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**MONASTERY MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT:
TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF LARGE SCALE
PLANNED CHANGE**

Garth N. Jones

**Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado**

November 1971

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
MONASTERY MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS A STRATEGY OF LARGE SCALE PLANNED CHANGE

by Garth N. Jones

COLORADO STATE UNIVERSITY
FORT COLLINS, COLORADO
NOVEMBER 1971

TECHNICAL
SERVICES

WATER MANAGEMENT
TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 14



79

**MONASTERY MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS
A STRATEGY OF LARGE SCALE PLANNED CHANGE**

Water Management Technical Report No. 14

by

**Garth N. Jones
Department of Political Science**

Prepared under support of

**United States Agency for International Development
Contract No. AID/csd-2162
Water Management Research
in Arid and Sub-Humid Lands of the
Less Developed Countries**

**Colorado State University
Fort Collins, Colorado
November, 1971**

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ID71-72GNJ9

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Review Draft

Reproduced in this form for the purpose of checking statements and figures for accuracy. The writer would appreciate comments and criticisms of this paper's contents.

An abstract of an earlier draft of this paper was prepared by Dr. Renē Mendoza, Graduate School of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, and published in the Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 14(October 1970), 414-35.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I want to thank the following persons who carefully read this paper and offered a number of constructive, written criticisms: Frank M. Landers, Chief, Public Administration Division, Agency for International Development, Pakistan; Charles Elkington, Program Evaluation, Agency for International Development, Washington, D. C.; Wesley E. Bjur, International Public Administration Center, University of Southern California; Vincent W. Brown, Deputy Mission Director, Agency for International Development, Pakistan; Raymond Anderson, Department of Agriculture/Economics, Colorado State University; and my former colleagues at the Institute of Advance Projects, East West Center, John Walsh, Ralph Allee, Toshio Yatsushiro, Francis Hsu and B. A. Abbas.

This paper was largely written while I was a Senior Specialist at the East West Center and revised later at Colorado State University. It was presented in October, 1971, to the International Interdisciplinary Seminar on Water Resources Management at Colorado State University. In regards to this presentation I wish to thank Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., Chairman of the Seminar. Also, I would like to thank respectively Minoru Shinoda, Director, Institute of Advance Projects, East West Center, and Maurice Albertson, Director, International Water Management Development Program, Colorado State University, and their staffs for the excellent assistance given to me in the preparation of this manuscript.

Despite all of this excellent assistance, I am, of course, solely responsible for the contents.

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Preface

Centralized planned development in the lesser developed countries has not met with much success. Neither the "planners" nor the "administrators" have displayed the capacity, realism, and ingenuity to conceive and execute planned development in a constructive fashion. The result is high waste of scarce resources and painful social dislocations.

Major social changes in the lesser developed countries are required to support modern or improved technologies. This will demand new and innovative institutions capable of mobilizing resources, and particularly labor, in large quantities. While the magnitude of the problem must be conceived on a large scale, the strategy advanced in this study represents essentially a "grass-roots" approach with the objective of changing the vicious circle of underdevelopment into a virtuous circle of development. This requires a "big push" approach which could be regarded as a "grand strategy." Incremental or gradualist pattern of development within the framework of traditional social orders (social systems) is considered to be impractical.

This is not to say that traditional social orders do not frequently have considerable latent or unused productive capacities, but rather that such orders seldom have the capacities to support a high level of technology and production. For example, traditional agriculture in Pakistan can never be very productive.

The major problem is that an entire society cannot be suddenly and drastically changed to fit the needs of newly introduced technologies, unless extreme measures of force and violence are employed. Then it is doubtful whether or not any permanent change can even be wrought by this fashion.

A reexamination of history is necessary to determine how organizations have achieved their development goals in hostile or apathetic environments. It appears that those organizations infused with religious value have been extremely successful in this regard and that the conceptual organization of Western-monasteries has much relevance.

Related to this discussion is the configuration of forces leading to successful change. This is an extremely complicated subject but three categories have been identified which appear important in a broad set of working relationships: (1) nature of the organizational environment, (2) nature of the change actors, and (3) composition of the emergent change relationships.

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The initial pressure for change, it appears, is usually external to any given social entity. If this observation is correct, then new concepts of working relationships for planned change are required.

Insular centers of poverty and productivity are hard core problems. Insular centers of high productivity are often sustained at the expense of draining-off scarce resources from the surrounding areas. The multiplier principle of development has not effectively operated. The creation of a viable organizational infrastructure to operationalize the multiplier principle is a significant development problem in most of the emerging societies, and constitutes the central concern of this study.

In final note, the problems of the next decade will be very much located in the lesser developed countries. Hopefully, this study makes a small contribution to their resolution.

Garth N. Jones
October 1971

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MONASTERY MODEL OF DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS
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I. Introduction

Planned development in the lesser developed societies is an uncertain process. Their social systems have low economic absorptive capacities and exhibit little innovative capabilities. The changing of the social patterns and relationships is often a difficult and a hazardous undertaking.¹

¹These along with other related characteristics of the under-developed countries have been much discussed. The literature is so voluminous that "bibliographies of bibliographies" are commonplace! For a few bibliographical references see Cyril Edwin Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), appendix; Frederick W. Frey, Survey Research on Comparative Change: A Bibliography (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1966); "Bibliography of Planned Social Change," Minnesota, 1969 (offset); John Brode, The Process of Modernization: An Annotated Bibliography on the Sociocultural Aspects of Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969); Eloise G. Re Oua and Jane Statham, The Developing Nations: A Guide to Information Sources (Detroit: Gale Research Co., 1964), and Garth N. Jones, Shaikat Ali, Richard Barber, and Jim F. Chambers, Planning, Development and Change: Bibliography on Development Administration (Honolulu: East West Center, 1970).

The problem of planned development is compounded many times because of other aggravating factors. The planners have little valid knowledge or social understanding of the social systems which they are trying to change.² Social science research is not a significant activity in the lesser developed countries.³

Because of imperfect knowledge of the social situation, the planning process often becomes an exercise in "intuitive judgments" and "educated hunches." Planners are not in a position to anywhere near maximize their inputs, but rather they gamble that their programs contain the right combinations to initiate a pattern of successful development.⁴ They realize from experience that the unanticipated consequences of planned development are frequently more important than the anticipated. Somehow these must be included in the overall development plan.⁵ In investment terms, the risks for success are high. Planned development is a "hit and miss" affair.⁶

²See Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), Part Four: "Values and Goals."

³See my "Failure of Technical Assistance in Public Administration Abroad: A Personal Note," Journal of Comparative Administration, 2(May 1970), 3-51.

⁴See especially Bertram M. Gross, "The Administration of Economic Development Planning: Principles and Fallacies," Studies in Comparative International Development, St. Louis, Missouri: Social Science Institute, Washington University, 3(1967), 89-110. For another perspective see Theodore Morgan, "The Theory of Error in Centrally Directed Economic Systems," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 78(August 1964), 395-416.

⁵This same problem applies as well to R & D and the Space Age programs where large centrally-directed investments are made in the development and the application of scientific research and engineering technology to achieve over a definite time period specific goals and targets. The planners of these programs realize that the secondary order consequences often represent higher benefit factors than the first order ones. They have developed some sophisticated concepts to ascertain and measure second order consequences. Little of this thinking, however, has found its way into the literature on economic planning and change. See Amitai Etzioni, The Active Society: A Theory of Societal and Political Progresses (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 199 et seq and Raymond A. Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1966).

⁶Against this situation one wonders if such activity should be termed planning. Maximization of goals is entirely out of the question. Planners are not even in a position to follow a lower order of decision making which Herbert A. Simon terms "satisfying," i.e., a course of action which is satisfactory or good enough, or if you wish to say, acceptable to the parties concerned who reach their decisions based on imperfect facts and knowledge. See his book, particularly the Preface, Administrative Behavior (New York: MacMillan Co., 1958).

More specifically, see Herbert Feis, Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martins, 1964).

There is also the aggravating problem of uncertainty of resource inputs. Planners can scarcely depend on the reliability of the projected amounts of either the internal (domestic) or the external (foreign) development resources. These are invariably subject yearly, if not even quarterly, to wide extremes. In recent years the developing countries have been confronted with the problem of rapidly diminishing amounts of external development assistance, and particularly from the United States.⁷

Surprisingly, planners have largely discounted these factors. They still insist on preparing elaborate plans which state detail goals and targets to be achieved. When goals and targets are not achieved, planners often use the convenient escape that the "administrators failed" and then prepare another elaborate five year scheme.⁸

The fact is that both the "planners" and the "administrators" failed. The plans have not been realistically conceived and the administrators have shown neither the ingenuity nor the capacity to execute the plans.

⁷This is summarized in the Pearson Report of the World Bank, now published as Partners in Development (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969).

⁸Review, as a case in point, the planning process of Pakistan which has often been hailed as a successful example of planned development. The planning process cannot be separated from the administrative process, an elementary fact. The two must form a continuum of social action. This aspect has only received "lip-service" in Pakistan. The accounting system was designed over 100 years ago, the budget system over fifty years ago, and there is little integration between the planning and the financial management cycles. It is a wonder that planning has had any success considering Pakistan's extremely archaic financial system. See my Pakistan's "Administrative Infrastructure and Modern Budgeting," NIPA Journal (Karachi), 7(June 1968), 123-39 and "Government Financial Improvement in Pakistan: The Development of a Comprehensive Action Program," Administrative Science Review (Dacca), 4(March 1970), 15-36.

Prime Minister Nehru of India, according to Professor Bertram M. Gross, is reported to have complained: "We have had lots of advice from experts on how to make economic plans, but when shall we hear something on how to implement them?" See his Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1967), 1. In still other terms some question whether or not government intervention can ever contribute effectively to economic development in the emerging societies. See Milton Friedman, "Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives," Yale Review, 47(June 1958), 500-16, and rebuttal by Charles Wolf, "Economic Aid Reconsidered," Yale Review, 50(Summer 1961), 518-32. Also see Edward Mason, Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business (New York: Fordham University Press, 1958).

Both have been placed in untenable political situations. Needed is a new conceptualization of planned development activities when working with unresponsive social environments and where the resource inputs for change are modest and characterized by a high degree of unreliability.

Until a workable change pattern is established, planned development will continue in its present haphazard fashion with a high waste of scarce resources and painful social dislocations. Progress will be made, but at a high "cost factor."

Suggested in the title of this study is that the "key" to the development of societies characterized by low economic productivity is found in medieval history. Few will question the successes of the Catholic Church, following the collapse of the Roman Empire, in spreading its influence throughout Europe and in the bringing about of significant social change. Valuable lessons on planned change are buried in medieval history. The basic approach employed by the medieval church was not unique, however. It has also been successfully utilized by other forms of social organization.

A clear understanding or model of the nature of societies which we are interested in changing is required. Included in this model must be the social processes of underdevelopment and development and their causal relationships. For this purpose, the notion of circular causation, a common theme found in the literature on underdevelopment, is used as a basic frame of reference.⁹

Two groups of scholars generally contend as to how best to improve low economic productive societies. One group believes that such societies can be launched on the path of economic development only by a "big push." The other group questions the "big push" approach and feels that development is essentially a gradual, evolutionary process.

⁹Much of this literature and thinking is summed up by Gunnar Myrdal, Asia Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), volume three, appendix 2.

Also see Fred W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1964), especially 367-96 which deals with the subject of "Local Government and Circular Causation" and Sheldon L. Messinger, "Organizational Transformation: A Case Study of a Declining Social Movement," American Sociological Review, 20 (February 1955), 3-10.

While a basic approach or strategy is essential, the critical dimension of development is organizational, a fact largely overlooked by both groups.¹⁰ The primary purpose of this study, therefore, is to advance a model or theory which provides a realistic organizational approach in utilizing scarce resources in the development process. It builds heavily upon the current writings of organizational theorists; many of whom have little interest in the underdeveloped societies but nevertheless have keen insights into the problems of organizational change. Hopefully, it capitalizes as well on the rich history of past mistakes and successes contained in the literature on development assistance.

¹⁰Probably the reason for this situation is that the field of development in both the terms of action and scholarship has been largely preempted by the macro-economists who display little interest in the organization component except in extremely broad terms. However, it should be noted that the other social scientists, and particularly the sociologists, have published studies on the role of bureaucracy in development. Many of these studies are found in Jones, Ali, Barber and Chambers, Planning, Development and Change, 1970, section of bureaucracy.

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II. Circular Causation: A Conceptual Mechanism of Underdevelopment and Development

Concept of the Vicious Circle

Ragnar Nurkse explains the concept of a vicious circle of poverty as follows:

(It is) a circular constellation of forces tending to act and react upon one another in such a way as to keep a poor country in a state of poverty. Particular instances of such circular constellations are not difficult to imagine. For example, a poor man may be weak; being physically weak, his working capacity may be low which means that he is poor, which in turn means that he will not have enough to eat; and so on. A situation of this sort, relating to the country as a whole, can be summed up in the trite proposition: 'a country is poor because it is poor.'¹¹

In administrative terms the expression: "Poor people have poor ways" has a ring of truth.

What Nurkse and others describe is that such performance reaches a low-level of self-perpetuating equilibrium and results in economic stagnation. The poor man is barely able to produce sufficient economic means to keep himself in a critical state of health to maintain a critical, low-level state of production.

As Gunnar Myrdal points out, should this man produce less than this critical level of means, a cumulative downward movement would be established. This process would become a "vicious circle." The "poor man would become poorer because he is poor."¹²

This process can be reversed and turned into a virtuous circle. This has always been implied in the theories of economic growth. Thus, if a poor man is given more economic means, his health improves. Since he is now physically stronger because of better health, his working capacity is greater and he produces more, and so on. The system breaks out of its low-level of equilibrium of economic stagnation and there occurs a cumulative upward movement.

¹¹See his Problems of Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), 4. Also quoted in Myrdal, Asian Drama, 1968, 1844.

¹²See especially his ibid., 1844-45.

From the point of view of planned change, the problem is how to break the chain of events leading to economic stagnation and set into motion a cumulative upward process. Circular causation is not unbreakable. The relationship can be changed into that of a virtuous circle, with the successful combination of resource inputs (organization, technology, human talent and energy, and financial or capital resources).

Change Strategy: Rationale for the "Big Push"

Scholarly findings indicate that, on both micro as well as macro-organizational levels, successful developmental change requires wholesale reorganization of social systems.¹³ Incremental change or a gradualist strategy generally does not provide a satisfactory outcome unless the organizational system undergoing the change is in a relatively strong and viable state and operating in a dynamic organizational environment.¹⁴

Involved in a gradualist strategy is an interplay of many intricate system parts and subtleties which break up in turn into small organizational segments and which later must be reintegrated along a multi-path approach in "stretched out" fashion. The organization experiencing successful gradual change must have considerable autonomy apart from its environment and the internal capability of considerable

¹³For a discussion on micro-systems see my Planned Organizational Change: A Study in Change Dynamics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969), especially Chapter 6, "Organizations in Change: Empirical Findings." The following is a good summary within the terms of macro-economics, Sankatha Singh, "Theory of Big-Push for Underdeveloped Economies," The Indian Journal of Economics, 44(April 1964), 361-75. For other perspectives see Harvey Leibenstein, Economic Backwardness and Economic Growth, Studies in the Theory of Economic Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957) and P. N. Rosenstein-Rodan, "Notes on the Theory of the Big Push" in Theodore Morgan (ed.), Readings in Economic Development (Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1963), 80-91.

