



Performance Evaluation

District Delivery Program (DDP)



April 9, 2012

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Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Government of Afghanistan, USAID, or any other individual or organization associated with this project.

Cover Photos:

Education Officials, Dand District, Kandahar Province

13 USAID-funded DDP Districts in Afghanistan

Kandahar Province: Arghandab, Dand, Panjwai, Zhari, Daman, Spin Boldak; **Nangarhar Province:** Behsud, Rodat, Shinwar/GhaniKhiel, Surkh Rod; **Laghman Province:** Qarghah'I; **Logar Province:** Baraki Barak; **Wardak Province:** Asadabad




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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACAP	Afghan Civilian Assistance Program
ACAP II	Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II)
ACSI	Afghanistan Civil Service Institute
ACSS	Afghanistan Civil Service Support (program)
AFMIS	Afghanistan Financial Management Information System
AFS	Afghanis (currency)
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program
ASOP	Afghanistan Social Outreach Program
ASGP	Afghanistan Sub National Governance Programme
ASP	Afghanistan Stabilization Program
CA	Civil Affairs (civ-mil)
C-B	Capacity Building
CBO	Community-Based Organization
CDC	Community Development Council
CDCs	Community Development Committees
CDP	Community Development Program
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CIDD	Capacity and Institutional Development Directorate (IDLG)
COIN	Counter Insurgency
COM	Chief of Mission
CSC	Civil Service Commission (also IARCSC)
CST	Central Support Team (also DDP Unit at IDLG)
CSU	Central Support Unit (also CST)
CBSG	Community-Based Stabilization Grants Program
DDAs	District Development Assemblies
DC	District Council (also District Centre)
DCC	District Community Council
DDP	District Delivery Program
DDWG	District Delivery Working Group
DG	District Governor
DGO	District Governor Office
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DM	Deputy Minister
DoWA	District office of Women's Affairs
DST	District Support Team
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FSN	Foreign Service National (Staff)
FS1/2/3	Funding Streams 1/2/3
FPO	Field Program Officer

FY	Fiscal Year (U.S. Government)
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HR	Human Resources
HRD	Human Resources Development
HRM	Human Resources Management
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
IDLG	Independent Directorate of Local Governance
IG	Interview guide
IJC	International Joint Command
IL	Implementing Letter
IP	Implementing Partner
IPA	Interagency Provincial Affairs (U.S. Embassy State Department)
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KTD	Key Terrain District
KPMG	Kellog Peat Marwick Group
LM	Line Ministries
LGCD	(Afghanistan) Local Governance and Community Development
LOI	(Technical) Letter of Implementation
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoI	Ministry of Interior
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NSP	National Solidarity Program
NPP	National Performance Plan
OAA	Office of Administrative Affairs
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
ODG	Office of Democracy & Governance (USAID mission)
PBGF	Performance Based Governance Fund
PC	Provincial Council
PFM	Public Financial Management
PG	Provincial Governor
PGO	Provincial Governor's Office
PMP	Performance Management Plan
POC	Point of Contact
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
O&M	Operating and Maintenance
RAMP UP	Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations

RC-E	Regional Command - East
RC-S	Regional Command - South
SDU	Special Disbursements Unit
SIKA	Stabilization in Key Areas (program)
SNG	Sub-National Governance
SOW	Scope of Work
VTC	Video teleconferencing
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD or US\$	United States Dollar
USG	United States Government
WB	World Bank

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ACAP	The Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), assists Afghan families and communities who have suffered losses as a result of international military operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.
APRP	Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) is led by the GIRoA and it seeks to provide a means for Anti-Government Elements to renounce violence, reintegrate and become a productive part of Afghan society. Provisions for increasing employment, sustainable livelihoods, and linking peace and development are intrinsic components of this peace-building initiative.
CERP	The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) is money for military commanders to use for rebuilding and reconstruction projects to address urgent reconstruction and relief efforts.
KTD	Key Terrain Districts (KTD). Districts where the bulk of the population is concentrated, and that contain centers of economic productivity, key infrastructure, and key commerce routes connecting such areas to each other and to the outside world
Mustofiat	Provincial level offices of the Ministry of Finance.
PMP	The Performance Management Plan (PMP) is the U.S. Mission in Afghanistan's tool to plan and manage the process of assessing and reporting progress towards assistance/foreign policy objectives identified by the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.
Stabilization	Stabilization programs are designed to improve security, extend the reach of the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in priority provinces. Their core objective is to implement projects that will improve stability so that more traditional forms of development assistance can resume.
Tashkeel	Tashkeel is the official civil service staffing system in Afghanistan. It is developed by the ministries and approved by the Ministry of Finance and the Civil Service Commission as part of the budget process.
Transition	Government of Afghanistan Process to take over leadership of security and development assistance programming from donors and implementers. Precipitated by the Lisbon accord on military transition.

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background and Purpose of the Evaluation

The District Delivery Program (DDP) was conceived in late 2009 as a means to quickly begin providing basic public services in areas recently “cleared” by the military and, through greater presence and visibility, help strengthen the credibility of the government so the population would stop supporting the insurgents. The purpose of this evaluation was to assess program performance in the 13 Districts that had been approved for USAID funding including identifying program delivery obstacles, achievement of objectives and benchmarks, and to recommend a way forward.

The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) was the project’s implementer on the Afghan side. DDP funds were for salary support to selected district officials, operations and maintenance (O&M) and to leverage small projects for key ministries operating in targeted districts.

DDP activity was based on workplans developed by IDLG staff following district level consultation and needs assessments, and approved by the District Delivery Working Group (DDWG) for funding. USAID’s budget for DDP was \$40M for 80 Key Terrain Districts (KTDs) of which \$24.5M was obligated in Aug. 2010. A preliminary advance of \$1.3M was made to the Ministry of Finance (MoF) in early 2011 for distribution through IDLG to 13 DDP districts.

When USAID requested a record of the disbursement of these funds several months later, some \$840K could not be accounted for properly – IDLG’s liquidation report had not met many of the conditions precedent in the DDP agreement signed by IDLG, MoF and USAID. In July 2011 USAID stopped approving further DDP funding requests and subsequently suspended program spending on March 19, 2012 pending a technical review (this evaluation) and a financial audit that commenced in April.

A number of issues in addition to financial reporting prompted this evaluation, including selection of Districts, effectiveness of DDWG oversight and IDLG coordination, GIROA responsiveness to local needs, District officials’ understanding of DDP and their involvement in planning and budgeting, the extent to which Tashkeels were filled, whether DDP affected absenteeism and quality of communication within the government, and whether any government systems were improved and District facilities better maintained.

Evaluation Methodology and Approach

The evaluation methodology included a desk review of DDP program documents and related literature; fact-finding interviews in Kabul with USG and GIROA personnel and other donors with similar programs (DFID, France); and fieldwork to interview individuals from the 13 districts in 3 provinces: Wardak, Kandahar and Nangarhar.

Key Findings

A key design decision was made by the U.S. Embassy to use an on-budget approach aimed to strengthen the Afghan government's systems. However, combining the dual objectives of supporting both stability and governance in the same project was the source of many DDP difficulties.

For example, due to intense pressure (mostly from the military) DDP was launched without an assessment and development of the capacity of IDLG or GIRoA's financial management system.

Also, small infrastructure projects in the workplans were essentially wish-lists based on assumptions of continued CERP funding (which was winding down), and there was a need for improved O&M planning and budgeting.

Gender equity was not in the DDP design so there was negligible activity in this area, likely also due to conservative values in the districts and other pressing priorities such as security.

Administration of the program by USAID and IPA left much to be desired: field staff reported being in a "black hole" of inadequate communication and support. This was compounded by high turnover (approximately 85%) in USG Kabul staff.

The program was overly ambitious, "a bridge too far" - it overestimated GIRoA capacity at all levels, which caused delays in program implementation, fund disbursement and reporting. The role of the Provincial administration had not been adequately considered, and some corruption contributed to challenges.

Although there were many problems, DDP was reported as having significantly improved subnational governance¹ and contributed to security in the districts². It strengthened district level administration and coordination of line ministry activity at the subnational level, and established communication and coordination among three levels of government: districts, provinces and the centre³. As a result of DDP, most districts' Tashkeels were almost full, absenteeism was significantly reduced and staff were reported to be working harder⁴. Being able to manage the O&M budget made district administrators feel for the first time that they were "really governing" their districts, and a greater volume of visitors to the district centers (a doubling on average) meant there was now "a real buzz" of activity.

¹ As a direct result of DDP over 100 vacant civil service positions were filled in the 13 USAID-supported districts, and O&M funds were made available for the first time.

² Many provincial and district level officials reported reduced insurgent activity where DDP-funded civil servants were present, and expressed concern that these gains would be lost if the civil servants left their posts.

³ There was much room for improvement in commitment and coordination at the central level.

⁴ The design of the DDP and this evaluation did not focus on performance of civil servants and/or the quality of services provided.

DDP “shone a light” on the government’s operations due to a number of problems that were linked to the rushed implementation without prior analysis and capacity building, coupled with management deficiencies by both USG and GIRoA. The DDWG was regarded as an ineffective rubber-stamp that failed to live up to its expectations. More importantly, there were difficulties with the program’s financial administration and due to the freezing of funds in the summer of 2011, most districts received funds for top up salaries and O&M only for the first quarter. IDLG requests for additional advances were not approved after July 2011. Due to delayed payment of salary incentives, a number District official were leaving their positions and concerns were expressed that those areas would revert to insurgent control. Inequalities in pay levels among staff caused tensions (some were not on DDP or Pay & Grading scales).

The DDP illuminated weaknesses and also how to fix them. For instance, shifting DDP funds flow from GIRoA’s development budget to its operating budget, with its effective AFMIS system that can quickly track and report on transactions, is apparently a relatively simple and quick solution to many of the problems encountered. Furthermore, a pilot project that is currently underway in MoF to address DDP’s financial problems is likely to have major benefits for improving funding for subnational governance across the board.

Main Conclusions

Despite its short duration and negligible disbursements, DDP has been a rich learning experience. It highlighted major shortcomings in DDP’s design and implementation. With respect to design flaws, the dual objectives⁵ of the program were valid but did not fit together well - one aimed at short-term quick impact and other longer-term institutional strengthening. The program is considered an anomaly as it was an on-budget stabilization initiative with TA provided through USG field representatives. Regarding implementation, the pressure for a quick roll-out, without other benefits of piloting and testing, contributed to problems based on inaccurate assumptions of GIRoA’s financial and staffing capability. IDLG requires considerable support at the central, provincial and district levels to operate effectively.

Program management by USG was deficient in many respects, and there was much room for improvement in the technical assistance provided at the provincial and central levels where support was needed most. Also, USG field staff have mixed capabilities and failed to receive adequate management supports.

GIRoA had difficulties operationalizing DDP, there was internal feuding and new leadership at IDLG; it has a weak M&E system, and the decision to use ASP to administer DDP funds was a mistake.

Recommendations

The overall recommendation is to continue and expand the DDP building on the strengths of the existing program. Specific recommendations are as follows:

⁵ Both stabilization and governance are mentioned in the Memorandum of Understanding (2010-04-13) and also in USAID Implementation Letters – the term “post-stabilization” is also used.

1. Objectives, Benchmarks and Strategy

- IDLG should produce a definitive DDP Program Document that clarifies program purpose, expected results, and contains a comprehensive strategic and operational plan
- IDLG should institute an Orientation Program for all participants in the program and for use at the outset of any potential sequel

2. Line Ministry Coordination and Communication

- Assign line ministry permanent staff as representatives on DDP's Central Support Team
- Each key Line Ministry should sign a written agreement with IDLG outlining roles and responsibilities of each party
- Encourage provincial and district governors to hold regular coordination meetings

3. DDWG Role and Effectiveness

- Strengthen the DDWG and ensure it fulfills its broader mandate

4. GIROA Financial Management System

- Transfer DDP funds from Development to Operating budget
- Encourage MoF to extend AFMIS to the district level
- Shift administration of DDP funds from ASP to IDLG's Finance unit
- Increase PGO and Mustofiat capacity to support DDP
- Strengthen District-level financial management capacity
- Review decision to run DDP funds for Line Ministries through IDLG

5. Government Staffing

- Continue salary top-ups and hazard pay until the P&G reform process is completed
- Encourage LMs to complete Pay & Grading in DDP districts as soon as possible for sustainability
- Improve disbursement of salary top-ups and hazard pay: increase frequency

6. Improved Facilities

- Take inventory of government facilities in districts for O&M planning/budgeting purposes
- Increase district level O&M planning and budgeting capacity
- Encourage districts to obtain O&M funds from GIROA's budget

7. Gender Equity

- Incorporate gender equity in DDP
- Include the Ministry of Women's Affairs in DDP

8. DDP Shortcomings

- Set achievable objectives for DDP programming

- Resolve dysfunctions in USG's joint management of the DDP
- Increase emphasis on the Provinces in DDP programming

9. Strengthen GIROA Capacity

- Provide matrix management training to Governors and Line Ministry heads
- Strengthen IDLG's Capacity Development Directorate

10. The Way Forward – Action Plan

- Strengthen the linkages with other DDP programs (UK, France, etc.)
- Ensure effective Coordination with other subnational governance initiatives, such as SIKA and RAMP-UP
- Design a DDP sequel with IDLG, building on the strengths and lessons learned from the current program

II. INTRODUCTION

1. REPORT OVERVIEW

This report begins with this Section 2 - an introduction to the DDP as well as goals and objectives, the evaluation context, purpose and methodology, including data collection methods and tools, and key deliverables and milestones. Section 3 presents the evaluation findings and analysis for each of the 13 main categories of inquiry according to the evaluation framework agreed by USAID. Section 4 then draws conclusions from findings in the previous section while Section 5 makes specific recommendations based on the conclusions in Section 4. Section 6 draws lessons learned from the DDP experience to date.

2. DDP DESCRIPTION

According to USAID's PMP Aug. 2010, the purpose of the DDP is as follows:

The DDP is designed to establish or improve Afghan government presence and service delivery in districts that lack significant government presence and are deemed critical to the counterinsurgency effort. The initiative places competent government officials from critical service delivery ministries at the district level to coordinate integrated packages of basic government services, including health, education, agriculture and justice, as well as basic infrastructure.

DDP is also an important step in placing responsibility for service delivery in the hands of the GIROA. At present, a majority of international spending in districts is done outside of government channels. In bringing line ministry government representation to key districts and then aligning these districts' programs under the DDP, the capacity of GIROA to actually deliver and the public perception of GIROA as being responsive and effective will increase.

DDP ensures national and provincial governments are visible in districts and is critical to the international community's approach to stabilization, which concentrates on building governance capability and responsiveness. It increases the population's perception that local, provincial, and national government structures are capable and responsive.

Three funding streams flow into two basic components of the DDP framework. Funding Stream 1 pays salaries for nine IDLG officials to oversee the program for one year, as well as supplements the salaries for public officials of DDP-relevant offices that have not yet completed pay and grade reform and who are deployed in the districts that the District Delivery Working Group has determined to be DDP-eligible. Those offices are: Ministries of Agriculture; Education; Justice; Public Health; Rural Reconstruction and Development; Attorney General's Office; and Supreme Court. In addition, Funding Stream 1 provides operating and maintenance funds to DDP districts to support the activities of the above seven offices when they are staffed at the district center.

Funding Streams 2 and 3 were to facilitate service delivery during year one of DDP. Donor funding was to be brought on budget as GIROA developed the capacity to execute development budget at district levels. Under Funding Stream 2, district officials were to work with USAID partners to align programs to meet the basic service delivery needs within the district in accordance with national service guidelines. Under Funding Stream 3, district officials were to work with local military commanders to access Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) money to pay for infrastructure projects to support the delivery of DDP-eligible basic services in line with national service guidelines. However, due to lack of formal buy-in from implementing partners and the military, neither funding stream became operational, and a very low percentage of projects were ever completed.

The DDP Program Objective according to the PMP is to place competent, resourced Afghan government officials from critical service delivery ministries in districts, and to support the implementation of integrated packages of basic government services.

This Objective will contribute to USAID's Stabilization IR 7.2, to establish basic governance, contribute ultimately to the overall Stabilization Assistance Objective 7: stability increased and maintained in targeted areas of Afghanistan to support the transition to longer-term development. For a more detailed description of the DDP and its implementation process, see Annex A.

3. Context - Relevant Issues for this evaluation

The rationale for this evaluation is driven by the need to determine whether to terminate or continue the program. If the latter, to improve DDP design and implementation, and in particular address issues such as:

- Low level of understanding of DDP design and purpose, as well as inadequate program documentation, among those involved in implementation.

- Poor DDP coordination, communication and cooperation among various levels of GIRoA as the program implementer, as well as USG deficiencies in management and in providing on-budget monitoring and support
- Inadequate participation by concerned line ministries in the DDWG as well as insufficient commitment or ‘buy in’.
- Inability of GIRoA’s financial management system to process DDP funds so they flow smoothly and on time, and to properly account for disbursements⁶, and district officials’ lack of involvement in planning and budgeting.
- Concern that some Tashkeel recruits may not be qualified, and top-ups having little effect on attendance as well as causing resentment among ineligible district staff.
- No real funding commitments for infrastructure projects listed in DDP workplans.
- Questionable utility of DDP as a tool for improving district-level governance.
- Doubts that DDP can effectively improve local citizens’ opinion of government.
- Lack of clarity on the way forward for DDP.

4. Purpose of the Evaluation

According to the SOW for this assignment (see Annex B), the objectives of this performance⁷ evaluation were as follows:


The main objective of this assessment of DDP is to complete a performance evaluation of the program, reporting on project effectiveness and achievements, and the extent to which the project has met its objectives and specific benchmarks. Further, the evaluation should assess the reasons (if appropriate) for any project shortcomings. The evaluation team will provide USAID with an independent and unbiased assessment of what did and did not work well in the project, and provide recommendations for follow-on projects.

The purpose of this evaluation is to learn from the experiences of DDP and to gain insights as to the impact, if any, that DDP has had on its intended beneficiaries and in reaching its goals. The evaluation must look at GIRoA’s ability to date to get ministries to work together at the national, provincial and district levels to deliver basic services. More specifically, the evaluation should focus on IDLG/MOF’s pivotal role in the GIRoA-led DDP program, including the effectiveness of the DDWG in terms of meeting expectations of district constituents within its oversight role of the DDP program. The evaluation must consider not only the effectiveness and achievements of the USG financed FS1 on-budget funding stream but also the broader integrated USG financed activities, i.e. USAID and CERP projects, along with other donors falling within GIRoA-led DDP, i.e. the British, French and Germans.

