

PDBAM 859

Evaluation

ASSESSMENT OF SELECTED PROJECT OPTIONS  
FOR AGRICULTURAL TRAINING IN  
THE GAMBIA

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20053



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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AID	Agency for International Development
AID/Gambia	Office of the Agency for International Development Representative in The Gambia
AID/Washington	The U.S. Agency for International Development in Washington, D.C.
CDS	Community Development Service
COP	Community Outreach Program
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
D	Dalasi (unit of Gambian currency)
DAP	Development Assistance Program
D.C.	District of Columbia (a federal area in the U.S. similar to a state, in which the nation's capital is located)
EOPS	End of Project Status
FAO	United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization
FY	Fiscal Year
GC	Gambia College
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOG	Government of The Gambia
GOIC	Gambia Opportunities Industrialization Center
GOTG	Government of The Gambia
logframe	Logistical Framework (for an AID project)
MANR	Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources
MC	Management Committee (of GOIC)
MFC	Mixed Farming Center
MIS	Management Information System
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MP	Member of Parliament
OIC	Opportunities Industrialization Center
OICI	Opportunities Industrialization Center International
OPG	Operating Program Grant (an AID funding mechanism whereby a PVO is provided with grant funding to operate a program in a developing country)
PA	Pennsylvania (a state in the United States)
PID	Project Identification Paper
PP	Project Paper
PSC	Personal Services Contract (the type of contract AID uses when it hires a person directly--rather than via another organization--to carry out a specific assignment)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RDP	Rural Development Program
TA	Technical Assistance
TCT	Technical Cooperation Team
TGOIC	The Gambia Opportunities Industrialization Center
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture

LIST OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES  
AND EXCHANGE RATES

Weights and Measures

1 kilogram (kg ) = 2.204 pounds  
1 metric ton = 1,000 kg  
                  = 2,204 pounds  
                  = 0.948 long ton  
                  = 1,102 short ton  
1 kilometer = 0.621 miles  
1 hectare = 2.47 acres

Exchange Rates

U.S. \$1.00 = D 2.00  
D 1.00 = U.S. \$0.50

Currency unit = Dalasi (D)

Fiscal Year

July 1 - June 30

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### A. Purpose

The purpose of this report is to assist AID/Gambia in determining whether the proposed Opportunities Industrialization Center International (OICI) follow-on project in The Gambia merits its financial support and, if not, to suggest an agricultural training project and use of the existing Gambia Opportunities Industrialization Center (GOIC) complex that would merit such support.

### B. Procedure

The assignment was carried out by one Devres staff member. He spent one day at AID/Washington, one day at OICI in Philadelphia, and two weeks in The Gambia. Relevant documents were reviewed, the current GOIC project site was visited (where staff, current and past students, and surrounding villagers were met with), and discussions were held with relevant AID/W, AID/Gambia, OICI, GOIC, and Government of the Gambia (GOTG) officials. A complete draft report was written during the two weeks in The Gambia.

Every attempt was made in carrying out the assignment to be objective and to include successful and beneficial as well as negative aspects in all considerations of the current GOIC project and a possible follow-on project. The current GOIC project, however, has failed to achieve most of its planned outputs and its purpose and goal. OICI has only marginal capacity to implement any new activities in The Gambia. Documenting these

conclusions and concentrating on their causes makes this report a decidedly negative one. Only the conclusion that an agricultural training project is possible in The Gambia and the recommendation that it be carried out helps, in the end, to counterbalance this negative tone. The following are the major conclusions reached in this report. Other conclusions can be found at the end of each major chapter in the report.

### C. Conclusions

- o The GOIC project has failed to achieve its purpose and has realized only a very limited degree of success. However, a core of successful accomplishment was developed by the project. Although limited in extent, this core of benefits is valuable and worth preserving as one part of a new project.
- o OICI's ability to effectively implement any new activities in The Gambia is marginal. Thus, OICI's further involvement, if any, in implementing training activities in The Gambia should be limited strictly to a situation where it is the only way to retain the benefits and contributions made by the GOIC project to date as part of a follow-on effort. OICI should have no other role in the follow-on project suggested in this paper.
- o The OICI proposal for a follow-on project is not meritorious as designed and does not deserve AID/Gambia financial support.
- o A meritorious agricultural training program, as is outlined in Chapter VII of this report, can be designed that would make effective use of the GOIC training center and which would deserve AID/Gambia financial support. Such a project would be taken cognizance of by the Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources (MANR) and would concentrate on providing existing farmers with proven technical packages and ensuring that they use them. The project would also include the training of resident youth as one of its components, but not the central one.
- o The benefits achieved by the GOIC project, limited though they are, can and should be preserved until they can be incorporated into the recommended follow-on project rather than allowed to dissipate. To do so requires eliminating any funding gap between the current GOIC effort and a follow-on project. To achieve this limited but important goal by January 1, 1982, an "Interim Stage" of one to one and one-half years<sup>1</sup> of funding to continue current

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<sup>1</sup>The exact length of the Interim Stage could be shorter or longer than this recommended period, depending upon the time required to prepare the Project Identification Document and Project Paper and obtain project funding.

Chamen site activities should be sought. Use of OICI as the implementing agency under MANR and as the funding channel during this period is the only expedient means for achieving this objective, but a clear specification and mutual agreement by AID/Gambia and OICI ahead of time as to the limits and nature of OICI activities during and after any Interim Stage must be reached before OICI is used as the implementing agency and funding channel for such a stage.

- o A detailed follow-on project as described in Chapter VII can and should be worked toward actively during an Interim Stage by AID/Gambia and the GOTG. It is possible to complete its design and secure its funding during this 12- to 18-month period, especially if there is timely and adequate support from AID/Washington and REDSO/WEST.
- o It is essential to secure strong GOTG commitment to and interest in the recommended project by beginning GOTG financing in the Interim Stage and increasing it gradually through Stages 1 and 2.

#### D. Recommendations


- o The OICI follow-on proposal is not meritorious and AID/Gambia should not fund it.
- o The agricultural training project outlined in Chapter VII of this report should be funded by AID/Gambia. It should be designed during the Interim Stage and implemented in two phases as indicated in Figure 1.
- o The Interim Stage of the recommended project should be funded beginning January 1, 1982 for 12 to 18 months so as to preserve and improve upon the core benefits generated by the GOIC project to date, including its youth training and Community Outreach Program (COP) aspects.
- o OICI should be the recipient of Interim Stage funds via an Operating Program Grant (OPG) and should be the implementing agency of the extended GOIC effort for this period of one to one and one-half years, but only if it agrees to the following preconditions:

That its involvement will terminate at the end of the 12- to 18-month Interim Stage;

That it will forego efforts to "politicize" its further involvement in the project; and

That it will give its full support to maintaining and improving the youth training and COP program at the GOIC center and to AID/Gambia's and the GOTG's efforts to design a new expanded project during the Interim Stage.

**Figure 1: Suggested Implementation Schedule for Recommended Project**



If OICI cannot agree to these preconditions or if it does not abide by them during attempts to negotiate an Interim Stage OPG, AID/Gambia should close down the GOIC effort on December 31, 1981 and work with the GOTG over the next 12 to 18 months to launch the Chapter VII project in 1983.

- o AID/Gambia should not fund an Interim Stage unless it continues and improves the current GOIC project. Sharp changes in the project by the GOTG such as a wholesale replacement of the senior staff should be ruled out during the Interim Stage, but they could be reviewed for inclusion as part of the Stage 1 activities of the new project. If the GOTG cannot accept this "extension" period, it may desire to continue GOIC activities during the proposed Interim Stage with its own funds, but AID/Gambia should not fund an Interim Stage under such circumstances.
- o During the Interim Stage, the GOTG and AID/Gambia should prepare a Project Identification Document (PID) and Project Paper (PP) for Stages 1 and 2 of the recommended project and secure funding for Stage 1.
- o The GOTG, via MANR, should have oversight responsibility for Stages 1 and 2 of the recommended project. Once implemented, MANR should use a Management Committee (MC) to manage the project on a day-to-day basis.
- o The GOTG should begin its financial contribution to the project in the Interim Stage and gradually increase it each year so that by the last year of Stage 2 (1990) it is financing most project requirements. The extra long project life (two stages) should not be agreed to by AID/Gambia unless it serves to achieve this objective.
- o The "next steps" suggested in Chapter VIII of this report should be undertaken by AID/Gambia, the GOTG, and OICI immediately.

## II. INTRODUCTION

### A. Purpose of Assignment and Report

The purpose of the assignment and this report as originally proposed was to assist the AID Mission in Banjul in determining whether the proposed OICI project in The Gambia merits AID financial support. Upon the arrival in Banjul of the Devres staff member carrying out the assignment, the Director of the Office of the AID Representative requested that only brief attention be given to evaluating the past efforts of OICI. His specific request was that Devres' work be concentrated upon developing a recommendation as to what training project, if any, should be supported by AID/Gambia, especially if the "Phase II" OICI project did not merit support as proposed. Thus, another aspect of the Devres assignment and this paper is to assist AID/Gambia by recommending a training project and use of the existing GOIC complex that would merit AID support if the existing OICI proposal as formulated does not.

### B. Scope of Work

The "formal" scope of work for this assignment is presented in Annex 1. This scope was expanded somewhat, as noted above, in conversations with the AID Mission Director in Banjul. The scope of work as finally agreed upon included the following components:

- o Briefly review the local situation, past history and performance of OICI in The Gambia.
- o Assess the merits of OICI's proposed use of the Chamen complex as put forward in its Phase II feasibility study.

- o Provide clear and decisive recommendations to AID/Gambia concerning the merits of OICI's recent feasibility study and OICI's capability to implement any new activities in The Gambia.
- o Recommend a training program and use of the Chamen complex, if any, that would merit AID/Gambia support if the current OICI proposal as put forward does not merit such support.

C. Assignment Strategy

Devres' strategy in carrying out this assignment encompassed five major components, as follows:

- o Review and evaluate the local situation and OICI's past history and performance in The Gambia primarily from existing documents but also from interviews and personal observations.
- o Assess the Phase II proposal by OICI and OICI's capability to carry it out by a review of existing documents, discussion with OICI, AID, and GOTG officials in Washington, D.C.; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Banjul; and Chamen/Farafenni,<sup>1</sup> and by undertaking relevant observations in all of these locations.
- o Become familiar with and assess other options proposed by AID and the GOTG by reading available documents and via discussion with AID, GOTG, and OICI/GOIC officials.
- o Integrate and synthesize the results of the above activities to reach conclusions regarding the best training program option and use of the OICI complex in Chamen, if any, including the most desirable implementation plan.
- o Assess the OICI feasibility study and OICI capacity to carry out relevant new activities in The Gambia in light of the above conclusions.
- o Formulate recommendations regarding AID's support of the program suggested in the OICI feasibility study and OICI's capacity to implement any new activities in The Gambia.
- o If necessary, recommend on the basis of the above analysis a training program and use of the OICI complex at Chamen, if any, that merits AID/Gambia support.

D. Brief GOIC Project Description

The GOIC project was designed to create a community-based training center at Chamen Village, Farafenni, in the North Bank Division. This

<sup>1</sup> Annex 2 lists the people met during the assignment.

center was to be the site of an agricultural training and resettlement effort for post-primary school leavers. Such school leavers were to be recruited for a two-year boarding program in which they would be trained in basic literacy and related matters, and intermediate agricultural skills directly related to village level farming operations, then resettled in their own locality as farmers. Additional "day-students" were to be recruited for a one-year program of individualized instruction along the lines followed by the boarding students.

A production farm associated with the center was to provide income that would eventually make the program financially self-supporting.

A Technical Cooperation Team (TCT) of four expatriates, together with a locally recruited staff, was to implement the project under the direction of a non-governmental Gambian governing board. End of project conditions were expected to be as follows:

- o Two hundred young farmers, including many women, were to have been trained in improved agricultural practices and resettled as active farmers in local villages.
- o The center and all its related activities were to be managed, administered, and supported by Gambian personnel.
- o The Gambia OIC was to have been recognized by the GOTG as an accredited, private non-profit training institution.
- o The training capacity of the Gambia OIC was to have increased from 24 in year one to 68 in year five of the project.
- o A 338-hectare area of land was to have been cleared, fenced, and properly exploited under an intensive crop and animal production scheme.
- o The training and production farm was to be fully equipped with appropriate farm implements, machinery, and vehicles to generate maximum output.
- o The production farm was to be generating annually-increasing revenues from the sale of food and cash crops on the local market.
- o The GOTG was to have committed annual budget allocations sufficient to continue the operation of the GOIC.

### III. REVIEW OF LOCAL SITUATION, PAST HISTORY AND PERFORMANCE OF OICI IN THE GAMBIA

#### A. Local Situation

##### 1. Macroeconomic conditions and framework

The Gambia is one of the poorest countries in the world when the measure used is Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. GDP per capita is estimated to be Dalasi (D) 686 (\$343) in 1980/81 at current prices. In real terms (1976/77 prices), GDP per capita<sup>1</sup> has fallen from D 561 (\$281) to D 542 (\$271) between 1974/75 and 1980/81.<sup>2, 3</sup> The decline in agricultural output during the latter part of this period is the primary reason for this decline.

About 60 percent of The Gambia's GDP is agricultural production and another 20 percent is trading, transport, and agro-industry. The Gambia's economy is highly dependent upon one cash crop--groundnuts--which accounts for nearly 50 percent (220,770 hectares) of the area cropped. The groundnut and its by-products provide 25 to 40 percent of GDP and 90 percent

<sup>1</sup>The population of The Gambia was estimated to be about 618,000 in mid-1981.

<sup>2</sup>United Nations, Republic of The Gambia Country Presentation for the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Paris, September 1981, (LDC/CP/22, March 1981), (Banjul, 1981), p. 13.

<sup>3</sup>The World Bank estimate of rural per capita income in The Gambia was \$130 for 1974. However, the study by Great Britain, Overseas Development Ministry, Land Resources Division, The Land Resources of The Gambia and Their Development (Surbiton, Surrey: ODM, 1976), Vol. III indicates that rural per capita income was much lower, ranging from \$75 to \$94 in 1973 and \$93 to \$113 in 1974. Urban per capita incomes are four to five times as high as rural incomes.

of exports. Livestock and fisheries are also important contributors to GDP, but account for only 3 to 5 percent<sup>1</sup> and 1 percent respectively of GDP. Manufacturing provides 6 percent of GDP and tourism provides about 8 percent. A more detailed breakdown of GDP is presented in Annex 3.

Imports are critical to the well-being of The Gambia's people. Much food and most other consumer items and capital goods are imported. Over half of the GOTG's revenues come from import duties.

The Gambia's ability to import depends upon its groundnut harvest and the world price of groundnuts. This one crop dependence has, in the recent past, seriously hindered the achievement of the economic development goals of The Gambia and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future because it allows the resources available for investment, consumption, and recurrent government expenditures to swing over a wide range from one year to the next. While international policy measures can dampen such swings to a degree, consistently poor groundnut harvests and The Gambia's exhaustion of its financial reserves has reduced the availability and palatability of such mechanisms.

The GOTG's basic strategy for development and, over the long term, to resolve its economic plight, is to develop its rural areas and lessen the economy's dependence on groundnuts. However, primarily due to the impacts of three years of poor harvests, The Gambia's overall economic situation has become increasingly precarious despite this strategy. Thus, taken together with the anticipated slow growth of developed nations in the near future, worldwide inflationary pressures, the unlikelihood of any increase in real groundnut prices in the next several years, and a non-buoyant

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<sup>1</sup> Depending on the source and year of the statistics used.

tourism market, The Gambia faces a difficult Second Five Year Plan period ahead.

Any short-term alleviation of this expected situation will require less dependence on imports (via policy measures), an increase in exports--especially of groundnuts and fish--and rapid increases in domestic output. This scenario implies a strong dependence on external assistance and upon the agricultural sector and more emphasis on the goal of increasing agricultural output as compared to other objectives. However, employment--especially within the agricultural sector--also must be an important objective if the deteriorating economic situation of the past is to be improved in the future. The GOTG has emphasized that the training of youth and their subsequent employment outside the GOTG, particularly in agriculture, will be an important element of its Second Five Year Plan.

## 2. Agriculture

Agriculture is the predominant economic activity in The Gambia, providing a livelihood for over 80 percent of The Gambia's population. Thus, it is important as a way of life and as an organizer of social and political activity.

The major crops grown in The Gambia are groundnuts, rice, millet, sorghum, maize, and cotton. Output levels of these crops in recent years are shown in Table 1. These are "wet season" crops, grown mainly under rain-fed conditions during a short five- to six-month rainy season (April-October).

Cropping patterns are similar throughout the country, being a mixture of fallow and foodcrops (millet, sorghum, maize, and rice) and cash crops (groundnuts and a little cotton). In the dry season, small vegetable plots may be grown if water is available.

Table 1: Production By Crop 1976/77 - 1980/81

(000 MT)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Groundnut</u>	<u>Cotton</u>	<u>Millet/Sorghum</u>	<u>Maize</u>	<u>Rice</u>
76/77	144	0.8	30	6	24
77/78	117	1.2	34	9	18
78/79	151	0.9	54	13	24
79/80	65	1.1	42	10	22
80/81	45	1.6	40	12	22

Source: GOTG

Crop yields are low and very few modern inputs are used. A traditional bush-fallow (slash and burn) system of agricultural production is used, although population pressure has increased land use without the traditional fallow period. The hand hoe is the primary agricultural tool, although some animal traction (mostly oxen) is used.

Livestock production in The Gambia consists of cattle, goats, and sheep and contributes less than 5 percent to GDP. Almost all livestock production is carried out using traditional methods. As a result, productivity in this sector is low.

The basic agricultural production unit is the compound (averaging about 16 people) in which blood relatives live in a single enclosed dwelling under the leadership of the oldest male. The compound is often divided into dabadas, which become the basic unit of agricultural production. A farmer will thus live with a wider family group, the compound, produce his livelihood as part of an intermediate dabada group, and consume his output with a nuclear family group. Women are full participants in farming activities, tending to raise crops such as vegetables and swamp and upland rice; they do not, however, directly control the output. The groundnut cash crop has tended to attract the men and the new technology, leaving women behind men in terms of both cash income and new skills.

Three-quarters of the compounds farm less than 11 hectares; the overall area cultivated per adult throughout The Gambia is 0.4 to 0.7 hectares.<sup>1</sup> Average holding size per farmer without implements is 4.8 hectares, while for farmers with implements it is 9.4 hectares. Most fields are near the village, but a single holding almost always consists of numerous plots.

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<sup>1</sup>MANR, Preparation Report for a Rural Development Program, 1980-1985, (Banjul: MANR, 1979), p. 4.

Nearly all land in The Gambia is held in trust by each District Council under the District Chief. Such land cannot be sold, rented, mortgaged, or pledged as collateral. Each village has an identifiable area of land. From this overall area, each compound is allocated land (which is symbolically returned to the village headman at the end of each year). This and any other compound land is inherited by each new compound head. Compound heads can allocate land to strangers (usually temporarily) and can clear land outside the village if unclaimed by any other person or community. This cleared land, which is then retained by the compound in perpetuity, has been an important release valve enabling growing needs for land expansion to be met.<sup>1</sup> However, new technology, large-scale agricultural development projects, and a growing population have increased the pressure on available land areas in some locations and put the above land tenure system under stress.

The social structure associated with agriculture in The Gambia greatly influences agricultural output and practices. Seen and lived out primarily as a way of life, less emphasis is given in this context to agriculture as a means to achieve income only. Thus, the communal land tenure restricts credit availability and use and hinders land improvement. Individual entrepreneurship and advance can be restricted by the hierarchy of decision making at the village level. Family or social obligations tend to reduce the ability to cumulate and utilize wealth productively. Thus, a more wealthy compound tends not to have more goods or productive implements in proportion to its wealth, but more wives, more relatives and "strangers" sharing the larger income, and more relief from the hard labor of agricultural work. In addition, particular cultural avenues channel

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<sup>1</sup>MANR, Preparation Report for a Rural Development Program, pp. 30-31.

disposable funds into religious charity, mosque buildings, etc.<sup>1</sup>

### 3. Nutrition

The nutritional status of the population of The Gambia is adequate for some, but quite inadequate for others. The urban population and most rural males obtain the needed calorie intake except during the "hungry season."<sup>2</sup> Rural women and young children have very deficient calorie intakes, however, especially during the hungry season. The weight of one-year-olds, for example, has been shown to be only 75 percent of the international standard in recent studies.

During the hungry season, the weight of the rural adult population drops 4 to 5 percent due to less calorie intake and the hard labor of the harvest season. Food intake has been shown to drop by over 20 percent from post-harvest peak to pre-harvest low.

The less than adequate food consumption of rural people in The Gambia appears not to be a matter of growing too little food or of purchasing other consumption items, but of selling crops for cash rather than keeping them for local consumption. This could be the result of malcontrol of crop sales. Rural males are better fed (eating first and apart from their wives and children) so they may not put as much emphasis upon increasing local food consumption. Also, at the time of the hungry season there is seldom enough money to meet all the needs of a family, most of the

<sup>1</sup>George Lowe, Rural Society and the Economics of Agricultural Development, Vol. III, The Land Resources of The Gambia and Their Development, Overseas Development Ministry, Land Resources Division, (Great Britain: Surbiton, Surrey, ODM, 1975), p. 2.3.7.

<sup>2</sup>The hungry season is the four months of the year nearest the new crop harvest. It is the time when the heaviest agricultural labor is required, when health conditions are at their worst, and when mothers have the least amount of time to care of their children.

harvest proceeds having been expended as soon as received.<sup>1</sup> This is especially true if--as in recent years--the cash crop has been poor.

#### 4. Education

According to the 1973 Census, only 12 percent of the male population and 6 percent of the female population of The Gambia have ever attended school. This makes the 10 percent literacy rate (much lower in the rural areas) for the country as a whole quite understandable.

The most recent estimates of school enrollments are that 37 percent of the eligible school age population is enrolled in primary school and 12 percent in secondary school. This is substantially higher than in the past, reflecting the rapid increase in educational facilities and opportunity in The Gambia. This has led to the hiring of poorly qualified teachers, however, and reportedly there has been no improvement in the quality of school graduates in recent years.

Any program designed to help meet the formal and nonformal education and training needs of The Gambia must deal with the lack of productive employment, low level of agricultural output, poor nutrition, poor health, and high infant mortality. Such a program as noted in AID's Development Assistance Program (DAP)<sup>2</sup> for The Gambia must be aimed at the following objectives:

- o Increasing food and livestock production;
- o Raising productivity and incomes of the rural population;
- o Ensuring equitable distribution of income and participation in economic activity and employment in all sectors;

<sup>1</sup>IBRD, Basic Needs in The Gambia, (Washington: World Bank, 1980), p. vi.

<sup>2</sup>USAID, Development Assistance Program for The Gambia, Washington, n.d.), p. VII-2.

- o Improving basic social infrastructure through self-help and community activities;
- o Popular participation in decision making;
- o Proper utilization of natural resources, including management of land; and
- o Increased foreign exchange earnings.

In pursuing its rural development strategy under its First Five Year Development Plan, one of the elements of the GOTG strategy was to reorient the educational system toward the needs of the rural community. Another was to encourage deeper involvement of community and divisional commissioners in the identification and implementation of rural programs and projects. By these and other means, the GOTG has sought to realize more rapid and better-balanced economic development of the parts of The Gambia where most people are farmers.

As AID's DAP suggests, these objectives and the GOTG strategy emphasize the need for educational outputs such as more and better qualified agricultural extension advisors, more relevant rurally focused educational systems, functional literacy training, community development training, and technical manpower development. To quote:

In the context of Gambian development and identification of minimal learning needs of the poor majority, it is helpful to focus upon selected subgroups, such as women and rural farmers, as targets for potential AID assistance. This poorest segment of the population has had the least access to improved technology, formal education, and involvement in the decision-making process. These subgroups, as opposed to the civil service, the urban private sector, and the trade community, will ultimately contribute most to increased productivity and earnings of The Gambia. One can say, in broad terms, that specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes need to be transmitted to the male and female farmer population as minimal prerequisites to fulfilling objectives of The Gambia Five Year Development Plan.

<sup>1</sup>USAID, Development Assistance Program, VII-4.

