

1. PROJECT TITLE Agricultural Development Support	2. PROJECT NUMBER 279-0052	3. MISSION/AID/W OFFICE USAID/Sanaa
	4. EVALUATION NUMBER (Enter the number maintained by the reporting unit e.g., Country or AID/W Administrative Code, Fiscal Year, Serial No. beginning with No. 1 each FY) <u>FY 84 02</u>	

REGULAR EVALUATION SPECIAL EVALUATION

5. KEY PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION DATES			6. ESTIMATED PROJECT FUNDING A. Total \$ <u>260 Mil.</u> B. U.S. \$ <u>195 Mil.</u>	7. PERIOD COVERED BY EVALUATION	
A. First PRO-AG or Equivalent FY <u>79</u>	B. Final Obligation Expected FY <u>94</u>	C. Final Input Delivery FY <u>95</u>		From (month/yr.) <u>09/78</u>	To (month/yr.) <u>01/84</u>

8. ACTION DECISIONS APPROVED BY MISSION OR AID/W OFFICE DIRECTOR

A. List decisions and/or unresolved issues; cite those items needing further study. (NOTE: Mission decisions which anticipate AID/W or regional office action should specify type of document, e.g., airgram, SPAR, PIO, which will present detailed request.)	B. NAME OF OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTION	C. DATE ACTION TO BE COMPLETED
1) <u>GENERAL</u> : Develop and implement a plan for resolution of procedural and contracting issues resulting in recruitment and other implementation delays.	CID/Y, CID/OSU, member universities	9/15/84
2) <u>CORE</u> : Design follow-on subproject based upon experience to date and evaluation recommendations accepted by AID.	CID, USAID Project Officer T. Atwood	PP - 9/30/85
3) <u>ISAI</u> : (a) Conduct discussions among all interested parties to resolve problems relating to YARG provision of financial inputs in timely fashion. (b) Design follow-on subproject based upon experience to date and evaluation recommendations accepted by AID.	USAID, CID, YARG/MOE CID, USAID Proj. Officer T. Atwood	ASAP PP 3/31/85
4) <u>HITS</u> : Expedite recruitment for all vacant advisory positions but particularly past control advisor. If quick recruitment proves impossible, devise alternative method for incorporating pest control assistance into on-going SP ASAP.	CID, with input by USAID, YARG	ASAP
5) <u>PETS</u> : Schedule additional evaluation work by outside contractor and prepare PES on that evaluation.	USAID, CID, YARG/MOE	ASAP
6) <u>Additional Subprojects</u> : Continue design of FOA and IFP subprojects	USAID, CID	As appropriate.

9. INVENTORY OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVISED PER ABOVE DECISIONS	10. ALTERNATIVE DECISIONS ON FUTURE OF PROJECT
<input type="checkbox"/> Project Paper <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Plan <input type="checkbox"/> Logical Framework <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Project Agreement <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Implementation Plan e.g., CPI Network <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/T <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/C <input type="checkbox"/> PIO/P <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Other (Specify) _____	A. <input type="checkbox"/> Continue Project Without Change B. <input type="checkbox"/> Change Project Design and/or <input type="checkbox"/> Change Implementation Plan C. <input type="checkbox"/> Discontinue Project

11. PROJECT OFFICER AND HOST COUNTRY OR OTHER RANKING PARTICIPANTS AS APPROPRIATE (Names and Titles) Dr. H. P. Peterson, Agricultural Dev. Officer G. T. Atwood, Assistant Agricultural Dev. Officer David Fredrick, Program Officer Abdulhafiz Qarhash, Ministry of Agriculture Thomas L. Rose, Deputy Director	12. Mission/AID/W Office Director Approval
	Signature <i>Thomas L. Rose</i>
	Typed Name Thomas L. Rose, Acting Director Date <u>10 July 84</u>

