

A CONCEPT OF HUMAN RESOURCES SUGGESTING ACTIONABLE AID PROGRAMS

DEFINITIONS 1
ASSUMPTIONS..... 3
CRITERIA..... 4
THE PROBLEM..... 7
TRENDS AND A DESIGN 20
SUGGESTED PROGRAMS..... 41
REFERENCES..... 44

Purchase Order #3138990
Contract # AID/CM/ta-147-312
December 13, 1972

John Badgley
The Johns Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies

A CONCEPT OF HUMAN RESOURCES SUGGESTING ACTIONABLE AID PROGRAMS

by John Badgley

DEFINITIONS

Human resource is a ubiquitous term. Its etiology explains why this is so, for planners have tried to classify humans, like a natural resource, to fit within the economist's concept of "value." Having used the notion these past few decades, and having incorporated bureaucracies in local, national and international agencies under the rubric, we cast around to determine what we are doing in the name of human resource development, either to or for people.

Webster defines resource as "something that lies ready for use or to be drawn upon for aid; a supply of something to take care of a need." Some measure school and vocational training output as though this was a sufficient measure of human resources. Others object to equating "manpower" with "human resource" because of the implicit assumption that schooling creates a resource. They argue that in an idealized social system this may be so, but more frequently in agrarian societies school leavers are unemployed, a non-resource because they lack skill or motivation to become a "supply of something to take care of a need." To equate human resources with manpower, therefore, can be misleading because the factors measured may not be operational criteria for the concept. The problem derives from our failure to objectively quantify human needs, or the uses to which we put one another. It is an ethical issue as to whether we should "use" each other at all, while it is not scientifically demonstrable that we can quantify human needs, apart from those essential to survival.

In his genius for adapting lies man's critical resource as a natural organism. He has survived and prospered on a planet where most species have expired. While we cannot know whether homo sapiens will forever survive, we can know from history that our capacity for adaptation is essential to our survival in the face of great odds: adaptation to climate, to social environment, to changing amounts of space, to our own technology, and if one is spiritually inclined, to God's will. Humans call upon creative talents in adapting, not evident in other creatures, and not known to themselves until history recorded discoveries and events forgotten before language provided us with memory.

With our memories functioning, it is evident that a resource in one era may become irrelevant or anathema to another. For example, no manpower chart includes shaman training, for the Judeo-Christian experience with the nearest cultural equivalent, the witch doctor, is viewed with disfavor nowadays. But a shaman today is a vital part of village society in many Northeast Asian villages, as well as in those Northwest American Indian tribes which still retain cultural integrity. And what of an exorcist, an acupuncturist, or a party cadre? Our own counter-culture as well as other ideologies call into question many of our practices in manpower allocations, and in some notable cases this critical stance is rewarded. Blue Cross has been persuaded to pay accredited acupuncturists, while paid political organizers are acceptable in both major parties.

So how can we conceptualize "human resource" when adaptability, an apparently unmeasurable attitude, is so critical to the process of human evolution? Can we not simply consider it to be those qualities that enable individuals to create and order culture? Culture, in turn,

infers all ways of expression--such as art, language, religion, business, technology, or science--indigenous to or used by a people. This definition refines that expressed in a recent AID publication (Program Strategy in Education and Human Resources: FY 1973-74, TAB/AID, August 1972) where human resources are said to be those..."people who have the knowledge, skills, motivation and opportunity to contribute constructively to their society, or who have the potential for acquiring such attributes." "Constructively" is necessarily a value judgment, as "The desirable" is culturally defined and the ultimate goals of any people are best represented by their own spokesmen. Not the foreign donors, but the principals within each cultural milieu in fact establish their goals of development.

The term "development" denotes planned change, while connoting modernization, or rationalization of productivity so as to maximize available goods and services for a society. A further connotation when one speaks of "human resource development" is the management of change so as to increase employment and sustain dignity for as much of the population as possible.

ASSUMPTIONS

Before reviewing those criteria currently used by AID to measure human resource development, consider my own assumptions about the process of planning and managing change.

- 1) New roles associated with modern institutions may not be perceived to be as worthy as those roles relinquished in leaving traditional society. For example, the change from "peasant" to "worker" can be both an ideological and psychological shock, although the task of cultivation itself may remain unchanged;

- 2) An improved livelihood, pride-in-self, and familial dignity may be goals common to all development strategies; however,
- 3) Increased productivity usually is the means to gain subjective goals which are culturally defined, indeed, there is no objective end to development;
- 4) Modernization is increasingly seen to be a process whereby a people gain the means to preserve their heritage;
- 5) The attitudinal consequences of planned change are often unpredictable, therefore the human resource component of development projects should be essentially concerned with creating new options for the populace, normally through rewards for resourceful behavior.

CRITERIA

What criteria are presently used by AID to evaluate changes in human resources? It is now standard procedure to take two static measures, the before and after situation, for there is assumed to be no way of sampling the dynamic process itself. (Evaluation Handbook, 2nd ed. AID, September 1972, p. 53) "A combination of baseline data and indicators will in most instances provide the evaluator with the necessary information:..."

Indices for measurement of social and civic change are offered in several appendices of this Handbook, and reflect the practices of not only AID but United Nations agencies as well. The indices correlate

The clear assumption behind these criteria is that to measure increases in modernity is to measure progress in human resource development. A possible error in this assumption rises from its dependence upon the "top down" theory of social change. As my own assumptions suggest, such an approach has not been demonstrably successful in the past, although it may have a complementary role to the obverse "bottom up" theory of change. The key difference is in the attitude of the planners towards their constituents: the consequence is in attitudes of the constituents towards change. Is change perceived as something being done to us, or is it a process in which we participate? Measurement of this perception is crucial to meaningful quantification of human resources.

Two types of social change are implicit in the literature on human resource development, while the conventional indices for such change focuses on only one type, that is the social indicators of new factors characteristic of modernity. This, in effect, is a concern for the cadæ, the mechanical aspects of development which can be readily measured, without consideration for the cultural milieu within which change occurs. The second type of change, which has been largely overlooked by planners, is cultural and attitudinal. It forms the configuration of the entire body politic, which is the objective of the process, yet experts normally limit their activities to sectors of the body with which they are expert. Fiscal management specialists work with their counterparts, as do educationalists, economists, and health technicians. The residual effect of all their efforts is conceived of as human resource development. Such an approach is unacceptable if we are serious about modifying the attitudes or perceptions of masses of people towards change, and thereby developing human resources.

It is illustrative to consider the conventional tactic in family planning clinics. For nearly two decades in India experts held seminars with regional officials and health clinicians propagated control devices, counting on the demonstration effect to reduce population growth rates. There is no scientific evidence that this limited program actually reduced birth rates. Likewise, agricultural extension experts in Latin America and Asia counted on demonstration effects to spread the efficacy of their technology, with comparably poor results, until the Green Revolution became self-evident to small farmers. The conclusion this suggests is not that expert advice is worthless, but that when taken alone it is an insufficient incentive to change custom.

What incentives are successful in influencing attitudes generally? The Green Revolution example suggests the exchange value proposition, that people will trade or forego something if the advantage is clearly defined and the risks are not too high. But that approach is limited to those few issues which have a clear measure.

Most issues of changing custom fall under the cultural dimension, that which has to do with "ways of expression," or identity. For our identity is largely defined by our mode of expression - our religion, language, clothing, work, and everyday living habits. This is the maze of a people, and to modify it involves the entire fibre of the society. Value priorities are assigned by the mores of each society to these ways of expression, thus to speak a language with colloquial style, to wear a particular garment when working, or to worship a given spirit on its birth date - all contribute to a people's identity. The cost of changing or modifying their participation or style is a significant

factor in mobilizing human beings. That cost generally has a political measure.