⁶ Of the initial \$1.3 million advanced, about \$840k had not been liquidated by GIRoA as of June 2011. As at March 5, the cumulative incurred costs as reported and submitted by DDP from inception through February 9, 2012, totaled \$2,029,427.20. After deducting the \$1.3M advance, in March 2012, DDP claimed reimbursement for the remaining costs (\$689,487.20) which were paid by USAID on March 7.

⁷ This is to be differentiated from impact evaluation that assesses program achievements at the goal level - typically long after program completion.

Figure 1: Status of Approved Districts



The evaluation will provide USAID with an informed basis to consider changes to the existing program and opportunities to foster synergies with other USAID programs, which would further USG stabilization and transition objectives. The evaluation's findings, conclusions, and recommendations will provide the Mission with valuable information and insight for decisions about further funding of DDP and other similar activities in Afghanistan.

The product of this evaluation is a final report which evaluates the successes, shortcomings, and lessons learned of DDP in the 13 Districts funded by USAID (see figure 1). The report should include recommendations for future assistance to strengthen sub-national governance (SNG).

Cecchi Consulting through its SUPPORT project was tasked with carrying out this work and a study team comprising two internationals (Andy Tamas and Denis Dunn) and two nationals (Shah Mansoor and Tamim Jebran) was engaged. The evaluation period for the study was 6 weeks in-country from February 1 to mid-March, 2012 and report finalization in early April.

In producing the final version of this evaluation report, there were no significant unresolved differences of opinion among funders, implementers or members of the evaluation team.

3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

In light of the above evaluation questions the assessment primarily focused on the last 18 months of DDP from August 2010 until February 2012.

Although the SoW contained no specific questions around gender issues, the evaluation team ensured that gender equity results were considered.

In terms of evaluation design (see evaluation design matrix in Annex C), the following evaluation methodology was used:

Desk Review: Source and examine DDP program documents and related literature;

Fact-finding: Consultations in Kabul with various stakeholders, as well as interviews with intermediary beneficiaries and IDLG staff;

Fieldwork: Interviews with 'key informants' in as many of the 13 US-funded DDP Districts as possible - from both GIRoA side (PGO, DGO and key Line Ministry officials) and USG reps side (State and USAID officials, and Civil Affairs at RC platforms, PRT, DST), with consultation at project sites to observe conditions in selected provinces.

Key documents included the Presidential Decree, the USAID MoU and Implementing letters, and amendments, handbooks and tools, activity plans, performance monitoring plans, quarterly reports, financial analysis reports, financial status reports, and annual reports. See Annex D for a listing of the main documents referenced in the evaluation.

The selection of key informants to be interviewed was developed in consultation with the DDP Joint Management Committee (State and USAID) as well as IDLG. The study team visited 4 provinces (Kabul, Wardak, Kandahar and Nangarhar), 5 Districts (Sayadabad, Arghandab, Dand, Spin Boldak and Behsud), and interviewed representatives from all 13 USAID-funded DDP Districts. Arranging visits to PRTs and FOBs/District Centres in non-permissive areas was a challenge that was compounded by inclement winter weather.

The table below summarizes the places visited and persons met. The full listing of meetings and persons met is in Annex E.

Table 1: Meetings Summary

Evaluation Meetings Summary	
Meetings	
# of Meetings	59
Individuals Met	
Funder (USAID)	36
Program Implementer (IDLG)	24
GIRoA – Kabul, Province and District	45
USG – State and Military	27
Checchi & Co Consulting Inc	2
Other –DFID, French etc.	6
Total	140
Places visited	
# of Provinces	4
# of Districts	5

Key Informant Interviews were conducted with US Embassy State and USAID officers in Kabul and in the field, the IDLG Deputy Minister of Finance & Administration and other officials, Provincial Government Officials, and District Officials, in order to ascertain their opinions and perspectives on DDP. Extensive interviews were conducted with IDLG staff - see the organizational structure in Annex F.

The DDP Joint Management Committee of the US Embassy not only briefed the evaluation team at the outset of the assignment but assisted with the logistics of the fieldwork and was highly cooperative and supportive throughout the assignment.

The evaluation team worked closely with J. Pekowski and V. Myev of the joint DDP Management Committee. A workplan and draft deliverables produced during the evaluation were discussed and agreed with this committee.

Data Collection Methods

The Evaluation used two data collection instruments:

- A semi-structured questionnaire or interview guide (IG) was designed for soliciting information from stakeholders and key informants - Annex G. The questions were based on the evaluation questions provided in the SOW – see Annex H for a comparison chart showing how the IG incorporated these questions. The IG facilitated data gathering with the funder, implementer and stakeholders, and subsequent analysis in a semi-structured fashion. After meetings, field notes were typed and shared with other members of the evaluation team for their review and comments.
- A simple questionnaire was developed to solicit basic information on DDP in each USAID-funded District – see Annex I for the nascent ‘dashboard’.

In addition, the team gathered information on current and recently completed relevant USG programs in Afghanistan to determine opportunities for synergy with DDP - see Annex J. The analysis in this evaluation relies heavily on primary sources of data and information gathered during key informant consultations and focus group sessions. As data was generated, it was collated and tabulated for ease of analysis. Secondary sources of information from the desk review of related literature helped to contextualize the narrative.

Milestones and Deliverables

The draft report fact-finding and analysis were carried out from February 2 to March 18, 2012, and USAID comments incorporated into a final report early in April. Key milestones for this evaluation as well as deliverables and the timing of their delivery were as follows:

Table 2: Evaluation Milestones and Deliverables

DELIVERABLES/MILESTONES	DATE
Commence assignment in-country	Feb 2.
Evaluation Work Plan Agreed USAID	Feb 6.
Mid-term briefings to USAID and State Dept.	Feb 15/16
Submission of Draft Report to USAID	March 18
PowerPoint Presentation to USAID	March 17
Receive Written Comments from USAID	April 3
Final Report Submission to USAID and end assignment	April 9

The evaluation comprised the following main activities:

- In-Brief: The Evaluation Team met at the assignment outset, and subsequently on at least weekly basis with the DDP Joint Committee for mission progress briefings.
- Evaluation Work Plan: The WP was developed and then approved by USAID/Afghanistan and included overall design strategy and methodology for the evaluation, data collection plan, and the team’s schedule for the evaluation.
- Meetings with DDP program management: the evaluation team held regular meetings with the program implementer (IDLG senior staff in Kabul and in particular the DDP Unit/Central Support Team), and the implementing partner (members of USG’s DDP Management Committee).
- Mid-term Briefings: Held separate mid-term briefings with USAID and State/IPA on the status of the assessment and potential challenges and emerging opportunities.
- Oral & PowerPoint Presentation/Briefings: presented key findings and recommendations to USAID based on draft report.
- Draft Evaluation Report: ensured this document was consistent with new USAID guidelines and submitted upon departure from country
- Final Evaluation Report: incorporated final comments from USAID/IPA and submitted final report.

The activity schedule in Annex K outlines milestones for this assignment as well as the timeline for evaluation main activities and deliverables.

III. FINDINGS

This evaluation’s findings are based on evidence gathered from interviews and documentation review, and analysis of this information and data. Findings are grouped in the same “General Categories of Information” that formed the basis of the Interview Guide. These questions were tailored to match different informants as appropriate.

1. OBJECTIVES, BENCHMARKS AND STRATEGY

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

What are DDP’s objectives, benchmarks and desired results? Are they clearly documented and well known by key stakeholders at all levels?

The DDP design had two general objectives that did not fit well together. One was to rapidly establish civil service operations in recently-cleared districts as part of a stabilization campaign⁸. The other was to strengthen the Afghan government’s administrative system by processing the funds to achieve the first objective through the government’s financial systems. This latter institution-building objective is more consistent with long-term capacity development initiatives than rapidly setting up so-called “government in a box” in selected

⁸ Parts of some Districts were not fully ‘cleared’ and the insecurity (intimidation, assassination) made DDP execution (such as ISAF /US Embassy airlifts) and service delivery problematic.

districts. The incompatibility of these twin objectives contributed to difficulties in DDP's implementation such as confusion on strategy and lack of clarity on roles and responsibilities.

Most informants knew the general intent of the program – to improve stability in recently-cleared areas and increase the legitimacy of the state by strengthening government operations at the district level. However, there were major gaps in the program's operating frameworks, support structures and performance systems, both within USG and the Afghan government.

The general objectives and desired results of the DDP were defined in a number of foundation documents, primarily the Presidential Decree and MoU⁹ (see Annex L), as well as a series of four Implementation Letters (with amendments). However, these high-level statements of intent were not supported by more detailed operationally-related documents that are normally found in a donor's development projects or a government's public service program plans. Also, there is some question about the awareness of the signatories regarding the complexity of the commitments they were making (such as GIRoA fully implementing Pay & Grading as a condition of receiving funding in the 'conditions precedent'.)

In most development projects, high level statements of intent such as ILs, MOUs, concept papers and the like are translated into more detailed project documents that are subsequently provided to an implementing partner (IP) such as a consulting firm as a basis for detailed workplans for operations and M&E frameworks. This was not done with the DDP due to desire to run the DDP "on-budget" rather than as an off-budget development project using an IP.

DDP is viewed by many informants as a 'hybrid' model due to the fact it is considered both stabilization and governance, stabilization yet 'on-budget' and partly managed or implemented by USG¹⁰ even though it is 'Afghan-led'. As an on-budget program, a U.S. contractor was not engaged – in such a case it may be normal not to have an Implementing Partner but unusual to have no technical assistance (TA) to facilitate processes. In comparison, DfID's approach in Helmand is to run DDP on-budget with assistance at the Provincial level rather than in the Districts, and to engage an IP to provide high-level international technical assistance. DDP was also test-piloted in one province before expanding the program to other Provinces¹¹.

In addition, the steps normally taken in the early stages of on-budget initiatives – such as USAID's supports in the education and health sectors – were not taken with the DDP. These initial steps usually include a capacity assessment of the host system's operations, including a pilot effort to identify and resolve implementation issues before large-scale operations begin. The DDP was launched without these crucial early diagnostic and capacity building steps.

⁹ Signed May 2010 by USG (USAID Administrator and Amb. Eikenberry), IDLG and MoF.

¹⁰ USG field reps. DDP role is to inform/educate, advise/mentor, monitor/track and report.

¹¹ After a recent positive review of DDP, DFID plans to invest another £20 million in 5 additional Provinces.

On the Afghan government side a similar administrative gap was in evidence. While the DDP was launched with a Presidential Decree issued on Jan. 5, 2010 subsequent to high-level meetings in which there were assertions of ministry-level cooperation and commitment to fully support the program, the DDP was not fully operationalized i.e. detailed workplans and systems required to do this were lacking. The Afghan government did not have the institutional capacity to create and manage these new administrative frameworks.

Although USAID was providing the funds, the State Department's IPA unit assumed control of the DDP – a responsibility which was not part of IPA's mandate. The management of the program left much to be desired.

USAID prepared a Project Management Plan (PMP) on 14 August, 2010 approximately 3 months after the USG officially joined the program. However, this did not appear to be widely referenced, and the rest of the documentation and organizational elements normally associated with the early phases of a project were not in evidence. The high staff turnover in USG agencies compounded difficulties as there was little 'institutional memory' and this meant, on the Afghan side, 'educating' and working with new POCs approximately every three months.

The intense pressure put on State and USAID by the military contributed to the challenge – the most senior US officials in Afghanistan at the time were military men who were accustomed to being able to rapidly deploy thousands of people to accomplish desired objectives. Senior officials underestimated the complexity of establishing even minimally effective government operations that require more time than launching a military campaign¹². This would apply in any jurisdiction, even more so in underdeveloped areas of Afghanistan.

Given these pressures, USAID and IPA did what they could under the circumstances and worked with the Afghan government, mainly IDLG, to implement the DDP. The result, however, was that the DDP was launched without the necessary due diligence and detailed administrative frameworks and support structures normally found in such initiatives. The original plan was to test pilot the DDP in six Districts but due to COIN imperatives there was pressure to roll out the program to more districts as quickly as possible.

In order to understand the emergence and evolution of the program, the evaluators arranged a half-day workshop with senior staff from the DDP Unit/CST in Kabul to delineate the DDP timeline of major events and associated documentation. The IDLG timeline was compared to the timeline prepared by the DDP Management Committee – see Annex M.

Due to the incoherent management of the program, both USG staff and GIRoA personnel at all levels expressed intense frustration at the inadequate guidance and difficulty obtaining accurate and timely information and reports about DDP from their respective organizations.

¹² Pleas from USAID in Kabul and the field to re-design or at least slow down DDP implementation fell on deaf ears i.e. the prevalent feeling was that Kabul was not listening to the field.

In spite of these difficulties, since DDP inception a number of programmatic elements described in this report have been developed that would normally have been present at the early stages of such an on-budget initiative. These are being incorporated into a framework that can form the basis for moving forward to more effectively address the original objectives of the program. More work is required to have these objectives, benchmarks, results and operational factors clearly documented and shared with stakeholders at all levels.

2. LINE MINISTRY COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

What effects have DDP's activities had on ministries' ability to work together at national, provincial and district levels to provide basic services to the public? Examples?

The DDP had a positive effect on improving linkages among the three levels of government. USG and Afghan officials reported the program helped strengthen these relationships, and in some cases this included increased collaboration among line ministries at the district and provincial levels. DDP makes it necessary for government staff to interact and talk horizontally between line officials in districts and vertically - up and down centre-province-district.

Photo 1: DG and Prosecutor, Sayadabad District



The Provincial Governor in Nangarhar, for example, recently began to host regular standing-room-only meetings in which ministry officials and others openly discussed the needs of the province and how their operations could best address these needs. This initiative began in the Finley-Shields FOB, with USG representatives and members of the military's Civil Affairs unit convening small meetings of key stakeholders to discuss DDP implementation and other related issues. Over several months Afghan participation

in these meetings grew and the forum shifted from the FOB to the Governor's offices under the Chairmanship of the Director of Administration & Finance at the PGO. This is evidence of clear ownership of DDP in that province due in part to the pro-active assistance provided by USG and civil affairs personnel.

There was little evidence of similar large-scale open inter-ministerial gatherings in other provinces and districts visited during this study.

3. DDWG ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

How effective has the DDWG been in guiding DDP activities?

Responses to this question about the effectiveness of the District Delivery Working Group were almost universally negative. Most field-level informants did not know the DDWG existed, and Kabul-based informants who knew of the DDWG and had participated in its meetings considered it to be a rubber-stamp for decisions made elsewhere.

In the early stages of the DDP there was high level participation in the DDWG by both IDLG and ministry representatives – over time this dropped from Deputy Minister to DG and more recently to Directors, significantly reducing the effectiveness of the group in influencing ministry activities and guiding the program. Inconsistent participation by ministry representatives further limited its impact.

There were some comments to the effect that the DDWG was delinquent, in that it was approving DDP plans for districts when it was known within USG that funding would not be made available for implementation. As the DDWG Secretariat, IDLG's DDP Unit (CST) should have ensured such items were included in the meeting agenda.

Although the concept behind the DDWG as the primary oversight, guidance and support mechanism for the DDP is sound, in practice its meetings were seen as formalistic affairs that fell short of meeting the program's initial expectations. The DDWG has a broader mandate to provide policy and strategy direction, and planning directives, yet has failed to deliver high-level program authority.

4. GIROA FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

What effect has the DDP had on the government's financial management systems?

This question addresses one of the most significant effects of the DDP to date, in terms of identifying elements of the financial systems that need strengthening to improve services at the district level. The DDP was described as “shining a light” on the workings of these systems and identifying key issues that need to be addressed by both GIROA and the funder. USAID has identified some \$25M for DDP (\$840k of USAID's initial \$1.3M advance was not fully accounted for until March 2012) and these funds will not flow unless the system works properly, which it currently is not the case.

It was interesting to note that a PFM analyst who had been working for five years as a Technical Advisor within the Ministry of Finance did not know about these difficulties until she had an opportunity to examine the funding process within IDLG associated with DDP activities. Her insights identified ways of making significant improvements in linkages between the centre and the districts, with major government-wide implications for how funding that is intended for the districts is managed at the central and provincial levels.

The DDP's district-level assessments produced “packages” or plans that identified needs in terms of personnel (Tashkeel) and salaries, O&M and infrastructure projects. The payroll

component consisted of salary top-ups that raised incomes to levels defined in the new Pay and Grading system, with an additional \$4.00/day supplement as Hazard Pay for working in insecure districts. These salary levels are seen as being in line with existing government practices and therefore are considered sustainable.

Photo 2: Mustofiat and Finance & Administration Officials, Kandahar.



These plans were costed and presented to the DDWG for review and approval, and, presumably, buy-in from donors and line ministries to move quickly toward implementation. Each line ministry was to approve their part of the package and take the administrative steps to move rapidly to release the funds and hire the staff to fulfill their part of the plan. Infrastructure project supports were presumably to come from the US military's CERP funds – about which more will be said in the “infrastructure” section below.

It was soon discovered that significant delays were encountered in ministry-level administrative processes that stalled program implementation. To overcome these delays an agreement was made that once a district plan was approved by DDWG, the Ministry of Finance would allocate funds to IDLG, which would rapidly make it available to the Mustofiat in the province and ready to distribute to the districts. This was essentially a parallel financial management mechanism within the Afghan government, by-passing the financial systems in the effected ministries.

The system soon ran into a series of snags that indicated further work was necessary. One was due to the decision that was taken by MoF to run DDP funding through the “development” budget rather than the “operating” budget¹³. This meant that approving and tracking expenditures required a cumbersome and inefficient manual process rather than being part of the much more effective and automated AFMIS system through which the operating budget is run.

Another snag was found within IDLG when the decision was taken to use the ASP project as the main financial processing agent, rather than the Finance unit. ASP was soon seen to be incapable of carrying out the required transactions in a competent and timely manner.

A third snag was discovered as funds were allocated to the provinces, where the Mustofiat were found to be ill-prepared to handle this new line of expenditures and other problems occurred that interfered with the timely disbursement of DDP funds to the districts.

¹³ GIRoA typically disburses 30% of its development budget and 95% of its operating budget.