279-0052 Agricultural Development Support - PES Narrative

13. Summary: The Agricultural Development Support Program (ADSP) was initiated in 1979 with approval of the Ibb Secondary Agricultural Institute Subproject. Since that time, three additional subprojects have been authorized and are now in varying stages of implementation: Core, Poultry Extension and Training (PETS), and Horticulture Improvement and Training (HITS). A Project Paper for a fifth subproject, Faculty of Agriculture, was reviewed by the NE Bureau and approved with minor modifications in early March. In addition, a Concepts Paper for a proposed sixth subproject, Irrigated Farm Practices, was reviewed in March by the Near East Bureau. The Concepts Paper along with answers to AID/W questions has been submitted as a SPID. No additional subprojects are planned under this sector program through FY 86, although extension of some existing subprojects is contemplated over the next few years. Authorized LOP funding for 052 is now \$53.128 million exclusive of the proposed Faculty of Agriculture and Irrigated Farm Practices subprojects, which would bring this total to approximately \$98 million. Obligations through FY 83 totalled \$34.796 million. USAID and CID have now agreed on a maximum LOP funding level of approximately \$195 million, including \$130 million for planned subprojects and their extensions, and \$65 million in other initiatives. Program emphasis is, however, on implementation of subprojects underway, with less effort devoted to SP design than in the earlier years of the program.

As we look back over the progress of this sector program in the context of its first "outside" evaluation since initiation, we believe it is useful to remind ourselves of the context in which the program has developed. This Mission was one of the first, if not the first, to envision a broad effort in the agricultural sector utilizing a new implementation concept--the Title XII collaborative assistance mode. In retrospect, knowing what we know now about the problems inherent in developing operating methods and relationships under this mode, and with a somewhat less sanguine view of the difficulties in implementing such a program in the Yemeni environment, we undoubtedly walked in where other angels would have feared to tread. Now, almost five years into the program, accomplishments under the ADSP are, with some exceptions, behind schedule or at lower levels than anticipated in project design and in annual work plans, although more recently program implementation has been improving. The slower pace of implementation is directly attributable to unrealistic expectations in original project design as well as to institutional deficiencies on the part of the YARG, CID, and AID. Bearing in mind the lessons we have learned from hindsight, we nevertheless believe that the prognosis for the next five to ten years is good. Under the ADSP, CID, AID, and the YARG have now developed improved implementation procedures which we believe will

serve the project better in the years ahead. Working relationships with the YARG are sound, although we will probably continue to have differences of opinion on the relative priorities of program objectives, e.g., institutional development versus production requirements in the face of increasing economic pressures. As improvements in project performance are sustained and expanded, we expect that the goal, purposes and outputs projected in work plans and other documents will likely be realized, although in many cases more slowly than originally anticipated.

Following is a brief summary of progress to date in each of the subprojects under implementation.

1. Ibb Secondary Agricultural Institute: Authorized 1979. Authorized LOP \$11.160 m; Planned LOP \$19.5 m.

- Ibb School staffed with expatriate staff since 1979 and operating with approved curriculum and 10-ha. training farm.

- 182 students to date, of whom 77 have graduated from the three-year program.

- Nine students currently in U.S. M.S. training and 15 in Egypt for B.S. training.

- Curriculum designed for Ibb now being used at other secondary agricultural institutions.

2. Core: Authorized 1980. Authorized LOP: \$21.4 m; Planned LOP: \$44.4 m.

- Local administration and logistics support offices established in Sanaa and at Oregon State University.

- Three resident advisors working with MOAF plus an engineer and technician working on subprojects.

- Two subprojects (Poultry and Horticulture) approved and funded and two additional SPs (Faculty of Agriculture and Irrigated Farming Practices) under development.

- DLRC under construction.

- 37 participants sent abroad for degree and non-degree training.

3. Poultry Extension and Training: Authorized 1982; Authorized LOP \$6.185 m.

- Constructed four satellite demonstration units in Saadah,

Sanhan and Jahliya, four brooder houses and four layer houses and equipment at the Sanaa Poultry Training Center (SPTC).

- Graduated 14 students from SPTC; identified 12 participants for long-term academic training, three of whom are now at OSU for B.S. training and the balance in English language training prior to departure for OSU.

- Over 700 farmers received training in poultry production to date.

4. Horticulture Improvement and Training: Authorized 1982; Authorized LOP \$14.383 m.

- Al Irra and Jarouba stations developed, planted and under production.

- 64 Yemeni trained to date in budding and nursery practice and management, and nine Yemeni in English training preparatory to training abroad.

14. Methodology: The terms of reference for this first external evaluation of the project were prepared collaboratively by USAID and CID/Y and approved by the Near East Bureau. A contract was negotiated with Pragma, Inc., an IQC firm, which proposed a range of prospective team members. USAID made final team member selections. The five-person team visited Yemen from October 14 through November 20, 1983, visiting all subproject sites and interviewing all relevant project personnel within MAF, MOE, CPO, CID, and USAID offices. Prior to their departure from Yemen, the team presented their first draft findings to USAID, CID and the YARG during a two-day review. Between November 20 and December 12, evaluation team members visited AID's NE and SER/CM offices in Washington, CID/Tucson, New Mexico State University, and Oregon State University. A list of the team and its contacts during the evaluation is contained in Appendix 1 of Attachment 4 of the Contractor's final report.