For example, rewards in terms of status, employment, medical care, or material amenities are scarce in all agrarian societies. The control of such matters is a political issue for it involves power in the public sector. Party membership, ethnicity, or family links may well determine the distribution of rewards rather than "rational" achievement. Therefore, to create a training program in a scarce skill without recognizing its political ramifications is to miss a self-evident fact in human resource development, that power is acquired or hoped for by those who learn valued skills or gain the status of diplomas. The gateways to modernity are tended by those interested in preserving their own power, or perpetuating that power within their own group. This suggests the basic political problem that obstructs current planning efforts.

THE PROBLEM

Consider the problem in its broadest context. Nearly one hundred states constitute the "third world." As UN members all of these governments are pledged to freedom and progress for their peoples. Yet, these are countries with manifest conditions of want and deprivation among their people. Illiteracy, under-employment, and chronic ill-health characterize their rural populations; crowded slums, unemployment, and rootlessness describe the conditions of their cities. Material well-being may not be the ultimate goal of mankind, but without the security of adequate diet, shelter, and belief in the promise of a better life, the political goals of freedom and justice are rhetorical platitudes.

The notion of "reconstruction and development" has been popularized to attain that end. The poor have been studied as never before and substantial funds expended through the U.N. agencies, AID, other bilateral country programs, and such private groups as The Ford Foundation for their improvement. Still, a vast portion of mankind is little better off. Experts contend among each other about the meaning of trends, but few disagree about the condition of third world peoples.¹ The gap between the rich and poor countries widens and our best efforts in legislation and action fail to generate significant material improvement in the third world. Consequently support for foreign aid is steadily declining.

Economic and administrative solutions have been too frequently idle speculation without a suitable political design, and a will to make that design work. The development problem should be seen as an integrated process, whereby economic, administrative, and educational planning are structured within a political frame.² This section will review the existing state structure, its heritage, and its principle difficulties in fostering human resource development.

The state, to succeed as a development instrument must secure loyalty from its inhabitants, from villagers and townsmen alike. That loyalty has been sought by leaders espousing egalitarianism, yet traditional inequities breed communal and ideological violence. Recurrent violence and political instability, the lack of trust in the state as the authoritative institution, the absence of civility and love for the law accounts for much of the delay in mobilizing people to modernity.

Independence leaders and Westerners once assumed that the state's philosophic underpinings would be readily transferable into non-Western cultures, that if the state existed as a legal and geographic entity, then somehow these other concepts would penetrate the thought processes and philosophies of the people cohabitating within the state. The assumption was unwarranted. Colonial powers left in their wake governments unable to direct change in the fashion new leaders desired, for Western administrators endowed their wards with insufficient capacity to carry out self-imposed constitutional obligations. Neither the financial nor human resources, nor the experience among leaders was enough to bridge the chasm between low production and high demand, or between the governed, the villagers, and the governors. Accentuating the weakness is the "land-man" problem which grows worse as the population climbs, causing greater unemployment among the cultivators.

Furthermore villagers in agrarian countries do not perceive themselves as do their bretheren in the West, as citizens of a nation, for their milieu affirms other identities. Rather than Indians, Vietnamese, Kenyans, or Nigerians, their primary self-image is formed by the language and institutions of their locale. In Southeast Asia such minorities as the Meo, Karens, Atchenese, Nagas, or Bugis have little identification with their respective states; and the villagers are primarily ethnic rather than national groups. The Javanese, Burmans, Thai, Tamils, or Bengalis are still rather remotely related to the authority of the state. Therefore, when discussing Asian and African politics, because of this communal characteristic, such terms as "national resource base" or "national welfare" must be used with caution.

Agrarian cultures are magnificently endowed with institutions, yet few of them are linked to the state. Most strong institutions are provincial in character, of family or community origin, like the spirit cults, sub-caste divisions, religious leadership, and cultivation practices. Development planners have been remiss in not creating acceptable administrative designs to enhance learning and equitable justice under the aegis of these institutions, rather than depending wholly on the state. Despite the state's ancient heritage in the West, non-Western governments are running in shallow water as political leaders and intellectuals attempt to organize the lives of some two billion people upon the basis of the state's authority. That authority is only dimly seen behind the more meaningful local institutions.

The State: Development Institution or Development Goal

Most studies on development fall short in not acknowledging a fundamental weakness in the system being "developed." The state, which is at the heart of most planning schemes, is an inadequate institution, alone, to implement social and economic change in most third world countries. Its weakness, stated most abstractly and simply, is a lack of authority. While administrators can command, they often cannot implement; while political leaders can demand, they usually lack a general or persistent following. The institutions of statehood are superficially rooted, and lacking in legitimacy in much of Asia and Africa; or, in Latin America governments too frequently stagnate either in the dogma of anti-communism, or with increasing frequency, practice a Marxism which eulogizes state control of all economic functions. That a few exceptions contradict these general conditions gives hope, but the nature of the exceptions, Korea, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, or Israel, demonstrate

how erroneous much of the advice has been, for these are homogenous states, united either by ethnicity or circumstance, and therefore unique specimens. The singular focus on state managed and centralized industrial projects, at the expense of dispersed and pluralistic rural town community development, has been politically disastrous. The vitality consequent to local control has been largely ignored in the pursuit of centerist, unitary power.³

The unitary state, apart from its immediate ability to command some resources, is generally a poorly designed system to cope with the cultures and civilizations of the third world. Yet, the notions of statism, of nationhood, and sovereignty were in vogue following World War II and accompanied independence; indeed, the leaders in new states had a mind-set remarkably like Latin American leaders in the early decades of this century.⁴ Development initially was defined as "constitutional nation-building," the models of powerful Western nation-states loomed large in the utopias planners and non-Western leaders sought to create. Such a goal made independence itself a mockery, for little of the blood and none of the cultural myths attached to the Western national concept could be transferred with the husk of legal sovereignty at independence. Indigenous elites, usually educated in modern, Western ways, gained power, while the villagers merely witnessed a change of rulers.⁵

In another context I reviewed what was required to create the nation-state in the West and in Japan.⁶ * Here let it suffice to note that evolution of the nation-state idea, commencing in Machiavelli's time, permitted a concurrent growth of political thought that attempted to

* See Asian Development, New York, Free Press, 1971. Chapter III.

explain man's relation to ultimate authority in terms of positive as well as natural law. Community customs and political cultures were joined before and during the 19th century, enabling European states and Japan to acquire ascendent power in the world. Never before could masses of men be so well mobilized for political purposes. Dominion over the earth was the creed of the modern West. This process created the colonial era which crested early in the 20th century. In Europe, America and Japan, "the nation" had become coterminous with "the state" and generally within single language communities. Yet where there were well-defined ethnic or language minorities within the state, politics was usually a strained affair. Paradoxically, the very powers experiencing this process of fusion between community and state set about creating multi-ethnic and linguistically heterogenous states elsewhere with little heed to the problem they were creating.

The colonial strategies of European powers and the United States were bent to satisfy their own goals, not those of peoples subjected to their rule. Their policies created colonies of groups hostile by tradition, thrown together within super-imposed boundaries.⁷ Policies of the Western powers differed in their emphasis, but few took serious action to ameliorate the destructive tensions of hostile ethnic communities. Indeed, the colonialists generally accentuated traditional communalism by administering hill peoples and smaller tribes separately from dominant ethnic groups.

