



USAID | **MOROCCO**
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM EVALUATION IN MOROCCO

FINAL REPORT

MAY 2010

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DISCLAIMER

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

PREFACE

The “USG Program” evaluated comprised 17 projects funded by three different USG agencies and implemented by two U.S. organizations and several national subgrantees. The projects span almost a decade and have produced large numbers of activities, reports and outputs. Each organization has its own terminology, reporting requirements, implementation methods and ways of tracking project progress. At the same time, there were other USG-funded projects related to political party strengthening, most implemented by the same two U.S. organizations, which were not included in the basket of projects put under the rubric of the “USG Program” in the evaluation scope of work.

The findings of this program-level evaluation need to be understood within this context. It is an attempt to assess the impact of the sum of these 17 projects on strengthening political parties in Morocco at the strategic level. It is not an evaluation of results at the project level, nor is it an evaluation of the results of the implementers’ portfolios of activities in Morocco. Had the evaluation been at those levels, the findings are likely to have been different as the focus would have been on the achievement of their specific project- or portfolio-level objectives.

Given the volume of activities, methods and ways of reporting, the evaluation team used generic terms to simplify reporting. Thus, the use of a word such as “workshop,” “training” or “activities” could include consultations by experts, forums, seminars and other methods of training. It has also required the descriptions of many activities to be consolidated into an overview sentence, with the examples provided for illustrative purposes as they may not reflect the many other activities that might have also been conducted.

Some of the 17 projects also included activities for civic education, observing the elections and strengthening elected institutions. As the evaluation focused on assessing the impact of the program on the development of political parties, these related activities were only assessed in terms of their contributions to party strengthening and not to the other objectives that they may have had.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
Conclusions and Recommendations	iv
I. BACKGROUND	1
Political Party Development in Morocco	1
Political Party Program Assistance	4
USG Assistance	4
Other Political Party Assistance	5
Political Party Program Evaluation	6
II. EVALUATION	8
Program Objectives and Results	8
Strengthened Internal Democracy, Accountability, and Transparency of Parties	8
Strengthened Communications Capacity of Parties	11
Strengthened Capacity of Parties to Compete in Elections	14
Strengthened Role and Participation of Women and Youth in Parties	19
Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach	25
Program Design and Implementation	29
Implementation	30
Performance Monitoring	33
Conclusions and Recommendations	35
Appendix A: USAID/Morocco's Results Framework (2004 – 2008)	A1
Appendix B: USG-Funded Projects Included Under the Evaluation and Their Objectives	B1
Appendix C: Evaluation Scope of Work	C1
Appendix D: Evaluation Methodology	D1
Appendix E: Persons Met	E1
Appendix F: References	F1
Appendix G: Illustrative Indicators	G1
Appendix H: Participating Parties in the USG Program	H1
Appendix I: Study Tours Under Program	I1
Appendix J: Subgrants Under Program	J1
Appendix K: Technical Experts Provided Under the Program	K1

ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Assistance Objective
ADL	Alliance of Liberties
CNI	National Ittihadi Conference
CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DG	Democracy and Governance
DI	Democracy International
DRL	State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
EU	European Union
FC	Citizen's Forces
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation
FFD	Front for Democratic Forces
FNF	Friedrich Naumann Foundation
IRI	International Republican Institute
IR	Intermediate Result
IT	Information Technology
KAP	Knowledge, Attitude, Practices
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEPI	Middle East Partnership Initiative
MNP	National Popular Movement
MP	Popular Movement
MSD	Democratic and Social Movement
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NGO	NonGovernmental Organization
PAM	Party for Authenticity and Modernity
PD	Democratic Party
PES	Social Equity Party
PJD	Justice and Development Party
PI	Istiqlal Party
PICD	Citizen's Initiative for Development
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PND	National Democratic Party
PPS	Party for Progress and Socialism
PR	Proportional Representation
PRD	Reform and Development Party
PRE	Reform and Equity Party
PSU	Unified Socialist Party
PT	Labor (Workers) Party
RJ	Renewal and Justice Party
RNI	National Rally of Independents
RV	Renaissance and Virtue Party
SO	Strategic Objective

SOW	Scope of Work
SUNY	State University of New York
UAF	Women's Action Union
UC	Constitutional Union
UD	Democratic Union
UMD	Moroccan Union for Democracy
UNFP	National Union of Popular Forces
U.S.	United States
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USFP	Socialist Union for Popular Forces
USG	U.S. Government
USP	Unified Socialist Party
WFP	Women For Women


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Government (USG) has been supporting the development of political parties in Morocco for more than a decade. The program under evaluation was implemented by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) and was funded by USAID (Morocco and Washington), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), and the State Department’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI). This program was made up of 17 separate projects from 2003 to 2010, with time frames ranging from three months to two years, and funding from \$110,000 to \$2,470,000. Project activities focused on strengthening political parties, supporting election-related activities, increasing the participation of women and youth, and strengthening locally elected officials and parliament for a total program cost of \$12,255,699 (IRI:\$3.5m; NDI \$8.7m). USAID/Morocco commissioned this study to assess the impact of these programs, to draw lessons learned, and to make recommendations for future USAID political party programming.

The evaluation found that despite a challenging political context, NDI and IRI were able to work with the parties and to contribute to party development in Morocco. Through training and advice, they helped the major parties to navigate some of the significant requirements of the political reforms adopted in the 2000s, such as fielding greater numbers of women candidates and holding more participatory party congresses. At the project-level, activities resulted in some noteworthy outputs. Attributing impact at the program level is difficult due to the large number of external factors and limited program inputs in some cases. Institutionalizing the government’s reforms, ending “political nomadism,”¹ developing stable responsive parties, changing entrenched attitudes, and reversing voter alienation will require a more sustained and integrated effort than has been provided to date and one that focuses directly on root causes of these problems, many of which are structural.

Among the program’s 17 projects, there were more than 50 objectives from which the evaluation team distilled five main objectives around which to organize its findings. These are:

1. strengthened internal democracy;
2. strengthened communications;
3. strengthened capacity for electoral competition;
4. increased participation of women and youth; and
5. strengthened capacity of parties at national and local levels on governance.²



¹ Also referred to as “political tourism” (“ashurance” in French) in interviews. This reflects the tendency of politicians to change parties depending on where they saw the most personal political advantage.

² The funding charts in the evaluation report are for illustrative purposes only and are best estimates of how funding was allocated among the five objectives as defined by the evaluation team.

Objective 1. Strengthened internal democracy, accountability and responsiveness

Several projects included components designed to increase the capacity of political parties to become more democratic, transparent, representative and effective. Activities were primarily conducted through workshops and other methods of training, such as forums, consultations and seminars, with some one-on-one mentoring. IRI tended to work with a broad range of parties, especially at the regional levels. After 2005, NDI focused more intensive attention on five primary partner parties (Constitutional Union or UC, National Rally of Independents or RNI, Socialist Union of Popular Forces or USFP, Popular Movement or MP, and the Party for Progress and Socialism or PPS), although they continued to include other parties in some activities. Activities with women and youth party members (discussed in Objective 4) were also seen as a means to increase demand for internal party democracy and inclusiveness.

The evaluation found that parties had an increased awareness of the need for internal democracy and that some changes had been made, most notably with more participatory party congresses and more active leadership consultations with politburos. Attributing results to inputs is difficult as the major changes appeared to be a result of the new legal requirements and internal demand by some senior party members. In addition, although participation was broadened, it has not been inclusive, and there is still a general lack of responsiveness to women, youth and local-level party members. Reform is a long-term process and will require more sustained and systematic efforts toward addressing the systemic, behavioral and attitudinal causes of the problems.

Objective 2. Strengthened communications capacities

Strengthening the communications capacity of parties was a recurrent objective. Activities included: workshops, expert consultations and trainings on communications strategies and methods; development of membership databases and strategic use of technology for communications; website improvements; and new media. It also included components on platform development (discussed in Objective 3) and developing and targeting messages to the public, especially during the pre-election periods.

The evaluation found the inputs to improve party communications and image had limited impact in the current Moroccan political context. Politics are personality-based and the disconnect between voters and the country's political institutions represents a systemic obstacle that political parties cannot easily overcome simply with improved communications.³ NDI and IRI appear to have made a difference in the use of survey and focus group research to help parties understand voter opinion and to develop communications strategies, target messages and platforms. Some of the parties intend to conduct their own polling before the next elections. Parties still lack good databases and significant use of IT. It is too soon to see impact from some of the more recent IT efforts, but these need to be seen as an investment in the future as most parties still lack basic IT infrastructure.

Objective 3. Strengthened capacity to compete in elections

³ NDI, *Final Report, Strengthening Political Party Capacity for Electoral Campaigns*, p 2.

Almost half of the projects and program funding was directed toward election-related assistance. These projects covered the periods leading up to municipal elections in 2003 and 2009 and national elections in 2002 and 2007. Activities included developing the basic campaign skills of party candidates, especially for women; campaign management at national and regional levels; increasing party understanding of voter opinions; platform development and messaging; and improving party pollwatching. There were also activities to support civil society participation and international observation.

Activities and outputs in this sector were evident in evaluation interviews. Determining the relationship between them and electoral success, however, presents a problem because neither NDI nor IRI systematically tracked training participants, and some of the parties that received the most assistance did not do as well as others in the polls. The program appeared to make a difference for some of the individuals interviewed; most appeared to have learned more modern ways to compete and communicate. However, many questioned the relevance of outside techniques in the Moroccan context, and several said they had applied the training but lost, attributing this to elections there being won in other ways. In the current system, there is little incentive for change. The proportional list system limits the ability for candidates who are not at the top of the list to win, and those slots go to those with connections or means. Record low turnouts reflect the depth of voter dissatisfaction with the current party system, which presents a much bigger problem than improving a party's technical capacity to compete.

Objective 4. Increased participation of women and youth

Approximately one-third of the projects targeted women and, to a much lesser degree, youth. Many of these focused on the electoral period and building the confidence and skills of women to campaign effectively, especially for the municipal elections of 2009 when the women's quota for local level offices went into effect. Other activities supported advocacy for the adoption of women's quotas within parties and elected offices. Youth activities focused on developing party youth strategies and structures and on attracting youth members.

