

HEAR 911

THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

OF CILSS

AN ASSESSMENT OF ORGANIZATIONAL AND
OPERATIONAL PRACTICES AND PROCEDURES

Thomas C. Irvin

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FOREWORD

The terms of reference for this mission - to study the organizational structure and operational procedures of the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS after the French acronym) - were agreed in September 1981 during meetings in Paris and Rome between the Executive Secretary of CILSS and AID's Director of Sahel-West African Affairs. The actual assignment covered five weeks from October 21 to November 21, 1981 in Washington, Paris and mainly Ouagadougou, Upper Volta; a short information-gathering trip to Bamako, Mali, and Dakar, Senegal, was undertaken from October 28 to November 4, 1981. A prior assignment - from mid-July to mid-September 1981 as team leader of two teams evaluating CILSS-FAO-AID projects in the Sahelian and two adjacent countries - served as useful orientation and fundamental introduction to the operation of CILSS throughout its member countries in West Africa.

The principal focus of the report is those elements of the Secretariat involved directly in programming and planning and linking those functions to member countries. A detailed and long-term review of the Secretariat's administrative and financial functions is in the competent hands of an International Labor Office expert-adviser to the Executive Secretary. We coordinated our tasks in order to avoid unnecessary duplication or repetition.

This report is not an audit of the CILSS organization and its relationships with its member countries, with other regional organizations and with the international donor community. Rather the report is a distillation of observations gleaned from conversations with and reports written by members of the CILSS technical staff,

representatives of national ministries and agencies associated or working with CILSS; directors and staffs of regional organizations active in the CILSS geographic area; and personnel representing various bilateral and multilateral sources of assistance to the CILSS and its member countries. A Ouagadougou meeting from November 9-12, 1981 among CILSS/Club/donors proved extremely useful as additional orientation.

In the interest of brevity, the author assumes a readership well-versed in the history and evolution of CILSS since its inception in 1973. This license affords the opportunity to discuss well-known and well-understood issues without laborious recitation of background details. It also makes possible the offer of suggestions and recommendations for change without rendering value judgments on the facts or flow of events that prompt or suggest change; the appropriate decision-makers need only reassess their understanding of the issues as a means of considering and selecting new courses of action. Finally, this approach enables the author to comment (in a candid and unbiased, yet fundamentally constructive fashion), on a variety of matters vital to CILSS, in particular the Executive Secretariat, and the active and interested supporters of CILSS.

The hallmark of any regional organization is service - to constituent member countries and their agencies and institutions, but above all to their people. As a political organism, the CILSS Secretariat links the member countries to the donor community on a special set of regional economic and social development issues. As a technical mechanism, the Secretariat has succeeded with the cooperation of the Club in mobilizing the international community and presenting it with national projects. What the Secretariat needs to address now in part as a matter of image - is the role that it

should and can play as the development process - and the planning that the process entails - goes forward at national levels under the regional strategy approved by the Council of Ministers. As it has become more institutionalized and experienced, some Secretariat staff has undoubtedly lost some idealism and displaced some common interest with self-interest, while unwittingly losing continuous contact with details of national development. This contact must be restored as a function of the Secretariat regaining its service-oriented image and retrieving the confidence of counterparts in national and regional institutions of economic and social development.

THE CILSS/SEC IMAGE

The formative years for CILSS were filled with a high state of urgency to meet the staggering needs of hungry people and starving animals left in the wake of the disastrous drought. In those early days, so much needed to be done that any action served a useful purpose. It made sense to emphasize in every available dialogue the dire conditions in the region and the tremendous suffering of the populations. The CILSS role focused narrowly on justifying relief aid, sensitizing the international public and private community and enjoining support for all orders of humanitarian assistance. The very facts of hunger-ridden families and oppressive living conditions served as fundamental justification for aid. The organizational image of CILSS from the Heads of State Conference through all echelons down to the Secretariat's clerical and support staff was that of people in a hurry, properly striving to the utmost to deliver sustenance and comfort to Sahelian millions.