Colonial administrators really had no theory of political development. Their widespread assumption was the liberal argument that progress itself would serve the noble end of uplifting their wards. It helped to

legitimize their rule in the eyes of Americans, Europeans, and even Japanese late in the game. Although some still fail to make the distinction, it is clear, that development is not an ultimate value, but a process whereby attitudes change through new forms of education, which interacts with rising income and status.⁸ We can

theorize about development because it is a means to gain the higher goal, something that motivates indigenous leaders as well as most statesmen to increase their country's power so as to protect their way of life and secure dignity for their people. The colonial administrators interpreted progress to mean economic change, erring by ignoring the necessity of interweaving the fabric of government with indigenous culture.

With few exceptions colonial regimes compounded the problem of cultural stagnation by sweeping from influence the creative spokesmen for indigenous culture, villagers fell back on the normative sanction of their local traditions. In music, religious scholarship, language, architecture, drama -- the range of expression that binds the civilization of high culture to local communities -- standards generally deteriorated during the colonial period. And in Latin America, the great achievements of Mayan, Aztec, and Incan civilizations were smashed by the Spanish conquistadors. Of course colonialism was not alone responsible for the erosion of indigenous standards. Political violence has been endemic throughout the world because common standards of authority, (religious, aesthetic, legal, political, or economic) could not be imposed or created until technology became sufficiently developed to conquer environmental barriers. The terrain, the climate, and simpler organization of economic life prevented the consolidation of cultures and of political power into sufficiently complex systems, essential to the persistent maintenance of order among diverse cultures.

Poorly designed political systems are a fundamental barrier to development, yet no strategy by super powers, international agencies,

or indigenous bureaucrats can re-create lost opportunities. We all must live with inherited customs and traditions, but strive to reduce the potency of those that would destroy amity, or prevent economic growth. We should recognize that the merger between/^{the}state and those indigenous cultures which formed nation-states, is a human activity peculiar to an earlier era, and may only occasionally be replicated in the third world. Where contemporary nation-states are being created, they will in all probability be unlike their Western antecedents. Consider that almost all indigenous non-Western political institutions -- councils inter-village of elders, headmen,/worship groups, ritualistic associations, monarchies and aristocracies -- are linked to pre-colonial, ethnic, and familial-based social organizations. The difference between the West and the third world in the pre-colonial era was not so great politically, for the nation-state had not been conceived. By contrast, contemporary differences in social and economic organization are enormous. Europe's three centuries of economic rationalism, and concomitant growth of political power through the union of industrial systems with national, statist cultures, should not be viewed as a model of others. The political consequence of national consolidation was three centuries of intermittent warfare in Europe, capped by two world wars in this century. Surely our imaginations can conceive of the future in the third world as something better than more "national liberation wars," such as characterized the modernization period in the West.

This interpretation of the third world's pre-colonial and colonial political heritage is not meant to condemn the intentions of past leaders. Their compulsion to seek security through aggregation of power is,

I believe, a quality innate to man; and the state is a political structure adept in achieving that end. So it is only natural that similar goals should motivate non-Western as well as Western man. However, the issue today is contentious as to whether, in the interest of security, the nation-state can expect to command our complete political loyalties. Advanced technology requires multi-state (and encourages universalist) economic and military federations so as to advance security beyond any guarantee provided by individual states. Their commitment to the universalist United Nations' agencies confirms that most "sovereign" leaders are quite aware of the limitations upon their sovereignty.⁹

Be mindful of two standards that influence most political leaders. One is that creed of universalist equality encompassed by the U.N. Charter, the other is the norm consequent to the political reality within their own states. No political leader can retain power without understanding the inherently unequal power and unique structure of his political base. When addressing the issue of planned change, state leaders are more aware than are donors of the specific constraints upon them if their regimes are to survive and their countries to endure. Rather than lament the frailty of third world states, I recommend a political design that encompasses both the vital local institutions in which people believe, as well as the less authoritative but more powerful governmental agencies.

The Contemporary Design of Third World States

The structures of states vary, yet most third world states share common deficiencies. Their human and financial resources are insufficient to meet the demands upon governments. Taxation by central governments

draws largely upon personal property and income taxes, or import-export duties. Most citizens pay no visible taxes at all and view avoidance of payment as an art form.¹⁰ Their effort to not participate, aside, most cultivators in fact do contribute through hidden/^{or indirect} taxes. Government market and export monopolies permit lower payment to producers for goods while the government garnishes the profit gained through selling at a higher price on the open market. This tax system pre-empts any possibility of major local taxation. It is a rare country in the third world, therefore, where local authorities have the sanction or capacity to collect sufficient taxes to meet their most elementary needs.

In a similar vein, the creation and availability of human resources is largely controlled by central governments. Private education and training institutions are often suppressed, whereas the stronger public systems are centrally controlled to serve the state's interests.¹¹ Most curricula are designed to build a national society and a loyalty to the central government; consequently, the most flagrant violators of pluralist liberal tenets are usually the educators who serve societal and state priorities at the expense of community and individual needs. Indeed, social and political change is probably delayed because of the overweening dependence upon nation-building and state development. The nature of the economic and educational inter-relationship is explored by others.¹² I wish to comment here only on the political consequence of this widespread practice which, in my view, gets the cart before the horse and delays development.

The immediate goal of national unity is lost if resentful townsfolk and villagers perceive a threat of cultural subversion from the center.

Development programs, which now prevail as models among both economic and educational planners, have the virtue of efficiency and standardization, at the cost of local acceptance. The delicate line that separates cooperation from coercion is crossed frequently because of the impatience of, and pressures upon, centerest functionaries to show "progress." But the human and programmatic failings so frequently cited in the development literature are merely trees in the forest. As one backs away from the immediate quest for progress reports, budgets, and accounting procedures, the issue so frequently confusing the effort is the goal of nationalism. Our conventional acceptance of the nation-building motivation dulls our critical stance.

Social scientists have concentrated on national studies of government and politics in third world countries -- on leadership, ideology, foreign policy, administration, and political parties -- except for anthropologists, who have tended to focus on village studies. This methodological division caused by the two levels of concern provides little understanding of the links between the city and the village. By ignoring the linkage issue until very recently, students of politics have not recognized it as the major contemporary problem in creating the new states.¹³

By political process I mean the activity of groups and their leaders who aspire to influence public affairs. The idea of "public" varies, of course, between the village and the city. The villager often perceives his community's public activities as limited to that which affects those whom he knows on a face-to-face basis; whereas the city dweller may well include the entire country in his "community."

If the politics of a state is to include the bulk of the population, which is the goal of most governments, then there must be some bond between the numerous village communities and those few who equate the state with their idea of public. Moreover, if the development process is to be self-generating and sustained, only the power gained by widespread involvement of villagers will achieve that end. The intermediary groups and their leaders are critical links in the creation of a viable political process.

Economic and political brokers in cities and towns not only convey (or deny) power from (and to) the center, but they also translate local sentiment for the state's leadership.¹⁴ E.A.J. Johnson has already demonstrated the critical importance of growth points for the economic system; likewise without an intermediary culture center there can be little political and cultural dispersion. Through such culture centers the changes in attitude essential for introducing modern values into traditional settings may be realized through higher productivity, birth control, and political participation, the result of transforming villagers into citizens.

