0	10
Integration of Services	3	5	2	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	1	2	5	1	1	10
Claim Making	1	3	2	3	1	10
	12	36	26	24	2	100
	48					

CHINA The Chinese system of local organization differs from most others but we think that for purposes of comparison, the following division is appropriate. The commune's performance of functions is divided equally between "local government" and "state administration" since it has both roles. The brigade is regarded as "local government" and the production team as an "associated organization," inasmuch as it evolved from cooperatives set up in the early 1950s in the countryside. The Communist Party at the county level and below is counted as 2/3 "state administration" and 1/3 "political organization." Poor and Lower Middle Peasant Associations are counted as political organizations.

	Local Organizations					
	Commune Brigade	Prod. Teams	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	1	6	0	1	10
Resource Mobilization	2	3	2	1	1	10
Provision of Services	15	6	25	2	3	50
Water	4	2	3	0	1	10
Fertilizer	2	1	5	1	1	10
Credit	4	2	3	0	1	10
Extension	4	0	6	0	0	10
Marketing	1	0	8	1	0	10
Integration of Services	3	1	3	0	3	10
Control Over Administration	3	1	3	0	3	10
Claim Making	3	2	2	0	3	10
	29	13	41	3	14	100
	42					

EGYPT Multi-village Village Councils are the local government referred to, and the land reform cooperatives are the associated organizations. The Arab Socialist Union (ASU) is the only political organization in Egypt with branches at the village level.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	8	0	1	10
Resource Mobilization	2	0	6	2	0	10
Provision of Services	1	26	17	6	0	50
Water	1	0	7	2	0	10
Fertilizer	0	9	0	1	0	10
Credit	0	9	0	1	0	10
Extension	0	0	10	0	0	10
Marketing	0	8	0	2	0	10
Integration of Services	2	3	5	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	2	0	7	0	1	10
Claim Making	5	1	2	0	2	10
	13	30	45	8	4	100
	43					

INDIA Both agriculture and local government are "state" subjects in India and thus there can be no standard system of rural local organization for the whole country. State to state variations are significant, e.g., Maharashtra has devolved substantially more authority to local government than other states, while states like Punjab and Tamil Nadu have an unusually active private sector in rural areas. "Local government" includes the village panchayat, the block-level Panchayat Samiti (composed of village panchayat chairmen), and the district-level Zilla Parishad (elected by the Panchayat Samiti). Thus, it includes organization up to a higher level than in some other cases. The associated organizations are cooperatives, most at a village or block level. Political organizations include the Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly from an area as well as the political parties functioning down to the village level, particularly the Congress Party in most parts of India.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	0	8	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	1	4	3	1	10
Provision of Services	1	7	19	23	2	50
Water	1	0	8	1	0	10
Fertilizer	0	3	0	5	2	10
Credit	0	2	0	8	0	10
Extension	0	0	9	1	0	10
Marketing	0	2	0	8	0	10
Integration of Services	3	1	4	0	2	10
Control Over Administration	2	0	7	0	1	10
Claim Making	4	0	1	3	2	10
	13	9	41	29	8	100
	22					

PUNJAB(INDIA) We have considered agricultural and rural development in the State of Punjab separately because it has been particularly dynamic. The major organizational difference between Punjab and the rest of India is in the operation of a cooperative Marketing Federation (MARKFED) with headquarters in every district and with powerful members of the farming community on their boards of directors. Coops are not comparably strong or federated in other Indian states. Panchayats, on the other hand, are a bit weaker in the Punjab. The role of the private sector is also more dynamic, with a correspondingly reduced role for state administration in relative terms. As the case study points out, other than organizational factors probably played the leading role in Punjab agricultural development.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	0	7	1	0	10
Resource Mobilization	0	1	4	5	0	10
Provision of Services	0	13	14	23	1	50
Water	0	0	5	5	0	10
Fertilizer	0	7	0	2	1	10
Credit	0	3	1	6	0	10
Extension	0	1	5	4	0	10
Marketing	0	2	2	6	0	10
Integration of Services	2	2	3	3	0	10
Control Over Administration	2	1	5	1	1	10
Claim Making	3	1	0	3	3	10
	9	18	32	36	5	100
	27					

INDONESIA The system of organization on Java has changed somewhat over the past 20 years. The estimates here reflect the more administrative approach since 1965 than the more politicized and somewhat more participatory structures before then. Analysis of the Indonesian system is complicated by the fact that the executive officer for the kabupaten (district) level, the bupati, serves nominally in a dual role as appointed agent of the central administration (and subject to removal only by it) and as representative of the people in the kabupaten. The figures shown attempt to allocate performance of functions between these two roles, administrative (state administration) and representative (local government). In fact, performance of the latter role is largely bureaucratic since accountability is upwards rather than downwards (the same holds for the camat, who is executive officer for the kecamatan, or subdistrict level). Only the desa (village) headman, the lurah, is directly accountable to rural people, and he is subject to removal from office by the bupati. So the mode of "local organization" contributions to rural development is different in this case.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	9	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	1	6	2	0	10
Provision of Services	5	10	17	18	0	50
Water	3	0	7	0	0	10
Fertilizer	0	7	0	3	0	10
Credit	0	2	0	8	0	10
Extension	2	0	8	0	0	10
Marketing	0	1	2	7	0	10
Integration of Services	0	1	9	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	1	0	8	1	0	10
Claim Making	2	0	6	1	1	10
	10	12	55	22	1	100
	22					

ISRAEL This system also is somewhat different in that the local organizations -- kibbutzim and moshavim -- combine local government and cooperative functions, and the structure of local organization is based on these settlements at the local level and on their regional organizations. Israel being a very small country, these regional organizations, which are responsible to their constituent members, the settlements, are best regarded as local organizations. The political organizations are representative of settlements, so they could also be counted as "local organizations," but have not been here in order not to overweight the comparisons.

	Local Organizations					
	Settlements	Reg'l. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	2	4	0	2	10
Resource Mobilization	3	2	4	1	0	10
Provision of Services	15	10	19	5	1	50
Water	4	1	4	0	1	10
Fertilizer	5	2	2	1	0	10
Credit	3	2	3	2	0	10
Extension	1	1	8	0	0	10
Marketing	2	4	2	2	0	10
Integration of Services	4	3	3	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	4	3	2	0	1	10
Claim Making	3	3	2	0	2	10
	31	23	34	6	6	100
	54					

JAPAN Because there have been two different periods of rural development in Japan -- the period of the Meiji restoration up to World War I, and then after World War II -- we consider the system of local organization both as of about 1920 and about 1960. In the first period, analysis is complicated by the fact that the channels of local government, associational organizations and private sector were not necessarily mutually exclusive. Frequently, an influential landlord served as head of the local agricultural association, the local cooperative and the local government. Thus the same person could represent many interests, including his own, in such areas as goal setting or provision of services. As best we can, we represent the relative importance of these channels in functional terms. The major change between 1920 and 1960 is the establishment of comprehensive rural cooperatives, nationally federated and performing multiple functions in the wake of effective land reform.

1920	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	1	2	5	0	10
Resource Mobilization	2	3	2	3	0	10
Provision of Services	3	21	10	16	0	50
Water	3	3	0	4	0	10
Fertilizer	0	3	2	5	0	10
Credit	0	7	0	3	0	10
Extension	0	2	8	0	0	10
Marketing	0	6	0	4	0	10
Integration of Services	4	0	6	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	1	0	9	0	0	10
Claim Making	3	2	2	2	1	10
	15	27	31	26	1	100
	42					

1960	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	2	3	2	2	10
Resource Mobilization	1	4	3	2	0	10
Provision of Services	2	30	8	10	0	50
Water	2	4	1	3	0	10
Fertilizer	0	8	0	2	0	10
Credit	0	8	0	2	0	10
Extension	0	3	7	0	0	10
Marketing	0	7	0	3	0	10
Integration of Services	2	6	2	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	2	1	6	0	1	10
Claim Making	1	4	1	1	3	10
	9	47	23	15	6	100
	56					

KOREA The score for associated organizations reflects the activity of government supported cooperatives which operate under the aegis of the National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF). The local government referred to is the village and hamlet organization. Because the township organization is effectively an arm of the state administration it is counted as such and not as local government.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	9	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	3	5	2	0	10
Provision of Services	1	18	17	14	0	50
Water	1	0	5	4	0	10
Fertilizer	0	10	0	0	0	10
Credit	0	4	0	6	0	10
Extension	0	0	10	0	0	10
Marketing	0	4	2	4	0	10
Integration of Services	5	0	5	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	1	0	9	0	0	10
Claim Making	1	1	8	0	0	10
	10	22	52	16	0	100
	32					

MALAYSIA The District Officer is an agent of state administration and not local government. Indeed, local government is essentially restricted to urban areas in Malaysia. Local elections for village councils were stopped in the early 1960s. These estimates represent the period of the 1960s and do not cover renewed efforts to establish Farmers Associations at the local level in Malayaia. If these were to extend effectively throughout rural Malaysia, the score for local organization would probably increase to 25 or 30.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	0	0	8	1	1	10
Resource Mobilization	0	1	7	2	0	10
Provision of Services	0	2	27	21	0	50
Water	0	0	10	0	0	10
Fertilizer	0	1	2	7	0	10
Credit	0	1	3	6	0	10
Extension	0	0	10	0	0	10
Marketing	0	0	2	8	0	10
Integration of Services	0	0	10	0	0	10
Control Over Administration	0	1	6	1	2	10
Claim Making	1	1	4	2	2	10
	1	5	62	27	5	100
	6					

PAKISTAN This matrix pertains to the period of Basic Democracies and does not include post-Ayub developments, such as the Integrated Rural Development Program, the People's Works Program or the Daudzai area rural development program initiated by the Pakistan Academy for Rural Development (Peshawar). Also, this represents a national mode. The score for local organizations would be somewhat greater if done separately for the Province of Punjab.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	9	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	0	4	5	0	10
Provision of Services	0	2	21	27	0	50
Water	0	0	5	5	0	10
Fertilizer	0	0	4	6	0	10
Credit	0	1	1	8	0	10
Extension	0	0	10	0	0	10
Marketing	0	1	1	8	0	10
Integration of Services	3	0	5	2	0	10
Control Over Administration	2	0	6	0	2	10
Claim Making	3	0	2	3	2	10
	10	2	48	37	4	100
	12					

PHILIPPINES This estimation is for the pre-martial law period. Since 1973, efforts are underway to establish a national system of cooperatives federated at the district and national levels. Pre-cooperatives (samahang nayon) are presently in the stage of being organized in some 13,000 communities. Also, barrio local government is being refashioned to include popular assemblies (barangay). These institutional developments if established nationally would change the score assigned to local organization substantially. In neither system are "political organizations" judged significant for rural development. In the pre-martial law period, the parties, however active down to the local level, had no positive institutionalized role in rural development and could not be a reliable channel for farmers to make claims or feed up information; instead the parties were engrossed in patronage politics with shifting alliances making no continuous contribution to rural development. (Scoring done by David Robinson and Norman Uphoff for pre-martial law period as matrix completed in Philippines was for post-1972 system which is being established; they drew on Robinson's 3½ years of experience in the Philippines working at rural development on the local level and on the case study.)