One of the consequences of these problems was that when USAID released a first payment of some \$1.3M to the Ministry of Finance for DDP operations in Jan. 2011 and subsequently requested an accounting of how those funds were disbursed (due 30 days after disbursement), the system could not report on the liquidation of some \$840K of this amount. After waiting 5 months for the government to respond to its request, USAID was unable to make any further advances as the initial advance remained unliquidated. IDLG, on the other hand, could not request a second advance until it had liquidated its first advance. The cumulative incurred costs as reported and submitted by DDP from inception through February 9, 2012, totaled \$2,029,427.20. After deducting the initial advance of \$1.3M, DDP requested reimbursement for the remaining costs (\$689,487.20) which was paid by USAID on March 7, 2012. DDP activities were formally suspended on March 19 2012 through Implementing Letter #4 dated March 5, 2012, pending a technical review and financial audit.

No additional advances (beyond the initial \$1.3M) for DDP were made by USAID and none would be made until the first tranche of funds was liquidated by IDLG. USAID's Office of Financial Management communicated the situation to IPA. However no explanation was officially communicated by IPA/USAID to field staff until mid-February, 2012 - some 7 months later – when a joint communication went out to the field from senior IPA/USAID management. It had not yet been reported by IDLG to its provincial and district level staff at the time of writing of this report.

These funding problems have had major impacts on DDP operations in the districts. O&M funds were reported as being difficult if not impossible to obtain, and salary top ups have not been paid for months. The repeated failures to obtain O&M funds have dissuaded district officials from further attempts, and they have resorted to turning to the US military to pay for items such as fuel for generators and infrastructure maintenance. This undermines efforts by USG field staff to teach GIROA staff basic O&M planning and budgeting skills.

District governors who reported that their districts were secure primarily because civil servants were seen to be occupying their posts and providing much-needed services, said that the positive impact of salary top ups on staffing levels (discussed in the following section) has seen some reversals since funds stopped flowing, with people beginning to leave their posts, with a perceived ripple effect on the security situation as insurgents begin to reassert themselves.

Fortunately a PFM specialist has said that it would be relatively easy to transfer DDP funding from the development budget to the operating budget, which will significantly improve the financial tracking and reporting required by USAID¹⁴. Implementing this will make it possible to address the capacity gaps noted at the Mustofiats and within IDLG, resulting in a more effective mechanism to move DDP funds from the Center to the districts. It will also have a positive impact on other Ministries' Provincial and District operations as they will be able to use the financial management systems that were created to support the DDP.

¹⁴ The flow of funds is dependent on IDLG liquidating advances and requesting further advances.

5. GOVERNMENT STAFFING

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:


What effect has the DDP had on the government's staffing systems?

The DDP had a major positive effect on the government's staffing systems. We received consistent reports that the program's salary top-ups¹⁵ and hazard pay, which often doubled Tashkeel salaries, contributed to significant reductions in vacancy levels and improved attendance at work. In some cases district governors took attendance to ensure staff were entitled to receive their extra pay. At least one USG field staff member did random checks to see if public servants were at work and reported high levels of attendance.

Most districts reported relatively high levels of staffing as a result of DDP – see DDP Unit/CST Tracking Sheet in Annex N. The figure below shows numbers according to Workplans (services packages) prepared subsequent to District assessments.

The continuing high vacancy level in Spin Boldak was attributed to the harshness of living conditions in the district and to the availability of employment in the private sector, which was described as stronger than in most other districts.

Figure 2: Tashkeel Filled/vacant



Even though salary top ups had not been received for months due to the lack of funding described earlier, most public servants remained at their posts in the belief that they would eventually receive this additional pay.

The governor of Kandahar reported that six of eight districts were relatively secure, due largely to the presence of public servants in their offices. He worried that if they did not continue to receive their salary top-ups they would abandon their posts, and the districts

would likely fall back under insurgent control. The same concern was expressed by a number of District Governors.

It is important to note (as stated earlier) that the salary top-ups raise pay levels to an amount comparable to the regular pay and grade reform approved salaries, with an extra \$4.00/day Hazard Pay bonus for working in insecure districts. These sums are in line with GIROA staffing policies and are therefore considered sustainable.

¹⁵ Salary top-ups is a misnomer – for those Line Ministries who have not yet completed P&G process and/or for approval from MoF, DDP merely “accelerates the process”.

Problems were reported in offices where only some employees were receiving extra pay – there was conflict with other staff who were not receiving benefits, even though they were working in the same insecure areas. There were also problems in districts where top ups were distributed even though some staff had not been at work – they were seen as being rewarded for non-attendance, which was seen as a problem.

We were told that in some cases it was better to have a position remain vacant than to have it filled by a person who did not perform. Our study did not assess performance of GIRA personnel, so we could not comment on the quality of service delivery¹⁶.

6. IMPROVED FACILITIES

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

To what extent has the DDP improved subnational government facilities?

DDP had some effect on improving government facilities. There were two dimensions to this: funds for O&M and for small infrastructure projects. In some districts the O&M funds that were made available early in the program were used to buy equipment and furnishings for governors' and line managers' offices, which contributed to increasing their credibility in the eyes of the local population. Later, when funding was no longer available, the difficulty in receiving further O&M funds had a negative effect on governor's planning and budgeting processes (noted earlier) and prompted some to revert to asking the local military unit for support.

Photo 3: Agriculture and Health Officials, Spin Boldak



With the demise of CERP funds and concomitant reduction of USG programs, a section in District DDP Workplans discussing small infrastructure projects raised false hopes by including an unfunded 'wish list' that raised expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

The Project component of the DDP was dropped when Funding Streams 2 and 3 were removed from the program. However, districts continued to receive support for facility construction and O&M from the military – this is likely to diminish in the near future as CERP funding dries up.

7. GENDER EQUITY

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

To what extent has the DDP supported gender equity? Examples?

Virtually all informants reported DDP as having negligible effect on promoting gender equity, citing the security situation and traditional conservative values especially in the South

¹⁶ Many informants indicated that as a result of the DDP incentives many district officials were now working harder – perhaps because they no longer needed to hold down a 2nd or 3rd job.

as reasons. They also said it was not a project objective. Several went so far as to say that the question was “a joke” which indicates the extent to which even educated informants (both Afghans and foreign) have much to learn about gender equity issues.

There were gender related activities that were not directly related to DDP. A few governors were reported to be reaching out to the DoWAs, district level offices of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, with a view to increasing the involvement of women in district governance. They indicated that if MoWA were included as a ministry in the DDP this would provide salary top ups and strengthen women’s visibility in the district’s administration.

In one area there were five women on the District Development Committee who were taking an active role in reaching out to other women to have them become more engaged in the district’s affairs. Apart from these few efforts, gender equity issues had very low visibility in DDP Districts.

8. DDP SHORTCOMINGS

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

What are the major shortcomings of the DDP?

While informants saw the DDP as well intentioned and much needed, one described it as “a bridge too far” – indicating that it overstretched itself and fell short of meeting its objectives. There were shortcomings among both main actors – USG and IDLG – and with other stakeholders such as MoF and the military. These need to be taken into account in planning any continuation of USAID support for strengthening governance in Afghanistan.

A major shortcoming was the incompatibility of the program’s twin objectives. As noted earlier, there was intense pressure mainly from the military to rapidly establish civil service operations in a number of priority districts – in late 2010 there were about 80 on their list, which could not all be addressed by the program. There was also pressure to strengthen the Afghan government by routing the program’s funding through their financial systems. While both objectives were valid, they did not fit well together.

To support the second objective of strengthening Afghan systems, in early 2010 it was decided to run DDP as an on-budget program rather than to contract an implementing partner to manage the project as a parallel initiative. While this is sound development practice, the organizational analysis and capacity development work normally done in the early stage of on-budget program did not take place due to the pressure to move quickly into large-scale implementation of the program. It soon became evident this was a mistake.

In response to these pressures, assumptions were made of GIRA’s administrative capacity that turned out to be overly optimistic. Its financial management systems were not as capable as required to handle the program. The decision taken by the Ministry of Finance to run the DDP funds through the development budget rather than the operating budget contributed to disbursement and reporting problems that led to USAID’s suspension of DDP activities

effective March 19, 2012. A major contributor to this was that the DDP did not adequately consider the role of the provinces in the government’s financial administrative system, and did not allocate resources to increase the capacity of provincial offices to support district-level development.

All this was reported to have put a heavy administrative burden on USAID. There also was conflict between USAID and IPA as to which agency would manage the project – control of the program seemed to shift back and forth between the two mainly on the basis of political power and the strength of personalities involved rather than a coherent well-founded program management strategy. This was reported to have contributed to lack of clarity regarding leadership and communication problems within the program.

Although the DDP was supposed to be Afghan-led, it appeared to have been primarily driven by USG, especially staff in the field. This was in response to IDLG’s inability to effectively take charge of the program.

Photo 4: Daman and Zhari District Officials



USAID and IPA had difficulty providing and managing appropriate field level technical assistance to IDLG to implement the program. USG field staff consistently reported receiving very little training or support, some describing their situation as operating in a “black hole” of inadequate information. The seven-month delay in explaining the funding situation placed field staff in an awkward position of not being able to answer district-level questions about DDP’s operations and negatively affected the credibility of the donor

and the government.

Some of the field staff assigned to districts were part of the “civilian surge” which distributed both seasoned and inexperienced personnel in DSTs/FOBs and PRTs in the provinces. While more experienced personnel were able to figure out how to make DDP work, the less capable staff were not as effective and experienced difficulty supporting DDP.

The high turnover of USAID and IPA personnel (estimated at 85% in some years) meant that there was a lack of continuity on the USG side that caused problems for IDLG, which has worked with at least five primary contacts over the past eighteen months.

The military exerted significant pressure on both State and AID to get government up and running in as many districts as possible, and was reported as ignoring the protests from AID that this is not feasible or desirable in the long run. This apparently had a negative impact on

morale within USAID's Kabul office, which saw itself as powerless to resist pressures from the Embassy and ISAF.

These problems can be described as systemic shortcomings within USG agencies that cannot be conveniently attributed to an individual manager who can be pilloried as a scapegoat for the program's difficulties – they are due to a collective set of factors for which many actors and structural elements are responsible.

There were also major shortcomings on the Afghan side. The initial enthusiasm of the President and Cabinet Ministers during and shortly after the program's launch in late 2009 soon wore off, and the detailed implementation plans required to implement high level policy decisions were not put in place. It was wrongly assumed that a presidential decree and an MoU would result in an effectively-operating program. Ministers signed Implementation Letters with conditions their systems could not meet (such as full implementation of Pay and Grading) before funds would be released.

DDP's Central Support Team spent months working in inadequate facilities and without proper equipment. Although they were eventually relocated to a more suitable office building, procurement problems continued. An example was a purchase order placed in October 2010 for 8 laptops – the equipment was received in March 2012. It was not clear whether this delay was due to simple bureaucratic incompetence or a desire to sabotage the program from within.

The Mustofiats did not receive clear guidance from MoF: it was not until 14 months after the program started that they had a directive and training on how to support the DDP.

IDLG's DDP Unit or CST was started many months into DDP implementation, and it took the DDP Unit almost a year to get M&E established and running. Furthermore, the CST was not able to provide financial records requested by USAID to properly account for disbursements, to provide comprehensive program documents to the evaluators, nor participate in the evaluation fieldwork.

The assessments were initially of low quality as community consultation was limited and inputs into the report did not fully reflect community needs and priorities. They were also not translated in Pashtu or shared within Districts. This situation improved over time.

Political in-fighting in IDLG and between IDLG and other ministries made it difficult to obtain consistent high level line ministry support for the program, particularly following the departure of two influential senior figures, Minister Popal and his Deputy Barna Karimi, who advocated strongly for DDP across the government.

The fund disbursement process in at least one province was tightly controlled by PGO staff, who reportedly skimmed off a portion of district employees' salary top-up payments each quarter. Procurement of items requested by districts was centralized at the provincial level, resulting in bottlenecks, delays and provision of inferior quality goods. The lack of O&M

funds made it difficult for well-intentioned civil servants to carry out their activities – some paid from their own pockets for transportation to visit schools or clinics in their provinces.

These and other similar shortcomings on the Afghan side are consistent with the realities of governance in a fragile post-conflict state which has not yet developed the transparently-functioning institutions and norms associated with a desire to provide quality services to the public. These are factors the DDP program and other initiatives are designed to address.

9. DDP ACHIEVEMENTS

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was as follows:

What are the major achievements of the DDP?

The DDP had many important achievements in spite of the shortcomings listed above. The past eighteen months of program operations have been similar to the diagnostic process in the early stages of an on-budget program, and highlight issues that need to be addressed to improve the capacity of the system.

A major benefit of the program is that it “shone a light” on the actual workings of the Afghan government financial administration and clearly indicated areas requiring improvement at central, provincial and district levels. The workings of the financial system became more evident as efforts were made to distribute funds from the centre through the provinces to the districts. Steps are being taken to remedy many of the issues identified by the program.

Not only did the DDP serve to highlight shortcomings in GIRoA’s financial management system, it has the potential to pave the way for a number of major reforms in support of Transition and subnational finance. A pilot project underway in MoF which involves transferring DDP funding to the operating budget and expanding budget codes, will indicate ways to strengthen GIRoA systems and procedures to the district level, while at the same time ensuring that key elements of a mechanism for direct support to O&M through the GIRoA system are developed, implemented and proven. This will allow IDLG to demonstrate to donors that the mechanism is not only an effective and low-cost means of disbursing funds but is also highly transparent and resistant to ‘leakages’.

Photo 5: USG field staff, Dand District



Governors reported that filling vacant civil service positions contributed directly to security in their districts – a key objective of the program.

Strengthening district level operations resulted in a major increase in the population’s interaction with the District Governor’s Office – while in some areas very few people visit those offices, in most DDP districts there was a steady flow of people coming for services. This connection between government and people is a major indicator of improvement in

governance in the districts.

Another related achievement was strengthening the linkages between the districts and the provincial and central administrations, addressing a major gap in the country's administrative systems. The key role of the PGO was highlighted through this process.

In some areas the program overcame the silos in which centrally-managed line ministries operate. However, in the provinces we visited, only in Nangarhar did the provincial governor convene regular standing-room-only meetings during which line managers and others consulted on local affairs and coordinated their activities to improve conditions in the district.

District governors were reported to be learning to plan and budget for on-going O&M of facilities and equipment, overcoming a tendency to wait until something breaks down before seeking funds from the Province or a near-by military installation.

Provision of O&M funds to the district level resulted in some governors asserting that for the first time they felt they were actually governing their districts.

The beneficial impacts of these achievements are significant – the recommendations section of this report builds on these as a foundation for the next stage of USAID's support for district-level governance in the country.

10. SUCCESS FACTORS

This section identifies factors that were associated with DDP's successes and explains part of its achievements.

The most important success factor was the political commitment, capacity and involvement of the Provincial and District Governors, and the increased engagement of their staff. Progress was evident where the PG or DG was actively engaged in promoting good governance and had established a functioning administration to interact with the people and line ministry heads, and could implement a range of programs that demonstrated the presence of government.

Payroll top-ups were linked to the presence of civil servants in the districts, which governors reported as the major factor in maintaining stability in those areas. This relatively low-cost input had a significant beneficial impact on security.

Another success factor was the ability of district-level Afghan and expatriate technical advisors to work together and do whatever they could to improve conditions in their areas. For example, the USAID FPO in Surkh Rod district in Nangarhar reported that the quality of these interpersonal relationships was a key to program success. In some cases, such as Surkh Rod, it took months before these linkages began to bear fruit, but when they did significant progress was evident. The most successful collaborations, such as in Finley Shields PRT in Nangarhar, and the FOBs in Spin Boldak in Kandahar, involved all foreign advisors in a team

approach, including military civil affairs officers, many of whom had well-developed analytical and communications skills and direct access to resources on the PRT or FOB.

The quality of support and supervision received by USG field staff in the DSTs and PRTs in Kandahar and Nangarhar had a direct impact on their effectiveness – progress was evident where these supports were timely and relevant to the issues they were addressing.

11. GIROA CAPACITY

One of the twin objectives of the DDP was to increase the capacity of the Afghan government (GIROA) to deliver improved basic services at the sub-national level in selected KTDs. By improving government presence or visibility, DDP would help to establish the legitimacy of the state and reduce the population's support for the insurgency (which makes DDP a hybrid: both a stabilization and a governance program). This performance evaluation identified a number of gaps in the capacity of GIROA at the central, provincial and district levels which constrained DDP's ability to achieve its objectives.

Central level issues:

Weak mandate of IDLG in relation to line ministries

IDLG does not have an established legislative foundation: it was created on the basis of a Presidential Decree. Other parts of the government which are based on strong legislative foundations cite this lack of a strong base as a reason to ignore IDLG's efforts to coordinate their activities at the provincial and district levels. IDLG's influence on other line ministries has relied on political and interpersonal relationships more than an established institutional framework that defines the roles of key actors in what is essentially a matrix management structure. At the subnational level, ministry directors have a solid-line relationship with their ministries in Kabul, and should have a dotted-line relationship with IDLG's representatives – the PGOs and DGOs. These roles are defined in the Subnational Governance Policy, which unfortunately is an unwieldy and poorly-crafted document that has been approved but has not been fully operationalized (considerable work is required before this can happen).

The matrix management relationships have not been institutionalized and key actors have not been trained in their operations. Where these relationships are working they are based on the characteristics of the individuals involved, which is not a sustainable arrangement. This may be changing with the current NPP process, but it is likely to take some time to effect the attitudes and habits of line managers at all levels.

Financial and administrative issues

As noted earlier, at the start of the DDP in 2009 the Ministry of Finance decided that the funds for the program would be administered through the development budget rather the operating budget, resulting in an ineffective disbursement and reporting process that ultimately caused USAID to suspend its support for the program. Apparently it is a relatively simple matter to transfer these funds to the operating budget, a move that may resolve many

of the disbursement and reporting issues¹⁷. While this is likely to have a beneficial effect, administrative problems within IDLG need to be resolved to enable the program to operate effectively.

The current practice of having the Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP) handle DDP's funds is a major snag in the system. ASP was reported to be mainly a construction project and lacked the capacity or mandate to properly carry out this function, which would be better handled by IDLG's Finance unit, which may need some support to acquire this capability. Although this situation has been evident for some time it has remained unresolved: a recent initiative within IDLG to create a new Department of Local Administration and Coordination is likely to improve matters as it is likely to absorb DDP's Central Support Team. However, it will take some months for this new department to become operational due to the government's procedures associated with such changes in its administrative structures.