¹⁴On the use of gradualist-type strategy see Amitai Etzioni, Studies in Social Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), especially 54-78.

adaptability, among other positive characteristics.¹⁵ Rarely do organizations in underdeveloped societies possess these essential qualities and characteristics, as well as being supported by positive factors of their larger environment.

Many scholars have noted the essential organizational or social system prerequisites (organizational infrastructure) necessary for sustaining a modern society. Gunnar Myrdal, holding that the vicious circle can be transformed into a virtuous circle, places these prerequisites or conditions into six broad categories: (1) outputs and incomes, (2) conditions of production, (3) levels of living, (4) attitudes toward life and work, (5) institutions, and (6) policies. He believes that there is a definite triangular causal relationship between the first three factors, which are essentially economic in nature, and a circular causation among the other three of the six factors.¹⁶

Gunnar Myrdal, along with a number of other scholars, holds the opinion that developmental change must be broadly conceived and represent a

¹⁵It should be emphasized that there is a fundamental difference between incremental change as an organizational goal and incremental strategy as an organizational mean. A strategy based upon an incremental approach is usually required to bring about successful organizational change, but nevertheless the final goal is still wholesale change--even though an incremental approach is employed to achieve this final goal.

A good example on these two important differences is the emphasis now being given to the development of the so-called "miracle seeds." This represents an incremental strategy to get at wholesale social reform. The benefits of increased agricultural production will be realized only if major social change takes place. Surpluses in the agriculture sector will create social imbalances and provide a means for significant change. Hugh Tinker in his insightful piece, "The Human Factor in Foreign Aid," Pacific Affairs, 32(September 1959), 288-97, notes that the poverty of Asia is different from that of Europe and the United States. Economic incentives must be substantial before the peasant will change because his debt burden usually is greater than his entire lifetime earnings. However, if the "peasant receives a genuine opportunity to better his lot, he will seize it with both hands," as the history of the canal colonies in the Punjab of India between 1890 to 1940 substantiates. The miracle seeds can again provide such an opportunity.

¹⁶Myrdal goes to great lengths explaining the relationships of each of these six factors. See his op. cit., 1860 et seq.

Also see the following: Eshref Shevky and Wendell Bell, Social Area Analysis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).

frontal attack on modernizing the entire social system. He quotes, with approval, Tibor Mendes' remarks about the futility of clearing the "jungle piecemeal," and notes with approval the "successes" of the Communists in implementing their broadly designed modernization programs.¹⁷

Gunnar Myrdal's thinking fits with the writings of the newer scholars in the field of development administration. Many of these writers are concerned about the situation of bureaucratic dominance, and although agreeing that a modern structure of government and administration is required, they believe more important is a healthy social system which relies on effective interrelationships of its factors as a source of higher productivity. Powerful administration in any form needs autonomous, yet independent, centers of power that can provide resources for and exact performance from each other. As Warren F. Ilchman writes:

A healthy economic system, a strong political organization, and functionally specific interest groups, are necessary for improving administrations. A 'big push' in the entire society is needed to develop independence from bureaucracy.¹⁸

Within these terms it becomes necessary to conceive the "big push" as a systematic and balanced modernizing effort touching on nearly every critical facet of social life. Bringing this down to the operational terms of planned action, the goal then becomes the development of a social and formal organizational complex that is capable of meeting the needs of a developing society--including private or government or mixed, social, political and economic. The civil bureaucracy usually becomes the focal point of social action and the chief innovating force, since here most of the development activities are initiated and controlled. But I must hasten to add again that bureaucratic systems the world over have no where near fulfilled the development role assigned to them.

¹⁷ Myrdal, ibid., particularly 1905 et seq. Also see his Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to World Prosperity (New York: Harpers and Brothers, 1957), especially 11-22 and An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1944, republished 1962), especially 75-79 and 1065-70.

¹⁸ See his "Rising Expectations and the Revolution in Development Administration," Public Administration Review, 25(December 1965), 315.

The scope of development action, and more specifically administration, includes these dimensions: sectoral development functions, socio-cultural-politico functions, and administrative management functions.¹⁹

1. Sectoral Development Functions. Included here are such program areas as agriculture, public health, education, public safety, and public works. These programs usually involve the mobilization of substantial human and material resources and often require complex technologies.

2. Socio-cultural-politico Functions. The structure and dynamics of a nation's development administration capacity is strongly influenced and shaped by its larger socio-cultural-politico complex. The growth of private enterprise, of new social groupings and associations, of politically effective extra-bureaucratic organs of government, or modernizing ideologies and identifications, may all be necessary conditions for development to take place, and development administration may in turn condition such processes of socio-cultural-politico modernization (change).

3. Administrative Management Functions. Staff and service aspects of statecraft support the developing sectors and influence the course of socio-cultural-politico change. Improved systems of taxation, civil service organization, budgeting, planning, administrative organization, communication, and management control, which are the traditional concerns of public administration, have far reaching effects beyond the confines of bureaucratic organization and practice. However, this is a dimension seldom considered in development assistance programs.²⁰

In sum, the "big push" approach requires that programs of change systematically strengthen each of these three sectors in that a viable organizational complex is established which can support modern technology and practice.²¹

¹⁹The conceptual thinking on this point is drawn heavily from the writing of Professor Milton Esman. See particularly his "Politics of Development Administration," Washington, D.C.: Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration, 1963 (mimeographed).

²⁰See my "Failure of Technical Assistance in Public Administration Abroad," 1970.

²¹As to what is involved in the way of program activities for one country see Naseem Mahmood, "Modernization and Pakistan," Administrative Science Review, 3(June 1960), 9-41 and my "Development Administration in Pakistan: Towards an Administrative Strategy," NIPA Journal (Karachi), 7(December 1968), 225-41.

Patterns of Change Forces

A particular society, which is a form of a complex or a higher organizational system, may be conceptualized as a composite of interlocking higher and lower dependent, independent, and interdependent social systems. The common tendency is for the total system complex to reach some equilibrium level and hold there for sometime, although in some cases there may be considerable fluctuation in the intensity of actor interaction and in the latitude in actor performance.²²

Following the concept of the vicious and virtuous circles, change in a complex system occurs only whenever the "equilibrium set" is disturbed. This results when the critical level of energy inputs, emanating either externally or internally, is drastically altered. A vicious circle develops when the energy inputs progressively decreases and a virtuous circle when the energy inputs progressively increases.

The discussion now leads us to an important distinction between the concepts of power and energy.

Power is a relative concept. It is the direct consequence of actor interaction. An actor obviously may be powerful under one set of circumstances and not powerful under another.

Energy is the input into an organizational system to keep it functioning at various levels of intensities and latitudes. Organizational inputs characteristically include people, material, physical energy, and technology. These are transformed by an organizational system and emerge as outputs typically in the form of goods and services, and in some cases direct psychological satisfaction to the members of the organization.

Change forces represent the products or better still the vectors of social power. They are composites of both power and energy, as just defined. The relationships of the principal system actors are constantly being altered and restructured in situations of disequilibrium or change. As a result, their power positions are always shifting which could mean an increase or decrease in their power relationships with no significant changes in their control over energy inputs. On this point the "power of organization" is evident which is roughly

²²See my Planned Organization Change, 1969, especially 62-63.

analogous to a "game of checkers." Power becomes solely a process of out-maneuvering the opponent with no significant changes in the energy levels.²³

The forces of change can emanate internally from any part or all of an organization's component systems or externally from the social (organizational) environment in which the organization is embedded.²⁴

Change patterns generally must be conceptualized as consequences of increasing or decreasing energy inputs. In other words, change is a product of actor interaction which to occur must include energy inputs. Change can be brought about because of declining action interaction (the vicious circle) or increasing actor interaction (the virtuous circle). Another way to look at this matter is in negative, constant, and positive working relationships.

In a dynamic organizational setting, social forces are constantly at work. The typical situation is that these forces are so arranged that, within a more or less degree, a state of organizational equilibrium is being maintained. This means that the energy inputs remain fairly constant.

Not every modification in an organization qualifies as change. Variation in the operating level of a factory, for example, within its engineering design cannot be regarded as change. Change is so classified when it involves the designing, devising, and evaluating of new

²³"Politics of poverty" is probably the appropriate designation for this kind of political behavior. The participants in the political process believe in the principle of the "iron law of power" which is similar in concept to the "iron law of wages." Power is viewed within the relationships of position situations which are governed by a fixed amount of power and which can be distributed only over a fixed number of positions. Much of the village politics in South and South-east Asia fit within this pattern. There is room only for one headman, five members on the council of elders, etc. The concept does not include any possibilities for an expansion of the power base (space) or the number of positions; both of which are reduced to fix quantities. A fuller discussion along these lines is John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," The American Political Science Review, 64(June 1970), 411-24.

²⁴A perplexing problem is the determination of the operational boundaries of a particular organization. For this study, a middle range theory is followed, as suggested by Etzioni, The Active Society, especially 54 et seq. and Karl W. Deutsch, "Autonomy and Boundaries According to Communication Theory," in Roy F. Crinker (ed.), Toward A Unified Theory of Human Behavior (New York: Basic Books, 1956), 278-97.

performance programs which have not previously been a part of the organization's repertory and can be introduced by a simple application of programmed "switching" rules.²⁵

Negative or reverse change occurs when a given stage of organizational equilibrium can no longer be maintained and drastic reorganization occurs which results in new and lower levels of organizational performance (vicious circle). Positive change is the opposite process (virtuous circle).

It is not very difficult to conceptualize change forces in negative terms, especially in the lesser developed societies which are typified by acute shortages of energy of all forms.

Although change is brought about by varying degrees of actor interaction (energy inputs), planned change should essentially be conceived within a pattern of positive change forces. As products of social power (relative actor position and energy inputs), they become the means to alter system configurations of an organization (all levels and all types) into new working patterns. The purpose of this activity is that the new system pattern will enhance the organization's goal fulfilling capacity.²⁶

Building further on this line of thought, this study addresses itself essentially to changing stagnant or declining societies. In such societies there are virtually no constructive change forces emanating from lower-order systems. This is not possible because of the critical level of energy supply. In a state of a vicious circle there is not even sufficient energy to maintain the status quo let alone marshal surpluses to bring about progressive change. In situations of near starvation the possibilities of positive change or reform become, indeed, very small.²⁷

Thus, in such types of societies the pattern of change forces usually flows downward from selected power centers in the higher order social systems. These social systems have been subjected to severe stresses and strains, for a variety of reasons (newly gained national independence, threats to national security, internal dissensions), and as a consequence are aggressively forcing lower-order systems (organizations) to initiate substantial changes which are basically necessary to cope with the new organizational demands.

²⁵ See my Planned Organizational Change, 1969, 69 et seq.

²⁶ See ibid., Chapter 8, "Goals in Change."

²⁷ This aspect of underdevelopment is increasingly attracting scholarly interest. See Robert B. Stauffer, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," Comparative Political Studies, 2(October 1969), 361-88.

In formal or official terms the innovative forces for change frequently originate outside of the boundaries of a given organization and precede any change effort. This is common in all societies and is particularly the case with those which have established strong central planning agencies or central guidance systems such as are found in nearly every developing country.²⁸ In these societies a progressive government agricultural agency, for example an agricultural bank, may be the aggressive force for establishing a fertilizer factory as the principal means to increase agricultural production. In an advanced industrial society a salesman of a large computer manufacturing firm with effective political connections may be the initial causal force stimulating a local government agency to establish a centralized computer (data processing) installation.²⁹

Patterns Toward Change Success

Within a broad set of working relationships, the conditions leading toward successful change appear to fall largely within these three categories: (1) organizational environment, (2) nature of the change actors, and (3) composition of the emergent change relationships.

²⁸This is part of the reason that planners in the new nations are so powerful and represent a challenge to the old established elites. See Warren F. Ilchman, Alice Stone Ilchman, and Philip K. Hastings, The New Men of Knowledge and Developing Nations, Planners and the Polity: A Preliminary Study (Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, 1968).

²⁹See my "Change Behavior in Planned Organizational Change Process: Application of Socioeconomic Exchange Theory," Philippine Journal of Public Administration, 13(October 1969), 442-464. Also see Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducement of Political-Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy," in Ralph Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1969), especially 77 et seq. For a slightly different approach see the writings on "penetrated political systems" such as defined by Professor James N. Rosenau as one "in which non-members of a national society participate directly and authoritatively through actions taken jointly with society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals." See his "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27-92. In this same edited book also see Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," pages 5-26. This concept is more fully developed in James N. Rosenau (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Connection of National and International Systems (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969).

1. Organizational Environment. The transactions of an organization with its environment is increasingly being seen as a crucial activity.³⁰ The test of organizational health is how successfully an organization is working out this relationship.³¹ Are its outputs sufficiently used and valued by its clientele to attract new inputs? Such a view of organization-environment places emphasis on the points

³⁰ See Peter M. Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations: A Comparative Approach (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1962), especially Chapter 3, "The Organization and Its Publics," and Chapter 8, "The Social Context of Organizational Life;" Frank P. Sherwood, "Devolution as a Problem of Organizational Strategy," in Robert T. Daland (ed.), The Administration and Politics of Cities (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1969), 60-87; Almond Gabriel, "A Developmental Approach to Political Systems," World Politics, 17(January 1964), 183-214; Henry J. Bruton, Principles of Development Economics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), especially 242-44; Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), especially 38-46; Ralph M. Stodgill, "Dimensions of Organizational Theory," in James D. Thompson (ed.), Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), especially 40-51, and Paul R. Lawrence and Jay W. Lorsch, Organization and Environment: Managing Differentiation and Integration (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1967). For other perspectives see Warren G. Bennis, "Organizational Development and the Fate Bureaucracy," Transaction, July-August, 1965; James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley Co., 1958), 84-93 and 106-08, and my "Integration of Political Ethos and Local Government Systems: The Utah Experience with Council Manager Government," Human Organization, 23(Fall 1964), 210-22.

³¹ A healthy organization is better able to cope with its external and internal problems by constantly strengthening such normative values which contribute toward more openness, trust, and collaborativeness, among other related qualities. See Matthew B. Mills and others, "Data Feedback and Organizational Change in a School System," New York: Teachers' College, Columbia University, 1966 (mimeographed); Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley Co., 1964); Warren G. Bennis, Changing Organizations (New York: McGraw Hill, 1966); Talcott Parsons, "A Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 1(1955), 63-85 and 225-39; Matthew B. Miles, "Planned Change and Organizational Health" in R. O. Carlson et al., Change Processes in the Public Schools, Eugene, Oregon: Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, 1965), 11-34; Alexander W. Astin, The College Environment (Washington, D.C.: The American Council on Education, 1968); Allen H. Barton, Organizational Measurement and Its Bearing on the Study of College Environments (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961), and Richard O. Carlson, Adoption of Educational Innovations (Eugene, Oregon: The Center for the Advanced Study of Educational Administration, University of Oregon, 1965).

of contact between what is in effect two social systems: (1) the patterns of communications channels, frequency and quality of the communications, speed with which transactions are translated into outputs, and (2) the extent to which outputs are directed towards and accepted by strategic clientele groups.