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	9	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	1	0	4	5	0	10
Provision of Services	3	8	15	24	0	50
Water	1	2	5	2	0	10
Fertilizer	0	2	0	8	0	10
Credit	0	1	4	5	0	10
Extension	1	1	6	2	0	10
Marketing	1	2	0	7	0	10
Integration of Services	1	2	6	0	1	10
Control Over Administration	1	0	8	1	0	10
Claim Making	2	1	3	2	2	10
	9	11	45	32	3	100
	20					

SRI LANKA The different channels are very straightforwardly identified with Village Councils (and Cultivation Committees), cooperatives, national civil service, private traders and markets, and political parties, respectively, in Sri Lanka. The estimates are for the period through 1972 after which a whole new set of local organizations have been instituted, particularly the Agricultural Productivity Committees at the local level, which would raise still further the score given to local organization.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	1	4	1	2	10
Resource Mobilization	1	1	6	1	1	10
Provision of Services	3	20	19	8	0	50
Water	3	2	5	0	0	10
Fertilizer	0	4	4	2	0	10
Credit	0	5	3	2	0	10
Extension	0	2	7	1	0	10
Marketing	0	7	0	3	0	10
Integration of Services	3	2	3	0	2	10
Control Over Administration	3	1	2	0	4	10
Claim Making	4	1	0	1	4	10
	18	24	34	11	13	100
	42					

TAIWAN Local government in this system is the Township Office and the Farmers' Associations and Irrigation Associations are the associated organizations. County government and above, as well as the Provincial Farmers' Association and Irrigation Association are regarded as state administration. The Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party is the only political organization at the local level.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	2	6	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	2	3	3	2	0	10
Provision of Services	3	18	20	9	0	50
Water	1	4	5	0	0	10
Fertilizer	1	3	5	1	0	10
Credit	0	4	2	4	0	10
Extension	1	4	4	1	0	10
Marketing	0	3	4	3	0	10
Integration of Services	2	3	4	0	1	10
Control Over Administration	2	2	4	0	2	10
Claim Making	2	2	3	1	2	10
	13	30	40	12	5	100
	43					

THAILAND The Changvat (province) Administrative Organization represents considerable deconcentration of central authority, but little devolution. It is essentially an extension of the central administration, though it has some representative (appointed) roles attached to it. Thus it is considered as state administration along with units of the central ministries. Muban and tambon councils are the local organizations referred to here.

	Local Org's.	State Administration				
	Local Govt.	Central Units	Provincial Offices	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	2	1	7	0	0	10
Resource Mobilization	2	1	3	4	0	10
Provision of Services	7	7	12	24	0	50
Water	2	5	1	2	0	10
Fertilizer	2	0	1	7	0	10
Credit	1	2	2	5	0	10
Extension	1	0	7	2	0	10
Marketing	1	0	1	8	0	10
Integration of Services	2	1	6	1	0	10
Control Over Administration	2	1	5	1	0	10
Claim Making	2	0	5	3	0	10
	17	11	39	33	0	100
		50				

TURKEY The state administration reaches down through the governorate level (at which there is an elected but weak Provincial Council) to the sub-governorate (kaza) level at which the kaymakam is the executive officer, equivalent to the District Officer in many ex-British systems. Below this there is a nominal district (bucak) with no representative and few administrative functions. "Local government" is provided by the village headman (mukhtar) and whatever council he may have. There are cooperatives in many villages. Political parties are not permitted to organize below the kaza level.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	1	0	5	2	2	10
Resource Mobilization	1	1	4	4	0	10
Provision of Services	1	6	23	20	0	50
Water	1	0	9	0	0	10
Fertilizer	0	1	2	7	0	10
Credit	0	2	3	5	0	10
Extension	0	1	9	0	0	10
Marketing	0	2	0	8	0	10
Integration of Services	0	1	4	3	2	10
Control Over Administration	1	1	4	2	2	10
Claim Making	2	0	4	2	2	10
	6	9	44	33	8	100
	15					

YUGOSLAVIA The Yugoslav system of government and administration places no state administrative personnel at the local level. All officials and staff are responsible to the Commune. Yet some planning and policy setting is done at the State (republic) level and some Commune activities are in effect state functions. The 18 points assigned to the Commune are divided 2/3 local government and 1/3 state administration, with the work of Neighborhood Associations included with that of the Communes as local government. Cooperatives and worker-owned enterprises are associated organizations.

	Local Organizations					
	Local Govt.	Assoc. Org's.	State Admin.	Private Sector	Pol. Org's.	Total
Planning and Goal Setting	3	2		1	4	10
Resource Mobilization	4	2		3	1	10
Provision of Services	13	24		10	3	50
Water	4	1		4	1	10
Fertilizer	0	8		2	0	10
Credit	4	5		1	0	10
Extension	4	5		0	1	10
Marketing	1	5		3	1	10
Integration of Services	6	2		1	1	10
Control Over Administration	8	0		0	2	10
Claim Making	5	1		1	3	10
	39	31	(13)	16	14	100
	57					

* * * * *

For easier inter-country comparisons (bearing in mind that these scores are relative and not absolute in magnitude), the cases are rank-ordered on the next page for each of the five channels. While persons might disagree on the assignment of a point or two here or there in the matrixes with respect to a particular channel and a certain function, few changes would alter very much the relative importance scores for the respective channels and cases.

Both ordinally and cardinally, we find the numbers estimated through the procedures described above yielding meaningful descriptive differences in the degree of involvement for each channel in rural development functions. We would remind readers that the score for "local organization" in each case (shown in Table 3) is a sum of the scores for local government and associational organizations as these together comprise the local structure for rural development activity.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT	
Israel(settlemts)	31
China	29
Yugoslavia	26
Sri Lanka	18
Japan (1920)	15
Egypt	13
India	13
Taiwan	13
Thailand	12
Indonesia	10
Korea	10
Pakistan	10
Punjab (India)	9
Japan (1960)	9
Philippines	9
Bangladesh	7
Turkey	6
Malaysia	1

ASSOC. ORGANIZATIONS	
Japan (1960)	47
Yugoslavia	31
Egypt	30
Taiwan	30
Japan (1920)	27
Sri Lanka	24
Israel (reg'l. organizations)	23
Korea	22
Punjab (India)	18
China (teams)	13
Indonesia	12
Bangladesh	11
Philippines	11
India	9
Turkey	9
Malaysia	5
Thailand	5
Pakistan	2

LOCAL ORGANIZATION	
Yugoslavia	57
Japan (1960)	56
Israel	54
Egypt	43
Taiwan	43
China	42
Japan (1920)	42
Sri Lanka	42
Korea	32
Punjab (India)	27
India	22
Indonesia	22
Philippines	20
Bangladesh	18
Thailand	17
Turkey	15
Pakistan	12
Malaysia	6

STATE ADMINISTRATION	
Malaysia	62
Indonesia	55
Korea	52
Thailand	50
Pakistan	48
Egypt	45
Philippines	45
Bangladesh	44
Turkey	44
China	41
India	41
Taiwan	40
Israel	34
Sri Lanka	34
Punjab (India)	32
Japan (1920)	31
Japan (1960)	23
Yugoslavia	13

PRIVATE SECTOR	
Pakistan	37
Punjab (India)	36
Bangladesh	35
Thailand	33
Turkey	33
Philippines	32
India	29
Malaysia	27
Japan (1920)	26
Indonesia	22
Korea	16
Yugoslavia	16
Japan (1960)	15
Taiwan	12
Sri Lanka	11
Egypt	8
Israel	6
China	3

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION	
China	14
Yugoslavia	14
Sri Lanka	13
India	8
Turkey	8
Israel	6
Japan (1960)	6
Punjab (India)	5
Malaysia	5
Taiwan	5
Egypt	4
Pakistan	4
Bangladesh	3
Philippines	3
Indonesia	1
Japan (1920)	1
Korea	0
Thailand	0

BANGLADESH (E. PAKISTAN)