Capacity development issues

IDLG has some 21,000 employees at all levels across the country. It currently has 8 competent Afghan capacity development specialists supported by the Afghanistan Subnational Governance Program (ASGP), funded by UNDP, and 9 staff (including 4 financial analysts) supported by USAID. They also have a number of junior-level trainers and other staff on the Tashkeel in each province, who receive support from the more skilled ASGP trainers. IDLG managers said these trainers and other staff were insufficient to service all their employees, and they have been seeking additional donor support to strengthen their operations.

They recently carried out rapid assessments of PGO competencies and prepared a comprehensive capacity development program for PGOs, DGOs, PCs and municipalities, and are ready to roll it out as soon as suitable trainers and other supports are available. The program's implementation plan and relatively modest budget (about \$1M per year) has been presented to ASGP and other donors with as-yet inconclusive results. In addition to assistance with staffing they need support for workshops, travel, accommodations, communications, training materials and other expenses.

Their program focuses on the governance requirements of the four levels of IDLG operations more so than on strengthening general administrative skills, which also need attention. These more generic skills would normally be addressed by the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI), which operated an effective training program for civil servants in Kabul and at the subnational level for several years, until funding through the Afghanistan Civil Service Support project (ACSS) came to an end in 2011. While ACSI's services are in great demand, it has considerably scaled back its operations and has limited ability to support IDLG's requirements.

¹⁷ See IDLG document, "District Delivery Program (DDP) Financial Management Restructuring: Transferring DDP to Operating Budget. Draft 9.0, January 16, 2012. A Proposal."

Provincial Level Issues

There were two main areas of concern about capacity at the provincial level: the Governor's office and the Mustofiat.

Governors' Office

We obtained considerable information about two PGOs – Kandahar and Nangarhar – which operated similarly. It was reported that the Mustofiat in Wardak lacked capacity to properly process DDP funds but there was insufficient information to discuss capacity issues in detail.

The PGO in Nangarhar appeared to be functioning at a higher level than in Kandahar. The Nangarhar governor and his staff had been assisted to develop regular well-attended meetings in which line ministry coordination and other issues were addressed. There was no sign of a similar coordination system in Kandahar, where the required capacity (or perhaps political will) did not appear to exist.

District level informants reported problems with procurement in both provinces – rather than allowing DGOs to manage the purchasing of supplies and equipment, this was done at the provincial level, often with unsatisfactory results in terms of quality of goods and timeliness of response. The managers of the procurement process did not appear to know how to properly serve the needs of the districts.

The transfer of funds from the center to the districts was handled by the PGO Administrative and Finance Department, which acted as an intermediate level distribution process and was not well liked by the districts. Although the transfer of funds was handled similarly in Kandahar and Nangarhar, there were few complaints about the funding process in Nangarhar. In the two provinces, DDP funds intended for the districts were allocated by the Mustofiat to a financial services office in PGO. In Nangarhar, the DGs appointed a representative to visit the PGO and collect and deliver the salary of all employees. On the other hand, in Kandahar the district employees needed to visit the PGO to obtain their funds. Travel was costly and often difficult, and those in charge were reportedly skimming off a portion of the funds during the allocation process, which lacked transparency. The Mustofiat and other PGO staff in Kandahar did not appear to be aware of how the distribution was supposed to operate.

District Level Issues

There was considerable variety in the districts that provided information for this study. While some (such as Dand) appeared to be well-managed, others (such as Arghandab) seemed to have more difficulty. These differences were linked to factors such as personalities of key individuals and their ability to establish effective management systems in their offices.

Most district officials expressed frustration with how their funds were being managed at the provincial level. Even when their DDP plans and budgets were well known, they reported difficulty accessing these funds. Capacity development efforts by USG personnel in some

districts were successful in helping their administrators learn how to reach up to the province to bring down the funds earmarked for them in their DDP plans.

The inability to properly manage O&M was reported in virtually all districts – there was limited capacity to plan and budget maintenance for equipment and facilities. Managers tended to wait until something broke down before seeking necessary funds. When the funds were not available from the province they turned to the nearest military installation, which often accommodated the request. This undermined capacity development efforts by USG personnel to help district administrations learn to plan and budget their O&M requirements. In summary - DDP has “shone a light” on a range of capacity development requirements within all levels of the Afghan government, issues that need to be addressed if the program is to be effective.

12. IMPACT

Although not an impact evaluation, this assignment did attempt to gauge some measure of early impact from DDP.

The Interview Guide question for this part of the study was to be directed at the citizens of the District and asked “How have things changed around here over the past year?” Unfortunately, the evaluation team’s access to local inhabitants was extremely restricted during field visits due to security issues, so the data was not acquired.

Instead, the evaluation team developed a proxy measure for impact - the number of local citizens visiting the District Center daily on average before and after DDP. This number reflected the ability (and presumably satisfaction or dissatisfaction now that there is representation in the district center direct complaints) of local citizens to access government services locally i.e. at the District as opposed to going to the provincial Centre, or seeking services from the insurgents.

The evaluation team obtained anecdotal evidence of a considerable increase in visitors to District Centers accompanied by such comments as “there is now a real buzz at the DC” and “we have crowds on a daily basis”.

The evaluators did consider referencing perception surveys that were carried out at least annually both in RC-East and RC-South. Unfortunately, these surveys did not focus specifically on DDP areas so it was not possible to clearly attribute from the survey findings perceived effects linked solely to DDP intervention.

The evaluation team assembled data from the field on the 13 USAID-funded DDP Districts. Annex I shows results at output (deliverables), outcome (objectives) and impact (goal) level. The table shows:

- The average USAID-funded District has a population of 174,000
- Daily visitors to District Centers on average doubled after DDP (10 Districts reported)

- District Workplan budgets for Tashkeel incentives averaged \$117,000 annually
- District Workplan budgets for O&M averaged \$150,000 annually
- Only 18% of O&M funds on average were received by Districts i.e. \$26,000 each
- Positions on the Tashkeel averaged 44 and the number at P&G levels was 23 (half)
- Vacancies before DDP averaged 23 (half of Districts reported) and after DDP was 5
- Almost all Districts only received one quarter of payment for top-ups from DDP.
- An average of 34 projects was identified in District DDP workplans.

Unfortunately, some of the numbers obtained have limited reliability i.e. anecdotal such as daily citizen visits to DC's, but the table is a good basis for a future M&E 'dashboard'.

13. LINKAGES WITH RELATED PROGRAMS - USG AND OTHER DONORS

The DDP is not the only program addressing the need to strengthen subnational governance. The information we received about the UK and French approaches to DDP indicate there is much to learn from these initiatives. There were a number of other projects such as RAMP-UP and SIKA that appeared to have similar objectives. We did not see much evidence of linkages with these other related initiatives. For instance, the evaluation team heard that the prospect for cooperation and collaboration between DDP and SIKA is hampered by the poor relations between MRRD and IDLG. Annex J contains a table describing current and recently completed relevant USG programs.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The conclusions that can be drawn from the evidence acquired through review of documentation and extensive consultations with key informants in Kabul and in the field are presented in this section.

Over its eighteen months of operations, the District Delivery Program experienced many problems while producing significant achievements. This period has also afforded a rich learning experience with many lessons that can be incorporated in future USG support for sub-national governance in Afghanistan.

The dual objectives of the DDP - supporting stabilization by rapidly deploying civil servants in key districts while strengthening the capacity of the Afghan administration by running the program on-budget - did not fit well together and this incompatibility contributed to problems with program implementation.

While most Afghan and USG administrators understood and supported the general purpose of the program, USG's role in DDP management left much to be desired. Intense pressure from the military to launch and roll-out quickly, the absence of clear benchmarks and a well-articulated implementation strategy, the lack of a cogent management structure, and high staff turnover in USG offices (estimated to be as high as 85%) contributed to challenges faced by the program, which were compounded by its being launched without the support of technical assistance (usually provided by a US contractor).

Due to COIN imperatives and the pressure from the military, the usual assessment and capacity building steps in an on-budget initiative were not taken with the DDP. This put USAID and IPA in a difficult administrative position. Their respective management roles changed over time, contributing to the program's difficulties. It was evident from the low quality of support for field staff (such as inadequate training and communications) that they were not providing capable project management.

The Afghan government also experienced difficulties with DDP. Although launched in late 2009 with a Presidential Decree and high-level line ministers' commitments to work with IDLG to support the program, these declarations were not quickly translated into functioning financial and administrative processes and practical workplans that could guide employee activity. It was soon discovered that assumptions about GIROA systems being able to handle the DDP program and make resources available at the district level were unfounded – they lacked capacity and required considerable strengthening before they could function properly. However, a valuable outcome of the DDP was that it “shone a light” on these systems so that shortcomings could be better understood and appropriate solutions formulated.

IDLG's Central Support Team (the DDP Unit), which included line ministry representatives, was established in early 2010 to conduct participatory assessments of conditions and needs in selected districts and prepare “service packages” or workplans for donor review and support. USAID advanced \$1.3M of its \$40M DDP project fund as a first step to support these plans. Although the quality and relevance of plans were initially rather low they improved over time. During 2011, as more workplans were prepared, approved and implemented, the capacity issues in the government's administrative and financial mechanisms became more apparent.

The decision by MoF to route DDP's funds through the development budget caused considerable difficulty with disbursement, tracking and reporting, ultimately prompting USAID to suspend DDP activities effective March 19, 2012. It took much too long (some seven months) for IPA/USAID to advise field staff of the funding situation that emerged in summer 2011 – a further indication of internal USG program management issues. Likewise, IDLG had not yet notified government staff in the field of the program suspension at the time this report was prepared.

However, recent analysis of this problem by an international PFM specialist in IDLG indicated that a relatively simple process of shifting DDP funds to the operating budget (with its tried and tested AFMIS system) would significantly improve disbursement and reporting. Furthermore, it was also discovered that the operating budget could be configured to track each line ministry's funds to the district level, which would be a major improvement in the country's financial systems. The analysis and resolution of DDP's financial problems appear to be prompting a much broader reform of the entire government's financial administration system – a major achievement in this environment.

Other positive results of DDP include significantly improved coordination among line ministries at the district level, as well as linkages between districts, provinces and the center, and sustainable deployment of civil servants in previously un-serviced areas. Reduction in Tashkeel vacancies and improved attendance were reported to be directly contributing to increased security in those areas – another significant achievement. District centers were much busier than before DDP, indicating that the public was increasingly turning to them for services, and some Governors were convening regular well-attended meetings to coordinate line ministry activities and improve relations between the government and the public.

Even where the program was operating at a minimal level it was very well regarded. One DG said, “DDP is the glue that is holding the district together,” and another said that the planning and financial supports from the DDP make him feel for the first time that he really is governing his district. This is precisely what the program was intended to accomplish.

In sum, while management of the DDP by USG and implementation by IDLG could be much improved, it is clear that over the past 18 months it has begun to meet its twin objectives and can act as a model with the potential to provide impetus for wider and more significant government-wide administrative reform and improvement of public sector operations across the country.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

This DDP performance evaluation was commissioned by USAID to examine the program’s achievements and shortcomings, and to help USG make informed decisions on the way forward. The following recommendations are based on the conclusions in the previous section, and presented in categories similar to the Interview Guide and the Findings section.

1. OBJECTIVES, BENCHMARKS AND STRATEGY

a. Produce a clear and definitive DDP Program Document

Much has been written about the DDP and there are several high-level agreements (President’s Decree, MOUs, Implementing Letters, etc.) but there is no single widely-accepted authoritative document describing the program’s purpose and how it should operate and clearly outlining roles and responsibilities of all parties. This document should be prepared by IDLG and endorsed by USG, and used by both to guide their support for the program.

b. Institute a DDP Orientation Program

A comprehensive DDP orientation program is required to properly train relevant IDLG and USG (including military) personnel at all levels to the program – it should be jointly prepared and delivered by IDLG and USG personnel.

2. LINE MINISTRY COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION

a. Improve selection of line ministry representatives on DDP's CST

Some line ministry representatives on DDP's Central Support Team have little influence in their home ministries due to their being temporary contractors or junior level staff. Ministries should be required to assign knowledgeable and influential representatives to the DDP team – appropriate MoUs should be drafted to this effect.

b. Encourage governors to hold regular coordination meetings

Provincial and district level governors should be helped to institute regular large-scale meetings where line ministry representatives and others have opportunities to share information and coordinate their activities.

3. DDWG ROLE AND EFFECTIVENESS

a. Strengthen the DDWG

The District Delivery Working Group was widely regarded as an ineffective body that essentially rubber-stamped decisions that were made elsewhere. It should have high-level representation, comply with its mandate and ensure that it operates as an oversight body concerned not only with selection of districts and approvals of workplans but with policy, strategy and planning.

4. GIROA FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

a. Transfer the funds for DDP to the Operating budget

The funds for the DDP should be transferred from the Development budget to the Operating budget – GIROA's AFMIS system will make it possible to more accurately track disbursements and produce reports.

b. Encourage MoF to extend AFMIS to the district level

AFMIS currently tracks financial activity only to the provincial level. MoF should be encouraged to extend AFMIS account coding to the district level, allowing district expenses to be clearly identified and tracked, so line ministries can better manage their financial operations. This is a straightforward and inexpensive accounting measure.

c. Shift DDP funds from ASP to IDLG's Finance unit

DDP funds are currently managed by the Afghan Stabilization Program (ASP) which is essentially a donor-funded construction project. It does not have the capacity to properly manage DDP's funds. This responsibility should be transferred to IDLG's finance unit and it should be provided with assistance to support DDP operations.

d. Increase PGO and Mustofiat capacity to support DDP

The Provincial Governors' Offices and Mustofiat need help to properly manage funds intended for district level procurement and operations – this assistance should be provided jointly by MoF and IDLG.

e. Strengthen District-level financial management capacity

Some district administrations have the potential to manage their own finances. Capacity assessments should be done jointly with MoF to select a few high-capacity districts as a pilot project with a view to providing districts with more authority over their financial operations.

f. Review decision to run DDP funds for Line Ministries through IDLG

The practice of running Line Ministry funds identified in DDP workplans through IDLG should be reviewed. The current system is essentially a parallel mechanism that was put in place to overcome blockages within Line Ministries. Line ministries should be helped to identify and remove those blockages so funds can be administered by the appropriate parties.

5. GOVERNMENT STAFFING

a. Continue salary top-ups and hazard pay

The beneficial effect of salary top ups and hazard pay were evident in virtually all districts, with civil servants filling positions and showing up for work. This had a positive impact on security, with reports that insurgents were less active in areas where public servants were operating. Salaries have been set at levels comparable to the new Pay and Grading system, so sustainability is not an issue.

b. Implement Pay & Grading in all ministries in DDP districts

The higher pay levels of staff who are on DDP is a source of conflict with other civil servants working in the same offices. Pay and grading reforms should be focused on DDP districts to reduce salary differentials that contribute to these tensions.

c. Improve disbursement of salary top-ups and hazard pay, increase frequency

Different methods were used to deliver DDP salary supplements to employees. In one province employees had to travel to the PGO to receive their pay, which was provided through a process that was not transparent and subject to skimming by PGO staff. A uniform, transparent and efficient process should be put in place and enforced. Disbursement frequency should be increased from quarterly to monthly.

6. IMPROVED FACILITIES

a. Take inventory of government facilities in the district

Over the past few years a number of facilities have been built in districts by the military and other actors. These will become government property as foreigners leave. An inventory is required to take stock of what has been built and begin planning O&M programs to maintain these facilities and extend their useful life in support of service delivery.

b. Increase district level O&M planning and budgeting capacity

Most districts do not have well developed O&M planning and budgeting processes. A training program should be designed and provided by IDLG and the Civil Service Institute that will help managers plan and budget their O&M operations.

c. Encourage districts to obtain facility (O&M) funds from GIROA's budget

District leaders have become accustomed to obtaining needed funds from PRTs and military installations rather than from the government's budget. This short cut is not sustainable and hampers the growth of the government's system.

7. GENDER EQUITY

a. Include gender equity in DDP programming

The DDP is silent on gender equity with the result that the issue is not on the table, which is a problem. DDP should include fostering the equality of women and men as a program objective.

b. Include the Ministry of Women's' Affairs in DDP

MoWA has district level offices (DoWAs) in the provinces, and some DGs have established contacts with them. These offices should be included in the DDP to increase their visibility and presence.

8. DDP SHORTCOMINGS

a. Set achievable objectives for DDP programming

DDP has been described as "a bridge too far" – indicating that some of its objectives were too ambitious. Planners should recognize that building up subnational governance, even in a COIN environment, takes more time than running a military campaign, and set their expectations accordingly. This would involve reconciling the program's incompatible twin objectives of fostering stability and strengthening governance.

b. Improve USG management of DDP

USG's joint USAID-IPA management of DDP has been dysfunctional due to a lack of clarity linked to the hybrid post-stabilization nature of the program. It needs to be located in an appropriate place in USAID (possibly ODG). High turnover and conflicts between State and USAID have left field staff in a "black hole" of inadequate communication and support. As with other budget support initiatives, the DDP should have dedicated Technical Advisors or an Implementing Partner (contractor) to provide continuity and adequate support for field operations.

c. Increase emphasis on the provinces in the DDP program

DDP activity has tended to focus on the center and the districts, overlooking the key role of the PGOs in government operations. Many of the problems identified in this evaluation are linked to this gap, which needs to be properly analyzed and addressed.

9. STRENGTHEN GIROA CAPACITY

a. Provide Matrix Management training to Governors and Line Ministry heads

Provincial and district level operations are in a matrix management situation with line ministry heads reporting to their Kabul offices while being coordinated by DGs and PGs.

Few are likely to know how to function in this structure, and basic training will do much to improve their relationships.

b. Strengthen IDLG's Capacity Development Directorate

The directorate has a comprehensive capacity development plan that needs about \$1M a year to operate. This support would do much to increase the effectiveness of subnational governance across the country.