To explain these and related relationships, organizational theorists have advanced the concept of organizational climate. This concept appears to be particularly useful because it connotes a pervasive quality of the setting in which an organization is located and thus becomes a conceptual means to examine systematically organizational behavior within its total working relationships, including both its internal as well as external factors. In addition, it provides properties that have meaning and purpose apart from the behavior of the actors in the organizational system.

Few will question that an organization is essentially a product of its physical and cultural environment. The physical environment and the nature of the resources available place constraints upon the structure of an organization, its aims and activities, and in some cases as well the right to organize. Nevertheless, these remarks add little to our understanding of organizational behavior.

A recent book edited by Professors Renato Taguiri and George H. Litwin explores to some depth what is meant by the concept of organizational climate.³² Professor Taguiri, after noting important attributes of the concept climate, advances the following definition:

Climate is the relatively enduring quality of the total environment that (a) is experienced by the occupants, (b) influences their behavior, and (c) can be described in terms of the values of a particular set of characteristics (or attributes) of the environment.³³

Later on in his essay Professor Taguiri modifies this definition by stating: "Organizational climate is a relatively enduring quality of the internal environment of an organization..."³⁴ This is a slightly more precise definition but it does not discount the pervasive influence of the climate (environment) in which a particular organization may be located.

³²See their Organizational Climate: Explorations of a Concept (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1968).

³³See his "The Concept of Organizational Climate," ibid., 25.

³⁴Ibid., 27. Emphases added.

The term organizational environment or climate permits the use of a variety of continuum comparatives such as nonproductive and productive, supportive and hostile, success and unsuccessful; and thus provides a means by which to make in-depth analyses of organizational behavior, including comparisons with its larger environment as well as with other comparable organizations. It is not necessary to pursue this line of thinking further except to note several perplexing aspects of organizational climate as they pertain to the planned change processes.

Organizational theorists generally agree, as already noted, that an organization must work out a compatible relationship with its larger environment, although this varies widely with various types of organizations, along with the situation.³⁵ Rapid planned change, however, requires that an organization must have considerable autonomy apart from its environment, even in conditions where a large number of favorable change factors prevail. After the change is accomplished, the organization then experiences the critical "time test" and makes the necessary adaptations which determine the degree of planned change success.³⁶

The hard question is how do the planners of the change find or create that vital situation of organizational autonomy?

In many cases successful organizational change can be accomplished only by first creating a favorable change environment or climate. Probably the best examples are in the field of education.

³⁵ See especially Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations: On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

³⁶ There is a fundamental difference between a cycle of planned change and a cycle of institutionalization. Planned change can be accomplished in a short time span. Institutionalization of change is usually a long, drawn out process. Probably a useful pattern for technical assistance projects is the following continuum: donor predominance (project operationalization) to recipient predominance (project indigenization) to community acceptance (project legitimization) and to community incorporation or indispensability (project institutionalization). See my "Department of Administrative Science, University of the Panjab: A Study of Planned Organizational Change in a Developing Society," Lahore: Department of Administrative Science, 1971 (processed). The following is a superb short treatise as to what is involved in the institutionalization process, Howard V. Perlmutter, Towards a Theory and Practice of Social Architecture: The Building of Indispensable Institutions (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965).

It is simply not possible to bring about significant educational changes unless the organizational climate is receptive to the proposed measures. Parental control is so strong that children are not permitted to participate (enroll in school) and without their participation no change is possible.³⁷

2. Nature of the Change Actors. Probably no aspect of planned change is as poorly researched and defined as that pertaining to the various types of change actors. Involved in change, even in simple situations, are a large number of change actors who perform critical roles at various junctures in the change process.

Scholars have conveniently lumped these actors under a variety of "blanket-like" terms such as change agent, development agent, social engineer, social participator, and change catalyst. While some degree of generalization and abstraction is necessary to study such a complex subject as planned change, the loose manner in which such terms are frequently used adds little to our understanding of the change process.

Since preliminary studies reveal that the nature of the change actors is a critical aspect in a change program, it is essential to define in more precise terms the qualities and the characteristics of those actors typically found in change situations.

The vehicle of change is always a social group or association of social groups. There can, of course, be room for much individual and detached intellectual activity, but social change is chiefly a product of "social selves" or "acting social collectivities." Significant change cannot be brought about by an individual acting alone, even in small social settings.³⁸

³⁷See Matthew B. Miles, "The Development of Innovative Climates in Education Organizations," Menlo Park, California: Stanford Research Institute, 1969 (mimeographed); Andrew W. Halpin, Theory and Research in Administration (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), especially Chapter 4, "The Organizational Climate of Schools," and my Planned Organizational Change, 1969, especially Chapter 6, "Organizations in Change: Empirical Findings."

³⁸See Etzioni, The Active Society, New York: 1968, especially Chapter 1. "The Active Orientation: Introduction."

The nature of groups can be classified in a number of ways.³⁹ Apparently, a useful classification for the change agent type is whether or not the change group is (1) essentially in composition external or internal and (2) indigenous or nonindigenous to the organizational (client) system which is undergoing the change.

Preliminary investigations reveal that change groups indigenous in character and operating internally in an organizational system have a much higher incidence of success than those nonindigenous in character and operating externally to the organizational system.⁴⁰ Basically, this means that successful change must be an inner-motivated organizational activity. The situation can fairly well be described in the old proverb: "You can lead a horse to water but you cannot make him drink."

3. Composition of Emergent Change Relationships. The composition of emergent change relationships appears to influence profoundly future conduct of change activities and the final degree of success of a change undertaking. Findings reveal a close correlation between the degree of organizational receptivity to the change to the consequent level of organizational effectiveness. Following a continuum ranging from highly unreceptive to highly receptive, the increase of organizational effectiveness tends to be a progressive trend. Highly receptive organizational systems experience remarkable increases in organizational effectiveness while it is virtually impossible to bring about any increase in the effectiveness of highly unreceptive organizational systems.⁴¹

While this finding provides a useful guide as to whether or not to enter into a change relationships and some indication of its eventual outcome, it provides little insight into the composition of a successful change situation. After studying nine large scale programs on planned change which took place in the United States, Great Britain, and India, Dr. L. E. Greiner reported ten sequential conditions which seem to differentiate the successful from the less successful. Successful change efforts followed a sequence where:

³⁹Probably, the weakest aspect of the scholarship on planned change is that a meaningful taxonomy of organizational systems has not been developed. Until this occurs, planners of change will be greatly handicapped. The conclusions of this section are largely based on the taxonomical relationships developed in my study, Planned Organizational Change, 1969. For another useful taxonomy see S. B. Sells, "An Approach to the Nature of Organizational Climate," in Taguiri and Litwin (eds.), Organizational Climate, 1968, 85-103.

⁴⁰See my ibid., especially 39-40.

⁴¹See ibid., especially 98-104.

1. The organization is under great pressures for improvement both from within and outside the organizational unit. These pressures precede the change attempts.
2. The organization and its management experience great difficulty in coping with the pressures.
3. A newcomer with experience and a reputation for improving organizations enters the picture.
4. The newcomer enters the organization at or near the top and begins to work with top-level managers.
5. An initial act of the newcomer is to clarify the working relationships he wishes to have with the organization.
6. The headman of the organization assumes a direct and highly involved role in implementing the changes.
7. The newcomer engages many parts of the organization in collaborative, fact-finding, problem-solving diagnoses of organizational problems.
8. The newcomer provides new methods and recommendations for solving problems and taking action.
9. The newcomer's proposals are tested on a small scale and found useful for problem-solving before they are introduced to the rest of the organization.
10. The change effort is spread through a series of success experiences and absorbed into other parts of the organization.⁴²

The less successful change efforts, according to Dr. Greiner, showed uneven gaps in these sequential activities.

Professor Louis B. Barnes rephased these ten points within the Lewinian change model which breaks down change into three processes: (1) unfreeze, (2) changing to new patterns, and (3) refreeze.

In explaining these processes Professor Barnes basically employs a dyadic model which places the change actors into either the category of advocates (rational advocates and radicals) and resisters (rational

⁴²Taken from Louis B. Barnes, "Organizational Change and Field Experiment Methods," in Victor H. Vroom (ed.), Methods of Organizational Research (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 69. Also see Greiner, "Organizational Change and Development," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge: Graduate School of Business, Harvard University, 1965.

resisters and traditionalists). His model is especially useful since it explains a sensible process by which change is internalized into the operating ethos of an organization undergoing planned change.⁴³

The Greiner-Barnes model (or models) notes the crucial role played in change by the newcomer or the outsider. This aspect has not been given much attention by change scholars except possibly in the field of educational administration.

The studies in educational innovation suggest that change or innovativeness should be conceived as an organizational property rather than as a personality property of individual innovators. For example, Professor R. O. Carlson's studies show that superintendents who were appointed from outside the school system to be far more innovative and successful than those who were appointed from within. Personality explanations are possible, but more plausible reasons appear that (a) as a change agent he is more fully legitimated by the board and (b) he is less subject to internal sanctions applied when he deviates from norms held by the teacher group.⁴⁴

This finding should not be considered as conflicting with a one which notes that change must be essentially an internal organizational effort. Brought into play is also the question of innovative leadership. The findings here suggest that under certain circumstances such leadership should be drawn outside of the organization but that the principal clientele of a particular organization have already agreed in principle to major change.

Certainly, other aspects are involved such as experience, age, personality and ethnic characteristics. However, there is no question that in a democratic or rather open environment succession by an outsider is frequently the best approach to facilitate change.⁴⁵

⁴³Barnes, ibid., 70.

⁴⁴See his Executive Succession and Organizational Change (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, 1961). Also see J. Renolds, "Innovation Related to Administrative Tenure Succession and Orientation," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, St. Louis, Missouri: Graduate Institute of Education, Washington University, 1965, and Matthew B. Mills (ed.), Innovation in Education (New York: Columbia University Teachers' College, 1964).

⁴⁵The findings here support a basic principle of the American two party system that there is a time and a need to change party leadership -- to throw the "rascals" out. How this leadership pattern would work in more authoritarian or closed organizational systems needs further examination.

Summary Note

Within a conceptual framework of circular causation, four facets of planned development were discussed. The basic problem is how to change a vicious circle into a virtuous circle. Because of the low energy level and potential of most of the lesser developed societies, a "big push" rationale was given as the most effective approach to break the vicious circle. The patterns of the change forces in lesser developed societies were sketched out which noted that in most cases these forces emanated from a few power centers located in higher order social systems. The present patterns of change forces do not provide an adequate framework against which to mount a "big push" effort.

The last part of this section deals with proven patterns of successful change and indicates what is necessary in organizational and administrative terms to implement a large scale development program.

The discussion to this point does not yet come to grips with the basic problem, i.e., how to plan and administer development programs under situations of a large number of crucial unknowns or poorly understood factors and with little certainty in and the control over the projections of the amounts of development resource inputs. About the only clear point is the need to "change in order to survive," and, with resources being very scarce, central planning frequently becomes the principal means for survival, and hopefully social progress.

III. Towards A Monastery Development Model

Inadequate Organizational Infrastructure: Severest Constraint on Development

As much discussed and described, the severest constraint on planned development in the lesser developed societies is inadequate organizational infrastructures.⁴⁶ Basically, such societies are controlled by their traditional-type social organizations such as the family, clan or tribe. Formal-type organizations ranging from political parties and interest associations to industrial corporations are few in number and completely or largely dominated by the traditional, both in terms of "real power" as well as "ethos."

In so far as the recruitment and locus of organizational loyalties are concerned, subjective and particularistic considerations compete strongly with objective standards in the appointment of people in organizations and the determination of social policy. Western "universalistic" concepts, essential for high rates of production (in effect generating, directing and controlling large amounts of energy required to break the vicious circle), such as impersonality, technical supremacy and loyalty to some abstract such as the "public interest," remain alien in these societies where primary loyalties and energies are directed to members of one's own family and related social groupings and to personal friends.⁴⁷

⁴⁶ See Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development, 1969; Bert F. Hoselitz and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society (Paris: UNESCO-Mouton, 1966); Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development: An Exploration in Comparative Political Analysis (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966), and Warren F. Ilchman and Norman Uphoff, The Political Economy of Change (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969).

⁴⁷ Hugh Tinker, a former Indian Civil Service Officer, has described the officialdom of Pakistan and India as a: "soaring pyramid, possessing a refinement of calculated gradation embodying both the Hindu Caste system and the English class system." Tinker, India and Pakistan: A Political Analysis (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, revised edition, 1968), 146. The prevailing concept of bureaucracy is one large authoritarian family. This creates the familiar tensions and conflicts associated with the joint family system, and accompanies an office-ethos which permits fairly wide misuse of official vehicles, telephones, etc. See M. A. Sheikh, "Bureaucracy, Local Government and Development in Pakistan," Birmingham: Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1968 (typewritten).

1. Breakdown of the Multiplier Principle. Planners in the past have placed undue, if not bordering on childish, emphasis on the multiplier principle of development. They can partly be excused because social scientists have never provided meaningful theories on the social change processes. Unfounded theories, for example, range from the so-called differentiation to the epigenesis processes.

Most studies of social change presupposes the existence of a unit, and then asks: How does it change, why, and in which direction? The differentiation model is frequently used for analysis of this range of social dynamics which assumes that the "primitive" social unit contains in embryonic form all the basic modes of social relations that later become structurally differentiated. Religious institutions become churches, educational institutions become schools, economic institutions become corporations, etc.

Other scholars have advanced the epigenesis (or accumulation) process, according to which "adult" units emerge through a process in which parts that carry out new functions are added to the existing ones until the entire unit is assembled. Earlier parts do not include the portrayal of later ones.⁴⁸

In change a social unit may appear to follow one process, say differentiation, and then the other, say epigenesis. Social scientists have not developed adequate models or advanced workable theories that take into account both of these as well as other related processes.

However, even a cursory investigation reveals that the multiplier principle nowhere near measured up to the original expectations. This principle involves three closely related processes: (a) reproduction of skilled people in a same or related areas, (b) reproduction of new organizations in the same or related areas to absorb the newly produced talent, and (c) expansion of the originally established organization to absorb the newly produced talent including its own.

The multiplier effect of producing new talent largely within the initially established mold has met with some measure of success. "Old timers" have trained "newcomers," although the resultant is often in a highly "diluted" form. The learning process, like that of communication, never follows an isomorphic pattern. The sad note is that the "old timers," who frequently have been trained abroad, seldom develop much beyond their basic training and the advancement of knowledge along with

⁴⁸For a fuller discussion see Amitai Etzioni, Studies in Social Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1966), especially 2-7.

people are only weak components in their professional ethos.⁴⁹ A story too frequently told is how retrogression sets in a project with the withdrawal of the technical assistance component. However, this is somewhat another subject. The multiplier principle has reproduced trained people, although not in the quality generally desired.