In the main, this will require the farmer to be both literate (in at least one local language) and numerate. These are the bases upon which the farmer can build and continuously upgrade his and her information relating to the following key practices:

- o Animal husbandry, including animal nutrition, animal health, selective breeding and reproduction, and understanding of the relationships between agricultural and livestock production;
- o Agricultural practices, including seed multiplication, use of improved varieties, animal traction, use of improved farm implements, crop integration, crop rotation, farm management, simple bookkeeping and record keeping;
- o Access to capital, including an understanding of the purpose of credit, marketing mechanisms, and the relationship between investment and income generation;
- o Health and nutrition, including an understanding of family planning and the relationship between agriculture, nutrition, and family health;
- o Village social development, including an understanding of the role of community member, the role of women and youth, participation in formal and informal cooperative structures and village self development;
- o Formal education, including fostering positive attitudes toward enrollment of children in primary school and the relevancy of education to rural life; and
- o An understanding by the farmer of his part in an ecosystem, including the capability to solve problems that influence his income and to see himself as having some control over his environment through scientific or technical awareness.<sup>1</sup>

It is also clear, given its limited financial and human resources, that The Gambia will depend increasingly on community self-help efforts to achieve these rural development objectives. The Community Development Service (CDS) of the Ministry of Lands and Local Government, for example, has existed for many years fostering self-reliance efforts in rural works,

<sup>1</sup>USAID, Development Assistance Program, pp. VII-4, 5.

training, and resettlement of young farmers, school and family garden development, nutrition and hygiene, etc.<sup>1</sup> Other ministries, private voluntary organizations (PVOs), and international organizations also encourage similar projects.

Finally, with respect to the GOTG agricultural training programs now attempting to reach existing farmers directly or via extension staff, the DAP indicates that they are not meeting the rural learning needs related to the improved agricultural practices set out above. To quote:

Current programs lack direction and supervision. Support facilities such as housing, offices, and visual aids are inadequate, and transport is a continuing problem. There is no coordinated work program and in-service training is irregular and insufficient. The training received by demonstrators and instructors has been essentially practical but of uneven quality and limited scope. Basic training has not been reinforced by periodic refresher courses. No organization provides training materials for use by field extension staff, contributing to the lack of farmer-level training.<sup>2</sup>

For example, training for CDS field workers, which was done at the Massembe Mixed Farming Center (MFC), was carried out in inadequate facilities and with little in the way of materials or equipment.

AID/Gambia funded a new facility in Mansa Konko to remedy this situation, but other similar problems remain unsolved in this important area.

#### B. Past History of OICI in The Gambia

OICI, with AID/W financial assistance, explored the potential for OIC-tive assistance in The Gambia beginning in early 1973. Initial OICI explorations resulted in the formation of a local group which expressed interest in helping solve the unemployment difficulties in the country via

USAID, Development Assistance Program, pp. VII-17.

<sup>2</sup>USAID, Development Assistance Program, p. VII-25 drawing upon the analysis made by the IBRD, Appraisal of a Rural Development Project, (Washington, 1974) - 21

a program which would provide training and other incentives to assist those without advanced education in obtaining useful jobs.

In response to this interest, OICI carried out a feasibility study in 1975 to determine how the objectives of the interest group might be achieved. The study recommended the establishment of a rural based training program to be implemented with OICI technical and financial assistance. The program was primarily designed to solve the problem of unemployed school leavers.

Acceptance of this recommendation in principle by AID/Washington led to a detailed project design which was funded by AID/Washington with \$1.3 million for five years beginning in October 1977. Additional funding of \$366,000 was made available by AID/Gambia during the life of the project (partly to carry it through December 31, 1981), bringing the total project budget to \$1.67 million.

OICI and GOTG personnel carried out a feasibility study in April 1981 to determine whether a follow-on project was appropriate and, if so, to recommend the content, budget, and life of such an additional project to AID/Gambia for funding.

## C. Performance of OICI's GOIC Project

### 1. Introduction

As noted in Chapter II, this section on the performance of OICI's GOIC Project, while definitive in terms of its general conclusions, is not intended to be exhaustive, especially with respect to its details and analysis. Rather, it is developed only to serve as a basis for assessing the merits of OICI's feasibility study for a follow-on project and for

determining OICI's capacity to implement any new activities in The Gambia.<sup>1</sup>

## 2. Achievement of project goal, purpose, and outputs

The logframe for the GOIC Project is presented in Annex 4. Other documents highly relevant to a determination of the degree to which the project has achieved its goal, purpose, and outputs include the mid-term evaluation of the project<sup>2</sup> and a partial review conducted by AID/Gambia in June 1981. The latter is included in this report as Annex 5.

### a. Project design

The initial project design was weak, a fact that later came to be recognized by OICI and AID/Gambia. Four aspects of the original design deserve brief mention in this regard. First, the project goal and purpose were imprecise both as drawn up in the logframe and as sought after in the actual implementation of the project. The project was to achieve the purpose of the "introduction of a training program." This purpose was not, however, what the project implementors or funders wanted. Instead, all parties involved desired, at a minimum, trained and resettled school leavers whose agricultural production performance was above the averages of the nation and their own villages.

The goal of the project was also diffuse. Had it been stated in terms of magnitude, target group, and specific time of achievement, it would have helped tighten the project design.

<sup>1</sup>A terminal evaluation of the GOIC Project is to be carried out by AID/REDSO, West Africa before the end of the 1981 calendar year.

<sup>2</sup>Quy D. Nguyen, et al., Report on Joint Evaluation of The Gambia OIC by OICI-USAID-GOTG, May 12-21, 1980, (Philadelphia: OICI, 1980).

Second, the output-to-purpose linkages were contradictory, repetitive, and incomplete with respect to the stated purpose and especially with reference to the real purpose. Thus, the role of the production farm (listed as an output in the logframe) is not to introduce and make effective the training program. In fact, as was later discovered, this output-purpose link actually took away from the achievement of the planned project purpose. Likewise, the lack of inputs (and design effort) aimed at trainee resettlement and follow-up greatly reduced the effectiveness of the appropriate output-to-purpose linkages that did exist. The fuzzy statement of purpose and muted emphasis on "placement" in the conditions section of the logframe made it easy to overlook the critical relationship between trainee recruitment/resettlement/follow-up and achievement of the project purpose and goal.

Repetition in verifiable indicators at different levels in the project design also led to confusion in efforts to implement the project. In particular, the number of trainees and placements is used as an indicator at both output and purpose levels.

Third, some of the input-output linkages in the original design were not technically, administratively, or economically sound. Later changes such as the addition of a mechanization component with attendant imported small tractors made matters worse.

Fourth, some of the critical project assumptions were not adequately assured at the time the project was approved and launched. In particular, the overt assumption that GOTG "facilities" (e.g., buildings) would be available was not valid. Had this been clear at the time the project was approved, it would have necessitated additional inputs to assure project success (more funding). When it became clear after the project

began that the GOIC would have to build its own buildings, however, no additional funding was made available from any source.

In the same vein, when the GOTG did not fulfill its tacit agreement to provide resettlement assistance and various kinds of funding, the logframe assumption that it would do so became invalid. Again, no inputs were forthcoming to solve this problem.

Finally, many of the "assumptions" set out in the project design were actually outputs. That is, they should have been targeted as elements of the project the implementation team was seeking to control. Perhaps the fact that these critical components were viewed as assumptions rather than outputs influenced the approach taken to them by GOIC.

Examples of such wrongly categorized "assumptions" are:

- o Development of linkages with the GOTG and other international donor agencies;
- o Development of local support committees;
- o Development of appropriate working relationships between the TCT and the GOIC Board of Directors;
- o Minimal turnover occurs among local staff; and
- o Annual targets for program completions are achieved on schedule.

b. Goal: To strengthen and diversify the capacity of the rural labor force<sup>2</sup>

At bottom, the project achieved very little of its goal. It trained fewer persons than anticipated and those who were trained, while most were employed at some type of work, did not show measurable increases in

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<sup>1</sup>The invalidity of this assumption, once known, perhaps did not have the impact it should have at first because of the three design problems mentioned above.

<sup>2</sup>The objectively verifiable indicators for goal achievement are noted in the original project logframe (Annex 4).

income per household, agricultural output, crop acreage planted, or the range of crops dealt with (see Annex 5). However, to the degree that the project did train persons not employed or employable in the past and resettle them on farms or into other jobs, it did achieve some of its goal. Also, some individual trainees who have resettled as farmers appear to have contributed to the achievement of the project goal by satisfying all or nearly all of the objectively verifiable indicators.

There are several reasons for this limited degree of goal achievement. First, the design of the project was weak. Thus, the planned inputs and outputs, even had they been fully achieved, would not have resulted in the conditions required to show the desired project purpose had been attained. Nor would the full achievement of the planned purpose have resulted in (satisfactory measures of) goal achievement. While this result primarily rests with the poor recruitment practices and lack of resettlement and trainee follow-up efforts in the original project design, other factors such as the inclusion of the production farm concept, lack of explicit attention to inputs such as GOTG finance and recognition, a fuzzy project purpose, and unclear output-purpose linkages contributed to it.

Second, the magnitude of outputs was far below plan for a variety of reasons. As the mid-term evaluation team reported, ". . . it will be difficult for TGOIC (The Gambia Opportunities Industrialization Center) to graduate by 1981 the targetted 150 school leavers (to be) engaged in income earning activities."<sup>1</sup> Indeed, even then it was clearly impossible for the project to meet most of its planned output levels. The difficult project start-up, subsequent administrative and management errors, and the tight project budget had already worked together to put the project into a tailspin from which it could not recover

<sup>1</sup>Nguyen, p. 18.

Third, some needed project inputs were not planned for, while others were not made available. Other inputs were not as effective or appropriate as anticipated. Examples of these "input" problems include the lack of a trainee resettlement package in the initial project formulation and lack of adequate GOTG recognition of GOIC (which required an immense amount of energy by GOIC to restructure its management design). Also, some TCT members were ineffective and the small-scale mechanical tractors brought into the project were inappropriate under the circumstances faced by GOIC and its trainees.

Fourth, project implementation and management proceeded without a clear framework to guide the application and conversion of input into planned outputs. This was partly the result of an inadequate project design, including poor budgeting. It also came about, however, because the project had several desired but competing "end-results"<sup>1</sup> at the same level of priority. Little effort was made to sort out and rank the importance of these desired objectives until the acid test of experience had shown that they could not all be achieved within the context and resources of the GO project. By then it was too late to redesign the effort so as to focus project resources on fewer priorities.

c. Purpose: To introduce a training program of intermediate level agricultural technology for rural school leavers

The objectively verifiable indicators for indicating whether the purpose of the project has been achieved were noted in Chapter II of this report. They can also be found in Annex 4. Assessment of the degree

<sup>1</sup>Trained school leavers (a social goal); resettled, productive trained farmers (an economic goal); an operational money-making farm (a financial goal); etc.

of purpose achieved has been undertaken by the mid-term evaluation team and, in part, by AID/Gambia's narrowly focused review exhibited in Annex 5.

The purpose as stated in the logframe was ostensibly met. However, the conditions specified as the objectively verifiable indicators of purpose achievement were, in large part, not fulfilled. Each of these conditions is considered briefly below.

(1) Two hundred school leavers trained in improved practices, all two hundred resettled as farmers

Of the 200 planned trainees, 96 were to receive two years of resident instruction and 104 were to receive one year of day time on campus (but non-resident) instruction. This would have provided 296 person years of instruction.

As of December 31, 1981 (the end date of the project), GOIC will have trained 81 school leavers, each student receiving one year of resident instruction. Thus, the program will provide only 81 person years (27 percent) of the 296 person years of on-campus instruction originally planned.

In addition to these 81 persons trained, the project (via a GOIC redesign effort) graduated 32 persons from its COP and has had an additional 270 persons "enrolled" in its COP for 8 months (of a planned 12-month program).<sup>1</sup> Counting these persons against the original planned output of on-campus students is questionable. If the results of the COP are taken account of, however, a maximum of an additional 33 student equivalent years (260 training days per year) will be realized by the project as of December 31, 1981. When taken together with the 81 person years of on-campus instruction,

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<sup>1</sup> Each COP trainee is supposed to receive one full day of training per week in a group context, but this level is not consistently achieved. It was used, however, to construct the COP student equivalents used in this report.

the COP training enabled the project to realize 39 percent of its originally planned output level.

The 81 persons trained at the GOIC site are not all available for resettlement to date because 34 will not complete their training until December 31, 1981. Of the 47 who could be resettled, only 20 (43 percent) have been. Seven others from the group of 47 (15 percent) are working in related agricultural jobs [cooperative societies, as adult farmer educators, and for Catholic Relief Services (CRS)]. At this same point in time, the original project design anticipated that 132 students would be resettled with 68 scheduled to complete training on December 31, 1981. Thus, the actual output of resettled students to date amounts to 15 percent of the planned output to date. Assuming that 43 percent (15) of the current 34 trainees will resettle, the end-of-project status (EOPS) for this indicator will be 17 percent of the planned EOPS.<sup>1</sup>

(2) GOIC managed, administered, and supported by The Gambia nationals

The EOPS of this indicator is inadequate in terms of the plan, but substantial progress has been made toward local management and administration.

At present there are 24 Gambian employees at the GOIC site and one expatriate (the Program Advisor). A Gambian is Program Director.<sup>2</sup> The GOIC Management Committee is entirely Gambian, nationwide in scope, and appointed by the President.

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<sup>1</sup>This assumes that all graduated trainees would be resettled as planned in the logframe.

<sup>2</sup>The staff structure of GOIC is shown in Annex 6.

The members of this Gambian staff and Management Committee are not yet completely responsible for the GOIC effort. They could, with additional staff and committee member training and a clear mandate, begin to manage and administer the GOIC within a short period of time. This would, however, necessitate adequate project resources and an appropriate overall structure for the program.

"Support" for the GOIC--financial, administrative, and otherwise--still primarily comes from AID/Gambia, AID/Washington, and OICI, although local community support is excellent in terms of both goodwill and contributions in kind. Major financial support is likely to come from AID for several more years, although the GOTG has been asked to play a larger role in support of any training project in the future (if it desires a new project).

(3) GOIC annual training capacity increased from 24 in Year One to 68 in Year Five of the project

This condition has not been fulfilled in that, at present, the GOIC has only 34 trainees in residence. It did, however, begin the year with 50 and arguably has the "capacity" to deal with 68 students now. Were 68 trainees on campus, it would be difficult for the existing staff and related resources (transport, training materials, etc.) to deal with them effectively. Additional resources could remedy this problem.

If capacity is interpreted to mean GOIC can recruit, retain, train, resettle, and follow-up on 68 trainees annually, the GOIC program must improve on many fronts before the EOPS for such a condition would be adequate.

(4) GOIC production farm generates adequate revenues

From the first production year (1979) the production farm lost money until, after the 1980 wet season, the concept was dropped entirely as part of the project. The reasons for failure of the production farm are legion: climate, lack of water for irrigation, growing the type or variety of crop that consumers did not want (lettuce), planting less acreage than anticipated, hiring farm labor instead of using students, lack of familiarity with local conditions and farming techniques by the TCT, the impact of pests and diseases on yields, and the use of poor quality seeds.

(5) GOTG has committed annual budget allocations for the continued operation of GOIC

The EOPS of this condition is far below that anticipated when the project was designed. The GOTG did provide some services in kind during the existing project, but their total magnitude was small in reference to GOIC's need. Also, in response to OICI's Phase II feasibility study, the GOTG has given some indication it might contribute D 380,000 at the end of a Phase II project. There is no indication to date that the GOTG would entertain annual budget allocations of any magnitude if necessary to continue GOIC's operation. This suggests that the GOTG is definitely not willing to fund all the costs of a GOIC-type Phase II project by itself, at least at this time.

(6) GOIC is recognized as an accredited, private, non-profit training institution by the GOTG

This condition is fulfilled in large measure, although a major effort was required to bring it about, especially on the part of OICI and GOIC staff. The GOTG required a renegotiation of the GOIC-GOTG relationship and a restructuring of GOIC's management before it would agree

to support the GOIC, both of which have now been achieved. The results of these changes were the signing of a formal GOTG-GOIC agreement and the appointment of GOIC's present national MC by the President of the GOTG.

Important aspects of this condition--such as the role of the GOTG with respect to the MC and control of the GOIC program and complex, and the "private" status of GOIC--however, are subject to change at present. Also, in that the GOTG is not prepared at this time to fund GOIC on its own, it has made AID/Gambia funding of the project (to enable GOTG to prepare to do so at a later time) a precondition for its recognition and support of GOIC. Should AID/Gambia not fund OICI (cum GOIC), the GOTG may not recognize and support GOIC in any event or, if it did, such support would be of little value in light of GOIC's financial needs.

In sum, while this condition seems to be met, the underlying circumstances are such that the fairly satisfactory EOPS could disintegrate rapidly.

#### d. Outputs

The outputs and the magnitude of outputs expected from the project are included in the logframe in Annex 4. Outputs included students and staff appropriately trained, a GOIC Board of Directors organized and trained, operating two-year and one-year training curricula, upgraded training facilities, functioning crop and livestock training and production units, organized small farmer cooperative societies, and effective community support. These outputs are reviewed briefly below in terms of the magnitudes anticipated in the logframe.

(1) Board members performing voluntary functions and activities

The Board was replaced by the MC midway through the project. The MC members are performing some voluntary functions and activities, but they have not had very much to do under the existing structure and have not been especially active. They have essentially been cut out of the deliberative process regarding a follow-on project by all parties--GOTG, ATD/Gambia, and OICI--and until recently seemed to accept this complacently. If given responsibility for control of funds, staff curriculum, etc. at the project, the MC could be much more active; but it appears reticent to actively seek such responsibility for itself.

(2) Local employees (16) functioning independently as administrators and instructors

This degree of local management, control, and assistance has nearly been reached. The local employees do function independently (there has been only one TCT person in the project for some time now) and most are competent at what they do. Nevertheless, despite this progress, there are weak spots within the local staff structure and the need for technical assistance at a reasonable level can still be documented in many areas. While one advisor is adequate to provide such assistance, that person is required now and will be for another year or so. Thus, the objectively verifiable indicator here has not yet been reached fully.

(3) Trainee completions and placements

As indicated in the discussion of the EOPS for anticipated project conditions above, trainee completions fell far short of target, as did their placement. The reasons for this lack of output were many: slower than anticipated development at the project site; delayed

project start-up; problems with the initial TCT staff; lack of staff housing at the project site or nearby in Farafenni; lack of stipends for trainees; difficulty in recruiting students; lack of a resettlement package; etc. Most of these causes can be attributed to OICI management and staff, as noted later. However, regardless of where fault can be lodged, the core output of the project--trained school leavers--was not forthcoming. This, more than any other factor, caused the project to fail.

Yet, some of the trainees who did go through the program and who were resettled do embody the key concepts behind the initial project. They are trained; they are farming; they are doing better than their peers; they are serving as change agents in their own village with respect to agricultural production practices. The number and extent of these "successes" is unknown<sup>1</sup> and is admittedly small. Nevertheless, the narrow but very important point to be made is that a "start-from-scratch" program badly run, without an adequate recruiting program, with very inadequate resources, without an effective resettlement program, stipends, etc. can still train some school leavers in a two-year period,<sup>2</sup> get them resettled and show that they and their villages benefit from and are excited about the impact of the overall program.

At bottom, the conclusion to be drawn on this point is that what the program did manage to accomplish with a few school leavers is

<sup>1</sup>AID/Gambia argues that such successes do not exist and that the training program as provided by the GOIC is not needed at all. Devres' observations, although very limited and impressionistic, did not verify this AID/Gambia viewpoint. In particular, the baseline used to assess GOIC trainees by AID/Gambia appears to Devres to be wrong. Trained school leavers should be compared with untrained school leavers having equivalent farming experience or with their own prior output levels, not with existing farmers, national averages, or different crop areas or years. A detailed discussion of the problems of the content of GOIC's training program is included in Chapter V.

<sup>2</sup>Only two years of trainees have had opportunity to be resettled.

something of central significance. While this core of success was very small in light of what was intended, it is worthy of preserving and expanding if it supplements (rather than distracts from) other elements needed to assure the overall cost effectiveness of a new training program designed to achieve the goal recently proposed by AID/Gambia and the GOTG of increasing food output in The Gambia.<sup>1</sup>

(4) Operational administrative and service systems

GOIC does have operational administrative and service systems, most of which are at least of average quality. It is certain that many of these systems could be improved, and they should be. However, it is important to give full credit to the importance of the systems already built up at the Chamen site. Curricula, standard operating procedures, financial, transport, communications, and numerous other forms of "soft capital" exist there. These are valuable in their own right and much of their value will be lost if the GOIC project lapses. While it is possible to recreate them for another follow-on project, there are few, if any, effective short cuts in doing so. Only the expenditure of hard work, time, and the cumulation of experience leads to the development of effective systems for a specific project. Thus, it is far cheaper and easier to inherit or buy such systems intact than for a new organization to try to build its own, whether from pieces or from scratch.

(5) Development of training facilities

The GOIC site includes 403 acres as contrasted to the planned 338 hectares (835 acres). Despite this smaller size, the site is

<sup>1</sup>This goal is in contrast to the goal of GOIC which is basically to provide skills and thus opportunity to a strata of society that has little, if any, opportunity to better its economic and social conditions. Both goals are explored at length in Chapters IV through VII of this report.

reportedly the largest contiguous farm in The Gambia. A total of 330 acres has been cleared by GOIC. Only about 135 acres are currently being used (for training), however, due to the curtailment of the production farm as reported above. While a full complement of trainees would enable more of the land to be used for training, 100 to 200 acres would still be available for other uses. This raises the possibility of using the GOIC farm as a seed multiplication site, as a research center, etc. Such uses would complement the training function and could use GOIC equipment as well.

A total of 13 buildings plus two staff apartments now under active construction exist on the site. These buildings were built by GOIC with project funds and via community self-help efforts, an activity and expenditure not planned for in the original project design.

A water system of one drilled well, a cistern, and water tower, and a water piping network has been developed to serve the center. The system cost much more than anticipated and is much smaller in scope than planned. As a result, water is used only on dry season vegetable crops and for human and animal consumption at the training site.

(6) Effective community support

The original GOIC Board of Directors operated with mixed results<sup>1</sup> until replaced by the current MC at the insistence of the GOTG. Since then, the nationally comprised MC has operated in a low-key manner with little overall impact on the ongoing operations or future of GOIC. The members of the MC, however, profess to be vitally interested in the GOIC project and the Chairman reports that the MC wants to take full responsibility for the project under the aegis of a line GOTG ministry.

<sup>1</sup>Nguyen, pp. 55 ff.

Local support committees have not been forthcoming as planned in the project design. One was initially founded in Farafenni, but its effectiveness was minimal.

Local villagers, including the alkalis, strongly support GOIC activities--both the training of local young people and the extension and demonstration efforts of GOIC staff on their behalf. Such villagers have assisted GOIC with weeding, harvesting, and other crop activities and some have provided GOIC with food raised via GOIC extension assistance. All in all, the relationship between GOIC and surrounding villages (including those in which past trainees have settled) is extremely positive and a high point of the GOIC program.

(7) Development of 10 new cooperative societies

This output has never materialized, primarily because it was impractical from the beginning. GOIC graduates are much too scattered geographically and there are too few to date to consider organizing them into such societies. Moreover, cooperative societies already exist in their own localities which they can join after farming for one wet season.

3. Effectiveness and appropriateness of project inputs

a. TCT

The quality and performance of the OICI TCT appears to have been spotty, with some being of high quality and providing good performances while others were much less satisfactory. However, in the main, the OICI and GOIC staffs were and continue to be strongly committed to the project. They made major use of the skills and resources they had to make the project a success. Only because of their effort was the project able to achieve as much as it did.

The total person months of TCT input planned was 216. Due to

budgetary problems, the actual number of person months expected to be realized at the end of the project is 131, or 61 percent of plan.

This cutback on TCT input was one route chosen to remedy unplanned expenditures for other project components. Recruitment of trainees and local staff, local staff development, quality of training, linkages with GOTG and other entities, and many other areas of the project were affected by this cutback. Thus, there can be no doubt that output levels, quality of outputs, and the degree of institutional development achieved by the project were seriously diminished by this diminution of the TCT input.

b. Local staff

The local staff now numbers 24.<sup>1</sup> It has consistently been lower than planned throughout the life of the project.<sup>2</sup> Also, while the quality and performance of existing local staff at the senior level appears to be quite good now, this reportedly has not consistently been the case. There also has been a great deal of turnover in local staff positions during the life of the project.

c. Equipment and commodities

Much of the equipment supplied for the project was aimed at developing and operating an effective production farm. Since the concept of such a farm has been abandoned, the equipment has become largely superfluous in terms of the project purpose.

The Gravelly tractors imported for use in the training program were shown to be inappropriate. They also were expensive and an unplanned project expenditure. Their purchase proved to be a costly mistake in

<sup>1</sup>Nguyen. pp. 63-67

<sup>2</sup>The GOIC staff structure is shown in Annex 6.

financial terms and a major factor in pulling funds from other critically needed project components--e.g., TCT, transport, and resettlement

Other equipment and commodities (water pump, generator, training materials, transport, livestock equipment, etc.) appear to have been appropriate and to have been effectively used in the project.

d. Short-term consultants

Few short-term consultancies were used.

e. Participant training

No local staff were brought to the U.S. for training as planned due to budget constraints, the late program start-up, and the late hiring of local staff. On the other hand, four U.S. trips were taken by GOIC Board Members whereas only two were budgeted for the entire life of the project.

f. Financial inputs

The budget for the project increased from \$1.314 million to \$1.67 million to date. Reallocations of line items within the overall budget were frequent. Major cost overruns were experienced in the categories of infrastructure, equipment and commodities, participant training, and other direct costs. These cost overruns were covered primarily by drastically reducing the TCT component of the project and by returning to USAID for more money. As noted already, since the TCT was the central input of the original project design, major harm was done to the project by this action.

g. HOST COUNTRY INPUTS

Nearly all host country inputs included in the logframe were

supplied to the project except the 60 person months of counterpart assistance. Again, this failure to provide the planned level of person years as a project input went to the core of the project's input-output relationship, affecting the project accordingly.

