ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration

ADVANCE MIDTERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

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List of Acronyms

ACCD	ASEAN Customs Clearance Document
ACE	ASEAN Competitiveness Enhancement
ACCP	ASEAN Core Competency Program
ADVANCE	ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration
AEC	ASEAN Economic Community
AFTEX	ASEAN Federation of Textile Industries
AHA Center	ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response
AICHR	ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights
AMS	ASEAN Member States
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASEC	ASEAN Secretariat
ASW	ASEAN Single Window
AusAID	Australian Agency for International Development
B2B	Business-to-business
CEPT	Common Effective Preferential Tariff
CLMV	Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam
CLV	Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative

CPR	Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DOE	Department of Energy
EAP-ASEAN ES	East Asia & Pacific – ASEAN Economic Support
E3	Economic Growth, Education, and Environment
HQ	Headquarters
HPAI	Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza
HRRC	Human Rights Resource Centre
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IQC	Indefinite Quantity Contract
LWG	Legal Working Group
MARKET	Maximizing Agricultural Revenues through Knowledge, Enterprise Development and Trade
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTV EXIT	Music Television End Exploitation and Trafficking
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSW	National Single Window
OCAT	Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
OPH	Office of Public Health
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PPR	Project Performance Reviews
RDMA	(USAID) Regional Development Mission for Asia

SAFSA   Source ASEAN Full Service Alliance

SME   Small and Medium Enterprise

SOW   Scope of Work

SWOT   Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats

TATF   Technical Assistance and Training Facility (TATF, or The Facility)

TIP   Trafficking in Persons

USAID   U.S. Agency for International Development

USAID/Indo   USAID/Indonesia

USASEAN   U.S. Mission to ASEAN

USG   United States Government

VALUE   Valuing ASEAN Linkages Under Economic Integration

VVF   Virtual Vertical Factory

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The *ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration* (ADVANCE) project has been the eyes, ears, and hands of U.S. Government (USG) technical assistance to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This innovative project combines policy and development objectives in an unprecedented way, and does so in the complex and dynamic environment of Southeast Asia. ADVANCE works across key areas in U.S. foreign assistance, including economic prosperity, democratic institutions, and regional security, and provides access to other federal agencies with overlapping portfolios in those areas to implement and coordinate with their counterparts in Southeast Asia. ADVANCE's location within the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) allows for collegial access to ASEAN staff, and its work has been critical in creating and fostering the trust that exists now in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

ADVANCE is a five-year program (2007-2012) funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State (as well as other USG departments and agencies) and managed by the USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA). The project was designed for considerable flexibility and maintains a demand-driven approach that RDMA had used with considerable success with ASEAN since 2004, and implemented as an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) under which different task orders for more specific sets of activities could be managed.

ADVANCE is currently divided into five Task Orders, of which only the first three in the list below are included in this evaluation. The five task orders are:

1) ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility (TATF, or The Facility): the demand-driven aspect of the project, providing technical assistance or facilitating meetings and workshops on topics that cover the spectrum of all ASEAN activities through the filter of U.S. policy interests;

2) ASEAN Single Window (ASW): promoting the development and automation of streamlined customs processes throughout ASEAN at both the regional and national levels (through national single windows);

3) Valuing ASEAN Linkages Under Economic Integration (VALUE): integrating and creating networks among private sector actors, initially in two sectors (tourism and textiles), and now operating in textiles only;

4) Luna-Lao project: providing assistance to Laos on their accession the   World   Trade Organization, implementation of the Laos-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement, and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) commitments; and

5) MARKET (Maximizing Agricultural Revenues through Knowledge, Enterprise Development and Trade) (announced in November 2011).

The location of ADVANCE (as represented by TATF) in the Secretariat itself has been a critical factor in ASEAN's perception and use of technical assistance and training, as well as their receptivity to the longer and more focused task orders. Each TATF COP and the small staff located in the Secretariat have created an informality of access between ASEAN and Nathan staff, so that each can ask questions and seek minor clarifications without delay. The rest of the TATF staff and all of the ASW staff are located in another building, close enough for easy access, in case of meetings or other work with Secretariat staff directly.

The purpose of this report is to review status to date and provide course corrections to the ADVANCE project. Rather than being a retrospective analysis of the project's impact, it instead concentrates on its performance and the potential to achieve the project's goals and objectives. This report describes and analyzes the findings from the mid-term performance evaluation of ADVANCE conducted from October 2011 – January 2012. The utility of this report at this time is that it provides additional material on how subsequent USAID-funded activities might better fit within the evolving context of U.S. foreign policy and the expanding role of ASEAN in the region.

Major Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations.

USEFUL DEMAND DRIVEN APPROACH

One of the underlying strategies in the project design was that the pattern of assistance to ASEAN would mirror ASEAN strategies, rather than simply U.S.-initiated activities. The demand-driven approach conditioned precisely that conclusion – where ADVANCE (and, in particular TATF) used the initial ideas from the ASEAN and Secretariat staff. There were periodic requests for different workshops or meetings from U.S. Government agencies, as well. This meant that the Task Order work plan was created through a series of reviews and consultations with U.S. Mission to ASEAN (USASEAN) (when that began), RDMA, State, ASEAN, and Nathan Associates, the dominant implementing partner and prime for the IQC.

While it was not evenly shared among all these different consultations (donors have different roles than either implementers or partner organizations), this consultative process has meant that there has been a refinement in themes and approaches. The demand-driven approach is now somewhat narrowed by what the donor is willing to fund, and what the donor is willing to fund is somewhat narrowed by what ASEAN is willing to approve. What this creates is a great deal of mediation for Nathan on a work plan, and a perception through ASEC and the ASEAN Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) that ADVANCE plans far more activities than it actually implements. This perception is especially valid for TATF, as the other two Task Orders have a much narrower scope and range of stakeholder engagement. The chronograph analyses highlight this difference between planned and actual in more detail. The evaluation was able to ascertain through interviews the relative 'ownership' of activities, and this emerged as an additional challenge in an unexpected way (discussed in more detail in the Conclusions and Recommendations). ADVANCE did a fair amount of mediation of the requests from both sides, either in terms of adjusting expectations to match the budgets provided, or adjusting the scope of the request to fit somewhat more comfortably into the broad mandate of their own contract. ADVANCE works across all three communities, to accommodate the demand-driven nature of

the project from both ASEAN and USG: the United States is the only dialogue partner to operate so comprehensively.

ADVANTAGES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Some of the advantages and accomplishments of ADVANCE are intangibles: building the relationship with ASEAN, or the downstream benefits of what appeared to be a one-off activity that helped springboard a subsequent discussion or serve as the beginning of a particular arc in activities on a related topic, e.g. human trafficking. Creating the space was part of the original intention of using a flexible design, and Nathan has kept that aspect in the forefront of their implementation of ADVANCE without representing themselves as the donor or policymaker.

Elaborating the process of decision-making would also be helpful in the context of RDMA and USASEAN, so that both offices know how and when different types of communication can advance each other's objectives. Placing a USAID employee in Jakarta with responsibility for lines of communication between ADVANCE and RDMA would be helpful in this regard, but only if the work plan and lines of authority for that employee are clearly delineated. This would also help with respect to relative degrees of 'ownership' of the project.

One of the most daunting challenges of working with a regional organization is the relative strength of the members in that organization. There is a varying range of capacity and abilities, and this contributes to delays in consensus-based decisions, which are further challenged by the decision to use English as the common language for ASEAN. This decision results in participants who are most fluent in English attending workshops, and these staff are infrequently the decision-makers, especially in the weaker Member States. ADVANCE is not responsible for follow-up with what participants do with the information from the workshop (only for routine workshop evaluations), and so much of the information dissemination is likely lost in terms of both translation and access. This is especially true when the workshops and other meetings are not part of arcs or clusters of activities, so that there is little chance to reinforce messages and ensure a broader distribution through other communication products or channels within ASEAN.

TATF (the Facility): The Facility has been fundamental to four major accomplishments for ADVANCE, which, while deliberate, are not necessarily tracked or tangible. The first of these is the visibility and relationships for the U.S. that they have built, and continue to build, by their presence and hard work while based at the Secretariat. The second is the incubator effect, where ideas can be discussed and either discarded, tabled, or elaborated. The third is the general 'affect' of the workshops, conferences, and meetings, since this contributes to the increased regionalization of interests through networking and platforms for discussing ideas. The fourth is simply the sheer burden of logistics attached to all of these events, for which the Secretariat (and ASEAN) has neither had to set up, nor pay. Logistics take time and effort, usually much more than one can anticipate. Having an embedded event coordinator has meant that ASEAN can dedicate time and resources to other activities. This capacity should become an in-house one, however, as it is neither sustainable nor desirable to have this reside with a dialogue partner (and their own priorities).

TATF as a service provider gets high marks for being able to organize and support workshops and meetings, and they have done dozens of these in multiple venues. The content of the workshops generally is well-received. One recent innovation, of having events on key topics

back-to-back with regularly-scheduled relevant ASEAN working group meetings has reduced the opportunity costs to participants and made it more appealing for the right people to attend. The opportunities for networking or more detailed conversations among those with shared interests but different locations can create and foster the TATF 'incubator'. Having TATF embedded within the Secretariat means that there is easier access to staff, and having former Secretariat staff work for TATF means that there is already an informal professional relationship that can help smooth communications and facilitate coordination.

ASW: The ASEAN single window is an integral part of ASEAN's own roadmap towards creating an economic community. The trade barriers between countries lead to delays in shipping goods: one interview revealed that it took four days to ship goods to Europe, but 24 days to ship them between ASEAN Member States (AMS). Automating the process helps, so that there are fewer opportunities for graft in obtaining signatures and necessary clearances. Automation without a fundamental review and modification of the underpinning legal structure, however, would be insufficient. The work by ASW in conducting precisely those reviews and in linking the different government ministries to work towards reform is one of the most important accomplishments of the entire ADVANCE project.

The focus for ASW has been on the regional single window (data harmonization, etc.), with smaller allocations for National Single Window (NSW) work. Progress on NSWs has opened the door for other donor interest in funding activities, especially as these fit with other bilateral programs. Given the much tighter focus of ASW, there has been a smaller pool of appropriate staff from each of the AMS. In addition, as customs regulations and trade policy are complicated and nationalistic procedures, ASW has worked much more closely with Steering Committee members and working groups, both technical and legal, in pursuit of creating a common platform. The smaller groups with a tighter focus have proven to be effective in generating both consensus for change and greater regional collaboration among the members.

VALUE: The VALUE project is unique in this IQC in that it only serves the private sector, and does so through both management and labor strategies. The virtual vertical factory (VVF) approach is proving to be an interesting model. Participants are enthusiastic about the networking capacity to align along key procurement streams. VALUE has evolved the networking model initially used with the tourism sector to incorporate a much wider networking and resource management approach that should facilitate the expansion of small and medium size industries.

CHALLENGES

Communication: ADVANCE receives funding from multiple USG sources, although perhaps not to the degree originally envisioned by the designers. However, the work that ADVANCE does intersects with that of other USG departments. There has been a certain amount of communication and coordination between and among these agencies. Most of the USG offices interviewed wanted increased communication and coordination, in large part because of these overlapping portfolios. It is not clear how frequently the agencies communicate with each other, which suggests that this is more *ad hoc* than routinized. USAID is not well understood among many of the other federal agencies, so some of the requests for assistance in the region are far outside of USAID's mandate. When the Contracting Officer's Representatives (CORs) are in

Washington, they do meet with individuals in these departments, emails are exchanged, and the USAID/Washington offices do also provide other points of contact and sources of information, again, as needed.

Funding a Whole of Government Approach: One of the additional challenges for incorporating the Whole of Government has been the very variable level of interest and/or funding available to support ADVANCE's objectives. While there are many federal entities tasked with oversight of specific elements within ADVANCE's mandate, relatively few of them have either funded specific activities, or otherwise provided constructive feedback to ADVANCE. Funding levels, in particular, have, in general, remained below what USAID would construe as a useable threshold: providing $18,000 for workshop that is likely to require $60,000 is neither a useful nor a use-able contribution to a development endeavor. Parameters should therefore be set at USAID/Washington regarding the level of buy-in and to help manage expectations about outcomes.

Identifying a key contact person in USAID/Washington for the other overlapping interests would help, together with a point of contact at RDMA. Sending routine updates on the status of different activities might help allay some of the concern expressed during interviews. Where appropriate, review mechanisms for activities that intersect with the other federal agencies' mandates would also be more efficient for coordination. This might lead to other types of stakeholder partnerships.

USAID FORWARD

There are four main areas where ADVANCE can work well with USAID Forward. These are: monitoring and evaluation, procurement/implementation reform, talent management, and science and technology/innovation.

Monitoring and Evaluation: For monitoring and evaluation, ADVANCE has already undertaken a mid-term performance evaluation. One aspect of this type of performance evaluation is how the findings and recommendations from the evaluation are used. This is the type of information that would be incorporated into a final evaluation, and could be incorporated into the project's final report. More urgently, ADVANCE needs to consolidate the current Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) information into the standard templates for an M&E plan, making sure to link indicators not only to objectives of the project, but also to situate these with the RDMA's reporting structures. An M&E plan will include a results framework; narrative text on the reporting schedule and types of reports, indicators and their collection strategies, and staff responsible for collection and analysis; an indicator tracking table; performance indicator reference sheets for indicators; and data quality assessments, again organized by indicator. ADVANCE has many of these components already, organized by task order: the ones examined, however, are outdated and fragmentary.

Implementation and Procurement Reform: For procurement/implementation reform, interviewees wanted to see a more ASEAN orientation. ADVANCE already works with the private sector for VALUE, and interacts with private sector actors in other workshop or conference settings. ADVANCE has also recently launched a small grants program, which will have the advantages of engaging more local actors, and expanding the pool of available implementers without going outside of its own consortium. One consistent comment from

interviews was the need for increased transparency in USAID procurement. While financial information is proscribed, it may be possible to provide more details on the process itself and determine at what point ASEAN review is more valuable (perhaps as part of the work plan development, or even as a separate meeting to show how the ASEAN and USG processes can work together). The Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) has a project cycle process diagram, together with set criteria for eligibility for different categories of funding that is much admired by those interviewed

Talent Management: For talent management, there is already considerable movement within RDMA to train current staff and expand their portfolio. Ensuring that there is supportive supervision and review of this new work will also help to manage the increasingly scarce staff resources. RDMA staff are already located in other countries: while RDMA staff are not posted to countries with bilateral Missions, having someone from Bangkok relocate to Jakarta to provide additional support to ADVANCE would probably mean a completely different contractual arrangement and is thus unlikely to be held by a U.S. direct hire funded by RDMA. The advantages of having USAID oversight in Jakarta, however, are intriguing, and seem to underscore the perceived need by RDMA and USASEAN for closer oversight and communication between both funding organizations, ASEAN and ADVANCE. Deploying staff so that they are still USAID, and situated either in USASEAN or ASEC is going to require not only supportive supervision, but very clear lines of reporting and oversight.

Science and Technology/Innovation: For science and technology/innovation, with appropriate resources ADVANCE is well-positioned to conduct more detailed studies on several topics. These include: the pattern of change in national single window programs following a legal gap analysis, the deployment of the ASW computer 'shell', an analysis of the functionality of the virtual vertical factory (VVF), and a review of the outcomes of both the successful and failed candidates in the ASEAN Core Competency Program (ACCP). Examining outcomes provides a more robust understanding of implementation so that these can be replicated, or, in the case of the VALUE project, testing the hypotheses inherent in their project design.

STRIKING A BALANCE

A key concern is that ADVANCE needs to balance the coordination needs of a development project within the different objectives of diplomacy; when is it worthwhile to do a single activity; and how well it fits with the overall strategic vision of U.S. cooperation with ASEAN. This makes ADVANCE a very unusual development project, at the same time it makes for an equally unusual diplomatic approach. In many respects, ADVANCE is closer in organizational dynamics to projects in Iraq and Afghanistan in the need to balance coordination needs, albeit the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan are between development and defense.

While this evaluation is entirely focused on the three Task Orders and IQC management of the ADVANCE project, there is minimal denial that the project can only operate within the evolving context of ASEAN. Some of these changes are at a profound organizational level, and are clearly outside both the scope of the evaluation and the ADVANCE project. And yet, changes to many of these elements could create a much more positive environment for organizational functionality than anticipated during ADVANCE.

ADVANCE has been the face of U.S. interests to ASEAN at the Secretariat, and, by its operations, the rest of this complex and evolving regional organization. The IQC structure has allowed it tremendous flexibility in responding to demands from both its donors and ASEAN, with the result that it has built a strong relationship based on both trust and past performance. The growing platform of U.S. engagement with ASEAN has been made possible by this strong foundation, a foundation further reinforced by its activities across all three ASEAN communities. With a little over a year left in implementation, ADVANCE can use the time to refine some of its operating modalities to reflect the maturity shown by ASEAN over the last five years. It is unlikely that ADVANCE will be able to implement all of the recommendations in this report, and these may serve, instead, to highlight areas where future assistance can concentrate to its best advantage.

One parallel development that will condition any future U.S.-ASEAN collaboration is the emerging maturity of ASEAN itself. Billboards, news stories, and specific name recognition throughout the region testify to the growing prominence of ASEAN as a regional power base that can build upon and support the national ones. This increased maturity also means that there will need to be changes in the more traditional donor/beneficiary/client relationship common in the development paradigm. The increasing prominence of regional policies also makes ASEAN in 2012 very different from that of 2007 when ADVANCE was designed, and points the way towards potential future changes in ASEAN's ability to engage and manage resources.

As ADVANCE moves forward, one of its greatest internal challenges will be in describing its uneasy position in the overlap between policy and development, and the 'pushme/pullyou' between its primary donor and its implementing manager. This evaluation has identified some areas at the project level that can be reinforced: changes at the more senior organizational levels will need much more thought and refinement for 'ADVANCE 3.0,' as well as other initiatives with a Whole of Government approach.

SELECTED ADVANCE PROJECT CONCLUSIONS

- ❖ ADVANCE has made a significant difference in U.S. and ASEAN relations through the provision of technical assistance.
- ❖ The value of ADVANCE as an incubator for ideas that lead to longer-term commitments is even higher than the resource requirements for the project. ADVANCE has provided good value for its cost, especially given the relatively modest levels of funding actually used. The legal gap analysis done for Vietnam has accelerated the pace of legal reform for Customs and trade in that country.
- ❖ ASW's technical assistance intersection with the Luna-Lao program has provided a rich cross-polarization of ideas and resources, critical in the resource-scarce government ministries in Vientiane.
- ❖ Working across all three ASEAN communities is the correct strategic approach, but the approach still needs a tighter focus.
- ❖ The workshops and meetings conducted by TATF have generally been of high quality in terms of content and logistics, and this could continue to improve with additional quality control over the qualifications of speakers and a stronger ASEAN orientation.

❖ The first eighteen months saw the highest number of 'one-offs' – that is, a single event/meeting that did not result in a larger programmatic arc. The roadmap provided a structure for the types of requests ASEAN made, without it being overly constricting.

❖ The ASW process will stop if there is not continued funding for components two and three from the U.S., although they are also looking for other sources. Previous attempts in the ASEAN region to create a common customs platform, prior to the ASW project, lost momentum due to funding gaps.

❖ Work in human rights is very sensitive and technical assistance must be appropriately nuanced; the Human Rights Resource Center represents a promising start in helping to nuance that technical assistance in an ASEAN context.

SELECTED ADVANCE PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

- As many of the planned legal gap analyses as possible should be undertaken in the time remaining to the project, using the model from Vietnam. Match up the gap analyses to show blockages and disconnects, and encourage additional donor resourcing and/or collaborations to keep the process moving.

- Develop communications templates for key reports that include format, level of detail, and preferred vocabulary and grammar; these should be developed in conjunction with RDMA and USASEAN so that the two primary consumers of this information have what they want.

- Improve participant tracking, either through a project or a Secretariat managed database. Having data set up in this fashion will also allow the operator to calculate trends over time in terms of attendance (by country and level of official representation), or other descriptive statistics. Having a database will also generate invitation lists to other events, as well as serving as a master contact list for referrals to projects or other contacts among the dialogue partners or traveling ASEAN officials.

- Finish competencies for the other five positions and promote ACCP to the regional industries.

- Do a pilot supply chain in each country as a demonstration model, and revise the sector analyses done at the beginning of ASEAN Competitiveness Enhancement (ACE), since these are outdated by this point.

- Provide summaries of policies (at meetings) for first-time participants, especially in public/private meetings.

- As presentations and meetings are held in English consider options for translation and recording for subsequent review and better comprehension.

- Improve both the quality and dissemination of ADVANCE's communications, especially within the U.S. government stakeholders.