In the areas of reproducing organizations or expanding established organizations to absorb the newly developed talent, the multiplier principle has not met with any measure of success. The amazing phenomenon is that organizations established with the assistance of foreign donors often continue for long time periods, sometimes for years, without virtually changing from the original model which is usually of a foreign design, lending support to the epigenesis concept.

Such organizations seem to be immuned or even sterilized from their environments and are not change-generating centers. They remain largely as foreign social entities and for some reason are allowed to continue as such.⁵⁰

The reason for this situation is somewhat obvious. The total organizational infrastructure consisting of such important facets as interlocking communication system(s), policy making and decision-making centers, systems for processing information, and central

⁴⁹This is a much discussed topic; and yet the simple fact remains that one has to look very hard to find examples where scholarship in social action terms has taken root. There is little hope for balanced social development until this occurs since there are no substitutes for an educated and enlightened population.

⁵⁰A good example is the University of Southern California project in Pakistan. This project called for a widespread and concerted effort to establish a complex of training and educational organizations and programs in public administration. This project was a singular success in meeting the objective of establishing the basic complex of organizations as provided in the project agreement. The project failed in its reproduction of related-type organizations. For example, there are no departments of public administration beyond the one established at the University of the Panjab, Lahore; no professional society of public administration, etc. See Wesley E. Bjur, "Final Report of the U.S. AID/Pakistan Contract (ICAc 1960-AIDc 1960) AID/Nesa-255m 1960-67: Institution Building in an Emerging Nation, Pakistan," Los Angeles: International Public Administration Center, University of Southern California, 1968 (processed); F. Burke Sheeran and Robert Abramson, Pakistan's National Institutes of Public Administration: A Case Study of Institution Building in a New Nation (Pittsburgh: Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh, 1968), and my "Department of Administrative Science, University of the Panjab," Lahore: 1971.

organizational memory center(s) are either nonexistent or extremely primitive. This occurs even when organizational units are geographically in close proximity. They exist side-by-side, almost oblivious to the nature, scope, and activities of their neighbors.

Propinquity is a crucial dimension of change and could even become a change strategy.⁵¹ However, if the actors in a given area do not or refuse to interact then all that exists is a conglomerate of closed social systems, and no change is therefore possible.

The amazing feature of all types of societies is the existence of a large number of impermeable or relatively closed social systems which function side-by-side in situations of "loose" social accommodation or ignorance. As Professor John K. Galbraith notes in his influential book, The Affluent Society, regions of insular poverty can and do exist in a society characterized by high economic productivity.⁵² On the other extreme, as Professor Gunnar Myrdal observes, pockets of high standards of business or economic productivity have and do exist in societies characterized by a hostile or negative socio-politico-economic environment.⁵³ The same observation is found in David Riesman's

⁵¹ See John W. Thibaut and Harold H. Kelly, The Social Psychology of Groups (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), especially 39 *et seq.* and Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension (Garden City, New Jersey: Anchor Books, 1969).

⁵² See his The Affluent Society (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952), 326-27.

⁵³ See his *op. cit.*, especially volume one, Chapter 1. In an earlier work, Myrdal further notes that economic changes in one region of a country seldom stimulate changes elsewhere; but, instead, cause new and more rapid changes in the region already experiencing growth and development. He calls this the process of "cumulative causation." The net consequence is that the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped regions widens as the former siphons off the scarce economic resources of the latter. See his Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions (London: Gerald Duckworth and Co., 1957), especially 17-26. In an unpublished paper, Telesforo W. Luna, Jr., in his "Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Structural Components of the Philippine Economy," Honolulu: East West Center, 1970, proves empirically that economic development in the Philippines tends to follow Myrdal's theory. Others have also noted the same phenomenon. Robert Sinai, In Search of the Modern World (New York: The New American Library, 1967), on pages 160-61 writes: "Mexico's rural areas...still constitute its greatest problem. After thirty-five years of reform rural Mexico, where about 70 percent of the people live and slightly over half of the total population carry on agricultural pursuits, has barely brought into contact with the stimuli of the modern world. The islands of progressive agriculture created by a small new landowning class of entrepreneurs are still engulfed in a sea of rural backwardness and unproductiveness. The ideal of the ejido--communal ownership of land by the village--has not proved a great success." Also see Frank Brandenburg, The Making of Modern Mexico (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), especially 47-118.

provocative book, The Lonely Crowd,⁵⁴ and the numerous studies by American urbanologists.⁵⁵ Then there is the extremely interesting phenomenon of communalism as found particularly in countries with a caste tradition.⁵⁶

Thus, even when there appears to be organizational bases, in the terms of planned development little exists as a structural framework against which to mount a development program. The essential element of communication is either lacking or extremely weak and erratic. Without this essential organizational property, planned development simply cannot take place.

It is rather ironic that no planner would ever think of building a basic industry unless the essential economic and physical infrastructure exists. He can see or visualize roads, waterworks systems, communication facilities, etc. Organizational infrastructure as a form of social structure is largely invisible and a product of images.⁵⁷ Social power is generated out of organizational bases and structural networks. Similar to electrical power, you cannot "see it" but you certainly can "feel it." In the case of lesser developed countries you can also feel the lack of it.

As with physical development, until there is built an adequate organizational infrastructure, planned development will largely be an "unplanned affair" with considerable waste of resources and little constructive and systematic activity. Building basic organizational infrastructure must be the foremost effort in the planned development program of any lesser developed society. How this problem is accomplished is not necessarily unique to contemporary times. It is a problem that has confronted for centuries planners of large scale undertakings.

⁵⁴Also prepared in collaboration with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer, New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950.

⁵⁵See Philip M. Hauser, "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization," in Hoselitz and Moore (eds.), Industrialization and Society, 1966, 199-217.

⁵⁶For a treatment within the terms of development administration see Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, 1964, especially 274-75.

⁵⁷See Kenneth E. Boulding, Conflict and Defense, A General Theory (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1963).

Monastery Models: Historical Examples

History is replete with examples where strong organizational complexes were successfully established in unfavorable or hostile environments by each individual organization securing for itself considerable autonomy. In other words, such organizations become almost impermeable social systems, purposefully cutting themselves off from their own larger environments and carefully admitting only those inputs and producing those outputs which are necessary for their survival (well being).

These organizations manage to penetrate and establish strategic "push" or "pull" relationships in their social settings with the final objective to control or dominate eventually the larger systems in which they are located. They pursue almost a "turtle-like" behavior. When the larger climate becomes unfavorable, the organizational components quickly and quietly withdraw into their own tight protective coverings and wait out the storm. The strategy of gaining total control is based on strategic withdrawal, following almost a guerrilla-type pattern and behavior.

A number of historical examples of this type of organizational structure and behavior can be noted. Much of the Roman Empire was built on this pattern. The British successfully pursued this course in its rule of the subcontinent which is exemplified in its numerous monastery-like organizations such as the military cantonments, factories, canal colonies, railroad enterprises, and even its bureaucratic organization.⁵⁸ Much of Japan's present day economic

⁵⁸The genesis of this essay emerged from my responsibility as a coordinator of the US AID financed project for the modernization of the West Pakistan Railways accounting system. I observed that inter-dispersed with the West Pakistan Railway headquarter's operations in Lahore, which covered large tracts of land, were schools, churches, mosques, dispensaries and hospitals, housing quarters, etc. These facilities were "walled-in" like a monastery. The same pattern prevailed for the other colonial-type organizations, which were invariably exemplified by being completely surrounded by protective, high red brick walls, topped by broken glass, and which represent pretty much the core organizational boundaries.

organization is organized in the same way.⁵⁹

The interesting aspect is that religious organizations have probably been the most successful, with the possible exception of Japan's industrial organization, in employing this approach. For illustration, the kibbutz system, although not measuring up to the original purposes, nevertheless has met with considerable success. Much of the hard work of pioneering agricultural development in Israel under conditions of extreme adversity has become the responsibility of the kibbutzs.⁶⁰ However, in terms of pioneering development on a large scale probably the best examples are: (1) the early medieval monastery movement in the British Isles, (2) the late medieval Cistercian monastery movement, and (3) the expansion of the Mormons in Far Western America.

⁵⁹This point was brought to my attention by my fellow associate Senior Specialist at the East-West Center, Toshio Yatsushiro. For a few references see T. F. M. Adams and N. Kobayashi, The World of Japanese Business (Tokyo and Palo Alto: Kodansha International, Ltd., 1969); J. C. Abegglen, The Japanese Factory, Aspects of Its Social Organization (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958); John William Bennett and Iwao Ishino, Paternalism in the Japanese Economy, Anthropological Studies of Oyabun-Kobun Patterns (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1963); Marshall E. Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy, Management and Government in Japan (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1968), and two works by William W. Lockwood (ed.), The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965) and The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954).

⁶⁰See Melford E. Spiro, Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956) and Richard D. Schwartz, "Democracy and Collectivism in the Kibbutz," Social Problems, 5(1957), 137-47. Professor Amitai Etzioni touches briefly upon some of the organizational problems in his The Active Society, 1968, especially 466 et seq.

1. Early Medieval Monastery Movement in the British Isles. In the fifth century, the British Isles, except for a small part of Southern England, was on the periphery of Western civilization. The Romans had not tried in any systematic way to introduce Christianity which was usually by the way of military conquest.⁶¹

St. Patrick, an orthodox Christian from southwestern England, in the fifth century spread Christianity throughout Ireland. Little is known about his work. It is clear that he had trouble in establishing the continental diocesan system. The rural condition of Ireland did not lend itself to the episcopal system of dioceses, which relied on the city as a nucleus. Consequently, the Irish Church was influenced more by monasteries than by the episcopates, and Irish bishops were often less important than abbots.

The Irish were unusual monks. They were wanderers and spread far out from their monasteries, literally like swarms of bees. They established monasteries in Scotland and other places as far removed from Ireland as Switzerland and Northern Italy. They were zealous missionaries and had a fine tradition for scholarship.

In the late 500 Pope Gregory the Great gave the responsibility of mission work in the British Isles to the Benedictines and Augustinians. These two groups by moving up from the south and the Irish from the north successfully converted the British Isles to Christianity. By the end of the 12th century these monasteries were so widespread in the British Isles that a man could not walk many miles without passing near one. These monasteries brought together the skill and talent to accomplish their multi-purposes which consisted of more than simply converting the pagans. Besides their missionary work, they set much of the pattern for opening up the wilderness, undertaking charitable and medical work for the poor and the sick, and pursuing excellence in scholarship including the arts.⁶²

⁶¹The literature on this subject is enormous. A few background references used for this section follows: Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher and Robert Lee Wolff, Civilization of the West (Englewood, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); James Hasting (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), volume eight, 711-805; "Monasticism," Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 690 et seq.; David Knowles, The Monastic Constitution of Lanfrang (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1961, Archibald G. Baker (ed.), A Short History of Christianity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1940); George G. Coulton, Medieval Village, Manor and Monastery (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960); Robert L. Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1962), especially 45-71, and "Monasteries," New Catholic Encyclopedia (New York: McGraw Hill Co., 1967), volume 9, 1021-24.

⁶²See J. C. Dickinson, Monastic Life in Medieval England (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1961), especially 62 et seq.

They represented a high order of organization which was based upon sensible principles of organizational doctrine, policy, leadership, membership participation and discipline, and social action.

The fundamental religious doctrine in monastic life is the personal renunciation of earthly, material values for the sake of more intangible, spiritual goods. Its morality is the discipline of the code and its wants few, so that the soul may be free as possible to serve purely religious ends. In the British Isles, the religious ends of the monastic movement were broadly conceived in the terms of gaining dominance over the environment. The military-type or garrison organization of monasticism was able to accomplish this purpose.

The basic principles of monastic life were advanced by an ex-soldier Pachomius around the middle of the 300's. In the terms of social reform, Basil of Caesaria made a significant addition by following the practice of establishing monasteries in close proximity to cities where they could exert stronger influence on the religious life of the church (a tactic of organizational propinquity). The basic organization of monasteries was very much a product of the administrative genius of the Romans. Many of the early monastic leaders were former Roman military officers and high government officials.

In organizational terms the strength of the monasteries was found in a carefully developed pattern of social action. The distinguishing features were:

- a. A tested, precise and codified set of principles, simple in form, against which to establish a viable organization and to frame rules governing the daily conduct of the members and participants (clienteles) such as the rule of St. Benedict. This resulted in an organic entity, a cloistered membership joined together under a common superior and bound by juridicial and economic bonds.
- b. A well-defined separation from the world and permanent attachment to the place of the monks, profession through the vow of stability, was monasticism's principal identifying feature. These were precisely defined in principle as well as practice. The total effect was a simplified but specific sense of mission or purpose.
- c. An almost complete autonomy of internal government of the individual house, but yet related in terms of effective and broader relationships to higher organizational authority.

d. Leadership vested in a single person called an abbot or prior. Once elected by the membership of the monastery, usually for life, the whole government was his ultimate responsibility. He appointed all monastic officials, received and processed novices, took disciplinary measures, and alone could grant special privileges.⁶³

Simplicity and unity characterized the monastery government, even today, in sharp contrast to the complex organization and legal structure of the centralized orders. This provided for administrative flexibility.

e. Following item number d, the monasteries introduced self-discipline in an age characterized by much indiscipline (lawlessness), a prerequisite for social progress. They upheld and exhibited the great, then almost original idea that men needed to rule and govern themselves; that they could do it, and that life could not be noble or perfect without this ruling.

f. Membership was usually selective and entrants passed through a long and complicated socialization (probation) process. People were selectively prepared for various specialized activities--career development patterns were established.

g. Concentration of work identified with the region where the monastery was located. The influence of the monastery was usually wielded locally in distinction to that of centrally controlled undertakings which called for large numbers of specifically trained persons.

h. As much as possible the monastery strived to become a self-sufficient economic unit, i.e., with sufficient economic productivity to meet its organizational needs.

By the Tenth Century these became time-tested principles of great organizational merit.

2. Medieval Cistercian Monastery Movement. By the beginning of the 13th Century a new religious movement began, although monastic in a general way, it was different in basic principles. This was the

⁶³The rules of monasticism also took in account the dangers of individualism as well as extreme authoritarianism. St. Benedict stressed the importance of obedience to the abbot who was the representative of Christ, but he also stressed equally the responsibility of the abbot to take advice and not to teach.

founding of the mendicant orders of friars, the Dominican and the Franciscan. The members of these orders were not monks but friars. They were ascetics but not cloistered. They were religious "knights of the roads," vowed to poverty, chastity and obedience like the monks, but they were not immured in monasteries. They ranged the streets and highways and could beg for a minimum of subsistence. They preached the gospel to all that would listen. Later these groups became known as orders.⁶⁴

During this same period other changes were at work which profoundly effected the monastic orders. Probably, the most significant was the phenomenal growth of the Cistercian Monastery and its tremendous accomplishments in developing the physical environment of Europe which is still evident. In little more than a century some 700 monasteries associated with this movement were established under the perpetual pre-eminence of the abbot and the House of Cîteaux. The central governance along with other unique organizational features such as a yearly assembly of the abbots of the affiliated monasteries and a firm constitutional doctrine provided for a strong pattern of organization.⁶⁵

Like many of the early monks of the Church, the Cistercians strove to withdraw as completely as possible from the world. Their abbeys were ordered to be established in places remote from human habitation, so desolate valleys and lonely forests were sought.⁶⁶

They provided a minimum of religious work to the world outside of their monasteries. Thus, almost total dedication was given to the central mission (organizational objective) of the order.

