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EVALUATION

Economic Growth Project

Task Order 5

Mid-Term Evaluation

July 5, 2012

This publication was produced by Weidemann Associates, Inc. for review by the United States Agency for International Development under Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment (RAISE) PLUS Contract No. AID-AEG-I-OO-04-00010, Task Order No. 38.



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ECONOMIC GROWTH PROJECT TASK ORDER 5 MID-TERM EVALUATION

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Parfumé Entier**

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ECONOMIC GROWTH PROJECT

TASK ORDER 5

MID-TERM EVALUATION

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Weidemann Associates, Inc.

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DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Sincerely,

Dr. Ismael Ouedraogo,

Mamadou Ba, and

Maimouna Savane

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACEP	Alliance de crédit et d'épargne pour la production
ANCAR	Agence nationale de conseil agricole et rural
BAMTAARE	Bureau d'appui, aux méthodes et techniques pour l'agriculture, les activités rurales et l'environnement
BDS	Business Development Services
BFPA	Bureau de la formation professionnelle agricole
CF	Contract farming
CFA	CFA franc, Senegalese currency
CLIN	Contract line item number
CMS	Crédit mutuel du Sénégal
CNAAS	Compagnie d'assurance agricole du Sénégal
CNCAS	Caisse nationale de crédit agricole du Sénégal
CNT	Coumba Noor Thiam
CORAF	Conseil ouest and centre africain de recherches et de développement agricole
CTS	Centre de traitement des semences
DA	Direction de l'agriculture
DAPS	Direction de l'analyse, de la prévision et des statistiques
DCA	Development Credit Authority
DHORT	Direction de l'horticulture
DISEM	Division des semences
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EMMP	Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan
ENSA	Ecole nationale supérieure d'agriculture
USAID/ERA	USAID/Education and Research in Agriculture Project
FEPRODES	Fédération des groupements et associations de femmes productrices de ST Louis
FEWSNET	Famine Early Warning System Network
FIARA	Foire international de l'agriculture et des ressources animales
FTF	Feed the Future
GAP	Good agricultural practices
GOANA	Grande offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l'abondance
GFSR	Global Food Security Response
GIE	Groupement d'intérêt économique
GOS	Government of Senegal
GPS	Global Positioning System
HA	Hectare(s)
IFPRI	International Food Research Institute
IRG	International Resources Group
ISFAR	Institut supérieur de formation agricole et rurale
ISRA	Institut sénégalais de recherches agricoles
LOASP	Loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale
MA	Ministry of Agriculture
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MEC	Mutuelle d'épargne et de crédit
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NERICA	New rice for Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PERSUAP	Pesticide Evaluation Report and Safe User Action Plan
PINORD	Plateforme des initiatives du Nord

PMP	Performance Management Plan
PNAR	Plan national pour l'autosuffisance en riz
PNIA	Programme national d'investissement agricole
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
REPROSENER	Réseau de production des semences NERICA
RESOPP	Réseau des organisations paysannes et pastorales du Sénégal
SAED	Société nationale d'aménagement et d'exploitation des terres du delta du fleuve et des vallées de la Falémé
SEDAB	Sahélienne d'agro-business
SFZ	Southern Forest Zone
SODEFITEX	Société de Développement et des Fibres Textiles
SOENA	Société d'encadrement agricole
SPCRS	Société de promotion et de commercialisation du riz sénégalais
SRV	Senegal River Valley
UNIS	Union nationale interprofessionnelle des semences
USAID/PCE	USAID Projet Croissance Economique
USDA	United States Department of Agriculture
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VC	Value Chain
YoY	Year over Year

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation of Economic Growth Project Task Order 5 (PCE TO5) is to assess progress to date and identify areas for improvement and actions that will facilitate attainment of project objectives. PCE TO5 was funded on April 6, 2009, for four and a half years (to end November 13, 2013) under the Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness (SAGIC) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) implemented by the International Resource Group (IRG). The original estimated budget ceiling was US\$47,192.452 (US\$21.1 million was left in the contract by the end of FY2011). The adoption of USAID/Senegal's Feed the Future (FTF) strategy in February 2011 led to the focus of PCE TO5 on priority value chains of USAID FTF: maize, millet, irrigated and rain-fed rice. Because of a general reduction in resources for Feed the Future (FTF), USAID notified IRG in mid-FY2011 of a 33% reduction in resources in the project's FY2012 budget¹. In addition to the value chains now outside of FTF's focus, the project initiated cuts in some activities to prepare for the coming budget shortfall. While the announced budget for FY2012 only affected the obligation and not the ceiling, USAID has since notified IRG of a possible cut in the ceiling itself for the balance of the project.

The purpose of PCE TO5 is to increase food security and reduce poverty through a set of interrelated activities, and thus contribute to the overarching goal of FTF: *to sustainably reduce poverty and hunger, to improve equitable growth in the agricultural sector, and to improve nutritional status of the Senegalese people*. Specifically, the project is the key instrument for achieving two (out of four) first level objectives of the USAID/Senegal Feed the Future strategy: Inclusive agricultural sector growth, and increased trade.

The evaluation focused exclusively on the four areas of the project aligned with USAID/Senegal's Feed the Future strategy: (i) Increased agricultural productivity and market linkages; (ii) Enhanced policy environment; (iii) Increased post-harvest and access to finance; and (iv) Increased institutional capacity and human resources. The evaluation was conducted March 15–April 2012 in Senegal by a team of three consultants under contract to Weidemann Associates, Inc.

Overall PCE TO5 (or simply PCE) has made good progress in its three years (April 2009-March 2012) of implementation toward its objectives and done so despite a significant budget cut that impacted its FY2011 activities going forward. However, the achievements have at times proven uneven across components over these three years of implementation in large part due to the cuts and other difficulties. This executive summary presents the major findings of the evaluation and a series of recommendations for the project and for USAID FTF.

MAJOR FINDINGS

COMPONENT I: VALUE CHAINS AND MARKET LINKAGES

At its core, PCE is a value chain development project. PCE likens its value chain activities to an export promotion operation, for which the products are local staple foods and the export market is the country's largest urban market, Dakar, where local products are forced to compete head-to-head with imports. The challenge under this component is to implement formal contract farming (CF) that involves smallholders producing staple grains for the domestic market. This constitutes a significant challenge as CF's success in Africa thus far has been confined to fruits and vegetables exports to global markets, or local processing of horticultural products.

¹ IRG estimates that this represents a drop of 27% from the average annual budget for TO5 contract value.

The CF arrangements of the project include forward sales (at a price set at planting) by producers to a consolidator (i.e., a large-scale produce buyer, doubling as an input supplier); a financial institution providing credit for inputs that are delivered in kind to the farmer by the input supplier/consolidator; and the producer agreeing to use good agricultural practices (GAP), with project assistance, in order to produce the quality demanded by the market.

In the maize value chain where it initiated its CF scheme, the project has facilitated three separate formal contracts with two parties at a time. In the Senegal River Valley (SRV), where the scheme is being introduced in partnership with a rice miller/consolidator, the project is attempting to facilitate one integrated contract, where all three parties sign one contract. At the same time, the project is providing support to existing vertically integrated rice operators to improve and formalize their relationships with their producer network. The project has determined that millet and rain-fed rice producers emphasize home consumption and have only small quantities to sell. However, these producers have shown considerable interest in acquiring certified seeds to improve productivity.

The seed development activities of the project cover the major stages of the seed supply chain: financial and technical support for the production of foundation seed by the Institut sénégalais de recherches agricoles (ISRA); rehabilitation of two seed certification laboratories in Richard Toll and Kaolack; facilitation of a seed processing plant public-private partnership; capacity building of the irrigated rice seed grower union in St.- Louis and that of the rain-fed rice seed grower association in Kolda; introduction and dissemination of certified and aromatic rice varieties through demonstrations, cost-sharing partnerships, mandatory use of certified seeds in the formal CF, and concerted efforts to promote aromatic rice varieties for irrigated rice (S177, S328, S329) and rain-fed rice (Nerica 1). In 2011, seed growers produced some 400 tons of certified seeds, sufficient for planting 3,000 ha. There have been delays, however, in the rehabilitation of the seed laboratory in Kolda and the seed processing facility public-private partnership (PPP).

The formal CF arrangement in the maize value chain achieved great results until the 2011/2012 season. The area planted in maize under the program expanded from 968 ha in 2009/2010 to 3,270 ha in 2010/2011; production increased almost eight-fold, from 1,120 tons to 8,442 tons. By 2011/2012, the project had enrolled six consolidators and engaged the participation of three credit institutions, compared to one consolidator and one credit agency that had started the program.

Two best practices deserve particular mention.

- Development of a geo-reference database in which producers have been trained to monitor the progress of their activities from planting to harvest, plot by plot. This is leading to a system of traceability. Women trained in this system have been empowered as they have gained knowledge on par with men about rice growing.
- Development of training guidebooks of good agricultural practices “the path to quality rice” and “the path to quality maize” (in French *le chemin du bon riz* and *le chemin du bon maïs*); these materials complement the geo-reference database management system.

The promotion at the 2012 Foire internationale de l’agriculture et des ressources animales (FIARA) of aromatic rice from SRV financed by the project was a great success. The project estimates that about 1,500 persons visited its booth daily. Project-supported millers sold some 74 tons of aromatic rice, with sale proceeds reaching CFA 30 million (approximately US\$64,000).

One major area of concern in the 2011/2012 maize season was the level of side-selling, which was a result of many concurrent factors: market prices that increased above contract price; a poor rainfall that led to low yield, and a consolidator who passed along higher input prices to producers. The producers only found out at the time of delivery of their grain according to the contract.

The project needs to reestablish quickly the confidence it had built among parties and find a solution for farmers with bank arrears. For the sustainability of the CF scheme in the maize area, the project needs to work with producers and consolidators on a mechanism to set flexible contract prices to minimize the temptation of side-selling.

COMPONENT 2: ENHANCED POLICY ENVIRONMENT

The project was tasked with helping the Government of Senegal (GOS) advance policy reforms related to three important areas of the *Loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale* (LOASP): agricultural development, financing rural areas; and land reform. The project is supporting policy working groups, established by the Ministry of Agriculture, on the decrees needed to implement the legislation.

The timely delivery of accurate agricultural data in itself contributes to policy reform because such data is critical to policy decision-making. The project was very successful in helping the agricultural statistical agency, Direction de l'analyse, de la prévision et de la statistique (DAPS), improve the efficiency, reliability, and timeliness of the national agriculture survey data. This has been accomplished through technical assistance that introduced better sampling methods, financial support that made available tools and equipment, and training in data management and analysis. One agent today can do the job it took three to do in the recent past. DAPS has increased its survey sample from 3,600 to 6,300 households and added new variables to cover issues related to food security, nutrition, and nonagricultural sources of income. In 2011, the project introduced DAPS to free satellite imagery to further improve its survey and eventually set up an early warning system.

In other areas, the project is being held back by the lack of political will on the part of the GOS, particularly in the difficult question of land reform. In Senegal, land reform pursues several aims: (i) reconciling traditional land rights with legacy colonial law and Muslim law; (ii) providing an incentive for investment and economic development in rural areas; (iii) helping advance decentralization; and (iv) improving women's access to land.

In areas of policy reform as broad as the LOASP and land reform, a single project alone cannot achieve success. The political will of the government and a coordinated donor effort is needed to provide incentives and the expertise to the government to tackle the reforms. In land reform, the active participation of rural communities, particularly rural women, is needed. Tools such as master land use management will be helpful.

COMPONENT 3: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

For the most part, the project's activities under this component are centered on the implementation of the formal contract scheme. Under this component, the project has attempted to introduce new financial instruments and assist USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) by assisting banks to access the program. The project's rural infrastructure work (village warehouses) was curtailed due to budget cuts.

The project is working on two areas of considerable interest for value chain actors:

- It facilitated the acquisition of 15 tractors by producers through a leasing company, Locafrique. A deal on a rice mill is also in progress. These results are very important because they show that investors may obtain medium-term credit without the risk of using one's personal property as collateral to obtain a bank loan. In the leasing program, the equipment or facility is the collateral.
- The project has signed an MoU with CNAAS (Compagnie d'assurance agricole du Sénégal) to facilitate agricultural insurance for producers. In both SRV and SFZ (Southern Forest Zone), climate risks are significant. Subscribing to an agricultural insurance policy is a sound economic decision,

In FY2011, the DCA program handled US\$8 million in loans. In the second quarter of FY2012, the amount loaned was about US\$3.6 million, with US\$1.6 million issued by rural credit institutions.

One area of concern is that many project results are reported twice, in this component and in the value chain component. The project needs to minimize such repetition. To the extent that the component needs to mostly address the formal CF arrangement, there is some confusion. One possibility would be to integrate the activity of this component in the value chain component.

COMPONENT 4: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RESOURCE

The value chain actors targeted under this component include: (i) producer groups operating in the target value chains and areas of intervention; (ii) private business enterprises involved in processing cereal produce; (iii) public agencies and NGOs; and (iv) agricultural training and research institutions.

The professional master's program established at Ecole nationale supérieure d'agriculture (ENSA) at Thies University may be considered as a best practice and is the first of its kind in Senegal. Fourteen students are entering the second year of the professional program. ENSA has leveraged the student tuition paid by PCE to secure a grant of US\$70,000 for three years to support operations from a consortium of African universities. Also, 60 percent of participating students have secured job offers from local agribusinesses.

Results of the project's capacity building program for the three directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture (Statistics, Agriculture, and Horticulture) include the training in FY2011 of 125 staff from the Ministry of Agriculture (MA) in agricultural policy design and analysis; use of software for statistical analysis; and methods and tools for the collection, management, and analysis of statistical data.

The Bureau de la formation professionnelle agricole (BFPA) gained considerable stature by organizing the project-supported training. One such BFPA training covered the use of basic office applications (76 staff, including 34 women, attended). Another covered methods and tools for the collection, management, and analysis of statistical data (25 staff attended); still another covered the design and implementation of agricultural policies (24 staff), to help staff produce analytical papers and sectoral development policies and program proposals. These training programs were well received by trainees and boosted the profile of BFPA.

In 2011, the project also provided (through partners under contract) training to 157 agribusinesses in the project's *contractualisation* approach, and to some 22,200 producers in the production of quality seeds and products. Because of budget cuts, however, the project dropped other training programs.

An area of concern has been the low level of participation of women in trainings. Encouraging more participation of women is suggested. Additionally, the Ministry of Agriculture has been affected by the budget cuts which have delayed or curtailed its institutional capacity building program.

OVERVIEW OF RECOMMENDATIONS

COMPONENT 1: VALUE CHAINS AND MARKET LINKAGES

- Using unit production cost and import parity pricing, assist producers and consolidators in devising a mechanism for setting contract prices to minimize side-selling.
- Implement an integrated, one-contract arrangement in the South Forest Zone to make the process more transparent and collaborative; it would also help build long-lasting trust among parties.
- To quickly identify and resolve issues, ensure frequent consultation among parties to the CF scheme.
- Proceed with the pilot formal CF arrangements in the upland rice value chain. PCE has the backing of the local consolidator, SEDAB (Sahelienne d'agro-business).
- Target large urban markets for SRV aromatic rice, and for SFZ maize, local processing plants where logistical constraints and lot size requirements can be dealt with more easily than in Dakar.
- Complete the business plan for the seed certification labs in Richard Toll and Kaolack.
- To help rice mills and seed farmers set up codes of good practices, conduct technical audits. Lessons learned elsewhere (e.g., Mauritania) indicate that many individuals who invested in rice mills do not have the knowledge of how to run them.

COMPONENT 2: ENHANCED POLICY ENVIRONMENT

- Collaborate with Bureau d'analyse macro-economique of ISRA to produce policy notes on key reform issues.
- Pursue analysis of policy options regarding the GOS fertilizer subsidy program initiated in 2011.
- Pursue the analysis of options related to seed policy, including regional trade, and produce a set of recommendations.
- Collaborate with other donors to broaden the expertise and support provided to GOS to implement *Loi d'orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale*, and provide funding to allow the broad participation of rural communities and women's representatives in policy working groups.
- Engage the Ministry of Agriculture to clarify the roles and responsibilities of DRDR (Direction regionale du developpe et rural) and DISEM (Division des semences). The seed labs in Richard Toll and in Kolda are handled by DISEM, but the one in Kaolack is handled by DRDR (Direction regionale de du developpement rural).

COMPONENT 3: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

- Ensure that beneficiaries hire managers and arrange training for an adequate time period.
- Develop a plan to promote the establishment of the Coumba Noor Thiam-type rice husk bio-fuel plant across the SRV.

COMPONENT 4: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RESOURCE

- Provide training in the generation and analysis of import parity pricing, in conjunction with training on the PCE contract farming arrangement.
- Require sponsored students to write brief papers about their key findings for dissemination.
- Develop a plan for internships or immersion of students of ENSA and Institut supérieur de formation agricole et rurale (ISFAR) in Bambey. Students could be brought into the field to help address the need for ad hoc problem solving.
- In training programs, emphasize that the value chain concept applies to whole industries, not a single firm. Michael Porter, who developed the concept of value chains, applies the value chain concept he

developed for a firm to a whole industry, calling it the “value system,” recognizing that all participating firms in the system generate value.

- Encourage collaboration between DAPS and SAED (Société nationale d'aménagement et d'exploitation des terres du delta du fleuve et des vallées de la Falémé) in the use of satellite images to collect and analyse agricultural data in the Sénégal River Valley.

CROSS-CUTTING AREAS

- Work more closely with project partner women’s groups in the two intervention areas to find innovative ways to improve women’s access to land.
- Document in progress reports how the project has complied with environmental guidance.
- Make the communications and M&E manager responsible to the COP, rather than through the senior manager of policy reform, communications and M&E. This would allow the communications manager to work directly with, and be equally responsive to, all senior and line managers in implementing the project’s communications strategy. It appeared to the team that the communications manager could be more effective if she were given this latitude.
- Initiate a series of analytical briefs to inform the GOS and other stakeholders of the project’s work. The content of these briefs would be more technical than that of the newsletter that targets a broader audience. Because both the content and target audience of the briefs and newsletter are distinct, they should not generate duplication.
- Promote bio-fuel technology using rice husk in the SRV (reported in component 4).
- Improve archiving of project documents for easy access. Update regularly in folders: contract, progress reports, PMP and indicator tables, studies/assessments, list of beneficiaries and partners by component and region, communications materials, and theses of sponsored students.
- Provide more realistic indicator targets for 2013 since the FY2012 targets can no longer be changed.
- Undertake regular internal data quality control assessments.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FTF IN PCE’S FOLLOW-UP

- Continue with the value chain approach, specifically CF arrangements, in PCE follow-up operations.
- Train value chain actors in cost of production and import parity pricing to help set contract prices.
- Promote post-harvest infrastructure with a coherent value chain development plan emphasizing meaningful private sector co-sharing, hiring of capable managers, and adequate training of managers.
- In policy reform work, collaborate with other donors to provide incentives and expertise for GOS to implement meaningful reforms. Support the participation of leaders of rural communities and rural women in policy working groups in the reform process.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

As part of the inter-agency Feed the Future (FTF) strategic plan, led by USAID/Senegal’s Economic Growth Office (EGO), Economic Growth Project Task Order 5 supports the Government of Senegal (GOS) to increase food security and decrease poverty through the promotion of a productive and competitive private sector. PCE TO5 was funded on April 6, 2009, for four and a half years (ending November 13, 2013) under the Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness (SAGIC) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) to contribute to the Presidential Global Food Security Response (GFSR), which evolved into Feed the Future. The original estimated budget ceiling was US\$47,192,452 over the life of the project, managed by the International Resource Group (IRG) that has handled the SAGIC IQC since 2005. Since 2009, SAGIC has been referred to as Senegal Economic Growth Project (Senegal PCE). At the close of FY2011, US\$21.1 million was left in the contract.

The purpose of PCE TO5 is to increase food security and reduce poverty through a set of interrelated activities, and thus contribute to Feed the Future’s overarching goal: *to sustainably reduce poverty and hunger, to improve equitable growth in the agricultural sector, and to improve nutritional status of the Senegalese people*. Specifically, the project is the key instrument for achieving two (out of four) first level objectives of USAID/Senegal’s Feed the Future strategy: Inclusive agricultural sector growth, and increased trade. (FTF’s other two primary objectives, improved nutrition status and improved resource management, are addressed by other projects). The project is set to achieve FTF’s intermediary results under the two primary objectives relevant to PCE. These results include: improved agricultural productivity; increased access to finance; improved markets; enhanced policy environment; and increased institutional capacity building and human resource. (PCE also addresses the intermediary result “improved rural infrastructure” under “improved markets.”)

To contribute to FTF’s objectives and expected results, the project’s strategy has been to encourage the ‘formalization’ of a traditionally informal business transaction system, focusing on FTF’s priority value chains—maize, millet, and rice—and intervention zones (Senegal River Valley and South Forest Zone). The lines of duty of the four senior managers of PCE constitute the project’s components: (i) Policy, Transport, Trade and Communication; (ii) Access to Capital; (iii) Capacity Building and Applied Research; (iv) Value Chains, Seeds, and Infrastructure. These components are divided into sub-tasks that follow the project’s contract line item numbers (CLINs).

The adoption of USAID/Senegal’s FTF strategy in February 2011 led PCE to shed several value chains (livestock, dairy, and export crops), but retain three: rice, maize, and millet. (FTF’s fourth value chain, fisheries, is handled by another project.) Shortly thereafter, but not linked to Senegal’s strategy, there was a reduction in resources for Feed the Future. Consequently, USAID/Senegal notified IRG that its budget for FY2012 will be reduced to US\$7.5 million in lieu of the expected US\$11.2 million (thus a reduction of 33%).² To prepare for the coming budget shortfall, the project initiated changes, including cuts, in some of its already planned FY2011 activities. These changes caused some resentment from project partners and beneficiaries. While the announced budget for FY2012 only affected the obligation, USAID has since notified IRG of a likely cut in the project’s ceiling itself, which would affect an eventual no-cost extension. If the ceiling cut materializes, the project may be forced to proceed to cut some FY2012 activities.

Meanwhile, the project went through several personnel changes in FY2010 and FY2011. Some of the changes were planned, such as to reduce the number of expatriates on the project and replace them with

² IRG estimates that this represents a drop of 27% from the average annual budget (US\$10.3 million) for TO5 contract value.

national experts. Other changes were unexpected, such as the departures of the COP, value chain senior manager, and value chain line managers. All positions were subsequently refilled save for the position of senior manager of transport, trade and public-private partnership. The project is currently led by an expatriate chief of party (COP) and four technical senior managers, with the senior manager of capacity building and institutional human resource, a Senegalese national, doubling as deputy chief of party. The senior manager of policy reforms, communications and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and senior manager of capital access are also national experts. The other expatriate on the team is the senior manager of value chains. (The project also includes a Senegalese national in the position of senior manager of finances and administration.)

PCE TO5 covers four core areas of Senegal's FTF strategy closely tied to the Accelerated Growth Strategy and Country Investment Plan of the GOS. (A fifth core area, nutrition, is handled by the USAID Yajeende project.) The four FTF core areas, the four components of concern to PCE TO5, are as follows:

1. Increased agricultural productivity and market linkages focused on rice (rain-fed and irrigated), maize, and millet value chains.
2. Enhanced agriculture policy environment, addressing key constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture by focusing on reforms to enhance the business environment—most specifically, the full implementation of the Agricultural Law of 2004 and continued discussions on land tenure.
3. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure, including associated access to finance to ensure long-term agricultural productivity. USAID/Senegal provides entrepreneurship training and technical assistance to help investors succeed and develops loan mechanisms through Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan portfolio guarantees.
4. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to, and the development of, next-generation agriculture in Senegal. This component is intended to lay a foundation for growth through a market-driven approach, including access to finance, training investors in business management, developing efficiencies in production and processing, promoting professionalization of cooperatives or producer organizations, and reinforcement of capacity within the associated civil and public institutions.

