

PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES  
121 Sewall Hall  
WILLIAM MARSH RICE UNIVERSITY  
Houston, Texas 77001

Paper No. 32

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

By  
Fred R. von der Mehden  
with  
Kim Q. Hill

Fall, 1972

The authors are Albert Thomas Professor of Political Science and graduate student at Rice University, respectively.

Program Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Discussion Papers should be cleared with the authors to protect the tentative character of these papers.



". . . want is the enemy of peace and hopelessness the mother of violence . the wealthy nations cannot survive as islands of abundance in a world of hunger, sickness and despair." -- President Johnson, 1967.<sup>1</sup>

### Social and Economic Conditions and Political Violence

Through the post-war years an underlying principle of American foreign aid and part of our "conventional wisdom" regarding poverty and violence has been the belief that there is a direct relationship between low economic and social levels and violence. All sorts of people--including U.S. Congressmen--believe that violence and Communism feed upon people who are poor, underfed and undereducated and that in order to achieve peace and democracy it is only necessary to raise those standards. From this central thought a number of more sophisticated arguments have been suggested: increased development results in greater support to the indigenous government, thus producing a more stable system; development brings larger sections of the population into the money economy, thus giving them a greater stake in the system and making them less vulnerable to those preaching violence; sustained economic growth will increase the viability of other economic and social institutions, thus creating the bases for stable democratic governments or, at least establish institutions more capable of meeting the grievances of disadvantaged power groups; what Princeton Lyman disparagingly calls the "candy bar theory," that political loyalty can be achieved by an appropriate gift.

However, more recent critics have begun to severely question these economic determinist arguments. For example, the prestigious Pearson Commission on international development stated, "Development is not a guarantee of political stability or an antidote to violence. Change is, itself, intrinsically disruptive."<sup>2</sup> However, while we

---

<sup>1</sup>United States, Proposed Foreign Aid Program FY 1968, Washington; Government Printing Office, 1967, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup>Patterns of Development, New York: Praeger, 1969, p. 7.

are beginning to recognize the complexities of violence and to be more cautious about the economic determinism of the past when discussing the developing world, the old arguments have crept into apologies for programs formulated in the United States to meet domestic violence. Former Attorney-General Ramsey Clark reflected this attitude in his book Crime in America,

Most crime in America is born in environment saturated in poverty and its consequences: illness, ugly surroundings, hopelessness.

The solutions for our slums, for racism and crime itself in mass society, are primarily economic . . . . If we are to control crime, we must undertake a massive effort to rebuild our cities and ourselves, to improve the human condition, to educate, employ, house and make healthy.<sup>3</sup>

While not denying that a relationship exists between economic and social deprivation and political violence, this paper seeks to more carefully delineate the character of the relationships cross-nationally using available aggregate data. In this way we may have a test of a statement made by Robert McNamara that, "there is a direct and constant relationship between the incidence of violence and the economic status of the countries afflicted,"<sup>4</sup> adding to "economic status," social position.

For the purposes of this analysis it was desired to choose from each geo-cultural region of the world the four most and least violent nations. Thus, comparisons could be divided between relatively violent and quiescent nations, both within regions and world-wide. Because domestic violence has a number of dimensions it is probably not possible to devise a single country-rating scheme that would account for them all. However, an effort was made to single out those countries with the highest and lowest incidence at domestic violence in terms of events and casualties between 1950 and 1965 (1960-69 for Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>5</sup>).

---

<sup>3</sup>Ramsey Clark, Crime in America, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970, pp. 57, 67.

<sup>4</sup>"Security in the Contemporary World," Department of State Bulletin, LIV, No. 1406 (June 6, 1966), pp. 874-81.