⁶⁴See Paul Hutchinson and Winfred E. Garrison, Centuries of Christianity, A Concise History (New York: Harcourt, Brace, World, Inc., 1959), especially Chapter 14.

⁶⁵John M. O'Brien, The Medieval Church (Totowa, New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams and Co., 1968), 84 et seq.; J. O'Sullivan, The Cistercian Settlements in Wales and Monmouthshire (Fordham: 1948), and Cardinal Gasquet, Monastic Life in the Middle Ages (London: G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., 1922), 223 et seq.

⁶⁶The first or parent monastery was called Cîteaux whose very name suggests the kind of sites upon which affiliated monasteries were to be located. According to Bennett D. Hill, "its older form of Cisteaux or Cistercium seems to be derived from Cisternae which means a marsh with stagnant pools, or cistels, or citeals or cisteauls--Old French words meaning marsh rushes." See his English Cistercian Monasteries and Their Patrons in the Twelfth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1968), 5. Also see, Arnold J. Toynbee, "The Desert Hermits," Horizon, 10(Spring 1970), 22-27.

A notable feature of Cistercian life was its stress on manual labor. This was not only a consequence of the order's doctrine but also of necessity. The Cistercian abbeys in the early days had very little endowment. They secured little from ecclesiastical revenues and were remotely located from towns where alms might be procured. The Cistercians resolved this problem by the use of lay brethren who provided a labor force far beyond the usual domestic needs of the monastery.

This labor force was sizeable because of the immense appeal of the Cistercian life in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Many persons who wished to follow the monastery life pattern did not have the qualifications to become choir monks. At this time most of the laity of every social class were illiterate. Yet such persons could be of great value if they took the monastic vows and, with diminished requirements of worship, concentrated their main efforts on manual labor. The monastic site had to be cleared, its buildings erected, gardens and fields laid out, swamps drained, land reclaimed, and crops and flocks tended. Such work was rapidly and effectively undertaken by the thousands of lay brethren who flocked to the Cistercian cloisters.

This work was highly organized, under the careful supervision of knowledgeable monks, and within a well-conceived plan of development. In practice it appears almost like that of building a large Gothic cathedral. Time had little relevance and the important thing was to build well, for eternity.

As a consequence, the Cistercians were instrumental in civilizing the borderlands of Europe and making them suitable for agriculture. They followed the highly farsighted practice that nature can be used without being exploited by the means of creative innovation.

The monasteries, as already noted, were largely established in the lowlands swamps, and remote places. The Cistercians learned how to drain the land and to use advantageously water power. Through these technological practices, they converted vast areas of swamps and forests--that were not habitable because of the prevalence of malaria and other diseases--into the wonderful fertile land that now makes up much of Europe's countryside.⁶⁷ They took the monastic principles of religious organization and used them effectively in pioneering a new form of agriculture where man could live in harmony with, instead of exploiting, nature.

⁶⁷ The Catholic White fathers of Africa also followed much the same pattern. They drained vast areas of swamp land and converted these to productive agricultural lands, pioneered new agricultural methods, developed superior breeds of livestock, and introduced well-conceived farm management practices, among other innovations. See Glenn D. Kittler, The White Fathers (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1961), especially 294-300.

3. Mormons in Far Western America. The saga of the Mormon success in developing vast sections of the semi-arid West is seldom mentioned in the literature on economic development.⁶⁸ The Mormons pioneered the most difficult environment of the United States under conditions of extreme economic and political adversity. They fought the physical elements, the United States Government, and hostile Indians, and their antagonistic neighbors all at the same time and yet managed to carve out a viable economy in a harsh semi-arid, virgin region within a brief period of 50 years!

Faced with an acute shortage of economic means, they successfully made up this deficiency at a surprisingly low level of social sacrifice with a superior form of social organization. In economic terms they employed a high order of organization in exchange for capital and technology.

Scholars of economic development frequently mention the interchangeable nature of these three elements, but few have discussed its administrative and social possibilities.⁶⁹ Mormon history is full of successes on this score.

It is difficult to sum up in a few words the complex organizational pattern of development used by the Mormon Church,⁷⁰ since it employed nearly every conceivable form of social organization known ranging from communal orders (communism) to cooperatives, and finally to private corporations (capitalism).

⁶⁸This is hard to explain because there is a rather sizeable literature on this subject. See Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, An Economic History of the Latter-Day Saints: 1830-1900 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958) and Beet Sugar in the West, A History of the Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 1891-1966 (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1966); Lowry Nelson, The Mormon Village: A Pattern and Technique of Land Settlement (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1952); Frank H. Jonas (ed.), Politics in the American West (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1969); Thomas F. O'Dea, The Mormons (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); George Thomas' two works, Development of Institutions Under Irrigation with Special Reference to Early Utah Conditions (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1920) and Early Irrigation in the Western States (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1948), and my "Integration of Political Ethos and Local Government Systems," 1964, 216-223.

⁶⁹See Fred Riggs, "Political Aspects of Developmental Change," in Art Gallaher, Jr. (ed.), Perspectives in Developmental Change (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1968), especially 131 et seq.

⁷⁰The official title is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS). Formerly the LDS Church disapproved of the nickname "Mormon Church." Now it seems to have official approval.

The genius of Mormon organization is a consequence of a number of unique social properties. Probably foremost is an ethos which led to remarkable cooperative behavior, almost like a beehive which is Utah's state symbol, and the will to venture into the unknown time-after-time. Failures seemed only to increase the "social" will to try again and then eventually succeed.

The number of areas successfully pioneered and developed, with the objective of maintaining social exclusiveness and progress, is phenomenal. The Mormons, with no prior experience or knowledge, pioneered a large part of the field of modern irrigated agriculture. This ranged from the legal and management requirements for the utilization of water resources to the development of engineering standards for the construction of irrigation facilities, and to the development of the knowledge and the application of scientific agriculture. Much of the sugar beet industry in the United States, for example, was almost solely and independently developed by Mormon scientists and technologists.⁷¹

Mormon efforts were not confined to agriculture but also included the construction and the operation of railroads, of telegraph and electrical power facilities, among other industries. In the 1890's Mormon entrepreneurs with substantial LDS Church financial assistance pioneered much of the hydroelectric industry and constructed the "first long-distance transmission from a man-made dam especially constructed to generate electricity."⁷²

The mastery of the environment for the welfare of mankind is an essential aspect of Mormon theology. This creates an ethos of practical, social activism with a high social premium on the successful accomplishment of physical mastery. Philosophically, as part of the great American epic, "God created an imperfect world for man to make it perfect." For a Mormon this reduces itself to the concept of human life as a period of advancement through the mastery of knowledge. Freedom, rationality, progress, self-improvement, and the mastery of the universe are its basic principles.

⁷¹ See Arrington, Beet Sugar in the West, 1966. One of the first successful sugar beet factories in the United States was opened in Lehi, Utah, in the year 1891. It was probably the first major factory in the United States to be completely constructed with materials and equipment entirely manufactured in the United States. From its beginning, the plant was entirely under the operation of local personnel who were largely self-trained! Some had not even seen previously an electric motor or a steam engine.

Involved, however, was more than the operating of a sugar plant, but the development of a complicated agro-industrial complex. This was accomplished with virtually no outside assistance.

⁷² See Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom, 1958, 396.

The important point is how the Mormon community accomplished its organizational ends.

An even cursory survey of Mormon history reveals that a monastery approach was employed. Brigham Young was a great colonizer and financier. Under his leadership, following the exodus from Nauvoo, Illinois, in February 1846, the Mormons quickly and systematically established colonies and stations throughout the Great Basin region and even in much of Southern California. By the time of the beginning of the Utah War in 1858, a brief decade after the arrival of the first Mormon contingent in Great Salt Lake Valley in July 1847, most of the important geographic centers of this vast area were under Mormon settlement!

Each settlement was, or almost, a self-sufficient socio-economic-politico unit, organized purposefully with the objective of gaining regional dominance. When the colonialists, always carefully organized and well-provisioned, departed from their safe havens in and around Salt Lake City, they were invariably on their own. They could expect no help from the central church authorities except under conditions of dire emergency. They placed their survival in careful scouting and pre-planning, in their own individual ingenuity, and in the hands of their God.

After the boundaries of the so-called Mormon empire had been established, Brigham Young called groups⁷³ to pioneer certain economic activities such as the iron and steel industry in Southeast Utah, the coal mining industry in Northeast Utah, and even the silk industry in Southwest Utah. Again these groups functioned largely as self-contained entities, not expecting to receive any assistance from the central church authorities.

The strength of the Mormon system was that it permitted the maximum local autonomy with the minimum of central control, but within a clearly conceived mission(s) and "clear cut" lines of authority.

Mormonism was born in a democratic environment and inherited a strong predilection toward democratic behavior. Thus, the Mormon Church has a tradition of congregationalism. Although it seems nigh impossible, the church organization and practice successfully harmonized authoritarian, prophetic leadership, and in the process binding charisma within its organizational form, with the strong congregationalist tendencies. This unique organizational combination made the Mormon Church one of the world's finest organizations and provided the organizational strength to accomplish almost the impossible--large scale substitution of superior organization for capital.

⁷³"Called" has a special meaning in Mormon life which implies that a person or group of persons have been requested by God to undertake a certain activity, spiritual or temporal. Thus, each group of colonists, although carefully selected by higher authority, had a high feeling of a Mission, a chosen few to accomplish God's will.

Summary Note

Simply stated, the monastery model of development appears to comprise only a few basic principles. First is a doctrine which is sufficiently definable and well-enough accepted that it can be used to formulate viable formal organizations. Next is central authority which is capable of providing a sense of direction and purpose. This authority holds to a minimum its central control function. Basic is the establishment of regional centers of excellence which are strategically placed and can function somewhat effectively as self-contained socio-economic-politico units. They have minimum dependence on larger organizations. Last are professional organizers who bind together the conglomerate or disparate regional organizations into some organic whole. As to what this means in the terms of organizational systems is treated in the next major subject.

IV. System Patterns Within Monastery Development Models

The overall strategy advanced represents a "grass roots" approach to planned development. Change in the higher of the macro-levels of organization is brought about by centering almost exclusively on the lower or the micro-levels. In some ways it presents an atomistic approach to macro-change.⁷⁴

If an adequate organizational infrastructure exists both in the terms of structure as well as potential capacity, then there is no need to employ this strategy. As already noted, the distinctive difference between the so-called lesser developed and the developed societies is their capacity to execute planned development work, and that this correlates strongly with the extent of the existence of purposefully constructed formal-type organizations. The model suggested represents the first or initial stage in a planned development process. It builds heavily upon the epigenesis concept of change.

A distinguishing difference between development administration and public administration as concepts, but not entirely so, is the extent to which a particular society or one of its relatively closed and larger sub-system(s) has evolved a formal organizational structure apart from its traditional social structure (family, clan, tribe, etc.).

A development administrator has not only to implement programs of many sorts but he must also construct the organizational structure and processes within which to implement these program activities. The task in many ways is simpler for a public administrator whose activities are confined largely to administering programs within an already established organizational system and developed technology.

Professor Irving Swerdlow notes that the "concept of development administration can best be conceived by comparing the tasks involved in administering an urban renewal program and in operating a water department in an American city."⁷⁵ He observes that:

...the job of maintaining an adequate water supply and distribution system, planning future requirements and expansion, reading meters and making appropriation charges for usage, training employees dealing with the public, the budget director, the

⁷⁴ See Etzioni, The Active Society, 1968, especially Part One "Foundations for a Theory of Macroscopic Action."

⁷⁵ See his "Introduction," in Irving Swerdlow (ed.), Development Administration, Concepts and Problems (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1963), ix.

mayor, and the unions, purchasing and maintaining supplies and equipment, and all the multifarious activities of operating a program in a busy, changing city. Yet...these activities are significantly different from those performed by the parts of city government responsible for identifying the areas of the city to rebuild, acquiring resources and land, moving the people now living in the area, redesigning the uses of the area, contracting for rebuilding and construction and reintegration of the area into the life of the city.⁷⁶

The administrator of a waterworks department of a large city or metropolitan area must be an expert in organizational management. He accomplishes his organizational objectives by working through a large number of formally-established organizational systems. An administrator of development must be an expert in pioneering, experimentation and related activities which must take place before and during the execution of the program(s). Getting a man on the moon is an example of this kind of administration. All administration consists of both kinds of features. The question to be answered: Is it "more-like" one than the other and this requires substantially different organizational structures and styles.⁷⁷

Total Organization as the Primary Instrument for Development

In system terms, a model of a total organization is advanced as the primary instrument for development. Such an organization is one where the boundaries of a community (sociocultural environment) and those of a formal organization are essentially the same and the result, in effect, is one social unit.⁷⁸ This type of organization is depicted in Figure 1.


⁷⁶Ibid., ix-x.

⁷⁷See my "Development Administration in Pakistan: Towards An Administrative Strategy," 1968, 225-241.

⁷⁸See my Planned Organizational Change, 1969, 78-81.

FIGURE 1

Pattern of a Total Organizational System



An historical example is the early Mormon communities in the Far West.⁷⁹ Another one is the Jewish sect, the Essenes, which withdrew into the desert in the second century.⁸⁰

Again, it must be cautioned that the model advanced must be conceived in broad terms. However, it is evident that a center of excellence can be only established in a negating environment by somehow separating it from the debilitating forces which surround it.⁸¹ At times this calls for drastic, protective organizational measures.

Not all types of organizations can establish effective-type barriers which filter out the undesirable external influences, both in relationship to time and to space. In a total-like organization there

⁷⁹See especially Nelson, The Mormon Village, 1952.

⁸⁰The concept for this type of organization was drawn from Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, New York, 1961, 246.

⁸¹Much of the social structure of South and Southeast Asia is built around this pattern. The innumerable villages constitute almost closed, self-sufficient systems. The problem is that they perpetuate unproductive practices, and are very unreceptive to change. See especially Guy Hunter, Modernizing Peasant Societies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

is virtually no distinctive separation between the social and the formal organizational patterns. The total well-being of the organizational participants must always be considered in any management decision. The thinking and the principles in the field of social economy have much relevance as a pattern for social action and decisionmaking.⁸²

The monastery model can function well only if the significant social variables are systematized and follow a regular and repetitive pattern. Disciplined actor behavior is important in all forms of organizational life, but particularly so for the model advanced here.

Surprisingly, this model appears to have a sizeable number of possible applications. Building and/or strengthening small communities with emphasis upon the core local government institution seems to be an appropriate area. This approach was somewhat followed in the Iranian model city program of the 1950's and the early 1960's.⁸³ It has been applied many times in the field of community development. The well-known Vicos project in Peru probably represents the best example.⁸⁴ Education is another area. Noteworthy are the missionary schools of excellence found throughout Asia.⁸⁵ The British-Indian colonial schools, although largely restricted to the elite, comprise a success story in establishing centers of high educational excellence. Within a broader educational framework, the Rural

⁸² See Howard R. Bowen, Toward Social Economy (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1948).