PCE has retained four technical senior managers, each coordinating work on a component. Project components correspond to the four components above, but with slightly different labels:

- Value Chains (for Increased Agricultural Productivity and Market Linkages)
- Capital Access (for Rural Infrastructure and Access to Capital)
- Policy, Trade, and Communications (for Enhanced Policy Environment)
- Institutional Capacity Building and Applied Research (for Institutional Capacity Building and Human Resources)

Over the years, however, the project has presented its work in different ways. The FY2009 was structured around three contract line item numbers (CLINs) and seven sub-components. The FY2010 annual report used five components (policy reform and communications, capacity building and applied research, infrastructure, trade and PPP; and capital access. The FY2011 workplan describes four major components (value chains, policy, trade and communications, capital access, and capacity building and applied research). In its FY2012 workplan and progress reports, responding to USAID's request, the project is now presenting its work along seven themes (in addition to cross-cutting areas introduced in the project's FY2011 workplan):

- Value chains
- Rural infrastructure

- Seed sector (which USAID/Senegal views as a strategic sector, and which is handled by the value chain senior manager)
- Access to capital
- Market access and trade (mostly concerning the monitoring of bribes and roadblocks along the Dakar-Bamako corridor)
- Policy reform
- Institutional capacity building and human resources

These different presentations of the project's work ultimately address FTF's core areas. A systematic and consistent breakdown in components and sub-components would have made analysis of the project's results over the years significantly easier.

PURPOSE AND ISSUES INVESTIGATED

PURPOSE

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to assess progress to date and identify areas for improvement and actions that will facilitate the attainment of project objectives. The evaluation focused on the four areas stated below, in addition to investigating issues related to the cross-cutting areas:

1. Increased agriculture productivity and market linkages focused on (rain-fed and irrigated) rice, maize and millet value chains.
2. Enhanced policy environment, addressing constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture.
3. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure, including associated access to finance in order to ensure long-term agricultural productivity.
4. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to, and the development of, next-generation agriculture in Senegal.

ISSUES INVESTIGATED

As requested, the evaluation team investigated the extent to which the implementing partner has addressed USAID/Senegal/EGO Objectives 1 and 2: Inclusive Agriculture Sector Growth and Increased Trade. Specifically, the evaluation measured achievements made through the four USAID/PCE TO5 components, in addition to the cross-cutting themes of gender; communications; climate change adaptation; partnerships; and technology, science, and innovation. The evaluation also produced recommendations on ways to maintain momentum, scale-up activities in support of the FTF strategy, make suitable/strategic modifications given budget realities, and prepare for a successful end of contract in 2013.

The evaluation team looked at the four components in the context of the Senegal FTF strategy, the soundness of project approaches, the quality of PCE TO5 overall management, the adequacy and efficiency of IRG/PCE's provision of project inputs/resources, beneficiary coverage and response, and the overall chance of sustaining project momentum beyond November 2013. The team was also tasked with recording good practices and lessons learned in addressing the four components and cross-cutting themes and answered the following questions for all components and cross-cutting themes:

- Has the project completed planned activities for the associated issue area within the stipulated times?

- Did the project inputs/services provided reach the target population in the expected numbers?
- To what extent did the target groups use the project inputs/services provided?
- Were any formal or informal mechanisms established for involving key stakeholders?
- What adaptations are required to fulfill objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?
- Are the planned results achievable in the present private or public sector organizational environment and serving the objectives as described in the FTF strategy?
- How well have the activities been coordinated and efficiencies established?
- Are the components, adapted to the FTF mandate over time, relevant (the right mix)?
- In what way are the components relevant? Are the targets set realistic?
- Are the intervention approaches used during the first 2.5 years of PCE conducive to sustainability?
- What intervention approaches need to be adapted to achieve sustainability under the FTF strategy?
- Is the project being implemented / transitioned to FTF as planned?
- Did project managers establish necessary linkages with government agencies/private organizations?

In addition, the team answered the following component- or area-specific questions:

Component 1: Value chains and market linkages

1. Has the value chain approach proven effective? Since approval of the FTF strategy, is the approach building momentum toward the FTF goal of scaling-up in a functionally sustainable manner?
2. Are dynamics of productivity/market demand and supply improved according to project expectations?
3. How have activities to improve productivity and associated market linkages led to improved trade?

Component 2: Enhanced policy environment

1. Have the policy reforms identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to GOS priorities?
2. Has the approach for accomplishing policy reform been effective?
3. Are the planned results achievable in the present political environment?
4. What legal, regulatory, or administrative barriers are to be lifted for attracting investments and making the private sector more competitive?
5. What adaptations are required to fulfill the policy objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?

Component 3: Access to finance and rural infrastructure

1. Are the planned results achievable with the current range of financing instruments or other institutional factors?
2. Are post-harvest infrastructure improvements well targeted to support the scale-up of activities needed to achieve project goals?
3. What does this experience suggest for the future potential for Public-Private Partnerships in Senegal?
4. What needs to be changed to speed-up and improve the PPP process?

Component 4: Institutional capacity building and human resource

1. To what extent were public and private institutions developed or strengthened?
2. To what extent has IRG/PCE made progress in identifying, developing and implementing capacity building activities within GOS and the private sector?

3. Has the capacity building identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to FTF priorities?
4. Has the approach been effective as described in USAID objectives and in the FTF strategy?

Strategy and cross-cutting issues: gender; climate change adaptation; communications; partnerships; and science, technology, and innovation

1. Is PCE TO5 adequately considering these issues during activity design and implementation?
2. Is PCE TO5 compliant with and accounting for environmental sustainability within the context of activities? What environmental compliance lessons have been learned? How are they captured?
3. Is PCE TO5 investing in areas which are not within the FTF TO5 strategy and/or within the updated focus or direction of USAID/Senegal?
4. To what extent can the project monitoring system meet the reporting requirements?
5. Is PCE working with USAID management to strategize sufficient and adequately targeted efforts to assure sustainability and implementation of USAID Forward objectives by November 2013? (Work Plan and associated phase-out strategy)

Stakeholders engaged by the team	
Category	Number
USAID/Senegal (debriefs)	6
IRG Washington	2
PCE Dakar	10
PCE Field stations	3
Ministry of Agriculture	8
USAID projects and others	9
Training and research	6
DRDR	4
Seed lab and processing	3
Field credit agencies	4
Consolidators	4
Beneficiaries	49
Total	108

For the evaluation components and cross-cutting issues, the team produced findings, conclusions, and recommendations that include corrective actions for the design, duration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of USAID/PCE TO5, and actions to strengthen and/or improve results.

DATA COLLECTION, METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS

The evaluation team prepared this document using document review, interviews, field visits, and analysis of findings, relying on interview guidelines and team meetings.

DOCUMENT REVIEW

The team reviewed project, USAID, and GOS documents to gain a thorough understanding of the Senegal Feed the Future (FTF) strategy, PCE TO5 activities, and GOS agricultural policy. Although a comparison of achieved versus expected results was not the focus of the evaluation, the team conducted such analyses to formulate hypotheses for testing in the field toward a fuller understanding of the project. The team conducted document review both before initiating interviews and field visits, but also during the course of the evaluation in order to check references and clarify issues. USAID/Senegal and IRG contributed documents prior to the evaluation and continued to do so after the team leader arrived in Dakar. The team also collected information from project partners and conducted literature reviews through web searches.

INTERVIEWS

In total, the team interviewed more than 100 persons (see list of interviewees in Annex 3), about 70 percent of them in the field. As for the selection criteria, the team set to gather relevant information pertaining to (i) all four components, (ii) the three value chains, (iii) the two intervention zones (Senegal River Valley and South Forest Zone); and (iv) knowledgeable members of the various project's staff and major categories of stakeholders involved in these components, value chains and zones. The team made these requests to the project, which made available its staff for interview, provided names of public officials to contact in Dakar in the region, and suggested partners and beneficiaries to visit in the field. Attempts were made to meet with women groups, producers, processors, seed producers, consolidators, credit institutions in the two intervention areas. Encouraging knowledgeable informants to remain objective is critical in assessments. As it turned out, the interviewees were quite open in their assessments of the project, both in their praise and their misgivings. (See the unedited summary of field interviews in Annex 4).

The team engaged all major stakeholders of PCE TO5 (see Stakeholders engaged by the team text box, page 19).

- From USAID/Senegal, the team sought clarification and guidance regarding the Scope of Work (SOW), environmental compliance, and data quality control.
- The team leader met with IRG in Washington to prepare for the mission. The PCE team in Senegal made a project presentation for the team, who interviewed senior managers in charge of the four components and cross-cutting issues. The team made repeat visits to PCE to clarify data gathered in the field.
- The team engaged project beneficiaries and partners, one-on-one or in group interviews, to gauge their knowledge and understanding of the project's activities, and to elicit their assessments of the project's impact on their operations, businesses and livelihoods. Beneficiaries and partners included lead farmers, producer groups and marketing cooperatives, "consolidators" (large-scale buyers of agricultural produce, doubling as input suppliers), business services providers, financial services institutions, as well as representatives of the GOS and other development partners. The interviews took place in Dakar and project intervention areas in the Senegal River Valley and South Forest Zone.



Group interview in Kolda region

FIELD VISITS

Field visits covered the irrigated rice and farming systems in the SRV and SFZ areas. The team traveled more than 600 km in the period March 26–30 to the SRV (St Louis, Richard Toll, Rosso area, and Ross Bethio), and for April 2–7, over 1,500 km to the SFZ (Kaolack, Niore, Tambacouonda, Kolda and surrounding villages). During these field visits the evaluation team interviewed project beneficiaries and partners and observed firsthand the quality and impact of the project on the ground, including rural post-harvest equipment and infrastructure. Summaries of the team's field visits are provided in Annex 4.

DATA ANALYSIS

The team compared findings from field visits against project reports and reviewed agricultural statistics provided by DAPS to put PCE TO5 achievements into perspective. Information from published literature was also used to assess project progress and possible improvements.

INTERVIEW GUIDELINES

The team developed two sets of questionnaire guidelines. The first was keyed to the issues to be investigated to allow the team to determine each day which issues had been addressed satisfactorily, and which ones remained to be investigated at the next opportunity. The second questionnaire guideline was developed to engage lead farmers, producer groups, marketing cooperatives and aggregators and gather information on their understanding of the project's purpose and approach, and to elicit their assessments regarding the impact of the project to date and likely impact after its close.

TEAM BRIEFINGS

The team relied on end-of-day briefings to collect thoughts, assess progress, draft notes, and prepare for the next day. Frequent meetings were invaluable in keeping the team focused and on schedule.

STUDY LIMITATIONS

The team interviewed key informants from a cross-section of project beneficiaries and partners but not from a “representative” sample in the statistical sense. The evaluation did not call for drawing a stratified random sample with a pre-determined sampling error from a complete list of project beneficiaries and partners. Time would not have permitted it, and the benefits of the information generated would not have justified the cost. Instead, with the project's assistance, the evaluation team set to draw a purposive sample of interviewees, so to gather relevant information pertaining to (i) all four components, (ii) the three value chains, (iii) the two intervention zones (Senegal River Valley and South Forest Zone); and (iv) knowledgeable members of the various project's staff and major categories of stakeholders involved in these components, value chains and zones.

Due to scheduling difficulties a small minority of proposed visits and interviews could not be conducted as planned. Easter Monday holiday (March 29) and Senegal's Independence Day (April 4) fell during the assessment and although the team worked on these days, some interviews could not be rescheduled. The targeted interviewees that were not conducted as originally planned included a visit with rain-fed producers in the Velingara area, a large-scale rice miller and a women's cooperative small mill operation. When conflicts of calendar arose with stakeholders in Dakar, however, the team was able to conduct telephone interviews such as with Pape Sene of USAID Yajeende, Paco Sereme of the Conseil ouest et centre africain pour la recherche et le developpement agricole (CORAF), and Cheikh Ngane, USAID Expanded Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (E-ATP) project.

FINDINGS

This section reviews the major findings from PCE TO5 for the four components outlined in the SOW. As indicated above, PCE TO5 covers these components, but follows a different structure. Over three years of implementation, PCE TO5 has achieved meaningful results that contribute to Senegal FTF's key

objective of improving equitable growth in the rural sector. There have been a few bumps along the road, and adjustments and improvements will be needed to consolidate and upscale these achievements.

COMPONENT I: VALUE CHAINS AND MARKET LINKAGES

The stated objective of the project's value chain activities is “to support farmers to adopt the skills, build assets and secure contract and financial linkages that enable them to increase their share of Senegal's food markets, in a sustainable and profitable way.” PCE likens its value chain activities to an export promotion operation, for which the products are local staple foods and the export market is Dakar, where local products are brought to compete head-to-head with imports on quality and price.

The project's signature mechanism for implementing this operation is its “*contractualisation*” scheme. This is a formal contract farming (CF) arrangement that involves forward sales (at a price set at planting) by producers to a consolidator (i.e., a large-scale produce buyer, doubling as an input supplier); a financial institution providing credit for inputs that are delivered in kind to farmers by the input supplier/consolidator; and producers agreeing to use good agricultural practices provided by the consolidator, and/or an extension services provider partnering with the project.

“Contract farming offers fresh hope for Africa's declining agriculture,” according to the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), but Africa's success in CF has largely been confined thus far to cash crops for export or local processing (fruits and vegetables, including tomatoes for processing in Senegal, as well as cotton, sugar cane, tea, dairy). The significance of the PCE CF scheme, for both USAID and Senegal, is that this mechanism is being applied to staple grains produced mostly by smallholders, particularly in the maize value chain. The production of food crops for the domestic market is not generally the object of formal CF because with these crops, consolidators tend to anticipate little value, large amounts of retention for home consumption, high transaction costs associated with consolidating scattered small volumes, and a high risk of side-selling. PCE has taken up the challenge to demonstrate that, given the right approach and conditions, small producers of food staples can be market-driven—just as smallholders have been motivated to produce fruits and vegetables for global export.

The project has been pragmatic in its value chain approach. In the maize and millet value chains in the South Forest Zone (SFZ), where the CF scheme has been in place since the 2009/2010 season, PCE facilitates three separate contracts between: (i) producers and the input supplier/consolidator; (ii) producers and the financial institution; and (iii) the input supplier/consolidator and the financial institution d'exploitation des terres du delta du fleuve Sénégal et des vallées du fleuve Sénégal et de la Falémé. Actually, in 2010/2011, the contractual arrangement with VITAL could only be put in place at harvest. Also in the SRV, the project is working to improve the operations of vertically-integrated rice millers/input suppliers that have already established their own CF with producers. These firms—e.g., GIE Yoro Malal Yoro Gueye, Entreprise Coumba Noor Thiam (CNT), GIE Naxari Deret, Fédération des groupements et associations de femmes productrices de la région de St Louis—FEPRODES—have built their operations on the remnants of state-run CF arrangements (through SAED, CNCAS, and the now defunct rice marketing board) after the liberalization of Senegal's rice sector in the 1990s. As SAED did then, these firms provide inputs on credit (from their own funds) and land preparation and harvesting services, along with extension services, in exchange for farmers' production paddy bought at a pre-harvest, favorable price (CFA 9,000 per bag of 80 kg) for their mills. Finally, in the upland rice value chain in the SFZ, the project focuses on the supply of certified seed, viewed as the best entry point for this value chain.



The project also covers upstream activities, as in the production and promotion of certified seeds, including aromatic rice varieties: Sahel 177, S328 and S329 for irrigated rice, and Nerica 1 for rain-fed rice. (Beyond its priority value chains, FTF seeks to increase the availability of strategic varieties and to strengthen the capacity and market responsiveness of the public and private actors involved in this sector.) The project is working with the Institut senegalais de recherches agricoles (ISRA), which has exclusive rights to produce foundation seed, to improve its operations and to respond to market demand. It is also working with seed farmers in the SRV and the Southern Forest Zone (SFZ) to help them better plan their operations to supply certified seeds to producers. PCE is supporting key infrastructure work to rehabilitate ISRA's seed stations (at Fanaye in the SRV and Nioro du Rip in the SFZ), rehabilitate/build seed certification labs, and rehabilitate seed processing facilities. Downstream activities include promotion of grain warehousing (called "stockpiling") to help millers operate all year.

The table below highlights year-over-year results from this component that indicate the project is making good progress in scaling-up achievements in area planted and yield achieved, particularly in maize, in which the project initiated its formal contract farming (CF) approach. The CF mechanism has contributed to increase farm price for participating producers. The area increase here is considered a success because it is achieved by producers following an innovative and demanding formal contract farming approach. However, the yields below expectation realized in irrigated rice and millet raise a major concern. If yields continue to decline, instead of increasing and stabilizing at a higher level, the sustainability of the CF scheme cannot be ensured. Millet has not received as much emphasis as maize in terms of CF because of budget constraints. However, the prospects appear good in the rice value chain. The project's CF approach is firming up in the irrigated river valley chain, with the new aromatic rice varieties being demonstrated by the project showed peaks of 10 tons/ha, 70% above the average 6 tons/ha. Similarly, trials of Nerica varieties showed average yields of 2.4 tons/ha and peaks of 4 tons/ha, compared to current yields of 1.3 tons/ha. Ultimately, sustained productivity and increased production will come from competitive value chains, i.e., farmers producing to meet market demand--including through such a working formal farming contract mechanism.

TABLE I: KEY VALUE CHAIN RESULTS

Value chain	Indicator	Baseline	Results FY2010	Results FY2011
Maize	Area (ha)	1,196	968	3,270
	Production (ton)	873	1,120	8,442
	Yield (kg/ha)	730	1,157	2,582
	Quantity sold (ton)	648	541	5,782
	Gross margin (CFA/ha)	82,180	105,998	224,214
Millet	Area (ha)	244	332	1,439
	Production (ton)	239	347	968
	Yield (kg/ha)	982	1,045	673
	Quantity sold (ton)	129	200	323
	Gross margin (CFA/ha)	54,100	51,683	74,074
Irrigated rice	Area (ha)	3,718	3,926	14,350
	Production (ton)	19,530	25,570	73,474
	Yield (kg/ha)	5,252	6,513	5,120
	Quantity sold (ton)	2,415	4,323	30,537
	Gross margin (CFA/ha)	297,591	347,144	241,613
Upland rice	Area (ha)			60

Yield (kg/ha)	1,900
Gross margin (CFA/ha)	249,313

PCE M&E Report, 2011, 2012

Other highlights of PCE's success in its value chain activities include:

- Expansion of the *contractualisation* arrangements in the SFZ from one consolidator and one credit institution in 2010 to six consolidators and four credit institutions in 2011, which led to an almost four-fold area expansion, as shown in the table.
- Introduction of aromatic rice varieties in the SRV (S177, S328, S329) and the SFZ (Nerica 1) that have caught on with producers and consumers alike. Some 400 tons of aromatic varieties were produced in FY2011
- Strengthening of association of irrigated rice seed growers in the SRV and Nerica rice in the SFZ.
- Also in FY2011, 14 tons of foundation seeds were produced and 1,939 tons of certified seeds were made available to farmers, all meeting expectations.
- Construction of two seed certification laboratories in Richard Toll (SRV) and Kaolack (SFZ).

The evaluation team identified the following best practices in this component.

- *Le chemin du bon maïs* and *le chemin du bon riz* are simple but effective visual displays that teach producers good agricultural practices in the production of maize and rice for the market.
- The introduction of a geo-referenced database, a sophisticated yet easy to implement system, allows producers to follow crop production from planting to harvest on a plot basis, providing a tool for traceability. This tool empowers farmers, and women and women groups in particular.

One concern is that in following FTF guidelines in estimating gross margin, which account on the cost side for cash inputs only (each input representing at least 5 percent of total cost), the project ignores the imputed value of family and farm equipment. However, it is difficult to compare the gross margin of a farmer who uses farm family labor to that of a farmer with a smaller family who uses more hired labor. Also for the purpose of negotiating contracts, production costs should not be calculated with only cash inputs.

The project hit a bump in the 2011/2012 year. Its CF scheme, which had worked well in 2010/2011, with a 100 percent credit reimbursement rate, encountered difficulties in the 2011/2012 maize season. Some maize producers engaged in side-selling when prices at harvest reached CFA 175–185/kg in rural markets, much higher than the pre-harvest contract price set initially at CFA 135/kg (later increased to CFA 145/kg). The situation was compounded by extraneous circumstances: poor rainfall pattern and the fact that one consolidator, without telling producers in advance, recouped the higher cost of inputs from the sale proceeds when producers delivered their maize.³ Thus a mechanism is needed for situations when the spot market price deviates substantially (up or down) from the contract price. Adding to the problem is that many producers do not yet fully grasp the legal nature of a contract. As one group leader said: “*je signe, mais cela ne m’engage en rien*” (I am signing but am not bound by it). Another major threat to implementation of the CF arrangement is the introduction of the government input subsidy program, which leads producers to wait for inputs that invariably come late and in quantities too small to be of much use.

³ SODEFITIEX (Société de Développement et des Fibres Textiles) bought inputs at market prices because subsidized inputs were not available. It put language in the contract that inputs will be provided at market prices, even though the contract also contains the lower-priced subsidized inputs, said that its reimbursement rate was 84.5% in 2009/2010 and 98% in 2010/2011 (when accounting for its seed business). As it turned out, as of April 2012, the reimbursement rate was 48.8%.

One area in which the project can support consolidators in the SRV is to push for the use of weights and measures. Under the project CF scheme, VITAL improved its reimbursement rate in the 2010/2011 rainy season to 95 percent, compared to 60 percent in the preceding off season (*contre-saison chaude*), before participation in the project. The miller complained, however, that producers delivered bags weighing 60–65 kg instead of the 80 kg bags promised. Surprisingly, rice value chain actors in the SRV have stuck to volume-based transactions of their paddy, whereas in the SFZ and Peanut Basin, millet and maize producers and traders have long weighed the grain transacted.

The consolidator/input supplier is an important player in the project’s CF arrangements, but VITAL, a miller, and SODEFITEX/BAMTAARE (a business development services provider) have reservations about getting into the input supply business due to their lack of expertise in that area. In fact, with the project working on inventory credit warehousing (which involves a third party handling stocks), millers like VITAL, would no longer need to serve as input suppliers.

The project completed the construction/rehabilitation of two seed certification laboratories (Richard Toll and Kaolack) out of the five planned by FTF and DISEM. (DISEM, however, had Dakar in place of Diourbel proposed by FTF.). The new laboratories are a great improvement over earlier ones, and they have already contributed to the release of both foundation and certified seeds (see p. 23). However, they are not being well maintained. Also, lab technicians, who come into contact with potentially hazardous chemicals and agents brought with the seed samples to be tested, lack protective gear (gowns, masks, gloves). (A concurrent Peace Corps mission made the same assessment, and the project is gearing up to address the situation.) As for the seed processing facilities, the project has been working to facilitate a PPP to improve the Richard Tool center, and with a private operator to set one up in Kaolack. (The Kaolack facility was not yet completed during the team’s visit of the area).⁴

On conceptual grounds, using cash inputs (each representing at least 5 percent of the total cost) to calculate gross margin, as recommended by the FTF monitoring and evaluation system, makes comparison across producers difficult. Under this method, a producer who relies on family labor can show a higher gross margin than the same producer who later expands his operation and uses hired labor. More importantly, when cash inputs are the only costs accounted for, the estimated total cost of production would appear low, and this puts producers in a poor bargaining position when negotiating contract prices.

Worth noting is the issue of how “value chain” is translated into French, as the project is attempting to set this concept apart from the competing “*filier*e” concept. The plural “*chaîne de valeurs*” is the better translation of the value chain concept as applied to a whole industry (and practiced by the project), where many firms generate value along the supply chain. The singular “*chaîne de valeur*” actually translates back into English as “valuable chain,” as with a gold chain.

Overall, this component remains the main asset of the project, and potential for the project to scale up is in this realm.

COMPONENT 2: ENHANCED [AGRICULTURAL] POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Agricultural policy reform is a notoriously complex, excruciatingly slow process in Senegal—as in many places. PCE was tasked with advancing implementation of the 2004 *Loi d’orientation agro-sylvo-pastorale* (LOASP), which was produced after a long gestation period. Its momentum has stalled ever since. For example, decrees have been issued for only 8 of the 52 commitments. The project has focused

⁴ Note: This section relates to the infrastructure improvement component of the seed subsector. The second component, increasing quality foundation and certified seeds by the public and private sectors, is covered elsewhere, for example in “other highlights of project’s success” (p. 23) and throughout the document.

on three of the nine thematic domains that make up the LOASP: rural finance, land tenure, and formal recognition of agricultural professions. Due to project budget cuts, the project has forgone addressing a fourth identified area of agricultural policy reform that dealt with the formal recognition of agricultural professions. Through another mechanism, however, USAID plans to address the formal recognition of agricultural professions in response to the Ministry of Agriculture's request.