<sup>5</sup>The violence data used in this study was the Feierabend's "Cross-National

The nations thus chosen for the analysis were:

LOW VIOLENCE

Europe	Asia	L. America	No. Africa	Sub. Africa
Denmark	Cambodia	Costa Rica	Afghanistan	Mali
Finland	Japan	El Salvador	Saudi Arabia	Somali
Netherlands	Malaya	Uruguay	Israel	Upper Volta
New Zealand	China (T)	Ecuador	Libya	Zambia

HIGH VIOLENCE

France	India	Argentina	Iran	Cameroon
Portugal	Indonesia	Bolivia	Iraq	Congo (K)
Spain	South Korea	Cuba	Sudan	Ghana
USSR	So. VietNam	Venezuela	Syria	Nigeria

It should be noted that this data showed "advanced" nations in both the highest and lowest levels of the violence ratings, although as a group the European states ranked the lowest in violent events of any of the regions surveyed.

A number of very serious caveats must be emphasized when considering this data. Before we proceed with our analysis, we should alert the reader to some defects or possibly misleading aspects of the technique we are using here. For example, nations

---

Data Bank of Political Instability Events" for 1948-1965 (from the Interuniversity Consortium for Political Research), a scaling method utilized by Betty Nesvold and the Feierabends was deemed suitable. The technique was two-fold. First, violent events from the Feierabend data set were cast into a four-point Guttman-like scale of the intensity of violence (based on the occurrence of particular types of violence events). Second, individual nations were given a scale score for each analysis year based upon the type and number of violent events reported therein. The scale scores were then accumulated for each state over the entire analysis period (1950-1965 for the original Feierabend nations and 1960-1969 for the SubSaharan African nations added for this study). Because the Feierabend data does not include Sub-Saharan African nations, event data for these nations was collected according to the Feierabend criteria and sources and then each of these nations was similarly scored.

The nations chosen for the original scaling were generally those in the Feierabend set (excluding Iceland because of its small population and South Africa because of a suspiciously high scale score resulting from a very high incidence of low violence events reported) and Sub-Saharan nations with a population of two million or more by 1968 and independence no later than 1965.

with a few high intensity violent events appear lower than those with a large number of low level experiences. Thus, Rwanda is not listed as a high violence case in spite of more deaths than Cameroon where there were a large number of executions, but considerably fewer deaths and far less destruction. In Europe, Hungary ranks far below the high violence states listed above, although the 1956 revolt was probably the bloodiest in post-war Europe. There is also the problem of poor reporting. This means that some states were not ranked as they might have been had more data been available. Thus, the data base used here does not place Colombia among the four highest violence Latin American cases, although some experts report that approximately 200,000 were killed over several years in inter-party conflict and Burma would have ranked far higher if consideration had been given to other data on the generation-long civil war which has racked that country since 1947. On the other hand, violence in Western states, with better communications and more interest to the reading public, appears more regularly in the files used in this technique. Thirdly, this listing does not take into account events transpiring before 1948 and after 1965, except in the SubSaharan African cases which cover the years 1960 to 1969. It may thus appear strange that Cambodia is included as a low violence case and that Pakistan is not included in the high violence list. However, the necessity to maintain consistency and the absence of reliable data for current activities has remained a controlling factor. Finally, there were cases where it was the judgment of the authors that the event data could not be employed, given our own evaluation of the level of violence in the particular state. Thus, Rwanda scored lowest of all the African states in spite of 10,000 to 14,000 killed in massacres in the early 1960s, South Africa scored highest of all states due to primarily insignificant incidents and Communist China ranked the fourth lowest of all Asian nations in spite of the political trials of 1950-52, the Tibetan civil war and the admitted killing

of political agents of the government of Taiwan (which the Communists state is a domestic issue). In sum, while we are generally satisfied that the listing includes cases from the highest and lowest violence states in each region, there can be strong arguments for considering other countries and we do not consider the data sufficiently reliable to rank states within the categories established.<sup>6</sup>

These states were then correlated with twelve economic and social variables in order to establish if there exists a significant relationship between violence and economic-social levels.