Although technological modernization is endemic in the cities, the culture of the villagers largely determines the style of local development. What people have been, as well as what they want to be, greatly influences what they will become. The mixture of traditional and modern beliefs evolving in each country is uniquely dissimilar from the modernity we know in the West. Interlocking the political process of the center with that in village communities brings into operation influences which eulogize folk culture. Therefore when discussing

development goals, bear in mind that "popular participation" is intractably bound to folk traditions and invites local assertiveness. This invitation to the countryside to join in political change creates the political movements in agrarian states which must be comprehended if the politics of decentralization is to be effective.

TRENDS AND A DESIGN *

The major political movement that swept the colonial territories following World War II was the quest for independence. By increasing power over their destiny, third world statesmen contended that development would follow hard upon sovereignty. This argument gained credence, despite the fact that the capacity of "old" states in the West to control their future has generally declined. Larger political and economic interests now impinge upon state sovereignty, and supersede the state in the modern world. Giant alliance systems, trade consortiums, world-wide corporations, and communications networks modify cultures to such a degree that nationalism seems anachronistic in the West. Yet it is nationalism that is supposed to give meaning to independence throughout the third world, from Peru to the Philippines.

The difficulty with the nationalism model as the dynamic motor of development is twofold. I described in the preceding section the constraints "nationalist" elites impose on pluralist societies, which suggests a misnomer for the regressive and destructive process of

* This section is a modified version of a paper prepared for/SEADAG seminar on regional development, April, 1971.

communal chauvinism. The second problem arises from technology. Cultures are now undergoing fundamental change throughout the world because of technological advances in the mass media, transport, education, and health measures. The process is slower in the third world than in the West, nonetheless several transformations are shattering the spatial isolation characteristic of earlier civilizations.¹⁵ Nationalism is one such phenomenon, but other, at once more universalist and particularist processes influence villagers and townsfolk. For example, this generation of third world youth gain impressions of wider vistas through the press, movies, and radio which draws their attention away from either communal or nationalist identities. It can even direct their political loyalty elsewhere, as operators of Voice of America, Radio Moscow, or NHK well know, or it can turn them inward to reject social authority, as projection of the hippie culture does.

The political consequence of these dualistic processes, which heighten awareness of both local and universal human identity, is the vogue of "revolutionary nationalisms." These ideologies are couched in socialist terms, and created by regimes in power as well as by opposition groups struggling to seize power. Both governments and oppositionists seek legitimacy by claiming identity with the future (revolution) and the past (tradition). Such diverse governments as those in Mexico, Bolivia, Ghana, Algeria, Tanzania, Burma, and both Vietnams illustrate this trend. Opposition movements likewise claim to be liberators, as have the Palistinians, Castroites, Biafrans, Karens, or Naxalites, while also facing in both directions, the past and the future. It seems clear, therefore, that the causes which now move men in the third world are more complex than simple nationalism, or revolutions.

The search for instruments which will heighten the power of a people to preserve their dignity and gain political security cause perceptive leaders to fasten upon other avenues in addition to national mobilization. The time and condition is past which permitted communal institutions to gradually nationalize as in the West. And it will be tragic if economic planners and development experts assume that a "viable" nation-state is the only political model, for the acceleration of change undercuts nationalism at the same time as it is fostered by central governments. In any event, the enormous rise in social and political demands stemming from the population explosion crowds the land and the cities leaving no alternative but to strengthen local, national, regional, and universal institutions simultaneously if the crisis is to be surmounted. The problem is in part to provide food and subsistence, but additionally the evocative power of governments' promises about freedom and justice may unleash many storms as unemployment spreads, and frustration rises. Those advocating political participation, whether Mao Tse-Tung or Congressman Donald Fraser, the author of Title Nine*, face the same difficulty in justifying a single determinate which can be destructive unless it is accompanied by real improvement in human conditions. That improvement involves development of a host of institutions in addition to the state.

With some attention to the history of development, one discovers that even in the more leisurely 18th and 19th centuries, religious, educational, entrepreneurial, and other social institutions contributed

*Title Nine of the Foreign Assistance Act, 89th Congress, 1966.

to modernization. Villagers and townsfolk, then as now, were steeped in their own heritage, were suspicious of central government in distant cities, and viewed change as alien and even dangerous unless supportive of those beliefs cherished within the community. James Madison conceived the problem as one of strength in diversity.

"a faction...united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, may be adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community....Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an ailment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency....As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed." 16

Such a pluralist policy does not yet prevail in third world countries, although many opposition groups demand it. The trend over the past decade has been monistic in character, generally suppressing liberty, while autarchic regimes replace legislative bodies or elected leaders.

There are, of course, variations of style within autarchic regimes -- such as the single party movements in Peru, Burma, Egypt, Mexico, or Tanzania; or the overt dictatorships of Greece, Argentina, Paraguay, or Mali and Sudan. While liberation from colonial rulers initially led to parliamentary democracies, second generation leaders turned back to these autarchic colonial and pre-colonial styles of rule. This movement is also currently rationalized by many development specialists as being in the interest of nation-building. It results from the need, they argue, to centralize decision-making so as to improve the efficient allocation of resources for economic development.¹⁷ Production curves and over-all growth in the economy are the primary indicators used by

many planners in determining decisions to invest in specific programs. The political issue usually becomes relevant to planners and statesmen only should violence threaten to disrupt the economic growth process. Yet the threat of "liberation" movements becomes most real as a consequence of such centerist decision-making, when insurgents base their political appeal upon the frustrations of class, tribal, or ethnic factions who feel repressed by central regimes. Such movements expose the fallacy of a "legitimate" national elite directing development from above, for "development" essentially provides advantages to civil and military bureaucracies in the urbanizing areas. Even after the hundred-plus "liberation" coups in seventy third world countries over the past two decades, only a handful of new leaders have turned away from the centerist conception of development.¹⁸

Third world leaders and modern planners often overlook the critical role non-state, public and private associations played in creating human resources because the idea of non-national, or "private," is viewed as self-serving and against the public interest. Institutions not controlled by the state are often condemned for they represent factions which threaten the weak authority of most governments. They also evoke the memory of colonialism which fostered corporate exploitation. Finally, socialist ideologies extoll altruism, causing "self-serving" associations to seem the natural enemies of the state.

Another movement that has become conventional is that which seeks a regime's legitimacy through demonstrable economic "progress." Centralizing investment decisions seem to enhance this immediate goal, thus by a shortcut in logic, development indicators and capital intensive

projects gain a political dimension by legitimizing regimes. The politics of technological achievements such as dams, roads, an international jet fleet, a steel plant, or a well-equipped army derives from its symbolic achievement, which many mistake for progress. Obviously, only central governments can afford to finance these projects. Tragically, such projects are frequently of negative value to the development process as they neither effect nor improve conditions for the bulk of the population. While most regimes engage in the chimera, Sukarno and Nkhruma were notoriously given over to the art of confusing symbolic "industrial" achievement for progress.

Until recently, those programs have been ignored which touch the villagers, in situ, where attitudinal change is essential if the value of higher productivity, scientific knowledge, and identification with a larger community, and world culture, is to be comprehended. That the world press and even development planners tend to ignore the few real success cases compounds the problem. That diverse regimes in Puerto Rico, Yugoslavia, Taiwan and Israel have sponsored significant improvement in rural areas by dispersion of urban growth points and development from below is very important for all our futures. Sadly, it is the glamorous central projects highlighted by the world press, which fail to capture the vitality and creative abilities of local leaders. Consequently the development process is left to wallow in the planning offices.