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The total inputs provided, while fewer in critical areas than planned, were still such that the project was cost ineffective. At the time of the mid-term evaluation, the staff-resident trainee ratio was 1 to 1.3. At present, it is about the same at 1.4. This is partly offset by the addition of COP trainees as part of the project. Thirty-two COP trainees have been "graduated" to date and 270 more have been worked with for one day per week over a period of eight months (out of a planned training period of 12 months). The exact impact of the COP on staff-student ratios is difficult to assess, but assuming 260 days of instruction as a student year equivalent measure,<sup>1</sup> the ratio would change from 1:1.4 to 1:2.7.

The financial ratios are even more extreme. Based on the final budget of \$1.67 million, the cost per resident student year of training achieved at the end of the project will be \$18,778. Assuming that

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<sup>1</sup> Student year equivalents for the COP were calculated based on each COP trainee receiving one day per week of instruction as follows:

- o Thirty-two trainees graduated in 1980 equals 32 trainees times 52 days each per year divided by 260 equals 6.4 student years equivalent.
- o Two hundred seventy trainees receiving instruction for eight months equals 270 trainees times 32 days each divided by 260 equals 33.23 student years equivalent.
- o Total student years equivalent equals 39.63. These student years equivalent are in addition to the 81 years expected to be realized from the resident trainee component of the project by December 31, 1981.

43 percent of the current group of 34 trainees will be resettled, the program cost for each of the 35 resettled trainees will be \$43,457.<sup>1, 2</sup> Given that the fully distributed cost of one year of university education in a major land grant U.S. university is only \$9,905,<sup>3</sup> these GOIC cost figures are astoundingly high. Even using the total annual costs incurred by AID/W in fiscal year (FY) 1982 for stateside participant training programs (including all transport, overhead costs for USAID, USDA, and the appropriate university, student tuition and fees, a clothing allowance and stipend, etc.) of approximately \$25,000, the GOIC costs per student trained end up being extremely high because it is a local program and includes few of the amenities and services offered as part of the USAID participant training program.

The funding of the project, while inadequate on the whole, was provided to OICI behind schedule by AID/W, especially in 1980/81 (see Annex 7). These funding delays created serious problems for OICI management and for the TCT. They also created cost increases as, for example, when commodities could not be purchased when needed, only

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<sup>1</sup>The total project cost used in these calculations was \$1.521 million. This value was arrived at by depreciating the center's buildings and drilled well over 20 years and all its equipment over 7 years. The annual costs thus developed were then added to the remaining project costs in accordance with the actual number of years they were incurred during the life of the project. Thus four years of depreciation (\$27,000 per year) were included for all equipment and two years (\$7,400 per year) for all buildings and the drilled well.

<sup>2</sup>Based on an equivalent of 260 days of instruction per student year, the cost per student equivalent year counting the COP outreach program would fall from \$18,778 to \$12,609.

<sup>3</sup>For the University of Maryland, College Park Campus. Their costs include all university-related costs (buildings, maintenance, staff salaries, etc.) for FY82 divided by the university's total number of student equivalent years (three semesters).

to later be rushed to the site at additional cost to meet training and farm production schedules.

#### 4. Project implementation and management

##### a. OICI

As noted earlier in this chapter, there were numerous positive and negative aspects to OICI's implementation and management of the project. The negatives outweighed the positives, resulting in very limited project success. Particular negative aspects of OICI's implementation and management of the project included:

- o Lack of technical experience in agriculture;
- o Poor choice of initial TCT members;
- o Inadequate project design and budgeting resulting primarily from inexperience in The Gambia;
- o Emphasis on mechanization as a major aspect of the project;
- o Poor recruitment, resettlement, and follow-on efforts for trainees;
- o Location of the center in an area and under the aegis of a principal founder when both were high risk options in political terms;
- o Isolation of the program from other institutions and failure to accommodate some participant needs such as stipends because of OICI's "philosophy".
- o Cutbacks on TCT inputs to enable other aspects of the program to go forward;
- o Mixing of conflicting objectives in the same project; and
- o Difficulties in relating to the GOIC Board of Directors and, in some cases, to local GOIC staff

In the main, the above elements were under the control of OICI. And the project was initiated, designed, budgeted, and implemented

by OICI. OICI's failure to achieve more in the way of project success, given all other relevant factors, rests primarily with it, not with other agencies or with the imposition of too many other factors outside OICI's control.

b. AID

AID, in Washington and Banjul, was a major factor in causing the project to fail. Having funded the set-up of OICI itself and then OICI's identification of projects in Africa (of which GOIC was one), it did little to assure The Gambia project was well designed or appropriately funded. In that OICI had little international experience, little agricultural experience, and little project design experience, USAID's uncritical stance was a disservice to OICI and to The Gambia as well. This same lack of stringent questioning of OICI by AID enabled the mechanization aspect of the project to be added after the original design was approved. Likewise, AID's late funding of the project in recent years (see Annex 7) created difficult circumstances for OICI and GOIC. Finally, AID/Gambia's growing disenchantment with OICI's performance led to inadequate communication and lack of quality working relationships between AID/Gambia and OICI. As a result, AID/Gambia took no action to assist nor to ensure a definite ending of the OICI-implemented project as the project ran further and further into trouble. This ambivalent and unclear stance regarding OICI by AID/Gambia has been especially problematical with respect to OICI's proposed follow-on project. AID/Gambia's failure to communicate clearly, definitively, and early regarding OICI's implementation of this prospective follow-on project led to grave uncertainty and morale problems at GOIC, to resentment within the GOTG, and to anger at OICI.

c. GOTG

The GOTG contributed to the failure of the project in several important ways. It did not provide the inputs included in the project design (counterpart personnel) and as tacitly agreed upon with OICI (buildings, resettlement assistance). It did not provide institutional support. And, most importantly, it politicized the project to such a degree that its entire management structure had to be reconstituted to satisfy GOTG demands. And, even though such a costly move has just been completed, the GOTG is now suggesting further alterations of the management structure for any follow-on project. As a result, it has not included the current GOIC management (the MC) in its deliberations regarding a follow-on project.

Like AID/Gambia, the GOTG has not been definitive about the type of follow-on project it desires. Although asked by AID/Gambia to proffer its views about such a project, it has been reluctant and slow to do so, insisting upon AID/Gambia's detailed response first. Having received such a response, the GOTG has chosen a mechanism (a secret Cabinet Paper) to determine its own mind. This makes early collaboration and discussion of its desired project impossible and any GOTG decision regarding such a project virtually non-negotiable. These actions, while aimed primarily at the future, have detrimentally affected GOIC's morale and effectiveness in the past and continue to do so at present.

d. Local people

Local villagers and others made major positive contributions to the implementation of the project in proportion to their means. Of importance, too, they did nothing to confound project implementation.

#### D. Conclusions

- o The GOIC has failed to achieve its original project goal, purpose, and outputs in substantial measure. The shortfall in each of these areas is apparent and serious. At bottom, based on the original project design and accounting for all subsequent changes in it, the project must be judged to be a failure on all major counts. In particular, its costs per student trained and per student resettled are very high.
- o Many extenuating circumstances explain the poor performance of the project, but in the main, the critical mistakes that brought about these circumstances and caused the project to fail can be laid at the doorstep of OICI. Inexperience in agriculture and The Gambia, lack of technical competence and astute management, poor choice of some technical staff, inadequate selection of equipment for training (the Gravely tractors), too much "philosophy" (e.g., no stipends) at the expense of flexibility needed to accommodate another culture, and the inability to establish needed linkages are cases in point.
- o The GOIC was over managed and undersupported financially and under managed strategically by OICI. This led to constraints affecting project performance and allowed major tactical and strategic mistakes which detrimentally affected project performance too.
- o OICI's approach and philosophy has detrimentally affected project performance and continues to do so. This is obviously something a funding agency "buys" when selecting OICI, but serious attention should be given to the applicability of the approach before and during any project. In this case, OICI's view that it had a better or special way of doing things tended to reinforce GOIC's isolation from the GOTG and from other agencies and training/research centers. It also resulted in forcing a participatory mentality upon some persons as in the case of refusing to grant stipends to trainees.
- o USAID was also a major contributing factor in causing the project to fail. Its funding delays, lack of critical assessment and assistance in correcting the initial project design, unwillingness to commit the resources needed for the project to succeed as circumstances changed and even as mistakes were made, and its continued dalliance as the project ran further and further into trouble are examples.
- o The GOTG also contributed to the failure of the project by its lack of political, financial, and institutional support and by its insistence upon changing the rules of the game with respect to the structure of the project for political reasons.
- o Local villagers made major positive contributions (in proportion to their means) to the project while not adding to its woes.

- o The OICI and GOIC staffs were and are strongly committed to the project, and they labored diligently to use the skills, resources, and experiences they had to make the project a success. They made many, some foolish, mistakes. Only by their resolve, spirit, and by dint of extra effort were they able to recoup as much as has been achieved by the project. Had the project, under identical circumstances, been operated by any agency or group who looked upon their work merely as a job, not nearly as much would have been accomplished as has been by GOIC.
- o The core successful accomplishments of the project, very limited though they are, are valuable and provide something to build upon in a new project. This core is primarily the Chamen site, the existing staff and "systems," the few successfully resettled trainees, the community outreach effort, and the strong support of local villages and individuals. Much of value would be lost if this core of benefits is allowed to dissolve. Central to this conclusion is that enough successful resettled trainees exist to suggest that the concept of providing school leavers with basic agricultural skills and resettling them as farmers and nominal change agents has merit. By applying what has been learned already and what has been missing in the project to date--e.g., better selection, resettlement assistance, strong trainee follow-up, and a better technical package--the success rate of such an effort can be improved.
- o The cost effectiveness of a training program that concentrates on school leavers or youth alone is inadequate. The intent (target group) of such programs should be greatly broadened to include existing farmers and change agents too.
- o The "community-based" approach to project implementation and management (a MC or governing board and close ties to it and other local non-governmental people) is viable in The Gambia. Such an approach has not worked well in the GOIC project, but is still a viable means for carrying out a follow-on project, even one that deals extensively with reaching existing farmers and extension workers. It retains flexibility, assures close attention from high level people on the governing board, etc. To be effective in a follow-on project, however, this approach must diverge from OICI philosophy to fit local conditions as necessary. It must also be able to attract requisite GOTG financial support, establish linkages with various other training programs and agencies, etc.
- o The fact that some graduated trainees do not farm should not be viewed as a problem. Certain of these trainees contribute measurably to other agricultural endeavors and those who do not still add to the country's skill bank and output via other productive employment.
- o A program such as GOIC's should transfer technology and result in measurably better farmers, and Devres' observations suggests it does in some cases. However, resettled trainees appear not to show greater productivity than other village farmers according to AID/Gambia's earlier research (see Annex 5). More evaluative work apparently must be done to verify one viewpoint or the other.

IV. DECIDING WHETHER TO BEGIN A FOLLOW-ON PROJECT:  
THE CENTRAL PROBLEM AND RELATED KEY ISSUES

A. Brief History of the Follow-On Project Idea

1. OICI

OICI began formally considering a follow-on project to the current GOIC effort with the initiation of its feasibility study in March 1981. It was carried out, however, in accordance with the implementation plan of its AID centrally funded OICI institutional support grant. Thus, the idea for such a follow-on project was informally entertained by OICI and AID/Washington much earlier than the beginning of OICI's feasibility effort in The Gambia.

The follow-on project idea was entertained by OICI and AID/Washington despite the severe difficulties experienced in successfully launching the initial GOIC project and despite AID/Gambia's reservations about the efficacy of the initial GOIC project prior to OICI's March 1981 feasibility study effort.

The nature and magnitude of the difficulties with the initial GOIC project were understood and generally accepted by OICI and the GOTG, as indicated in their prior mid-term evaluation of the project and in the terms of reference formulated for their joint feasibility study.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>The terms of reference were as follows:

- o To ascertain the relevancy of the program;
- o To redesign the project, if necessary;
- o To critically evaluate present deficiencies and make recommendations;
- o To assess the project impact on the local community; and
- o To develop and design a proposal with significant input from GOTG and USAID/Gambia that would be mutually agreeable to all parties.

AID/Gambia also made its concerns known to the feasibility study team as reported by the team in the study document<sup>1</sup> and evidenced in AID/Gambia's internal files.

While the team reportedly had "no preconceived ideas or solutions," the phrasing of the last element in its scope of work and subsequent events strongly suggest it was intent upon preparing a proposal despite the serious problems of the past and AID/Gambia's lukewarm response to the existing and prospective projects.

## 2. GOTG

The GOTG participated fully in the feasibility study effort at the working level. This high degree of involvement and the lack of any alternative response to the feasibility study by the GOTG suggested that it accepted and approved the follow-on project as presented by the feasibility study team. The GOTG's response in meetings to consider the follow-on project also suggested this. However, as noted later in this report, the GOTG (as of this writing) is composing a Cabinet level response that differs from the feasibility study project primarily because of AID/Gambia's negative response to the OICI feasibility study.

## 3. AID

In general, AID/Gambia supported or at least acquiesced in the follow-on project idea being pursued by OICI and the GOTG. AID/Washington funded an institutional strengthening grant for OICI that included the idea of and funding for a feasibility study for a follow-on project to the GOIC effort.

<sup>1</sup> Mannings, et al., Report of the Gambia OIC Feasibility Study, March 2, 1981 to April 2, 1981, (Philadelphia: OICI, 1981), pp. 11-111.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

AID/Gambia appears to have participated gingerly in the follow-on project idea. However, it never actively opposed the idea of a follow-on project to be carried out by OICI and funded by AID despite its serious concerns about the GOIC project to date and about OICI's institutional capacity to improve on its performance. Nor did AID/Gambia react clearly or strongly to the follow-on project as proposed in the feasibility study until a point in time when both the OICI and the GOTG had generally and rightfully interpreted AID/Gambia's non-response as a positive one.<sup>1</sup> Moreover, when AID/Gambia finally did oppose the OICI feasibility study follow-on project verbally, it did so in such a way that the problem being addressed was unclear to both OICI and the GOTG. In fact, AID/Gambia was dissatisfied with the OICI and GOTG feasibility study proposal and believed it to be predominantly an OICI effort (which is a fair assessment of the situation). Thus, AID/Gambia strongly suggested the GOTG "come up with some ideas of its own" for a follow-on project. The GOTG, however, refused to do so until AID/Gambia responded to the feasibility study proposal and set out its own ideas of what should be done.

The subsequent written response from AID/Gambia to the GOTG (see Annex 8) indicated that its concerns with the feasibility study proposal were legion: The project purpose (training school leavers) was wrong, its community-based thrust and accompanying organization and management were inappropriate, and the need for any OICI involvement in a follow-on project unlikely.

<sup>1</sup>AID/Gambia did raise numerous questions in writing for consideration by the feasibility study team. OICI and the GOTG believed that in dealing with these issues as part of the feasibility study they had also dealt with AID/Gambia's concerns. AID/Gambia's later response to the feasibility study proposal shows that this belief by OICI and the GOTG was erroneous.

Coming very late in the process and challenging as much of the OICI and GOTG thinking to date as it did, AID/Gambia's specific response to the feasibility study proposal created "resentment"<sup>1</sup> in government circles and angered OICI.<sup>2</sup> While AID/Gambia had been tentative about the follow-on project being proposed by OICI and the GOTG, it had never openly and strongly opposed the suggested project. Arguably, then, OICI and the GOTG felt, upon receipt of AID/Gambia's response, that they had been "led down the primrose path" and now, at the end, were being dictated to by AID. OICI, of course, had the most to lose in that AID/Gambia's response might cut them out of any follow-on project altogether and deeply undermine the basic tenets of the "OICI philosophy and approach."

Procedurally, AID/Gambia in its written response regarding the feasibility study requested the GOTG to discuss AID's option or to propose others it might want considered. The response of the GOTG has been to have the MANR staff develop a Cabinet decision paper which is now awaiting the signature of the Minister of MANR. Although the text of this Cabinet decision paper could not be obtained for this report, the essence of the GOTG's proposal for a follow-on project resembles that suggested by AID/Gambia. (What is known about the GOTG proposal is presented in Chapter VI of this report.)

D. THE PROBLEM

The above circumstances pose one central problem for resolution among all the parties involved, namely: Shall there be a follow-on project and, if so, what shall it be?

<sup>1</sup>The term used by more than one GOTG official.

<sup>2</sup>See OICI's rejoinder to AID/Gambia's response to its feasibility study in Annex 9.

AID/Gambia indicates it is willing to fund a follow-on project if one acceptable to it and the GOTG can be developed. Whether or not OICI would or should be involved in such a project is, from AID's viewpoint, a completely open question.

The GOTG desires a follow-on project, but has not yet put forward its own ideas as to what the main elements of such a project might be. At bottom, the GOTG is flexible and appears to date to be attempting to determine exactly what AID/Gambia wants (and would be willing to fund) so it can formulate its proposal accordingly.

OICI strongly desires a follow-on project that reflects the current thrust of GOIC and that would retain OICI as the implementing agency. Thus, while OICI is open to certain changes in its feasibility study project design, it would not be amenable to implementing a GOTG project fully integrated into and controlled by a line GOTG ministry. Moreover, OICI is unwilling at this point to exit the Gambia scene gracefully should AID/Gambia and the GOTG propose (1) to use the GOIC complex as part of a project at odds with OICI's basic development philosophy and (2) to end OICI's involvement when the current project is completed on December 31, 1981.

Five key issues are related to this central problem. They are: (1) the target group of any new project, (2) its timing with respect to the existing project, (3) the organization and management to be used in the new project, (4) the agency to be selected to implement the new project, and (5) the extent of funding to be put forth by the GOTG for such a project. Each of these issues is discussed briefly in the section that follows in order to provide a broad framework for assessing the follow-on projects suggested by OICI, AID/Gambia, and GOTG in Chapters V and VI.

They are also important in reviewing the follow-on project recommended in Chapter VII and the suggested steps for AID/Gambia, the GOTG, and OICI included in Chapter VIII.

### C. Issues

#### 1. Target Group

The basic issue with respect to the target group of any follow-on project is whether it should retain the training of school leavers (or other youth)<sup>1</sup> as its centerpiece or make the training of existing farmers its main purpose. Both approaches would include some pre- and in-service training for extension workers,<sup>2</sup> and the former would include some work directly with existing farmers. Thus, while a mix of different kinds of training could be undertaken at the GOIC center in a follow-on project, the basic issue is still whether to emphasize youth or existing farmers in such a project. The basic arguments for and against both approaches are presented below.

#### a. Training of school leavers

The pros of training school leavers include:

- o The large number of school leavers or youth in the Gambia without further opportunity for training or employment is a major social, political, and economic problem that this approach deals with directly.
- o Creates skilled and employable persons from among those who are unskilled and basically unemployable. In this way, this approach also deals directly with the unemployment problem of The Gambia, especially among its rural youth.

<sup>1</sup>School leavers and youth are used here to mean the same target group of youth who are not independent and who are not experienced in farming on their own. In fact, youth who have little or no schooling at all are probably better recruits for the project than school leavers. The latter are less likely to return to farming in their local village.

<sup>2</sup>The latter option, however, would include much more of this kind of training.

- o Provides a unique and important channel of upward mobility for one of society's disadvantaged groups, whether by resettling a trainee as a farmer or by providing confidence and skills to be used productively in other employment.
- o Emphasizes the importance of agricultural production and provides skills and technologies that enable selected persons to be more productive in the agricultural sector.
- o Training school leavers can be the core, or central thread, of a much expanded training center program that includes dealing extensively with existing farmers (demonstrations, day-long short courses, village outreach, etc.) and with pre- and in-service training for extension agents. The trainee's year-long crop and livestock activities, for example, could be the basis for much of the work undertaken with these other groups at the center.
- o Existing local staff at the Chamen center already have substantial experience in dealing with youth which would be lost if this aspect of the program was abandoned.
- o There is strong community support for the current project's provision of skills and jobs for school leavers and for its emphasis on community-center joint participation and mutual benefits. Additional opportunities for one's children where few, if any, existed before are very important to the local communities affected.
- o Rural youth, when properly selected for training and appropriately assisted in their resettlement, are the type of persons who can be retrained in rural areas as productive members of their villages and divisions.

The cons of training school leavers are:

- o This approach is too expensive; the most efficient use of resources is not to train non-farming youth to be farmers because they make too little impact per dollar spent in training them on overall agricultural production.
- o Youth do not generate enough spread effects with their skills, new techniques, and the other benefits they obtain in their training.
- o School leavers from the existing GOIC program do not outperform other farmers in their village or exceed national average output levels. Thus, it appears their training does not transfer much new technology. Rather,

it merely makes them better farmers than they would be if they were not trained.

- o Many school leavers trained in the GOIC program do not farm. While some end up in jobs off the farm that use their GOIC garnered skills, others obtain jobs in which they use their agricultural expertise little, if at all.
- o Lack of adequate agricultural output is a more fundamental problem than unemployment or political unrest caused by young school leavers or other youth without jobs or training opportunities.
- o Existing farmers are more concerned about improving their own skills and output levels than about the opportunities for training available to their school leaver sons and daughters.
- o The school leaver approach is not easy to institutionalize or to fund because it does not fit readily within an existing GOTG structure. MANR would emphasize the agricultural aspects of the program while the Ministry of Education would emphasize its school leaver and educational aspect.

b. Training of existing farmers

The pros of training existing farmers include:

- o This approach provides the maximum spread effects from the project by reaching more farmers directly. It thus has a more direct impact on the problem of insufficient agricultural production in The Gambia.
- o This is a more efficient approach to enhance agricultural output because it emphasizes working with those already farming; can concentrate on the most productive farmers, teaching them skills and technologies; and reaches more people.
- o The training of existing farmers is easier to institutionalize and fund within existing governmental structures.
- o This approach is supported by MANR and AID/Gambia.
- o Linkages between the Chamen center and other governmental institutions carrying out similar and related activities would be easier to create because of their affinity of purpose and, if the center is operated as a GOTG institution, because of the various meetings and institutional relationships created in the natural course of GOTG activity.

The cons of training existing farmers include:

- o This approach does not deal directly with community needs such as unemployed youth, school leaver training opportunities, and rural-urban drift.
- o As proposed by the GOTG and AID/Gambia, this approach would be a GOTG-to-people one, fully controlled and operated by a GOTG Ministry. This is very likely to result in a bureaucratic, inflexible, and unmotivated institution which will not provide the high-quality performance needed in such circumstances.
- o Training existing farmers to the exclusion of school leavers would eliminate the benefits of the current effort: experienced staff, a good curriculum, standard operating procedures, community goodwill, resettlement, follow-up, etc.
- o This approach, due to paperwork requirements associated with a non-PVO implemented project and with such a distinctly different project concept, would ensure a large gap in time between the existing project and the new one. The loss of staff, momentum, and community goodwill would be serious.

## 2. GOTG organization and management of a follow-on project

The central issue with respect to GOTG organization and management of a follow-on project is whether it will continue to utilize a community-based (or national) management committee or will fully integrate the project and its management as a line operation of a GOTG ministry.

### a. Pros and cons of a community-based management committee

#### (1) Pros

- o Such a committee already exists and can be moved into a follow-on project so as to effectively retain the momentum and whatever benefits have been created by the existing project.
- o The management committee approach would result in more local character, interaction, and non-governmental community support.
- o A management committee places senior people closer to the institution and makes it more important in their list of priorities; to the degree MC members represent relevant agencies, they will assist the project in establishing the linkages required to enhance its effectiveness.

- o This approach will be more flexible, adaptive, and aggressive in meeting the needs of all those being trained and of the surrounding community--the opposite of a bureaucratic structure.

(2) Cons

- o A management committee system will provide less GOTG control (especially direct day-to-day control) of the center.
- o A management committee structure has less likelihood of obtaining GOTG support and funding at completely adequate levels; such an institution, even though under the jurisdiction of a GOTG ministry, will not have the same status in that ministry as it would if directly managed by the ministry itself. Also, a management committee will not have the same degree of power within the ministry to cope with problems or to compete for resources.
- o This approach is more likely to result in the project and its training center remaining isolated from similar and related GOTG institutions and activities.

b. Pros and cons of direct control and management by a GOTG ministry

The pros and cons of the integration of a follow-on project into a GOTG ministry are essentially the reverse of the above pros and cons for the management committee approach.