A. Economic Development

1. Electricity Production (MW) per Capita, 1955 and 1965
2. National Income per Capita, 1955 and 1965
3. Total Government Expenditure per Capita, 1955 and 1965
4. Agricultural Population (percent of Work Force), 1965

B. Communications and Education

1. Telephones per Thousand Population, 1955 and 1965
2. Radios per Thousand Population, 1955 and 1965
3. Newspaper Circulation per Thousand Population, 1955 and 1965
4. Illiteracy Rate (percent), 1965

C. Societal and Political

1. Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization
2. Separatist Potential
3. Armed Forces as percent of Population, 1965
4. Security Forces per Ten Thousand Population, 1965

All of the caveats presented in the Introduction on the use of violence data need to be underlined when considering economic and social data, particularly when dealing with developing nations. However, every effort was made to insure the accuracy of the statistics upon which the charts used herein were based, and while

---

<sup>6</sup>The bulk of the socio-economic data used in this study was provided by George Antunes from material collected from his dissertation, "Socio-economic, Political, and Violence Variables as Predictors of Government Expenditures in Nations: 1955, 1960, 1965", Northwestern University, 1971. In cases where data was updated or missing data was supplied, reference was generally made to more current United Nations publications or the original sources themselves.

the authors are not totally satisfied with all the data presented, they believe that the data provide the basis for some tentative conclusions.

#### Economic Development Data

Our economic statistics showed significant relationships with levels of political violence only in Europe and in the agriculture statistics for Asia. In the European cases low violence tended to coincide with higher per capita electricity production, national income and government expenditures. However, this pattern tended to become less apparent over time and France and the USSR, high violence states, were also on the higher end of the economic scale. In the Asian statistics, a higher percentage of agricultural workers tended to be correlated with high violence countries. For the rest of the regions analyzed, no significant relationships were brought out by the data. For the countries as a whole it cannot be argued that evidence supports McNamara's conclusion regarding the coincidence of violence and economic status, within geographic areas, with the possible exception of Europe.

#### Communications and Education

We were also interested in discovering whether a significant relationship existed between communications and education and political violence. It can be argued that better education and the existence of greater means of communicating ideas and information should lead to greater systemic stability and lower levels of political violence. Our material does not bear out this proposition.

Three areas of communications were considered: telephones, radios and newspapers, in each case analyzing per capita possession or circulation in relation to categories of political violence. While there were slight variations and minor relationships, particularly in Europe, overall there was little correlation between communications and the presence of violence.

Our education information also offered no support for the view that education has a positive relationship with lower levels of violence. Illiteracy showed little or no regional correlation with categories of violence, with only two states, Portugal and Israel, showing any significant divergence from the norm.

#### Societal and Political Data

This section considers two politico-social elements, social divergence of groups within a state and the presence of organized security. While this does not relate directly to economic and social standards, it is worthy of note because of the significance of the data and the relation to what was discussed in Chapter IV. The data showed that there was some significance in the degree to which a society was ethnically and linguistically homogeneous and levels of political violence. However, an even stronger relationship was found when we viewed the percentage of regional or ethnic groups dissatisfied with the government.

Post-war political conflict has certainly been based in many cases on communal and separatist issues. However, the case method might bring forward some interesting questions as to why so many countries with high separatist aspirations have not displayed high levels of violence.

It also can be asked if greater government force exists as either a cause or result of levels of violence. These charts show considerable mixture, but no significant correlations.

In sum, with the exception of separatist potential and ethnic-linguistic divisions, no significant correlations appeared between levels of violence and economic development, communications and education, and societal and political data in all but one of the regions analyzed. Only in the European case, higher levels of energy production, GNP, government expenditures and communications per capita correlated with the lower category of political violence. No such pattern displayed itself in the developing

states.

Finally, an attempt was made to establish if increases in economic standards and communications could be related to levels of violence, i.e., does development correlate with levels of violence? Again, there was no significant correlation. Per capita gross national product in nearly all cases grew from 1955 to 1965, whether the state be in the high or low category of violence. Only four countries remained the same or declined, three of which were high violence cases. However, statistics were sufficiently unreliable in several countries to prohibit the formulation of firm conclusions. In total government expenditures per capita, only four states did not show increases, two high and two low violence cases. In communications (radios and telephones) and electricity production every state but one showed growth. The material available did not allow us to draw conclusions on the basis of rate of growth. In sum, available data did not prove any correlation between increased income, output, production and communications and levels of violence, although more reliable statistics might show variations based upon the rate of development.