The project has not made much headway on the land tenure issue due to the lack of political will on the part of the GOS and the overwhelming nature of the issue. Land tenure issues actually threatened to derail the adoption of the LOASP, and land tenure ended up being removed from the legislation; in article 23, the law includes an injunction for stand-alone land reform legislation to be submitted within two years of adoption of the LOASP. Eight years later, no action has been taken thus far. Land reform is complex in Senegal, as in much of Africa, because it involves many competing aims: (i) reconcile a variety of traditional land rights, including those of pastoralists, often at odds with sedentary farmers, legacy colonial law, and Muslim law, in certain cases; (ii) provide incentives for investment and economic development in rural areas; and (iii) advance the political aim of decentralization by transferring governance of land tenure to local communities. Add to these a fourth aim: (iv) improve women's access to land. For its part, the *Programme national d'investissement agricole* (PNIA), the country's national investment plan, envisions a government body (*Structure chargée de l'aménagement foncier et de l'équipement rural*) to promote investment in rural areas.

Expertise is needed in all these areas, and the participation of local communities will be critical to advance the process. At a project-sponsored training seminar on agricultural policy held in December 2011 for 28 communications professionals, the representative of the MA (as reported by the project) acknowledged that there had been little progress on land reform. He did indicate, however, that they were at work on a key instrument: a land use master plan, *Plan d'application et d'occupation des sols* (PAOS).

A major project achievement likely to have long-lasting impact is the increase in the capacity of the agricultural statistical agency *Direction de l'analyse, de la prévision et de la statistique* (DAPS) to produce a reliable and timely national agriculture survey. This capacity building and technical assistance program serves as an agricultural policy reform activity because the timely delivery of accurate agricultural data is critical to policy decision making. Since 2009, the project has provided DAPS with agriculture survey methods, tools—150 Global Positioning Systems (GPS) and 150 motorbikes—and trained 300 field agents. To locate a household and measure its fields, DAPS now needs one field agent instead of three, and one GPS as opposed to two poles and a rope. DAPS has increased its survey sample from 3,600 to 6,300 households and added new survey variables to the questionnaire, including status of food security, nutrition, and nonagricultural sources of income. In 2011, the project introduced free satellite imagery to DAPS to further improve its survey and eventually set up an early warning system. Four professionals were trained at Michigan State University in the use of this technology. According to the head of DAPS, the agriculture survey data has gained public confidence since 2009 because of its reliability and timeliness. He boasted that Senegal's agriculture survey system has become the model for the region.

Other project initiatives for this component include the following:

- Initiation of seed policy reform to support ISRA in producing adequate foundation seed on time and in adequate quantities for seed growers, through the establishment of a seed production unit.
- An assessment of the government fertilizer subsidy program.
- Assistance to the Ministry of Agriculture to produce the first update report on the implementation of LOASP (expected on a yearly basis), covering the 2004–2010 period.
- Support to MA in revising the country's investment program (PNIA). As part of PNIA, along with supporting an input subsidy program, the GOS has launched ambitious initiatives which have yet to reach their lofty goals, such as: the grand offensive for food and abundance, *Grande*

offensive agricole pour la nourriture et l'abondance (GOANA), and the rice self-sufficiency program by 2012. FTF is supportive of these two initiatives.

In conclusion, the improvement in the country's agricultural survey system is the result under this component that is likely to endure through the methodology and analytical tools that have been incorporated into the system. However, as with most state-supported activities, sustainability will depend on budgetary support. To the extent that the system remains operational, it could indeed become a best practice, as the director of DAPS claims it is.

COMPONENT 3: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Access to capital focuses on (i) development of financial models and financial coaching of value chain actors in support of the formal contract farming scheme for cereals; (ii) introduction of new financial instruments; (iii) provision of technical support to USAID's Development Credit Authority (DCA) guarantees, especially for agriculture); and (iv) training of financial institution staff on agricultural lending.

The work of the project to improve access to finance is mostly centered on the *contractualisation* scheme promoted in the value chain component. Both components deal with the same key value chain actors on the same issues, including making arrangements with consolidators/input suppliers, financial institutions, and lead producers to implement the CF scheme. The same results are also often reported at length for both components. For example, the contractual arrangements under this component are considered "market linkages" activities. Also, the inventory credit system being worked out between the project and VITAL is dealt with in both components. The same results for the 17 maize humidity testers and 25 rice humidity testers are reported in both components.

Listed below are achievements under this component.

- PCE's facilitation of a medium-term credit facility through the leasing company Locafrique constitutes an important result, given the shortage of medium-term credit. Banks, when they do give credit, require collateral that many borrowers lack. This project activity, under which the equipment is the collateral, resulted in the acquisition of 15 new tractors by producer groups in 2011 and a rice mill by one GIE Naxari Deret to be delivered in 2012.
- Crop insurance as an instrument of climate change adaptation is another encouraging development pursued by the project under this component. The project has signed with the agricultural insurance company CNAAS, a private-private partnership with the GOS. This was in order to protect producers. In light of the difficult experience of 2011/2012, this instrument has considerable potential.

PCE has supported USAID/Senegal's Development Credit Authority (DCA) program by working closely with banks. In FY2011, 2,516 DCA-supported loans were issued for a total of more than US\$7 million. The DCA is not necessarily linked to the project's value chain activities; however, rural credit institutions have shown interest in this facility that can lead to improved access to credit for the value chain actors. In the just published report for January-March 2012 FY2012, loans under the DCA program totaled about US\$3.6 million, US\$1.6 million of which was provided by Alliance de crédit et d'épargne pour la production (ACEP). By involving the banks through its formal farming contract mechanism, the project facilitates producers' access to farm inputs in the rice and maize value chains. The project also works with existing contract farming operators (in the SRV) to improve their operations, which results in improved access to inputs for rice farmers.

Under this component, the project financed two rice mills for a women's group and took an extra step often missing similar grants or cost-sharing agreements: training the women (16 in this case) in their

operations. The project also introduced maize threshing equipment to producers. In 2011, the project closed out its involvement in the construction of village warehouses due to budget cuts and also because it found there was not enough justification to continue building these units rather than allowing them to be built by the actors themselves. By that point, the project had already completed five small grain warehouses and had initiated some financial support for SODEFITEX to improve a 1,000-ton silo. As it turned out, SODEFITEX has yet to complete its project because it can't secure enough maize for the silo, which shows that the investment would not have succeeded.

In conclusion, under this component the project introduced innovative credit leasing to value-chain actors. It has been working on a promising crop insurance program, which is greatly needed in a country like Senegal with declining or erratic rainfall. It has also done a good job on the DCA by facilitating three new DCA guarantees specifically for agriculture (including for the women's group FEPRODES) and supporting existing holders to expand the use of DCA guarantees.

One concern is overlap and the repetition of results reported from the contract farming arrangement under this component and under the value component. While the two components complement each other, this calls for limiting repetition in the reporting of project achievements.

COMPONENT 4: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RESOURCE

PCE is focused on building the capacities of four key value chains actors: (i) producer groups operating in the target value chains and areas of intervention; (ii) private business enterprises involved in processing cereal produce; (iii) agri-food support institutions, including public agencies and NGOs; and (iv) agricultural training and research institutions. The project objective for this component is to develop the requisite skills for a critical mass of Senegalese agri-food actors (ranging from small-scale entrepreneurs to policy makers) to understand and apply the value chain approach.

In 2011, PCE organized several well-received trainings through the Bureau of Education and Professional Training (Bureau de formation professionnelle agricole, or BFPA) for three national directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture: agriculture (DA), statistics (DAPS), and horticulture (DHORT). The sessions, designed to help staff produce analytical papers and sectoral development policies and proposals, covered use of basic office applications (76 staff, including 34 women, attended); methods and tools for the collection, management, and analysis of statistical data (25 staff attended, including 4 women); and design and implementation of agricultural policies (24 staff attended, including 6 women). As an indication of the relevance of the workshops to the trainees, the head of BFPA noted that some trainees had commented that they were expected to conduct policy analysis but did not really understand what it meant. "No wonder Senegal hasn't made much progress in agricultural policy reform," they said. A consulting firm handled a capacity building program for the Agence nationale de conseil agricole et rural (ANCAR), a private entity.

The project's other major achievement in this component is the development of a two year-master's program in agribusiness at the Ecole nationale superieure d'agriculture (ENSA) at Thies University. The goal of the program, the first program of its kind in Senegal, is to groom the next generation of agribusiness entrepreneurs to pioneer the value chain development approach in Senegal. The 14 students are provided opportunities to develop theses based on areas of interest to value chain actors in the intervention zones. In 2011, the project sponsored seven ENSA students (from the master's degree and the school's agricultural engineering programs). Two research topics are of particular note: the determinants of production cost and marketing incentives for maize, and the feasibility of bio-gas production at farm and village levels in the Senegal River zone.

In 2011, the project provided training (through partners under contract, as with the other capacity building activities) to 157 agribusinesses in the *contractualisation* approach, and to some 22,200 producers in the production of quality seeds and products of the project's value chains. Also in 2011, as the project prepared for the budget cuts, it revised its priorities and felt compelled to postpone or cut several capacity building programs aligned with Senegal's FTF strategy. (see text box on following page regarding budget cuts).

Budget cuts led to postponement of the following planned FY2011 capacity building programs:

- Strengthening the National Value Chain Network as a potential pole of excellence (activity transferred to USAID ERA);
- ANCAR capacity building program: (i) participatory construction of demand for technical advisory and support services; (ii) practical methods and tools for agricultural extension professionals, and (iii) training in the value chain approach;
- Training of small-scale agri-food business entrepreneurs on product marketing strategies;
- Training in the management of grain warehouses in the central zone;
- Training of seed technology specialists and professionals;
- Thematic exchange and animation meetings of stakeholders, to be held in in the SRV and the SFZ on the following topics: (i) joint offensive against striga as a major threat to cereal production, (ii) prospects for rain-fed rice; and (iii) national debate on agricultural policy in general or a related critical issue.

In conclusion, this component has suffered from budget cuts, and the MA has wanted more of the project's support in building the capacity of its directorates. In spite of the cuts, results have been significant, particularly the outstanding achievement of the two-year master's program in agribusiness. It is the first of its kind in Senegal and may be emulated in other countries as well. One area of concern noted by the project itself is that women's participation in capacity building activities has remained low.

ISSUES INVESTIGATED

COMPONENT I: VALUE CHAINS AND MARKET LINKAGES

Has the value chain approach proven to be effective? Since the February 2011 approval of the FTF strategy, is the approach building momentum toward the FTF goal of scaling-up in a functionally sustainable manner?

The project's value chain approach has been effective because it has been targeted (with its focus on effective market demand) and pragmatic (in promoting two variants of contracts, while working to improve the performance of existing contract farming arrangements). The approach has been opening new markets (commercial maize and aromatic rice) for producers; providing assurances for banks to lend more credit to producers; and introducing new varieties, practices, and tools to make producers more productive and responsive to market demand. This is reflected in increases in area planted (see Table 1 in the Findings section). In 2011, area increase year-over-year was 237% in maize, 333% in millet, and 266% in irrigated rice. Increase in production was 654% in maize, 179% in millet, and 187% in irrigated rice. Across the board value chain stakeholders praised the project for introducing a well-thought-through and structured approach. The program has brought an increased number of small producers (1-4 ha per farm household) to commercial maize production. The contract farming mechanism provided good access to inputs that increased maize yields. The CF also started in 2010 with a higher contract price (CFA125/kg) compared to the market price at the time (CFA95/kg). The project has built momentum in expanding the CF mechanism to more and more areas in the SRV and SFZ. At the same time, with the difficulties encountered in 2011/2012 in the maize value chain, many actors in the SFZ are now waiting for the project to show its full potential going forward.

The project has been building momentum, if one looks at the YoY improvements since the adoption of FTF in February 2011 and continuing into the 2011/2012 production season. In the maize value chain, it has expanded from one consolidator that handled a few hundred tons in 2009/2010 to six consolidators⁵ that were on contract to purchase 12,000 tons in the 2011/2012 season. It has also increased the number of credit institutions from one to three.⁶ Before PCE's intervention, credit institutions would systematically grant less input credit than producers requested in order to minimize risk. For example, the Credit Mutuel du Senegal (CMS) reported that its loan portfolio increased from CFA 91,472,430 for 48 beneficiaries in 2010/2011 to CFA 225,354,900 for 202 beneficiaries in the 2011/2012 season. In the SRV, the project has worked with seed farmers to produce some 400 tons of certified rice seeds, sufficient for planting 3,300 ha. As indicated earlier, however, the difficult situation in the SFZ risks derailing the project in this area. As of November 2010, CMS had 100% reimbursement for the 2010/2011 season, but for the 2011/2012 season, only 51% reimbursement as of April 2012.

On this critical issue value chain actors are looking to the project--not to provide solely financial assistance or to immerse itself in loan negotiations, but rather to facilitate a dialogue among the three parties and provide assurance that it will continue the program for the next season or two. With the project's continued involvement, banks would be reasonably assured of good production from farmers. They would therefore be more willing to reschedule producers' loan payments and provide new loans to

⁵ SODEFITEX/BAMTAARE (Société de développement et des fibres textiles/Bureau d'appui, aux méthodes et techniques pour l'agriculture, les activités rurales et l'environnement), SOENA (Société d'encadrement agricole), RESOPP (Réseau des organisations paysannes et pastorales du Sénégal), SEDAB (Sahélienne d'agro-business), Etablissements Tamedou, and Etablissements Tool Baye.

⁶ CNCAS (Caisse nationale de crédit agricole du Sénégal), CMS (Crédit mutuel du Sénégal), ACEP (Alliance de crédit et d'épargne pour la production).

continue the program. The project also needs the program to continue so that it can find and test a mechanism to minimize the reoccurrence of the problem.

Are the dynamics of productivity/market demand and supply improved according to project expectations?

The dynamics of market demand engendering increased productivity and supply worked in the maize value chain up to the 2011/2012 season. This dynamic is put in motion by the project identifying and expanding market demand (commercial maize and millet, and aromatic rice's high demand in Dakar), through facilitation of contractual arrangements among producers such as credit institutions and consolidators, and through the promotion of certified seeds as well as practices and techniques to build producers' and millers' capacities to produce quality product. Maize yields increased over twofold in 2010/2011 over the previous year. Rice yields have not done as well (untimely delivery of inputs and delays in soil preparation for off-season production have been blamed for this drop), although demonstration plots showed significant yield improvement of up to 10 ton/ha, compared to average yields of 5–6 ton/ha. There has been ready demand to absorb producers' supply—a good “market fit.”

How have activities to improve productivity and associated market linkages led to improved trade?

Improved productivity and market linkages have combined to increase producers' marketed surplus of maize, millet, and rice. The focus of PCE, however, has been on the domestic market and not regional trade since the inception of Senegal FTF. For example, in the villages of Bantancountou Maounde and Touba Sadou, in the Kolda region, area planted in maize increased from 2 ha to 8 ha and from 8 ha to 24 ha, respectively. Producers, particularly in the Kolda region, who had previously grown maize for home consumption, have expanded production to such an extent that maize is now thought of as a cash crop. With the formal CF, producers have inputs not only to expand the area cultivated but also to apply the recommended amounts on their lands; this results in productivity increase with maize of yields 2-3 tons/ha compared to the average 1.3 tons/ha

COMPONENT 2: ENHANCED POLICY ENVIRONMENT

Have the policy reforms identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to GOS priorities?

The project initially outlined a more ambitious agriculture policy reform program but was forced to target three policy areas because of budget cuts following its alignment with FTF strategy. The three selected areas (agriculture, rural finance, and land tenure) are relevant to GOS priorities. Particularly on land reform, there is a noticeable lack of political will on the part of the GOS to make headway. The project has gone beyond this core set of reforms to advance the country's seed policy in support of timely production in adequate quantities, and to assess the government's fertilizer subsidy program.

Has the approach for accomplishing policy reform been effective?

PCE's assistance to DAPS (through financial support, technical assistance from US experts, and capacity building) has been quite effective. The project has put in place an approach to assist the Ministry of Agriculture's policy working groups to produce draft decrees, for review by the MA. However, this approach has not yielded the intended results due to a lack of GOS political will to confront difficult policy reform issues. Senior staff of the MA recognizes that since the adoption of the LOASP, there has been no concrete initiative to prepare the decrees to implement the LOAS.

Are the planned results achievable in the present political environment?

The presidential elections are over, but the new administration will only be completely established following the parliamentary elections scheduled for the summer. The political environment is likely to

remain in a state of flux for some time, with the possibility of continued government intervention.⁷ However, to the extent that DAPS is not severely affected by staff change, the project can be expected to consolidate the results achieved in its support to this agency.

What legal, regulatory, or administrative barriers are to be lifted for attracting investments and making the private sector more competitive?

The main concern for non-residents who would like to invest in the SRV (and elsewhere in Senegal) remains secure access to land, with contract enforcement mechanisms (which could be applied by local authorities). This does not necessarily mean land acquisition, but rather, secure user-rights over a reasonable time frame to allow for a decent return on investment. On one hand rural communities go up in arms when the central government attempts to allocate rural land directly, and on the other there have been instances in which land allocation by rural community leaders has lacked transparency. For women, access to land remains an issue even after the gain of economic power. The women's association, Fédération des groupements et associations de femmes productrices de Saint Louis (FEPRODES), has a well-run micro-finance institution, Mutuelle d'épargne et de crédit (MEC), but has difficulties financing women producers due to the fact that the land rights inevitably belong to male members of the households.

The GOS input subsidy policy distorts the market, affecting producers seeking to expand their operations. Many producers fall into the trap of waiting for fertilizer that usually comes late, is of bad quality, and is of insufficient quantity. It is a disincentive for would-be input importers, who are at a cost disadvantage to sell their imports. It may well push the few companies with licenses to import the subsidized inputs to collude in order to inflate fertilizer prices so that the subsidies provided by government increase over time. The situation is further complicated by the fact the focus of the government input subsidy program is not solely focused on enhancing rice production but also to support a declining peanut sector.

Are there any notable adaptations required to fulfill the policy objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?

One lesson learned is that agriculture policy reform succeeds when donors coordinate their efforts to work with governments. For example, the reform in Senegal's rice subsector came about through the combined efforts of USAID and the World Bank. A few years before, USAID was able to push through reforms in cereal policy liberalization at Mali's Office du Niger, which played the role of SAED for rice development in Mali, by closely collaborating with the World Bank and the European Union. For land reform, for example, policy working groups need to be facilitated by the right mix of experts and the participation of community leaders and women groups needs to be funded in order to make further advances. Some donors may provide support to the experts; others can support the participation of rural communities, while still others can help with land use planning to support the reform.

COMPONENT 3: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

Are the planned results achievable with the current range of financing instruments or other institutional factors?

The project will not achieve all its planned activities with the current financing mechanism. As shown earlier, several activities in the FY2011 workplan had been postponed. These delays were a result of project's strategic response to the budget cut. For example, the project has reduced or delayed its commitments in post-harvest infrastructures in trying instead to facilitate PPPs, such as with the seed

⁷ On April 19, making good on a campaign promise, the president lowered retail prices of rice, sugar, and oil. Lower prices, depending on how they are administered, have the potential of lowering prices at the farm gate.

processing facility in Richard Toll, warehouses, and a rice processing platform for GIEs. However, the project has completed two major works: the seed certification laboratories in Richard Toll and Kaolack. It has also delivered the necessary equipment for a private entity to set a seed processing facility in Kaolack and delivered equipment. It plans to complete the renovation (or new construction) of the seed certification lab and also facilitate the establishment of a private seed processing facility both in Kolda.

Are post-harvest infrastructure improvements well targeted to support the scale-up of activities needed to achieve project goals?

Seed certification laboratories and processing facilities are needed in order to scale-up activities vital to achieving project goals. Past project interventions in infrastructure improvement were not well targeted (e.g., the silo in Tambaounda, given that SODEFITEX should be able to build or renovate on its own). The project has since curtailed activities subsidizing the construction of warehouses. A better course of action is facilitating bank loans or leasing mechanisms to help the private sector acquire grain warehouses. For example, the large rice operator, CNT, spends approximately CFA 6 million each year in canvas cover to protect its paddy left outdoors; it should be willing to spend as much and possibly more in installments to acquire a warehouse on credit or through leasing.

What does this experience suggest about the future potential for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in Senegal?

Senegal has elaborate PPP legislation that involves state-built property, but its track record is rather poor when it comes to small- to medium-scale PPPs, such as the one initially contemplated by the project regarding the seed processing facility. However, this remains a limited experience by PCE to draw definite conclusions about the future potential of PPPs in Senegal. Nonetheless, the fact that this limited PPP has taken so long to complete is not encouraging. The other forms of PPPs, implemented between the project and a private firm, do not fall under this category.

What needs to be changed to speed-up and improve the PPP process?

A streamlined approach that does not involve the transfer of government-built property to a private sector entity is needed. The project is looking at such a proposition which would entail some form of rental arrangement with conditions put in place to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure. However, the project may be better off relying on an existing organization rather than trying to create a cooperative for this purpose. The project needs to ensure that a capable manager has been trained to operate the facility.

COMPONENT 4: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RESOURCES

To what extent were public and private institutions developed or strengthened?

The project has followed through with its objective of building the capacities of its target groups: producers, agribusiness, public and NGO support agencies, and agricultural training and research institutions. Its achievements in terms of numbers of persons trained have been quite remarkable, as discussed in the findings. The capacity building program has had an impact on many, and the BFPA reports that professional training has regained its rightful place within the Ministry of Agriculture. One woman lead farmer in the SRV proclaimed that the best practice training coupled with the database management training have turned her into an accomplished agricultural engineer. “I can now challenge anybody when it comes to irrigated rice production techniques,” she said.

To what extent has IRG/PCE made progress in identifying, developing and implementing capacity building activities within GOS and the private sector?

The PCE conducted value chain assessments and used a needs assessment with follow-up workshops to determine and implement capacity building activities for the GOS and the private sector. This process was effective in establishing training needs and demands. Previously, workshops were career driven rather than oriented toward the needs of the institution and as a consequence many trainees would resign after their training thus depriving the institution of the benefits of the trainings. The project has also worked with credit institutions to bring them into the CF arrangements and has made progress in strengthening the technical and managerial capacities of private enterprises. For example, it helped strengthen the CF arrangements of CNT and Naxadi Deret, assisted the national association of seed growers (UNIS) in the SRV in drafting a three-year business plan, and established the network of Nerica seed growers, Réseau de production des semences Nerica (Reprosener), in the SFZ.

Has the capacity building identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to FTF priorities?

The project had to scale back its capacity-building activities when confronted with budget cuts. These cuts created discomfort between the project and public institutions that had built project assistance into their programs. However, even with the budget cuts, the project capacity-building initiatives have achieved good results, including 14 graduates from a long-term training program (master's degree program). From 2010 to 2011, the number of short-term trainees went from 20,356 to 24,000, while institutions/organizations receiving assistance increased from 27 to 31.

Has the approach been effective as described in USAID objectives and in the FTF strategy?

Despite the budget cuts, the project was quite effective in strengthening the capacities of institutions and community-based organizations that respond to USAID FTF. Grassroots organizations were trained in good agricultural practices, through such materials as "*le chemin du bon riz*" and "*le chemin du bon maïs*." Producer groups are quite impressed with the project's introduction of geo-referenced database management that allows a group to monitor its production system over time and space.

STRATEGY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES: GENDER; CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION; COMMUNICATIONS; PARTNERSHIPS; AND SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND INNOVATION

Is PCE TO5 adequately taking cross-cutting issues into consideration during activity design and implementation?

The project's gender mainstreaming includes the targeting of value chain activities that involve women in the current social framework, including in the production and processing of rain-fed rice. It also includes the targeting of women's organizations, such as FEPRODES, and other women-led organizations such as the GIE Malal Yoro Gueye in the SRV, and the GIE Boubou Deme in the SFZ. The project takes gender into consideration in its capacity-building programs and disaggregates results by gender. However, gender participation has remained low (below 25 percent) in the capacity-building activities.