10. THE WAY FORWARD

a. Link with other DDP programs

The British and the French have their own approaches to DDP that seem to operate more effectively than the USG program. Linkages with these other versions of DDP would permit sharing best practices and strengthen all programs.

b. Coordinate with other subnational governance initiatives

USG is supporting other subnational governance initiatives such as RAMP-UP and SIKA, and the UN and other donors are active in the field. Coordinating DDP with these can produce mutually-beneficial exchanges of information and resources.

c. Design a DDP Sequel with IDLG

If DDP stops, something similar will need to be put in its place to strengthen subnational government. Ideally DDP should merge into ongoing GIRoA operations, but this is unlikely in the short term, and USG support for subnational governance will be required for some time. The existing program with its relatively modest costs for salary top-ups and district level O&M is having good results – USAID should work with IDLG to design an appropriate sequel, building on the strengths of the existing program.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

DDP offers a rich learning experience and there are many lessons to be gained from the past 18 months of operations:

1. A fragile war-torn state is unlikely to have the political, financial and administrative systems to properly manage its own affairs.
2. When a program has two incompatible objectives, such as stability and governance, there will be incoherence and difficulties with implementation.
3. Building up governance in any environment, let alone one characterized by COIN, cannot be done overnight – it is a long-term endeavor.
4. A 'comprehensive approach' to nation building involving military, diplomacy, development and others will be ineffective if it is dominated by any of the participants.
5. While the State Department and USAID may be good at drafting development policies and designing and overseeing projects they are not set up to be an 'implementing partner'.
6. Before launching a major development initiative, it is essential to have all parties on board i.e. obtain demonstrable commitment and support or 'buy in'.

7. Host country administrative systems progress more slowly than donors would like, and have an array of largely opaque internal political and interpersonal dynamics that have major impacts on their effectiveness.
8. To secure funding, host country officials may unknowingly (or in some cases, knowingly) sign agreements and make commitments their systems are incapable of fulfilling.
9. It is good development practice to begin an on-budget program with a capacity analysis and a small pilot to identify weaknesses in the system before scaling it up – i.e. do the necessary groundwork and testing before rolling out the initiative country-wide.
10. Field staff will not be effective or motivated if they are kept in the dark on what's going on with their program – they should be informed of major events and decisions.
11. The criteria for selection of districts for DDP should be strictly adhered to as it is unproductive (and dangerous) to initiate the program in non-permissive areas.
12. Implementers need to have strong M&E systems from the outset to capture all necessary information and data to be able to analyze and report on results in a timely and accurate manner – and a solid baseline of data is essential to measure impacts later on.
13. Donors should put pressure on implementers to both report comprehensively (accurately and up-to-date) and disseminate results to a wider audience.
14. Implementers need to broadcast results to all interested parties and “tell the story”. It is crucial to promote program results through multiple channels such as media, web site, and brochure and fact sheet, especially to overcome false perceptions of unsustainability.
15. Evaluations are invaluable to keep a project on track, with decisions on any new course of action based on sound judgments of program performance and accurate knowledge of local development realities.
16. It is unreasonable to expect performance from a system that has not acquired the capacity to demonstrate that performance.

ANNEX A: DDP DESCRIPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

DESCRIPTION OF DDP (Prepared by Evaluation Team)

Background

District Delivery Program (DDP) is an Afghan government led capacity building program designed to enhance the ability of GIRoA officials to deliver basic services at the district level and to strengthen GIRoA fiscal and procurement systems from Kabul to the provinces and to districts. The Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) is the GIRoA body that develops policy and plans for sub-national governance. It was authorized by President Karzai in March 2010 to coordinate DDP policy and operational activities among 10 key Ministries and agencies. These key ministries and agencies are the Supreme Court and Attorney General's Office (AGO) for the Justice Sector, the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL), the Ministry of Education (MoE), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the Civil Service Commission, the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the Ministry of Defense (MoD).

A number of donors support the DDP. The USG version of DDP was described in a MOU signed on May 2010, and formally launched via Implementation Letter #1 (IL1), signed on August 2010 by the USAID Mission Director, Minister of Finance, and Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). \$40 million was approved for the two-year program, of which \$24.5 million were sub-committed in August, 2010 to support the first year of activities. So far 1.4 million has been transferred to MoF. The money is allocated to pay salary top-ups and hazard pay for government officials, and to pay for operating and maintenance expenses.¹⁸

The technical design and implementation of DDP is governed by implementation letter (IL) No. 4 signed between USAID, the IDLG and the MoF in August 2011¹⁹. The IL covers fund disbursement details, authorities, contractual obligations, accounting and oversight, and accounting procedures.

The absence of a single authoritative and comprehensive program document was a major concern for GIRoA and donors and created confusion on how to operate the program. From the USG there were memos, implementation letters (IL), A-Z handbook and PMP. Different stakeholders have different views of the DDP objectives and process. For example, in the view of the French it was a stabilization program, for the USG it was a post-transition program and for the U.K. it was governance and stabilization program.

¹⁸ Statement of work for Evaluation of DDP

¹⁹ .S. Mission Handbook to support implementation, A-Z of DDP

Goal:

Due to the lack of authoritative program documentation the program's objectives were determined through reading documents and reports and discussions with key stakeholders in the government and the donors.

The main goal of the DDP is to improve visibility and legitimacy of the government, by delivering important basic services to population at the sub-national level in Key Terrain Districts (KTDs).

Objective:

The objective of the DDP is to build capacity of line ministries at all levels to deliver local public services and have a functioning district level government system.

Output:

The major outputs of the DDP program are as follows:

The DDP program carries out needs assessments in selected districts, and in consultation with stakeholders at the central and local levels prepares “packages” (work plans) of funding and services to be implemented by line ministries at the district level.

Funding of the DDP by USAID is disbursed through the GIROA financial mechanism and budgeting system. The DDP fund flow process starts with the approval of the work plan which includes the budget allocated for each district, to the transfer of funds to the district. The Afghanistan Stabilization Program (ASP), which is a sub office of IDLG, manages the DDP finances for Funding Stream 1.

Sub national government cannot function properly and deliver basic services to the population without qualified and properly trained staff. A major function of the DDP is to provide the necessary tools and resources required for the districts to extend the reach of the government by delivering services to the people. The DDP provides the necessary resources for the districts to fill vacancies that are already listed on the official Tashkeel.

Activities: Major activities of the DDP are as follows.

Finance: The DDP funds three types of expenditures at the district level.


Funding Stream1 funds salaries, and operational and maintenance costs. USAID provides on-budget funds to the MoF to cover salary incentives and operations & maintenance costs in the districts. Stream 2 funds projects that facilitate service delivery during first year of DDP. Stream 3 funds infrastructure projects such as construction or refurbishment of district centers, schools, basic health clinic and other one time infrastructure and refurbishment projects previously from CERP, which are seen as 'last resort' and are winding down as part of the US withdrawal.

Staffing: One of the activities of the DDP is to assess the status of the Tashkeels and initiate the hiring process for vacant positions and identify the need for training through the civil service institute (CSI).

Facilities: Funding Stream 3 supports infrastructure projects such as construction or refurbishment of district centers, schools and other GIROA facilities identified and prioritized by the DDP package.

Implementation Process:

The eight step process in the following figure shows the implementation process from the approval of the district to delivering funds to the district.





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ANNEX B: SCOPE OF WORK

STATEMENT OF WORK for EVALUATION OF THE DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM (DDP)

PROJECT INFORMATION

PROJECT NAME: DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM

CONTRACTOR: N/A

AGREEMENT #: 306-IL-10-04

AGREEMENT VALUE: \$40 MILLION

LIFE OF PROJECT: AUGUST 2010 – FEBRUARY 2013

PROJECT SITES: KEY TERRAIN DISTRICTS IN RC-E, RC-S, RC-W AND RC-N

INTRODUCTION

Formal government in Afghanistan has been largely confined to Kabul, the nation's capital and home to Parliament, the Executive branch, and all line ministries. Sub-national government (SNG) at the provincial, district and sub-district levels is an emerging concept, constrained by a paucity of skilled human resources, challenges to rule of law including the power of tribal warlords, low social capital and insecurity from decades of conflict.

The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and the policies of GIRoA put emphasis on deconcentrating central government, i.e., extending the reach of line Ministries, rather than on decentralizing authority. Line ministries ordinarily have administrative offices at the provincial level and some have offices extending to district level. The Karzai Administration appoints provincial and district officials, further emphasizing the power of central administration. GIRoA entities at the provincial level and below, however, compete with a warlord-feudal structure, and often have little connection to GIRoA in Kabul. Preparation of GIRoA budgets and work plans for line Ministries is largely done by government officials in Kabul with little direct or systematic input from the field.

The District Delivery Program (DDP) was conceived in late 2009 as a means of empowering SNGs and placing greater responsibility for service delivery in the hands of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). In bringing government representation in the districts up to tashkiel (staffing structure) levels, and providing the funds to allow them to deliver services themselves, DDP was intended to build the capacity of GIRoA to actually deliver – and be seen to deliver – needed government services where they are needed most.

BACKGROUND

A number of donors support DDP-like programs. The Germans, French, and British directly fund governance and small-scale development activities in nine districts. The USG version of DDP was described in a MOU signed on May 2010, and formally launched via Implementation Letter #1 (IL1), signed on August 2010 by the USAID Mission Director, Minister of Finance, and Director General of the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG). \$40 million were approved for the two-year program, of which \$24.5 million were sub-committed in August, 2010 to support the first year of activities, with a mortgage of \$15.5 million available for the second year. The money is allocated to pay salary top-ups and hazard pay for government officials, and to pay for operating and maintenance expenses (“Funding Stream #1 – FS1”) for selected line Ministry offices and the district center. Funding for service delivery, provincial capacity building, and other infrastructure activities was to be provided from other resources, such as USAID projects, and the Department of Defense Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. The DDP programs supported by the Germans, French and British directly fund infrastructure projects as well as the costs of establishing and operating GIRoA ministry offices at provincial and district levels.

The IDLG and the MOF are USAID’s primary partners in DDP. Program oversight comes from the District Delivery Working Group (DDWG), an inter-ministerial and donor group convened to designate DDP districts, approve workplans and budgets, and provide ministerial support for approved service delivery projects; and USAID staff based at Regional Platforms, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and District Support Teams. In some instances, a conflict arose between the list of districts approved by DDWG and those that ISAF and the US Mission nominated. For the USG, ISAF and other donors, priority was accorded the Key Terrain Districts and the need to support stabilization in areas cleared by military campaigns. This conflict on district selection now has been largely resolved in favor of Afghan-led decision making. As specified in IL1, an IDLG team would first carry out an assessment of the district on basic services, vacant Tashkeel positions, and required funding. Initially, nine districts were proposed for funding to commence in late 2010; four more would be approved for funding in June 2011.

According to IL1, USAID is to advance funds on a monthly basis to the MOF, based on the IDLG request. IDLG and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) are required to account for the advances through monthly liquidation receipts. In January 2011, USAID advanced \$1.1 million to the MOF to cover the first 30 days. Based upon GIRoA’s partial liquidation, USAID advanced another \$200,000 in the ensuing months – bringing the total advance to more than \$1.3 million. In June 2011, USAID suspended further advances until IDLG and the MoF could account for \$852,000 in unliquidated advances. IDLG has redoubled efforts to gather financial and reporting documents, but limited progress has been made to date. It is important to not underestimate the challenges of obtaining accurate, timely and comprehensive information in the Afghan context.

The DDWG has approved (as of January 2012) 24 districts for possible USG funding. At this stage, additional advances of USAID funds to support the proposed districts is unlikely. Finding workable alternative financing mechanisms would seem essential to making DDP successful and achieving a project “turn around.”

EVALUATION OBJECTIVE

The main objective of this performance evaluation of DDP is to complete a performance evaluation of DDP, reporting on project effectiveness and achievements, and how well (or not) the project has met its objectives and specific benchmarks. Further, the evaluation should assess the reasons (if appropriate) for any project shortcomings. The evaluation team will provide USAID with an independent and unbiased assessment of what did and did not work well in the project, and provide expert findings and recommendations for follow-on projects.

The purpose of this evaluation is to learn from the experiences of DDP and to gain insights as to the impact, if any, DDP has had on its intended beneficiaries and in reaching its goals. The evaluation must look GIRoA’s ability to date to get ministries to work together at the national, provincial and district levels to deliver basic services. More specifically, the evaluation should focus on IDLG/MOF’s pivotal role in the GIRoA-led DDP program, including the effectiveness of the DDWG in terms of meeting expectations of district constituents within its oversight role of the DDP program. The evaluation must consider not only the effectiveness and achievements of the USG financed FS1 on-budget funding stream but also the broader integrated USG financed activities, i.e. USAID and CERP projects, along with those activities of other donors falling within GIRoA led DDP, i.e. the British, French and Germans.

The evaluation will provide USAID with an informed basis to consider changes to the existing program and opportunities to foster synergies with other USAID programs, which would further USG stabilization and transition objectives. The evaluation’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations will provide the Mission with valuable information and insight for decisions about further funding of DDP and other similar activities in Afghanistan. The product of this evaluation will be a final report which evaluates the successes, shortcomings, and lessons learned of DDP activities. The report should include recommendations for future assistance and if USAID programs have particular comparative advantages in areas not addressed by other initiatives.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

The evaluation shall answer the following questions, which are intended to guide, but not limit, the evaluation team’s analytical effort to gauge the challenges, strengths, weaknesses, lessons learned and provide recommendations for the future of the project. For the purposes

of this evaluation, “DDP district” refers to those 13 districts approved for USG funding from January 2011 through July 2011.

How much (if any) do residents of DDP districts today consider their district, provincial and national governments more responsive to their needs than prior to the beginning of funding in January 2011?

How well do district officials understand what DDP is: its goals, processes and methodology?

To what extent are the district tashkiels filled? Have the district tashkiels been filled with women as well as men? Have women received salary top-ups comparable to those of the men? How much credit can DDP take for progress? How were DDP-supported officials selected and what is the level of their experience and competence? Have salary top-ups and hazard pay reduced absenteeism?

How successful were district officials in delivering basic services since the beginning of funding in January 2011 in DDP districts? Are there any outstanding examples of successful (and/or not successful) interventions? What credit do district officials attribute to DDP in improving or providing these services?

What communications and outreach strategies have district officials implemented to build the credibility of GIRoA for improved governance and service delivery? Are there any good or bad examples?

What systems have been implemented at the district and provincial levels to ensure financial management and accountability? Are these sufficient to achieve the level of performance required by the USG and to permit funds to flow regularly to the DDP districts?

What role do district officials take in the budget planning process at the provincial level?

What is the general condition of district facilities? Are they being maintained? Are there any observable differences in those districts which received DDP assistance for improving district facilities with those that did not?

Were there any benefits/disbenefits to GIRoA which were unforeseen in the design of the DDP, particularly the IL and MOU?

What were the major obstacles to successful implementation of DDP?

Has DDP improved communications between Kabul ministries and their provincial and district representatives?

Has IDLG’s role as the representative of local governance to the ministries been strengthened?

To what extent and at what level do ministries participate in the DDWGs? Do they take responsibility for on-budget projects?

METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide answers to the above questions considering the DDP districts from January 2011 through July 2011. The evaluation will be both quantitative and qualitative.

The evaluation will rely largely on qualitative data collection methods including, but not limited to, semi-structured interviews, direct observation at project sites, focus groups of stakeholders and project beneficiaries, and documentation reviews. Where feasible and appropriate, efforts will be made to incorporate quantitative methods to measure program impact by reconstructing the baseline project scenario ex post at key project sites using secondary data, project data, recall methods, perception surveys, and interviews/surveys with key informants, among other tools. Data collected in this manner will be vetted for consistency with qualitative findings.

In addition, the team will decide on selection criteria for a sample of project staff and target beneficiaries to be interviewed and/or surveyed. Thus, the Evaluation Team will decide on final selection of the methods and instruments to be used during the field visit and prepare for the data collection exercise in the field. Upon the completion of the development of data collection methods, strategy and survey/interview/focus group questions, the team shall present the methods, strategy and questions to USAID for approval prior to proceeding. The following methods for the evaluation are highly recommended:

Literature Review: The evaluation team will conduct a thorough literature review of existing relevant documentation such as studies, reports, assessments, etc. produced by public and private sources, and will analyze the data therein. A range of documents will be provided by the USAID Stabilization Unit to the Evaluation Team for review prior to arriving in-country. The results of the document review will inform the data collection design and implementation. Finally, at the conclusion of document review, the evaluation team will outline preliminary field visit plans to observe, learn and assess the 13 DDP districts as well as relevant actors in the MoF and IDLG.

Field Visits: The evaluation team will plan and coordinate all the necessary logistics for the qualitative and quantitative collection of data at the field level. To the greatest extent possible, each type of activity under DDP should be visited at the field level. Due to security concerns, advanced planning will be required for field visits and the team should coordinate closely with USAID/Afghanistan staff in the Stab U office. The team shall submit its field visit plan for USAID approval prior to proceeding.

Checklists or Questionnaire: The evaluation team should develop checklists and/or questionnaires to ensure consistency in data collection. The evaluation team shall submit the checklists and/or questionnaire for USAID approval prior to use. See also Development of Evaluation Methods section below.

Focus Group Discussions: The evaluation may include focus group discussions with USAID/Afghanistan Stab U staff, USAID/Afghanistan field staff, IDLG and MoF staff, local leaders, US Embassy, Interagency Provincial Affairs (IPA), other donors and organizations working in Afghanistan, etc.

Individual/Key Informant Interviews: The evaluation may include individual discussions with USAID Stab U staff, USAID field staff, IDLG and MoF staff, local leaders, US Embassy/IPA, other donors and organizations working in Afghanistan, etc.

REQUIREMENTS AND DELIVERABLES

In-Briefing: The Evaluation Team, upon arrival to Afghanistan, shall meet the USAID/Afghanistan DDP team for introduction; presentation of the Team's understanding of the assignments, initial assumptions, evaluation questions, etc.; discuss and answer questions on initial work plan; and/or adjust SOW if necessary, etc.

Work Plan: The Evaluation Team shall provide an initial work plan prior to the arrival of international consultants in country, and the revised work plan within 3 days after the in-briefing. The work plan may include suggestions for revisions in the statement of work, evaluation design and methodologies, and an outline of the evaluation report. The work plan shall reflect the evaluation team's schedule for interviews, data collection, field visits, report writing, and periodic interim briefings/updates with USAID.

Interim Briefings/Updates: The evaluation team shall provide regular interim briefings/updates --via email, phone, and meeting -- to the USAID DDP team. Weekly meetings will be held at USAID (when possible) or via teleconference.

NOTE: The field work, data collection and analysis are all to be completed at sites in Afghanistan. In addition, the team is expected to produce a completed draft Evaluation Report prior to departure. The team may depart three working days after submission of a complete draft report acceptable to USAID. Communication with USAID as described in items d) through g) shall be done electronically.