⁸³ See my "Municipal Administration in Pakistan: Elements Contributing Toward a Modernization Complex," NIPA Journal (Karachi), 6(December 1967), 183-229 and Ursula K. Hicks, Development from Below, Local Government and Finance in Developing Countries of the Commonwealth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961).

⁸⁴ See the two articles by Allan R. Holmberg, "Land Tenure and Planned Social Change: A Case from Vicos, Peru," Human Organization, 18(Spring 1959), 7-10 and "Changing Community Attitudes and Values in Peru: A Case Study of Guided Change," in Richard N. Adams (ed.), Social Change in Latin America Today (New York: Harper, 1960). Also useful is "The Vicos Case: Peasant Society in Transition," special issue, The American Behavioral Scientist, 8(March 1965), 120-130.

⁸⁵ Probably the best example is Atchison College, formerly known as Chief's College, which is located in Lahore, West Pakistan. This school is patterned after the British public schools and prior to partition of the subcontinent was the principal educational center for the young Indian nobles.

Development Academy at Comilla, East Pakistan, probably represents the crowning achievement in applying the monastery approach to regional rural development.⁸⁶

Industrial development can usually take place only within this framework, since this often constitutes outright importation of technology which can only be regarded as a form of a foreign culture.⁸⁷ The approach also appears to have wide applicability in the field of agricultural development. The Salinity Control and Reclamation Program (SCARP) in Pakistan is a good example. Although this program is largely conceived within agricultural engineering and economic terms, it illustrates the usefulness of utilizing a geographical and an incremental approach within a closed system design in implementing

⁸⁶See Muneer Ahmad, "Comilla Experiment: An Attempt at Planned Rural Development," Administrative Science Review (Dacca), 2(September 1968), 16-25; J. W. Green, "Success and Failure in Technical Assistance - A Case Study," Human Organization, 20(Spring 1961), 1-10; Akhtar Hameed Khan, "The Basic Principles of the Comilla Program," Journal of the East Pakistan Academy for Rural Development, 3(February 1963), 10-20; A.Z.M. Obaidullah Khan, "An Experiment in Modernization of Rural Community in East Pakistan," India Quarterly, 19(October-December 1963), 370-80, and Edgar Owens, "The Local Development Program in East Pakistan," International Development Review, 9(March 1967), 27-30.

⁸⁷This aspect has surprisingly never been emphasized in foreign development. One of the best studies is by Professor James A. Lee, "Developing Managers in Developing Countries," Harvard Business Review, 46(November-December 1968), 55-65. If a nation is going to import Boeing 707 jet liners and fly international flights it must master completely this technology which is almost entirely a product of the United States culture. This applies to other areas as well where the United States is the world leader such as in the production of pharmaceuticals. This cultural import is so specific in detail that it requires absolute mastery of the American English language.

Professor Lee gives a case example where an African manager complained that the aptitude tests for selecting pilot trainees for Boeing 707 pilot training were cultural-bound and that the African applicants should be given twice as much time to complete the tests as was specified. Lee states that the African manager persisted in his "argument for 'fairness' until I promised to double the time limit for the tests under one condition: that he go around the world and double the length of all the runways!"

agricultural development in an irrigation-based economy.⁸⁸ The proposed monastery model appears applicable for such other development facets as land and taxation reform, development of market centers and agro-agricultural industries, improvement of agricultural credit programs, and other social and organizational prerequisites required to increase agricultural production and to improve rural life.⁸⁹

The area of communication also appears susceptible to this approach. This is extremely relevant since scholars recognize the critical place of communication in the development process.⁹⁰ One of the best examples is the International Postal Service, probably the most successful international body ever established. The IPS has been in continuous operation since 1874, and even during World Wars I and

⁸⁸ Information on the SCARP's is scattered, including a broader reference framework as to the social organizational requirements to mount balanced agricultural development. The following constitutes the best treatment in solely engineering and economic terms, Pieter Lieftinck, A. Robert Sadove, and Thomas C. Creyke, Water Resources of West Pakistan, A Study in Sector Planning (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), volumes 1 and 2. Also see Mamza A. Alavi, "Structure of the Agrarian Economy in West Pakistan and Development Strategy," Pakistan Administrative Staff College Quarterly, 6(September-December 1968), 57-76. For descriptive discussions see Agricultural Division, "Role of Nation Building Departments at the Union Council Level in Scarp-IIA, Concepts and Proposals," Lahore: Agency for International Development, 1969 (mimeographed), and Robert F. Schmidt, Water Management in West Pakistan (Peshawar: Academy for Rural Development, 1971).

⁸⁹ On these points, one only has to recall the development process of the Tennessee Valley Authority. See Herman Finer, The T.V.A., Lessons for International Application (Montreal: International Labor Office, 1944) and C. Herman Pritchett, The Tennessee Valley Authority, A Study in Public Administration (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943). Also see A. T. Mosher, Creating a Progressive Rural Structure to Serve Modern Agriculture (New York: Agricultural Development Council, 1969).

⁹⁰ For a few references see Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), The Integration of Political Communities (New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964); Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) and "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, 55(September 1961), 493-514, and Lucian Pye (ed.), Communications and Political Development: Studies in Political Development (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963).

II it carried out its activities.⁹¹ Several countries have maintained for many years outstanding postal organizations. China is an excellent example where an ancient postal system continues to this day with remarkable organizational strength.⁹²

Illustrations of successful law and order programs, probably present better cases of the monastery model at work. For British India, this program went to the extent of establishing a remarkable judicial system which could almost be conceived as the development of a "monastery" within a "monastery" and represents in many ways the crowning achievement of the colonial government.⁹³

System Patterns for Change

The monastery pattern for development calls for a number of basic interlocking systems, both in the terms of internal as well as external working relationships. In approaching this subject five aspects will now be singled out. First is a discussion on systems, with the final purpose of arriving at a workable definition. Next is an overall design of the monastery pattern of development which builds on a societal profile of needs, resources, obstacles, and potentialities. This will be followed by models of both internal and external systems. The last will deal with some of the relevant problems of change and systems development.

⁹¹For a summary see Encyclopedia Britannica (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966), volume 18, 318-319. The International Convention of 1875, with little modification, remains the foundation of the international postal service. The first and basic principle of the organization is that for the purposes of postal communication all of the signatory countries form a single territory and that each country is bound to use its best facilities to deliver the mail. Thus, even here a partial monastery approach is being followed with the mail being delivered to a certain point after which it becomes the responsibility of that country involved.

⁹²This unique organization was pointed out to me in March 1970 by my fellow associate at the East-West Center, Professor Francis L. Hsu.

⁹³See Martin D. Lewis (ed.), The British in India, Imperialism or Trusteeship? (Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1962); S. M. Bose, The Working Constitution in India (Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1939); Ram Lal Handa, A History of the Development of the Judiciary in the Panjab, 1848-84 (Lahore: Panjab Government, 1927), and Daya Krishna Kapur, A History of the Development of the Judiciary in the Panjab, 1884-1926 (Lahore: Panjab Government, 1928).

1. Systems, Organization and Planned Development. The systems approach provides an analytical structure for visualizing planned development as an integrated organizational whole, including both internal and external environmental factors. It allows recognition of the proper place and function of subsystems within a broader organizational complex. The systems with which planners and managers of development must operate are complex. Planned development, however, via the system concept fosters a way of thinking which dissolves some of the problem complexity and helps planners recognize the nature of variables and their interaction within complex situations.

—System Defined. A system is an organized or complex whole; an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming a complex or unitary whole.⁹⁴ The term covers a wide spectrum of concepts. For example, it is used to describe mountain systems, river systems, solar systems, nervous systems, communication systems, and a host of others. The word system means plan, method, order, and arrangement. It is widely used by scientists, researchers, planners, and managers.⁹⁵

2. Overall Design of Organizational Infrastructure for Development. At this time it is necessary to define further what is meant by organization and organizational infrastructure.

An organization as a concept is treated as an open and dynamic social system. By this is meant that there is a continuing process of input, transformation, and output accomplished by the means of some

⁹⁴This definition is drawn from the writings of Ludwig von Bertalanffy. See particularly his "General Systems Theory, A Critical Review," General Systems, 7(1962), 1-10 and "General Systems Theory, A New Approach to the Unity of Science," Human Biology, 23(December 1951), 303-61. Also see Andrew M. Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967), especially 27-35.

⁹⁵See the two following works by Richard A. Johnson, Fremont E. Fast, and James E. Rosenzweig, "Systems Theory and Management," Management Science, 10(January 1964), 367-84, and The Theory and Management of Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1963). Also see Fremont Fast, "Systems Concepts and Organization Theory," in Preston P. Le Breton (ed.), Comparative Administrative Theory (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), especially 147-54; Kenneth Boulding, "General Systems Theory: The Skeleton of Science," Management Science, 2(April 1956), 197-208; Herman A. Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (New York: Harpers, 1960), and David Meister and Gerald F. Rabideau, Human Factors Evaluation in System Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), especially 45-50 on system behavior taxonomy.

type of social entity. The totality of this activity and the social structure is called an organizational system or simply organization.⁹⁶

Organizational input includes people, materials, and energy in relationship to time and space. Organizational output takes typically the form of goods and services, and, in some instances, psychological benefit (satisfaction) to the members of the organization. Openness of the organization means that it is dependent, to a more or less degree, upon its environment for the absorption of its products and services, the transformation process, and the maintenance of the organization. The boundaries of the organizational system are determined by the relationships and patterns of behavior which carry out the continuing cycles of input-transformation-output.⁹⁷

Since organizations are being treated as social systems within the societal level (organizational environment), the conceptualization of a system as advanced by Professor Talcott Parsons appears particularly appropriate. He, along with several associates, have postulated that any social system has four basic function requisites:

⁹⁶An organization is characterized as having structure, process, function, and product. These terms are defined as follows: structure means the identification of the elements in an organization and the relation between them. Process has two meanings. One is the sequence of events or phases by which an organization and its elements grow, develop and change. The other is the sequence of events or interactions between the elements and structure once they are established. Function is a consequence of system interaction: a pattern of interdependence between two or more structures, a relationship between variables. Product means the output of an organization. This includes both the technical accomplishments, such as making a commodity or rendering a service, and the satisfaction of the wants and needs of the members of the organization, individually and collectively. For a particularly useful reference on these items see Riggs, op. cit., especially 18-31.

⁹⁷See my Planned Organizational Change, 1969, especially 4 et seq. For other dimensions also see William F. Whyte and Lawrence K. Williams, Toward an Integrated Theory of Development (Ithaca: New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University, 1968), especially 75 et seq.; Sol Levin and Paul E. White, "Exchange as A Conceptual Framework for the Study of Interorganizational Relationships," Administrative Science Quarterly, 5(March 1961), 583-601; S. N. Eisenstadt, Essays on Comparative Institutions (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), especially 22 et seq., and Allan R. Beals and Bernard J. Siegel, Divisiveness and Social Conflict: An Anthropological Approach (Stanford: University Press, 1966), especially 2-15.

(1) adaptation, (2) goal attainment, (3) pattern maintenance and tension management, and (4) integration.⁹⁸

As industrial development, for example, cannot systematically take place unless there exists an infrastructure of transportation (highways, railroads, shipping, etc.), communications (telephone, telegraph, radio, etc.), training centers and the like, organizational development cannot take place for the same reason. For illustration, broadly based public policy must be supported by some kind of institutional arrangement that provides for extensive interest aggregation. Another illustration, little would be gained by introducing into either business or public organizations modern data processing equipment and systems unless there exist competent business establishments to service the machines, provide materials, and render technical assistance and consultation.

Organizational infrastructure, therefore, consists of the pattern of essential relationships between organizational systems which have become systematized or regularized. Included here are several kinds of patterned relationships: such as communication, influence, and exchanges of all sorts.⁹⁹

⁹⁸ See Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956). For a good discussion of these requisites see Chandler Morse, "The Functional Imperatives," in Max Black (ed.), The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961), 100-53.

⁹⁹ See my Change Behavior in Planned Organizational Change, 1969. Very much relevant is the study by Holt and Turner, The Political Basis of Economic Development, 1966, especially chapter 2, "A Framework for the Study of the Political Basis of Economic Growth." Another useful study is by Ralph M. Stodgill, "Dimensions of Organizational Theory," in James D. Thompson (ed.), Approaches to Organizational Design (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966), especially 40-51. Also see Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Society: A Setting for International Affairs (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966), especially the introductory sections, and Jiri Kolaja, Social System and Time and Space: An Introduction to the Theory of Recurrent Behavior (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969), especially Chapter Three, "Structure, Social System and Recurrent Behavior."

The totality of these system relationships constitutes an organic whole, an integrated system of dependent, independent, and inter-dependent structures and functions.¹⁰⁰

—Model City as Example. Figure 2 gives an example of system relationships where various kinds of monastery-type organizations are used to develop a regional area. The central or mainspring system is the model city. The central guidance system is a cluster of central planning and development agencies with the planning agency occupying the pivotal role.

The central planning agency has direct contact with each of the somewhat major independent, autonomous systems such as the model city, the agriculture university, the pilot agricultural development project, the industrial park, and the urban water development authority. Its relationships are broadly construed, but essentially are that of a change agent. Most of the systems in a regional area, to a greater or lesser extent, overlap. This is shown in Figure 2 which indicates the extent that each system is dependent upon each other.


Figure 2 depicts also a situation of system "spin-off" where the university established a model village that resulted in the further "spin-off." This follows the growth pattern of the Cistercian monastery movement.

Viewing planned development within a flat or single perspective is useful in providing a scope of reference such as is the case with early medieval paintings. Development must also be viewed within an organic or three dimensional perspective, as earlier discussed: (1) sectoral, (2) socio-cultural-politico, and (3) administrative management. Such a perspective within a social action framework of a model city is depicted in Figure 3.

The change objective is to develop a healthy community, i.e., a total complex of social institutions capable of providing the services essential for the "good life." There is no need to debate here what is meant by the final objective, "the good life." Important for our purposes are the functional requirements which contribute towards this end, which are depicted in Figure 3. A healthy community can emerge only if these functions are integrated together in an effective operating whole.

¹⁰⁰ See Raymond L. Hilgert, "Modern Organizational Theory and Business Management Thought," The American Behavioral Scientist, 8(October 1964), 18-24; Chris Argyris, Integrating the Individual and the Organization (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), and F. Kenneth Berrien, General and Social Systems (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1968), especially Chapter One, "The Need for General Systems Theory."


FIGURE 2. Model City and Its Relationships with other Monastery-Type Systems



Legend

The solid circles represent the boundaries of each monastery-type system. Two circles for the model city are used to depict inner and outer boundaries. Straight lines indicate direct system contact where organizational boundaries do not overlap. Extent of overlapping indicates degree of system dependency. Broken circles represent the major agencies of the central planning cluster.