In the latter half of the Seventies, the emergency waned and Sahelian programs were expanded to include some projected development in the intermediate and long-ranges. A compendium of projects and ideas was hastily compiled and presented by CILSS through the newly-formed Club du Sahel to the international donor community, mainly OECD countries. Well-conceived and well-documented activities found

financing; others remained undeveloped and probably would never be bankable. In a parallel vein, a food assistance program took form as a hedge against the possible recurrence of even temporary drought conditions in the interim before basic development efforts took shape and produced expected results and progress. As this process continued, the CILSS Secretariat could have -- but did not consistently -- begun to stress its successes and gradually displaced the emphasis on the Sahel's plight with stress on purposeful development: the international community had been mobilized and organized; enormous stocks of food aid had been received and distributed; scores of development projects had been initiated by member countries with financing ^{from} bilateral channels. Unfortunately, CILSS, in particular the Secretariat, resisted the formulation of a new vernacular for articulating Sahelian economic and social development requirements. CILSS matured as a regional organization, but the image cast was not in focus with the progress occurring across the expanse of the member countries.

As the decade of the Eighties began, the CILSS/Club partnership formulated and then reformulated a regional strategy for attacking the basic problems of drought control, food self-sufficiency and ecological balance. While member countries were re-casting and putting substance into national development plans, many CILSS Secretariat staff members continued to talk about completing the so-called First Generation Program. Several conclusions about this

Program are widely accepted: this "Program" was mainly a list of projects and project ideas; the best and most urgent propositions were quickly financed by bilateral donors; CILSS member countries do not program by "Generation", thus any relationship to current national programs is obscure; the Sahel would certainly receive the magnitude of resources calculated under the "Program", but probably not through items left on ^{the} "Program" list; and, finally, most donors assume the power of suggestion will ultimately persuade CILSS to abandon the "Program". A large body of opinion -- Sahelian and non-Sahelian -- considers that the "First Generation Program" as a mechanism served a very useful purpose and should now be enshrined among CILSS memorabilia. New planning and programming concepts -- described in more detail below -- are emerging as potentially vital new links between the Secretariat and the constituent national governments and their agencies.

As suggested earlier, CILSS is launched on a development program whose emphasis differs from the earlier years. The role of linking the donor community to member countries pursuing planned development is complicated; the process requires identification of needs, sorting out priorities in rank order, documenting conditions, and planning and justifying resources to accomplish well-defined goals and objectives. This entails a certain re-orientation -- not at all apparent -- of the relationship between the Secretariat staff and their principal counterparts in national agencies through channels not as yet developed.

Unfortunately, many of these counterparts as well as representatives of other regional organizations and the donor community have an image of the Secretariat as a drifting ship. Frequent absences from the Headquarters of all senior staff, beginning with the Executive Secretary

himself, gives rise to queries of who runs things? The fact that things might in fact run smoothly is less important than the impression created by a continuous coming and going of top managers. Secretariat staff, especially Sahelian and expatriate experts, also spend considerable time -- some estimates say over fifty percent of their work schedules -- traveling in the Sahel as well as to far-off locations that bear no apparent relationship to CILSS and its goals and objectives. Even if much of the Sahelian travel occurs because mechanisms for coordination at the national levels are not fully developed, again the impression left only adds more arguments to the analogy of the drifting ship. If the system has weaknesses, then its principal managers should engage themselves heavily in identifying such weaknesses, finding ways to overcome them and, in the process, orienting their national counterparts on the genuine purposes of CILSS/Sec activity.

CONDUCT OF CILSS BUSINESS

The CILSS policy-making apparatus is firmly in place, i.e., the biennial Heads of State Conference; the biannual Council of Ministers; the Minister Coordinator; the Executive Secretariat (which will be discussed in detail below). Many functionaries within the member states and a host of donor representatives are persuaded that the Council of Ministers could justifiably cut back to a single annual meeting without harming the CILSS image. With the pressure to get things done and pay concerted attention to business during the early emergency years, the Committee was wise to convene twice a year. The organization was forming and needed the frequent counsel and decisions of the responsible Ministers. With the gradual transition into an organization serving to support economic and social development, the process of change is less rapid and measuring progress in six month increments is problematical, if possible at all. The idea of a single meeting has been discussed by the Council in recent sessions; at its next meeting it ^{should} elect to change to annual meetings as a step toward demonstrating ever more maturity as a regional organization. Several points are listed in further support of the recommendation:

- A considerable saving in valuable time and resources would result: for the hosting country; for the member countries; for the Secretariat.
- Member delegations and the Secretariat could devote more time in review of Council decisions and appropriate implementation (reading records of past meetings now conveys an impression of one continuous session in which many issues are carried forward time and again).
- The Secretariat could prepare a more structured one or two

year work schedule and accompanying budget in which conferences with donor organizations could be better scheduled to reduce the number of conferences and consequent travel. The work schedule could be updated at annual Council Meetings.