Draft Evaluation Report: The outline of the Evaluation Report shall be approved by USAID. A draft report shall be submitted to USAID four days prior to the presentation of evaluation findings to USAID and other USG agencies.

Discussion and Review of Draft Evaluation Report: The evaluation team will submit a draft of the Evaluation Report to USAID, which will then provide preliminary comments prior to the presentation. The Team will submit the completed Draft Report four days prior to the presentation. USAID will have approximately two days to return their comments, and the evaluation team will have two days to make any changes prior to the presentation.

Presentation of Evaluation Findings to USAID and other USG agencies: After the completed Draft Report has been submitted and the Team has left Afghanistan, the evaluation team shall present the evaluation findings to USAID and other USG agencies via VTC (video teleconferencing). This session shall also be used to further solicit comments and clarify issues.

Final Report: The final evaluation report shall be submitted to USAID by the Evaluation Team Leader no later than 7 working days upon receiving USAID comments. The final report should contain an Executive Summary of not more than five pages and should clearly identify the team's findings, conclusions and recommendations. Appendices should, at a minimum, list the people and organizations interviewed, the Evaluation SOW, evaluation framework and instruments used, success stories, reports on information and data collection, and references cited. The final report should be single spaced, using Times New Roman font size 12, with each page numbered consecutively. Items such as graphs, charts, should be included in a maximum of 30 pages (excluding annexes). Specific Criteria for the expected quality of the final report are included in Section IX Evaluation Report Requirement below.

TEAM COMPOSITION AND QUALIFICATIONS

The Evaluation Team shall consist of four persons: two international consultants and two local consultants.

A. The Evaluation Team Leader (one, international) must have:

- Advanced degree in finance, municipal planning, public administration, or a related field.
- At least 10 years professional experience in project evaluation.
- Demonstrated ability in planning and conducting impact evaluations in governance programs.
- Possess a broad understanding of issues relative to SNG in developing countries (ideally conflict countries), and in particular the Afghanistan Sub National Governance Plan, the Kabul Process, and the Afghanistan Pilot Budget Project.
- Proven ability to analyze data collected as part of program evaluations and developing reports, including program recommendations.
- Proven writing and leadership skills.
- Excellent written and verbal communications skills; ability to communicate ideas effectively and to write quickly and clearly under pressure.
- Familiarity with USAID project planning, implementation, and evaluation processes.
- In-depth knowledge of development issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan is an advantage.
- Strong interpersonal skills and demonstrated track record of working in a team environment with multiple priorities and tight deadlines.
- Must be fluent in English.

B. Team Members:

Sub-national Governance Specialist (one, international):

- Advanced degree in budgeting, municipal planning, public administration, or related field.
- At least 5 years professional experience in project evaluation.
- Demonstrated ability in planning and conducting impact evaluations in governance programs.
- Possess a broad understanding of issues relative to SNG in developing countries, and in particular the Afghanistan Sub National Governance Plan.
- Excellent written and verbal communications skills; ability to communicate ideas effectively and to write quickly and clearly under pressure.
- Strong interpersonal skills and demonstrated track record of working in a team environment with multiple priorities and tight deadlines.
- Must be fluent in English.

Sub-national Governance Specialist (one, local):

- University degree in economics, business, public administration or related field.
- At least 3 years of working experience in finance or sub-national government.
- Familiarity with various donor supported projects and efforts to support SNG.
- Must be fluent in English.

Local Translator/Logistician (one, local):

1. University degree in economics, business, public administration or related field.
2. At least 3 years experience providing logistical and translation support for expatriate consultant teams.
3. Must be fluent in English.

ESTIMATED LEVEL OF EFFORT (LOE)

It is anticipated that fieldwork for this assignment shall start o/a February 5, 2012, and is expected to take a total of 40 working days. Document review, prior to arrival in country of the ex-pats, will consist of four workdays for each consultant team member. The local logistician shall be allotted four workdays for arranging initial meetings and other logistical arrangements prior to the start of fieldwork. Each of the four team members will have five workdays to work on the draft report. This is included in the days in country, and the Team Leader will have five additional workdays, with the rest of the Team contributing two days to prepare the final evaluation report. A six-day workweek will be allowed.

Position	Preparation n (days)	Travel (days)	In-Country (days) (field work & draft report	In Country Final report	Total (days)
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			preparation)	(days)	
Evaluation Team Leader	-	4	40	8	52
Sub-National Governance Specialist	-	4	40	8	52
Local Sub-National Governance Specialist	-	--	48	--	48
Local Translator/Logistician	-	--	48	--	48
Total LOE (days)		8	176	16	200

EVALUATION REPORT REQUIREMENTS

The evaluation report shall include the following:

Title Page

Table of Contents

List of any acronyms, tables, or charts (if needed)

Acknowledgements or Preface (optional)

Executive Summary (not to exceed 5 pages, see also g) final report under VI. Requirements and Deliverables)

Introductory Chapter

A description of the program evaluated, including goals and objectives.

Brief statement of why the program was evaluated, including a list of the main evaluation questions.

Brief statement on the methods used in the evaluation such as desk/document review, interviews, site visits, surveys, etc.

Findings – Describe the findings, focusing on each of the questions the evaluation was intended to answer. Organize the findings to answer the evaluation questions.

Conclusions – This section will include value statements that both interpret the facts and evidence and describe what each mean.

Recommendations – This section will include actionable statements of what remains to be done, consistent with the evaluation’s purpose, and based on the evaluation’s findings and conclusions. This section will provide judgments on what changes need to be made for future USAID programming. Since this is a country-wide and all Mission activity, this section should also recommend ways to improve the performance of future USAID programming and project implementation; ways to solve problems this program has faced; identify adjustments/corrections that need to be made; and recommend actions and/or decisions to be taken by management.

Annex

Statement of Work

Places visited; people interviewed

Methodology description

Copies of all survey instruments and questionnaires

Critical background documents

Copies of any key documents reviewed

SUPERVISION AND LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE

The Evaluation Team will report to Julie Pekowski (jpekowski@usaid.gov) and Victor Myev (myevv2@state.gov), Stabilization Unit, USAID/Afghanistan. Designated USAID/Afghanistan staff will review all reports and attend briefings. USAID/Afghanistan and DDP staff will assist in arranging appointments with officials, private sector representatives and other donors for the evaluation team. The evaluation team is responsible for necessary field visit logistical arrangements for field data collection.

ANNEX C: EVALUATION DESIGN MATRIX

DDP Evaluation Objectives:						
how cost- effective is DDP including DDWG?						
what has DDP achieved - did it meet its objectives and benchmarks?						
make recommendations - the way forward (phase 2)						
lesson learned e.g. USAID management of DDP						
design DDP, compare to UK, German and French						
Evaluation Specific Questions:	Measures or Indicators	Info Source[s]	type of evaluation design	type of sampling	data collection instruments	data analysis
citizen response to GIRoA	personal opinion of District resident	citizen	goal-free question	random	ad hoc survey of residents at District Centres	collate and sort responses
district officials understanding of DDP		district official		selected	SSIG **	
tashkeel filled		LM HR depts.		selected	SSIG	
services delivered due to DDP		LM DMs		selected	SSIG	
DDP communication & outreach		IDLG Comm dept.		selected	SSIG	
financial management systems		LM Finance depts.		selected	SSIG	
district officials involved in budgeting		district officials		selected	SSIG	
facilities improvements	inspect facility	direct on-site observation		selected	SSIG	
unexpected results		key informants		selected	SSIG	
obstacles to implementation		key informants		selected	SSIG	
Line Ministry commm/coord Kabul-Prov-district		key informants		selected	SSIG	
IDLG as key agency for local governance		key informants		selected	SSIG	
LMs and DDWG		key informants		selected	SSIG	
** SSIG = semi-structured interview guide						

ANNEX D: MAIN DOCUMENTS REFERENCED

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ANNEX E: MEETINGS AND PERSONS MET

List of the People met by District Delivery Program Evaluation Team								
No. of Meetings	No.	Date	Name	Organization	Position	Phone #	E-mail	Province
1	1	2.4.2012	Bill Mays	CHECCHI	Director of Administration	0796 233 987	bmays@checchiconsulting.com	Kabul
2	2	2.5.2012	Ezatullah Ahmadzai	IDLG	Transition Manager		ezatullah.ahmadzai@idlg.gov.af	Kabul
3	3	2.7.2012	Robbin Burkhart	USAID	Controller			Kabul
	4	2.7.2012	Ron Barkley	Department of State	Interagency Provincial Affairs	0790 643 251	barkleyrb@state.gov	Kabul
	5	2.7.2012	David Thompson	USAID/ODG	Director			Kabul
	6	2.7.2012	Maggie Rajaja	USAID/OPPD				Kabul
4	7	2.8.2012	Dr. Sibghat	IDLG	Director		khan.sibghat@yahoo.com	Kabul
5	8	2.11.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Kabul
	9	2.11.2012	Vic Myev	USAID	DDP	0700 104 740	myevv2@state.gov	Kabul
	10	2.11.2012	Monty Worthington	USAID	Field Program Officer/RC-East,	0777 301 195	mworthington@state.gov	Kabul

					DST-Laghman			
6	11	2.12.2012	Anne Davies	CHANNEL/DFID	Evaluation Consultant		annedavies99@yahoo.co.uk	Kabul
	12	2.12.2012	Andre Kalhmeyer	CHANNEL/DFID	Evaluation Consultant		kalhmeyer@channelresearch.com	Kabul
6	13	2.12.2012	Vic Myev	USAID	DDP	0700 104 740	myevv2@state.gov	Kabul
	14	2.12.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Kabul
7	15	2.12.2012	Dr. Sibghat	IDLG	Director			
	16	2.12.2012	S. Masood Hashimi	IDLG	Program Manager	0786 303 333	smasoodhashimi@gmail.com	Kabul
	17	2.12.2012	Naila Baheer	IDLG	Assistant to Director	0700 173 215	ddp.afg@gmail.com	Kabul
8	18	2.12.2012	Ab. Rahman Rasekh	IARCSC	DG of Provincial Affairs	0777 404 845	abrasikh@gmail.com	Kabul
	19	2.12.2012	Fawad Karmand	IARCSC	Director of Local Program	0700 228 970	fskarmand@gmail.com	Kabul
9	20	2.12.2012	M. Cael Coleman	USAID	Field Program Officer	0793 370 770	Mcoleman@usaid.gov	Kabul
10	21	2.14.2012	M. Nader Yama	IDLG	Director for Strategy & Programs	0700 171 045	nader.yama@gmail.com	Kabul
	22	2.14.2012	Hamed Sarwary	IDLG	M&E Specialist	0799 396 201	hsarwary@yahoo.com	Kabul
	23	2.14.2012	Ehsanullah Fayeque	IDLG	M&E Specialist	0786 677 663	ehsan.ddp@gmail.com	Kabul
11	24	2.14.2012	M. Ehsan Hail	Ministry of Finance	Manager of Good Governance, Rule of Law, and Human	0700 246 629	ehsan.hail@yahoo.com	Kabul

					Rights Sector			
12	25	2.14.2012	Adam Smith	USAID	Field Program Officer	0700 323 277		Kabul
13	26	2.15.2012	Adam Briendel	CHECCHI	SR. M&E Manager	0706 615 739	abriendel@checcicon.sulting.com	Kabul
14	27	2.16.2012	Francesca Stidston	DFID	District Approach Coordinator	0794 155 502	f-stidston@dfic.gov.uk	Kabul
15	28	2.16.2012	Olivier Crone	French Embassy/ Stabilization Team	Governance Officer		olivier.crone@diplomatie.gouv.fr	Kabul
	29	2.16.2012	Amaury Halle	French Embassy/ Stabilization Team	Deputy Project Manager		amaury.halle@diplomatie.gouv.fr	Kabul
	30	2.16.2012	Germain Groll	French Embassy/ Stabilization Team	Deputy Head/ Deputy Senior Civilian Representatives		germain.groll@diplomatie.gouv.fr	Kabul
	31	2.16.2012	Christophe Pradier	French Embassy/ Stabilization Team	Manager for France's DDP		christophe.pradier@diplomatie.gouv.fr	Kabul
16	32	2.19.2012	Dr. Sibghat	IDLG	Director		khan.sibghat@yahoo.com	Kabul
17	33	2.20.2012	Vic Myev	USAID	DDP	0700 104 740	myevv2@state.gov	Kabul
	34	2.20.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Kabul
17	35	2.20.2012	Dr. Sibghat	IDLG	DDP Head		sibghat.khan@yahoo.com	Kabul
	36	2.20.2012	Sharif Fayez		Deputy Director of DDP	0786 650 075	sharif.fayez@idlg.gov.af	Kabul

	37	2.20.201 2	Baryalai	IDLG	Advisor/CSC	0772 288 533	baryal.baryalai@gmail.com	Kabul
	38	2.20.201 2	S. Masood Hashimi	IDLG	Program Manager	0786 303 333	smasoodhashimi@gmail.com	Kabul
	39	2.20.201 2	Ehsanullah Fayezi	IDLG	M&E Specialist	0786 677 663	ehsan.ddp@gmail.com	Kabul
	40	2.20.201 2	Dr. Shafiq	IDLG	Team Leader	0797 846 519	shafiq_ullah7@yahoo.com	Kabul
	41	2.20.201 2	Dr Emal	IDLG	DDP Advisor	0700 210 456	dr_emal@yahoo.com	Kabul
	42	2.20.201 2	Ghayasuddin	IDLG		0784 556 284	ghays264@gmail.com	Kabul
	43	2.20.201 2	Nasir Figar	IDLG	Program Manager	0788 780 126	nasir.figar@gmail.com	Kabul
	44	2.20.201 2	Hamed Sarwary	IDLG	M&E Specialist	0799 396 201	hsarwary@yahoo.com	Kabul
18	45	2.20.201 2	Sharif Fayezi	IDLG	Deputy Director of DDP	0786 650 075	sharif.fayezi@idlg.gov.af	Kabul
19	46	2.21.201 2	Jodi Rosenstein	USAID	FPO		Jrosenteine@usaid.gov	Kabul
20	47	2.22.201 2	Dr. Muslimyar	Saydabad District	District Governor			Wardak
	48	2.22.201 2	Akhtar M.	Saydabad District	Prosecutor			Wardak
	49	2.22.201 2	Abdul Malek	Saydabad District	Manager of Education			Wardak
	50	2.22.201 2	M. Farid	Saydabad District	Manager of Agriculture			Wardak
20	51	2.22.201 2	M. Taher	Dept. of State	DST Officer			Wardak

21	52		Mike McDaniel	USAID	Maydah Shahr DST Team Leader		-	Wardak
22	53		Colin L. Kiser	Dept. of State	Senior Governance Specialist	0702 591 778	KiserCL@state.gov	Wardak
23	54		Victor Myev	USAID	DDP Mmgt. Comm.		-	Wardak
24	55		Colin Guest	USAID	Director of Model Outreach		-	Kandahar
25	56	2.25.201 2	Andrew Haviland	Dept. of State	Senior Civilian Representative	0794 001 090	Havilandab@state.gov	Kandahar
26	57	2.25.201 2	Billy Woodward	USAID	FPO	0702 592 392	BWoodward@usaid.gov	Kandahar
27	58	2.26.201 2	Prof. Toryalai Wesa	Governor House	Governor	0776 484 878	toorwesa@gmail.com	Kandahar
	59	2.26.201 2	Dr. Najib	Governor House	Chief of Staff			
28	60	2.26.201 2	Haji Niaz M. Sarhadi	Zhari District	District Governor	0700 313 158		Kandahar
	61	2.26.201 2	M. Hashem	Zhari District	Prosecutor	0702 150 912		Kandahar
	62	2.26.201 2	S. M. Yousof	Zhari District	Education Manager	0700 329 460		Kandahar
	63	2.26.201 2	Saraj A. Khan	Daman District	District Governor	0700 301 823		
29	64	2.26.201 2	M. Amin Kamin	Governor House	Director of Admin/Finance			
	65	2.26.201 2	Azim Khan Ahmadzai	Mostafiat	Finance director	707181893		
	66	2.26.201 2	Abdul Hanan	Kandahar gov office	Finance officer	700301038		
30	67	2.27.201	Michael L.	Dept. of State	International	0793371081	Cygrymusml@state.gov	Kandahar

		2	Cygrymus		Relations Officer	0702592593	<u>v</u>	
	68	2.27.201 2	Brian Shea	DST Arghandab	General Development Officer	0793 370 908	-	Kandahar
	69	2.27.201 2	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer	0793 370 767	<u>Jpekowski@usaid.gov</u>	Kandahar
31	70	2.27.201 2	M Yuosuf	DG office Arghandab	Administration manager	773227101		Kandahar
	71	2.27.201 2	Khairullah	DG office	Extension Manager	796075984		Kandahar
	72	2.27.201 2	Haji Fayez m	Arghandab District	Education Manager	700330955		Kandahar
32	73	2.27.201 2	Haji Shah m. Ahmadi	Arghandab District	Arghandab DG			Kandahar
	74	2.27.201 2	Haji ahmadulah khan alko	Ashraf school principal	Principle	700339231		Kandahar
34	75	2.27.201 2	M Fahim	Arghandab Court Office	Prosecutor	0700517719 0789428019		Kandahar
	76	2.27.201 2	Rahmatullah	Arghandab Court Office	Court Writer	799136586		Kandahar
	77	2.27.201 2	M Nasim	Arghandab Court Office	Judge	796869981		Kandahar
	78	2.27.201 2	Mansoorullah	Arghandab Court Office	Judge	776512582		Kandahar
	79	2.27.201 2	M Nabi Mazllom	Arghandab Court Office	Prosecutor	700326564		Kandahar
35	80	2.28.201 2	Cip C. Jungberg	USAID/DAND DST	General Development Officer	793371077	<u>Cjungberg@usaid.gov</u>	Kandahar
36	81	2.28.201 2	Ahmadullah Nazak	DAND District	DG	799293116	-	Kandahar
37	82	2.28.201	Douglas Grindle	USAID	FPO		<u>Dgrinlle@usaid.gov</u>	Kandahar