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central Departments with functional ministries. District staff under a Deputy Commissioner (DC) and Thana staff under a Circle Officer (Development)	Basic Democracies set up with 17 District Councils (4 mill. pop.); 410 Thana Councils (150,000 pop.); 4,300 Union Councils (14,000 pop.) with 15 members, 2/3 elected and 1/3 nominated by government	Union Multipurpose Coops covering province at union (local) level; not considering Comilla-type coops which were active in only one out of 17 districts in East Pakistan	Private market with retailers and wholesalers down to village level; interest groups at various levels	Official government party moribund except for patronage allegiance; Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League hugely popular but without influence
FUNCTIONS General Role	Annual and middle range planning; functional ministry services provided down to thana level, sometimes to lower levels	Execution of central and provincial plans through district, thana and union levels	Provincial network of coops supposed to supply all inputs and extension education, mobilize credit, etc; only supplied credit	Provision of most credit through private lending; reallocation of inputs from coops through black markets	Some reallocation functions through patronage network
Planning and Goal Setting	Top-down planning, with functional ministry plans generated and combined into 5-year plans	Some planning through administration of Rural Works Program (RWP) at district, thana and union levels, mostly ad hoc	No planning functions	None except on individual basis	No role
Resource Mobilization	Domestic taxation plus channeling of foreign aid under US. P.L.480	Virtually no resource mobilization	Virtually none, though official function was to mobilize savings	Considerable thru private markets	No role
Provision of Services	Major flood control and irrigation works; disaster relief; import of fertilizer through granting of licenses	Small scale irrigation infrastructure through RWP	Credit only	Major share of rural credit; most of the physical inputs thru private and black markets	No role except for influence on reallocation
Integration of Services	Similar to Indian pattern;	D.C. and C.O.(D.) worked with district, thana and union councils on this	No particular role, but some informal integration	No role	No role
Control over Administration	Bureaucratic control from center	Some influence over admin. through elected representatives; concerned mainly with distribution and not policy making	None	Intense corruption throughout admin. structure; mode of control	E. Pakistan official party an adjunct to administration only; little Awami League influence
Making Claims	Some role but not formally sanctioned	Some articulation of claims from bottom, diminishing at higher levels of Basic Democracies	Some small role, mostly complaints	Interest group activity, and corruption	Ditto

CHINA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATED ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central, provincial and county government offices; would consider one-half of commune staff and two-thirds of Party staff as functioning for state admin.	Commune is the major local government institution (20,000 to 50,000 population) together with brigade (1,000-2,000 people in 10-20 villages)	Production teams (20-50 families in one village or part of a village) are part of commune local government but started as cooperatives in early 1950s	Private plots and markets	Communist Party, with cells at brigade and team level
FUNCTIONS General Role	General plan for social and technological development	Basic administration and coordination of development activity	Carrying out plan; input of information from bottom	No general role	Help communicate local needs to planners; mobilize local efforts
Planning and Goal Setting	Development and coordination of national economic plan	Help in administration of plan; allocation of targets	Can refuse to accept proposed plan if beyond means	No role; but slowdowns and strikes can alter plans if insufficient incentives	Formulate and communicate ideological aims but no direct role
Resource Mobilization	Collection of land tax; distribution of some investment funds	Profits from local industry can be reinvested	Profits from collective agriculture are invested in rural development	No private investment permitted; labor on plots and handicrafts account for 20% of family income	Efforts to mobilize masses, maintain labor "enthusiasm"
Provision of Services	Train and provide specialists, organize agric. research, oversee education and health services; extensive market controls	Provide all production inputs (some purchased from state) and also health and education	Sometimes primary education, sometimes welfare services	Some role in marketing	Can help persuade higher levels to provide services
Integration of Services	Require administrators to have downward mobility and become aware of local needs and problems	Major role in integration of services	Inform brigade and commune of local needs and experience	No role	Check on performance and integration of services
Control over Administration	Careful checking of administrators	Checking, reporting, elections, criticism	Complaints and criticism	No role	Channel complaints; frequent evaluation and criticism mtgs.
Making Claims	Assessment of overall needs of rural development	Make requests in conjunction with making plans	Make requests	No role acknowledged but role of private sector taken into account by local inst's. and Party	Communication of needs to higher levels

EGYPT

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central Ministerial Departments: staff at governorate level under Governor and at district level and at village level	Governorate Councils (25) 1-3 mill. pop. Town/District Councils (140) 180,000 ave.pop. Village Councils (750) 4,800 average population	Cooperatives at governorate, district and village levels, all operated through national federation	Very small private market, limited to small plots of vegetables, etc., sold in local markets	Arab Socialist Union, organized at national, governorate, town and village levels (7,584 basic units)
FUNCTIONS General Role	National development policies and programs of each Ministry: Agriculture, Education, Social Affairs, Health, Irrigation, Housing, Public Utilities, etc.	Implementation and coordination of national policies; some self-help community programs in town and village councils	Provision of services; distribution of seeds, fertilizer, marketing and credit	Very little role	Formulation of programs, platforms, ideological positions and policies
Planning and Goal Setting	Primary responsibility; each Ministry in coordination with Ministry of Finance generates short term and long term goals; national plan	Each level is encouraged to develop an annual budget projecting present needs and future goals; all budgets eventually determined at national level	Some local planning by cooperatives for specific local needs, but overall planning and goal setting accomplished at national level	No role	National Congress of ASU which includes party and high govt. officials seeks to legitimize and communicate national goals and aspirations to public
Resource Mobilization	Major role through tax system	Minor role; local councils collect some local taxes, but all monies go into general fund; some self-help voluntary contributions	No role	Some private investment in land, irrigation and equipment; only larger landowners	No specific role; local ASU units have sought to encourage local savings programs with little success
Provision of Services	Major responsibility for all rural services: Agriculture, Irrigation, Education, Health, Social Affairs, etc.	Town and Village Councils play a general role, e.g., arbitration of local disputes, advocating local interests	Local cooperatives distribute seeds, fertilizer, machinery and equipment, credit, and control most marketing activities	Some role in provision of water and marketing; still have small role in fertilizer and credit distribution	No direct function, however local ASU units can seek to resolve disputes and seek to stimulate local development projects
Integration of Services	Local coordination of most services is the function of governorate-level administration in conjunction with Governorate, Town & Village Councils		Governorate level coops coordinate allocation of services to local coops	No role	No direct role, however local ASU units can encourage implementation of natl. programs/policies
Control over Administration	Internal evaluation and review system	Oversight of administrative system; sanctions mostly limited to governorate level	No role except over own staff	No role	No specific role; some ASU members play "watchdog" functions, reporting irregularities to higher levels
Making Claims	No formal role; however Ministry staff in ex-officio roles on Governorate, Town and Village Councils can articulate demands for change	Governorate, Town and Village Councils are given major responsibility for channelling requests and articulating demands upward	Minor role; coops are state organizations to devel agricultural sector; coop demands usually channelled thru members on local Councils	Some lobbying activities are informally carried out through personal contacts; nothing institutional	Local ASU units articulate specific demands through ASU channels, although most local ASU leadership sits on local Councils and can communicate through them

INDIA*

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central and State Departments: staff at district level under Deputy Commissioner and at block level under Block Development Officer (BDO); at lowest level Village Level Worker (VLW) and Panchayat Secretary, Coop Society Secretary, etc.	Zilla Parishad (district panchayat) 1-2 mill. pop.; Panchayat Samiti (block or subdistrict level of 80,000-100,000 population; Village Panchayat (1,000-3,000 pop., 1-4 villages)	Cooperatives at district, block and village levels, often federated at state levels	Private market with retailers and wholesalers down to village level; various interest groups at different levels	Congress Party and other parties, organized on constituency basis for election of MP and MLA, who have role in RD; panchayat elections at least nominally nonpartisan
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development programs of Depts. of Agriculture, Education, Community Dev., Cooperatives, Water, Roads, etc.	Oversight and coordination of state govt. programs; some self-help community programs at lower levels	Services: credit, fertilizer distribution, and marketing in some areas	Services: purchase of farm produce, credit from moneylenders; sale of farm inputs and implements	No direct functions; elected representatives can make demands through state or natl. legislatures and lobby with bureaucracy
Planning and Goal Setting	Primary responsibility; preparation of detailed district plans	Local planning responsibility not exercised; little goal setting	Some planning for provision of services only	No role; some lobbying by interest groups	Some influence on goal setting through legislature and bureaucracy
Resource Mobilization	Major role through tax system; no agricultural income tax	Minor role; reluctance to tax; some self-help voluntary contributions	Minor role; some savings through cooperatives but relatively little	Private investment, varies greatly	"Ins" responsible for levying taxes; "outs" likely to object
Provision of Services	Major irrigation development; extension services	Minor irrigation; local roads and bridges	Credit; marketing; and fertilizer	Credit; fertilizer; agric. chemicals; marketing	No role; some "patronage" influence in distribution of services
Integration of Services	DC and BDO are to integrate services in conjunction with Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samiti at the district and block levels		No formal role; some informal coordination of credit/fertilizer/marketing	No role apart from "market mechanism"	No role; some involvement in complaints on lack of coordination
Control over Administration	Internal reviews; discipline and sanctions	Oversight of administration but few sanctions	No role, except over own staff	No role (except through "corruption" maybe)	Articulation of complaints against administration
Making Claims	No role; receives and transmits some claims	Major responsibility for articulating demands to higher levels	Some role pertaining to own functional area only	Lobbying activities; demands through market	Major responsibility with representatives at all levels making demands

* MAIN DIFFERENCES FOR STATE OF PUNJAB: Marketing Federation (MARKFED) links village and district cooperative societies (none at block level) into state system, with wholesale marketing societies at market town level; Village Panchayats are smaller, covering 1-2 villages and 600-1500 population; private sector much more active in integrating services.