The failure to grasp the human talent latent in the countryside by "modernizing the basic institutions that influence farmer conduct," is not entirely surprising.¹⁹ Upon reflection the process must be recognized for what it is, social revolution. The idea of revolution

is not readily acceptable to public leaders in the third world who must mediate between members of the elite who view "modernization" as their own material progress, and the vast majority in the villages who live by the values of tradition. For villagers the old ways of thinking, doing, and feeling serve as moral guides to the future. Consequently, progressive leaders who might help create new urban places and expand areal economic growth, are potential threats to both central governments and villagers who share a commitment to persistence of "things as they are."

The genius required to grasp the problem and also to gain the confidence of bureaucrats and farmers alike is surely rare, and explains why so few states are changing rapidly enough to meet the level of demands that will rise in the future as unemployment increases. Such leaders understand the political importance of symbols, be they schools or new styles of national dress in the village, and recognize the symbols of local progress as manifestations of a changing political order. The sense of timing which responds to these changes is crucial for a successful, multi-level development process. Powerful leaders such as Kemal Ataturk, Chiang Kai-shek or / ^{Park Chung-hee} or managers of change such as Tito or Betancourt, or / ^{especially} efficient governing cabinets such as those in Puerto Rico or Israel are examples of alternative forms of governance which can lead in the same direction. The several political movements in the third world are actually not so different from those in the "first" or "second" worlds. Contravailing trends of bigness vs. localism, corporate structure vs. community, cooperative group action vs. individual freedom are apparent in the Soviet Union, the United

States, and most smaller developed countries as well. The issue is one of degree, not of utter uniqueness. The intensity of the problems vary from country to country, depending on their social and economic development.

"moderns"

In the third world, particularly, we/can participate both in the introduction of modern institutions, such as schools or health clinics, and also the modernization of ancient institutions within the village, such as the kind of decisions made by the headman, the council of elders, and the local authorities in religion, magic, and healing.²⁰ The sense of pending change creates more receptivity and understanding of modernization than many planners believe possible. The demands in towns and villages is for competent technicians, not functionaries. The appeal of charismatic, but blind, leadership of the fifties and early sixties has been replaced by consensus in many third world countries concerning the worth of competence in leaders, be they bureaucrats, politicians, or military officers. This is a consensus about the need for educated authorities.²¹ The capacity of regimes to identify with, to claim as their own, this new knowledge about technology and application of science will depend upon the rapport established between central governmental functionaries and progressive local groups and their leaders. In short, the amount of know-how delivered on the spot becomes increasingly the measure of the government's legitimacy.

Values of local leaders, and the very meaning of local institutions are also being modified by the new systems of learning via schools, travel, the pr radio, films, and television. Whereas most rural folk may still adhere to traditional ways, there is more toleration for rapid change generally

because of the changes already afoot. Interviewers in remote villages now find demand for new education and new markets which lead to the social and political changes inherent in modernization.²² Following a century of gradual movement along the continuum from traditional to modern forms of order, in many countries pressure rises for programs which can introduce economic change locally. In effect, a new authority is extant or on the horizon in most third world countries because of the perception of change by progressive groups at the center as well as in the countryside.

In practical terms, expansion of local educational and economic opportunities is essential, in part to replace superstitious beliefs with scientific knowledge, but primarily to create an ethos of change concerning cultivation practices, health and nutrition habits, and family planning in villages. The political virtue of this policy is that it serves an exchange function, bringing to rural and minority folk the possibility of technical and professional knowledge as well as material improvement. Although dispersed schools and market systems in the past have been endorsed by central regimes in most countries, often the policy is not implemented because of the assumption that learning and business goes on in cities, or simply because central leaders have their political base in the urban sector and therefore patronize it. That short range view must be modified to meet the need for "learning" and producing in the countryside, where most people live. Government administrators must free innovative teachers, entrepreneurs, and cultivators from the constraints that have in the past characterized government assistance. Creation of more complex federated governmental

and political systems to match the configuration of diverse and multitudinous local communities is essential to cope with the actual situation in most countries.

The problem created by unitary state systems based on the national theory of development cannot be solved alone through a more suitable pluralist design. That is one critical step, perhaps the most critical, but a number of accommodations must be negotiated, always bearing in mind that long range survival is the stake. Because the chauvinism of central governments is severe, the antipathy or outright hostility of ethnic, linguistic, and local groups can be attenuated and redirected through the planned local cities, the culture centers, to enable local groups to elevate the quality of their own lives. Dispersed education and investment is crucial.

Actually, these two issues recently have been approached more reasonably in three countries with nearly two thirds of the world's village population, China, India, and Indonesia. Although I do not deal with China's solutions, per se, the post-Great Leap Forward policies are instructive for our purpose. Decentralization is more prevalent than at any time since the communist regime came to power. Provincial "Revolutionary Committees," mainly controlled by army officers, determine most budget allocations that affect their provinces. Education and rural development (including roads) absorb over half of these expenditures, while most procurement and tax collection is also performed by provincial agencies. The central government retains dominant control over such matters as curriculum content,

the development of universities, hospitals, public health, railroads and arterial highways, investment in industry, external trade, and strategic defense -- still, substantial activity is carried out by decision-makers at provincial, and in some instances, local levels.²³

India is particularly interesting because of the recent emergence of regional political forces that force the central government to be more responsive to provincial state needs. The Jana Sangh, Tamil DMK, Bangala Congress, the Bengali communist coalition, and the Kerala communists are regional parties/demanding dispersion of central power. Decline in Congress party control at the center requires of Mrs. Gandhi a domestic policy directly atuned to provincial issues if her new Congress party is to survive. Nonetheless, as in China, key functions remain under central control. Universities are standardized by budgeting and examinations administered from New Delhi, as are educational curricula, public health facilities, most transportation, industrial investment, foreign trade, and both fiscal and monetary policy. Despite the rising political pressure to patronize local groups, India probably is now more centrally controlled today than is China following the Cultural Revolution. The administrative apparatus left by the British remains a "steel frame" structured to serve the center. Admittedly the eighteen states have their own legislative, judicial, and executive functions, but most taxation, all civil service recruitment, and budgetary allocation is the preserve of the center's bureaucracy. Nonetheless, the trend in political decentralization is loosening the grip of New Delhi.²⁴

The Indonesian case also illustrates some of the common difficulties in central dominance. From the outset of independence, indeed even before, the Djakarta leadership acknowledged the right of the outer

islands to have local self-government. But economic planners saw little to be gained by investing in the remote regions, Sumatra excepted, inhabited by the minorities. Furthermore, the Javanese politicians and Soekarno, himself a Javanese, were anxious to reward their own constituencies. The combined influence of short-term political interests and expert economic advice far outweighed the political wisdom of long-term investment in economic growth of the outer islands. Consequently, the potentially large urban centers, such as Medan, Palembang, Ambolna, Singaradja, or Makasar were left outside the growth sector of the economy. Djakarta and a few other Javanese cities received much of the investment designed to help Indonesia prosper. Most Javanese towns were also bypassed, although nearly two dozen Javanese cities now exceed 100,000 population.

Since the creation of Suharto's new order, dispersed economic growth is a policy, and the twenty seven provinces now receive budget allocations. Also, the higher education system encouraged some cultural growth in those cities where new colleges exist, but the direction comes from Djakarta and the pace of change is slow. There is little reward in terms of meaningful employment of many college graduates. Fundamentally, the problem is that no strategy for social change has been devised for Indonesia, despite its commitment to development. The unrealized potential for regional growth in Indonesia would not be difficult to stimulate, were the government to modify its view of how change comes about.