-- Scheduling the single meeting in January, for example, would facilitate budget review and approval, preparation of food assistance estimates based on current crop production figures and initiation of any modified guidelines for the next campaign.

- An annual report based on Council deliberations and Committee progress could be initiated for wide distribution as evidence of CILSS work and accomplishments.

Recommendation: That the CILSS/Sec recommend to the Council of Ministers, and that the CM approve, a change in procedures whereby the Council convene only once a year.

The current CILSS organization corresponds to the statutes as amended in 1977. As indicated in the Foreword, this report will focus primarily on the Executive Secretariat's Division of Projects and Programs (DPP), somewhat on the Division on Liaison with NGO (DONG) and to a limited degree on the Division of Administration and Finance (DAF) on the issue of budget execution. For the most part a more thorough and detailed study of administrative and financial issues will emerge from the work begun by the International Labor Organization advisor to the Executive Secretary. His work had already begun in these important areas when the author of this report arrived on the scene; it seemed prudent to draw on the ILO advisor's accumulated experience, while providing him with a possible

blueprint on program matters, CILSS relations with member state agencies and donors and current and suggested operating procedures in the program field.

The DPP internal organization consists of a series of units, each working in a priority sector or sectors as described in the 1980 Strategy for Drought Control and Development in the Sahel: Crop Production including Hydraulics; Ecology/Forestry; Livestock; Fisheries; Transport and Infrastructure; and Human Resources; a design and evaluation unit -- going under the name of planning unit -- works across sectoral lines on policy issues. The units are different in size, ranging from five experts (and another on the way) in Crop Production/Hydraulics to one each in Livestock, Fisheries and Transport. Obviously, the priority of one sector among all sectors cannot be discerned from the number of experts assigned nor has any effort been made to rank sectors by priority. Within each unit, a nominal leader or spokesman provides loose supervision, but by and large each expert acts as his own agent in dealing with his colleagues, with the Division Director, with functionaries in other Divisions and with the outside world, e.g., the individual donors whoever they may be and wherever located. The outside observer senses a certain absence of discipline in these arrangements.

Non-uniformity appears in numerous other instances in the CILSS/Sec organization and acts as a deterrent to smooth and efficient operating procedures. Nowhere has CILSS/Sec by itself or in concert with Club/Sec or the donors set down in writing an outline of minimum requirements, technical and logistical, for experts -- Sahelian or expatriates -- supported by donors. The following comments illustrate problems this causes:

- One donor may provide a complete support package -- including vehicle and abundant travel allowances -- for an expert.
- Experts provided by international organizations operate according to the procedures of their organization.
- CILSS/Sec staff are paid from the regular CILSS budget which must also support a number of administrative and logistics costs for some experts.

It is easy to see the implications of this situation. One unit in DPP, for example, may have a representative expert from each of the above described examples. The outcome of such relationships can only be dissent, disagreement and disruption.

Recommendation: That the Directors of DPP and DAF review the terms of reference of all experts with a view to achieving a minimum set of standards for use as a negotiating base with donors and member countries. The assistance of Club/Sec and local donor representatives in Ouagadougou should be enlisted in a small task force to study and seek to resolve basic conflicts.

In its deliberations, the task force might consider a number of possibilities. Could each expert agreement include a fixed sum to be a part of the CILSS/Sec operating budget for allocation only on the joint sign-off by the expert and the Director of DPP? Another feature might be funds specifically earmarked for payment of secretarial personnel, drivers, file clerks or other administrative positions. Still another possibility might be a pledging of administrative funds by the donors in the annual CILSS/Club meetings: release of these funds might be made contingent on full payment of annual support costs by all CILSS member countries. Donor pledges

could be a supplement to the budget for specific and limited purposes and be reviewed periodically by a committee of donor representatives assigned in Ouagadougou. For the most part, these supplements would be for the purpose of evening out support for Sahelian and expatriate experts in an effort toward uniformity of operational effectiveness. Care would have to be given to assuring that disparities between experts and regular CILSS/Sec staff did not emerge as a result of the exercise. Two things need to rank foremost in addressing this problem:

- The unlikely prospect of quantum increase in the level of CILSS member contributions to the operating budget. On the other hand, donors have a right to expect that annual contributions assessed by the members themselves should be paid.
- CILSS/Sec benefits from the presence and availability of donor-provided technical talent. Only if problems of disparity and lack of uniformity among support packages for experts are resolved will CILSS continue to benefit.