Three obvious conclusions can be summarized here. First, our data did not support Mr. McNamara's contention that there was a constant relationship between economic level and violence. There obviously have been examples of violence generated by economic or social deprivation, but on the basis of our examination these conditions cannot be flatly stated to be consistent causes of violence. Secondly, all should acknowledge that data reliability for the developing states was a constant problem and raises questions as to the utility of statistical analysis involving the employment of data from these regions.

Finally, this exercise suggests that analysis should be limited primarily to those states and data in which we have some confidence as to the reliability of our

information. In the meantime, every effort should be made to sort through data on developing areas, establishing points that are accurate, searching for new ways of gathering better data and, most importantly, making clear to other researchers the reliability of the material employed. Under these conditions the development of aggregate data can remain both fun and frustrating, but will provide better building blocks for future research.

Chart 1: 1955 Electricity Production (MW) per Capita  
 0-0.5 MW      0.5-1.0      1.0-2.0      2.0--

LOW--          HIGH-- Portugal Spain	Denmark          USSR	Finland Netherlands          France	New Zealand
LOW-- Cambodia China (T) Malaya   HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam	Japan		
LOW-- Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Uruguay  HIGH-- Argentina Bolivia Cuba			
LOW-- Afghanistan Libya  HIGH-- Iran Iraq Sudan Syria	Israel		
LOW-- Somali    HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K)			

Chart 2: 1965 Electricity Production (MW) per Capita

0-0,5 MW	0,5-1,0	1,0-2,0	2,0--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Portugal Spain</p>	<p>Denmark</p>	<p>Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France USSR</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia Malaya</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam</p>	<p>China (T)</p>	<p>Japan</p>	
<p>LOW-- Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH-- Bolivia Cuba</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Argentina Venezuela</p>		
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Sudan Syria</p>		<p>Israel</p>	
<p>LOW-- Somali</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K)</p>			

Chart 3: 1955 National Income per Capita

	\$0-100	101-500	501-1,000	1,001--
	LOW--  HIGH--		Denmark Finland Netherlands  France	New Zealand
	LOW-- Cambodia  HIGH-- India S. Korea	China (T) Japan Malaya  Indonesia S. Viet Nam		
	LOW--  HIGH--	Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Uruguay  Argentina Cuba Bolivia	Venezuela	
	LOW-- Afghanistan Libya  HIGH-- Sudan	Saudi Arabia  Iran Iraq Syria	Israel	
( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( All est.	LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta HIGH-- Congo (K) Nigeria Cameroon	Zambia  Ghana		

Chart 4: 1965 National Income Per Capita

\$0-100	100-500	500-1,000m	1,001--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Portugal Spain</p>	<p>USSR</p>	<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France</p>
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH-- India S. Korea</p>	<p>Cambodia China (T) Malaya</p> <p>Viet Nam</p>	<p>Japan</p> <p>Indonesia</p>	
<p>LOW-- Costa Rica El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Ecuador</p> <p>Bolivia (GDP/cap)</p>	<p>Uruguay (GDP/cap)</p> <p>Argentina Cuba Venezuela</p>	
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan</p> <p>HIGH-- Sudan</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p> <p>Iran Iraq Syria</p>	<p>Libya</p>	<p>Israel</p>
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta</p> <p>HIGH-- Congo (K) Nigeria</p>	<p>Zambia</p> <p>Cameroon Ghana</p>		

Chart 5: 1955 Total Government Expenditures/Per Capita

\$0-50	50-150	151-300	301--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH-- Portugal Spain</p>		<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France</p>	<p>USSR</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia China Japan Malaya</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam</p>			
<p>LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH-- Argentina Bolivia</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p> <p>Cuba</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Venezuela</p>	
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Sudan Syria</p>	<p>Israel Saudi Arabia</p>		
<p>LOW-- Upper Volta Mali Somali Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Congo (K) Ghana Cameroon</p>			