15. External Factors: Worker remittances to Yemen have leveled off in the past two years, and Arab donor assistance appears to be diminishing. Central Bank Foreign exchange reserves are less than three months of imports. As a result of this downturn in resources available to the government, YARG planners and political leaders are increasingly recognizing the value of agricultural policy development and efforts to increase agricultural production. The MOAF's strong support for the production aspects of PETS and HITS derives from top-level instruction to produce more fruit and poultry products in-country, so that imports can be reduced. The MOAF

is also willing to accept more institution-building efforts, as long as some tangible production achievements can be touted concurrently.

Yemen's financial squeeze helps our agricultural program in some ways but creates new problems as well. The most serious new problem is increased reluctance by the Ministry of Civil Service to create, and the Ministry of Finance to fund, new positions in the MOAF, the MOE, and Sanaa University, which will be required if our institution-building efforts are to succeed.

The ADSP's broader range of subprojects has created new problems for the CID organization. Until 1983, only Oregon State University and New Mexico State University were directly involved in subproject implementation, while CID/Tucson was a peripheral coordinator. Now, with the addition of Cal Poly and others, CID's coordination and management procedures are again in flux, and the coordination role of CID/Tucson is assuming additional importance. CID is currently modifying its management procedures to incorporate the expanding number of lead universities in the overall program.

The termination of UNDP/IBRD technical assistance to the MAF considerably enhanced Core's role as provider of technical assistance and advisory services to the MAF, which is now considerably more appreciative of this input than they were at the time the UNDP/IBRD advisors were in place within the Ministry.

Poor design of the IBRD funded facilities and insufficient/inappropriate equipment for the Ibb School has required scaling back on project activities in terms of numbers of students who can be accommodated, and actual instruction which can be offered, given the equipment available.

16. Inputs: The evaluation concluded that one important positive aspect of the ADSP is its flexibility which not only allows new subproject implementation to proceed under the Core once a PID is approved, but also allows the contractor to modify levels, types, and scheduling of inputs to reflect changing conditions in Yemen without having to amend the basic documents (project paper, contract and grant agreement).

The evaluation did, however, identify several inputs for which timeliness or quality could be improved:

Although the contractor's performance in fielding short-term advisors was lauded on all subprojects (and, in fact, in the Ibb subproject there may have been too many short-term advisors

with uncoordinated schedules), its performance in recruiting long-term advisors was weak, especially in the Core and HITS subprojects. There are at least two major causes of slow recruitment of long-term advisors. CID has yet to develop satisfactory subcontracts with its member universities which would enable the consortium as a whole, or designated lead universities, to begin processing candidates prior to execution of actual contract amendments. Although the basic AID/CID contract authorized pre-SP approval activities and expenditures, this flexibility has yet to be extended to contracts between CID and its member universities. The resulting reluctance by CID's member universities to expend effort and funds prior to contract signature in some cases severely offsets the advantages gained by the ADSP's allowing some implementation to proceed prior to full project approval. Identification of key long-term advisors should begin at least upon PID approval, and possibly earlier. CID's current procedures make it almost impossible to fill approved long-term positions from outside the lead university in a timely fashion. Once the lead university has been eliminated as a possible recruitment source, a search of other CID resources is undertaken. Only after all these resources have been exhausted is CID prepared to proceed with national and/or international recruitment. This lengthy sequential process needs to be streamlined if advisors are to be recruited in a timely fashion. Nevertheless, we do not believe that it is fair to compare recruitment for other subprojects with that of New Mexico State University for the Ibb subproject where, because of the need for Arabic language capability, the recruitment process went international very quickly, and resulted in the creation of the Third Country Professional staff category. Applying this same process to all our subprojects would effectively signal the end of our desire to create longer-term relationships between the U.S. land grant university system and the YAKG.

On the issue of advisor quality, we concur with the evaluation that long-term advisors to date, once located, have generally been of good to excellent quality. One problem which is woven throughout the university system, however, is the lack of incentives which would make overseas service attractive to individuals working on the campuses of member universities. This is an open issue within the university system, involving the relative priority of their overseas activities and level of commitment to overseas programs. Until the universities are prepared to deal with these issues, the validity of the Title XII concept remains suspect.

