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## **Lessons for Future Programming**

## **USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program**

**June 2010**

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# LESSONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

## USAID/PERU'S ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

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**DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Arvin R. Bunker  
Roberto Castro  
Oswaldo Medina  
Josefa Nolte  
Alfredo Mendivil  
Alberto Troilo  
Ana Toledo  
Jose Panta

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## ACRONYMS

AASAR	Asociación de Agricultores Santa Rosa
ACEPAT	Asociación Central de Palmicultores de Tocache
ADP or AD	Alternative Development Program (In Spanish: Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo)
APTAA	Asociación de Plataneros Tecnificados de Aguaytía
APROCAPP	Asociación de Productores de Cacao de la Provincia de Picota
APTAA	Asociación Plataneros Tecnificados Aguaytía
APTRA	Asociación Plataneros Tradicionales Rio Abajo
APTRA	Asociación de Plataneros Tecnificados de Rio Abad
ASPASH	Asociación de Palmicultores de Shambillo
CAPTACY	Consorcio Agrario de Primavera y Centro Yurac
CIOOY	Consorcio de Productores de Plátano
CN	Counter Narcotics
COCEPU	Central Committee of Palm Oil Producers of Ucayali (In Spanish: Comité Central de Palmicultores de Ucayali)
COFIDE	Corporación Financiera d Desarrollo, S.A.
COPALGSA	Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"
COPAMON	Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo
COP	Chief of Party
COTR	Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
COPPU	Consorcio de Productores de Plátano de Ucayali
CORAH	Control and Reduction of Coca Leaf in Upper Huallaga
DEVIDA	Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas
ESAN	Escuela de Administración de Negocios
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FFS	Farmer Field Schools
FOB	Free on Board
FY	Fiscal Year
GOP	Government of Peru
ICT	Institute of Tropical Crops (In Spanish: Instituto de Cultivos Tropicales)
IDB	Inter American Development Bank
IESTP-H	Institución Educativa Superior Tecnológica Pública - Huallaga
INIA	National Institution for Agrarian Innovation (In Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria)
INRA	National Agrarian Reform Institute (In Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria)
IR	Intermediate Result

KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (German government-owned development bank)
LOE	Level of Effort
Naranjillo	Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo (CoopAIN)
NGO or ONG	Non-government organization (In Spanish: Organización No Gobierno)
NUODD	United Nations Office of Drug and Crime Prevention (In Spanish Naciones Unidas, Oficina contra las Drogas y el Delito)
OLAMSA	Oleaginosas Amazónica S.A.
OLPASA	Oleaginosas Padre Abad S.A.
OLPESA	Oleaginosas del Perú S.A.
PRA	Poverty Reduction and Alleviation
RAISE	Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment
RNPM	Red Nacional de Promoción de Mujeres
Sol Naciente	Agricultores Sta. Rosa Sol Naciente
SOW	Scope of Work
SUNAT	Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria
T/TA	Training/Technical Assistance
UN	United Nations and its agencies FAO, UNDP, etc.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VRAE	River Apurímac and River Ene Valley

# INTRODUCTION

Favorable outcomes for USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program (ADP) are being demonstrated by the thousands of Peruvian households that have chosen to enjoy a preferable lifestyle by rejecting coca leaf production for licit crops, thus creating a safe and family-friendly community and beginning the process of long-term wealth creation through production of legitimate crops.

This evaluation had two primary objectives, which are:

1. Identify the lessons learned from the programmed eradication in Tocache and suggest which of those lessons can improve future interventions in the region of Aguaytia-Huipoca.
2. In the Northern San Martin region identify and recommend program interventions that best continue agricultural sector development for a coca free environment.

**Section I** contains the Executive Summary, Findings and Conclusions, and Lessons Learned.

**Section II** applies the learning from programmed eradication in Tocache to the upcoming eradication in areas in Aguaytia-Huipoca.

**Section III** assesses how to support the long-term sustainability of the accomplishments of ADP in Northern San Martin.

# SECTION I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## I.1 RESULTS IN SAN MARTIN & LESSONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

Success of the Alternative Development Program in reducing coca production in the San Martin Region is evidenced by the density of coca in 1996 (Figure 1) as compared to 2008 (Figure 2). In these figures red represents a high density of coca production; orange, medium; and yellow, low density of production. The area of coca production in San Martin was reduced from 22,000 hectares in 1996 to less than 2000 hectares in 2008. <sup>1</sup>

Voluntary eradication was the approach for most of the eradication in San Martin. Programmed eradication was utilized in Tocache Province beginning in 2006. Both programs were successful.

To identify lessons learned and to respond to the two primary evaluation objectives, the Weidemann Associates team visited sites in all of the principal areas of implementation of ADP, including Northern San Martin, Tocache, Tingo Maria, Aguaytia, Pucallpa, and surrounding areas. Team members interviewed key stakeholders in U.S. Government offices, ADP staff, staffs of institutions that are subcontractors to ADP, agribusinesses supplying inputs and purchasing products from participating producers, public officials in the Government of Peru (GOP), Regional Governments, Municipal Governments, specialists in counter narcotics policies and programs, other donors, and households/producers in coca production regions. More than 100 institutions were contacted with more than 800 persons participating in interviews with team members.

Nearly all project activities depend on the ADP first selling an intangible: hope. The hope the communities are buying is removal of violence and terrorism, a family friendly community with a future, and adequate and reliable income sufficient to meet basic needs and to provide economic growth and wealth creation for households and therefore their communities.

Households that join the program are asked to make significant sacrifices that include: lower income from the new crops that will replace coca and major reduction in income until replacement crops begin production—3 years to first production and 5 to 6 years before full production. During the period between the eradication of coca and income generated from tree crops, the project provided limited help for the family to grow licit crops to sell in local markets. In many households the men left to find work elsewhere, and women remained to operate the farm.

Selling hope is not remarkable; donors have sold hope to rural dwellers many times over. What is remarkable is that the ADP program has been engaged in this for eight years on a large scale. If ADP were not delivering results in keeping with what the communities and households have been led to expect, this approach would not have endured.


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<sup>1</sup> Source of data: USAID, DEVIDA, United Nations.

The two sections below summarize important results of this investigation organized around the two principal objectives in the Statement of Work (SOW).

**COCA PRODUCTION DENSITY IN SAN MARTIN REGION 1996 AND 2008**

**Figure 1: 1996**



**Figure 2: 2008**



Colors represent hectares of coca production per square kilometer as follows: Yellow, from 0.1 to 1.0; orange, from 1.1 to 4.0; and red, 4.1 and more.

Source: USAID/Peru

### ***1.1.1 Learning from Tocache***

Tocache participated in voluntary eradication for many years. Programmed eradication went so well that nearly all persons in the ADP staff in that office recommend programmed eradication as the approach for other locations. When compared to voluntary eradication, programmed eradication in Tocache required less time for communities to decide to participate in ADP and fewer ADP resources consumed.

Coca-producing households associated violence and terrorism with the production of coca. In nearly every interview women first mentioned improving the quality of life by removing violence and terrorism from their community as their reason for joining ADP and for encouraging men to join ADP.

When responding to the question of why they joined ADP, most men first mentioned that the potential income from replacement crops was adequate and reliable to sustain their families.

Women also frequently mentioned the potential for adequate and reliable income as a secondary reason for joining ADP, and men also frequently mentioned improving the quality of life by removing violence and terrorism from the community as a secondary reason for joining ADP.

Both women and men responded that the infrastructure and social investment offered by ADP were also critical incentives to join. These investments predominately remove barriers that restrict effective participation of households in markets for licit products, such as improved roads or electrical power to the community. A few investments improved other community services or provided additional income opportunities.

Thus the three pillars of hope that induce communities to join ADP are:

1. Improve the quality of life by removing the violence and terrorism from the community,
2. The potential income from replacement crops was adequate and reliable to sustain their households, and
3. Infrastructure and social investments removed barriers of access to markets and provided additional to in infrastructure

Hope is sustained over time by the capacity of ADP to deliver on the promised support to the satisfaction of the communities in terms of investment in the community, crops and infrastructure.

Producers reported that they continue their participation in ADP because of the improved quality of life in the community: safety, sufficient income with replacement crops, support for producer associations that provide improved marketing services for their products, and completion of the improvements ADP agreed to make in the community. The principal replacement crops supported by ADP are cacao, palm oil, and coffee.

The evaluation team found that the ADP program has gained respect for its delivery on the promise to bring tranquility and safety to communities; fulfill their promised investments in seeds, planting materials, training and technical assistance for replacement crops; and execute their infrastructure investments. In effect, ADP has established a measure of social capital that

motivates communities to voluntarily sacrifice income over an extended period for the promise of an improved lifestyle without violence.

When the evaluation team asked participants about the reasons their neighbors gave for not participating, the most frequent response was that neighbors said they did not believe the offer presented by ADP, followed by the lack of roads and access to their parcels, and the expense of establishing new crops.

Removing coca production from a community is a complex process, unique for every community. A key objective of the community, removal of violence, was accomplished by the actions of community members. While ADP helped start and motivate actions, it had little direct involvement in the process that removed the violence. It was community members that stood before the pro-coca interests and stated that they would no longer grow coca. ADP's role was to offer a reliable path to sustainable income without coca and intensive support to the community as households motivated new leaders to emerge and pro-coca leaders to depart. In Tocache, an intensive period of ADP support in the community began about three months after programmed eradication began and lasted for a period of 18 months, depending on the needs of the community. Experience demonstrates that once new leadership is installed and functioning and the replacement crops and infrastructure investments are underway, the need for community development support is reduced.

A communication campaign encouraged communities to sign the “convenio marco.” The intensive campaign partly conducted by CORAH (Control and Reduction of Coca Leaf in Upper Huallaga) and partly by ADP, was helpful before, during and immediately after the programmed eradication.

According to producers, the most useful activities implemented by ADP were technical assistance, Farmer Field Schools (FFS), study tours, and installation of new infrastructure.

Many community households want to remove the remaining small pockets of coca that are produced in the community. Other than persuasion they have few tools or support. The evaluation identified no GOP or regional or local government programs to support communities that wish to remove remaining pockets of coca, although the ADP can remove support if a community does not comply with the terms of the agreements signed by the community and DEVIDA.

Income alternatives in Tocache were adequate and reliable, supported in part by GOP and United Nations investments many years earlier that resulted in palm oil and cacao trees in production. Because of these earlier eradications in the zone, there were ex-coca producers who could verify

**Figure 3 Typical terrains in the region**



Source: Weidemann's Team

favorable results for these crops. Study tours were effective in convincing newly eradicating producers of the veracity of the data presented by ADP staff.

Toache's favorable soil, terrain, and climate conditions supported the establishment of new crops, allowing households to grow their own food and sell the surplus as income until the primary crops began producing. Finally, road improvements, partially project supported, reduced transport cost to major markets.

The three primary crops (cacao, palm oil, coffee) all currently boast favorable worldwide demand and prices, which is fortunate given that ADP's strength is not in market development.

A challenge was the lack of state presence, especially in distant communities, which weakens the position of households that want a licit lifestyle.

### ***1.1.2 Recommendations for Aguaytia-Huipoca:***

The five principal components of the strategy for reduction of coca in Aguaytia-Huipoca as recommended by the evaluation team are:

1. Utilize programmed eradication.
2. Use an integrated approach, with community development as the central focus, supported by productive activities that result in reliable income sufficient to support the hope that households eradicating coca can have a prosperous lifestyle.
3. Prepare an adequately funded communication strategy that supports rural households and communities as they change the direction of their communities and their leadership and counters false or misleading statements by pro-coca interests.
4. Work with new community leaders to identify the critical barriers restraining economic growth in the community, and identify how to remove those barriers. Often this step requires infrastructure investments. Improved infrastructure not only reduces production costs and opens previously unavailable markets, but also captures the hearts and minds of people who can then build coalitions for change.
5. Deliver on the program interventions as agreed between the project and the communities. When interventions encounter unanticipated barriers and require modification, ensure that new approaches are transparent for all stakeholders.

An important factor contributing to Aguaytia's return to coca cultivation are the market signals that favor coca production. At current prices, growing coca is profitable, there are ready buyers, and there are few negative consequences for coca growers. Even participants in ADP are growing coca, which they justify as a means to gain resources to expand their palm oil or cacao plantations. In addition, new immigrants, mostly from Huánuco, are experienced coca producers who rarely integrate themselves into the local community, making it difficult for the community to control new plantations of coca. Yet another factor is the strong support of public media and many local political leaders for increased coca production. Resources to counter these pro-coca messages are limited. At the same time, the ADP staff in Aguaytía is struggling to establish a

vision for how to achieve a successful economic development program that removes existing coca and discourages new plantings.

In the view of many ADP staff and of the evaluation team, women are active change agents, pushing to sign the agreements with DEVIDA (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida Sin Drogas) in both the voluntary and programmed eradication phases. They cited concerns for the safety of their families, especially children, and how the sudden influxes of money from coca leaf had been wasted on drinking and other non-productive activities. Children, they reported, had little interest in schooling, and many had no long-term plans to develop productive skills. Insecure and unsafe environments reduced incentives to work for a better future and induced households to live day to day. Women continue to defend the new community lifestyle that has resulted from the removal of coca production.

Support for women in ADP activities has been noteworthy in several ways. Women's participation in the Farmer Field Schools has strengthened women's participation in key family decisions. In team interviews, women often participated as actively as their husbands and they credited the FFS for giving them the confidence to participate as equal partners in farm production and marketing decisions. It was noted that when extra labor is needed, it is often women filling the role (such as at harvest time) and that women often predominate in certain tasks such as grafting cacao seedlings. After forced eradication and when seeding the first plots of replacement crops, women have often taken charge of agricultural production while many of the men are away seeking work to maintain family income.

A network of regidoras (women members of a municipal or regional council) has formed in Tocache and Northern San Martin with the purpose of mutual support and exchange of experience, which assists them in focusing their actions to create and formalize regulations and ordinances of importance to women. The women interviewed say they feel supported to have the backing of an organization that facilitates cooperation on public issues.

Gender awareness within the prime contractor is a work in progress. All personnel now receive gender awareness training upon hiring. The work of the subcontractor that supports gender issues has been hampered by the long periods of interruption without contracts, even though some gender advisors continued working.

Communication campaigns for this region should include inclusive language, assuring that messages equally address women's and men's concerns, and especially address quality of life issues and the benefits of a licit lifestyle. ADP should continue the incorporation of women as equal partners in the FFS so that women have equal opportunities for learning. Funding of small projects is another way to support women's development, when the resources and skills of the participating women are sufficient to anticipate successful outcomes.

### ***1.1.3 Long-Term Sustainability of Achievements in Northern San Martin and Pucallpa***

The Statement of Work referred to the graduation of communities in Northern San Martin and Pucallpa. While the word "graduate" has multiple meanings, based on statements by and

conversations with USAID/Peru personnel and the use of the word “consolidate” in the sub question, the evaluation team has understood “graduate” as used in the question to mean “to arrange in grades or gradations.” Thus the evaluation focuses on the mix of tasks remaining for ADP to continue supporting the success achieved in the regions.

The label “miracle” applied the work in San Martin does not reflect the real story, which is:

*USAID/Peru through ADP and other US programs and Peruvian government activities, and with help from selected Peruvian institutions, provided sufficient support so that ordinary citizens in the region decided to stand up and declare they would no longer produce coca, which resulted in the narco-traffickers and pro-coca interests leaving the region. The financial sacrifice of those ordinary citizens was significant; in exchange, they gained a preferred lifestyle with a future.*

Northern San Martin, Tocache and Pucallpa are all on a path to minimize coca production in the region, though much remains to make that change sustainable.

About half of the producers that have eradicated coca in the San Martin and Tocache regions have less than four years of experience in growing the new crops. Producers in many of these communities will need continued support to achieve sustainability of their licit crops. ADP can assist by continuing its process of sub-contracting training and technical assistance to local institutions. Many of the sub-contracted institutions are producer-owned associations or cooperatives that also purchase farm output.

While buyers of farm output may seem like a logical choice for trainers, that is not always the case. Most businesses that focus on marketing and processing are not especially proficient as training institutions. While the current basic training gets high marks from producers, the evaluation team questions whether the process is sustainable beyond program support. None of the institutions receiving large subcontracts for training indicated it would continue to provide basic training without subsidies. Smaller associations and cooperatives showed more interest in training and appear to be doing it well, but cannot offer basic training without subsidies.

After eight years, ADP is adept at organizing trainings but did not demonstrate to the team a viable methodology for transferring or “consolidating” local institutions in the training and technical assistance market.

The PRA (Poverty Reduction and Alleviation) project provides a model for private sector institutions as trainers for agricultural production. As these institutions also require government or donor payments to conduct training, they likewise are not sustainable without subsidies. Including them in the mix of potential training providers would inject competition into selection of training providers; facilitate sharing the costs of basic training by other funding institutions, and reducing the number of producer marketing/processing associations that formed with the initial task to train producers. These associations will need of ongoing ADP support over many years to reach sustainability. ADP may want to consider a modified approach that invites institutions specialized in training to respond to a request for proposals to provide training and technical assistance services.

While many municipal and regional governments that once favored coca production are now favoring licit crops, few of these possess the technical skills to effectively promote a licit

agricultural sector and agribusiness development. Support by ADP can help these institutions establish a favorable agricultural sector investment environment and attract funding for licit crop production. The number of ADP personnel dedicated to such a service needn't be large; the role of staff would be primarily to identify needs, together with these governments, and identify sources of support. A few municipal and regional governments in San Martin and Ucayali are now supporting ADP like activities, primarily helping prior coca producers adopt licit crops.

Currently, a total of 533 ADP and subcontractor personnel are supporting establishment of licit crops and related community and business development. Sixty-eight percent are technical specialists; 20 percent, administrative and monitoring personnel; and 12 percent, directors and coordinators. Of these, 226 are employees of the prime contractor and 308 are employees of subcontractors.

The allocation of personnel by region is as follows: Aguaytia–11 percent, San Martin–28 percent, Tocache–19 percent, Tingo Maria–12 percent, Ucayali–22 percent, and Lima–9 percent. San Martin and Tocache combined account for 47 percent of personnel. Declining coca production in that region suggests the possibility of managing activities in San Martin and Tocache with fewer personnel.

Cooperation with other donors has been limited but important. The United Nations established plantations of palm oil and cacao in San Martin and Ucayali Regions in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and ADP adapted much of that technology into its training packages. USAID also assumed some of the promised interventions of the UN when its funding declined, and currently uses the UN to deliver training and technical assistance to producers. That relationship has been fruitful and should continue. Spanish and German cooperation has also provided small but important contributions to development of licit crops in the region. German efforts (using approximately the same technology as ADP) continue and are coordinated with ADP; each works in different areas.

## **I.2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS**

The following are conclusions and recommendations that in the team's view would contribute to a successful alternative development program in Peru. The order of presentation does not necessarily denote the relative importance of a finding or conclusion.

1. Delivery of services by ADP begins with the marketing of an intangible: hope. Until a community buys "hope," ADP has little to do. That hope must sustain a community through the turbulent transition from a violence prone community that was led by coca interests to a tranquil community with newly selected leadership, and during the next several years of reduced income until the three primary crops that ADP promotes generate adequate and reliable income, making licit crops a sustainable lifestyle.

**Conclusion:** While ADP has been successful in selling hope, ongoing refinement of the processes and skills of personnel to sell intangibles is a critical component of success.

2. Selling hope is a specialized skill; most technical specialists ADP uses such as agricultural production, business development and infrastructure specialists will have little training or skills in selling intangibles.

**Conclusion:** Leading the presentations to the communities considering joining ADP should be persons skilled in selling intangibles. Technical specialists that will be carrying out the work should participate in the selling process, to build trust and rapport with members of the community.

3. The decision of a community to participate in ADP involves many variables. In the perception of the team, the most important is the desire for a community free of violence and terrorism. This is a desired result that the opposition cannot satisfy. Women more often than men mention this first as the reason for participating in ADP.

**Conclusion:** For the period of community discussion regarding how to respond to eradication, ADP should design messages to address how ADP supports the community in removing violence and terrorism. For more impact, design messages that speak to women.

4. Nearly as important as a safe community in choosing a licit lifestyle is the ability to generate adequate and reliable income with replacement crops. This income can be less than the household earned with coca, but must be sufficient to meet basic needs and provide a surplus for investment in their farm toward creating long-term wealth. Men more than women spoke about adequate and reliable income. In communities that had replacement crops in production, both men and women were pleased with the generation of wealth.

**Conclusion:** Selling hope requires reliable estimates on likely income from replacement crops. Design communication messages that address both income and wealth, and have those messages speak to women and men.

5. In naming factors in choosing licit crops, after removal of violence and assurances of adequate and reliable income, community members next mentioned infrastructure and social investments that support the community as it passes through the phases of leaving behind illicit products and beginning production of licit products.

**Conclusion:** Design the communication with community members to address these high priority issues. Target audiences include men and women.

6. The timing between post eradication and ADP intervention should be long enough to avoid the perception of linkages between CORAH and ADP.

**Conclusion:** The experience in Tocache suggests that three or more repetitions of coca eradication are needed before most communities are convinced that coca production is not the future for that area, that communities have removed or reduced the effectiveness of the pro-coca leadership, and that ADP can effectively support the changeover to

**Figure 4 Crossing the Huallaga River**



Source: Weidemann's Team

production of licit commodities.

It is possible that future eradications by CORAH can point to the experience of Tocache to help persuade coca growers not to replant, which if successful would reduce the share of producers that replant coca for a second or third time. In this case, ADP may be able to enter the zone sooner than was feasible for Tocache.

Other major community changes also influence the timing of a decision to abandon coca for licit crops—for example, the departure of coca interests from the community that allows new leadership to emerge.

7. ADP intervention continues to focus on three crops: palm oil, cocoa and coffee. These crops have established market channels that can absorb large numbers of new entrants and have track records of success that encourage other communities to start the transformation process.

**Conclusion:** Focus income alternatives on these crops. Other crops should be added as primary crops only after there is clear evidence that ready and willing buyers are available, that the markets can accommodate many new entrants, that tested and proven production packages are available, that prior producers can verify ADP claims of potential success, and that the crops are suited for the growing conditions of the area.

8. Favorable market signals for oil palm, cacao and coffee and proven production technology packages developed by the United Nations and prior production in Peru facilitated the acceptance of these crops as viable alternatives to coca leaf production.

**Conclusion:** A nice break for ADP—Projections of world demand and prices for the products from these crops continue to be favorable. All crops have cycles of attractive and less attractive markets and prices. While significant downturns are not currently anticipated, ADP may want to encourage Peruvian institutions to establish support systems to maintain industries for these crops through any downturns.

9. Programmed eradication reduces the time necessary for communities to decide to participate in ADP and results in the need for fewer ADP resources to support communities in focusing on licit crops.

**Conclusion:** When possible, programmed eradication should first remove coca from the communities. Once the coca is gone, development efforts can help communities select wisely those economic activities that will best provide for their social and economic development.

10. Correct timing by ADP in approaching the community greatly increases the ability of ADP staff to find households that accept the hope they are selling.

**Conclusion:** ADP staff should be especially alert to messages from communities living through programmed eradication and be ready to respond immediately to signs that community members want information on crops to replace coca. When possible, establishing communication links with the community before programmed eradication will facilitate communication during the critical eradication and transition period.

11. Fertilization is a critical factor in maintaining and/or increasing yields in palm oil and cacao plantations. There is a source of dolomite in the Huánuco region that could be complemented by other inputs bought at wholesale prices. The fertilization requirements will differ between regions and crops based on soil characteristics, which leads to different fertilizer formulations.

For cacao, to maintain organic certification and improve yields, it is advisable to consider a bio fertilizer plant using as key ingredients –escobajo,” a by-product of palm oil processing, and rice hulls, both available in large quantities in the region.

**Conclusion:** To address the issues of low-cost fertilizer availability, a business plan for establishing one or more fertilizer mixing plants in the area should be prepared.

12. The United Nations has been a valuable partner in the development of palm oil and cacao production technology and continues to facilitate important multi-donor cooperation for ADP as well as training and technical assistance to growers.

**Conclusion:** Given the expertise of the United Nations in palm oil production, ADP should consider continuing the partnership with this institution for the provision of technical assistance to producers.

13. The prestige of Peruvian cacao is determined by the quality of the cacao bean. How the product is harvested and handled during post harvest is critical to achieving premium quality beans. It is difficult to maintain optimal post harvest handling by many small farmers; this can best be achieved through local institutions, such as farmer associations, cooperatives or other local commercial buyers. These institutions also have a comparative advantage in selling farm inputs to producers.

A number of these associations and cooperatives stated that they want to be exporters; some say they want their own cacao bean processing facilities. Few of these institutions will become effective exporters of cacao beans or further processors of cacao during the next five years. There are several established cooperatives that do have the capacity to process and export cacao.

**Conclusion:** ADP should continue support to local institutions, many of which are cooperatives and producer associations, to help them focus on increasing their technical and administrative capacity to effectively and efficiently assist in first-stage post harvest handling and marketing and to sell inputs to farmers. While local institutions have a comparative advantage in these activities, they are at a comparative disadvantage in exporting and further processing of products.

14. For long-term success for each crop, agricultural research needs to be addressed. Without research, Peru production technologies will lag behind other countries and producers will gradually lose market competitiveness. At present, there is a need for research on the mix of cacao plants for resistance to disease and yield and production of high quality beans. The same issues hold true for palm oil plant varieties to achieve high yielding plants resistant to disease and adaptable to a variety of soil and climate conditions.

Local universities and ICT (Institute of Tropical Crops) are desirable institutions to involve in applied research to address production, processing and marketing problems. Businesses will primarily fund research that is needed to resolve processing and marketing issues. More difficult is the funding of research to resolve production issues. In this context, there is a role for the “Mesas Técnicas” in supporting effective coordination among the institutions and organizations supporting and promoting each product. This is important to assure that appropriate varieties are available for the range of soils and climate conditions in the areas where these crops will be planted as replacements for coca.

Many competitor countries benefit from research funded by governments and private businesses and funding available to producer groups. In Peru there have been prior “check-off” programs that discount a small amount of payments to producers from sales to commercial buyers, which funds are then used to support research to benefit producers.<sup>2</sup> Typically producer groups are the primary but not the only decision-makers to determine how these funds are used.

**Figure 5 Young producing oil palm trees in Shambillo Valley**



Source: Weidemann’s Team

**Conclusion:** ADP should support ongoing and emerging efforts to form technical groups, federations or institutions that support production of palm oil and cacao. ADP should also ensure that representatives of the private sector are represented in these advisory groups as active participants. The role of ADP should be to promote this concept and provide technical assistance. Direct ADP financial support should be limited. The GOP, regional and local governments, national research institutions, producers and processors are the primary beneficiaries and should provide the funding.

15. OLPASA (Oleaginosas Padre Abad S.A., the palm oil processing plant near Aguaytia) is promoting the creation of a “Fondo Palmero” that would be available to fund expansion of palm oil plantations by making available credit for longer periods than commercial financial institutions are willing to lend. This fund would receive some of the “earnings” of OLPASA and also

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<sup>2</sup> “Check-offs” are programs that discount by a small percent or amount payments to producers. The funds generated support promotion of markets for the products, improvement of production technologies, lobbying for an improved production environment, and other activities that benefit the sector. Producers vote to select their representatives that guide the “check-off” programs.

solicit funding from various levels of Peruvian government and from donors.<sup>3</sup>

**Conclusion:** Depending on how the fund is structured, ADP should support the initiative to create a “Fondo Palmero” with revenues from OLPASA, which might then be in a position to leverage additional resources from USAID and/or COFIDE (Corporación Financiera de Desarrollo, S.A.). Subsidized operating costs and interest rates should be avoided. Support by donors for this fund may be greater if other farmer-owned palm oil processing plants in the region participate.

16. As the number of producers increases, the effectiveness of direct extension agent-to-producer assistance declines as the time between visits grows longer and longer. One relatively new ADP approach is selection and training of producers to become agricultural promoters. These promoters are trained producers who can respond to many of the questions that new producers have. The extension agents supervise their work and provide to promoters continuous training to keep them updated with improved cultural practices.

Many institutions in Peru use promoters; most are unpaid, although they may receive benefits in kind and other recognition. ADP promoters are called on frequently to help other producers resolve production problems that preserve or increase their income. For sustainability, these promoters should be paid, at first by ADP but eventually by the producers they serve.

**Conclusion:** ADP should expand as quickly as possible alternatives to the current practice of face-to-face extension agent-to-producer technical assistance by using skilled producers in the community or in a nearby community to improve service to newer growers. These local promoters would work under the direction of ADP supported extension agents. The local promoters should be compensated for their services, with all or nearly all of that compensation paid by beneficiaries.

A title other than “promoter” would better distinguish their skills and the work of these persons to increase producer income compared to the activities of most other promoters in the village.

17. The presence of the GOP in the production areas where ADP works is minimal. Reduced budgets to local municipalities minimize their participation in community development. Regional governments now appear to have some funds that can be made available for additional support to economic and business development activities. They are beginning to use some of these funds to support activities parallel to ADP and to support infrastructure improvement in rural areas. While most local and regional political officials praised the concept of decentralization, many considered the process of participatory budgeting (presupuesto participativo) a futile exercise.

**Conclusion:** ADP should continue supporting regional and local governments in those areas with the capacity to support alternative development program goals. Decisions

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<sup>3</sup> Earnings of OLPASA are paid as dividends to the Association (ASPASH) and individual investors and are used in part to support technical assistance to producers and to provide inputs to growers.

regarding the type and time length of support should be made on a case-by-case basis. Mostly this support by ADP would consist of short-term technical assistance.

18. Current interdiction of chemical inputs for coca leaf processing does not appear to be effective in some areas. Some specialists interviewed suggested that perhaps two to four percent of these inputs are interdicted. It could make a difference in reducing coca cultivation if interdiction is increased. Several coca producers interviewed by the team were coca producers during the time that President Fujimori increased interdiction, causing the price of coca leaf to fall below profitable levels, effectively reducing coca production. These producers said that if the same were to happen today they would stop growing coca.

**Conclusion:** Continue to encourage the GOP to aggressively interdict chemical inputs for coca leaf processing, which would support ADP activities by reducing the economic incentive for coca production.

19. Many farmers under the “voluntary eradication” strategy retain small areas of coca leaf production. Coca serves as a source of “caja chica,” to cover urgent cash needs and the expansion of licit crops.

**Conclusion:** ADP should consider increasing consultations with communities, municipal and regional governments, and GOP representatives to identify policies or processes that would provide incentives to communities to reduce the number of small plots of coca. Many local communities would welcome this support.

20. The strengthening of producer associations and cooperatives will require a review of current tax regulations that have been designed with urban institutions in mind. The distortions created by these regulations are creating inefficiencies in operations. Some business transactions are made at night to avoid SUNAT (Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria) efforts to track taxable activities.

**Conclusion:** Work with policy specialists to assess the impact of current tax administration policies and processes on rural and small town businesses that service agricultural producers and make recommendations.

21. Credit available for crop expansion is a limiting factor for most producers in the regions supported by ADP. For producers new to licit crops, credit is unavailable from commercial financial institutions. For producers with farms with tree crops of three or more years, production credit is beginning to become available. Financial institutions are making credit available based on expected production, often through producer associations and with the support of companies that are buying the product.

Values for land that produces palm oil, cacao or coffee trees appear to be sufficient in many areas to serve as collateral for mortgage-backed loans for households with land titles. The team was informed by specialists that income streams from cacao and palm oil is sufficient to make payments on loans to producers that are large enough to extend production by several hectares.

Palm oil producers with excellent credit histories should soon enjoy offers of credit from area financial institutions for crop expansion. Producers with trees more than three years old and

that are reaching expected yields have net incomes and properties valued sufficiently to acquire loans to expand production by two to four hectares with a payback period of two to three years. Palm producers are more concentrated by location and will likely be the first to enjoy credit availability. Cacao producers have equally attractive income prospects and property values as palm producers, but are more dispersed, which increases loan management costs and increases risk. Lending institutions will go first to the areas where earning potential is the greatest.

Producers willing to sign delivery agreements with processing plants may be able to facilitate loan access by a full or partial guarantee for the loan. Plant guarantees in palm oil production areas are simpler because the cost to deliver product to alternate buyers reduces opportunities to sell product outside the terms of the loan agreement.

However, credit guaranteed by a processing plant will only be extended to expand delivery of product to that plant. Most growers prefer credit from providers that allow them greater flexibility in how they can use the funds, such as purchasing labor-saving equipment or non-product-specific farm improvements. If markets and farm income continue to perform as expected, these credits should become available over the next few years.

Credit is also needed for modernizing and expanding processing facilities, especially those that reduce the cost of delivering farm inputs and post harvest handling and farm to market collections.

**Conclusion:** ADP should continue its work encouraging financial institutions to extend credit to those producers with trees of three or more years since planting and other ADP supported producers that demonstrate adequate collateral, income and credit history data.

22. The “Mesas Técnicas” are moving in the right direction to address the needs of each key crop. They are gathering data on alternative technical approaches to production and attempting to provide coordinated and reliable information to producers on best practices for production and post harvest handling of crops. Mesas Técnicas need to be strengthened by incorporating representatives of the private sector.<sup>4</sup>

**Conclusion:** Continue to support the role of “Mesas Técnicas” in maintaining high quality of technical assistance to producers. Avoid making these groups regulatory in effect; rather, their role should be supportive, to help technical assistance providers deliver high quality advice.

23. The success in coca leaf eradication in San Martin was labeled a “Miracle” by a newspaper reporter. Subsequently the term became a common label in USAID/Peru to succinctly describe the success of ADP in the region. However, this miracle is actually the result of a coordinated effort between regional authorities and international donors, the latter playing a dominant role, especially in the early years. Support of regional authorities for licit crops began about five years ago.

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<sup>4</sup> Mesas Tecnicas are informal groups of crop production specialists that meet to establish high standards for technical assistance provided to growers of ADP supported crops and to encourage providers to follow these standards. ADP is providing technical assistance to these groups.

**Conclusion:** Rather than perpetuating the “miracle” label, which is a nice sound bite but not true, focus on telling the real story of the region: USAID/Peru (through ADP and other programs and U.S. and Peruvian government activities, and with help from certain Peruvian institutions) provided key support that empowered ordinary citizens in the region to stand up and refuse to grow coca, thus driving the narco-traffickers and pro-coca interests from their communities. Their financial sacrifice was significant; in exchange, they gained a preferred lifestyle with a future.

24. The term “graduate” has multiple meanings and may confuse more than clarify USAID/Peru’s objectives for alternative development in San Martin and Pucallpa.

**Conclusion:** Considering comments by and conversations with USAID/Peru personnel, the evaluation team suggests a focus on “strengthening” local institutions to continue agricultural and rural development rather than on “graduating.” The evaluation team understands “graduate” as used in the question in the SOW to mean “to arrange in grades or gradations.” Thus some producers and associations and cooperatives need assistance for several years and some can continue with minimal assistance. How to determine the appropriate level of assistance and how to deliver that assistance are critical questions for all program stakeholders.

25. One factor that contributed to the success of Tocache’s programmed eradication was the continuous eradication that took place from 2002 onward, which demonstrated to communities in the area considering replacement options the viability of replacement crops supported by ADP and the reduction of violence that follows.

**Conclusion:** Likewise, in some areas of Aguaytia ADP can demonstrate positive results of income from replacement crops from prior voluntary eradication and the reduction in violence in participating communities. Other areas in Aguaytia have little or no prior eradication history to demonstrate positive results. In these areas examples of positive results will come from other areas in Aguaytia, or Tocache or Pucallpa.

26. Some producers reason thus: High coca prices provide incentives to produce. The GOP could lower coca prices by interdiction of precursors as it did during the administration of President Fujimori. Because interdiction does not occur, the GOP actually favors (ultimately) increased production of coca. Producers in the Aguaytia area were more likely to express the above logic than producers in other regions visited by the team.

**Conclusion:** Actions by the GOP that demonstrate a commitment to sustained coca reduction will enhance results for ADP.

27. GOP support for the construction of the highway linking San Martin with the coastal region of Peru and a number of electrification projects have contributed to the region’s overall development, making it the main supplier of rice in the country, and second in cacao and palmito production.

**Conclusion:** Continue to encourage and support GOP efforts to improve roads from the region to consumption centers in Peru.

28. The number of communities with coca in the northern San Martin area is declining.

**Conclusion:** A new strategy and new mechanisms of implementation should take place in the San Martin region. This new strategy should focus on strengthening local institutions or developing institutions and subcontracting with them for support in community development, democracy and governance, production support, and other activities needed for consolidation. Eventually only a small ADP staff should remain in this region, with its primary tasks to maintain the technical quality of services, to identify and strengthen local institutions to take on the funding of these services, and to train or retrain local service providers as needed.

29. Some associations and cooperatives supported by ADP focus more on meeting donor needs than producer needs.

**Conclusion:** When organizing or working with new associations and cooperatives, producer owners need to clearly define why the association is needed, how much they are willing to invest in their institution, and how that investment will occur. Assure that the institution management focuses first on meeting customer needs.

30. The team noted the apparent assumption by some ADP personnel that marketing and processing institutions will continue the training of new producers when in fact these practices might not survive the end of subsidies for new producer training.

Advanced training and technical assistance may be provided by commercial buying and selling institutions.

**Conclusion:** For training producers, who are eliminating coca, expand consideration of potential training institutions beyond associations and cooperatives. Including other training institutions in the mix of options will facilitate the transfer to Peruvian institutions of the training and technical assistance functions of ADP. However, like commercial buyers, other training institutions will likewise cease training when funds are exhausted. Encourage regional and municipal governments to support and help fund training in their areas.

Program budgets should include sufficient funds for at least basic training for new producers of licit crops and TA (technical assistance) until they have products to sell. Once producers are selling product, ongoing technical assistance may be needed as well as partial subsidies for some crops, especially those for which selling outside the contract is difficult to control.

31. The staff of the actual ADP main implementer Chemonics and its subcontractors totals 533 persons. Technical specialists account for 68 percent of the total, directors and coordinators—12 percent, and administration and monitoring—20 percent. Personnel in San Martin and Tocache account for 47 percent of personnel.

**Conclusion:** The share of personnel in San Martin and Tocache may reflect past program activities but may not reflect current program priorities, suggesting the need for a plan to decrease and reposition personnel

### ***1.2.1 Social Capital***

Social capital has multiple definitions and uses. This evaluation used the term as defined by Robert Putnam: –Social capital refers to the features of social organizations such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual trust.”<sup>5</sup>

Thus social capital here refers to the members of a society that have learned to trust others, resulting in cooperation in the formation of new groups and associations, and through this cooperation, execute mutual activities for the development of the society. Mahyar Arefi identifies this consensus building as a direct positive indicator of social capital. Consensus implies –shared interest” and agreement among various actors and stakeholders to induce collective action. Collective action is thus an indicator of increased social capital.<sup>6</sup>

ADP has generated social capital. People and communities listen to the presentations of ADP and make decisions to change their behavior. That change is based on a determination that the information presented by ADP is likely true and that the promised results will conform to their goals and hopes as a community. Communities investigate the claims by ADP of past performance and assess whether ADP can deliver what they are promising. Learning of the experience of producers in nearby areas is an important means of verifying the claims by ADP and building trust in the process of conversion to licit crops.