Chart 6: 1965 Total Governmental Expenditures Per Capita

\$0-50	50-150	151-300	301--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Portugal Spain</p>		<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France USSR</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia China (T)</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia South Korea</p>	<p>Japan Malaya</p> <p>Viet Nam</p>		
<p>LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH-- Bolivia</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p> <p>Argentina Cuba</p>	<p>Venezuela</p>	<p>Uruguay</p>
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan</p> <p>HIGH-- Sudan Syria</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p> <p>Iran Iraq</p>	<p>Libya</p>	<p>Israel</p>
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo Nigeria</p>	<p>Zambia</p> <p>Ghana</p>		

Chart 7: 1965 Agricultural Population (% of Work Force)

0-25%	26-50	51-75	75--
<p>LOW-- Denmark Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>HIGH-- France</p>	<p>Finland</p> <p>Portugal USSR Spain</p>		
<p>LOW-- Japan</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Malaya</p>	<p>China (T)</p> <p>S. Korea India Indonesia S. Viet Nam</p>	<p>Cambodia</p>
<p>LOW-- Uruguay</p> <p>HIGH-- Argentina</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p> <p>Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>Bolivia</p>	
<p>LOW-- Israel</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Libya</p> <p>Iraq</p>	<p>Saudi Arabia</p> <p>Iran Syria</p>	<p>Afghanistan</p> <p>Sudan</p>
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>		<p>Ghana</p>	<p>Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>Congo (K) Cameroon Nigeria</p>

Chart 8: 1955 Telephones Per Thousand Population

0-50	51-100	101-200	201--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH-- Portugal Spain USSR</p>	<p>France</p>	<p>Finland Netherlands</p>	<p>Denmark New Zealand</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia China (T) Japan Malaya</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam</p>			
<p>LOW-- Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Uruguay</p> <p>HIGH-- Bolivia Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Argentina</p>		
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Israel Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Syria Sudan</p>			
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K) Ghana Nigeria</p>			

Chart 9: 1965 Telephones per Thousand Population

0-50	51-100	101-200	201--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH-- USSR</p>	<p>Portugal Spain</p>	<p>Finland</p> <p>France</p>	<p>Denmark Netherlands New Zealand</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia China (T) Malaya</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam</p>		<p>Japan</p>	
<p>LOW-- Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH-- Bolivia Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Argentina</p>		
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Sudan Syria</p>		<p>Israel</p>	
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K) Nigeria</p>	<p>Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>Ghana</p>		

Chart 10: 1955 Radios per Thousand Population

0-50	51-100	101-200	200--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Portugal Spain</p>	<p>USSR</p>	<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia China Malaya</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia S. Korea Viet Nam</p>		<p>Japan</p>	
<p>LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p> <p>Bolivia</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Argentina Cuba Venezuela</p>	
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Syria Sudan</p>		<p>Israel</p>	
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Ghana Nigeria Congo (K)</p>			

Chart 11: 1965 Radios per Thousand Population

0-50	51-100	101-200	200--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>		<p>Portugal Spain</p>	<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France USSR</p>
<p>LOW-- Malaya Cambodia</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia Viet Nam</p>	<p>China (T)</p> <p>South Korea</p>		<p>Japan</p>
<p>LOW-- Ecuador</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Costa Rica El Salvador</p>	<p>Bolivia Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Argentina</p>
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Sudan</p>	<p>Iran</p>		<p>Israel</p> <p>Syria Iraq</p>
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Nigeria Congo (K)</p>	<p>Ghana</p>		

Chart 12: 1955 Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 Population  
 0-50 copies                      51-100                      101-200                      201--

LOW--			Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand
HIGH--	Portugal Spain		France USSR
LOW-- Cambodia China Malaya			Japan
HIGH-- India Indonesia Viet Nam	S. Korea		
LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador	Costa Rica	Uruguay	
HIGH-- Bolivia		Argentina Cuba Venezuela	
LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia			Israel
HIGH-- Iran Iraq Syria Sudan			
LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia			
HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K) Ghana Nigeria			