The women's activities were among the most visible during the evaluation. Most of the party women interviewed had participated in a program event. The quota systems have dramatically increased the number of women in elected office. Whether program efforts increased the standing of participants in their parties or in winning their elections was difficult to ascertain due to the lack of post-training tracking.⁴ Training, and in particular the leadership components, appeared to empower many of the women, especially in rural areas. The cross-party training introduced by IRI and NDI built active multiparty networks of female political leaders, most of which still meet today. Much of the training was limited to election periods and reached a fraction of the total number of women candidates in 2009. More continuous assistance, and including male political leaders, could help to make more of an impact. Women are still marginalized, and leadership roles for women within parties are limited to women's wings. The candidate selection process for the quota lists mimics the problems with the general lists. This limits the opportunities for many qualified women.

⁴ NDI's recent efforts to track the women from its 2009 training showed that about 18 percent of their trainees ran for office of which 25 percent won, with 13 percent of these elected to leadership positions within office.

There were fewer activities with youth, but some outputs were visible at the national youth wing level. Little was visible outside of Rabat.

Objective 5. Strengthened capacity for governance, policy development and constituent outreach

Several projects focused on strengthening parties by improving the governance skills of their elected officials at the national and local levels and by helping to bridge the gap between elected officials and their constituents. This was primarily done through training and workshops at the municipal level and within parliament. Work within parliament also focused on constituent outreach and improving the effectiveness of party caucuses. NDI also supported a parliamentary internship program.

Improving good governance is essential to strengthen the democratic system of governance and the accountability, transparency and representational aspects of elected office. There appeared to be an increased awareness among those who had attended the trainings on the importance of these aspects of governing. The trainings also appeared to have built good will and a sense of solidarity among participants with NDI and IRI on issues of democratization. To be able to make a significant difference in improving the overall governance within the targeted areas or to institutionalize these values within the parties, however, the scale of the inputs would need to be vastly increased. NDI's work with parties in parliament appeared to be useful at the staff-level within the party caucuses, and there was some anecdotal evidence of increased parliamentary oversight stemming from training and other assistance, such as the interns. Directly training MPs appeared to be problematic, and indirectly reaching MPs through the professionalization of staff seemed a much more effective approach. The results of the internship program appear to have been mixed, with some finding it a useful experience.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Development programming with political parties is contextual, sensitive and risky; nevertheless IRI and NDI successfully implemented the USG portfolio of 17 projects and achieved a long list of project-level outputs. Although higher-level impact appears to be limited and is primarily visible at the individual level, both IRI and NDI succeeded at developing good working relationships with most parties and obtained a certain degree of mutual trust and professional respect. Given the broader political context, this is a major accomplishment. Although the current context is not conducive to an individual party development approach, addressing the structural constraints to the development of a more democratic and meaningful party system and political competition would likely make a more significant contribution toward achieving the ultimate objectives of a USG party strengthening program.

It is important for the U.S. Government to remain involved in this sector for strategic reasons. The participants in these programs are the future leaders of Morocco, and this program sows the seeds for more democratic governance in the future. To overcome the status quo or to avoid reversion to a less democratic system of government, a critical mass of moderate reformers needs to be developed and supported. The political system itself needs reform to improve the substance of political competition, rebuild democratic momentum, and regain the trust of voters.

As a result, the **evaluation recommends:**

- **Shift in program focus toward strengthening the party system** rather than on individual parties. Although the primary partners would still be the parties, the end focus would be on electoral and political reform, the consolidation and restructuring of parties so they are more viable and internally democratic, and increasing the accountability and responsiveness of the party system as a whole. This would include working with parties at the local level and strengthening their voice and participation, which would also fit in with the government's priority of regionalization.
- **Identification and support of target individuals/groups** as future leaders and agents of change, particularly through cross-party trainings and the building of multiparty networks for reform. Implementers should also track program participants to provide a better sense of the impact of their activities.
- **Adoption of a long-term program approach** with continuing objectives and indicators, and gender programming even if the projects are short-term. Having a clearly articulated vision of the desired end state of assistance for 2020 would help ensure programming is more synergistic and focused on achieving this ultimate goal. Future planning should also be done in coordination with the parties to ensure buy-in, realism, and responsiveness to the needs perceived by the potential beneficiaries.
- **Increased coordination and complementarity of programs** among implementers and greater synergies between the political party program and those of local governance and civil society.
- **Resumption of public opinion polling** and continued use of focus group research to strengthen dialogue and develop public policy. Polling should be used to improve the targeting of program activities as well as for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) purposes.
- **Development of a political party development index** along the lines of the NGO or Media Sustainability Index to facilitate the measuring and tracking of party development. This could be used as part of the program's performance monitoring plan as well as to identify the critical constraints to party development that need to be addressed.

I. Background

POLITICAL PARTY DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO

Morocco has undergone a fundamental reform of its democratic institutions in the past 15 years. Although it had a multiparty political system for 50 years and parties have been integrated in government since the country’s independence in 1956, it was an authoritarian system that marginalized the political participation of parties. The first parliament elected in 1963 resulted in clashes between the monarchy and the two main opposition political parties of the time—UNFP (later the Socialist Union of Popular Forces or USFP) and Istiqlal Party (PI) in 1965. King Hassan II subsequently banned parliament until 1970, and the opposition did not return to parliament until 1977.

The 1996 constitutional reform process represented a junction of challenges and wills. King Hassan wanted to prepare for his succession and started a reconciliation process with the opposition. The opposition, led by the USFP and Istiqlal, and their large Democratic Coalition, wanted constitutional reforms. They agreed on direct elections for the lower house of the newly bi-cameral parliament, and the main opposition parties voted in favor of the new constitution for the first time in Morocco’s history.

In 1998, King Hassan appointed the former opposition leader Abderahman Youssoufi as Prime Minister, after the USFP won a plurality of seats in the lower house in November 1997 elections. This represented a huge change in the political dynamics of the country, as the USFP had long held a minority of seats in the parliament. The Justice and

MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES 2010	
LEFT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Socialist Union for Popular Forces (USFP) • Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS) • Unified Socialist Party (USP) • Front for Democratic Forces (FFD) • Workers Party (PT) • Socialist Party (PS)
CENTER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Istiqlal Party(PI) • National Rally of Independents (RNI) • Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM)
RIGHT	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitutional Union (UC) • Popular Movement (MP)
ISLAMIST	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justice and Development Party (PJD) • Renaissance and Virtue (RNI)

Development Party (PJD), an Islamist party that had run in the elections for the first time in 1997, gained 11 seats which gave some credibility to the opposition.

The first government led by USFP (1998-2002) was handicapped by several factors including a strong ministry of interior that reported to the King, its distance from citizens in its decision making, a weak communications strategy, and an inability to respond to Moroccan expectations. Though the USFP lost some seats in the 2002 legislative elections, it maintained the plurality of seats. When King Mohammed VI nominated Idriss Jetou as Prime Minister, who was not affiliated with a political party,

the USFP agreed to remain in government but only after a long internal debate. The party lost more seats in the 2007 legislative elections, and although it continued in government sections of the party wanted to return to the opposition.

In the legislative elections in 2007, the PJD received the most votes and was second in seats after the Istiqlal Party. The USFP came in fifth after the PI, the PJD, the MP and the RNI. The palace perceived the results as a threat, which encouraged the former deputy minister of interior, Fouad Ali Elhima, who had won all three seats in his local

constituency, to found the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). According to the PAM leaders, this was intended to create a more dynamic political field. The PAM is a grouping of some leftist activists and members of parliament who were elected with other parties. It became the leading political force in parliament, with 56 seats in the lower house and 65 seats in the upper house.

Many analysts perceived the electoral win of the PJD to have resulted from its daily contact with constituents and the historical weakness of Moroccan political parties. It appeared to be more internally democratic and to have a more coherent and consistent ideology than the government parties. The palace encouraged the PAM as the alternative to the historical parties and the PJD at the same time. The PAM took advantage of this opportunity and launched a series of initiatives to build its party, including enlarging the representation from the regions within its politburo and providing opportunities for women and youth in leadership. With the PAM clearly on the rise, as demonstrated by the 2009 local election results, the PJD sought alliances with the center (RNI) and the left (USFP). These discussions failed because of internal RNI issues (which ended in the replacement of the party president) and the renunciation of past positions by the USFP leader, who was willing to ally with the PJD when he became a member of the government.

Most of the political parties do not have a clear vision and coalitions are formed without consideration for ideological platforms. The left, represented by the socialist party USFP, is closely allied with the Istiqlal Party, which is a conservative party. Although they do not agree on economic policy, these two parties have common ground with regard to some issues such as democracy and human rights. There is not the same shared ground between the USFP and the RNI or Istiqlal and the MP. The Istiqlal Party and the USFP used to boycott these parties by refusing to publish their news in their newspapers and never attended RNI or MP activities because they considered them to be “parties of the administration.” Then these parties suddenly appeared publicly in a coalition without explaining to their constituents why this change in positions took place. Although this happened in 1998, observers still question these strange coalitions. In 2009, the MP joined the government, which was not accepted easily within the MP itself.

When he came to the throne in 1999, King Mohammed VI started a reform process to liberalize the political space and to initiate democratic reforms. This reform vision and advocacy by political parties and civil society resulted in a number of substantial reforms. To reduce the increasing fragmentation of parties, the electoral laws were amended to increase the thresholds for parties to 3 percent in 2002 and 6 percent in 2007. To increase the political participation of women, they set quotas for women’s representation in parliament (10 percent in 2002) and local government (12 percent in 2007). Parliament adopted a political party law in 2006 that included requirements for internal party democracy as well as for more accountability and transparency. These included:

- Requiring a minimum of 300 citizens living in at least half of the 16 Moroccan regions for party registration instead of five people as it was before;
- A quota for women and youth in decision-making bodies including party politburos;
- Annual financial reporting by political parties to the Audit Court;

- Holding party congresses at five-year intervals;
- Limiting public financing to parties elected at the national level with 5 percent of the vote and reporting requirements on the use of the funding. This was the first time public funding had been provided to parties outside of the elections.

Although these reforms required some changes in the way parties operated, they have not yet generated enough new practices to improve the image of political parties with the public or to address some of the issues facing political parties, including the continuing lack of internal democracy, the lack of differentiation between parties, and the opportunistic switching of parties by its leaders (“political nomadism”). Elected governments have been unable to deliver much to the population, especially with regard to employment, education, and health. The King’s power surpasses the authorities of government, and his continuing role in directing government, appointing ministers, and launching large projects makes attribution of successes or failures to the parties in government difficult. The Prime Minister limits his actions to implementing the King’s agenda and does not have the right to enforce his ministers to resign, although he does propose them to the King in the first place.