The donor community shares many of the views outlined above. It is necessary to observe, unfortunately, that many of the donors offer criticism without at the same time producing constructive alternatives. The fact of providing an expert does not in itself constitute technical assistance in the full meaning of the word. In fact, any assistance that does not have mutually agreed goals and objectives may become more of a burden than an asset. Rather than decry any existing inadequacies, the donors might be better advised to offer structured recommendations for change along with the requisite resources to bring about the change. This single topic might well serve as the basis for a frank and candid dialogue

between local donor representatives and the Secretariat's top managers, including the Executive Secretary, whose own views expressed in such circumstances could be beneficial, both to his staff and to their colleagues in the foreign assistance community. When the minutes of the November 9-12, 1981 meeting are available, a useful agenda for a short follow-up meeting might be developed around this topic of technical assistance the CILSS/Sec considers might be useful. (While no specific recommendation is included here, the CILSS/Sec should give thought to this matter).

Among donors, some reservations have been expressed about CILSS/Sec budget execution. The United States, for example, has completed a series of audits of development projects across the Sahel, including some in the CILSS system. The conclusion is that effective accounting systems exist, but a certain *laissez faire* surrounds their operation. The financial plight of the CILSS/Sec, while due in part to tardiness by some members in paying their required subscriptions, results also from incurring expenditures at an accelerated rate which, when projected over twelve months, had to produce a deficit. The deficit now is a matter of record and some donors are saying that more attention to the detail of managing accounts could have avoided the problem or at least prevented arrears that now exceed CFA 120 million. Another mitigating factor has been a heavy, unforeseen travel schedule involving negotiations with OPEC donors on project and budget support as well as food assistance. Now that fundamental relations with major OPEC and OECD donors have been forged, CILSS/Sec should be able to address the need for conferences in a more systematic fashion.

Recommendations:

a. CILSS/Sec should forecast international conference activity related to donor financing of CILSS member country programs at least two years in advance, as suggested above on the matter of Council of Ministers meetings only once a year.

b. CILSS/Sec senior managers should review budget execution at least quarterly and reschedule or cancel activities according to updated projections of finances available.

The matter of tardiness by member countries in forwarding annual contributions to the CILSS/Sec budget raises some perplexing issues when considered in the context of the following table:

<u>Member Country</u>	<u>Firm Donor Commitments to National Projects</u>		<u>Status of Budget Support Account</u>
	<u>Amount</u> (US \$000)	<u>Percentage</u>	
Cape Verde	86,535	3.76	Current
Chad	199,283	8.68	Owes 1979-80-81
The Gambia	69,987	3.05	Current
Mali	531,825	23.15	Owes part of 1981
Mauritania	374,272	16.29	Owes 1980-81
Niger	309,758	13.48	Current
Senegal	363,541	15.82	Owes 1981
Upper Volta	312,977	13.62	Current
Regional	49,300	2.15	
Total	2,297,478	100.00	

Effective date: September 1980

October 1981

Source: Club du Sahel

CILSS

First of all, the Chadian arrears must be provisionally discounted given the internal strife and civil war that have plagued the country. Secondly, one would assume that members would measure the worth of CILSS/Sec in terms of the level of resources the CILSS/Club channel produced for members activities. Stated another way, members benefitting most would be prompt in contributing to CILSS/Sec operations. Strangely enough, this is not the case. Three countries whose accounts are not current for 1981 (one also owes for 1980) are the combined recipients (as of September 1980) of more than 55% of the donor resources committed via the CILSS/Club intermediary.

Viewed from the local donor perspective in Ouagadougou, especially those donors who provide institutional support to CILSS/Sec in one form or another, the question is frequently posed of why "we" should be so prompt when member countries are not. CILSS/Sec experts often approach donors with requests for ad hoc support of business trips, such as attendance at a conference or to present a project proposal to one or another international agencies for financing consideration. Not only do such requests generally detract from the orderly and professional conduct of business, they represent extra-budgetary activity when restraints on budget commitments would be consistent with shortfalls in financial flows from member countries. Calculating the annual level of all funding sources for CILSS/Sec operations proves problematical at best because no single accounting system covers the CILSS/Sec regular budget, annual institutional support from some donors, one-time support for individual assignments and support by some donors and international organizations for individual experts or technicians. Sooner rather than later the donor community will undoubtedly begin to counsel its own constraints by requiring uniform accounting for all support flowing into CILSS/Sec

coffers through whatever channels. In other regional areas and organizations, strict matching of donor funds with member contributions is more the rule than the exception.