The evaluation team also identified the shortage of qualified Yemeni as a factor in weakened project implementation. This

problem is especially acute in the identification of counterparts and qualified participants. The problem is most serious with the Ministry of Education and the Ibb subproject where less than half the number of planned counterparts/participants have been identified after four years of implementation.

The low quality of participants available for nomination by the YARG further slows implementation of training plans because of the remedial courses required. Two years or more of ESL training are required before a student reaches the required call forward score of 500 TOEFL, and a number of students who are unlikely to meet this level might be programmed for Arab universities. Once in U.S. universities, most students cannot carry the maximum load of credits required if they are to receive degrees in the established time period, and degree programs need to be extended accordingly. This reality must be reflected in future participant planning.

Some of the delays in provision of inputs have been caused by the lengthy review and approval process followed by AID/W. This adversely affected the PETS by creating a credibility problem for AID with the MOAF, who consequently reallocated a pullet-rearing facility scheduled for the PETS to become a commercially-oriented broiler unit. The slowness of AID/W approval of needed long-term advisor positions under Core has at times hindered prompt implementation of the advisory function. During the past year the problem appears to have been resolved with the general acceptance of the Program Strategy Statement.

The YARG's provision of budgetary and land resources has been spotty, with the primary budget problem to date under the Ibb subproject. Although the YARG is committed to providing funding for recurrent cost items such as salaries of Yemeni staff, student allowances, supplies and farm operations, and in fact funding for these costs has been included in the YARG budget, actually obtaining the funds necessary to cover planned costs has been difficult. The evaluation quite rightly recommended greater efforts by all concerned parties to understand the MOE's financial difficulties and to work out alternative arrangements for addressing this financial bottleneck. In addition, the YARG's slowness in providing terraced land adjacent to the Ibb School farm has undoubtedly hampered project effectiveness. The MOE purchase of 11 ha. of adjacent terrace land will fully meet the school's requirements, and there will be no need for the additional land recommended by the evaluation team in light of the projected size of the student body. This land purchase has been ongoing for more than two years, but until the farmers receive full

payment they will not relinquish the land. With respect to the PETS and HITS projects, we believe that the YARG has been quite responsive to these projects' needs, both in terms of financial resources provided, and land made available. Our only problems with the YARG in these two subprojects is with the slow pace of counterpart, in-country trainee, and participant candidate identification, a problem which characterizes most, if not all, of our activities in the YAR.

One substantive area which has emerged from this evaluation as substantially deficient has been the area of pest and disease control in relation to the HITS project. USAID fully concurs with the evaluation's recommendation that we do more in this area which has, until now, been neglected because of the lead university's inability to field a pathologist and an entomologist. Closer coordination with other donors with related activities in this area should help to make the CID advisor more effective when they arrive.

17. Outputs: Across the board in the ADSP, the level of advisory services being provided has picked up substantially over the past year and will be significantly improved when the remaining HITS and Core advisor positions are filled. The evaluation deals only with the quantitative aspects of this overall output, and in general USAID agrees that it is impossible to determine this early in the long-range program how these services are impacting on project purposes. Our overall impression, however, is that good progress is being made. As indicated in the previous section, for a number of reasons, progress under the ADSP has been substantially less than projected in the training area, and this deficiency hampers accomplishment of longer-range institutional development goals.

Some specific comments on outputs of individual subprojects:

A. Core:

--After a shaky start, CID, USAID and the YARG seem to have finally reached the stage of providing effective administrative support to all subprojects. We concur with the evaluation team's assessment that CID staffing in Sanaa appears excessive, and now that administrative and logistical arrangements have been established, we will be looking closely at program administrative costs, both in Sanaa and in Corvallis, to see if they can be streamlined.

--One of the major implementation accomplishments under this subproject is the Documentation Learning Resource Center. Approved by AID/W only last summer, it now appears that this

center will be completed this summer, and staffing recruitment is progressing satisfactorily.