Climate change (CC) was recently introduced in PCE's program, and the project has since showcased how it is contributing to CC adaptation in its activities. These adaptations include the promotion of short-term rice varieties, conservation farming developed in collaboration with Wula Naafa, farming techniques to reduce "striga" infestation in millet production, and the crop insurance program. The project has organized training on CC for ANCAR agents. In addition, the 70 kw capacity bio-gas plant (built for Coumba Noor Thiam enterprise on a grant) uses rice husks, thus reducing solid waste pollution in the SRV and is a CC mitigation measure because it reduces the use of electricity produced by fossil fuel.

Communications is taken into account, but apparently not as a cross-cutting issue, as the communications manager responds to the senior manager for policy reform, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and communications. The project has retained a local professional agency, which is called as needed—for example, to produce appealing communications materials for the project farmer training program and its promotion of aromatic rice, such as at the recent agricultural trade fair, *Foire internationale de l'agriculture et des ressources animales* (FIARA). Ten success story documents focused on the maize, millet and rice value chains and were produced during FY2010 (5) and FY2011 (5). Several of the project's activities have been posted on YouTube, such as the Nerica rice program, the DISEM seed certification lab in Richard Toll, capacity-building activities, and promotion of local products. An electronic newsletter, informational films, and media coverage of field visits are proposed in the FY2012 workplan.

The transfer to the private sector of the state-owned seed certification facility is one example of a public-private partnership (PPP). For the project, however, a PPP can also be a form of structured collaboration, including through cost-sharing arrangements. Partnerships may take the form of an MOU or a purchase order contract with consolidators and data collectors. Through these arrangements the project partners are building their capacities which should endure beyond the project's closure. In FY2011, for example, the project established 28 such partnerships; the target for FY2012 is 44.

The project deals with sciences, technology, and innovation through the following activities: the introduction of certified seeds (including aromatic rice for irrigated and rain-fed rice, and hybrid maize), geo-referenced database management for producers, statistical data collection methods and analysis, and the introduction of a bio fuel unit to reduce solid waste pollution and the use of fossil fuel.

Is PCE TO5 compliant with and accounting for environmental sustainability within the context of activities? What are the environmental compliance lessons that have been learned? How have they been captured?

The PCE complies with environmental regulations, following the guidelines in its Environmental Mitigation and Monitoring Plan (EMMP) and its Pesticide Evaluation Report and Safe User Action Plan (PERSUAP), drafted in collaboration with Wula Naafa. USAID/Senegal indicated to the evaluation team that PCE is not required to produce an Environmental Review Form (IERF) or Environmental Review Report (ERR). For civil works, PCE follows the environmental guidelines for an environmental review. The project reports that in the past it missed one or two checks (site visits prior to civil works) that turned out to be of no consequence (the site for the seed lab is on an existing site and not a new one).

Is PCE TO5 investing in areas which are not within the FTF TO5 strategy and/or within the updated focus or direction of USAID/Senegal?

PCE is fully aligned with FTF value chains and with other core FTF areas (including transport and trade). The evaluation team did not come across any PCE TO 5 activities outside of the FTF strategy. The FY2011 PCE annual report still contains activities pertaining to Task Order 6, but these are clearly identified as such.

To what extent can the project monitoring system meet the reporting requirements?

The project's M&E system meets the reporting requirements for the components, as well as cross-cutting issues. Gender disaggregation, technology and innovation, and partnerships are all reported on in project indicators. The M&E system also keeps track of environmental assessments of civil works. Success stories and most communication materials are readily available; however, the project has yet to develop a regular newsletter to disseminate its results or an archive of major news clips about its activities.

Is PCE working with USAID management to strategize sufficient and adequately targeted efforts to assure sustainability and implementation of USAID Forward objectives by November 2013? (Work Plan and associated phase-out strategy)

Regarding the Implementation and Procurement Reform goal of more USAID funding going directly to local partners, USAID and PCE have two informal sessions. A close of the project by November would mean the tapering off of technical work some three to six months before. This means in the middle of 2012/2013. Yet the project needs time to implement a flexible contract pricing system to strengthen its formal farming contract mechanism. A phase out strategy would not be advisable, resources permitting.

GENERAL QUESTIONS INVESTIGATED

In addition to the questions pertaining to the individual components the evaluation team investigated the following general questions per USAID/Senegal instructions.

Has the project been able to complete the planned activities for the associated issue area within the stipulated times?

PCE TO5 has not been able to complete all planned activities within the stipulated time. This project went through a period of restructuring to adjust for FTF and plan for the anticipated budget cut. As a result, the following activities were delayed or eliminated: rehabilitation of the seed certification lab in Kolda (delayed), rehabilitation of seed processing facilities (delayed in Richard Toll and Kaolack) and reduced activities in the millet value chain. The major works completed include the construction of the seed certification laboratories in Richard Toll and Kaolack. A private seed processing facility is being established in Kaolack thanks to a project grant to the private firm.

Did the project inputs/services provided reach the target population in the expected numbers?

The project’s reach has been good to date, consistently exceeding targets in terms of the number of firms, persons, and community-based organizations (CBO) assisted, as well as business-to-business partnerships. (See table below)

TABLE 2: PROJECT INPUTS/SERVICES PROVIDED TO TARGET POPULATIONS

Services provided by the project to target populations	Target FY2011	Results FY2011
Number of institutions/ organizations undertaking capacity/competency strengthening as a result of USG assistance	27	121
Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) receiving USG assistance	800	1,698
Number of members of producer organizations and community based organizations receiving USG assistance	24,000	36,141
enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, trade and business associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) that applied new technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance	600	1,581

PCE M&E Report, 2011, 2012

To what extent did the target groups use the project inputs/services provided?

Clearly, the project has provided valuable services to its target groups over the years. Throughout the evaluation team's field visits, numerous project beneficiaries and partners spontaneously commended the project for services such as the geo-referenced data base, food agricultural practices (GAP), and access to input credit through CF arrangements. A seed farmer said that his family can no longer eat non-aromatic rice. The head of DAPS stated that people no longer question the accuracy and reliability of Senegal's agricultural statistics and that Senegal's system is now the reference in the region.

Were any formal or informal mechanisms established for involving key stakeholders?

The project has established both formal and informal mechanisms for dealing with stakeholders. Formal mechanisms are found in purchase orders, cost-sharing, and MoUs with partners as well as CF arrangements that link producers, consolidators, and banks. However, the project also maintains informal relationships with trainees and beneficiaries assisted by lead farmers supported by the project, and informal mechanisms include informal meetings with beneficiaries and other partners.

Are there any notable adaptations required within the issue area to fulfill the objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?

Modifications are required in several areas. CF arrangements require a flexible mechanism in setting contract prices in order to minimize side-selling and bank defaults. Policy reforms, particularly land reform, require donor coordination and participation of rural communities. Additionally, a coordinated approach is needed to promote investment in post-harvest infrastructure. Finally, the PPP process should be reviewed to avoid the difficult issue of transfer of government property to the private sector.

Are the planned results achievable in the present private or public sector organizational environment and serving the objectives as described in the FTF strategy?

Good progress in two key objectives is likely achievable under present conditions: (i) increased agricultural productivity in the maize and rice value chains (both in yield and quality), through the introduction of certified seeds and GAP; and (ii) strengthened capacities of DAPS and ENSA. However, given staff turnover, support is needed beyond 2013 to train more staff to ensure continuity. ENSA appears likely to be able to achieve its results for the master's degree program because of outside grants from African universities.

How well have the activities been coordinated and efficiencies established?

The evaluation team has not observed, or been made aware of, any major problems related to project coordination. Still, the considerable staff turnover, realignment with FTF, and budget cuts must have been serious challenges. The strong results achieved indicate that project senior management has established efficient project coordination under difficult circumstances.

Are the components, adapted to the FTF mandate over time, relevant (the right mix)?

For USAID's reporting needs, the project is actually structured along seven themes or sub-components. Together, however, these sub-components cover the four of FTF's core areas referred to here. However, a consistent breakdown in components and sub-components would make an assessment over the years much easier. There is also overlap in activities, so regrouping activities in components and sub-components would help clarify the structure of the project and help in coordinating activities. There is a compelling logic to combine the value chain activities with those of access to finance and the training of producers in GAP and to combining policy reform with institutional capacity building. Managers of cross-cutting areas should report directly to the COP or DCOP, not through a senior manager. These

cross-cutting managers need to work directly and equally with all senior managers and line managers to be effective across all areas of the project.

In what way are the components relevant?

The areas covered by the components are relevant to FTF, but given the overlap in certain activities, they would benefit from restructuring as explained above. Admittedly, the time left on the project and the level of funding must be considered in such a proposition.

Are the targets set realistic?

The targets are not realistic, in part because some do not reflect the budget cuts (e.g., the quantity of millet sold is 8 percent of the target); in another instance, targets should have been readjusted when results exceeded targets up to five or ten times (e.g., the number of business-to-businesses developed was 1,292 for a target set at 86). An internal data quality assessment (DQA) is also needed to assess the accuracy of the data. The current M&E manager is new in his position and has not yet implemented such a DQA.

Are intervention approaches still valid in light of 2.5 years of experience?

The value chain approach implemented by the project remains valid after three years of operation. Value chain actors appreciate the scheme. The project, however, needs to work more on the mechanism for contract pricing.

What intervention approaches need to be adapted to achieve sustainability under the new FTF strategy?

Value chain actors need to develop ways to better enforce contracts through arbitration, not necessarily through courts. Policy reform, particularly land reform, is better addressed through donor coordination and is not achievable by any one project alone. Infrastructure development should emphasize facilitation for credit/leasing or cost-sharing, a business plan, hiring of a manager, and commitment from FTF to train the manager for an adequate period of time.

Are the intervention approaches used during the first 2.5 years of PCE conducive to sustainability?

The value chain and the institutional capacity building approaches are truly establishing a sound foundation for sustainability. However, this foundation will not hold without support after the project ends. Between now and the project's close, the project needs to facilitate the creation of a mechanism for setting contract prices and help repair the credit of those producers who were forced to go in arrears with their loans.

The value chain and the institutional capacity building approaches are truly building a sound foundation for sustainability. However, this foundation would not hold if no support is provided after the project closes. Between now and the project's close, the project needs to make progress in facilitating a mechanism for setting the contract price and to repair the credit situation of some producers.

Is the project being implemented/transitioned to FTF as planned?

The project has transitioned to and has been fully aligned with FTF since 2011. It is focused on the priority value chains of FTF, although the project components are not fully identical to the four components discussed in this assessment.

Did the project managers establish necessary linkages with governmental agencies and private organizations?

The project has established excellent relationships with government agencies and private sector organizations. Actors in both sectors are appreciative of the project's interventions, as they benefited from their relationship with the project.

LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES

The evaluation took note of the following lessons learned and best practices from the project.

Formal contract farming involving smallholders producing local staple grains for the domestic market is possible, given the right tools and conditions. NEPAD has lamented the lack of CF, and the International Food Research Institute (IFPRI) has cautioned that CF does not make economic sense for staple grains (except for seeds, grains for brewery, and for state-run irrigated schemes). With the project's facilitation, producers who mostly produced for home consumption in the recent past have started viewing maize as a cash crop. Actually, contract farming in the rice-irrigated areas already exists. The project is helping to formalize and strengthen these arrangements, while extending the scheme to other producers.

Building infrastructure can be straightforward, but ensuring that it is properly managed and maintained also requires the attention of the project. Projects need to ensure that a business plan is in place, see that a capable manager or technician is hired by the beneficiaries, and provide technical assistance to the manager for an adequate period of time to make sure the operation sustainable. This applies to both public and private investment. In the case of public investment, such as the seed certification laboratories, a business plan should be prepared if only to ensure that a reasonable fee could be charge to pay for part of the cost. Also a qualified technician should be recruited and trained, particularly when the current technician is due to retire.

Import parity pricing is a valuable tool, which actors involved in contract farming arrangements should be trained to use. The import parity price measures the incentives for farmers to produce for the market and thus the competitiveness of local production against imports. USAID Famine Early Famine System Network (FEWSNET) has long advocated the use of import parity pricing in the analysis of food security. In contract farming negotiations, it indicates the level of local product price that would be equivalent to the cost of the imported product offered to consolidator or processors—that is, if the quality of local product matches that of the imported good. It can help detect unfair pricing in price negotiations.

Best practice: The introduction of geo-referenced farm data collection by farmer networks. The project trained its 27 data collection partners in the use of GPS and area mapping to improve precision of area estimates and to provide field traceability of network farmers. Farmers have responded enthusiastically; many indicate that it has helped them become experts in farm management.

Best practice: The development of maize and rice production guides. These guides—“*Le chemin du bon Riz*” and “*Le chemin du bon mais*” —are simplified training guides in poster form that integrate best production and harvesting practices to increase yields and commercial quality of maize and paddy rice.

CONCLUSIONS

Overall, USAID/Senegal’s Economic Growth Project Task Order 5 (USAID PCE TO5) has made excellent progress in its three years of implementation, in spite of challenges. The PCE TO5 team is passionate about its work and believes it can make a difference in FTF’s priority value chains. The evaluation team’s assessment of partners and beneficiaries generally supports this conviction. The project, however, is facing challenges in the maize value chain and needs to respond quickly to maintain its momentum in the SFZ.

The project’s value chain approach is sound; overall, it has done very well in its value chain activities. The formal contract farming scheme (“*contractualisation*” in French) has become its signature instrument, recognized as such by all actors. The significance for USAID FTF is that the project is demonstrating that a formal contract farming scheme can be implemented not only for fruit and vegetable production for export markets and for local processing, but also with smallholders producing staple grains for the domestic market. The formal CF has many benefits. The scheme ensures that farmers have access to adequate inputs. It compels producers to use certified seeds. Also to support this scheme, the project has introduced best practice tools, such as geo-referenced database management of producer networks, and simple but effective poster guides to train producers in the production of quality products with “market fit.” (i.e., that responds to market demand). The CF has also contributed to increase producer prices. The introduction of local aromatic rice varieties has captured the attention of producers and consumers alike and is further strengthening the project’s impact on Senegal’s rice imports.

Other notable project successes include the strengthening of the country’s statistical survey agency to produce reliable, timely data. The development of the two-year professional masters’ degree at the university is a first in Senegal and is likely to be emulated in the region. In its access-to-finance activities, the project can be commended for facilitating a credit leasing program that has allowed producers to acquire farm equipment. Its crop insurance initiative promises to have a great impact when it is implemented.

The project, however, faces challenges. One major challenge is for the project to regain its momentum in maize value chain work after the disastrous 2011/2012 season that saw many producers go off-contracts, and/or fall back on their credit reimbursement. This was caused by the pre-harvest contract price that turned out to be much lower than market prices at harvest and worsened by poor rainfall. The project needs to give its full attention to this challenge. Another concern is the lack of political will on the part of the government, which has hampered the project’s policy reform activities. Finally, budget cuts have forced the project to delay or abandon certain initiatives. These delays and curtailment of activities have been noticed by beneficiaries. However, the project has worked hard to explain the situation and regain the confidence of its partners and stakeholders.

RECOMMENDATIONS

COMPONENT I: VALUE CHAINS AND MARKET LINKAGES

- **Assist producers and consolidators in devising a mechanism for setting a contract price to minimize side-selling.** This mechanism would determine a floor and a ceiling price, within which producers and consolidators would negotiate contract prices at planting and at harvest. These are the necessary steps:
 - The floor price (under which producers should refuse to produce, i.e., their reservation price) would be the unit cost production that takes into account all production costs. These include cash inputs, as well as imputed family labor and use of own farm equipment. The ceiling price, the benchmark for the local product, would be the import parity price at farm gate, adjusted for quality.
 - The contract would stipulate that producers will be guaranteed the floor price, possibly with a reasonable margin, but would be paid a higher price closer to the import parity price at farm gate, as conditions allow. If at planting time such market conditions point toward an import parity price close or below the unit cost of production, producers should not be encouraged to produce for the market.
 - A benchmark represented by free on board (f.o.b.) prices from exporting or grain futures on international grain exchanges is not practical because the gap with production cost is too large for meaningful negotiations.
 - The import parity price is a powerful tool, which indicates whether producers can compete against imports given foreseeable market conditions; it can also help detect unfair prices offered to producers by consolidators, and to consolidators by processors. PCE has sponsored several studies that make use of this tool in the rice and maize value chains. All value chain actors should be trained to understand and make use of it.
- **Implement the integrated, one-contract arrangement in the South Forest Zone (SFZ).** When informed that the project is implementing an integrated CF arrangement in the Senegal River Valley, all SFZ value chain actors interviewed by the team indicated that it should be introduced in the maize value chain as well. This arrangement makes the process more transparent and collaborative and also helps build long-lasting trust among parties.
- **Facilitate more frequent consultation among parties to the CF scheme, as the season unfolds, to quickly identify and resolve problems.** There have been several meetings between producers and consolidators to settle contract prices. Credit institutions, however, have not met with producers or consolidators, particularly around harvest time, which would have helped in preparing for the difficult situation in the 2011/2012 season.
- **Proceed with the pilot formal CF arrangements in the upland rice value chain.** Thus far, the value chain activities in rain-fed rice have been limited to the production and distribution of certified Nerica seeds. The project has indicated its intention of piloting a CF arrangement in this value chain because rain-fed producers are viewed as focusing only on home consumption. PCE should be comforted in the fact that the local unit of SEDAB, an input supplier/consolidator, is very “bullish” about this prospect of rain-fed rice farmers producing for the market. Small farmers in the Kolda region had only produced maize for household consumption but started to view maize as a cash crop once the PCE CF opened access to credit and inputs for them. In agreement with the maize farmer, SEDAB thinks that rain-fed rice farmers would have the same positive reaction when given the same opportunity.

- **In addition to Dakar, target another large urban market for the SRV’s aromatic rice and local maize processing plants for the SFZ maize.** Because of logistical constraints and lot size requirements related to the Dakar market, consolidators and producers could enhance their competitive advantage if they target markets closer to their production sites. Admittedly, the remaining life of the project, and resource constraint, could make this impossible.
- **Complete the business plan for the seed certification labs in Richard Toll and Kaolack.** The project has plans to do so, particularly following a Peace Corps fact-finding mission in Richard Toll. The business plan should look at instituting and harmonizing the fee for testing seed samples and spell out uses of funds (janitorial work, protective gear for the technicians, office supplies).
- **Conduct a technical audit of rice mills and seed farmers to help them set up their own code of good practices.** Building on the parallel of the value chain approach and export promotion operations, PCE is planning to help rice millers and seed farmers establish their own best practices validated by public authorities. For seed farmers, for example, DISEM would simply need to check if actors have their internal quality controls in place and conduct spot checks to confirm. This is a good idea, but it assumes that all these operators are knowledgeable about all aspects of their business. Lessons learned elsewhere indicate that many businesses lack such understanding. A technical audit of these actors’ operations would serve to show them where they are succeeding and what they could improve. The next step would be to share this information with them and empower them to formulate best practices.

COMPONENT 2: ENHANCED POLICY ENVIRONMENT

- **Collaborate with ISRA/BAME to produce brief policy notes on key reform issues.** The Bureau d’analyse macro-economique (BAME) was set up to conduct policy analysis and communicate information to policy decision-makers. The project should collaborate with the BAME to communicate its key findings to the public and policy decision-makers. Alternatively, it can set up a program with the Bureau de la formation professionnelle agricole (BFPA) to train staff of the Ministry of Agriculture to do the same. This will ensure some continuity after the project ends.
- **Pursue the analysis of policy options regarding the GOS fertilizer subsidy program.** The project has undertaken a structure-conduct-performance study of fertilizer with an emphasis on government subsidies. It has shared the results with the Ministry of Agriculture, and spearheaded support for a working group to formulate policy and administrative measures to improve access, use and quality.
- **Pursue the analysis of options in the seed policy, including regional trade.** Member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have now agreed that seed varieties that have gone through the homologation process in one country can be traded to another without restriction. Apart from hybrid and genetically modified seeds, farmers can plant seeds from the previous harvest instead of purchasing new certified seeds. This practice has the potential to reduce demand for certified seeds offered by seed growers. It could still happen that seed growers may overcommit and face this decrease demand. The project should prepare seed growers for sale of certified seeds in the regional market.
- **Collaborate with other donors to assist the GOS in implementing the LOASP.** Donor collaboration in advancing needed policy reform has been effective in Senegal and elsewhere. This lesson should be applied to the LOASP and land tenure reform, in particular. The project’s support to working groups is a sensible approach, but these working groups would have more voice if backed by donors’ coordinated efforts. These groups also should include the right mix of expertise to address the many, often antagonistic, aims of land reform. The participation of rural communities in these debates is critical, as is that of women.

- **Engage the Ministry of Agriculture to clarify the roles and responsibilities of DRDR and DISEM.** Confusion persists about which government agency administers the seed certification labs. For the most part it is DISEM (Division des semences), and in Kaolack and Kolda, the labs are indeed managed by DISEM staff. In Kaolack, however, the lab is handled by the DRDR (Direction regionale du developpement rural). Perhaps as a result, tests are handled differently in Richard Toll (blind test, no fee collected), in Koalack (no blind test, no fee collected), and Kolda (blind test, fee collected, but no uses of funds available).

COMPONENT 3: ACCESS TO FINANCE AND RURAL INFRASTRUCTURE

- **Ensure that paid managers are hired by beneficiaries and that they receive project-provided training for an adequate period,** when infrastructure or equipment is provided by the project to beneficiaries. The project, which is working on the business plan for the seed processing plan, would do well to keep this in mind. In another instance, the project has provided equipment to a women's group and trained 16 of them to manage the equipment. The project needs to follow-up on this training. Despite their justifiable prudence, financial institutions would be willing to finance equipment, for example, for women's groups. The group, however, has to demonstrate its capacities in managing such equipment and generating enough revenues toward paying back the loan.
- **Develop a plan to promote the establishment of the Coumba Noor Thiam rice husk bio-fuel plant across the SRV.** Rice operators have long found use for the paddy straw and the rice bran as animal feed, but not for the husk until the establishment of the bio-fuel plant. This success story should be used to encourage other millers to use the technology.

COMPONENT 4: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING AND HUMAN RESOURCES

- **Provide training in the generation and analysis of import parity pricing, along with training on the PCE's contract farming arrangement.** Training should be provided to four target groups (producers, private agribusiness firms, institutional support agencies and NGOs, and training and research institutions). As indicated in component 1, import parity prices are useful in assessing the potential competitiveness of local production and can help detect unfair pricing.
- **Require sponsored students to draft briefings of their key findings for dissemination.** As informative as a thesis may be, only those who attend the student's defense are likely to know of the information the thesis contains. Once the document is finalized, it is likely to sit on a shelf.
- **Develop a plan for internship or immersion of students of ENSA and Bambey.** Although the thesis work pursued by ENSA students reflects concerns of value chain actors, it remains academic. Students could be brought into the field to help address the need for ad hoc problem solving. Examples could include students working with producer groups to master the intricacies of crop budgets and import parity pricing and helping producers with quality management processes. This would help value chain actors and provide students with real world experience.
- **In training programs, emphasize the concept of value chain applied to a whole industry, rather than applied to a single firm.** Michael Porter developed the concept of value chain to enhance a firm's competitive advantage but later applied his value chain concept to whole industries, calling this the "value system" and recognizing that all participating firms in the system generate value. This gives rise to a "win-win" proposition, when all firms along the supply chain are focused on the market demand for the product they are concerned. This is the concept of value chain that the project practices on the ground and writes about in its reports: it should be then emphasized in the training programs.
- **Encourage collaboration between DAPS and SAED in the use of satellite images to collect and analyze agricultural data in the SRV.** The SAED mandate over the SRV requires it to

report on agricultural data on this zone and to share it with DAPS so that the latter can provide a comprehensive picture for all of Senegal. For many years, SAED has used satellite imagery to collect data. The two agencies will certainly gain by sharing their experience in this field.