In the area of northern San Martin, cacao is contributing to the strengthening of social networks including of institutions and political networks that were debilitated by narco-trafficking. ADP provided a vision of what the community could be, offering an integrated program, a pillar of which was adequate and reliable income to replace coca. To that were added investments to remove physical barriers to an improved economy. ADP efforts to strengthen community leadership and to promote group action through meetings, discussions, farmer field schools, shared investments in local cooperatives for training, technical assistance and post harvest and marketing activities have increased the ability of communities to work toward shared values. In the process, ADP developed social capital, as demonstrated by the trust communities demonstrated in following the path offered by ADP for improved communities. As the first instance of measurable

#### **Community Members Stand Up to Narco-Traffickers - Motivate their Departure**

In an interview in a town in the Province of Mariscal Caceres an official stated that ADP entered and drove the narco-traffickers out of their community.

How did ADP do that, asked a team member? ADP personnel came without police, without firearms, and usually came one to two at a time. Exactly, what did ADP do to drive out the narco-traffickers.

After a few seconds reflection, the official recognized that community members were the change agents that drove the narco-traffickers from communities. They did that by agreeing as a group to end coca production and sticking with that agreement, despite significant reduction in their immediate income, long-term reduction in income and threats to their livelihoods and sometimes threats of physical violence. ADP’s role was secondary; supporting the hope that the promised results justified their sacrifices.

<sup>5</sup> Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital*, Journey of Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

<sup>6</sup> Wikipedia, –Social Capital” – [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social\\_capital](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital).

collective action, community members rejected existing leadership and selected economic activities they hoped would produce greater personal, family and community satisfaction and adequate economic benefits over the long term. These decisions required intermediate-term sacrifice of income in exchange for the hope for a better community environment several years later.

Other evidence of social capital generated by ADP includes the investments of community members in associations and cooperatives to improve training, acquisition of production inputs, and improved and value added post harvest and marketing activities of their products. Interviews by the team with producers demonstrate a strong perception of positive outcomes associated with these cooperative activities.

**Conclusion:** Hundreds of communities have listened to how ADP can help reduce violence and terrorism in their communities and provide adequate long-term income after coca eradication. After verifying ADP's claims, most communities decide to undertake collective actions recommended by ADP and that they believe will produce positive results. They understand that household income will be significantly less during the period that replacement crops are immature and that when replacement crops are mature, projected income may still be less than anticipated income from coca. This is the evidence that ADP has acquired social capital.

The actions that the communities take require sacrifice of part of their household income in the short-term, increased uncertainty of economic outcomes, a change in community leadership and increased personal physical risk during the period of transition, and long-term behavior change to prosper within the licit economy.

The hoped for outcome is a tranquil and safe community, adequate household income, intermediate- and long-term wealth creation, and a place of honor in the community. Because of the improved stability and business environment that results from production of licit crops, household investments have increased potential to generate long-term wealth.

### **I.3 LESSONS LEARNED**

Below are the significant lessons learned that can serve to improve future interventions. The order of presentation does not indicate the level of importance to successful or challenged implementations in other locations. Some lessons are documented with empirical data, some but not all of which is presented in this document. Other lessons learned arise from thoughtful consideration of the team, and stakeholder experience, comments and recommendations.

1. The critical first step for any ADP intervention in productive activities arises from selling an intangible to communities in the target areas—hope that the departure of pro-coca interests will reduce violence and terrorism in the community, hope that the new crops proposed by ADP will provide adequate and reliable income, hope that households will have sufficient food and resources until the new tree crops most often proposed by ADP generate substantial income, and finally hope in the promised infrastructure investments, production training and technical assistance, community development support, and that the promised changes in quality of life will actually occur.

On the other side are well financed pro-coca interests that are persistent in their efforts to destroy the hope being offered by ADP, DEVIDA, and the United States and Peruvian governments. Supporting ADP, they argue, requires an unreasonable sacrifice of your right to a prosperous life; you are producing what the market wants. Also they say, –Consider the many times the government promised and failed to end your poverty. It is foolish to believe them now.”

That many communities select the option offered by ADP demonstrates that social capital has been created over eight years of program implementation. Communities or groups of producers voluntarily select actions that require sacrifice and greater risk that they believe will be to their long-term benefit.

2. Community Development should be the overall ADP focus, not income. The hope that most drives change is a desire for a more family friendly community environment. That hope is driven more by women than by men. A violence-free community is a strongly desired result, which the competition (pro-coca interests) cannot deliver.

Focusing on income allows the competition to claim that they offer superior results. Furthermore, putting income first when promoting ADP may reduce the attractiveness of ADP's offer to that portion of the community that most wants violence and terrorism to end—the women.

3. After assurances of a new community environment, adequate and reliable income becomes the next big question for a community considering leaving illicit crops. Crops proposed by ADP to replace coca have to sustain the hope that the household and community can survive the change, that their sacrifices will be recompensed with long-term economic growth. If ADP cannot adequately answer the second question the hope will rapidly diminish.
4. Identifying key market signals and trends helps to design effective interventions, are much less costly to implement, and tend to produce superior results. The principal ADP crops of cacao, palm oil, and coffee all enjoy attractive market prices and international demand. Given the scale of change caused by eradicating 10,000 hectares per year, ADP should only promote proven crops that can absorb production by 500 or more producers.

None of the –minor” crops promoted by ADP, such as pineapple, platano, livestock and pastures, palmito, small animals or any of the others, provided hope for change as well as did the three primary crops. The evaluation team considered more than a dozen minor crops and livestock products, none of which meet the requirements to be added to the list of the three primary crops promoted by ADP.

Households value security and a peaceful way of living more than the superior monetary income coming from coca leaf production. Alternative crops that yield incomes per hectare less than coca have replaced coca. Farm income from replacement crops must be sufficient to sustain a family's basic needs plus a surplus large enough for the family to plan for economic growth.

5. Infrastructure investments are effective to build and sustain hope for two reasons. First they remove barriers to production, processing and marketing of new crops. Second, they motivate a community to become and remain coca free.

Investments in productive activities and infrastructure are key bargaining components. Many a community was “pushed over the top” and decided to enter ADP because of the offered investments in productive activities and infrastructure, “fixing” frustrating limitations the community had lived with for years, and sometimes a few community members able to initiate a desired small project.

A few communities may request infrastructure investments that have a stronger social than productive objective. Examples of requests for social investments include community centers, sports fields, education and health facilities. While ADP personnel strongly encourage communities to select investments that increase income, social investments may advance program objectives by motivating removal of illicit and planting of licit crops.

6. Programmed eradication motivates communities towards change, speeds community decision-making and reduces level of effort (LOE) and investment costs by ADP. The transition period from coca to new crops is compressed into fewer days. During the transition there are heavy demands for information, many discussions with community members, and sometimes heightened risk for ADP personnel. The benefit, however, is earlier departure from the community of pro-coca interests, faster change in community leadership, earlier decisions to change course, and enhanced commitment to live without coca. There are fewer alternatives for participating communities to consider and fewer opportunities for the opposition to create uncertainty in households.
7. Alliances with local authorities are desirable to speed up the process of adoption of new crops, especially after post eradication. In most communities with dense coca production, the political system will not be favorable. But an unfavorable political environment does not necessarily block ADP success.

**Figure 6 Young cacao tree in Tocache area**



Source: Weidemann’s Team

In the Peru environment with relatively open and competitive elections, the political leadership will change with the changing positions of community members. Political leadership in San Martin and Ucayali and many of the municipalities is now favorable to licit crops. These two regional governments are now partners with ADP in training producers, improving infrastructure, and attempting to establish more favorable rural and agricultural development policies.

One ADP strategy is to divide tasks according to the interests of local

institutions. Regional and local governments may be tasked with establishing policies that foster an enabling environment for agricultural production and agribusiness growth and attracting investment into the region. These same governments often will invest in new or refurbished infrastructure.<sup>7</sup> ADP can focus on selling hope to communities, transferring modern technological packages to producers, and providing additional infrastructure that governments cannot fund.

8. To enhance effectiveness in post eradication areas, ADP technicians must differentiate themselves from CORAH. Working in close proximity to CORAH creates the impression among many residents that ADP and CORAH are linked. When ADP has worked close to CORAH operations, some residents concluded that ADP personnel were serving as informants for CORAH.

The boundaries established by CORAH for eradication may not coincide with community boundaries. So while CORAH may have moved their base of operations to another community, they may still be eradicating coca within the boundaries of a prior community. Timing ADP's entry into a community is important. Entering too soon may reduce effectiveness of ADP activities with increased risk to personnel. Wait too long and ADP is not present when their skills are most needed by the community. In Tocache, continuous eradications for at least three months were required before ADP could effectively work in the area.

9. Support for establishing local producer associations or cooperatives have been popular interventions with producers. Many producers of coffee and cacao deliver farm output to their local associations, even though some for-profit buyers offer higher prices. Producers believe that a farmer-owned association will generate higher margins and better control over the marketing of their production in the intermediate- to long-term.<sup>8</sup>

In that belief they are correct. Producer-owned and -controlled cooperatives and associations in many countries achieve high market shares for sales of farm inputs, including credit, collection and first stage post harvest handling of farm outputs.<sup>9</sup> Serving that market is their strength. Selling branded consumer products is not their strength; few cooperatives achieve high market shares in that market segment.

10. Seldom did livestock work as a desirable alternative for coca leaf production. Lack of experience in managing livestock led to decreased soil fertility, less nutrition available from pastures and increased deforestation.

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<sup>7</sup> With the decentralization process the regional governments now have disposable funds to make these investments while municipal governments receive less funding from decentralization and have limited capacity for new investments.

<sup>8</sup> Most producer-owned cooperatives and associations will require ten or more years of support by donors before they become sustainable.

<sup>9</sup> Cooperatives and associations have a high market share for delivery of credit to producers in the US and some European countries. In the US, producer-owned cooperatives and associations enjoy implied government support for funding of producer credit.

11. In addition to the differences in climate and soils between Tocache and Aguaytia, the introduction of technological packages must take into account the place where migrants are coming from. Producers in Tocache usually came from the northern –sierra,” while migrants to Aguaytia are mostly from the central –sierra” (Huanuco, Junin, Ayacucho). Farmers from each –sierra” have different values, traditions and agricultural production experience that are transferred into the areas to which they move. The former are more experienced in livestock while the later tend to give more attention to crop production.
12. It is feasible to recover soils degraded by continuous coca cultivation through adequate fertilization and organic matter replenishing. Kudzu and dolomite available in the region contribute to this process.

## SECTION II: APPLYING THE TOCACHE EXPERIENCE TO INTERVENTIONS IN AGUAYTIA-HUIPOCA

Favorable outcomes for the Alternative Development Program are demonstrated by the hundreds of Peruvian households that have rejected coca leaf production for an improved community environment and preferred lifestyles, with adequate and reliable income from legitimate crops supporting long-term wealth creation.

Following voluntary eradication of coca in Tocache for more than half a decade, programmed eradication began in mid 2006. After the first eradication of the zone, a majority of producers replanted their coca, not realizing that as part of the new approach being implemented, CORAH, the Peruvian Government agency carrying out the eradication, would return and remove replanted coca. Only after the third pass by CORAH through the eradication zone did a significant majority of producers realize that coca eradication would be repeated until the crop was eradicated. Repeated eradications in the zone continued for about five months.

-With coca we had cash, but little wealth."

*A prior coca producer, now an ADP supported producer.*

Three years later there is very little coca in the zone, and replacement crops supported by ADP (palm oil, cacao and coffee) are beginning to generate sufficient income to motivate private sector investment to expand the hectares in production. Communities in rural areas have returned to their traditional peaceful and family-friendly lifestyles. Political leaders that previously supported illicit crops have changed their allegiance to licit crops or have been replaced, and interest in and support for agricultural and rural development is beginning to emerge. Private sector investors, including producers, are now investing in post harvest handling and processing and marketing businesses related to the crops supported by ADP. Producers invest with the hope of increased returns from improved efficiencies in post harvest handling, improved marketing power, and reduced costs of production inputs. Businesses invest to expand their capacity to process and market crops, to improve operations efficiency, and to expand their marketing capacity.

### II.1 WHY PRODUCERS JOINED ADP

The evaluation team utilized stakeholder and focus group interviews to learn why producers had joined ADP and why they continue their participation in ADP. A discussion guide was prepared to help insure that key issues were raised in each interview. While the initial questions asked were consistent, the way interviewees responded suggests their priorities, the reasons behind those priorities, and the processes that occurred during the period when communities were deciding whether to participate with ADP. Follow-up questions allowed the team to probe more deeply into the reasons why ADP was successful in Tocache.

Three dominant motivating factors emerged as the reasons communities selected to participate with ADP, as follows:

1. A desire to remove violence and terrorism from the community,

2. ADP's promise that adequate and reliable income would result from the proposed crops to replace coca, and
3. The benefits from infrastructure and social investments offered by ADP to facilitate the transition to a licit economy.<sup>10</sup>

Tocache communities participating in programmed eradication had one additional frequent comment: "What else can we do?" This comment reflects the accelerated decision-making process precipitated by the sudden and complete elimination of income from coca production. Some producers required three or more eradications of their replanted coca before comprehension settled in that coca growing would truly no longer be tolerated.

In the process of deciding to join ADP, communities first considered the two above-described factors. Women most frequently cited the first, and nearly always it was the first mentioned, and in the judgment of the team, their most strongly expressed reason to eradicate coca.

To the same question, men more frequently mentioned the second factor, which was nearly always their first response.

Considering the frequency and passion in the responses of the interviewees, it is the opinion of the evaluation team that these two factors were the first considerations and decisive, with women as key change agents.

### ***II.1.1 Remove violence and terrorism: Improved Quality of Life***

Community members participating in the team's interviews clearly associated the violence and terrorism in their communities with coca leaf production. When coca was the dominate crop, decisions in their communities were dominated by those persons that were trafficking in drugs along with cooperating coca producers. The entry of ADP, with their subcontractors, DEVIDA and others, offered sufficient hope for those members of the community who preferred a violence-free environment to raise their voices and precipitate discussions that previously had

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<sup>10</sup> One of the principal approaches for this evaluation was key stakeholder interviews and including focus groups when the situation was appropriate. Because of their dynamic structure stakeholder interviews capture additional information from respondents that was not anticipated prior to the interview and measure subjectively the intensity with which certain opinions and viewpoints are held. This is an effective approach to identify the reasons why persons engaged in specific behavior.

Because the team separated into several groups to reach a wider group of stakeholders interview discussion guides were prepared. These discussion guides focused on the questions contained in the Statement of Work. The questions were open-ended and designed to draw out stakeholder views, opinions and recommendations related to the ADP program. As interviews progressed evaluation team members probed deeper into specific issues as needed to clearly comprehend the actions of the stakeholders as they participated in or observed the actions of the ADP program and to capture their recommendations.

Team members met frequently and reviewed responses from stakeholders, referring to notes taken during the interviews. Those notes recorded stakeholder opinions, actions and reactions to events, data on inputs and outcomes of the program and occasionally specific comments by stakeholders. This discussion process included data on the frequency of the most strongly held response by each community.

been seldom tolerated. As these discussions progressed, more and more households opted to attempt building a coca free community.

Selling an intangible such as hope is a skill distinct from all other program operations of ADP. Getting a community to join ADP is –selling an intangible.” A few principles apply.

People purchase intangibles from persons they trust. Trust is built by the seller first understanding well the needs (desired end results) of the buyers, or households in the community. The seller and his or her team must be transparent. The ADP team must do the right thing for households in the community.

Some things that ADP is doing help make the hope it is selling more tangible, such as documentation of results of like communities, testimonials from like households using the service (study tours), and collaboration with the community in building some infrastructures partly with local labor and materials.

Most agronomists, business development, communication or governance specialists, or program administrators would have little training or experience in selling intangibles. However, those persons that will be delivering the actual services should be in the room when the intangibles are being offered and discussed. In the environment surrounding the work of ADP face time with the buyers is critical. And ADP has learned that the seller, the person that gained the trust of the community has to remain attached to the project, with periodic visits and be available when needed for problem solving or when planned services to the community need to be changed in any way.

Persons selling insurance, financial investments, image creation services in mass media, product promotion campaigns, and similar sectors will likely have training and skills in selling intangibles.

### ***II.1.2 Adequate and Reliable Income***

The three principal crops offered by ADP (cacao, palm oil and coffee) demonstrated adequate and reliable income, even if that income mostly appeared over the medium- and long-term. For those with trees in production the income was adequate and reliable. This comment was made by producers with producing but young trees, of 4 or 5 years old.

*“We are respected members of our community; we can approach and talk to anyone. As a coca producer, if I saw the police on the road ahead, I would slip into the forest and hide until they were gone.”*

*A producer selling product to the Cooperativa Agroindustrial de Tocache*

In addition, ADP had value chain models that worked including farm inputs, technical assistance to growers, a reliable production technology within the existing or acquirable skills of community households, support for post harvest handling of crops and first stage processing by producer groups, buyers including exporters, and in many cases, manufacturing and product

transformation. Fortunately for ADP, the need for market development for the three key crops was limited; eager buyers already existed for those crops.<sup>11</sup>

Income projections for producers are generated by the potential yields of replacement crops and the markets for farm inputs and outputs. Prices are dictated by the market. USAID can vary the potential returns to producers by inserting improved technology that reduces costs and/or increases yields and/or quality of products harvested, or promise subsidies. Of course, sustainable interventions are preferable.

A less frequent but important reason for joining ADP mentioned by households was payments for labor for eliminating coca, building roads, and other infrastructure projects.

Households with children at home mentioned education for children as an important secondary consideration. As anticipated, females mentioned education more frequently than males. However, the comments about education were seldom linked to school improvements by ADP. More common was the comment that children could now attend school because of reduced violence. A related benefit was that children were now more frequently given tasks to help with food production and household chores, a less utilized “education” technique when the household was primarily a coca producer.

Every producer that was asked responded that they earned less cash income now than they did producing coca.

The offer by ADP for study tours “pasantias” to other communities was well received and allowed households to confirm the statements of results by ADP and helped to sustain the hope that life beyond coca was feasible and preferable.

How to survive during the three to four years before the primary crops would produce significant income preoccupied households in all communities. In Tocache, common short-term crops were maize or rice for the first year and platano in the second to the fourth or fifth year. Platano also provided shade to young cacao trees.

During voluntary eradication, ADP provided seeds or plants for these short-term crops along with technical assistance. In Tocache it was learned that producers already knew how to acquire the planting material and how to produce these short-term crops. Additional assistance from ADP was seldom needed for these crops. In areas with good agricultural production potential, experienced producers and relatively easy access to markets as existed in Tocache, ADP can focus on getting producers to adopt best practices in the production and post harvest handling of primary crops. In other areas with less productive agricultural resources, that are more distant from markets or have poorly trained producers or immigrant producers not familiar with agricultural crops in the region, support for short-term crops planted for temporary subsistence and income may still be required.

To mitigate risk, every producer strives to have two or more cash crops or products to sell. For this second economic activity producers in Tocache grew a variety of crops or animal products

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<sup>11</sup> Many of the eager buyers of producers output were institutions that USAID/Peru, GOP and other donors helped to establish and supported. These institutions were selling to local and foreign buyers. During the existence of ADP, world markets for these three crops had attractive prices with many buyers seeking additional sources of supply.

that are sold in local markets. It was not necessary for ADP to provide the second cash crop, neither in Tocache nor in Northern San Martin. It appears that a focus on the primary crop is sufficient and that producers in all regions will identify and plant a second or more income crops on their own initiative.

Once communities decided that the hope generated by ADP's presentations was valid, the discussions progressed to exactly how the transition would occur, adding issues of infrastructure and social investments to the discussions and determining exactly when and how those activities would occur. Primarily ADP offered infrastructure and social investments to remove barriers to production and marketing of licit crops. Some investments by ASP responded to specific requests by the community for improved services, infrastructure or funding to establish crops or livestock products other than the primary crops supported by ADP.<sup>12</sup>

### ***II.1.3 Infrastructure and Social Investments***

Satisfied with the reduction in violence and income projections, community members next considered infrastructure improvements that were offered to enhance production and post harvest handling and marketing. More than a few communities mentioned that negotiations on investments provided an important incentive to join ADP. Nearly every community first mentioned roads and bridges as the key infrastructure investment that persuaded community families to join ADP. Electrical service was mentioned occasionally.

Infrastructure and social investments served two purposes. The first was to remove barriers that create inefficiencies in the value chain. Nearly all communities need significant investments to improve access to markets, or to improve post harvest handling and marketing that is best done at or close to the production sites.

The second purpose was to "complete the buy-in" by offering those items especially desired by the community. This might include additional technical assistance for other crops or small animals, help with short-term food crops, a refurbished school or medical services, or assistance in establishing a producer association to facilitate post harvest handling, for example.

The ability of ADP to counsel communities to select wisely the investments that can best support their economic development is an important skill. Likewise the flexibility to deliver a wide range of investments is an important program element.

Investments in schools, medical posts, and community structures were seldom mentioned as benefits in interviews with the team in Tocache. In fact, during programmed eradication in Tocache, there were few investments in these areas. Because these investments were reported

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<sup>12</sup> Proposing to completely change a community's primary source of income is asking them to make a gigantic, life changing decision. A decision of such magnitude generates strong emotions and is always complex with fluid decision-making processes. The simplified processes described above reflect the team's efforts to identify the primary reasons and processes leading to a decision to join ADP.

in prior evaluations as appreciated components in voluntary eradication programs, team members began asking about them if they were not mentioned voluntarily by interviewees. When this happened, in most communities one or a few members of the group remembered that there had been investments in health, education and other community projects. Whether those investments were physically located within the community the team was interviewing or in a nearby community was seldom clarified in the stakeholder interviews.

Much of the investments in health and education are directed at Provinces, Regions or GOP institutions, and consequently they may or may not be perceived by community members as a part of ADP.

#### ***II.1.4 Why Neighbors Did Not Join ADP Groups***

The evaluation team asked those participating in the ADP program what reasons their neighbors gave for not participating. The most frequent response was that they did not believe the offer presented by ADP, followed by the lack of roads and access to their parcels, and that establishing new crops is expensive. In their presentations ADP offered to put in roads or other infrastructure as needed by the community, and subsidies were offered for establishing the first one or two hectares. Non joiners either did not comprehend what was contained in these offers by the ADP or chose not to believe they would occur.

Team members purposefully structured the community interviews to take respondents mentally back to the period when they were deciding whether or not to join ADP. In this environment there likely were significant numbers of pro-coca participants in the discussions. Many of the pro-coca interests may have presented their views to neighbors more to promote a pro-coca decision than to defend their personal decision.

A second common response for not joining ADP was a concern for the threats of physical and economic reprisals coming from pro-coca interests that would accompany a decision to join. Threats by coca interests were experienced by both those that joined and those that did not join. In most of the interviews with communities participating in ADP, the issue of threats surfaced. It may be that households that did not join with ADP took the threats more seriously.

## **II.2 WHY PRODUCERS CONTINUED IN ADP**

The three most important reasons given for continued participation by interviewed producers are:

1. The improved quality of life in the community, both in terms of safety and sufficient income with replacement crops,
2. The support for producer associations that provides improved marketing services for their products, and
3. Completion of the items offered by ADP to the community.

Women reported that the departure of violence improved the environment for child-rearing including improved behavior by children, better attention to parental guidance and greater

interest in school. The training provided to improve production skills, on-farm technical assistance, and the observed results gave men and women greater confidence in their future and confirmed their self-worth; they were producing crops demanded by licit consumers, both in Peru and other countries. The technical support was helping them in becoming better producers. For producers with trees yielding harvests, their yields and income were beginning to increase compared to the income during the transition period. Households now perceived that they were or would soon be making economic progress, something few claimed they were doing when producing coca. While cash income was easier to earn with coca, household wealth did not increase, and desired outcomes such as education of children was not achieved. “We do not need coca to sustain our family. We now have funds for motos (both two- and three-wheeled motorcycles) and tools for reducing labor for production and for household tasks,” said a producer of palm oil in Shambillo.

ADP has gained credibility with many communities because of its record of completion of the items or projects they agree to do. Most communities indicated to the team that community members were completely satisfied. Some communities mentioned that the final deliveries differed from the original agreement, but that ADP had informed them of the change and worked to resolve any issues to the satisfaction of the community. Even in cases where ADP did not do everything it had originally agreed to (possibly because of budget issues), the community was satisfied with what was carried out.

A few households, mostly younger producers, mentioned that the replacement crops “provide income to send my children to university.” Others, mostly older producers, said the crops “will assure my retirement income.” Increased wealth was noted by a number of households, primarily in the form of increased land values.

“I have been selling my coffee to a reliable buyer in Lima for eight years. He pays a price slightly higher than the local coffee producers association. Nevertheless, I now sell about 20 percent of my production to the association as an investment to help them become established in the market.”

*Quote from a producer in the community  
Nuevo Belen/Montecristo*

Support to producer associations was a popular benefit offered by ADP. By participating in their association, producers felt they were entering the processing and marketing chain for their product, which would eventually yield them more control over their income source and create greater income for their product. Whether that will actually occur is too early to tell for most associations. A few of the more mature institutions, such as the cooperatives Naranjillo (Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo)

and ACOPAGRO, are beginning to demonstrate that they can be sustainable and that they can achieve the goal of the producers to have greater involvement in post harvest activities for their products.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>13</sup> It is not yet apparent that producers are receiving increased income for their participation in associations and the sale of their production to cooperatives. In the few locations we were able to gather reliable estimates the associations and cooperatives generally pay slightly less than corporate buyers for the same product. When including the later payments to growers after the crop is sold (“reintegro”) by cooperatives, the resulting total payments was sometimes less and sometimes more than that paid by buyers of investor-owned companies.

### ***II.2.1 Inherent Strengths of Cooperatives in the Value Chain:***<sup>14</sup>

The inherent strengths of producer-owned and -controlled private sector cooperatives worldwide are related to serving producers. Cooperatives' market share is largest in those market segments that deal directly with producers; selling of farm inputs to producers; providing services to producers such as product storage, harvesting services, soil testing, technical assistance, market analysis, and others; and purchasing and/or handling farm output from producers.

Usually at the farm level there are many sellers and few buyers. In this environment, producers everywhere seldom trust private sector buyers, citing prior failure to honor purchase agreements, lack of transparency in the business relationship, excessive margins earned by buyers or sellers, and abrupt entry and departure from the business. Producers often turn to cooperatives to offset these perceived market imperfections. A second important reason that producers cite in forming their own cooperatives is that they believe the margins their cooperative will earn will be passed to the producers as higher prices for their output, or increased dividends paid to owners.<sup>15</sup>

**Figure 7 Oil palm plant nursery in Pucallpa**



Source: United Nations

All of the cooperatives and associations interviewed by the team are involved in supporting post harvest handling and/or processing of farm products. Many are also involved in the supply of farm inputs to producers. With these activities they are providing the services/products they are best positioned to accomplish well. They are focusing on their strengths.

### **II.3 ACTIVITIES WITH GOOD AND WITH LIMITED RESULTS IN TOCACHE**

ADP is presently working in more than 1,000 communities, 85 percent of which joined ADP under voluntary eradication and 15 percent under programmed eradication.

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<sup>14</sup> In this section the word cooperatives is used to indicate both cooperatives and producer-owned associations that are involved in post harvest handling/processing and/or marketing of farm inputs and outputs. Most cooperatives supported by ADP are involved in post harvest handling and/or marketing.

<sup>15</sup> As agricultural products move up the value chain, market shares of cooperatives worldwide become smaller very quickly. Only a few cooperatives achieve significant market share in consumer-level products. The strength for most cooperatives is the first stage collection and processing of farm output, and the last stage delivery of farm inputs to producers. For most cooperatives the manufacture and delivery of branded consumer products is a weakness.

The Province of Tocache is home to about 72,000 people, of which 60 percent are rural residents. There ADP is working in about 127 communities with about 3,800 households, approximately 30 households per community.

USAID/Peru and other institutions have successfully replaced production of coca with licit crops in Tocache. The programmed eradication of coca began in 2006, and by 2009 the coca removal process was complete. Nearly all of the communities visited by the team in 2010 reported that the coca promoters were seldom seen in the community and that most producers had eradicated their coca.

In the judgment of ADP staff the programmed eradication and the following economic development efforts of ADP accelerated community decision-making, quickened the changeover to licit crops and reduced overall LOE compared to what was required in northern San Martin.

### ***II.3.1 Strategies Generating Good Results***

#### **Programmed Eradication:**

The ADP program in Tocache –sold” to community members hope that after replacing their coca they would have a safer and tranquil community, that they could produce other crops that returned an adequate and reliable income, that production of the new crops was within their skills and capabilities with ADP’s support, and that investments by ADP would remove infrastructure and other limitations to access markets for licit crops. With available program resources producers could afford the high costs of materials to establish these crops.

After programmed eradication, households in Tocache had an additional motivation to join the program. “What else could we do?” they said.

Programmed eradication speeded the departure of pro-coca people from the communities, quickly strengthening the position of the remaining community members to say no to pro-coca interests and proposed activities. This rejection of pro-coca interests and activities facilitated open and frank discussions on the activities that would be best for the community, and helped to rebuild trust among community members. These discussions were not always peaceful and respectful. Many comments described expressions of strong opinions, threats to existing livelihoods, threats of physical violence, past histories of broken promises, departing businesses, and personal verbal attacks. High levels of uncertainty, high stress, and disruption of household routines were experienced by many. Despite the intensity of these experiences, decisions to proceed without coca were often the result. With programmed eradication, these decisions were made sooner and with reduced LOE by ADP.

Post eradication established a modified negotiation strategy of ADP with affected communities, which included less infrastructure investment, fewer subsidies, and more sharing of responsibilities and costs for investments. The post eradication environment facilitated establishing a win-win relationship with ADP and communities, allowing program benefits to focus more on income replacement activities and less on other investments and subsidies. The result was more quickly negotiated win-win agreements with income generation as the primary

focus and a secondary focus on other social areas like community leadership development, governability, and improvements in education, health and the environment, all of which are components in building a sense of security, prosperity, inclusion and equity.<sup>16</sup>

A top objective of the community, removal of violence, was accomplished by the actions of community members; ADP helped to start and motivate the actions of community members in standing up to pro coca interests but had little direct involvement in that process. ADP's role was to offer a reliable path to sustainable income without coca.

Nearly all ADP staff that have worked with programmed eradication prefer programmed to voluntary eradication. The evaluation team concurs that programmed eradication yields superior post eradication results.<sup>17</sup>

### **Adequate and Reliable Income:**

The offers of income from cacao, palm oil and coffee worked well in Tocache. In this area many producers were already familiar with these crops and understood the potential for income generation. In the area were old plantations for palm oil owned by state industries, and newer plantations of private investors that were yielding fruit. Soil and climate conditions were favorable for the three principal crops promoted by ADP.

Convincing producers to switch was easier in Tocache than it was in Northern San Martin, because coca had been eliminated as an alternative crop to produce household income through programmed eradication.

Another important innovation started in Tocache was the decision to support small farmers (ex-cocaleros) to install more than one hectare (usually two) of trees instead of one. This change improved potential income when crops began to yield fruit and improved the speed at which additional area can be brought into production, further increasing prospects for household income.

### **Infrastructure Improvements:**

For many families and communities, ADP's offers to improve infrastructure to support the production and marketing of alternative crops was crucial in rejecting the arguments of pro-coca interests. Assurances of additional investments that would bring additional benefits was the variable that kept open the dialog between the communities and ADP and helped to establish confidence in the community that "we can make a change" and make that change permanent.

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<sup>16</sup> Fewer investments in Tocache in non-income generating activities do not imply these other investments are not necessary or helpful; they are. In the Tocache environment, with relatively favorable agricultural income prospects and coca income eliminated, communities focused on reducing violence and replacing income. Other communities with less promising prospects for agricultural income may require a higher degree of other investments. Compared to the experience with voluntary eradication, the team anticipates that programmed eradication will reduce but not eliminate community requests for health, education and other services.

<sup>17</sup> In a meeting with about 10 of the ADP personnel of Tocache in attendance, two persons favored voluntary eradication over programmed eradication.

### **Completing Activities as Agreed with the Communities:**

One of the most important components in sustaining hope is prompt implementation by ADP of the agreements the communities signed with DEVIDA. When asked why neighbors did not join the ADP assisted group, the most frequent response to the evaluation team was that the non joiners did not believe the promises of ADP staff on the assistance with new crops and that infrastructure building would occur.

The ADP focus on integrated community development is critical to establish and sustain hope. In the judgment of the evaluation team, if only income from new crops had been promised by ADP, fewer communities would have signed up for assistance. While the infrastructure investments are critical to persuading the communities to participate, the many benefits (and costs) of the various interventions that were offered during the early stages of implementation of voluntary eradication are not needed with programmed eradication. What is required is a focus on those interventions that support the hope that the rising community leaders can communicate to households and which motivates a change in attitudes and actions of community members.

To establish hope, interventions in each community must be selected through community consultations, and the wishes and voices of the community must be taken into account. Offering a “one-size fits all” community development package does not meet this requirement. Therefore the amount of funds available for income and community development cannot be rigidly determined by the area of coca eradicated, the number of members in the community, number of hectares of new crops, or other such indices. Guidelines on how to take these factors into account to arrive at approximate amounts to invest in the community are appropriate.

### **Communication in Tocache:**

Communication in Tocache under voluntary eradication were designed to motivate communities to sign the “convenio marco,” which announced the community decision to replace coca production with licit crops. DEVIDA also signed the agreement on behalf of the GOP, and established written moral and political obligations to support to the communities through their transition. That support was mostly provided by ADP through a variety of activities. The GOP joined in that additional support for extending services such as schools, medical facilities and supplies, judicial services, roads and other services. Occasionally regional and local governments provided support for selected activities. With increased funding, regional governments in San Martin and Ucayali are now actively supporting interventions that support agricultural and rural development. Many municipal governments also now support agricultural and rural development but dedicate few funds to those activities.

The communication program promoted the benefits of a lifestyle that is economically supported by licit products. To assist delivery of these messages the communication program trained 162 persons to advocate for a licit lifestyle. These community spokespersons (“voceros comunitarios”) used community bulletin boards and community loudspeakers to disseminate information among community members. ADP supported sporting events between communities, called “caravans for development,” which attracted entire families and provided an opportunity to hand out pro-licit lifestyle promotional material.

To support programmed eradication, an aggressive communication campaign was implemented before, during, and after the actual eradication by CORAH. Messages such as “Acabemos con las drogas antes que las drogas acabe con nosotros” (“We end our relationship with drugs before drugs end our lives.”) were broadcasted intensively. While programmed eradication was taking place the program was broadcasting offers of products such as cacao, palm, pigs, banana, and coffee. After a four-month intensive communication campaign, 48 communities had signed the agreement to not grow coca and plant licit crops. The communication specialists in ADP/Tocache believe that communication activities were instrumental in shaping public opinion at large and were important factors for the success in establishing licit crops.

As the proportion of communities that signed the “convenio marco” or “acta de entendimiento” (in the case of programmed eradication) increased, the communication program began the process of transferring to local media the responsibility of maintaining positive messages of the benefits of a licit lifestyle. Those messages continue according to ADP, though not with the intensity or frequency of the ADP communication program.

Only personal opinion data was presented to the team regarding the success of the communication program in Tocache; as expected no hard data was available. The team does concur with the need for intense support that includes public and program communication before, during, and after the period that communities are deciding on a licit lifestyle.

The team was informed that ADP is currently embarking on a program to support Community Development Plans, through an agreement with CARITAS. It is too soon to determine the ultimate results of this activity. The evaluation team considers that the ADP supported communities already have an economic development plan, which is to establish the planned crops and to expand their area according to the resources available to each household. Households were intensely implementing that plan.

### **Short-Term Income:**


In Tocache, the intermediate and short-term income needs of families before the new crops began producing income were mostly resolved by producers, existing providers of inputs, existing buyers of farm output and existing local institutions. Seldom was ADP input needed and offers by ADP to support short-term food crops were discontinued during the Tocache campaign. The evaluation team concurs with this decision.

Tocache is an agricultural production region with good soil, adequate rainfall, and terrain suitable for intensive production. Yields of crops are higher than in some other regions. While ADP did not need to offer assistance with these short-term crops in Tocache, it might be necessary to offer support for short-term crops in other areas where yields are less and market prices do not generate sufficient household income to sustain households adequately.

## Focus on Key Long-Term Crops:

Each of the three crops that consistently yielded acceptable results in all regions served by ADP for coca replacement—cacao, coffee, and palm oil—currently enjoy favorable prices, sufficient product demand in international markets so that buyers are motivated to seek new sources of supply, current market demand that can absorb the products from large numbers of new producers, and satisfactory production when planting sites are well chosen and producers follow cultural recommendations. ADP has well established and tested technologies for production and post harvest handling. Post harvest marketing services and facilities are provided by private

**Figure 8 Scene near Santa Rosa kilometer 200, Ucayali, winner of the 2009 Selva Ganadora Prize**



Source: USAID/Peru

sector companies, cooperatives and producer associations. Many of the cooperatives and producer associations in the region are supported by ADP.

### **Support for Cooperatives and Associations:**

Increased production in distant areas required ADP to support efforts to deliver inputs to producers and to bring farm production to market. Each product has its own set of issues to resolve. For cacao, which was a new product for many communities, ADP embarked on a process of establishing producer-owned associations to assist in gathering cacao beans, fermenting, drying and making them available to buyers.

In situations of many producers and few buyers, producers worldwide prefer to deliver their output to a producer-owned institution, usually an association or cooperative, rather than an investor-owned buyer. This preference is apparent in the regions in Peru where ADP operates. Despite there being multiple potential buyers for cacao, ADP responds to requests from producers and assists in organizing local producer associations or cooperatives. The principal

service of these companies is to gather daily the cacao harvested by producers, ferment the product to maintain high quality, dry it and sell it to other companies and transport it to processing centers.

Most of these associations or cooperatives are new, still very small, and require support from ADP to survive. Most will require support over the next five to ten or years before they have a reasonable chance to remain sustainable.

As a model, a few associations or cooperatives that were organized more than five years ago are now important producer-owned marketing and processing companies. They provide a valuable service to the ADP program through purchase of farm output, providing training and technical assistance to growers, and confirming to new coca eradicators that life with cacao is possible and attractive.

This model of post harvest processing and initial stages of marketing support was part of the successful strategy to convince Tocache communities to adopt licit crops.<sup>18</sup>

Nearly every producer association or cooperative announced to the team and to their members that one of their principal goals was to become a direct exporter of consumer products. When the team questioned why, most explained that producers would benefit from the greater margins that they believed existed in those later stages of product processing and marketing.