Chart 13: 1965 Newspaper Circulation per 1,000 Population

0-50 copies	51-100	101-200	201--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Portugal</p>	<p>Spain</p>	<p>Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>France USSR</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia Viet Nam</p>	<p>China (T) Malaya</p> <p>S. Korea</p>		<p>Japan</p>
<p>LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador</p> <p>HIGH-- Bolivia</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p> <p>Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Argentina</p>	<p>Uruguay</p>
<p>LOW-- Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Iran Iraq Sudan Syria</p>		<p>Israel</p>	
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo (K) Ghana Nigeria</p>			

Chart 14: 1965 Illiteracy Rate (%)

0-5%	6-15	16-50	51-100
<p>LOW-- Denmark Finland Netherlands New Zealand</p> <p>HIGH-- France USSR</p>	Spain	Portugal	
<p>LOW-- Japan</p> <p>HIGH--</p>		<p>China (T)</p> <p>S. Korea</p>	<p>Cambodia Malaya</p> <p>India Indonesia Viet Nam</p>
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH-- Cuba</p>	<p>Uruguay</p> <p>Argentina</p>	<p>Costa Rica Ecuador</p> <p>Venezuela</p>	<p>El Salvador</p> <p>Bolivia</p>
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	Israel		<p>Afghanistan Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>Syria Iran Iraq Sudan</p>
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>			<p>Zambia Mali Somali Upper Volta</p> <p>Cameroon Congo (K) Ghana Nigeria</p>

Chart 15: Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization  
1965 - same for all years

	.0 - .25%	.26 - .50%	.51 - .75%	.76 - 1.00%
LOW	Costa Rica (.07) Denmark (.05) El Salvador (.17) Finland (.16) Israel (.20) Japan (.02) Libya (.23) Netherlands (.10) Saudi Arabia (.06) Uruguay (.20)	Cambodia (.30) China (.35) New Zealand (.37)	Afghan. (.66) Ecuador (.53) Malaya (.72)	
HIGH	Cuba (.04) Portugal (.01) South Korea (.00) Syria (.22) Venezuela (.11)	Argentina (.30) France (.26) Iraq (.36) Spain (.44)	Bolivia (.68) Sudan (.74) USSR (.67)	India (.89) Indonesia (.76) Iran (.76)

Chart 16: Separatist Potential  
same for all years

	0 - 10%	11 - 20%	21 - 40%	41 - 50%
LOW	Cambodia (3) Taiwan (0) Costa Rica (0) Denmark (0) Ecuador (0) El Salvador (0) Finland (0) Israel (0) Japan (0) Libya (0) Malaya (0) Netherlands (0) New Zealand (0) Saudi Arabia (0) South Korea (0) Uruguay (0)			Afghan. (50)
HIGH	Argentina (0) Bolivia (0) Cuba (0) France (0) Portugal (0) Syria (10) Venezuela (0)	Iraq (20) Spain (15)	Indonesia (35) Iran (25) Sudan (30)	India (45) USSR (45)

Chart 17: 1965 Armed Forces as a Percentage of Population

0-5	6-10	11-25	25--
<p>LOW--</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Finland New Zealand</p> <p>Spain</p>	<p>Denmark Netherlands</p> <p>France Portugal USSR</p>	
<p>LOW-- Cambodia Japan</p> <p>HIGH-- India Indonesia</p>	<p>Malaya</p>	<p>Viet Nam South Korea</p>	<p>China (T)</p>
<p>LOW-- Costa Rica El Salvador Uruguay</p> <p>HIGH-- Argentina Bolivia Venezuela</p>	<p>Ecuador</p> <p>Cuba</p>		
<p>LOW-- Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH-- Sudan</p>	<p>Afghanistan Libya</p> <p>Iran Iraq Syria</p>		<p>Israel</p>
<p>LOW-- Mali Somali Upper Volta Zambia</p> <p>HIGH-- Cameroon Congo(K) Ghana Nigeria</p>			