--A major problem under this SP, and one which has been accurately identified by the evaluation team, has been CID's inability until recently to comply adequately and in a timely fashion with the various program and project documentation requirements of the AID system. Part of the blame for this deficiency undoubtedly lies in the fact that CID, AID and the YARG were feeling their way through a new type of contracting relationship. Because of the newness of this mode, USAID was, perhaps unwisely, reluctant to assume a superior role in document development, even when it became apparent that CID had neither the analytical ability nor the document preparation skill expected by AID/W. Yet AID/W, too, shares part of the responsibility for problems in this regard, as it sought to control an inordinate amount of decision-making from AID/W where competing philosophical views and design guidance did not always result in quick and useful instructions. Ultimately, we believe that, with CID's acquisition of an experienced AID design officer, as well as greater inclination on the part of AID/W to release decision-making authority to the field, many of these hurdles have been overcome. Our primary concern is that CID maintain someone on their staff who can provide leadership in AID design and documentation requirements.

--Two planned outputs of the Core SP are proving more elusive. The evaluation itself is ambivalent as to whether there is a continued need for Core to involve itself in designing other SPs for YARG or other donor funding. Given the YARG's financial stringencies, and other donors' expressed preferences for funding projects of their own design, we believe that this objective is of lower priority at this time.

--Of potentially more concern is the perception that because of CID's inability to field advisors from its member universities, we will have greater difficulty in meeting the objective of establishing long-term links between the U.S. land grant university system and Yemeni institutions. If we ultimately were forced to place more participants in Arab universities

this objective could be even more difficult. Our own perception is that it is too early to tell, although there are counterbalancing positive signs which lead us to conclude that the objective is attainable. There exists within the YARG substantial respect for the value of a U.S. university degree. Certainly participants returning to Yemen from the U.S. will be a significant link to U.S. universities, and we are convinced that the Faculty of Agriculture SP will play a major role in creating such linkages.

B. Ibb Secondary Agricultural Institute

--Undoubtedly, the fact that the school itself has been established and is functioning with what all agree is a much-improved curriculum is the paramount output of this project, and USAID believes that the project's emphasis to date on this aspect has been well placed.

--Projected outreach programs have been slowed by budgetary problems, insufficiency of Yemeni counterparts and logistics, but there have been some successes, notably with respect to the beekeeping demonstrations.

--In-service training of Yemeni counterparts appears to have some problems, particularly in English Language Training. The recommendations of the evaluation team on this score are worth pursuing. Given the problems identified in in-service training, USAID is seeking alternative mechanisms for English language training and M.S. participant training. Our initial reaction is that the goal of 30 M.S. graduates probably remains valid, particularly in light of the YARG's desired expansion of secondary agricultural education opportunities throughout the country, and our own inclination to support these efforts under an extension of the Ibb SP. The time frame for achievement of this objective will have to be extended well beyond the initial five years of the project.

--The subproject's efforts to incorporate women as students have not succeeded to date. We plan to increase our efforts in this regard, using the recent WID study and any other resources we can identify. Although we do not foresee full-time women students at Ibb for the near future, we plan to expand our efforts to include women in short courses and outreach/extension activities, with the longer-range objective of building female participation in agricultural training programs.

C. The Poultry Extension and Training Subproject will not be discussed here in light of USAID and AID/W problems with the Poultry component of this evaluation. As recommended by the NEAC a separate independent evaluation review of PETS is being done. A PES covering only PETS will be submitted covering the findings and recommendation of both reviews.

D. Horticulture Improvement and Training Subproject

--Much has been accomplished under this subproject, both under pre-implementation and initial stages after project approval. Certainly in terms of infrastructure development both at Al-Irra and Jarouba, this project has accomplished much in a short time.

--Institutional development within the MOAF is proceeding apace, albeit with the same problems as other subprojects in terms of counterpart and participant identification.

--Commodities and equipment have been delivered at appropriate times and are being fully utilized. We believe that largely as a result of import controls on fruit imposed recently, this aspect of the subproject will receive high priority from the MOAF in the future.

18. Project Goal

The goal of the entire ADSP is "to increase rural income in the YAR through agricultural development." This sector program is far too young to enable any assessment to be made of progress in reaching this admittedly broad-ranging goal. Because so many of our efforts to date have involved advisory services and training, with an eye toward long-range growth in agricultural production and agricultural policy development, it is difficult to point to evidence of progress, although we believe there is some. Certainly the well-received beekeeping demonstrations at the Ibb School should result in increased production and ultimately higher income for participating farmers. Recipients of poultry in Dhamar should see their pre-earthquake income restored, and possibly increased. Also the recipients of fruit tree seedlings should be generating additional income, once these trees begin to bear in three to four years.