INDONESIA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central and Provincial Government Departments: staff at district level under Bupati and some staff at sub-district level under Cemet	Kabupaten (district) 1-2 million pop.; Kecemetan (sub. dist.); 20,000-35,000 pop. Desa (village) under Lurah (headman) with 3,000-5,000 ave. pop.	Various past efforts with cooperatives; presently have BUUDs (cooperatives) in most Kecemetan but recent and not well established	Wholesalers of inputs down to Kabupaten level plus merchants and moneylenders	Representatives of political parties elected to Kabupaten's legislative body, dominated by govt. party (GOLKAR)
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development programs of Departments of Agriculture, Public Works, Logistics Bureau (Bulog), Rural Bank (BRI) etc.	Coordination of central, provincial and kabupaten development programs	Dispense fertilizer, pesticides, rice processing, some credit and some marketing	Aides BIMAS program in dispensing credit; still major role in marketing	No direct role
Planning and Goal Setting	Primary responsibility; detailed district plans	Local planning capacity is minimal; but some role in goal setting	No role	No role	No role
Resource Mobilization	Major role in setting tax rates and provision of incentives for land tax collection	Administration of land tax collection; incentive system allows some local tax mobilization	Minor role in collecting interest on loans	Some investment	No role, though can devise new local taxes
Provision of Services	Major irrigation development and extension work	Minor irrigation services; local roads and bridges ulu ulu regulates water use	Fertilizer, pesticides and marketing	Dispensation of credit; marketing; some fertilizer distribution	No role
Integration of Services	Bupati has primary responsibility for this, assisted by cemet	Little role	Some role in integrating services which they provide	No role	No role
Control over Administration	Internal reviews	Oversight of administration but few sanctions	No role	Some influence by local notables	Can review administrative program, but little action thus far
Making Claims	Some role, with regional officials articulating demands	Bupati plays key role in conveying demands	No role	Minor role	Some articulation of local demands by legislative body

ISRAEL

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL SETTLEMENTS	REGIONAL ORGANIZATION	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	The Jewish Agency: Land Settlement Department; Government Ministries: Agriculture, Housing, Trade and Industry, Interior, Education Local Govt. Center	Moshav (M) & Kibbutz (K) as basic local units, combining economic and political functions; relatively autonomous but linked through regional organizations	Regional Councils (M&K) Regional Centers (M&K) Purchasing Org's (M&K) Block (Area) Center (M&K) Local Service Center (M) Processing Center (M) Inter-Regional Council (K) Industrial Org's (K)	Relatively little private activity servicing rural sector	Party organizations are based on ideological distinctions, which provide structures for rural settlement, i.e., Settlement Movement
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development programs of depts. of agriculture, land settlement, immigrant absorption, commerce & industry, education, housing; provision of physical infrastructure, water, roads, energy sources	Moshav integrates individual farm units into an overall cooperative framework, implementing individually organized or state planned agric. or industrial projects; kibbutz operates collectively, implementing agric./industr. projects	Moshavim and kibbutzim function within wider regional networks; the various regional org's service and support the individual settlement units	Little general role	Political party affiliations are the basis of all Moshav and kibbutz organizations. Political parties are thus directly associated with developing, purchasing, marketing, agric., and ind. org's of rural sector
Planning and Goal Setting	Nation-wide planning of agric. production based on national needs and market fluctuations; physical planning of settlements; planning and motivation of inter-settlement cooperation; encourage diversification of labor force activity	Moshav: certain degree of control in planning production of farm units acc. to cooperative principles and w/i wider natl. planning context; Kibbutz: direct planning & initiating agric. and ind. production w/i wider natl. plan context	Regional organization for both moshavim and kibbutzim have legal authority and actual ability to plan and implement physical projects; they also influence extension of communal regional activities	No role	Influence on planning of national agricultural projects in acc. with strength of party as represented in national, state and public institutions
Resource Mobilization	Allocation of production quotas, land, water and finances	Mobilization of capital and investment mostly from public funds and private savings (M) or from own and external sources (K); communal use of labor for org'l and maintenance needs (M) or production and all other needs (K)	Mobilization of capital from participating local units (M or K) and from centrally allocated credit resources (also some use of private loans by K); mobilization of labor from participating units (M or K) and partial use of outside hired labor	Some private savings and investment but most within M or K structures	Exercise of influence on allotment of resources to individual settlements and regions, but little role in raising resources (except externally)

ISRAEL (CONT.)

	State Administration	Local Settlements	Regional Organization	Private Sector	Political Organization
Provision of Services	Partial provision of physical infrastructure; extension services; educational and cultural resources; health and sanitation resources	Supply of production services for farm and consumer services for families (M) or self-supply of services for agriculture and other activities (K); supply of educational, cultural and recreational facilities on local level (M & K); maintenance of physical infrastructure on settlement level (M & K)	Process, purchasing and marketing facilities for settlement units (M & K); supply of educational, cultural and recreational facilities on regional level (M & K)	Some involvement with fertilizer (for citrus), credit and marketing	Exercise of influence concerning provision of land and water resources, physical infrastructure, production activities, and educ./cult./recreational facilities (so ideology of movement is maintained)
Integration of Services	Initiation of cooperative local centers of supply of production services and agric. marketing; motivation of local initiative to formulate regional cooperative efforts to supply educ., cult. and entertainment facilities	Support and control of agric. production by individual farm units w/i communal context of equal distribution of means of prod. on natl. level (M); Support and control of agric. production of Ks on national level (K)	Initiation and implementation of processing and service centers through marketing purchasing org's (M) or w/o context of regl. cooperative enterprise (K); integration of communal inter-regional activities (M & K)	No role	Provision of encouragement and motivation to local settlements to form cooperative regional and sectoral organization for joint implementation of projects
Control over Administration	Self-control over local performance by central administrative and political movement bodies	Establishment of moshav and kibbutz as a municipal self-governing framework (M & K); self control of cooperative activities (M); complete self-responsibility for local administration (K)	Two-faceted control for M regl. org's, from center above and from settlement below; K regl. org's mainly controlled by participating Ks with consideration of movement-based attitudes	No role	Exercise influence on the performance of state functions via local government and regional frameworks
Making Claims	Crystallization and articulation of claims through local and regional admin. channels and transference of these claims to the control level	Making claims through instl. (movemental and pol.) org's and informal channels connected with resource allocations (M); ability to exercise pressure determining physical structure and overall development of settlement acc. to plans (K)	Exercise of influence through M and govt. org's. for mobilization and support of development (M); exercise of influence through K org's for mobilization and support of development and maintenance needs (K)	No role	Gather claims and channel them into appropriate national governmental and public organizations

JAPAN*

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central Administration with staff in the Prefecture (Ken) and District (Gun) as well as in the Administrative Village (Mura) which is also part of local govt.	Administrative Village (Mura) created to link up "natural" villages or hamlets (Buraku or Osta) which had their own leadership	Agricultural Associations and Industrial Cooperative Associations (the latter, when rural, were also concerned with agriculture)	Market; traditional communal groups; private irrigation associations	Several national pol. parties, but no organization at local level
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development of national policies, research, education, extension, agr. banking, rice policies	Mura to implement and coordinate development efforts; Buraku to carry out activities	Provision of services; also exchange of information about new techniques, varieties, etc.	Provision of services	Some efforts to get benefits for rural areas
Planning and Goal Setting	No overall planning; widely shared aim was to raise agricultural productivity throughout country		No planning or goal setting as such	No role	No role
Resource Mobilization	Land tax was levied and collected; basic source of revenue	Local taxes levied and collected; voluntary contributions, including labor for irrigation	Savings	Private investment	No role
Provision of Services	Major land reclamation projects undertaken	Smaller road and irrigation projects	Credit, fertilizer and marketing	Also credit, fertilizer, marketing	No role
Integration of Services	State role important in administrative system	Important integrative functions performed by communal groups at hamlet level		No role	No role
Control over Administration	System highly integrated and centralized, so little outside control	Traditional concensual decision-making processes had some influence on administration		No role	No role
Making Claims	Some role but not formal	Buraku demands articulated at Mura level	No real voice until 1950s	Some role depending on wealth and social status	Some claims made on behalf of rural areas

*Japan in 1960 differs largely in terms of the establishment and effective functioning of cooperative organization, participating in all of the functions of rural development and performing relatively more of these functions than in 1920, correspondingly diminishing the role of the state administration, local government and private sector. Political parties are also on the scene in 1960, especially the Liberal-Democratic (Conservative) Party in rural areas, though its role is almost exclusively electoral.

KOREA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central Ministries represented at Provincial (Do) level, County (Kon) level and Township (Myon) level	The only local government which is representative of rural people is the hamlet (Ri) with a headman; Township also part of local government	National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF) has township level coops federated nationally; essentially an organization of the state	Private markets; money clubs (Kye)	Two national parties with no organizational impact at local level; defunct after 1971
FUNCTIONS General Role	Program development and administration through Ministries of Home Affairs and Agriculture & Fisheries, Office of Rural Dev., and New Community Movement	Coordination and implementation of development programs, between township and hamlet levels	Provision of all essential services, credit, purchasing, marketing, chemical fertilizers, sales, extension, machinery, consumer goods, etc.	Provision of credit through moneylenders; marketing; older water projects	No role
Planning and Goal Setting	All must be called "planning" in Korean context, done in very centralized manner	Some minimal role	Planning done through state administration for NACF	No role	No role
Resource Mobilization	Heavy central subsidization of local projects	Some contributions of "voluntary" labor	Some savings through coops	Savings and private investment	No role
Provision of Services	Primarily involved in extension services through ORD; also role in water provision	Minor role; only some in water management	Major role as noted above under "general role"	Credit and marketing; also water systems	No role
Integration of Services	Highly vertical, centralized pattern of integration	Township and hamlet have active role in integration of services	No real role since not participatory from below	No role	No role
Control over Administration	Almost entirely a matter for the state administration itself	Some small role	No role	No role	No role
Making Claims	Almost all initiative comes from within the state administration	Some petitioning, hamlet meetings	Farmers may make claims on coop officials	No role	No role