Chapter One: Overview of ADVANCE and ASEAN

The *ASEAN Development Vision to Advance National Cooperation and Economic Integration* (ADVANCE) project has been the eyes, ears, and hands of USG technical assistance to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This innovative project combines policy and development objectives in an unprecedented way, and does so in the complex and dynamic environment of Southeast Asia. ADVANCE works across key areas in U.S. foreign assistance, including economic prosperity, democratic institutions, and regional security, and provides access to other federal agencies with overlapping portfolios in those areas to implement and coordinate with their counterparts in Southeast Asia. ADVANCE's location within the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) allows for collegial access to ASEAN staff, and its work has been critical in creating and fostering the trust that exists now in U.S.-ASEAN relations.

During 2009-2011, the USG raised ASEAN's level of prominence in U.S. foreign policy in Asia. Several significant events demonstrated this elevated relationship. During her first overseas trip as Secretary of State in February 2009, Hillary Rodham Clinton visited the ASEAN Secretariat, the first U.S. Secretary of State to do so. Then in November 2009 President Barack Obama attended the first-ever ASEAN-U.S. Leaders Meeting with all 10 ASEAN heads of state. The U.S. also announced the placement of a full-time, resident U.S. Ambassador to ASEAN in Jakarta. The Ambassador heads a permanent U.S. Mission to ASEAN (USASEAN). This heightened attention to ASEAN as an organization mirrors the U.S. attention to Southeast Asia's economic strength and role in geopolitics in the region.

The purpose of this report is to review status to date and provide course corrections to the ADVANCE project. Rather than being a retrospective analysis of the project, it instead concentrates on current performance and the potential to achieve the project's goals and objectives. This report describes and analyzes the findings from the mid-term performance evaluation of ADVANCE conducted from October 2011 – January 2012. The utility of this report at this time is that it provides additional material on how subsequent USAID-funded activities might better fit within the evolving context of U.S. foreign policy and the expanding role of ASEAN in the region.

A. The ADVANCE Project

ADVANCE is a five-year program (2007-2012) funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Department of State (as well as other USG departments and agencies) and managed by the USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA). The project was designed for considerable flexibility and maintains a demand-driven approach that RDMA had used with considerable success with ASEAN since 2004, and implemented as an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) under which different task orders for more specific sets of activities could be managed.

The ADVANCE program provides technical assistance, support, and services to strengthen the ASEC; implements regional activities that enhance ASEAN integration and cooperation; complements regional programs with single country pilot programs in AMS that are related to their commitments under the ASEAN Blueprints for integration; and, leverages funding and

expertise of development partners such as corporations, foundations, AMS, other donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to address jointly defined development challenges.

ADVANCE is currently divided into five Task Orders, of which only first three in the list below are included in this evaluation. The five task orders are:

> 1) ASEAN-U.S. Technical Assistance and Training Facility (TATF, or The Facility): the demand-driven aspect of the project, providing technical assistance or facilitating meetings and workshops on topics that cover the spectrum of all ASEAN activities through the filter of U.S. policy interests;

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> 4) Luna-Lao project: providing assistance to Laos on their accession the World Trade Organization, implementation of the Laos-U.S. Bilateral Trade Agreement, and ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) commitments; and

> 5) MARKET (Maximizing Agricultural Revenues through Knowledge, Enterprise Development and Trade) (announced in November 2011).

B.   Funding Streams and Sources

These five projects have a total estimated cost of $50 million over their project life cycles, divided as per the following charts only for the three task orders in the evaluation. Most of the funding goes to the TATF task order, and this task order also incorporates the most varied funding streams outside of USAID and the State Department. The majority of the funding still comes from the State Department over all five years to date for TATF; all of the funding for VALUE comes from RDMA. RDMA manages the contract and all of the funding streams, as well as relationships with the donor offices. One of the challenges with managing the resources for the project is the difference in procurement cycle timing, so that tranches of funding arrive on a variable schedule, discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.

Chart 1: Technical Assistance and Training Facility Funding

CHART 1: Technical Assistance and Training Facility (TATF) Funding

The different Task Orders are developed primarily through the incubator effect of TATF, in combination with discussions from the different stakeholders in the U.S. government and also ASEAN. While the funding streams for TATF have varied, inputs from State have remained relatively constant (Chart 1). By contrast, funding for ASW has moved in large measure from USAID sources to State ones, offsetting the slight decline in funding for TATF directly (Chart 2).

Chart 2: ASEAN Single Window Funding

CHART 2: ASEAN Single Window Funding

The funding for VALUE has come entirely from the RDMA. In FY2009 the project shifted from a two sector focus (tourism and textiles) to a single one (textiles). The overall commitment to textiles increased the following year (Chart 3).

Chart 3: Valuing ASEAN Linkages under Economic Integration (VALUE) Funding

Legend: ■ RDMA-OP DV

Y-axis values: 2,000,000 / 1,500,000 / 1,000,000 / 500,000 / -

X-axis categories: FY 2007, FY 2008, FY 2009, FY 2010, FY 2011, FY 2012

CHART 3: Valuing ASEAN Linkages under Economic Integration (VALUE) Funding

The cumulative percentages of funding over the past four fiscal years show the clear dominance of State as the major donor for ADVANCE (Charts 4 and 5), especially for TATF, but certainly overall for the three Task Orders in this evaluation. The key point from this brief overview of the funding is the relative low cost of the project in comparison with its scope. The overall design was flexible to expand and to encourage many other funding streams (interviews noted between 20-30 task orders were originally anticipated). While only five have been initiated, the preparatory work for other types of collaboration can be built on this foundation.

The State-USAID joint funding has created an interesting and an innovative approach to blend policy and development, and this creative tension is one of the defining characteristics of the ADVANCE project. As such it is illuminating to consider ADVANCE as a case study for the QDDR and the Whole of Government approach currently advocated in Washington, and this will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven of this evaluation report.

Chart 4: Technical Assistance and Training Facility Total Funding FY 2007 to FY 2011

Pie chart segments:
- EAP-ASEAN 76%
- USAID/Indo-OP 9%
- OPH-AI 6%
- RDMA-OP 6%
- OFDA 3%
- DOE/IAA 0%

CHART 4: Technical Assistance and Training Facility (TATF) Total Funding FY 2007 – FY 2011

Chart 5: ASEAN Single Window Total Funding FY 2007 to FY 2011

State EAP-ASEAN 26%

RDMA-OP 51%

USAID Asia and Middle East-OP

CHART 5: ASEAN Single Window Total Funding FY 2007 – FY 2011

Because of the nature and scope of the potential technical assistance, the winning contractor assembled a consortium of seven partners to cover the potential sectoral involvement covering all three main communities for ASEAN: economic, political-security, and socio-cultural. The prime, Nathan Associates, manages the IQC and also has the lead on most of the activities in the economic community. Two members of the consortium, the East-West Center and Louis Berger, with other assistance from The Futures Group and Michigan State University, have provided the largest amount of expertise in other technical areas. The portfolio has shifted over time, and, although it is easier to work with members of the consortium than go outside it, some members of the consortium are not as relevant as originally anticipated.

Each task order has its own individual Chief of Party (COP) and is independent of the other task orders. All task orders are managed by Nathan's IQC Manager and his team from Nathan's headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Two of the three task orders considered in this evaluation are managed from Jakarta (VALUE is based in Bangkok), and all of the regional COPs meet periodically. Meetings with HQ backstops occurs less frequently in-person (several times annually), but emails and phone calls provide additional and timely contact.

The location of ADVANCE in the Secretariat itself has been a critical factor in ASEAN's perception and use of technical assistance and training, as well as their receptivity to the longer and more focused task orders. Each TATF COP and the small staff located in the Secretariat have created an informality of access between ASEAN and Nathan staff, so that each can ask questions and seek minor clarifications without delay. The rest of the TATF staff and all of the ASW staff are located in another building, close enough for easy access, in case of meetings or other work with Secretariat staff directly.[1]

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[1] The continuing viability of this location in the context of the greatly changed ASEAN is a subject for additional discussion in the conclusions/recommendations chapter of this report.

C.   ASEAN and Secretariat Structures

The basic structure of ASEAN is one of levels of councils and communities, backed by national and sectoral bodies. At the head of ASEAN is a Member State "Chair" (nominated on an annual alphabetical rotating basis) and a Secretary-General, appointed to a five year term.   The Secretary-General is supported by four Deputy Secretaries-General on variable terms of office of 3 or 6 years. Each Deputy Secretary-General heads a Coordinating Council that provides policy and guidance.   There are three communities with matching Community Councils: economic, political-security, and socio-cultural.   Providing inputs into implementation, cooperation, and recommendations are the Sectoral Ministerial Bodies. At the ASEAN Secretariat (ASEC) itself, desk officers review and oversee key technical projects, usually across multiple sectors.   The Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN (CPR) is a relatively recent addition to the organizational structure and, while currently defining their role and interactions with the Secretariat, is taking the lead in donor coordination[2], as well as oversight of the functionality of the Secretariat. Members of the CPR hold ambassadorial rank and provide country coordination for different dialogue partners who are not members of ASEAN.   The Secretariat, rather than being a decision-making body, serves to coordinate the communications with and inputs from the sectoral bodies (such as approvals of dialogue partner proposals), as well as coordinating and 'chauffeuring' both community-specific initiatives and those that intersect multiple communities.

The blueprints and roadmap provide a structure to ASEAN objectives that was not fully articulated and approved prior to these documents.   These elaborated the key elements within each of the communities and provided benchmarks for when different activities should be accomplished.   Because these were developed by ASEAN and then approved by the wider sectoral bodies, they create a legitimate strategy for regional action that buttressed the initial creation and the ASEAN Declaration.   From a dialogue partner standpoint, these also help delineate where the best fit for donor-funded activities, especially given the contrasting strategies at the donor's own national level and the regional focus for ASEAN.   In addition, the roadmap and blueprint also serve to create country scorecards on economic performance against those objectives, which can galvanize national efforts. Scorecards for the other communities are under consideration. It is also important to consider the timing of these different events in light of the development of the ADVANCE project and its current implementation cycle, the subject for additional discussion in subsequent chapters of this report.

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[2] Dialogue Partners are non-Member States with a formal diplomatic engagement with ASEAN. A brief comparison of U.S. and other dialogue partner engagement is found in chapter 7 of this report. Dialogue Partners work closely with a Member State "Coordinating Country."   The U.S. is currently represented at the CPR by The Philippines (2011), and was previously represented by Singapore (2010). Burma will take over that representation in mid-2012.

TABLE 1: A Brief ASEAN Primer by Key Dates

1967	The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created, with a membership of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand
	The ASEAN Declaration: the aims and purposes of ASEAN are to: (1) accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region and (2) to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter.
1977	United States becomes a dialogue partner with ASEAN
1984 - 1999	New members states of Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Burma[3], and Cambodia
1997	Adoption of the ASEAN Vision 2020
2003	Restructuring of ASEAN into three communities: Economic, Political-Security, and Socio-cultural. Each of these three communities is further divided into technical areas, such as Customs Reform, Human Trafficking, etc.
2007	Declaration on the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, moving ahead the target date for establishing the ASEAN Community by 2015
2008	ASEAN Charter signed, which provided ASEAN with a legal personality, created the Committee of Permanent Representatives from its Member States, called for the establishment of a human rights body, and strengthened the role of the annual rotating Chairmanship of ASEAN
2009	Adoption of the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009-2015 – including Blueprints for integration of all three ASEAN Communities and the IAI

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[3] ASEAN uses the designation of Myanmar for this country. The USG, however, continues to use the alternative name 'Burma'. Throughout the evaluation report, 'Burma' is used to be consistent with the USG policy.

Chapter Two: Evaluation Purpose and Methodology

A.   Purpose of the Mid-term Performance Evaluation

A mid-term performance evaluation, in general, is designed to review status to date and provide course corrections to a project or program. Rather than being a retrospective analysis of the project, it instead concentrates on current performance and the potential to achieve the project's goals and objectives.

The ADVANCE project is at the beginning of its fifth and final year, so the timing of this particular performance evaluation is not standard. However, given the high profile of the work and the unusual nature of the project and its operating environment, it was determined that this was still within an appropriate timeframe to look towards the future implementation.

The RDMA developed a detailed scope of work for the mid-term performance evaluation, including several key questions and focus areas (listed in Table 2 below). This scope of work was shared with ASEC staff for their input. Once the evaluation team arrived at the RDMA Office in Bangkok, additional questions and framing paradigms were added to the Scope of Work, designed to embed the evaluation design more closely into the most current USAID policy initiatives.

TABLE 2: Key Evaluation Questions and Content

Key Evaluation Questions and Content (from the Scope of Work and Mission Inputs)
- What has changed in the institution of ASEAN as a result of each of the ADVANCE task orders under evaluation?   - Has ADVANCE been effective in leveraging U.S. comparative advantage in assistance relative to other donors and ASEAN capacity?   - What are the most important areas of focus for future U.S. assistance in order to achieve the greatest impact given limited budgets and ASEAN capacity?
- Identify the major challenges to effective implementation that impact program performance and analyze potential mitigation strategies. Challenges should include logistical and management issues, as well as the political context in which the program operates.   - Identify: (i) at a regional level, possibilities for ASEAN Secretariat management capacity building that would help to fill identified gaps in the assistance delivered and its utilization; and, (ii) at a national level, differences in capacity needs among AMS receiving assistance and possibilities for appropriate national-level approaches.   - Identify lessons learned and best practices from the initial program period and distill them into clear guidance for the remaining period of implementation.   - Provide forward-looking comments and recommendations on opportunities to replicate practices deemed successful under the ADVANCE program to date in the design of future U.S. assistance programs for ASEAN.

Some of these new focus areas included integration into the USAID Forward framework, examining regional/bilateral interactions, interagency collaboration, the intersection of policy and program (and the relative pace of change in each), comparisons with other dialogue partner/donor activity in ASEAN, and reviewing the existing management model. To the extent possible, the evaluation team has incorporated these modifications into the evaluation, primarily through more extensive interviews with USG and ASEAN staff.

B.   Methods and Technical Approach to the Evaluation

Given the scope of the assignment and the timeline, different activities needed to be sequenced carefully to maximize resources. In particular, this meant that different data collection activities occurred simultaneously (concurrent interviews in multiple countries, for example). At the same time, it was important to dedicate time to analyze the diversity of data sources, to describe patterns in that analysis, and also to return to the project documentation and management to ensure that information was crosschecked to ensure accuracy as much as possible.

A mixed methods approach, combining qualitative and quantitative approaches, best fit this type of flexible but sturdy analytical framework. In order to accomplish this framework, the evaluation design identified seven integrated data collection strategies: document review, stakeholder interviews, rapid email survey, key informant interviews, site visits, and staff capacity assessments. Table 3 shows the relationship between the key elements in the evaluation, the choice, and crosschecks provided by the methods proposed below as part of the evaluation design.

TABLE 3: Methods Matrix

Key Elements	Methods						
	Document Review	*Stakeholder Interviews*	*Rapid Survey*	*Key Informant Interviews*	*Results Analysis*	*Site Visits*	*OCAT*
validity and effectiveness of approach	x	x		x	x	x	
confirmation of results; performance measurement & targets	x		x	x		x	x
responsiveness to stakeholder needs		x		x	x		
challenges to implementation	x	x		x		x	
ASEAN absorption and sustainability			x	x		x	x
lessons learned, guidance, recommendations	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

C.   Challenges and Adaptive Responses

1. Organizational Capacity Assessment.

The ADVANCE evaluation did not conduct the organizational capacity assessment (OCA Tool) originally proposed, either at the Secretariat or at the national level, due to Mission preferences. However, AusAID was, at the time, conducting an analogous exercise of the Secretariat, and the evaluation team was able to participate in an out-briefing of preliminary findings with the AusAID team.   Key members of the Secretariat also attended this meeting and provided additional context to those findings, as well as leading a discussion on next steps.   Elements from that briefing are used in Chapter 8 to reinforce conclusions and recommendations derived from the evaluation's primary sources.

2. Rapid survey outcomes and interview findings.

One of the more promising methods in a project where considerable resources go to trainings and workshops is to return to those participants in order to determine what they were able to use from the skills and knowledge acquired during those activities. Given the dozens of workshops, meetings, and conferences undertaken by ADVANCE (across all three task orders), this seemed like a logical tool to use. However, despite anticipating a low response rate and over-sampling to compensate, there was an extremely low response rate. As a consequence, the rapid surveys have been incorporated into the basic interview analysis. The survey and interviews used the

same instrument deliberately to make analysis easier. Key informant interviews, stakeholder interviews, and rapid survey responses are clustered as appropriate to topics, and separated out by group when that level of precision is required for the descriptive analysis. Overall, the evaluation team conducted 88 interviews with 120 people. This included participant interviews across all three task orders, Nathan employees, USG stakeholders (both in Washington and overseas), ASEAN staff, dialogue partners, and the private sector.

3. Site and field visits. When the evaluation design was conceived, it was assumed that different field activities by TATF or the other task order implementation teams would occur during the evaluation, so that the team would be able to observe these events. This was not the case. Field visits to conduct stakeholder and key informant interviews provided more contextual information, e.g. the operating environments of Customs officials in Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos.

4. Documentation.

The evaluation used two major sources for documentation: from the RDMA and Nathan Associates. Both provided extensive materials on project implementation, which are the primary source for the chronographs and the analysis of events presented in chapters four through six. This documentation was a rich resource, and on select activities would have been more immediately useful if it was in a more accessible format, such was the case for beneficiary lists[4]. At the same time, there are still some basic project materials that are missing in part or their entirety: chief among these is the project performance monitoring plan (PMP), as well as task order PMPs. All of these task orders report against indicators, used by the RDMA in project performance reviews (PPR), and those have been consolidated in chapters four – six to help analyze the multi-year patterns in those indicators. One of the challenges for the project is that the indicators used in the PPRs are not necessarily the indicators used by project management internally, as a project PMP usually includes far more indicators than what the Mission uses for reports to Washington. This leads to discontinuities in tracking planned/actual performance, generally a critical component in any evaluation.

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[4] While it is normal for formats to evolve over the life of a project, there was limited standardization in the reporting formats used, both at the IQC and task order levels. These discrepancies added to the time required to map activities.

Chapter Three: Overall ADVANCE IQC Patterns and Management

This chapter sets the stage for the next three chapters by examining the structure and processes used by the IQC management, and how activities accomplished in each of the task orders reverted to IQC management. These four chapters follow roughly the same structure and analytical frameworks, as they describe the overall IQC, and then the three task orders included in the evaluation statement of work (SOW). The first section of the 'task order' chapters includes a list of indicators used and a brief analysis of overall planned/actual results. The second section of the 'task order' chapters includes a longer analysis of planned/actual activities, based on a high level analysis of a series of chronographs (see Annex 1). The intention of this analysis is two-fold: 1) to show the process of the entire project to date across all of the different technical sectors, and 2) to determine the types of patterns and changes over time in the overall portfolio. Project documentation is the source for the data in the chronographs. The final section of each of these 'task order' chapters is a high level summary of key findings from all of the interviews, examining different patterns of information from the interviews and short surveys. The intention here is also two-fold: 1) to provide the stakeholders with a voice in the evaluation, looking at both the advantages/accomplishments and challenges, and 2) determining what themes emerge from clustering the interview findings.

Activity data for each of the three task orders has been arranged into chronographs, using data primarily taken primarily from project quarterly reports, with crosschecks from weekly and annual reports. Additional information from project staff has been added to the VALUE task order chronographs. TATF, ASW, and VALUE activities involved various inputs and outputs, which are tracked in the chronographs:

- Meetings
- Briefings/presentations
- Workshops/conferences/trainings
- Studies/reports
- Work planning/progress
- Staffing
- Agreement/results, and
- Materials produced.

Technical assistance, as defined by direct policy/implementation advice to ASEAN counterparts from project staff, was not consistently reported and thus has not been tracked in the chronographs. Chronographs are meant to provide a general picture of project activities throughout the first three years of the ADVANCE program. The records reflect the data provided in the quarterly reports, and yet may not represent the full extent of activities that have taken place due to identified inconsistencies in reporting mechanisms for example, data in the Performance Plan and Reports do not have the same numbers as those in the quarterly report for a random sample used as a crosscheck.

TATF also funded short- and long-term technical assistance in multiple sectors: trade, pandemic preparedness, climate change, education, and disaster management. Many of the activities listed in the chronographs, as well as the short briefing notes produced by ADVANCE, were due to the work of the individuals providing technical assistance. For example, the climate change advisor helped develop a scope of work for an ASEAN policy on climate change. Most of the time, however, the advisor's work focused on smaller activities that were reactive to requests from the Secretariat. The overall role may have been too complex, including both policy work and technical assistance, and difficult to structure given the requests both from State (for example, cookstove related activities) and the Secretariat. There was a similar situation with a public health advisor, who moved the topic from a focus on infectious diseases to a wider disaster preparedness and management. This wider focus meant that there was greater engagement in yet another complex and intriguing collaboration with the U.S. military through a series of tabletop exercises on response. The experiences of the technical advisors demonstrated how difficult it was to engage staff at the Secretariat for discussions, as many of the topics are cross-cutting, and having staff from multiple offices be available at the same time has proven logistically challenging given staff travel schedules. As with food security and disaster management, it is only through the persistence of these advisors that there has been a considerable increase in lateral communication, as opposed to vertical communication within one sector, in ASEAN.