Finally, consider the two largest countries in Africa and South America, Nigeria and Brazil. They both suffer even more from the rigidity of central planning than do the three largest Asian states.

The Biafran war represented extreme regional distress over "national development," yet the administrative structure of Nigeria remains essentially unchanged. The form of government is federative, but the practice is for decisions to be made in Lagos where a balance of power prevails among tribal leaders and representatives in every field. The idea of urban growth focused in Huasa, Falani, Yoruba, or Ebo regional capitals is not acceptable to either educators, planners, or business elites who persist in viewing Nigerian national development and integration as the foundation for modernization.

In Brazil the problem differs only in degree. A century of imperial rule from Rio de Janeiro preceded formation of the present republican form of governance. Although the capital has moved to Brasilia, the center of control remains. Army officers have suspended civilian rule, as is also the case in Nigeria, and central planning, execution of plans, and general direction of the society persists. Statist assumptions abound in official policies in economic as well as educational development. Like Indonesia, Brazil has enjoyed rapid economic growth in recent years, but the sectors profiting from this trend are essentially restricted to urban elites. The northeast and central states, with half the population, remain backwaters of human misery, as is also the case in the favelas of Rio.²⁵

If the central governments are not adequate instruments to cope with modernization, either in terms of capability or acceptability, then what are alternative institutions at the local level? Local institutions which retain authority in most of the third world are rooted in the family and community. The size and functional scope

of both groups vary enormously among cultures, from the multi-million member Chinese clan, to the nuclear Catholic family in Mexico, but the quality of cohesiveness and capacity for local leaders, or patrons, to command action is politically significant. Closely related to family cohesion is the authority of local community institutions and their patrons. Usually these men or women perform economic, entertainment, or sacerdotal functions. People within walking radius of each other congregate to share experiences, exchange goods, and propitiate natural, or supranatural deities. The territorial basis of community is a powerful identity factor and underlies the market and political exchange function within communities. Townsfolk and villagers are drawn together for shared tasks at the time of harvest, planting, marriage, and death. Tribal societies, indeed, are largely organized upon the basis of total participation in ritual. It unites the tribe and provides security throughout the year against perceived threats and natural human stress. Cyclical celebrations have changed in character in industrial societies but remain in vestigial form to remind us of their overwhelming importance within rural communities.

The family, of course, remains the strongest human social organization, in terms of its resilience and adaptability. Whether matrilineal or patrilineal, monogamous or polygamous, it meets those human needs within rural society not satisfied by the community. Actually, in many village cultures, the distinction between community and family is blurred, whereas the distinction between state and community is very sharp. It is of more than idle interest to reflect on the clear division in the Western societies between state, government, and religion

while community and state boundaries are almost lost. Likewise, the family has lost its vitality as other social institutions -- economic, educational, recreational, and political in nature -- have generally usurped familial authority. The mobility required for industrial growth caused this change in the West, however the agricultural economies of the third world are severely threatened by a pre-mature, but parallel human movement today. The priority in planning should be upon production increases in rural areas by improved subsistence cultivation within the context of local community and family structures.²⁶

Modern institutions can flourish within the structure of these two primary local groupings, and several deserve particular consideration because of their immediate relevancy: schools (learning centers), co-operatives, and political party organizations. The idea of schools as learning centers for adults as well as the young seems a radical local departure for many/educators, who view "schooling" largely as the rote memorization by the young and their examination by governmental educators. The potential value of community learning centers follows in the concluding section. Meanwhile consider the political design that seems most feasible to foster/development goals.

Culture Centers: A Feasible Solution to Decentralization

Few countries have experienced such a profound effort by central governments or political parties bent on rapid change as have the smaller states of Puerto Rico, Israel, Yugoslavia, and Taiwan. The inducement of an incentive market system, heavy education expenditures, and integrated political systems capable of governing enabled these

countries to create vigorous and productive societies, relieved of most barriers to development that afflict their neighbors. These cases offer a relevant lesson. The sort of planned change likely to succeed in the heterogeneous third world is one based on new political centers structured to serve large populations now remote from cities. It requires decentralization of many administrative decisions. It means that the influence of primate cities, such as Bangkok, Djakarta, Karachi, Lusaka, or Lima will be reduced.

Political change that will permit the creation of modern, civil societies must be designed so that familial, patron, and communal groups can create their own urban centers. Of the minorities in Southeast Asia, for example, none but the Chinese are able to influence their own destiny through influence in an urban sector. As their local cultural and political centers grow, community leaders can promote change by their own volition. Thus, no one commanded the Chinese of Singapore, who are a majority, to work vigorously throughout their lives. They elected to do so in order that their children might gain a better education and start their careers with more than a subsistence income. The social and economic systems were so structured as to invite Chinese mobilization. This is a parallel example of the success, under a more restrictive political system, in Taiwan.

The case for development from below rests upon the assumption that in the long run greater power can be gained to break the grip of disease and malnutrition. Sufficient control over tropical environment will eventually permit hill tribes and lowland cultivators alike to attain modernity. Human beings want change built upon their own heritage, it needs but to be stimulated. Pride, dignity, and self-respect are

the hallmarks of every community when viewed from inside; the tendency to denigrate aliens, parochialism, and suspicion are obverse characteristics seen by the outside observer. In most of the crowded, tropic countries, for example, there is little basis for civility and mutual regard between ethnic groups.²⁷ A catalyst that helps to break this heritage of suspicion and distrust is the local city. The growth of a local urban complex permits nearby villagers to identify with, and gain the advantages of, modern technology so as to express their own heritage.

The economic value of town-centered change has already been demonstrated. The political value of local urban growth is even more compelling. The basic issue is one of providing the setting for self-expression, or creating the opportunity through modern media and education for local artists, craftsmen, and entrepreneurs, as well as politicians, to progress within their own institutions. A central government attempting to administer the pace of change and life styles for ten, thirty, or one hundred million people is bound to be over-extended and unresponsive to the perceived needs of local leaders. Conversely, expansion of education and employment opportunities in nearby towns permits ambitious youth to remain in a familiar environment. There is retention of the sense of community authority which is usually lost when villagers are forced to migrate to a distant and alien primate city. Today how familiar to the foreigner and well-to-do resident of most crowded primate cities is the need for guards around his compound to protect against robbery. Yet in the traditional community, apart from crimes of passion, there is little criminal behavior. The noticeable rise in political terror in rural regions

suggests the logical end to rising frustration in the cities. Better educated youth turn to underground warfare as an apocalyptic solution for a bankrupt political system, built on the centerist beliefs of cautious independence leaders, as in Ceylon in 1971, or in the Philippines today.

Rather than depending upon the model of human behavior that people must be commanded before they react, and the hope that national values inculcated in the young will motivate them to become efficient workers for the state, it would be entirely feasible to stimulate local innovative ability. It is illustrative that in Brazil and Indonesia the climate for change is now impressive, despite the centerist dominance, thanks to several decades of influence from mass education and the mass media.

Nothing is more real to community leaders than their identification with their territory, their families, their local authorities, and their religious shrines and traditions. Their concept of security is intimately tied to the symbols representing localism. Rather than attempting to crush local identity, as centerist governments have implicitly done in their nation-building planning; the strength of localism should be cultivated and encouraged by stimulating areal development. Financial credits, education, and technical aid should be provided to individuals, groups, or village clusters that demonstrate interest and talent in modern technology that is relevant to their locale. For example, freight and passenger transport; fabric, fertilizer, or machinery repair and rental cooperatives; private health clinics, technical and

special learning institutes; leisure facilities and entertainment companies; media such as a press or mobile cinema; these are all types of activities that town life needs and to which modern technology can be adapted to suit local environments.