CROSS-CUTTING AREAS

- **Work with women's groups to find innovative ways to improve women's access to land.** There are powerful women's groups, such as FEPRODES, and women heads of GIE (GIE Malal Yoro Gueye in the SRV and GIE Boubou Deme in the SFZ), with whom the project can set up pilot projects for that purpose. Showcasing these experiences would provide an entry point to the national debate about women's access to land.
- **The project should be made to document how it has applied the environmental guidance in its progress reports.**
- **Make the communications manager respond to the COP, not through a senior manager.** Because communications cuts across all components and cross-cutting areas, its manager should not report to one senior manager. This set up is more matter of convenience than efficiency, as the communications manager remains the expert in this field. It appeared to the evaluation team the communications manager would be more effective if she has direct access to all senior managers and line managers to implement a shared communications strategy for the project. .
- **Initiate a series of analytical briefs to inform the GOS and other stakeholders of the project's work.** The briefs, of two to five pages each, would address policy issues, value chain special topics, innovative financial tools, gender, and climate change, for example. Briefs are more elaborate and technical than success stories and what is typically reported in newsletters for a broader audience. These briefs are also a way for the theses of students sponsored by the project to be synthesized in a compelling form. Currently, these briefs are not always easy to digest and are left to gather dust on bookshelves. Such briefs could accompany the one-page policy notes prepared in collaboration with ISRA/BAME.
- **Promote bio-fuel technology using rice husk in the SRV (reported in component 4).** Along with the introduction of certified seed and aromatic rice, the bio-fuel project is the most single important innovation introduced by the project. It has been the subject of a success story and some reporting. A bigger push is needed, however.
- **Improve the archiving of project's documents for easy access.** The project provided a CD with project documents, but the list of documents is dated. This list should be updated regularly and structured in folders, such as: project contract, progress reports; PMP and indicator tables; studies and assessments; list of beneficiaries and partners by component and region; communications materials; thesis of sponsored students; etc.
- **Provide more realistic indicator targets for 2013 (if still possible).** In some cases, indicators are well below targets, and in other they were well above targets, despite the budget cuts. These indicate that targets should not be lowered because of the budget cut.
- **Undertake regular internal data quality control assessment.** These controls should be made every quarter by the M&E staff to ensure that the project's partners are following data collection guidelines and collecting reliable data. These controls would help the project get ready for the mission data quality assessment (DQA).

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FTF

- **Continue the implementation of the value chain approach in PCE's follow-up operations.** Specifically, FTF should strengthen the contract farming mechanism for small-scale producers of staple foods initiated by PCE, while remaining pragmatic in working to support other contractual

arrangements. The CF scheme, when made more effective, can alleviate major constraints to enhancing food security, including: producers' limited access to market and finance; producers' low capacities to produce quality products; financial institutions' low confidence in producers' ability and willingness to pay back credit. USAID/FEWS has championed the use of import parity pricing in food security analysis. FTF should continue promoting its practical use in the contract farming arrangements.

- **Promote post-harvest infrastructure with a coherent VC development plan that emphasizes meaningful private sector co-sharing.** Centered on the value chains, promote post-harvest and other infrastructure works supported within a coherent plan with meaningful private cost-sharing by private sector actors. In some cases, what is needed is facilitate the access of value chain actors to finance to build post-harvest infrastructure.
- **In policy reform work, collaborate with other donors to provide incentives and expertise for GOS to implement meaningful reforms.** The prospects of one donor and one project succeeding in a narrow, specific area (e.g., one export window) are good; however, the prospects of succeeding in a complex issue like land tenure reform (that should promote women's access to land) are extremely poor.

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Web documents and articles

The Value Chain

“A firm's value chain is part of a larger system that includes the value chains of upstream suppliers and downstream channels and customers. [Michael] Porter calls this series of value chains the *value system*.”
<http://www.netmba.com/strategy/value-chain/>

Contract farming offers fresh hope for Africa's declining agriculture

“Contract farming arrangements can also fill in the void left by governments in the wake of liberalisation by providing access to inputs, technologies, credit and other services. „Due to its immense potential, contract farming has been given a central role in the latest strategy by the Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to revive the continent's agriculture.”
<http://www.worldagroforestry.org/projects/relma/pdfs/Policy%20Brief%20-%20Contract%20Farming.pdf>

Thai Scientists Patent Rice Genes Responsible for Aromatic Rice

“The team has found that a genetic mutation is responsible for the fragrant aroma of jasmine rice... Of the 50,000 genes in Jasmine rice, eight genetic characters do not work. „„In laboratory tests, the team has successfully changed non-fragrant Japanese rice into fragrant rice. ...The technique can be applied to improve other crops including wheat, corn and soybeans.” Australian researchers have since repeated the feat.” (http://www.business-in-asia.com/thai_rice.htm)

ANNEXES

ANNEX I: MIDTERM EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

C.1 BACKGROUND

As part of the inter-agency Feed the Future (FTF) strategic plan led by USAID/Senegal's Economic Growth Office (EGO), Economic Growth Project(PCE) Task Order # 5 (TO5) activities build upon past and current efforts of the Government of Senegal (GOS) to increase food security and decrease poverty through the promotion of a productive and competitive private sector. Through this project and others, USAID/Senegal supports the GOS Accelerated Growth Strategy and the Country Strategic Plan (CIP). USAID/Senegal/Economic Growth Office (EGO) leverages past successes implementing the African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI), the continuing momentum of West Africa Trade Hubs in Dakar and Accra, and parallel USAID financed projects such as USAID/Senegal Natural Resource Management Project ("Wula Nafaa"). (More recently the USAID EGO portfolio was expanded by the FTF focus to include an Education and Research project (ERA), Agriculture and Nutrition project, Yaajeende, and the COMFISH project for collaborative management of Senegal's fisheries.) Senegal's FTF strategy and the associated PCE TO5 were designed specifically to build upon the ongoing activities of EGO's Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness (SAGIC) project, a single award Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) 685-I-00-06-00005-00 awarded by USAID/Senegal to International Resources Group (IRG) on December 12, 2005.

The 2005 SAGIC IQC provides technical expertise and management in areas related to accelerate economic growth, increased agricultural competitiveness, and trade. The IQC has the following four components:

- Development of strategic sub-sectors using a Business Development Services (BDS) model or other state-of-the-art interventions to promote increased trade, especially African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)-related trade.
- Development of public-private partnerships (PPPs) that attract investment for efficient delivery of public goods or services.
- Policy reforms for improved business environment.
- Fiduciary services/management services and building GOS capacity.

Under the SAGIC IQC, USAID funded TO5 on April 16th, 2009 and the estimated completion date of this contract is November 30, 2013. The purpose is to increase food security and reduce poverty through a set of interrelated activities. The activities mirror Senegal's FTF initiative and are tied closely to the GOS's CIP. Therefore, Economic Growth Project TO5 implemented through the SAGIC IQC is focused on four areas:

1. Increased Agriculture Productivity and Market Linkages focused on rice, maize and millet value chains.
2. Enhanced policy environment addressing key constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture. The TO5 focus is on policy reforms to enhance the business environment, most specifically full implementation of the Agricultural Law of 2004 and continued discussions on land tenure.
3. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure including associated access to finance to ensure long-term agricultural productivity. USAID/Senegal provides the entrepreneurship training and technical assistance to help investors succeed, develops loan mechanisms through Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan portfolio guarantees, and achieves the GOS goal of enabling post-harvest links necessary for sustainable agriculture-driven economic growth.

4. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to and the development of next-generation agriculture in Senegal. This component will lay a foundation for growth and includes scaling up productivity through a market driven approach including access to finance, training investors in business management, developing efficiencies in production and processing, professionalization of cooperatives or producer organizations, and reinforcement of capacity within the associated civil and public institutions.

C.II PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED EVALUATION

The evaluation will focus exclusively on USAID's Economic Growth Project, PCE TO5. The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to assess progress to date and identify improvements that will facilitate the attainment of planned results. Specifically, the components of TO5 to be evaluated during this mid-term evaluation include the four areas directly serving Senegal's whole of government FTF strategy stated above in Section C.I:

1. Increased Agriculture Productivity and Market Linkages focused on rice, maize and millet value chains.
2. Enhanced policy environment addressing constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture.
3. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure including associated access to finance in order to ensure long-term agricultural productivity.
4. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to and the development of next-generation agriculture in Senegal.

After about 30 months of implementation (April 2009 - October 2011), a comprehensive look at these components will help to identify strengths and needed adjustments to the intervention approaches, nature of services, and efficiency with which the project provides inputs. The external consultants conducting this evaluation will gather a wide range of background information from USAID/Senegal and IRG staff to ensure that the findings and recommendations are based on an accurate understanding of the project.

C.III ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED

The evaluation team will investigate to what extent the implementing partner has addressed USAID/Senegal/EGO Objectives 1 and 2: Inclusive Agriculture Sector Growth and Increased Trade. Specifically, the evaluation will measure achievements made through the four USAID/PCE TO5 components listed in Section C.III above, plus certain cross-cutting themes such as gender, climate change adaptation, communications, partnerships, and science, technology, and innovation.

The evaluation shall provide general and specific conclusions and recommendations on ways to maintain momentum, scale-up the activities according to the FTF strategy, and make the most suitable/strategic modifications in the project given realities of budget and preparing for a successful 2013 end of contract. USAID/Senegal is interested in knowing about the adequacy of the components stated in Section C.III within the context of the Senegal FTF strategy, the soundness of the project's approaches, the quality of PCE TO5 overall management, the adequacy and efficiency of IRG/PCE's provision of project inputs/resources, the beneficiary coverage and response, and the overall chance of sustaining the project momentum beyond November 2013. The evaluation team will also record good practices and lessons learned in addressing the four components and cross-cutting themes.

It is USAID/Senegal's intent to use mid-term evaluations to systematically measure the progress of programs, adjust future Work Plans based upon on-the-ground realities, and to learn from experience relating to the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, and impact of USAID/PCE.

The evaluation team will answer the following questions for all four components and cross-cutting themes:

- Has the project been able to complete the planned activities for the associated issue area within the stipulated times?
- Did the project inputs/services provided reach the target population in the expected numbers?
- To what extent did the target groups use the project inputs/services provided?
- Were any formal or informal mechanisms established for involving key stakeholders?
- Are there any notable adaptations required within the issue area to fulfill the objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?
- Are the planned results achievable in the present private or public sector organizational environment and serving the objectives as described in the FTF strategy?
- How well have the activities been coordinated and efficiencies established?
- Are the components, adapted to the FTF mandate over time, relevant (the right mix)?
- In what way are the components relevant? Are the targets set realistic?
- Are intervention approaches still valid in light of 2.5 years of experience?
- Are the intervention approaches used during the first 2.5 years of PCE conducive to sustainability?
- What intervention approaches need to be adapted to achieve sustainability under the new FTF strategy?
- Is the project being implemented / transitioned to FTF as planned?
- Did the project managers establish necessary linkages with governmental agencies and private organizations?

Below are questions to be answered that are issue specific and are to be answered in addition to the general questions.

Component 1: Improved agriculture productivity and associated market Linkages

- Has the value chain approach proven to be effective? Since the February 2011 approval of the FTF strategy, is the approach building momentum toward the FTF goal of scaling-up in a functionally sustainable manner?
- Are the dynamics of productivity/market demand and supply improved according to project expectations?
- How have activities to improve productivity and associated market linkages led to improved trade?

Component 2: Enhanced policy environment

- Have the policy reforms identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to GOS priorities?
- Has the approach for accomplishing policy reform been effective?
- Are the planned results achievable in the present political environment?
- What legal, regulatory, or administrative barriers are to be lifted for attracting investments and making the private sector more competitive?
- Are there any notable adaptations required to fulfill the policy objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?

Component 3: Improved rural infrastructure and access to finance

- Are the planned results achievable with the current range of financing instruments or other institutional factors?
- Are post-harvest infrastructure improvements well targeted to support the scale-up of activities needed to achieve project goals?

- What does this experience suggest about the future potential for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in Senegal?
- What needs to be changed to speed-up and improve the PPP process?

Component 4: Increased institutional and human resource capacity

- To what extent were public and private institutions developed or strengthened?
- To what extent has IRG/PCE made progress in identifying, developing and implementing capacity building activities within GOS and the private sector?
- Has the capacity building identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to FTF priorities?
- Has the approach been effective as described in USAID objectives and in the FTF strategy?

Strategy and Cross-cutting issues: gender, climate change adaptation, communications, partnerships, and science, technology, and innovation

- Is PCE TO5 adequately taking cross-cutting issues into consideration during activity design and implementation?
- Is PCE TO5 compliant with and accounting for environmental sustainability within the context of activities? What are the environmental compliance lessons that have been learned? How have they been captured?
- Is PCE TO5 investing in areas which are not within the FTF TO5 strategy and/or within the updated focus or direction of USAID/Senegal?
- To what extent can the project monitoring system meet the reporting requirements?
- Is PCE working with USAID management to strategize sufficient and adequately targeted efforts to assure sustainability and implementation of USAID Forward objectives by November 2013? (Work Plan and associated phase-out strategy)

Evaluation components and cross-cutting issues must be addressed through findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations should include: corrective actions for the design, duration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of USAID/PCE TO#5, and actions to strengthen and/or improve results from the Project.

C.IV METHODOLOGY

The team conducting this mid-term evaluation shall review all the relevant documents pertaining to USAID/PCE, including those listed in sections C.I and C. VII. The team will meet and interview representatives from the Government of Senegal, donors, partners and other stakeholders in Dakar and in a sample of targeted localities.

The evaluation team shall propose its own methodology, however it is expected that the evaluation will be implemented through document review, key informant interviews, and focus group meetings. USAID/Senegal expects that the analysis will consider at minimum all Section III components, topics, and issues to be investigated.

ANNEX 2: MID-TERM EVALUATION WORKPLAN

March 20, 2012 (Revised)

BACKGROUND

As part of the inter-agency Feed the Future (FTF) strategic plan led by USAID/Senegal's Economic Growth Office (EGO), Economic Growth Project (PCE) Task Order # 5 (TO5) supports the Government of Senegal (GOS) to increase food security and decrease poverty through the promotion of a productive and competitive private sector. PCE TO5 was funded on April 6, 2009 for four years (ending on November 13, 2013) under the Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness (SAGIC) Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) to contribute to the Presidential Global Food Security Response (GFSR), which evolved into Feed the Future. The adoption of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy in February 2011 led to PCE TO5 shedding several value chains in order to retain but three (rice, maize, and millet), and trimming personnel in order to accommodate a 45% budget cut in early 2011. Currently, PC TO5 focuses on four areas of activities that are fully aligned with Senegal's FTF strategy and closely tied to the GOS's Accelerated Growth Strategy and Country Strategic Plan (CIP). These four components are as follows:

1. Increased agricultural productivity and market linkages focused on rice (rainfed and irrigated) rice, maize, and millet value chains.
2. Enhanced policy environment, addressing key constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture by focusing on reforms to enhance the business environment—most specifically the full implementation of the Agricultural Law of 2004 and continued discussions on land tenure.
3. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure, including associated access to finance to ensure long-term agricultural productivity. USAID/Senegal provides the entrepreneurship training and technical assistance to help investors succeed, develops loan mechanisms through Development Credit Authority (DCA) loan portfolio guarantees
4. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to, and the development of, next-generation agriculture in Senegal. This component will lay a foundation for growth through a market-driven approach, including access to finance, training investors in business management, developing efficiencies in production and processing, promoting professionalization of cooperatives or producer organizations, and reinforcement of capacity within the associated civil and public institutions.

Implemented by the International Resources Group (IRG) and partners, PCE TO5 operates in USAID priority zones: the Senegal River Valley (SRV), from St Louis to Matam, and the Southern Forest Zone (SFZ) of Ziguinchor, Sedhiou, Kolda, Kedougou, Tambacounda, and Fatick.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this mid-term evaluation is to assess progress to date and identify improvements that will facilitate the attainment of the project's planned results. The evaluation will focus exclusively on the four areas stated above:

5. Increased agriculture productivity and market linkages focused on (rainfed and irrigated) rice, maize and millet value chains.
6. Enhanced policy environment, addressing constraints with the broadest impact on agriculture.
7. Improved rural post-harvest infrastructure, including associated access to finance in order to ensure long-term agricultural productivity.
8. Increased institutional and human resource capacity to ensure access to, and the development of, next-generation agriculture in Senegal.

ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED

The evaluation team will investigate to what extent the implementing partner has addressed USAID/Senegal/EGO Objectives 1 and 2: Inclusive Agriculture Sector Growth and Increased Trade. Specifically, the evaluation will measure achievements made through the four USAID/PCE TO5 components listed above, in addition to cross-cutting themes, such as gender; climate change adaptation; communications; partnerships; technology, science, and innovation.

The evaluation will provide general and specific conclusions and recommendations on ways to maintain momentum, scale-up the activities according to the FTF strategy, make the most suitable/strategic modifications in the project given budget realities, and prepare for a successful 2013 end of contract.

USAID/Senegal is interested in knowing about the adequacy of the components stated in Section C.III within the context of the Senegal FTF strategy, the soundness of the project's approaches, the quality of PCE TO5 overall management, the adequacy and efficiency of IRG/PCE's provision of project inputs/resources, the beneficiary coverage and response, and the overall chance of sustaining the project momentum beyond November 2013. The evaluation team will also record good practices and lessons learned in addressing the four components and cross-cutting themes.

It is USAID/Senegal's intent to use mid-term evaluations to systematically measure the progress of programs, adjust future Work Plans based upon on-the-ground realities, and to learn from experience relating to the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance, sustainability, and impact of USAID/PCE.

The evaluation team will answer the following questions for all four components and cross-cutting themes:

- Has the project been able to complete the planned activities for the associated issue area within the stipulated times?
- Did the project inputs/services provided reach the target population in the expected numbers?
- To what extent did the target groups use the project inputs/services provided?
- Were any formal or informal mechanisms established for involving key stakeholders?
- Are there any notable adaptations required within the issue area to fulfill the objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?
- Are the planned results achievable in the present private or public sector organizational environment and serving the objectives as described in the FTF strategy?
- How well have the activities been coordinated and efficiencies established?
- Are the components, adapted to the FTF mandate over time, relevant (the right mix)?
- In what way are the components relevant? Are the targets set realistic?
- Are intervention approaches still valid in light of 2.5 years of experience?
- Are the intervention approaches used during the first 2.5 years of PCE conducive to sustainability?
- What intervention approaches need to be adapted to achieve sustainability under the new FTF strategy?
- Is the project being implemented / transitioned to FTF as planned?
- Did the project managers establish necessary linkages with governmental agencies and private organizations?

In addition to these general questions, the evaluation team will answer the following questions that are specific to the components and cross-cutting areas:

Component 1: Improved agriculture productivity and associated market linkages

1. Has the value chain approach proven to be effective? Since the February 2011 approval of the FTF strategy, is the approach building momentum toward the FTF goal of scaling-up in a functionally sustainable manner?
2. Are the dynamics of productivity/market demand and supply improved according to project expectations?
3. How have activities to improve productivity and associated market linkages led to improved trade?

Component 2: Enhanced policy environment

1. Have the policy reforms identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to GOS priorities?
2. Has the approach for accomplishing policy reform been effective?
3. Are the planned results achievable in the present political environment?
4. What legal, regulatory, or administrative barriers are to be lifted for attracting investments and making the private sector more competitive?
5. Are there any notable adaptations required to fulfill the policy objectives of USAID/Senegal's FTF strategy?

Component 3: Improved rural infrastructure and access to finance

1. Are the planned results achievable with the current range of financing instruments or other institutional factors?
2. Are post-harvest infrastructure improvements well targeted to support the scale-up of activities needed to achieve project goals?
3. What does this experience suggest about the future potential for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in Senegal?
4. What needs to be changed to speed-up and improve the PPP process?

Component 4: Increased institutional and human resource capacity

1. To what extent were public and private institutions developed or strengthened?
2. To what extent has IRG/PCE made progress in identifying, developing and implementing capacity building activities within GOS and the private sector?
3. Has the capacity building identified been sufficiently ambitious and relevant to FTF priorities?
4. Has the approach been effective as described in USAID objectives and in the FTF strategy?

Strategy and Cross-cutting issues: gender; climate change adaptation; communications; partnerships; and science, technology, and innovation

1. Is PCE TO5 adequately taking cross-cutting issues into consideration during activity design and implementation?
2. Is PCE TO5 compliant with and accounting for environmental sustainability within the context of activities? What are the environmental compliance lessons that have been learned? How have they been captured?
3. Is PCE TO5 investing in areas which are not within the FTF TO5 strategy and/or within the updated focus or direction of USAID/Senegal?
4. To what extent can the project monitoring system meet the reporting requirements?

5. Is PCE working with USAID management to strategize sufficient and adequately targeted efforts to assure sustainability and implementation of USAID Forward objectives by November 2013? (Work Plan and associated phase-out strategy)

Evaluation components and cross-cutting issues must be addressed through findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Recommendations should include: corrective actions for the design, duration, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of USAID/PCE TO#5, and actions to strengthen and/or improve results from the Project.

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS

The evaluation will be implemented through document review, interviews, field visits, and analysis of agricultural statistics, relying on interview guidelines and frequent team meetings.

Document review. The team will review project and other documents to gain a thorough understanding of FTF, PCE TO5, and GOS agricultural policy. Although a comparison of achieved vs. expected results is not the focus of the evaluation, this analysis will help the team formulate hypotheses for testing in the field to understand the project. Also, most of while the review has been done before the team initiates the interviews and field visits, the review will continue during the course of the evaluation in order to check references and clarify issues. USAID/Senegal and IRG have contributed several documents prior to the evaluation and have continued to do so after the team leader arrived in Dakar. The team will also search for other public documents in Senegal, including agricultural statistics.

Interviews. The team will engage all major stakeholders of PCE TO5.

- With USAID/Senegal, at the onset, the team will seek clarification and guidance regarding the SOW, and will discuss the proposed work plan, schedule and outline of the report. It will interact with the mission at the debriefing at the end of the trip.
- The team will request a presentation of the project by PCE staff, and will interview PCE senior managers in charge with the four components and cross cutting issues. The team anticipates the need for some repeat interviews with PCE senior managers and other staff to clarify information gathered in the field.
- The team will engage project beneficiaries and partners, in one-on-one or group interviews, to gauge their knowledge and understanding of project's activities, and their own assessment of project's impact on their operations, businesses and livelihoods. Project beneficiaries and partners include lead farmers, producer groups and marketing cooperatives, "aggregators" (traders, processors, and other middlemen), business services providers, financial services institutions, as well as representatives of the GOS and other development partners. The interviews will take place in Dakar and surroundings, as well as in the project intervention areas in the SRV and SFZ.

Field visits. These will provide an opportunity for the evaluation team to interview project beneficiaries and partners, but also to observe firsthand the quality and impact of project's realizations on the ground, including rural post-harvest equipment and infrastructure. To the extent possible, the team's site visits will cover the irrigated rice, rainfed rice, maize, and millet farming systems in the SRV and SFZ areas.

Data analysis. The team will analyze agricultural statistics to put PCE TO5's achievements into perspective. It will make use of available, secondary information on crop area planted, yields, production, and farm margins related to the project's value chains.

Interview guidelines. The team will develop two sets of questionnaire guidelines. The first will be keyed to the issues to be investigated to allow the team to determine each day which issue has been addressed satisfactorily or not, and which ones remain to be investigated at the next opportunity. The second

questionnaire guideline will be developed to engage lead farmers, producer groups, marketing cooperatives and aggregators to gather information on their understanding of the project’s purpose and approach, and their own assessment of project’s impacts to date and after its close.

Team briefings. Frequent team meetings have proven invaluable in keeping an evaluation team focused and on schedule. The team will rely on end-of-day briefings to collect its thoughts, assess its own progress, draft notes, and prepare for next tasks ahead.

TASKS AND ACTIVITIES

The evaluation will be implemented according to the following table, assuming the smooth political situation endures.