MALAYSIA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATION	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central and State Department Staffs at District level, coordinated by District Officer (DO) and District Development Committee of officials	The ketua kampong (headman) serves the kampong (village) in traditional style; the penghulu at the mukim level above this is also traditional in most functions	Scattered single-purpose coops at village level, under aegis of Federal Government department. Multi-purpose Farmers' Associations (on Taiwan model) being organized at mukim (sub-district) level but too new to count here	Active network of distributors, processors, marketers and non-instl. credit sources with links to national commercial and financial centers	Local units of national parties, especially UMNO, which controls Federal and most State governments; also locally resident Federal MPs and State Representatives
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development activities of all government departments and statutory corporations engaged in RD	No contemporary rural development functions; earlier efforts with (appointed) Village Dev. Committee abandoned	Some scattered credit, procurement and marketing functions	Perform preponderant share of supply of inputs, credit, processing and marketing activities	Concerned with interests of constituents; esp. active in District Dev. Committees
Planning and Goal Setting	District development plans set through DDC; implemented through "Red Books" primarily new investments and amenities provided, little support of on-going rural activities	No role in planning or goal setting for RD	Representatives participate in DDC, but limited role even here	No role formally but practically some influence	Participate in State and District Dev. Committees
Resource Mobilization	National tax system provides resources for investment and operations; only minor land rents paid by peasants	What local self-help activities there are are related to religious and social functions	Modest role in mobilizing savings through coops	Private substantial share savings and investment in rural areas for private account	No direct role
Provision of Services	All extension, irrigation, health, education, land development activities; some credit processing and marketing	No role; no structure or staff for this	Limited credit and marketing	Most of credit, processing, marketing and provisions of inputs	No role
Integration of Services	Function of DDC, but primarily for amenities, not for on-going rural services	No role	No actual role, but intend for Farmers Associations where activated	Local merchants and middlemen control and integrate most business type services, e.g., credit, marketing	No direct role except through District Dev. Committees
Control over Administration	Internal supervision and review; Red Book procedures control at district level	No authority; ketua kampong and penghulu are subject to admin.	Minor influence over officials of Department of Commerce	Little role	Articulate constituent complaints, negotiate with local officials and carry complaints to higher levels
Making Claims	Some local demands are transmitted to higher levels of government	Some role in making requests to higher levels on behalf of village	Minor role through federated coop channels and through contact with local party org's and politicians	Claims made on own behalf through admin. and party contacts, but not on behalf of whole rural population	Use party channels to demand more resources on better terms for constituents

(W.) PAKISTAN

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Provincial Departments with staff at district level controlled by District Commissioner. Below district, Depts. were weak, without co-ordinating authority of B.D.O. as in India. Village Aid program initiated in early 50s put village level workers in field, supervised by Development Officer at Union Council level	District Council for 1 to 1.5 mill. pop. in about 1,500 villages; Tehsil Council for about 150,000 pop. in about 165 villages: Union Council for 8,000 to 14,000 pop. in 3-4 villages. All carefully regulated by Local Govt. Dept. and hierarchically arranged. Higher Councils indirectly elected with official representation. DC chaired District Council	Cooperatives at all levels but very weak. Market Committees in Punjab Province nominated by interests and appointed by government. These are effective and important	Trade mostly in private sector; also active in supply of inputs and equipment; institutional credit very weak	Parties based on patronage and personal loyalties before; BD system was intended to compensate by using local govt. institutions to exchange patronage for support of the President (Ayub Khan); no functioning national political parties reaching rural areas
FUNCTIONS General Role	Full range of development functions, with usual problems of penetration to local level.	Propose and manage small local projects, particularly rural public works. Usual local services	No general functions	Mistrusted by Civil Service but generally tolerated in Pakistan; no serious effort to supercede its functions	Patronage system, shift rewards to kulak farmer at local level, with elitist natl. pol. structure intact, run by Ayub
Planning and Goal Setting	Plans and programs mostly from Provincial level. Individual Depts. had their own development programs	District Council could set some priorities and had role in distribution of projects. Union Councils could propose specific projects	No role	No role	No role for organization; Ayub appears to have been well aware of constituencies however
Resource Mobilization	Land revenue collected. Funds for rural public works channelled from state administration	Local taxes, income from fees, permits, cesses. District Council fairly strong for collecting funds; Union Councils rather weak	Local project committees essentially ad hoc organizations	Very important investment: in tubewells, etc. (larger and middle farmers invested their own mobilized resources)	Frequently local notables or MLAs served as catalyst for local project committee but no formal role
Provision of Services	Extension weak; communication & transport good; irrigation (canals) good; inputs in some cases	Public buildings, roads, drains, bridges, adjudication; facilitation of local self-help efforts	Market regulation; coops provided some credit in some cases	Full range of services through market	Patronage and communication only; no direct role
Integration of Services	Responsibility of DC to achieve, relatively weak during 60s; no "package" concept and no "area" development: project-oriented	Local Councils had some role in communication, location of projects, timing of progress, but District Council most important	No role	Market mechanism relied upon; quite good in the Punjab Province	No role
Control over Administration	Technical control in Departments	No direct control; some effect via publicity and personal contacts	No role	Personal and private methods used	Access important at all levels, but more personal than organizational
Making Claims	New programs (RWP, IRDP, VAID) often serve as spokesmen for rural needs; connection frequently between rising bureaucrats and political innovation	Claims of Councils tend to be against administration and then only when personal approaches fail; no impact on basic policy	No role	Personal and private communication, also "irregular"	Politicians typically used programs to make name for themselves and promote their careers; some useful role

PHILIPPINES

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	National and Regional Departments: staff at provincial level under Provincial Dev. officer; at lowest level a Barrio Level Worker	Provincial Government (50,000 to 3 mill. pop.) under Governor; Municipality (5,000 to 300,000 pop.) with Mayor; Barrio Council (500 to 5,000 pop.) elected and headed by Captain	Cooperatives functioning in many localities, supported by government; being superceded now by samahang nayons at barrio level designed to be federated at municipality and provincial levels (not counted in figures)	Private markets and stores with retailers and wholesalers down to the barrio level; moneylenders and rural banks important; various religious and other groups	Political parties organized down to barrio level electing Congressmen and Senators; shifting alliances and considerable political corruption prior to martial law (1972); no functional pol. org's. under martial law conditions
FUNCTIONS					
General Role	Development Programs of Departments of Education and Culture, Agriculture, Natural Resources, Local Government and Community Development, Public Works, Public Highways, etc.	Overseeing and coordination of national govt. programs; some undertaking aided or self-help programs at provincial, municipal and barrio levels	Some provision of credit, fertilizer, seed, etc.; rural electrification and marketing in some areas	Major role in provision of services; buying of agric. production, credit from rural banks and moneylenders; sale of farm tools and other inputs	General orientation of parties was patronage and holding authority; few direct developmental activities
Planning and Goal Setting	Major responsibility; with more specific regional plans set up	Local planning responsibility encouraged; local goal setting allowed	Some local planning for services handled by coops	Peripheral role as evidenced by pressure of interest groups	No involvement from barrio up; incumbent party has autonomous role at top
Resource Mobilization	Takes care of the tax system and assessment program; agricultural income tax being set up	Assists in collection of taxes; limited local taxes; some voluntary contributions	Currently minor role; expected to increase tremendously in future with samahang nayons	Major role through private investments	No role
Provision of Resources	Major responsibility for irrigation, road, extension and natural resources utilization; minor roles in setting up delivery systems	Minor role in development of irrigation, local roads, extension, natural resource use, and marketing	Coops involved in provision of credit, fertilizer, electricity, seeds and marketing where they exist; local irrigation associations have some function	Credit; fertilizer; other farm inputs; marketing	No role
Integration of Services	Regional Directors to integrate services among provinces for rural dev. activities such as irrigation construction, cooperatives development, extension work, etc.	Provincial, municipal and barrio councils and development staffs assist in integration of needed services	Very minor role; coordination with national and local govt. representatives on credit/fertilizer	No role except through market mechanism	Some role through complaints voices to officials
Control over Administration	Undertakes internal reviews and some general supervision of some rural development projects	Delegated some supervision and exercises some degree of operational control	Informal influence, through local staff	Informal influence	No role for developmental purposes
Making Claims	Encourages some claims; takes direct action thru local agents; receives and transmits other claims	Responsibility for transmitting demands to higher levels; barrio level mechanisms encouraged in this	Minor role especially as it relates to its own functional area	Lobbying activities; demands through market and other mechanisms	Some role on behalf of rural areas, though claims made for partisan advantage