A certain sense of laissez faire also relates to general operating practices. In the November 9-11 meeting, for example, several participants affirmed that the Bilan-Programme (BP, described in more detail below) is a top national priority and a top CILSS/Sec priority. Nevertheless, not all units in DPP are engaged full-time on the BP for their sector. Some DPP staff keep espousing the need to complete the First Generation Program, a task that runs contrary to the BP concept and really may be rearguard action to forestall launching the painstaking work required to produce a sectoral BP. Until the BP is completed for all sectors for all member countries, the CILSS/Sec will not have the basis for the next programmed phase in CILSS/Sec-member country relationships.

Recommendation: That each DPP expert prepare a detailed two-year work program - to be updated annually - containing a firm schedule for completion of all required BP for his/her sector. Any unrelated activities should be discouraged as long as the fundamental BP is not completed.

A PROPOSED NEW LOOK

The future capability of the CILSS/Sec to serve member country development needs, depends on forging effective lines for molding appropriate components of national programs into a regional program. An opportunity missed at this juncture could foreshadow an erosion of the CILSS' evolution as a useful agency for regional growth. With purposeful planning, however, CILSS/Sec can anticipate its own future requirements, modifying its internal organization accordingly and provide member states with representation instilling confidence and pride in mutual accomplishments. In the paragraphs that follow, a narrative presentation will describe certain recommended organizational changes which are then represented in chart form at Attachment A. Specifically, the narrative modifies and amplifies the duties and responsibilities of DPP and the Division of Liaison with NGO (DONG) and suggests an important new linkage between them.

The adoption of the Drought Control and Development Strategy in 1980 focussed CILSS/Sec attention on the Bilan-Programme (BP) as a basis for pursuing the goals and objectives of the strategy. In short, a BP would be completed for every Strategy Sector for each member country and would comprise the following components:

- The actual situation, including objectives, resources engaged, results produced and constraints encountered.
- The state of progress of projects under implementation.
- The conclusions to be drawn for the future program as well as its composition.

-- The preparation of files on projects to be submitted to financing sources.

The experts working out of DPP on the BP are establishing vital contacts through technical channels with the technicians in various national agencies responsible for project design and implementation. The DPP experts represent useful technical resources to these national agencies. Because planning is a continuous process, DPP experts -- once the BP for each sector is completed -- will necessarily update the BP annually and add to the sector package any new projects formulated by national planners. If one forecasts far enough into the future, a full scale national/CILSS program can be foreseen encompassing all priority sectors and identifying every activity responding to the priorities in the regional strategy. DPP experts will review these national/CILSS programs periodically - working in temporary task forces - for purposes of modification and up-dating the regional strategy and to factor out possible sub-sectors for which new policy, projects and financing may be appropriate. Analysis and evaluation of projects will continue in order to provide managers with performance data important for the decision making process on project implementation.

Some new duties and responsibilities will emerge to challenge the DPP experts. Temporary task forces will have to initiate inter-sectoral analysis and provide results to the national planners. Some of this work could accompany work on the BP, but should not impede completion of the sectoral inventories. The following ideas only serve to illustrate the requirements:

- Health and nutrition implications of the evolving cereals policy and the goal of food self-sufficiency.
- Relation of vector-borne diseases to the expansion of irrigated agricultural and irrigation perimeters.
- Relation of family planning to food self-sufficiency and restoration of ecological balance.
- Manpower training priorities by sector and among sectors. Design of training materials with definite development themes -- both urban and rural -- as orientation side benefits.
- The comparative merits of expanded international road systems versus the railroad. The potential represented in either transportation system for expansion of food crops versus cash crops.

DPP experts should also take the lead on special studies, e.g., recurrent costs, cereals policy, strategy for mixed agriculture (grain plus livestock). Even granted the potential unpopularity of the subject and the possible outcome, Sahelian and expatriate experts should formulate some guidelines for the assignment of priorities to development activities. Most development thinkers and strategists recognize the enormity of the resources ultimately required to meet Sahelian development needs. Given the reality that resource flows are limited by time and amount and that Sahelian needs compete with other Third World area needs, some rank ordering of sectors is advisable; probably as important, rank ordering of projects within sectors should be considered, e.g., not every project in food crop production can stand at the top of the sector priority list. In some instances, the priority ranking

may result from a process of sequencing or phasing projects as progress builds on progress. Suffice it to say at this juncture that concerted attention should be focused on the issue of priorities. This procedure can prove useful in sensitizing planners and policy makers to the importance of priority rankings.