Tasks	Number of Days (6-daywork week in Phase II)			Total Days LOE	Timeline
	Team Leader	M&E Sp.1	M&E Sp.2		
Review of USAID and relevant Project Documentation	3	2	2	7	March 7-9
Drafting of Draft Work Plan	3	0	0	3	March 12-14
Team Leader meets with IRG/Washington	1			1	March 15
Travel to Dakar	1	0	0	1	March 15-16
Team mobilization / review of workplan	1?	1?	1?	3?	March 17
Meetings with USAID/Senegal	1	1	1	3	March 19
Meetings with IRG/PCE	1	1	1	3	March 20
Deliverable I – Work Plan	11	4	4	19	
Dakar site visits and interviews	4	4	4	36	March 21 – 24
Selected site interviews	9	9	9	27	March 26- April 5
Dakar site visits and interviews	8	8	8		April 5 – 13
Drafting of key findings/collaboration	4	4	4	12	April 14-18
Debriefing for USAID/Senegal &IRG/PCE	1	.5	.5	2	April 19
Debriefing for GOS	1	.5	.5	2	April 19 or 20

representatives (Min. of Ag., DAPs, ANSD)					
Deliverable II – Debriefing Key Findings	27	26	26	79	
Fly back to Washington	1	0	0	1	April 20
First Draft revision	6	2	2	10	Complete by April 30
Deliverable III – Draft Report	7	2	2	11	
USAID Review of the Interim Report	0	0	0	0	Complete by May 21
Submit Final Evaluation Report	3	1	1	5	Complete by June 21
Deliverable IV – Final Report	3	1	1	5	

EVALUATION TEAM

The evaluation team includes Dr. Ismael Ouedraogo, team leader and the primary responsible for assessing the value chain and policy components of the project, as well as the crossing-cutting issues related to climate change; Maimouna Savane, monitoring and evaluation specialist and the primary responsible for assessing the rural infrastructure and access to finance component of the project, as well as the cross-cutting issues related to gender and partnerships; and Mamadou Ba, monitoring and evaluation specialist and the primary responsible for assessing the institutional and human resource capacity component, as well as the cross-cutting issues related to communications and science, technology and innovation. All team members will contribute to the overall effort of the evaluation.

DRAFT OUTLINE

- Acknowledgements
- Acronyms and abbreviations
- Executive Summary
- Table of contents
- Introduction and background
- Purpose and issues to be investigated
 - Purpose
 - Issues to be investigated
- Data collection methodology and tools
 - Desktop review
 - Interviews of beneficiaries and partners
 - Field visits
 - Analysis
 - Interview guidelines
 - Study limitations
- Findings
 - Component 1: Improved agriculture productivity and associated market linkages

Component 2: Enhanced policy environment
Component 3: Improved rural infrastructure and access to finance
Component 4: Increased institutional and human resource capacity

Issues investigated

Component 1: Improved agriculture productivity and associated market linkages
Component 2: Enhanced policy environment
Component 3: Improved rural infrastructure and access to finance
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Cross-cutting areas
General questions

Conclusions

Lessons learned

Recommendations and strategic options

Bibliography

Annexes

Statement of work
Persons and organizations contacted
Summaries of field interviews
Summary indicators table

Mid-Term Evaluation Detailed Agenda

Friday, March 16

- 10:00 p.m. Arrival of team leader in Dakar

Saturday, March 17

- 9:00 a.m. – 5:00 p.m. Team meeting and document review

Monday, March 19

- 10:30 a.m. USAID/Senegal
- 2:00 p.m. Introduction of team to PCE TO 5

Tuesday, March 20

- 9:00 a.m. Andy Keck, PCE COP
- 11:00 a.m. Matar Gaye, DCOP and senior manager of capacity building
- 3:00 p.m. Jean-Michel Voissard, senior manager of value chains

Wednesday, March 21

- 9:30 a.m. Tidiane Ba, Division des semences (DISEM)
- 11:30 a.m. Gorgui D. Diallo, DAPS
- 2:30 p.m. Gabriel Bassene (retired DISEM staff)
- 5:00 p.m. Maimouna Lo Gueye, SG Ministry of Agriculture

Thursday, March 22

- 9:30 a.m. Alioune Dieng, retired ISRA/BAME director (PCE cost-benefit analysis)
- 12:00 a.m. Abdourahmane Taye, BFPA
- 3:00 p.m. Souleymane Sarr, ANCAR

Friday, March 23

- 9:00 a.m. Ibrahima Diakhoumpa, senior manager, Capital access
- 10:00 a.m. Lamine Cissé, manager, M&E
- 1:00 p.m. Souleymane Wade, senior manager policy reform, communications, and M&E

Saturday, March 24

- Team meeting

Monday, March 26

- Travel : Dakar – St Louis
- Direction régionale du développement rural (DRDR), St Louis
- Fédération des femmes productrices de St Louis (FEPRODES), St Louis
- Plateforme des initiatives du Nord (PINOR), St Louis
- Abdoulaye Faye, ISRA/St Louis

Tuesday, March 27

- Travel: St Louis - Richard Toll
- Coumba Nor Thiam (large scale rice miller/consolidator), Thiagar
- Groupement des producteurs de Boundoum, Boundoum
- VITAL (large-scale rice miller/consolidator), Richard Toll
- GIE Malal Yoro Gueye (woman-led small-scale rice miller/consolidator), Richard Toll

Wednesday, March 28

- Coumba Nor Thiam's rice mills, Thiagar
- GIE Naxariderett (small-scale rice miller/consolidator), Thiagar
- Union interprofessionnelle des semenciers (UNIS), Richard Toll
- Laboratoire de semences, Richard Toll
- Centre de traitement de semences, Richard Toll
- PCE Richard Toll

Thursday, March 29

- Travel: Richard Toll – Dakar
- Ross Bethio CNCAS
- 3:00 p.m. Aliou Ndiaye, ENSA de Thies

Vendredi 30

- 9:00 a.m. Idrissa Wade, ENSA Thies (in Dakar)
- 10:30 a.m. Macoumba Diouf, Directeur général ISRA (time to be confirmed)
- 12 :00 p.m. Ibrahim Wade, Secrétaire permanent, Stratégie de croissance accélérée (SCA)

Saturday, March 31

- Team meeting

Sunday, April 1

- Travel: Dakar – Kaolack

Monday, April 2

- Taiba Niassene: GIE Ousmane Thiam (maize value chain)
- Paoskoto: \ GIE Boubou Deme (producteurs de maïs)
- Kaolack : Crédit mutuel du Sénégal
- Kaolack port: SDV warehouse

Tuesday, April 3

- KASEC (maize consolidator)
- Unité privée de traitement des semences
- Laboratoire de semences
- Travel: Kaolack - Tambacounda
- SODEFITEX

Wednesday, April 4

- Travel: Tambacounda - Kolda

Thursday, April 5

- Kolda Caisse nationale de crédit agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS)
- Alliance pour le crédit et l'épargne pour la production (ACEP)
- Groupement des producteurs des semences de Nerica
- Groupement des producteurs de semences de maïs (affiliée à la SEDAB)

Friday, April 6

- Travel : Kolda - Kaolack

Saturday, April 7

- Travel: Kaolack - Dakar

Monday, April 9

- Team meeting

Tuesday, April 10

- USAID ERA
- USAID Wula Nafaa
- USAID Yaajeende
- PCE senior managers

Wednesday, April 11

- ANSD
- Commissariat à la sécurité alimentaire (CSA)
- World Bank/Senegal projects

Thursday, April 12

- Dakar site visits

Friday, April 13 – Wednesday, April 18

- Drafting of key findings

Thursday, April 19

- Debriefing for USAID and PCE

Friday, April 20

- Debriefing for GOS representatives
- Team leader flight back to Washington

Guide de questionnaire

Localité :

Date :

Personne interviewée :*

Organisation d'affiliation :

Contact :

1. Comment vous caractériser-vous (fonction) ?
2. Depuis combien de temps êtes-vous engagé dans cette fonction ?
3. Que savez-vous de la nature et des objectifs du PCE ?
4. Quelles étaient vos attentes vis-à-vis du PCE aux débuts de vos interactions ?
5. Quelles interactions avez-vous eu avec le PCE jusqu'à présent ?
6. Donnez des exemples saillants de la réussite du PCE vous concernant en particulier.
7. Avez-vous d'autres exemples de réussite du projet concernant d'autres que vous-mêmes ?
8. Quelles difficultés avez-vous rencontrées dans vos interactions avec le PCE ?
9. Vos attentes ont-elles été satisfaites/déçues à ce jour ?
10. Le projet est-il en train de réaliser ses objectifs ?
11. Que devrait faire le projet d'ici sa clôture (Novembre 2013) pour réaliser ses objectifs fixés ?
12. Que laisserait alors le projet de tangible à sa clôture ?

Note: (*) pour les groupes, recueillir les noms et contacts de tous les autres

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

USAID/Senegal

Aaron Brownell, Acting Chief EGO
Mrs. Fatou Thiam, M&E Specialist, COTR for the PCE mid-term evaluation
Jennifer Harte, EGO, COTR, of USAID/PCE
Moustapha Ly, EGO
Aminata Niane Badiane, Deputy Chief, EGO
Ousmane Sané, EGO

IRG Washington

Philip DeCosse
Melissa Watkins

IRG/PCE Dakar

Andrew Keck, COP
Matar Gaye, DCOP
Jean Michel Voisard, Value Chain Manager
Lamine Cissé, M&E Specialist
Soulèye Wade,
Abdou Guèye, Capacity Building
Ousmane Fall, Policy
Ibrahima Diakhoumpa, Capital Access
Mamadou Diop, Capital Access
Rose Kâne, Communication Specialist
Ada Diack, PCE Richard Toll
Serigne Modou Mbaye, PCE Kaolack
Souleymane Gaye, PCE Kolda

USAID/Senegal projects and others

Pap Sene, COP, USAID Yajeende
Jeffrey Povolny, COP, USAID Wula Nafaa
Jean-Michel Borie, USAID Wula Naafa
Patrice Beaujaut, USAID Wula Naafa
Patrick Guilbaud, COP, USAID Education and Research in Agriculture (ERA)
Demba Farba Mbaye, DCOP, ERA
Mrs. Maty Bocoum Sarr, ENSA Coordinator, ERA
Cheickh Ngane, E-ATP
Paco Sereme, CORAF

GOS

Maimouna Lo Guèye, Secretary General, Ministry of Agriculture
Tidiane Ba, Chief, DISEM, Ministry of Agriculture
Gorgui Djibril Diallo, Director, DAPS, Ministry of Agriculture
Waly Ndiaye, Division Chief, DAPS, Ministry of Agriculture
Alassane Seck, Division Chief, DAPS, Ministry of Agriculture
Cheikh Sadibou Pène, Division Chief, DAPS, Ministry of Agriculture
Gabriel Bassène, former Chief DISEM, Ministry of Agriculture
Abdourahmane Faye, Chief BFPA, Ministry of Agriculture

ISRA, Dakar

Alioune Dieng, BAME, ISRA
Macoumba Diouf, Director General, ISRA

Saint-Louis

Tacko Diawara Ndaw, Director, DRDR
Mrs. Penda Gueye Cissé, President FEPRODES
Mrs. Aminata Sall, Vice President FEPRODES
Abdoul Ba, Facilitator FEPRODES
Djibril Diaw, President PINORD
Ibrahima Ly, Coordinator PINORD
Abdoulaye Fall, ISRA

Richard Toll

Ada Diack, PCE
Ibrahima Sall, President CNT, Thiagar
Michel Lo, CNT Industry Manager, Thiagar
Daba Fall, VITAL
Korka Diaw, President GIE Malal Gueye
Seydou Ndiaye, Data base manager, GIE Malal Yero Gueye
Cheikh Diallo, President GIE Naxari Derett, Thiagar
Baba Diallo, GIE Naxari Derett, Thiagar
Samba Diallo, GIE Naxari Derett, Thiagar
Ousseynou Ndiaye, President UNIS Nord
Oumar Diop, UNIS Nord
Serigne Saer Niang, UNIS Nord
Malick Baldé, Seed certification lab technician
M. Diop, CTS Manager

Boundoum Barrage

Diawar Diop, Union President
Abou Diop, Cooperative President

Ross-Béthio

Seydou Kâne, CNCAS Agency Chief

Thiès

Dr. Saliou Ndiaye, ENSA Director of Studies

Paoskoto, Kaolack region

Mrs. Nimma Diayté, President GIE Boubou Deme
Mrs. Amy Sarr
Mrs. Khoyane Diouf, President Keur Gamou
Elimane Diouf, GIE Bok Xol
Mamadou Seck, GIE Bok Xol
Sette Cissé, GIE Wenthiewy
Elimane Diallo, GIE Wenthiewy
Babou Fall
Elimane Diouf, GIE Bok Xol
Mamadou Seck, GIE Bok Xol
Sette Cissé, GIE Wenthiewy
Elimane Diallo, GIE Wenthiewy

Amath Bakhoum, GIE Taku Liguey
Abdoulaye Ndiaye
Omar Camara
Felicien Malou, ANCAR Agent
Omar Niasse, Keur Mallé
Mendy Thioye, GIE Wenthiewy

Taiba-Niassène, Kaolack region

Ousmane Thiam, Preisident GIE Keur Mathiam Maty
El-Hadj Aliou Dioum, President GIE Japo Liguey

Kaolack

Falilou Faye, DRDR
Seydou Ndongo, Seed certification lab technicien
Leyti Diop, DRDR, seed field inspector
Yahyia Ba, Credit mutuel du Senegal (CMS) Chief

Tambacounda

Goulé Gueye, Bamtaare Director, SODFITEX/BAMTAARE

Kolda

Souleymane Gaye, PCE
Oumar Mballo, Lab technician
Hassim Kandé, SEDAB
Youba Diedhiou, SEDAB
Mohamed Cissé, President, REPROSENER
Seydou Mané, CNCAS Agency Credit Agent
Ibrahima Badiane, ACEP Agency Chief

Village of Bantoucountou Maoundé, Region of Kolda

Sékou Kandé, Président GIE Kawral
Ibrahima Kandé, membre GIE Kawral
Bocar Kandé , membre GIE Kawral
Saloum Mballo, Président GIE Kawral Aynabe
Ousmane Baldé, Membre GIE Kawral Aynabe
Oumar Baldé, Membre GIE Kawral Aynabe
Fodé Kandé, Membre GIE Kawral Aynabe
Alassane Kandé, Membre GIE Kawral Aynabe

Village of Touba Sadou, Region of Kolda

Souleymane Diamanka, President GIE Kawral Touba Sadou
Sadou Diamanka, membre GIE Kawral Touba Sadou
El-Hadj Aliou Diamanka, Chef de Village
Moussa Diamanka, membre GIE Kawral Touba Sadou

ANNEX 4: SUMMARIES OF FIELD INTERVIEWS

Senegal River Valley

March 26-31, 2012

This weekly summary presents fact-finding notes following the evaluation team's meetings with USAID PCE and interviews with project's partners and beneficiaries. These notes may be corrected as the team acquires better information in the course of the evaluation.

Date:

Monday, March 26

12:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited:

- Direction régionale du développement rural (DRDR), St Louis

Persons met:

- Ms Ndao Tacko Diawara, Regional Director DRDR

Key findings

- DRDR plays a role in the control and certification of seeds produced by seed farmers, as well as in the dissemination of improved varieties to producers.
- PCE's support to DRDR has been in the following areas: (i) construction and equipment of a new seed control lab at Richard Toll; (ii) provision of one power generator for the lab, and another for the seed processing facility, (centre de traitement des semences, CTS); (iii) a business plan for the operation of the CTS; (iv) training in seeds certification.

Reported project's successes

- Fully-functional seed laboratory at Richard Toll
- PCE's promotion of aromatic rice varieties has captured people's imagination
- One seed inspector was trained in the USA

Major challenges encountered

- DRDR is not fully informed of PCE's activities in its region.
- The lab is operated by one technician due to retire in December 2012
- There is some confusion in the fact that the technician at the regional lab is under the Dakar-based DISEM.

Suggestions for way forward

- A formal relationship (MoU) between PCE and DRDR is needed to improve collaboration between the two.
- PCE needs to complete the public-private partnership (PPP) for the transfer of the CTS to the private sector.
- The Ministry of Agriculture needs to address the issue of the lab technician about to retire
- The Ministry also needs to clarify DRDR's and DISEM's roles and responsibilities at the regional level.

3:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Fédération des groupements et associations des femmes productrices de St Louis (FEPRODES)

Persons met:

- Ms Cissé Penda Guèye, president; Ms Aminata Sall, vice-president ; Mr Abdoul Bâ, facilitator

Key findings

- FEPRODES, created in 1997 by Ms. Gueye (an accountant by training), comprises 346 women groups and associations, with up to 38,000 members. It aims at promoting rural activities, access to land and finance, food security. It is best known, however, for its seed farm and micro-finance operations. It started its micro-finance operations with subscription of CFA 50 per month and per member and credit of CFA 5,000. One year later FEPRODES had a credit balance of CFA 7million. In 1999, FEPRODES was formally approved as a microfinance Institution (MFI).
- FEPRODES has come to realize that, for example, a women group of 80 given credit to cultivate 40 ha lacks the incentive to do a good job because each member is set to gain a tiny slice of the overall benefit. The federation has now decided to provide credit to good-standing individual borrowers within a group, rather to the group itself.

- FEPRODES was already a SAGIC's partner in 2008. PCE has provided support to FEPRODES started since 2009 with inputs for the production of certified seed (40 ha) and paddy (60 ha).

Reported project's successes

- Training, called "making sense," in the management of women's micro-enterprises.
- Training in contract arrangements to help the federation better organize its network of members, suppliers and clients
- Training in good agricultural practices for the production of good quality seed and paddy.
- In 2010/2011 FEPRODES multiplied by 10 (1000 ha) the area under improved varieties
- Promotion of local rice at the agricultural trade fair, Foire internationale de agriculture et des ressources animales (FIARA)

Major challenges encountered

- Lack of storage facilities (for seed, paddy, and processed rice) to expand the federation's activities
- Women face poor access to land, as most of them do not own land. To overcome this, FEPRODES try to partner with its members' husbands by making the latter understand that "you have the land, but your wife has the money" (through the federation's MFI) to develop it.

Suggestions for way forward

- Help the federation build storage facilities

3:30 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Plateforme des initiatives du Nord (PINORD)

Persons met:

- Mr Djibril Diaw, Président; Mr Ibrahima LY, Coordonnateur

Key findings

- Created in 2002 as the Programme d'appui des initiatives du Nord by OXFAM to deal with emergency situations that year, PINORD has since transformed itself into a "platform" to promote rice produced in the Senegal River Valley, through the promotion of rural entrepreneurship from St Louis to Bakel. By 2008, PINORD has supported 15 micro-enterprises (ME); by 2011, up to 300 ME; and by 2015, it expects to reach 1000 ME.
- PINORD provides training in good agricultural practices and is promoting the brand "RIVAL" that stands both for "riz de la vallée" and "rival" (to imported rice)
- PINORD has a mixed view of its interactions with PCE. It states that the result-based purchase orders signed with PCE results in PINORD pre-financing activities before presenting deliverables for payment. PINORD backed out of the second PO, which they claimed was "risky" because the deliverable required the signing of contracts that they were to facilitate.

Reported project's successes

- PCE's training in good agricultural practices to boost the quality of rice produced in the valley.

Major challenges encountered

- PINORD claimed to have suffered long delays (4-5 months) in payment in their PO, which the evaluation team has not yet verified.

Suggestions for way forward

- PINORD and PCE should draw lessons from their partnership and find corrective measures to promote the value chain approach to PINOD's members.

6:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Institut sénégalais de recherches agricoles (ISRA), St Louis

Person met

- Abdoulaye Amadou Fall, directeur

Key findings

- Local rice has a comparative advantage over imported rice, according to studies he conducted, including for the International Finance Corporation (IFC)
- Contrary to popular belief, there is a market for long grain in Senegal, particularly in Dakar.
- The major constraint in the millet value chain is in the multiplication and distribution of certified, according to the millet value chain Fall conducted for PCE

- PCE's assistance to ISRA has been in the rehabilitation of the seed farm station at Fanaye.

Reported project's successes

- Introduction of aromatic rice varieties

Way forward

- For PCE's contractualisation to take hold, producers need to learn to take into account of the "hidden" costs, as well as the out-of-pocket, when they prepare crop budgets for negotiation.
- The approach needs a couple of more years to be internalized by value chain participants

Date

Tuesday, March 27

10:00 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Coumba Nor Thiam SUARL (CNT), Thiagar

Person met

- Mr Ibrahima Sall, CEO

Key findings

- CNT is an vertically integrated enterprise: it produces its own certified seed (from foundation seed) and paddy; operates a rice mill; and distributes rice in Saint-Louis, Dakar, Thiès, Kolda and Tambacounda. Mr Sall and his father started the enterprise with paddy production on 5 ha of land, which they worked with a donkey-drawn plow. They added a milling operation in 1989, after experiencing difficulties getting clients pay for their paddy. Today, CNT operates 7,000 to 9,000 ha of land.
- CNT has developed its own contract model with some 3,000 paddy producers to supply its milling operation. Producers receive inputs (certified seed and fertilizer), which they pay back in kind based on the set price of CFA 9,000 per paddy bag of 80 kg. CNT issues a number to each producer, so to keep track of the quality of paddy delivered. Any time the quality is lower than agreed-upon, the supplying producers are made to pay for the shortfall the following production season.
- CNT has received support from PCE since 2010. The project introduced and funded 33% of CNT's biomass renewable energy program, which uses byproducts from its paddy and milling operations. CNT also received PCE's support in its production of certified seed (about 5% of its need). For the 2011/2012 campaign, the project is supporting CNT in capacity building, including in data collection, data base software, and technical assistance in setting contracts with its producer network.
- With regard to gender, CNT employs women in the paddy fields and up to 100 women in rice-processing factory.

Reported project's successes

- Renewable energy program introduced by the project
- M&E tracking system for quality control at field level
- Training in contracting arrangements

Major challenges encountered

- For 2011/2012 campaign, PCE's support did not include fertilizer
- PCE did not provide support for the construction of warehouses, as expected. Each year, CNT spends about CFA6 millions in canvas sheets to cover the paddy from the rain, so to avoid the kind of losses it suffered in 2009/2010.
- Birds are a threat to paddy production.

Suggestions for way forward

- Support for rehabilitation of irrigated schemes
- Development of pumping station to replace the current moto-pumps which are not efficient

1:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- VITAL Agro-Industrie (at PCE offices, Richard Toll)

Person met

- Ms Daba Fall, supply chain manager (paddy purchasing)

Key findings

- VITAL is a newly-established rice-processor in the SRV. It operates a silo and a rice mill with a capacity of 5 tons per hour. The company has set up to increase its milling capacity and currently needs 15,000 tons, and 30,000 tons next year.
- In the 2009/2010, VITAL set up to provide input credit to producers in return for paddy. Not only did VITAL antagonize CNCAS, which saw the company as a competitor, it also suffered a 40% non recovery rate from paddy producers (about CFA 100 million of bad debt). Since then, PCE has convinced VITAL to play its role as processor/consolidator and let CNCAS play its as a lender. However, VITAL was able to set up contracts with producers only after they had already harvested the paddy. VITAL could only secure 3,000 tons of paddy, but saw the non-recovery rate dropped to 5%.
- For the current off-season production (March-May), PCE is proposing its "contractualisation" model to VITAL: a five-party contract arrangements with VITAL, CNCAS and producer group as the main partners,

with PCE and SAED acting as support institutions. VITAL has set up an ambitious target of 15,000 tons of good quality paddy. The arrangement will kick off after a mid-April workshop,--not quite before planting as the idea originally calls for.

Reported project's successes:

- VITAL believes in PCE's multi-party "contractualisation" model and is encouraged by last year's experience, even though it still needs to recover 5% of its investment.

Major challenges encountered

- issue of weights and measures, i.e., move from selling by volume to selling by weight (the bag of paddy supposed to weigh 80 kg actually turns out to be 60-65 kg of actual rice, with straw sometimes deliberately stuffed in to make up the volume).
- Lack of new professional warehouse operators, whose role and major value added would be to provide large quantities of good quality paddy at set locations.

Suggestions for way forward

- Implement the "contractualisation" scheme for the upcoming season and build on the lessons learned
- Continue quality coaching for paddy producers and consider introducing quality grades for paddy and white rice

4:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Groupement des producteurs de Boundoum, Boundoum

Persons met

- Diawar Diop, Président de l'Union de Boundoum (Seeds); Abdou Diop, Président Union des Coopératives de Collecte de Boundoum

Key findings

- Two distinct entities exist within the larger group: a producer organization, which manages water supply for irrigation. It collects water fees to pay SAED and maintain the irrigation scheme. The seed production unit operates independently, with paddy producers as its main clients.
- Both sub-groups received support from PCE in terms of input and capacity building in the production of good quality seed and paddy.