Chart 18: 1965 Security Forces per 10,000 Adult Population

0-10

11-25

25-45

45--

<p>LOW-- Finland</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Denmark New Zealand</p> <p>Portugal</p>	<p>Netherlands</p> <p>Spain USSR</p>	<p>France</p>
<p>LOW-- Cambodia</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Japan</p> <p>India Indonesia South Korea Viet Nam</p>	<p>China (T)</p>	<p>Malaya</p>
<p>LOW-- Ecuador El Salvador Uruguay</p> <p>HIGH-- Argentina Bolivia Cuba Venezuela</p>	<p>Costa Rica</p>		
<p>LOW-- Libya Saudi Arabia</p> <p>HIGH--</p>	<p>Afghanistan</p> <p>Iran Sudan Syria</p>	<p>Israel</p>	<p>Iraq</p>
<p>LOW-- Mali Upper Volta</p> <p>HIGH-- Nigeria</p>	<p>Somali Zambia</p> <p>Ghana Cameroon Congo (K)</p>		

PROGRAM OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

Discussion Papers

- No. 14 "The Incidence of Taxation in Colombia"(1971). . . .Charles E. McLure, Jr.
- No. 15 "The Effect of Changes in the Distribution of Income on Labor, Foreign Investment and Growth in Brazil" (1971) Samuel R. Morley and Gordon Smith
- No. 16 "Korean Rice, Taiwan Rice, and Japanese Agricultural Stagnation: An Economic Consequence of Colonialism--A Comment" (1971). . . Yhi-Min Ho
- No. 17 "The Incidence of Taxation in West Malaysia"(1971) Charles E. McLure, Jr.
- No. 18 "Vocational Improvement Centers: A Successful Nigerian Experiment" (1972) . . . . . Gaston V. Rimlinger and Carolyn Stremiau
- No. 19 "Government Expenditures, the Revenue Constraint and Wagner's Law: The Case of Turkey" (1972) . . . . . Marian Krzyzaniak
- No. 20 "The Long-Run Incidence of Government Spending on Education" (Rev. No. 10) (1972) . . . . . Marian Krzyzaniak and Ibrahim Eris
- No. 21 "On Solow's Method of Estimating the Residual" Yhi-Min Ho and Clive Bell
- No. 22 "Models of Development Incorporating Income Distribution" (1972) . . . . . James W. Land and Ronald Soligo
- No. 23 "Disguised Unemployment in a Subsistence Economy" (1972) . . . . . Jose Hamilton Gondim Silva
- No. 24 "A Proposal for Research on 'Distribution of Gains, Wealth and Income from Economic and Political Development'" (1972). . . . . James W. Land
- No. 25 "Optimal Wage and Education Policies with International Migration" (1972). . . . . R. Albert Berry and Ronald Soligo
- No. 26 "Marketing and Economic Development: A Brazilian Case Study, 1930-70" (1972) . . . . . Gordon W. Smith
- No. 27 "Indigenisation of Industry and Progress of the Second Nigerian National Development Plan" (1972). . . . . Gaston V. Rimlinger
- No. 28 "The Distribution of Income and the Short-run Burden of Taxes in Turkey, 1968" (1972). . . . . Marian Krzyzaniak and Süleyman Ozmucur
- No. 29 "The Proper Use of Indirect Taxation in Latin America: The Practice of Economic Marksmanship" (1972) Charles E. McLure, Jr.
- No. 30 "Distributional Equity, Inflation, and Efficiency in the Brazilian Fluctuating Exchange Rate System" (1972). . . . . Donald L. Huddle
- No. 31 "A Diagrammatic Exposition of General Equilibrium Tax and Expenditure Incidence Analysis with One Immobile Factor" (1972) Charles E. McLure, Jr.
- No. 32 "Social and Economic Conditions and Political Violence" (1972) . . . . . Fred R. von der Mehden with Kim Q. Hill

Note: Discussion Papers are available upon request to individual scholars and researchers and libraries of educational institutions.