		2						
	83	2.28.2012	Cip C. Jungberg	USAID/DAND DST	General Development Officer	793371077	Cjungberg@usaid.gov	Kandahar
38	84	2.28.2012	Zakeria	DAND District	Sectorial manager	706691652	-	Kandahar
	85	2.28.2012	M karim Kamin	IDLG DDP	IDLG DDP Advisor	703238609	Karimkamin@rocketmail.com	Kandahar
39	86	2.28.2012	Abdul Ahad	Dand district	Education Manager	704287600		Kandahar
	87	2.28.2012	Esmatullah	Chiplani school principal	Chiplani school	700903124		Kandahar
	88	2.28.2012	Amanullah	Education Advisor	Dand Education Department	700346106		Kandahar
40	89	2.29.2012	Trisha Bury	USAID/SPB FOB	FPO/DST	0793 371 027	Tbury@usaid.gov	Kandahar
	90	2.29.2012	Josh Rosenblum	USAID/SPB FOB	FPO		-	Kandahar
	91	2.29.2012	Ab. Aziz Haqparast	USAID/SPB FOB	Political assistant	0796660349 0702593065	-	Kandahar
41	92	3.01.2012	Haji ab ghani muslemyar	Spin Boldak District	DG	700300361		Kandahar
	93	3.01.2012	Ghulam Hazrat	Spin Boldak District	Executive Manager	797283997		Kandahar
42	94	3.01.2012	Haji Badurdin Badar	Spin Boldak District	Education manager			Kandahar
	95	3.01.2012	Haji Ab. Ghani Ghaznavi	Spin Boldak District	Agriculture manager	700346819		Kandahar
	96	3.01.2012	Dr Rashid Alokozai	Spin Boldak District	Health Manager	703009006	Drrashid_alokozai@yahoo.com	Kandahar
43	97	3.01.2012	William Hewett	Spin Boldak FOB	Civil Affairs Officer			Kandahar


		2	(Capt.)					
44	98	3.01.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer-Special Projects	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Kandahar
	99	3.01.2012	Tom Pope	USAID	Sr. Development Officer		tpope@usaid.gov	Kandahar
	100	3.01.2012	Lea Swanson	USAID/Stability	Director		lswanson@usaid.gov	Kandahar
	101	3.01.2012	Rich Pacheco	Dept. of State	Governance Lead		pachecoR2@state.gov	Kandahar
	102	3.01.2012	John Wagner	USAID	General Development Officer		iwagner@usaid.gov	Kandahar
	103	3.01.2012	Brian Shea	USAID	General Development Officer		bshea@state.gov	Kandahar
45	104	3.03.2012	Lajla Catic	IDLG	PFM Advisor	0706 783 992	lejla.catic@gmail.com	Kabul
46	105	3.03.2012	Dr. Sibghat Khan	IDLG/DDP	Head of DDP	0771 171 416	sibghat.khan@yahoo.com	Kabul
47	106	3.06.2012	Mike Dempsey	USAID	FPO		Mcdempsey@usaid.gov	Nangarhar
	107	3.06.2012	Pnina Levermore	USAID	FPO		plevermore@usaid.gov	Nangarhar
	108	3.06.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer-Special Projects	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Nangarhar
48	109	3.06.2012	CPT. James Hanson	PRT-Nangarhar	Civil Affairs			Nangarhar
	110	3.06.2012	1st Lt. Ingrid Alvarez	PRT-DST Behsud	Civil Affairs			Nangarhar
	111	3.06.2012	Lt. Col. Willmarth	Fineley shields			martin.willmarth@afghan.swa.army.mil	Nangarhar
	112	3.06.2012	CPL. Martinez				augie.martinez@afgha	Nangarhar

		2					n.swa.army.mil	r
	113	3.06.2012	SPC. Trapp					Nangarhar
49	114	3.07.2012	Lt Col John C. Notter	FOB J abad	PRT commander	0799214 330	John.notter@swa.army.mil	Nangarhar
	115	3.07.2012	Lt Cornel Beckley					Nangarhar
	116	3.07.2012	Lt.Col. Turner					Nangarhar
	117	3.07.2012	Captain Leach					Nangarhar
	118	3.07.2012	Captain Norton					Nangarhar
50	119	3.07.2012	Richard H. Riley, IV	Dept. of State	Senior Civilian Representative	793371072	Rileyrh@state.gov	Nangarhar
	120	3.07.2012	Shapor Khan Raz	PRT-Nangarhar	DST KUZ KUNAR		-	Nangarhar
	121	3.07.2012	Pnina Levermore	USAID	FPO		plevermore@usaid.gov	Nangarhar
	122	3.07.2012	Chris Rienstadler	KUZ KUNAR DST	FPO	0793 371 091	-	Nangarhar
	123	3.07.2012	Sidiqullah Reshteya	PRT-Nangarhar	Political Assistant		-	Nangarhar
	124	3.07.2012	S Fazal Amin	Rodat District	Political Assistant		-	Nangarhar
	125	3.07.2012	Sean	Dept. of State			-	Nangarhar
51	126	3.07.2012	Major James Aams	NGR PRT	Civil Affairs		-	Nangarhar
	127	3.07.2012	Alvarez	NGR PRT			-	Nangarhar


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	128	3.07.2012	James Hanson	NGR PRT				Nangarhar
	129	3.07.2012	Willmarth	NGR PRT				Nangarhar
52	130	3.07.2012	Haji Hazrat Khan	Rodat District	District Governor	0700 606 150		Nangarhar
	131	3.07.2012	Habib Rahman	Rodat District	Admin/Finance Manager	0776 297 978		Nangarhar
53	132	3.07.2012	M. Alam Eshaqzai	Mustofiat	Mustaofi	0777 254 637		Nangarhar
54	133	3.07.2012	Sayed Ali Akbar	Surkhrod District	District Governor	0700 628 571		Nangarhar
55	134	3.07.2012	Haji Zalmai	Shinwar(Ghani Khail) District	District Governor	0799 364 287, 0777 740 413		Nangarhar
	135	3.07.2012	Fateh Gul	Shinwar(Ghani Khail) District	Executive Manager	0700 602 561		Nangarhar
56	136	3.07.2012	Qareebullah Hejrat	Governor House	Admin/Finance Director General	0788 188 688	q.hijrat@yahoo.com	Nangarhar
	137	3.07.2012	Saif Rahman Seerat	Governor House	Executive Manager	0799 202 542		Nangarhar
57	138	3.08.2012	Lajla Catic	IDLG	PFM Advisor	0706 783 992	lejla.catic@gmail.com	Kabul
58	139	3.11.2012	Julie E. Pekowski	USAID	Stabilization Officer-Special Projects	0793 370 767	Jpekowski@usaid.gov	Kabul
59	140	3.12.2012	Dr. Sibghat Khan	IDLG/DDP	Head of DDP	0771 171 416	sibghat.khan@yahoo.com	Kabul

ANNEX F: IDLG AND DDP/CST ORGANOGRAMS
(As Provided by IDLG)

IDLG Org Structure



DDP/CST Org Structure



ANNEX G: INTERVIEW GUIDE

DDP Performance Evaluation – Interview Guide

General categories of information for the performance evaluation of the District Delivery Program – questions will be tailored to match informants as appropriate.

1. What are DDP’s objectives, benchmarks and desired results? Are they clearly documented and well known by key stakeholders at all levels?
2. What effects have DDP’s activities had on ministries’ ability to work together at national, provincial and district levels to provide basic services to the public? Examples?
3. How effective has the DDWG been in guiding DDP activities?
4. What effect has the DDP had on the government’s financial management systems?
5. What effect has the DDP had on the government’s staffing systems?
6. To what extent has the DDP improved subnational government facilities?
7. To what extent has the DDP supported gender equity? Examples?
8. What do you see as DDP’s shortcomings?
9. What do you see as DDP’s achievements and success factors?
10. What (if anything) should donors do in the future to increase their ability to help the government improve services in the districts?
11. Goal-free evaluation type question for members of the public: “How have things changed around here over the past year or so?” with a follow-up question probing perception of expectations and changes in government performance.

Categories of Informants

1. DDP Director and key staff
2. Donor representatives
3. IDLG managers
4. Ministry of Finance managers
5. Civil Service Commission managers
6. Mustofiat representatives
7. Military and security sector representatives – Kabul and subnational
8. Line Ministry representatives – Kabul and subnational
9. Provincial governors’ office representatives
10. District governors’ office representatives
11. District-level civil servants
12. Members of the public

ANNEX H: SOW QUESTIONS VS. INTERVIEW GUIDE QUESTIONS

Semi Structured Questions (Interview Guide)	Evaluation Questions (SOW)												
	1, Objectives of DDP Understood	2, DDP effect on L.M.	3, DDWG role in guiding DDP activities	4, DDP effect on guiding Financial Management	5, DDP effect on GIROA government taskkils	6, DDP improve taskkils	7, DDP & gender	8, DDP improve facilities	9, DDP shortcomings	10, DDP achievements	11, Donors help government	12, public perception	
1, Residents consider government more response													
2, District officials understand DDP	x												
3, Tashkieis filled				x									
4, Delivering basic services								x					
5, Communication & outreach strategies		x											
6, Financial management			x										
7, Budget planning			x										
8, District facilities					x								
9, Implementation letter & MoU								x					
10, Obstacles to implementation							x						
11, Communication between Kabul LM		x											
12, IDLG's role		x											
13, Ministry participation in DDWGs		x	x										
<p>Evaluation question 1 through 13 are part of the original SoW. After carefully analyzing the questions in light of evaluation objectives, questions were revised and turned into 11 more focused and with sequence questions, shown in horizontal line. Each semi structured question is related to atleast one question on the evaluation questions. in this way, all the concerns raised at the SoW questions are addressed.</p>													

ANNEX I: RESULTS TABLE FOR USAID-FUNDED DDP DISTRICTS

Questions	Status of USAID Funded DDP Districts																
	13 DDP Districts funded by USAID	Agehandab	Baraki Barak	Behsud	Darman	Dand	Panjiwayee	Qargahyee	Rodat	Saydabad	Shinwar(Ghani Khil)	Spin Boldak	Surkh Rod	Zhari	Total	Average	
2	Provinces	KDR	LGR	NGR	KDR	KDR	KDR	LGN	NGR	WDK	NGR	KDR	NGR	KDR	5		
3	Population in 1000	180	23	18.4	74	168	90	325	280	180	198	250	326	150	2,262	174	
4	No. of citizens visit DC daily BEFORE DDP	3	0	110	12	135	0	0	250	70	65	60	70	3	778	60	
5	No. of citizens visit DC daily AFTER DDP	125	0	175	40	250	0	0	300	190	110	105	130	140	1565	120	
6	Work plan Prepared	10/20/10	10/6/10	12/11/10	2/6/11	10/20/10	10/20/10	10/20/10	1/24/11	12/11/10	1/22/11	2/6/11	12/11/10	10/20/10	N/A		
7	Work Plan Approved	10/24/10	10/24/10	12/22/10	6/7/11	10/24/10	10/24/10	10/24/10	6/7/11	12/22/10	6/7/11	6/7/11	12/22/10	10/24/10			
8	Annual Budget in WP for tops/hazard (\$) in 1000	101	109	124	102	110	106	119	140	124	124	119	139	104			1,521
9	No. Positions on tashkeel in DC	36	45	45	36	38	39	39	53	46	50	47	64	37	575	44	
10	Positions on Tashkeel at Pay & Grading level (i.e.	Number	15	25	25	17	24	21	23	20	23	26	25	28	21	293	23
		Percentage	42	60	55	55	70	55	55	40	50	51	50	40	60	683	53
11	No Vacancies BEFORE DDP	2	8		8	35				41		43			137	23	
12	No. Vacancies AFTER DDP	0	0			3				5	3	21			32	5	
13	Number months districts received 'top ups' before funding halted	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	6.5	3	3	42.5	3.3	
14	O&M budget from DDP for districts in \$ 1000	151	136	151	151	154	138	154	151	151	151	150	151	153	1,942	149,385	
15	O&M budget received to date as	Percentage	17	17	25	23	13	7	0	23	24	23	24	25	10	231	18
		Amount in \$ 1000	25	24	38	35	20	10	0	35	36	35	36	37	15	346	26,615
16	Number projects listed in WP	37	16	24	34	19	34	23	80	22	46	50	26	27	438	34	

ANNEX J: SIMILAR USG PROGRAMS AFGHANISTAN

USAID-Kabul Funded Stabilization Programs			
Name	Description	Affiliated Offices	Status
Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP)	The ACAP project provides support for Afghan civilian families and communities that have suffered losses resulting from military operations between coalition forces and insurgents. These grants provide relatively small-scale assistance packages, also known as kits, to Afghan families that have suffered losses such as death, bodily injury, and substantial damage to property. Eligible families receive a standard kit containing essential items for the home, children’s education, and tailoring supplies. Some families receive additional assistance and can choose a grocery kit, rural livelihoods kit, or haberdashery kit.	Office of Stabilization	Completed
Afghan Civilian Assistance Program –II (ACAP II)	The ACAP II project will build upon the success of ACAP to assist Afghan families suffering loss, injury, or battle damage caused by U.S. or coalition military operations against insurgent groups. The project will immediately respond to the unique circumstances of affected families with appropriate emergency aid and tailored livelihood assistance. Assistance may be in the form of packages of essential goods, medical referrals, vocational training and referral support, business startup support, and referrals of victims to other complementary assistance programs. Special consideration is given to the needs of primary breadwinners and women beneficiaries. To help ensure that networks are in place for the accurate and efficient delivery of assistance to beneficiaries, USAID will work closely with government entities at the sub-national level, particularly the Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, and other key stakeholders such as the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, United Nations, U.S. Government agencies, NATO forces, and Afghan civilians to ensure timely, responsive, and coordinated efforts improve the accurate and efficient delivery of assistance.		Ongoing
		Office of	Ongoing

Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)	USAID supports the ARTF, which is a partnership between the international community and the Afghan government for the improved effectiveness of the reconstruction effort. ARTF is administered by the World Bank and all support is on-budget, directed through the Ministry of Finance to the relevant line ministries. Since early 2002, 30 donors have pledged more than \$4.3 billion, making the ARTF the largest contributor to the Afghan budget – for both operating costs and development programs. ARTF’s support for national priority programs, for costs of government operations, and for the policy reform agenda is contributing to the achievement of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy goals. USAID has obligated \$971 million to date, of which, \$590 million has been preferenced in support of the National Solidary Program implemented through the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development.	Stabilization	
Community Based Stabilization Grants (CBSG)	The Community-Based Stabilization Grants (CBSG) project, in support of counterinsurgency, helps “hold” communities after military operations and insulate unstable communities from further insurgent intrusion. The project addresses drivers of instability through grants to community-based organizations or community development councils in 14 targeted provinces in the northern, western, and central regions of Afghanistan. CBSG is an “Afghan First” project, implemented through Afghan non-governmental organizations. Under CBSG, USAID supports eligible community-based organizations to work with the Afghan government to identify sources of instability and undertake small-scale community level projects such as rehabilitation of irrigation canals, schools, health clinics and public meeting halls, purchase of commodities or equipment for such community facilities, and support for capacity-building training, peace jirgas and women’s projects. The projects are limited in size – the maximum grant award is \$25,000 – and generally take no more than three months to complete.	Office of Stabilization	Ongoing
Community Development Program-Kabul (CDP-K)	The CDP-K project promotes temporary employment and income in targeted populations with the intended effects of reducing food insecurity and promoting stability. The strategic objective is to provide short-term job opportunities for food insecure households of Kabul City and surrounding areas to improve family income amongst the vulnerable population of Kabul	Office of Stabilization	Completed

	Province. USAID implements activities in Kabul in collaboration with the Kabul Municipality, Kabul provincial governor’s office, Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Development, and Ministry of Women’s Affairs. Project activities also brings added benefits to the province through improved infrastructure and community assets, improved green zones including construction of concrete boundary walls of Bagrami and Bibi Mahru public parks, and enhanced agricultural land and irrigation facilities. In addition CDP also facilitates community disaster risk reduction programming and skills training aimed at household income generation in target communities.		
Community Development Program-North (North)	CDP-N promotes stability through temporary employment and income generation in targeted populations to reduce the number of unemployed Afghans joining the insurgency. The project covers Balkh, Bamyán, Faryab, Takhar, Kapisa, Baghlan, Sari-Pul, Samangan, and Kunduz provinces in the north where the “hold” and “build” phases of counterinsurgency strategy predominate. Key deliverables include rehabilitation of secondary roads, drainage canals, schools, and irrigation systems. The project also includes mid-term activities that support the transition from stability to longer-term development such as repair of irrigation systems to increase agricultural production, rural farm-to-market and feeder road construction to improve market access, flood prevention, drainage system rehabilitation, and small-scale water supply system rehabilitation.	Office of Stabilization	Completed
Community Development Program South, East, and West (CDP-SEW)	CDP-SEW promotes stability through temporary employment in targeted districts to reduce the number of unemployed Afghans joining the insurgency. Project activities are implemented in close coordination with coalition forces engaged in the clear, hold, and build phases of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to pave the way for a smooth transition. CDP-SEW works in Kandahar, Hilmand, Uruzgan, Zabul, Nimroz, Farah, Nangarhar, Kunar, CDP-SEW promotes stability through temporary employment in targeted districts to reduce the number of unemployed Afghans joining the insurgency. Project activities are implemented in close coordination with coalition forces engaged in the clear, hold, and build phases of	Office of Stabilization	Completed

	<p>counterinsurgency (COIN) operations to pave the way for a smooth transition. CDP-SEW works in Badghis, Daykundi, Farah, Ghazni, Ghor, Hilmand, Hirat, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Nimroz, Paktika, Paktya, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Zabul provinces. The focus in the south and east, during the clear and hold phases of COIN, is on quick-impact programs that provide short-term livelihood opportunities in support of broader stabilization efforts. Activities include rehabilitation of village reservoirs, drainage canals, and irrigation systems. The program also supports the transition from stabilization to longer-term development through activities such as the repair of irrigation systems to increase agricultural production, rural farm-to-market and feeder road construction, drainage system rehabilitation, and small-scale municipal infrastructure construction or repair.</p>		
District Delivery Program(DDP)	<p>The DDP project represents an umbrella approach to ensuring that the reach of the Afghan central government extends to the districts. In partnership with the Independent Directorate of Local Governance and the Ministry of Finance, DDP provides support for budget planning and execution at the district level, resulting in improved delivery of key services. Funding Stream 1 provides on-budget partial salary support, hazard pay, and operational and maintenance funds for district officials and offices in key sectors (administration, health, justice, agriculture, and education) via the Afghan budgetary system. Funding Stream 2 aligns traditional USAID development and Afghan government programs to provide services as prioritized by district officials and community representatives. Funding Stream 3 is U.S. Military funds used to finance small-scale district government infrastructure related to service delivery. During its second year, DDP will seek to strengthen fiscal flows and accountability mechanisms from the center, provinces and districts and to improve basic service delivery at the district level in collaboration with key ministries.</p>	Office of Stabilization	Ongoing
Food Insecurity	<p>FIRUP promotes stability through temporary employment and income generation in targeted populations to reduce the number of food-insecure and/or unemployed Afghans joining the</p>	Office of Stabilization	Completed