This particular chapter varies slightly from the pattern outlined for chapters 4-6, as there is no over-arching chronograph for the IQC. Instead, this is an overview of the management of the project and how well ADVANCE fits with the ASEAN roadmap (2009-2015). The last section in this chapter is also a high-level summary of stakeholder interviews, emphasizing USG stakeholders and particularly the insights from the RDMA staff.

A.   General Project Work Plan Analysis

One of the underlying strategies in the project design was that the pattern of assistance to ASEAN would mirror ASEAN strategies, rather than simply U.S.-initiated activities. The demand-driven approach conditioned precisely that conclusion – where ADVANCE in particular TATF used the initial ideas from the ASEAN and Secretariat staff. There were periodic requests for different workshops or meetings from U.S. government agencies, as well. This meant that the Task Order work plan was created through a series of reviews and consultations with USASEAN, RDMA, State, ASEAN, and Nathan.

While it was not evenly shared among all these different consultations (donors have different roles than either implementers or partner organizations), this consultative process has meant that there has been a refinement in themes and approaches. The demand-driven approach is now somewhat narrowed by what the donor is willing to fund, and what the donor is willing to fund is somewhat narrowed by what ASEAN is willing to approve. What this creates is a great deal of mediation for Nathan on a work plan, and a perception through ASEC and the ASEAN CPR that ADVANCE plans for more activities than it actually implements. This perception is especially valid for TATF, as the other two Task Orders have a much narrower scope and range of stakeholder engagement. The chronograph analyses highlight this difference between planned and actual in more detail. The evaluation was able to ascertain through interviews the relative 'ownership' of activities, and this emerged as an additional challenge in an unexpected way

(discussed in more detail in the Conclusions and Recommendations chapter). ADVANCE did a fair amount of mediation of the requests from both sides, either in terms of adjusting expectations to match the budgets provided, or adjusting the scope of the request to fit somewhat more comfortably into the broad mandate of their own contract. ADVANCE works across all three communities, to accommodate the demand-driven nature of the project from both ASEAN and USG: the U.S. is the only dialogue partner to operate so comprehensively.

B.   Management and Process Review

There are several different elements that contribute to the challenges in managing this IQC for Nathan and/or the RDMA: 1) project evolution, 2) task order dispersion and relative isolation, 3) staff experience and availability, and 4) demand-driven focus from both ASEAN and other USG stakeholders.

The project was designed five years ago. During this time, ASEAN has changed, and, while ADVANCE has shifted somewhat to compensate, the initial premise of building a relationship has remained the primary driver in the design. Efforts to make ADVANCE more results-focused have had varying success, both because of the resource base that is already stretched very thinly, and also due to resistance from the partner organizations. For example, bilateral missions operating in the region can have similar – or very dissimilar – results that they report. Working with a regional project can add assets and scope to a country project at the same time it can add bureaucratic and administrative tasks, as well as potentially diffusing results reported. The task orders operate across three country bases, and, while the COPs of each communicate fairly regularly, these are, *de facto*, independent projects that do not often have a value-added relationship. Only the Luna-Lao project staff noted ongoing and close collaboration with any other Task Order (ASW), while Secretariat staff was far more familiar with TATF than with any other. National staff in most countries knew only about the Task Order in which they were directly involved, and frequently did not know or acknowledge any donor support for the activity. Staffing for key management or backstop positions is part-time or rather junior from the Nathan HQ side. The COPs of the task orders have considerable experience both in management and the region; while the task order staff are mostly local-hires, critical for the multiple language requirements of the region. Only one of the relevant RDMA staff (referring to the three Task Order backstops included in this evaluation) had COR experience and training prior to ADVANCE which is not unusual in the relatively resource-thin staffing at USAID. Managing the institutional relationships with ASEAN and the funding partners on top of the basic management of an IQC is more than a full-time job in itself, and this is not the extent of the portfolio undertaken by the staff at the RDMA. While the long-distance support is mitigated by email and phone communication, and is, in fact, the model of how regional operations are supported globally, there is simply no substitute for the close personal relationships that flourish best in a face-to-face environment. RDMA has already set precedent for successfully posting regional advisors in non-presence countries to manage programs. Following on this model, in an effort to address the difficulties of managing from afar, RDMA intends to place an advisor in Jakarta to enhance stakeholder engagement and project management. Where the CORs have had the resources to build the connections, there is a much tighter focus on management and task order deliverables, and the recent dedicated presence of CORs to the individual task orders has made a difference to the contractor in terms of communication and decision-making.

Management, planning, and budgeting take a lot of time, and the initial demand-driven approach for the facility exacerbated management demands, as the scope and focus of those requirements would shift in the interplay between the planning process and funding obligation. This is particularly noticeable at the Facility, but is also present in the other task orders not implementing planned activities (which one can see on the chronographs). Variations from planned to actual results in a standard development project are more often performance-based (fewer people showed up at a health training than anticipated, for example); within ADVANCE, variations from planned to actual are more often functions of funding and not getting administrative approvals. As a result, the analysis notes when activities were planned and not done, but the focus of the analysis in these four chapters is more on what ADVANCE did accomplish, rather than on the variations between planned and actual.

C.   Engagement with subcontractors

A classic challenge with any IQC is that the prime controls the game board. The group of subcontractors is generally selected for specific technical abilities so that they can present a strong platform of options. One of the challenges for ADVANCE was that there was limited information about the types of sectors, the types of activities, and the general pace of implementation within ASEAN and especially the Secretariat. Concentrating on the economic community in the beginning was partially a political and partially a strategic decision: State was the main donor, and was more interested in the political access ASEAN could provide. The economic community was seen as the easiest of the three in which to effect change: far less sensitive than the political-security community, and far more concrete and of immediate interest than the socio-cultural community.

There are few references to the seven IQC subcontractors among the participant interviews East-West Center was mentioned most frequently, the few references is due to four factors: a) the relative absence of branding of subcontractors, which is intentional, b) the timing of most events and participants' ability to recall, c) the natural tendency to 'lump' any activity undertaken by a project by a single name, and, finally, d) the much heavier concentration on economic activities for which Nathan was primarily responsible in the consortium. Given that many of the participants were unfamiliar with the project name and assumed that the activity had simply been funded by ASEAN, recall of company names seemed much less important than ascription of the project to the appropriate dialogue partner. The lack of ascription to USAID, however, is noticeable in terms of interview content; communications materials (posters, brochures, etc.) all clearly designate USAID in the appropriate fashion. Most participants remember events, and not the publicity. Secretariat members understand the role of dialogue partners, but are also legitimately focused on furthering the image of ASEAN among their Member States.

D.   'Goodness of Fit' of ADVANCE Activities/Outcomes with ASEAN Scorecard and Roadmap

ADVANCE started before ASEAN had either scorecards or ADVANCE started in fall 2007. The economic blueprint came out in November 2007; the remaining two community blueprints were issued in March 2009. There is striking change in the documentation and project work plans to take into account the headings and divisions used in the roadmap so that these would

align during these first two years of the project. One of the advantages with this shift in reporting is that it is clear where there is the biggest concentration of USG resources focused on the economic community and then the gradual opening up into other communities. The economic community used to account for more than 80% of project activities; this has dwindled to just over 30% for TATF. This is both a specific shift in the activities undertaken by TATF and due to the creation of specific task orders, all of which have a predominantly economic focus. There is limited synergy among the task orders with the exception of ASW and Luna-Lao, where the pool of national staff involved with each task order overlaps almost perfectly.

ASEAN currently has annual scorecards to show progress against their roadmap. On the one hand, having this type of annual scrutiny can help keep the Member States transparent about the precise status of different initiatives. On the other hand, this is self-reported, and the grades reflect a certain tendency to over-state accomplishments as reported in the interview data. One example was the presence/absence of a national single window: announcing the start of the process of creating a national single window is not precisely the same as a fully functional national single window.   This can lead to misperceptions about ASW's continuing value and its very real accomplishments: functioning NSWs are incremental, and take time. Overstating accomplishments in the national reporting is, clearly, outside the purview of ADVANCE. A case like this might be mitigated through better communication with the relevant Minister by ADVANCE and the ASW working groups.

One interesting development from the Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR) is the first-ever donor matrix. This includes both the dollar value of projects and sectors[5], using the roadmap categorization. While the December 2011 document is a first draft, it shows the much narrower focus of the other dialogue partners within single pillars, or fewer specific topics even within a single pillar. As dialogue partners or donors engage more actively with ASEAN, there are readily identifiable gaps, as well as potential opportunities for partnerships in areas of mutual interest. What this document does not show, however, is how much has been accomplished towards achieving the very ambitious goals in the roadmap, however, and this type of master scorecard would be enormously helpful in determining precisely how to prioritize resources as ASEAN moves from 2015 to 2030.

E.   Project advantages and challenges

Different stakeholders provided comments across all three task orders and for ADVANCE as a whole or for ASEAN as a whole, as well. Where it was possible to cluster findings (same topic, for example, expressed slightly differently), these have been consolidated. The findings are not reported quantitatively because participants in individual task orders tended to focus their comments on specific activities. 'Big picture' comments, by contrast, are drawn from U.S. government agency interviews (Energy, Commerce, Trade Representative, State) as well as RDMA staff, Nathan Chiefs of Party, ASEC CPR staff, and USASEAN staff.   This type of comment represents such a diversity of interests, however, that would bias any aggregation.

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[5]The U.S. funding information by individual activity is missing from this report, while the overall funding by task order is captured. Donors have also reported that, while this was a good first attempt, there are numerous lacunae and inaccuracies.

Where there were consistent comments and sources could align, these have been noted in the text.

<u>Advantages</u>

Some of the advantages and accomplishments of ADVANCE are intangibles: building the relationship with ASEAN, or the downstream benefits of what appeared to be a one-off activity that helped springboard a subsequent discussion or serve as the beginning of a particular arc in activities on a related topic e.g. human trafficking. Creating the space was part of the original intention of using a flexible design, and Nathan has kept that aspect in the forefront of their implementation of ADVANCE without representing themselves as the donor or policymaker.

Nathan's management of both the IQC and the individual Task Orders, especially TATF has done a very good job at advancing USG interests with ASEAN without representing itself as the U.S. government. Its presence within ASEC, and its hiring of former ASEC staff, have meant that they have knowledgeable people on staff about how ASEAN and ASEC functions, as well as personal relationships with key desk officers. The durability of the Chiefs of Party has also led to the creation of additional personal and professional relationships, and the office's relatively small 'footprint' at ASEC has led to an increased informality in contact and discussion that would be absent in either a larger office presence or where appointments were mandatory.

> "ADVANCE is one of the few cases where a USAID project has tried to swing for the fences, rather than just being another policy project."

Having an IQC structure means that there are available resources for many different types of training and technical assistance, and this was especially critical for the demand-driven approach. ADVANCE's concentration on the economic community was deliberate at first to create additional demand, and also to concentrate on a 'low hanging fruit' of shared interests. Working within that community, in turn, generated three additional Task Orders [6] to further elaborate key elements that intersected USG interests and ASEAN objectives while building a relationship that could support more challenging topics.

ADVANCE has created useful networking opportunities, both through longer-term working groups and 'one-off' workshops throughout the region and with other potential stakeholders and donors. In the first case, the relationships among participants create a different type of access and openness to ideas and partnerships, without necessarily a focus on immediate deliverables. In the second case, having a solitary workshop in one year can start a dialogue or create a window of opportunity that then develops in subsequent years.   Both these networking opportunities were strongly acknowledged by both USASEANUSASEAN and RDMA staff, and open the door for subsequent collaborations now that communications between these two offices has also improved (see Chapter Seven).

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[6] ASW, VALUE, and Luna-Lao, which was outside the scope of this evaluation.

Challenges

The most consistent challenges represented throughout all of the stakeholder interviews are of communication, coordination, strategy, and transparency. As ASEC and ASEAN have become more sophisticated managers, interacting with an increasing pool of other dialogue partners, their expectations of inclusion and oversight have also grown. USAID's procurement policies are not (and should not be) an open book, but they can be better explained and, where possible, harmonized with the ASEAN guidelines as they evolve.

Communication and coordination are never a one-way street, and it is common to find that there are different expectations even among two partners as to what constitutes 'enough' or 'too much'. When there are many partners, stakeholders, funding structures, and government/non-governmental entities, some miscommunication and failures to coordinate are inevitably going to occur. Having a great deal of confusion over who talks with whom about what topic, as demonstrated through interview data in the next three chapters, four years into a project, however, speaks to the absence of nuanced communication protocols, outlining who talks with whom and in which settings. The quality, style, and format of the reports at each different level of communication (implementing partner to donor, USG to USG, USG to ASEC, et al.) vary by author, rather than following standardized templates. Nathan recently hired a communications specialist in response to concerns about their own report production. Having a more in-depth conversation about the protocol, expectations, and use of information at different levels would not only help that specialist do his job more effectively, but also help manage concerns from other project information consumers. Using the same information in multiple formats will improve utilization without requiring additional data collection.

Other USG agencies still do not understand USAID's mandate, or how it operates. This leads to a consistent misperception about the types of activities USAID might undertake, as well as the relative cost and timeframe for implementing activities. Given the overlap between some of the ADVANCE activities and mandates in other USG departments, this can create additional tension because of a perceived turf incursion. Thus the increased concentration on communication may help, as well as the continued outreach from Nathan headquarters in engaging these 'not yet donors'.

ASEC and CPR interviews emphasized the lack of transparency in the decision-making process for ADVANCE. While these are consistent over several years, it is also a function of how the decision-making process within ASEAN has changed over that timeframe, as well as the high visibility of the planning process for AusAID, which is seen as a model by ASEC and CPR. There are considerable time lags in making decisions within one government agency, let alone a regional organization. Creating shared decisions across multiple government agencies and a regional organization, especially one whose own internal review processes are evolving and often complex, should be challenging, but could be made less so with more clarity on the different roles and responsibilities for all of the stakeholders. There is considerable sensitivity (especially from RDMA staff) about revealing the U.S. procurement process, and yet it seems as though providing a timeline and an indication of the review process might also be helpful without impinging on procurement-sensitive issues. A flow chart showing the different offices where reviews and decisions are made, including the ASEC and CPR, would be helpful to ASEAN, but also helpful to the current donors at both USAID and State.   If this was

accompanied by an additional communication that included some type of internal approval checklist, so that the approvals/review were clear for each stage of planned activities, this would also reduce the perception in ASEAN and ASEC that almost half the activities proposed did not have sectoral endorsement and were thus dropped from the implementing partner's work plan. It would also make it easier for ASEC to identify which desk officers had responsibility for which activities, and thus for the project to follow up through shifts in personnel and availability.

Elaborating the process of decision-making would also be helpful in the context of RDMA and USASEAN, so that both offices know how and when different types of communication can advance each other's objectives. Placing a USAID employee in Jakarta with responsibility for lines of communication between ADVANCE, RDMA, and USASEAN would be helpful in this regard, but only if the work plan and lines of authority for that employee are clearly delineated. This would also help with respect to relative degrees of 'ownership' of the project.

One of the most daunting challenges of working with a regional organization is the relative strength of the members in that organization. There is a varying range of capacity and abilities, and this contributes to delays in consensus-based decisions, and this is further challenged by the decision to use English as the common language for ASEAN.   This results in participants who are most fluent in English attending workshops, and yet they are infrequently the decision-makers, especially in the weaker Member States. ADVANCE is not responsible for follow-up with what participants do with the information from the workshop, and so much of the information dissemination is likely lost in terms of both translation and access. This is especially true when the workshops and other meetings are not part of arcs or clusters of activities, so that there is little chance to reinforce messages and ensure a broader distribution through other communication products or channels within ASEAN.

Chapter Four: Task Order TATF Detailed Review and Analysis

A.   TATF Performance Indicators

TABLE 4: TATF Performance Indicator Table

Indicator	FY08 Target[7]	FY08 Actual	FY09 Target	FY09 Actual	FY10 Target	FY10 Actual	FY11 Target	FY11 Actual
Number of USG-supported training events held that are related to improving the trade and investment environment	10	10	21	18	12	0	8	0
Number of male participants in trade and investment environment trainings	236	236	300	493[8]	140[9]	118	140	471
Number of female participants in trade and investment environment trainings	178	178	195	369	110	70	110[10]	339
Number of groups trained in consensus-building processes assisted by USG	13	13	18	16	18	13	14	42
Number of people trained in consensus-building processes assisted by USG	397	397	450	497	450	418	450	1,611
Number of USG-assisted consensus-building processes that result in an agreement/plan of action that reflects the interests of a wide array of stakeholders (sectors)	3	3	5	2	3	2	2	4
Number of activities to build consensus and advance regional governance	19	19	30	30	25	31	25[11]	30
Number of forums organized with USAID funding where best practices and lessons learned related to Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) are shared	5	5	8	5	5	3	3	5
Number of	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0

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[7] FY08 and FY09 Targets were retrospectively posted based on Actuals for new areas.

[8] FY09 data taken from 2009 PPR report. Other report documents indicated lower attendance numbers at trade and investment trainings.

[9] FY10 targets are reduced in many cases (highlighted in green) based on FY09 and FY10 performance and funding.

[10] This figure may be inaccurately recorded in the FY09 PPR. The total target for male and female participation was 300 and male participation was projected at 140.

[11] FY11 targets are increased in many cases (highlighted in yellow) based on FY10 performance.

simulation/tabletop exercises in HPAI outbreaks and influenza pandemic preparedness conducted with USAID support							
Number of USG-supported training events held that are related to disaster management	0	0	7	8	5	3	4	5
Number of participants in training events for disaster management	0	0	220	172	105	136	175	269
Number of female participants in training events for disaster management	0	0	88	66	42	65	42	143
Number of male participants in training events for disaster management	0	0	132	106	63	71	63	126
Number of people trained on money laundering or financial crimes			57	57	60	0	50	0
Number of activities conducted to support participants in ASEAN Regional Forum dialogues			4	4	2	1	1	1
Number of executive office operations supported with USG assistance			2	2	2	1	1	1
Number of people affiliated with non-governmental organizations receiving USG supported anti-corruption training			14	14	50	0	75	202
Number of people receiving USG supported training in global climate change including Framework Convention on Climate Change, greenhouse gas inventories, mitigation, and adaptation analysis					100	211	200	258
Number of people in host country trained on Trafficking in Persons (TIP) related issues with USG assistance							50	0
Number of male administrators and officials trained							45	136
Number of female administrators and officials trained							35	116
Number of public-private dialogue mechanisms as a result of USG assistance					1	1	3	6

Indicators from this table represent primarily selections from the F Bureau list of standard indicators by relevant program area of funding, rather than those customized for the specific task order, with the addition of a few USAID-specific indicators (pertaining to the donor offices' own reporting indicators). F Bureau indicators emphasize outputs that can be aggregated, especially for reporting to Congress; project indicators generally include some F Bureau indicators, but most of the indicators on a project PMP reflect the project's own results framework more closely. Using F Bureau indicators as the primary source of information is a help in aggregating upwards, but these do not represent the actual accomplishments of the task order. The chronograph analysis in the following section, and the interview findings in the last section of this chapter are truer representations of those accomplishments.

B.   Activities, Results, Outcomes

Driven by the three ASEAN communities and burgeoning needs of the ASEC, the TATF task order conducted work in five key areas:
- ASEAN Economic Community
- ASEAN Political Security Community
- ASEAN Socio-cultural Community
- Strengthening ASEC Resources, and
- General Support to ASEAN and Monitoring and Evaluation.

Each of these five areas was subsequently divided into activity streams, sub-streams and finally individual activities. Activities pertaining to the three ASEAN communities were aligned with specific sections of the respective blueprint. Throughout the duration of the ADVANCE project, streams shifted and activities were reallocated as the work became more focused and refined.

Economic Community
In the first year TATF Economic Community activities were divided into six streams: Sector Integration, Investment, Economic Agreement Implementation, Customs and Trade Facilitation, Trade in Services, and Trade Negotiations. Two activity streams were further divided into sub-streams, as indicated in parentheses: Sector Integration (Information and Communications Technology (ICT) and Logistics); Customs and Trade Facilitation (ASW and Rules of Origin). Each activity stream or sub-stream consisted of activities (18 in total between all six streams).

In the second year of TATF, the workflows and reports were more focused and linked to three specific sections of the ASEAN Economic Blueprint: Single Market and Production Base, Competitive Economic Region, and Equitable Economic Development.   As in the first year, these areas were divided into streams, sub-streams and activities. Overall, the Economic Community work stream planned[12] a total of 60 activities. Fifteen of these activities were

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[12] 'Planned' is the term used consistently in this report to indicate activities that were proposed in ADVANCE work plans (and for which there may or may not have been CPR/ASEC approvals or available funds). 'Actual' is the term used for those activities reported in ADVANCE annual reports and were implemented (and thus had funding and the presumption of CPR/ASEC approvals).

withdrawn, leaving a total of 45 activities pursued. Table 5 illustrates the distribution of activities and outputs.