19. Project Purposes (Subgoals)

A. Core: The purpose of the Core SP is "to improve the capacity of the YAR Government to plan and implement a national agricultural development program." The Core Subgoal is: "to improve the capacity of the YARG and Yemeni agricultural producers to develop and sustain an agricultural sector which effectively and efficiently uses Yemeni natural resources, is integrated into the economy and is supportive of a broad-based and equitable social and economic development." As stated in the evaluation report, Core seeks to address these purposes by providing advice and training to professional staff in the MAF and Sanaa University, the key YARG institutions on the Yemeni agricultural scene. While it is very early in Core's long-term efforts, it is apparent that some progress is being made in these areas. The actual level of improvements in YARG capability will not be known for some time, at least until advisors have been on the scene for several years and trained personnel return to Yemen to assume their responsibilities in Yemeni institutions.

B. Ibb Secondary Agricultural Institute

The purpose of this subproject is "to establish a training center capable of serving Yemen governmental and rural sector needs for personnel with middle level agricultural skills." At this point in the project, a portion of the planned outputs have been achieved, and we are at the transition stage where some concrete outputs can be expected to begin to be translated into some success in achieving the project purpose. This transition stage can be expected to last until Ibb School graduates are employed in positions of responsibility and the multiplier effect of their training begins to take place. The subproject has been relatively weak to date in outreach to rural inhabitants in the Ibb area. USAID believes that a follow-on project including, among other components, outreach and institutional development is required to broaden and speed progress toward achievement of the established goal.

C. Horticultural Improvement and Training Subproject

The goal of this subproject is "to increase the quantity, quality and diversity of fruits produced in the YAR." As stated in the evaluation, the project is far too young to produce any measurable progress toward achievement of its goal. Suffice it to say that if vacant advisory positions are filled and progress continues at or better than the pace to date, this subproject stands a good chance of achieving its objectives.

D. Poultry - To be addressed in forthcoming supplementary PES.

20. Beneficiaries. As of 1980, the IBRD estimated that 75% of Yemen's population is involved in agriculture and related activities, and are thereby the ultimate beneficiaries of the ADSP. The MAF, MOE, and to a lesser extent, Sanaa University have been direct beneficiaries to date of institution-building activities of ADSP. Other direct beneficiaries include about 1,000 families in the Dhamar area who have received pullets and/or beehives; about 200 people who have received or are receiving English language training; about 100 people who have received or are receiving U.S. and third-country specialized training; about 500 people who have received in-country training in poultry, beekeeping, horticulture, etc.; 100 graduates of ISAI; and all the people who have purchased the 34,000 young trees produced by HITS.

21. Unplanned Effects. In 1983, YARG stopped import of all fresh fruit during Yemen's fruit production season. This ban should increase long-run profitability for domestic fruit production. Already, the increase in demand for rootstocks and extension services is evident. In PETS, the major unplanned

event was opportunity for training of staff for two public sector operations at Rawdah and Marib. The ISAI has gained a very good reputation among government officials, and its high standards are becoming a model for other agriculture schools. Because of this excellent reputation, the Surdud Agricultural School has revised its curriculum and procedures to conform with those at ISAI. The ISAI expatriate teaching staff, most of whom are from other Arab countries and share some of Yemen's culture, have established a positive academic environment and a favorable relationship with the community of Ibb. Their technical advice is highly regarded and utilized by other YARG and donor agriculture projects.

22. Lessons Learned. 1. The Title XII concept assumed that once AID funding was available land grant universities would be able to identify appropriate personnel for overseas activities from within their own organizations and over time, would supplement their faculties with personnel prepared to serve substantial portions of their academic career abroad. This assumption has proven false. So far most of the CID technical assistance positions have been filled with third country nationals and retired or about-to-be retired faculty or former AID employees. There are two or three instances where young professionals are involved, but their tenure situation with lead universities is uncertain. Part of this problem stems from the fact that universities' ability to deliver personnel from within their own staffs was grossly overestimated. Given this scarcity of appropriate staff before program design, the staffing problem has been further complicated by universities' uncertainty as to whether ADSP (or any collaborative program) really is a long-term program warranting substantial investment. Building up an institutional capability based on AID funding is a risky matter for universities who could get stuck with tenured professors and administrative organizations with no work to do. The next two to three years will be critical in the confidence-building process. Clearly, CID universities should accept this responsibility after \$30 million of ADSP funding, and particularly given the large amount of AID work done in other countries.