The political party and electoral laws offer an opportunity for parties to develop, but internal party reforms and the lack of citizen involvement in public-policy making remain the parties’ biggest challenges. Governance and the political process continue to take place in a closed space where the government, the political party leaders, and the members of parliament are the main actors. Citizens and local sections of political parties are excluded. The only occasion when they are contacted by parties’ leaderships is during the electoral campaign. Once elected, elected officials at all levels manage public affairs as they see fit. The result is voter alienation, as reflected in a 37 percent turnout for the 2007 national elections, the lowest in Morocco’s history.

The independent media have played an important role since 1998 in bringing these issues to public attention. The newspapers and electronic media now regularly cover debates on internal democracy, transparency, and accountability within parties. Members of political bureaus are becoming more open to the media, which have become more credible sources of what happens behind closed doors. This represents a significant development compared with the past, when “keeping the secret” was considered a militant virtue. With the technological revolution, information on parties has become more readily available. The result is that those parties that open to the media have become more effective at reaching their targets than others. Also, the parties that communicate better with the media enjoy more influence.

The King continues to promote reforms. The current focus is on regionalization, which will mean that political parties will have to do more work at the regional and local levels. New elites should be prepared to fill in the positions that will be created, especially in elected bodies and possibly including regional parliaments. Also, as Morocco moves closer to EU markets and continues to negotiate an advanced status agreement, it must meet EU standards related to human rights and the rule of law, which will continue to bring Moroccan laws and practices toward international standards.

POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM ASSISTANCE

USG ASSISTANCE

The U.S. government has supported the development of political parties in Morocco for more than a decade. Its programs have been implemented primarily through the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute through a series of projects funded by USAID (Morocco and Washington), the NED, MEPI, and the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).

USAID/Morocco's *Country Strategic Plan 2004–2008* set a strategic goal of “**a** Educated and Democratic Society Successfully Competing in the Global Market Place,” and USAID provided democracy and governance (DG) assistance its Strategic Objective (SO) 13, “**I**ncreased Government Responsiveness to Citizens.” The purpose of this objective was to “**i**mprove standards and norms for good governance at the national and local level ... and reflect transparency, accountability, and equity at all levels of the system.” It was also to contribute to the “**s**uccess of the moderate middle of society as it broadens its own ground between radical alternatives, and takes a leadership role for Morocco in engaging the global economy.”⁵ Political party support came eventually under IRI 3.5: “**I**mproved capacity of political parties to define, advocate, communicate and promote policies.” There were several areas of focus under this IR, including more democratic internal operations, increased capacity of political parties to communicate effectively (externally and internally), and enhanced ability of parties to expand their bases of support.⁶ There were also significant levels of assistance for activities related to municipal (2003, 2009) and national elections (2002, 2007), including strengthening the campaign skills of women and platform development. This SO framework is provided in Appendix A.

The NED's 2002 strategy saw assistance to Morocco within the framework of gradual democratization of semiauthoritarian countries where “**s**uccess or failure will significantly affect the prospects for democratic development” in their regions. Support to political parties was seen as part of a multisector approach to expand the political space for opposition party development, to build effective governing coalitions, and to establish linkages between civil society and political parties in order to build subcultures of democratic activism. This included cross-border assistance within the region to share experiences and promote enlargement of democratic practices.⁷ For the past several years, the NED has referred to Morocco as a country with “**s**ustainable space for limited democratic progress,” which can be interpreted as semiauthoritarian.⁸

The USG adopted a Country Assistance Strategy for Morocco in December 2008, under which assistance was to contribute to “**a** stable, well-governed, democratic, and prosperous Morocco meeting the needs of its people, especially its youth.” Under this common USG strategy, party strengthening activities fell under Priority Goal 3:

⁵ USAID, *USAID's Assistance Strategy for Morocco 2004 – 2008*, p 40.


⁶ USAID/Morocco, *Democracy and Governance February 2009 Portfolio Review*.

⁷ NED, *Strategy Document 2002*, p 7.

⁸ E-Mail to Team from Gregory Houel, NED Program Officer 5/27/10.

–Improved Effectiveness of Democratic Governance”⁹ with the idea that stability was based on the government’s ability to represent, respond to, and be accountable to its citizens. Strengthening political parties and fostering political competition through political parties was an integral part of Goal 3.

Seventeen projects are included in this evaluation of the USG political party program in Morocco. These projects are listed in Table 1. Most of the projects focused on election-related programming (Objective 3), with some funding provided for internal democracy (listed on the estimated funding allocation table as Objective 1), strengthening party communications (objective 2), increasing participation of women and youth (Objective 4) and strengthening the capacity of parties at the national and local levels (Objective 5).



OTHER POLITICAL PARTY ASSISTANCE

The German party foundations are active in Morocco and appear to be the only other organizations working directly to promote political party development in the country. Four German party foundations have programs in Morocco, but during interviews the parties specifically mentioned the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF).

The FNF has a long-time Moroccan director and a budget of less than \$500,000 a year. It supports parties on the right side of the political spectrum and has collaborated at times with NDI, most notably from 2005 to 2008, on some joint or complementary workshops. It works in the same areas as the USG program, including promoting democratic reform, institutionalizing these reforms within parties, and increasing the participation of youth and women. The FNF provides ongoing consultations with parties (mentoring) to sensitize party leadership on the need for change and responds to requests for forums and other training from partner parties (primarily the MP and to a lesser degree the UC). Among other activities, it sends 15 party members a year to Germany on exchanges and supported a –Caravan of Hope” with youth from five parties in 2005, expanded to 14 in 2006, which was designed to build contacts between communities and parties and promote good governance.

The FES reportedly had a budget of \$3 million a year, but only a part of this goes to party support. It has the same focus areas as the FNF, but it provides support to parties on the left side of the political spectrum. The USFP is its biggest partner. After an internal evaluation showed limited impact of its assistance on the key problems facing the parties, the FES changed in late 2009 to focus on increasing party transparency and improving communications and messaging. The FES intends to showcase the efforts of reformers who have made a difference and to illustrate the relevance of parties to everyday life. It

⁹ USAID, *Morocco Country Assistance Strategy*.

also sponsors exchanges with Europe, some of which are linked to the international and regional party councils, such as the Socialist International.

POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM EVALUATION

USAID/Morocco commissioned Democracy International (DI) to undertake this evaluation of the impact of the USG-funded political party program, draw lessons learned, and make recommendations for future USAID political party programming. The program under evaluation was made up of 17 separate projects from 2003 to 2010, ranging from three months to two years in duration, and funded by USAID, MEPI, and the NED. Total funding was \$12,255,659. Table 1 includes a list of these projects.

Table 1: Projects included in the Evaluation

#	IRI			NDI		
	Project	Funder Dates	\$	Project	Funder Dates	\$
1	Strengthening local elected officials	NED 7980 7/09-6/10	494,000	Build capacity of political parties	USAID Morocco 608-A-00-08-00044 4/08-9/10	2,470,000
2	Party strengthening for municipal elections	NED 7882 9/08-12/09	323,325	Sustaining parliamentary internship program	NED 09047 10/09-9/10	115,800
3	Young leaders empowerment	NED 7782 9/08 -12/09	110,000	Strengthen Women's Participation in the Maghreb	MEPI S-NeAPI-060CA-173 2/09-2/10	450,000
4	Women's municipal program	MEPI CA-284-50 2/09-6/09	305,815	Parliamentary internship program	NED 08020 3/08-2/09	115,000
5	Public opinion & civic participation	NED 7584 1/08-12/08	200,000	Strengthening political party capacity for election campaigns	USAID Morocco 608-A-00-00015 12/06-02/08	1,207,955
6	Political party building for elections	USAID Morocco 608-A-07-00016 2/07-9/07	800,000	Support civil society in 2007 elections	USAID/ Morocco 12/06-12/07	1,151,000
7	Political party building	USAID Morocco DGC-A-00-00004 3/04-3/08	1,473,776	International observation of 2007 legislative elections	MEPI S-NEAPI-07-CA-249 8/07 -10/07 S-NEAPI-06-CA-173 9/07-5/08	450,000 130,000
8				Supporting emerging leaders of political parties	NED 2006-266 UU (06049) 10/06-9/07	224,988
9				Party strengthening & parliamentary reform	USAID/ DC DGC- A-00-01-00004 3/04012/06	1,917,000
10				Supporting political parties in advance of 2003 municipal elections	USAID/ Morocco 608-A-00-03-00032 3/03-10/03	515,000
	TOTAL IRI		3,706,916	TOTAL NDI		7,423,095

The 17 projects covered by this evaluation collectively had more than 50 objectives. (For a complete list of objectives, see Appendix B). From these, the evaluation team distilled five main objectives around which to organize its findings. These main program-level objectives were:

1. strengthened internal democracy, accountability and responsiveness of parties;
2. strengthened internal and external communications;
3. strengthened capacity of parties to compete in elections;
4. increased participation of women and youth; and,
5. strengthened capacity of parties at national and local levels on governance, policy development, and constituent outreach.

The scope of work (SOW) for this evaluation asked the team to address whether the USG programs achieved their intended results, to identify contributing factors of success or failure, to determine the sustainability of interventions, and to highlight the major strengths and weaknesses of the programming. In addition, USAID asked for the political party leaders' impression of the assistance and its effectiveness, as well as the team's assessment of the monitoring and evaluation measures undertaken under the program. The scope of work for the evaluation is provided in Appendix C.

The team undertook the field work for this evaluation in April and May 2010 in Morocco. The team was composed of two international experts in political party development and DG programming, Sue Nelson and Frank Hawes, and Ahmed Jazouli, a Moroccan expert and political scientist. They were assisted by Latifa Lamarani Hassani. Evaluation interviews were conducted in Rabat, Casablanca Fez, and Khemmiset with representatives from the main political parties in Morocco, elected officials and government officials, civil society representatives, journalists, and representatives of the German political party foundations. The team also met with the DG staff of USAID/Morocco and U.S. Embassy political officers as well as with IRI and NDI. The list of persons met is provided in Appendix E. The evaluation methodology is provided in Appendix D and the list of documents consulted is in Appendix F.


II. Evaluation

PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

STRENGTHENED INTERNAL DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY OF PARTIES

Activities

Strengthening internal democracy was a recurrent theme throughout many of the projects and in particular within USAID/Morocco’s large CEPPS (Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes) project (\$3.39 million) on political party building with IRI (Project #7) and NDI (Project #9), and in its current agreement with NDI (Project #1 for \$2.47 million). IRI worked with most of the main parties at regional levels while NDI worked with most of the main parties at the national level and with some regional workshops organized through its primary partners (UC, RNI, USFP, MP, and PPS).