Few of these institutions will ever deliver significant quantities of their product as branded consumer products. The Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo (COOPAIN, usually called Naranjillo), one of the most successful and advanced cooperatives in the region, said their branded consumer cacao products accounted for between 5 and 7 percent of their total sales. Meanwhile, all cooperatives and associations in that region collect less than 25 percent of cacao production in the region. It appears to the team that this successful business is focusing its administrative efforts on expanding sales in an area that generates very limited sales and that most would consider an inherent weakness. It could, however, focus its administrative efforts on those activities that directly impact its ability to more efficiently source additional product and in an activity that most analysts would consider its inherent strength. Larger margins on 95 percent of the business, even though the percentage increase in margins may be small, will likely contribute more to profits than increased margins on 5 percent of sales, even though the percentage increase in margins may be large.

The evaluation team suggests that ADP continue their support to these institutions, specifically to help them excel in their strengths of supplying farmer inputs and buying the farm output at the best possible price. Assisting these farmer-owned institutions to excel in their areas of strength will result in greater satisfaction to growers and improved results for ADP and the Alternative Development program than providing help them toward exporting branded consumer products.

### **Early Donor and Peru Government Support:**

The United Nations began introducing cacao and palm oil into the region served by the ADP in the late 1980s and continuing until the late 1990s. Their work established successful small-holder plots of trees and initial investments for processing plants for palm oil, and small farmer plots of cacao. When implemented correctly, their technology generated good yields and adequate producer income at prices that encouraged families to replace coca with palm oil and cacao plantings.

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<sup>18</sup> The long gestation period to achieve sustainability carries program risk for USAID/Peru because of the implicit commitment to keep these companies viable. Failure of an association or cooperative that provides post harvest handling and marketing for many producers could negatively impact the selling of “hope” to future eradicators.

Because of the UN actions, in the early 2000s, ADP was able to demonstrate to producers eradicating coca that within three years, cacao and palm oil trees would produce small amounts of product, and by year five or six, income from a few hectares of these crops would generate income sufficient to motivate producers to eradicate their coca. The results of the United Nations project in cacao and palm oil helped ADP persuade producers in San Martin and Ucayali Regions to accept voluntary eradication of their crops.

As United Nations funding declined, USAID increased funding so that the United Nations could continue its producer support programs, which has worked well for the ADP.

### **Study Tours (Pasantias):**

Early in the life of ADP the existence of the UN program provided a rich opportunity for ADP to organize study tours of producers who were eradicating their coca to visit with other producers and to learn from their peers how the crops of palm oil and cacao promise income adequate to support the family after the elimination of coca. Later ADP added other communities that had successfully converted to palm oil, cacao and coffee and that were willing to receive producers from areas just entering into life without coca. These study tours were often cited by producers as an important component in verifying the messages of ADP production specialists.

### **Remove Remaining Pockets of Coca Production:**

A persistent issue of contention within communities, called a “cancer in the society” by many interviewees, are the remaining pockets of coca production. This is not a Tocache issue, but is nearly universal. Some areas were more successful than others in removing all of the production. Some communities described significant efforts to persuade producers to remove their coca, bringing community pressure to bear on producers reluctant to eradicate. Other communities appeared to have given up the effort to remove all of the coca production until additional tools and policies are available to support the effort. The perception of the evaluation team is that in San Martin they have been more successful in eradicating remaining small plots of coca. Aguaytia has been less successful in persuading producers to remove their remaining plots of coca, even after palm oil or cacao trees are in the second or later year of production.

In no area did the team identify support from national, regional or local governments that focused on the removal of small coca plots.

## ***II.3.2 Activities that Produced Limited Results***

### **Minor crops:**

Crops other than cacao, coffee and palm oil contributed less to household income, yet created hope for a coca free environment in a limited number of communities.<sup>19</sup> Their promotion motivated some communities to join ADP, a positive contribution. However, their contribution to the overall success of ADP was limited.

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<sup>19</sup> The other crops and animal products are referred to in this document as minor commodities.

These less utilized crops included platano (several types), pineapple, palmito, papaya, cattle and pastures, chickens, small animals, and other products. The evaluation team reviewed these and other products with specialists from ADP and other institutions with the goal of strengthening the ability of ADP to persuade coca producers to adopt licit products. With additional viable crop and animal options, ADP could recommend crop options to producers with a wider variety of climate and soil types, thereby attracting more producers to licit crops.

The data presented to the evaluation team did not demonstrate significant net income gains from other crops compared to cacao, coffee and palm oil, nor did they offer benefits for these crops that are sufficient to persuade large numbers of producers to participate with ADP. Except for palmito, the principal market for all of these crops is domestic consumption. Even when a favorable domestic market exists, a few hundred hectares of additional production may generate oversupply and lower prices.

Preparing packages for successful production and marketing of minor crops and maintenance of skills of technical specialists likely consumed significant program resources with little contribution to achieving overall program objectives.

Some communities claimed benefits of improved food security because households grew a greater portion of their food needs. Some communities effectively sold surplus crops and animal products in local markets at attractive prices. Both results are positive. Nevertheless, many producers growing any of these crops will require ADP to allocate significant resources to market development.

Despite these limitations, supporting minor commodities serves a program objective, to persuade communities to join ADP. Near the end of the community discussions to adopt licit crops, offering an additional benefit such as technical assistance for a minor crop or another product can “tip the scale” and persuade the community to adopt licit crops. However, program risk increases with such a decision because of the higher rates of failure for these crops.

### **Premature Entry of ADP during Eradication**

ADP entered into some communities to promote alternative crops as early as three months after CORAH had begun eradication in the area. While the coca had been eradicated in the communities approached by ADP, some ADP personnel report that entry was too soon because CORAH was still eradicating coca from other communities in the area.<sup>20</sup> As a consequence, ADP personnel were accused of being connected with and/or informants for CORAH. ADP personnel reported that they felt increased risk of working in the area and reduced effectiveness in working with the communities. They recommend waiting until CORAH had completed eradication in the area before attempting the intense efforts that are part of the process of community development - perhaps more accurately characterized as community rebuilding.

Nearly all field personnel in Tocache cautioned against premature entry into communities while CORAH was still eradicating in the area. In instances where entry was premature, ADP programs were linked to CORAH programs, which was a very negative association for ADP.

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<sup>20</sup> CORAH eradicates coca in areas that they select. These areas may or may not coincide with community boundaries. Furthermore, some community boundaries are poorly defined.

Programmed eradication, which is strongly associated with violence, intolerance and impunity, should never be officially linked with alternative development; once this association is made it is almost impossible to remove and ADP then has to function with this handicap.

## II.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS IN TOCACHE

Some external factors enhanced results in Tocache and some reduced results as follows.

### II.4.1 Favorable Factors

Two of the most favorable external factors were worldwide demand and relatively high prices for the three primary crops promoted by ADP. Most important to Tocache were palm oil and cacao.

**Figure 9 Picturesque terrains in coca production areas**



Source: Weidemann's Team

The second was improved roads that significantly lowered transport costs.

Problems of cacao production in other Latin American and African countries have helped to maintain favorable prices for Peruvian producers. Cacao prices are expected to remain favorable over the next few years. Much of Peruvian cacao and coffee is sold as organic and/or fair trade products, which brings higher prices. During the beginning months of the recent global recession (first half of 2009), however, the price for premium (organic or fair trade) cacao declined, resulting in little or no price premium for these products.<sup>21</sup> This caused temporary declines in prices for most Peruvian producers. The margin for premium cacao has since returned to more normal levels.

The palm oil produced in Peru replaces imported palm oil. Nevertheless, the price for palm oil also reflects the use of palm oil as biodiesel, and therefore is influenced by the world price of petroleum.

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<sup>21</sup> One cacao marketing institution reported that during the recent world economic slowdown, prices for organic cacao were very close to prices for regular cacao for several months.

Another favorable factor were road improvements that reduced transit time (and cost) and reliability of transport of products from Tocache to other markets, the most important market being Lima.<sup>22</sup> Lima is the export location for most Peruvian cacao. Factories refining crude palm oil are located in Lima and in other major cities.

While roads are mentioned here as an external factor, USAID had a hand in both major road improvements as well as local feeder road improvements. Major road improvements were funded mostly by GOP and other donors; USAID supported feasibility studies and planning.

Many feeder roads were primarily funded by ADP, most resulting from requests from communities agreeing to eradicate their coca. Feeder roads are a lasting and frequent reminder to the rural residents that ADP changed their lives by lowering transport costs. With decentralization bringing more funding to regional governments, these entities are increasing their funding for construction, often serving rural areas.

Another important external factor were efforts by the United Nations to establish technical processes and skills in the production and post harvest handling of cacao and palm oil. This work, begun in the middle 1980s, established technical processes for production of these crops and trained workers in the area, in northern San Martin, Tocache, Tingo Maria, Aguaytia, Pucallpa, and in VRAE. Some of these plantations were mature stands while some were just coming into production when the first ADP program began in 2002. ADP offered study tours for members of communities eradicating coca to observe production by mature trees and young trees and to receive assurances from their peer producers that a sufficient and reliable income is possible.

The United Nations also established three palm oil processing plants in Tocache, Aguaytia and Pucallpa (Campo Verde). When United Nations program funding declined, USAID provided support to finish the last plant in Aguaytia and to support start-up operations.

#### ***II.4.2 Negative Factors***

Perhaps the most important negative factor restraining replacement of coca by licit crops is the lack of state presence in distant rural areas. This is evident in the poor infrastructure in roads, education, health services, electrification, and limited police and judicial services. Public sector agricultural production support is for the most part non-existent and there is little public or private sector research on genetic material and agricultural practices appropriate for different ecological zones. Public policies give little attention to the rural economy; land titling is limited, taxation policies and processes reflect business processes in urban areas, finance policies and regulations likewise serve urban areas but do not enable financing for rural agricultural production. The government-operated Agrobanco provides very limited funding for small- and medium-sized producers, and loan policies and processes mirror rural credit practices that were long ago discredited in many countries as poor and non-sustainable practices.

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<sup>22</sup> The road is improved from Tarapoto to Tingo Maria. Tarapoto to Juanjui is mostly asphalted. The road from Juanjui is still gravel, but improved in recent years with USAID support. There were frequent statements by people in the area that hard surfacing the road from Tocache to Tingo Maria would begin in 2010 or 2011. The team did not attempt to verify these dates for road improvements.

With decentralization and additional funding, regional governments in San Martin and Ucayali are beginning to respond to the needs of commercial agricultural in their regions and are initiating funding of technical assistance and training for small- and medium-sized producers. That technical assistance and training is planned to be conducted directly by employees of the regional governments, which are searching for technically skilled personnel to implement this training.<sup>23</sup>

The lack of a state presence can also be seen in the minimal efforts in some areas of interdiction of products used in processing of coca leaf. Persons in these zones report that these products are widely available and that efforts to control this traffic appear to be limited and ineffective.

This limited state presence weakens the efforts of those families that want a coca free community and encourages other producers to maintain or expand coca production. Several producers interviewed stated that it is acceptable to replant coca in the Aguaytia region because no national, regional or local government agency is taking actions to finish the task of establishing coca free communities, even though those communities agreed to remove their coca in exchange for economic development. From conversations with producer groups, the team members believe a majority of ADP supported producers in the Aguaytia region maintain small plots of coca.

## **II.5 IMPLEMENTING ADP IN AGUAYTIA-HUIPOCA**

The San Martin and Tocache eradications and prior voluntary eradication in Aguaytia-Huipoca provide important learning than can be applied to a programmed eradication in the area of Aguaytia-Huipoca. Capturing lessons learned from prior eradication in Aguaytia-Huipoca is reduced because of ADP staff turnover.<sup>24</sup> Similarities as well as differences between the two regions and even between the several zones in Aguaytia-Huipoca because of terrain, soil types, existing infrastructure, climate and residents' preferences suggest the need for careful planning and flexibility to react to unforeseen challenges.

Key elements of an approach for Aguaytia-Huipoca as recommended by the evaluation team include:

1. Utilize programmed eradication.
2. Use an integrated approach, with community development as the central focus, supported by productive activities that exhibit sufficient and reliable income to build hope that households eradicating coca can have a prosperous lifestyle.

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<sup>23</sup> The reality of low public sector remuneration and frequent changes in personnel when administrations change complicates the hiring and retaining of skilled agricultural technical specialists.

<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately the team was not able to travel into Huipoca, save passing by the zone on the road between Aguaytia and Pucallpa. While in the area, the team inquired of specialists in the region to gain information on terrain, soil types, existing crop production and animal products, markets for these products, and existing infrastructure in the area.

3. Prepare a communication strategy that is adequately funded to counter false or misleading statements by pro-coca interests and that supports rural households and communities as they change the direction of their communities and their leadership.
4. Work with new community leaders to identify those critical barriers that restrain economic growth for the community, and identify how to remove those barriers. This step requires infrastructure and social investments. Offers of improved infrastructure not only remove barriers, they also capture the hearts and minds of people and help build coalitions for change.
5. Maintain acquired social capital by delivering on the program interventions that are agreed to with communities. When planned interventions experience unforeseen barriers and need modification, ensure that processes are transparent.

Each task above contains multiple components; the most important of these are discussed below. Most of these are known and have been utilized in prior coca leaf production eradication interventions. Identifying the environmental and market signals that point to which interventions might be most effective and implementing those interventions with the correct timing is not simple. When done well the result is rewarding, with results that some believed were beyond the possible in San Martin and Tocache. The success of the USAID/ADP and GOP programs benefit the households that learn to live well without coca.

### ***II.5.1 Utilize Programmed Eradication***

As reviewed above, programmed eradication worked well in Tocache, reducing ADP expenses and speeding the processes within communities that result in a new vision for the community's economic future with fresh community leadership to reflect the new community development plan. The immediate and complete departure of coca production is extremely disruptive, even when households know the day will eventually come. The experience in San Martin and in Tocache suggests that a majority of community residents will eventually support the change to a licit lifestyle. Those that are married to production of illicit crops leave the community; the transformation to a more traditional and enduring lifestyle begins.

#### **Timing Entry by ADP:**

In Tocache the process of a community deciding for a licit lifestyle was reported to take as few as three months for some communities and up to a year or more for other communities. The timeframe in Aguaytia-Huipoca will most likely be similar for Ucayali. If, however, residents in Aguaytia-Huipoca grasp the finality of the CORAH eradication in Tocache, change in community leadership and the decision to change to a licit lifestyle could happen sooner.

ADP efforts will be more effective and results improved if the field staff can keep abreast of emerging community transformations and are ready to provide residents with specific and reliable information on life without coca, what interventions are possible to change the community environment, what alternatives are available to generate licit income, and what are the processes for obtaining help. ADP/Tocache personnel reported that with programmed eradication communities sometimes sent representatives to the ADP offices to gather more

information, a clear indicator that community change is eminent or, more likely, already in process. However, by the time the community inquires at the ADP office community residents may have already asked –someone else” what to do, increasing the likelihood of delivery of wrong information and increased LOE to reverse early impressions.

More effective is finding a way to monitor signals from community residents that groups of households are beginning to realize that coca will not remain in the community, are now considering how to sustain their households, and that the frequency of these discussions is increasing. At this early stage of coca eradication, ADP personnel may not yet be able to enter a community and must rely on pre-established channels of information to convey to the community ADP’s capability and desire to support community change. While public media can penetrate communities and convey messages of support, hope is best transmitted and sustained by personal contact with reliable people.

Determining the appropriate steps and best timing for ADP to enter a community remains an art, not a science.

### ***II.5.2 An Integrated Approach Focusing on Community Development***

The team recommends an integrated approach, with community development as the central focus, supported by the following key components:

1. **Productive activities** that exhibit sufficient and reliable income to producers to sustain hope of economic improvement using licit products.
2. **Strengthen community leadership**: Intense support to communities working through the process of changing community vision and leadership and building human and social capital, followed by less intense but continuing support according to the community issues that arise. This intense support can include identification and training of potential community leaders that can motivate producers in coca areas to enter the ADP program, to organize producer training, and to build cooperation and sharing within the community, support for infrastructure improvements, and more transparent decision-making. In time some of these potential leaders will begin serving as community political and technical leaders, business leaders, youth leaders and some may become technical support specialists for the productive activities introduced by ADP.
3. **Support for local and regional political leaders** should be offered when they are ready. This may require many months as support for coca dwindles and is replaced by support for licit and sustainable economic development.
4. Introduce **infrastructure improvements** that focus on removing barriers to effective and efficient productive and social activities and that can gain the support and confidence of community households.

A surprise to some members of the team was that the replacement crops of palm oil and cacao performed well on the soils degraded by coca production. ADP personnel learned that a recovery period for the soil after coca was removed was not necessary before planting of palm

oil or cacao trees.<sup>25</sup> Using recommended cultural practices, the new trees took root and achieved normal growth rates. Whether planted on normal or degraded soils, achieving high yields required appropriate levels of fertilization when the trees began to yield fruit.

All three crops (cacao, palm oil and coffee) provided improved ground cover and reduced soil erosion compared to coca production. Cacao trees require partial shade during development. In most cases platano provided the needed shade as well as food and cash income during the growth period of the replacement crops.

Because the replacement crops were the new permanent source of income, they usually received priority care by households. In areas that trees were producing, the team observed that farm improvements were appearing, such as improved trails, bridges over streams or wetlands, agricultural production tools, home improvements and a few gasoline-powered implements and motorcycles.

### ***II.5.3 Concentrate Production Support on Key Products***

ADP has technically reliable production packages for cacao, palm oil and coffee. The transition period from coca to licit crops may be difficult, but households that follow the recipe survive and thrive. Before introducing new products ADP should consider carefully the criteria listed below. Of all the other products (beside cacao, palm oil and coffee) that were suggested by local technicians and interested observers to replace coca, none meet those four conditions at this time.

1. Can absorb the entry of a large number of new producers.
2. Have established markets and value chains with private sector companies, including cooperatives that are working in the area, with export markets large enough to absorb production from thousands of new producers without saturating that market.
3. Have prior successful producers who are willing to share their experience of removing coca from their communities and now have increasing incomes from their new crops.
4. Have proven technical packages for production and post harvest

**Figure 10 Loading a truck with platano for transport from Aguaytia to Lima**



Source: USAID/Peru

<sup>25</sup> Soil types, conditions and slopes in some areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca may be sufficiently different to require cultural practices that vary from those that were necessary in Tocache.

handling by small and inexperienced agricultural producers.

Developing production and marketing packages to meet the above criteria takes time and resources. The cost to develop a new product that can serve as an income replacement for coca is about the same, regardless of the crop. If the new crop cannot absorb at least 500 new producers it is likely not a cost effective alternative for ADP. The production packages for palm oil and cacao by the United Nations took nearly a decade to develop, implement and document.

Palmito was reported by several specialists as having a large market in nearby Brazil and satisfying numbers one, two and four of the above criteria. However, the team was not presented with evidence that Peru can effectively penetrate that market.

A forestry product would serve ADP needs because much of the coca to be eradicated is produced in areas normally dedicated to forestry production. However, much work remains to be done to satisfy the above-mentioned criteria two, three and four. While there are some forestry development projects in Peru that were reported to have exhibited satisfactory production results, the team was not presented any that were ready for large-scale implementation by small holders. Nor was there available an analysis of policy and legal issues that often complicate forestry investments by private investors.

#### ***II.5.4 Communication Strategy***

Create a top level communication strategy that establishes overall ADP objectives and guides a second level strategy that supports specific objectives for each area of intervention.

The overall communication strategy will need to support both overall ADP objectives and specific objectives for each area of intervention while addressing broader issues such as public relations, institutional image, press releases and responses to press inquiries, and public opinion. The overall strategy should be aimed at designing and implementing medium-term processes rather than short campaigns. Detailed materials for the broader issues should be prepared as needed.

A separate strategy for each area of intervention addresses issues specific to the area and the intervention. Areas of intervention may be defined by geographic location, by the target audience including ADP staff, a specific issue or other situation. Examples include geographic areas of program operations, community transition support, production technology, product marketing, and responding to local issues that develop. Messages needed to support ADP in upper Shambillo may be quite different than those needed to support activities in Huipoca, and message delivery methods may greatly differ.

Communication is a cross-cutting activity affecting all levels of ADP activities. A communication strategy should be designed to cope with a specific reality. Strategies for specific realities should be consistent with and contribute to the overall strategy. Included in the design should be when and how to evaluate results. While strategies for areas of intervention work best when developed for medium-term activities, some program activities may require short-term strategies, such as the intensive information campaigns needed with programmed eradication

as the communities transition from an illicit to licit economy or to counter negative messages by coca interests when they threaten to derail program implementations.

An intensive campaign before, during and immediately after programmed eradication is essential for several reasons:

1. To respond to public statements by pro-coca interests. Often these statements are incorrect or misleading and if not responded to will be believed as fact.
2. To promote the benefits of a licit lifestyle.
3. To convey information about ADP programs that provide support to communities that wish to switch from a coca led economy to a licit crops led economy.
4. To publicize results from producers and communities that have travelled the road from coca to licit crops.

In Aguaytia-Huipoca communication may consume an important share of financial resources because of the anticipated intensive pro-coca public campaigns. Because the only radio station and only newspaper now reflect pro-coca messages, those resources will likely not be available to support ADP programs. It would be worth considering the benefits and costs of installing a mass media transmitter (radio, for instance) to broadcast pro-licit lifestyle messages, at least during the intensive period during and immediately after programmed eradications for some areas.

In the experience of the evaluation team, the communication budget is a critical portion of the general program. During the initial intense period of an eradication, the proportion of the budget used for communication should not be less than 10 to 13 percent of the program investment, decreasing to 5 to 7 percent when communities have accepted ADP and are on track.

This communication plan must be flexible. While communication specialists and ADP staff may anticipate what many of the needed messages will be, there will always be surprises and an urgent need to craft new messages or new delivery processes.

In Aguaytia 85 percent of the population has migrated from other regions, mainly from Huánuco. Many of these immigrants are experienced coca growers. Preparation of the messages for programmed eradication should take into account the specific messages that have greater potential to appeal to these immigrant households given their backgrounds as well as their needs and interests.

When the intensive stage of the communication campaign is phased out, the above messages will still be needed, but much less frequently.

As the program moves from supporting decision-making by communities to actual delivery of agreed upon benefits, the communication program takes on two additional tasks:

1. Supporting extension services by preparing printed and other materials that serve to “extend” the knowledge delivered by the extension agent beyond his training or technical assistance visit.

2. Document those activities, stories and accomplishments that can strengthen the communication campaign for the next area to be eradicated, including the gathering of multimedia material associated with those activities, and stories and accomplishments that are likely to be effective in a future campaign. The evaluation team heard many touching histories of how households suffered yet survived the transition from coca to licit crops and the subsequent rewards for their courage. Sharing these stories with households confronting a future without coca can support their hope for a better future.

### ***II.5.5 Infrastructure***

Rare is the community governed by pro-coca interests over an extended period that has adequate infrastructure for licit economic development. In some communities that infrastructure never existed, especially in communities born from coca production. The evaluation team heard numerous stories of destruction of infrastructure in coca producing areas, such as burning of transport vehicles and intentional destruction of highways and roads. Poor roads and lack of bridges appear to be the most frequent obstacles to legitimate crop production and were the most frequently mentioned infrastructure improvements desired and received by nearly every community visited by the team.

Decisions on which constraints to address through infrastructure investments are made by community leaders after informed discussions with ADP specialists. While communities are able to elaborate on what infrastructure improvements are needed, they may have little understanding of the issues to be resolved in order to install those improvements and the cost. Communities do ask for non productive investments such as community centers, soccer stadiums, school improvements, medical services upgrades, and so forth. In the team members' experience, communities that receive non-productive investments are ultimately disappointed when their incomes remain the same. ADP has long experience counseling community leaders on decisions about infrastructure that improve farm productivity and market access, and ADP social investment specialists strive to support communities to make wise selections.<sup>26</sup> With the guidance and direction by USAID/Peru, ADP staff appears to be adequately informed to reorient these requests toward productive investments.

Once decided, prompt and effective action to install the infrastructure builds program social capital with that community and facilitates resolution of future issues or conflicts that are sure to arise.

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<sup>26</sup> Recently USAID/Bolivia Alternative Development program used infrastructure improvements to successfully win over the local population. Communities that requested and received non-productive investments soon discovered that even though they had a beautiful square, for example, their income remained unchanged. Future requests for infrastructure improvements focused on improving productive capacity.

### ***II.5.6 Selected Recommended Practices for Key Products***

Within the above approach there are several recommended practices that have yielded good results in prior areas of San Martin including Tocache and in Pucallpa.

1. Promote Farmer Field Schools (FFS) using the participating producers' farms as an effective training methodology. Today the name FFS is applied to a wide range of methodologies. The technology adopted by ADP should deliver training on participating producers' farms, with hands-on training a part of every session.

ADP might consider preparing more advanced training for existing producers of palm oil, which might motivate and help producers to take the necessary steps to increase yields of existing plantations. The evaluation team was only shown a basic FFS course for each crop; apparently no crop has an advanced course, even though in many communities nearly half of the producers have cacao, coffee and palm oil trees planted more than 4 years ago. These producers could use advanced training on specific tasks. One frequent question was how to lower the cost of fertilization for their crops. Organic certified crops, in particular, had fewer alternatives for low cost fertilizer.

2. Increase the efficiency of technical assistance through a network of extension agents and community agricultural promoters. Provide training to both groups through FFS and study tours (pasantias) to successful farms in the region. Agricultural promoters could receive in-kind benefits, privileges of additional training and technical assistance, and special recognition for their service. Eventually promoters must be paid if their service is to endure. Within a short time the value they can add would likely be such that other producers would be willing to contribute a small amount for their services in training or technical assistance.
3. Promote working linkages between extension agents and agricultural research institutions such as local universities, INIA (Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria) and ICT. Help producers to understand that a publically funded, or partially public funded institution will help keep their industry competitive in world markets. Producers may need help in actions to promote their industry to political authorities.
4. Assist producer associations and local and regional governments to identify priority projects to support ADP, as well as in the preparation of proposals (–expedientes tecnicos”) to obtain financial resources from the GOP or other financing institutions.
5. Assist district and provincial municipalities to improve their administrative and financial operations when that support converts to political support for the ADP agenda and methodology.
6. Focus a portion of communication resources on –selling hope” to coca leaf producers through stories of successful farmers who switch from coca to AD crops.
7. Support women's groups' efforts to engage in productive community improvement activities.
8. Strengthen producer associations and processing plants through training and support to the managers, directors and key employees.

9. Strengthen –Mesas Técnicas” for key products to address research and extension needs as well as other constraints on the value chain. The purpose of –Mesas Técnicas” is to improve the production packages that are available to producers.

### ***II.5.7 Establish a Technology Transfer Plan***

Resources are insufficient for ADP to train directly and provide ongoing technical assistance to all producers. Likewise the United Nations cannot directly provide these services. Clearly resources are insufficient to provide these services over many years. ADP has taken steps to deliver training and technical assistance through local cooperatives and associations that are participating in the value chain for their products. The larger cooperatives are beginning to provide technical assistance for producers who are selling their production to the cooperative. Training and technical assistance to new producers, however, is beyond their financial capabilities. From the beginning the training and technical assistance plan should include how and when to transfer those services to local institutions. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Section III.

### ***II.5.8 Seek Political Support - Proceed Regardless of Response***

The evaluation team interviewed 15 municipal, district and regional governments with about 35 persons participating in these interviews.<sup>27</sup> All of these units interviewed were enthused about the work of ADP in their jurisdictions and pledged their continued support. ADP personnel reported that very few of these governments were supportive of ADP at the beginning; some at least were polite. Most opposed vocally or quietly opposed ADP’s actions.

While political opposition created implementation challenges, it did not derail ADP programs with community development. As the communities demonstrated their commitment to licit crops and changed their own leadership, the local and regional leadership also changed. Political leadership is desired but not essential to ADP success.

**Figure 11 Flowers adorn a community homestead**



Source: Weidemann’s Team

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<sup>27</sup> In the many interviews there were certainly other political leaders who identified themselves as representatives of other institutions or their association with governments was not disclosed or recorded.

As ADP won over communities to a licit lifestyle the political leadership either changed their position to favor a licit economy or they were gradually removed from office. Nearly all mentioned the need for improved infrastructure in rural areas; only a few had sufficient funds for substantial investments. Both regional governments were planning to initiate training programs for agricultural production including for the same principal crops that ADP support. Coordination with ADP was claimed but at this early stage of program development appeared to be more distant than close.

Both regional and several district and municipal governments recognize the need to promote economic development and some have installed personnel to these positions. As anticipated the experience level in these governments is limited and their staff needs support in multiple areas. Creating an enabling environment to attract investments in commercial business is an unfamiliar exercise for many in these governments.

Nevertheless, these governments are enthusiastic that coca is leaving the region and new licit crops are taking hold on the economy. Now they say wealth is being created, investments by private companies increasing, new companies are arriving to do business, and the area is peaceful. Now –we can see the light,” said one representative. They described the prior coca driven economy as disruptive, driving out production and processing of licit products, inviting violence and terrorism and weakening local government authorities.

All governments requested continuing support from ADP, both the training for agricultural producers, infrastructure improvements and support for their own economic development.

## **II.6 AGUAYTIA’S RETURN TO COCA CULTIVATION**

Despite USIAD’s high level of investment in this area since 2002 there has been a growing production of coca in recent years. This section discusses the factors contributing to this increase.

### ***II.6.1 Market Signals Favor Coca***

Economic development is much more effective when interventions work in keeping with market signals. That is not happening in Aguaytia. As one producer, a participant in ADP, told the team, “[In Aguaytia] the market is telling me to grow coca; the price is high, yields are good, and ready buyers exist. If the price would fall, as it did during Fujimori’s [administration], we would not grow coca.” His comments highlight the lack of negative consequences for being a coca producer in Aguaytia. CORAH has not had a presence in these areas for several years.

Virtually all community efforts to remove coca from their communities in Aguaytia have stopped; persuasion no longer works – producers are not listening and communities have no other tools to utilize. In the team’s assessment, a majority of producers in the region likely still grow coca, even among ADP participants.

Among the factors that contributed to the return to coca cultivation in Aguaytia is the lack of negative incentives for coca producers, especially small-scale producers. Some producers in

Shambillo recalled the violence and terrorism that previously existed in the Shambillo area. But their children and younger producers professed few or no problems for small-scale coca growers, mostly from one-fourth to one-half hectare per household.

Under the voluntary eradication strategy, a number of ADP producers continue to produce coca not only for “social/personal consumption” as is usually argued, but also for financing expansion of licit crops. In fact, COCEPU (Comité Central de Palmicultores de Ucayal) palm producers recognized that in the absence of credit for new palm areas, coca leaf had become the source for financing an expansion of this crop. Some cacao producers in the Aguaytia area also stated that coca helps them to subsist during the waiting period from planting to production.

Even though there are many small plots of coca, most of the new production in Aguaytia-Huipoca comes from areas beyond the reach of roads and where the evaluation team did not enter. In short, there are areas in the region that are successfully implementing alternate crops, even though many producers retain small coca plots. Other nearby areas have experienced significant increases in coca production and account for most of the increase in the region over the past few years.

### ***II.6.2 New Immigrants***

Most immigrants to the Aguaytia area are from the Huánuco sierra region looking for a quick means of making money to bring back home. Coca is a crop that meets their expectations. Producers work long enough to plant coca, go back to their home in the sierra, and return after three to four months to harvest and sell their coca leaf production.

It is difficult for communities to influence these immigrants. In most cases their interaction with the community is limited, few community members know the immigrants or where their distant coca plots are located, the community has little or no legal authority to take any action to remove the coca production, and police or Peruvian officials appear to have little interest or capability to assist with any attempts to remove the coca. Removing the coca might be in the best interests of the community, but it is risky. The immigrants live and act with little of the social restraints normally associated with households living in communities.

**Figure 12** Platano from the Consorcio de Productores de Plátano (COPPU) transferring from canoes to truck for shipment to Lima



Source: Weidemann’s Team

### ***II.6.3 ADP Program in Aguaytia***

It appears to the evaluation team that the ADP staff is struggling to find a vision of how to achieve a successful community and economic development program. Most of the staff were hired just a few months ago and have not yet defined an effective approach to their goals nor have they determined which interventions they believe will be most successful.

Upon the arrival of the evaluation team, the staff produced prior studies that a variety of crops could be successfully produced in the region and that a market existed for their production. For example, platano from the Consorcio de Productores de Platano (COPPU) was presented as a major success, purchased directly by buyers in Lima. When the producers were asked if they could increase their production by 300 hectares, they responded “that would be a problem.” Later the team learned that the buyers for their platano were banana chip processors in Lima and that the processors had sufficient raw material supply to meet their production schedule. On the day the team visited the loading dock in Aguaytia for platano, the community’s sales agent told the team that the buyer ordered a half truck load of platano. During the winter months, the team learned, less than full truck loads were frequently requested by the buyers.

The platano group of producers cannot expand their production until additional buyers for their product are located. ADP staff is challenged to locate new buyers in Peru for products for which there is ample supply from competing producing communities.

The Aguaytia staff also suggested pineapple as a viable crop to replace coca. In the field the team heard negative feedback from producers about the prospects for pineapple; the crop had been attempted in the zone and failed.

The Regional Office was recently moved to Aguaytia; now is an opportunity to change attitudes, implement new strategies and boost morale.

### ***II.6.4 Identify Incentives to Remove Small Coca Plots***

The team did not identify any USAID, ADP, GOP or regional or municipal government policies or programs that support removal of remaining small plots of coca. Under programmed eradication most of these small plots will be removed, and removed multiple times over a several-month period until producers learn that coca production is ended and they must leave or grow another crop. One can understand that community members and leaders who once had their lives threatened, and many of whom lost family members to violence and terrorism, want all coca removed. In their minds coca invites the return of violence and terrorism. Some are frustrated with a system that promised them a coca free community and then looks away as coca production slowly returns to their communities.

The team recommends that ADP identify and test policies and practices that provide negative incentives to producers that replant or retain small coca plots and/or positive incentives for communities that achieve coca free status over a period of time. To be sustainable, most of the negative or positive incentives must come from the GOP, or regional governments working together with other local and regional governments.

CORAH could reenter the zone to take out the remaining small plots of coca, though this might be more disruptive than beneficial. Incentives to remove the existing coca plots might involve local police, or perhaps specialized CORAH units that work with communities to help them remove the small plots. As local community plots are identified, trained police might visit a parcel's owner and request that the coca be removed; otherwise sanctions would be imposed. Sanctions could be simple and limited. Most growers that now are producing palm oil, cacao or coffee will likely select removal of coca rather than risk losing income from licit crops.

On a temporary basis ADP incentives might be withheld for growers with small plots, or expanded for non-coca growers. For example, an advanced FFS dealing with key issues on how to improve yields might be made available only to growers who demonstrated no coca production in their parcels in the community, or on other parcels they operated in or nearby the community. Alternately, a restriction or amplification of technical assistance benefits or production inputs that are available through the association might be effective as incentives to palm oil producers to remove coca production.

In the Shambillo area, even many producers that had palm oil in production still cultivated coca. They told the team that they would end coca production when they had planted enough palm oil trees, but gave no specific dates for that event.

### ***II.6.5 Media Influence***

The communication strategy in Aguaytia is similar to that in Northern San Martin, and less so to that applied in Tocache. In Aguaytia the communication strategy is not a significant factor in promoting a desire in favor of a licit lifestyle, nor does it generate intensive support to achieve the strategic results expected by ADP.

The Aguaytia media is, in general, manipulated by pseudo journalists that sympathize with the pro-coca interests. Local journalists encourage communal peasants, especially the ones coming from Huánuco as field workers for legal cultivation, to cultivate coca and produce narcotics. Many of these field workers already have experience with coca production.

The Federation in Defense of Cocaleros, for instance, issued the destabilizing message: "From ten dollars that ADP receives, nine remains in the pocket of the employees." That was a clear counter message to "From ten coca leaves, nine are going to narcotics traffic." Aguaytia ADP office does not have the resources to counter the barrage of messages from media outlets.

As a zonal office Aguaytia does not have the decision-making ability or the resources to mount first-rate messages to shape public opinion. Hope exists that the conversion to a regional office will bring greater resources and increased awareness of the need for public outreach. The intensive communication required during a programmed eradication are not incorporated into the strategy for Aguaytia. Furthermore, some of the messages utilized in Tocache may not work well in Aguaytia-Huipoca because of the different migration patterns and available agricultural production resources. The recent experience in Paraiso might offer more lessons than Tocache about communication strategies that may be appropriate for Aguaytia.

## II.7 GENDER CONSIDERATIONS

To incorporate gender issues into the ADP program Chemonics International sub-contracted with Development Training Service (DTS) in 2008. To support gender activities and changes in attitudes of personnel, DTC engaged the National Network of Promotion of Women (RNPM).<sup>28</sup> That first contract was for the period from May to September. In 2009 the contract covered the period April to October. For 2010 the contract has yet to be signed. Despite these non-paid periods most of the gender coordinators continue their services to the program.

Training of all personnel, from senior executive to field workers, occurred in 2009. Incorporating gender awareness is a work in progress. The most significant achievements to date are the inclusion of women in the Farmer Field Schools, improved comprehension of the potential role of women in the domestic and farm business roles of the rural household, the incorporation of inclusive language in program activities, the organizations of networks of women regidoras (women elected to a municipal or regional council), and support for some economic undertakings headed by women.

ADP has adopted inclusive language and there appears to be a concern for the participation (number) of women at all levels, to comply with the goal of incorporating gender as a cross-cutting issue. Incoming ADP personnel receive gender information during the induction period in Lima; no follow-up training was reported.

Activities of Gender Coordinators vary by region. Coordinators function as subcontractors. The specific tasks they implement depend on their personalities and the acceptance of their ideas by the team leader of each office. In one region the Gender Coordinator reported that the Regional Program Coordinator had declared explicitly not to share for personal reasons the viewpoint of the gender specialist. In another region the coordinator has an office at another site, which contributed to, in the words of the coordinator, a “distant” relationship with the Regional Coordinator.

The ADP program is a large program with many diverse activities. The gender coordinators are buried deep within the administrative structure making it difficult to establish a consistent application of gender issues throughout the organization (red arrow in Figure 13).

ADP provides scholarships for regidoras to take classes at the Escuela de Administración de Negocios (ESAN) in Lima. Some regidoras can take e-courses, which reduces costs as they must only pay transportation and hotel costs when they come to Lima once per month.