FIGURE 3
 Functional Requirements for Community Development
 with a Model City as the Mainspring



Planners must view communities as "organic wholes." It is virtually impossible to bring about balanced development by centering exclusively upon one function, say education, although such an approach may be consciously used as a strategy to create system imbalance and set in motion the stage for subsequent change. The totality of a community as a complex organizational system must be examined and change programs initiated to bring about growth and development in a balanced and constructive fashion. It is impossible to have high productive workers, for example, if suitable housing is not available; and so goes on the causal interrelationships of community systems as they effect the well being of individuals who in turn effect the behavior of the systems in which they reside.¹⁰¹

3. Internal and External System Designs. Two examples are used to depict the internal and external system design in rather closed or monastery-type organizations. One is a company town and the other a knowledge utilization system of a large private corporation located in an advanced industrial economy.

—Company Town. Figure 4 depicts the system design of a company or factory town which follows the concept of a total organizational system. The inflow and outflow with the environment does not indiscriminately occur. The management of the company functions as a strong gatekeeper; almost entirely determining the rate and the kinds of inflows and outflows into the organizational system and it constitutes the major bulwark for system stability. The management's influence is pervasive throughout the internal system.¹⁰²

The system is designed as to meet nearly every conceivable social need of the organization's membership, as depicted in Figure 3. The social behavior of the members are carefully controlled through an elaborate process of recruitment and socialization, following in principle the monastery model.¹⁰³


¹⁰¹Figure 3 also depicts the essential but subtle difference between organizations and institutions. An organization is a technical instrument for mobilizing resources, largely human, to achieve certain ends. It is an expendable tool. An institution, on the other hand, is more a product of social needs and pressures. It is not as readily expendable. See Perlmutter, Towards A Theory and Practice of Social Architecture, 1965, especially 2 et seq.

¹⁰²See Joseph H. Monane, A Society of Human Systems (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), especially Chapter 3, "The Action with Environment."

¹⁰³See particularly Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, 1961, 141-73.

FIGURE 4

Company Town as Example of Monastery Development Model

Legend

The circles represent the boundaries of the several independent and dependent systems. Overlapping indicates the degree of system dependency. Straight lines indicate direct system contact where organizational boundaries do not overlap. Broken circles represent major agencies in the central planning cluster.

The planning implementation function is greatly simplified with the central planning agency working directly with the factory management which is responsible for all of the structural and functional development needs of the organizational system. Also the central planning agency, as shown in Figure 4, has delegated considerable power and authority of project oversight to the industrial bank and other government authority; thus greatly reducing its planning and administrative burden. Activity of the Ministry of Finance is subordinate to that of the central planning agency, placing centralized control over scarce financial resources.

—Knowledge Utilization. The utilization of knowledge constitutes an important but perplexing problem for all societies. The agricultural extension services of the U.S. land grant universities have developed remarkable delivery capacities in this area.¹⁰⁴ However, it is doubtful that the so-called land grant model is applicable in much of the lesser developed world because of the weak or non-existent organizational infrastructure in the rural sectors.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ See Everett M. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

¹⁰⁵ I only know of one study which addresses itself specifically to this problem. See Lester R. Brown, Seeds of Change, The Green Revolution and Development in the 1970's (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970). My studies on associational development in Pakistan point out that this constitutes the severest constraint on this nation's agricultural development program. See my "Community Associations in Pakistan: A Survey of Organizational Development," NIPA Journal (Karachi), 8(March 1969), 2-86.

As an alternative, the large public corporations have been suggested, since this form of organization has greater control over its organizational and social variables.¹⁰⁶

Proceeding further, probably the best examples are to be drawn from large scale private corporations in the United States, and particularly those of a conglomerate nature.¹⁰⁷ Such corporations represent an interesting case of integration of a number of semi-closed (dependent) organizational systems to secure a multiplicity of organizational objectives; the primary one of maximum total organizational growth within a competitive environment characterized by a large number of uncertain or unknown variables. In other words, it is not possible to foresee or account for all of the business risk factors. A conglomerate arrangement recognizes this aspect and spreads the risk factors throughout a diversified complex of business organizations.

¹⁰⁶As Professor Gerhard Giesbrecht, "Entrepreneurship vs. Modern Management: A Co-Aim for Business," MSU Business Topics, 16(Winter 1968), 23-31, points out it is often easier to introduce modern management practices into large scale public corporations than family-type enterprises which typifies much of the business community in under-developed countries. An overriding consideration for family enterprises is to enrich the family that owns the firm or that has access to jobs or positions of power. It is not considered poor business practice to secure jobs for relatives or buying from friends rather than the lowest bidders. Primary propensity is to measure profit by its beneficial effects to the family rather than return on capital invested or social benefits accrued. Thus, the public corporation can under certain circumstances prove to be a more effective social mechanism to introduce rational management practices and in turn achieve increased efficiency and economy of resource utilization than by using business establishments which have grown up from small family beginnings.

Also see A. H. Hanson, Public Enterprise and Economic Development (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1959), especially 182-83 where he writes: "It is clear...that the extension of public enterprise...will in many cases accelerate the pace of economic development, even though the government has no coherent economic plan and lacks an adequate economic intelligence agency and planning machine...public enterprise without a plan can achieve something; a plan without public enterprise is likely to remain on paper." Japan probably represents the best case in the constructive use of the public corporate device. See Lockwood (ed.), The State and Public Enterprise in Japan, 1965, and Dimock, The Japanese Technocracy, 1968.

¹⁰⁷See the provocative book by Jean-Jacque Servan-Schreiber, The American Challenge (New York: Atheneum, 1968). A succinct summary is by James Monahan, "The Book That Shook Europe: The American Challenge," Reader's Digest, 39(August 1968), 75-80.

The great strength of the Japanese economy is that through government intervention the entire business establishment is treated as a conglomerate. The system is designed to maximize quickly economic (business) opportunities and to spread the risk factor.¹⁰⁸

The critical dimension of such a system is the knowledge utilization component. Again the Japanese experiences provide a sound lesson for the less developed nations on how this factor can be systematically managed through government intervention for securing high level economic growth.¹⁰⁹ In the narrower terms, the model, as depicted in Figure 5, presents an actual system of knowledge utilization which nevertheless appears to have wide application.

There is no need to duplicate here the details of this model as explained by the authors.¹¹⁰ For our purposes, it is observed that a total organization approach with a strong gatekeeping activity is employed, both for the development as well as the utilization of knowledge. The inflows and the outflows are carefully controlled by top management to meet the functional and specialized needs of a variety of affiliated or incorporated organizations.

The authors observe that the key element in the system is the systems engineers who bridge the gap between the basic research (development) and the applied research (application of knowledge).


¹⁰⁸This is summarized by James C. Abeggler, "The Economic Growth of Japan," Scientific American, 222(March 1970), especially 35 et seq. For popular accounts see John K. Jessup, "How the Japanese Got So Rich So Fast," Life, 68(March 27, 1970), 44-46 and Richard Halloran, "My Name is Watanabe Taro," Worldwide P and I Planning, 3(November/December 1969), 76-84.

¹⁰⁹See Chitoshi Yanaga, Big Business in Japanese Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), particularly Chapter 4, "The Role of the Bureaucracy;" Ryūtarō Komiya (ed.), Postwar Economic Growth in Japan, translated by Robert S. Ozaki (Berkeley's University of California Press, 1966), particularly Part V, "Management," and Kozo Yamamura, Economic Policy in Postwar Japan, Growth versus Economic Democracy (Berkeley: University of California, 1967), particularly Chapter 7, "The Zaibatsu Question."

The importance of this subject as to the future of the United States is summarized in the following: "Now it's a 'Technology Gap' that Threatens America," U.S. News and World Report, 70(June 7, 1971), 22-24.

¹¹⁰See Ronald G. Havelock and Kenneth D. Benne, "An Exploratory Study of Knowledge Utilization," in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne, and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969), 124-42.

FIGURE 5. Knowledge Utilization System*



The above diagram outlines the knowledge utilization chain in a large corporation. Note especially the linkage role represented in this system by "systems engineering." Systems engineers are especially adept at deriving implications from basic research while leaving the basic researchers to pursue purely scientific interests without fear of company constraint.

*Taken from: Ronald G. Havelock and Kenneth D. Benne, "An Exploratory Study of Knowledge Utilization," in Warren G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin (eds.), The Planning of Change (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 130. The authors note that this figure was constructed from information supplied by a participant in a seminar and from material by J. A. Morton, "From Research to Technology," International Science and Technology, May 1964.

Systems and Change: A Summary

A system has been defined as regularized pattern of action. This pattern is its norm and the basis of its identity. The definability of a system depends upon its power structure and firmness of purpose. The more closely integrated the components, the less random will be the systems action--thereby making it a more distinctive social entity.¹¹¹

Systems may be classified along some power continuum, ranging from low to high organization. The structure proposed as a change instrumentality represents a high form of organization, requiring a strong power structure. Norms and roles are carefully specified and rigorously enforced, largely by internal guardian forces. The gatekeeper's function becomes specific with careful scrutinization of system inflows.

Alternatives for system change are limited. It may: (1) develop within, (2) come about through system's inflow or outflow (inputs or outputs), or (3) occur as a combination of these. Another way to say this is that the foci of change are: (1) internal to the organization or (2) external to the organization.

Change vis-a-vis the environment relates directly to a system's gatekeeper action. The tighter an organization regulates the inflows and outflows to its environment, the less likely change will occur within it. The pattern of internal action tends to remain firm.

If the environmental forces increases, constituting a threat to the established order, the organization can withdraw and strengthen its barriers both in the terms of space as well as time. This capacity was early mentioned as an organizational strength of the monastery strategy of development.

The paradox of the change strategy as advanced in this essay is that the very organizational qualities sought to bring about change are identical with those that constitute high resistances to change.

Resistance to change or the acceptance of it largely rests with an organization's power structure.¹¹² Organizations, like individuals, do not change unless some form of stimuli exist. In organizational terms

¹¹¹See Monane, A Society of Human Systems, 1967, especially Chapter 4, "System Identity and Change."

¹¹²See my Planned Organizational Change, 1969, especially Chapter 6, "Organizations in Change: Empirical Findings."

a state of disequilibrium or system imbalance is required to set in motion a pattern of change or better still resystematization.¹¹³

The objective of the change strategy is to create a large number of high performance organizations (centers of excellence) with hard shells of system impermeability. Such organizations call for the following system traits: (1) monolithic social entity--a specific norm directed by a specific power unit, protected by specific internal guardians and specific gatekeepers of inflow and outflow, (2) high organization--strong mutual support of the system components and responsive adaptability, and (3) high frequency of contact along the normative ways--built in system momentum to hold to the present course.

Systems of this sort are not only well equipped to resist change but capable as well of converting change forces into constructive patterns of organization modification when the situation so demands.

One could well visualize that the strategy of development advanced in this essay could easily "backfire," the "centers of excellence" stagnating within their own trained incapacities and the hard shells of impermeability inhibiting countervailing forces of modernization. In such a situation one hastens to think of the "domino" theory of international politics where the 'entire structure' collapses when a few key system pieces are destroyed. Another example that comes to mind is the failure of the strategic hamlet system in the Vietnam war. This system, following a crusader or "turtle-like" mentality of building strong castles at strategic geographic positions, was easily outflanked

¹¹³ An organization as a form of a social system is in a state of disequilibrium when its regularized processes start to become differentiated. If the process differentiation continues, the organization disintegrates and a new organization appears. Total disintegration (means systemic death) and a movement of components out into entropy and randomness seldom occurs. Rather they regroup, somewhat within the old cultural pattern, and continue along the same system pattern, to a more or less degree.

For further discussion see Scott, The Functioning of the International Political System, 1967, especially Chapter 15, "System Change, Malfunction, and Breakdown."

and destroyed at will.¹¹⁴ Then there is the distressing history of the plantation economies the world over which were invariably based upon racial differences and "seats of wholesale enslavement."¹¹⁵

Such disintegrating and stagnating situations must be avoided and minimized. The existence of a strong central planning agency which is reinforced with timely and constructive government intervention is conceived as the principal social instrumentality to prevent the emergence of such destructive situations.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴After reading James Albert Michener's vivid fictional account of the destruction of a crusader's castle by the Moslems, one thinks twice about advancing this strategy. See his novel, The Source (New York: Random House, 1965), "Level V. Volkmar." The sudden collapse of law and order could lead to an identical story. Developing societies are especially vulnerable to insurgency. It is an extremely difficult course of public action, even in highly stratified societies, to favor some population segments over others. Such situation has the "seeds" of revolution. However, this is the dilemma of economic development, even under conditions of capital abundance. It is impossible to treat all groups equally. Thus, the development in the terms of economic welfare is a highly uneven process. Out of necessity certain groups must be exploited or neglected for the general good of society, both in the short as well as the long range. Within these terms all development becomes political.

¹¹⁵A. G. Keller, Colonization: A Study of the Founding of New Societies (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1908), 11. For a summary see Andrew W. Lind, "Towards a Theory of Race Relations," Honolulu: East-West Center, 1970 (mimeographed).

¹¹⁶The encouraging development in the emerging societies is the existence of well-staffed central planning agencies. The planning function is an accepted fact and constantly being strengthened. The future of these societies heavily rests in the hands of their young planners. See Bertram Gross (ed.), National Planning: The Underdeveloped Nations (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1965) and Ilchman and others, The New Man of Knowledge and the Developing Nations, 1968.

V. General Conclusions

Resource management for development in much of the lesser developed world roughly is analogous to preserving precious moisture in a parched desert. Organizations to survive in such harsh environments need tough protective coverings and clearly demarcated boundaries. They appear almost in layout like a giant cactus patch in an Arizona desert, carefully spaced by "mother nature" to secure the optimum growth pattern.

These remarks are hopefully more than rhetoric. Much of the scarce resource investments in the "deserts" of poverty have yielded disappointing returns--like water poured onto scorching sands. Large numbers of persons have been trained abroad in technical and higher skills required for development. Stories are endlessly recounted where such persons' newly acquired skills in their home countries are not, or scarcely, used and the countries which trained these persons frequently end up as the beneficiaries in the form of "brain drain."¹¹⁷ These societies do not have much organizational absorptive capacity.

Considerable development assistance follows a "broadcasting" approach with the result that little has taken root in providing an organizational complex capable of sustaining constructive and balanced development. Authentic development can take place only by first starting at the lowest system level. It cannot begin by building downward, but, like constructing a pyramid, societal development must begin at its very foundation and build upward.

¹¹⁷For a discussion of the "human capital loss" suffered by countries whose students fail to return from study abroad, see Paul Ritterband, "Toward an Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of Study Abroad," International Education and Cultural Exchange (U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Fall, 1966), 26-35. Also see James A. Perkins, "Foreign Aid and the Brain Drain," Foreign Affairs, 44(1966), 608-19. Senator Walter J. Mondale of Minnesota has stated that: "...12,077 Asian students admitted for 'temporary' study purposes adjusted their status to permanent United States resident in the 1962-66 period or about 28 percent of the total." Regarding Asian professionals, he says, "The 5,931 who came here in fiscal year 1966--the first year under the new immigration act--more than doubled the average of about 2,700 for the previous four years." He goes on to write that "there is no doubt in my mind that the brain drain threatens the progress of a number of new nations. If we are serious in saying that future world power and stability depends on this development, we are going to have to give the brain drain the same attention that we give to other major problems which keep the world's poor locked into poverty, The New York Times, May 28, 1967. For the view that the brain drain is less serious, see Some Facts and Figures on the Migration of Talent and Skills (Washington, D.C.: Council on International Education and Cultural Affairs, 1967).