Work with women and youth party members was also seen as a means to increase demand for internal party democracy and inclusiveness and is discussed in –Strengthened Role and Participation of Women and Youth in Parties” below.

Assistance was provided primarily through seminars and other trainings and in some cases one-on-one mentoring. NDI and IRI had informal discussions with party leaders and members of parliament on the amendments to the electoral and party legislation reforms, hosting a few seminars and consultations on reform topics. In addition, both worked with parties on the impact of the new political party law, which included discussions on some of the steps needed to comply with the regulations. NDI organized several forums on the issue of internal democracy, including, among others, the *Challenges of Internal Democracy and Financial Transparency for Political Parties and Renewal of Elites within Political Parties*.¹⁰ IRI conducted a series of party discussions in Fes, Marrakesh, and Casablanca with PI, MP, PPS, RNI, UC, and USFP in 2008 on improving internal communications. Much of the discussion focused on the need to improve internal democracy and institute party reforms.

Findings

In 2003, NDI provided the following description, which can serve as a baseline for the status of internal democracy and responsiveness of parties at the start of the program:

In many cases the parties are driven by personality, with autocratic leaders and little internal democracy. In the past, these leaders have been able to make deals between themselves and with the Palace to secure votes and positions in the government. This lack of accountability with the party

¹⁰ NDI *Party Strengthening and Parliamentary Reform (04860/1)*, Quarterly Report March 31, 2006, p2.

membership has contributed to the party splits and a plethora of new parties. While in many cases the party leadership understands the new, democratic election environment, they have been slow to develop effective methods to contact and persuade voters. The exception to this autocratic style has been the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which has developed broad appeal and made substantial gains in the Parliamentary elections.¹¹

Although the evaluation did find some encouraging progress, this description still applied in 2010. Some changes had been made within parties, most notably with more participatory party congresses and more active leadership consultations with politburos. Parties still remain driven by personalities who have little accountability, and positions in government are still achieved through negotiations with the Palace. A general lack of responsiveness to women, youth, and party members endures at the local level. The most democratic party remains the PJD, which did not receive program assistance.

The 2006 party law requires parties to hold congresses and to conduct transparent elections for party leaders. All held their first congresses under the new law and are either preparing, or about, to hold their second congresses. NDI and IRI assistance helped some parties plan for their congresses and promoted the expanded participation of women and youth. The party congresses have been more participatory, although in some cases the selection of participants comes from a limited pool of party members. In other cases, there have been more inclusive processes established to elect representatives at the local level. More debate has been noted during congresses. In one example, the use of a list to elect the USFP's secretary-general came under heated debate because doing so required a change in the party's internal by-laws. According to NDI, the level of debate was new within the USFP and is an emerging trend within that party.¹²

In another example, the MP party credited program support for its *less chaotic* administrative structures and in helping them to develop a more strategic vision. This, they said, was directly related to the program work with survey research and platform development (discussed in "Strengthened Capacity of Parties to Compete in Elections" below). They intend to replicate this work during their upcoming party congress by using survey research to develop their *big vision* for the 2017 elections.

Program training provided across the objectives by NDI and IRI has resulted in an increased awareness among individuals on the career paths within parties, so that some, especially women and youth, have become more demanding in terms of participation and leadership positions, particularly at the national level. There is still a long way to go in getting parties to be more responsive and equitable. Polling done in 2008 by IRI of local members of six parties in Fes, Casablanca, and Marrakech found that 95.6 percent of the respondents thought party reform was necessary.¹³ In talking to party members, the evaluation found mixed results, with some (especially men in Rabat and Casablanca)

¹¹ NDI *Final Report: October 31, 2003 Supporting Political Parties In Advance Of the 2003 Municipal Elections*. p1.

¹² NDI *Quarterly Report: April 1–June 31, 2008, Building The Capacity Of Political Parties* p2.

¹³ IRI, *Party Empowerment Initiative Morocco, Report on Survey and Focus Groups*, p28.

generally optimistic that changes were underway toward democratization, while others, in the regions or among women members, were far less positive.

Attributing higher-level results to program activities is difficult due to the large number of external and internal factors affecting party development. Most changes within the parties appear to be the result of the reforms mandated by the 2006 political party law, which clarified the roles and responsibilities of parties, required the regular party congresses, and promoted the representation of women and youth. The advent of public financing also required increased accountability and transparency related to the use of those funds. Internal demand for change arose among senior party members, particularly in the USFP and RNI. External factors such as a more active media playing a watchdog-type role, the internet revolution, and globalization also played a role. With the threshold requirements, these factors contribute to consolidation and restructuring of parties, usually described in interviews as revolving around three poles on the spectrum--right, center, and left. To some degree, the program assisted this process through its consultations with parties and its support of reform advocacy efforts.

Parties are changing, some merging, some potentially disappearing, making the institutional base that program activities are supposed to be strengthening fluid and unpredictable. This limits the opportunities for lasting institutional change. Support directed at strengthening individual parties also only addresses the tip of the iceberg because many of the critical constraints are structural. Within the current system, the King sets policy rather than the parties elected into office. Although the King's commitment to democratization has been the driving force for change, his continued control over the government limits the ability of parties to mature. The selection of ministers by the King rather than the winning parties (as in 2002 and 2007) was described as preventing political party development and highlights the continued inability of parties to direct government once elected. An MP official recounted that 20 out of the 21 members of their executive council voted to go into opposition when their candidates for minister posts were not accepted. After two years, they changed their aging leader because they thought the King was sending them a message about the need to be more internally democratic. In these kinds of cases, the party development assistance provided by NDI or IRI can be extremely useful since it can provide reformers with the information and moral support needed to make fundamental changes within their party's organization. At the same time, however, it does not address the larger systemic issues that perpetuate the status quo.

Institutionalizing reform and changing the political culture is a long term process that will take more sustained and systematic efforts than those provided to date. The pace of change is very slow and will require a major shift in individual attitudes and behavior. The King first called for party modernization in 2002, followed by the political party law in 2006, followed by the holding of congresses and other internal reforms. Many of those interviewed thought internal democratization and major reforms would take decades. Others were more optimistic, but warned about expecting short term results. An area of focus for this objective should be assisting the parties to implement their action plans to reflect the reform vision of the King, including the regionalization of the parties. This

decentralization process, if actualized, could bring major reforms into the parties through the empowerment of their local branches.

STRENGTHENED COMMUNICATIONS CAPACITY OF PARTIES

Activities

Most projects included components aimed at improving the internal and external communications of parties. The ability to communicate was seen as a critical component of developing parties that were more transparent and internally democratic as well as more responsive and accountable to their constituents.


To strengthen **internal communications** both IRI and NDI worked with the parties on improving their membership data bases and on using them to communicate with

parties before and after elections. IRI used its survey research to help parties select areas where it could improve membership recruitment and identify bases of support as well as to strengthen membership database systems. NDI assessed the internal communications capacity of its main political partners (2008) and provided national and international expertise in the development of training and workshops to help improve each of their partner's internal communications systems and to encourage communications with their regional offices. Most of this occurred at the national level, with a few regional locations benefiting from limited training.

To strengthen **external communications** NDI focused on helping parties develop an integrated and unified communications strategy for and between elections. This was done through consultations and analysis of the communications capacities of the parties. More recently it provided assistance on the use of technology for communications, website improvements, and new media as a way to develop this strategy. IRI undertook similar activities, using its polling results with parties to work on communications strengthening. Assistance directly related to improving communications during elections and improving governance between elections is covered in –Strengthened Capacity of Parties to Compete in Elections” below and –Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach,” respectively.

Findings

The projects appear to have made some inroads into enhancing the communication skills within particular parties and individuals. Most of the core party partners have individuals who have attended an IRI or NDI workshop and who are still working in the area of communications. The Team heard anecdotal evidence that the websites, membership data bases, and use of IT for communications by some partners had improved. However, the main issue for program activities is their relevance to the core problems facing parties, in



particular the fact that the King provides the political vision within Morocco rather than party ideologies and that the disconnect between voters and the country's political institutions represents a systemic obstacle that political parties cannot easily overcome simply with improved communications.”¹⁴

The type and quality of communications within the parties and with their constituents remain major issues. NDI trained party technology agents who they reported went on to provide training that emphasized the use of internal communication tools to more than 1,100 regional members, particularly youth, throughout Morocco. The use of technology is popular and NDI sees this as a vehicle to develop better communications with the parties. It has recently started a more in depth program, which benefits the IT staff within some parties and has increased the awareness of some national-level party members regarding the need for improved communications. During evaluation interviews, the Team could not identify significant use of IT for internal party communications or development of membership and the links between members, such as between doctors, teachers, farmers, students, and others were not exploited. Although the number of internet users in Morocco has tripled between 2006 and 2009 and now exceeds 10 million,¹⁵ apart from the party leaders active at the national level, most parties lack the basic IT infrastructure needed to apply the training at the regional and local levels. The political culture remains top down within most parties, which limits their interest in and commitment to developing a dynamic two-way system of communications.

NDI's work on improving party databases continues, with NDI citing results as well as an interest in sustaining this work with most of its partners. The exception is the PPS, which initially resisted the idea of an electronic database and told NDI that it had not yet established a system to effectively manage its data centrally. According to NDI, the MP, UC, and RNI now have electronic membership lists, and the MP has undergone several “ma carte” registration drives and has also just launched a new website that includes online membership enrollment. USFP had an Oracle system in place and did not need basic program support but indicated interest to NDI in learning how to better use their data for outreach and targeting. USFP was printing membership cards during the Team's visit to its headquarters. The evaluation found that the quality of databases and level of sophistication for its use differed between parties. Many of the changes visible during the evaluation appeared to be the result of the global technological revolution and peer/self teaching. Several parties have very savvy IT and communications personnel while others' knowledge was still based on antiquated systems. Most have had membership cards for years. As an example, one of the PJD persons interviewed still had his computer-generated membership card from 1998. NDI thought its value added was in showing the parties how to use their databases by developing effective electronic messaging and understanding the value of the new media for messaging.