The highest number of activities (21) was concentrated within the Single Market and Production Base stream and consisted of workshops, conferences, and trainings.
In addition to the quantitative tabulation of the four common types of activity, TATF has produced a few qualitative accomplishments of note in the Economic community. TATF has successfully facilitated the revision of an ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature from HS 2007-2012 and has also helped ASEAN to create a Common Technical Dossier. Initially, TATF spearheaded efforts for an ASW. These efforts were consolidated and became a separate task order.

Political-Security Community
The Political-Security Community activities occupy a much smaller scope within the TATF task order. The activity stream was comprised of 24 planned activities. Activities addressed two key elements of ASEAN's Political-Security Blueprint: Rules Base Community of Shared Values and Norms and Cohesive, Peaceful and Resilient Region. The Rules Base work has focused entirely on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights with a total of 9 activities. Activities within the Cohesive, Peaceful and Resilient Region theme have attempted to cast a wider net to cover Nontraditional Security Issues (Transnational Crime, Strengthening the Rule of Law and Judiciary Systems and Legal Infrastructure) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. A total of seven activities were planned for Nontraditional Security Issues and an additional eight activities were planned for the ASEAN Regional Forum. The initial work plans also included the blueprint mandate of "Rights of Migrant Workers," but activities on this topic were not pursued. However, the Socio-cultural Community has absorbed the issue of migrant workers to some extent as will be discussed in the following section.   The more significant quantitative outputs in the Rules Base Community of Shared Values and Norms coincide with the successful outcome of the establishment of a Human Rights Resource Center to support research and training on human rights issues in the region.

TABLE 5: TATF Economic Community Activities

ECONOMIC COMMUNITY								
	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Sector Integration	6	1	5	0	1	0	0	1
Investment	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	1
Economic Agreement Implementation	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0
Customs and Trade Facilitation	6	1	5	0	0	2	0	2
Trade in Services	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	2
Trade Negotiations	2	0	2	2	2	0	0	4
Single Market &Production Base	27	6	21	10	9	20	3	42
Competitive Economic Region	5	3	2	2	0	1	0	3
Equitable Economic Development	6	1	5	1	0	1	1	3
Total	**59**	**15**	**44**	**15**	**12**	**27**	**4**	**58**

TABLE 6: TATF Political-Security Community Activities

POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY								
	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/Traini ng	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Rules Base Community of Shared Values and Norms	9	0	9	10	1	4	1	16
Cohesive, Peaceful and Resilient Region	15	3	12	4	2	5	2	13
Total	**24**	**3**	**21**	**14**	**3**	**9**	**3**	**29**

Socio-Cultural Community

Activities within the Socio-Cultural Community all fell under the mandate of "Social Welfare and Protection" in the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Blueprint. The bulk of TATF's most recent work has focused on these activities. Socio-Cultural Community activities were divided into nine streams and sub-streams (indicated in parentheses):

- Building Disaster-Resilient Nations
- Enhancing Food Security
- Public Health (Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness)
- Human Development (Advancing and Prioritizing Education and Promotion of Decent Work)
- Facilitating Access to Applied Science and Technology
- Community of Caring Societies (Poverty Statistics)
- Social Justice and Rights
- Building ASEAN Identity (Promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community)
- Ensuring Environmental Sustainability (Responding to Climate Change and Addressing its Impact and Promoting Sustainable Development through Environmental Education and Public Participation).

These activity streams comprised 59 planned activities, of which 56 were pursued. Table 7 illustrates the enumeration of activities and activity outputs for each stream.

Due to availability of resources, the work stream of Enhancing Food Security was particularly active, holding meetings, forums, conferences and reports. This concentration has resulted in the Food Security work stream becoming its own task order with additional funding through the USG's global Feed the Future initiative. Additional successes were achieved in the Public Health and Disaster Management work stream where activities focused on national and regional assessments of pandemic and disaster preparedness. Training materials for disaster management were created and used for a regional exercise in the Philippines.   It should also be noted that these two work streams have been separately funded by two other USAID/Washington offices.

Strengthening Secretariat Resources

Outside of the three ASEAN communities, TATF has established a work stream focused on strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat. Activities in this area are divided into three streams: Human Resource Development, Public Relations, and Information Technology. A total of 23 activities were planned in this stream and 5 were withdrawn, leaving a total of 18 activities. The primary activities have focused on increasing the capacity of Secretariat staff to promote the efforts of ASEAN, as was evidenced in the production of press kits for the ASEAN Blueprints. Under this activity stream, TATF has also taken a few steps towards the improvement of the Secretariat website. Human Resource Development efforts were not continuous or linked to broader outcomes.

TABLE 7: Socio-Cultural Community Activities

SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY								
	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Building Disaster Resilient Nations	10	0	10	3	1	5	1	10
Enhancing Food Security	6	0	6	2	1	9	2	14
Public Health	18	2	16	4	2	9	3	18
Human Development	11	1	10	3	4	5	4	16
Communities of Caring Societies	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	2
Social Justice and Rights	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Building ASEAN Identity	3	0	3	2	0	0	2	4
Ensuring Environmental Sustainability	9	0	9	3	2	11	0	16
total	**59**	**3**	**56**	**17**	**11**	**39**	**13**	**80**

TABLE 8: Strengthening Secretariat Resources Activities

STRENGTHENING SECRETARIAT RESOURCES								
	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Human Resource Development	1	0	1	0	0	3	0	3
Public Relations	12	3	9	0	0	1	0	1
Information Technology	10	2	8	0	0	2	2	4
total	**23**	**5**	**18**	**0**	**0**	**6**	**2**	**8**

General Support to ASEAN, Monitoring and Evaluation
The final work stream to capture the activities of TATF is General Support to ASEAN and Monitoring and Evaluation. This section included six activity streams:

- Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
- General Support to RDMA and USG/Washington
- ASEAN Blueprint Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
- Additional COP/Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) Technical Assistance
- Support of RDMA Efforts re: Donor Coordination, and
- Additional Facility Support to the ASEAN Region.

Within the broad category of Additional Facility Support to the ASEAN Region, two key projects have emerged – the Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN and Indonesia Ministry of Trade Support. The activity data for these two projects is captured in Table 9, which enumerates the breakdown of the 23 planned activities across all six streams. To the extent possible, meeting data has been culled from quarterly reports, although these documents also refer to many additional meetings (as well as other support activities) have taken place beyond those reported (for example, any workshop is likely to require several planning meetings leading up to the actual activity, although these meetings could be informal or via the telephone). Technical assistance activities have not been consistently reported and could not be captured quantitatively in this evaluation. Both work streams of monitoring and evaluation were relatively untouched, with the exception of TATF support for the creation of an economic scorecard to measure progress to measure commitment implementation in each AMS.

C.   Changes over time

This section provides in-depth analysis of the overall arc of TATF activities. A significant portion of TATF work has included the production of workshops, conferences, trainings and meetings. A total of 65 workshops, conferences and trainings were implemented to reach 47 activities and another 69 meetings were held and reported in the quarterlies.

Economic Community
The first year of activities demonstrated a steep learning curve as many of the activities did not lead to additional work or outcomes. Of the seven work streams, five did not demonstrate a clear arc or path of work over time. For example, the activity stream for Economic Agreement Implementation retained a legal advisor for dispute settlement support, but the outcome of this staffing was not recorded, leading to the conclusion that the individual provided technical assistance and/or advice for a short time and the services were under-utilized so that the activity terminated. The Customs and Trade Facilitation Stream has more success, as the ASW work became its own task order.

TABLE 9: General Support to ASEAN, Monitoring and Evaluation Activities

GENERAL SUPPORT TO ASEAN, MONITORING AND EVALUATION								
	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Project Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	10	1	9	5	0	1	0	6
General Support to RDMA and USG/Washington	1		1	5	0	8	0	13
ASEAN Blueprint Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0
Additional COP/DCOP Technical Assistance	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Support of RDMA Efforts re: Donor Coordination	1		1	9	0	0	0	9
Additional Facility Support to the ASEAN Region	5	0	5	4	0	5	2	11
total	23	2	21	23	0	14	2	39

Second year activities created more continuous paths of work that developed over time. Within the Single Market and Production Base work stream, Trade Facilitation activities began with meetings, an assessment, briefings, and workshops that eventually resulted in a Trade Facilitation Forum. In Customs Integration, a workshop, report, briefing and meetings resulted in the development of a Standardized Nomenclature. Planned activities in Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade proved more difficult to implement fully: of the 16 activities, six were withdrawn and an additional two activities did not have data reported. Many of the activities that were implemented – workshops on Vehicle Standards, Hazard-Based Safety Engineering, for example – did not have follow-up within the project period under evaluation. The most successful activity in Standards was the Medical Devices Standards Harmonization. After initial workshops, meetings and briefings, a multi-year capacity building program was developed to create a standard curriculum according to the Global Harmonization Task Force on Medical Devices and to hold multiple regional workshops in the Philippines, Cambodia, and Malaysia.

Nonfinancial Services activities have consisted of two trainings for service regulators in Laos and Vietnam as well as an economic needs test. However, there is not a clear path of action and the capacity building program for services regulators in CLV has not yet been pursued in Cambodia. Similarly, activities in the Competitive Economic Region have not demonstrated success. Isolated meetings and a workshop remain detached from an overall plan or arc and three activities have been withdrawn.   Equitable Development activities (five in total) only resulted in an SME concept paper and a consultation between the Coordinating Committee on Investment and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council.

Political-Security Community
The Promotion and Protection of Human Rights developed a strong arc throughout the project period. Initial workshops and meetings resulted in the launch of the Human Rights Resource Center (HRRC) for ASEAN, which has become a stand-alone organization with multiple sources of donor and foundation funding. More recent work has focused on staff training. Further work proposed such as the ASEAN Declaration and Human Rights Roundtable as well as support to the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) Thematic Studies have yet to be implemented as the extent to which dialogue partners can support AICHR remains unclear.

The Cohesive, Peaceful and Resilient Region stream has had less success in creating and implementing a focused work plan, due in part to USG policies on the types of activities that are eligible for funding involving law enforcement officials. Initial efforts in the area of transnational crime have not established a strong footing and three planned activities were withdrawn. The area of financial crimes has had the most success, with planned Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (CLV) -focused workshops on Trade-based Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling completed in Vietnam and Laos, and the third scheduled in 2012 in Cambodia. Efforts regarding Trafficking in Persons have been limited, but ASEAN's recent partnership with the MTV End Exploitation and Trafficking (EXIT) program to fight trafficking through public awareness campaigns will allow the TATF to support these efforts. TATF has also recently initiated activities to facilitate a judicial workshop to explore the establishment of judicial cooperation in ASEAN.

Work efforts to support the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) have been scattered over time, with various meetings and briefings. Gap analysis plans have stagnated and ARF work plans on Disaster Management have not demonstrated outcomes, partly due to unclear mandates in this area between ARF and other ASEAN-related bodies working in disaster management (ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management and AHA Center). Recent efforts have turned the focus to Best Practices on Peacekeeping in the ARF Vision Statement, though activities are nascent and it is too early to evaluate the potential impact. In terms of outputs, the ARF Unit website has been upgraded. The final stream under Cohesive, Peaceful, and Resilient Region – Rights of Migrant Workers – was reallocated to the Socio-Cultural Community.

Socio-Cultural Community
Activity streams in this community were mixed, with some establishing clear paths while others failed to gain traction and have yet to lead to additional activities or outcomes. Of the work streams, the Enhancing Food Security was most successful in developing a focused trajectory. While outcomes have not been reported, a forum and additional conferences as well as reports, presentations and dialogue meetings between the public-private sectors have helped to establish Food Security as a separate task order.

Efforts in Advancing and Prioritizing Education, Disaster Resilience, Public Health and Ensuring Environmental Sustainability also demonstrate the capacity to become a focused area of work. In education, activities began with a study or an ASEAN education work plan. Meetings have also addressed the creation of an ASEAN studies program and the reference materials for primary and secondary courses on ASEAN were created under the Building ASEAN Identity work stream. Additional efforts resulted in a Rural Connectivity Forum that has the potential to create cross-cutting work with technology and education.

Disaster Resilience efforts were initially concentrated on assessment and the establishment of training materials, which have been used in a regional exercise in the Philippines. In May 2011, the TATF brought on a full-time disaster management expert with planned activities – particularly studies - that demonstrate the potential for a clear path of work, particularly as the ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response (AHA Center) becomes functional. Public Health activities were concentrated in Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness and included meetings; regional assessment activities initiated in six countries; and isolated trainings (Incident Command System). Disaster preparedness now includes many of the Public Health content areas, as the preparation and outreach are often managed by the same national response organizations.

There were eight Environmental Sustainability activities. Several workshops have been held and while they have yet to establish a clear mission, they have established a presence and potential. Initial efforts regarding climate resilient cities have been initiated, though planned activities of a city-to-city technical exchange have yet to take place. Environmental issues also have the potential for cross-cutting work with Disaster Resilience and Food Security. For example, Flood and Drought workshops were held under the environment work stream and the Disaster Resilience work stream has planned for the incorporation of Flood and Drought Vulnerability in ASEAN's Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy.

Less focused work streams were: sub-streams within Human Development and ASEAN identity. Other topics – Applied Science and Technology, Cook stove workshop; Promotion of Decent Work; Communities of Caring; Social Justice and Rights - were completely isolated from a broader vision or work stream and were marked by few planned activities and fewer demonstrable results, with the exception of Labor Migration. Labor migration activities demonstrated a period of continuous activity for six quarters and while it has yet to produce results, may pave the way for future work.

Strengthening Secretariat Resources
Activities in this area have focused on skills training for Secretariat staff in a variety of areas. Five training activities have been held without reported follow-up or action. Three additional planned trainings in Photo Bank, Visual and Editing Training, and Speechwriting were withdrawn. In Q10, there was planning on Press Release training, Outreach Writing, and Presentation trainings. While these activities point to an overall goal of increasing the profile of the Secretariat and its ability to engage the public, effects have not been demonstrated. The other key area of activity is Information Technology. The TATF completed and implemented a Knowledge Management Assessment. In June of 2011, the TATF brought on a full-time IT Program Manager to provide direct support to the Secretariat IT Unit and Public Outreach staff to upgrade the ASEAN website and produce a medium-term IT Strategy for the Secretariat.

General Support to ASEAN and Monitoring and Evaluation
Activities in Project Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation have received little attention in program reporting mechanisms. Beyond initial discussions of strategic planning, monitoring indicators and a baseline outline indicator, project documents do not present outcomes in this area. Other areas originally contemplated in the activity stream (Support for Revision of ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action, ASEAN-U.S. Eminent Persons Group, ASEAN-Asia-Pacific Economic Corporation [APEC] Cooperation) have not reported activity, due to the role of the USG vs. the TATF over time. USG took over direct management of these activities with the full establishment of USASEAN. However, the Facility demonstrated continuous involvement in supporting the ASEAN-U.S. Working Groups and Leaders meetings. A few efforts in Clean Energy Program design were initiated, without additional activity. However, these activities may be better addressed and assumed under the Socio-Cultural community. While initial support was provided to the development of Blueprint scorecards, only Economic Scorecards have been created and project reporting mechanisms have not provided information on progress towards developing scorecards for the other ASEAN communities.

General Support to RDMA and USG/Washington is not frequently reported, yet the Facility has evidenced a strong commitment to meeting with many USG entities - Trade, ITC, Commerce, Justice, State, Treasury, Labor, USDA and others – and has likely held many more conversations and meetings than those recorded in the project chronograph (Appendix 1).

The Facility has also reported regular activity in support to Donor Coordination. While project reporting mechanisms do not consistently discuss COP/DCOP Technical Assistance, presumably these efforts take place both frequently and routinely. More concentrated efforts of general support have focused on HRRC and Indonesia Ministry of Trade Support. As relatively new initiatives that started in Q6 (8/10 – 10/10), the Facility has held quarterly meetings with the

Indonesia Ministry of Trade and has provided continuous technical assistance to the HRRC. Both efforts have resulted in a study. Most recently, the Facility has initiated plans for HRRC Women and Children Research.

D.   Project advantages and challenges

The Facility has been fundamental to four major accomplishments for ADVANCE, which, while deliberate, are not necessarily tracked or tangible.   The first of these is the visibility and relationships for the U.S. that they have built, and continue to build, by their presence and hard work while based at ASEC. The second is the incubator effect, where ideas can be discussed and either discarded, tabled, or elaborated. The third is the general 'affect' of the workshops, conferences, and meetings, since this contributes to the increased regionalization of interests through networking and platforms for discussing ideas. The fourth is simply the sheer burden of logistics attached to all of these events, for which the ASEC(and ASEAN) has neither had to set up, nor pay. Logistics take time and effort, usually much more than one anticipates. Having an embedded event coordinator has meant that ASEAN can dedicate time and resources to other activities. This capacity should become an in-house one, however, as it is neither sustainable nor desirable to have this reside with a dialogue partner (and their own priorities).

> "TATF gave me the ability to think of this work in the big picture and in an integrated way." Workshop participant

TATF as a service provider gets high marks for being able to organize and support workshops and meetings, and they have done dozens of these in multiple venues. The content of the workshops generally is well-received. One recent innovation, of having events on key topics back-to-back with regularly-scheduled relevant ASEAN working group meetings has reduced the opportunity costs to participants and made it more appealing for the right people to attend. The opportunities for networking or more detailed conversations among those with shared interests but different locations can create and foster the TATF 'incubator'. Having TATF embedded within the Secretariat means that there is easier access to staff, and having former Secretariat staff work for TATF means that there is already an informal professional relationship that can help smooth communications and facilitate coordination.

<u>Advantages</u>

TATF has taken on the role of workshop facilitator for the USG-sponsored activities. This means that travel arrangements, logistics, and content fall to a single organization, which is a tremendous resource for ASEC and ASEAN as a whole, as well as for the USG. Dedicating staff to logistics reduces the learning curve with running any workshop, and repeated meetings in key locations further reduce logistics problems.

The various workshops and meetings have opened up networking opportunities within sectoral interests, as well as across national ministries. More importantly, they have also opened up a realization about the need to work across topical sectors (and across ASEAN communities), as

exemplified in disaster management and food security. The rural connectivity workshop was another good example of providing a springboard for discussion on a topic. The workshops also provide an opportunity for regional networking on shared topics, as well as for expanding the discussion platform between the public and private sector. ADVANCE has helped ASEAN events become more open to the private sector.

An excellent example of the 'incubator' effect of TATF is with standards for medical devices. This started as a single workshop, then went into a multi-year arc of activities. An ASEAN standard for medical devices is scheduled to be adopted in 2014.

Another, more subtle advantage of TATF facilitating meetings is that the opportunity posed by networking can make the argument that ASEAN is not simply individual members working together, but rather that there are regional advantages in working together. Respondents engaged in the disaster preparedness activities were especially forceful about this advantage, as the tabletop exercises and other networks showed the clear positives in coordination. Given the tendencies in the region to natural disasters (typhoons, floods, tsunamis, etc.), this helped to underscore lessons learned from previous disaster coordination efforts in a structured and forward-looking manner without emphasizing the differential strengths of the Member States' own responses.

Challenges

TATF is somewhat the victim of its own success, as ASEAN has high expectations for its performance. Responding to requests for technical experts can present challenges, not simply because those experts are not necessarily available during the timeframe of the workshop. Nathan Associates tends to operate within its existing consortium for short-term technical assistance because it is faster than going outside (and this is the main reason for funding a consortium – because it will be faster). However, the consortium members from five years ago are not always the right fit for ASEAN requirements today.

One consistent problem with workshops/meetings/events in the region is the English language requirement. This results in three main scenarios:
1. The selection of participants more for language capacity, rather than technical capacity or organizational responsibilities.
2. Participants attending meetings where their input is minimized because they cannot communicate with the wider group effectively.
3. Uneven status among participants (Ministers, very junior staff, more senior technical staff), which also inhibits participation in a status-conscious environment.

The choice of participants is ASEAN's responsibility, not ADVANCE's responsibility. Having the wrong participant, however, minimizes the effect of the workshop/meeting, both in terms of participation and 'take-aways' from the event. It also makes it difficult to affect change in the host organization upon returning, because that may be far outside of the participant's own job description. Using ASEAN to determine who the right participants in the different Member States are could result in more targeted invitations. Participants who require translation could

request that service, depending on resources available for the workshop. Cost-sharing the translation services would give ASEAN participants more of a stake at sending the right person to workshops/meetings. Building English capacity in Southeast Asia is already a high growth industry. Having Ministry officials attend English classes is not the solution: budget and time constraints aside, the technical vocabulary required for climate change, disaster preparedness, disease pandemics (to name a few) is both specific and nuanced enough in English to create confusion for native speakers. Routine communication prior to meetings with topics, talking points, key definitions, and/or copies of presentations would help with increasing participation. Continuing the communications outreach after workshops to reinforce the vocabulary and the technical approach simultaneously would also keep participants engaged in that discussion.