Reported project's successes

- Assistance in establishing a seed data base to manage supply and demand
- Establishment of the seed control lab at Richard toll
- Introduction of aromatic varieties

Major challenges encountered

- Extent of project's assistance not clearly communicated (expected more in terms of assistance)

Suggestions for way forward

- Rehabilitation of the seed processing facility

Date

Wednesday, March 28

9:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- GIE Malal Yoro GUEYE, Richard Toll

Person met

- Ms Korkea Diaw, President; Mr. Seydou Ndiaye, database manager

Key findings

- The GIE comprises 70 women members. It cultivates 100 ha and operates a collective rice-mill with a capacity of 38 tons per day, with a milling charge of CFA 16,000 per ton to users.
- PCE has supported the GIE over the June 2009 - May 2011 and June 2011 - May 2012 periods. PCE's support included inputs (seed and fertilizer); set up of a data management system with provision of computer equipment; training in good agricultural practices; helping the GIE establish a network of suppliers and clients.

Reported project's success

- Introduction of aromatic rice in the SRV, for which the GIE has received several orders that it couldn't unfortunately fill for lack of resources.
- The GIE has the capacity to produce certified seeds to cover its network's needs and will not need PCE's assistance in this area in the up-coming production season.
- Also thanks to the project, the GIE's network has expanded its potential from 100 ha to 400 ha.

Major challenges encountered

- Delays in implementing PCE's support program because of its budget cuts;
- There is a shortage of aromatic rice seeds.
- PCE's proposed 50/50 cost-sharing for the construction of a warehouse would require a contribution of CFA 9 million for the GIE. If the GIE had that amount, it could build a warehouse on its own (without the environmental safeguards)>
- Also because of PCE's budget cut, the GIE will not be able to take advantage of its network's production potential ion capacity (400 ha)

Suggestions for way forward

- Provide training in quality control
- Help with the construction of a warehouse

2:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- GIE Naxadi Deret, Thiagar

Person met

- Mr Cheikh Diallo, Président ; Mr Baba Diallo, Responsable Exploitation; Mr Samba Diallo, Comptable

Key findings

- The GIE Naxadi Deret was created in 1987 (the same year as CNT, its neighbor), but has been in operation since 1989. It has 15 members, including 5 women. It operates 250 ha.
- As CNT does, the GIE provides inputs to producers outside the GIE in order to increase its supply of paddy for its rice mill. The GIE boasts that it is "doing a better job than CNCAS" because it follows closely producers who are provided the inputs on credit, and get full reimbursement of its credit.
- The GIE is about to acquire a larger rice processing unit to accommodate the increased amount of paddy it is getting from its production and its network/
- PCE's support started in June 2011 and included provision of seed and fertilizer for 30 ha, equipment (GPS, humidity tester), capacity building, generation of a database, technical assistance for contracting between the GIE and paddy producers

Reported project's success

- Training in data base management (with the use of GPS) has contributed to strengthen the GIE
- Training in good agricultural practices to produce good quality paddy
- PCE "has contributed to impact mentalities and to bring change in rice VC"

Major challenges encountered

- PCE has been slow in making decision (related to budget cuts)

Suggestions for way forward

- Continue the promotion of aromatic rice

4:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Union nationale interprofessionnelle des semences, Nord (UNIS-Nord)

Person met

- Mr Ouseynou Ndiaye, président ; Mr Serigne Saer Niang, financial comptroller ; Mr Omar Diop, treasurer

Key findings

- UNIS is a private association of rice seed producers. It has 36 active members, but only 18 are operational, including 2 women groups. (A member who stays out of production for one year is dropped from the list of accredited seed farmers).
- PCE has supported the seed value chain in 2009/2010 and in 2010/2011. The support was as follows: capacity building on seed production regulation, production and promotion of aromatic seeds, construction of a new Lab, power generators. PCE buys UNIS members' production of aromatic seed for dissemination purposes
- PCE had committed to fund a new seed processing facility on a cost-share basis with UNIS, but has scaled back this commitment because of its budget cut, leaving a financing gap of CFA 45 million.

Reported success

- Capacity building in good agricultural practices and use of ,GPS
- Production of aromatic seeds: GIE Mame Oumar Niang has increased its production by 25% thanks to PCE support
- Promotion and marketing of aromatic rice seeds

Major challenges encountered

- Find a solution for establishing a new seed processing chain

Suggestions for way forward

- Finalize the PPP scheme for the upcoming seed processing facility.

5:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Seed control laboratory, Richard Toll

Person met

- Mr Malick Baldé, Technicien responsable du laboratoire

Key findings

- The new PCE-financed seed lab was completed in March 2011. Since then it has performed over has performed 1063 seed control and analysis and has rejected 36 certification requests.
- The seed laboratory is operated by the Dakar-based DISEM, but also counts as a regional facility and an asset for DRDR.

Reported success

- Control and certification process is anonymous and reliable because the technician performs blinds tests, which are repeated a second time as seeds are cleaned.

Major challenges encountered

- The lab is operated by 1 staff, who will retire in December 2012. There is no prospects for new hiring.
- The lab is relatively clean, but lacks storage/shelves to tidy its appearance.

Suggestions for way forward

- Sensitize the Ministry of Agriculture on the critical issue of staffing the Lab
- Complete the lab's fitting (shelves, closed storage spaces) to make it a more professional platform

6:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Centre de Traitement des Semences (CTS)

Person met

- Mr El Hadji Mamadou Diop, Chef du CTS

Key findings

- In the seed processing facility, certified seeds are cleaned, sorted/graded, and packaged
- The sorting chain inefficient as it can only process 1 ton of seed per hour instead of 3 tons. There also missing elements in the chain, which forces manual processing.
- The rehabilitation of the facility has been postponed following PCE's budget cut.

Reported project's success

- None thus far.

Major challenges encountered

- No clear sources of funding for the rehabilitation of the facility following PCE's budget cut.

Suggestions for way forward

- Identify funding mechanism for the rehabilitation of the facility
- Finalize the PPP arrangement for the transfer of the facility to the private sector

Date

- Thursday, March 29

9:00 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Caisse nationale de crédit agricole du Sénégal (CNCAS)
- **Person met**
- Mr Seydou Kane, Chef d'Agence

Key findings

- CNCAS Ross Bethio is the lead of CNCAS agency in the Valley. It covers 80% of CNCAS outstanding loans. Its new director was PCE's former manager of the maize value chain, and is familiar with the project's value chain approach.
- Two key, interdependent issues in the SRV: (a) secure credit reimbursement; (b) secure the marketing of paddy, especially of producers with CNCAS loans
- PCE's multi-party "contractualisation" scheme was implemented as such in the 2010/2011 (with CNCAS, VITAL, and producer groups, with assistance from PCE and SAED), after harvest and not before planting. This coming off-season campaign (March – May), the scheme will be implemented, with CNCAS, VITAL and selected paddy producer in 2012. It will be just a few week after planting. (A workshop scheduled for mid-April will kick off the scheme)
- Another positive impact of the credit provided by CNCAS is that the agency require all producer to use certified seeds. CNCAS with the support of SAED performs regular field visits in the cultivated areas
- Depending on value chain actor's credit worthiness and willingness to contract a credit CNCAS network in the SRV may consider to finance equipment and development of infrastructure as well as equipment eligible to BOAD credit line.

Reported success

Mr. Kane joined CNCAS a couple of months and has not success to report thus far.

Major challenges encountered

- The contract arrangements will start just a few weeks after planting

Suggestions for way forward

- The "contractualisation" is a self-sustained scheme as far as VC actors are committed to comply with their commitments

3:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Ecole nationale supérieure d'agriculture (ENSA) Thiès

Persons met

- Saliou Ndiaye, directeur des etudes

Key finding

- l'Institut national de developpement rural (INDR) became ENSA in 1982, drawing inspiration from the agronomic schools in Paris-Grignon and Morocco. That's the first two years has a general curriculum (preparation), which means transfer students from other schools must spend at least year of "preparation" before getting with the other specialized subjects.
- PCE is funding a two-year Master's degree program in value chain development, which is run by Michigan State University, one of IRG's partner

Reported project's successes

- The Master's training program in value chain development is the first of its kind in the region

Major challenges encountered

- PCE did not quite know how to support students in the Master's program;
- There has been some delays in the procurement of equipment, e.g., video equipment

Suggestions for way forward

- Provide better linkages with other training programs, e.g., Bambey

Date**Friday, March 30****10:30 a.m. Institution/organization visited**

- Institut sénégalais de recherches agricoles (ISRA)

Persons met

- Macoumba Diouf, directeur général

Key findings

- ISRA has stations in 7 ecological zones, which are key to its seed operations. There is where producers are introduced to new varieties.
- Following PCE-funded study to evaluate ISRA's foundation seed production cost, ISRA plans to set up an autonomous seed production unit. The production unit will sell foundation seed and generate revenue for ISRA, just as the sale of vaccines does.
- PCE has assisted ISRA in capacity building and was set to rehabilitate the seed research stations at Fanaye in the SRV, and Nioro du rip, just like the sale of animal vaccines

Reported project's successes

- Production of foundation seed for seed farmers
- Value chain assessment and the study on ISRA's foundation seed production cost

challenges encountered

- PCE has not kept its promises, e.g., regarding vehicles and rehabilitation of additional research station.

Suggestions for way forward

- Rehabilitate seed research stations to make them more functional

South Forest Zone
April 2 - 7, 2012

This weekly summary presents fact-finding notes following the evaluation team's meetings with USAID PCE and interviews with project's partners and beneficiaries. These notes may be corrected as the team acquires better information in the course of the evaluation.

Dates

- Monday, April 2

10:00 a.m., Institution/organization visited:

- Kaolack – GIE Boubou Dème

Persons met:

- Ms Nimna Diaté and other members (see list of attendance)

Key findings

- In 2010/2011, the project introduced the GIE to a microfinance institution (Crédit mutuel du Sénégal - CMS) and a “consolidator” (SODEFITEX) to establish a partnership through three separate contracts.
- In the GIE/SODEFITEX contract, producers agree to sell to the consolidator a given quantity of grain at a set up (pre-harvest) price as reimbursement for the bank's input credit. In the GIE/CMS contract, producers applied for a credit for inputs to be delivered in kind by the consolidator/input supplier. In the CMS/SODEFITEX contract, the bank agrees to reimburse the consolidator/input supplier the value of inputs, as soon as the consolidator/input supplier delivers the inputs to producers, and the consolidator agrees in turn to deposit in the producers' accounts, the cash value of the grain delivered by producers.
- The GIEs working with the consolidators have agreed to deposit the maize for pick up at 18 consolidation points of sale, in so-called pole-villages.

Reported project's successes

- The GIE credits the project for promoting a new, more integrated approach, compared to past projects with a narrow focus.
- The formal contractual arrangement has helped farmers become more accountable in their business, build their credit worthiness, and open new markets.
- Producers have expanded the area planted in maize from 80 ha by one GIE before the project to 199 ha by 5 GIEs and 19 independent producers

Major challenges encountered

- This year (2011/2012 season), the subsidized inputs were of poor quality and were delivered late, in July.
- The late delivery of input, coupled with poor rains, resulted in low yields. Some farmers did not produce enough maize (e.g., 600 kg/ha) to deliver the 800 kg/ha agreed on the contract.
- The pre-harvest price was set too low compared to market prices that kept rising, which incited some producers to sell their grain in the open market.
- The GIE expected PCE's help in building warehouses
- The GIE does not have enough maize threshers

Suggestions for way forward

- Train producers in good agricultural practices, including soil conservation techniques at the grass roots level
- Provide regular technical follow-up and in-field quality coaching
- Help the GIE become their own input supplier and grain consolidator to sell directly to processors
- Help with database set up

12:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Taiba Niassène – GIE Keur Mathiar Maty (GIE KMM)

Person met

- Mr Ousmane Thiam, maize seed producer, GIE president

Key findings

- In the 2009/2010 season, the PCE provided subsidized input and technical assistance to the GIE to set up a test program on five ha. The pilot was conclusive and generated considerable enthusiasm in the following season, with SODEFITEX as the consolidator.
- In 2011/2012 season, PCE expanded the program by bringing more consolidators (SEDAP, SOENA, and SODEFITEX) and financial institutions (ACEP, CNCAS, CMS) to cover different production zones. The area of the GIE was mapped to SODEFITEX. Banks have different requirements: ACEP requires 6% of personal contribution to the credit; CNCAS 10% and CMS 23%.
- The 2011/2012 season did not go well. Faced with increased input prices (even still subsidized: CFA 15,250/50 kg bag of NPK; CFA 11,250 /50 kg bag of urea; CFA 1,050 /kg of hybrid seeds – compared with CFA 400 for ordinary seeds), producers asked for a pre-harvest price of CFA 150/kg, but had to settle for 135 (after 3 days of negotiations). As the season progressed badly and with market prices still rising, however, producers were able to secure an increase in the contract price to CFA 145/kg.
- On the contract, inputs were to be delivered on June 1, but ended up being delivered after July 17 and as late as early August.
- As it happened, SODEFITEX could not secure inputs at the government-subsidized prices, which was the basis of the contract with producers: hybrid maize was CFA 2,875/kg, compared to CFA 1,250; NPK, CFA 17,000 per 50kg bag, compared to CFA 15,230; and urea, 12,600 per 50kg bag, compared to CFA 11,250. SODEFITEX, (which had indicated in the contract that inputs would be sold at the cost it would acquire them) as the team learned tried to pass along the price increase to producers, but the latter refused.
- SODEFITEX appeared to have relented, but when producers delivered the grain, it applied the price increase (which it called “surplus”) and credited producers’ bank accounts a reduced amount that resulted in the bank sending notices to producers for bad debts.
- GIE Ndiobène, for example, delivered 33.249 tons, expecting a price of CFA 145/kg and total amount of CFA 4,821,000 to be credited to its account. SODEFITEX, however, only transferred CFA 3,619,799 to the GIE’s account, keeping the difference (CFA 1,201,309) as payment for the increased input cost that the GIE had refused to pay when the inputs were delivered. Similarly, GIE Keur Mathiar delivered 53.323 tons, expecting a transfer of CFA 7,731,830 to his account, but only found out a deposit of xxx because SODEFITEX had retained CFA 2,173,460 “surplus.”
- In both cases, the value of the grain delivered at the contract of CFA 145/kg fell short of the credit contracted. The expected transfer of the first GIE (CFA) was against a credit of CFA 8 million; the second’s expected transfer was again a credit of CFA 9 million. The surplus applied by SOEFITEX had worsened their positions with the bank, which started sending them SMS on The GIEs claim that yields (with the more expensive hybrids) were bad, but as leaders, they wanted to stay in the program by delivering grain, while planning to negotiate with the bank to pay back the remaining balance of the credit.

Reported successes

- The PCE’s program has worked well the previous year
- Grain warehouse built by the GIE with the project’s financial support

Major challenges encountered

- Issues related above

Suggestions for way forward

- The PCE should facilitate a tripartite consultation (farmers, consolidator, financial institution) to find a solution for the “surplus” payment taken by SODEFITEX, which is worsening producers’ credit positions.
- Adapt the pre-harvest price setting to reflect market conditions
- Continue building producers’ awareness of the importance of contractual arrangements.
- Promote more integrated contractual arrangements between producers, consolidators, and financial institutions to allow frequent consultations.
- Learn more about input delivery to avoid delays in delivery.

Date

- Tuesday, April 3

9:30 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Direction regionale du developpement rural (DRDR) Kaolack

Persons met

- Mr. Falilou Faye, director; Mr. Seydou Ndongo, lab technician; Mr. Leyti Diop, field inspector

Key findings

- Unlike Richard Toll's seed control lab that comes under the reasonability of DISEM, Kaolack seed control laboratory is under the authority of DRDR. DRDR contends that a unit of a directorate (the seed lab) should not come under the authority of a mere division (DISEM) within a counterpart direction (DA).
- However, as with Richard Toll, DISEM is ultimately responsible for seed certification. DISEM's mandate comes from a presidential decree, which supersedes the ministerial arête that set up DRDR's mandate.
- Whereas the technician at the Richard Toll's seed lab performs blind tests, as he receives identified only by numbers, the technician at Kaolack lab receives samples with names and locations of seed farmers. The technician records the test results and sends them to DISEM, which determines who passed or failed tests for certification.
- The technician operates without blouse, gloves and mask. The lab is relatively clean, but various items boxes and other items have started to pile up on the countertop and inside the open storage space underneath
- DRDR ensures seeds control at the parcels and in the laboratory. DISEM is in charge of seeds certification and certification label delivery. DRDR hosts a "Bureau des semences" which oversees the control agents throughout Kaolack Region.
- The lab is in operation since July 2010. There is no formal manual of procedures developed for the lab even though the lab assistant is fully able to explain how he performs his work. The Lab assistant reported that he was employed since November 2011, since then he has performed 240 tests for all crops.

Reported project's successes:

- The lab is a great asset to the seed industry in the region. There was no Lab in Kaolack before the PCE, so the seed samples were taken to Diourbel for analysis.
- The lab technician was trained in the USA.

Major challenges encountered

- There is no seed processing plant in Kaolack. The one supported by the project is not yet built, but the equipment has been acquired (the facility was closed when the team tried to visit the site)
- The air conditioning unit was out of service at the time of the team's visit.
- Maintaining a clean facility appears to be a challenge and may worsen with time.
- Lack of statistics keeping track of services provided to seed farmers.

Suggestions for way forward

- Complete the construction of a seed processing facility. One is in construction under the auspices of seeds production association of Kaolack.
- Require clear government's commitment to implement a business plan to ensure proper and sustainable management of the facility.
- Consider payment for lab services (along DISEM's guidelines or new ones) and a transparent system of the uses of funds, including provision of gloves, blouses and masks to the lab technician, and cleaning of the facility, etc.

11:00 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Crédit mutuel du Sénégal (CMS), Kaolack

Person met

- Mr Yahiya Ba, Superviseur risques

Key findings

- CMS has been in operation in the region since 1997. It started its partnership with PCE in 2010/2011 on its maize program in the department of Nioro with SODEFITEX as a consolidator. CMS grants a credit to farmers and proceeds to the payment of the consolidators. In 2011, CMS's outstanding credit was CFA91,472,430 for 48 producer groups. Producers delivered grain valued at CFA 130 million to

SODEFITEX, who was able to buy additional quantities beyond what producers had agreed to deliver (at 125 CFA/kg)

- The 2011/2012 season was not as good. CMS provided CFA 225,354,900 million for 202 beneficiaries (at 12.50% over 9 months) through two consolidators/input suppliers (SODEFITEX and SOENA). There was a shortage of fertilizers in the market and the consolidators were not able to ensure neither timely delivery (mid July 2011), nor the quantities expected by farmers.
- This affected maize production and reimbursement of credit. In the previous season, credit reimbursement rate was almost complete by November 2010. For the 2011/2012 season, credit reimbursement stands at 51% in April 2012. While in 2010/2011, credit recovery was almost completed by November 2011
- On the basis of this adverse experience, producers at Taiba Niassène are trying to set up their own input distribution system.

Reported project's successes:

- Thanks to the PCE programs, CMS has acquired new clients with the average credit increasing from CFA 200 000 to CFA 3 million.

Major challenges encountered

- In the absence of a more integrated contractual scheme, producers may attempt to default on their commitments.
- PCE is focusing on matchmaking farmers and consolidators and there is not enough follow up to this partnership until a disagreement arises.

Suggestions for way forward

- PCE should facilitate a meeting between PCE and the contractual partners (producers, consolidators, CMS) to find a solution to producers' bad credit situation for the 2011/2012 season.
- Implement a more integrated contractual arrangement scheme for the upcoming season.

4:30 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- SODEFITEX BAMTAARE, Tambacounda

Persons met:

- Mr Goulé Guèye, Directeur Bamtare

Key findings

- BAMTAARE (Bureau d'appui aux méthodes et techniques pour l'agriculture, les autres activités rurales et l'environnement) is a play of words to mean « development » in Al Pulaar, the dominant local language. It is a business development service (BDS) provider, set up to fulfill the public service mandate of SODEFITEX, a private company. BAMTAARE provides training and capacity building to farmers, and operates rural radios across the south eastern part of Senegal. (SODEFITEX also comprises an agribusiness operation and an M&E system).
- SODEFITEX had worked with SAGIC in the “bissap” value chain development in 2006, and was receptive to the idea of partnering with PCE in the project's maize program in 2009. Because of its experience in SODEFITEX cotton and maize contract farming schemes, BAMTAARE agreed to play the role of consolidator/input supplier in the PCE program. As such, BAMTAARE signed two separate contracts, one with producers and another with the financial institution, as described by producers in the Kaolack region. Consolidator/input suppliers must “pre-finance” the acquisition of the inputs to get reimbursed by the banks once producers take delivery of the inputs. BAMTAARE has worked with PCE over the past growing seasons: 2009/2010, 2010/2011, and 2011/2012.
- In the 2011/2012, SODEFITEX tried to acquire subsidized inputs for farmers. It thought that the subsidized inputs will come through, most as subsidies for cotton production usually do, even if late. At any rate, SODEFITEX has indicated in the contract that inputs will be provided at the prices they will be acquired (prix coutants). Because of this clause, SODEFITEX felt in its right to charge producers for the higher input prices even after producers refused to pay these higher prices at the delivery of the inputs. Mr. Gueye said he hinted that a compromise could have worked out if all producers had delivered the amount of grain indicated in the contract. SODEFITEX sold some 400 tons of the maize delivered by producers to processor in Dakar at CFA 193 /kg and kept the balance (about 700 tons) for its own maize processing plant.

Reported successes

- Cultivated areas, yields, production and prices have increased over the 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 seasons. The 2011/2012 was also expected to confirm these trends until we faced problems.

Major challenges encountered

- The PCE contract farming scheme (contractualisation) is facing a confidence crisis from many parties (consolidator, farmers, and credit institutions).
- There are risks involving in pre-financing inputs for resale to producers, and BAMTAAEW would rather just play the role of consolidator and not that of input distributor.
- Because of the problems faced by many parties this year, Mr. Gueye thinks that the success of the PCE maize program was helped by subsidized inputs (first with PCE in the 2009 test and then the government-subsidies in 2010/2011 (crop budgets, however, are calculated with inputs valued at market prices).

Suggestions for way forward

- A meeting between PCE and the project partners (farmers, SODEFITEX, SOENA, CMS) is required to determine a relevant solution for credit reimbursement
- If producers want to have adequate supply of inputs on time, they should not wait for the government input subsidies.

Date

- Thursday, April 5

8:00 Institution/organization visited

- Reseau des producteurs de semences de Nerica (REPROSENER), Kolda

Persons met:

- Mr Mohamed Cissé, president and certified seed producer of REPROSENER

Key findings

- PCE helped establish the REPROSENER network, which became a formal GIE in June 2011 with 9 members and 3 new members in 2012. PCE has also sponsored capacity building of the GIE
- The GIE is working on a three-year program to determine the demand for seed from seed farmers and producers, in order to order foundation seed from ISRA, the only institution granted the right to do so in Senegal. It could take three years for ISRA to produce the successive generations of foundation up to “pre-base” sold to seed farmers for multiplication into certified seed (R1) sold to producers.
- There is a seed control laboratory at Kolda, but it is in poor shape and charges CFA 6,250 per test. Seed farmers must also pay CFA 120 for two labels for each 30kg-bag of certified seed (one in the inside and the other on the outside).
- Mr. Cisse finds these charges excessive, especially since he doesn't know how the generated funds are being used.

Reported project's successes

- The creation of the seed producers GIE is a great success for the seed industry in the region. Thanks to the project's capacity building training, they have “become seed experts in their own right.”
- The GIE has thus far conducted tests on 27 Nerica species, and has been able to draw a manual of procedures for their association
- The on-going 3-year programming will help ensure that seed farmers have adequate seeds to supply farmers.

Major challenges encountered

- The scarcity of foundation seed is a major constraint to the development of the seed industry.
- There is no seed conditioning center in Kolda; the closest one is located in Vélingara (120 kms), or even Tamabacounda.