Party youth were very interested in the use of technology to reach out to other youth and to be reached by parties. They did not care for the “being talked to” methods of training and instead asked for more interactive tools, including the creation of youth blogs and Facebook pages. NDI did start such activities with its initiative on citizen journalism and

¹⁴ NDI, *Final Report, Strengthening Political Party Capacity for Electoral Campaigns*, p 2

¹⁵ Open Arab Network, <http://www.openarab.net/en/node/1635>.

blogging through a subgrant to 2007 Daba, but this was limited to a workshop without follow up. The use of SMS and social media is increasing on its own. For instance, the evaluation team called one party leader for an interview and was told to contact him at his Facebook account. The USFP spokesman said he had found over 100 USFP blogs, each with their own opinion of the party and its operations. This free flow of information on the internet is being noticed by party leaders, many of whom are not used to being questioned and especially not by the rank and file. According to NDI reports, there are –still misgivings within some parties regarding the use of technology, in some cases because of fears that it will over-empower a younger generation of members, and in others because of concern that electronic databases could be poached through computer networks.”¹⁶ Nevertheless, the internet and social media will ultimately change the way the parties operate and relate to their members.

The Team attempted to check the parties’ websites. The RNI and PI sites appeared to be under renovation while others, such as USFP and PJD, were relatively static. There was a lack of interactivity and the most dynamic website looked to be MP’s, which included video clips and links to its youth membership site. The Team was visitor number 105,037, so the site has received some traffic.

External relations still remain relatively static. Although statistics show that the circulation of party newspapers is declining,¹⁷ most parties said their most important means of communications both internally and externally still come from their party papers. Many of these papers have created on line versions without apparent external assistance.¹⁸ Most parties also seem to use occasional public forums to interact with their constituents and discuss important issues. The program has supported some forums as a means to implement some of their assistance to political parties. Most of these appear to be done at the national level in the capital or at an urban center. The parties also conduct their own forums. For example, the UC said it scheduled open forums every two months in its headquarter city of Casablanca, while the PPS was scheduling a series of monthly forums in Rabat on various topics during the evaluation field work.

Public opinion of the parties apparently changed little from the start of the evaluation period to today. NDI focus group research in 2003 concluded that –political parties have a severe image problem. Moroccans have nearly no understanding of the role of political parties. Unlike democracy, which they view positively, political parties are generally viewed in a negative way. The participants said there is no difference between the political parties, and that political parties make promises they do not keep. They added that the voters only hear from the political parties at election time, and that political parties only serve themselves.”¹⁹ This sentiment appears to be unchanged today. According to polls conducted by IRI in 2007, only five percent of Moroccans identified

¹⁶ NDI, *Build the Capacity of Political Parties, Quarterly Report, Jan-March 2009*, p 15.

¹⁷ For example from 2009 to 2006 the PI papers have lost more than a quarter of their readership (Al-Alam from 12,688 to 9,936 and L’Opinion from 22,179 to 17,635); USFP almost half (Al-Ittihad al-Ishtiraki from 14,669 to 8,717 and Liberation from 4,031 to 2,098), MP stayed static (1,034 to 1,002 in 2008), and PPS was also down by a third (Al Bayane from 3,239 to 2,329). www.ojd.ma

¹⁸ Al-Alam, L’Opinion, Liberation and Al Bayane.

¹⁹ NDI, *Findings of Post-Election Focus Groups Following the Communal Elections in Morocco*, p 40.


themselves as party members. Sixty-eight percent said they did not know what distinguished one party from another and only 21 percent said that political party platforms and programs reflected the needs and priorities of the Moroccan public.²⁰

STRENGTHENED CAPACITY OF PARTIES TO COMPETE IN ELECTIONS

Program activities

Almost half of the projects and program funding was directed toward elections-related assistance, including strengthening its processes and encouraging engagement with voters.²¹ These projects covered the municipal elections in 2003 and 2009 and the national elections in 2007.

Both NDI and IRI actively administered projects that sought to develop the basic campaign skills of party candidates, especially for women, enhance campaign management by the party at national and regional levels, increase party understanding of voter opinions, platform development, and messaging, and improve party poll-watching. Other activities supported civil society participation and international observation (NDI).



For the national legislative elections in 2007, NDI focused on message development and campaign techniques, creating a comprehensive vision and structures for campaigns through workshop events and consultations with four main party partners which requested NDI support to create a national campaign team (USFP, RNI, PPS and MP), and related training for other parties. NDI also conducted a study tour during the Quebec provincial elections, focus group research and message testing, and training on elements such as get-out-the-vote, campaign media coverage, war room management, and poll-watching. IRI focused on regional assistance in four zones: North (Tangier, Tetouan, Cefchaouen, Larache), West (Rabat, Nador, Bouarfa, Oujda), South (Marrakech, Agadir) and Central (Fes, Ifrane, Mekness, Azrou), with a dedicated coordinator for each. It used polling with targeted party officials to improve outreach and develop region-specific messages and strategies. It also encouraged economic platform development through hosting three multiparty economic conferences in Rabat and by providing other candidate training and follow-up. Its main partners were the RNI, USFP, MP, PPS, and PI, with UC and other parties attending some of the training sessions.


²⁰ IRI, *Political Party Building for Elections, Final Report*, p 2.

²¹ NDI funding also includes the \$580,000 used to support international observation for the national elections. There may have been other USG funding for the 2003 municipal elections but these projects were not part of the 17 projects included in the evaluation. IRI also had a CEPPS Agreement from USAID for *Municipal Elections Support* for the 2003 municipal elections for \$300,000 that was not included in the evaluation and thus is not reflected in the funding table.

For the municipal elections in 2009, both NDI and IRI activities concentrated on the campaign training of women candidates (discussed in “Strengthened Role and Participation of Women and Youth in Parties” below). In addition, IRI continued its focus on platform development, on economic reform policies through multiparty conferences, and on undertaking economic reform study papers with its *Economic Initiative Working Groups*. NDI continued its focus on strengthening party campaign communications, particularly with the use of e-campaign techniques.

Findings

Many of those interviewed in the meetings held during the evaluation had participated in some way in NDI and IRI



programs during the municipal or national elections. There were various reactions to the nature and quality of the inputs and the evaluation also found varying degrees of usefulness in the different activities. However, the current political and economic context of Morocco limits the ability of these mainly capacity building projects to effect

meaningful change beyond the individual level.

One of the primary limiting factors is that the electoral system uses the proportional representation (PR) system rather than first-past-the-post. According to interviews, this was adopted in 2002 without much deliberation and with the idea that it would satisfy opposition demands for increased representation and reduce corruption. It does ensure a broader representation of parties within parliament and avoids a winner-take-all system, but the list system reduces the accountability of elected officials and limits the ability of candidates to get elected, especially at local levels. A candidate must be near the top of the list to win a seat and placement on the lists depends on personal influence and connections rather than on the ability to run a good campaign. This is also a prime factor contributing to voter alienation.

Another issue revolves around the marginalization of parties and party platforms. Voters vote for individuals rather than parties. Only 10-20 percent of the population were said to care about platforms, and they are the educated class that does not vote. Party platforms are similar and are not implemented once a party gets into government as policy is directed by the King and his advisors. The goal for parties is to get into government and obtain a ministry seat. Most parties have become opportunistic and form alliances across the political spectrum, which includes different alliances at different levels, further blurring party differences. Internal power struggles and party dynamics combine to provide another limiting factor. NDI reports that internal power struggles and party dynamics account for the differences in party performance during the 2007 elections, and

they also explain why the parties assisted had not done better in the polls.²² Given these structural issues, the first step to improving political competition is to review the electoral system and its effect on political party development. As noted by NDI, “NDI must work on the improvement of this legal framework and not only on parties’ assistance if we want to be an agent of change.”²³

The bottom line for program assistance for this objective is reflected in the statistics for the national elections—the four main parties that received the bulk of the assistance did not win the most seats in the polls and voter turnout was the lowest ever at 37 percent, with a spoiled ballot rate of 17 percent. Perhaps some of the individual candidates assisted by the program did better than others who were not assisted and perhaps they will become party leaders in the future who will be better able to effect meaningful change within their party and elected office. But this outcome level information is not available because neither NDI nor IRI systematically tracked their participants after training.

Platform Development and Messaging

A significant level of effort was aimed at platform development and messaging related to election campaigns. NDI sought to “empower and give capacity to independent structures within each party to work toward creating a comprehensive vision for the election campaign that would integrate national, regional and local activities and messages.”²⁴ IRI had a similar vision, with “political parties developing and running on clear policy platforms.”²⁵ Impact at these institutional levels was minimal for the reasons already noted. The continuing focus of voters and the media on individuals during elections rather than on campaign issues demonstrates the need for assistance to be firmly grounded within the Moroccan electoral context. As NDI found, it “is clear that either the media was not prepared or interested in covering issue-based campaigns, or NDI and its partners failed to craft effective media strategies, or both. We need [to develop] new media strategies that take better into account the style of elections media coverage.”²⁶ The issue of context for assistance was raised repeatedly throughout the evaluation and is discussed in “Implementation” below.

Both IRI and NDI used multiparty trainings as well as one-on-one work. The multiparty training appeared to work for broader external issues, such as the economic policy development promoted by IRI, but parties said they did not want to participate in multiparty training on issues related to their internal workings or for political strategizing. As one party leader put it: “They are the enemy, I’m not going to share my communications strategy with them. This is very important.”

Those who were involved in some way with the trainings credited IRI and NDI with introducing new campaign techniques and sharpening their campaign messages and

²² Latulippe, *Strengthening Political Parties Capacity to Campaign in National Elections, A Case Study of NDI Morocco*, p 18.

²³ Ibid, p 21.

²⁴ Ibid. p 4.

²⁵ IRI, *Final Report, Morocco: Political Party Building for Parliamentary Elections, Result No. 2.*

²⁶ Latulippe, Op Cit p 17.

platforms. This included the use of surveys to target messaging and focusing platforms on specific issues of interest to the voters. NDI credited the MP with having “one of the most professional and advanced electoral campaigns, [which] has certainly been one of the program’s greatest success stories.”²⁷ The evaluation found that the MP appreciated NDI and IRI assistance and found the information useful; the party used the survey research to analyze the electorate and target its audiences (“voters, women, and youth”). The MP thought it had a well-orchestrated campaign. However, much still remains to be done. IRI felt the MP had made limited progress in candidate selection process, with many candidates rarely using the party messages in their campaigns.”²⁸

IRI followed up on its economic conferences after the elections with a *Morocco Economic Reform Initiative* that sought to blend its survey research with multiparty, multisector workshops to guide elected officials in their policy development. This initiative is discussed in “Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach.”