The foregoing discussion gives considerable support to a contention that responsibility for coordinating the BP -- once developed -- with national level agencies should be assigned to a CILSS/Sec entity other than DPP. The suggestion -- for a variety of reasons -- is that this responsibility be added to those already assigned to DONG, which might be re-named Division for National Operations and Liaison (DNOL). This division already operates in liaison with the member countries on matters affecting non-governmental organizations working in development and relief in the Sahel. DONG as presently constituted also coordinates food assistance matters among the member countries, accumulating annual production figures and preparing appropriate presentations for the donors. What is here proposed is that the redesignated division -- DNOL -- also be charged with developing the terms of reference for the CILSS national committee "secretariats" and for providing the link between the CILSS/Sec and member countries on all operational aspects related to the ultimate national/CILSS programs. The following sequence is suggested:

-- Four experts are selected from those now assigned to DPP and transferred to DNOL, each to coordinate programs with two member countries.

-- These experts would remain abreast of BP activities for

each sector in countries assigned to them as DPP develops the first three of the four BP components.

- DPP would transfer the BP to DNOL after completion of phase three for future operational coordination through the CILSS national committee "secretariat" (see below). DPP experts would provide technical advisory support, when and as needed.
- The DNOL national "secretariat" channel would process all operational correspondence and communications.
- Ultimately, the DNOL functionaries would aggregate the BP for all sectors into a complete national/CILSS program for their assigned countries.
- In the interim, in coordination with national "secretariats", DNOL coordinators would assemble project files prepared by national agencies and arrange combined national level meetings with CILSS/Club/Donors (See Attachment B for a narrative conceptualization).

The "secretariats" of the CILSS national committees, as discussed in the November meeting in Ouagadougou, should have the following responsibilities as a minimum:

- a) Serve as principal office of contact for all CILSS/Club activities and inquiries. Receive and respond to all CILSS/Club requests for information. Provide support to all official missions, e.g., meet and arrange lodging and conference space, if necessary; make all appointments in advance, provide all administrative support, such as clerical work, reproduction facilities and local transportation.
- b) Organize all national planning meetings and activities

with CILSS/Sec in mind, thus obviating the need for CILSS/Sec to send advance representatives. Distribute all documents after all important meetings, especially to CILSS/Sec and Club/Sec. .

- c) Receive all CILSS/Club documents, prepare summaries and distribute same to all affected national agencies.
- d) Prepare the national position in advance for all important meetings, e.g., recurrent costs. Coordinate among national operating ministries and Ministries of Plan and Finance.
- e) Transmit to CILSS/Sec all important national development documents from all national agencies. Assure uniform usage at national level of the joint CILSS/Club/Project Identification Document (PID).
- f) Establish and maintain current statistical data on all AID flows -- both official public and NGO -- through all national ministries and report data to CILSS/Sec on a regular schedule.

The author of this report, as were many participants in the November conference, is persuaded that this "secretariat" should reside in the Ministry of Plan or Finance -- depending by country on which is responsible for managing development resources -- but operate under the delegated guidance of the CILSS National Committee already provided for in the CILSS statute. The office should be staffed by one senior functionary, performing Committee work on a full-time basis, assisted by a secretary or clerk. As a matter of operating procedure, this office should receive either action or information copies of all correspondence originating in CILSS/Sec, in particular

letters to the Minister Delegate, and be cited for information copies of all ^{CILSS/SEC} telexes. From national level to CILSS, this office should receive copies of all communications, including telexes. Some member countries might wish the office to prepare much of the CILSS-related correspondence.

A certain flexibility may be a watchword in addressing the idea of such a "secretariat". As mentioned in the November conference, a task force would meet to prepare some terms of reference. Because USAID has agreed to consider financing this sort of activity, local AID missions will undoubtedly have views that the task force may wish to incorporate into its findings. It was further suggested that perhaps only one or two "offices" would be proposed as a start -- one in Upper Volta -- in order to gain some experience and afford modifications, if appropriate.