SRI LANKA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Ministry Staffs: Dept. staffs at center and in districts; Govt. Agent (GA) as district officer with Divisional Revenue Officer (DRO) at sub-district level; Grama Sevaka as central govt. rep. at village level	District Development Council (300,000-500,000); Division Development Committee (80,000-150,000) (both are political-administrative bodies); Village Councils (5,000-10,000); and Janata Committees at ward level	Cooperatives at district, divisional and village levels; Cultivation Comm's at village or ward level; Rural Development Societies and Community Centers also functioning in most villages	Private wholesale traders (only few remain), local merchants and traders	Major parties: SLFP, LSSP, UNP (other parties mainly strong in cities or north); VC Chairmen and M.P.s plus personal polit. networks
FUNCTIONS General Role	Field operations of Depts. of Agriculture, Agrarian Services, Irrigation, Cooperatives, Plantation Industries, Education, Health, Planning	Implementation responsibility for central programs; control and reporting on local operations	Sale and purchase of agricultural inputs & produce; local "watchdog" function; irrigation decisions; mobilization of local resources for small RD activities	Some role in supply of inputs; purchase of non-grain farm produce; some illicit paddy purchase	Rural development and welfare services are the main political currency, so very active facilitating role
Planning and Goal Setting	Final authority over locally decentralized plan targets	Most plan targets come from district level with disvisional and village input	Cultivation at village level is primary organization making inputs to agricultural plan	Very little role	Large role in setting basic planning priorities, i.e., rural/urban distribution; little role in details
Resource Mobilization	Center has all significant tax authority	Limited tax powers are not fully utilized	Cultivation Committee very effective in collecting irrigation fees; coops have not mobilized much savings	Very little medium or large private investment	Sporadic role; can raise plenty at election times
Provision of Services	Extension, major irrigation, health clinics, education, roads bank credit	Sanitation, libraries, feeder roads, additional support for clinics and water supply	Credit, paddy purchase, fertilizer and agr. chemicals; youth group RD programs; local recreation	Small proportion of physical inputs; non instl. credit; role in marketing	Small direct role but MPs very interested in keeping the "flow" of services to his constituency
Integration of Services	Govt. Agent has formal responsibility to integrate all services in district	District Dev. Comm. brings together admin., technical and political representatives to plan implementation	Cultivation Committee is primary unit dealing with Depts. of Agriculture, Irrigation, & Agrarian Services; pressure them to keep their services integrated	Virtually no role	Political channels seen as legitimate way of bypassing admin. bottlenecks and with issues cutting across admin. boundaries
Control over Administration	Extensive use of power of "legislative review" and parliamentary comm's of investigation	Janata (People's) Comm's play "watchdog" role with power to inspect all official files	Coops have poor internal review mechanism; CC's have informal control function	No role	Political parties and politicians are strongest force controlling admin.
Making Claims	No role; political pressure mobilized to countervail civil service preferences	Village Councils make claims on local admin. and in national arena; DDCs more concerned with servicing claims	Minor role; claims presented mostly through local govt. channels	Voice of private sector quite weak but still some claims made	Political channels both aggregate claims from below and generate many of their own

TAIWAN

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Central and Provincial Government together with County Government; also Provincial Farmers Assoc. and Provincial Irrigation Association (the province of Taiwan is geographically the same as the central government's domain)	Township Office governs area with about 30,000 population	Township Farmers Association and Irrigation Association; the areas covered by each are not necessarily contiguous	Free market in fruits, vegetables, pesticides, etc. (much marketing, particularly for food grains, controlled by FAs)	Kuomintang (Nationalist) Party is only party; has branches at township level
FUNCTIONS General Role	Make all major social and economic decisions and development plans	Administers local development	Assure broad economic participation; provide required services	No particular role given; has role in the provision of services	Smoothes the workings of the bureaucracy; communicates local needs
Planning and Goal Setting	Make plans for regional development, promote agr. specialization; provide water, roads, etc.	Determines sequence of community development; makes input to plans	Allocate some cash crops to particular people and places; make input to plans	No role; capital is free to move to most profitable sectors	No role
Resource Mobilization	Determine and collect all taxes; make major investments	Mobilizes some funds for community development	Profits from marketing and credit are used for extension, scholarships, etc.	Profits reinvested mostly in industry	No role
Provision of Services	Education, agricultural research, credit, police, etc.	Welfare services for needy, some assistance to education, rural clinics	Marketing, irrigation, farm inputs; extension staff works for FAs	Significant role still in marketing and credit; some medical services	No role in agricultural services, some in welfare and job finding
Integration of Services	County government tries to maintain integration services	Some role in integrating roads, irrigation, etc.	Integrate extension, credit, fertilizer, seeds	Can ask for a variety of services to help individual problems	Oversight role
Control over Administration	Constant checking by officials; police investigations	Can complain to county government if bureaucrats fail to perform correctly	Can complain to provincial FA or IA; some development staff on township FA or IA payroll and so controlled	No role	Report local activities to higher levels
Making Claims	Determine what is needed to meet plans	Report local needs to higher authorities	Mobilize votes in local elections, wield influence	Ask for support or contracts	Report on local needs to higher levels

THAILAND

	STATE ADMINISTRATION		LOCAL GOVERNMENT				
	Central Field Units	Functional Offices	Changwat Administrative Organization		Sanitary District	Traditional Units	PRIVATE SECTOR*
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Ministry Operating Offices: central staff at regional & provincial level; Public Enterprise Offices: staff at provincial level	Department Offices: central staff at provincial and district level; also have workers at community level	Technical Offices: central and local staff at province level; under supervision of Deputy Governor and Asst. Deputy Governor	Tambon Council Comm. appointed and operating under chairman (kamnan) with Deputy District Officer and Community Development Officer as advisors	Sukhapiban Council composed of District Officer, Technical District Officials, town & village headman & village representatives	Muban Organization: Local elite and secular leaders with village headman (phuyaiban) as chairman	Private Market with retailers and wholesalers down to village level
FUNCTIONS General Role	Development of infrastructure projects in irrigation, highways, agric. research, Development resources & services: BAAC, credit and fertilizer	Development programs in agriculture, coopr, community development, local administration, health	Rural elementary education, Accelerated Rural Development Prog., rural health	Tambon level minor development activities	Sanitary related activities, primarily in municipal areas	Limited role in education, welfare services, general well-being; information on employment and migration opportunities	Sale of farm inputs; provision of credit; purchase and transport of produce; processing
Planning and Goal Setting	Detailed national plans in specific functional areas	Primary responsibility for detailed province and community plans	Primary responsibility for rural area plans for some functions	Responsibility of commune project planning with approval from Prov. and Dist.	Detailed yearly plan for Sukhapiban	No role	No role
Resource Mobilization	Limited role; farmer savings with credit through BAAC	Major taxation role at national level; some voluntary self-help contributions	Limited self-help role; some voluntary contributions	Limited taxes on land development, slaughtering and registration; some self-help	Land, property and business taxes; limited revenues	Contributions of labor and donations for local projects	Private Investment
Provision of Services	Irrigation, highways, major agricultural production credit program	Agricultural extension, education, medical services, land and labor	Education, health, access roads, village water, agric. coops	Limited road and small works projects	Health and fire prevention	Minor problem solving; religious construction and ceremonies	Fertilizer, implements, new technology, credit, transportation, etc.
Integration of Services	Some outside specific functional channels	Coordination by Governor and District Officer with limited authority however	Asst. Governor draws final plans for approval by central office	Limited role	Informal role through District Office	Informal role of local elite; can alter mode of service delivery	No role apart from market mechanism
Control over Administration	Internal reviews	Oversight over administration, not tech. operations; limited sanctions	Oversight but few sanctions	Control over own internal operations	District Officer controls all internal operations	None	Demands through market mechanism and prices
Making Claims	No role apart from implementation of policies and plans	Some role for District Officers and Inspection Officers	Minor role	Informal complaints can be made to District Officer	Minor role	Informal complaints made by village elite to District Officers	Use of influence and connections, even some corruption to get needs met

*Throughout almost all the period for which the case study applies, there were no political organizations reaching into rural areas. Political activities through private channels

TURKEY

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Governorate operating under Min. of Interior; Central Ministry field agencies report through Governor except for "regional administration"; Kaymakam is executive officer at sub-governorate (kaza) level	Under Governorates have Municipalities with elected Mayors in urbanized areas; weak Provincial Councils; administration at sub-governorate (kaza), district (bucak) and village levels, with headman (mukhtar) in village assisted by council of elders	Cooperatives in many villages; also voluntary associations roughly depending on level of community development	Private market system with strong government intervention (credit, subsidies, import licences, etc.)	Political parties active nationally and quite competitive, but law prohibits party organization below kaza level except for agent (no membership)
FUNCTIONS General Role	Provincial development plans prepared and reviewed by provincial governor and staff; provincial government field agencies implement	Municipal governments active developers; the rest of the province remains in the hands of the state administration	Services and marketing common in more developed areas; some specialized production cooperatives in these areas	Controls transport, storage, most marketing, much distribution of agricultural inputs & materials	Protect rural and peasant interests, especially price supports
Planning and Goal Setting	Primary responsibility in conjunction with Planning Commission and Cabinet at center	Relatively weak except for active municipalities	Organized interests can try to intervene via political channels	Strong central influence via industrial emphasis and investment controls	Intervene on issues such as land reform; give rural orientation to much of national policy
Resource Mobilization	Strong central planning of investment, monetary and trade needs; no agric. income tax	Some voluntary projects in towns; largely await government investment	A few very successful "migrant" coops have significant savings	Major role for private investment, though attempts made to have it within "plan"	Support for firm monetary and trade controls
Provision of Services	Major regional and energy and transport projects. Irrigation; extension; price supports	Assist central govt. in provision of services, but little initiative	Credit, fertilizer and seeds provided through more active coops	Credit, fertilizer, marketing, transport and storage	Some patronage and administrative easing of local needs, but not specific role
Integration of Services	More effective on paper than in fact; state remains strong influence	Depends heavily on preferences and initiative of government; municipalities can by-pass it	Largely restricted to special issues	Maintain entire private credit, marketing and supply sector fairly well integrated	Most intense issues left to National Assembly
Control over Administration	Administration is major force; some ministry infighting; middle levels weak	Government has strong controls over local govt. but moderated by parties and growing regionaliz'n	Can effectively intervene on some issues	Thriving private sector encouraged; some influence over administration	Can set priorities over policy but reluctant; can get sanctions made
Making Claims	Agricultural and industrial development controlled from center	Protection of "residual" powers, e.g. tax exemptions, via parties	Effective on some issues, e.g., mosque construction, imam payments	Lobbying and administrative intervention generally effective	Important in tripartite division of power with military and bureaucracy