Polling

One of the most important strategies transmitted by USG assistance was the use of quantitative and qualitative polling for party and platform development. The evaluation found the concept of polling and its usefulness firmly embedded in some parties, many of which are now conducting, or intend to conduct, their own research. Although not all of this can be attributed to program activities, it appears to have been a contributing factor, especially in how parties can more effectively use the data collected to strengthen their party and campaign. Both NDI and IRI used survey research as a development tool throughout the period under evaluation, and it is probably the area where project-funded activities have achieved the most sustainable results. Through separate funding, NDI established the People’s Mirror in 2003 to conduct focus group research. NDI projects used this program to provide some of the parties and civil society organizations (CSOs) with useful information.²⁹ Party members at the national level viewed the focus group results as valuable. For example, after the 2007 elections NDI organized a series of focus groups on why many citizens had not voted. According to party officials, the findings were eye openers (“The King does everything and parties are corrupt, so why vote?”) that served as important lessons. In particular, the MP said it continued to use these findings to develop its 2009 municipal election campaign messages.

IRI undertook quantitative survey research and provided capacity building to party members in polling. Among other activities, it sent 10 party officials to a regional polling conference in Tunis in 2005 and brought in a polling expert from Lebanon twice to provide training to parties in the practical application of survey research. IRI also contracted periodic public polling with a Moroccan survey research firm. These poll results and training were also appreciated by party officials as IRI used them individually with the parties to refine their strategies and messaging. IRI got into difficulty when one of its 2005 polls appeared to project a clean sweep at the polls by the PJD party and was

²⁷ Latulippe, Op cit. p 19 and p 13 respectively.

²⁸ IRI, *Final Report, Morocco: Political Party Building for Parliamentary Elections*, p 13.

²⁹ The People’s Mirror apparently tried to become an independent organization and failed, closing in 2010.

leaked to the press. Although this was the result of a hypothetical election among a small percentage of voters who said they would vote and not a projection for the national election results, it soured relations with the Islamic parties, who saw this as American interference in their internal political affairs. The U.S. Ambassador at the time subsequently prohibited the USG program from funding polls. The political fallout from this unfortunate incident appears to have broken IRI's programmatic momentum, something from which it only recently appears to have recovered. At the time of the evaluation, the Team did not find any lingering animosity or negative impact from the incident. The parties characterized the incident as a "technical error" rather than as part of a broader political agenda by IRI or the USG and, with only a few exceptions, were eager for more polling from both NDI and IRI.

IRI is still doing focus group research, most of it related to governance training with elected officials. NDI has not continued its focus group research, primarily because of funding constraints, but it hopes to resume it in the future. The Team believes that polling is a useful tool for party strengthening activities as well as for measuring program impact.

Campaign Training

As part of the elections-assistance package, IRI and NDI provided assistance in campaign management and campaigning. The program focused on targeting women candidates in particular (discussed in "Strengthened Role and Participation of Women and Youth in Parties" below) as well as modernizing political campaigns and coordinating local level campaigns with the national level effort. Participants had a mixed reaction to this assistance. They appreciated much of the training, in particular the exchange visits to the U.S. and Canada where party officials observed parties planning and implementing their campaigns.³⁰ What struck the participants about these North American campaigns was the spirit of volunteerism and enthusiasm for campaigning and manning the polls, the fact that parties not only asked for votes but also for donations from their constituents, and the degree of communication with local party officials. At the same time, they felt things were very different in Morocco and that much of what they had seen would not be applicable for years. However, the experience seemed to increase their awareness of a more dynamic and participatory political process, which is a lesson most wanted to put into practice.

Taking training outside of Rabat to regional locations was extremely useful. Many of the candidates in the urban centers are politically savvy and do not need basic training. The level of sophistication outside of Rabat is much lower, which makes the potential impact from this type of training much greater in these areas. Outside of best-practices and exchanges, which most perceived as useful, parties questioned the relevance of campaign training in European or American campaign techniques. They thought many of the trainers did not know the Moroccan context and that foreign or generic training modules were not useful. Several participants told the Team that they had tried to use the techniques but lost the elections, including one woman in Fes who called herself an NDI

³⁰ The visit to the U.S. was funded under NDI's Project #3, which is a women's participation program in the Maghreb and which sent 2 women per partner party to the U.S. for a month and to Quebec in Canada to see the provincial elections in 2007 under NDI Project #5.

poster-child. She said this type of clean campaign is only understood by about 20 percent of the population who do not vote. Many said that elections were won by money, use of state resources, cronyism, and intimidation.

Another key issue affecting the impact of campaign training is the list system and the methods used to select candidates. Candidates not near the top of the list are discouraged from actively campaigning because they are unlikely to win regardless of the quality of their campaign. The selection of candidates is not a transparent process and the best spots on the list usually go to a local notable or cronies, which undermines the notion of succeeding through professionalization and modernization, as transmitted by the USG program. The lack of systematic tracking of participants after training means the actual results of the training on individual candidates in terms of their having done better in elections and politics than those who had not received training is unknown.

Nevertheless, the international observation effort organized under the USG program thought the campaign of 2007 was a marked improvement over recent elections, with those parties setting out clearer differences, responding more directly to voter interests and engaging more directly with citizens. This included taking advantage of new media, such as the Internet and mobile phone technology, as well as more compelling use of advertisement and improved voter outreach. It is also noteworthy and positive that major parties also participated in public debates and town-hall meetings to present their platforms.”³¹

Pollwatching

In 2007 and 2009, NDI held several training workshops to train the party pollwatcher trainers who came from 13 different parties. The parties reported to NDI that they trained and deployed more than 19,000 pollworkers. It was difficult for the evaluation to make a determination of the efficacy of the effort and its impact. The quality of the party pollwatchers was not mentioned in international observation reports and only a few party officials mentioned the training during interviews. It does appear the NDI training increased party officials’ awareness of the important role of pollwatching and helped to hone their pollwatching skills. But, the primary value added of the program seemed to be that it encouraged the parties to undertake cascade training, which enabled them to provide many more of its pollwatchers with training than would have otherwise been the case.

STRENGTHENED ROLE AND PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN AND YOUTH IN PARTIES

About a third of the program’s efforts was directed toward the increased participation of women and youth, with most of this targeted at women.³²

³¹ NDI, *Final Report on the Moroccan Legislative Elections*, p 12.

³² The amount for women’s participated noted in this table repeats the funding listed for women’s campaigns in the Elections-Related Assistance chart for Objective 3.

Women Activities

Most of the women’s activities focused on the periods leading up to the elections and building the confidence and skills of women to run for office and campaign effectively. It also supported women’s networks that advocated for women’s quotas in parties and elected office. Program activities expanded exponentially for the municipal elections of 2009 when the 12 percent quota for women went into effect. This dramatically increased the opportunities available for women to enter politics. Both NDI and IRI provided trainings through workshops and trainer of trainer trainings within some of their partner parties throughout Morocco. For MEPI-funded activities in 2009 (IRI Project # 4, NDI Project # 3), IRI covered the north of the country, with NDI working in the south. Within two months, IRI had trained 2,733 women in 28 cities,³³ with NDI reaching 2,071 in 26 locations through its —Women for Women” network and through its own training. Most of the training included components in leadership as well as in campaign basics. Some female elected officials at the local and national levels were targeted during the governance-related training, which is covered in —Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach” below.

Women Findings


The activities that had been undertaken with women were visible during the evaluation field work. Almost all of the party women interviewed had attended a program workshop or training or were part of a women’s network that linked back, in one way or another, to activities undertaken by IRI or NDI.

Table 2: Number of Women Candidates Legislative Elections

Date	# of women		%	
	candidates	elected		
1977	8	0	0	
1984	16	0	0	
1993	36	2	2	
1997	87	2	0.66	
Quota		Q	Reg	
2002	255	30	5	10.77
2007		30	4	10.6

the men in subsequent interviews. Impact beyond this occasional replication of training and the sense of empowerment of the individuals who had received training is difficult to determine without systematic follow up or before and after surveys (of knowledge, attitudes, and practices- KAP). NDI has

These women, at both the national and regional levels, were extremely enthusiastic about the assistance, and in particular about the leadership aspects of the training. In Fes, some of these women recounted using the training materials to replicate the training in their area, not only for other party women but for their male counterparts as well--which was confirmed by



³³ IRI, Quarterly Report, April-June 2009, CAP-284-SO.

identified the status of the women from its 2009 training. After contacting more than half the women directly and checking against party and official results, NDI estimates that 18 percent of the women trainees ran for office, and 25 percent of them won, which constitutes about 3 percent of the current women in office from the eight southern regions they targeted. Of these, 13 percent were then elected to leadership positions (as president, vice president, or secretary).³⁴

Morocco had a dismal record for including women in politics until the reforms. In 2002, the electoral law ushered in a 10 percent quota (30 seats) for women in the national legislature and 12 percent in 2009 for the women in the municipal councils. These reforms directly increased the number of women candidates and the number of women in office, presenting a serious challenge to the parties to find enough qualified women to serve as candidates. In these circumstances, NDI and IRI provided extremely useful assistance to the parties to help sensitize women to the idea of running for office and then to build their capacity as candidates, especially in regards to the local elections where many women would be running for the first time. Competing for office in the rural areas is particularly difficult for women, who face social and cultural pressures from their families as well as from the broader community.³⁵ Although still difficult, women's participation is more common in urban areas and there are strong networks of women activists for support.

Both institutions used multiparty training approaches and worked directly with the women's sections of parties. They had two-tier objectives, first building the capacity of women to participate fully in political parties and the political process, compete in

Table 3: Number of Women Candidates
Municipal Elections

Date	# of candidates		# Elected		
	Total #	Women	Total	Women	
1960	17,174	14		0	
1976	42,638	76		9	
1983	54,165	377	15,423	43	
1992	93,000	1,086	22,820	75	
1997	102,179	1,651	24,230	84	
2003	122,658	6,024	944	127	
Quota				Q	Reg
2009	130,223	20,458	27,795	3,200	206

electoral contests and fulfill office³⁶ and to increase the level of party support for their female candidates.³⁷ At the project level, the evaluation team thought that the first objective had been met. The second objective was not met and will require time to change the political culture. NDI worked with the NGO *Union de l'Action Feminine* (UAF), which had been active in women's rights since its inception in 1987. NDI provided the UAF with sub-grants to create the Women for Women's (WFW) network and to provide training to women candidates for the 2007 legislative and 2009 municipal elections. This network had a reported

³⁴ Email to Team from Jeffrey England, NDI. May 27, 2010.

³⁵ In addition, women face other barriers such as a higher illiteracy rate (65 percent in 2001/61 percent in 2007) as compared to men (41 percent in 2001). AFROL *Enhancing Women's Political Participation in Morocco*, 2001 and UNICEF, *At a Glance Morocco*.

http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/morocco_statistics.html#70.