Suggestions for way forward

- Rehabilitate the seed lab at Kolda and establish a seed certification facility in Kolda
- Follow up the GIE's needs assessment for foundation seeds, transmission of their order to ISRA for timely delivery of the amount of foundation seed requested.
- Provide a motorcycle for the seed inspector
- Revise the charges (lab test and labels) supported by seed producers

- Continue strengthening the GIE's capacity building

10:00 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Caisse national de credit agricole (CNCAS), Kolda

Person met

- Mr Seydou Mané, agent de crédit ; Aliou Gueye, chef d'agence (telephone conference from Dakar)

Key findings

- Under the 2011/2012 PCE program, CNCAS provided inputs to producers through SEDAB. For this program, however, CNCAS saw 70% of producers paying back their credit in cash, and not in kind through SEDAB.
- The CNCAS credit committee holds two sessions in May and June to examine producers' credit requests. Selected requests are sent to headquarters in Dakar for approval. The whole process may take 15-20 days.
- The agency presented a sample of a farmer's credit request that consisted in a short letter stating the amount requested without any other information. This other information is provided by the input supplier.
- CNCAS has no problem with fund availability to finance marketing operations or equipment. CNCAS can well finance small-scale equipment for women's group, but it needs to make sure the group has the capacity to operate the equipment for profit in order to pay back the credit

Reported project's successes

- None reported

Major challenges encountered

- Producers are often late on the May 2 deadline in requesting credit, and end up receiving funds and inputs late in the season.
- Non compliance with the contract terms when market prices rise above the contract price.

Suggestions for way forward

- Keep building farmers' technical capacities
- Sensitize VC actors to comply with their contractual commitments
- CNCAS urges PCE to conduct more field coaching of farmers

2:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- Seed control laboratory, Kolda

Person met

- Mr Oumar Mballo, lab technician

Key findings

- The lab in Kolda was built in 1989. The lab is under DISEM's under DISEM technical oversight and DRDR administrative oversight, i.e., the technician is a DISEM's agent.
- The lab is in poor shape. It is regularly flooded when it rains because of gapping holes in the ceiling and the roof. It lacks basic equipment, including cold storage.
- The lab charges a fee for testing, in line with DISEM's guidelines (reportedly CFA 5,000 instead of the CFA 6,500 reported by REPROSENER). Apparently the agent uses the funds to maintain his 10-year motorcycle, pay for cleaning and some miscellaneous expenses.
- An average of 300 – 400 seed samples is analyzed per year out of which 60 are rice samples and 30 Nerica samples.

Reported project's successes:

- None

Major challenges encountered

- Difficult, even unhealthy working conditions for the technician

Suggestions for way forward

- Build a new, or rehabilitate the lab
- Provide better working conditions (gloves, mask, blouses), cleaning services, and an office

- Help technician with transportation

3:30 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- GIE Kawrale and Kawrale Ainab, Batancoutou Maoundé village, Kolda

Person met

- Sekou Kande, president; Saloum Mballo, and others (see list in annex)

Key findings

- Before the PCE's intervention, access to credit was difficult and producers mainly use inputs on a small piece of land to grow maize for home consumption.
- In the 2011/2012 program, the GIEs got credit to acquire inputs through SEDAB, their regular input supplier. SEDAB has managed to acquire the government-subsidized inputs and deliver them on time, except for the urea.
- As they usually do, many producers elected to wait for the second rain to plant maize, but rainfall was erratic and those producers ended planting maize late. Those who planted early got better yields. One lesson one GIE's president said he learned was to always plant on time the "credit crop" so to be able to pay back the loan.
- Nonetheless, some GIE that did experience poor harvest went ahead to reimburse their credit in kind, even as market prices were above the contract price.

Reported success

- Thanks to the PCE program, producers gain better access to credit and were able to cultivate more area. Before the program, GIEs could only plant about two ha, but with the program they were able to plant from 7 to 10 ha, with maize turning into a cash crop.

Suggestions for way forward

- Consider a more flexible way of setting the contract price to reflect market conditions.

6:00 p.m. Institution/organization visited

- SEDAB (Sahélienne d'agro-business)

Persons met

- Mr. Hassim Kandé; Youba Diedhiou

Reported project's successes:

- The PCE program helped producers expand their operations through increased access to credit. Some were even able to have two loans for two crops, including rice. (A lead producer may request a loan for him and other members, if he has no current outstanding loan with the credit institution).

Key challenges encountered:

- The absence of a seed certification facility at Kolda is a serious problem. Also several producers do not yet master production techniques.

Suggestions for way forward:

- Establish a seed certification facility at Kolda
- SEDAB is convinced the PCE contractual arrangement program can be applied to upland rice, the same way it was applied to maize producers, who were only producing maize for home consumption for lack of access to credit and market opportunities.

Date

- Friday, April 6

8:00 a.m. Institution/organization visited

- Alliance de crédit et d'épargne pour la production (ACEP)

Person met

- Mr Ibrahima Badiane Chef de Région ACEP Kolda

Key findings

- ACEP provides credit at market rates, but is able to compete with CNCAS because of its fast turn around credit approval, within 48-72 hours. The decision is made at the local level rather than the central office in Dakar (except for loan above CFA 15 million)

- In the 2011/2012 PCE program, ACEP provided CFA 42 million credit to 40 producer groups through SODEFITEX and SEDAB.
- SEDAB managed to acquire the government-subsidized inputs, while SODEFITEX did not, creating some confusion with many producers.

Reported success

- ACEP provided more credit to producers because the PCE's intervention has contributed to reducing the bank's perceived risk. The bank was thus able to increase its loan portfolio from CFA 6 to CFA 42 million, going from 2 to 40 producer groups in the region.

Major challenges encountered

- Adverse weather condition
- Lack of pro-active coaching of producers by the project

Suggestions for way forward

- Refine the contract farming scheme, and ensure that the terms and conditions are clearly understood and accepted by all parties.
- Address the issue of fertilizer subsidy, which is creating distortions in the value chain operation.
- Urge SODEFITEX to improve its partnership with farmers and to play a fair role as consolidator
- Consider, if possible, a price variation clause in the contract

ANNEX 5: PCE TO 5 INDICATOR TABLE

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
1	IR 1 Improved Agricultural Productivity	Gross margin per unit of land or animal of selected product	USD/ha	See breakdown by crop						
		Irrigated Rice GM	USD/ha	469	N/A	716	499	562	629	849
		Upland Rice GM	USD/ha	N/A	N/A	Not available	272	592	340	408
		Maize GM	USD/ha	169	N/A	219	264	522	264	274
		Millet GM	USD/ha	112	N/A	107	109	173	134	181
2	Sub IR 1.1 Enhanced human and institutional capacity development for increased agricultural sector productivity	Number of individuals who have received USG supported long-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training	No.	0	0	0	14	14	0	0
		Male				0	10	10	0	0
		Female				0	4	4	0	0

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
3	Sub IR 1.1 Enhanced human and institutional capacity development for increased agricultural sector productivity	Number of individuals who have received USG supported short-term agricultural sector productivity or food security training	No. of unique individuals trained	3,279	12,590	20,356	24,000	22 328	56,600	96,400
		Male		1,856	11,768	15,267	18,000	18 595	42,450	73,300
		Female		1,423	752	5,089	6,000	3733	14,150	24,100
4	Sub IR 1.2 Enhanced Technology Development, Dissemination, Management and Innovation	Number of additional hectares under improved technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance	Ha	0	75	74	10,380	11 592	24,770	32,540
		Rice (ha)					4,380	4 723	9,580	16,120
		Maize (ha)					3,000	5 465	12,190	12,420
		Millet (ha)					3,000	1 404	3,000	4,140

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
5	Sub IR 1.2 Enhanced Technology Development, Dissemination, Management and Innovation	Number of farmers and others who have applied new technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance	No.	0	3,165	4,338	9,960	19 973	29,330	55,810
		Farmers					9,900	19 973	29,210	55,600
		Firms								
		Government agents								
		Others					60	0	120	210
6	Sub IR 1.2 Enhanced Technology Development, Dissemination, Management Innovation	Number of new technologies or management practices made available for transfer as a result of USG assistance	No.	0	10	9	17	23	26	9
		Production (a)					13	14	18	4
		Processing (b)					1	5	4	4
		Production and processing (a+b)					14	19	22	8
		Other (c)					3	4	4	1

Nº	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
7	Sub IR 1.2 Enhanced Technology Development, Dissemination, Management and Innovation	Number of new technologies or management practices under research as a result of USG assistance	No.	0	6	10	20	20	20	20
		Production					8	8	8	8
		Processing					0	0	0	0
		Production and processing					8	8	0	0
		other					12	12	12	12
8	Sub IR 1.2 Enhanced Technology Development, Dissemination, Management and Innovation	Number of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions		0	14,300	20,420	23,900	36 141	56,600	96,400
9	IR 1 Improved Agricultural Productivity	Quantity of foundation seed produced		0	0	0	5	14	9	11
10	IR 1 Improved Agricultural Productivity	Quantity of certified seeds produced by public and private sectors		0	533	400	970	1,939	1,800	2,650

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
11	Sub IR 1.3 Improved Agricultural Policy Environment (increase productivity)	Number of policies / regulations / administrative procedures analyzed(Stage 1 of 5)	No.	0	5	10	18	18	11	1
12	Sub IR 1.3 Improved Agricultural Policy Environment (increase productivity)	Number of policies / regulations / administrative procedures drafted and presented for public/stakeholder consultation (Stage 2 of 5)	No.	0	0	0	11	30	12	2
13	Sub IR 1.3 Improved Agricultural Policy Environment (increase productivity)	Number of policies / regulations / administrative procedures presented for legislation/decree (Stage 3 of 5)	No.	0	0	0	5	0	10	4
14	Sub IR 1.3 Improved Agricultural Policy Environment (increase productivity)	Number of policies / regulations / administrative procedures prepared with USG assistance passed/approved (Stage 4 of 5)	No.	0	0	0	5	0	11	5

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
15	Sub IR 1.3 Improved Agricultural Policy Environment (increase productivity)	Number of policies / regulations / administrative procedures passed for which implementation has begun (Stage 5 of 5)	No.	0	N/A	N/A	2	0	9	5
16	Sub IR 1.4 Enhanced institutional capacity development for increased agricultural sector productivity	Number of institutions/ organizations undertaking capacity/competency strengthening as a result of USG assistance	No.	0	23	128	27	121	31	33
17	Sub IR 1.5 Agricultural producer organizations strengthened	Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, trade and business associations, and community-based organizations (CBOs) receiving USG assistance	No.	0	399	698	800	1 698	1,000	1,700
18	Sub IR 1.5 Agricultural producer organizations strengthened	Number of members of producer organizations and community based organizations receiving USG assistance	No.	0	N/A	(This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	24,000	36,141	56,000	96,000

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
19	Sub IR 1.5 Agricultural producer organizations strengthened	Number of private enterprises, producers organizations, water users associations, trade and business associations and community-based organizations (CBOs) that applied new technologies or management practices as a result of USG assistance	No.	0	3,165	4,338	600	1 581	800	1,200
20	IR 2 Expanding Markets and Trade	Volume and Value of production processed and sold		0	N/A	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)				
		Millet								
		Volume	Ton				4,100	323	6,500	8,800
		Value	USD (,000)				1,437	114.73	2,278	3,266
		Maize								
		Volume	Ton				5,600	5 782	33,700	79,400
		Value	USD (,000)				1,501	1 623	8,338	18,008
		Rice								
		Volume	Ton				41,500	30567	108,500	189,500
		Value	USD (,000)				11,274	7 343	27,946	48,927

Nº	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY 2010	Target FY 2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
21	IR 2 Expanding Markets and Trade	Value of incremental sales (collected at farm- level) attributed to FTF implementation (USD)	'000 USD	0	N/A	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	4,490	3 101	14,030	26,980
		Millet	'000 USD				420	48.79	880	1580
		Maize	'000 USD				870	1 461	4850	10500
		Tota; riceValue	'000 USD				3200	1 591	8300	14900
22	Sub IR 2.6 Improved Post-harvest market information	Post harvest losses as a % of overall harvest	%	Not available	(This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	(This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	(This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	11%	15%	10%
23	Sub IR 2.7 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services	Value of Agricultural and Rural Loans (USD)	'000 USD	Not available	206	238	6,000	13 820	12,000	12,000
24	Sub IR 2.7 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services	Number of MSMEs receiving USG assistance to access bank loans	No.	0	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	1,500	6 669	3,000	6,000

Nº	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
25	Sub IR 2.7 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services	Number of MSMEs receiving business development services from USG assisted sources	No.	0	11,027	20,420	24,000	36 141	56,600	96,400
26	Sub IR 2.7 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services	Amount of private financing mobilized with DCA Guarantee	000,000 USD	0	0	2.481	3.000	11 100	6.000	2.000
27	Sub IR 2.7 Improved access to business development and sound and affordable financial and risk management services	Number of trainings of IMF, bank personnel related to agricultural lending	No.	0	6	1	4	6	14	5
28	IR 3 Increased private sector investment in agriculture and nutrition related activities	Number of public-private partnerships formed as a result of FtF assistance	No.	0	5	4	31	25	44	58

N°	FTF Initiative Affiliation	Indicator Title	Unit	Baseline (2009)	Target FY 2010	Results FY2010	Target FY2011	Results 2011	Target FY 2012	Target FY 2013
29	IR 3 Increased private sector investment in agriculture and nutrition related activities	Value of new private sector investment in the agriculture sector or food chain leveraged by FTF implementation	USD '000,000	0	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	N/A (This is a new FTF indicator hence no FY 10 value)	870	1 717	1.330	1.800
30	IR 3 Increased private sector investment in agriculture and nutrition related activities	Number of business-to-business partnerships developed	No.	0	17	21	86	1 292	252	468
31	IR 4 Increased agriculture value-chain productivity leading to greater on- and off-farm jobs	Number of jobs attributed to FTF implementation	No	2,714	279	2,695	4,500	4 034	12,000	22,000

ANNEX 6: USAID/PCE FEEDBACK ON MID-TERM EVALUATION DRAFT REPORT

General comments:

1. We are generally pleased with the final product to the extent that it has allowed USAID to have an independent perspective on the strengths, successes and challenges facing achievement of Feed the Future goals in the three cereals value chains. We agree with many of the conclusions and recommendations and would like to note that many of those recommendations are already part of our FY12 activities and FY13 plans.
2. The TOR put an emphasis on four “components” of the project that are of greatest relevance in the new FTF strategy. However, the report could have given more attention to a number of strategic considerations useful for understanding performance and future project design. For example, a clearer explanation and analysis of the project’s intervention approaches (how things get done such as the decision criteria used for cost-share investments, choice of partners and scoping of in-kind grants, etc...), the quality of overall management and project coordination, and the specific critical challenges and opportunities for sustaining momentum beyond November 2013, etc. Perhaps this simply reflects the inherent limitations of a relatively short study. The PCE team believes that these are issues that merit more in-depth discussion between USAID and the PCE team over the next year in order to draw out all the lessons and recommendations for designing any type of follow-on assistance after PCE’s closure.
3. The document contains a number of important factual errors that we have attempted to identify and note here for correction.
4. Concept of “component”. The MTR suggests that the project has 7 components, rather than 4. This is inaccurate. We have four teams/components as discussed in the MTR, each one with a Senior Manager. In contrast, the project generates a work plan and progress reports around 7 thematic areas in response to a request from USAID Senegal because USAID has reporting requirements according to these 7 themes, plus a number of “cross cutting” themes. Inevitably, this leads to repetition in reporting, but USAID has said they appreciate the segmentation as it helps them to formulate their reports that are transmitted to Washington.

Specific observations on the report

1. About budget cuts and the adoption of the FTF strategy. The Executive Summary brings up the issue of the adoption of the FTF strategy in early 2011 and the subsequent cut to the project’s budget for FY12. It is incorrect, however, to state that these two events are linked. USAID did not cut our budget as an effect of adopting the FTF strategy focused on 3 cereals and fisheries. Rather, the budget cut came from an overall compression of resources for USAID, dictated by Congress. Moreover, the ES says our overall budget was cut 45%. This is incorrect. Consider that the average annual budget for TO5, based on contract value, was about \$10.3 million. The FY12 budget was cut back to \$7.5 million, which represents a 27% drop from that average. The overall contract value, however, was not formally reduced. It will be soon, with a formal reduction of about \$3 million, or about 8% of total value. We can say, though, that the budget cut was significant and that it has forced us to make some difficult decisions on what to fund and at what scale. In that regard, the report is accurate in describing the project’s strategic choice of NOT directly funding infrastructure in favor of facilitating private investment and loans for such infrastructure, with a modest co-financing allowance coming from the project.
2. The Executive Summary provides an inaccurate explanation of the place of millet and rainfed rice. The ES states “The project has determined that millet and rain-fed rice producers shun the markets, they emphasize home consumption.” That’s not accurate. For rainfed rice, it’s a new product in most cases so there is no notion of “shunning”. It just doesn’t have that potential yet. For millet it is true that it is a security crop for farmers for their home consumption. But millet is sold extensively and eaten regularly in Dakar and other urban areas. It is the absence of a large market for “quality” and processed millet products that in effect limits the potential of the formal contracting and financing model. The team can find specific numbers in our millet VC study and from consultation with our VC senior manager and millet manager if they wish to give a sense of dimension to this issue.

3. In the interest to avoid any confusion and ambiguity about the scope of “infrastructure” support in the seed sector, see the following list of what the project has accomplished or is currently pursuing as part of FY12:

- a. Construction of the Richard Toll seed lab and key equipment (managed by the ministry of Agriculture) Completed. Additional equipment procurement and training on lab management norms is on-going.
- b. Construction of the Kaolack seed lab and key equipment. Completed. Additional equipment procurement and training on management norms is on-going.
- c. Construction of the Kolda seed lab and key equipment. On-going. This activity has been contracted in FY12 and will be completed in early FY13. It is accompanied by training on lab management norms.
- d. Development of a PPP and rehabilitation of the seed processing facility (the CTS) in Richard Toll. On-going. The project is working with the Ministry and UNIS-Nord since FY10 on developing a PPP for management of the existing facility which has been largely amortized and must be renewed. The PPP will be signed this FY based on progress to date. The private partner will be the COOSEN, which is already legally established and is linked to UNIS-Nord. PCE is expected to provide some of the financing needed to rehabilitate the facility after signature of the PPP, that means in FY13. Assistance on management practices of that facility will also be provided.
- e. Construction and equipment of a privately-operated CTS in Kaolack. Completed. The private sector (KASEC) financed the construction of the facility. USAID/PCE provided an in-kind grant for the equipment inside the facility. The CTS Kaolack has recently received its “agrément” from the Ministry of Agriculture and will begin offering seed processing services during FY12.
- f. Construction and equipment for a privately-operated CTS in Kolda. In planning. As the report points out, there are efforts underway to identify a private partner to work with PCE for developing a private CTS in Kolda, similar to the partnership with the KASEC.
- g. Rehabilitation of the ISRA Fanaye research station. On-going. The project can provide as necessary to the MTR team the details on the current investments being mobilized to rehabilitate the ISRA Fanaye research station. While we hope these investments will be completed in FY12, they may spill over into early FY13.
- h. Targeted rehabilitation of the ISRA Nioro research station. On-going. Same comments as the previous point.

USAID/PCE and USAID will continue to assess the potential for the project to provide technical and financial support to other labs and CTS as needed and in accordance with the spatial and strategic priorities of Feed the Future. It is not accurate to state that the project has eliminated entirely any intent to intervene on seed labs outside the three mentioned above.

4. The Executive Summary discussion of Component 2 (Policy) is a bit misleading. If we refer to the initial scope of work for Task Order 5, the project was tasked to work on agriculture policy reforms in a very broad way with some indicative orientations including support to LOASP and to the PNIA. The choice of the three subject areas discussed in the MTR report was only made with USAID very recently (last 6 months), on the basis of a request that came from the Ministry. Prior to that time, we were asked to help the GOS in general to move the PNIA process forward (which we did) and to find a way to help with LOASP as a whole (which progressed much more slowly).

5. Regarding Capital Access, we advise the MTR team to categorize the project’s interventions as follows:

- a. First, development of financial models and financial coaching services in support of the formal contract farming scheme for cereals.

b. Second, introduction of new financial instruments such as equipment leasing, agriculture insurance and warehouse receipts.

c. Third, provision of technical support and monitoring in collaboration with USAID to expand the number of financial institutions that have Development Credit Authority (DCA) guarantees (especially for agriculture).

d. Training of financial institution staff on lending for agriculture (development of financial models and financial instruments specific to agriculture value chains)

As mentioned in the MTR and above, the project's direct financial assistance for rural infrastructure work (notably warehousing) was curtailed due to budget cuts and the project has instead focused on supporting mobilization of private financing for warehouses.

5. The authors seem to argue that it is the responsibility of USAID/PCE to find a solution to the debt arrears issue for maize growers. Our project is indeed assisting with solutions in terms of facilitation. It is not our policy and of questionable legality for the project to financially intervene on behalf of the maize growers and pay their loans. Moreover, such an intervention would contradict the overall philosophy of interventions aimed at facilitating sustainable business linkages through a contractual process.

6. We agree that some form of price flexibility would be part of the solution to the side-selling problem that occurred in maize. It is also worth mentioning that what maize producers are requested to sell through their contracts represent approximately a half of output in a normal year. Even if the main reason is to allow them to meet household consumption needs, this implies that selling outside does not necessary lead to the violation of contractual rules.

7. Regarding reduction of expatriate staffing, it was part of the consortium's strategy under TO5 to progressively reduce the expatriate personnel. The early departure of the transport SM helped us respond to USAID's concern in this area. For the VC SM, he was replaced within 2 months time. For the Capital Access SM, he stayed for the planned duration of his contract with transfer of his responsibilities to a Senegalese colleague who is now the SM.

8. The Sodefitex silo: Contrary to what was stated in the MTR, USAID/PCE did not finance construction of a 1000 Ton silo for Sodefitex. This may have crept into some old reports, but it is inaccurate. PCE funded upgrades, notably of the automatic/electronic controls at the existing silo to allow Sodefitex to use it. However, Sodefitex has not, to date, made their final cost-share investments to actually operationalize the silo (with maize storage). Sodefitex has not purchased a sufficient quantity to merit storage in the Tambacounda silo given the set-up that encourages immediate resale to the local animal feed industry. PCE can provide the MTR with precise details of the financial support provided related to the Sodefitex silo.

9. Efficiency of internal organization of Communications and M&E. The MTR team argues that Communication is not taken as a cross cutting issue since the communication manager does not answer directly to the COP. The PCE team fundamentally disagrees with the conclusion and recommendation of the MTR. The project has a Senior Manager for Communications and M&E who reports directly to the COP. It is his responsibility to ensure the cross-cutting nature of communications and M&E. Why is the hierarchical arrangement of communications used as a reason to say it is not cross-cutting? The project's teams work well with the communications staff and senior manager to pull together our communications work and this shows with the recent (FY12) growth of communications activities.

10. USAID Forward: Note that PCE and USAID have held at least two working sessions on the subject of USAID Forward and opportunities for carrying forward that strategy after the end of PCE.

11. Data Quality Assessment. Is the MTR team aware that USAID recently completed a DQA? The discussion here suggests they do not know this.

12. Import parity pricing. The project is currently working on an import parity pricing model for the maize VC where the challenge of information asymmetry is greatest and where the year-over-year price variation has been strongest. It is also because the maize VC is all about displacing imported maize so understanding the prices paid by the animal feed industry is essential for future negotiations for prices for maize.
13. The title of Component 2 should be “Enhanced Agricultural Policy Environment” to be in conformity with the content that does not touch to any other sector beyond agriculture.
14. The FY11 training events that registered 76 participants including 34 women were about basic office applications rather than statistical analysis. For the data collection and stat analysis training, there were 25 participants including 4 women.
15. The number of women participants in the training on “Design and Implementation of Agricultural Policies” is 6 out of 24
16. The recommended partnership ‘of DAPS’ with ISRA/BAME to produce policy notes on key reform issues could be extended to Higher Learning Institutions.
17. Officially SAED means « Société Nationale d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du fleuve Sénégal et des Vallées du fleuve Sénégal et de la Falémé » instead of « Société d'aménagement des eaux du Delta” (page 9). Initially, it was « Société d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta)
18. The 3 LOASP components prioritized by USAID/PCE are: formal recognition of agricultural professions, rural finance, and land reform. In the initial policy support plan for 2012, only two LOASP themes were excluded, namely the National Livestock Development Plan and the Forestry Action Plan
19. The selection of ENSA students sponsored for applied research work is not limited to those enrolled in the agribusiness program but extended to all who are in their fifth and last year of the Ag. Engineering curriculum (page 22).
20. The two paragraphs under “*Are the intervention approaches used during the first 2.5 years of PCE conducive to sustainability?*” are practically the same. “
21. For seeds, note that DISEM means «Division des Semences » and not « Direction des semences ». It would be helpful to provide some thoughts on possible implications of integrating OCDE norms for rice and maize seeds starting next year.