YUGOSLAVIA

	STATE ADMINISTRATION	LOCAL GOVERNMENT	ASSOCIATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS	PRIVATE SECTOR	POLITICAL ORGANIZATION
STRUCTURES AND STAFF	Practically no state administration at local level; only veterinary health and other inspections (have assigned 1/3 of Commune points to state administration)	Communal Assembly plus its Council for Agriculture and Forestry and its administration; Neighborhood Associations as local constituent units of Commune	Cooperatives, forestry associations, tourist associations, agro-industrial "kombinats," other economic organization	Groups of farmers in "machine communities," cattle breeders' assoc. beekeepers' assoc.,etc. common pastures, informal cooperation, "model farms"	League of Communists with selected permanent membership; Socialist Alliance as mass organization with special section for agriculture; trade unions for those employed in state sector of agriculture
FUNCTIONS General Role	Control of the legality of functioning of local decision-makers	Development programs for agriculture, education, public utilities, local improvement; self-help projects	Services: credit, extension service, marketing, participation in community development	Promotion of agricultural production by rational use of resources, land, machinery, etc	Discussion of general program of rural dev. and its implementation; articulating specific needs of localities; inspiring socialist efforts
Planning and Goal Setting	No role for local level	Short-term and long-term planning, specific goal setting within the general agrarian policy	Planning for their specific functions and areas; initiative for new programs	Only secondary role, jointly with professional institutions (regional & state agric. institutes) for program of modernization	Joint meetings, consultations with representatives of Commune on "social plan"; support for planning efforts
Resource Mobilization		Compulsory taxes and voluntary contributions of work organizations for specific programs	Savings through coops and forest organizations; modernization of houses for tourism, building roads, etc.	Intensification of production through savings and appropriate private investment	Important role in organizing referenda, various actions for self-help & community dev.
Provision of Services		Promotion of agriculture, roads, schools, etc. through credit from Commune fund	Marketing, credit, education, seeds, fertilizers, etc.	Common use of machinery advising on needs of modernization programs; major role in marketing; joint application for credit	No role in direct provision but important in distribution and in propaganda activities
Integration of Services		Coordination of all programs for rural development	Cooperation among assoc's and with Communal bodies	Very limited role, just among private farmers	Consultations with different participations within Socialist Alliance in local community
Control over Administration		Oversight of administration with sanctions	No separate role; all through Commune	No role	Articulation of complaints against administration has effect
Making Claims		Major responsibility through voters meetings, councils, assemblies; obligatory to respond	Through council of cooperative or agrokombinat, council of farmers or forestry associations	Informal contacts with leaders	Responsibility through voters meetings or directly through own organization to articulate & coordinate demands by other organizations and groups

APPENDIX D

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME IN THE SIXTEEN CASES

For purposes of analysis and comparison, we established a grouping of cases by degree of income equality (or inequality). The data on which measures of income distribution are based are invariable inadequate, particularly with underreporting at the top and the bottom of the income range, which hopefully balances out. Measurement of rural incomes, a large proportion of which are not monetized, is even more questionable. Still, there are real differences between cases, and we wanted to consider these.

The measure we decided to use was the ratio of income received by the top 20% compared to that received by the bottom 20% of the income distribution. It is more reflective of degrees of equality (or inequality) than the Gini coefficient, especially with reference to upper and lower income groups, than are most other measures. Because it is a ratio, it does not give clear cardinal values; as a ratio, it magnifies divergence between top and bottom incomes. But since we desired essentially ordinal comparisons, it was quite suitable for this.

Where possible, we have used data for rural income distribution, but in some cases, only national data were available so we tried to fit the case into the group in which corresponding national figures for other cases would put it. We have been able to use household income distribution data in almost all cases, and feel that the cases with personal income distribution are properly grouped as they are. In one case, Indonesia, we have had to infer group placement from consumption distribution, and that is explained below.

We have taken the most recent figures available with the exception of Pakistan and Bangladesh, where for well-known reasons data in the latter 1960s and early 1970s are subject to challenge, having become highly politicized. In several cases we have used as a ratio the average of two distributions which should have been similar but gave divergent numbers, where choosing either figure would have probably biased our analysis.

Most of the data sets used come from a World Bank Staff Working Paper prepared by Shail Jain of the Income Distribution Division of the Bank's Development Research Center, Size Distribution of Income: Compilation of Data, No. 190, November 1974. We had begun working with an earlier version, dated August 1973, and were able to use the later figures in this final draft. Ms. Jain has painstakingly acquired and analyzed data from 79 countries, estimating for each set of distributional data, the income shares accruing to each 5 per cent of the population (national, urban or rural). We express our appreciation for her massive work on this. In the cases of China, Egypt, Indonesia, Punjab and Turkey we are using data acquired separately for this analysis.

CHINA Income distribution data from China are practically non-existent, though it is widely understood and accepted that the distribution there is one of the most equal anywhere. We are using a calculation of distribution of collective income by household and by person, done by Ben Stavis from data for the village of Liu Ling in 1961 reported by Jan Myrdal in Report from a Chinese Village (Pantheon, 1965), pp. 38-44, 120-122, 154-156. The data do not include data from the small but significant private sector. We have no reason to believe that China is not correctly classified in Group I.

Top seven families	¥ 10,495	with 45 persons	¥ 233 per capita
Bottom seven families	¥ 2,281	with 22 persons	¥ 103 per capita
HOUSEHOLD	4.6:1	PERSONAL	2.3:1

EGYPT We use here data presented in a "cumulative frequency distribution of population by personal income" for 1966-67 by deciles, L'Egypte Contemporaire (January 1971), p. 61. The ratio of 2.3 for personal income means a ratio between 4 and 5 probably for household income. Egypt has a nearly confiscatory tax on upper middle and upper class incomes so the classification of this country in Group I is reasonable.

I	6.8%	III	7.8%	V	8.3%	VII	9.0%	IX	16.7%
II	7.6%	IV	8.1%	VI	8.6%	VIII	10.4%	X	16.7%
	14.4%			PERSONAL 2.3:1					33.4%

SRI LANKA Sri Lanka is one of the few countries to accomplish some redistribution of income over the last 10 years from the top decile to the lower ones through peaceful means. The figures presented here are from the ILO study, Marching Employment Opportunities and Expectations: A Program of Action for Ceylon, Technical Papers, Geneva (1971), pp. 62-64.

Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio
9.0%	43.0%	27.0%	4.8:1

KOREA, TAIWAN, JAPAN, ISRAEL AND YUGOSLAVIA Data for these cases, all of which are relatively equal in their distribution of income, are taken from the paper compiled by Jain.

Korea: Computed from Farm Household Survey of 1971 by Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Taiwan: Data from Harry T. Oshima, "Income Inequality and Economic Growth: The Postwar Experiences of Asian Countries," Malayan Economic Review (October 1970), p. 13. No more recent data were found for analysis. Rural income distribution may be more equal than this.

Japan: Data from Oshima, ibid. No more recent data were found for analysis. Rural income distribution may be more equal than this.

Israel: Report of the Committee on Income Distribution and Social Inequality, Tel Aviv (1971), p. 48. This study was for urban households only and included only Jewish wage-earning households. Other studies indicate that including Arab households raises the ratio considerably. At the same time, since Israel's rural sector is based on cooperative or collective principles of distribution, so it does probably belong in Group II.
Yugoslavia: Computed from Yugoslav Federal Institute of Statistics, Household Budget Survey of 1968.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio
Korea (1971)	8.1%	39.2%	23.2%	4.8:1
Taiwan (1964)	7.8%	40.1%	26.3%	5.1:1
Japan (1963)	7.7%	40.0%	24.0%	5.2:1
Israel (1968/69)	6.9%	38.9%	23.4%	5.6:1
" (1970)	7.8% } 7.4%	38.3% } 38.6%	23.2%	4.9:1 } 5.3:1
Yugoslavia (1968)	7.0%	39.0%	23.0%	5.6:1

INDIA Distribution of income has probably been more studied and debated in India than in any other country in the world. Jain has analyzed 25 different published sets of data. The National Sample Survey (NSS) has been analyzing income distribution every year or two since the 1950's. The 1964-65 data are cited by Pranab K. Bardhan in an unpublished paper, "Income Distribution in India: A Review," February, 1971, p. 4; they were assembled by K.R. Ranadive from data gathered by the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER). The 1967-68 data are also from the NCAER, All India Household Survey of Income, Savings and Consumer Expenditure (with Special Reference to Middle Class Households), New Delhi, 1971, p. 26.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio
1964-65	7.4%	44.7%	30.9%	6.0:1 } 8.5:1
1967-68	4.9%	53.3%	36.1%	10.9:1

PUNJAB The distribution of income in the Indian State of Punjab has been much disputed in the wake of the "Green Revolution." We have used here calculations made from data for 1969-70 for distribution of income among farmers (household heads) in the Ludhiana disarict. S.S. Johl, "Gains of Green Revolution: How they have been shared in Punjab." Punjab Agricultural University, August 1973, p. 11. A Lorenz curve drawn showed the bottom 20% receiving 8% of the total income, and the top 20% receiving 43%, for a ratio of 5.4:1. A similar calculation from data for 1967-68 yielded a ratio of 4.4:1. Since the data do not include landless laborers, the total rural income distribution ratio is probably somewhat higher. A separate analysis of consumption distribution data for the Punjab, while not directly comparable with Johl's, supports the conclusion that income is relatively equally

distributed in Punjab, but also suggests increasing inequality. The ratio of top 20% to bottow 20% in terms of consumption was 3.5:1 for 1960-61 and 4.4:1 for 1970-71, using National Sample Survey (NSS) data. Indira Rajaraman, "Poverty, Inequality and Economic Growth: Rural Punjab 1960/61-1970/71, Discussion Paper No. 45, Research Program in Economic Development, Princeton University, May 1974, Table 2. The data indicate classification in Group II is reasonable, not with the most equal but nevertheless fairly equal distributions of income.

BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN The income distribution data for East and West Pakistan cited here are from 1963-64, as reported in the generally accepted study as Asbjorn Bergan, "Personal Income Distribution and Personal Savings in Pakistan, 1963/64," Pakistan Development Review (Summer 1967), pp. 196-198 and 199-204. There are surveys in the latter 1960's, but the ratios, such as 4.2:1 for West Pakistan are simply not acceptable. Pakistan's income distribution is if anything less equal than that of India; thus, the ratio of 6.3 is probably an underestimate of the degree of inequality in Pakistan. Bangladesh has a more equal distribution of income because of its land reform carried out in the early 1950's; even so, it mibht belong in Group III.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio
Bangladesh (E. Pakistan)	8.0%	43.0%	26.0%	5.4:1
Pakistan (W. Pakistan)	6.8%	43.0%	28.0%	6.3:1

INDONESIA We have only been able to obtain data on the distribution of rural household expenditure, from a survey in 1964-65. Since distribution of income is considerably more unequal than distribution of household expenditure, the ratio derived from this survey should be increased by 30 to 50 per cent to be comparable, if the data are accepted as valid. A survey done again in 1967 when there was more severe inflation showed more equal distribution of expenditure, but so much so that it would have made Indonesia one of the most equalitarian countries in the world (the bottom 20% were shown having 10.9% of expenditure). We suspect, in fact, that income distribution in Indonesia is much closer to that in the Philippines, Malaysia or Thailand, but on the basis of available data, we think Indonesia can at least be classified with Group III if not possibly Group IV.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio
Java and Madura (excl. Jakarta)	7.7%	43.0% (est.)	25.8%	5.6:1

PHILIPPINES, MALAYSIA AND THAILAND There have been fairly recent income surveys done in each of these countries, showing similar distributions. They are reported in Jain's paper.

Philippines: Data from Bureau of the Census and Statistics report, Family Income and Expenditure 1971, BCS Survey of Households Bulletin (1972), p. 151, for rural households.

Malaysia: Data calculated from Post-Enumeration Survey, 1970, for rural households.

Thailand: Two contemporaneous studies give quite different results so these are averaged; the National Statistics Office has reported a Household Expenditure Study, 1968/69 with data for "all villages" which is cited by Ingle in his case study; a codument prepared in 1971 for ECAFE on "Distribution of Income and Wealth in Thailand," reported in Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East (1971), Table I-3-8, p. 59, gives a much lower ratio.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio	
Philippines (1971)	4.2%	51.2%	34.8%	12.3:1	
Malaysia (1970)	4.0%	51.5%	35.8%	12.9:1	
Thailand (68/69)	3.0%	56.3%	39.8%	18.8:1	14.0:1
" (1970)	5.5%	51.5%	34.5%	9.3:1	

TURKEY The most recent data for Turkey show a distribution so extreme that we average it also with an earlier calculation which we made from 1963 farm income data, reported by Reşat Aktan, "Basic Characteristics of Turkish Agriculture and Problems of Productivity," Turkish Yearbook of International Relations, 1969-70, Ankara: Faculty of Political Science, 1971, p. 61, cited by Ashford in his case study. This ratio, to be sure, is somewhat low because it did not include households of landless laborers. The other figures are national ones, reported by Tuncer Bulutay, Timur Serim, and Ersel Hasam, Turkiye'de Gelir Dagilimi 1968, (Distribution of Income in Turkey, 1968) Ankara University: Faculty of Political Science Publications, No. 325, 1971, Table 1.1A, p. 23.

	Bottom 20%	Top 20%	Top 10%	Ratio	
Farm Income (1963)	4.5%	55.0%	37.0%	12.2:1	16.2:1
National Households (1968)	3.0%	60.6%	45.5%	20.2:1	

APPENDIX E

WORKSHOPS ON CASE STUDIES

A series of workshops was held at Cornell University during the spring of 1974 to discuss and criticize the first drafts of our case studies, and to explore the implications of the case studies for our general propositions about the role of local institutions in rural development. The working group would like to thank all those who participated in the workshops.

Two case studies grew out of the first workshop, as S. J. Burki and G. Ram Reddy were prevailed upon to develop the ideas they expressed about rural local government experience, respectively, in the Punjab Province of Pakistan and the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh. Also, information about Susan Hadden's study of rural electrification in the State of Rajasthan led us to invite her to Cornell and then to prepare her case study for this project. Unfortunately, we were not able to have workshops on the Israeli and Yugoslav cases.

The schedule of the workshops was as follows:

February 1-2	India and Pakistan
March 1-2	Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
March 15-16	Egypt and Turkey
April 4-6	Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand
April 19-20	China and Taiwan

The fourth workshop was organized as a seminar of the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group (SEADAG) under the auspices of its Development Administration Panel, chaired at that time by Dr. Norman Uphoff. We would like to express our appreciation to SEADAG for making possible the participation in this workshop of three of our case study authors from Southeast Asia.

The following persons participated in the respective workshops:

Byung-joon Ahn, Department of Political Science, Western Illinois University [China]

Gary Allinson, Department of History, University of Pittsburgh [Japan]

*Ronald Aqua, Department of Government, Cornell [Japan and Korea case studies]

*Douglas E. Ashford, Department of Government and School of Business and Public Administration, Cornell [Turkey case study]

*member of working group on Rural Local Government, participated in all workshops

George Axinn, President, Midwest Universities Consortium for International Affairs, Michigan State University [Bangladesh]

Banthorn Ondan, Faculty of Social Administration, Thammasat University, Bangkok [Thailand]

Milton Barnett, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell [Malaysia]

Robert Beckman, Asia Bureau, USAID [India]

*John S. Blackton, Department of Government, Cornell [Sri Lanka case study]

*Harry W. Blair, Department of Political Science, Bucknell University, and Visiting Fellow, Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University [Bangladesh case study]

Richard G. Blue, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota [India]

Vincent Brandt, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University; [Korea]

S. J. Burki, Development Advisory Service, Harvard University; now Policy Planning Division, IBRD [Pakistan/Punjab case study]

Ledivina Cariño, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines [Philippines case study]

Kang Chao, Department of Economics, University of Wisconsin [China]

Stephen Chee, Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya [Malaysia case study]

Jack Chen, Center for International Studies, Cornell [China]

Yuan-Tsung Chen, Center for International Studies, Cornell [China]

Ulker Çopur, Department of Policy Planning and Regional Analysis, Cornell [Turkey]

E. Walter Coward, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell [Philippines]

Donald DeGlopper, Department of Anthropology, Cornell [Taiwan]

Paul Deuster, Department of Economics, Ohio University [Indonesia]

Michael Donnelly, Social Science Research Council [Japan]

Naiem El-Sherbiny, School of Business Administration, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee [Egypt]

Yakin Erturk-Samaun, Department of Rural Sociology, Cornell [Turkey]

*Milton J. Esman, Director, Center for International Studies, and Department of Government, Cornell

Richard Franke, Department of Anthropology, Montclair State College, New Jersey [Indonesia]

Jerome P. French, Office of Development Administration, Technical Assistance Bureau, USAID [Philippines]

Frederick P. Frey, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology [Turkey]

Ronald Grant, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois University [Indonesia]

Gary E. Hansen, East-West Technology and Development Institute, University of Hawaii [Indonesia case study]

Ilya Harik, Department of Political Science, Indiana University [Egypt]

Shigemochi Hirashima, Institute of Developing Economics, Tokyo; on study leave with Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell [Japan]

Marcus Ingle, Maxwell School of Citizenship, Syracuse University [Thailand case study]

Bruce Jacobs, Department of Social Sciences, Clarkson College of Technology [Taiwan]

S. S. Johl, Department of Economics and Sociology, Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana, India [India /Punjab case study]

Pyung Kun Kang, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Platteville [Korea]

Mary Katzenstein, Department of Government, Cornell [India]

Uma J. Lele, on leave from IBRD; Center for International Studies and Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell [India/Bangladesh]

Gilbert Levine, Department of Agricultural Engineering, Cornell [Philippines/Taiwan]

Marc Lindenberg, School of Public Administration, University of Southern California [Malaysia]

Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, USAID [Korea]

Omi S. Marwah, Center for International Studies, Cornell [India]

J. Bruce Mayfield, Department of Political Science, University of Utah [Egypt case study]

John W. Mellor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell [India/Pakistan/Bangladesh]

John D. Montgomery, Department of Government, Harvard University [Taiwan]

Tony Moulton, Department of Political Science, University of Chicago [India]

David Mozingo, Department of Government, Cornell [China]

*Mohinder S. Mudahar, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell [India/Punjab case study]

Gananath Obeyesekere, Department of Anthropology, University of California, San Diego [Sri Lanka]

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Ted Owens, Technical Assistance, Asia Bureau, USAID [Taiwan/China]

Ferhunde Ozbay, Department of Sociology, Cornell [Turkey]

T. J. Pempel, Department of Government, Cornell [Japan]

Indira S. Rajaraman, Research Program in Economic Development, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University [India]

G. Ram Reddy, Department of Political Science, Osmania University, Hyderabad; Visiting Professor, University of Chicago [India/Andhra Pradesh case study]

Herbert Rees, Asia Bureau, USAID [Bangladesh]

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Herbert Rubin, Department of Sociology, Northern Illinois University [Thailand]

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William J. Siffin, Director, International Development Research Center, Indiana University [Thailand]

Santiago S. Simpas, College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines [Philippines case study]

Robert J. Smith, Department of Anthropology, Cornell [Japan]

Theodore Smith, Ford Foundation, New York [Indonesia]

Aygul Sonmez, Department of History, Columbia University [Turkey]

Benedict R. Stavis, China-Japan Program and Rural Development Committee, Cornell [China and Taiwan case studies]

John W. Thomas, Development Advisory Service, Harvard University [Bangladesh]

*Norman T. Uphoff, Chairman, Rural Development Committee, and Department of Government, Cornell

Karl von Vorys, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania [Pakistan]

Raquib Zaman, formerly Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Dacca [Bangladesh]

Peasant and Bullock by Chuah Theah Teng
From the collection of Dr. and Mrs. Clifton R. Wharton, Jr.