3. Timing

The basic issue with respect to the timing of a follow-on project, if any, is whether it should begin immediately upon the termination of the existing project (December 31, 1981) or whether a gap in time between the end of the existing project and the beginning of the follow-on project should be allowed.

In part, this issue will be resolved by the decision regarding the target group of any follow-on project. If the target group is such that the current

GOIC approach and local staff are not essential to the follow-on project, a gap in time will not be of critical import. In fact, such a gap is unavoidable given the long lead time necessary to fully prepare and fund a unique project proposal. However, if the school leaver and community-based approach of the current project is retained as an important aspect of a follow-on project, the prospect of a lapse in funding and gap in time between the existing and the follow-on project is of major import.

The issue is also impacted by the decision regarding GOTG organization and management of the project. If the GOTG retains a MC structure and a community-based approach, the possibility of rapid funding of OICI or another PVO to help implement the project is a possibility via the OPG mechanism. If the GOTG itself is to implement a governmentally controlled project, the preparation and funding of such an option will necessarily lead to a gap in time and funding between projects.

a. Pros and cons of an immediate follow-on project

The pros and cons of beginning a follow-up project without a lapse in time and funding are:

(1) Pros

- o Retains existing center staff, procedures, momentum, infrastructure, and community relationships intact.
- o Avoids problems within the local community of the loss of about 24 jobs, of the appearance of GOTG and AID/Gambia indecision, and of their removal of a community based and accepted program without community consultation.

(2) Cons

- o Requires a rapid decision to retain the staff, basic program thrust, and community-based nature of the GOIC program. This creates pressure for a decision

before all parties are comfortable with and agreed upon one solution.

- o Implies that OICI program has been successful and that there is a role for OICI in the follow-on project. In fact, to avoid a gap between the existing project and any follow-on project, OICI may have to be involved due to the time lags associated with non-OPG types of funding mechanisms.

b. pros and cons of a lapse in time

The pros and cons of allowing a lapse in time between the existing project and a follow-on one include:

(1) Pros

- o Enables more deliberation before a final decision is made regarding any follow-on project.
- o Avoids a decision to retain present GOIC staff and project thrust and any pressure to keep OICI involved in the project as a matter of expediency; creates a clean slate for GOTG and AID/Gambia.

(2) Cons

- o Loses most of momentum, spirit, and benefits built up by existing project; as GOIC staff dissipates, much of the center's current effectiveness will disappear with it.
- o Likely to create problems of an economic and possibly a political nature in the Chamen/Farafenni area because of staff lay-offs, morale problems, and lack of community involvement in a decision to close down a community-based project.

4. Implementation

The issue with respect to the implementation of any follow-on project is whether OICI or another organization (local PVO, etc.) or agency [AID Personal Services Contract (PSC), GOTC, etc.] should implement it.

Several facts are relevant in the consideration of this issue.

First, OICI has indicated it is not interested in implementing just "any"

project. Rather, that project must be congruent with its overall philosophy (especially a community-based approach) and should encompass the thrust and achievements of its existing GOIC project. In essence, OICI would be willing to implement a follow-on project only if the existing project (staff, school leaver approach--as at least part of the new project--and the management committee concept) was incorporated within it. OICI may be willing to sustain its GOIC effort while a follow-on project is prepared and then terminate its involvement in The Gambia, but this is not a certainty.

Second, OICI's poor performance in implementing the existing project must be fully accounted for in considering its role in a second project. What type of follow-on project is anticipated? Given all the circumstances (extenuating and otherwise) of the GOIC project, could the use of OICI to help implement such a follow-on project be justified on its merits? Or would the use of OICI be only an expedient move to rapidly resolve the immediate funding requirements of a follow-on project and to avoid possible "political" interventions by OICI in Washington and The Gambia?

Third, AID/Gambia can speedily fund an OPG, whether for a U.S.-based or local FVO. Other types of follow-on project funding require more paperwork and more time to finalize.

Fourth, the choice of implementing agency will strongly impact upon the current GOIC project. Selecting OICI to assist with a follow-on project would provide an institutional memory and retain the staff, current momentum, and core bundle of benefits that have accrued from the current GOIC project. Using any other implementing mechanism would dilute the accrued benefits of the existing GOIC project in some measure. On the

other hand, assuming a new follow-on project would entail much more than a school leavers program and more technical agriculture as well, OICI's capacity (which has led only to a minimal core of the benefits originally envisioned from its current effort) may be too limited to handle the expanded assignment.

The pros and cons of using OICI and other implementing agencies are briefly presented below.

a. Pros and cons of using OICI

(1) Pros

- o Enables maximum continuity, if desired, between the two projects.
- o OICI's TCT experience in developing a project in The Gambia and in the type of training desired probably exceeds that of other possible non-governmental implementing agencies, including most Personal Services Contract possibilities.
- o The GOTG and the current MC support some involvement by OICI in a follow-on project, if one is forthcoming.
- o Utilizing OICI as the implementing agency enables funding of a follow-on project to occur in the shortest possible time. (Other PVOs theoretically could be funded in as short a time, but substantially more discussion, etc. would be required to involve a new PVO at this stage.)
- o OICI has a program advisor in The Gambia at present who is prepared, if agreed to by AID/Gambia and the GOTG, to remain and assist in implementing a follow-on project acceptable to OICI. This would eliminate the time lag necessary to recruit such a person by another implementing agency.
- o Selecting OICI as the implementing agency would avoid the potential of political hassles instigated by OICI in Washington and The Gambia--e.g., possible attempts to reverse a decision not to use OICI and the potential that OICI would not cooperate in enabling AID/Gambia and the GOTG to use the Chamen complex for their desired ends.

(2) Cons

- o OICI's inadequate performance in the GOIC project would arguably be passed along to the follow-on project.
- o OICI has only a limited capacity to implement agricultural programs similar to that contemplated for the follow-on project. An expanded follow-on project is arguably beyond its capacity to assist effectively. Moreover, at issue is exactly what support is purchased for the Gambia project by paying for OICI Philadelphia involvement (via indirect costs).
- o The basic value in using OICI is that it will avoid a time lapse between the GOIC project and a follow-on project, yet this pressure to decide regarding OICI now is a definite disadvantage of the OICI option.
- o Other options are available to achieve project implementation that should be fully explored before deciding to utilize OICI. Given the limited capacity of OICI in Philadelphia to implement an expanded follow-on project in technical agriculture, these other options are likely to be more effective than OICI in achieving project success. Moreover, some options could put staff on the job in The Gambia quickly, thus eliminating one of the basic pros of using OICI.
- o OICI is an option to implement a follow-on project only if the project carries on with most of the elements of the existing GOIC project.
- o OICI Philadelphia (as contrasted to GOIC), for a variety of reasons, has a poor working relationship with AID/Gambia which is a fundamental weakness in any prospective OICI implementation role in a follow-up project.

b. Pros and cons of using other implementing mechanisms

This option allows possibilities for implementing assistance such as utilizing a local PVO, using a PSC, or using the GOIC directly.

(1) Pros

- o Will obtain greater capacity to implement an expanded agricultural training project.
- o Are available to implement whatever program is agreed upon by the GOTG and AID/Gambia; can be put on the job quickly in some cases, thus minimizing any break in continuity between the current project and the new follow-on project.
- o Reduces (at least in a visible manner) the overhead expenses of OICI in some cases.
- o Do not have to decide now or quickly to utilize one or the other of these possibilities unless it is desirable to do so.
- o Likely to attain a better AID/Gambia-implementing agency relationship than that now prevailing between AID/Gambia and OICI.

(2) Cons

- o More likely to break the continuity between the GOIC project and a follow-on project and would diminish continuity to some degree in any event.
- o Would mean, in most cases, starting over again with an unknown entity (agency/organization and individuals) in implementing a follow-on project. The end result could be better than OICI, but there is no guarantee of this.
- o A follow-on project could not, in most instances, be funded as rapidly if this option is selected and if OICI was chosen.
- o A new implementing agency/organization is less likely to generate as much community support and participation as OICI, at least initially.

5. GOTG financial support of a follow-on project

The issue is whether the GOTG should financially support a follow-on project in a substantial or minimal way. As proposed in OICI's feasibility study and reportedly in the GOTG's draft Cabinet Paper, the GOTG would provide D 380,000 for a follow-on project, all of it coming in the last year of the

project. This would amount to slightly over 11 percent of OICI's proposed budget.<sup>1</sup> The assumption behind this proposed funding is that the GOTG would, in the very next year after the follow-on project is completed, pick up the total cost of the project, an annual amount of about \$260,000 (D 520.000) without accounting for inflation.

Another funding option would be for the GOTG to pick up more of the cost of any follow-on project, beginning with lower annual funding at first and increasing its contribution as the end of the project neared. This would help ensure AID/Gambia of the GOTG's commitment to the project as it goes along and would also assure that the GOTG grows used to the recurrent cost burden which the follow-on project will impose upon it when AID/Gambia funding ceases.

The pros and cons of these different funding options are presented briefly below:

a. Pros and cons of limited and late GOTG funding for a follow-on project

(1) Pros

- o Makes it easier for the GOTG to agree to the project.
- o Provides GOTG with more time to prepare to bear the entire cost of the project.
- o Provides better assurance of adequate funding for the life of the project due to AID/Gambia taking on the bulk of the financing.
- o Avoids AID/Gambia-GOIC hassles that might ensue if the GOTG proves to be reluctant to put up project money every year in a timely fashion.

(2) Cons

- o GOTG will provide less commitment and attention to the project.

<sup>1</sup>Mannings, p. 75.

- o Financial burden of the project hits the GOTG all at once.
- o The AID/Gambia phase-out/GOTG phase-in would be more difficult since the GOTG would be picking up responsibility for the project all at once.

b. Pros and cons of larger and increasing GOTG funding for a follow-on project

(1) Pros

- o A large and increasing financial contribution by the GOTG would prove the Government's commitment to the project for AID/Gambia and AID/Washington.
- o Such a financial contribution would help guarantee that the GOTG will give substantial attention to the project during its implementation.
- o This option gets the GOTG used to the financial burden of a follow-on project gradually, but in increasing proportion to the ultimate burden to be imposed by the project.
- o This approach, by the last year of the follow-on project, will help assure a smoother transition between AID/Gambia and the GOTG in financing and managing the project.

(2) Cons

The cons are essentially the reverse of the pros for the limited and late GOTG funding option above.

These issues form a backdrop for the analysis and discussion presented in Chapters V, VI, VII, and VIII which follow. Chapter V assesses OICI's feasibility study in the light of these five key issues and other considerations as well. Chapter VI considers AID/Gambia and GOTG suggestions for a follow-on project, again with reference to these key issues. Chapter VII recommends a follow-on project and related actions that specifically deal with and recommend resolutions for each of these issues. In Chapter VIII, next steps for AID/Gambia, the GOTG, and OICI are suggested, assuming the recommendations in Chapter VII are accepted.

V. ASSESSMENT OF OICI FEASIBILITY  
STUDY AS A FOLLOW-ON PROJECT

A. Brief Project Description

The project would develop and institutionalize a GOIC Rural Training and Demonstration Center to train young farmers and school leavers (via a resident program) as well as persons in selected villages (through a community outreach program) in practical agricultural skills. The trainees would be settled as farmers and in jobs where they would use their skills to improve their own economic situation and that of the rural people of The Gambia. The logframe for the proposed project is included as Annex 10.

B. Design Considerations

The design of the proposed project is weak in numerous respects. The goal is vague, as are the proposed measures of goal achievement. For example, the design fails to establish a baseline for these measures and for the technical situation of would-be trainees. Nor does it specify the technical content for the proposed training program that would enable this baseline to be exceeded.

The purpose is made reasonably clear by the conditions that would reflect an appropriate EOPS, but several of these conditions are not as specific as necessary, even when the entire document is read. As one example, the range of linkages to be established with various organizations reflects a shotgun approach which includes many "interesting" ideas but

not a well thought out plan. Moreover, the content of the linkages to be established is not clearly specified. If the project is allowed to go forward, the implementors would essentially have to begin from scratch to determine which linkages to pursue and why.

Output definitions also lack specificity in the design. Trained MC members, for example, is one output, but the study gives no details as to what kind of training is needed, how it might be done, and exactly what "output" is expected. Likewise, the output of "Board development sessions" is completely unspecified in the proposal.

The project's output-purpose-goal linkages are confusing. Most outputs (e.g., trained students) are not related to the purpose (institutionalization) and the purpose is only tangentially related to the goal as stated. In particular, the specified conditions that will indicate the purpose has been attained are little related to most of the project outputs.

These design faults may appear superficial at first glance, but they are serious. Moreover, these faults relate only to the project as proposed; that is, the design problems noted above assume that the basic structure and intent of the project as already laid out is satisfactory. As noted in the section below, however, not only is the extant design internally inadequate, it also leaves out much of what must be included to assure an appropriate and potentially successful project.

### C. Overall Project Content

The feasibility study project adopts the goal of improving economic conditions for rural Gambian people. Measures of goal achievement are increased per capita income for rural farmers. increased farming skills

and land area in production, and diversification of sources of agricultural output and income. Trying to achieve this goal via the training and resettling of 144 school leavers and the training of 240 village farmers over a four-year period is an unbalanced matching of outputs (to purpose) to goal. Moreover, as with the current GOIC project, the input-output relationships are inappropriate.

If the stated goal of the project is to be achieved to the maximum degree possible, every aspect of the inputs of the project should be geared to producing project outputs which demonstrably impact efficiently upon the desired purpose and goal. Even assuming each trainee becomes a top-flight farmer, the project as currently designed does not exhibit this characteristic. It does not because it directly violates the cardinal principle of all training programs--have a measurable objective and design a program which will achieve it at least cost.

To satisfy this principle in the context of the goal selected for the project, one must do three things:

- o Design and carry out a training program that provides demonstrable and highly profitable solutions to the real problems faced by farmers in their own farming situation;
- o Bring this training program together with the best and most committed existing farmers one can find, either directly or indirectly (via change agents); and
- o Devise and implement teaching and follow-up methodologies and environments that assure farmers will understand, will be able to use, and will actually use the new knowledge being made available in her/his own farming situation.

The feasibility study suggests changing the current curriculum to be even more practical, but it does not emphasize improving the technical package to be conveyed. Given that the content of the current GOIC curriculum does not always result in demonstrable production increases by

graduate trainees (see Annex 5), its improvement must be a central feature of any new project. The proposed design must be changed so as to emphasize the development and teaching of a proven technical package--one that does contribute to the project goal.

The feasibility study does not give enough emphasis to reaching a maximum number of persons already well qualified as farmers. Nor does it include an adequate component of change agent training.

Finally, the study does not, in light of the performance of the GOIC project upon which it draws, give adequate attention to the problem of effectively conveying the selected technical package to all of the above groups. Specific teaching methods as well as a strategy for efficiently conveying or carrying the selected technical package to as many existing farmers as possible so that they can and will effectively use it must be included as part of the project.

This would involve working with many GOTG and non-government change agents--extension workers, CDS staff, informal education personnel, PVO staff, etc.--to "train trainers" so as to enable even more farmers to be exposed to the technical package. It also would require close substantive and programmatic links with agricultural research stations, other training centers (governmental and non-governmental), and formal educational institutions. The proposed teaching methods would have to be expanded to include pedagogical devices other than the informal approach and actual performance of the required production practices used now by the GOIC. All of these elements need to be detailed and added to the feasibility study to create an effective and desired project.

These additions to the OICI feasibility study do not suggest or require that school leavers and other young farmers not be trained in the

manner suggested. They do, however, indicate that a COP and the training of resident school leavers alone are not the basis for an adequate project.

#### D. Technical Considerations

##### 1. Content

The basic technical package as included in the current GOIC curriculum and as altered in the feasibility study appears to include content relevant to the kind of trainees anticipated and the conditions that will prevail on the ground. As noted above, however, there is evidence that this content is not always effective when applied by graduate trainees in their own villages. Unless this problem is solved, there is little value in the training program, no matter who is trained. Thus, a critical (but now missing) aspect of the project must be the identification of a technical package that, when taught to trainees, farmers, and others and applied by them under "field conditions," will result in substantially greater output, income, etc. than would be the case if it was not used.

##### 2. Training procedures

The training procedures proposed for resident trainees appear to be appropriate. A balance should always be sought between classroom and practical instruction, however, based on the individual and group skill levels of trainees.

The "slowness" and high cost of learning resulting from having students actually carry out a season of farming tasks on a small plot is a worrisome aspect of the method proposed. Every effort should be made to speed the pace and increase the amount of training offered by intersticing as many subjects as possible between the various field tasks that must be carried out in the farming of the demonstration plots.

Some linkages dealing with training approaches and methods are mentioned in the feasibility study. This would be an important aspect of the project as proposed. The informal educational experience of the Ministry of Education and the self-help experience of the Ministry of Local Government and Lands, for example, could be drawn upon. People from both Ministries could be asked to help with the training effort or to evaluate it: they might even be seconded to the project as staff members.

### 3. Linkages to the GOTG and others

As noted earlier, most of the linkages mentioned in the feasibility study lack content. Moreover, they are thought of primarily in terms of institutionalization. There are vital linkages that must be established for such a project as proposed, however, that relate to technical content. These are not adequately dealt with in the feasibility study.

In particular, the staff at the project site will be teachers/trainers with heavy work and travel loads. They will seldom be able to develop new ideas or answers to farmers' problems on their own. To replenish their own skill bank and knowledge, they will have to visit, work with, and read the data from the staff of agricultural research centers, formal educational institutions, and other organizations in The Gambia and abroad. Gambian researchers and teachers should regularly visit, teach, and provide demonstrations at the project training site. Every effort also should be made to bring similar people to the site from abroad.

The feasibility study does suggest that there be a major interchange between MFCs and the agricultural extension service--a

necessary and sound idea for both staff and students. The possibility of a research station being located on the project site is also an excellent idea. The feasibility study notes the contribution of the current GOIC site to the Rural Development Program (RDP) seed multiplication effort in the past. Use of part of the current Chamen facility by the RDP for seed multiplication purposes could provide some important inputs for the training program and would be a valid use of excess land and equipment at the site.

#### E. Social Soundness Considerations

The social soundness of the feasibility study project is one of its strongest features (although it might be argued that it does not go far enough in that it reaches too few people and, therefore, results in a meager overall impact on the groups and problems being addressed). It deals with some of the most fundamental problems in The Gambia: unemployed rural youth, agricultural output levels, rural/urban drift, village-level training, etc.

Briefly, it seeks to provide rural unskilled youth with literacy numeracy, and agricultural skills that will enable them to increase their agricultural output and income and remain in the rural areas. It also aims to equip these trainees as nominal change agents, thus spreading the impact of their training throughout many villages in The Gambia. To the degree it reaches such people effectively, the project would deal with some of The Gambia's poorest and least advantaged people, making them more self-sufficient and productive members of society outside the government sector. It would help solve The Gambia's economic problem by producing more food, more foreign exchange, and the potential for more imports to

fuel development. And it would contribute to a better balance between the urban and rural sectors in The Gambia.

The COP included as part of the project would have these same potential effects. In addition, it would extend the benefits of the project to many women, something the resident training effort has been unable to do for a variety of reasons.

The outputs of the project, if achieved, would enable these hitherto disadvantaged, but very important, groups of people to make their needed contribution to The Gambia's overall development plan. If the GOTG's macro-objectives are ever to be achieved, it will be because the rural people of The Gambia have been enfranchised with the skills and support necessary to do their vital part, which is just what this project is designed to do.

#### F. Economic Considerations

The cost and returns, in pure financial terms and in broader benefit/cost terms, of the technical package to be taught by the proposed program and applied by participants in the COP and graduates of the training program are not considered in the feasibility study proposal. This issue must be addressed carefully to assure that the technical package (which may increase output, perhaps substantially) being proposed also increases the net income of those using it sufficiently to assure the project outputs contribute to its purpose and goals.

If net income does not increase or if it does not increase substantially with respect to increases in costs when the desired skills and techniques are used at the field level, the project will fail if implemented. When such circumstances prevail, as they may in this case, the project must be redesigned or abandoned.

## G. Administrative Considerations

### 1. Organization

The study proposed that the MC of the GOIC project be retained and that the new project eventually become a parastatal under the aegis of the Ministry of Education. OICI would provide a TCT for the life of the project to assist in implementation. Other agencies would provide inputs as it was in their interest or as the project staff was able to persuade them to do so. (Some members of the MC would be line officials of various of these agencies, making it more likely that such agencies could be persuaded to assist the project in some way from time to time).

This organization of the project is adequate and appropriate. The MC approach has several distinct advantages over other options, as noted earlier in Chapter IV.

The Ministry of Education has valid interests in such a project, especially via its concerns and field work in rural locales in the areas of informal and nonformal education and youth and sports. However, MANR is a much stronger option for dealing with the expanded elements that must be included in the project to justify it. MANR has the most concern with the goal and outputs of the project. It has the strongest interest and best support capability in the content area encompassed by the project. Also, MANR would loom over the Ministry of Education as the entity with the most linkages to the proposed project. These reasons overpower any that can be put forward on behalf of the Ministry of Education.

### 2. Management

The proposed management of the project is via the existing GOIC MC, with OICI carrying out the primary implementation responsibility as day-to-day advisors to local project staff. The central issue and concern

here is whether the MC and OICI have the capacity to effectively implement and manage the project.

The existing MC for GOIC has done little in the way of managing GOIC. Nor has it been willing to fight to be involved in the deliberations about a follow-on project. This is perhaps because it has had very little to do, but the MC would have to express a very strong desire to manage a new project before this option would be an effective one. If the MC does strongly desire to manage the project, however, and if this is acceptable to the GOTG, this option is preferable to any line ministry management of the project for the reasons provided in Chapter IV. In particular, the MC-based committee approach would place a broader range of senior people in close proximity to the project, would maximize the flexibility of the project to deal effectively and quickly with content, procedure, staff, community involvement, etc. as the need arises and would assure more emphasis on and opportunity for local participation. Of compelling force, however, is the argument that the MC could avoid the bureaucratic inertia and lack of commitment that goes along with direct government management of training institutions.<sup>1</sup> This "governing board" approach is common in The Gambia, especially with respect to schools and colleges. It is also used to manage several parastatals.

OICI's capacity to effectively manage and advise regarding the project must be judged to be extremely limited based on its past performance. The project, when expanded, would be more complex than the current GOIC effort. Moreover, despite one's best wishes, there is no guarantee (in fact it is unlikely) that implementation of the new project

<sup>1</sup>As noted in Chapter III, the GOTG's direct line management of training institutions has not been an exception to this general rule.

would be any less difficult than was that of the GOIC project. Nor is it clear, given its limited vision regarding the need for an expanded project to date, whether OICI would or could grasp and implement someone else's vision.

An important part of this project's start-up and implementation would be the management of "content"--the technical package. GOIC's current OICI program advisor, in the main, has some of the needed capacity, but OICI's permanent staff does not. Nor does OICI have the experience needed to effectively assess the economic impacts of its training and technical package as used by students. To date, for example, it has made no attempt to monitor any of these elements in a concise way as a means of improving its current GOIC effort.

The expansion of the project and its target group would pull the project even further away from OICI's basic expertise, experience, and philosophy. Dealing with agricultural extension and other change agents, existing farmers, and various agricultural research and other institutions, and technical agricultural problems is not OICI's major strength as an organization. To use OICI to implement and manage the project, then, would make project success dependent almost exclusively upon the OICI TCT. Put bluntly, selecting OICI as the implementing agency purchases little in the way of either a substantive or technical contribution to the success of the project except its TCT. Using a PSC to obtain the needed technical assistance would purchase almost as much for the project at less cost.

Finally, given the arguments from some quarters of the GOTG that OICI's TCT is not needed (even for the first year) and that OICI desires to institutionalize the project rapidly, it is appropriate to have OICI--or

any other outside implementing agency--phase out of the project more rapidly than proposed in the study.

In summary, OICI's capacity to undertake this new project is marginal. Thus, any contribution OICI is apt to make to a follow-on project will stem directly from the unique circumstances of the situation that has evolved in The Gambia, not from OICI's inherent management capacity and experience in the areas central to the success of the proposed and expanded project. For example, OICI is now experienced in The Gambia, its current TCT plans to implement the follow-on project, and OICI probably has learned something from its past mistakes. Also, OICI could begin implementation of a follow-on project without a break in time or funding between the existing GOIC project and a new one. These are situational elements that may make OICI the best choice to help implement the kind of follow-on project that would draw upon the existing resources, relationships and approaches of the GOIC project. If, however, AID/Gambia truly was starting from scratch in considering such a new project in The Gambia, OICI should not be considered because of its marginal capacity to deal with the content of and to implement such a project and because of its poor track record in implementing the current GOIC project.