<p>Response for Urban Populations (FIRUP)- WEST</p>	<p>insurgency. Project activities are implemented in close coordination with coalition forces engaged in clearing operations, or in advance of clearing operations to pave the way for a smooth transition. Key provinces are located in the South and East, as well as those in the North and West considered ready for the transition from <i>hold</i> to <i>build</i>. The focus in the South and East (<i>clear to hold</i> phase) is on quick impact programs that provide short-term livelihood opportunities in support of broader stabilization efforts. Activities include: street cleaning; rehabilitation of wells, drainage canals, schools, houses, and irrigation systems; and orchard plowing. During the <i>hold to build</i> period, projects consist of mid-term activities that support the transition from stability to longer-term development. Activities include: the repair of irrigation systems to increase agricultural production, rural farm to market and feeder road construction to improve market access, flood prevention, drainage system rehabilitation, and small scale water supply system rehabilitation.</p>		
<p>Local Governance and Community Development (LGCD)</p>	<p>Active in 21 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, the LGCD project is a field-staff driven stability program that helps establish conditions for medium and long-term efforts. The project objectives are: 1) assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to extend its reach into unstable areas and engage at-risk populations; 2) create an environment that encourages local communities to take an active role in their own stability and development; and 3) address the underlying causes of instability and support for the insurgency. LGCD works closely with USAID field staff, military units, GIROA officials, non-governmental organizations, and a host of other stakeholders to plan and execute projects that promote stability within a U.S. Government counterinsurgency context. The program meets its objectives through the implementation of strategically integrated activities related to the following technical focus areas: 1) assess (shape): assess community grievances and design cost-effective solutions to address those grievances, and Assist military units with shaping activities; 2) local stability initiatives (clear): quick impact stability initiatives to meet recovery needs in priority communities; and 3) community development and mobilization (hold): address priority grievances of at-risk populations through integrated community development projects. LGCD is</p>	<p><i>Office of Stabilization</i></p>	<p><i>Completed</i></p>

	in its last phase of implementation and will focus its final efforts in Kandahar City and Maywand District in Kandahar Province through July 2011.		
Provincial Reconstruction team Quick Impact Projects (PRT-QIP)	<p>In Afghanistan, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been an important vehicle for the delivery of U.S. and international assistance outside of Kabul, particularly in unstable provinces.</p> <p>In FY2003, USAID Afghanistan established the PRT-QIP (Quick Impact Project) program, implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS).</p> <p>The purpose of the program was to provide USAID officers located at the PRTs with the ability to implement small projects (over 90 percent cost less than \$350,000 per project) that further the core objectives of stability, reconstruction, and building support for the central government of Afghanistan.</p> <p>As of August 2007 over 440 projects have been completed. The majority of these have been relatively small infrastructure projects, such as community irrigation systems, clean water supply, road improvements, small power systems, and the construction or rehabilitation of government buildings, schools, and clinics. In addition to infrastructure, QIP funds have been used to support government capacity building, job placement, micro-finance, gender-related activities, and media projects.</p>	Office of Stabilization	Completed
Stability in Key Areas-East& West (SIKA E&W)	The purpose of this contract is to promote stabilization in key areas by supporting the GIROA at the district level, while coordinating efforts at the provincial level, to implement community led development and governance initiatives that respond to the populations' needs and concerns in order to build confidence, stability, and increase the provision of basic services. Work will focus on key districts prioritized by the United States Government (USG) Regional Platform-West (RP-W) and aligned with the GIROA Key Terrain District (KTD), District Delivery Program (DDP) and other priority districts as determined by the relevant provincial governments.	Office of Stabilization	Ongoing
USAID-Kabul Funded Sub-National Governance Programs			
Name	Description	Affiliated Offices	Status

<p>Afghanistan Local Government Assistance Project (ALGAP)</p>	<p>The primary goal of the Afghanistan Local Government Assistance Project is to improve the basic skills of sub-national governance actors in Afghanistan. The primary target beneficiaries of this activity are Provincial Councilors, the lowest elected officials in Afghanistan. ARD helps provincial councilors to conduct consultation visits and travel throughout their province to learn of constituent needs. These consultations will expand to include other provincial governance actors, further contributing to strengthened ties between provincial governance actors and the citizenry. Civic Education activities will also take place to improve citizen knowledge about the roles and responsibilities of sub-national governance bodies.</p>	<p>Office of Democracy and Governance</p>	<p>Completed</p>
<p>Support to Sub-National Governance Institutions</p>	<p>This project supports the U.S. Government's Anti-Corruption Strategy for Afghanistan. The four pillars of the strategy are to improve the transparency and accountability of Afghan government institutions to reduce corrupt practices; improve financial oversight; build Afghan capacity to investigate, prosecute, and/or remove corrupt officials from power; and help Afghans educate the public about efforts to reduce corruption and improve the resources available for the public to demand and participate in transparent and accountable governance. The project supports strategic, technical, and administrative institutional capacity development at the Afghan government's anticorruption agency, the High Office of Oversight, ministries delivering key services to the Afghan public, and outreach to civil-society organizations engaged in the fight against public corruption.</p>	<p>Office of Democracy and Governance</p>	<p>On-going</p>

ANNEX L: PRESIDENTIAL DECREE & USG MEMO ON DDP

(Informal Translation)

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE- DDP

Date: January 5, 2010

Proposal

As the Excellency knows, the first contact of the people with the government comes at the district level. Therefore, continued and capable presence of government institutions at the district level enables effective delivery of basic services to people. Many times it has been noticed that lack of and low presence of government institutions in the districts increases the enemies' activities in those areas.

Therefore, to establish effective and continued presence of government at provincial level and districts where security will be improved, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance proposes that government institutions including Judicial and Prosecution (Prosecutors and Courts) should fill their approved Tashkeel in directorates, departments and unites in order to start and expedite the delivery of services to people.

In addition, to establish coordination and management, IDLG requests to appoint a committee to act as the coordinating body.


The coordinating body with the membership of:

1. Director of Independent Directorate of Local Governance, the head of committee
2. Deputy Minister for Finance, MoF member
3. Deputy Minister for programs, MRRD, member
4. Technical Deputy Minister, MoJ, member
5. Deputy Minister for Policy, MoPH, member
6. Deputy Minister for Administration, MoE, member
7. Deputy Minister for Administration, MAIL, member
8. Director of Administration, General Prosecutors office, member
9. Director of Administration, Supreme Court, member
10. Director of Defense and Security, Office of Administration Affairs, member
11. Director of Provincial Affairs, CSC, member

Shall be created to create do the necessary coordination among members of the committee and relevant external organizations and to report to the President about the establishment and service delivery of these institutions in provinces and districts.

بهتر، کمیته بی به حیث نهاد واحد هماهنگ کننده تعیین گردد.
با استفاده از فرصت یکبار دیگر مراتب سپاسگزاری ما را بپذیرید.

با احترام



جیلانی یوسیف

رئیس عمومی

اداره مستقل ارگان های محلی



Memorandum of Understanding

Between
THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
("USAID")
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
("GIROA")
IN SUPPORT OF THE
DISTRICT DELIVERY PROGRAM

I. Purpose

USAID and the GIROA, represented by the Ministry of Finance ("MoF") and the Independent Directorate for Local Governance ("IDLG", and together with MoF and USAID, the "Parties"), wish to cooperate in a mutual effort to build the capacity of the GIROA to deliver services to citizens at the sub-national level. The purpose of this Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") is to set forth the understandings of the Parties with respect to the above objective.

Subject to the availability of funds and any necessary Congressional and other U.S. and GIROA approvals, the Parties intend to implement a District Delivery Program (DDP), a new Afghan-led initiative, which will enable the GIROA to deliver improved services in key terrain districts across Afghanistan. The DDP supports stabilization efforts by providing a strong GIROA presence at the district level and provides responsive and effective basic services, through participatory government.

II. Background

DDP is designed to support district government efforts to consult with its constituents, produce a district plan in cooperation with provincial and central government, and provide funding to cover the operating costs of district government salary support to government officials at the district level. Funding provided by USAID for operating costs and salary support would be disbursed in accordance with an implementation letter between USAID, IDLG and MoF setting forth the terms and conditions for the disbursement of funds (the "IL").

DDP ensures national and provincial governments are visible in districts and is critical to the international community's approach to stabilization, which concentrates on building governance capability and responsiveness. It contributes towards increasing the population's perception that local, provincial and national government structures are capable and responsive.

DDP is also an important step in placing responsibility for service delivery in the hands of the GIROA. At present, a majority of spending in districts is done outside of government channels. In bringing government representation in the districts up to tashkiel

levels, and providing the funds to allow them to deliver services themselves, DDP will build the capacity of GIROA to actually deliver – and be seen to deliver – needed government services where it matters most.

III. Understanding of the Parties

A. USAID

USAID wishes to furnish, and the GIROA wishes to receive, an amount currently estimated at approximately \$40 million over a period of two years subject to terms and conditions which would be set forth in the IL and subject to the availability of funds and congressional approval. The Parties anticipate that the funds will be disbursed in increments and that the funds will be on budget for Afghan fiscal years 1389 and 1390. This MOU does not obligate funds. All funds described in this MOU will be obligated, disbursed and expended in accordance with the IL, the terms and conditions of which will be mutually agreed to by USAID and the GIROA.

B. GIROA

In the event USAID furnishes assistance described above, GIROA will undertake support for the project implementation - to recruit and facilitate training of staff in support of DDP, to enact new laws if necessary, establish and implement new policies, and to assume responsibility (financial and administrative) for continuation of basic services at the district level following completion of USAID assistance and support.

IV. Conditions to Disbursement

The IL will provide appropriate conditions for disbursement, which would be met by the GIROA prior to the disbursement of any funds. Such conditions will be developed to ensure a transparent, auditable process for ensuring funds are “pushed down” to the local level, reporting requirements, establishment of a monitoring plan and other technical conditions related to the Program.

V. Coordination and Consultation

The Parties will provide each other with such information as may be necessary to facilitate implementation of the Program. Any issues concerning the interpretation, administration or implementation of this MOU will be resolved by consultation between the Parties.

VI. Effect of the MOU

This MOU does not constitute a legal obligation or binding agreement or effect an obligation of funds by USAID or the U.S. Government, and it does not contemplate a transfer of funds from USAID to GIROA or assumption of liability by USAID. USAID will obligate and disburse funds and carry out operations pursuant to this MOU in accordance with applicable laws and regulations of the United States.

VII. Modifications

This MOU may only be amended through written agreement of the Parties. Any Party may terminate this MOU by giving the other Party thirty (30) days written notice.

VIII. Effective Date and Termination

This MOU will be effective as of the date of the last Party's signature of the MOU, as indicated on the signature page hereto, and shall remain in effect until terminated or two year from the effective date, whichever occurs earlier.


IX. Authorized Representatives

The Parties will be represented by those holding or acting in the offices held by the signatories to this MOU. Each Party may, by written notice to the others, identify additional representatives authorized to represent that Party for all purposes other than executing formal amendments to this MOU.

{Signature Page to Follow}


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the GIRA and USAID, each acting through its duly authorized representative, have caused this MOU to be signed in their names.

GOVERNMENT OF THE ISLAMIC
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE



Dr. Omar Zakhilwal,
Minister of Finance

UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT




Dr. Rajiv Shah, Administrator

DATE:

DATE:


INDEPENDENT DIRECTORATE
OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE



Jalal Popal, Director General

DATE:

UNITED STATES EMBASSY



Ambassador Karl W. Eikenberry

DATE:

*Signature Page to Memorandum of Understanding in Support of
District Delivery Program*

ANNEX M: DDP TIMELINE

(As Provided by IDLG)

DDP conceived by Ambassador Eikenberry and Minister Zia	Sept	2009	Months	Years
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High Level Meetings DDWG Terms of Reference(Draft) 	Oct			
President Karzai Decree on DDP	Feb	2010		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> CST recruitment started. First DDWG meeting. Marjah and Nad Ali approved 	Apr			
IL #1 signed, DDP team leader recruited	Aug			
M&E plan letter signed	Oct			
DDP Diagnostic, Andy	Nov			
IL #2 signed, bridge funding from MoF.	Dec			
WP Ghani Khail, Nangarhar, USAID transferred fund to DAB	Jan			
Heidi's memo to Ambassador Wayne	Feb	2011		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ambassador Eikenberry and MD Gast approved Daman and Spin Boldak. M&E work plan prepared by IDLG Draft Memorandum of Understanding of DfID and the Danish Government with the GIRoA on DDP. 	Apr			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First M&E report, Memo sent to Amb. Eikenberry to reorient DDP 	May			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> IL #3 Signed, USAID FMO Derrick Brown sent a letter to Minister of Finance, IDLG DG 	Jun			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First liquidation reports, Amendment to IL1, IL #4, Strategic communication paper 	Jul			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> M&E report by IDLG, KPMP deliver draft DDP report 	Aug			
GIRoA provinces focused DDP,	Sep			
Discovery of possible embezzlement of \$500,000,DDP financial specialists recruited	Oct	2012		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MoF Directives to Mustofiat, Draft amendment 2 to IL #1 	Nov			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> M&E team recruited, DDWG approved 6 work plans, SIKA east press release 	Dec			
DDWG meeting.	Jan			
Checchi consulting team in brief with USG personnel	Feb			

ANNEX N: DDP TRACKING SHEET

(As Provided by IDLG)

1= Occured (done)

Independent Directorate of Local Governance District Delivery Program Tracking Sheet - Monthly Summary Report

Reporting Period: 4 oct 2011

Region	Province	Districts Covered/to be Covered by DDP	Assessment			Package Development			Fund Disbursement				Tashkeel				
			Assessment Completed	Assessment ongoing	Assessment Planned	Package Completed	Package under donor review	DMG Conducted/ Package Approved	ASP		Nbf		Received	Distributed	Authorized/Approved	Filled positions	Vacant
									Completed	Ongoing	Completed	ongoing					
South West	Helmand	Nad Ali	1			1								45	38	7	
		Marja	1			1								36	16	20	
		Nahre Saraj	1			1								57	35	22	
		Nawa	1			1								51	33	18	
		Sangin	1			1											
		Musa Qala	1			1											
	Kandahar	Garm Ser	1			1											
		Spin Boldak	1			1									50	29	21
		Daman	1			1									38	22	16
		Arghandab	1			1									46	33	13
		Dand	1			1									51	35	16
		Panjwayee	1			1									41	31	10
	Zabul	Zherery	1			1									51	28	23
		Maiwand	1			1											
		Shah wali Kot	1			1											
East	Nangarhar	Shah joy	1			1											
		Qalat	1			1											
		Tarnak wa Jaldak	1			1											
		Surkhroad	1			1									62	60	2
		Behsood	1			1									52	51	1
		Ghani Khail	1			1									53	49	4
		Rodat	1			1									59	55	4
		Kama	1			1									41	40	1
		Batikot	1			1									53	46	7
	Laghman	Koz Kunar	1			1									54	54	0
		Khogyani	1			1											
		Mohmand Dara	1			1											
Kunar	Qarghayee	1			1									54	52	2	
	Alinghar	1			1												
South East	Logar	Nurgal	1			1								51	47	4	
		Khas Kunar	1			1								45	41	-4	
	Mohammad Agha	1			1									42	38	4	
	Baraki Barak	1			1									58	57	1	
Ghazni	Deh Yak	1			1												
	Khost	1			1									43	31	12	
	Nadir Shah Kot	1			1									25	14	11	
North East	Paktika	1			1												
	Urgun	1			1												
Centre	Baghlan	Baghlan Jadid	1			1											
		Khan Abad	1			1								67	65	2	
West	Kunduz	Char Darah	1			1											
		Sorubi	1			1								51	47	4	
	Kapisa	1			1									48	46	2	
	Nijrab	1			1												
West	Wardak	Sayed Abad	1			1								57	47	10	
		Jalrez	1			1									44	40	4
	Badghis	Bala Murghab	1			1								40	22	18	
West	Heart	Moqur	1			1								40	22	18	
		Shindand	1			1											
	Farah	Bala Bolock	1			1											
		Backwa	1			1											
Total	18	49	46	0	3	26	0	26	12	7	19	0	19	19	1505	1224	273

ANNEX O: BASIC M&E LOGICAL FRAMEWORK FOR DDP

DDP Logical Framework – Results Chain

Design	DDP designed as on-budget temporary mechanism (1-2 years support) to accelerate resources flow to Districts in Key Terrain Districts for stabilization purposes (clear-hold-build) and later evolve as bridge to transition (governance)	
Goal-impact	To improve GIROA visibility in selected KTDs and more positive opinion of local citizens with more satisfaction and confidence in government (proxy indicator is number of daily visitors to District Centers)	
Objectives-outcomes	Build capacity of GIROA to deliver improved basic services at sub-national level in KTDs i.e. a functioning district governance	Strengthen GIROA planning & budgeting, and coordination & communication among parties concerned with DDP implementation i.e. horizontal (across District Level) and vertical (Kabul to Province to Districts)
Strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Synergies/links with related programs 	
Outputs – deliverables	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Assessment ▪ Workplans ▪ Tashkeel numbers and recruits ▪ O&M categories ▪ Projects numbers and types 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ amount salaries top-ups and time lag ▪ hazard pay and time lag ▪ O&M disbursed and time lag ▪ Capital investment
Targets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ 89 KTDs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪
Activities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Select Districts ▪ Community consultations ▪ Service packages/workplans ▪ Review USAID and LMs ▪ Approval DDWG ▪ Funds flows ▪ Recruit district officials and forward top-ups ▪ Spend O&M ▪ Monitor projects ▪ Deliver services 	

**Inputs -
resources**

- USG budget \$40m
- Obligated \$24.5 m
- Advanced \$1.3 m
- Non-liquidated \$845k