### ***II.7.1 Women as Change Agents***

When the team asked producers why they had decided to join ADP, women more frequently than men cited the improved quality of life that would come about through reduced violence and terrorism associated with coca production. They cited concerns for the safety of their families,

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<sup>28</sup> In Spanish, the Red Nacional de Promoción de la Mujer.

especially children, and sudden influxes of money from coca leaf that were wasted in drinking and other non-productive activities. Children, they reported, had little interest in schooling and many had no long-term plans to develop productive skills. Insecure and unsafe environments reduced incentives to work for a better future and induced households to live day-by-day.

As explained during team interviews with ADP personnel and with women participants, women were first to take the initiative to select a licit lifestyle and a better community, and pressured their spouses to sign the agreements with DEVIDA. Women more than men now openly reaffirm their decision regarding coca production, citing the evidence of reduced violence, improved security and the potential to create wealth in intermediate- to long-term periods. Children, they reported, had resumed their interest and participation in schooling.

In the view of many ADP staff and of the team, women are active change agents, pushing for the “convenio marco” to be signed during both the voluntary and programmed eradication phases. And they continue to defend the new community that has resulted from the removal of coca production. After forced eradication and when seeding the first plots of replacement crops, women took on a critical role by taking charge of the agricultural production while many of the men were away seeking work to maintain family income.

Participation of women in the Farmer Field Schools has been a decisive step to empowerment of women. Today men in many households consider women equal in their capacity to understand technical information, and hence the farm production decisions can be shared. Interviews with women in Palmiche, de Chazuta in San Martin and in Nueva Esperanza in Tocache expressed the reality of these changes. The “Technical Encounters” in Tocache have effectively allowed women to participate as equals with men in sharing their learning.


The women have learned the technical processes for the management of the plantations and they typically implement some tasks with greater dexterity than the men, for example, cutting and grafting of cacao. Except for physical tasks that require lifting heavy objects, many women told the team that they are active participants in the field work. While they are not in the field as often or for as long as the men, some women are primary providers of labor on certain tasks, such as cutting and grafting of cacao plants, and they are a much needed source of additional labor when needed, especially for harvesting and post harvest handling. Women can dedicate more time in the field when their children are in school.

Because they now have learned the technical information they are also involved in management and investment decisions for their farms. In the view of the team, a great benefit is that many women say that they now participate regularly in farm management and production decisions, that they can more quickly capture the benefits and costs of household production decisions, and more accurately project household revenue from farm sales.

ADP staff in general recognizes that the inclusion of women in training provided through the FFS has empowered women, which is a positive outcome. Before, they report, women were listeners only, whereas now they are full participants. Several women asserted that the certificate of completion is confirmation that they are qualified to participate with men in making household production decisions.

The training workshops for leaders have developed and fortified their individual capacities, and the establishment of women leader networks has contributed to the promotion of women's rights and their position in the households and communities. The women feel strengthened by the endorsement of an organization, which also fosters cooperation among them in promoting public issues, an important contribution to the sustainability of a tranquil and safe community.

Figure 13 Organizational Chart of ADP



Source: Chemonics

As regidoras in the regional governments, women have received training to better carry out their duties. A network of regidoras has formed in Tocache and San Martín with the purpose of supporting each other and to exchange experiences, which helps them to focus their actions to create and formalize regulation and ordinances of importance to women. Maintaining contacts with this network helps them negotiate with other institutions actions to improve living conditions of women. In Tocache, a regidora had an important role in developing public policy and managed to enact several ordinances that benefit women including the donation of a parcel of land for the use of women. The network of women regidoras earned social capital when they

took on important issues for women, such as violence against women, support for literacy programs, more comprehensive health services, and identity cards for women (the cards are required for land titles).

Two cooperatives participating with USAID have instituted actions designed to strengthen the participation of women in their activities. In ACOPAGRO the participation of women is increasing, as is the share of employees that are women. Oro Verde has created a Women's Committee, in part because of the desire of the manager, and also because it is required to receive the Fair Wages (Comercio Justo) certification.

A few other associations and cooperatives have formed women's committees or assigned an executive the responsibility to promote women's issues. Most likely there are other institutions taking steps to support women that did not come to the awareness of the team. Nevertheless, the team considers that most of the associations supported by ADP are in the start-up phase and have yet to address women's issues specifically.

**Figure 14 Directors of the Association DICASAP in Campo Verde**



Source: Weidemann's Team

One example of a women-directed institution is the

Association of Productive Women, which has opened a restaurant featuring the transformation of pork into jerky and sausage. Several ADP funded horticulture economic initiatives were developed by women in Tingo Maria and Aguaytia.

In Ucayali in 2009 the association DICASAP (Dinamarca, Catalina and San Pedro) was organized by three communities in Campo Verde to develop and jointly market byproducts of yucca. ADP is helping with market analysis, especially in export markets. The National Institute of Agricultural Innovation (INIA) is providing technical assistance to improve production processes and product quality. The Ministry of Production provided training in product quality management, including packaging requirements and regulations to use the Ministry for Women and Social Development (MIMDES) seal "Made by Women." ADP is providing continuing on improving business processes and the legalization of the company statues. In Aguaytia-Huipoca the Association of Coffee Producers Santa Rosa is an important institution in the Santa Rosa community and is led by a woman. This community is a model for licit lifestyle as evidenced by winning the competition for the Selva Ganadora.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> A competition sponsored by ADP in which communities competed to determine those that best demonstrate a licit lifestyle.

### ***II.7.2 Gender Program Components in Aguaytia-Huipoca***

Given the limited progress on gender issues within the implementation staff, the team recommends that especially in this office the Chemonics leadership periodically assess the need for follow-up activities or training in gender issues.

Communication campaigns should include inclusive language and ensure that messages equally address women's and men's concerns, and especially address quality of life issues and the benefits of a licit lifestyle. In particular, area specific communication during the period of change-over from coca to licit crops should target women as important change agents.

ADP should continue the incorporation of women as equal partners in the FFS so that women have equal opportunities for learning cultural practices for crops selected in that community. The "Technical Encounters" that were provided in Tocache should also be continued to reinforce and amplify the learning provided by the FFS. The study tours should also include women and specific arrangements made for the women in both communities to share their experiences.

During these study tours, women, and especially women that are serving in leadership positions, should be given the opportunity to share their learning with potential leaders in the newly eradicated communities. These contacts will help to inspire women in the newly eradicated communities to be active participants in community decision-making, resulting in decisions that incorporate women's views and needs and are more family-friendly.

Funding of small projects can also be a way to support women's development, when the resources and skills of the participating women are sufficient to anticipate a successful outcome. Because some areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca may be less suitable for the primary crops supported by ADP, there may be a greater number of requests for small projects. Just as the FFS incorporated women into the training, small projects should also incorporate women into their planning and implementation.

Prior efforts to identify and support women leaders have been useful and should continue as part of the program in Aguaytia-Huipoca. Networks of women leaders in this area should also be supported to visit similar networks in Tocache to share learning and resources.

## **SECTION III: SUPPORTING LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY IN NORTHERN SAN MARTIN**

The SOW contained the phrase, "To what extent is it possible to graduate AD Communities in Northern San Martin and Pucallpa?" When used as a verb with an object the word "graduate" has four distinct meanings, two of which are relevant to this discussion:

1. "To confer a degree upon, or to grant a diploma to, at the close of a course of study, as in a university, college, or school."
2. "To arrange in grades or gradations; establish gradation in."

Based on statements of and conversations with USAID/Peru personnel and use of the word –consolidate” in the SOW, the evaluation team believes item two above most closely reflects the purpose of the stated question.

Furthermore, in the environment in which this question is asked, a follow-on question will certainly be, –what happens after graduation.” Absent the presence of ADP personnel the answer to this follow-on question will most likely be determined by the beneficiaries. Within the controlled environment of USAID/Peru and development partners the answer to follow-on question can be controlled. When used with larger groups or in public communication, however the message that the recipient may insert may be difficult to control and determine.

In the view of the evaluation team the answer to the issues addressed in this section requires additional data, analysis, stakeholder and evaluation team comments, opinions, and recommendations that can serve to guide decisions on future interventions by ADP to build the capacity of Peruvian institutions to extend the sustainable development of licit economies in the areas served by ADP.

A new strategy and new mechanisms of implementation should take place in the San Martin region. This new strategy should focus on strengthening local institutions or development institutions and subcontracting them for support in community development, democracy and governance, production support and other activities needed for consolidation.

### **III.1 WHAT INTERVENTIONS ARE STILL NEEDED?**

Individuals, households, and institutions of all kinds participate in ADP.<sup>30</sup> Some of these entities have been associated with the program for eight years or more (e.g., CEDRO), and some are just entering. New entrants need intensive support, save a few that are well-established institutions or individuals and households that are larger and experienced in agricultural production. For most entrants there is much knowledge to acquire, a wide range of tasks and learning to master, and policies and programs to put in place to establish and sustain the agricultural sector. Principal interventions that should continue include:

1. Community development and governance,
2. Training and technical assistance to agricultural producers,
3. Establishing local, first-stage post harvest handling and processing institutions,
4. Implementing infrastructure investments, including helping communities make wise selections and supervising design, installation and training,
5. Supporting institutions buying, processing and marketing agricultural products, and selling farm inputs,

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<sup>30</sup> Institutions include communities, producer-/member-owned cooperatives and associations; private sector investor-owned companies; non-governmental organizations (NGO); other donors; national, municipal and regional governments; and public and private sector support institutions such as universities and research and training institutions.

6. Supporting agricultural sector services such as financing, research, sector business development, training and other information dissemination, and sector policies and regulations.

While all of these interventions are needed, the intensity and frequency of interventions will be much reduced. Community development and governance support, for example, is sporadic after the intense transformation period throwing of pro-coca leadership.

Each of these principal interventions is discussed below.

**Figure 15 A remarkable family; the first to adopt Voluntary Eradication in Shambillo**



Source: USAID/Peru

### **III.2 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE**

As described in Section I, communities undergoing eradication of coca undergo an intense period of conflict as the decision to produce licit crops is finalized. Community members need assurances that:

1. Program support is available at any time,
2. ADP is acting in the best interests of the community,
3. The information they are receiving reflects the reality of their environment and is reliable, and
4. Agreements between communities and DEVIDA/ADP will be honored.

In the view of the evaluation team, support during this intensive period is best managed by and funded through ADP. Producer training, infrastructure building, community support and other activities may be subcontracted to local institutions.

After the coca is eradicated and training and technical assistance for production of licit crops is underway and infrastructure projects are in construction, the need for community development support by ADP begins to subside. Within a year, in most cases, community support visits can be intermittent, the interval between visits determined by the stability of the community and their progress in establishing licit crops. Visits should not be entirely discontinued, however, until the licit crops are installed and producing income, the infrastructure is completed and the community appears stable. For most communities this is three to five years after eradication of coca. During this period ADP or their partner institutions may respond to emergencies and events that may threaten the sustainability of licit crops and the stability of the community.

As the political leadership and political institutions begin to change toward support for licit crops municipal and regional governments may be receptive to cooperation with ADP. Often these

governments have limited experience in how to establish an environment friendly to economic growth of the agricultural and agribusiness sector.

Regional and municipal governments that are ready to move to support licit crops should be supported. Short-term support in technical areas is the greatest need. Seldom should ADP support come in the form of a full-time advisor within the political unit. ADP may provide short-term support directly if staff with the technical skills is available. Preferable in San Martin and Pucallpa is that ADP subcontract with a provider of these skills, monitoring performance and results.

As the number of communities with coca in the northern San Martin and Pucallpa areas decreases, the ADP staff will also decrease. Strengthening local institutions and subcontracting with them to provide the community development, democracy and governance, production support, and other activities should be a priority. Eventually only a small ADP staff should remain in this region, with the primary task to maintain the technical quality of services, to identify and strengthen local institutions to take on the funding of these services, and to train or retrain local service providers when needed.

### **III.3 TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO PRODUCERS**

One of the most important ADP activities is support for production of the new principal crop, including training in management of the new crop, technical assistance to resolve technical issues that arise, and the provision of selected inputs sufficient to plant two to 5 hectares in the case of coffee and cacao, and 5 to 10 hectares in the case of palm oil.

ADP may deliver this training and technical assistance directly or through subcontractors. Most training subcontractors are the associations and cooperatives to which many of the producers may eventually be selling their production. There is no obligation for the producers to sell their production to the institution that is providing the training.

Nearly all training and much of the TA is delivered through FFS, which appears to be working well. Most producers gave the training provider and ADP high marks for the quality of the training. The basic training is a set of farmer field schools that meet once per month for about 12 sessions. These sessions cover the basic training needed by producers. Other than this basic course, no additional training in advanced or refresher courses was presented to the evaluation team, for any crop.

As presented below a large share of producers have already received the basic course in production and post-harvest handling. Periodic refresher workshops may be needed, and some advanced training may help resolve specific production problems. The number of basic training courses will decline. There will, however always be new producers to be trained.

Training and technical assistance can be subcontracted to local institutions. The task of supervising these training providers should gradually be transferred to local institutions with local sources of funding. Regardless of the training provider, ADP's role is to intervene as needed to maintain the quality of the training and to verify with community members that they are satisfied with the results.

Ongoing support to producer association and cooperatives is needed. As their leadership becomes more experienced and effective in their administration and decision-making the levels of program support can be reduced but not eliminated, at least for the intermediate term.

There appears to be an assumption by some program implementing personnel that the companies, including cooperatives and associations buying the product, will pick up the training task when ADP funding is reduced for the San Martin area. The team is not convinced that these companies will respond as assumed. ADP supported cooperatives visited by the team had mixed views of providing training to new producers. Some indicated they would consider providing technical assistance to producers that were already trained and delivering product to the company. Several expressed reservations about providing training for beginning producers. Their management teams were much more animated when discussing their plans for buying, processing and selling of product. Those institutions providing training to many producers also had relatively large subcontracts with ADP. With the possible exception of the palm oil processing plants, no institution claimed to be directing large amounts of their own funds to training. Some smaller cooperatives appeared excited to be providing training; probably ADP funding is a larger share of their revenue.

The current ADP training model is not broken; it delivers training that producers like. After eight years, however, there is still not a viable plan for leaving that training in the hands of local institutions. The institutions favored by ADP to carry on the training will likely do little training for new entrants into production of licit crops beyond what is funded by donors.

With proper promotion, new local training institutions can provide basic training for new producers as effectively as the associations, cooperatives and other agribusinesses can. Utilizing specialized training institutions allows for competitive selection of training providers, and may reduce the propensity to organize local associations and cooperatives.

An advantage of this model is that those institutions that decide to excel in training have an opportunity to learn updated technology and strengthen their training capacity.

In this model eligible institutions for training include NGOs, universities, consulting companies, governments, associations and cooperatives, and private sector companies, including suppliers of inputs to farmers and buyers of their product.

### ***III.3.1 Community Promoters***

One training support technology mentioned often to the team was community promoters for specific crops. Promoters are producers who have: excelled during the training for a crop, acquired additional information on their own initiative, demonstrated production practices consistent with the training, and who are willing to share that information with other producers in the community. Once selected, promoters may receive additional training, minor tools or inputs that facilitate their instruction to other producers, and recognition at community and other events.

There are many “promoters” in Peru working with many institutions on many different tasks. The evaluation team suggests selecting a different title, one more descriptive of the work the

individual is expected to undertake and the preparation needed. Furthermore, promoters are generally unpaid, so most households will expect promoters supporting ADP programs to be unpaid. A “technician” or “specialist” or other such title would more closely reflect the work expected of these persons. Nevertheless, for the discussion here we will employ the word “promoter” for consistency with the current terminology of ADP.

For sustained service they must be paid either partially by ADP or other funding source, by producer contributions, or shared by multiple sources. If initially subsidized, over time community members should pay an increasing share of the promoter’s training cost. The role of the promoter is to provide as much of the technical assistance to community members as they can, calling upon the specialists of the training provider to resolve more difficult questions.

While promoters increase the availability of technical support to producers and reduce costs, they are still assistants. Professional extension personnel who are trained in production technologies and adult education direct the training program, mentor the promoters, and monitor the quality of training and technical assistance delivered to producers.

As part of the process of transferring the training and technical assistance functions to Peruvian institutions, ADP should solicit national, regional and local governments to share in funding the training provider. Table 1 provides some reasonable estimates of training costs, the sharing of funding by multiple institutions, and an estimate of revenue for the training institutions and the trainers.

In the training options discussed below, some trainees would be expected to contribute a portion of the cost of training. For producers entering after eradication, the contribution would be small to nothing. Producers with more experience or with income-producing crops would pay a higher portion of training costs. With time ADP would need only a small staff in San Martin and Pucallpa to supervise the training and technical assistance provided by the associations and cooperatives and professional training institutions.

Table 1 provides options for funding training by Farmer Field Schools through third party providers. This is a desktop example; the assumptions on costs and willingness of funding sources to participate need to be verified against actual experience by ADP. This assumes that continued producer training in the region will be primarily by FFS with an average of 25 students each training. Producers with less than 4 years’ experience since planting their new crop would receive the basic training with 12 sessions, at an average cost of US\$8 per student per session. Producers with 4-5 years since planting their crop would receive intermediate training at a cost of US\$10 per student per session, and a 10-session class. Producers with more than 5 years would be offered a training of 6 sessions at a cost of US\$14 per student per session.

**Table 1 Illustrative Options for Funding Training by Farmer Field Schools in San Martin and Pucallpa through Third Party Providers**

<b>Years since first planting for producers to be trained</b>	<b>Less than 4 years</b>		<b>4-5 years</b>		<b>More than 5 years</b>	
<b>Farmer Field Schools (FFS) (20 to 30 producers)</b>						
Cost per student per session with materials (\$US)		8.00		10.00		14.00
Sessions per class		12		8		6
Fixed share for overhead to provider institution		15.0%		17.0%		20.0%
Fixed share to trainer, technical assistance provider		85.0%		83.0%		80.0%
<b>Cost to program for one FFS with 25 students</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2,100</b>
<b>Payments to Training Provider</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>\$US</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>\$US</b>	<b>Share</b>	<b>\$US</b>
Share to provider for overhead	15%	360	17%	300	20%	315
Share to trainer or technical assistance provider	85%	2,040	83%	1,700	80%	1,785
<b>Total</b>		<b>2,400</b>		<b>2,000</b>		<b>2,100</b>
<b>Funding Source per Class</b>						
For Producers	0%	0	30%	600	40%	840
For ADP	80%	1,920	45%	900	5%	105
For Regional Government	20%	480	20%	400	5%	105
For DEVIDA	0%	0		0		0
For Municipal Government	0%	0		0		0
For Buyer of Product	0%	0	5%	100	50%	1,050
For Other Donor	0%	0		0		0
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,400</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,000</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,100</b>

With these assumptions one basic course would cost a total of US\$2,400. The training provider would retain 15 percent of the revenue for overhead expenses. The trainer would receive 85 percent of the revenue for delivering the training. The trainer would cover his or her own social benefits and transport costs.

Funding for the training can be shared by multiple institutions; in this example funding is shared by ADP, regional governments and a buyer of farm product.<sup>31</sup> Few buyers will share the costs of basic training. Some may be persuaded to share the cost of intermediate or advanced training or technical assistance where producers have product to deliver.

Table 2 uses the costs and co-funding data presented in Table 1 to estimate the costs to funding agencies if producers were provided training in San Martin North and Tocache regions. There are a total of 17,660 producers in the two regions, of which 7,303 are at less than four years from their first plantings, 2,355 producers with 4-5 years since plantings, and 8,002 producers with more than 5 years of experience since first planting. Given the assumptions in

<sup>31</sup> The Regional Director of San Martin wants to establish a Center of Excellence for Cacao in his department. He would likely be supportive of sharing funding of training and be able to interest training providers to respond to a request for proposals.

Table 1, training costs for ADP would total US\$611,663 if 100 percent of the new producers were trained, 50 percent of producers with 4-5 years were given intermediate training, and 25 percent of producers with more than 5 years were given advanced training. This also assumes the sharing of costs among funding institutions as presented in Table 1.<sup>32</sup>

The objective of tables 1 and 2 is not to precisely estimate training costs, but rather to suggest a model for USAID/Peru through ADP to provide leadership and a reasonable plan that incorporates local institutions into training and technical assistance and transfers appropriate technology to them for sharing with producers. This model facilitates inclusion of governments in San Martin and Ucayali in funding business development activities. Training and TA providers may continue to be associations and cooperatives or professional training institutions, whichever best meets the needs of producers eradicating their coca. Sharing costs may facilitate participation by multiple funding institutions. Using associations, cooperatives or specialized training institutions and having those institutions establish and support one or more promoters for each community will improve service to producers and reduce costs.

### ***III.3.2 Which Community Needs Training?***

Basic training is nearly always accomplished during the first year a new producer is in the program. Basic training will always need full or partial subsidy from governments or donors. The team identified no near-term prospect of the subsidy becoming available from the GOP. Currently donors and regional governments are the only available funding sources for this subsidy.

Producers that have five or more years of production experience need limited training, mostly in specific topics, such as combating disease and pests, reducing production costs, increasing yields, reducing fertilizer costs, and adopting promising new technologies. Commercial enterprises may also be a source of funding for this training. Governments and donors may consider supporting preparation of the training curriculum and materials. In some sectors commercial enterprises may be able to contribute to the cost of delivering this level of training to producers. Where there are few buyers in a local area, such as in palm oil, there is greater potential for commercial enterprises to fund training through discounts in payments to producers. Only in palm oil did commercial enterprises hint that they might contribute to training of producers not yet delivering product to their plants. With other commodities where there are many buyers, such as coffee, the ability of commercial enterprises to fund training is limited. Producer- and/or industry-approved discounting programs that mandate a unit or value tax on product can be used to finance training. The same program could also fund research and market development programs. These types of programs have been used before in Peru, but none now existence for cacao, coffee or palm oil.

Producers with four to five years of experience have received the basic training but may need refresher training to confirm their knowledge and convert that knowledge into practice. These

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<sup>32</sup> Tables 1 and 2 are very rough estimates of training costs for the primary crops promoted by ADP to the communities served by ADP. Training costs for other crops, animal products or communities may be quite different.

producers are just beginning to generate sufficient income from their new products to allow them to begin expansion of production and to invest in improved production practices. Training is an opportunity to review post harvest best practices and prepare them to manage wisely the phase of expansion of production.

Governments and donors will need to fund a large portion of the cost of this training. At the very least, governments and donors will need to subsidize preparation of training curriculums and materials. While these producers now have some income from their new crops, for most, spending it on training will be a lower priority than expansion of production or in meeting postponed investment or even consumption needs. Some regional governments are initiating training in agricultural production, and their focus appears to be on the basic training component.

New entrants into ADP arrive by community so training is delivered to groups. For most communities only one crop is selected to be supported by ADP.

ADP provided the team with data on the number of years since the first planting of cacao or coffee. In northern San Martin, ADP is working with 346 communities, for which 198 (57 percent) are at less than four years since their first planting of product (see Table 3 and Appendix 4, Table 1). These 198 communities, with 6,022 producers, are in the phase of receiving basic training for production. Producers in some of these communities will have completed their series of 12 sessions of basic training and have practical experience with planting and maintenance of trees. Only a few will have practical experience with post harvest activities or on how fertilization impacts income.

Communities with more than five years of experience total 117 (34 percent) of all communities. Many of these communities can acquire training and technical assistance from commercial companies that are providing inputs or purchasing farm output. Only limited support is needed from outside sources.

Local leadership in the implementing institution indicated to team members that they are planning for how to manage this technology transfer to commercial enterprises and incorporate regional governments into the process. There was little evidence that this activity has progressed beyond the design phase.

In Tocache there are a total of 128 communities participating in ADP, of which 53 (41 percent) have less than four years of experience (see Table 3 and Appendix 4, Table 2). These communities contain 1,281 producers. Communities with more than five years of experience total 66 (52 percent), and serve 2,502 producers. There are 9 communities with four or five years of experience (9 percent), with 186 producers.

In Pucallpa there are a total of 175 communities participating in ADP, of which 101 (58 percent) have less than four years' experience (see Table 3 and Appendix 4, Table 3).

**Table 2 Estimating Sharing of Costs for Training in San Martin North and Tocache by Funding Institutions**

Item	Percent of Participants Trained	Less than 4 years		4-5 years		More than 5 years		Total	
		Number of Producers to Train	Amount of Funding by Group US\$	Number of Producers to Train	Amount of Funding by Group US\$	Number of Producers to Train	Amount of Funding by Group US\$	Number of Producers to Train	Amount of Funding by Group US\$
<b>Number of Producers</b>	100%	7,303		2,355		8,002		17,660	
	75%	5,477		1,766		6,002		13,245	
	50%	3,652		1,178		4,001		8,830	
	25%	1,826		589		2,001		4,415	
<b>For Producers</b>	100%	7,303	0	2,355	56,520	8,002	268,867	17,660	325,387
	75%	5,477	0	1,766	42,390	6,002	201,650	13,245	244,040
	50%	3,652	0	1,178	28,260	4,001	134,434	8,830	162,694
	25%	1,826	0	589	14,130	2,001	67,217	4,415	81,347
<b>For ADP</b>	100%	7,303	560,870	2,355	84,780	8,002	33,608	17,660	679,259
	75%	5,477	420,653	1,766	63,585	6,002	25,206	13,245	509,444
	50%	3,652	280,435	1,178	42,390	4,001	16,804	8,830	339,629
	25%	1,826	140,218	589	21,195	2,001	8,402	4,415	169,815
<b>For Regional Governments</b>	100%	7,303	0	2,355	37,680	8,002	33,608	17,660	71,288
	75%	5,477	0	1,766	28,260	6,002	25,206	13,245	53,466
	50%	3,652	0	1,178	18,840	4,001	16,804	8,830	35,644
	25%	1,826	0	589	9,420	2,001	8,402	4,415	17,822
<b>For Buyer of Product or Input Supplier</b>	100%	7,303	0	2,355	9,420	8,002	336,084	17,660	345,504
	75%	5,477	0	1,766	7,065	6,002	252,063	13,245	259,128
	50%	3,652	0	1,178	4,710	4,001	168,042	8,830	172,752
	25%	1,826	0	589	2,355	2,001	84,021	4,415	86,376

The source for number of producers with number of years since first planting of cacao or coffee in their community is ADP.

**Table 3 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community**

February 2010	Total	Number of Participating Producers and Communities		
		Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years
<b>Region North San Martin</b>				
<b>Total number of producers</b>	13,691	6,022	2,169	5,500
<b>Percent</b>	100%	44%	16%	40%
<b>Number of communities</b>	475	241	74	160
<b>Percent</b>	100%	51%	16%	34%
<b>Region Tocache</b>				
<b>Total number of producers</b>	3,969	1,281	186	2,502
<b>Percent</b>	100%	32%	5%	63%
<b>Number of communities</b>	128	53	9	66
<b>Percent</b>	100%	41%	7%	52%
<b>North San Martin and Tocache</b>				
<b>Total number of producers</b>	17,660	7,303	2,355	8,002
<b>Percent</b>	100%	33%	7%	60%
<b>Number of communities</b>	603	294	83	226
<b>Percent</b>	100%	49%	14%	37%
<b>Region Pucallpa</b>				
<b>Total number of producers</b>	4,328	2,064	979	1,285
<b>Percent</b>	100%	48%	23%	30%
<b>Number of communities</b>	175	101	37	37
<b>Percent</b>	100%	58%	21%	21%
<b>All Regions San Martin, Tocache, Pucallpa</b>				
<b>Total number of producers</b>	21,988	9,367	3,334	9,287
<b>Percent</b>	100%	43%	15%	42%
<b>Number of communities</b>	778	295	120	263
<b>Percent</b>	100%	42%	42%	17%

It is clear from Appendix 4, Tables 1, 2 and 3 that communities within a district tend to be within one group or another. However, this tendency to group by district is less pronounced in Tocache than in northern San Martin. Perhaps this results from Tocache and Mariscal Caceres being provinces where both voluntary and programmed eradications have occurred. Programmed eradication may result in a surge in the demand for basic training.

In both San Martin North and Tocache, ADP is working with 17,660 producers, 7,303 producers of whom have less than four years of experience. Many of these producers will still need basic training and more intensive technical support. These producers are located in 294 communities, about half of the total number of communities served by ADP. Much of this training will need continued subsidy.

For the producers in the 37 percent of the communities with more than five years of experience, the training needs are more limited and could be partially financed by buying or input supplying institutions, by producers, and by small contributions by ADP and regional governments. Few of

the palm oil producers in this group, for example, will need subsidized training. Coffee growers may find that buyers are reluctant to provide training because of the presence of competitors that do not have training expenses and as a consequence may offer better prices.

The data in Appendix 4 tables one, two and three give a preliminary approximation of the unfinished training needs. A more detailed community-by-community analysis is needed to determine the training needs of each community.

ADP needs to ensure that no community is left without access to technical assistance and training. The route that ADP takes to make that training and TA available or the route that producers may take to request support may not be the same for all communities.

### **III.4 LOCAL POST HARVEST HANDLING**

Local associations and cooperatives are popular with producers when they are organized by the producers, are owned by the producers, or at least eventually to be owned by the producers, and function to serve a defined economic need of the producers. Associations and cooperatives visited by the team appear to meet these criteria, or should mature to meet these criteria.

As with support to producers of new crops, the support to local first-stage handling institutions is labor intensive, and can be capital intensive. The type and amount of support differs depending on the crop. In this discussion three crops are assessed.

#### ***III.4.1 Cacao***

Cacao must be fermented and dried immediately. Fermentation should begin within 24 hours of harvesting and continue for about a week or more, depending on the potential quality of the cacao bean. Then the bean must be dried and packaged. Without experienced and dedicated attention to the processes and without instrumentation it is difficult to consistently yield premium quality cacao beans. Few of the small producers supported by ADP have the ability to achieve consistent high quality post harvest handling of cacao beans. Fermentation and drying is best accomplished by a nearby facility.

It is impractical for multiple buyers to build fermentation and drying facilities in a local production area. Private sector investors that build local fermentation and drying plants often struggle to persuade growers that the investors are not extracting excessive margins in the purchase of their harvest. A workable solution is often a producer-owned facility. ADP has established a number of these facilities.

Most of these local associations/cooperatives focus on their primary task, to build sufficient capacity and to train their personnel to receive from producers their cacao grains and to ferment, dry and sell them to buyers. A few have realized that there are additional potential income-generating activities such as selling farm inputs to growers, and marketing coffee and other commodities of producers in the area they serve.

Support for start-up of associations/cooperatives will require substantial ADP support, most likely weekly visits and a significant time commitment to help the institution prepare the business

plan, organize, attract members, acquire productive assets, arrange and manage financing, select and train management and workers, and operate the institution.

**Recommendation for Cacao:** Continue technical assistance to the associations and cooperatives started by ADP. The intensity and duration of this support should be determined institution by institution, declining as the institution matures. The technical assistance should focus on improving the administrative capacity of directors, administrators and workers, and in helping obtain financing for plant and equipment improvement/expansion and for working capital.

### ***III.4.2 Coffee***

Nearly all producers harvest the beans and perform first-stage post harvest processing, including removing the pulp, drying the beans and packaging them in burlap sacks for delivery to buyers. There are many coffee buyers and processors in the region where ADP works. During the year some of these buyers provide technical assistance, some provide inputs. During harvest season these buyers send vehicles to collect harvested coffee beans.

Because of the long history of coffee production in Peru and the presence of many buyers, the level of support from ADP for coffee marketing and processing cooperatives is limited. One cooperative, Cooperativa La Divisora, has received ADP support to improve its quality control activities and strengthen its administration.

**Recommendation for Coffee:** Ongoing support to coffee associations and cooperatives should be limited to special needs, most importantly finding buyers for the coffee grown producers in communities eradicating coca. Support for Cooperative La Divisora should be phased out for most marketing and processing operations. Support to associations and cooperatives should continue only in the case of producers that have recently eradicated coca and have selected coffee as the replacement crop and need training.

### ***III.4.3 Palm Oil***

As part of the UN's development program in the 1990s, two palm oil processing plants were established to handle the extraction of oil from palm fruit. A third plant was established in March of 2009 in the Tocache region. In the early 2000s, the UN funding declined, and USAID/Peru agreed to support the completion of some of the plants and to provide technical and needed funding support until the production in the region reached sufficient volume for the plant to become sustainable. The OLAMSA plant is considered by the team to be sustainable. OLPESA in Tocache is very new and will need support for several years. OLPASA in Shambillo likewise will need support for several more years.

However, all of the plants are being asked by USAID/Peru and other donors to continue to train and provide technical assistance to producers who have recently or will soon be eradicating coca and becoming palm producers. Beginning producers will have meaningful amounts of palm

**Figure 16 La Ducha del Diablo near Pucallpa**



Source: Weidemann's Team

fruit bunches to sell in about four years. Financing training and technical assistance for new growers on the scale desired by USAID and other donors is difficult for these plants, who are struggling to finance their own needs for increased plant capacity and working capital.

Equity capital from producers who are the owners is difficult to acquire; producers have their own capital needs to increase area of production. Loan capital is limited by the limited value of physical assets that are available to pledge as collateral, the few years of financial records available to demonstrate sufficient cash flow to meet debt payments, and limited data available in Peru of similar operations that financial institutions use to set feasible loan repayment plans.

All three plants market most of their oil through members of the Sociedad Nacional de Industrias. Some plants market a small portion of their production locally. The purchase price is determined by the FOB (free on

board) price in Indonesia plus costs of transport and nationalization in Peru.

High yields for palm oil requires fertilization. In Peru chemical fertilizers are expensive; most ingredients are imported. Proposals exist for formulating fertilizers in Peru with varying proportions of local ingredients. The evaluation team did not attempt to identify whether these proposals are feasible. To help increase yields and lower costs, ADP should consider supporting feasibility studies for production of fertilizers from local ingredients. (Some of the cacao producers need fertilizers suitable for organic cacao.)

**Recommendation for Palm Oil:** Limited support is needed for the palm oil processing plants. The team considers OLAMSA as sustainable and may need help only in exceptional circumstances. Others, such as OLPESA, OLPASA, and INDUPALSA need continued support for 4 to 5 years more, the level of support declining over time. This support should focus on increasing throughput in the plants (currently at 40 to 50 percent of capacity), improving administrative capacity including relationships with growers, facilitating delivery of inputs to

growers, guiding research to achieve increased yields and labor saving production practices, and improving marketing of output.

For any of these plants and their related producer associations, the large number of incoming palm oil producers as a result of coca eradication will create the need for continued support to these institutions for training and technical assistance until the new producers enter the production phase. At that time the palm oil processing plants should be capable of covering the cost of training and technical assistance to producers from which they purchase raw materials.

### **III.5 INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS**

ADP is the primary negotiator with the communities when the decisions are made as to which infrastructure investments best serve the needs of the community. Therefore, ADP is best positioned to supervise the process of design, approvals and installation of these investments. The actual implementation of the design, approvals and implementation can be accomplished by working through subcontractors. Working through subcontractors may be less costly and facilitate technology transfer to Peru.

The process of determining alternative infrastructure investments and the wise selection of these investments is in itself a valuable training exercise for community leaders. The community's involvement in the planning and decision-making processes and in the actual implementation of the investment creates buy-in for the investment and helps to ensure support for maintenance of the investment.

### **III.6 PROCESSING AND MARKETING INSTITUTIONS**

#### ***III.6.1 Cacao***

Several cooperatives provide processing and marketing services both to cacao growers and to first-stage handling associations and cooperatives; ACOPAGRO, Oro Verde, Naranjillo, and La Divisora being the largest and most experienced.<sup>33</sup> In the team's estimation, three of these can be considered sustainable, able to continue operations without additional ADP assistance.<sup>34</sup> These are ACOPAGRO, Naranjillo and La Divisora. Oro Verde is still in a consolidation phase and may need up to two more years of technical assistance before attaining sustainability.

Each of these institutions plays an important role in the ADP program, providing services of marketing and processing for producers that are eradicating coca. Surely USAID, and other donors, will be asking them to increase buying from producers participating in ADP. This would mean incurring extra costs in training, member support, increasing processing capacity, and finding markets for additional product. Fortunately in the present marketing environment, costs

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<sup>33</sup> The full names are Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera, Cooperative Oro Verde, Cooperative Agraria Industrial -Naranjillo" (COOPAIN), and Cooperativa La Divisora.

<sup>34</sup> Sustainable to the team means that the company could remain viable for five years or more without additional donor assistance.

for indentifying additional markets are minimal. However, costs for plant expansion and training are significant. To allow some institutions to expand operations rapidly so that additional producers have a place to sell their production, USAID may consider providing credit guarantees for plant expansion and increased working capital.

Multiple private sector for-profit buyers for cacao operate in the region served by ADP. Most pay growers prices very similar to that offered by associations and cooperatives. Some now advertize that they offer credit and technical assistance to growers.

Naranjillo publishes the prices they pay for cacao beans that qualify as premium quality. Price offers from for-profit buyers to producers were often reported to the evaluation team by producers as about S/ .20 to S/ 0.35 more than the published price by Naranjillo. Cooperatives often pay an additional return to producers (reintrego) after the entire crop is sold and final earnings established, which adds a few cents to the final price received by the producer. Adding in the reintrego may result in a final price to producers from the cooperative that is higher or lower than paid by for-profit buyers. It appeared to the team, and Naranjillo personnel claimed, that the price published by Naranjillo establishes a regional reference price for cacao.

**Recommendation for Cacao:** USAID/Peru should continue providing technical assistance to Oro Verde over the next one to two years. In addition, USAID/Peru should consider funding ongoing training, technical assistance and inputs to all of these institutions when they provide services to new producers that are planting cacao as a replacement for coca. The amount of funding for assistance can be determined on a case-by-case basis, or (as presented above) as a fixed amount per producer per training series. USAID/Peru may also consider support to selected cooperatives and associations to improve collection of product from producers and provision of farm inputs.

Assistance may also be needed to increase plant processing capacity as a result of increasing production by these new coca eradicators. The team considers that for new eradicators in 2010 that are planting cocoa, the need for assistance from USAID/Peru should be minimal; three years from now as the production from new planting begin to arrive the processors should be sufficiently established to seek commercial capital to finance expansion.

### ***III.6.2 Coffee***

Technical assistance is needed by La Divisora with the purpose of strengthening the support it provides to ADP activities, primarily training of new producers.

**Recommendation for Coffee:** Assistance needed for internal operations and marketing is limited. Assistance will be needed if La Divisora is asked to train and the many new coffee producers eradicating coca in the years to come.

### III.6.3 Palm Oil

The three institutions discussed above are both first stage post harvest handling institutions and processors and marketing institutions. The discussion and recommendations are contained in the section above.

In Pongo de Caynarachi there is a processing plant for palm oil, not supported by ADP, but which contributes to the sustainability of palm oil in the region.

### III.7 STAFFING BY OFFICE AND DUTIES

The ADP-Chemonics reported a total of 226 staff personnel as of mid March. Table 4 indicates the number of personnel by location of assignment and by type of activities. Twenty-one percent of this ADP personnel are located in Lima.