The conclusions to be drawn from this are as follows: First, if the central core of OICI's approach and strength--nonformal training of school leavers and other youth and the newly instituted COP--is included as part of the follow-on project finally developed, OICI could be considered as a possible agency to help implement the project. If this core is not included in a follow-on project or is not an important feature of such a project, then OICI should not be involved in any way in implementing the project.

Second, in the event the project is one OICI is capable of helping to implement, OICI's selection should be based primarily on its opportunity cost and expediency rather than on OICI's capacity and performance to implement such a project. Thus, if OICI's involvement would on the whole maximize the benefits from a follow-on project, it should be selected to help implement it. On the other hand, if OICI's involvement would not maximize the chance of project success given the present unique circumstances of this case, then OICI should not be retained as a part of the follow-on project effort.

Third, if OICI is selected to assist in implementing the project it should be involved only for the shortest period of time possible. Any follow-on project implemented by OICI would draw heavily upon current GOIC staff and approaches. Thus, OICI should be given only 12 to 18 months to phase out of such a project. (Projects using less of GOIC's content may need a longer period of outside implementing assistance.) At the end of whatever period is chosen, the local implementing agency, be it the MC or a line GOTG ministry, would gain full control of the project.

### 3. Linkages

Administrative and managerial linkages are not articulated clearly in the feasibility study; rather, they are left to be detailed as a part of project implementation. This lack of precision in project design and preparation led to substantial difficulty in the current GOIC project. Thus, it should not be left to chance or to be resolved later again. Moreover, a crisp delineation should be made in the project between content linkages (discussed above) and administrative linkages

(being considered here). Both are mixed together in the study and the latter-type linkages are considered only briefly. In particular, any actual transfer of resources, skills, or knowledge (including the likely or agreed-upon mechanisms for doing so) should be pinned down, especially if such inputs are essential to project success.

One example of this kind of linkage has been mentioned by OICI and others several times during the field work for this assignment. It is that MANR, especially if it becomes the ministry responsible for funding the project, progressively take over all the salaries and emoluments of existing staff at the center and progressively supply its own personnel to the project as permanent staff as well. Nothing is said about this possibility or many other likely possibilities in the study.

#### H. Proposed Budget/Cost Effectiveness

The budget proposed for the project is \$2.077 million. No breakdown of the local and foreign currency components is provided, nor is there an annualized summary of planned costs by line item, either for the total project or for its local and foreign exchange currency components.

Of the total budget of \$2.077 million, \$1.048 million is budgeted for OICI staff and associated direct and indirect costs, and \$1.030 million for local staff and associated direct costs.

OICI's portion of the budget of \$1.048 million is made up of indirect costs (OICI's overheads) and TCT and related costs directly associated with the project. OICI's indirect costs are \$433,414,<sup>1</sup> or about 26.4 percent of AID's contribution of \$1,644,350 to the total cost of the

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<sup>1</sup>The budget includes a figure of \$433,574. The discrepancy is probably due to an arithmetic error in the original submission.

project. The TCT component of OICI's total budget is \$614,993, a total TCT cost of \$11,604 per person month (\$139,243 per person year) of technical assistance delivered in the Gambia.

The budgetary figures per se are not unreasonable. OICI's overhead rate of 32.1 percent is appropriate for non-home office personnel and costs, especially since OICI does not charge any Philadelphia staff time directly to the project budget. The total TCT cost per year of \$139,000 also is reasonable, especially in a country where there is a 20 percent post differential.<sup>1</sup>

The GOTG financial participation is phased in much too rapidly (in the fourth year). There should be an earlier financial commitment by the GOTG and a gradual increase in its commitment over the life of the project. Even then, it is doubtful that the GOTG will be prepared to accept full financial responsibility for the project as soon as envisioned in the feasibility study.

The cost effectiveness ratios of the project (as proposed) that can be derived are shown below:

- o Total project cost per resident student trained: \$8,658;
- o Total project cost per resident and COP student trained: \$4,329;
- o Total project cost per student enrolled: \$3,463;
- o Total project cost per student, demonstrator, and other person reached: \$3,054; and
- o Total project cost per student settled: \$14,430.

These illustrate only the cost of training a student, not the cost effectiveness of the actual training itself. On the basis of this limited

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<sup>1</sup>The budget was calculated with a 25 percent post differential; the post differential in The Gambia is now 20 percent.

criterion alone, however, the proposed project is not cost effective, just as GOIC has not been. Thus, more must be done to utilize the same level of expenditures to reach more farmers.

In the terminal evaluation of the GOIC project about to be conducted, the cost effectiveness of the training itself should be further examined, primarily by assessing its impact on net income under field conditions. Since no baseline exists, efforts should be made to compare student performance with that of their peers and other villagers. It would be interesting if there could be a comparison between graduated trainees and some others with the same number of seasons of farming experience.

## I. Conclusions and Recommendations

### 1. Conclusions

- o The feasibility study project is not well designed, and it should not be undertaken as proposed. In particular, too little attention has been given to the technical content and cost effectiveness of the training being provided, to the costs per student year equivalent, to maximizing the impact of the inputs on the project goal (by reaching the maximum number of existing farmers) and to specifying the management and implementation structure of the project.
- o The project gives too little attention to the training methods needed to assure training has the desired and assumed impact under field conditions.
- o The project does not adequately specify the linkages to be developed with other agencies, why they are important, and what impact they will have on the project purpose and goal. It does not distinguish between technical and administrative linkages.
- o The social soundness of the project as designed is exceptionally good in the context of The Gambia.
- o There is no evidence that the project concept is economically sound. The content of the training being provided is assumed to lead to higher net incomes, etc., but there is no specific indication that this does occur from either the existing GOIC project or the feasibility study.

- o OICI's ability to implement and manage the proposed project is marginal. An expanded project such as suggested earlier in this chapter is even further beyond OICI's capability to fully implement. Such a project has its roots in technical village agriculture, agricultural research, extension, etc. and less in informal agricultural training of disadvantaged youth. Thus, it is a project even farther away from OICI's main experience and philosophical base than is the GOIC. Moreover, there is no capacity to backstop or effectively manage the central aspects of such a project at OICI in Philadelphia. OICI's management would be limited to administrative support from the U.S. and heavily dependent upon the TCT in The Gambia. Given past problems with the OICI-GOIC management relationship, creating such a situation for a more complex project which OICI in Philadelphia would not understand as well as the GOIC effort, would be certain to reduce the potential for project success.
- o The only situation in which OICI should be considered as the implementing organization is one in which the central thrust of the current GOIC project is an important aspect of the follow-on project so that the current GOIC effort should not be allowed to collapse. In this situation, the OICI input would be based on retaining and improving the youth training and COP aspects of its GOIC project while AID/Gambia and the GOTG design a new project to include existing farmers and change agents. OICI should be involved for only a limited period of time in such circumstances (for no more than 18 months) and only on the condition that it agree to phase out completely during that period in favor of another entity chosen by the GOTG and AID/Gambia. The potential of OICI "political" actions on its own behalf during such a phase-out period would have to be dealt with satisfactorily as a part of such an agreement.
- o The institutionalization of the proposed project within the GOTG is well conceived except for two points. First, MANR is the better ministry to carry out the expanded project envisioned. Second, the financial phase-in and takeover of the project by the GOTG is much too rapid when it finally comes within the project time frame (the fourth year), but it comes too soon as well. The GOTG should be involved financially on a progressive basis beginning in the first year of the project and over a longer period of time.
- o The administrative linkages necessary to assure a successful project have not been thought through nor specified in the proposal. In that such vagueness led to a host of problems in the GOIC project, additional effort to define such linkages and to ensure their acceptance by the parties involved is essential.

- o The proposed budget appears generally realistic for the project proposed. Some areas, such as transport, are much too thin, however, if all the COP, resettlement, and follow-up work anticipated is to be done. Thus, some reallocation of or additions to the present budget are in order. Moreover, the scope of the project as proposed is inadequate and an expanded project is needed. The new scope is likely to require more staff, training materials, etc. and thus a revised and larger budget.

## 2. Recommendations

- o The feasibility study project as proposed should not be funded.
- o A new project should be designed, however, that encompasses the basic elements of the feasibility study proposal--namely the training of rural youth and the COP, but which expands upon them substantially as well, as indicated in Chapter VII.
- o The technical content, training methods, and the transmission system for both should be carefully documented (with a baseline as to the technical content) as part of designing such a new training project.
- o The MANR should be the ministry that takes responsibility for a project such as that suggested by the feasibility study and expanded upon in this chapter and Chapter VII.
- o OICI should not implement an expanded project. It could, however, be provided with interim funding to preserve the value of the current GOIC project for a follow-on effort. If OICI is to play a part in the implementation of an expanded follow-on effort, its participation in the project should be limited to 12 to 18 months. OICI's phase-out at the end of this interim period, its pledge not to attempt to remain involved, and its agreement to support the GOTG and AID/Gambia in their effort to design a new expanded follow-on project during this interim period should be insisted upon as preconditions for OICI's being funded to carry on its youth training and COP activities. If OICI will not agree to these preconditions, AID/Gambia should allow the current GOIC project to end on December 31, 1981.
- o The necessary technical and administrative linkages between the project entity and other agencies and organizations should be specified clearly in designing an expanded project.
- o The economic merit of the technical content of any proposed training program should be documented as a part of the project design effort.

- o An expanded project should be designed to be as cost effective as possible by reaching the maximum number of existing farmers with a proven technical package known to produce higher net income for farmers under average field conditions in The Gambia.

## VI. ASSESSMENT OF OTHER SUGGESTED FOLLOW-ON PROJECTS

### A. AID/Gambia

#### 1. Brief project description

AID/Gambia's suggested follow-on training project is presented in Annex 8. It seeks to have a maximum impact on the goal of attaining food self-sufficiency. The primary purpose of the training undertaken by the project would be to increase crop and animal production and diversification of traditional farming activities. The principal project output would be better trained existing farmers. The project would seek to reach a maximum number of existing farmers with a technical package which would demonstrably increase both their output and their net income. No effort would be made to train youth who want to become farmers, thus eliminating the central aspect of the current GOIC project and OICI's follow-on project proposal. Nor does the project mention a COP. A training program would be designed and operated which would teach existing farmers and change agents to apply such a technical package or train others to apply it under field conditions.

The effort would be a GOTG-to-people project. MANR would have oversight responsibility for the project according to GOTG policies, personnel standards, and operating procedures. The implementing agency for the project would be determined during its preparation. A community-based board would be established to advise the program.

## 2. Analysis

AID/Gambia's proposed project differs from that of OICI in two major areas. First, it changes the focus of the project somewhat by concentrating on maximizing food output and self-sufficiency. To do this, it emphasizes reaching the maximum number of existing farmers (as contrasted to relatively few youth who are not yet farming). Second, it aims to eventually integrate the project into MANR as an integral part of its agricultural training effort.

### a. Technical

The technical aspects of the suggested project are undefined. Thus, the same problem and issues would have to be resolved in the design phase of such a project as is true for all the other projects considered in this paper.

### b. Social Soundness

The social soundness of the project is good, although its lessening of the emphasis on employment of those not now employed and on the training of persons who have few if any skills means that it addresses fewer of the serious social concerns of The Gambia than does the OICI feasibility study proposal. Likewise, lack of a COP decreases its social soundness in comparison to OICI's proposal, especially with respect to the impact of the project on women. On the other hand, if the project impacts much more widely upon the output/income needs of farmers than the OICI proposal, it could end up having a higher degree of positive social impact.

c. Economic

The economic soundness of the proposed training has not been researched. This, as is the case with the OICI proposal, would have to be rectified during the project design stage.

d. Administrative (including implementation)

The major administrative aspects of the proposal include its complete integration into MANR as a government-to-people effort, its emphasis upon reaching existing farmers, and the attempt to maximize the strength of various MANR linkages with the training center.

In organizing the center as a line-managed effort of MANR, AID/Gambia seeks to assure its compatibility with GOTG policy and the interest of a GOTG entity in the project that is capable of managing and funding it. Also, since MANR is charged with attaining the goal of food self-sufficiency and carries out the bulk of agricultural research, training, and extension in The Gambia, the project arguably fits best under its jurisdiction.

This entire line of reasoning is acceptable except for two points. First, MANR line management of the project is virtually certain to result in limited project success. As noted in Chapter III above, all existing GOTG training programs are plagued with major problems and few, if any, are effective. There is no reason to expect that a MANR project as described by AID/Gambia would be any different. On the other hand, there is every reason to expect that it will be bureaucratic, inflexible, uncreative, and of low priority to key policymakers. Furthermore, while it is implied by AID/Gambia that such an organizational arrangement will maximize needed linkages and the exposure of key technical ideas to the maximum number of farmers, directly and via extension agents, the

available evidence suggests that such an implication is unwarranted. MANR training institutions, especially at the grassroots level, are noted for their lack of community involvement, lack of transport, lack of motivated staff, lack of contact with each other, and inability to convey meaningful new ideas to their constituencies.

At bottom, then, the premise that a MANR line institution will be more effective than a parastatal controlled by a national management committee is subject to serious question. While such an arrangement has some advantages in this context, it has serious disadvantages that more than outweigh its positive features. This central aspect of the AID/Gambia proposal is unlikely to provide for better organization, management, or linkages than the MC concept proposed by OICI.

Second, AID/Gambia's option assures that the existing GOIC staff and program would be abandoned, along with OICI. This would jettison some valuable assets that could be used effectively if they were retained. Importantly, it also assumes either that the GOTG's ability as an implementing agency is at a par with the start-up and management requirements of the new project envisioned, or that a non-GOTG entity other than OICI would be used to help implement the project. Such an assumption with respect to the GOTG is not deserved and should be re-examined. However, the use of a non-GOTG implementing agency other than OICI, given the AID/Gambia proposal, is a distinct option. It should be stated as the only one, however, both to assure project success and to avoid confusion.

e. Budgetary

No budget is indicated for the AID/Gambia proposal. If outside technical assistance (TA) was not included to implement it, the cost of the project could be less than OICI's proposal. If TA is included, the budget for the project is likely to exceed OICI's because of the expanded scope of the project and OICI's relatively low overhead rate.

f. Conclusions

- o The proposal is very much on target with its goal, purpose, and emphasis on training existing farmers and extension agents. By leaving out much of the GOIC concept, however, it unnecessarily jettisons the value built up by USAID's funding of that project.
- o It is not a fully conceived proposal, especially in terms of technical, economic, and budgetary considerations. All of these areas would have to be considered in an extensive project design effort.
- o The social soundness of the proposal is good, but not as good as that of OICI's proposal, especially with respect to women.
- o The proposal is ill conceived in terms of the structure of the project. Developing the project as a line effort of MANR will diminish the chance for project success substantially. Moreover, this structure is unnecessary in that MANR has not pressed for it and another existing option--that of the MC--enjoying the sanction of the GOTG is already in force in the GOIC project. Even though the two projects would be distinctly different under this AID/Gambia option, the preservation of the MC concept in the follow-on project is definitely preferable to the MANR line management structure proposed.
- o Initial implementation of the project is likely to require outside TA and this possibility should be explored as part of the project design.

B. The GOTG

1. Introduction

The follow-on project that will actually end up being preferred by the GOTG as an option for AID funding is still very fluid as of this

writing. A paper has been developed by MANR staff for consideration by the entire Cabinet, but it has not yet been formally commented upon by any ministry, nor has it been approved by the Minister of MANR. What follows in this section is a brief description and analysis of what is known of the MANR Cabinet Paper. This effort is very incomplete, however, in that the contents of the Cabinet Paper have been relayed to AID/Gambia and Devres only in summary form via discussions with MANR staff. Despite this handicap, the concern for as much completeness as possible dictates that the GOTG's latest thinking, no matter how sketchily known, be considered in this analysis.

## 2. Brief project description

The project as described closely mirrors that put forth by AID/Gambia with two major exceptions. First, the project would either be a line operation of MANR or of Gambia College (GC). This would require a formal "institutionalization" of all the day-to-day operations in accordance with MANR or GC procedures. Current GOIC staff, for example, would have to be appraised according to the GOTG's civil service system. Second, OICI apparently would not be used to help implement the project, although some kind of a link would be maintained, perhaps via infrequent OICI visits to the project. Either MANR or GC would be the implementing agency and funding channel for AID/Gambia.

In brief, the project emphasizes food production and crop diversification, the training of existing farmers and extension agents, and linkages between the training program and other existing agencies

The AID/Gambia proposal strongly implies this would be the case also, but leaves the issue open for additional discussion (see Annex 8).

and organizations. It would not train persons on campus at the center for long periods of time, nor would it have a COP operated by the training center staff. The GOTG, via MANR, would contribute about 10 percent of the cost of the project (in its last year) and would take over full financial responsibility for it at project end.

### 3. Analysis

The technical content and teaching methods to be included in the project are not specified and would have to be worked out as a part of the project design.

The social soundness of the project is good, being essentially the same as the proposal put forward by AID/Gambia. Lack of a COP and heavy emphasis on formal channels for working with existing farmers is likely to diminish the impact of the project on women.

The economic soundness of the project is not apparent and would have to be determined during the project design process.

The option of placing the project under MANR has the same disadvantages as noted for the AID/Gambia proposal.

Selecting GC<sup>1</sup> as the cognizant implementing and management organization would have the same detrimental impact on the likelihood of project success as selecting MANR, but for different reasons. First, the project would receive little attention from the top administrators of the College. Second, those at GC responsible for the center and its activities are academics and would be prone to utilize formal training techniques for a clientele which is ill suited for such methods. Third,

<sup>1</sup>Gambia College falls under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. It is governed by a Board of Directors and operates essentially as a "parastatal."

college faculty are sometimes poor managers and are seldom able to contribute effectively to the operational well-being of an institution. Fourth, college faculty members seldom get excited about trying to work directly with existing farmers in rural areas. They delegate the job to students. Fifth, numerous other types of organizations--especially PVOs--can be shown to be more effective and more relevant in training existing farmers (and change agents to work with them) in remote areas. Sixth, it is highly unlikely that GC would fight for GOTG funding for the center. The project is far removed from the interests of GC. The intellectual content of the program is mundane from a national college viewpoint and the primary output of the center (trained farmers) does not reward the college or its faculty within their core frame of reference.

The selection of GC to carry out the project would probably have little, if any, differential impact on the budget required as compared to choosing MANR. In any event, the budget and cost effectiveness of the project under all of these options would need to be detailed as a part of project preparation.

#### 4. Conclusions

- o The GOTG option for a follow-on project closely resembles AID/Gambia's proposal. Given that the GOTG formerly supported OICI's proposal in the main, this suggests that the current proposal reflects the GOTG's perception of what AID/Gambia now wants and will fund.
- o The GOTG proposal adequately reflects its own high agricultural priorities, but its lack of continuity with the GOIC project discards the value gained from that effort.
- o The GOTG proposal does not specify its technical, economic, and budgetary content.

- o The social considerations addressed by the proposal are appropriate, but the project would not be as socially sound as an expanded OICI proposal.
  
- o As with the AID/Gambia option, the proposed organization and management of the project is unsound. Use of either MANR or GC to implement and manage the project will diminish the project's goal achievement for reasons specified in the analysis above. The current GOIC staff procedures, etc. would be changed immediately under both options so as to fully conform with GOTG regulations. This would diminish or even eliminate many of the benefits attained by the GOIC to date.

## VII. RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-ON PROJECT

### A. Brief Project Description

The project recommended for follow-on to the current GOIC effort would be aimed at the goal of food self-sufficiency. Its purpose would be to increase the number of farmers that use an explicit, proven, highly profitable technical package by a specified number (say 2,000) by the year 1987. The primary outputs of the project would be trained existing farmers, trained extension personnel and other change agents, and trained and resettled youth. Inputs would include, but not be limited to, technical assistance personnel and local staff, AID and GOTG funding, the proven technical assistance package, training techniques, the physical facilities at the existing GOIC center, and developed mechanisms such as the COP, demonstrations, short courses, resettlement packages, selection criteria and programs, follow-on systems, and explicit technical and administrative linkages between the center and other programs and agencies.

The basic intent of this project is to get as many farmers as possible to use a proven and profitable technical package in their farming operations. It, therefore, emphasizes reaching existing farmers, directly and via trained change agents. However, the project retains the GOIC youth training concept as well. This is done for three reasons. It makes achievement of the project purpose and goal more efficient, it preserves what benefits and accomplishments have been realized by the GOIC project, and it strengthens the social soundness of the project in conformity with GOTG objectives (as noted in Chapter III). A brief description of the

recommended content and the administrative and implementation aspects of the project is presented below.

B. Overall Project Content

The primary content of the project would be specific technical packages in all major wet season crops and in vegetables, poultry, sheep, goats, cattle, and beekeeping. Associated training in bookkeeping, etc. would also be included.

The technical packages and related courses would be taught to three major streams of trainees:

- o Youth;
- o Existing farmers (including women); and
- o Change agents.

The entire project would be developed to provide the desired technical content to on-site trainees and off-site trainees. The target group for on-site training would be youth, existing farmers (including women), and change agents. For off-site training, it would be existing farmers (including women) and former on-site trainees. The COP would reach the latter target group more intensively in villages nearby the Chamen center.

On-site, a constant resident program of about 10 months in duration would be provided to carefully selected youth. This training program would concentrate on enabling youth to utilize the desired technical packages when resettled back in their own compounds. It would also pass along the skills and experiences necessary to make these students effective change agents in their own village. Well-conceived selection and resettlement programs and a strong follow-on effort would be provided to

help these students begin farming upon graduation.<sup>1</sup> This is essentially a follow-on of the current GOIC program, but would be a much improved one. Selection, training content and procedures, resettlement, and follow-up would be more effective and better managed. Moreover, the major aim of the program would shift from making school leavers more employable to enabling youth intending to be farmers to use proven technical packages effectively and to demonstrate and help teach them to others.

The youth training program would use practical, hands-on techniques and would not depend greatly on literacy and numeracy except as students had or obtained such skills. (In this way, it will help provide project staff with skills and experiences for reaching existing farmers effectively.) It would follow the major crop cycles in the wet and dry season, with livestock and poultry cycles as well as all other related training interspersed into these cycles.

This basic youth training program would not be the central feature of the project, but rather would serve to provide the primary structure for all other training carried out by project staff. Thus, as specific events would arise in the cycle of a crop as being taught to the resident youth--e.g., early weeding, pesticide application, harvesting, etc.--they would be used as a focal point for training existing farmers and change agents on-site. On-site demonstrations, day long short courses, etc. for these other target groups would be structured around the actual teaching of a specific technique or process in the ongoing youth training

<sup>1</sup>It is understood that there would be some leakage from this program. Students may end up in agriculturally related or other jobs; however, the aim of the resident program will be to train farmers. As noted earlier in Chapter III, this leakage should not be considered to be a major problem.

program. In this way, the constant training being undertaken at the center would serve as a catalyst and demonstration point for teaching the desired technical packages to existing farmers and to change agents. When appropriate, groups of change agents or existing farmers also would be brought on-site for a short course concentrated on one aspect of a crop cycle such as early weeding and pesticide application. Women, for example, might be brought on-site for a two-day vegetable bed preparation and planting course.

The resident youth would be involved in and exposed to these on-site efforts to train existing farmers and change agents. They would gain exposure to carrying out demonstrations, hear staff answers to questions raised by off-site trainees, and gain confidence in their own ability to use and demonstrate the various technical packages.

The crop cycles being followed in the resident youth training program would serve the same catalytic function in orienting project staff work in the COP and with other existing farmers. As the on-site students began to deal with a certain practice in the crop cycle, the staff could concentrate on that practice in the villages too. Student could go into the outlying villages with the project staff to assist and demonstrate. This would expose them to more variable conditions in the way of field practice, to the work of the project staff as change agents, and help them to better understand various attitudinal and practical factors that make adoption of the desired technical package easier or more difficult to achieve.

The work of the project staff with change agents--pre- and in-service training--would be on a higher level than the rest of the training program. More classroom work and teaching, a faster pace, and a higher level of

explanation of the causes and effects of the technical packages being taught would characterize this element of the project.

Feed-in mechanisms to identify, interest, and recruit on-site trainees would be the COP, the project recruitment program, extension agents, and (via linkages to be established as part of the project) cooperatives, MFCs, agricultural research centers, and other organizations.

On-site training would be carried out not only by the project staff, but also by research station personnel, extension agents, MFC staff, international experts (perhaps provided for long- or short-term assignments or as brief visitors) from existing projects in The Gambia, the FAO, etc.

Mechanisms to identify and recruit off-site target group members would be the COP, extension agents, project staff and, via the various linkages developed with other organizations, cooperatives, MFCs, and the like. Off-site training in the desired technical packages would be carried out by project staff, extension agents trained on-site, and resettled youth who had graduated from the program; various other persons also would be asked to participate from time to time from those organizations with linkages to the project.

The youth trainee program would have the following elements:

- o Selection;
- o Orientation/counseling;
- o Training
  - Feeder,
  - Technical packages,
  - Demonstration, and
  - Multiple exposure (COP, existing farmers, etc.);
- o Resettlement: and

- o Follow-up
  - Materials,
  - Refresher,
  - Trouble shooting,
  - New ideas,
  - Linkages, and
  - Change agent role.