The reason for confidence in local responsiveness to the prospect of progress is found in the evidence from around the world of "villages that chose progress."²⁸ For people to risk new ventures their government must be prepared to risk the decentralization of decision-making. Greater autonomy is necessary, for without creating the means for villagers to invest in their own organization they will be unable to break out of their traditional patterns. The new life styles which modernity demands can develop only if the techniques are available within the community structure.

The priority goal of ^{human resource} development should be creation of prospering local communities, the foundation of any civil polity. The issue evolves from the very idea of politics. Without grasping its meaning in the context of agrarian states, any idea of a political design for the future is groundless. Although the concept of civility has its roots in western jurisprudence, its function is familiar and prized in Asia and Africa. Civility connotes harmony among men and between man and the ethos. To relate to the environment peacefully, while pursuing self-interests within a commonweal, is a traditional art highly prized and frequently portrayed in Asian drama and African dance. Conflict is assumed to be normal, but the non-violent resolution of competing interests is so commonplace in most villages that it is not considered political; yet the process is the very root of

politics, the authoritative allocation of valued but scarce goods and status within the community.

A civil polity is one in which the public interest is served by men accountable to their community. The perception of trust is real for those with political obligation, they are accountable and those who suffer because of errors or injustice know precisely whom to blame. Traditional communities are, of course, personal in nature and individuals are quite exposed to each other because their character is known. Enlarging the scope of the civil polity, so as to include areal or regional communities, and still retain the sense of political obligation and accountability is the process by which political development in fact occurs.

To create a sense of political obligation among leaders, the worth of the endeavor must be clear, otherwise local leaders will remain bound by local mores. To feel obliged to tolerate the diverse customs of all peoples within the polity is to create widespread accountability for justice. The difficulty, then, in creating a polity that diverse peoples can accept, is primarily one of resolving the problems of obligation and defining the public interest in a fashion that can be accepted.

The first decades of independence were spent by the founding statesmen in Africa and Asia in designing ways of governance reflective of modern states. It was a process of self-reassurance that independence was real and that, legally, their states were equal to the most powerful. Parliaments, elections, political parties, civil bureaucracies, and universities, the training grounds for the public sector, were all

institutionalized. But now the pathetic inability of these foreign modes of governance to work is obvious, and simpler styles of military rule have swept across the region. Only the most Westernized of the agrarian states escaped this second generation of political fashion. Until political comity is institutionalized, governments face the hard issue of succession crises, and the problem of avoiding violent secession. Most agrarian regimes in our lifetime, must continue to live with substantial dissidence from peoples who do not believe their interests are being served by the government. In accepting responsibility for governance over peoples with different folkways, politicians must recognize the necessity of promoting local interests as their own. To ignore this trust is to invite insurgency.

The potential for a world wide effort to design organizations and programs related to human development is magnificent, but until now the problem was not defined, therefore it has been touched upon only at random. The prescription to alleviate the excesses of nationalism, well-tested by theorists and practitioners, is the cultivation of indigenous pluralism. Planners should not lose sight of the strengths already within their own cultural fabric. The power of traditional community institutions is considerable. Indeed, the apt phrase, "the modernity of tradition" suggests the strength for change that rests within extant social and cultural communal institutions.²⁹

Within third world countries, the unreasonableness of the several assumptions underlying the concept of political development-cum-nation building becomes particularly revealing. I have described why few of these states can hope to avoid serious violence, if not dissolution,

over the next four or five decades if they pursue nation-building as the only political objective. To pin their aspirations on the nation, by inculcation of purely national values within the young, will invite resentment from minorities and unrepresented rural folk. How much the better part of wisdom to construct the sense of commonality towards mankind within the context of the local community, the neighborhood of villages meaningful to old and young alike, than to transform youth into something unfamiliar, even alien. The environment of third world countries accounts for the considerable divisiveness that has effected their culture and political character historically, it continues to do so, and to compel integration is to defeat the goal of comity.

SUGGESTED PROGRAMS

To recapitulate my thesis, the attitudinal aspect of human resource development should receive equal attention with the skill and learning programs. Since response to change is largely related to cultural identity, consideration for the cultural milieu within which projects are placed should be a serious factor. Without motivation to use training and education, development programs cannot have positive effect. My concern is for the institutionalization of change within traditional milieux, which is to say within extant communities.

1) The location factor should be considered for all social programs, i.e., nutrition, health, education, training, family planning, and community development. Although no precise ratio of people-per-cultural center (growth point) should be evoked, a rule of thumb measure should be the creation of programs only where local participation can be gained by incentives meaningful within the community. For example, status or financial rewards should have value within the existing group structure, so that the mobilized people are not drawn out of their communities by the very process they are expected to foment.

2) Since the dynamics of social change are difficult to measure, more disaggregated data, by community and ethnic groups, should be developed to indicate real impacts of programs on longevity, housing, health, employment, and economic security. Census and survey data can indirectly measure quality of life factors through such a research design within each country. Success or failure of various AID programs with a human resource dimension could be more readily determined.

3) While the most positive sorts of development occur in those societies where cultural dimensions are acknowledged, there certainly are genuine risks involved in a cultural emphasis for it entails great indigenous self-consciousness about the character of colonization and modernization. There will be greater wariness towards external influences, which should not be mistakenly labeled "xenophobic," but rather will enable a country to be a tougher international bargainer. Since the fundamental goal of current U.S. foreign policy is to foster self-sufficiency, attention to the cultural dimension would appear to be an essential aspect of any foreign aid program. Such consideration need not result in explicit expenditures for human resource development, but it will help avoid pitfalls which follow from perceiving development projects as culturally neutral. To operationalize this aspect of human resource development, value priorities of people should be determined by surveys in the locality where programs are to be placed. Furthermore, no programs should directly attack traditional institutions, but wherever possible should build upon tradition-bearers for support of programs. Finally, tests for ethnocentrism and educational arrogance by the donor and governmental staffs should be given before assigning personnel to work in the field.

4) The will to develop is the most valuable human resource. Planners can expect to play only a contributory role in creating that will, however it should not be lost sight of in our search for measurable devices to determine "how much human resource development" has occurred. No testing device exists to measure a society's will, or its adaptability. However because of the shortage of donor capital and manpower, care should

be taken to avoid AID programs in those countries where there is no manifest will to plan and carry out change. The chief enemy to our own future is lassitude in facing up to those crises that affect mankind. We should not squander our resources and efforts on regimes which do not take these problems seriously. The day is past when narrow ideological differences should be considered the basic criteria for or against aid. Let the chief political consideration be the recipient's will to develop, as demonstrated by operational programs.