³⁶ Amalgam of NDI and IRI objectives.

³⁷ Ibid.

membership of 1,081 in June 2009.³⁸ The evaluation found the WFW network still active and the women dynamic and determined to achieve equity within the parties and political office. The UAF leadership credited NDI with creating a *movement*, where before there had only been a national *committee*, and expanding the network by providing the means and a catchy name. Through other funding, NDI also assisted the Women MP's Forum, an association of women parliamentarians that worked on issues related to women's quotas and on other activities in the lead up to the elections.

According to some of the women interviewed, IRI had taken the lead in developing women's networks in Morocco, referring to an IRI-sponsored multiparty women's network that was active before 2005. IRI provided leadership training for several women in Tunisia and then those participants traveled around Morocco to share the experience with other women. Participants felt this had been an important effort but one with an abrupt and unexplained end. They still hoped IRI would resume work with this network. With other funding, IRI also sent two women to IRI's regional women's Democracy Network conference in Amman, Jordan in 2007. In 2010, IRI brought in the former U.S. Treasury Secretary, Anna Escobedo, who made an extremely positive impression on the women who attended her seminar. This sharing-of-experiences type of exchange appears to give the participants a can-do, practical attitude toward working in a male-dominated sector. The development of national and international peer contacts and networks is an extremely positive result of the program and many of the women spoke of the personal and professional benefits of being able to contact a successful party woman or elected official as a sounding board and mentor. With other funding, IRI is opening a Morocco Chapter of the Arab Women's Leadership Initiative to be managed out of their Jordan office. This should develop synergies with the other women's networks within Morocco including the Women for Women.

The second half of the program's objective, that of increasing party support for women members, still needs substantial work. Women remain second-class citizens in parties. The candidate selection process for women on the quota lists was characterized as arbitrary and nontransparent with the seats going to family members or wives of cronies. Women who had already benefited from a quota seat in 2002 were reluctant to give it up in 2007 and run for an open seat, which limits the opportunities for other women to benefit from this affirmative action mechanism. Several women said they had left their parties to join PAM because they were either not selected by their parties for the women's list or were given such a low position that they could never win. IRI reporting provided some assessments of the parties fielding women candidates. For the MP, it thought "women's mobilization was irregular and varied by region. Women on the local lists were very rare. For the PI, which they also assisted, the party was less effective in mobilizing youth and women."³⁹ The entire UC slate of women for the legislature was disqualified because one of the candidates was under-aged. Women interviewed said that UC party women deliberately sabotaged the list because they were outraged that these seats had gone to others.

³⁸ NDI, Build the Capacity of Political Parties, Quarterly Report, April-June 2009, p 10.

³⁹ IRI, *Final Report, Political Party Building*.

Women reported being marginalized within their parties and in elected office. If they were given positions of leadership, they were within the women's wing or on a women's issue. The Team asked the group of Women for Women being interviewed in Fes about the role of women in their parties. One of the PI women responded, "I wish I had one." The responses at both the national and local levels did vary according to the party and persons interviewed, with some women extremely frustrated with their parties (such as the RNI) and others more positive in their party roles (MP). Program training has raised their consciousness regarding internal democracy and equity within parties. Women interviewed were in most cases outspoken about the lack of inclusiveness and the idea that change begins when a subject is openly discussed.

The main drawback to the women's programs revolved around the fact that it was primarily limited to the electoral periods (and in a few cases to the governance training discussed in 'Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach'). Much of this related to the election-based focus of the funding agreement. However, continued follow up of the participants and mentoring by IRI and NDI as the women started their new political careers and elected office would increase program impact.

Youth Activities

Activities for youth centered on increasing their participation within the parties and helping the parties organize that participation within youth wings, especially during the lead up to elections. From 2003-2005, IRI worked with the NGO Citizenship Forum to bring youth into the process through their youth clubs and in get out the vote initiatives in Casablanca, Rabat-Sale, Fes, Oujda, and Tangier. In its later project to empower young leaders before the 2007 and 2009 elections, IRI conducted multiparty youth capacity building workshops in Rabat, Fes, and Marrakech. NDI also worked with the parties to increase youth participation and strengthen youth wings utilizing workshops, trainings, and one-on-one assistance with its five partner parties and their youth leaders. NDI also worked with the National Institute for Youth and Democracy (Ministry of Youth) to hold a multiparty youth leadership seminar before the 2007 elections and provided a sub-grant to 2007 Daba to increase voter, and especially youth, participation for those elections. NDI also trained party technology agents who provided training to regional members in at least 21 locations.⁴⁰ In addition, NDI supported a parliamentary internship program, which is discussed in 'Strengthened Party Capacity for Governance, Policy Development, and Constituent Outreach'.

Youth Findings

The objectives of IRI and NDI were to develop youth strategies and the structure of the parties to attract younger membership and to motivate youth leadership and participation in the political process. These were ambitious objectives given the limited scope of the funding. Although there was some progress on improving the formal party structures for youth, results at the higher levels appear to be marginal. Youth marginalization continues within most parties and the participation of youth remains extremely low. Most interlocutors said the 2007 Daba effort with business and community leaders to increase

⁴⁰ NDI comments to Team, 5/27/10.

participation was a good effort, but a “complete failure” as those elections had the lowest turnout ever. Even among NDI and IRI’s core partners, higher level results proved difficult to achieve. As an example, IRI reported that MP, which was both an NDI and IRI partner for these activities, had one of the highest average ages for candidates and its mobilization of youth for the 2007 campaign was irregular.⁴¹ NDI also found that most parties “face the obstacle of youth section leaders who refuse to vacate their posts to allow for leadership renewal; often resulting in an aging and ineffective youth branch.”⁴² MP subsequently held a Youth Constitutive Congress of 800 youth representatives from various regions to elect the MP’s national youth board and secretary general. During the congress, the party decided to limit the age of youth section members to between 18 and 35 years old. This exemplifies a significant step toward ensuring that younger party members comprise and manage youth sections. According to NDI, “this represents the first time a Moroccan political party has enacted an age requirement for youth sections.”⁴³

The problems facing youth compare to those facing women. The party system is hierarchical and personality-based with entrenched male leaders. Participation may have broadened, but it has not been inclusive. NDI focus group research in the lead up to the 2007 elections found youth “extremely suspicious about the political parties, except for the PJD, and disenchanted with the political system as a whole.”⁴⁴ Only the PJD was seen as having an identity--conservatism and an Islamist agenda--that, according to the research, appealed to the young educated participants’ sense of cultural pride.⁴⁵ The youth felt parties were dominated by old men who do not reach out to youth or provide a structure for political participation, except for the PJD again, where they said the youth structures were active.

Nevertheless, outputs were visible for some parties during national level interviews and in NDI/IRI reporting, in particular with the MP. In 2008, IRI reported that only the PJD and other minor leftist parties had active, structured youth branches.⁴⁶ Subsequently, with program (and FNF) assistance, the MP held its youth congress and created its Haraki Youth Section that NDI describes as a “fully functioning, autonomous body within the party structure, with its own board and website.” The MP youth leaders interviewed expressed great enthusiasm for their section and pride at being featured in a party poster showing a diversity of members. They had many plans for the future. The RNI held a youth conference in January 2009 on promoting internal party reform.⁴⁷ USFP youth interviewed in Fes say they met occasionally, but cited the problems of time, transport, means, and lack of access to computers and internet. They had received the IRI training but thought its focus rested more on the communal charter than on youth leadership and

⁴¹ IRI, *Final Report, Political Party Building*.

⁴² NDI, *Build the Capacity of Political Parties, Quarterly Report April-June 2008*.

⁴³ NDI *Quarterly Report: October 1 – December 31, 2008 Building The Capacity Of Political Parties* p 7.

⁴⁴ NDI, *Final Report on Moroccan Legislative Elections*, p 51.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p 52.

⁴⁶ IRI, *Final Evaluation Report, Young Leaders Empowerment*, p 2.

⁴⁷ *CEPPS/NDI Quarterly Report: April 1- June 30, 2007 Morocco: Strengthening Political Party Capacity For Election Campaigns*.

they wanted it to be more participatory with fewer lectures.⁴⁸ Youth has a definite interest in technology and the new social media and NDI’s approach of using its media training to bring in larger numbers of young people to the parties and their operations appears to be a good one.

The evaluation did find lingering animosity with the Citizenship Forum over IRI’s program. Their main issue appeared to be what they characterized as a lack of partnership with IRI, a singular approach that did not tailor to the political context of Morocco, a take-it-or-leave-it attitude about the type of assistance, and unrealistic expectations of quick results. This seems to be unfortunate as they appear to be a large network of organizations nationwide that work in the same areas of interest. However, IRI reporting says it ended its relationship with the Forum over alleged financial improprieties and other donor funding and management issues.⁴⁹

STRENGTHENED PARTY CAPACITY FOR GOVERNANCE, POLICY DEVELOPMENT, AND CONSTITUENT OUTREACH


The program included several components focused on strengthening parties by improving the governance skills of their elected officials at the national and local levels. Assistance was intended to familiarize them with their mandate, helping bridge the gap between elected officials and their constituents by bringing together civil society, parties, and elected officials, and facilitating initiatives that were responsive to citizen priorities. This was done primarily through training and workshops in targeted municipalities and within parliament.

Parliament Activities

From 2004 to 2006, NDI worked to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of members of parliament and their party caucuses through training, workshops, and technical assistance.⁵⁰ It supported the constituency outreach efforts of reform minded members through town hall-type events in their districts.

NDI provided training to help individual MPs and caucuses push reform issues through training on topics such as media relations, coalition building, and collaboration with NGOs. For the past three years NDI has provided the caucuses with intern researchers to enhance their effectiveness relative to policy and committee oversight, reform of parliamentary rules, research support for question periods, and briefings on parliamentary procedures. This effort also provided exposure for law students to the work of parliament and parliamentarians.

Parliament Findings



⁴⁸ IRI also found this trainer unsatisfactory and was no longer using him at the time of the evaluation.

⁴⁹ IRI, *Political Party Building, Quarterly Report, October-December 2005*, p 6.

⁵⁰ NDI also had a separate grant through NED and International Resources Group with parliament that was not included in the program evaluation.

The evaluation focused primarily on the impact of program assistance for party development. As a result, assistance to parliament was assessed on whether or not it increased the capacity of the parties in parliament (in terms of their caucuses and elected officials) to work more effectively and if this assistance then had an impact on party development. The evaluation found that assistance appeared to be useful for the party groups at the staff level, with some staff asking for continued assistance. The training with members was said to be more problematic because most did not think they needed training. Training caucus staff seemed to be an effective means to professionalize the members as they prepared all of the briefing materials, and, as one put it, “trained their members.”