The change agent program would comprise training in technical packages, means to effectively teach them to existing farmers, and follow-up. The existing farmer program components would be training in technical package use and follow-up.

The actual technical packages, training techniques, linkage content, logistics, staffing, and many other aspects of the program outlined above would have to be specified in detail during formal project preparation. If these elements can be developed sufficiently to justify such a project--and there is good reason to believe they can--the project would have several advantages over other approaches.

First, it would preserve the accomplishments and potential of the current GOIC project.

Second, the resident youth trainee program would be likely to make the project more efficient in achieving its purpose, not less efficient. Without such a component, all the farming and other activities necessary for or related to demonstration and training activities for existing farmers and change agents must be carried out by project staff or hired labor. Little is gained directly in the way of training or project purpose by these activities. In such a situation, the output of the center itself is restricted to farmers and change agents who can be

brought onto the farm, exposed to new ideas, and sent home to use them. Such exposure on non-working farms is seldom realistic in terms of conditions faced by farmers, and its "unit cost" is high. Having the youth training program ensures that center activities result in direct "output" and should reduce the cost of the demonstrations, etc. aimed at existing farmers and change agents.

Third, the resident youth training approach tends to force the pace of on- and off-site training onto project staff. The ongoing training and crop and livestock cycles create continuous opportunities for demonstrations, etc. for existing farmers and change agents. And students are in residence to help prepare for and carry out such events as a part of their own training, making it easier for project staff to plan and implement on-site training efforts.

Fourth, the existence of resident students at the center can be beneficial because they keep up with the routine work of preparation, management, etc. of the farm at the center and its various crop and livestock components as a part of their ongoing training. This enables project staff to devote less time to such details and more to carrying out on- and off-site training activities.

### C. Administrative Aspects

#### 1. Organization

The recommended organization of the project is to place it under the jurisdiction of MANR, but to retain the MC as the day-to-day managing entity. Outside TA could be used to assist in implementing and managing the project for some period of time beginning with Stage 1.

The name of the GOIC center would be changed (to something like the North Bank Rural Training and Demonstration Center). In essence, this structure would make the project a parastatal. Other GOTG entities would relate to the project via detailed formal and via informal linkages to be worked out during the design of the project. To mention but a few of these linkages, GC should be an active and ongoing participant in building a curriculum for the change agent portion of the project, agricultural research centers must participate in defining and improving each technical package, and the Extension Service must be formally involved in numerous ways.

The training components, as set out above, would comprise the entire project and would bound the extent of MC involvement, AID funding, etc. However, this project would not use all the land and equipment at the current GOIC site effectively. Thus, during the formal project preparation stage, MANR should split out land and equipment at the current GOIC site to develop two activities--a seed multiplication farm and a sub-station for agricultural research purposes. Both should be linked to project training activities to the maximum degree possible. A preliminary suggestion is that these activities use 150 cleared acres of the 400-acre site, leaving 150 cleared acres and 100 uncleared acres (for forage, etc.) to the training center. Most of the large equipment now at the GOIC center could be used best by these two activities, but it would need to be shared with the training project at certain times of the year.

## 2. Management

The project under the MC's management would conform to all policies of the GOTG as required by MANR. The retention of the MC, however,

would enable the community-based nature of the current GOIC project to continue, would assure priority attention is given to the project by senior persons appointed by the GOTG who are from many different organizations with contributions to make to the project, and would help assure the flexibility needed by the center and its staff to vigorously meet the needs of farmers and change agents.

The exact areas of MC responsibility and authority in managing the project and the ideal make-up of the MC would be an important matter for resolution in the preparation of the project. As envisioned, however the MC would serve as a board, being responsible for the staff activities resources, and management of the project under the policy guidance of MANR. A Gambian Project Director appointed by the MC with appropriate MANR approval would execute the day-to-day activities of the project. The MC, while national in scope, would have several members (such as the Divisional Commissioner) from the North Bank Division to help assure local political linkages, make frequent oversight visits, and to help guide local aspects of the project such as its COP.

#### D. Implementation

Implementation of the project would be carried out in three stages--an Interim Stage and two development stages--as indicated in Figure 1 (see Page 4).

##### 1. Interim Stage (1982)

This is a 12- to 18-month stage beginning in January 1982.

The purposes of this stage are several fold, but its main purpose would be to serve as a bridge between the current GOIC project and the project recommended in this chapter.

To carry out this stage, OICI would be funded beginning January 1, 1982 to carry on with and improve the youth training and COP aspects of its work at the GOIC center. This "extension" of OICI's current activities would enable the GOTG and AID/Gambia to design a new project to begin with Stage 1. OICI would terminate its involvement and transfer its activities and the Chemen center to the implementing agency chosen by the GOTG and AID/Gambia by the beginning of Stage 1 of the new project. OICI should fully accept this procedure for planning and implementing the new project before AID/Gambia agrees to fund the interim stage.<sup>1</sup>

During the Interim Stage the following activities would be undertaken by OICI:

- o Continue the youth training and COP activities of the GOIC center
- o Expand existing linkages of the GOIC center with other organizations relevant to the COP and youth training;
- o Improve the recruitment, resettlement, and follow-up elements of the youth training program;
- o Improve the technical packages being used for all crop and livestock cycles;
- o Improve the training techniques used in youth training and the COP;
- o Continue staff development activities for local staff;
- o Phase out involvement in center activities by the beginning of Stage 1; and

<sup>1</sup>There is the chance that OICI would not find it possible to meet these conditions. If such is the case, AID/Gambia should end the GOIC project and begin work with the GOTG to develop and fund the project recommended above beginning in 1983. Such a start-up project (for that is essentially what it would be if such a time lag occurs) is likely to require a TA component to assure its success.

- o Turn over the Chamen center and all associated activities to the implementing agency responsible for Stage 1 as a component of the new project.

The GOTG and AID/Gambia would prepare (PID and PP) and fund a new project to begin with Stage 1 during the Interim Stage.

2. Stage 1 (1983-1986)

During this stage the project as sketched out above and as specified in the PP would be implemented under MANR auspices.

3. Stage 2 (1987-1990)

This stage would be implemented as a follow-on to Stage 1, subject to the results of a detailed end-of-Stage 1 evaluation and AID/Gambia's and the GOTG's willingness to continue with the project.

E. Budget

No attempt has been made as a part of this assignment to estimate the budgetary requirements of the recommended project. A rough estimate of the Interim Stage budget is \$500,000, 5 percent of which should be provided by the GOTG. A Stage 1 budget, including AID/Gambia and GOTG contributions, might be about \$1.4 million and a Stage 2 budget about \$2 million, but these are just preliminary guesses.

There is one critical budgetary aspect of the proposed project: AID/Gambia should ensure that the GOTG assumes financial responsibility for the project from its beginning and gradually increases that responsibility vs. AID/Gambia. This gradual increase in the GOTG's financial contribution to the project will help ensure that in 1991 it will be able to take over full financial responsibility for the project by boosting its 1990 contribution by only a relatively small amount.

As noted in Chapter IV, this also will ensure the GOTG's interest and commitment to the project and, if the agreed annual GOTG financial commitment does not materialize, will act as a trigger for AID/Gambia to review the reasons why the GOTG's interest is flagging. This aspect of the Interim Stage and of Stage 1 and Stage 2 should be insisted upon by AID/Gambia as a precondition to the project.\*

#### F. Recommendations

- o The above project should be designed and implemented by the GOTG and AID/Gambia. If the assistance of an outside implementing agency is required to implement the project, one other than OICI should be selected. The major strength of such an implementing agency should be in technical agriculture and training of existing farmers and change agents in modern agricultural techniques.
- o The current GOIC infrastructure--staff, relationships, MC, etc.--should be preserved via AID/Gambia's funding of an Interim Stage to be implemented by OICI while a definitive Stage 1 project is defined, agreed to, and funded.
- o The preparation of the Stage 1 and 2 project during the Interim Stage should clearly define enough of the technical and economic content of the training effort to assure that the purpose and goal of the project will be met if farmers actually use what is taught. The procedural content of the project also should be defined explicitly so that reaching farmers, resettling trainees, etc. is ensured and their actual use of the content of the training is highly likely.
- o The GOTG should be required to make financial contributions to the project beginning in the Interim Stage and increasing annually thereafter until, at the end of Stage 2, the GOTG is financing nearly all project requirements. The extra long project life (two stages) should not be agreed to by AID/Gambia unless it serves to achieve this objective.
- o AID/Gambia should fund the Interim Stage and OICI only if there is agreement by all parties as to the preconditions, objectives, and procedures to be adhered to during this period. The principal

<sup>1</sup> There are numerous ways in which the GOTG contribution can be worked out. One example is to second current GOTG staff to the project, such staff to be fully paid for by the GOTG agency.

objective of such funding would be to preserve and improve upon the core benefits of the GOIC project to date so as to include them intact in the expanded Stage 1 project. In particular, OICI should agree to and see the Interim Stage as only a simple extension of its current project, after which OICI will terminate its involvement in The Gambia. This period should serve to carry forward and improve the GOIC project, enabling OICI to achieve more of its (original) project purpose and to pass along better institutionalized activity for inclusion in an even larger and more complex technical agricultural training effort. The GOTG should agree to and see the Interim Stage as a bridge to preserve and improve the benefits of the GOIC project. Thus, no sharp change should be made in the project during this stage such as a wholesale replacement of project staff or rapid diminution of the center's relative autonomy. These or other changes, if thought desirable, should be included in the PP as part of the expanded project and carried out in implementing Stages 1 and 2. If the GOTG cannot accept this period as an extension of the existing GOIC effort, it may choose to fund the Interim Stage on its own; but, AID/Gambia should not fund the Interim Stage under such circumstances.

## VIII. BASIC DECISIONS AND SUGGESTED NEXT STEPS

This chapter sets out two types of activities that need to be undertaken by AID/Gambia, the GOTG, and OICI if the recommendations in this report are to be accepted and followed. First, Part A indicates the basic affirmative decisions that must be made by each of the three parties in order to proceed along the pathway recommended in this report. Second, assuming that each party is able to decide "yes" to the decisions posed in Part A, basic next steps are suggested for each party in Part B to begin implementing those decisions.

### A. Basic Decisions for Each Major Party Posed by This Report

#### 1. AID

AID would have to make affirmative decisions along the following lines in order to accept and follow the recommendations made in this report.

- o The core of benefits generated by the GOIC project to date is worth retaining for inclusion in an expanded project.
- o An expanded project, as described in Chapter VII, is desirable, likely to be feasible, and is a plausible candidate as a "new start" for AID/Gambia in 1983. A PID and PP for such a new start will be undertaken immediately. They can be completed and Stage 1 can be funded in a 12- to 18-month period.
- o OICI can be worked with effectively during the proposed extension period (Interim Stage) and it is capable of satisfactorily implementing such an extension, thus justifying the additional funding and the continuation of the GOIC project until an expanded project is initiated.
- o OICI's capability to implement the desired expanded project is inadequate per se, primarily because the project centers on

technical agriculture and the training of existing farmers and change agents to cope effectively with problems under field conditions, an area in which OICI has limited experience and capacity. Numerous other possible implementing agencies can exhibit more experience and a better performance in this area than OICI.

- o There is a good chance that OICI will accept its role as outlined in this report and that it will not attempt to further politicize its involvement in The Gambia now or in the future. In particular, OICI can be trusted to work cooperatively with AID/Gambia and the GOTG and to terminate its involvement in The Gambia at the end of the Interim Stage if it agrees to do so now.
- o The GOTG is likely to agree to the proposed graduated financial participation in the project beginning with the Interim Stage.
- o The GOTG is likely to agree not to undertake any sharp changes in the GOIC project during the Interim Stage.

## 2. GOTG

The GOTG would have to make affirmative decisions along the following lines to accept and follow the recommendations in this report.

- o The core of benefits that have resulted from the GOIC project is worth retaining for inclusion in an expanded project.
- o An expanded project, as described in Chapter VII, is desirable and likely to be feasible. It can be prepared (in cooperation with AID/Gambia) and funded in a 12- to 18-month period.
- o OICI can be worked with effectively during the proposed extension period (Interim Stage) and it is capable of satisfactorily implementing such an extension, thus justifying the additional funding and the continuation of the GOIC project until an expanded project is initiated.
- o OICI's capability to implement the desired expanded project is inadequate per se and especially in light of the experience and performance (in the areas of technical agriculture and the training of existing farmers and change agents) of other possible implementing agencies.
- o There is a good chance OICI will accept its role as outlined in this report and remain faithful to it now and in the future.
- o The GOTG will undertake the proposed graduated GOTG financial participation of the project beginning with the Interim Stage.

- o The GOTG will not make sharp changes in the GOIC project during the Interim Stage.

### 3. OICI

OICI would have to make affirmative decisions as follow in order to accept and pursue the recommendations made in this report.

- o The core of benefits realized to date from the GOIC project is worth retaining for inclusion in an expanded project.
- o The current GOIC effort can be sustained and improved during a 12- to 18-month extension period in which OICI is the implementing agency.
- o OICI can effectively implement the planned extension period activities.
- o An expanded project, as described in Chapter VII, is desirable and its likelihood of being implemented serves as adequate justification for OICI's effort to sustain its current activities until they can be made a part of such a project.
- o OICI will cooperate fully with the GOTG and AID/Gambia in the role specified for it in this report and will terminate its involvement in the existing project and the new follow-on project at the end of the Interim Stage.
- o The GOTG is likely to agree not to make any sharp changes in the GOIC project during the Interim Stage.

### B. Suggested Next Steps

#### 1. AID/Gambia

- o Review this Devres report and the recommended project.
- o If the recommended project is acceptable, initiate discussions with the GOTG forthwith (before a decision can be made on the pending Cabinet Paper). Make GOTG aware of the timing and funding impacts of any likely GOTG decision regarding the project. Find out what issues might arise from the GOTG side with respect to the recommended proposal (e.g., changing the staff at the GOIC center).
- o Determine the views of the GOTG about the recommended proposal in a preliminary way. If favorable, initiate discussions with OICI.

- o If OICI is favorably disposed toward the role suggested for it in this report and is willing to accept the preconditions regarding its own involvement in the Interim Stage, begin OPG preparations for January 1, 1982 funding of the Interim Stage. Work with OICI (and the GOTG) to develop a detailed implementation plan for the Interim Stage.
- o Begin preparation of the PID and PP for Stages 1 and 2.

## 2. GOTG

- o Review AID/Gambia's proposal and discuss it thoroughly with AID/Gambia personnel prior to the pending Cabinet Paper being decided upon.
- o If approve the proposal in principle, alter the pending Cabinet Paper accordingly and obtain Cabinet approval of the altered paper.
- o Convey the contents of the Cabinet Paper to AID/Gambia and discuss it with AID/Gambia personnel.
- o Work with AID/Gambia and OICI to prepare a detailed implementation plan for the Interim Stage and with AID/Gambia to prepare for Stages 1 and 2 of the desired new project.

## 3. OICI

- o Consider AID/Gambia's recommended proposal and role for OICI and decide whether to wholeheartedly endorse them and whether to agree to the preconditions for OICI involvement in the Interim Stage.
- o If so, work with AID/Gambia and the GOTG to prepare a detailed implementation plan for OICI's activities during the Interim Stage.

**ANNEX 1**

**Scope of Work**

## Background

The Opportunities Industrial Center, International (OICI) has been implementing an agricultural training school in The Gambia since 1977. AID support was initially provided under a centrally funded grant and later from an Africa Bureau grant. The Africa Bureau grant will expire on December 31, 1981 and OICI has submitted a proposal for a new project. The Mission in The Gambia is requesting assistance in determining if this proposal merits support.

### I. Title

The Gambia OICI Proposal Evaluation.

### II. Objective

To assist the AID Mission in determining if the proposed OICI project in The Gambia merits support.

### III. Statement of Work

1. To review the proposed use of the OICI complex from a feasibility and cost benefit standpoint as regards the training of as many rural Gambians as possible.
2. To review the local situation, past history, and performance of OICI in The Gambia.
3. To make clear, decisive recommendations to the Mission concerning the merits of the recent OICI proposal and that organization's capacity to implement any new activities.

In addition to on-site work in The Gambia, discussions should be held with OICI officials in Philadelphia and AID staff in Washington.

### IV. Reports

1. A discussion of findings will take place with Mission staff before the contractor leaves Banjul. The final report should be submitted no later than five weeks after the start date of this contract.
2. Fifteen (15) copies of the final report should be mailed to the AID Mission in The Gambia. Ten (10) copies of this report should be delivered to the Projects Officer for The Gambia, AID/W.

### V. Relationships and Responsibilities

The contractor will work under the technical direction of Mr. Thomas Moser, AID/Banjul.

**ANNEX 2**

**List of Persons Met**

ANNEX 2

List of Persons Met

Kura Abedje, OICI  
Dr. Manuel Alers-Montvalo, Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management  
Project  
Bala Ann, GOIC Staff  
Saumabia Bah, Villager, Tankanto Village  
Dennis Baker, AID/Washington  
Bubacar M. Baldeh, Food for the Hungry Campaign, The Gambi  
Momodu Baldeh, GOIC Staff  
Sheriff Baldeh, GOIC Trainee  
Saikuba Barrow, GOIC Trainee  
D. E. Belds, GOIC Staff  
Quincy Benkow, AID/Gambia  
Ross Bigelow, AID/Washington  
Rosemary Burke, OICI  
Abdulie Camara, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Dembo Camara, GOIC Staff  
Lamin Camara, GOIC Trainee  
Nasina Camara, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Abdou Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Alhafi Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Alhafi Machi Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Ebrima Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Fainaka Ceesay, Resettled GOIC Trainee  
Fatou Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Gai Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Maddy Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Omar Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Ougman Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
S. M. Ceesay, Undersecretary, MANR  
Tijan Ceesay, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Badou O. Cham, GOIC Trainee  
Sambu Cham, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
Bimba Danpha, Villager, Tankanto Village  
Mulai M.K. Darboe, GOIC Trainee  
A. E. Darmeh, GOIC Staff  
David Dougwell, AID/Gambia  
Buba M. Dubois, GOIC Staff  
Sunko Fatty, Villager, Tankanto Village

Sherrif A. Faye, GOIC Staff  
 Tony Funicello, AID/Gambia  
 Chebou Gai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kimthen Gellen, GOIC Staff  
 Hawa Iou, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Awa Jadama, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Demba Jadama, GOIC Staff  
 Essay Jadama, Villager at Village Dai  
 Musukeba Jadama, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Tida Jadama, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Kebba Jadama, Resettled GOIC Trainee  
 Malick Jadama, Father of Resettled GOIC Trainee  
 Halli Jagne, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Hosa Jague, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Babou Jain, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Amadou Jallow, GOIC Staff  
 Halli Jallow, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Jsabou Jallow, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 M. K. Pa. Jallow, Commissioner, North Bank Division  
 Ramaba Jallow, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Sai Jallow, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ya-Mama Jallow, GOIC Staff  
 Awa Jamba, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Dr. Donald A. Jameson, Gambia Mixed Farming and Resource Management  
 Project  
 Binta S. Jammeh, GOIC Staff  
 Fuijay Jammeh, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Honja Jammeh, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Mai Jammeh, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Mamanding Jammeh, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Njouku Jammeh, GOIC Staff  
 Amulai Janneh, Chairman GOIC Management Committee  
 S. Janneh, Member, GOIC Management Committee  
 Jainaba Jatta, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Ndumbeh Jeng, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Aulai Jobe, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Babou Jobe, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Penda Jobe, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Dan Joof, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ebou Joof, Assistant Commissioner, North Bank Division  
 Dawda K. Kantel, GOIC Staff  
 Bimba Kanyi, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Kebba Kassama, GOIC Staff  
 Hawa Keita, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Marikou Keita, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Alhafi Lowe, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Katira Lowe, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village

N-fally Manka, Resettled GOIC Trainee  
 Mr. Manka, Father of Resettled GOIC Trainee  
 Adama Manneh, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Dr. C. L. Mannings, GOIC Staff  
 Badjic Mariabou, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Abeabou Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Aminaba Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Binba Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Kaddy Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Kaddy Dampha Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Mauama Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Mbinkinding Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Sambou-Jeng Marong, Village Head, Tankanto Village  
 Suadu Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Suterling Marong, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Baich Mbye, GOIC Staff  
 Fanna Mbye, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Fatou Mbye, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ture Mjai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Thomas Moser, AID/Gambia  
 Fusupha A. N'Dom, GOIC Staff  
 Karama Ndow, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Majula Ndow, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Nyima Ndow, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Quy Nguyen, OICI  
 Amie Njai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Fatou Njai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Haja Njai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Satang Njai, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Massaneh Njie, GOIC Staff  
 Fatou Nyang, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Gary Robinson, OICI  
 Baboucar Sadiaw, Curriculum Development Center, The Gambia  
 Abdou Salla, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Anoki Sambou, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Mai Sanneh, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Fanta Sanyang, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Ibrima F. B. Sanyang, GOIC Staff  
 Joel Schiesinger, AID/ Washington  
 Babou Secka, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Jay Secka, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Abdulie Seeka, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Binba Sey, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Sai Sey, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 R. J. Silla, GOIC Staff  
 Nato Sima, Villager, Tankanto Village  
 Keith Simmons, AID/Gambia

Fenda Singaleh, GOIC Staff  
 S. Singateh, Minister, MANR  
 Fatou Sise, GOIC Staff  
 Fartou Sure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 M. M. Suso, GOIC Staff  
 Kebba Touray, Society President, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Sainey Touray, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ali Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Alieun Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Babou Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ebou Yasin Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ebrima Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Ebrima Awa Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Fana Yasin Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Katuu Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kebba Karim Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Layim B. Toure, GOIC Staff  
 Lien Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Malick Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Mby Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Modon Rohey Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Muhammed Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Omar Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Sahet Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Saihou Omar Toure, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Bom Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Fatou Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Haddy Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Hamie Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kaddy Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kalim Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kan Awa Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kani Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kanni Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Kari Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Rohey Ture, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village  
 Lamin Tuawally, GOIC Trainee  
 P. C. Vesseur, The Netherlands Livestock Survey Project  
 Hadam Willan, Villager, Maka Farafenni Village

**ANNEX 3**

**GDP of The Gambia at Factor Cost**

**1974/75 to 1980/81**

Gross Domestic Product at Producers' Values (Factor Cost) by Broad Industrial Origin 1974/5 to 1980/1  
(1974/5 to 1980/1 at current prices; in millions dalasis)

	<u>1974/5</u>	<u>75/6</u>	<u>76/7</u>	<u>77/8</u>	<u>78/9</u>	<u>79/80</u>	<u>80/1</u>	<u>Percentage of GDP</u> <u>(Average 78/9-80/1)</u>	<u>Annual Growth Rate</u> <u>74/5-80/1</u>
Agriculture (2)	70.5	92.5	104.1	96.4	128.2	81.6	102.1		6.4
Industry (2)	6.5	11.8	14.2	13.1	17.7	19.4	23.7		24.1
Electricity and water	1.4	1.3	1.8	2.3	1.8	2.2	2.9		12.9
Construction, mining and quarrying	12.8	14.1	17.2	27.1	28.8	34.2	36.4		19.0
Trade (2)	49.1	43.1	75.7	63.2	56.5	59.6	56.4		2.3
Hotels and restaurants	4.1	5.3	7.2	6.9	9.8	13.8	14.5		23.4
Transport, storage, and communications	12.5	17.7	19.8	25.0	27.8	32.2	37.7		20.2
Banking and insurance	7.9	10.9	9.7	10.5	11.9	14.4	12.9		10.2
Real estate and business services	19.3	20.3	21.6	24.4	20.0	24.6	26.2		5.2
Other services	3.5	4.5	5.6	6.6	7.5	8.0	8.8		16.6
Imputed bank charges	(5.2)	(6.4)	(6.2)	(6.4)	(6.8)	(8.2)	(7.2)		
Government services	20.9	29.2	37.2	43.4	46.5	51.0	54.0		17.1
<hr/>									
<u>Gross Domestic Product</u> <u>at producers' value</u> <u>(factor cost)</u>	202.6	244.3	307.9	312.5	349.7	332.8	368.4	100.0	10.5
Net indirect taxes	17.7	33.0	46.4	47.0	53.9	64.2	51.2		19.4
GDP at producers' value (market prices)	220.3	277.3	354.3	359.5	403.6	397.0	419.6		11.3

- Notes: (1) For years 1974/5 to 1977/8 estimates from CSD; for 1978/9 to 1980/1 MEPID preliminary estimates.  
(2) Agriculture includes groundnut production up to farmgate, livestock, forestry, and fishing; industry includes small-scale manufacturing; trade includes groundnut marketing.  
(3) A parenthesis ( ) indicates a negative figure.