The prime objective in recommending modification of the organization as well as some duties and responsibilities within the CILSS/Sec is to achieve a certain balance between policy planning and strategy development, on the one hand, and program operations and coordination, on the other. From a management point of view, it often proves beneficial to have the planners -- the sector experts and strategists, if you will -- relinquish their product at the point where operations and coordination become a requirement. The "operators", as it were, should be well-versed in the capabilities of the member countries which they support as an assigned responsibility. In every case the operators know that their activities and the results produced will ultimately be scrutinized and critiqued by the planners. This provides an effective check and balance and should

contribute to mutual support within the CILSS/Sec as well as reinforcement between CILSS/Sec and member country planners and implementers.

As an adjunct to the building of new working relationships between the Secretariat and member country agencies and with due regard to the unclear image of CILSS, each member of the Secretariat staff -- Sahelian and expatriate alike--may wish to do their own personal Bilan-Programme. For the Sahelians, the sum total of all activities should bear a measurable relationship to improving the economic and social position of the Sahelian peasant and urban dweller. More particularly, all individual activities undertaken should be defensible in common, public interest served, rather than any personal goal or objective. Those Sahelians, serving on contracts with donors or international organizations, may wish to reinforce their commitments to CILSS.

For the expatriates, stock taking may consist of adding up the tasks completed that have aided the Secretariat as a whole in doing its job better. In this context, it may also be worthwhile to ask whether any tasks or attitudes have detracted from the good conduct of business (this same observation counts for Sahelians as well). Equally as vital are the substantive contributions that expatriate/ ^{have made within} their areas of specialization. Considering that most development technicians have performed a variety of tasks in their careers, are all experts prepared to assist where and as needed or prone to isolate themselves within a shell of exclusivity? Given the premium in the Sahel on trained talent for development, few regional organizations can afford the luxury of the latter category, except in the rare case of very highly specialized

experts.

Talking directly with CILSS/Sec personnel, local donor representatives in Ouagadougou and functionaries in various national and regional agencies, one gets an impression that the talent and knowledge within the ^{CILSS}/organization itself is overlooked. This applies particularly to the prospect of reducing travel, especially in the region. A decision to hold a conference may be made before the necessary material for the conference is collected and analyzed; ^{completing} these ^{first} processes/might in some cases show that a meeting was really premature or maybe even unnecessary. As one donor put it in the November meeting, the question of National Committees and their roles was to be solved in 1979, again in 1980 and now again in 1981, but the first thing to do was send a team around to all the capitals and assess the situation. Why not just appoint a task force of CILSS personnel who know each national situation and have them produce a study drawing on their own knowledge? This is one concrete example to illustrate how the exercise of imagination, innovation, initiative and, especially, flexibility may produce solutions to many problems and answers to many questions right within the organization itself. This approach is not defended as a panacea for all ills, but it certainly merits more study and attention than it has received to date. Reaching into one's own store of resources may be a rewarding alternative to reaching for blank travel orders.

SOME UNRESOLVED ISSUES



An assessment of this nature, given time constraints and frequent unavailability of key personnel, inevitably results in a few unresolved issues. This assignment was no exception.

Crop and Post-Harvest Protection is a major CILSS program monitored by the Regional Management Unit established in the Management Protocol for that Program. An extensive evaluation to two AID-financed projects in that Program awaits the deliberations - scheduled for next month - of CILSS-FAO-AID decision makers on many matters of common concern. When and as those decisions take shape, the role and place for RMU in the CILSS organizational structure may become more clear. Until that time, however, speculation appears premature.

As was reported in the November Conference of CILSS/Club/Donors, the Division of Documentation and Information (DDI) has a host of problems, ranging from equipment needs, e.g. micro-fiche readers, to guidelines on document inventory and accessions. More specific recommendations will result from review and publication of the conference minutes. For now, the issue needs to be posed along the lines of reconciling the documentation functions of DDI with those of the Institut du Sahel. A computer capability for Insaah is foreseen in the current SDPT Project Paper. One can envision that capability handling most DDI needs through a terminal at CILSS/Sec. The technology and tribulations of such arrangements are beyond the scope of the author's experience. Before events proceed too far, however, some exploration and investigation should be undertaken.