2. Largely through the ISAI subproject, we have learned that enhancing the role of women in development in conservative, Islamic Yemen requires systematic analysis and understanding of implicit and explicit regulations and practices, the social-cultural factors which vary among Yemen's communities, and the approaches to women's education that have already been applied and accepted. If we are to succeed in including women in this and other projects, we need to focus very carefully at the project design stage, and not merely assume that this by-product can be achieved over time. Even with a good analytical foundation, we may not be successful. Without it, we have little chance of success.

3. Participant training is now recognized by YARG, CID, and AID as one of most essential inputs for achieving the ADSP institution-building objectives. Guidelines, procedures, and follow-up systems have been established for training programs. In retrospect, however, establishment of these important elements should have been one of our first priorities, before participant selection. It is difficult enough to identify qualified or near-qualified participants in Yemen, given the standards and procedures which have now been established. Without the necessary framework, selection and monitoring of participants with a high probability of success is nearly impossible.

4. Assumptions made during project design overstated YARG's ability to provide budget, staff, and facilities to the ADSP. A higgling process has brought in YARG contributions that are more realistic, and still meet authorization requirements. Project design should pay more attention to realistic host-country budgets and carefully consider economic trend forecasts to the extent feasible.

5. We should have insisted that proper facilities be completed at the Jarouba Horticultural Station, located in the uncomfortable Tihama region, before implementation was scheduled to begin. The lack of facilities led to problems in recruitment, and once recruitment problems were resolved, to difficulties in transportation and communications. Ultimately, progress in training and extension activities was slower than might otherwise have occurred.

23. Special Comments. The evaluation does not suggest substantive modifications or revisions to USAID's current agricultural development strategy, although such recommendations were invited as part of the original scope of work for the evaluation. In fact, there is very little commentary in the evaluation regarding how subproject areas of emphasis contribute to the program goal, whether the mix of activities chosen is appropriate, whether there is evidence of high priority YARG commitment to selected subprojects, or whether CID and the U.S. have a comparative advantage over other donors in providing the required resources (see SOW, Item II.2J4). Rather, the evaluation focuses heavily on managerial issues, timeliness and effectiveness of inputs and, to a lesser extent, outputs. The evaluation is weak on assessing whether or not achievement of planned outputs is likely to result in accomplishment of program and subproject goals and purposes.

Although USAID was by no means looking for a major reassessment of our objectives and plans now when we are finally beginning to feel that we are on solid ground in terms of planning and implementation, the Mission would have welcomed more of the teams' thought on our plans for the future. In particular, we do not believe that the evaluation adequately supports the need for extension of the Ibb SP, a need which we discussed in our CDSS and which to us is readily apparent.

We conclude that, in retrospect, this evaluation was not properly focused, particularly given the time constraints and the various stages of implementation of the subprojects. There is little sense that the evaluation really grappled with the program as a whole, rather than individual subproject pieces. We believe that future evaluations of the program should focus on functional topics which cut across all subprojects, e.g., in-country training programs, extension activities, or the impact of advisory services.

Attachment I

Mission Comments on Evaluation Report

Recommendations

Section II - ADSP (General) - Items are keyed to Recommendations on pages II-29 to II-31.

1. (a) Concur.

1. (b) Concur.

1. (c) The meaning of this recommendation is unclear. If it is meant that USAID has not to date been a full partner in program design, implementation and evaluation, we believe that although this may have been true to some extent in the earlier stages of the program, it is no longer true.

2. Concur.

3. Concur. USAID, YARG and CID are prepared to begin implementation as soon as the FOA SP is approved and authorized. Pre-authorization activities have been underway for some time.

4. Concur. Concepts Paper reviewed by NEAC and, with minor revisions, will become an SPID.

5. Recommendation is unclear. USAID has always assumed that there will be a need for some form of Core subproject through the life of the program.

6. Concur. As stated in our most recent CDSS, planning is already underway for an Ibb extension.

7. Concur.

8. Concur.

9. Concur. Limiting factors for USAID are personnel availability and travel funds.

10. Assumption incorrect. Defer Mission comment pending further review of Poultry SP.

11. Defer.

12. Recommendation unclear. If it refers to the need for arrangements between CID and its member universities, concur.

Section III - Core - Relates to recommendations on pages III-26 to III-28.