**ANNEX 4**

**Logical Framework Matrix for the GOIC Project**

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX  
THE GAMBIA

Life of project:  
From CY77 to CY8

Page

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Project Goal</p> <p>To strengthen and diversify the capacity of the rural labour force.</p>	<p>Measure of Goal Achievement</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Degree to which imbalance and inequality in agricultural training opportunities is corrected.</li> <li>2) Degree of increase in rural income per farm household.</li> <li>3) Degree of increase in agricultural production per employed person.</li> <li>4) Degree of reduction in rural under-employment and unemployment.</li> <li>5) Degree of increase in average area planted to different crops for farming units growing the respective crops.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) a-Min. of Ed. statistics on agricultural training institutions. b-Min. of Ag. statistics on non-formal agricultural training programs.</li> <li>2) Ministry of Labour statistics on rural household receipts.</li> <li>3-4) Min. of Economic Planning statistical data concerning:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) agricultural sector growth trends</li> <li>b) national employment by occupation and income level</li> </ol> </li> <li>5) The National Agricultural Census Central Statistics Division, President's Office, Banjul.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) That diversified agricultural development continues to be GOG priority during the life of the project.</li> <li>2) That climatic conditions are conducive to crop and livestock production</li> <li>3) That the proposed linkages with relevant Ministries and other international donor agencies are viable.</li> </ol>

**PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX  
THE GAMBIA**

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p><b>Project Purpose</b></p> <p>To introduce a training program of intermediate level agricultural technology for rural school leavers in the North Bank Division of The Gambia.</p>	<p>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved (End of Project Status):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 200 school leavers trained in improved agricultural practices:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) 150 school leavers engaged in income-earning activities in rural cooperative societies.</li> <li>b) 25 school leavers farming individual holdings.</li> <li>c) 25 school leavers farming on family holdings.</li> </ol> </li> <li>2) GOIC managed, administered and supported by nationals of The Gambia.</li> <li>3) GOIC annual training capacity increased from (24) in year 1 to (68) in year 5 of the project.</li> <li>4) GOIC production farm generates adequate revenues from marketing of produce, livestock and poultry.</li> <li>5) GOG has committed annual budget allocations for the continued operation of GOIC.</li> <li>6) GOIC is recognized as an accredited, private, non-profit training institution by GOG.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Gambia OIC MIS records on trainee follow-up activities.</li> <li>2) Direct observation, annual evaluations, and GOIC MIS records.</li> <li>3) GOIC MIS records on student enrollments.</li> <li>4) GOIC Fiscal records, annual financial audit.</li> <li>5) GOG Estimates of Development Expenditure - for each project year.</li> <li>6) Documents of certification from appropriate government ministry.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) OIC training methods are acceptable to trainees and the local community.</li> <li>2) OIC methodology and techniques are transferable during the 5 year life of the project.</li> <li>3) Annual targets for program completions are met as projected.</li> <li>4) That farm market prices do not decline drastically during the LOP.</li> <li>5) That GOG budget allocations are according to a projected schedule.</li> <li>6) GOIC will fulfill the eligibility requirements for certification.</li> </ol>

**PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX**

THE GAMBIA

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Project Outputs</p> <p>1) The Gambia OIC Board of Directors organized and trained.</p> <p>2) Gambian agriculturists trained.</p> <p>3) Gambian administrators trained.</p> <p>4) Operating agricultural training program-The GOIC</p> <p>a) Training Curriculum Developed-Two-Year Board Program:</p> <p>1-Feeder(Literacy and Numeracy</p> <p>2-Plant Science</p> <p>3-Soil Science</p> <p>4-Animal Science</p> <p>5-Animal Traction</p> <p>6-Basic Coop Management &amp; Practices</p> <p>7-Agric. Bookkeeping</p> <p>8-Extension Methods &amp; Animation</p> <p>b) Training Curriculum-One-Year Day Program:</p> <p>1-Feeder</p> <p>2-Plant Science-Vegetables</p> <p>3-Soil Science</p> <p>4-Poultry Science</p>	<p>Magnitude of Outputs</p> <p>1) Board members performing voluntary functions and activities according to the Articles of Incorporation &amp; Memo of Agreement with OICI.</p> <p>2) Ten (10) local employees functioning independently as instructors, farm managers, extension &amp; coop services coordinators.</p> <p>3) Six (6) local employees performing key executive &amp; supportive functions.</p> <p>4a-b) Trainee Completions &amp; Placements:</p> <p>CY77 - 24 trainees-Demonstration Phase</p> <p>CY78 - 20 trainees-Day Program</p> <p>CY79 - 68 trainees-Day &amp; Boarding Prog.</p> <p>CY80 - 20 trainees - Day Program</p> <p>CY81 - 68 trainees-Day &amp; Boarding Prog.</p> <p>Total 5 yrs--200 trainees-Day &amp; Boarding</p> <p>4c) Administrative/Service System-GOIC</p> <p>1-Recruitment, screening, individualized counseling, placements &amp; follow-up are performed for each trainee.</p> <p>2-Annual plans and budgets developed by local staff with TCT assistance.</p> <p>3-MIS/Fiscal systems implemented and operational.</p> <p>4-Annual program and staff evaluations performed by local staff in conjunction with TCT, OICI, AID &amp; GOG.</p>	<p>1) Evidence of Board activities provided by MIS monthly reports, annual evaluations &amp; direct interviews.</p> <p>2-3) Evidence of local staff performance provided by annual evaluations, MIS reports, &amp; GOIC personnel records.</p> <p>4a-b) GOIC MIS records showing subjects offered, enrollment and completions statistics.</p> <p>4c) GOIC MIS records on student services, budgets, expenditures, etc.</p> <p>5) Certification by Government building inspectors.</p> <p>6-8)</p> <p>a-Field visit to project site, direct observation.</p> <p>b-Records of Min. of Ag.</p> <p>9) Registrar of Cooperative Union of The Gambia.</p> <p>10) In-kind contributions of support committees - documented in GOIC MIS.</p>	<p>1) That a mutually cooperative working relationship is achieved among GOIC Board, GOG, &amp; the GOIC Management team.</p> <p>2-3) That minimal turnover occurs among the local counterpart staff.</p> <p>4) Annual targets for program completions are achieved as scheduled.</p> <p>5) Training equipment and materials are available and arrive on schedule.</p> <p>6-8) That climatic conditions are adequate for engaging in agricultural activities.</p> <p>9) That cooperative movement continues to expand in The Gambia.</p> <p>10) Support committees are necessary to effect community involvement in project activities.</p>

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PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX  
THE GAMBIA

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS
<p>Project Outputs (cont)</p> <p>5-Basic Coop Practices 6-Agric. Bookkeeping</p> <p>c) Administrative/Service Systems Developed: 1-Student Services 2-Planning/Programming 3-Fiscal/MIS Guidelines and Procedures 4-Program Evaluation</p> <p>5) Training Facilities Renovated/Upgraded.</p> <p>6) Small livestock breeding and production unit.</p> <p>7) Food &amp; cash crop production unit.</p> <p>8) Crop, livestock and poultry training unit.</p> <p>9) Small farmer cooperative societies.</p> <p>10) Community Consciousness and support: a- Agricultural Advisory Committee b-Cooperatives Management Advisory Committee c-Fund Raising Campaign</p>	<p>Magnitude of Outputs (cont)</p> <p>5) Donated training facilities are fully equipped, furnished.</p> <p>6) 100 ha of land fully utilized on a rotating basis.</p> <p>7) 100 ha of land fully utilized on a rotating basis.</p> <p>8) 130 ha assigned to trainees in the day and boarding programs.</p> <p>9) 10 new coop societies registered composed of GOIC graduates.</p> <p>10) GOIC support committees perform voluntary advisory roles, attract increasing membership.</p>		

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PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY  
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

THE GAMBIA OIC

Page 5

NARRATIVE SUMMARY	OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS	MEANS OF VERIFICATION	IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS																																				
Project Inputs	Implementation Targets																																						
A. OICI Inputs	A. OICI	A.1-5) Annual Audit of GOIC Program(External/Internal)	1) Program supplies and equipment purchased abroad are available and delivered on schedule.																																				
1. Technical Cooperation Team (TCT) a-Program Advisor b-Fiscal/Admin. Spec. c-Animal Husbandry Spec d-Farm Mgr./Coop Spec.	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>1. CY</td> <td>77</td> <td>78</td> <td>79</td> <td>80</td> <td>81</td> </tr> <tr> <td>a)</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b)</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c)</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d)</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> <td>12mm</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="6">Total 216 mm LOP</td> </tr> </table>	1. CY	77	78	79	80	81	a)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	b)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	c)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	d)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	Total 216 mm LOP						B. 1) Agreement with Min. of Ag. 2) Agreement with Min. of Local Government	2) GOG land and facilities will be available as scheduled.
1. CY	77	78	79	80	81																																		
a)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm																																		
b)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm																																		
c)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm																																		
d)	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm	12mm																																		
Total 216 mm LOP																																							
2. Short-term consultants	2. \$2500 \$1500 \$1500 \$1500 \$2000	3-4) Agreement with Min. of Finance.																																					
3. Participant Training	3. - \$3892 \$6102 \$6102 \$6102																																						
4. Commodities and Equipment/Infra.Cost	4. \$81520 \$103812 \$2062 \$3437 \$2062																																						
5. Other Direct Costs: Communications, facilities renovation & maintenance, printing, etc.	5. \$27602 \$31449 \$17148 \$18878 \$21305																																						
B. Host Country Inputs																																							
1. Counterpart for agricultural Specialist.	1. 60 MM LOP																																						
2. Farm land & existing facilities for GOIC.	2. 298 ha surveyed and utilized by 1981.																																						
3. Tax exemption for TCT staff.	3. Government does not attempt to collect taxes from TCT staff.																																						
4. Exemption from customs and storage charges for project related equipment, vehicles & personal effects.	4. Customs officials do not impose duties on GOIC commodities entering The Gambia.																																						

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ANNEX 5

AID/Gambia Study of GOIC Resettlement Efforts

June 3 - July 2, 1981

## Study of GOIC Resettlement Efforts

June 3 - July 2, 1981

### I. Introduction

This paper reports the results of a survey of the graduates of the Gambia OIC Agricultural Training and Resettlement Program located at Chamen, North Bank Division. The survey was performed at the request of USAID/Banjul in order to obtain information which could be used generally to evaluate the goals, objectives and purposes of the GOIC program and specifically to evaluate the resettlement program of those graduates. The survey was conducted June 12-25, 1981. It shall be noted that the comments in this report are limited to those goals, objectives and purposes for which the information obtained is relevant.

In order to prepare for carrying out the survey, the documentation on the program available at USAID/Banjul was studied, including the original program proposal, the May, 1980 evaluation, the revised program proposal, the one quarterly report available (April 1 - June 30, 1981), the feasibility study for a Phase II, plus other documents available in the USAID/Banjul file on OICI/The Gambia. Following the activity, the project site at Chamen was visited to obtain the names and current locations of the graduates and to examine graduates' files and follow up reports on graduates' activities. In addition, discussions were held with members of the training center staff, who also provided a tour of the center. From the information obtained from the documentation and the training center visit, a questionnaire was designed with which to interview the graduates of the training program. After the questionnaire had been completed, interviews were conducted with the graduates wherever they could be found throughout the country. An interpreter fluent in English, Wolof and Mandinka was

employed to assist on those occasions when a graduate was not certain of the exact nature of a query.

Thirty-five of the forty-seven individuals listed as graduates by the GOIC were interviewed. Of the twelve who were not interviewed, seven were reported by their families to be living in the Banjul/Serrekunda area; two were reported to be in Senegal, two others were in the Provinces, but could not be located; the location of the remaining graduate is unknown.

## II. Results of Interviews

### A. Number of Graduates

The staff of the GOIC provided a list of 47 names of individuals whom they consider graduates of the training program - 30 of these were from the 1979 training program and 17 from 1980. During the interviews, however, four of the graduates stated that they had left the training program before its completion: one 1979 graduate left in September 1979, 4 months before the end of training, to take a job with G.U.C.; one 1979 graduate left two months early to join the Field Force; one 1979 graduate left the program after 7 months to work as a literacy teacher for Coops.; one 1980 graduate was expelled from the training program for disciplinary reasons in September, 1980.

### B. Characteristics of all Graduates

The thirty-five graduates interviewed represent 74% of the total graduates. This figure includes 24 graduates (80%) of the 1979 training program and 11 graduates (65%) of the 1980 program. The surveyed graduates averaged 9.8 years of formal schooling and 7 years of farming experience before attending the GOIC. Currently, 17 (48%) of the surveyed graduates plan on farming individual or family land during the 1981 season, 13 (37%)

are holding jobs of permanent or temporary nature, and 5 (14%) are unemployed, as summarized in Table I. Twelve of the surveyed graduates are currently residing in the Banjul-Serrekunda-Brikama areas; only one of these is farming.

Table I

<u>Current Occupations of Surveyed Graduates</u>	
1979 Graduates	Farming Individual Holding ..... 7
	Secy-Coop Union (also Farming) ..... 1
	Asst. SECCO Supervisor - Coop Union ..... 1 (also Farming)
	Coop Literacy Instructor (also Farming) ..... 2
	CRS Village Monitor ..... 1
	Police or Field Force ..... 8
	Clerk - Garage ..... 1
	Pump Attendant G.U.C. .... 1
	Unqualified Teacher ..... 1
	Unemployed ..... 1
1980 Graduates	Farming Individual Holding ..... 5
	Farming Family Holding ..... 1
	Temp. Clerk - Commissioner's Office ..... 1
	Unemployed ..... 4

C. Characteristics of Graduate Farming

In order to facilitate analysis in this section, each growing season is considered separately. In 1980, only the 1979 graduate farmed in the village, while during the current season, 1981, individuals from both years training programs plan to farm

In 1980, 14 graduates (of the 24 surveyed in the 1979 training program) farmed during the rainy season. According to the GOIC records, 16 (53%) of the 30 graduates farmed in 1980, but three of these either turned their fields over to family members or abandoned their fields before the harvest. The number of graduates who actually farmed in 1980 is considerably lower than the number reported as planning to farm in the May 1980 evaluation report. Their activities can be summarized as follows:

all graduates who farmed on individual land for an average of 5 days a week and on family land for 2 days. One group of three (brothers) and one group of two graduates worked together. The area of land cultivated individually amounted to a combined total of 26.59 hectares or 1.9 hectares acreage per graduate. (The GOIC figures are somewhat different than those provided by graduates - both sets of figures are indicated in Table II).

groundnuts were planted by all graduates farming. The yield figures for groundnuts harvested by the graduates vary according to the source. (The GOIC figures are somewhat lower than those reported by graduates). In every case except one, the graduates reported their groundnut yield in total number of bags harvested or in donkeys (two bags per donkey). According to one of the graduates who works for Cooperatives Union, a bag of groundnuts from the fields can vary in weight from 46-56 kg. each, depending on the moisture content and dust present. The total harvest for graduates was 216 bags, or between 9936 kgs., and 12096 kgs. (46 kg./bag or 56 kg./bag). Both of these figures are higher than the figure recorded by the GOIC for the harvest: 8016 kgs. ~~Whichever figures are used, the average yield per hectare is considerably lower than the average for NRD as a whole in 1980 and lower than the national average for the same period. When considered individually rather than collectively, five of the graduates equalled or slightly surpassed the NBD average, if their own~~

reported yield is used. Only two equal or surpass the NBD average according to the GOIC records. (Groundnut yields are summarized in Table II).

two graduates planted three crops in 1980, 7 planted two crops and five planted only one crop (groundnuts). (Crop diversification is shown in Table III).

Animal husbandry activities were practically non-existent. One graduate raised two sheep. Several were planning to start poultry projects, but did not receive the necessary materials.

All of the graduates farming received some help from the GOIC in the form of tractor plowing, / <sup>motorized</sup> cultivator, seeds and fertilizer for which they were required to repay 10% of the cost at the end of the season. Two of the graduates also received assistance from the cooperative society, primarily in the form of seed and fertilizer.

All the graduates farming reported receiving income from the sale of their crops of D250 to D1400. In every case, the figure represented the amount for which the graduate sold his crop. Only four could provide a figure for <sup>net</sup> income. The income figures recorded by the GOIC for the graduates were lower than those reported by the graduates during the interviews.

In 1981, 17 of the 35 surveyed graduates are planning to farm, 12 from the 1979 training and 5 from the 1980 training. Two of the graduates who farmed in 1980 have dropped out of farming in 1981. The planned farming activities of these graduates can be summarized as follows:

- fifteen of the graduates are planting a total of 42.39 hectares, 18.72 hectares of which will be planted in groundnuts. One other graduate could not estimate the area he would plant, as he was working in one village as a literacy teacher at the time of the survey and did not know what land

would be available in his own village. Another graduate was planning to assist his father and brothers, but was not sure of the area of his father's land nor the crops he was planting. The increase in total area planned this year is accounted for primarily by three of the 1980 graduates two who are planting 6 hectares of rice and one who is planting 6 hectares of groundnuts, maize and sorghum. (Area planned is summarized in Table II).

One graduate is planting three crops, nine are planting two crops, and five are planting only one crop. Twelve of the fifteen are planting groundnuts. (Crops diversification Table III).

Animal husbandry activities are minimal. One graduate maintains 8 cows. Several hoped to start poultry projects, but materials have not been provided.

Table II

Area Cultivated and yield by Surveyed Graduates

YEAR	# OF GRAD.	SOURCE	TOTAL HECTAR-AGE	AVERAGE PER GRAD.	G'NUT HECTAR-AGE	YIELD-G'NUTS - Kg/Hct.	NBD AVERAGE	NATIONAL AVERAGE
1980	14	SURVEY	26.59	1.90	21.12	* 216)=12096kg.@56:633 kg: bags= 9936kg.@46:520 kg:	930 + 848 ++	729 + 639 ++
		TGOIC	31.06	2.21	24.64	8016kg.** :363 kg:		
1981	17	SURVEY	42.39	2.83	18.72	--	--	--
ANNED								

\* based on 19.12 hect. - no yield figures on 2 hect.  
 \*\* based on 22.11 hect. - no yield figures on 2.53 hect.  
 \*\*\* based on 15 graduates  
 + source - PPMU - Ministry of Agriculture  
 ++ source - Central Statistics Division

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Table III

Level of Crop Diversification of Surveyed Graduates

Crops Planted in 1980	# OF GRAD.	# CROPS PLANTED	# OF GRAD.
Groundnuts	14	1 crop	5
Maize	6	2 crops	7
Sorghum	1	3 crops	2
Millet	2		

Crops Planned in 1981	# OF GRAD.	# CROPS PLANNED	# OF GRAD.
Groundnuts	12	1 crop	5
Maize	6	2 crops	9
Sorghum	1	3 crops	1
Millet	3		
Rice	2		

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Two of the graduates farming have received assistance from the GOIC this year, primarily in the form of leveling and plowing of their rice fields, for which they were charged D147. Five of the graduates have obtained some assistance from the cooperatives, in the form of seed and fertilizer, but in four cases the assistance is insufficient.

#### D. Resettlement

According to the surveyed graduates, one of the original features of the GOIC training program which encouraged them to enroll was the resettlement package to be provided to the graduates at the completion of training. The graduates' perceptions of the assistance they had been told would be provided varied considerably, but included such items as assistance with land acquisition, loans to purchase animals and farm implements, loan of a motorized cultivator, loan of the training center tractor for plowing their fields, provision of seeds and fertilizer, provision of chicks and poultry materials, loans to purchase a tractor, loan of oxen or donkey and equipment, provision of power tillers and pumps.

In 1980, the GOIC provided resettlement assistance to 16 of the 30 graduates (14 of the 24 surveyed). The assistance took the form of land acquisition assistance, plowing by the training center tractor, or loans of a motorized cultivator, seeds, fertilizer and food grain for a total of D4541.94 or D3743.36 depending on which figures from the GOIC records are used. The graduates were required to repay 10% of the amount of assistance provided them. In addition, a staff member from the GOIC made a field visit about once a month during the growing season to each graduate farming. During the interviews with the graduates, it became evident that the resettlement assistance which was actually provided amounted to considerably less than the graduates had expected based on the information they had been given

during orientation at the beginning of the training program.

In 1981, the GOIC has provided assistance to two graduates in the form of plowing of their fields by the Center tractor. All of the graduates farming this year have expressed the need for continuing assistance from the GOIC. One who intends planting 5 hectares of groundnuts and maize indicated that he could not farm this year without such assistance.

Among the graduates not farming, eleven stated that they would return to farming if they could obtain the materials they considered necessary for farming. Five of these eleven, however, are currently in the police force, which requires a five year term of service. Another six graduates surveyed would not return to farming under any conditions.

### III. Evaluation

The major objective of the Gambia OIC program as stated in the 1981 Feasibility Study is to train young Gambians in agricultural techniques and resettle them into the farming occupation. In order to determine what progress has been achieved in reaching this objective, certain indicators of goal and purpose achievement, as contained in the revised Logical Framework Matrix of the Gambia OIC Program Proposal, FY 81, are examined in relation to the survey results.

The project goal, strengthening and diversifying the capacity of the rural labor force, was to be measured by the increase in rural income per trainee farm household, the increase in agriculture production per employed person, the reduction in rural underemployment and unemployment, and the increase in crop diversification. According to this survey's results,

significant progress has not yet been achieved with regard to project goals.

Agricultural production by those graduates who farmed has been lower than the average for other farmers in the region. While this lower production may be attributed to poor germination, adverse climate conditions, or insufficient materials, the situation prevailing for the graduates has not been significantly different than conditions existing for other cultivators, who are constrained by many of the same factors. Indeed, the GOIC graduates have had access to inputs such as tractor plowing and technical advice from the GOIC, which may have been unavailable to other farmers.

Crops diversification has not significantly increased - the great majority of graduates plant only one or two crops.

Although some reduction in rural unemployment can be claimed in that 17 graduates are employed in farming, only five of them are productively occupied outside the growing season, two as employees of Cooperatives Union, two as literacy instructors, and one as a secondary school student. Of the non-farming graduates, only one is employed in an agricultural-related position. For the others who are employed, obtaining their positions was not measurably aided by the GOIC training.

Among the surveyed graduates farming, some increase in rural income has occurred, but the amount is difficult to measure, given the inconsistent income and expense figures available.

The project purpose, introducing a training program of intermediate level agricultural technology for rural school leavers, includes as one indicator of achievement that 30 school leavers would be trained in improved

agricultural practices by the end of FY 79 and 25 more by the end of FY 80. In addition, at least 60% of the school leavers would be resettled in income - earning activities either an individual or family farm holdings.

At the present time, 43 trainees, or 78% of projections to this point, have completed the training program, 27 in 1979 and 16 in 1980. Fewer than half of these graduates have been resettled in farming activities. It has been reported in other documents and in discussions with the GOIC staff that lack of resettlement funds on the part of the GOIC has seriously hindered the resettlement effort.

Despite the continuing financial problems of the training center, it is unfortunate that so few resources have been directed toward the one factor by which the validity of entire program can be determined: graduate farmers demonstrating improved agricultural practices through significant crop diversification and production.

Of further interest is the general character and quality of the training as a whole. Judging from the results of the resettled graduates thus far, it is not clear if "technology transfer" has occurred, if the training provided by the center has in fact been assimilated and correctly applied.

One disturbing viewpoint which became evident during the interviews was the unrealistic expectation of the graduates (both those farming and those who indicated a willingness to farm given the necessary materials) toward the type of agricultural production they would become involved in. Some of those graduates interested in crop production talked in terms of obtaining a tractor or power tiller, technology which is clearly beyond

their capability to afford or maintain. Those graduates interested in poultry production mentioned their need for a freezer and generator for their operations, but had scarcely given any thought to such factors as steady sources of chicks and feed, source of transportation, location of markets, etc. Whether they held these views before entering the training program is undetermined, but clearly this type of attitude must be addressed by the training program.

The GOIC lost considerable credibility in the eyes of the trainees by promising one thing as resettlement assistance at the beginning of training, but producing substantially less at the time of resettlement. This factor not only affected the morale of the graduates, but has placed serious constraints on the institution's future recruitment ability. From the experience of one graduate, no other youths from his village are willing to consider attending the GOIC.

#### IV. Recommendations

1. Direct priority attention to providing 1979 and 1980 graduates with adequate resettlement assistance to farm this year.

It is counterproductive to lose already trained manpower resource while continuing to train new, particularly since the validity of project concept to successfully train and resettle individuals in productive agricultural activities has yet to be proven.

2. Establish better follow up on the GOIC graduates.

Currently only those graduates farming receive follow up visits. The GOIC has lost contact with at least twelve of its graduates.

3. Install in trainees a more realistic attitude toward the level of sophistication of their future farming activities.

4. Establish more stringent selection criteria for trainees.

Applicants who have little interest in agriculture are not suitable candidates - six of the graduates interviewed do not want to farm. Neither should the program accept applicants who are employed at the time of application, as was the case with two of the 1979 graduates.