Finally, the author was unable to formulate any specific recommendations for linking the SDP Team to CILSS/Sec. Auditors have recommended the Team move from Bamako to Ouagadougou. With some justification, the response to this suggestion has been that too much U.S. presence might detract from CILSS' continued evolution as a regional organization. Having registered these views, however, the two sides have neglected to articulate how better this team can assist CILSS/Sec. One suggestion may be for the Executive Secretary to request direct collaboration

between the recommended "national coordinators" in a reorganized DNOL and the SDP Team on the various tasks associated with establishing the CILSS/national linkages related to the Bilan-Programme and organizing the CNC "Secretariats". AID program specialists have much to contribute in this vein on the basis of linkages between AID/Washington and the field Mission planning and operations functions. Another way to approach the CILSS/Sec to SDP Team relationship may be for the Team Leader to engage in a free-ranging dialogue with the CILSS Directors of DPP and DONG (DNOL) designed to reveal areas or activities where available U.S. talent can strengthen CILSS capabilities as work progresses on the completion of the BP and the new order of activity that will follow in its wake.



National/CHSS Program Coordinators (4)
National Food Assistance Coordinator (1)

N.B. Each Program Coordinator would be responsible for two member countries

COMMENTS :

I - DIVISION OF PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS

- A. The term "task force" is used rather than "unit", thus giving the Director more flexibility in the assignment of personnel and on deciding priority activities. "Unit" has a connotation of permanence, which may not be desirable in a dynamic programming and planning process. In any event, a "task force" can assume any duration that managers may decide.
- B. In Sectorals Studies, the Director may wish to consider all assigned personnel as a Board of experts, allowing for wider use of their talents and foregoing fixed associations with specific sectors.
- C. When all Bilan-Programme are completed in their initial versions, the Director may wish to re-structure task forces to address new sectors added to the regional Strategy or to concentrate on inter-sectoral issues.

II - DIVISION OF NATIONAL OPERATIONS AND LIAISON

- A. It is assumed that some shift of clerical personnel between DPP and DNOL will occur in staffing the new national operational function.
- B. The Director may wish to add an expatriate advisor in his own immediate office during the formative period for this operational function. An individual with extensive operational background and liaison experience is suggested.

(One Possible) Conceptualization of Bilan-Programme Evolution

1. CILSS/DPP experts collaborate with their counterparts in national agencies active in the target sector :
 - a. Status of work completed in the sector ;
 - b. Inventory of accomplishments, resources, constraints and solutions;
 - c. Progress toward implementation of projects underway.
2. CILSS/DPP forwards completed studies to appropriate DNOL program coordinator, who informs the CNC "Secretariat" of work completed, forwards relevant documents and requests meeting for discussions with representatives of all national agencies.
3. CNC "Secretariat" in collaboration with Ministry of Plan schedules meeting and distributes all relevant documents in advance.
4. Min Plan representative chairs meeting for discussion of sector documents; CILSS/DNOL (and possibly principal DPP expert) attend meeting in advisory role. National agencies are requested to review national programs and prepare Project Identification Documents (PID-CILSS/Club version) for all activities meeting criteria outlined in the BP and contributory to achievement of the Regional Strategy. Deadlines are set for submission of PID to CNC "Secretariat".
5. CNC "Secretariat" receives all PID and forwards copies to CILSS/DNOL, which arranges for rapid review with DPP experts. Completed package is transmitted to Club/Sec. which in turn provides copies to all donors. Club/Sec sets deadlines for donor indications of interest in specific projects. Club/Sec. notifies CILSS/DNOL of deadline and suggests possible dates for national level meeting.
6. CILSS/DNOL forwards suggested schedule to CNC "Secretariat" for coordination with Ministry of Plan. Min Plan establishes definitive calendar, which is then forwarded through CNC, CILSS/DNOL, Club/Sec channels to all donors.

7. On the appointed date, Min Plan convenes meeting with donors; CILSS/Sec and Club/Sec serve in advisory roles and provide support in preparation of finally agreed package.
8. Donors and member country proceed with negotiation on individual projects in bilateral channels.

Some Assumptions :

- A. That donors will be more responsive to projects arranged in some order of national priority.
- B. All projects identified as meeting BP criteria and supporting the Regional Strategy may not necessarily receive donor support. In such cases, the Min Plan should reserve conference time for review of such projects with donors to determine the causes of reluctance and to explore potential modifications, combinations or additions for improving the projects.
- C. CILSS/DNCL, CILSS/DPP and Club/Sec will review all projects finally unfunded after the donor meeting with the /objective of resolving any shortcomings in project presentation or identification
This process should contribute to annual review and up-dating of the Bilan-
Programme, by CILSS/DPP.
- D. Last - and most important - all priority sectors will ultimately be combined by country into a full-scale national/CILSS program. The learning process on the road to achieving this ultimate objective will be recorded and applied to modify procedures when and as appropriate.