USAID concurs with the thrust of the recommendation to place more long-term advisors in the MAF, a recommendation which is consistent with the plan previously presented in the Program Strategy Statement. We do not believe, however, that we should be indiscriminate in placing advisors for all agricultural subsectors. Experience has shown that if advisors are placed in response to MAF's perceived needs, they have a much higher potential for effectiveness. We are prepared to consider additional advisors, beyond those currently planned, on a case-by-case basis.

We disagree with the implication that the program should be placing advisors even where there are no Yemeni counterparts, in anticipation of trained YARG personnel five to ten years down the line. However, in order to meet institutional development objectives it may be necessary to provide temporary replacements through project auspices so that key YARG staff can be released for long or short term training. CID advisors should not be in the role of performing line functions in the MOAF in lieu of Yemeni personnel, although this need does exist. Alternatives will be explored during design of the next phase of the Core Subproject. Nevertheless, we would not a priori agree to placement of any advisor without a counterpart.

With respect to developing new subprojects as an alternative to expanding advisory services under the Core, we believe that the evaluation overstates the ability of advisory services to achieve the same objectives as subprojects and, in fact, overlooks the differing rationales for these program elements. While we are not currently projecting additional subprojects beyond FOA and IFP, we nevertheless would not wish to preclude development of another subproject if appropriate circumstances (YARG interest coinciding with ADSP goals) warranted. We see subprojects as producing a much more direct effect on the program goal than advisory services alone can do. We thus believe that the recommendation misses the point we have been trying to make: that a mix of program elements has a greater chance of success in achieving program goals.

While we believe we understand the rationale for splitting out the administrative support aspects of Core from the advisory services aspects, and will give this careful consideration in design of the planned Core extension, we nevertheless believe that the virtues of this approach may be overstated, and from a practical perspective, may be much easier said than done.

We also question the logic of the evaluations' projected staff savings. If we understand the recommendation correctly, we would still be adding advisors to the YARG, all of whom would require home office and Sanaa support. At the same time, we would not be reducing CID's design workload, at least until the Core and Ibb extensions have been authorized (i.e., after FY 86). Although we will certainly keep our eyes open for any savings in these areas, we would not expect any significant changes at least until we are quite sure no future design work is planned.

Section IV - ISAI - Items are keyed to recommendations on pages IV-38 to IV-42.

1a. As stated in earlier cables (Attachments 2 and 3), Mission does not concur in the magnitude of additional land recommended by the evaluation. We believe that the terraced parcel being acquired by the MOAF fulfills the land requirements for the Ibb School.

1b. Concur.

1c. Concur.

1d. Concur.

2a. Concur.

2b. Concur.

2c. Concur, but see comments on 1a above.

2d. Concur.

2e. Concur.

2f. Concur, but note that improved budgeting system can only be effective to the extent that it is coordinated with, and reflects the realities of the MOE budgeting process.

3a. This may be an appropriate long-term objective, but we prefer to focus the curriculum for the short-term on areas where the school can also provide practical training.

3b. Concur.

3c. Concur.

3d. Concur. This is in process.

3e. Concur. This is a planned major objective of the follow-on project.

3f. Concur. We are bearing in mind the recommendations of the recent WID analysis.

3g. Concur.

3h. Concur.

3i. Concur.

3j. Recommendation requires more specificity before we can concur.

4a. Concur. This requirement results from problems with IBRD's performance, and was not anticipated in original Ibb project design.

4b. Concur. Same comment as 4a.

4c. Concur.

5a. Concur, although recommendation is so general as to be virtually meaningless.

5b. We believe that both the planned outputs and the approach to achieving these outputs remain valid. What is most appropriate, in our view, is extension of the time frame for accomplishment of these objectives. The planned project extension will address these problems.

6a - 6n. All of these recommendations appear appropriate for a follow-on project, although we envision additional emphasis on outreach and use of the Ibb framework to expand the project's impact to other secondary agricultural institutes in Yemen, e.g., Surdud and the Veterinary School.

Section V - To the extent that Mission intends to respond to the evaluation's recommendations on PETS, comments are included in Attachment B, Sanaa 0981.

Section VI - Horticulture Improvement and Training Subproject - Items are keyed to recommendations on pages VI-15 to VI-16.

1. Concur.

2. Concur. See Mission comments Para. 3A, Attachment B. Also refer to comments in body of PES regarding why we do not see NMSU's recruitment effort for ISAI as a perfect solution to CID's recruitment difficulties.

3. Concur.
4. Concur.
5. Concur.