The continuing issues of communication, coordination, and transparency recur for TATF, and perhaps more strongly because of its location within the Secretariat and the sweep of its activities. One aspect added here is the need for sensitivity to the different Member States. For example, some countries prefer to be more actively involved with the initial logistics or have specific protocol requirements. Finding the right local entity (ministry, department, business organization) to partner with can help finesse the intricacies of ten radically different operating environments.

Getting the right participants to workshops is not limited to ASEAN countries. Several of the donor offices noted the challenge of attending meetings with limited advance notice (three weeks' time was not enough to balance other work commitments, even though the topic was relevant and strategic). For other stakeholders, the desirable location of the workshops prompts attendance. In some cases, that location presents additional problems for a U.S.-funded project in terms of equal access and travel regulations: ADVANCE could not fund participants, for example, from Singapore to a conference in the U.S., nor could it fund business-class travel for any of the participants. While a creative solution was found to ensure that the conference occurred, this left a legacy of ill-feeling among CPR members that was strongly expressed in interviews. Greater clarity about U.S. regulations in advance, through official diplomatic channels rather than project staff, may help to alleviate such issues in the future.

TATF has had some challenges in conducting workshops in more academic settings, in part because both the coordinators and participants had very high expectations for the quality and content of the workshops. In one case, respondents noted that the entire proposal (developed by TATF staff) had had to be redone so that it matched their needs. In several other cases, there was little basic workshop follow-up.

Chapter Five: Task Order ASW Detailed Review and Analysis

A.   ASW Performance Indicators

TABLE 10: ASW Performance Indicator Table [13]

Indicator	FY08 Target	FY08 Actual	FY09 Target	FY09 Actual	FY10 Target	FY10 Actual	FY11 Target	FY11 Actual
Number of customs harmonization procedures implemented in accordance with internationally accepted standards as a result of USG assistance			2	0	2	1	2	2
Number of electronic documents that has (*sic*) been harmonized (*sic*) and mapped for cross-border trade exchange			5	11	18	0	0	Merged with above indicator
Number of USG-supported training events held that are related to improving the trade and investment environment	1	1	3	6	3	5	7	9
Number of male participants in trade and investment environment trainings	30	30	90	220	90	111	140	230
Number of female participants in trade and investment environment trainings	30	30	90	135	90	45	70	88
Number of trade and investment diagnostics conducted[14]			4	1	4	1	2	2
Number of formal consultative meetings with private sector			2	1	2	1	2	2
Customized Applications/Software in operation or in development for exchange of cross border trade information	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Number of Road Maps for National Single Window			1	1	2	0	1	0

The rest of this chapter shows the accomplishments of the ASW task order more effectively and impressively. Not having this information updated and easy to track on an indicator table –

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[13] Indicators for this task order also reflect primarily the use of F Bureau indicators, with only a few customized for the task order. Information on results achieved for these indicators is also missing from the available documentation.

[14] FY09 TATF PPR also reported on this indicator: target 4; actual 5.

especially with indicators that match project performance – illustrates a particular weakness in reporting that could be easily corrected. Being able to review and use this information routinely makes a much easier project review for those not as closely associated with the complexities of establishing a common single window structure for ten disparate systems.

B.   Activities, Results, Outcomes

The ASW task order is divided into five work streams:
- Strategic Planning
- Technical Implementation
- Legal Implementation
- National Single Window (NSW), and
- Outreach and Awareness.

These streams are broken down into 44 planned activities, with the exception of Strategic Planning which stands alone as a categorical task. Table 11 provides data on four key types of activity: meeting; briefing/presentation; workshop/conference/training; and study/report.

Strategic Planning
Unlike the other four work streams, Strategic Planning was not divided into individual activities. Nonetheless, the strategic planning efforts under this task order have been substantial, as indicated by eight planning workshops and sessions, as well as 14 official meetings have been reported in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia. There were many additional formal and informal meetings that contributed to the overall planning of the ASW task order. These meetings and workshops covered technical (cf. Trade Facilitation Forum) and programmatic support (donor meetings) topics. Some activities, such as project staff attendance at the TATF-organized ASEAN Food Security Conference, were not explicitly connected to the overall goal of ASW, and it is likely that this simply presented an opportunity for additional networking.

Technical Implementation
Technical implementation activities focused on and resulted in the construction of an ASW data model shell. Within the first year of the project, a pilot application was successfully tested using the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Form D to communicate information between Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Laos. Following this pilot application, component 1 of the pilot project was initiated. Meetings and briefings were held in seven Member States. By Q12 the contractor for the data model had submitted an early prototype for the data model. A similar prototype was developed for the ASEAN Customs Clearance Document (ACCD) Application, which was tested between Malaysia and Singapore. The contractor produced five reports, including an implementation plan, of which component two is now underway.

Legal Implementation
Legal Implementation required more effort in collaborative meetings (12) and research and reporting (15) than trainings and workshops (2). After initial negotiations starting in Q2, a

Memorandum of Understanding for the legal implementation of ASW was eventually signed in Q13. The legal implementation of ASW took place through regular Legal Working Group meetings throughout the project. The Legal Working Group (LWG) met nearly every quarter; however, in Q10 they did not have funds to support the meeting. The creation of a guiding document for conducting a legal gap analysis has proved a crucial component in task order implementation and resulted in the completion of gap analyses in Laos and Vietnam. Other planned activities fell by the wayside, including a CLV Capacity Building workshop, the development of a Cross-Border Mutual Recognition Model, and a workshop on Certification Authorities and Mutual Recognition; however, there was no information on why those were dropped.

TABLE 11: ASW Activities

	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Strategic Planning	1	0	1	14	3	8	0	25
Technical Implementation	12	0	12	12	7	7	7	33
Legal Implementation	12	0	12	12	2	2	15	31
NSW	7	0	7	2	2	3	2	9
Outreach and Awareness	12		12	6	5	3	3	17
Total	**44**	**0**	**44**	**46**	**19**	**23**	**27**	**115**

NSW
While the ASW task order's goal is to create a functional ASW, the project has worked the development of NSW into the activity stream as Member States must all have an NSW before an ASW can be functional. Efforts in this work stream have been comparatively low and equally distributed among the types of activities tracked. Of the Member States, Vietnam and Laos have received specialized support for their NSWs, including a benchmarking study in Vietnam and fact-finding missions in Vietnam, Laos, and the Philippines. Following the legal gap analysis activities in Laos and Vietnam, NSW activities were initiated in each location. Towards the end of the project period being evaluated, the Philippines had also requested assistance with NSW and a fact-finding mission had been completed.

Private Sector Outreach and Public Awareness
Activities in the Private Sector Outreach and Public Awareness work stream were limited, as a result of a joint ASEAN and USG/ASW Project decision to focus limited funds on the technical and legal implementation of ASW. Twelve total activities were planned for this work stream, four of which have not been implemented. Activities focused on private sector outreach have received more attention than public awareness activities, as evidenced by meetings, studies, and presentations held with the private regional sector and concentrated activities on the Business Case for ASW. The project has reported the creation of updated public outreach flyers and success stories; however, dissemination results have not been reported.

A. Changes over time

Strategic Planning
The formal reported strategic planning activities were concentrated from Q7-Q14. The resignation of a senior technical staff member in Q8 did not delay project activities as a new staff was quickly hired.

C.   Key Findings on Advantages and Challenges

ASW is an integral part of ASEAN's own roadmap towards creating an economic community. The trade barriers between countries lead to delays in shipping goods: one interview noted that it took four days to ship goods to Europe, but 24 to ship them between AMS. Automating the process helps, so that there are fewer opportunities for graft in obtaining signatures and necessary clearances. Automation without a fundamental review and modification of the underpinning legal structure, however, would be insufficient. The work by ASW in conducting precisely those reviews and in linking the different government ministries to work towards reform is one of the most important accomplishments of the entire ADVANCE project.

The focus for ASW has been on the regional window (data harmonization, etc.), with smaller allocations for NSW. Progress on NSWs has opened the door for other donor interest in funding activities, especially as they fit with other bilateral programs. Given the much tighter focus of ASW, there has been a smaller pool of appropriate staff from each of the AMS. In addition, as Customs regulations and trade policy are complicated and nationalistic procedures, ASW has worked much more closely with Steering Committee members and working groups (both technical and legal) in pursuit of creating this common platform.

<u>Advantages</u>

ASW has a decided advantage in that it has a relatively narrow scope, with a well-defined technical approach, and with nicely concrete deliverables. While the process of producing those deliverables is not necessarily easy, there are some striking accomplishments that are well-recognized by the interviewees.

Establishing a common nomenclature for Customs has helped create a useful platform the live exchange of data and in providing guidance for forms. This was a tough process, and ASW delivered for ASEAN with their participation and cooperation. The advantage with using electronic forms is that there is far less fraud; there is still a gap in legal systems that still require a hard copy, but this is a critical first step.

In any of the national Customs, there are multiple agencies involved with the process. Via ASW's working groups, the lead agency in most countries is now in touch with their counterparts in these other agencies. In Thailand, for example, the NSW lead agency was in touch with 29 of the 30 government offices that had some oversight on trade and Customs.

The ASEAN Trade Facilitation Forum in August 2011 was very helpful for networking, not just government to government, but also in expanding the conversation into the business sector. The USG and ASW project staff has consistently encouraged stronger participation from the private sector in discussions about Customs and trade regulation. Customs cannot simply be about the forms themselves, but about the people who complete those forms. Together the public and private sector can work together more effectively than either one alone to update and streamline business processes, although this collaboration is still in a very preliminary state at this point.

Working group members noted that there is very good coordination with the ASW team. Both the ASW team and the consultants they employ provide very good support. Having a road map for developing an NSW, as well as the NSW legal analysis (for example, the one for Vietnam), provide useful ways for each member state to determine what else needs to be done in order to complete tasks for an NSW. This also means that different donors can be approached for components within each NSW, especially as those components mesh more closely with bilateral (or multilateral) program objectives.

One interesting facet of ASW is the relative priority of the regional system with respect to the individual NSWs. Some elements clearly take regional priority (a common nomenclature), but the specific automated platform for an ASW can be started in parallel with the development, refinement, or even in the absence of a NSW. The basics of the computer system can be programmed to fit together in more of a modular structure as all of the Member States move towards complete automation.   The technology is easier to harmonize than the Customs process.

<u>Challenges</u>

The main challenges for ASW return to the earlier themes of coordination and transparency, but add resource constraints. ASW (and the NSWs) are facing the 2015 deadline for an ASEAN

Economic Community more directly than TATF; the end of ADVANCE in early 2013 leaves only a year to accomplish many key steps in a convoluted and complicated process. For most countries, the Customs Office is the lead on single window. Interviewees noted repeatedly that there were multiple ministries and departments involved with this process: upwards of 25 was the general rule. Turf issues over communication and coordination within national governments are an inevitable challenge, and this has made the overarching coordination requirements of an NSW much more difficult to meet. This is compounded by the varying levels of technical capacity and staffing in the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam (CLMV) cluster, and results in a much lower participation in shared meetings. The operating premise now is that there will be an ASW, to which all Member States can align – but not all Member States will be ready to do so by the deadline.

Transparency for ASW IT procurement has also been an issue, and occasioned a number of forceful comments regarding both the process and the outcome. In addition, several of the Member States already had either systems or platforms in place, and are concerned that the procurement may either replace or interface badly with those. Shifting from the manual to an automated system is, oddly, easier for the less-resourced countries, because it is a complete overhaul and not patchwork additions to earlier fixes.

One other challenge for ASW is the need to link this system with the other half of the user groups: the private sector. Harmonizing within and between governments is a tremendous feat, and, in most cases, automating an archaic, handwritten, and cumbersome process will be even more so. However, ASW cannot operate without the group that is primarily tasked with moving the goods from one country to the next: the producers and transporters of those goods.

There are concerns about the level of leadership in the (technical and legal) working groups, and the appearance that both working groups are almost at a saturation point. This makes it more difficult to concentrate on the individual NSWs to the extent that any country would want, and, while ASW has been strategic about its technical assistance choices, this has seemingly highlighted more of the gaps than filled them.

Chapter Six: Task Order VALUE Detailed Review and Analysis

A.   VALUE PERFORMANCE INDICATORS

TABLE 12: VALUE Performance Indicator Table

Indicator	FY08 Target	FY09 Target	FY09 Actual	FY10 Target	FY10 Actual	FY11 Target	FY11 Actual	FY12 Target
Number of firms receiving USG assistance to invest in improved technologies	0	0	0	n/a[15]	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Number of business associations and trade unions that are at least 50% self-funded as a result of USG assistance	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	1
Number of trade and investment environment diagnostics carried out	2	6	6	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Number of direct beneficiaries in RDM/A supported training in competitiveness activities	0	10	0	20	17	0	0	n/a
Number of private sector funded participants in competitiveness activities	0	20	435	200	545	500	349	1000
Percentage increase of ASEAN imports of targeted product areas – HS5208	6.6%	7%	6.7%	8%	11.57%	9%	0	n/a
Percentage increase of ASEAN imports of targeted product areas – HS5209	3.4%	4%	1.94%	5%	33.01%	6%	0	n/a
Percentage increase of intra-ASEAN imports of textile and apparel	n/a	9%		10%	-17.56%	11%	21.19%	15%
Number of Common competencies for textile and garment industries adopted and implemented by AFTEX		10	5	10	5	5	5	10
Number of individuals certified in ASEAN common competencies for the garment industry		0	0	100	52 28 male; 24female	100	107 49 male; 58female	100

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[15] Several indicators were dropped or reduced targets (highlighted in green) due to program performance and funding streams.

As with the other two task orders, it seems likely that this table is unused for reporting. One particular challenge with this table is the difficulty in determining whether or not the targets are cumulative or annual. Of more concern, however, is the inability for the project to directly affect the relative percentage increases over time. There are few factories engaged in VALUE, and only one sector: increases of even one percent across ten national economies attributable to such a modest intervention would be both remarkable and very unlikely. It is also quite challenging for the entire Task Order to report across time, as the entire tourism sector is absent from this indicator table.

B.   Activities, Results, Outcomes

At the beginning of the project period, the VALUE task order selected two industries that would become the focus of the project: Textiles and Garments and Tourism. These were two of the twelve priority integration sectors for ASEAN. In this section, the activities, results, and outcomes of each industry project are discussed.

Textiles and Garments
The Textiles and Garments developed work plans divided into six key areas:
- Supply Chain Corridor Identification and Diagnosis
- Marketing
- ASEAN Core Competency Program (ACCP)
- Investment Facilitation; Association Development/Source ASEAN Full Service Alliance (SAFSA), and
- Intra-ASEAN trade.

These six work streams included a total of 86 planned activities, four of which were withdrawn. Table 13 illustrates the relative density of activities within each work stream.

Activities in Intra-ASEAN trade primarily consisted of meetings and presentations surrounding the SourceASEAN.com website. Key accomplishments in Intra-ASEAN trade have included the popular business-to-business (B2B) meetings at various garment and textile shows, of which there had been a total of seven by the end of Q14.

The Supply Chain Corridor Identification and Diagnosis created the structure upon which the rest of the task order was built. As expected, activities consisted of studies and reports, including Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) analyses in Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Indonesia. These activities led to the successful establishment of a Virtually Vertical Factory (VVF) model, Source ASEAN Full Service Alliance (SAFSA). The establishment of SAFSA marks one of the key accomplishments of the VALUE project and continues to produce substantial activity outputs. The work plans for this project component were detailed and included step-by-step instructions. The actual reported outputs of 44 meetings, six presentations, two workshops and two studies demonstrate a high level of activity in comparison to other work streams. By the end of the project period under evaluation, 19 factories had joined SAFSA.

 The primary activity for the Marketing work stream was the hiring of a knowledge management specialist and the creation of the SourceASEAN.com website. The Investment Facilitation work stream included two activities, both of which were withdrawn.

Tourism

The Tourism project was divided into four work streams (total of 31 planned activities):

- Branding and Marketing
- Knowledge Management
- Tourism Product Development, and
- ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan.

The Tourism Product Development work stream was closed out, leaving 30 activities between the remaining three work streams. Branding and Marketing and Knowledge Management activities targeted an ASEAN regional website www.southeastasia.org as well as the exploremekong.com website. The two work streams overlapped significantly as both were focused on the websites and related content management.

TABLE 13: VALUE Textiles and Garments Activities

VALUE TEXTILES and GARMENTS	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Supply Chain	9	0	9	2	1	0	5	8
Marketing	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0
ACCP	22	1	21	1	0	1	8	10
Investment Facilitation	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
SAFSA	41	1	40	44	6	3	2	55
Intra-ASEAN Trade	7	0	7	8	2	2	0	12
total	**86**	**4**	**82**	**55**	**9**	**6**	**15**	**85**

TABLE 14: (ACE) Tourism Activities

(ACE) TOURISM	Activities Planned	Withdrawn Activities	Total Activities Pursued	Meeting	Briefing/ Presentation	Workshop/ Conference/ Training	Study/ Report	Total Activity Outputs
Branding and Marketing	22	0	22	10	4	0	0	14
Knowledge Management	5	0	5	0	2	2	0	4
Tourism Product Development	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strategic Planning	3	0	3	6	2	0	0	8
total	**31**	**1**	**30**	**16**	**8**	**2**	**0**	**26**

Key accomplishments for the Tourism project included the creation of the *Southeast Asia: feel the warmth* campaign slogan, the re-establishment of the Mekong Tourism Forum in May 2010, and the final vetting and presentation of a strategic plan at the ASEAN Tourism Forum in Cambodia in 2011. Furthermore, the project was responsible for developing a website with meta-search technology that would allow visitors to book multiple destination vacations in the ASEAN region. However, very few, if any, bookings have been made through the website. The Tourism component of this task order was terminated early by USAID, and resources were shifted to Textiles and Garments.

A. Changes over time

Textiles and Garments
The first year of the VALUE project followed the work plans for the Supply Chain Corridor work. Activities deviated little from the work plan and created a continuous path of activities that built upon each another. In Q1-Q2, a corridor e-survey was followed by the creation of an ASEAN producer list representing Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Corridor candidates were selected from this list and supply chain corridors were proposed. Immediately following this work, SWOT analyses were conducted and an action plan was created.

Marketing activities were more fragmented. Project reports did not document steps to review the website, nor did the project develop the proposed ASEAN supply chain directory. The retention of a Knowledge Management Specialist in Q3 did lead to a marketing plan, although the implementation or impact of this plan is unclear. In Q6 the SourceASEAN.com website was launched. Additional activities for the website were recorded under the Intra-ASEAN work stream, as discussed below.

Overall, the ACCP work stream followed a continuous output of activities that resulted in the certification of more than 100 workers. Of the 22 proposed activities for ACCP, one activity (Study trips) was formally withdrawn. Some additional project activities were not fully implemented. While the common competency trainings were held in numerous Member States, the VALUE project has not developed the proposed database of certified workers, which was to be included on the ASEAN Federation of Textile Industries (AFTEX) website. Training-of-trainer sessions were planned for three areas, but only held in two areas. The follow-up visits also remain incomplete.

The Association Development/SAFSA work stream has received a steady stream of inputs and in the most recent quarters has received the bulk of the project's attention and resources. The VALUE project is looking forward to a sustainable future that it envisions happening through membership fees. Hence, activities have been focused on enrolling new members. Initial development efforts began with obtaining legal status for SAFSA, followed by the development of the services manual. While the manual was created, some steps in the planned processes were skipped or undocumented, including: circulation of proposed services to AFTEX and feedback from AFTEX regarding the proposed range of services. However, AFTEX input was solicited later in the process during the Quantification of Specific Service Standards and Levels. Plans in later quarters to update the manual have not been documented.

A standard work flow emerged for the creation and implementation of factory auditing standards. Support for SAFSA members is ongoing and has included an e-newsletter and updated industry profiles for Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, Laos, and Cambodia. SAFSA members and potential customers have come together in two annual Global Garment Forums in Singapore (2010) and Thailand (2011). Efforts to promote SAFSA in the United States and Europe have occupied a large portion of project activities in the last few quarters. More than 15 meetings took place throughout the Southeast Asian region and Hong Kong to recruit potential buyers.

The Intra-ASEAN Trade work stream initially focused on the SourceASEAN.com website that was launched at the Bangkok International Fashion Fair in 2009. However, VALUE learned of a similar and operational website hosted by the American company Tiger Trade. Rather than replicate services, VALUE linked into Tiger Trade and focused activities on the successful B2B business forums. Plans to hold workshops on the SourceASEAN.com website as a marketing tool and the creation of promotional and instructional videos for the website were dropped.

C. Key Findings on Advantage and Challenges

The virtual vertical factory (VVF) approach is proving to be an interesting model. Participants are enthusiastic about the networking capacity to align along key procurement streams. VALUE has evolved the networking model initially used with the tourism sector to incorporate a much wider networking and resource management approach that should facilitate the expansion of small and medium size industries. VALUE is unique in this IQC in that it only serves the private sector, and does so through both management and labor strategies.