Production specialists are engaged in helping producers grow licit crops. Much of their work is with subcontractors that are the delivery mechanism for most of the training for producers. Other specialists include community development, governability, social capital, value chain, and others. On ADP's staff for every productive specialist, there are 1.8 other specialists.

The administrative staff accounts for 27 percent of the total number of personnel and includes monitoring and evaluation personnel as well as chauffeurs and messengers and cleaning personnel for some offices. After Lima, the greatest number of personnel is in San Martin, followed closely by Ucayali. San Martin and Tocache combined account for 37 percent of ADP personnel; Ucayali, including Aguaytia, for 30 percent.

**Table 4 Number of ADP (Chemonics) Personnel by Location and Activities**

Office	Director, Coordinator	Production Specialist	Other Specialists*	Administrative	Total
<b>Aguaytia</b>	2	4	10	7	23
<b>San Martin</b>	6	9	19	12	46
<b>Tocache</b>	5	9	12	11	37
<b>Tingo María</b>	4	6	13	6	29
<b>Ucayali</b>	5	9	15	15	44
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>179</b>
<b>Lima</b>	9	2	17	19	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>86</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>226</b>

Source: ADP-Chemonics. Data does not include Chemonics International personnel assigned to the project.

\* Other specialists include community development, governability, social capital, value chain, and others.

Subcontractors provide most of the training and technical assistance and use a total of 308 persons (Table 5). A total of 190 (62 percent) of those are extension agents, 49 (16 percent) are promoters, 34 (11 percent) are administrative staff, and 34 (11 percent) are coordinators or directors. Promoters are producers that also provide technical assistance to other community members 167 of whom (54 percent) are located in San Martin or Tocache.

For ADP-Chemonics there are about four specialists for each director or coordinator. For subcontractors there are more than seven specialists and promoters for each director or coordinator.

Combined, the staff of ADP-Chemonics and subcontractors totals 533 persons working out of the following locations (Table 6):

- Aguaytia, 57 (11 percent)
- San Martin, 150 (28 percent)
- Tocache, 99 (19 percent)
- Tingo Maria, 65 (12 percent)
- Ucayali, 115 (22 percent)
- Lima, 47 (9 percent)

Combined, San Martin and Tocache have 249 workers, or 47 percent of the total. The share of personnel in these regions may have reflected past program priorities, but it does not appear to reflect anticipated program priorities.

Technical specialists, extension agents and promoters total 364 persons, or 68 percent, administrative support including monitoring and evaluation total 104 persons (20 percent), and directors and coordinators total 47 (12 percent). Directors and coordinators play mixed technical and administrative roles.

Thirty nine subcontracts are active or were recently ended (see Appendix 1, Table 3). Thirty six are with associations, foundations, or cooperatives; three are with investor-owned companies. Thirty five subcontracts are classified as in the consolidation phase, four as in post eradication phases. In the four post eradication phase subcontracts, 21 persons are working.

**Table 5 Number of Subcontractor Personnel by Location and Activities**

Office	Director, Coordinator	Extension Agent	Promoter	Administrative	Total
<b>Aguaytia</b>	4	16	8	6	34
<b>San Martin</b>	10	70	16	8	105
<b>Tocache</b>	8	42	2	10	62
<b>Tingo Maria</b>	5	26	1	4	36
<b>Ucayali</b>	7	36	22	6	71
<b>Total</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>308</b>

Source: ADP-Chemonics

**Table 6 Combined Number of Personnel by Location and Activities**

Office	Director, Coordinator	Technical Specialist	Administrative	Total
<b>Aguaytia</b>	6	38	13	57
<b>San Martin</b>	16	114	20	150
<b>Tocache</b>	13	65	21	99
<b>Tingo Maria</b>	9	46	10	65
<b>Ucayali</b>	12	82	21	115
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>345</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>486</b>
<b>Lima</b>	9	19	19	47
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>364</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>533</b>

Source: ADP-Chemonics

**Table 7 Combined Share of Personnel by Location and Activities**

Office	Director, Coordinator	Technical Specialist	Administrative	Total
<b>Aguaytia</b>	1%	7%	2%	11%
<b>San Martin</b>	3%	21%	4%	28%
<b>Tocache</b>	2%	12%	4%	19%
<b>Tingo Maria</b>	2%	9%	2%	12%
<b>Ucayali</b>	2%	15%	4%	22%
<b>Sub Total</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>91%</b>
<b>Lima</b>	2%	4%	4%	9%
<b>Total</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>68%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>100%</b>

Source: ADP-Chemonics

### III.8 SUPPORTING AGRICULTURAL SECTOR SERVICES

Support for agricultural services includes finance, research in production technologies, market development, infrastructure development, policies and regulations, and natural resources management.

The ADP has provided extensive infrastructure development, especially in rural areas. Improved roads and bridges and electrical service are major contributors to the viability of licit crops. Commitments to infrastructure investments occur when communities sign agreements to end coca production and begin

establishment of licit crops. The team did not attempt to catalog outstanding infrastructure commitments in the San Martin, Tocache or Pucallpa regions.

ADP's attempts to persuade financial institutions to provide credit to producers served by the program met with limited success. The future is brighter for those producers that now have trees yielding product for sale. In particular palm oil growers should soon find that commercial financial institutions will begin offering financial products with acceptable terms for small producers. This should speed planting of additional area to palm oil.

### III.9 DONOR COORDINATION IN SAN MARTIN AND PUCALLPA

ADP built on the previous work of the United Nations (UN), both in the San Martin Region and Pucallpa. USAID/Peru continues to fund UN units to provide training and technical assistance to producers. Germany Cooperation also supported installation of 5,800 hectares of palm oil trees in the area of ACEPAT (Asociación Central de Palmicultores de Tocache) and OLPESA (Oleaginosas del Peru S.A., a palm oil processing plant), later supported by ADP. To this extent, there was and is donor coordination with the Germans and the UN.

The UN introduced palm oil trees, cacao and palmito in the Northern San Martin Region in the last years of the '90s. Its strategy was to support producer organizations to take on the role of intermediaries in the processing of these crops. Thus, the UN financed processing plants for palm oil, organized the associations of ACOPAGRO and Oro Verde to process cacao in the San Martin Region, assisted in targeting specialized European markets for high flavor cacao and also supported the palmito plant of APROPAL, ALIANZA, S.A. As part of its strategy for strengthening these associations, the UN provided experienced managers to each association and paid their salaries for two years. These managers have remained in these associations playing an important role in their growth.

In Pucallpa, the UN introduced palm oil as a replacement crop for coca in 1992, establishing a plant nursery in 1993. The initial production did not have a market because processing facilities were lacking in the area. This led to the creation of COCEPU, a five-hundred-family palm producer association that took the lead in financing the OLAMSA palm processing plant, with COCEPU as the main stockholder. As one producer stated, “The palm oil has allowed us to leave behind the darkness, making it possible for us to live in the open and interact with authorities and regular people.” “Liberty, tranquility and transparency are the qualities of life resulting from palm oil,” said another.

OLAMSA, (Empresa de Oleaginosas del Amazonas, S.A.) started by processing 6 TM/hr., increasing its capacity recently to 12 TM/hr. By October, the plant will have the capacity to process 24 TM/hr. However, with new areas coming into production, COCEPU is negotiating with the Banco de Credito a line of credit to build a second processing plant in Campo Verde.

Through the “aval” (guarantee) of OLAMSA (Oleaginosas Amazonica S.A.), members of COCEPU (Comité Central del Pamicultores de Ucayali) are credit recipients for production, fertilization and maintenance of plantations; they do not have credit for expanding new areas. However, some members are credit card holders.

COCEPU has used earnings from OLAMSA’s operations for funding a palm nursery to provide plants for an additional 3,000 hectares in the process of being planted. Most of these new areas are financed by the producers themselves. OLAMSA pays bi-weekly to its members about US\$200,000. Its sales exceed one million dollars monthly.

### ***III.9.1 Other Donor Activities that Support Licit Crops***

The United Nations established a palmito plant in Santa Lucía (Uchiza). Spanish assistance made possible the establishment of a palmito plant in Pongo de Caynarachi, Alianza (called “La Orquidea”), as well as a chocolate plant in Tarapoto. There was no indication of coordination with ADP in establishing these plants.

German cooperation began in a small valley of the River Chontayacu in the Tocache area supporting alternative crops. With additional funding from KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau), the area of attention expanded considerably. This project has been coordinating activities with ADP. The early phases of this project have ended and another phase is under negotiation with UN.

PRONATEA, a Swiss group, is currently coordinating with ADP in Campo Verde in creating a working capital fund for S/.136,000 for a community in the area.

In Pucallpa, the UN strategy introduced palm, cacao and palmito crops, promoted producers associations and funded the OLPASA palm processing plant. The UN also funded a small palmito processing plant in Aguaytia that is not operating at present.

There is another palmito processing plant in Sungaroyacu, (Puerto Inca) that is not operating at present but could be restarted when conditions are appropriate.

In summary, there is not strong evidence of effective donor coordination in either the San Martin or Pucallpa regions. Donors have been present at different periods and have implemented projects based on their agendas, which have been similar to the agenda of USAID/Peru—to establish licit crops that generate sufficient and reliable income to motivate rural residents to select that lifestyle.

The most related and coordinated efforts have been with the UN. This donor, while funding lasted, was able to establish a basis for later ADP successes in the Northern San Martin Region. The introduction of palm oil, cacao and palmito in the region, the grouping of producers in associations and the establishment of processing plants with managerial assistance, were instrumental interventions in ensuring that these associations to have a business orientation.

ADP intervention benefitted from the work of the UN, and as coca eradication progressed in the zone, ADP was able to successfully join efforts with regional and municipal governments in support of licit crops. Today in the region, licit crops are the dominate source of agricultural income.

**Conclusion:** Based on the UN presence in the region, the team recommends continuing the relationship between USAID/Peru and the UN, with UN's primary role to train producers eradicating coca and to enhance the capacity and performance of the oil palm industry.

# **APPENDIX 1 STATEMENT OF WORK**

In the continuation is the statement of work provided by USAID/Peru for this evaluation.

## **Evaluation of USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program**

### **I. PURPOSE**

The evaluation is an important tool to increase program presence and fortify gains made in the fragile areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca, Tingo Maria, and Tocache, areas which will likely be affected by the Government of Peru's ongoing eradication program in 2010 and 2011. The evaluation will review both successes and failures of the current USAID/Peru's Alternative Development (AD) Program, specifically recommending strategies for gradual redeployment of ADP resources from more secure areas in northern San Martin, and elsewhere, to areas where they are most likely needed in this fragile triangle (i.e., Aguaytia-Huipoca, Tingo Maria, and Tocache). To more easily identify promising interventions that can be applied in other post-programmed eradication zones, evaluators will pay particular attention to the AD program in Tocache, where measurable successes have been made within this former, hard-core coca growing area.

### **II. BACKGROUND**

USAID/Peru signed a five-year, \$79 million contract with Chemonics International in September 2007. The goals of the new Alternative Development (AD) Program are as follows: (1) to assist significant numbers of new communities and families to transition to a licit lifestyle after programmed eradication and (2) to ensure the sustainability of the licit development gains made to date in the 800 communities of the voluntary eradication program, taking place between 2002 and 2007.

As part of this strategy, USAID/Peru initiated a post-programmed, alternative development program that moved in behind the Government of Peru's (GoP) eradication program, focusing on investments in short-term labor, small animal husbandry, high-value crops, building social capital, and strengthening governability. The new Alternative Development contract was designed to consolidate voluntary eradication areas and post-programmed eradication alternative development areas. Targets and goals in the contract were defined to measure results towards the programs' objectives of new hectares of licit crops planted and the productivity of those crops, strengthening social capital and governability, and overall behavior change.

This initiative was innovative and risky, but over the next several years the program had and continues to have great success. These cumulative program successes in both the voluntarily eradicated and program eradicated areas of San Martin have been termed by many the San Martin Model, and by some Peruvians, "the San Martin Miracle."

Alongside this program success in San Martin is a less sanguine development context in the region of Huánuco, where the AD program also operates. Intensified GoP military action in the *Sendero Luminoso* stronghold of the Valle del Rio Apurimac y Ene in south central Peru has caused the terrorist group to try to solidify its hold in the Huánuco region. As part of that increased activity, production has moved north towards the successful post-eradication alternative development program, threatening provincial and local mayors and even ADP program participants. It is clear that increased investments in this area are needed if the program is to hold its ground.

At the same time, it is also apparent that the areas in and around Aguaytia, in the Ucayali region, are also suffering from a deteriorating security situation. Committed cocaleros (coca growers) have moved out of Tocache, following the government's eradication program, and migrated to other areas of the country in order to continue illicit activities. Unfortunately, one of the main destinations for these *cocaleros* has been Aguaytia-Huipoca and the outskirts of the Shambillo valley, where the USG has invested millions of dollars to date. Deteriorating circumstances in these areas have precipitated the need to "redouble" efforts, in order that investments and hard-won successes are not lost to the *cocaleros* and narco-traffickers.

### **Activity Summary:**

USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program, a key component of the USG's comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy, operates in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, including the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as the Government of Peru (GOP), to promote licit development in formerly coca growing areas and sustain coca reduction achieved with eradication programs. USAID works in close coordination with the Narcotics Affairs Section to identify potential communities where programmed eradication by the GOP has taken place. Those communities are offered the opportunity to sign "no replanting agreements" in which they commit to remaining coca free and USAID and the GOP commit to support their transition to a licit livelihood with a package of assistance tailored to each community's priorities and needs — thereby making programmed eradication sustainable.

As the program expands into new areas in support of programmed eradication activities, USAID simultaneously continues to support the growth and sustainability of a licit economy and lifestyle in communities previously assisted by the program. USAID support to these communities has evolved to focus on the consolidation of the economic and social gains made in prior years, to make them sustainable for the long term. This means increasing the productivity of installed cacao, café, and oil palm, helping farmers in accessing credit to expand their crop production, strengthening producer associations and cooperatives to ensure optimum prices and access to local and international markets, and working closely with producers and communities to build their capacity for collective action and self-advocacy. Women's well-being and gender equity are also important components of the program, emphasizing creative, participatory approaches for inclusion of women in economic activities and overall consciousness-raising in communities, to ensure that both genders have equal access to program benefits.

- **More than 15,117 hectares of illicit coca have been voluntarily eradicated by former coca growers**, equivalent to approximately 80,000 kilos of annual cocaine production with a street value of \$8 billion.
- **The program has had a major development impact in communities that have been eradicated.** Since 2002, the program has completed 660 infrastructure works, including 175 schools, 100 potable water systems, 15 health clinics, 139 community multi-purpose buildings, 41 bridges, and 87 rehabilitated rural roads. Over 52,000 families have received assistance with licit crops, such as cacao, coffee, cotton, corn and palm oil and pijuayo for palmitos, on more than 67,000 hectares. In addition, the program invested nearly \$30 million in rehabilitating 90 kms of a major thoroughfare between Juanjui and Tocache, eliminating a major bottleneck and connecting isolated jungle communities economically and socially to the rest of the country.
- **More than \$10 million dollars in sales of cacao were reported in FY 2008**, expected to triple in value by 2010. The equivalent of more than 2,500 jobs was created through farm labor in ADP communities.
- **More than 42 municipalities have been strengthened** through training programs, management improvement, and technical assistance. The impact of this touches all citizens who benefit from improved local government in these remote rural areas.
- **New credit products have been designed that will link credit-worthy alternative development farmers** to formal financial institutions for the first time. Through alliances with private banking institutions, program interventions made investments in credit feasible by lowering risk for banks through improved information and pre-vetted clients for revolving credit accounts for investments in crop expansion.

### **Principle Evaluation Questions for Program Evaluation:**

1. **What are the factors that have contributed to the continual participation of program participants in Tocache?** In answering this question, please differentiate between the initial reasons why participants entered the program and the underlying factors that have contributed to program retention.
2. **What AD strategies worked in Tocache and what strategies failed to produce anticipated results? Why?**
3. **To what degree can external factors be credited or blamed for successes and failures of the AD program in Tocache** (e.g., commodity prices, government or other donor interventions, economic conditions)?
4. **What AD strategies should be considered for Aguaytia-Huipoca**, based on the Tocache experience and the particularities of Aguaytia-Huipoca? In answering this question, please also examine and make recommendations on the ADP office staffing pattern and composition that would be necessary to produce sustainable results in Aguaytia-Huipoca.
5. **What factors have contributed to Aguaytia's return to coca cultivation** despite

USAID's high level of investment in the area since 2002? In answering this questions, please make sure to substantively evaluate the AD communication strategy in Aguaytia for weakness and strengths.

6. **What role, if any, has gender played as a cross-cutting issue to achieve results in Tocache? How should gender be treated and considered in terms of program design and implementation in Aguaytia-Huipoca.**
7. **To what extent is it possible to graduate AD communities in northern San Martin and Pucallpa from direct USAID assistance?** Additionally, what interventions are still needed to consolidate these communities and specifically which ones? In terms of sequencing, in what order should activities be phased out?
8. **To what degree has donor coordination played a role in achieving AD successes in San Martin and Pucallpa?** How might USAID enhance donor coordination to leverage successes moving forward?

### III. METHODOLOGY

The evaluation shall combine elements of both a desk review of available publications, reports, and proposals and field visits to ADP program areas, specifically, San Martin, Huanuco, and Ucayali. Relevant documents shall be distributed prior to commencement of entrance conference. Determination of specific site visits will be made in consultation with USAID.

### IV. LANGUAGE

All international consultants forming part of the evaluation team must be fluent in both English and Spanish.

### V. PERSONNEL

The team should be composed of between 3-4 members. At least one member should have a strong background in the use of gender analysis for program evaluation purposes. Also, to the extent possible, team members should have some familiarity with alternative development (inside or outside of Peru) and knowledge of the general Peruvian context.

**Team Leader:** Economist or specialist in agro-business. Should have a strong background in monitoring and evaluation, with expertise in both qualitative and quantitative evaluation techniques. Prior experience in evaluating agriculture and livelihood development programs will be helpful.

**Deputy Team Leader:** Sociologist, with emphasis on community-based development and social capital theory and detailed knowledge of Peru.

**Other Suggested Team Member:** Agronomist or agriculture expert, preferably a specialist currently residing in Peru.

## APPENDIX 2 ITINERARY

### Agenda de Entrevistas por Weidemann Associates

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Tuesday</b> <b>16.02.2010</b>	9:00	Meeting with Alternative Development Program Team Location: USAID CR 131
	15:00	Meeting with Charles Oberbeck (Director) and Lawrence Szott (Deputy Director), Chemonics. Location: Chemonics

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Tuesday</b> <b>16.02.2010</b>	9:00	Meeting with Alternative Development Program Team Location: USAID CR 131
	15:00	Meeting with Charles Oberbeck (Director) and Lawrence Szott (Deputy Director), Chemonics. Location: Chemonics

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Wednesday</b> <b>17.02.2010</b>	8:30	Courtesy call with Andrew Herscovitz (Acting Mission Director) and Steve Olive (Acting Deputy Director) Location: USAID
	15:00	Meeting with Manuel Estela, ConsultAndes Location: USAID CR 205
	16:30	Reunion con Hugo Centuron (Director de Desarrollo Social) Location: Chemonics
	17:30	Reunion con Juan Jose Vega (Director de Comunicaciones) Location: Chemonics

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Thursday</b> <b>18.02.2010</b>	9:00	Meeting with Fernando Hurtado, DEVIDA's Alternative Development Chief. Location: Devida
	11:00	Meeting with Abelardo Arias (NAS) Location: American Embassy
	16:00	Reunion con Aaron Drayer (Director de Desarrollo Economico) y Equipo Jose Gamarra (Gerente de FCV), Hugo Palma (Gerente de Actividades Economicas), Jose Luis Lozano (Gerente de Acceso al Credito) y Pablo Pampa (Especialista en Proyecto Productivos) Location: Chemonics.

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Friday</b> <b>19.02.2010</b>	8:30	Meeting with Jaime Garcia, ConsultAndes Location: ConsultAndes
	10:00	Meeting with Raul Salazar (Director) Location: Macroconsult
	11:30	Meeting with Cristina Olive, Education Office Chief Location: CR – 205 USAID

### **PROPUESTA Preliminar de AGENDA**

**Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores** a la Oficina Regional San Martín  
Tarapoto 22 - 25 de Febrero del 2010

#### GRUPOS 1 y 2

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Lunes</b>  <b>22.02.2010</b>	13:30- 14:30	Refrigerio en Hotel "Rio Shilcayo"
	15:00-16:30	Reunión con el Presidente de la Región San Martín / Lic. Cesar Villanueva
	16:45 – 18:00	Visita experiencia ICT — Ing. Enrique Arevalo Gardini y Equipo
	18:00- 19:30	Breve reunión con equipo PDA de San Martín

#### GRUPOS 1 y 2

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Martes</b> <b>23.02.2010</b>	07:30 — 08:00	- Viaje de Tarapoto a Lamas
	08:00 — 10:00	- Reunión con el Gerente de la CAC Oro Verde y Dialogo con agricultores participantes del PDA en café y cacao
	10:00 — 10:30	- Retorno de Lamas a Tarapoto

#### GRUPO 01: VISITA A OZ TARAPOTO Y PONGO DE CAYNARACHI

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Martes</b> <b>23.02.2010</b>	10:30 — 12:00	- Viaje de Tarapoto a Pongo de Caynarachi
	12:00 — 13:30	- Almuerzo en el Rest. Chino Tang
	13.30 — 13:45	- Traslado a la comunidad de Yumbatos
	13:45 — 15:00	<u>Comunidad de Yumbatos:</u> - Reunión con autoridades y productores de cacao, participantes del PDA.
	15.00 — 15.20	Traslado a la Planta Procesadora de Alianza SA
	15.20 — 16.45	<u>Reunion en Alianza SA</u> - Conversación con el Gerente de Alianza SA - Reunión con agricultores que conducen palmitos
	16:45 — 18:00	- Retorno a la ciudad de Tarapoto.
	19:30 — 20:30	- Cena en Restaurante "Rincón Surer**"
		- Descanso en el Hotel Rio Shilcayo.
<b>Miercoles</b> <b>24.02.2010</b>	07:30 - 08:30	- Viaje de Tarapoto a Chazuta.
	08:30 - 10:00	- Reunión con Alcalde y Regidores de la Municipalidad de Chazuta.
	10:00 - 11:00	- Reunión con Presidente y Gerente de ALLIMA Cacao.
	11:00 – 12:00	- Visita a la comunidad Banda de Chazuta: Reunión con autoridades y agricultores participantes.
	12:30 - 13:30	- Almuerzo en Rest. Charito.
	13:30 - 13:45	- Traslado a la comunidad de Ramón Castilla.
	13:45 - 16:00	<u>Comunidad de Ramón Castilla.</u> - Reunión con autoridades comunales y participantes.
	16:00 - 17:30	- Retorno a la ciudad de Tarapoto
	17.45 — 18-45	- Visita y entrevista con Gerente / trabajadores de Agro Industrias Mayo (empresa que produce los "Chocolates Orquídea"
	19.00	- Cena en Restaurante "Café Do Mundo" - Descanso en el Hotel Rio Shilcayo.

<b>Jueves 25.02.2010</b>	08:30 — 09.30	- Reunion con funcionarios de DEVIDA/Pedro Talla y Equipo - Reunion con representantes de la Mesa Monica de Cacao de la Region San Martin.
	10:00 — 11.15	
	11:15 — 11:30	- Traslado al Aeropuerto.
	12:30	- Retorno a la ciudad de Lima

**GRUPO 02:** Visita a las OZ Juanjui y Bellavista

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Martes 23.02.2010</b>	10:30 – 12:45	- Viaje de Tarapoto a Juanjui
	12:45 – 13:00	- Chequeo y registro en Hotel Capricornio
	13:05 – 13:35	- Dialogo con personal de la Oficina Zonal de Juanjui del PDA
	13:40 - 14:30	- Almuerzo Restaurant "La Selva"
	14:30 - 15:30	- Traslado a la comunidad de Alto El Sol
	15:30 - 17.30	<u>Comunidad de Alto El So!:</u> - Dialogo con autoridades comunales, lideresas y participantes PDA
	17.30 - 18.30	- Traslado a la ciudad de Juanjui
	18:30	- Acondicionamiento y descanso Hotel Capricornio
	20:00	- Cena Restaurant La Selva
<b>Miercoles 24.02.2010</b>	7:00 - 7:45	- Desayuno en Hotel "Capricornio"
	7:45 - 08:30	- Viaje de Juanjui a Saposoa
	08:30-10:00	Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga: Dialogo con autoridades municipales: - Fernando Grandes Veintemilla - Alcalde Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga. - Roberto Pacheco Armas — Gerente municipal - MP Huallaga - Juan Delgado Talled° - Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Piscocoyacu. - Rodolfo Ivan Bardales Aspaj - Regidor MD Piscocoyacu
	10:00 - 11:30	Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga - Dialogo con productores lderes y lideresas de cacao y café
	11:30 - 12:30	Agencia Agraria - Saposoa - Reunión con adores locales (Mesa Tecnica Provincial Cacao — Huallaga)
	12:30 - 13:15	- Retomo a Juanjul
	13:20 - 14:20	- Almuerzo Restaurant La Selva
	14:25 - 14:50	- Acondicionamiento y descanso Hotel "Capricornio"
	15.00 - 16.00	Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Caceres: Dialogo con autoridades municipales: - Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz — Alcalde(e) Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Caceres y Regidora de la Comisión de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano - Jose Gilberto Ydrogo Vera — Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo - Rodil Cachique Cappillo — Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo - Rub& Ruiz Weninger— Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza - Napoleon Seijas Valles — Gerente Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
	16.10 - 18.00	- Reunion con encargada de la Gerencia de ACOPAGRO — Srta. Luzmila Paredes, directivos y coordinador tacnico Proyecto Cacao. Visita planta de procesamiento, laboratorio de calidad, almacenes.
	18.10 - 19.30	- Reunion y dialogo con representantes de empresas privadas y con empresas acopiadoras de cacao en Juanjui.
	20:00	- Cena Restaurant La Selva
	<b>Jueves 25.02.10</b>	7:00 – 8:00
8:00 – 8:30		Reunion con agricultores de la Comunidad de Las Mercedes y otras
9:45 -10:30		<u>Planta de Beneficio de Pucacaca</u> - Dialogo con productores lideres y lideresas de cacao y café

10:30 - 11:30	- Retorno a Tarapoto
11:30 - 11:45	- Traslado al Aeropuerto

**PROPUESTA DE AGENDA (03-03-2010)**  
**Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores a la Oficina Regional de Tocache**  
Tocache – 01 al 05 Marzo del 2010

GRUPOS 1 Y 2.

DIA	HORA	ACTIVIDAD
<b>Lunes</b> <b>01-03-2010</b>	7.00 – 14.00	Viaje delegación Tarapoto -- Tocache
	14.00 – 17.00	Instalación delegación
	17.15 – 18.45	Presentación del trabajo del PDA en la Oficina Regional de Tocache, participante Director Regional y Coordinadores Zonales, Especialistas transversales (M&E, Comunicaciones, Infraestructura, medio ambiente) y cadenas de valor

GRUPO 01: Visita OZ Uchiza

DIA	HORA	ACTIVIDAD
<b>Martes</b> <b>02-03-2010</b>		<b>GRUPO 1: UCHIZA</b>
	07.00 – 08.15	- Viaje de Tocache a Uchiza
	08.15 – 08.45	<u>Uchiza</u> - Desayuno en el Restaurante Estela Maris – Uchiza.
	08.45 – 09.30	Reunión con Alcalde Distrital y Gerente Municipal / Coordinador Zonal - Sr. Segundo Emilio Núñez Pantoja Alcalde - Sr. Andrés Tarazona Gerente Municipal
	09.30 – 10.00	- Viaje de Uchiza a la comunidad de Valle Shunte
	10.00 – 11.00	<u>Comunidad de Valle Shunte y Los Angeles:</u> - Reunión con autoridades y productores(as) de cacao, participantes del PDA. Entrevista: En parcela de Abilio Espinoza Piñán y Honan Morales Sánchez.
	11.00 – 11.10	- Traslado a la comunidad de Los Angeles
	11.10 – 12.00	<u>Comunidad Los Angeles:</u> - Reunión con autoridades y productores(as) de cacao, participantes del PDA.
	12.00 – 12.30	Traslado a Uchiza.
	13.00 – 14.00	<u>Uchiza</u> - Almuerzo en el Restaurante Estela Maris
	14.00 – 15.30	<u>Uchiza</u> - Reunión con directivos / personal técnico – administrativo de la Asociación de Productores de Cacao de Uchiza (APCU). Temas a conversar - Implementación de proyectos productivos (cacao) - Organización y vision empresarial de APCU - Visita a la planta de beneficio (en construcción)
	15.30 – 16.30	<u>Uchiza</u> - Reunión con Equipo Zonal de Uchiza
	16.30 – 17.45	- Retorno de Uchiza a Tocache

GRUPO 02: Visita OZ – Pólvara y Tocache

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Martes 02-03-2010</b>	06.30 – 9.00	Salida de Tocache – comunidades CEPESA – La Florida
	09.15 – 10.30	Reunión con autoridades, líderes y agricultores de las comunidades Puerto Rico, Villa Los Ángeles, Cedro, La Florida y CEPESA (Distrito de Pólvara). Responsables Agente y Delegado de La Florida. Lugar: Institución educativa. Visita de parcelas de cacao (Amada Guerra)
	10.35 – 11.40	Traslado La Florida – Balsa Probana
	11.45 – 13.15	Reunión con autoridades, líderes y agricultores de Balsa Probana Responsables: Maria Pinedo (Agente Municipal), Reinaldo Jara (delegado) y Fílida Ruiz (Lideresa). Lugar: Institución Educativa Observación: Infraestructura: local communal, comedor popular, Puente Gramalote, sistema de agua. Módulos de cuyes (Tercero Valles y Clara Jamba)
	13.20 – 13.30	Traslado Balsa Probana – Filadelfia
	13.35 – 13.50	Observación / diálogo sobre módulos de piscigranjas (Pablo Mendoza)
	13.50 – 14.00	Traslado Filadelfia – Tananta
	14.00 – 14.30	Visita de parcelas de Palma. Aceitera. Entrevista: Sr. Arellano Padilla Marcelo.
	14.35 – 14.45	Traslado Tananta – Nuevo Bambamarca
	14.50 – 15.10	Reunión con Alcaldesa de CP Nuevo Bambamarca
	15.15 – 15.30	Reunión con representantes de la Empresa Amazon TRADING (cacao).
	15.35 – 15.50	Reunión con representantes de la Organización de Productores ASPROC-NBT (cacao).
	15.50 – 16.20	Traslado Nuevo Bambamarca - Tocache
<b>Miércoles 03-03-2010</b>	07.00 – 08.30	Traslado Tocache – Nuevo Belén en distrito de Shunte.
	08.30 – 09.30	<u>Nuevo Belén:</u> Reunión con agricultores(as) cafetaleros(as) Entrevista: Ceferino Pino Vera, Bonifacio Torres Hernández, Mario Margarín Alvarado
	09.35 – 09.40	Traslado Nuevo Belén – Montecristo
	09.45 – 10.45	<u>Montecristo:</u> Reunión con agricultores(as) cafetaleros: Entrevista: Néstor Quiroz Florez, Manuel Carranza Acosta y Segundo Flores López.
	10.50 – 12.10	Traslado Montecristo – Tocache

	15.30 – 17.00	Reunión de trabajo con la Municipalidad Provincial de Tocache Entrevista a: Alcalde Provincial y Gerente de Desarrollo Económico. Temas: El PDA en Tocache. Obras de Infraestructura. Proyecto Cacao. Diagnóstico Mishollo. Fortalecimiento de Red de Regidoras. Coordinación y trabajo con PDA.
<b>Jueves 04-03-2010</b>	07.15 – 07.25	Traslado Tocache – Almendras
	07.30 – 09.30	Reunión con la Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache (Cacao) Presidente, Gerente y Coordinador y Sub Coordinadores / equip técnico – Lugar: Comité Sectorial de Almendras / Tocache.
	10.00 – 11.00	Reunión con la Mesa Técnica de Cacao. Entrevista a sus principales representantes y directivos. Lugar: Oficina PDA
	11.30 – 12.00	Reunión con ELECTRO TOCACHE Entrevista: Gerente Temas: Financiamiento de obras de electrificación y trabajo conjunto con PDA. Lugar: Oficina PDA.
	15.50 – 17.00	Reunión con ACEPAT-OLPESA: Tema de Palma aceitera. Situación actual, perspectivas. Entrevista: Presidente Eli Ney Sánchez Ríos, Gerente OLPESA Norberto Angulo García. Presidente directorio OLPESA Sr. Néstor Sánchez Falcón Director OLPESA Sr. José Fernández Vela Lugar: Local de ACEPAT
	17.15 – 18.30	Visita a grupo de mujeres “La Fuerza del Mañana” Entrevista: Presidenta, Gladis Gamarra y socias. Temas: Negocio de confecciones
<b>Viernes 05-03-2010</b>		Reunión con la CAC DIVISORIA (Café). El café en Tocache, situación actual y perspectivas. Presidente, Gerente Lugar: Local Divisoria en Tingo María

**PROPUESTA Preliminar de AGENDA  
Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores  
a la Oficina Regional de Tingo María**

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Viernes 05 de Marzo del 2010</b>	12.15-13.00	Refrigerio/ Almuerzo en Tocache
	14.30 – 15.30	Reunión con la Asociación de Productores Juan Velasco Alvarado. Implementa proyecto cacao en paraíso. Entrevista con Directivos, personal técnico, administrativo, Alcalde del Centro Poblado Menor de Paraíso y Equipo Técnico de PDA en Nuevo Progreso - Paraíso
	15.30-18.00	Viaje Nuevo Progreso – Tingo María.