Although the forces of change may largely be external, the desire to undertake change must emanate internally within a given organizational system. Successful and enduring change invariably is a product of the lowest levels of social action and never a consequence of unilateral action imposed from higher organizational levels. This requires that change activities largely be confined to working with and/or constructing definable, viable, and manageable social organizations.

Unless an organizational complex exists which is firmly embedded in its social milieu, little constructive development can occur.¹¹⁸ A good example is the present case of Indonesia. The planners/economists managed to bring somewhat under control the inflation and establish relative economic stability at a low level of production.¹¹⁹ What about the future? The country at the best has the organizational capacity to sustain an economy sufficient to meet only its critical immediate needs. The nation is handicapped by "over-inflated," inefficient, and ineffective civil and military bureaucracies. The new "technocrats" who now control the situation with the overthrow in early 1966 of the despotic and corrupt Soekarno regime find themselves in a dilemma: preparing plans is one thing and the implementing of plans is another.¹²⁰

How to get around this dilemma in preindustrial development, as illustrated in the Indonesian case, constitutes the principal dilemma of planned development.

¹¹⁸ See Bertram M. Gross, "The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting," in Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators, Cambridge: 1966, especially 214 et seq. and Action Under Planning: The Guidance of Economic Development, New York: 1967.

¹¹⁹ This was listed as one of five noteworthy achievements in President Nixon's annual foreign aid report to Congress. See "President Nixon's State of World Message to Congress," New York Times, February 19, 1970, 25, and The Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to Congress, Fiscal Year 1969 (Washington: Government Printing Press, 1970).

¹²⁰ The irony of the Indonesian story is that the American policy, which apparently has its antecedents in the thinking of the American Ambassador at the time of the overthrow of the Soekarno regime, was that any future U.S. technical assistance should exclude public administration. This policy to date has been rigorously followed, although the Indonesians made requests for technical assistance in this area. See my Failure of Technical Assistance in Public Administration Abroad, 1969. A strong statement supporting the U.S. policy is contained in Robert E. Asher, Development Assistance in the Seventies, Alternatives for the United States (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1970), 107.

If the basic finding of the research studies in organizational change, ranging from small to large scale systems, is reasonably correct that the pattern of the change forces in the initiating stage are usually external to a given organization, then this means that these forces also hold much of the knowledge and skill, including the culture values as to what is necessary to establish new or improved organizational systems. The situation of an African nation which wishes to import Boeing 707's and engage in the international airlines business has already been noted. This requires an outright importation of a segment of American culture that cannot be compromised by lower system standards. One flies such planes according to the American cultural specifications or quickly suffers disastrous consequences.

Although other cultural specifications may not be as finely designed as this example, this is nevertheless true for nearly all forms of technological importations. Often involved is the hard question, and sometimes social issue, of cultural change and sacrifice of traditional values which goes far beyond the possibilities of the process of cultural accommodation. Sometimes the only possible course of action for breaking the vicious circle is the strong medicine of drastic cultural change brought about by the powerful influence of an external party.¹²¹ This "smacks" a form of colonialism which in this age has an unsavory connotation.¹²²

This leads us to another perplexing problem. Each development assistance program has a minimum of two principal parties who have intense and strong vested interests in the "joint activity." "Jointness or mutuality in the operations" is presumed to be a desirable goal but, as the history of development assistance reveals, this is no mean

¹²¹See John D. Montgomery, Forced to be Free, The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

¹²²This theme is found in a number of studies on developmental assistance such as Jahangir Amuzegar, Technical Assistance in Theory and Practice: The Case of Iran (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1965); Lloyd D. Black, The Strategy of Foreign Aid (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1968); Maurice Domergue, Technical Assistance: Theory, Practice, and Policies (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1968); Roland C. Nair, International Aid to Thailand: The New Colonialism (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965); Herbert Feldman, "AID as Imperialism," International Affairs (London), 43(April 1967), 219-35; George E. Taylor, The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), and Immanuel Wallerstein (ed.), Social Change: The Colonial Situation (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966).

accomplishment.¹²³ More often than not development assistance projects have been prematurely terminated because the "jointness in operations" was never established or even existed as a change goal.

On the other hand, it should not be concluded from this discussion that "jointness in operations" is the best and the only approach. On this point, a striking contrast in the operations of the steel mills erected in India in the late 1950's with British and German assistance and the one erected with Russian aid is possible. The superior performance of the Russian-built mill at Bhilai can be attributed in considerable measure to the close and constant supervision given by the Russians at their insistence after the mill went into operation.¹²⁴ The British and the Germans did not insist upon such supervision because of Indian resistance to accept it. Not until the mills constructed by the British and Germans deteriorated to a considerable extent did the Indian government agree to foreign participation in these mills' operations.¹²⁵

Brought into question here is bilateral versus multilateral development assistance. This experience tends to support bilateral

¹²³This terminology is derived from a study by Robert J. Shafer, "The Servicio Experience, The Past and Prospects of Joint Operations in Technical Assistance," Syracuse, New York: Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 1965 (offset).

¹²⁴See William A. Johnson, The Steel Industry of India (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966), 178-83.

¹²⁵See Alan Carlin, "Project versus Programme Aid: From the Donor's Viewpoint," Economic Journal, 77(March 1967), 52. His article constitutes rebuttal of an earlier one strongly supporting program aid. See H. W. Singer, "External Aid: Plans or Projects?" Economic Journal, 75(September 1965), 539-45. Carlin's article is an excellent treatment of the overall type of development assistance program necessary for preindustrial societies. He further notes that: "Investment in physical capital is only one essential requisite of industrial growth: it is also necessary to develop skills, particularly managerial skills, to use capital efficiently once it is built...Most L.C.C.'s are reluctant to admit that such aid is vital to the success of many projects; project aid provides the donor with some leverage for insisting that it is accepted." The following gives a detailed account of the German involvement in this project: Jan Bodo Sperling, The Human Dimensions of Technical Assistance (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969).

assistance with the donor taking a hard line on performance requirements and heavy involvement in the projects operations, especially in the initial stages.¹²⁶

The donor's influence can be exercised in a number of ways such as insisting on high standards of project preparation, introducing technical aid as part of the project, imposing conditions precedents on progress requirements in the execution of the project or, in the extreme case taken by the Russians, partial or complete supervision of the project's operations. More than capital is needed in lesser developing societies to insure and protect a process of development. In many cases, technical assistance and other kinds of external influence can do considerably more in improving the economics of a project than capital infusion.

The disposition of "the day" is to support multilateral against bilateral aid.¹²⁷ Much of this thinking is emotional and based upon the hyper-sensitivities of the new, recipient nations. Largely overlooked are the basic values and motivating factors of the parties involved and the organizational requisites necessary for mounting successful development ventures.¹²⁸ That the burden of development

¹²⁶This aspect is seldom mentioned in the burgeoning literature on development assistance. Although he gives no concrete evidences to substantiate his conclusions, Asher writes in his recent book, Development Assistance in the Seventies, Washington, 1970 on page 120, "for a short, big-push, regionally focused effort like the Marshall Plan, the bilateral approach has much to commend it. It is considerably less appropriate for the long-haul, during which all the strains inherent in the relationship between rich donor and poor recipient, each pursuing a variety of objectives, can come to the surface."

¹²⁷For one statement on this new direction see Eugene R. Black, "Policy for a New Era," Foreign Service Journal, (October 1969), 15-19. For a larger treatment see his Alternative in Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969).

¹²⁸Until the participating parties face up to these basics there is no possibility for establishing sound development assistance programs. This is not a "given," but a "cold reality." Development assistance often calls for drastic social action. This aspect is "soft pedalled" in two recent influential reports which now appears to be the supporting documentation for the President's new foreign aid program. It is a distressing note that these "influentials" have lost faith in American "activism" which in the Brookings study cited below is termed "excessive activism." See A New Conception of U.S. Foreign Aid, A Joint Statement by the NPA Joint Subcommittee on U.S. Foreign Aid, and the NFA Board of Trustees and Standing Committees, Special Report No. 64, (Washington: National Planning Association, 1969) and U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's: A New Approach Report to the President From The Task Force on International Development (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970).

assistance must be more equally shared and increased by the more prosperous nations cannot be questioned. The problem is how development assistance can be best administered? There are times when it should be multilateral, other times consortium or consortia, and still others bilateral. It is not a question of either one or another form.

The fundamental organizational prerequisite is that the parties involved in the development activity share common values and developmental goals.¹²⁹ The Rural Development Program of Taiwan under the direction of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) is one of the better examples of development assistance based on this principle. The JCRR was responsible for the entire Taiwanese program of rural uplift. Americans served on the Commission and in roles of project responsibility.¹³⁰

Public corporations appear to offer the prospect of becoming a sound development instrument along the lines of the JCRR. The merit of the public corporation is that a strong gatekeeper device can easily be instituted.

Regardless of the kind of social mechanism employed, it must have the capability of high cultural accommodation. The objective of the

¹²⁹Imagine a situation, a common one in the United Nations technical assistance, where the objective is to develop a public administration educational center with the advisory staff consisting of a Britisher, a Frenchman, an American and an Indian; all of whom are trained and educated in their traditional environments! I experienced this in my early days in Indonesia where a number of nationalities were involved in teaching and/or advising in the Faculty of Social and Political Science of the University of Gadjah Mada, Jogjakarta. We could not even agree on a grading system, let alone more important matters.

This experience should be contrasted with a later one in establishing from "scratch" a Department of Administrative Science at the University of the Panjab, Lahore. The American educational system was accepted in principle by both the Pakistanis and American change agents and successfully installed. See my Department of Administrative Science, 1970.

¹³⁰See John D. Montgomery, Rufus B. Hughes, and Raymond H. Davis, Rural Improvement and Political Development: The JCRR Model, Papers in Comparative Administration, Special Series, No. 7 (Washington, D.C.: Comparative Administration Group of the American Society for Public Administration, 1966); Richard Lee Hough, "AID Administration to the Rural Sector, The JCRR Experience in Taiwan and Its Application in Other Countries," Washington: Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, 1968 (mimeographed), and Ralph Braibanti, "External Inducement of Political-Administrative Development: An Institutional Strategy" in Braibanti (ed.), Political and Administrative Development, 1969, especially 12-14.

monastery approach is to build in the organization the capacity to withstand the debilitating forces of the larger environment. It is virtually impossible to bring about drastic cultural changes in the short range.¹³¹ Nevertheless, this should not necessarily be viewed with alarm. Successful administrators quickly learned that it is much easier to build a workable and effective organization within the process of cultural accommodation than within that of radical cultural change.

A good example is the British-Indian Army. This was a superb fighting machine which showed its "mettle" in the last two world wars. The British-Indian Army was almost entirely built within the principle of cultural accommodation. Its soldiers were largely drawn from a few carefully selected cultural or ethnic groups, the so-called martial races, namely the Gurkhas from Nepal, the Shikhs, the Punjabi Moslems, and certain tribes such as the Panthans from the foothills of the Himalayas.

Troops were neatly grouped into battalions, companies, and sometimes even platoons of specified classes, based on tribal, sectarian, and caste distinctions. These groups retained essentially their traditional tribal or communal loyalties. No one who did not belong to one of these classes was allowed to enter the army simply because he was physically fit.¹³²

The development of a reliable reporting system providing information on social indicators of growth and development is a difficult operational problem. Involved in any large scale national undertaking are numerous consequences--direct (primary) effects and indirect

¹³¹This is a popular theme in post World War II anthropological literature. See L. M. Hanks, "The Corporation and the Entourage: A Comparison of Thai and American Social Organization," Catalyst, Number 2, (Summer 1966), 55-63.

¹³²See Kate L. Mitchell, "The Mechanism of British Rule" in Martin D. Lewis (ed.), The British in India, 1962, 71-77; Gautam Sharma, Indian Army Through the Ages (New Delhi: Allied Publishers Ltd., 1966); Rajendra Singh, History of the Indian Army (New Delhi: Sardar Attar Army Educational Stores, 1963), and Margaret MacMillan, "The Indian Army Since Independence," South Asian Review, 3(October 1969), 45-58. For a bibliographical reference see South Asia: A Strategic Survey (Washington: Department of the Army, 1966).

(secondary) ones, good and bad ones, intended and unintended, "spin-offs" and "spill-overs," and "feedbacks."¹³³ The monastery approach should greatly simplify the evaluation of development activities, since only a relatively few project centers would be required to monitor program progress. Developmental information and feedback would be derived almost entirely from basic levels of societal organization and this should add considerably to the reliability and the authenticity of the communications, the application of social intelligence, and the control of development activities.

Maintenance of civil order is another difficult task in any society, but particularly so in the developing ones which are invariably characterized by high political tension and instability. This situation greatly complicates the development process because the industrial systems, more so than others, are highly vulnerable to civil disorder. They depend on reliable transportation, communication, and other networks. Even if a small "break" occurs, large scale paralysis usually results. The monastery model is specifically designed to cope with the problem of civil disorder.

An attractive feature of the monastery model is that development assistance is directly channelled to the areas where needed, the rural and urban poor. The "trickle-down" theory of development, which provides benefits for the poor only after the rich have become richer, has been too commonplace in the past and must be avoided.

Corruption and maldistribution of income gains are not the same thing but they frequently go together. Shocking displays of wealth acquired through access to economic assistances is an old tale. The monastery model comes to grips with these crucial issues and provides a democratic means to root out corruption and arrive at a more equitable distribution of income.

¹³³ For a selected bibliography on this subject see Carol Agocs, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 388 (March 1970), 128-32. See Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators, 1966; Daniel Bell, "The Idea of a Social Report," The Public Interest, No. 15, (Spring 1969), 72-84; Wilbur J. Cohen, "Social Indicators: Statistics for Public Policy," American Statistician, 22(October 1968), 14-16; Bertram Gross (ed.), Social Intelligence for America's Future: Explanation in Societal Problems (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1969) and State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting (London: Tavistock Institute, 1966); Eleanor Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (eds.), Indicators of Social Change: Concepts and Measurements (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968); Harold I. Wilensky, Organizational Intelligence: Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1967), and Peter Henriot, Jr., "Political Questions about Social Indicators," The Western Political Quarterly, 23(June 1970), 235-55.

In final note, a simplified approach is advanced to deal constructively with a difficult problem. Considerably more imaginative thinking is necessary to cope adequately with the problem of development under conditions of intense, widespread poverty than has been given to it in the past. The vicious circle constitutes a real problem for much of the world's population. In this age of shrinking dimensions, the world can no longer tolerate the economic and social extremes of the past. This is the age of "planners" and "revolutions." Hopefully, this study contributes more to the former than the latter, and provides a means to convert revolutions into constructive reform.