Survey of TGOIC Graduates

1. Name \_\_\_\_\_ Date of Interview \_\_\_\_\_
2. Village \_\_\_\_\_
- 3.a. Age \_\_\_\_\_ b. Marital status \_\_\_\_\_ c.No. of Children \_\_\_\_\_
4. Year of graduation from TGOIC \_\_\_\_\_
5. If trainee did not complete program, reason for leaving TGOIC:
- \_\_\_ curriculum too difficult
  - \_\_\_ living conditions unsatisfacto
  - \_\_\_ discipline
  - \_\_\_ lack of stipend
  - \_\_\_ training not useful
  - \_\_\_ better opportunity elsewhere
  - \_\_\_ other \_\_\_\_\_
6. No. of years attended/ before TGOIC: \_\_\_\_\_ Government \_\_\_\_\_ Korani
7. Level of spoken English \_\_\_\_\_
8. Literate \_\_\_\_\_ English  
\_\_\_\_\_ Arabic  
\_\_\_\_\_ Other
9. No. of years farming experience (individual/family) before TGOIC training \_\_\_\_\_
10. No. of years farming experience (individual/family) after TGOIC training \_\_\_\_\_

Employment

11. Where did you go to work after completing training at TGOIC?
12. How long did you do this work?
13. What is your current work?
14. Why are you doing this work? or Why did you take this job?

15. What kind of work do you want to do in the future?

16.a. If you are not farming, what is the primary reason you left farming?

b. If you are not farming, would you consider returning to farming? Under what conditions?

Training

17. a. What training at TGOIC has been most useful to you?

b. What training at TGOIC has been least useful to you?

18. a. Inservice training courses offered after graduation \_\_\_\_\_  
b. " " " attended " " \_\_\_\_\_

19. a. What do you think about the school facilities - housing, food, etc.?

b. How would you rate the instructors?

c. How did you use the counseling services? Were they helpful?

20. If you had not attended TGOIC training, how well could you do the work you are now doing?

21. What skills have you learned at TGOIC which have helped you most in your work?

22. When considering your experience, what changes in the training program would you suggest that would help prepare new students for jobs?

23. What further training would you find useful?
24. What did TGOIC say they would provide you to begin farming after graduation?
25. What did they actually provide?

-----

Farmers only (including those who farmed in 1980 but are no longer farming)

1980 Season

26.a. How much land did you plant last year?

	<u>Area</u>	<u>Total yield</u>
groundnuts	_____	_____
maize	_____	_____
sorghum	_____	_____
millet	_____	_____
rice	_____	_____
vegetables	_____	_____
other	_____	_____

b. How close is your land to your house?

\_\_\_\_\_ < 1 km      \_\_\_\_\_ 1 km      \_\_\_\_\_ 2 kms      \_\_\_\_\_ 3 kms

27.c. What kinds of equipment did you use on your farm? Source?

b. How did you prepare your land? Source of equipment?

c. Did you plow following the contour?

d. How many days a week did you work on your fields? \_\_\_\_\_  
 How many days a week did you work on your family fields? \_\_\_\_\_

28. Where did you get your seed? fertilizer? How financed?

29. How much money did you earn from your crops?

groundnuts \_\_\_\_\_ cereals \_\_\_\_\_ vegetables \_\_\_\_\_

30. Did you raise livestock?

cattle \_\_\_\_\_  
sheep \_\_\_\_\_  
goats \_\_\_\_\_  
chickens \_\_\_\_\_  
other \_\_\_\_\_

31. How much money did you raise from your livestock?

32. Do you have written records of your farming activities? May I see them?

1981 Season

33.a. How much land are you planting this year?

groundnuts	_____	millet	_____
maize	_____	rice	_____
sorghum	_____	veg.	_____

b. How close is your land to your house?

\_\_\_\_\_ < 1 km      \_\_\_\_\_ 1 km      \_\_\_\_\_ 2 kms      \_\_\_\_\_ 3 kms

c. What resources do you need that you do not have now?

34.a. What kind of equipment is available for your use this year? Source?

b. How have you prepared the land? Source of equipment?

c. If different than last year, why the change?

d. Are you contour plowing any of your land?

35. Where did you get seeds? fertilizer? How financed?

36.a. Which cooperative do you belong to?

b. What help have you obtained from the coop.?

c. Is it sufficient?

37. When did the TGOIC Cooperatives Extension Coordinator last visit you?

38. How did he help you?

39. What help do you need from TGOIC?

40. What kinds of animals do you keep? own?

cattle	_____	_____
sheep	_____	_____
goats	_____	_____
chick.	_____	_____
other	_____	_____

41. What do you feed them? From what source?

42. What do you use them for?

43. What work did you do after the harvest last year?


44. What did you learn at TGOIC that you have shown to your neighbors and family,

- \_\_\_\_\_ plant spacing
- \_\_\_\_\_ fertilizer application
- \_\_\_\_\_ cultivation techniques
- \_\_\_\_\_ contour plowing
- \_\_\_\_\_ crop rotation
- \_\_\_\_\_ animal husbandry
- \_\_\_\_\_ other

**ANNEX 6**

**The GOIC Staff Structure**

The Gambia OIC Staff Structure



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ANNEX 7

Dates of AID Funding Approval and  
OICI Receipt of Funds

Dates of AID Funding Approval and OICI Receipt of Funds

<u>Date Budget Request Sent to AID by OICI</u>	<u>Date Signed by AID</u>	<u>Date Federal Reserve Letter of Credit Received</u>	<u>Annual Budget Period</u>	<u>Grant Amendment Number</u>	<u>Budget Amount</u>	<u>Amount Obligated</u>
Nov. 22, 1976	n/a*	Oct. 31, 1977	Oct. 1, 1977- Sept. 30, 1978	14	326,700	326,700
Aug. 17, 1978	letter not dated	Oct. 3, 1978	Oct. 1, 1978- Sept. 30, 1979	22	348,900	348,900
July 27, 1979	Aug. 31, 1979	Oct. 9, 1979	Oct. 1, 1979- Sept. 30, 1980	31	411,900	411,900
n/a	Sept. 21, 1979	Nov. 26, 1979	Oct. 1, 1979- Sept. 30, 1980	34	62,700	62,700
n/a	March 14, 1980	May 8, 1980	Oct. 1, 1979- Sept. 30, 1980	35	15,700	15,700
May 22, 1980	Aug. 29, 1980	Oct. 17, 1980	Oct. 1, 1979- Sept. 30, 1980	40	24,700	24,700
July 29, 1980 Aug. 5, 1980	Sept. 30, 1980	Dec. 1, 1980	Oct. 1, 1980- Sept. 30, 1981	n/a	314,900	150,000
n/a	March 24, 1981	April 13, 1981	Oct. 1, 1980- Sept. 30, 1981	1	"	149,400
July 10, 1980	Aug. 19, 1981	Nov. 23, 1981	extending period to Dec. 31, 1981	3	increasing 314,900 above to 475.600	176,200

\*n/a - not available

Source: OICI

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ANNEX 8

AID/Gambia's Response to OJCI's

Phase II Feasibility Study



AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA

UNITED STATES ADDRESS  
BANJUL (I.D.)  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON D.C. 20523

INTERNATIONAL ADDRESS  
U.S.A.I.D.  
C/O AMERICAN EMBASSY  
P. O. BOX 596  
BANJUL, THE GAMBIA.

July 24, 1981

Mr. Alieu Jagne  
Permanent Secretary  
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources  
Central Bank Building  
Banjul

Dear Alieu:

I regret being so late with our response to the Phase II GOIC Feasibility Study which was discussed at the June 23, 1981 meeting chaired by Sol Ceesay. Although I was unable to attend the meeting, I understand that there was a far ranging and highly spirited discussion of the proposal on the part of many government officials representing various ministries concerned with this subject. We had not formed a position on the study prior to the meeting inasmuch as we were hoping other options might be presented by the GUTG in addition to that proposed in the study. While we were impressed with the consensus viewpoint of those attending the meeting to endorse the Feasibility Study as presented, we were also stimulated to explore other possibilities for the Chamen Center for consideration along with the existing proposal. This is what our staff has been engaged in over the past month. We have undertaken a series of discussions with a cross section of relevant Gambian officials, reviewed existing documentation in detail, investigated existing agricultural education and training activities and commissioned an informal follow-up study of GOIC graduates, a copy of which is enclosed. From all this activity, we have formulated a different option for the GOIC project which is put forward below for your consideration.

Although the GOIC program has been in The Gambia since 1978, the original AID grant was made in Washington from a central source of funds. While we were always interested in GOIC, only during the past year when

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funding shifted from the Washington end to our bilateral program, has AID/Banjul become deeply involved with the project. The existing project concludes at the end of this calendar year, hence the desire on the part of all concerned to decide on the future use of the GOIC center at Chamen which is the focal point of project activity.

GOIC, as originally conceived and operated, has been a community-based, board-governed institution designed to train a specific target population in improved farming methods and to resettle them on the farm or in other forms of employment. The proposed Phase II project as described in the feasibility study somewhat modifies the previous project but retains the same basic character e.g., to train farmers and resettle them or find jobs for them. The proposed outputs as stated in the feasibility study would be to train 240 live-in farmers and an additional 240 farmers through a community outreach program. Of the 240 live-in farmers, 60 percent would be resettled and 40 percent placed in jobs. The total cost of the project proposal is approximately 2 million dollars of which 1.8 million would come from AID.

In the process of reviewing the feasibility study, we have come to the realization that we should take a different look at GOIC in determining our reaction to any future AID involvement. This exercise has broadened our thinking. Initially, we were trying to provide ideas to those conducting the study that would improve the basic model as outlined in the original proposal and the revised program for 1981, but as we became more involved we began to realize that the program itself and its goals as originally conceived do not fit into our primary goals as much as they should, which, simply stated, are to support GOTG's priority goal of attaining food self sufficiency by means of improved animal and crop production and diversification. After considerable thought and discussions with a broad cross section of Gambian officials, we have reached the view that the center at Chamen should be focused on reaching directly and indirectly the maximum number of farmers with improved farming methods and that this can best be accomplished by fully integrating the center into

existing Gambian Government institutions which are involved in and responsible for farmer training. We believe the Chamen Center should be administered by MANR, (perhaps as part of the Department of Agriculture's agricultural extension and training program) and that it not only train selected farmers but that it also become a focal point for pre-service and in-service training for various levels of MANR extension staff. Perhaps farmer training courses should be of considerably shorter duration than as proposed in the feasibility study allowing more time for MANR staff training and development. Management and teaching staff at Chamen Center would be MANR employees and the center would be subject to established GOTG policies and procedures governing its program design, course content, curriculum, etc., as well as its financial and personnel management. We feel that this approach is more feasible inasmuch as it will have far greater potential for achieving our objectives of increasing agricultural production and diversification than that proposed in the feasibility study. It should also pose less of a recurrent cost problem to the GOTG as it gradually assumes financial responsibility between 1982 and 1985.

In reaching this conclusion of converting the center to a more traditional, government-directed farm training center, we are not overlooking the fact that the community-based, board-governed philosophy which underlines the GOIC concept unfortunately will be sacrificed. However, it simply strikes us that in a country the size and level of development in The Gambia, the most efficient use of available resources is on a centrally directed, government-to-people basis. Perhaps there would be a value in maintaining a community based advisory board including farmer representatives but we are suggesting that over the next several years at least, the center be fully integrated into and play a major role in the MANR's agricultural training program. Other ministries and institutions which have expertise in certain aspects of the center's activities could assist MANR in carrying out its responsibilities.

Inasmuch as present funding for the existing GOIC project runs out the end of this calendar year, we would like to meet with you and any others you may designate as soon as possible to discuss the suggestions contained herein and any other proposals you may wish to raise

regarding the use of the center. As I am sure you can appreciate, it will take AID and the GOTG time to develop a proposal and submit it for approval and funding. We will need to work expeditiously in order to minimize the break between the current GOIC project and the initiation of a new one, assuming one is approved. A determination of the need for continued U.S. technical assistance, as has been provided to date by OICI, will become much clearer as we jointly develop the future use of the center.

Again, I regret the delay in this response and wish to commend the joint OICI/GOTG team for their effective efforts in preparing the Phase II Feasibility Study which has contributed significantly to the evolution of our thinking as presented above. I look forward to hearing from you on this important matter at your earliest convenience. Best regards.

Sincerely,



Thomas A. Moser  
AID Representative

Attachments: (1) Resettlement Study  
(2) Questionnaire (see Annex 5)

TAM/fbc.

ANNEX 9

OICI's Rejoinder to AID/Gambia's Response  
to Its Phase II Feasibility Study

OICI's Rejoinder to AID/Gambia's Response  
to Its Phase II Feasibility Study

July 31, 1981

The following is OICI's official comment regarding July 24 letter of AID Mission/Banjul to Mr. Alieu Jagne.

1. It is almost three months since OICI submitted the Phase II Feasibility Study to AID Mission for its consideration. Prior to the June 23 meeting, AID Mission was given ample opportunity to formulate a response in writing to OICI and GOTG by June 15. There was no response nor any specific and viable alternative proposal presented at the June 23 meeting. Since AID Mission presented no alternative proposal and since the GOTG representatives unanimously endorsed the Phase II proposal, the meeting adjourned with a resolution that the question of having jurisdiction over the Phase II project between Ministry of Agriculture, Education and Youth Sports was considered an easy in-house decision that was going to be made without any serious problem by the ministries concerned. The more important unresolved issue had to do with the request made to AID Mission to get back to the Gambia Government and OICI with a defined position as to funding Phase II.

2. As the July 24 letter to the Permanent Secretary indicates, AID Mission continues to thwart the cooperative efforts and wishes of the GOTG and OICI by returning to a square one position without any specific solution or commitment on its part. AID Mission alludes to "converting the center to a more traditional Government-directed farm training center," thereby giving the impression that neither the community nor The Gambia Government contributed to and benefited from the project in the past four years. Nor does AID Mission stance acknowledge that the vast majority of the present OICG Board of Directors are Government representatives. AID Mission does not suggest what actually is wrong with either Phase I or with the proposed Phase II to warrant the need for other options that it so repetitiously states without defining or justifying exactly the nature of the "option" or their superiority to the Phase II proposal.

3. It is particularly noteworthy that the unanimous support of Phase II proposal by GOTG authorities, made absolutely clear in the June 23 meeting and even in the above-referred July 24 letter of the Mission itself, was completely disregarded without any justifiable explanation. In the same communication, having disregarded the wishes of the Gambian Government, AID Mission now states that "they have undertaken a series of discussions with a cross section of relevant Gambian officials," without specifying who these officials are and what Government agencies they represent.

4. It is equally incomprehensible why the Mission unilaterally chose (without involving OICI, OICG, and the GOTG) to commission the so-called informal follow-up study of GOIC graduates on such an important project which requires the joint participation of all interested parties; nor is it comprehensible that the outcome of such informal study could serve as a better basis for decision making and for considering other options than the feasibility study jointly prepared by OICI and the GOTG, with the Mission having been given ample opportunity to have its own input. In point of

fact, all recommendations made then by the Mission are already incorporated in the Phase II proposal.

5. AID Mission claims that as Phase I concludes, it is "the desire on the part of all concerned to decide on the future use of the GOIC center . . . This statement is inaccurate since it clearly contradicts the unanimous vote of the GOTG authorities in favor of undertaking Phase II, via the collaboration of OICG, GOTG, and OICI. Once again, towards that end the June 23 meeting called on AID Mission to focus on the Phase II proposal as presented to AID Mission on May 4, 1981. In the same meeting, AID Mission was further urged to fund Phase II as soon as possible so that GOTG can begin to institutionalize the project, considering that the study is a joint document of OICI and GOTG and that GOTG is willing to immediately earmark its own financial contribution towards its implementation.

6. Put differently, GOTG authorities after careful review and deliberation, did conclude that the Phase II proposal as submitted is in line with the development priorities of the GOTG and with the Government's desire to involve and benefit target communities.

7. OIC International believes that the GOTG is eminently qualified to define its needs without being dictated by AID Mission to accepting its undefined options which have already had their day in the June 23 meeting.

8. OICI challenges AID Mission to prove that both Phase I and the proposed Phase II have not been in "support of GOTG's priority goal of attaining food self-sufficiency by means of improved animal and crop production and diversification." It is difficult to understand how the training of young farmers and the promotion of agricultural extension services as carried out by GOIC is in conflict with the GOTG's goal of increasing food production. On the contrary, to date and in the years ahead the efforts of GOIC in the training and resettlement of young farmers and in helping improve animal husbandry and crop production does indeed conform to the Government's goal of increasing food production. In fact, it was precisely in appreciation of GOIC's effort that the GOTG made available to GOIC supportive services via the Community Development Agency and the Senior Agricultural Station. It might be recalled that GOIC actively participated in the seeds multiplication program of the Government.

9. OICI further challenges AID Mission to prove that the scope of GOIC activities did not fit into the primary goals of the AID Mission, i.e., "support GOTG's priority goal of attaining food self-sufficiency . . ." As to the Mission's view that the GOIC "center at Chamen should be focused on reaching directly and indirectly the maximum number of farmers . . . and that this can be accomplished by fully integrating the center into existing Gambian Government institutions which are involved in . . . farmer training," the Mission should be enlightened with the following points:

a. GOIC has focused on reaching directly and indirectly an appreciable number of farmers, subject, of course, to resource and time constraints and economies of scale. To suggest "maximum" number (whatever that is) as opposed to "optimum" only suggests a lack of genuine appreciation of operational constraints.

b. The direction of Phase II jointly developed by OICI and GOTG clearly points to the integration of the center into the pool of Government farmer training institutions, without sacrificing the benefits of its grassroots approach and community participation. The interest of the Government in community participation as a means of ensuring the success of this project was clearly evident in the minutes of the June 23 meeting which is again sidestepped by AID Mission in order to advance and impose its own unsupported elusive views. In the same meeting, GOTG authorities have made it clear that they reserve the right to decide on their own the specific ministry which is to monitor the project. They further acknowledged that a resolution of that issue would be reached through inter-ministerial discussion. Yet AID Mission insists in imposing its "solution" on the GOTG as expressed in its July 24 letter to the Permanent Secretary of the MANR.

In summary, AID Mission has failed to address itself in specific terms to the issues.

1. What is wrong with the GOTG/OICI Phase II proposal?
2. What is AID Mission's full-fledged alternative proposal and what are its contents and how is it more beneficial to The Gambia than the provisions of the GOTG/OICI proposal? And how does AID's "alternatives" proposal (whatever it is meant to be) pose lesser recurrent cost problem to the GOTG than that indicated in the Phase II proposal of GOTG and OICI? AID Mission here again has conveniently sidestepped the Phase II provision which only requires the GOTG to assume financial responsibility gradually.
3. Why is it that AID's "alternative" was not developed before or at the time the GOTG/OICI feasibility study was conducted or even shortly thereafter, instead of telling OICI and the GOTG at this late stage (which is budget time) that other options should be considered? We believe AID Mission's position is entirely untenable in that it lacks forethought, sincerity, and a genuine desire to cooperate in this matter.

In light of the points elucidated above, we firmly believe that neither the GOTG nor OICI should engage in further futile discussion with the AID Mission until the issues are more meaningfully dealt with at higher level between OICI and the Agency for International Development in Washington.

Respectfully yours,

Kura Abedje, Deputy Executive Director  
and Director Finance and Administration  
OIC International

P.S. Please share a copy of this communication to Ambassador Sallah and Dr. Mannings, our Program Advisor.

**ANNEX 10**

**Logical Framework Matrix for the**  
**OICI Feasibility Study Project**

**X. THE GAMBIA OIC  
Logical Framework Matrix for Phase II**

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verifications	Important Assumptions
<p><u>Goal:</u></p> <p>To Contribute towards the improvement of economic conditions for the rural people in The Gambia</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increase in per capita income of rural farmers.</li> <li>2. Increase in farming skills and land area put under cultivation.</li> <li>3. Diversification of agricultural income including poultry, beekeeping and vegetable gardening.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. MIS reports</li> <li>2. Joint Evaluation USAID/GOG/OICI</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Agricultural development continues to be a priority in The Gambia.</li> <li>2. The Government Ministries concerned give adequate support to OIC.</li> </ol>

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Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Important Assumptions
<p><u>Purpose</u></p> <p>To institutionalize a viable Gambia OIC Rural Training and Demonstration Center in The Gambia</p> <p>156</p> <p>Devres</p>	<p><b>E.O.P.S.:</b></p> <p>1. Operational linkages established with GOG Ministries concerned with Rural Development:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Agriculture</li> <li>b. Community Development</li> <li>c. Health &amp; Social Welfare</li> <li>d. Education, Youth, Sports &amp; Culture</li> <li>e. RDP</li> </ul> <p>2. GOIC operating under a Memorandum of Agreement established with the Ministry of Education.</p> <p>3. GOG establishes and implements actions incorporating GOIC within its parastatal structure.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Incorporates the GOIC center in its Annual Budget Estimates</li> <li>b. Incorporates GOIC in its future Planning Documents</li> </ul>	<p>1. a. MIS reports</p> <p>b. Letters of support from concerned Ministries</p> <p>2. Memorandum of Agreement</p> <p>3. a. Memorandum of Agreement</p> <p>b. MIS</p> <p>c. GOG contribution to operating costs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(i) in kind</li> <li>(ii) cash</li> </ul> <p>d. Annual Budget Estimate</p> <p>e. Long term planning schedule (Five Year Plan)</p>	<p>GOG continues to feel the necessity and usefulness of a program such as OIC for rural development in The Gambia</p> <p>GOG takes initiative and action in preparing to assume responsibility for GOIC after 1985.</p>

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators				Means of Verification	Important Assumptions	
	<u>Years</u>						<u>Total</u>
<u>Outputs</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>			
a. Management Committee	7	3			10	MIS reports	GOIC Management committee remains stable and committed.
b. Local Staff Trained	24				24	Joint Evaluation GOG, USAID, OICI	
c. Formal Staff Development Sessions	12	12	12	14	48		
d. Formal Board Development Sessions	6	6	6	6	24		GOIC management committee takes active role in monitoring achievement of program outputs
e. Community Outreach Programs (COP)	2	2	2	2	8		
f. COP trainees	60	60	60	60	240		
g. On-site trainees enrolled	90	90	90	90	360		
h. On-site graduates	60	60	60	60	240		
i. Resettlements	36	36	36	36	144		
j. Job placements	24	24	24	24	96		
k. Graduates join co-op (on-site)	30	30	30	30	120		
l. Graduate farming groups	4	4	4	4	16		
m. Curriculum redesign							
1. COP	1				1		
2. Feeder	1				1		
3. Agricultural	2				3		
n. Linkages developed with other Ministries	1	2	1	1	5		
o. Advisory Committee formed	1				1		
p. Fund raising activities	1	1	1	1	4		
q. Workshops & Demonstrations held	1	1	1	1	4		
r. External audit reports	1	1	1	1	4		
s. External joint evaluation (GOG, USAID, OICI)		1		1	2		

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators					Means of Verification	Important Assumptions												
<u>Inputs</u>	<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th colspan="4"><u>Years</u></th> <th><u>Total</u></th> </tr> <tr> <th></th> <th><u>1</u></th> <th><u>2</u></th> <th><u>3</u></th> <th><u>4</u></th> <th></th> </tr> </thead> </table>						<u>Years</u>				<u>Total</u>		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>			
	<u>Years</u>				<u>Total</u>														
	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>															
<u>OICI</u>	a.	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>OICI</u>	<u>OICI</u>												
a. TCT (in person months)						MIS reports	a.-e. Shipping and Transportation of project equipment is not hampered by excessive delays.												
1. Program Advisor	1.	12	12	12	12	Joint Evaluation													
2. Ag. Specialist Consultant	2.	1	1	1	1	GOG, OICI, USAID													
3. Finance Specialist	3.	3	3	3	3														
b. 24 Local Staff	b.	288	288	288	288		Inflation for the 4 year period does not exceed 40%.												
c. Short-term Consultants	c.	3	2	4	3		That USAID Grant funds are released on schedule												
d. Equipment Vehicles	d.	\$73,573																	
e. Infrastructure	e.	\$78,475																	
<u>Local</u>						<u>Local</u>	<u>Local</u>												
a. Revenue from demonstration activities		D80,00				a. Production records	a. Harsh climatic conditions do not become more severe throughout LOP.												
b. Local Community Contribution		Labour, tools, animals				b. Financial MIS reports													
c. GOG Contribution		D300,000				c. Financial MIS reports													

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**ANNEX 11**

**GOIC Management Committee Members**

TGOIC Management Committee

1. Honorable Amulai Janneh, Chairman
2. Mr. M.K. Jallow, Secretary  
Commissioner, North Bank Division
3. Mr. S.S. Dorbo, Treasurer  
Project Officer, R.D.P.
4. Mr. B.O.M. Kah, Member  
Lecturer, Gambia College
5. Mr. S. Janneh, Member  
Assistant Director of Agriculture
6. Mrs. A. Sosseh, Member  
Education Officer
7. Mr. S. Bojang, Member  
Farmer