FOOTNOTES

1. Recent studies include: Lester B. Pearson, Partners in Development, New York: Praeger, 1969; Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968; Barbara Ward, The Lopsided World, New York: W. W. Norton, 1968; and Kermet Gordon, ed., Agenda for the Nation, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968.
2. The literature on architectonics is limited, although the concept was prominent in discussions by Greek philosophers, and recurs in Western political thought with Hegel. See, for example: Plato's Statesman, Martin Ostwald, ed., J. B. Skemp translation, New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957; The Politics of Aristotle, Ernest Barker, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948, Book II, "Review of Ideal States"; and Thomas More, Utopia, H.V.S. Ogden, ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1949, Book II. Also see: R. S. Peters, "Hegel and the Nation-State," Political Ideas, David Thomson, ed., Baltimore: Penguin, 1969; and for its current application see Wilson C. McWilliams, "Introduction," Garrisons and Government, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1967; and Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966, Ch. I.
3. For an explicit statement of the merit found in a centralized, unitary state see: A.F.K. Organski, The Stages of Political Development, New York: Alfred F. Knopf, 1965, pp. 7-17; also, William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations," Nation-Building, Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Foltz, eds., New York: Atherton Press, 1963. A more sophisticated analysis, but founded on the same assumption, is C. Johnson, op. cit., pp. 15-39. A refreshing exception is Aristide Zolberg, Creating Political Order, Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966.
4. J. Lloyd Meacham, "Latin American Constitutions: Nominal and Real," The Dynamics of Change in Latin America, John Martz, ed., Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965; also, John J. Johnson, Political Change in Latin America, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958, p. 9.
5. The problem of alien rulers is particularly poignant in plural societies. See: Rupert Emerson, "Self-Determination in Plural Societies," From Empire to Nation, Boston: Beacon Press, 1960; also, John H. Fautsky, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962, pp. 33-38.
6. See: Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, especially Ch. I; also, Joseph R. Strayer, "The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe," and Carl Friedrich, "Nation-Building," in Deutsch and Foltz, op. cit., pp. 17-32. The following portion is extracted from Asian Development: Problems and Prognosis, New York: Free Press, 1971.

7. For earlier warnings see: Emerson, op. cit., pp. 329-359; and J.S. Furnival, Netherlands India, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939, p. 468. Recent research which perceives even greater dangers include: Donald L. Horowitz, "Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics," World Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 2, January 1971, pp. 232-244; Robert L. Solomon, "Boundary Concepts and Practices in Southeast Asia," World Politics, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, October 1970, pp. 1-23; and Walker Conner, "Ethnic Nationalism as a Political Force," World Affairs, Vol. 133, No. 2, September 1970, pp. 91-97. The best study is Cynthia Enloe's Ethnic Politics and Political Development, Boston, Little Brown, 1972.
8. The recent literature on education as an instrument in development planning is extensive, but one of the earlier works retains its eminence as a comprehensive analysis of the problem. See: Education and Political Development, James S. Coleman, ed., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
9. Exceptions to this generalization were prominent in the early and mid-1960s, e.g., Sukarno and Nkhroma; however, statements in the General Assembly, at UNCTAD conferences, and in regional association conferences confirm the trend. Illustrative of this view are: UNCTAD, International Monetary System, New York: United Nations, 1969; OAS, Meeting of American Chiefs of State, Punte del Este, Uruguay, April 12-14, 1967, Washington, D.C.: Pan American Union, 1967; and SEAMEO, Proceedings Fourth Annual Conference, 1969, Bangkok: Secretariate, 1970.
10. Nicholas Kaldor, "Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963. The Pearson Commission viewed this issue benignly, with the assertion that high savings rate demonstrated successful tax programs, op. cit., pp. 30-31. Myrdal is more realistic in his assessment, but also ignores the need for local incentives to tax, op. cit., pp. 2096-2103.
11. Support for dominance of public or free education is unquestioned by any contributor to the Coleman study, op. cit., or by most other commentators in the literature. Illustrative is: Mary Jean Bowman and C. Arnold Anderson, "Concerning the Role of Education in Economic Development," in Clifford Geertz, Old Societies and New States, New York: Free Press, 1963, pp. 247-279; although Anderson has second thoughts in his article, "Some Heretical Views on Education Planning," Comparative Education Review, October 1969, pp. 260-275. Also, see the provocative chapters by John Vaizey, "Some Dynamic Aspects of Inequality," Social Objectives of Educational Planning, Paris: OECD, 1967
12. Social Objectives...op. cit., OECD, Higher Education and the Demand for Scientific Manpower in the United States, 1963; F. Harbison and C.A. Myers, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964; J.W. Hanson and Cole Brumbeck, Education and Development of New Nations, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

13. Interest in linkage politics followed a conference on the topic, published as Linkage Politics, James Rosenau, ed., New York: Free Press, 1969; John Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 3, September 1970; also, Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa," APSR, Vol. 62, No. 1, March 1968
14. The term political "broker" was introduced by Lucian Pye, Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, pp. 30-31. Its meaning is comparable to, but less inclusive than, Herbert Feith's use of "solidarity makers," The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962, p. 25. An improved analysis of the broker idea, but seen as the exchange function is in W.F. Ilchman and N.T. Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change, Berkeley: University of California, 1969, pp. 92-135. Also see my discussion of intermediary leaders in Politics Among Burmans, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1970. Edgar A.J. Johnson, Spatial Planning and Economic Growth, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1971.
15. Theodore Geiger, The Conflicted Relationship: The West and the Transformation of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, New York: McGraw Hill, 1967
16. No. 10, The Federalist Papers, New York: Modern Library Edition, pp. 54-55.
17. Illustrative are the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) mission reports on Ceylon (1953), Thailand (1959), Iraq (1952), Turkey (1951), Malaya (1955), Morocco (1966), and Nigeria (1955), published by The Johns Hopkins Press.
18. Edward Luttwak, Coup d' Etat, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969, Appendix C.
19. A. T. Mosher, pp. 1-2, cited by E.A.J. Johnson, op. cit. pp. 188n
20. An insight of enormous value on this issue is offered by Robert Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. For another example of the same phenomenon see Manning Nash's study of Upper Burma, The Golden Road to Modernity, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965, pp. 93-103.
21. This bold statement is justified by reports from such diverse countries as Thailand, India, Egypt, Brazil, and Mexico. Charles Keyes, Isan: Regionalism in Northeastern Thailand, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967; Kasum Nair, The Lonely Furrow, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1969; Stefan Robock, Brazil's Developing Northeast, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963; Donald C. Mead, Growth and Structural Change in the Egyptian Economy, Homewood, Illinois: R.D. Irwin Press, 1967; Roger Hansen, Mexican Economic Development, Washington, D. C.: Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins SAIS, 1970

22. Manning Nash, op. cit., Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965; Robert Redfield, A Village That Chose Progress, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, Phoenix edition, 1962; also, Marc J. Swartz, ed., Local-Level Politics, Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1968
23. Audrey Donnithorne, China's Economic System, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1966, pp. 496-511; also Franz Schurman, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Berkeley: University of California, 1966, pp. 173-307; and "Mao's Educational Revolution," in American Education: Washington, D.C. Office of Education, May 1972.
24. An early prediction of this trend, with excellent analysis, is Selig Harrison's India: The Dangerous Decade, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. For a recent statement,
25. The withdrawal of Manuel Freire's political rights, because of his brilliant adult rural learning programs in the northeast, is instructive evidence of the statist bent by the current government.
26. "A nation can be maintained only if, between the State and the individual, there is intercalated a whole series of secondary groups near enough to the individuals to attract them strongly in their sphere of action and drag them, in this way, into the general torrent of social life." My own interpretation of social theory owes much to Emile Durkheim, particularly The Division of Labor from which this quotation was drawn. See the Simpson translation, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953, p. 28.
27. See the studies by Conner, Horowitz, and Solomon cited in the previous section.
28. This phrase is taken from Robert Redfield's book of the same title. See also the more recent symposium edited by Martin Rudner dealing with "development from below" in "Society and Development in Asia," Asian and African Studies, Volume 6, 1970.
29. Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967.