Advantages

Mills and factories within SAFSA communicate much faster than before, and membership should help the small and medium-sized customers by opening up new markets to them. At the same time, there is a challenge in opening up new giant markets to them, which might overwhelm their capacity and further reduce profit margins. Managing SAFSA is thus a delicate balancing act between the needs and capacities of the members.

Global Forums have provided a useful networking opportunity beyond the SAFSA membership (which is still quite small). Linking buyers with suppliers has previously been relatively limited to the buyers' own individual networks. Creating a wider forum opened up the possibilities to expand networks, as well as to use the VVF model for additional supplies and resources.

The ACCP is more contentious, and, for that reason, the discussion falls squarely between the advantages and challenges. Of the ten job descriptions, five have been finished. Among five participating countries, more than 100 participants have been certified, with an unknown number going through the process. In some countries, participants have to pay the company a $35-$50 fee for that certification. This is very high given the daily wage, and for a certification whose overall worth is still unknown. English language capacity has been a challenge for some of the job categories, and this resulted in some candidates not receiving the certification (for example, for pattern makers, which requires interaction with buyers in a way that sewing machine operator does not).

Unions and trade associations have been supportive of ACCP: what makes labor stronger and puts them in a better bargaining place are obvious advantages, even if these are far downstream and not part of most of the workforce yet. The larger companies have their own internal quality control mechanisms for laborers in place, so there has been little incentive for their workers to get an outside certification. Getting this certification also increases their relative risk of leaving that employment in the factory's perception. It thus presents a danger to the worker of being let go pre-emptively.

One of the working hypotheses behind ACCP would be that it would allow the certified workers to move between ASEAN countries. This seems unlikely given both the language challenges and the cost of moving. Having a certification might help the lower end of the workers be placed at their correct skill set; the cost of the certification process puts this out of their reach without additional resources. One additional factor to consider is the effect of this certification on the existing migrant workers, such as the Laotians or Burmese (especially in Thailand). The certification could give them more standing in the labor market, but also move them more prominently into more regulated arenas (taxes, etc.). Corporate social responsibility (CSR) might have a role to play in assisting workers with taking the certification, and in easing some of the employment constraints.

Challenges

Orders via this mechanism (the VVF) are slow, however, although interviewees thought that this was more a function of seasonality and pre-existing orders with the usual suppliers. One of the challenges for the existing buyers is that they operate several seasons in advance of the actual calendar year, and they need to have a certain assurance of both quality and volume. The larger producers are able to provide this assurance, and this makes it difficult for the small to medium industries to compete (even when they are linked together).

The initial website VALUE designed for SAFSA did not work well. SAFSA shifted to a different provider (and website). Information on the website for members is still inadequate, and there is little follow-up (for queries, etc.).

SAFSA membership is an ongoing challenge, as the fee structure is currently a disincentive for the smallest companies. Larger companies have the resources to join SAFSA, but little economic incentive to do so. SAFSA, however, will not become sustainable without a wider membership base.

Creating an organization that allows for the one-stop approach right now works better with businesses that can afford the current membership fee; this will be a challenge for SAFSA to become self-sustaining if membership does not increase. Changing the membership fee to a sliding scale, both in terms of business revenue and levels of access, might attract more members. And, while having giant multinationals as members adds revenue and opportunities for CSR, it also creates disequilibrium among the rest of the membership and can minimize their willingness to participate actively.

One of the challenges with VALUE is that they have not been able to work in Vietnam; Vietnam sends representatives to meetings and could join SAFSA. It is not clear whether this was due to

sensitivity about the garment/textile sector nationally, or if this originated from U.S. concerns (interviewees presented different reasons for the lack of engagement).

This particular task order changed from two sectors to one based on a USG decision. Stopping any assistance to tourism meant that the website was left without resources to continue in-house, and the website has now been taken over to maintain in exchange for advertising revenue. Either due to this lack of support or the presence of larger tourism companies in the region, there have been few, if any, bookings on the site.

Chapter Seven: Donor Communications, Coordination, and Management

ADVANCE is an unusual USAID project in that it receives multiple funding streams from different parts of the U.S. Government. While the project team has a role to play in developing work plans, budgets, and responding to information requests, most of the management of the government to government transactions falls to RDMA and its team of CORs. One of the later evaluation questions was how ADVANCE fits into the USAID Forward policy, and it is difficult to separate out the answer to that from the other management advantages and challenges presented by a regional office managing a regional project that supports a regional organization. This chapter provides more information on those advantages and challenges, acknowledging that ADVANCE operates in this three-way intersection of implementation, management, and policy. Most of the evaluation to this point has focused on the implementation and management by the contractor: this chapter focuses on the management of the project by RDMA and describes in more detail how the project advances policy objectives for both USAID and the USG.

TATF has been the incubator for the other Task Orders, and is likely to maintain that function through the end of the project. A close review of the chronographs in Chapters 4-6 may provide the RDMA with additional insight as to which activities may be best poised to germinate; and yet the overall structure of the IQC, how RDMA manages the IQC, and both ASEAN and USG changing priorities should also be taken into account in developing a follow-on project.

There are a number of confluences that should be considered, both with respect to a follow-on project, and also in the context of ADVANCE as an innovative Whole of Government undertaking. The following sections illustrate some of those confluences, as well as the overall ASEAN context, which need to be considered in light of any potential follow-on. It is important, in this context, to remember that the role of TATF has been bifurcated: both as an incubator for new and/or networked ideas, and also to provide technical assistance/training to ASEC and ASEAN at large. As a consequence, the initial ADVANCE consortium should be reviewed and revised for any follow-on (since it is unlikely that this would happen for the remaining life of project) to accommodate changing priorities, new policies, as well as development objectives.

A.   RDMA: project support and ASEAN role

The genesis for ADVANCE was from a previous Mission Director of RDMA, wanting to find a flexible model to provide support to ASEAN, and, in particular, to build upon economic and trade policy work already undertaken in the region. While some of the intense focus on the economic community has shifted to the other two communities over time, concentrating on keeping USAID (and, by extension, U.S. Government interests and resources) engaged with ASEAN has remained constant throughout the life of the project to date. One challenge to ADVANCE has been the processing time associated with the different funding streams made available to the IQC, and this has also presented an equal challenge to the management team at RDMA. ADVANCE is managed out of the regional USAID office in Bangkok (RDMA). Funds are transferred to this central account from State, other parts of USAID, or other USG agencies. Funds can be tied to specific activities or else available to different task orders per their work

plans and negotiated budgets, but, once allocated, are difficult to move to other activities, even though ASEAN priorities may have shifted in the interim between planning and funding.

While the RDMA is based in Bangkok, only one of the task orders is actually based in Thailand (VALUE). One of the task orders is in Laos, while the other two are in Jakarta. There were two CORs working on the ADVANCE project at the beginning, covering four task orders. An additional COR was added in early 2009 and recently two more were added so that each task order now has a separate COR. This is seen by the contractor as an advantage, as communications can be more focused at the task order level, and then larger issues can be brought up where the contractors, RDMA, and USASEAN are (virtually) present. Managing contracts at a distance is the usual *modus operandi* for a regional USAID mission, generally via videoconferences, emails, augmented by periodic site visits.

The project CORs responsible for TATF and ASW travel to Jakarta on a regular basis, and also attend many of the conferences and workshops, increasing their availability to the contractor staff in case of questions. Where general backstopping has becomes an issue for ADVANCE is in two ways: the complexity of these task orders requires closer oversight, and the relationship with ASEAN also requires additional caretaking. Adding other CORs has addressed the first concern, and the recommendation of having a dedicated USAID staff person for ASEAN in Jakarta will address the second.

B.   Regional and bilateral USAID functionality

There are varying levels of involvement with the bilateral programs. There are USAID Missions, offices, or staff deployed in Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Laos, as well as the RDMA in Thailand. ADVANCE has not worked in Cambodia[16]. The three most active country contacts with ADVANCE are Laos, Vietnam, and Indonesia. The main USAID contact in Laos is the health officer, while the project operates on trade policy. The Ambassador's office is interested in staying informed about the USAID programming in Laos, especially as how that intersects with the current State interests in economic policy in this country. There is limited contact, however, between that economic team, the Luna-Lao TO team, or visits from the ASW team when they have provided technical assistance, based on interviews with the Embassy (although the RDMA staff have a different perception). USAID/Hanoi has other projects with similar objectives (reforming trade policy), although again there is limited contact with ADVANCE. USAID/Jakarta's Economic Growth, Education, and Environment (E3) office has a similar project in trade policy, and has somewhat closer ties to ADVANCE, in part because they put funds directly into ADVANCE to support the Indonesian Ministry of Trade. When the CORs travel to Jakarta, they also contact the Mission staff. Communication is therefore relatively robust, although with varying interest and efficiency, depending on the engagement of the bilateral Missions. A closer review of their strategic plans, as those develop, might serve to highlight other potential areas of collaboration and engagement.

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[16] This situation has changed while the evaluation was being conducted, and activities in Cambodia will probably expand over the remaining life of project. The bilateral USG management in Phnom Penh has shifted, and Cambodia has now assumed the rotating ASEAN Chairmanship for 2012.

C.   RDMA, State, and USASEAN engagement

Splitting the funding streams with State and USAID as the primary donors can mean that there would be a certain amount of tension between the different objectives of those agencies. Diplomacy and development may be two of the three communities of foreign assistance, but communities are designed to operate in parallel. Instead, ADVANCE is more of a Venn diagram, with the two circles of diplomacy and development overlapping to create an area where ADVANCE operates. ADVANCE is still, however, managed as a USAID project. The stated objectives of ADVANCE have an unusually high policy focus. RDMA and State communicate routinely about funding and other management issues, and State has periodically requested activities focusing on different topics. Additional coordination and communication about: funding/procurement, appropriate roles, downstream effects, and greater clarity on the intersection of policy and development would create a stronger working partnership.

A key concern is that ADVANCE needs to balance the coordination needs of a development project within the different objectives of diplomacy; when is it worthwhile to do a single activity (level of funding and potential for other activities); and how well it fits with the overall strategic vision of USG work with ASEAN. The distinction, as determined by the evaluation interviews, is that the clear delineation between development and diplomacy still remains to be drawn, and, as such, there needs to be clarity from the RDMA as to what are the precise objectives of ADVANCE for the duration of the project, and what constitute the USAID priorities for any future ASEAN project.

One of the challenges with responding to different federal agencies is that the funding cycle and approvals varies with each agency. This is particularly true for State and USAID, as State is much more comfortable in funding a two year process, with most of the allocations occurring in the second year. USAID, by contrast, generally funds projects on an annual cycle, and this disjoint is compounded when the State funding cycle requires two –three months to clear, and then the USAID process also has a clearance process upon receipt of funding. Greater clarity between the funding offices about the timeframes of each others' processes has been discussed but needs some additional reinforcement.

ASEAN interacts most appropriately with government representatives: ADVANCE has been a careful steward in not taking on that role. The increased prominence of ASEAN and the evolving role of the Committee of Permanent Representatives resulted in the placement of a new office in Jakarta, the U.S. Mission to ASEAN (USASEAN). USASEAN does not manage ADVANCE, but controls much of the relationship with ASEAN. ADVANCE is co-located with the Secretariat and must have a working relationship with them.   The RDMA, while connected electronically and through periodic visits, has considered the option of placing one of its staff in Jakarta to improve the lines of communication and supervision. Interviewees strongly supported this move, and many other interviewees noted the lack of clarity in communication that would be mitigated by a more active USAID presence, as well as additional communication about specific protocols and lines of authority. Prior to moving staff, however, USASEAN and RDMA will need to negotiate not only a job description, but clear lines of authority and management both of that staff person and of the ADVANCE IQC.

D.   Whole of Government Engagement

ADVANCE receives funding from other USG sources, although perhaps not to the degree originally envisioned by the designers. However, the work that ADVANCE does intersects with that of other USG departments. There has been a certain amount of communication and coordination between and among these agencies. Most of the USG offices interviewed wanted increased communication and coordination, in large part because of these overlapping portfolios. It is not clear how frequently the agencies communicate with each other, which suggests that this is more *ad hoc* than routinized. USAID is not well understood among many of the other federal agencies, so some of the requests for assistance in the region are far outside of USAID's mandate. When the CORs are in Washington, they do meet with individuals in these departments, emails are exchanged, and the USAID/Washington offices do also provide other points of contact and sources of information, again, as needed.   The communication should be increased, but could be done in a modest way, for example, a monthly ADVANCE update sent to donor agencies and other key USG stakeholders. One of the COPs for ADVANCE noted that the current weekly reports are circulated, as he would periodically get comments back on those; this may still be more detail than is warranted for the larger audience.

One of the additional challenges for incorporating the Whole Of Government has been the very variable level of interest and/or funding available to support ADVANCE's objectives. While there are many Federal entities tasked with oversight of specific elements within ADVANCE's mandate, relatively few of them have either funded specific activities, or otherwise provided constructive feedback to ADVANCE. Funding levels, in particular, have, in general, remained below what USAID would construe as a viable threshold: providing $18,000 for an event that is likely to require $60,000 is neither a useful nor a useable contribution to a development endeavor. Parameters should therefore be set at USAID/Washington regarding the level of buy-in and to help manage expectations about outcomes.

Identifying a key contact person in USAID/Washington for the other overlapping interests would help, together with a point of contact at RDMA. Sending routine updates on the status of different activities might help allay some of the concern expressed during interviews. Where appropriate, review mechanisms for activities that intersect with the other federal agencies' mandates would also be more efficient for coordination. This might lead to other types of stakeholder partnerships.

E.   Implications for USAID Forward

There are four main areas where ADVANCE can work well with USAID Forward. These are: monitoring and evaluation, procurement/implementation reform, talent management, and science and technology/innovation.

For monitoring and evaluation, ADVANCE has already undertaken a mid-term performance evaluation. One aspect of this type of performance evaluation is how the findings and recommendations from the evaluation are used. This is the type of information that would be incorporated into a final evaluation (if there is one), and could be incorporated into the project's final report. More urgently, ADVANCE needs to consolidate the current monitoring and evaluation (M&E) information into the standard templates for an M&E plan, making sure to link

indicators not only to objectives of the project, but also to situate these with the RDMA's reporting structures. An M&E plan will include a results framework; narrative text on the reporting schedule and types of reports, indicators and their collection strategies, and staff responsible for collection and analysis; an indicator tracking table; performance indicator reference sheets for indicators; and data quality assessments, again organized by indicator. ADVANCE has many of these components already, organized by task order: the ones examined, however, are outdated and fragmentary.

For procurement/implementation reform, interviewees wanted to see a more ASEAN orientation. ADVANCE already works with the private sector for VALUE, and interacts with private sector actors in other workshop or conference settings. ADVANCE has also recently launched a small grants program, which will have the advantages of engaging more local actors, and expanding the pool of available implementers without going outside of its own consortium. One consistent comment from interviews was the need for increased transparency in USAID procurement. While financial information is proscribed, it may be possible to provide more details on the process itself and determine at what point ASEAN (and/or ASEC) review is worthwhile. AusAID has a project cycle process diagram, together with set criteria for eligibility for different categories of funding that is much admired by those interviewed.

For talent management, there is already considerable movement within RDMA to train current staff and expand their portfolio. Ensuring that there is supportive supervision and review of this new work will also help to manage the increasingly scarce staff resources. USAID staff that report to the RDMA are already located in other countries. RDMA staff have not been posted to countries with bilateral Missions in the past, so posting a USAID staff person to Jakarta to provide support to ASEAN and ADVANCE would probably mean a completely different contractual arrangement (and is thus unlikely to be held by a U.S. direct hire). The advantages of having USAID oversight in Jakarta, however, are intriguing, and seem to underscore the perceived need by RDMA and USASEAN for closer oversight and communication between both funding organizations, ASEAN, and ADVANCE. Deploying staff so that they are still USAID, and situated either in the USASEAN or the Secretariat is going to require not only supportive supervision, but very clear lines of reporting and oversight.

For science and technology/innovation, ADVANCE is well-positioned, if resources are available, to conduct more detailed studies on several topics. These include: the pattern of change in national single window programs following a legal gap analysis, the deployment of the ASW computer 'shell', an analysis of the functionality of the virtual vertical factory (VVF), and a review of the outcomes of both the successful and failed candidates in the ACCP. Examining outcomes provides a more robust understanding of implementation so that these can be replicated, or, in the case of the VALUE project, testing the hypotheses inherent in their project design.

F.   Dialogue partner engagement

Dialogue partner and donor are used at times interchangeably, but the two do not perfectly overlap. ASEAN has now limited the number of dialogue partners, and these countries have a member of the CPR facilitating communication with ASEAN leadership). Donors, by contrast, widen the resource base without necessarily the communication platform. Dialogue partners

currently operate in one of two primary modes: through setting up a trust fund or providing direct support via projects that are jointly managed. Japan is the most important source of funding in the first mode, having donated more than $200 million to ASEAN, although those funds have not yet been fully used because of restrictions. One of the most important in the latter mode is Australia, via project support from AusAID. The U.S. is one of few dialogue partners that has a contractor operating its project without dialogue partner presence at ASEC. The COR comes to Jakarta for any dialogue partner meeting, so the contractor is not meeting with dialogue partners. That said, the ADVANCE team should and does interact with dialogue partners, however, as their work overlaps in numerous technical areas. AusAID is literally down the hall from the ADVANCE office, and the two entities have a similar philosophy regarding access and assistance to ASEAN.

Dialogue partners may also attend events, and work together on different Secretariat initiatives that ADVANCE staff may attend. The CPR (December 2011) did an initial dialogue partner matrix, which is being revised based on dialogue partner feedback. The U.S. is the only dialogue partner to operate across all three ASEAN communities, and also the only one not to have provided funding information for its activities by individual activity, but rather by overall project. With the increased involvement of the CPR in the Secretariat, there is likely to be more active dialogue partner coordination as well, both with their country coordinators (on the CPR) and among themselves. This could be more actively encouraged by the dialogue partners. Since dialogue partners are not members of ASEAN, their country coordinators become important mechanisms to share and disseminate information to key decision-makers. The U.S. has had two of the stronger AMS as its previous country coordinators (Singapore and the Philippines). The incoming country coordinator is Burma, which represents at once an intriguing diplomatic opportunity and an interesting legal complication, yet to be resolved.

Based on information from the AusAID briefing[17], the Secretariat still has considerable challenges with respect to project management, financial/administrative management, and human resources. There are considerable ranges in competencies, both in terms of the technical knowledge (of subject matter) and English language skill. There were also two categories that affect the Secretariat's ability to function, and over which the Secretariat itself has minimal control, that is: a) the level of funding available to the Secretariat (replacing and/or retaining staff, for example), b) organizational dynamics between AMS and the Secretariat. The presence of the Committee of Permanent Representatives currently serves more of an audit and oversight function, spotlighting weaknesses and inconsistencies. It was also acknowledged at the AusAID briefing, however, that the dialogue partners are willing to keep building capacity. The findings from the AusAID report should help determine which capacities are priorities, and how to work through more transparent processes of project approval and review with and among the sectoral bodies, the Secretariat, and the CPR. This report can be considered the baseline for organizational capacity, and the final version could be used in designing any other organization capacity-building for follow-on USAID support.

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[17] The lead evaluator and the COP for TATF attended a briefing of the preliminary findings for this AusAID product. Both ASEC and dialogue partners were in attendance, and the briefing served to provide an overview of the current situation that led to a wider discussion among the attendees as to what could or might be done. It was intended as an open discussion that would enrich the final version of the AusAID report.

G.   Operating Context with ASEAN

While this evaluation is entirely focused on the three Task Orders (and IQC management) of the ADVANCE project, the project can only operate within the evolving context of ASEAN. Some of these changes are at a profound organizational level, and are clearly outside both the scope of the evaluation and the ADVANCE project. Many of the interviews within ASEAN and the donor community emphasized that are there changes to many of these elements that could create a much more positive environment for organizational functionality than anticipated during ADVANCE:

- There need to be internal champions of change that determine not only which capacities should be built, but then measure the changes in performance created by those heightened capacities.
- Determine which capacities at ASEC can be addressed by which dialogue partner/donor, and work with a local partner to help develop training materials (including on-line resources) for project management, proposal development, report writing, inter al.
- Determine which countries or individuals who have attended training sessions might be available to serve as mentors to others that are not as advanced; this could be done via help lines or other.
- There is an ongoing challenge in level of organization and regional positioning between ASEAN and APEC. There has been some collaboration, and some of the members also overlap. APEC is both larger and operates in a very different structure than ASEAN. There may be lessons on how APEC operates that USASEAN and RDMA can incorporate into their discussions with ASEAN on organizational effectiveness.

Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Recommendations

A.   ADVANCE: General Operations, Process, Pace, and Constraints

ADVANCE has been the face of U.S. interests to ASEAN at ASEC, and, by its operations, the rest of this complex and evolving regional organization. The IQC structure has allowed it tremendous flexibility in responding to demands from both its donors and ASEAN, with the result that it has built a strong relationship based on both trust and past performance. The growing platform of U.S. engagement with ASEAN has been made possible by this strong foundation, a foundation further reinforced by its activities across all three ASEAN communities. With a little over a year left in implementation, ADVANCE can use the time to refine some of its operating modalities to reflect the maturity shown by ASEAN over the last five years. It is unlikely that ADVANCE will be able to implement all of the recommendations in this report, and these may serve, instead, to highlight areas where future assistance can concentrate to its best advantage.

One parallel development that will condition any future U.S.-ASEAN collaboration is the emerging maturity of ASEAN itself. Billboards, news stories, and specific name recognition throughout the region testify to the growing prominence of ASEAN as a regional power base that can build upon and support the national ones. This increased maturity also means that there will need to be changes in the more traditional donor/beneficiary/client relationship common in the development paradigm. The increasing prominence of regional policies also makes ASEAN in 2012 very different from that of 2007, and points the way towards potential future changes in ASEAN's ability to engage and manage resources.

As ADVANCE moves forward, one of its greatest internal challenges will be in refining its uneasy position in the overlap between policy and development, and the 'pushme/pullyou' between its primary donor and its implementing manager, so that it can retain some demand-driven flexibility while adopted a more focused and strategic portfolio. This evaluation has identified some areas at the project level that can be reinforced: changes at the more senior organizational levels will need much more thought and refinement for ADVANCE 3.0, as well as other initiatives with a Whole of Government approach.

B.   Principal Conclusions

The evaluation team has spent a considerable period of time in data collection and analysis. While the individuals closest to ADVANCE will recognize many of the following conclusions and recommendations, creating a more exhaustive list of specific accomplishments, both tangible and intangible and challenges to continuing operations represents the final stage of an evaluation process. It should also be underscored that no project operates either in a vacuum or perfectly: many of the conclusions and recommendations presented in the following pages are due precisely to ADVANCE's original design structure and to its unusual position between policy and development. At the same time, there are elements that all of the stakeholders know can be improved, irrespective of those contextual features.

ADVANCE Project Conclusions.

❖ ADVANCE has made a significant difference in U.S. and ASEAN relations through the provision of technical assistance.

❖ The value of ADVANCE as an incubator for ideas that lead to longer-term commitments is even higher than the resource requirements for the project. ADVANCE has provided good value for its cost, especially given the relatively modest levels of funding actually used.

❖ The legal gap analysis done for Vietnam has accelerated the pace of legal reform for Customs and trade in that country.

❖ ASW's technical assistance intersection with the Luna-Lao program has provided a rich cross-polarization of ideas and resources, critical in the resource-scarce government ministries in Vientiane.

❖ Working across all three ASEAN communities is the correct strategic approach, but it still needs a tighter focus.

❖ The workshops and meetings conducted by TATF have generally been of high quality in terms of content and logistics, and this could continue to improve with additional quality control over the qualifications of speakers and a stronger ASEAN orientation.

❖ The first eighteen months saw the highest number of 'one-offs' – that is, a single event/meeting that did not result in a larger programmatic arc. The roadmap provided a structure for the types of requests ASEAN made, without it being overly constricting.

❖ The ASW process will stop if there is not continued funding for components two and three from the U.S., although they are also looking for other sources. This type of gap happened after an earlier effort at ASW.

❖ Work in human rights is very sensitive and technical assistance must be appropriately nuanced; the HRRC represents a promising start in helping to nuance that technical assistance in an ASEAN context.

Nathan and the IQC Management Structure

❖ Specific communication protocols regarding Nathan-ASEAN, USAID-USASEAN, USAID-ASEAN, and USAID-Nathan are not clear enough, and this creates confusion for all.

❖ The initial completely demand-driven nature of the IQC has outlived most of its utility with the added precision and structures within ASEAN, and could be reduced.

❖ The arcs of activities are good measures of the interest in a topic and point towards the increased focus in project activities over time.

❖ Singleton activities are both an artifact of the demand-driven approach, and the incubator function of TATF.

❖ Singleton activities can open other fruitful discussions and topics, often years after the initial event. This has not been tracked systematically, but could be a useful diagnostic for future planning exercises.

❖ The difference between planned and actual events at TATF remains unusually high if this was solely a development project. The intersection of delayed or reduced funding levels,

the ASEAN approval project, and shifts in policy priorities means that this difference is somewhat misleading if taken as a measure of contractor performance, as the approvals for planned activities are outside the contractor's control.

❖ The difference with USAID is that there is a contractor in place at ASEC; the other dialogue partners usually either provide money alone, or send staff and money. This is both a good and a bad thing. It can provide a faster response time to requests, and yet that also creates tension when ASEAN staff (especially the CPR and key desk officers) feel rushed or blindsided.

❖ While Nathan has been careful not to represent itself as part of the USG, they are implementing a USG-funded project. There is considerable feedback from all sections about the need for increased transparency in the processes, as well as improved communication and coordination.[18]

❖ Communications and reporting quality are not currently satisfactory, and high quality is important when either the USAID or ASEAN logos are attached.

The operating context for ADVANCE

❖ ASEAN's increased sophistication and influence are not matched by the current levels of resources and capacity at ASEC.

❖ The presence of a pool of more engaged dialogue partners will allow for coordination and innovative partnerships in assisting ASEAN and the Secretariat to continue to grow and become more effective.

❖ English language training is a critical and widespread need for ASEAN, although this should not be done by ADVANCE.[19]

❖ It is increasingly important for the Secretariat to demonstrate strong management ability, and for its role to be clarified as ASEAN grows and evolves bureaucratically. A resource-poor Secretariat will not be able to provide the type of coordination that ASEAN will require, nor will a weak Secretariat help ASEAN develop further as a regional power.

❖ Private sector engagement still needs to be encouraged and nurtured, and the connectivity promoted by ADVANCE has been useful in creating a more enabling environment for that to occur.

C.   Principal Recommendations

Some of the recommendations are resource-dependent for ADVANCE. These have been italicized, as the planning and funding processes are already well underway for the last operational year for ADVANCE. If these activities cannot be done by March 2013, there is a greater possibility of them needing remedial acceleration before a successor project comes on-line. Other recommendations are ones that present a challenge to ASEAN and/or the

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[18] When there wasn't a CPR in place, and when the project first started, there were short-cuts that the staff based in the Secretariat could take to move approvals for activities along. The informality and the collegiality of the relationships between the TATF staff in ASEC is a tremendous asset, and it is increasingly important that these relationships be seen as supporting the existing review processes and not undercutting them.

[19] Brunei and the United States have recently developed a partnership for English language training delivery; it is not associated with ADVANCE and does not work through USAID.

Secretariat's own internal functionality, and, while they are somewhat beyond the scope of an individual development project, do condition the effectiveness of any technical assistance provided to the region as a whole, and could be used to help establish specific organizational capacity-building efforts. Greater coordination with the CPR, ASEC, and dialogue partners/donors would also open up opportunities for different funding sources for collaborations on both discrete sectoral initiatives and staff development at the Secretariat.

There were a total of fifteen different funding streams for ADVANCE through FY 2011 (sometimes smaller offices within the larger agency funds delineated in Chapter One). These funding streams provided a great deal of flexibility for the project and kept the demand-driven focus; however, at the same time, there has been a growing perception among both the donors and implementing organization that there has been too much flexibility. Additional structure and thus reducing the demand-driven approach (perhaps to 60-70%) was suggested so that there would be a more robust platform on which to develop more focused and strategic task orders.

High-level Recommendations

- ⊕ Add a USAID staff person dedicated to ASEAN/ADVANCE to either the USASEAN team or co-locate with ADVANCE at the Secretariat to improve communications and coordination.
- ⊕ Mapping the responsibilities of government ministries and the requirements of the private sector with respect to Customs through national workshops would create a neutral environment to foster the required networking and information exchange. The tighter connection fostered by ASW between the private sector and ASEAN writ large would be useful to pursue at the national level, especially as changes made to Customs policies directly affect the private sector.
- ⊕ Create a regionally-available pool of trainers in key content areas so that there is follow-up training on IT or other technically challenging aspects (especially of ASW); this could also include previously vetted companies that can conduct fee-based training supported by the national governments.
- ⊕ There would be additional value to the workshops if the participants were the ones who could effect change in their home institutions. ADVANCE can help ASEAN make these choices with 'who should attend' descriptions with the invitations, as well as with more comprehensive follow-up on outcomes upon the participants' return.
- ⊕ Going forward from some key strengths in USAID and State, there are a few gaps in which additional technical assistance would help ASEAN. These are listed below; however, going through the roadmap to 2015, then the donor matrix, and finally the key strengths of USG collaboration would create a more fungible development strategy. Potential areas could include climate change, disaster management, and human rights, inter al.
- ⊕ Encourage greater private sector involvement; maybe also host workshops with some closed sessions (for government only), so that there is more coordination but still maintain some internal lines of communication for the public sector.
- ⊕ Bring back and expand the road show about ASEAN to more than just the economic community (for example, to tourism). Also use an adapted version of the road show to encourage additional stakeholder engagement and potentially funding from USG offices.

- Determine how to coordinate among and between the different ministries in each country so that there is more clarity on roles and responsibilities.

Project level Recommendations.

- As many of the planned legal gap analyses as possible should be undertaken in the time remaining to the project, using the model from Vietnam. Match up the gap analyses to show blockages and disconnects, and encourage additional donor resourcing and/or collaborations to keep the process moving.
- Develop communications templates for key reports that include format, level of detail, and preferred vocabulary and grammar; these should be developed in conjunction with RDMA and USASEAN so that the two primary consumers of this information have what they want.
- Improve participant tracking, either through a project or ASEC managed database. Having data set up in this fashion will also allow the operator to calculate trends over time in terms of attendance (by country and level of official representation), or other descriptive statistics. Having a database will also facilitate generate invitation lists to other events, as well as serving as a master contact list for referrals to projects or other contacts among the dialogue partners or traveling ASEAN officials.
- The chronographs can help shape a more strategic selection of elements within those communities that mesh with U.S. policy objectives, including reviewing those activities already conducted to see where useful next steps and/or linkages might emerge.
- Expand levels and types of membership in SAFSA to make it more appealing.
- There needs to be a workshop for the general director level of companies to make a case for SAFSA membership.
- Finish competencies for the other five positions and promote ACCP to the regional industries.
- Create a website with a list of suppliers for fabrics, accessible to the public and not just SAFSA members.
- Do a pilot supply chain in each country as a demonstration model, and revise the sector analyses done at the beginning of ACE (since these are outdated by this point).
- Nathan could do a business process analysis, especially with the private sector - this is a critical gap for all Member States.
- Provide summaries of policies at meetings for first-time participants, especially in public/private meetings.
- As presentations and meetings are held in English consider options for translation and recording for subsequent review and better comprehension.
- Improve both the quality and dissemination of ADVANCE's communications, especially within the USG stakeholders.

ANNEX 1: ADVANCE Chronographs

ACTIVITY COLOR CODES

RESULTS/AGREEMENT ACHIEVED
BRIEFING/PRESENTATION
MEETING
WORKSHOP/TRAINING SPONSORED
WORKSHOP/TRAINING ATTENDED
STAFFING
STUDY/REPORT/PAPER
WORKPLANNING/PROGRESS STEPS/DRAFTS
MATERIALS PRODUCED
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MISC. MATERIAL SUPPORT

Miscellaneous Codes

(WD) Withdrawn Activity
(Just) US Justice Department
(Treas) US Department of Treasury
(Labor) US Department of Labor
(State) US Department of State
(USDA) US Department of Agriculture
(Trade) US Department of Trade
(CC) Chamber of Commerce
(FF) Feed the Future
(APEC) Asia-Pacific Economic Community
(UNIC) United Nations Children's Fund
(CBP) US Customs and Border Control
(EAP) US Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and
        Pacific Affairs

LOCATION CODES

(C)   Cambodia
(T)   Thailand
(L)   Laos
(M)   Malaysia
(BR)   Brunei
(I)   Indonesia
(V)   Vietnam
(S)   Singapore
(P)   Philippines
(BU)   Burma
(US)   US, General
(DC)   Washington DC
(NYC) New York City
(EU) European Union
(MAC) Macau

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TATF ECONOMIC COMMUNITY CHRONOGRAPH	SA1 11/07-4/08	SA2 5/08 – 10/08	SA3 10/08 – 3/09	Q1 4/09-7/09	Q2 8/09-10/09	Q3 11/09-1/10	Q4 2/10-4/10	Q5 5/10-7/10	Q6 8/10-10/10	Q7 11/10-1/11	Q8 2/11-4/11	Q9 5/11-7/11	Q10 8/11-10/11
[SECTOR INTEGRATION]													
[Information&Communications Technology (ICT)]													
Advancement of ASEAN Information Infrastructure		X	X										
Frequency Management Wkshp	WD												
Survey of ASEAN e-Commerce Readiness													
Technological Neutral Programs for Universal Service	X												
Promotion & Publication on the Review of ASEAN ICT		X											
[Logistics]													
Workshop on Implementation of the Logistics Roadmap													
[INVESTMENT]													
Collection of Statistics on FDI in Various Service Sectors	X												
[ECONOMIC AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTATION]													
Dispute Settlement Support	X												
Competition Advisor	WD												
Competition Policy Website	WD												
Intellectual Property Rights Assessment	WD												
CUSTOMS AND TRADE FACILITATION													
[ASEAN Single Window]													
Technical Advisors for ASW Steering Committee Working Groups	X												
[Rules of Origin]													
Workshops on Rules of Origin and their Administration	X	WD											
[TRADE IN SERVICES]													
Design of an Inventory of Laws	X												

Regulating Services at the National Level															
Trade in Services Training	X														
[TRADE NEGOTIATIONS]															
Study of Economic Benefits of ASEAN Economic Community		X	X		X		X	X X							
Technical Assistance for Laos WTO Accession	X														
SINGLE MARKET AND PRODUCTION BASE															
FREE FLOW OF GOODS															
Trade Facilitation															
Trade Facilitation Framework Assessment		X		X X I		I X		X						
ASEAN Trade Repository			X	X							I				
ASEAN Trade and Environment Forum													S		
Workshop on World Bank Ease of Doing Business Survey Methodology													V		
ASEAN Trade Facilitation Forum															I
Customs Integration	X														
Investigation, Enforcement, and Risk Management in Customs Administration				X X	X X										
Review of the ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature						X X X	X							
Support for revision of the ASEAN Harmonized Tariff Nomenclature from HS 2007 to HS 2012											S X	BR P BU X			T X
Standards and Technical Barriers to Trade															
Forum on Standards and Conformance Activities in ASEAN	X														
Good Manufacturing Practices in Pharmaceuticals		X	WD												
ASEAN Common Technical Dossier		X X													
Food Safety/Labeling Requirements	WD														
Standards and Regulatory Issues															

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
with respect to Automotive Use of Biofuels													
Electronic and Electrical Equipment Regime Forensic Investigation Workshop	WD												
Compact Florescent Light Standards Workshop													
Vehicle Standards and Regulatory Issues			X										
Medical Devices Standards Harmonization			M		X								
Building and Construction Materials Working Group	WD											X	S
Conformity Assessment Workshop	WD												
Hazard-Based Safety Engineering Workshop for the Joint Sectoral Committee for Electrical and Electronic Equipment									I				
Workshop on Establishment of Commercial and Residential Building Envelope and Windows Labeling and Certification Program	WD												
Hazard-Based Safety Engineering Workshop for Industry						X							
Global Harmonization Task Force Medical Devices Multi-year Capacity Building Program and Workshops									P		C X	M	V
FREE FLOW OF SERVICES													
Nonfinancial Services		X											
Training for Service Regulators					L					V			
Economic Needs Tests – Enhancing Transparency		T X	X										
Capacity Building Program for Services Regulators in CLV, Cambodia, Vietnam													
COMPETITIVE ECONOMIC REGION													
Competition Policy													

	C1	C2	C3	C4	C5	C6	C7	C8	C9	C10	C11	C12
Training of Trainers in Competition Policy	WD											
Intellectual Property Rights												
Infrastructure Development												
ASEAN-US Energy Cooperation											X	
Inception Meeting on Information Infrastructure		X										
Universal Service Symposium	WD											
Appliance Energy Efficiency Standards and Labeling									V	V		
Transportation Cooperation												
ASEAN Logistics Forum	WD											
EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT												
SME Support Concept Paper for ASEAN		X										
New Subjects Related to the AEC Blueprint												
Commercial Law Reform	WD											
FREE FLOW OF INVESTMENT												
Investment Facilitation and Cooperation												
Facilitate Consultation between Coordinating Committee on Investment and ASEAN-US Business Council				I								
Workshop on Foreign Affiliate Trade Statistics				M								
INTEGRATION INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY												
Coherent Approach to External Economic Relations												
Supporting ASEAN-US Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement												

TATF POLITICAL-SECURITY COMMUNITY CHRONOGRAPH	SA1 11/07-4/08	SA2 5/08 – 10/08	SA3 10/08 – 3/09	Q1 4/09-7/09	Q2 8/09-10/09	Q3 11/09-1/10	Q4 2/10-4/10	Q5 5/10-7/10	Q6 8/10-10/10	Q7 11/10-1/11	Q8 2/11-4/11	Q9 5/11-7/11	Q10 8/11-10/11
RULES BASE COMMUNITY OF SHARED VALUES AND NORMS													
PROMOTION AND PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS				I S X							I X		
Regional Workshop: Challenges and Prospects for Regional Cooperation on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in ASEAN		X			X								
Human Rights Resource Center for ASEAN – Legal Establishment						X	X X / X		X X				
HRRCA Launch									I				
HRRCA Technical Advisor							X X	X	I X X				
Study of the Legal Framework for the Protection of Human Rights in ASEAN Member States										S T I			
Training for the Staff of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights													
ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights Visit to the United States										US			
ASEAN Declaration and Human Rights Roundtable													
AICHR and ACWC Staff Training												S	
Support for AICHR Thematic Studies													
COHESIVE, PEACEFUL AND RESILIENT REGION													
NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY ISSUES													
Transnational Crime													
Trade-Based Money Laundering				L	V								
Compendium of Laws on Illegal Weapons/Small Arms	WD												
Drafting ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counterterrorism	WD												

Activity	Status															
Legal Information Sharing	WD															
Cambodia Trade-based Money Laundering and Bulk Cash Smuggling Workshop		X														X
Support for ASEAN's Work Program to Address Trafficking in Persons											X	X				
Strengthening the Rule of Law and Judiciary Systems and Legal Infrastructure																
Judicial Workshop and an Exploration of an ASEAN Chief Justices Organization															X	X
ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM																
Support to the ASEAN Regional Forum Unit		X			X											
ARF Unit Website Upgrades					X			X	X	X			X		X	X
ARF HA/DM Gap Analysis Plan Development					X	X										
ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response Exercise					P											
ARF Annual Security Outlook					X	X										
Technical Assistance to the ARF Unit														X	X	
Study on the Implementation of the ARF Work Plan on Disaster Relief					US											
Review on Best Practices and Lessons Learned on Peacekeeping in the ARF Vision Statement																X
RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS																

TATF SOCIO-CULTURAL COMMUNITY CHRONOGRAPH	SA1 11/07-4/08	SA2 5/08 – 10/08	SA3 10/08 – 3/09	Q1 4/09-7/09	Q2 8/09-10/09	Q3 11/09-1/10	Q4 2/10-4/10	Q5 5/10-7/10	Q6 8/10-10/10	Q7 11/10-1/11	Q8 2/11-4/11	Q9 5/11-7/11	Q10 8/11-10/11
SOCIAL WELFARE AND PROTECTION													
BUILDING DISASTER-RESILIENT NATIONS			X										
Needs and Damage Assessment Manual and Workshop		P X	X P										
ASEAN Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA)			X										
ICT Needs Assessment					S X		X						
Support for the ASEAN Emergency Rapid Assessment Team for Cyclone Nargis		BU BU		BU						X			
Training of ASEAN Emergency Response Assessment Team													
ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management (AADMER) Work Programme Support					X X	X	X	P				X	
ASEAN Early Warning System Baseline Study and Outreach					X					X	X	X	
Study of Existing AMS Early Warning Capabilities and the Role of the AHA Centre													
(Continued) Support for the Establishment of the AHA Centre									X X				X X X X
Incorporating Flood and Drought Vulnerability in ASEAN's Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy													
ENHANCING FOOD SECURITY AND SAFETY													
ASEAN Food Security Forum							X	S					
Support to ASEAN-SEAFDEC Conference on Sustainable Fisheries for Food Security Towards 2020									T	T X		X X X X X	
ADB/FAO/IFAD/USAID Food								P					