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Sabado 6 de Marzo del 2010</b>	08.30-10.00	Reunion equipo PDA. Presentacion, dialogo y entrevista.
	10:00-11:30	Traslado a CAC DIVISORIA Reunion con Gerente y CD CAC Divisoria, Ing. Romulo Echegaray (no estará presente) Se ha delegado a Administradora Katia Tito Pocori. Reunión con productores (as) de Café. (06 participantes)

		Comunidades de Margarita, Ugarteche y Hermilio Valdizan. - Presentación de cooperativa y CD PDA - Muestra de productos, citación y degustación de café - Recorrido de instalaciones.
	11:40-1:30	Traslado a COOPAIN ( de Naranjillo a Afilador) Reunión con Gerente y COOPAIN, Sr. Magno Cantaro. (No estará presente) Se ha delegado al Ing. Héctor Vera - Presentación de cooperativa y CD PDA - Muestra de productos, citación y degustación de café - Recorrido de instalaciones.
	1:30-2:45	Almuerzo: Restaurante Campestre Las Lomas – Afilador Almuerzo de trabajo con Jefe de Oficina desconcentrada de DEVIDA, Manuel Lambruschini Pardo
	3:00 – 4:00	Reunión con productores(as) de Cacao (6 participantes) Comunidad de Huyhuantillo y Pendencia. Lugar: sala de reuniones de PDA
	4:00 – 5:00	Reunión directivos y participantes de AGROFLORA (6 participantes) Lugar: sala de reuniones de PDA Ing. Lancy Ponce Falcón Ext. Napoleón Ponce Falcón
	5:00-6:00	

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Domingo 7 de Marzo del 2010</b>	(por definir entre Luis Ramos y Arvin Bunker)	Viaje a Tingo Maria – Aguaytia - Pucallpa
		Llegada y registro en Pucallpa. Nota. Definir Hotel (Recomendamos Hotel Foresta Inn)

### **Propuesta de Agenda**

Visita Empresa Weidemann Associates INC, Comisión Evaluadora del Programa, a la Oficina Regional Ucayali Pucallpa 08 de Marzo del 2010

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Lunes 08.03.2010</b>	7:00-7:45	Desayuno
	8:00-9:00	<u>Reunión con el Equipo de Ucayali</u> Presentación del personal y dialogo con los trabajadores de la OR
	9:00-10:00	<u>Viaje de Pucallpa a Neshuya</u>
	10:00-11:00	<u>Visita a la Planta de OLAMSA</u> Promoción del cultivo, Asociatividad, Fortalecimiento Organizacional/Dialogo con los representantes de COCEPU y OLAMSA
	11:00-11:15	<u>Viaje de Neshuya a Sauce del Alto Uruya</u>
	11:15-12:15	<u>Visita a la Comunidad Sauce de Alto Uruya</u> Zona de producción, manejo técnico, asociatividad/Entrevistas con productores líderes
	12:15-13:00	<u>Viaje de Sauce de Alto Uruya a Campo Verde</u>
	13:00-14:00	Almuerzo – Campo Verde
	14:00-14:30	<u>Reunión con el Equipo Zonal Campo Verde</u> Presentación del personal y dialogo con los trabajadores de la OZ
	14:30-15:30	<u>Visite a la Municipalidad Distrial de Campo Verde</u> Promoción del Cultivo de Cacao, Trabajos de Desarrollo Social/Entrevista al Alcalde, Gerente de Desarrollo Económico y Gerente de Desarrollo Social
	15:30-15:45	<u>Viaje de Campo Verde a Nueva Dinamarca</u>

	15:45-16:45	<u>Visita a la Comunidad Nueva Dinamarca</u> Ampliación de áreas, manejo técnico, practicas asociativas y Fortalecimiento Organizacional/Entrevista a productores lideres, representantes del Comité de Productores Nueva Dinamarca y Directiva de la CAC Campo Verde
	16:45-17:30	Viaje de Nueva Dinamarca a Pucallpa
	17:30-18:30	<u>Visita al Gobierno Regional de Ucayali</u> Dialogo con el Vicepresidente Regional y Gerencias Regionales
	22:15-23:15	Retorno Pucallpa - Lima

**Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo**  
**Programa de trabajo Evaluadores Empresa Weidemann**  
**Associates Inc. en OFICINA ZONAL AGUAYTIA**  
**(Aguaytía del 09-11 de marzo 2010)**

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Martes 09 de Marzo</b>	06.45-9.45	Viaje Pucallpa – Aguaytía
	10.00-11.20	Reunión: Oficina Regional de Aguaytía Equipo Oficina Regional
	11.20-11.40	Traslado a Boquerón
	11.40-13.00	<u>Reunión</u> Productores de Palma (Parcela Sr. Patricio Nolasco) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Victoria Flores E.</li> <li>• Patricio Nolasco</li> <li>• Bravo Guerrero</li> <li>• Guillermo Jhon</li> </ul>
	13.00-13.20	Traslado a Aquatía
	13.20-13.00	Almuerzo
	15.00-16.30	<u>Reunión</u> con representantes, directivos y personal técnico del Consorcio de Productores de Plátano ( <i>COPPU</i> )
	16.30-17.30	<u>Reunión</u> con representantes de la Sub Región del Gobierno Regional de Ucayali <i>Ing. Wilson Pinedo – Gerente Sub Región</i>

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Miércoles 10 de Marzo</b>	08.10-08.20	Traslado Aguaytía – Centro Yurac. Visitar y entrevistar a productores de plátano.
	08.20-10.00	<u>Reunión 01: Parcela Teófilo Berrosti</u> Reunión con productores (as): Marina Mera Adela Falcón Teofilo Berrosti Alfonso Rodas
	10.00-10.20	Traslado de Centro Yurac a Boquerón Visitar y entrevistar a productores de cacao
	10.20-12.00	<u>Reunión 02: Parcela de cacao de Atencio Rojas.</u> Reunión con productores: Solózano Falcón Marina Rodríguez Guerrero Igor Eusebio Bustillos Máximo Marcos Eusebio Bustillos
	12.00-12.40	Traslado Aguaytía
	12.40-13.30	Visitar y dialogo con comercializadores/productores de plátano en el Puerto

		Fluvial Aguytía. Coordina. Ing. Sandro Sandoval
	13.30-15.00	Almuerzo/descano
	15.00-16.00	Reunión 03: Oficina ORAG Reunión con directivos y personal técnico de la Asociación de Productores Cacaoteros Tecnificados del Valle de Shambillo (APCTVSH).
	16.00-16.10	Traslado a la Municipalidad Provincial Padre Abad
	16.10-17.30	Reunión con Alcalde y representantes de la Municipalidad Provincial de Padre Abad. (MPP) Sr. Luis Maguiña – Alcalde Srta. Gricelda Solano Regidora Sr. Junior Huaranga – Gerente General
	17.30-18.30	<b><u>Dirección de la Agencia Agraria de Padre Abad – Aguaytía</u></b> Ing. Edgardo Miranda Ruiz

<b>DIA</b>	<b>HORA</b>	<b>ACTIVIDAD</b>
<b>Jueves 11 de Marzo</b>	08.30-8.50	Traslado a Planta Agroindustrial de Oleaginosas Padre Abad SA (OLPASA)
	08.50-10.20	<u>Reunión 01 – Local OLPASA</u> Directiva, equipo técnico y productores de la Asociación de Palmicultores de Valle de Shambillo
	10.20-11.20	<u>Reunión 02</u> Gerente y directivos de OLPASA
	11.20-11.40	Traslado a la Aguaytía
	11.40-13.00	<u>Reunión 03</u> Reunión de coordinación final con Director Regional y Coordinador Zonal de PDA en Aguaytía
	13.00-14.00	Almuerzo
	14.00-17.00	Traslado a Pucallpa
	17:00- 18:00	Henry Centeno, DEVIDA Pucallpa

## APPENDIX 3 CONTACT LIST

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
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### USAID, Febrero 16

Loren O. Stoddard	ADP Chief	USAID-Perú
Donato Peña	M & E Coordinator	USAID-Perú
Tammy Palmer	Program Officer	USAID-Perú
Stela Coello	Administration Program PDA	USAID-Perú
Carla Queirolo	Communications Assistant	USAID-Perú
Jennifer Bernuy	ADP Deputy Chief	USAID-Perú
Machi Cárdenas	Communications Specialist	USAID-Perú

### Chemonics, Febrero 16

Charles Oberbeck	Director Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo	Chemonics
Lawrence Szott	Subdirector Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo	Chemonics

### USAID, Febrero 17

Andrew Herscowitz	Acting Mission Director	USAID-Perú
Steve Olive	Acting Deputy Director	USAID-Perú
Loren Szott	Director Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo	USAID-Perú
Donato Peña	M & E Coordinator	USAID-Perú
Tammy Palmer	Program Officer	USAID-Perú

### CONSULTANDES, Febrero 17

Manuel Estela	Director	CONSULTANDES
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### Chemonics, Febrero 17

Hugo Centurión	Director de Desarrollo social	Chemonics
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### Chemonics, Febrero 17

Juan José Vega	Director de Comunicaciones	Chemonics
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### DEVIDA, Febrero 18

Fernando Hurtado	Jefe de Desarrollo Alternativo	DEVIDA
Lucio Batállanos	Medio Ambiente	DEVIDA

### NAS, Febrero 18

Abelardo Arias	Director	NAS-Perú
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### Chemonics, Febrero 18

Aaron Dryer	Director de Desarrollo Económico	Chemonics
Jose Gamarra	Gerente de FVC	Chemonics

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Hugo Palma	Gerente de Actividades Económicas	Chemonics
José Luis Lozano	Gerente de Acceso al Crédito	Chemonics
Mariela Rodríguez	Coord. Desarrollo Comunitario y Gobernabilidad	Chemonics
Pablo Pampa	Especialista en Proyectos Productivos	Chemonics

### **CONSULTANDES, Febrero 19**

Jaime Garcia	Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo	CONSULTANDES
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### **MACROCONSULT, Febrero 19**

Raúl Salazar	Director	MACROCONSULT
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### **USAID, Febrero 19**

Cristina Olive	Education Office USAID Chiel	USAID
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### **Chemonics, Febrero 19**

Carlos Diaz	Director de Gestión Regional	Chemonics
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### **San Martín, Febrero 22**

César Villanueva	Presidente. Región San Martín.	Tarapoto
Darwin del Águila	Director Región San Martín. Chemonics.	Tarapoto
Sergio Lopez Zapata	Coordinador Zonal Tarapoto	Tarapoto
Wagner García Tuesta	Esp. Proyect Production	Chemonics
Alvaro Mondragon Perez	Esp. Fort. Cad de valor.	Chemonics
Isabel Machaca Atauje	Coordinadora Administrativa	Chemonics
Milagros Mendoza Soltero	Esp. D. Con & Gov	Chemonics
Qeningu Cerro Anguila	Esp. Comunicaciones	Chemonics
Crox Alvarado San Martín	Esp. M&E	Chemonics
Jorge Mera Perez	Esp. M&E	Chemonics
Dennis Graus Arbildo	Esp. I...	Chemonics
Daniel Angulo Rojas	Esp. RRNN y MA	Chemonics

### **Instituto de Cultivos Tropicales (ICT), Febrero 22**

Enrique Arévalo	Director	ICT. Tarapoto
Luis Zúñiga	Sub Director	ICT. Tarapoto
27 agricultores de Monzón	Productores	Training class in ICT

### **PDA, Juanjui, Febrero 23**

Darwin del Águila	Director	Chemonics, Región San Martín
Luis Artemis Tangoa Pisco	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Prudencio Piña Sangama	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Rafael Torres López	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Jose Antonio Lozano Macedo	Extensionista	Lamas, Juanjui

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Segundo A. Amasifuen Sinarahua	Extensionista	Cheriyacu, Juanjui
Jaciento Flores Guevara	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Pastor Sangama Guerra	Extensionista	Misquiyaquillo, Juanjui
Mario del Aguila Sevan	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Davit Aspajo Tangoa	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Niger Gonzalez Guerra	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Hernan del Aguila Collasos	Extensionista	Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Idelfonso Sangama Sangama	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Orlando Torre Saavedra	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Marg Ceopa Fasabi	Extensionista	Chacchaypampa, Juanjui
Gilda Chujutalli Chuquiando	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Agustin Sanguma Sangama	Extensionista	Shanao, Juanjui
Wilder Diaz Anguly	Extensionista	Pinto Rocaelo, Juanjui
Roosveth Saboya Rodriguez	Extensionista	Chachaypampa, Juanjui

<b>San Martin, Cooperativa Oro Verde, Febrero 23</b>		
Hilderico Bocángel	Gerente.	Cooperativa Oro Verde, Lamas
18 productores de café y cacao	Socios.	Cooperativa Oro Verde, Lamas
53 productores de cacao	Miembros.	CC de Yambatós, Pongo de Caynarachi
Sergio Herrera	Presidente. .	APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi
10 productores de palmito.	Socios	APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi

### **Alto El Sol, Febrero 23**

Ramiro Saavedra Del Castillo	Socio de ACOPAGRO y administrador módulo de fermentación de cacao de origen	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Julio César Chacón Tapullima	Agente Municipal	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Olivia Mozombite Ushiñahua	Teniente Gobernador	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Héctor Saavedra Del Castillo	Socio de ACOPAGRO	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Mardinio Quiñones Solano	Presidente Comité Central de ACOPAGRO	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Esteban Gutierrez Gómez	Socio de ACOPAGRO, administrador módulo de fermentación de cacao y promotor comunitario	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Fredy Gonzáles Paredes	Presidente APAFA I.E. N° 0448	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Tomasa Solano Acuña	Delegada del Comité Central de ACOPAGRO	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Luis López Pinedo	Socio Comité Sol Naciente de Romex	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Neptalí Silva Cárdenas	Docente I.E. 0448 - nivel primario	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Leoncio Tello Torres	Agente Municipal	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Asunción Shapiama Pinchi	Presidenta Club de Madres	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
María Caballero Del Águila	Lideresa	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres
Daniel Díaz Cárdenas	Ex Teniente Gobernador y promotor comunitario	Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal Caceres

### **Allima Cacao, Pongo de Caynarachi, Productores de Cacao, Febrero 23**

Sergio López	Coordinador Zonal	Chemonics
Daniel Vásquez	Coordinador Pongo de Caynarachi	Chemonics
Wilfredo Cenepa Panaifo	Presidente	Asociación Allima Cacao
Carlos Sangama Iahuiza	Fiscal	Asociación Allima Cacao
Cecilia Tangoa de Andoa	Secretaria de Economía	Asociación Allima Cacao
Renger I. Cabrera R.	vicepresidente	Asociación Allima Cacao
Yolanda Coral Guerra	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Pongo
María E. Rodriguez	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Pongo
Floriano Acho Cachique	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Beizaida Romero T.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Julio Lataya Huizo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Hector Cachique Marichi	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Julio Tapullama A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Nixon Shupinghua C.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Francisco Pashanasi I.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Gilder Sinarahua Isuiza	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Fernando Cachique A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Walter Amasifuen Isuiza	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Eliseo Garcia González	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Angélica Pashanasi S.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Belisario Amasifuen Higalo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Arquimedes Huansi Jaulin	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Metilluyoc
Marcelino Huamán Rios	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Metilluyoc
Sinecio Sinrahua Isuiz	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Rigoberto Romero Huansi	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ramón Pashanasi T.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Formila Sangama A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Mercith Sangama A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Roger Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Anita Iñapi Smupinghua	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
María T. P. de Tapullima	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Noel Pinedo Amasifuen	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Esquivel Amasifuen T.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ramón Sangama A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Roberto Pérez Pozo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Marlon Amasifuen P.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Próspero Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Merlín Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Arquimedes Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Wilfredo Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Bretin Tapullima P.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Wender Amasifuen A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Segundo Amasifuen P.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Waldemar sinti Amasifuen	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. San Miguel
Calvino Pinedo Tangoa	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Alen Amasifuen Pashanisi	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Ginder Amasifuen C.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Hilmer Tapullima Bautista	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Aurora Tapullima A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Marlene Tangoa Tapullima	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Alfredo Amasifuen Hidalgo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ancelmo Sangama A.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Marilú Guerrero Calderon	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Sildia Perez Vasquez	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ludmith Cenepo Grandes	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ismael Rafael Nuñez	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Loimer Montenegrno C.	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Pongo
Cesar Torres Goicochea	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Pongo
Ivan Tuesca Reátegui	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao. Pongo

### **Planta Alianza S.A. y Agricultores de Palmito (APROPAL), Febrero 23**

Raúl Torres Talledo	Gerente	Planta Procesadora Alianza
Sergio Herrera	Presidente	APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi
xxx	Secretaria	APROPAL
Amadeo Guerra Hansi	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Ostin Sanchez Mori	Socio, Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Pablo de la Cruz Rangel	Agricultor	Pampa Hermosa
Asunción Pashanasi Acho	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Raúl Curitina Yuyarima	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Manuel Huiñapi Marichi	Agricultor	Pampa Hermosa
Orlando Amasifuen Huansi	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Maximandro Correa Córdova	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Fran Correa Córdova	Agricultor	Pongo Caynarachi
Josué Salas Lancha	Socio, Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Emanuel Guevara Chicoma	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Daniela I. Flores Chuquilen	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Raúl Hemeryth del Aguila	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Salvador Rubio Torrillo	Agricultor	Davicillo
	Agricultor	Pampa Hermosa
José Sergio Herrera Delgado	Agricultor	Bonilla

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Valentín Flores Abril	Agricultor	Bonilla
Emeterio Chiyutalli Cartagena	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Serapio López Calle	Productor de palmito	Alianza
David Samame Dávila	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Sandro Guevara Chicoma	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
Felipe Cajo Ayala	Socio Agricultor	Planta Alianza
María del Pilar Ríos Trigozo	Agricultor	Pampa Hermosa

### **Mesa Técnica de Cacao, San Martín, Tarapoto, Febrero 23**

Angel Pérez	Director Técnico	PDA
Zarita Zapata Vasquez	Asesor Técnico	Gobierno Regional
Américo Arévalo Ramirez	Gerente Registro	Agrobanco
Sidlia Torres A.	Director Comercio Exterior	Gobierno Regional
Andres Sixto	Representante	SENASA
Fernando Ramirez	Representante	DEVIDA

### **San Martín, Balsa Probana, Febrero 23**

Reinaldo Javo Dominguez	Delegado PDA Pres. Junta Comunal Vecinal	PDA, Balsa Probana
Maria Pinedo Orbe	Agente Municipal	Balsa Probana
Felix Ruben Salgero	Director Centro Educativo	Balsa Probana
Filida Ruiz Salazar	Pres. Comité de Obras,	Balsa Probana
Maria Jesus Diego Chutay	Pdte. Vaso Leche	Balsa Probana
David Vergara	Colaborador Tnte. Gobernador	Balsa Probana
Leovina Rodriguez	Miembro Vaso de Leche	Balsa Probana
Yolanda Ortega Florez	Profesora, Secr. Junta Vecinal	Balsa Probana
Erevista Orbe Cartagena	Fundadora del Caserío	Balsa Probana
Rosaura Orbe Pinedo	Productora de cacao y de cuyes	Balsa Probana
Zarela Vasquez SolSol	Productora de cacao y de cuyes	Balsa Probana
Rosana Cargagena	Productora de cacao y de cuyes	Balsa Probana
Maria Quiroz	Vice Pdta. APAFA Primaria	Balsa Probana
Belsia Rios Aguirre	Vice Pdta. Vaso de Leche	Balsa Probana

### **San Martín, Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta, Febrero 24**

María Rosario Tuanama	Regidora. .	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Leydy Torres	Jefa de Desarrollo Económico Local	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Varlin Rengifo	Administrador.	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Maximo Pollar Saurin Pezo	Imagen Institucional	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
4 regidores y 1 regidora	Miembros	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
40 productores de cacao	Socios	Asociacion Allima Cacao, Chazuta
12 productores de cacao	Miembros	CC Ramón Castilla, Chazuta

### **Mesa Técnica, Saposoa, Febrero 24**

Manuel Cervantes Huamani	Miembro	Saposoa
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<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Martha Ramírez Vásquez	Miembro	Saposoa
Elena Meléndez Cárdenas	Miembro	Saposoa
Oscar Tantalean Cubas	Miembro	Saposoa
Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda	Miembro	Situlli
Juan García Morales	Miembro	Montevideo
Antonio Panduro	Miembro	Situlli

### **Agencia Agraria, SAPOSOA, Febrero 24**

Pascual Molina Alvarado	Extensionista	San Regis
Mario Medina Chacón	Extensionista	Nuevo Horizonte
Juan García Morales	Extensionista	Montevideo
Walter Mondragon Llatas	Extensionista	Montevideo
Nito Sepúlveda Cárdenas	Extensionista	Shima
Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda	Extensionista	Situlli
Israel Cárdenas Pérez	Extensionista	San Regis
Lindes Caza La torre	Extensionista	Bagazan
Henry León Rafael	Extensionista	Pasarrayo
Oscar Tantalean Cubas	Extensionista	Coopalgsa
Walter Ludeña González	Extensionista	Piscoyacu
Orlando Meléndez Adrianzen	Extensionista	Nuevo Saconche
Julián Hernandez Díaz	Extensionista	Nueva Vida
Celso Arévalo Ruiz	Extensionista	Piscoyacu
Manuel Deza Pérez	Extensionista	Piscoyacu
Blanca Solsol Ruiz	Extensionista	Saposoa
Antonio Panduro Grandes	Extensionista	Saposoa
Elbelio Saavedra Murrieta	Extensionista	Saposoa

### **Auditorio Chari Allima Cacao, Febrero 24**

James Arévalo Mori	Agricultura	Allima Cacao
Gilberto Rivera Campos	Presidente	Allima Cacao
Fabián Guerra Insapillo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Gino Luis Chujatalli Zambo	Secretario de Actas	Allima Cacao
Hernán Arévalo Shpiama	Fiscal	Allima Cacao
Crispol Torillo Parede	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Regis Gómez Insapillo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Víctor Pizango Zapullima	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Italo Ojanamo Panaico	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Evangelisto Sangama T	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Miguel A. Tapullima Guerra	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Eulalia Chujatalli Cenepo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Víctor López Sowalaya	Delegado	Allima Cacao
Rodolfo Sangama Zumba	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Isabel Tulumba Sangama	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Efio Ishuiza Panajo	Socia	Allima Cacao
Edwin Tuanama Choshnamote	Invitado	Allima Cacao

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Dorita Ishuiza Tapulima	Agricultor	Allima Cacao
Pedro Cahuaz Guerra	Agricultor	Allima Cacao
Calichenia Parnaijo Sangama	Agricultor	Allima Cacao
Andrés Panifo Chujandrima	Productor de cacao	Casiyacu
Loyda Sangama Zumba	Secretaria	Aguana Meyuna
Ana Tuanama Topullima	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Segundo Sánchez Fernández	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Carlos Ságoma Ishuiza	Fiscal	Allima Cacao
Plácido Olanova Ganorifo	Productor de cacao	Allima Cacao
Edwin Gómez Shapinova	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Wilter Gómez Shapinova	Presidente	Aguana Meyuna
José E. Sangama	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Navio Panaigo Cenefon	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Jerónimo Tulumba	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Luis Panaijo Cur	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Hilter Marichin Tomaito	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Orlando Silda Chillanuela	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Alejandro Tapullima López	Productor de cacao	Aguana Meyuna
Cecilia Gangoa de Andra	Productor de cacao	Ramón Castilla

#### **Equipo Oficina Zonal Juanjui, Febrero 24**

Tuesta Pinedo, Ángel Luis	Especialista en Proyectos Productivos	PDA Juanjui
Trujillo Valderrama, John Walter	Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario & Gobernabilidad	PDA Juanjui
Trigozo Pezo, Keny Kevin	Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario & Gobernabilidad	PDA Juanjui
Torres Trigozo, Groder	Especialista en Fortalecimiento de Cadenas de Valor	PDA Juanjui
Sandoval Cárdenas, Katty Joanne	Especialista en Proyectos Productivos	PDA Juanjui
Delgado Mesía, José Enrique	Coordinador Zonal	PDA Juanjui
Ramirez Valqui, Cenith	Auxiliar de Oficina	PDA Juanjui
Sánchez Flores, Carlos	Chofer	PDA Juanjui

#### **Municipalidad Provincial Mariscal Castilla, Febrero 24**

Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz	Alcalde (e ) e Integrante de la Comisión de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano	Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Cáceres
Rubén Ruiz Weninger	Alcalde	Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza
Rodil Cachique Cappillo	Alcalde	Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo
Napoleón Seijas Valles	Gerente	Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
Victor Rolando E. Rodriguez Radas	Gerente	Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Cáceres

#### **Planta de Beneficio Cacao, Mesa Técnica del Cacao, Pucacaca, Febrero 24**

Porfirio Tananta Ushiñahua	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
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<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Alex Flores Perea	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Jorge Flores Paredes	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Elvis Tananta Tenazoa	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Gonzalo Garcia Tangoa	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Manuel Melendez Ramirez	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
José Sister Grandez Armas	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Richard Murrieta Pinedo	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Ticardo Tello Upiachihua	Socio	APROCAPP, Picota
Warner Torres Tello	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Felipe Figueredo Chavez	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Joel Felipe Figueredo Escudero	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Israel Davila Trigozo	PRODUCTOR	Pucacaca
Marleni Chavez Ramirez	PRODUCTOR	Pucacaca
Israel Shuña Flores	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Israel Shuña Chujandama	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Davis Curt Grandez Sinti	Socio	ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Camila Shuña Flores	Socia	ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Twiggie Damian Gronerth (*)	socio	ACOPAGRO
Rita Flores Tello	SociaA	ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Varlin Rengifo	Administrador	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
4 regidores y 1 regidora	Miembros	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
40 productores de cacao	Socios.	Asociacion Allima, Chazuta
12 productores de cacao	Miembros	CC Ramón Castilla, Chazuta

### **ACOPAGRO, Febrero 24**

Vanguiman Ríos Pereira	Presidente	ACOPAGRO, Chambira
Edilberto Barrera Perdomo	Presidente del Comité	ACOPAGRO
Wagner Barrera Cerrón	Directivo del Comité de Educación	La Victoria
Américo Del Castillo Pizango	Delegado de Comité	ACOPAGRO
Roldán Rojas Paredes	Encargado del Departamento de Organización	ACOPAGRO
Luzmila Paredes Ortiz	Asistente de Gerencia	ACOPAGRO
Luis Pérez Ochoa	Coordinador técnico del proyecto cacao	ACOPAGRO

### **Municipalidad Provincial Mariscal Castilla, 24 de Febrero**

Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz	Alcaldesa e Integrante de la Comisión de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano	Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Cáceres
Rubén Ruiz Weninger	Alcalde	Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza
Rodil Cachique Cappillo	Alcalde	Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo
Napoleón Seijas Valles	Gerente	Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
Victor Rolando E. Rodriguez Radas	Gerente	Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Cáceres

### **Equipo parcial de la Oficina Zonal, Bellavista, Febrero 25**

Enrique Agreda Sánchez	Coordinador Zonal	PDA
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Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Herbert García Arévalo	Especialista en Proyectos Productivos	PDA
Manfred Coral Lozano	Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario Y Gobernabilidad	PDA
Olga Trigoso Rivera	Auxiliar de Oficina	PDA

### **Municipalidad Provincia de Huallaga, Febrero 25**

Fernando Grández Veintemilla	Alcalde	Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga
Roberto Pacheco Armas	Gerente	Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga
Juan Delgado Talledo	Alcalde	Municipalidad Distrital de Piscocoyacu
Manuela Doza Pérez	Regidora	Municipalidad Distrital de Piscocoyacu
Rodolfo Iván Bardales Aspajo	Regidora	Municipalidad Distrital de Piscocoyacu

### **Productores en la reunión con la Agencia Agraria, Saposá, Febrero 25**

Pascual Molina Alvarado	Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta	ACOPAGRO. San Regis
Marín Chacon Medina	Comité Nuevo Horizonte	ACOPAGRO. Nuevo Horizonte
Juan Garcia Morales	Copamon	Copamon. Montevideo
Walter Mondragon Llatas	Copamon	Copamon. Montevideo
Nito Sepulveda Cardenas	Productor	Shima
RosaPisco Sepulveda	Comité De Productores	Situlle
Israel Cardenas Perez	ACOPAGRO	ACOPAGRO. San Regis
Linder Cara Yayoyin	Coopalgsa	Coopalgas. Bagazan
Hemly Leon Rafael	Productor	Pasarraya
Walter Ludeña Gonzales	Productor	Piscocoyacu
Orlando Melendez A.	Comité Cafetaleros Nuevo Sacanche	Nuevo Sacanche
JuliánHernandez Diaz	ACOPAGRO	ACOPAGRO. Nueva Vida
Celso Arevalo Ruiz	Productor	Piscocoyacu
Manuela Doza Perez	Productora	Piscocoyacu
Blanca Solsol Ruiz	Productora	Saposoá
Antonio Panduro Grandes	Productora	Saposoá
Elbecio Saavedra Murrieta	ACOPAGRO	ACOPAGRO. Santa Fe

### **DEVIDA, Tarapoto, Febrero 26**

Fernando Ramírez	Coordinador	DEVIDA. Tarapoto.
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### **Mesa Técnica Provincial de Cacao, Huallaga, Febrero 25**

Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda	Tesorera	Comité de Productores Situlli
Reynaldo Solsol Perez	Funcionario	Agencia Agraria SAPOSOA
Antonio Panduro Grandez	Presidente Comité Central Saposoá	ACOPAGRO
Martha Ramirez Vasquez	Directora	LESTP-H
Elena Melendez Cardenas	Extensionista	ACOPAGRO
Manuel Cervantes Huamani	Coordinador Del Equipo Técnico	ACOPAGRO
Lorenzo Romero Mudarra	Especialista en Proyectos Productivos	PDA
Manfred Coral Lozano	Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario y Gobernabilidad	PDA

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Nadia Campos Valera	Promotora	Agencia Agraria SAPOSOA
Juan García Morales	Presidente	Copamon
Oscar Tantalean Cubas	Extensionista	Copalgsa

### **Chemonics, Oficina Regional Tocache, Marzo 1**

José Lazarte	Director Región . Chemonics	Tocache
Gloria Duenes	Coordinadora Zona Chemonics	Uchiza
César Pereyra	Coordinador Zona Chemonics	Uchiza
Julio Hinostraza	Comunicaciones. Chemonics	Tocache
Julio César González	Coordinador Medio Ambiente. Chemonics	Tocache
Gonzalo Ramírez	Chemonics	Tocache
Augusto Soto	Coordinador Pólvora. Chemonics	Tocache

### **Equipo Zonal de Uchiza. Marzo 02**

César Pereyra Lozano	Coordinador Zonal	PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics
Elmer Gevara	Especialista en Proyectos productivos	PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics
Luis Alberto Aliaga	Especialista en Proyectos pecuarios	PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics

### **Comunidad Valle de Shunté, Uchiza, Marzo 2**

Abilio Espinoza	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté
Francisco Cuyayala	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté
Mario Espinoza	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté
Martín Carpio	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté
Nery González	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté
Alberto Apaza	Productor de cacao	Valle de Shunté

### **Frente de Defensa para el Desarrollo de Uchiza, Marzo 2**

Modesto Páucar	Presidente	F.D.D. de Uchiza
Alcides Maldujano	vicepresidente	F.D.D. de Uchiza
Marco Oroya Chacón	Coordinador	PDA Uchiza, Chemonics

### **Comunidad Los Angeles, Uchiza, Marzo 2**

Amorfo Fernández	Productor de cacao	Los Angeles
Hernán Sánchez	Productor de cacao	Los Angeles
Eutimio Vega	Productor de cacao	Los Angeles
Silverio Silva	Productor de cacao	Los Angeles
Miguel Santillán	Productor de cacao	Los Angeles

### **Municipalidad de Uchiza, Marzo 02**

Segundo Núñez Pantoja	Alcalde	Municipalidad de Uchiza
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### **Asociación de Productores de Cacao de Uchiza - APCU, Marzo 02**

Antonieta González	Productor de cacao	APCU
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Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Subael Palacios	Productor de cacao	APCU
Raúl Iapa	Productor de cacao	APCU
Isabel Fonseca	Coordinadora de Asistencia Técnica	PDA - Tocache. Chemonics
Damuel Rodríguez	Coordinador Uchiza - Nuevo Progreso	PDA - Tocache. Chemonics

### **Municipalidad de Nuevo Bambamarca, Marzo 02**

Lola Acosta	Alcaldesa	Nuevo Bambamarca
3 miembros municipalidad	Regidores	Nuevo Bambamarca

### **Amazonas Trading. Marzo 02**

Luis Linares Torres	Gerente	Amazonas Trading
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### **Asociación Productores de Cacao, Nuevo Bambamarca, ASPROC-NBT, Marzo 2**

XXXX	Gerente (Ing. Agr.)	ASPROC-NBT
XXXX	Presidente	ASPROC-NBT

### **Comunidad Nuevo Belén, Shunté, Tocache. Marzo 03**

Ceferino Pina	Productor de café	Nuevo Belén
Bonifacio Tomás	Productor de café	Nuevo Belén
Mario Margarín	Productor de café	Nuevo Belén
Gloria Dueñas	Coordinadora Zonal, Chemonics	Tocache
Gidier Vásquez	Extensionista	PDA
Carlos Jáuregui	Extensionista	La Divisoria

### **Comunidad Montecristo, Shunté, Tocache, Marzo 03**

Reiner Pérez	Productor de café	Montecristo
Carranza Quiroz	Productor de café	Montecristo

### **Municipalidad Provincial de Tocache. Marzo 03**

José Enrique Muñoz R	Teniente Alcalde	M.P. de Tocache
Noemí Aura Moreno P.	Regidora	M.P. de Tocache
Ana Sánchez V.	Gerenta de Infraestructura	M.P. de Tocache
Carlos Espinoza P.	Gerente Municipal	M.P. de Tocache
Leticia Guevara R.	Asistente del Alcalde	M.P. de Tocache
José Lazarte Farfán	Gerente Regional	PDA - Chemonics. Tocache

### **Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache - CAT, Marzo 04**

Raymundo Angulo	Presidente	CAT, Tocache
Antonio Barrios Jara	Productor cacao	CAT, Tocache
Rosel Acosta Pizango	Presidente	CAT, Tocache
Freider Sánchez Rios	Vicepresidente	CAT, Tocache
Gualberto Cruz Godos	Coordinador Técnico	CAT, Tocache
Rosa Tarazona Rengifo	Gerente Desarrollo Social	CAT, Tocache
Carlos Grandes Aguilar	Productor Cacao	CAT, Tocache
Mariana Coro Rivera	Productor Cacao	CAT, Tocache

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Maritza Trujillo Herrera	Sub Coordinadora .	CAT.
Samuel Rodríguez G.	Sub Coordinador	CAT.
Isbel Fonseca López	Sub Coordinadora .	CAT
Raúl Olivera Barrientos	Coordinador Técnico	CAT
Max Álvarez Pinedo	Proyectos productivos	PDA - Chemonics. Tocache

#### **Electro Tocache, Marzo 04**

Carlos Vela	Director	Electro Tocache
José de la Cruz	Gerente de Operaciones	Electro Tocache
Franklin Piña M.	Jefe Unidad Control de Calidad	Electro Tocache

#### **DEVIDA - Tocache. Marzo 04**

César Reátegui	Coordinador Regional	Tocache
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#### **Mesa Tecnica del Cacao-Tocache. Marzo 04**

Maria Mallma	Presidenta	Asoc. Product. de Cacao, Uchiza
Julio Pisco Rojas	Jefe Departamento Técnico	Asoc. Product. de Cacao, Uchiza
Subael Palacios	Presidenta	ASCROP-NBT, Bambamarca
Rocael Palermo	Fiscal	Control prod. Coca, Nuevo Horizonte
Raymundo de la Vega	Gerente de Operaciones	Cooperativa de Tocache
Edino Guillen	Gerente de Operaciones	Asoc. Produc. Cacao, Bambamarca

#### **ACEPAT - OLPEA. Tocache, Marzo 04**

Jefe Departamento Técnico	Presidente de ACEPAT.	ACEPAT
Norberto Angulo	Gerente general. OLPEA.	OLPEA
Ernesto Sanchez Falcon	Presidente	OLPEA
José Fernández	Director.	Tocache
Néstor Sánchez	Director	OLPEA

#### **Reuniones San Martin, Marzo 04**

Antonieta González	Productora de cacao. Asociación de productores de Cacao	Uchiza
Súbale Palacios	Productor de cacao	Uchiza
Raúl Iapa	Productor de cacao	Uchiza
Isabel Fonseca	Coordinadora de Asistencia técnica. Chemonics	Tocache

#### **Asociación "Fuerza del Mañana", Tocache, Marzo 04**

Gladys Gamarra	Presidenta	Fuerza del Mañana
9 socias.		Fuerza del Mañana

#### **Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, ONUDD, Tocache, Marzo 04**

José Fernández	Jefe Proyecto	UNODC-Tocache
Roberto Gómez	Especialista en cacao	UNODC-Tocache

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
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### **Mesa Técnica del Cacao, Tocache, Marzo 04**

Maria González	Presidenta	Asociación de Productores de Cacao
Edinova Achagua	Gerente	Asoc. Productores de Cacao en Nueva Cajamarca
Julio Pisco Rojas	Jefe Departamento Técnico	Asociación Productores de Cacao
Subael Palacios	Presidente	Asoc. Productores de Cacao en Nueva Cajamarca
Raúl Lapa	Fiscal	Asoc. Productores Cacao Nuevo Horizonte (Pólvora)
Raymundo de la Vega	Gerente de Operaciones	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Edino Guillen	Gerente de Operaciones	Assoc. Produc. Cacao Bambamarca
Raymundo Angulo	Consejero	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache

### **Asoc. Prod. Agropecuarios Juan Velasco Alvarado, Paraíso, Tocache, Marzo 05**

José de Arimatea Huaman Sánchez	Presidente. Asociación Juan Velazco Alvarado.	AJVA, Paraíso
Nolberto Noreña Castillo	Tesorero	AJVA, Paraíso
Juan Ibarra Huaman	Administrador	AJVA, Paraíso
Jorge Cesare Coral	Coordinador Técnico	AJVA, Paraíso

### **Nuevo Progreso Paraíso, Tocache, Marzo 05**

Gustavo Carcumo Lozano	Coordinador Zonal	AJVA, Paraíso
Oscar Hidalgo	Cadenas de Valor	Chemonics Nuevo Progreso. PDA
Marlith Tello	Asistente contable	Chemonics Nuevo Progreso. PDA
John R. Borja	Gobernabilidad	Chemonics, Nuevo Progreso. PDA
Richard Borja Ramón	Especialista Desarrollo Comunitario	Chemonics AJVA, Paraíso
Aldo Sánchez Vicente	Proyectos Productivos.	Chemonics AJVA. Paraíso
Artemio Miranda Dávila	Alcalde	Munic. Distrital, Paraíso
Gustavo Cárcamo	Coordinador Zonal	Nuevo Progreso. PDA

### **Oficina Regional Tingo María, PDA, Marzo 06**

Luis Ramos	Director Regional	Tingo María. PDA
César Falcón	Gobernabilidad	Tingo María. PDA
Aldo Pereyra	Coordinador Tingo María	Tingo María. PDA
Walter Basurto	Proyectos productivos	Tingo María. PDA
Pavel Vila	Monitoreo	Tingo María. PDA
Jorge Caico	Comunicaciones	Tingo María. PDA
Hércules Córdova	Cadenas de valor	Tingo María. PDA

### **Cooperativa "La Divisoria", Tingo María, Marzo 06**

Karina Escobar	Administración	Coop. La Divisoria
Rodríguez Pastor	Gerente	Coop. La Divisoria
Sara Ramírez Grandez		CAC Divisoria
Stuerino Meriano Hidalgo		CAC Divisoria

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Flor Angel Rivera Salazar		H. Valolizan
Manuel Rodriguez Copicha		Hermilio U.
David Arostegui Lino		Margontou
Hercules Cordova Torres		PDA
Walter Barusto Fleves		PDA
Luis Ramos Chone		PDA
Aldo Pena Ramos		PDA
Julian Aucera Echarre		CAC Divisoria
Katia Tritto Poccor	Gerencia	
Raydol Rodriguez Pascual	Presidente	
Maria del Rosario Rodriguez Pascual		
Jorge Cayco Marquez		

### **Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo-COOPAIN, Tingo María, Marzo 06**

Isaac Zúñiga Aguilar	Gerente General	COOPAIN
Horlando Herera Ramirez	Directivo Coopian	COOPAIN
Krupskayc Canalis Gorenga	Contador General	COOPAIN
Luis Ramos Chong	PDA	
Alfredo M.B	Constructor	
Mey A. Choy Paz	J. Industrial	
Mereoj Custre Wbila	Sed. C. Ad.	
Aldo Pereyra Romo		PDA
Jorge Cayeo Marquez		PDA
Pabel Vila Galindo		PDA
Cesar Falcon Mollqui		PDA
Herculos Cordova Torres		PDA
Erika Portocarrero Lumbre		COOPAIN
Hector Vera Hernandez		COOPAIN
Saldana Torres Kilder		COOPAIN
Juan Guevara Ruiz		COOPAIN

### **Comunidades Huayhuantillo y Pendencia, Tingo María, Marzo 06**

Ramón Aguilar	Productores de cacao y café	Huayahuantillo
Mario I. Enríquez Rodríguez	Productores de cacao y café	Huayahuantillo
Clemencia Chávez Enríquez	Productores de cacao y café	Huayahuantillo
Juan Francisco Enríquez Santamaría	Productores de cacao y café	Huayahuantillo
Emilio Mayhua Ruiz	Productores de cacao y café	Bajo Pendencia
Lizardo Pamduro Armas	Productores de cacao y café	Pendencia

### **Asociación "Agroflora", Tingo María, Marzo 06**

Lancy Ponce Falcon	Presidenta, Productora de flores	Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Efrain Castaneda Palacios	Socio, Productor de flores	Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Arturo Coma Diaz	Socio, Productor de flores	Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Victor Abarca Aquello	Secretario, Productor de flores	Provincia de Leoncio Prado

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
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### Oficina Regional Ucayali, PDA, Pucallpa, Marzo 06

Tito Jaime	Director (encargado)	OR Pucallpa
Luis Miguel Fernández	Especialista en Créditos	Of. Zonal Campo Verde
Winiston Pinchi	Contador	OR Pucallpa
Narciso Vásquez	Especialista en Medio Ambiente	OR Pucallpa
Noemí Vásquez	Análisis Financiero	OR Pucallpa
Carlos Vásquez	Especialista en Infraestructura	OR Pucallpa

### COCEPU / OLAMSA, Neshuya, Marzo 08

Ronier Fernández	Presidente	COCEPU/OLAMSA
Lauter Tananta	Director	COCEPU/OLAMSA
Raúl Flores	Secretario Técnico	COCEPU/OLAMSA
Pedro Seijas	Jefe Dep. Técnico	COCEPU/OLAMSA
John Barbosa	Extensionista	OR Pucallpa

### Parcela de Nixon Tamani (Palmicultores), Campo Verde, Marzo 08

Nixon Tamani	Presidente	Comunidad Sauce de Alto Uruya, Campo Verde. Neshuya
7 productores	Socios	CC Sauce de Alto Uruya, Campo Verde Pucallpa

### Oficina Zonal Campo Verde - PDA, Marzo 08

Tito Jaime	Coordinador	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Narciso Vásquez	Especialista en Medio Ambiente	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Karina Tapia	Esp. en Desarrollo Comunitario y Gobernabilidad	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Jeysi Bereca	Esp. en Desarrollo Comunitario y Gobernabilidad	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Julio García	Esp. en Proyectos productivos	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
David Beli	Extensionista	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Luis Miguel Fernández	Esp. En Cadenas de valor	OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Carlos Gavidia	Especialista Pecuario	OZ Campo Verde. PDA

### Municipalidad de Campo Verde, Marzo 08

William Amasifuén T.	Alcalde	Municipalidad de Campo Verde
15 personas entre Regidores y técnicos	Miembros	Municipalidad de Campo Verde

### Parcela de Harrison Álvarez, Campo Verde, Marzo 08

Harrison Álvarez	Productor de cacao	Comunidad. Nueva Dinamarca
Erik Shapiana	Presidente (cacao)	Cooperativa Campo Verde (cacao)
Otros 4 agricultores de cacao	Miembros	Cooperativa Campo Verde

### Región Ucayali, Pucallpa, Marzo 08

Mojalot Dávila	Vicepresidente	Región Ucayali
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Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
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### **Parcela de Guillermo Jhon, Palmicultor, Shambillo. Marzo 09**

Guillermo Jhon	Productor de palma	Shambillo
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### **Consorcio de Productores de Plátano de Ucayali, COPPU, Marzo 09**

Marino Gavilán	Presidente	APTAA. Aguaytía
Teófilo Berrosi	Presidente	CAPTACY. Centro Yurac
Marina vera	Productor plátano	APTAA. Nuevo Paraíso
Adela falcón	Productor plátano	APTAA. Bellavista

### **Sub Región Padre Abad, Marzo 09**

Segundo Mojaloc Dávila	Representante	Sub Región Padre Abad. Ucayali
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### **Productores de Plátano, Parcela de Jorge Pinedo, Aguaytía, Marzo 09**

Jorge Pinedo	Productor de plátano	APTAA. Aguaytía
Marino Gruilan Quintanilla	Presidente, Productor de plátano	APTAA. Aguaytía
Teófilo Berrosi Grablez	Presidente, Productor de plátano	CAPTACY. Centro Yurac
Marina Vera Damatt	Productor plátano	APTAA. Nuevo Paraíso
Adela Falcón Ramón	Productor plátano	APTAA. Bellavista

### **Parcela de Atencio Rojas, Aguaytía, Marzo 09**

Atencio Rojas	Productor de cacao	Boquerón
Marina Solórzano	Productora de cacao	Boquerón
Olinda xxx	Productora de cacao	Boquerón
Marina Rodríguez Falcón	Productora de cacao	Boquerón
Marcos Eusebio Bustillos	Productora de cacao	Boquerón
Máximo Eusebio Bustillo	Productora de cacao	Boquerón

### **Productores de Palma Parcela Sr. Patricio Nolasco, Marzo 09**

Victorio Fores E	Productor de palma aceitera	Shambillo Aguaytía
Patricio Nolasco	Productor de palma aceitera	Shambillo Aguaytía
Bravo Guerrero	Productor de palma aceitera	Shambillo Aguaytía
Guillermo John	Productor de palma aceitera	Shambillo Aguaytía

### **Trabajadores Aspash, Asoc. Palmarultores, Shambillo, Marzo 09**

Melchor Hamilton Rosas	Promotor Aspash	
Alfredo Asenjo Fernández	ADM-CD-091	
votprop Ch. Flores Estacio	Promotor	
Ladislao Viena Grandes	Extensionista	
Baltazr Peña Drivis	Sig	
Milson R. Salirrosas N.	Coordinador	
Edwin Solís Torres	Tesorero ASPASH	
Sandro Sandoval Silva	Esp. FLV POA	

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Julio Alberto Cárdenas Otoyá	Extensionista-Aspash Olpasa	
Roy Porras Espinoza	Extensionista Aspash PDA	

### Representantes de la Sub Región del Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, Marzo 09

Wilson Pinedo	Gerente Sub Región	Sub Región Ucayali
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### APCTVSH. Shambillo, Padre Abad, Marzo 10

Julio César Luna Pinchi	Productor de cacao	Asociación Shambillo
Eliseo Rodríguez Atalaya	Productor de cacao	Asociación Shambillo
Dionisio Santa Cruz A.	Productor de cacao	Asociación Shambillo

### Municipalidad Provincial de Padre Abad, Aguaytía, Marzo 10

Luis Maguiña	Alcalde	Municipalidad Padre Abad
Luis Junior	Gerente Municipal	Municipalidad Padre Abad
Griselda Retis	Regidora	Municipalidad Padre Abad
Junior Huaranga	Gerente General	Municipalidad Padre Abad
Esther Ramírez	Gerente de Desarrollo Social y Medio Ambiente	Municipalidad Padre Abad

### Agencia Agraria Aguaytía. Marzo 10

Edgardo Miranda	Director	Agencia Agraria Aguaytía
Carlos Zavaleta	Extensionista	Agencia Agraria Aguaytía

### En Parcela de Sr. Teófilo Berrosti, Centro Yurac, Marzo 10

Marina Mera	Productora de plátano	Aguaytía
Adela Falcón	Productora de plátano	Aguaytía
Teófilo Berrosti	Productora de plátano	Aguaytía
Alfonso Rodas	Productora de plátano	Aguaytía

### Parcela de Jonás Chau. Shambillo, Marzo 11

Jonás Chau	Productor de palma aceitera	Shambillo
Víctor Chau	Productor de Palma aceitera	Shambillo

### ASPASH y OLPASA, Shambillo, Marzo 11

Arturo Hoyos	Gerente General	OLPASA
Rómulo xxx	Presidente	ASPASH
Arturo Cárdenas	Gerente	ASPASH
Elmer xxx	Productor de palma	
Melitón Sal y Rosas	Coord. Departamento Técnico	ASPASH
Alfredo Atencio	Productor de palma	ASPASH
Roy Pires	Extensionista	ASPASH
Rodolfo Espinoza	Productor de palma	ASPASH
Julio Roberto Cardenaz	Productor de palma	ASPASH

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
L. Grande	Productor de palma	ASPASH
Milton	Productor de palma	ASPASH

### Comunidad Tahuantisuyo. San Alejandro. Marzo 11

Nicanor Pineda Rodríguez	Productor de cacao	Tahuantisuyo, San Alejandro,
Marcia Delgado	Productora de cacao	Nuevo Oriente
Paula Valverde	Productora de cacao	Nueva Bellavista, San Alejandro, Pucallpa
2 agricultores	Productores de cacao	Nueva Bellavista, San Alejandro, Pucallpa

### COCEPASA. San Alejandro. Marzo 11

Juan Vicente Santa Cruz	Gerente de planta	COCEPASA, San Alejandro, Pucallpa
Priscilia Cabrera	Presidenta	COCEPASA, San Alejandro, Pucallpa
3 productores de cacao	Socios	COCEPASA, San Alejandro, Pucallpa

### DEVIDA. Pucallpa. Marzo 11

Henry Centeno	Representante	DEVIDA. Pucallpa
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### NN.UU. Lima. Marzo 15

Flavio Mirella	Representante en Perú	ONUDD
Hans Jochen Wiese	Especialista en Palma, ATP-PDA Preu	ONUDD

### Entrevistas especialidades por Género, Josefa Nolte

<b>Febrero 20</b>		
Yolanda Platón	Asesora de educación	Proyecto APRENDES y SUMA en zona de PDA
Carla Queirolo	USAID	
<b>Febrero 21</b>		
Alarìa	Agricultora de café	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Licenia	Agricultora de café	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Emérita	Ex tesorera del club de madres, tesorera del Vaso de Leche	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Leonila	Titular de ACOPAGRO	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Ofelia	Presidenta del club de madres	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Celina	Agricultora de café	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Judith	Presidenta del Vaso de Leche	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Isidora	Agricultora de café y cacao	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Edwin Sangama	Teniente Gobernador	Comunidad de PALMICHE
Rodolfo Gil	Extensionista	Cooperativa Acopagro
Hiderico Bocangel Zavala	Gerente	Cooperativa Oro Verde
Alex Escudero Saldaña	Coordinador	APAE Grano de Oro
<b>Febrero 22</b>		

<b>Nombre y apellido</b>	<b>Título o Cargo</b>	<b>Comunidad y/o Asociación</b>
Luzmila Paredes	Secretaria de Gerencia	Cooperativa Acopagro
Tomasa Solana		Cooperativa Acopagro
Edwin Sangama Sangama	Presidente de Comité	Cooperativa Acopagro
Madero Pérez	Presidente del comité de Saposoa	Cooperativa Acopagro
Glinda Pasco Tarazona	Regidora	Huicungo
Telma Falcón Pezo	Regidora, Socia de Acopagro	Pachiza
Libi Vanessa Pinchi Cárdenas	Regidora	Juanjui
Leila del Aguila Ruíz	Regidora	Juanjui
<b>Marzo 25</b>		
Edita Herrera	Coordinadora de Género	Chemonics
Elvira Angulo	Coordinadora de Género	Red Nacional de Promoción de la mujer, San Martín
<b>Marzo 25</b>		
Cecilia Hurtado	Coordinadora de Género	Red Nacional de Promoción de la mujer, Tocache
Julia Alvarado	Coordinadora de Género	Red Nacional de Promoción de la mujer, Tingo María
<b>Marzo 3</b>		
Violeta Bustamante	Coordinadora de Género	Red Nacional de Promoción de la mujer, Pucallpa
Laura Imburgia	InterPares Rural Development Consulting Group Consultora	Consultora
Cathyl Barrera	Gerente (consultora)	Barrera Consultores
<b>Marzo 25</b>		
Raúl Olivares	Coordinador APAE	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Elizabeth Alarcón Tenorio	Comité de Desarrollo de la Mujer	
Washington Hugo Saldaña	extensionista	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Noemí Moreno Príncipe	Regidora	Municipalidad Tocache
Sonia Flores Hernández	Secretaria de la Ronda Campesina de Bajo Limón, Ganadora del Mejor Cacao de la zona	Nueva Esperanza
Lucía Bendezù	Presidenta de APROSAN, Agente Municipal Bajo Limón	Nueva Esperanza
Erika Viera Huatias	Presidenta del Vaso de Leche	Nueva Esperanza
Eulalia Laguna Briones	Vocal de la Junta Vecinal de Nueva Libertad, Tesorera de la Asociación de Productores de cuyes, Vocal de la Piscigranja	Nueva Esperanza
Esterfilia Salvador García	Teniente Gobernadora de Bajo Limón	Nueva Esperanza
Yolanda Camasco Ramos	Presidenta del Comité de Mantenimiento Vial y Caminos Vecinales de Nueva Esperanza, Presidenta del Comité Local de la Provincia para licitaciones públicas	Nueva Esperanza
Josefina Huamán Eugenia	Presidenta del Vaso de Leche	Nueva Esperanza
<b>Marzo 3</b>		
Eva Falcón Tarazona	Regidora	Tingo María

Nombre y apellido	Título o Cargo	Comunidad y/o Asociación
Maximiliana Ponce	Socia de la asociación de productoras cafetaleras Santa Rosa, ganadora de Selva Ganadora	Santa Rosa, Aguaytía

ACOPAGRO: Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera "ACOPAGRO"

APROCAPP: Asociación de Productores de Cacao de la Provincia de Picota

APTAA Asociación Plataneros Tecnificados Aguaytía

APTRA Asociación Plataneros Tradicionales Río Abajo

AASAR: Asociación de Agricultores Santa Rosa

CAPTACY: Consorcio Agrario de Primavera y Centro Yurac

CIOOY Consorcio Productores Plátano

COPALGSA: Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"

COPALGSA: Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"

COPAMON: Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo

COPAMON: Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo

IESTP-H: Institución Educativa Superior Tecnológica Pública - Huallaga

PDA: Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo

Sol Naciente: Agricultores Sta. Rosa Sol Naciente

## APPENDIX 4 TABLES

Appendix 4, Table 1 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, Northern San Martin

Office Region San Martin North		Number of Participating Producers				
February 2010		Age of First Planting				
Province	District	Community	Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years	
BELLAVISTA	ALTO BIAVO	ALTO YANAYACU	51			
		BARRANCA	15			
		CENTRO AMERICA	78			
		INCAICO			18	
		JOSE OLAYA	43			
		LOS ANGELES	22			
		MURALLA	17			
		NUEVO SAN MARTIN	26			
		NUEVO SAN MIGUEL	10			
		NUEVO TRUJILLO	23			
		PUERTO BERMUDEZ	57			
		Total	342	0	18	
	BELLAVISTA	BELLAVISTA	BUENOS AIRES	61		
			HUACHO			68
			LIMON	11		
			MERCEDES			96
			MISHQUIYACU			29
			NUEVA FLORIDA			56
		Total	72	0	249	
	HUALLAGA	HUALLAGA	ALTO PAÑAZAPA	24		
			GRAN BRETAÑA	35		
				Total	59	0
	SAN PABLO	SAN PABLO	CONSUELO	19		
			DOS DE MAYO	37		
			FAUSA LAMISTA			60
			FAUSA SAPINA	67		
			HUINGOYACU			190
			NUEVA ESPERANZA			53
			RAMON CASTILLA	36		
			SHAMBOYACU	36		
				Total	195	0
	DORADAGUA BLANCA	DORADAGUA BLANCA	ALTO ALGARROBO	40		
			ALTO YURACYACU	31		
AZANGIHUA			15			

		Total	86	0	0
SAN JOSE DE SISA	AMINIO		20		
	BANDA DE PISHUAYA		7		
	HUAJA		26		
	HUANCABAMBA				16
	ISHICHIHUI		21		
	LAS PALMERAS		58		
	MIRAFLORES		30		
	NAUTA		27		
	SAN ISIDRO		15		
	SAN JUAN DE MIRAFLORES		38		
	SAN JUAN SALADO		13		
	SANTA CRUZ		35		
		Total		290	0
SAN MARTIN	ALFARO		10		
	ALTO ROQUE		9		
	BUENA VISTA		15		
	CONSTANCIA		28		
	FLOR DEL ORIENTE		9		
	NUEVO PORVENIR		14		
	PEBAS		10		
	REQUENA		20		
	SAN MARTIN		6		
	SANANGO				21
	SINAMI		32		
	Total		153	0	21
SANTA ROSA	BARRANQUITA		30		
	CHANCHAMAYO				10
	MACHU PICCHU		19		
	SANTA ELENA				39
	SANTA MARTHA		16		
	SANTA ROSA		12		
	SHUCSHUYACU				23
	Total		77	0	72
SHATOJA	ALTO SHATOJILLO				8
	LA FLORIDA				28
	LA UNION		11		
	NUEVO HUANCABAMBA				28
	SAN PEDRO				19
	SHATOJA		10		
	Total		21	0	83
HUALLAGA	ALTO SAPOSOA	NUEVA VIDA			40
		PASARRAYA			129
		YACUSISA			109
		Total		0	0
PISCOY ACU	HUACCHA		13		
	JOSE OLAYA		21		
	LA PEDRERA		12		

		LA PRIMAVERA		11		
		NUEVA ESPERANZA		11		
		NUEVO PISCOYACU		10		
		NUEVO SACANCHE				21
		PISCOYACU				66
		SAN LORENZO		14		
			Total	92	0	87
	SACANCHE	COLLPA		25		
		SACANCHE				101
			Total	25	0	101
	SAPOSOA	AHUIHUA				47
		ALMENDRAS				30
		ALTO PACHIZA				134
		ALTO SITULLI				44
		ARMANAYACU		19		
		BAGAZAN				27
		CHAMBIRA				26
		CHIQUINQUIRA				17
		EL DORADO				48
		INTIYACU DIAZ				20
		LA DIVISORIA		5		
		LA PERLA				40
		MONTEVIDEO				16
		MURO				29
		NUEVO HORIZONTE				48
		NUEVO PERU				21
		NUEVO SAN ANDRES				37
		NUEVO SAN MARTIN				34
		NUEVO TRIUNFO		8		
		PALTAICO				60
		PINTILLO				31
		QURICO		31		
		SAN ANDRES				
		SAN REGIS				
		SANTA FE				
		SANTA ROSA		26		
	SHIMA				61	
	SITULLE				29	
	TANGER				29	
			Total	89	0	828
LAMAS	ALONSO DE ALVARADO	MIRADOR DE ALTO ROQUE		13		
		ROQUE		16		
			Total	29	0	0
A N C		BARRANQUITA		44		

	GRAU		37			
	JORGE CHAVEZ		23			
	JUAN SANTOS ATAHUALPA		15			
	KUMAMOTO		11			
	LA UNION		5			
	LAS PALMAS		13			
	LAS PALMERAS		36			
	NARANJAL		22			
	NUEVO ALEGRIA		18			
	NUEVO LIBERTAD		11			
	PIÑAL		63			
	PUERTO PIZARRO		10			
	SAN JUAN DE PACHICILLA		36			
	SAN MARTIN		17			
	SANANGO		31			
	SANGAMAYOC		18			
	SANTA ELENA		3			
	SANTIAGO DE BORJA		19			
	VISTA ALEGRE		10			
		Total	442	0	0	
CAYNARACHI	ALFONSO UGARTE		38			
	ALIANZA		189			
	BONILLA		89			
	CARACHAMAYOC		22			
	CONVENTO		8			
	COPAL		17			
	METILLUYOC		48			
	NARANJAL		16			
	PINTOYACU		26			
	PINTOYAQUILLO		17			
	PONGO DE CAYNARACHI		84			
	SAN JUAN DE SHANUSI		33			
	SAN MIGUEL DE ACHINAMIZA		32			
	SAN MIGUEL DE SHANUSI		7			
	SANTA ROSA DE DAVICILLO		65			
	SANTA ROSA DE TIOYACU		17			
	SHAPAJILLA		28			
	YUMBATOS		94			
			Total	830	0	0
	CUÑUMBU QUI					
ALTO ANDINO					77	
		Total	0	0	77	

LAMAS	CHIRAPA		91		
	HUAPO		31		
	NARANJAL		29		
	PAMPAYACU		22		
	Total		173	0	0
PINTO RECODO	ALTO PALMICHE				37
	BELLAVISTA				35
	CHUMBAQUIHUI				32
	CHURUZAPA				5
	EL MIRADOR				29
	MISHQUILLAQUILLO DE SHAPUNGA				28
	MISHQUIYACU		13		
	MORILLO			24	
	PALMICHE		92		
	PAMPAMONTE				15
	PINTO RECODO		9		
	Total		114	24	181
RUMIS APA	PACCHILLA				39
	Total		0	0	39
SAN ROQUE DE CUMBAZA	ALTO SHAMBOYACU		102		
	AUCALOMA		19		
	AVIACION		15		
	BOCA DE SHAMBOYACU		18		
	CHIRIKYACU		25		
	CHONTAL				36
	CHUNCHIWI		29		
	PAMASHTO		126		
	SAN ROQUE DE CUMBAZA		30		
	URCUPATA		68		
	YURILAMAS		22		
	Total		454	0	36
SHANA O	SHANAO		16		
	Total		16	0	0
TABALOSOS	ALTO PROGRESO DE ALMENDRILLO				32
	ALTO UNGURAHUI				15
	ANALLO				106
	BARACASHA				48
	CACHIPAMPA				32
	CHACCHAYPAMPA		24		
	CUMBAQUIHUI				45
	LEJIA				22
	MACHINGAO		16		
	NAZARET		11		

		NUEVA AMERICA				20
		NUEVA ESPERANZA				45
		NUEVO SAN MARTIN				22
		PANJUY		38		
		PLAZA NORTE				67
		PORVENIR				24
		PUCAYOC				23
		PUEBLO NUEVO				34
		RUMIYACU				40
		SAN LUIS				34
		SAN MIGUEL DE MAYO				82
		URCO				37
				Total	89	0
ZAPATERO	NUEVA ESPERANZA				22	
	NUEVO CELENDIN				12	
	SAN JUAN DE TALLIQUIHUI				65	
		Total	0	0	99	
MARISCAL CACERES	CAMPANILLA	AUCARARCA		101		
		BALSAYACU		113		
		CAMPANILLA		21		
		CHALLUAYACU		46		
		CINCO UNIDOS		35		
		CUÑUMBUZA		29		
		MASHUYACU				76
		NUEVO JUNIN				27
		NUEVO PACASMAYO		28		
		PAMPA HERMOSA		67		
		PUERTO FRANCO			51	
		RAMON CASTILLA		62		
		SHUMANZA			175	
	Total	502	226	103		
HUICUNGO	DOS DE MAYO			130		
	HUICUNGO		233			
	LA PRIMAVERA				51	
	MIRAFLORES			78		
	MOJARAS				53	
	NUEVA ESPERANZA			23		
	PIZARRO				68	
	PUCALLPILLO				50	
	SAN JUAN DE ABISEO				98	
	SANTA INES				60	
	SHEPTE			57		
	Total	233	288	380		
JUANJUI	AGUA AZUL				16	
	CERRO AZUL			6		
	CHAMBIRA		45			
	CUNCHUHUILLO GRANDE		8			

		EL PORVENIR			52
		JUANJUICILLO		5	
		LA CALERA		11	
		LA VICTORIA		7	
		PUCUNUCHO		13	
		SACANCHILLO		15	
		Total	104	6	68
	PACHIZA	ALTO EL SOL			101
		ATAHUALPA - 1			31
		BAGAZAN			141
		BELLO HORIZONTE - 1			54
		GERVACIO		50	
		MAGDALENA			42
		MARISOL			36
		MONTERREY			48
		NUEVO CHIMBOTE			76
		PACHIZA	49		
		RICARDO PALMA			49
		SAN JUAN DEL CAÑO			55
		SAN RAMON			111
		SANAMBO			38
		SANCHIMA			28
	SECTOR SORRAPA	27			
	Total	76	50	810	
	PAJARILLO	ARMAYARI	36		
		BAJO JUÑAO		36	
		CAPIRONA		77	
		CHURO	18		
		COSTA RICA			145
		DOS UNIDOS		61	
		MARICHE		27	
		NUEVO PARAISO		22	
		PAJARILLO	26		
		PLAYA HERMOSA		39	
		PORVENIR - 1		26	
		RETAMA (VICTOR RAUL HAYA DE LA TORRE )		21	
		SAN JOSE DE JUÑAO		32	
		SOLEDAD		51	
		ZANCUDO		37	
	Total	80	429	145	
PICOTA	PICOTA	PICOTA	30		
		SANTA ROSILLO	16		
		Total	46	0	0
	PILLUANA	MISHQUIYACU			43
		PILLUANA	28		
Total	28	0	43		
A C	CEDROPAMPA	57			

SAN MARTIN		PUCACACA		57		
		SHIMBILLO		25		
			Total	139	0	0
	SHAMBOYACU	ALFONSO UGARTE		38		
		CHAMBIRA				18
		PAUCAR		20		
		SHAMBOYACU		38		
		SIMON BOLIVAR		27		
		VISTA ALEGRE		15		
			Total	138	0	18
	TINGO DE PONASA	HUAÑIPO		29		
		LEONCIO PRADO		20		
		MARISCAL CASTILLA		27		
		NUEVA ESPERANZA		50		
		SAN ANTONIO		15		
		TINGO DE PONAZA		26		
		Total	167	0	0	
	TRES UNIDOS	BAÑOS				79
		LA UNION				27
		SAN JUAN				44
SAPOTILLO					25	
	Total	0	0	175		
ALBERTO LEVEAU	CERRO SAN PABLO		10			
		Total	10	0	0	
CHAZUTA	ACHINAMIZA			187		
	AGUANOMUYUNA			109		
	CALLANAYACU				56	
	CANAYO			68		
	CC.NN. MUSKU LLACTA					
	CHIPAOTA			97		
	CURIYACU			89		
	LA BANDA DE CHAZUTA			265		
	LLUCANAYACU			51		
	RAMON CASTILLA				96	
	RICARDO PALMA			59		
	SHILCAYO			97		
	SIAMBAL				71	
	TUNUNTUNUMBA			99		
TUPAC AMARU			25			
	Total	0	1146	223		
CHIPURANA	NAVARRO		23			
	SAN PABLO DE TIPISHCA		36			
	YARINA		27			
		Total	86	0	0	
POR VENI	PELEJO		20			
	PUERTO ALEGRE		2			

		SAN LUIS	5		
		Total	27	0	0
HUIMBAYOC		ALTO ATUN QUEBRADA	14		
		ATUN QUEBRADA	14		
		COROTOYAQUILLO	14		
		DOS DE MAYO	40		
		HUIMBAYOC	88		
		INAYUCA	27		
		IRAPAYO	4		
		JULIAN ALTO	17		
		JULIAN BAJO	14		
		MIRAFLORES	73		
		PARAISO	22		
		PONGO ISLA	37		
		PROGRESO	10		
		PUCALLPA	72		
		SAN JOSE DE SOLTERITOS	22		
		SAN JOSE DE YANAYACU (YANAYACU)	53		
		SANTA CECILIA	5		
		SANTA MARTHA	44		
		SANTA ROSILLO	45		
		SHUNGUYO	17		
	TIOYACU	8			
	UNION COROTOYACU	13			
	YANAYACU CHIMBANA	1			
	Total	654	0	0	
LA BANDA DE SHILCAYO		ALTO POLISH	11		
		LA UNION DE PUCAYACU	25		
		PROGRESO	5		
		SAN FERNANDO DE PUCAYACU	2		
	Total	43	0	0	
SAN ANTONIO		SAN ANTONIO	41		
	Total	41	0	0	
SAUCE		ALTO SAUCE			21
		LOS ANGELES DE CANOAYACU			22
		NUEVA ESPERANZA			19
		PRIMAVERA			67
		PUCARARCA			103
		SANTA ROSA DE HUAYALI			34
	Total	0	0	266	
SHAPAJA		ALTO SHATUYACU			14
		NUEVO LAMAS			21
		SANTA ROSA			18
	Total	0	0	53	

<b>Office Region North San Martin</b>	<b>Total</b>			
<b>Total number of producers</b>	<b>13,691</b>	<b>6,022</b>	<b>2,169</b>	<b>5,500</b>
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>44%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>40%</b>
<b>Number of communities</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>241</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>160</b>
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>34%</b>
<b>Number of communities with more than 20 producers</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>123</b>
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>41%</b>

**Appendix 4, Table 2 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, Tocache**

Office Region Tocache February 2010			Number of Participating Producers		
			Age of First Planting		
Province	District	Community	Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years
MARISCAL CACERES	CAMPANILLA	NUEVO JAEN			81
		PERLAMAYO			63
		SAN JUAN KM 33		31	
		<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>144</b>
		<b>Number of Communities</b>			
TOCACHE	POLVORA	10 DE AGOSTO			24
		BALSAYACU	61		
		BELLO ORIENTE	45		
		BOLIVAR			37
		BUENOS AIRES - LA LOMA			48
		CACHIYACU	18		
		CAÑUTO	7		
		CEDRO			47
		CHALLUAYACU			10
		CUSMAYACU			7
		EL PORVENIR DE ALTO CAÑUTO		11	
		FLOR NACIENTE	10		
		HUASCAYACU	8		
		ISCOTE			12
		JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI			54
		KUWAIT			44
		LA FLORIDA	27		
		LUIS SALAS			13
		MANA HERMOSO	23		
		MIRAFLORES			16
		NUEVA CHILIA			39
		NUEVO CASMA			21
		NUEVO HORIZONTE			155
NUEVO PARAISO	9				
NUEVO PATAZ			13		
NUEVO SAN ANTONIO	22				
NUEVO SAN MARTIN					
POLVORA			69		

	PRIMAVERA	17		
	PUERTO RICO	36		
	SAN JUAN DE CAÑUTILLO (CUEVACHUNCHI)			33
	SAN LUIS	7		
	SAN MIGUEL DE NUEVO HORIZONTE			44
	SECTOR 21	2		
	TAYSHAN			12
	UNION NUEVA VICTORIA	20		
	VILLA LOS ANGELES	25		
	VILLA PALMA			27
	<b>Total District of Polvora</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>725</b>
SHUNTE	LA VICTORIA			30
	MARIPOSA			84
	MONTE CRISTO			26
	NUEVO BELEN			22
	PAMPA HERMOSA			20
	SHUNTE			28
	<b>Total District of Shunte</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>210</b>
TOCACHE	ACCESO HUALLAGA	5		
	ALMENDRAS			29
	ALTO BAMBAMARCA			56
	ALTO LIMON			20
	ALTO SARITA			14
	ATUSPARIA			18
	BAJO LIMON			20
	BAJO TANANTA			49
	BALSA PROBANA			96
	BENTEJEBE			77
	CARRICILLO			14
	CEPESA			25
	CERRO PORTENO			15
	CHAN CHAN			14
	CULEBRA			13
	FILADELFIA			50
	INDOAMERICA	24		
	ISHANGA			28
	IV SECTOR LIMON			31
	JORGE CHAVEZ DEL RIO ESPINO			19
	LAS AMERICAS	23		
	MANTENCION			43
	MIGUEL GRAU	20		
	NARANJAL			49
	NUEVA ESPERANZA			43
	NUEVA LIBERTAD	3		
	NUEVO AMANECER	2		
NUEVO			30	

	BAMBAMARCA			
	NUEVO BAMBAMARCA SECTOR E		5	
	NUEVO BAMBAMARCA SECTOR PAPAYAL			49
	NUEVO BELLAVISTA	12		
	NUEVO JORDAN	33		
	NUEVO SAN JUAN DE HUAYRANGA			48
	PUCAYACU	2		
	PUERTO LOS OLIVOS (PELEJO)			24
	SAN AGUSTIN DE HUAQUISHA	30		
	SAN MIGUEL DEL PORVENIR			54
	SAN PEDRO DE ALTO CULEBRA	25		
	SANTA ROSA DE ALTO TANANTA			48
	SANTO CRISTO			19
	SHISHIYACU			58
	SIN SIN			30
	TANANTA			130
	TIESTO			42
	TOCACHE VIEJO			20
	UNION ALEGRE			34
	VIÑA DEL RIO			22
	YACUSISA			39
	<b>Total District of Tocache</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>1370</b>
UCHIZA	08 DE JULIO (ANEXO DE SHAPAJA)			14
	ALTO HUAYNABE		18	
	BAJO PORONGO	31		
	BARRO BLANCO	17		
	BOLAYNA	11		
	BOMBONAJE	7		
	BUENOS AIRES	20		
	CAHUIDE			39
	CAJATAMBO	10		
	CHONTAYAQUILLO (OSHITO)	38		
	CRUZ PAMPA	50		
	EL PORVENIR KM 9	57		
	FRAY MARTIN DE PORRES		34	
	JOSE. C. MARIATEGUI	8		
	KUNYAG			
LA PARCELA	3			

LOBOYACU	87		
LOS ANGELES	35		
NUEVA UNION		27	
PAMPAYACU	21		
PEZO	15		
PUCAYACU	9		
PUERTO HUICTE		28	
RAMAL DE CACHIYACU	56		
SAN CRISTOBAL	26		
SAN JOSE KM 2	11		
SAN JUAN DE OLLATES	32		
SAN JUAN DE PORONGO		3	
SAN JUAN KM 4	18		
SANTA LUCIA	22		
SANTA LUCIA - ANEXO CERRO DULCE		29	
SANTA ROSA DE SHAPAJA	117		
SANTO DOMINGO	24		
TINGO DE UCHIZA	7		
VALLE SHUNTE	33		
<b>Total District of Uchiza</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>53</b>

Region of Tocache	Total	Number of Participating Producers Age of First Planting		
		Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years
<b>Total number of producers</b>	<b>3,969</b>	1,281	186	2,502
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	32%	5%	63%
<b>Number of communities</b>	<b>128</b>	53	9	66
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	41%	7%	52%

**Appendix 4, Table 3 Number of Communities and Producers by Years since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, Pucallpa**

Province	District	Community	Number of Participating Producers			
			Age of First Plantings			
			Total	Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years
CORONEL PORTILLO	CAMPOVERDE	10 DE JULIO	8	8		
		AGUA DULCE	7	7		
		AVEJAICO	65	65		
		CIUDAD DE LOS INCAS	5	5		
		CONDOR	21	21		
		HERMOZA SELVA	11	11		
		JUVENTUD	12	12		
		LA MERCED DE NESHUYA	61	61		
		LOS ANGELES	14	14		
		LOS VENCEDORES	10	10		
		NARANJILLO	18	18		
		NUEVA DINAMARCA	19	19		
		NUEVE DE FEBRERO	4	4		
		NUEVO PIURA	2	2		
		NUEVO SAN PEDRO	20	20		
		PUEBLO LIBRE	8	8		
		SAN ANDRES	16	16		
		SAN FRANCISCO DE NESHUYA	3	3		
		SAN MARTIN MOJARAL	8	8		
	<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>312</b>	<b>312</b>	-	-	
	<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>	-	-	
	NUEVA REQUENA	BAJO RAYAL	29	29		
		CEDRO ISLA	17	17		
		EL CARIBE	11	11		
		LA PERLA DE SANJA SECA	26	26		
		MIRAFLORES	6	6		
		NARANJAL	23	23		
		NUEVO PARAISO	14	14		
		NUEVO SAN JUAN DE SHESHEA	18	18		
		SAN PABLO DE JUANTIA	35	35		
		SANTA CLARA DE UCHUNYA	32	32		
		SARITA COLONIA	4	4		
		TRES ISLAS	17	17		
UNION PROGRESO		21	21			

		<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>253</b>	<b>253</b>	-	-	
		<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>	-	-	
PADRE ABAD	CURIMANA	16 DE NOVIEMBRE	13	13			
		AGUA DULCE	15			15	
		ANDRES AVELINO CACERES	10	10			
		BELLO HORIZONTE	28	28			
		DIEZ DE MARZO	27			27	
		DOS DE MAYO	17	17			
		FLOR DEL VALLE	2	2			
		LAS LOMAS, ANEXO CURIMANA	14		14		
		LAS MALVINAS	22		22		
		LAS MERCEDES	15	15			
		MARONAL	16	16			
		MONTE SINAI	22	22			
		NUEVA ALIANZA	43		43		
		NUEVA BELLAVISTA (CURIMANA)	35	35			
		NUEVA LIBERTAD	11	11			
		NUEVA MERIBA	48	48			
		NUEVO JERUSALEN	22	22			
		NUEVO PARAISO	10	10			
		NUEVO SAN JOSE	40	40			
		PUEBLO LIBRE	15	15			
		ROCA FUERTE	18		18		
		SAN JUAN DE TAHUAPOA	41	41			
		SOL NACIENTE	4	4			
	VISTA ALEGRE	25	25				
	ZONA PATRIA	26	26				
	ZORRILLOS	11	11				
			<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>550</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>42</b>
			<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>
	IRAZOLA	ALTO YANAYACU	2	2			
		ASUNCION DEL AGUAYTILLO	48	48			
		BAJO TAHUAYO	15	15			
		BAJO URUYA	14		14		
		BANDEJA POZA	42			42	
BUENOS AIRES (IRAZOLA)		61			61		
CANAAN DE PIEDRAS		7	7				
CORAZON DE JESUS		57			57		
EL MILAGRO		32	32				
EL PORVENIR		46		46			
EL TRIUNFO		3	3				
JOSE DE SAN MARTIN DE CHIA		23	23				
LA UNION Km. 75 (IRAZOLA)		37	37				

LAS PIEDRAS -ANEXO CPM VON HUMBOLTH	14		14	
LIBERTAD DE PASARRAYA	12		12	
LIBERTAD DE PASARRAYA ANEXO NUEVO JUANJUI	28		28	
MANCO CAPAC	20			20
MAR DE PLATA	35		35	
MARCO RAMIREZ	33			33
MIGUEL GRAU	35	35		
MIRAFLORES	13	13		
MONTE DE LOS OLIVOS	29	29		
NORBERT ALTO URUYA	44		44	
NUEVA ESPERANZA	20	20		
NUEVA FLORIDA	79	79		
NUEVA IRAZOLA	16		16	
NUEVA PALESTINA (IRAZOLA)	11	11		
NUEVA TIWINZA	1	1		
NUEVA UNION (PALOMETA)	54	54		
NUEVO BELLAVISTA	58			58
NUEVO HORIZONTE	24			24
NUEVO HUANUCO	16			16
NUEVO JERUSALEN DEL ALTO URUYA	14		14	
NUEVO ORIENTE	29			29
NUEVO PROGRESO	11	11		
NUEVO SAN ALEJANDRO	6	6		
NUEVO SAN JUAN (KM 69)	2	2		
NUEVO SATIPO (IRAZOLA)	29	29		
NUEVO TAHUANTINSUYO	78			78
NUEVO UCAYALI	60			60
PIJUAYO WINSTON	27		27	
PRIMAVERA	24	24		
PUEBLO NUEVO	9			9
PUERTO NUEVO	15	15		
SAN JOSE	12	12		
SAN JUAN (KM. 71) - ANEXO NVO. ORIENTE	28		28	
SAN JUAN BAUTISTA	8		8	
SAN MARTIN	12		12	
SAN PEDRO DE GUINEA	10		10	
SANTA CRUZ	23		23	
SANTA ROSA DE GUINEA	30		30	
SAUCE DEL ALTO URUYA	31		31	
SECTOR SANTA BEATRIZ	6		6	
SHIRINGAL ALTO	50		50	

	SHIRINGAL BAJO	80	80		
	SINCHI ROCA	102	102		
	UNION CENTRO RAYA, ANEXO VILLACAMPO	28	28		
	VALLE SAGRADO	65			65
	VICTOR RAUL	10	10		
	VILLA DEL CAMPO	18	18		
	VILLA EL SALVADOR	24	24		
	VILLA MERCEDES	36	36		
	VIRGEN DE FATIMA	23	23		
	VIRGEN DEL CARMEN	20		20	
	VISTA ALEGRE DE CHIA	52		52	
	<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>1,901</b>	<b>829</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>552</b>
	<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>13</b>
PADRE ABAD	3 DE OCTUBRE	22			22
	ALTO ORIENTAL	28			28
	ALTO SHAMBILLO	17		17	
	ANDRES AVELINO CACERES	28			28
	ASSPA - AGUAS VERDES	2		2	
	BAJO GUAYABAL	8	8		
	BAJO SHAMBILLO	85			85
	BOQUERON	38			38
	CENTRO YURAC	37			37
	CHANCADORA	18	18		
	DIVISORIA	52			52
	EL PORVENIR	6			6
	ERIKA	20	20		
	HORMIGA	34			34
	HUACAMAYO	6			6
	IDAYACU	36			36
	INCA GARCILASO DE LA VEGA	14			14
	JUAN VELASCO ALVARADO	5	5		
	LA LIBERTAD DE SAMIRIA	13	13		
	LIBERTAD	6	6		
	LOS OLIVOS	29		29	
	MARISCAL CACERES	42	42		
	MEBANAÑU	28	28		
	MEDIACION	27			27
	MICAELA BASTIDAS	5		5	
	MIGUEL GRAU SEMINARIO	56			56
	MINAS DE SAL	18			18
	MIRAFLORES (ALTO)	4	4		
	MIRAFLORES (BAJO)	2	2		
	NUEVA ESPERANZA ( YAMINO )	52	52		