Security Investment Forum Support - Pre-forum event														
ASEAN Food Security Conferences: Food Production and Trade												P X		I
Public-Private Sector Engagement with the ASEAN Ministers of Agriculture and Forestry										I T				
Multi-sectoral Framework for Climate Change									X X					
PUBLIC HEALTH														
Capacity Building for Pandemic Preparedness	M	X												
ASEAN Secretariat Pandemic Preparedness Plan	WD													
Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness														
Advocacy Training														
Contingency Plan Training		X		X X										
Assessments of National Multi-Sectoral Pandemic Preparedness		X	X	I T	I	X		M T						
Support for the Initial Technical Working Group Meeting		X												
Workshop on Incident Command System						P								
Development of Regional Pandemic Preparedness Response Plan for Regional Initiatives								C						
Building Capacity for Multi-sectoral Pandemic Preparedness and Response in the ASEAN Secretariat, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam				X				V						
Capacity Building for the ASEAN Committee on Disaster Management to Mainstream Pandemic Preparedness	WD													
Regional Assessment of Pandemic Preparedness						X	X X			TSCML			P	
Regional Workshop on Business Continuity Planning								V						
National Workshops on Business										L		I	P	

Activity	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Continuity Planning														
Incorporation of Multi-sectoral Pandemic Preparedness and Response Plans into the Framework of the AADMER														
Regional Strategic Planning Workshop on Multi-sectoral Pandemic and Public Health Emergency Preparedness and Response												T		X
Reporting on National Assessments of Multi-sectoral Pandemic Preparedness													X	
Regional and Member States PPR Mechanisms Gap-response Activities														
Continuity of Operations Planning with PREPARE										C				
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
Labor Migration/Migrant Worker Rights				X I	X X	X	X	X	X					
Impact of Globalization on Poverty and Rural Development	WD													
Advancing and Prioritizing Education														
ASEAN Resource Information – Web & Print												X	X	X
Scoping Study for the Development of the ASEAN Education Work Plan				X										
Development of the ASEAN Education Work Plan						X	X		T X		T X BR			
AUN ASEAN Studies Program													X	I X
ASEAN Rural Connectivity Forum													X	V
ASEAN Scholarship Review Study														
ASEAN Education Project Grant Program													X	X
Promotion of Decent Work														
Support for drafting the ASEAN Labour Ministers Work Programme							I	X X						
Facilitating Access to Applied Science and Technology														
Workshop on Next Generation Cook						T X								

Stove Design														
COMMUNITY OF CARING SOCIETIES														
Statistics on Poverty in ASEAN				X	X	X								
SOCIAL JUSTICE & RIGHTS														
Promotion and Protection of the Rights and Welfare of Women, Children, the Elderly and Persons with Disabilities														
ASEAN Committee on Women and Children (ACWC) U.S. Visit														X
BUILDING ASEAN IDENTITY (under SSR)														
Developing Reference Materials for Primary and Secondary Courses on ASEAN				X X	X									
ASEAN Web Portal Development						X								
Promotion of ASEAN awareness and a sense of community														
ASEAN Volunteers Program (under SSR)					X	X	I BU X							
ENSURING ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY							P X							
Responding to Climate Change and Addressing its Impact					X		X P X							
Support for Climate Resilient Cities: Identifying Best Practices									I	X				
ASEAN-US Mayors Climate Resilient Cities Conference												X V	X BU	X
Drought Vulnerability and Adaptation Assessment/Workshop								T						
Flood Vulnerability and Management Assessment/Workshop							I							
Creating Climate Resilient Cities – Measuring and Monitoring Pilot							M			I	I		X
Launching of City to City Technical Exchange Program														
Building Public-Private Partnerships on Climate Change: Agriculture,														

Fisheries and Forestry towards Food Security													
ASEAN Action Plan for the Joint Response for Climate Change												X	V
Promoting Sustainable Development through Environmental Education and Public Participation													
Inspiring ASEAN Eco-schools											I	M	

TATF - DEVELOPING ASEAN INSTITUTIONS CHRONOGRAPH	SA1	SA2	SA3	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5	Q6	Q7	Q8	Q9	Q10
	11/07-4/08	5/08 – 10/08	10/08 – 3/09	4/09-7/09	8/09-10/09	11/09-1/10	2/10-4/10	5/10-7/10	8/10-10/10	11/10-1/11	2/11-4/11	5/11-7/11	8/11-10/11
HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT													
Resource Support													
Skills Training Rapid Response	I	X X											
Public Relations													
Brochures/Power Point Presentations		X											
AEC Blueprint Press Kits		X X											
AEC Web Portal Support				X	X								
ASEAN Photo Bank	WD												
ASEAN Journalism Program			X										
Basic Visual and Editing Training	WD												
Speechwriting Course	WD												
Photography Workshop								I					
Press Release Drafting Workshop											X		
ASEAN Secretariat Web Site											X	X	X X
PR Technical Assistance				X X									
Outreach Writing and Presentation Trainings												X	X
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY													
Knowledge Management Analysis for the Secretariat		X											
Knowledge Management Implementation				X	X								
IT Capacity Building-Infrastructure Improvement				X									
Information Systems Unit Institutional Development											X		
Improving Access to ASEAN Documents											X		
Reducing the Carbon Footprint of ASEAN													
Statistics													
Refinement of ASEAN tracks to Facilitate the Application of the ASEAN Community Progress	X	X											

Monitoring System (ACPMS)														
Pilot Project on Development of A System for ASEAN Trade Data Pre-Processing	WD													
Assessment of SNA Catch-up Program for CLMV		X P	X X											
ASEAN Foundation														
ASEAN Foundation Training	WD													

GENERAL SUPPORT TO ASEAN, MONITORING AND EVALUATION CHRONOGRAPH	SA1 11/07-4/08	SA2 5/08 – 10/08	SA3 10/08 – 3/09	Q1 4/09-7/09	Q2 8/09-10/09	Q3 11/09-1/10	Q4 2/10-4/10	Q5 5/10-7/10	Q6 8/10-10/10	Q7 11/10-1/11	Q8 2/11-4/11	Q9 5/11-7/11	Q10 8/11-10/11
PROJECT PLANNING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION													
Development of the Phase II Facility Strategic Plans	X												
Development of Specific Program Monitoring Indicators for Each Strategy	X												
Baseline Outcome Indicator Database Development	X												
Impact of the ASEAN-US Facility and ASW Project Support to ASEAN	WD												
Support for the Revision of the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action													
ASEAN-US Eminent Persons Group													
Support for ASEAN-US Working Groups & Leaders Meeting				I DC		X	X		X				
Clean Energy Program Design								X	X				
ASEAN-APEC Cooperation													
Support for ASEAN-US Summit					X								
GENERAL SUPPORT TO USAID/RDMA AND USG/WASHINGTON				I DC	X X	X	Trade;	Just; Treas; Labor; CC; FF; State	Comm Treas; State; USDA; CBP; APEC	T		X	
ASEAN BLUEPRINT PLANNING, MONITORING AND EVALUATION													

Support for the Design of Implementation Scorecards			E										
Support for the Implementation of AEC Blueprint Scorecard													
ASEAN Talks Business II	WD												
ADDITIONAL COP/DCOP TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE													
Demand driven day-to-day advisory support													
Facilitation/support of policy studies, assessments, training and other technical assistance													
Development of the ASEAN Project Database				X									
SUPPORT OF USAID/BANGKOK EFFORTS RE: DONOR COORDINATION				X	X	X	X	X	X X	UNIC	EAP	X	X X X
ADDITIONAL FACILITY SUPPORT TO THE ASEAN REGION													
Human Rights Resource Centre for ASEAN													
HRRCA – Technical Assistance for Research Coordination									X	X X	X	X	
HRRCA – Women and Children Research												X	X T
Indonesia Ministry of Trade Support									X	I	I	I	I X
Provide demand-driven day-to-day advisory support													
Facilitate-Support Policy Studies, Assessments, Training and other Technical Assistance													
ADVANCE website									X				

translation														
SUPPORT FOR OTHER USG AGENCIES AND PARTNERS													X	X X

ASEAN SINGLE WINDOW CHRONOGRAPH	Q2 3/08-6/08	Q3 7/08-9/08	Q4* 10/08-12/08	Q5 1/09-3/09	Q6 4/09-6/09	Q7 7/09-9/09	Q8 10/09-12/09	Q9 1/10-3/10	Q10 4/10-6/10	Q11 7/10-9/10	Q12 10/10-12/10	Q13 1/11-3/11	Q14 4/11-6/11	Q15 7/11-9/11
GENERAL ASW STRATEGIC PLANNING			*NO Q4 Report		V	EU C T I	X – T S	M M M I	I S	P P P I	I X I	X S S X X	X X	
TECHNICAL IMPLEMENTATION														
Data & Document Standards	X	post	poned											
Standard ASW Business Processes					X									
Standardized Interface Protocol														
ASW Prototype Server							X							
Development of the ASEAN Data Model for the ASEAN Single Window	X X X I			X I	X X V	X	X	M						
Pilot Application -- Extension	I>M			BR->L X										
ASW Pilot Project							X	X	X	I X	X BR I M P S T V	X X	X	X
ASW Architecture and Operational Features – Standardized Technical Platform							X	X						
ASW Technical Prototype - Preliminaty Testing and Pilot Simulation														
Finalization and Capacity Building on the ASEAN Data Model for ASW														
Development of ACDD Application							X	X	X	X	X	X M->S	X X	XXX XX
Capacity Building of ASW Technical Working Group											X	X	X X	X
LEGAL IMPLEMENTATION	X X X			XXX X XXX	X									
Support to work being	X			X				X						X

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undertaken by the Legal Working Group																
Development of a Comparative Guidance Document for NSW-Related Laws (Gap Analysis)				X X		X										
SW Legal Capacity Workshops		V						X								
CLV Capacity Building Legal Workshops																
Memorandum of Understanding		X		X		X					X				X	
Comparative Guidance for NSW and ASW Related Laws (Gap Analysis)					X	X										
CLV Workshop																
Legal Working Group Meeting	X	V		V	L I	X	I	M		X			X	X		
Cross-Border Mutual Recognition Model																
Workshop on Certification Authorities and Mutual Recognition																
Support for Legal Framework Agreement																
Legal Gap Analysis for NSW and ASW Related Laws and Regulations						X					L	L L V	L	X	
NATIONAL SINGLE WINDOW						I		X	X	X					
Initial Country Visits		V														
NSW Implementation – Vietnam		X			V											
NSW Benchmarking Study							X V									
Support to Vietnam NSW Development					X	X			X X V						
Response to NSW Request for Technical Assistance																
NSW Fact-Finding Missions					V V V					X	T L	P			
Support to Laos NSW Development											L	X	I	
PRIVATE SECTOR OUTREACH & PUBLIC	X X			X X											

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AWARENESS															
Regional Private Sector Outreach		X		X	X				X	X					
ASW Consultative Process							X								X
Public Awareness Campaign															
Implementation of ASW Communications Strategy						X	X			X					
ASW Private Sector Consultative Committee (ASW-PSCC)									X		X		X		
Business Case for ASW						X				X	X X	X			
ASW Symposium															
Development of ASW Outreach Material								X X			X				
ASW Private Sector Consultation Forum															
ASW Case Studies															
ASW Web Portal									X		X				
Private Sector ASW Awareness Events									X	X	X X	X			

VALUE - TEXTILES AND GARMENTS CHRONOGRAPH	Q1 3/08-5/08	Q2 7/08-9/08	Q3 10/08-12/08	Q4 1/09-3/09	Q5 4/09-6/09	Q6 7/09-9/09	Q7 10/09-12/09	Q8 1/10-3/10	Q9 4/10-6/10	Q10 7/10-9/10	Q11 10/10-12/10	Q12 1/11-3/11	Q13 4/11-6/11	Q14 7/11-9/11
SUPPLY CHAIN COORIDORS IDENTIFICATION			X											
Conduct corridor e-survey		B												
Collect and analyze ASEAN producer list database	T I C L V	X												
Determine specific corridor candidates		X												
Propose textile & garment supply chain corridors for AFTEX endorsement		X												
Recruit Senior Textile & Garment Specialist		X												
SUPPLY CHAIN CORRIDORS DIAGNOSIS				X										
Conduct corridor surveys for major supply chain segments		C	X V B											
Acquire customs and logistics information from third party				X	Report Apr '09									
Prepare SWOT analysis report				X	C-I TH-VN	TH-CA & IN-CA								
Develop Action Plan				X	X I	I X								
MARKETING														
Recruit Knowledge Management Specialist			X											
Develop marketing plan		I	X	Jan			X							
Review AFTEX														

website for potential improvements													
Develop "Source ASEAN" website					Launch								
Develop ASEAN supply chain directory													
WORK FORCE DEVELOPMENT-> ACCP													
Assist in design and implementation of ASEAN Textile and Garment Common Competency Program		X T											
Survey regional programs and resources					Sep-Oct								
Sponsor or co-sponsor study trips													
Confirm capacity and interest of partner training institutions				M									
Identify and retain a Workforce Development and Training Manager					X								
Conduct the survey of participating institutions					X	X							
Establish a directory of PTI's on the AFTEX website													
Organize trade related Meetings													
Identify interested PTI's													
Select training resources													
Introduce training content to AFTEX leaders													
Enter agreement					X	MOU							

(MOU) with the International Trade Center to jointly offer ITC's trade related textile and apparel courses in ASEAN						signed									
Train trainers in 3 trade-related subjects						I									
Follow-up visits to the PTI's															
Support the ACCP															
Develop and implement the certification process								M C 12		C 13 T		V 12 T 2 V 12	10		
Establish a database of certified individuals															
Develop ASEAN competency-specific training programs															
Assess survey results to identify gaps in training for competency in 5 pilot skills							X X								
Organize training of trainers											M				
Verify that TOT results in validated certification of individuals						X									
Further refine the process for assessing the five competencies				X											
Train Assessors															
5 New Competencies Selected													X		
Sponsor or co-sponsor an exchange program	WD														
INVESTMENT FACILITATION															

Survey funding sources																
Develop textile/garment investment and funding guide/AFTEX web-link																
ASSOCIATION DEVELOPMENT										logo X						
Engage legal council		I			I											
Develop membership fee proposal				X												
Develop and offer new services to AFTEX members	WD															
Assist AFTEX in becoming a legal entity							X			X		X		X		
Develop capacity for AFTEX to offer new services to its members											X X					
SOURCE ASEAN FULL SERVICE ALLIANCE (SAFSA) PROGRAM					X X X	X		X			X X		X X		X
Determine Range of Services to be provided					Pro-posal											
Prepare a list of required services					List											
Circulate list to AFTEX																
Receive AFTEX Input																
Quantify Specific Service Standards and Levels							X	X								
Draft an initial outline of key services																
Determine current standards of these services as offered by ASEAN factories																
Conduct first quantification of level of service																

Task														
Write manual						X								
Circulate manual to AFTEX members						X								
Receive AFTEX input							X							
Receive core customer input														
Complete and print SAFSA Service Manual							19							
Enroll Customers					X	X 8		X X / X	X 23 MOU	X	X HK			19
Create Virtual Vertical Factory Audit Check-list								SGS check list						
Appoint Audit Company to carry out audits							X	SGS began Jan '10				Agreement signed Jan		
Create audit check-list							X							
Finalize audit check-list														
Enroll ASEAN Suppliers												13T 21	11I M I	
Invite ASEAN factories to apply for SAFSA membership						C M T S L	35	X				X	I 5	
Audits by select Audit Company								21						
Second audit														
Final SAFSA selection									14 I B				19 Total	
Engage SAFSA representative for Indonesia											X			
Revise audit scoring matrix														
Organize ASEAN Global Garment Forum									S				X	
Post Forum Activities														
Critique 2010 forum														

Task														
Plan selection process for 2011														T 16 MOU
Commence new selection for VVF														7
Commence new selection for customers														
Provide support to and seek input from founding SAFSA members														
Develop SAFSA E-newsletter					1st issue									X X
Organize meetings, seminars, and workshops for founding members								IN Apr TH May		TH Oct				
Visit founding members' factories and customers' offices														
Develop and update selected countries' textile and garment industry profiles							TH	VA IN CA			LA			
Update SAFSA Quality Services Manual (QSM)														
Update SAFSA Quality Services Audit Checklist										X				
Promote SAFSA in the United States and Europe														
Develop and produce SAFSA marketing material														
Identify and engage consultants or consulting firms to represent SAFSA in the US and Europe										X				

Develop relationships between AFTEX/SAFSA and Textile and Apparel Associations in the US and Europe										X	X X	X X	X	
Identify list of potential SAFSA customers														
Marketing to potential SAFSA customers										X M S T	X 8	HK; HK; T; HK	HK NYC
INTRA-ASEAN TRADE														
Launch, promote and manage SourceASEAN.com website		X			X	X	X						X
Develop and implement web- and events-based marketing plan for SourceASEAN.com				T I C									
Launch website at Bangkok International Fashion Fair				T	X								
Promote awareness of website at major textile and garment trade shows								T			T		
Workshops/seminars on using SourceASEAN.com as marketing tool													
Develop on-line promotional & instructional videos SourceASEAN.com													
Organize business matching events at textile and garment													

trade shows in ASEAN region															
Coordinate with national AFTEX associations to arrange B2B sessions at the national textile and apparel/fashion trade shows				V						XX	X	X	X	
Promote intra-ASEAN trade shows/B2B participation on Source ASEAN website and all ACE textile and apparel related event													T	

VALUE – TOURISM CHRONOGRAPH	Q1 3/08-5/08	Q2 7/08-9/08	Q3 10/08-12/08	Q4 1/09-3/09	Q5 4/09-6/09	Q6 7/09-9/09	Q7 10/09-12/09	Q8 1/10-3/10	Q9 4/10-6/10	Q10 7/10-9/10	Q11 10/10-12/10	Q12 1/11-3/11	Q13 4/11-6/11
BRANDING AND MARKETING													
Support development & launch of Visit Southeast Asia marketing plan		X X P X		X MOU	Mkt stra-tegy & plan								
Support establishment & development of ASEAN Tourism Market Research Group				V M									
Support establishment of an ASEAN Destination Marketing Organization to implement the Visit Southeast Asia Campaign								X X T					
Develop a consumer website visitsoutheastasia.travel								X					
Provide ongoing content management and new media development consultancy for visitsoutheastasia.travel.													
Improve or replace the Visit ASEAN Pass technology/functionality								Wego meta-search launch					
Help develop ASEAN Promotional Chapter for Tourism													

Provide ongoing content management and new media development consultancy for exploremekong.org		X	X		X X X | X X X								
Develop a dedicated **consumer** micro-site for *the Socially Responsible Tourism Guide CLV*					X	X							
ASEAN Level													
Implement ASEAN Tourism Marketing Strategy and Plan			MAC		X BU X	X X	MOU						
Establish a pilot ASEAN Tourism Marketing Center						X							
Develop www.southeast-asia.com						X	X X MOU	Launch					
Use meta-search technology on www.southeast-asia.com to plan and book multi-destination travel						X		Launch					
Engage online marketing firm to develop & implement Southeast Asia Online Marketing Campaign						X	X X						
Engage public relations firm to develop and implement Southeast Asia PR Campaign							X					X	
Launch and roll-out SE Asia							X	X		X End			

Marketing Campaign														
Monitor, review, and update Marketing Plan														
Content, community, and social media management for www.southeast-asia.com						Man-ager hired			X X					
Greater Mekong Sub-region Level:														
Use meta-search technology on www.exploremekong.org to plan and book multi-destination travel to and within the GMS						X			X X				C	
Content and social media support for www.exploremekong.org														
Facilitate an agreement between ASEANTA and a private company to manage ASEAN Tourism Marketing Plan & www.SoutheastAsia.org											X	T		
Hosting and maintenance for www.SoutheastAsia.org						Agree w/ Wego, ASEANTA								
KNOWELDGE MANAGEMENT														
Develop knowledge			C	X X	C X	X								

management plan for ASEAN Tourism stakeholders													
Facilitate greater communications and cooperation between the private and public sectors				X X									
Provide ongoing content management and new media development consultancy for mekongtourism.org & electronic newsletter				X		X							
Help the MTCO reestablish the Mekong Tourism Forum								C					
Greater Mekong Sub-region Level													
Determine and implement MTCO knowledge management solution													
TOURISM PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT													
Support the development of the Peam Krasop Eco-tourism site	WD												
ASEAN TOURISM STRATEGIC PLAN													
Collaborate with PATA to					MOU	S P X X	BR P X	C X			T	T X	

develop the ASEAN Tourism Strategic Plan for 2011-2015													
Complete the final draft ATSP and vet with ASEAN NTOs											ASEAN Tourism Task Force meetings		
Present Final ATSP: 2011 – 2015												ASEAN Tourism Forum Phnom Penh	

ANNEX 2: List of Evaluation Contacts

ASEAN DIALOGUE PARTNERS			
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ANNEX 3: Bibliography

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VALUE Final FY 2010 PPR, September 22, 2010
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      Quarter 6: April – June 2009
      Quarter 7: July – September 2009
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      Quarter 9: January – March 2010
      Quarter 10: April – June 2010
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