NUEVA PALESTINA	13			13
NUEVA PRIMAVERA	1	1		
NUEVA UNION	39	39		
NUEVO JORDAN	33		33	
NUEVO MUNDO	35		35	
NUEVO PARAISO	60		60	
NUEVO PROGRESO	26			26
PAMPA HERMOSA	9		9	
PREVISTO	35		35	
PUERTO AZUL	36		36	
RIO BLANCO	26		26	
SANTA ROSA	75		75	
SANTA ROSA KM 200	48			48
SECTOR ALTO CHAMBIRA - NUEVO PROGRESO	8			8
SECTOR COPAL-CCNN SANTA ROSA	1	1		
SECTOR OTORONGO - SIRENA	1	1		
SECTOR SABALO- TANGARANA	9	9		
SECTOR YURAC YACU (BOQUERON)	8	8		
SELVA TURISTICA	43			43
TARAHUACA	2	2		
VALLE DE SION	35			35
ZONA RESERVADA - BARRIO UNIDO	31			31
<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>1,312</b>	<b>259</b>	<b>362</b>	<b>691</b>
<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>25</b>

	Number of Participating Producers			
	Age of First Plantings			
	Total	Less than 4 years	4 - 5 years	More than 5 years
<b>Region of Pucallpa</b>				
<b>Number of Producers</b>	<b>4,328</b>	2,064	979	1,285
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	48%	23%	30%
<b>Number of Communities</b>	<b>175</b>	101	37	37
<b>Percent</b>	<b>100%</b>	58%	21%	21%

**Appendix 4, Table 4 Subcontracts for Training and Technical Assistance**

<b>Etapa</b>	<b>Oficina</b>	<b>Sub-Proyecto</b>	<b>No. de personas trabajando en el sub-proyecto y su cargo</b>	<b>Nombre del Donatario</b>
Consolidación	San Martin	Módulo porcinos, ganado vacuno y aves	01 coordinador, 09 extensionistas, 01 asistente administrativo, 03 promotores	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo
Consolidación	San Martin	Cacao	01 Coordinador, 8 Extensionistas, 01 Asistente administrativo	Asociación de Productores Agrarios Ecológicos Grano de Oro
Consolidación	Tocache	Café	1 Extensionista	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada
Consolidación	San Martin	Cacao, Café	- 01 coordinador - 17 extensionistas - 01 promotor - 01 asistente administrativo	Asociación de Productores Agrarios Ecológicos Grano de Oro
Consolidación	San Martin	Cacao	01 Coordinador Técnico, 01 Administrador, 12 Extensionista, 10 Promotores Agrícolas	Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera - ACOPAGRO
Consolidación	San Martin	Cacao, Café *	* 02 Coordinadores. * 12 Extensionistas. * 12 Promotores. * 01 Administrador.	Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera - ACOPAGRO
Consolidación	Tocache	Cacao	1 extensionista agrícola, 1 asistente administrativo	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache Ltda.
Consolidación	Ucayali	Cacao	18 PERSONAS (1 Coordinador Técnico, 8 Extensionistas, 8 promotores de campo y 1 Administrador)	Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación	Tingo Maria, Tocache	Café	1 Coordinador técnico, 6 extensionistas y 1 asistente administrativo	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada
Consolidación	San Martin	Palmito	01 Coordinador, 03 extensionistas, 01 asistente administrativo	Alianza S.A.
Consolidación	Ucayali	Cacao	01 Responsable Técnico, 01 Responsable Administrativo, 03 Facilitadores Extensionistas y 03 promotores	Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación	Aguallita	Café	01 coordinador 01 administrador 02 extensionistas 02 promotores	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada

Consolidación	Aguaytia	Palma Aceitera	01 coordinador 01 administrador 02 extensionistas 02 técnicos 04 promotores	Asociación de Palmicultores de Shambillo
Consolidación	Aguaytia	Cacao	01 coordinador 01 administrador 03 extensionistas 02 técnicos 04 promotores	Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación	San Martín	Módulo de ganado vacuno	- 01 extensionista - 01 asistente administrativo	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo
Consolidación	Tingo María	Café	9 Extensionistas, 1 promotor, 1 Coordinador Técnico, 1 Asistente Admin.	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada
Consolidación	Tingo María	Cacao	5 Extensionistas, 1 Coordinador Técnico, 1 Asistente Admin.	Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación	Tocache	Palma Aceitera	1 extensionista y 1 asistente administrativo	Asociación Central de Palmicultores de la Provincia de Tocache
Consolidación	Tocache	Módulo de Piscigranja	1 extensionista y 1 asistente administrativo	Asociación Provincial de Técnicos de Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación	San Martín	Módulo porcinos y aves	- 01 extensionista - 01 asistente administrativo	Asociación de Productores Agrarios Ecológicos Grano de Oro
Consolidación	Aguaytia	Palmito	01 extensionista 01 asistente administrativo	Consorcio de Productores de Plátanos de Ucayali-COPPU - EN PROCESO DE CIERRE
post-erradicación	Tocache	Cacao	1 Coordinador Técnico, 5 Extensionistas, 1 Administradora y 2 Asistentes Administrativas.	Asociación de Productores de Cacao del Distrito de Uchiza
post-erradicación	Tocache	Café	1 Extensionista	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada
post-erradicación	Tocache	Ganadería	1 Coordinador Técnico, 1 Extensionistas y 1 Administrador	Asociación de Ganaderos del Distrito de Uchiza el Oriente - AGDUO
Consolidación	San Martín	Animales Menores	01 Extensionista, 01 Promotor agropecuario, 01 Administrador a 1/4 tiempo	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo
Consolidación	San Martín	Módulo de ganado vacuno	01 Extensionista, 01 Promotor agropecuario, 01 Administrador a 1/4 tiempo	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo

post-erradicación	Tingo Maria	Cacao	06 Extensionistas, 1 Coordinador Técnico, 1 Administrador.	Asociación de Productores Agropecuarios Juan Velasco Alvarado
Consolidación	Tocache	Módulo de cuyes, porcinos y aves	1 Coordinador técnico, 3 extensionistas y 1 asistente administrativo	Asociación Provincial de Técnicos de Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación	Tocache	Módulo de Piscigranja	1 Coordinador técnico y 1 extensionistas	Asociación Provincial de Técnicos de Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación	Aguaytia	Plátano	01 extensionista 01 administrador	Consortio de Productores de Plátanos de Ucayali-COPPU - EN PROCESO DE CIERRE
Consolidación	Tocache	Ganadería	1 Coordinador técnico, 1 Asistente administrativo, y 5 extensionistas. Desde Febrero 2009 a Marzo 2010 trabajan un equipo de insumisión artificial conformado por 3 personas y una persona de servicio veterinario.	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo
Consolidación	Ucayali	Palma Aceitera	1 Coordinador técnico, 1 asistente administrativo, 3 extensionistas, y 1 facilitador FOP	Comité Central de Palmicultores de Ucayali - COCEPU
Consolidación	Aguaytia	Pastos	01 coordinador 01 administrador 03 extensionistas	Ecoselva Perú S.R.L. - CERRADO
Consolidación	Ucayali	Modulo de ganado vacuno	01 Responsable Técnico, 01 Responsable Administrativo, 01 Facilitador Extensionista	Empresa Comunal de Servicios Agropecuarios SRL -"Unión y Trabajo"
Consolidación	Tingo Maria, Tocache	Cacao	1coordinador técnico, 3 sub coordinadores, 22 extensionistas, 1 administrador, 1 asistente técnico administrativo	Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache Ltda.
Consolidación	Ucayali	Cacao	1 Coordinador general, 2 sub coordinadores, 17 extensionistas, 1 especialista en productividad, 5 promotores calificados, 4 promotores, 1 administrador	Cooperativa Agraria Cafetalera Divisoria Limitada
Consolidación	Ucayali	Modulo de ganado vacuno	05 PERSONAS (1 Coordinador Técnico, 3 Extensionistas, y 1 Asistente Administrativo)	Central de Productores Agropecuarios Forestales de Monte Alegre

Post- erradicación	Tingo Maria	Ganadería	01 Coordinador	Asociación de Productores Agropecuarios Juan Velasco Alvarado
Consolidación	San Martin	Módulo de porcinos, gallinas y ganado vacuno	01 Coordinador Técnico, 01 Administrador, 05 Extensionista, 02 Inseminadores	Fundación para el Desarrollo Agrario del Alto Mayo

## **APPENDIX 5 DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS**

Follows is a brief and informal description prepared by a member of the team for several producer associations and cooperatives that were visited by the team.

### **Cooperativa Oro Verde**

Está localizada en Lamas.

Fundada En 1997 con apoyo de las NNUU y se inicia con 56 productores de café.

Objectives:

- Comercializar directamente los productos de sus asociados (originalmente café y hoy incluye el cacao).
- Elevar el nivel de vida de sus asociados.
- Implementar una organización referente de los productores: gremial y empresarial.

Solo manejó café hasta el 2005 y en la actualidad el cacao ya representa el 25% de sus valores de venta.

El año 2005 comienza a recibir apoyo del ADP y ya cuenta con 1,200 socios, así como con una muy buena imagen.

El principal apoyo que recibe del ADP es la asistencia técnica, pro debido al muy rápido crecimiento que ha tenido la Cooperativa, tiene aún muchos asociados que no han sido capacitados.

Calificación de sus asociados:

1. Es el socio empresario y son 400 socios.
2. Están en proceso de estabilizarse. Son 300 asociados.
3. Son los que comienzan después de dejar la coca. Inician la rehabilitación de sus plantaciones de café y no están en plena producción. Son 500 productores.
4. Se encuentran en eslabonamiento con la Cooperativa. No son aún asociados pero reciben asistencia técnica. Son 500 productores.

La mayoría de productores continúan trabajando café "hola" y se está avanzando con el café lavado.

Vende solo café orgánico, por lo que recibe un mejor precio.

Cuenta con un Departamento Técnico y otro de Educación, así como un Comité de Mujeres (CODEMU).

Los productores presentes manifestaron la disposición de pagar por la asistencia técnica, aunque no con total convencimiento.

Requieren de capacitación gerencial con la finalidad de manejar mejor los costos.

El año 2009 vendió 15,000 qq de café y 150 TM de cacao.

Pretenden crecer hasta completar 1,500 á 1,800 asociados.

Se notó falta de preparación de los cuadros empresariales de recambio cuando sea necesario.

### **Conclusiones**

- La cooperativa está en franco proceso de consolidación, excepto por la falta de personal gerencial de recambio.
- Se le debe fortalecer empresarial y asociativamente durante uno o dos años, para dejar paulatinamente de prestarle apoyo en asistencia técnica, que deberá ser asumida por la cooperativa.

### **Asociación de Productores de Palmito Alianza - APROPAL**

Está localizada en el Pongo de Caynarachi

Se fundó el año 1997, por gestión del Ministerio de Agricultura en 1996 frente a la Cooperación Española. Las siembras de Pijuayo (palmito) se iniciaron en 1997.

Existen 536 há. de Pijuayo instaladas en la zona, que llegarán a 800 há. por cuenta del ADP, además de otras 500-700 há. por cuenta de AECI.

La Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional - AECI contribuyó con los equipos para procesamiento y el MINAGRI contribuyó con la infraestructura, asociando a los productores a través de esta planta de procesamiento como elemento para la eliminación del cultivo de coca.

La planta pasó por un período de paralización debido al mal manejo gerencial que tuvo, acumulando deudas que están comenzando a ser pagadas.

En la actualidad la planta procesa 15,000 a 17,000 tallos (-ehontas") diariamente. Al inicio de la planta solo procesaban 4,000 talos por día. El primer contenedor se embarcará el 01-Mayo-2010.

Los productores consideran que el ADP es la organización más exitosa que se ha presentado en la zona.

Los equipos de la planta son ya muy antiguos (más de 10 años) y se necesita renovar la mayor parte de ellos, así como instalar el HACCP para garantizar la calidad del producto procesado.

El ADP tiene programado instalar 400 há. de Pijuayo el presente año.

La calidad de palmito ha desmejorado por falta de fertilización adecuada. Sin embargo están vendiendo al Mercado Solidario al precio de US\$ 20.00 por una caja con 12 frascos. El precio convencional es de US\$ 14.50 por cada caja de 12 frascos.

### **Conclusiones:**

- Es necesario fortalecer la Asociación.
- Es necesario fortalecer la asistencia técnica para levantar la producción, proponiendo tecnologías mejoradas de producción.

Para mejorar la fertilización se requiere de créditos promocionales que podrían ser negociados con AGROBANCO, aunque se demoren mucho en aprobarlos. Las tasa de AGROBANCO son de 1.5% mensual. CEPCO ofrece crédito al 4.5% mensual que es demasiado alto.

### **Asociación de Productores de Cacao – ALLIMA Cacao**

Se fundó el año 2003 a raíz de la EV y con ayuda del ADP y el Gobierno Regional, al notar los agricultores la necesidad de trabajar organizados. Cuenta con 475 asociados, en 14 comunidades con plantaciones de menos de 4 años de edad.

Es una asociación aún incipiente, que el año 2009 vendió tan solo 12 TM de cacao de buena calidad. Su comprador fue Oro Verde, pero piensan que entre sus compradores potenciales están PRONATEC, Romero y Machu Picchu, entre otros.

Algunos agricultores que comenzaron con 1 hectáreas, ya tienen 2 y hasta 3 hectáreas muy jóvenes.

El año 2010 tienen como meta vender 30 TM., aunque el año 2009 en la zona se produjo 250 TM. El ADP les proporcionó cajas de fermentación y bandejas para el secado.

#### **Conclusiones**

- Es aún una organización incipiente que requiere de tiempo y asistencia para su consolidación. La zona es un potencial reducto de cocaleros y si se descuida podría llenarse de coca.
- No se le debe dejar aún pues requiere trabajos en asistencia técnica y fortalecimiento institucional.

### **Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache – CAT Tocache**

Fundada en 1990 con apoyo de las NNUU.

Cuenta con 20 Comités Sectoriales y 490 asociados formalizados.

Sufrió una época de paralización por la situación socio-política en Tocache, y en la actualidad está en franco desarrollo. Recibe apoyo del ADP desde el año 2008 y le pagaron al Gerente durante 9 meses.

Está centralizando el acopio en “baba” para uniformizar la fermentación y el secado. En la actualidad cuentan con 7 centros de acopio financiados por el ADP y las NNUU. La meta inmediata es completar 23 centros para atender la post-cosecha de 1,500 há. de sus asociados.

Los asociados pagan una cuota de S/. 60.00 por año, además de S/. 10.00 por sepelio y otros S/. 20.00 por servicios de salud. Estos aportes son anuales.

Paralelamente reciben aportes monetarios extraordinarios voluntarios y en mano de obra para instalar los módulos de fermentación y secado.

Adicionalmente la CAT Tocache recibe aportaciones pagando 12% de interés anual, al igual que las financieras de la zona.

El año 2009 acopiaron y vendieron 360 TM de cacao orgánico de primera calidad, y la meta para 2010 es acopiar 650 TM, que es el 75% del total de cacao producido por sus socios.

Un reclamo de los socios es que solo reciben cacao de primera calidad y se ven obligados a vender el resto a los acopiadores de firmas que operan en la provincia. En esta forma es posible que un determinado porcentaje adicional de la producción de los socios vaya también a manos de los acopiadores. Aparentemente esta discriminación en la recepción de solo el cacao de primera calidad responde a que se busca que todos los socios produzcan solo esta primera calidad, con lo que se beneficiarían.

Algunos productores expresan que el precio pagado por la cooperativa y los acopiadores es el mismo, pero no mencionan que al final de la campaña la cooperativa les paga un reintegro de acuerdo con el resultado final. Esto no lo hacen los acopiadores.

Cuentan con un aporte de US\$ 600,000.00 de una financiera holandesa con aval del comprador europeo con que cuentan, Los intereses que pagan son de 9% al año.

EIADP financia a 22 extensionistas de campo y 6 coordinadores, que trabajan a través de la Cooperativa.

Su visión a largo plazo es contar con una planta procesadora de manteca, licor, cocoa y chocolates.

### **Conclusiones**

- La cooperativa está en un buen camino para consolidarse.
- Su actividad es aún limitada, como lo demuestra que solo acopien 650 TM el 2010.
- Cuenta con productores que obtienen hasta 4,000 Kg/ha/año y les queda un largo camino por andar, ya que disponen de 1,500 hectáreas de cacao en diversas edades.
- Considero que no se debe aflojar el apoyo que recibe la CAT Tocache, pues es una forma gremial que debe servir de base para la consolidación rural de la región.
- Es conveniente que desde el próximo contrato se establezca que la extensión debe ser pagada por los productores a través de la cooperativa.
- Debe mejorarse la capacitación y la información a los socios.

### **ACEPAT – OLPESA**

Cuenta con 14 asociaciones de base.

Por medio de la Cooperación Alemana se implantaron 5,800 hectáreas, en el valle, apoyados posteriormente por el ADP.

Inicialmente entregaban los frutos a Palma del Espino, que recibía volúmenes limitados, hasta que el año 2002 cerró la recepción en vista que su producción cubría la capacidad de la planta. En esta situación tuvieron que llevar los racimos a OLAMSA a 400 Km. de Tocache.

Es en ese momento los productores muestran interés en instalar una planta. Para la ejecución del proyecto correspondiente contaron con ayuda de las NNUU.

Para la compra de los equipos los palmicultores debieron hipotecar sus tierras a AGROBANCO por US\$ 1,823,000.00 y AGROBANCO pidió que además los palmicultores aporten US\$ 300,000.00 que finalmente se rebajó a US\$ 75,000.00 que consiguieron con el apoyo de las NNUU, con lo que compraron los equipos.

La instalación y el transporte de los equipos hasta Tocache fueron por cuenta de la empresa.

El accionariado de OLPESA es como sigue:

- 54.65% Socios de ACEPAT
- 15.75% Productores individuales
- 10.60% Otros inversionistas

- 19.00% Industrial Alpamayo

La planta inició sus operaciones el 13-Dic-09 con una capacidad de producción de 10 TM/hora.

La planta sirve a alrededor de 1,500 familias que cuando cerró ENDEPALMA quedaron abandonadas y ahora se han vuelto a agrupar y están renovando las antiguas plantaciones que quedaron abandonadas por viejas.

La planta otorga pequeños préstamos a sus asociados, para apoyar el cultivo y operaciones simples.

El año 2009 vendieron 13,300 TM de frutos, resultando en una utilidad neta de S/, 600,000.00. La proyección para el 2010 es de 25,000 TM que representa una utilidad aproximada de S/. 1.2 millones.

Tienen programado ir asumiendo paulatinamente la asistencia técnica y las necesidades de fertilizantes.

La producción de 1 TM de aceite rojo demanda 4.7 TM de frutos.

La planta de OLPESA está trabajando al 30% de su capacidad.

### **Conclusiones**

- Es destacable el esfuerzo y compromiso que han asumido los agricultores, demostrando que cuando se quiere hacer algo y se cuenta con el conocimiento necesario, se consigue.
- Se debe hacer hincapié en que no se debe dejar de contar con la asistencia técnica para evitar bajas de producción, conforme sucedió en Neshuya.
- La asistencia técnica debe ser transferida paulatinamente a los receptores de la misma, durante un período no menor a 2 años, en vista que las utilidades lo permiten.
- El fortalecimiento de las organizaciones ACEPAT y OLPESA es de vital importancia.
- Debe programarse un crecimiento ordenado en la producción hasta cubrir 2.5 á 3 turnos de trabajo de la planta.

### **Cooperativa La Divisoria**

Hace 14 años que las NNUU los orientó para formar una cooperativa, que ahora cuenta con 666 socios y 200 productores en proceso de asociación.

Todos fueron coccaleros y luego de firmar con el ADP (DEVIDA) un convenio para la erradicación voluntaria eliminaron sus cocaleros, pues notaron que tenían amenazas de diversas fuentes. Manifiestan que actualmente tienen una vida tranquila, sin peligros y educando a sus hijos.

Su principal producto es el café, y están comenzando a incursionar en cacao, que por el momento es de poco volumen, pero esperan incrementarlo en el mediano plazo, enfatizando en calidad de primera.

Luego de la firma del convenio han recibido apoyo técnico del ADP mediante las ECAs y visitas a las chacras de café y cacao. Con el ADP están mejorando sus tecnología de producción y esperan que en otros 3-4 años puedan estar con una productividad promedio no menor a los 20 qq/ha de café de primera calidad.

No tienen problemas de vender toda su producción a la cooperativa pues les pagan mejores precios que los acopiadores, en vista que toda su producción de café y cacao es de primera calidad.

Muchos productores cultivan café desde hace más de 14 años y en la actualidad cuentan con una productividad de 15 qq/ha de café orgánico.

Si bien acopian café y cacao hasta en Tocache, su mira es fortalecer la producción de su zona (La Divisoria), por lo cual no se han impuesto un límite de asociados como expresan en las Cooperativas Oro Verde y ACOPAGRO. Se proyectan a que el año 2014 deban tener 1,000 asociados.

Por lo general cuentan con un premio adicional de US\$ 10.00 por cada quintal, con lo que esperan que en el corto plazo puedan financiar la transferencia de tecnología y la asistencia técnica en general.

El año 2009 vendieron 350,000 Kg. de los cuales 60,000 fueron de calidad 87 puntos (muy alta), 200,000 Kg. de 84 puntos (alto +) y el resto de 78 puntos (alto). Por el café de más 80 puntos les pagan US\$ 300.00 por quintal, y por los de menos de 80 reciben US\$ 130.00 á 140.00 por quintal.

Cuentan con un laboratorio de control de calidad con los equipos donados por el ADP y un catador diplomado estable en el mismo. A los productores se les paga de acuerdo al grado de calidad del producto que entregan.

El proceso de premiación por el café entregado es como sigue:

- El productor entrega su café y se le asigna un código, cuyo talón con nombre se deposita en un ánfora lacrada.
- La hoja con la descripción va directamente al laboratorio
- El ánfora se abre cuando termina la campaña de ventas y se determina la calidad del café entregado por cada productor y se le asigna un premio por calidad.
- Recién en ese momento se sabe de quién es cada lote entregado a la cooperativa.

En cacao han recibido el producto y pagado de acuerdo al aspecto físico del mismo, así sea orgánico o no. Este año 2010 ya tienen preparado un protocolo para pagarlo de acuerdo a la calidad analizada en laboratorio.

El año 2009 vendieron 150 TM a PRONATEC (Suiza).

### **Conclusiones**

- Si bien es una cooperativa con pocos años de fundada, su proceso de consolidación es fuerte y bien avanzado.
- Para fortalecer esta área sería conveniente continuar con la asistencia técnica por uno a dos años, pero pasando esa responsabilidad paulatinamente a la cooperativa, que ya ha manifestado su decisión de asumirla.
- El fortalecimiento empresarial es necesario continuarlo, pero también programando su término en el corto plazo.

### **Cooperativa Agraria Industrial “Naranjillo” – COOPAIN**

Fundada en los años '70 la cooperativa cuenta con 2,934 agricultores asociados, productores de cacao y café. Sin embargo, el 65% de los agricultores de su zona de

influencia no están asociados a esta u otra cooperativa, comercializando su producción indistintamente a los acopiadores y a la COOPAIN o Cooperativa La Divisoria.

Están apuntando al desarrollo de productos para no quedarse en venta de materia prima o semi procesada.

Cuentan con una planta procesadora de cacao que originalmente (1984) fue donada por las NNUU y posteriormente potenciada con algunos equipos más modernos adquiridos por la propia empresa.

Esta cooperativa tuvo una crisis generada por la convulsión terrorista y el narcotráfico en el Alto Huallaga, que la llevó a casi paralizar durante varios años. Sin embargo ya se ha recuperado y se puede decir que es la cooperativa con mayor grado de consolidación en la Región Selva, contando con una gerencia altamente calificada y un Directorio renovado con gente joven y mayor preparación que sus antecesores, aplicando un modelo de Gestión Estratégica.

Sus proyecciones para el mediano plazo son:

- El desarrollo de una o más marcas para los mercados externos y doméstico
- Siendo sus columnas el cacao y el café, realizarán una investigación de mercados externos y doméstico para sus actuales productos manteca, licor y cocoa, además que están comenzando con la fabricación de chocolates. En la actualidad este rubro representa solo un 7% del total de sus ventas, pero esperan crecer en el corto plazo al vender al Comercio Justo.
- Sus productos con mayor valor agregado están siendo diseñados para los sectores de población A y B.
- Por lo pronto ya están exportando a Europa pequeñas cantidades de chocolates con la marca –MECSA OSHA” con 55% de cocoa orgánica.
- El café con logotipo de –NARANJILLO” ya se exporta a USA.
- Consideran que una marca genera estabilidad en el largo plazo.

Dada su fortaleza la COOPAIN es quien fija el precio base del cacao en la zona.

Habiendo acopiado algo más de 3,000 TM el año 2008, el 90% de sus ventas fueron en 2008 para el mercado europeo y con compromisos a precios cerrados, pero muchos fueron cancelados debido a la crisis económica mundial. El año 2009 iniciaron la recuperación de esos compradores y esperan nivelarse en el presente año en base a calidad y a los productos orgánicos.

Las principales ventajas que tienen los productores al entregar su producto a la COOPAIN son:

- Control de la producción desde el campo.
- El asociado quiere a su empresa.
- El asociado cuenta con un precio base para el año y al final de la campaña recibe un reintegro de acuerdo a los resultados obtenidos.
- El asociado cuenta con un seguro médico familiar.
- La COOPAIN les proporciona medicinas al 50% del precio en el mercado.

## **Conclusiones**

- La COOPAIN se encuentra en un grado de consolidación muy avanzado y requerirá asumir durante el año 2010 las funciones que le está proveyendo el ADP.
- Esto sería materia de discusión en el caso que la estrategia de intervención sea dirigida a Monzón y el Bolsón Cuchara, dada las características de estas zonas y su proximidad a la COOPAIN.

### **Oleaginosas Amazonicas S.A. – OLAMSA**

#### **Comité Central de Pamicultores de Ucayali - COCEPU**

Industria fundada a fines de los '90 por gestión de las NNUU, quien les donó los primeros equipos para procesar palma aceitera, en la actualidad se encuentra en muy buena condición física, económica y financiera.

En la actualidad procesa 12 TM/hora y ya tienen programada una ampliación a 24 TM/hora para entrar a operar en setiembre/octubre del presente año, en vista que las proyecciones de cosecha apuntan a que la planta será altamente insuficiente para procesar la oferta de frutos por parte de sus asociados a fines del presente año.

Adicionalmente tienen programado para el año 2014 poner otra planta para procesar inicialmente 12 TM/hora en Campo Verde, para aprovechar la expansión del cultivo de palma en esta zona. Actualmente el Banco de Crédito está evaluando este proyecto para decidir su financiación.

COCEPU es accionista mayoritario de OLAMSA y cada agricultor es asociado. Las utilidades se reparten en bienes como plantas nuevas, y no en efectivo.

El ADP está contribuyendo a instalar nuevas siembras de palma en coordinación con COCEPU, así como al fortalecimiento institucional y a la capacitación del personal técnico de campo.

El precio de venta del aceite rojo se establece de acuerdo al precio FOB en Indonesia más los costos de transporte y nacionalización en el Perú.

Los compradores principales son socios de la Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (SIN), y frecuentemente tienen mejores ofertas pero prefieren mantenerse con los de la SIN para asegurar su mercado presente y futuro. Separan un 5% de su producción para el consumo local.

La capitalización con palma aceitera genera que los bancos ofrecen tarjetas de crédito de consumo a los asociados de COCEPU.

### **CONCLUSIONES**

- Tanto OLAMSA como COCEPU son organizaciones ya consolidadas y el ADP debe considerar que las funciones de apoyo que oferta a las mismas deben ser asumidas por ellas en el más corto plazo.

### **Asociación de Palmicultores de Shambillo – ASPASH**

#### **Oleaginosas de Palma S.A. – OLPASA**

OLPASA se formó el año 2004 en base a los socios de ASPASH y está localizada en el valle de Shambillo, en Aguaytía. El 97.3% de las acciones pertenecen a ASPASH y el restante 2.7% a productores individuales.

Las primeras actividades para implantar palma en Shambillo se realizan el año 1999 con apoyo de las NNUU como una actividad de desarrollo alternativo, pues hasta el año 2000 la zona era de monocultivo de coca.

El año 2001 se instalan dos viveros para instalar 1000 há. de palma con fondos de las NNUU y consecutivamente los años siguientes se instalan viveros para otras 1,500 há. con fondos del Gobierno Regional, USAID y el Ministerio de Agricultura.

OLPASA inició sus operaciones en Enero de 2009 reportando ese año utilidades por US\$ 240,000.00 que revirtieron a ASPASH en forma de plántones, fertilizantes, etc.

En la actualidad la planta opera con 1.5 turnos diarios con 6 TM/hora, pero trabaja todos los días.. La proyección para 2010 es que terminará el año trabajando 2 turnos diarios, y a fines del año 2011 ya trabajará os 3 turnos correspondientes a su capacidad operativa.

Los compradores del aceite rojo de OLPASA son los asociados de la Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (ALICORP, Palmas del Espino e Industrias Alpamayo).

El Perú tiene solo 40,000 há. de palma aceitera y requiere de por lo menos 80,000 há. para satisfacer sus necesidades actuales.

### **CONCLUSIONES**

- OLPASA está muy bien encaminada para lograr su consolidación, que se espera será a fines del año 2011 o antes de la mitad de 2012.
- Es conveniente seguir apoyándola en el fortalecimiento organizacional, así como con la asistencia técnica y transferencia de tecnología mejorada, pero con una proyección de que en el corto plazo asuma estos servicios.
- Se nota que la gerencia general no refleja que se estén preparando elementos de recambio para el futuro.

## APPENDIX 6 MATERIALS REVIEWED

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4. CRS Report for Congress, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes, November 2005.
5. DEVIDA, Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, Ttocache – Uchiza, julio de 2002.
6. DEVIDA, Annual Survey, 2008 and 2009.
7. DEVIDA, Verifications, 2008, 2009.
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9. Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, Plan de desarrollo regional concertado, 2004-2010, incluyendo el plan actualizado 2008-2010.
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11. Industria del cacao y café Naranjillo, Organic Products.
12. Macroconsult, Narcotráfico: Amenaza al crecimiento sostenible del Perú, Estudios sobre coca, cocaína, seguridad y desarrollo, 2008.
13. PDA, Cesar Morocho Marchán, Estudio de la Cadena de Valor del Platanos en Aguaytia, enero de 2010.
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15. PDA, DEVIDA, Conociendo más el programa de desarrollo alternativo.
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18. PDA, DEVIDA, Programa de desarrollo alternativo región Huánuco.
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24. Program of Alternative Development, Annual and Quarterly Reports, 2006 to 2009, Chemonics.
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27. UNODC, Perú, Monitorio de Cultivos de Coca, junio 2009.
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31. USAID/Bolivia, Integrated Alternative Development Program Assessment, November 2009.
32. Novak, Fabián, Jaime García, Sandra Namihás, Pablo Moscoso, El Problema del narcotráfico en la región Ucayali, Pontifica Universidad Católica de Perú.
33. Ministerio de Agricultura, Fortalecimiento de la cadena productiva de la piña en el valle de Aguaytia, provincia de Padre Abad.
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35. USAID, Marco Lógico del Programa Desarrollo Alternativo en su Etapa 2008-2010.

## APPENDIX 7 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime. *Alternative Development: A Global Thematic Evaluation. Final, Synthesis Report*, Vienna, 2005.

This report is a comprehensive evaluation within available voluntary resources, for determining best practices in alternative development by assessing the impact of alternative development on both human development indicators and drug control objectives. Recent studies from South-East Asia (Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, and in the Andean region (Bolivia, Columbia and Peru) were reviewed. Twelve basic conclusions are presented. Three basic recommendations are:

- A firm political commitment needs to be made to pursue alternative development in coordination with all stakeholders so that it is sustainable and has human development as the ultimate aim.
- A global partnership should be established between development entities and national groups to make reducing the cultivation of illicit crops a cross-cutting issue, thus maximizing the impact of efforts.
- The elimination of illicit crops should be conditional on improvements in the lives and livelihoods of households. It should not be a prerequisite for development assistance.

2. Devida, Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, Tocache – Uchiza, julio de 2002.

A preinvestment study for a program of Alternative Development in Tocache and Uchiza. A companion paper by Wolfgang Haupt of GFA Terra Systems is titled –Peru, Proyecto Desarrollo Alternativo Tocache Uchiza' en el marco del Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo, Informe de la misión de consultoría sobre la formulación del Proyecto.”

3. Acuerdo Nacional, Informe de Seguimiento 2006-2008, Auspiciado por Embajada de España en Perú, noviembre de 2009.

Report on the actions taken to follow up on the –Acuerdo Nacional” for the period 2006-2008 in four areas: Democracy and Rights, Equality and Social Justice, Competitiveness of the Country, and the State of Efficiency, Transparency, and Decentralization in Peru. The last chapter discusses production and trafficking in illegal drugs with conclusions and recommendations.

4. Macroconsult, *Narcotráfico: Amenaza al crecimiento sostenible del Perú*, 2008.

A collection of papers dealing with issues relating to coca production, cocaine, security and development by various authors. The papers support the development of a rational public policy to combat the undesirable impacts to Peru's development.

5. DEVIDA, 2009 Impact Report. (–Informe de Impacto 2009”)

The document presents the 2009 annual evaluation of the Alternative Development Program, which was carried out by the DEVIDA evaluation and sampling team in nine priority areas for USAID and DEVIDA. The Report gathers useful field information for decision-making of the institutions involved in the ADP.

The methodology used is a statistical design for an impact survey that was targeted to three types of ADP domains: domains defined as ADP 2002-2007, comprising communities signing the “Convenio Marco” under the voluntary eradication strategy; domain defined by communities signing the “Acta de Entendimiento” during the period 2005-2008 in the Tocache Province under the Programmed eradication; and domains comprising non-ADP communities that are within the intervention areas of ADPADP but that did not sign the “Convenio Marco” or the “Acta de Entendimiento.” These communities benefited, directly and indirectly, from ADPADP intervention during the period 1995-2002.

6. IDEI, Catholic University of Peru, 2009. The Narcotrafic Map in Peru. (“El Mapa del Narcotráfico en el Perú”).

The report, presented by the Institute of International Studies of the Catholic University of Peru, compiles a number of articles by different authors dealing with the narco-traffic problem in Peru. The purpose is to analyze the problem’s multiple dimensions and show how it became a menace to democracy, security and development in Peru. The report is divided in three parts. The first analyzes how narco-traffic is an international phenomenon and how it impacts various aspects of Peruvian life. The second part describes the social, economic and political impact of narco-traffic in the 12 regions of Peru where coca leaf cultivation is present: San Martín, Ucayali, Huánuco, Ayacucho, Cusco, Junín, Pasco, Loreto, La Libertad, Amazonas y Cajamarca. The third section is devoted to principal conclusions and recommendations that derive from the previous two sections.

7. UNODC- DEVIDA, Commercial Performance of the Enterprises promoted by Alternative Development/2008. (“Desempeño Comercial de las Empresas Promovidas por el Desarrollo Alternativo/2008”)

The report analyzes the commercial performance of the enterprises supported by Alternative Development projects of the United Nations Office against Drug and Crime (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito,” UNODC). The analysis is based on sales in international and national markets. The report highlights the progress to date of enterprises of organized farmers and beneficiaries of the different programs of alternative development. Among them are the “Central de Cooperativas Agrarias Cafetaleras” (COCLA) and “Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo,” both institutions supported at the beginning of the UNODC Cooperation.

8. Chemonics International, Inc. Annual Report for October 2008 to September 2009.

The report summarizes progress achieved during the second year of the Contract 527-C-07-00002 with Chemonics International Inc. During this year, social unrest and insecurity affected negatively the program’s work in the Aguaytia and Tingo Maria regions. Intense rains during the second quarter affected communication routes and the transport of personnel, grantees and products. In addition, the

international crisis resulted in decreased prices for coffee and cacao, two of the program's principal crops during the first half of 2009. In spite of the above, the program assisted the development of 27,351 hectares of alternative crops, 20,173 families, created 9,862 jobs, produced \$37.1 million in sales and helped strengthen 42 local governments.

The program's activities focused on agricultural production, value chain strengthening, credit, social development, community development, governance, gender, infrastructure, communication and monitoring and evaluation.

9. Penny, Mary E., et al. Can Coca Leaves Contribute to Improving the Nutritional Status of the Andean Population?

The study assesses the nutritional potential of eight samples of coca leaves from different regions of Peru, examining the nutritional value of coca leaves that had a mystic and cultural importance in ancient Andean societies. Coca was originally restricted to ceremonial use by the ruling Inca. Spanish colonists were responsible for an increase in production and the extension of use of the leaf throughout the Andes. Since the 1970s and increasingly in past years, the consumption of coca leaves has been promoted in Peru and Bolivia for its supposed nutritional value. Because coca leaf is being promoted for consumption by an inherently vulnerable population at nutritional risk, it was necessary to undertake a more exhaustive study of its nutritional value.

The results of the study showed that 100 g. of dried coca leaves contained: protein, 20.28 g with lysine as the limiting amino acid; B-carotene, 3.51; vitamin E, 16.72 mg; and trace amounts of vitamin D, calcium, iron, zinc and magnesium. Cocaine was the principal alkaloid, with a concentration of 0.56 g; other alkaloids were identified. These results were compared with those of other leaves that are normal constituents of the human diet in Peru and Bolivia. Overall, coca leaves show no significant advantage in terms of mineral content. Parsley, for instance, has more than three times as much iron as coca leaves, while bay, coriander and oregano have 50 percent more iron. oregano has more than 50 percent higher calcium content and 70 percent higher zinc content than coca leaves.

The study concluded that two spoonfuls of coca leaf flour would satisfy less than 10 percent of dietary needs for school children and adults for critical common deficiencies when eaten in the recommended quantities, and the presence of absorbable cocaine and other alkaloids may be potentially harmful; hence coca leaves cannot be recommended as a food.

10. Veillette, Connie and Carolina Navarrete-Frias. CRS Report to Congress, November 18, 2005. Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes.

The report discusses US support for drug crop eradication and alternative development programs in the Andes. The report states that Colombia, Bolivia and

Peru collectively produce nearly the entire global supply of cocaine. The US provides counternarcotics assistance through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI). This Program supports a number of US Missions, including interdiction of drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternative development, and rule of law and democracy promotion. From FY 2000 through FY 2005, the US has provided a total of about \$4.3 billion in ACI funds. Additionally, funding for the Andean region is provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, both managed by the State Department. FMF assistance has the objective of establishing and strengthening national authority in remote areas that are prone to drug trafficking. Funding for the FMF and IMET programs from FY 2000 through FY 2006 amounted to \$324.3 and \$20.3 million, respectively.

ACI funds support programs for eradication and interdiction, as well those focused on alternative development and democratic institution building. Providing alternatives to drug crops is believed to be crucial to achieving effective eradication. This often includes technical support for farmers, marketing assistance and strengthening the transportation structure in order to get crops to market. The US approach to support for alternative crops is to link that support to eradication of coca.