Caucus staff interviewed seemed extremely competent and had been working within parliament for many years. They thought the program trainings provided by Moroccan academics were not as useful as ones done by parliamentary professionals. In particular, they appreciated the exchanges with international experts and trainers, citing the examples of other parliamentarians who came from Hungary and Belgium, although from the NDI reporting, it appears that the “Belgium MP” was actually the NDI Resident Director at the time who presented the case of Belgium. However, for both, they reported learning something useful, in the first case on the different use of oral questions and in the second on the budgetary process and the reforms needed to eliminate the overlapping budget authorities between the two houses. There was some anecdotal evidence of increased parliamentary oversight resulting from reforms and the better use of question time and in parliamentarians being better prepared for work in commissions. The staff said their parties took positions on issues in committees through their caucuses and that some of the training and use of interns had helped with these improvements.

NDI saw its parliamentary support activities as mutually reinforcing its political party strengthening activities. This appeared to be the case in several of its caucus forums held on issues such as party mergers, electoral law reform, and the role of youth activists in politics. These included international experts and best practices.

Reaction on intern support was mixed. Some thought the assistance was extremely useful because interns provided research for the caucuses and some prepared the work for MPs in their committees. Others thought interns were interested in the pay (\$250/month)

STATUS OF FORMER INTERNS
<p>First Cycle (2005-2006) Of the 30 interns, the 23 located were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2 Administrators (Customs, MOJ) • 17 Senior Administrators (MOI, PM, General Affairs, MOH, Civil Protection Services, Parliament, Religious Affairs) • 2 Inspectors (Min of Employment) • 2 University Professors • 1 immigrated to Canada <p>Second Cycle (2008 – 2009) Of the 19 participants, the 16 located were:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 Administrators (MOE, MOI, MOF, Ministry of Employment,) • 5 PhD students • 2 Teachers + finishing PhD • 1 Inspector (Ministry of Employment) • 1 NDI Researcher <p style="text-align: right;">Source: NDI</p>

rather than the work and were selected through personal connections. NDI acknowledged problems in the second year when the secretary general selected the interns. The caucus chairs were unhappy, in particular those of the USFP, who refused the offer of interns. NDI now provides the list of potential interns to the caucus chairs who make their selection and sign the contracts.

Through other projects NDI had supported the multiparty Women MP association, which was active in the lead up to the 2007 and 2009 elections. Although this assistance was not part

of the USG program in the evaluation, the Team believes these multiparty women's networks can be extremely effective for advocacy and joint action on issues of common interest across parties. Women MPs thought the assistance before the elections had provided them with a push, but they hoped for more sustained assistance once in office. One of the women MPs, who appeared to be extremely successful and articulate, summed it up—"we need help, we are drowning here."

The issue of supporting the multipartisan parliament and municipal councils as political institutions – compared to supporting political parties – requires further analysis. It has been noted that individual parties are evolving and in some cases may cease to exist. The institutionalization of a program may better lie in the permanent, non-political council administrations and parliamentary committees. Recognizing that these institutions are weakened by the power structures under the King, it is possible that further headway could not be made in supporting political parties. On the other hand, providing research interns to partisan caucuses rather than to multiparty committees also has drawbacks. Some parties were more satisfied than others with the interns; possibly they had better interns appointed, but the result is not necessarily good for an emerging political system. One of the more positive findings was that women had successfully formed nonpartisan groups, which have the potential to significantly help mature the political system as a whole. Supporting the institutions rather than the parties can help support this political maturation while also enabling the program to reach the PJD who decline to work as a party with NDI and IRI.

The recent USAID evaluation of the State University of New York (SUNY) parliament support project also noted that –working with party caucuses may also provide an opportunity to encourage – through the appeal to their own self-interest – the more frequent use of committee tools, such as investigative visits and subcommittees, as well as engaging potential political allies through the cover provided by issue-based caucuses. Peer pressure among politicians may also be a useful element of this strategy as politicians often respond to good examples by others and thus good politicians should be supported and encouraged to promote good governance among their colleagues."⁵¹

Local Governance Activities

Both NDI and IRI have worked with local governance, but IRI has been much more active at this level and has worked on a number of different activities. In the mid 2000s it worked with the Citizenship Forum, local government officials, and grassroots community organizations in Casablanca, Meknes, and Essouira and developed three pilot community projects in Casablanca, Tetouana, and Tangier (two of which were completed and focused on community clean up campaigns). IRI's current work focuses on good governance training of municipal councils in the cities of Agadir, Rabat, and Tangiers. It includes training on the roles and responsibilities in the Communal Charter (municipalities' law), strategic planning relating to community issues, such as garbage and water, developing municipal commissions of enquiry, and how to organize a town hall meeting. It uses focus groups in each location as a means to determine constituent

⁵¹ USAID/Morocco, *Report on the End of Project Review and Assessment of the Parliamentary Support Project (PSP) 2004-2009*, p23.

areas of concern. On a test case basis, it contracted development of an economic plan for one municipality. NDI has just started training municipal councilors on their interface with their party, on bringing party perspectives to community policies, and in development planning.

Local Governance Findings

NDI's work is too recent to show results. For IRI, there appeared to be an increased awareness among those who had attended training as to the importance of good governance, the ideas of representation, and consultations with civil society and citizens. The workshops seemed to have built good will and a sense of solidarity among the elected official participants and with IRI on issues of democratization and a combined sense of purpose. Among other things, this probably illustrates the thirst for knowledge on these kinds of issues, although in reality this is probably more limited to the newly elected officials than to traditional politicians. These findings were across parties and included a PJD participant who spoke to the Team.

The local council strengthening activities that IRI has undertaken throughout much of the evaluation period seemed well-conceived and their primary limitation appeared to be budgetary. The workshops enjoy good attendance and training appeared to be popular. IRI's current effort has classroom type training in the morning with practical workshops in the afternoon that apply the lessons to a mock project. Some of IRI's training topics have included financial management, budgeting, account management, internal controls and oversight, decision making processes, community development planning, basic service delivery, and constituent communications. Some of the newly elected local officials told the Team that the training on leadership, roles and responsibilities, and working with civil society was especially useful. IRI used economic development as a recurrent theme in training, which their focus groups identified as a critical concern of citizens. The Team did not have enough information on the pilot economic study to make a judgment on its usefulness or necessity, but noted the number of economic development reports already completed by other institutions and the government.

IRI's pilot projects seemed to successfully engage the communities, schools, and public officials in community campaigns, and its relations with the municipalities assisted appear to have been good. IRI's reporting states it was asked by Casablanca city officials to assist in the Chicago-Casablanca sister cities program, IRI also worked with the municipal council, with a majority of PJD officials in Meknes, and with the city council in Essouira, which was headed by Morocco's first female mayor.⁵² During the evaluation, the Team noted the need to bridge local collectivities with local sections of political parties in towns where a party won an outright majority in the local council. This was especially palpable in Fes among minority parties in the council.

At the strategic level, even though the current assistance is targeted geographically to maximize impact, the scale of assistance provided (generally three workshops) is too small to make a significant difference in improving the overall governance within the targeted areas, or to be able to internalize these values within the institution. This presents a broader issue for USG funding decisions because there needs to be a link between the

⁵² IRI, *Political Party Building, Quarterly Report: July 1 – September 30, 2005*, p4.

desired end state, actual needs, and available resources. This assistance has planted the seeds for better governance through the personal enlightenment of some of the participants, some of whom could make major differences through their work in future years.

PROGRAM DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Strategy and Design The USG “program” actually consisted of 17 different projects funded by three different agencies, through at least six different types of funding mechanism. There were evidently other USG-funded projects ongoing at the same time, including DRL projects implemented through the U.S Embassy and other IRI and NDI projects, as well as regional programs that included Moroccan participants. USAID also funded other projects in related fields such as the SUNY project in parliament and other USAID-funded DG projects. Each of the projects had its own strategic objectives, implementation plans, reporting requirements, and monitoring and evaluation frameworks.

The evaluation found a certain level of consistency in NDI and IRI’s approaches and areas of assistance. For some projects, the donor decided on the particular area or activities it wanted to fund, but in many cases the program strategy, approach, and implementation methods were similar and funding level primarily determined the extent of the effort. At the same time, many project designs seemed overly ambitious for the amount of time and resources available. It was also unrealistic to expect the level of results stated in some of the proposals or program descriptions, especially when the level of effort comprised a couple of forums or one-off training events.

Initial projects focused on election-related events and included most parties, and in particular the eight major parties in parliament. NDI changed its approach in the mid-2000s to focus its efforts on the parties it thought had the capacity to absorb and apply its lessons.⁵³ Because NDI and IRI had similar activities, especially under the CEPPS-funded projects, they decided on an urban-rural split of the country with IRI focusing more on the regions. In practice IRI also worked at the national level and NDI conducted some training sessions in the regions. The evaluation team found a completely different environment in the local areas and thought the regional work was important because assistance provided at the top did not filter down to these levels. The exception was the party members who wore local and national hats but who were, in effect, urban-based politicians. Most of the urban party members interviewed were extremely sophisticated and politically astute. The type of training that could benefit them differed completely from what was needed in the local areas. Local party members were also politically astute but lacked the broader experience and exposure to other systems that could change party operations at the local levels and increase demand for more participatory and transparent party processes within their national headquarters.

⁵³ According to NDI, its analysis of over 30 parties found that only eight have the base of support, number of seats won, and a real future for success. For this reason, it targets its main assistance to these eight. PJD and PI have declined U.S. support for political reasons and PAM only came into existence in Aug. 2008. As a result, NDI currently focuses on five major parties: RNI, USFP, USC, PM, and PPS.

Both IRI and NDI use a multiparty approach with one-on-one training as follow up or in specific areas for party strengthening activities. The multiparty forums were extremely useful as they enabled members from parties who were not formally participating with NDI or IRI (such as the PJD) to benefit from program assistance on a personal basis. NDI notes that parties who have not been their core partners, such as the PAM, PI and PJD, are increasingly participating in their activities. The multiparty forums are also useful for building cross-party relationships and networks on particular reform issues, such as women's equity. However, the parties said they resented multiparty forums where they were expected to discuss internal party affairs in front of others. There were a limited number of international exchanges included in the program, but in general these (and others funded through other USG programs) appeared to have changed attitudes in a positive way toward the U.S. while also creating a more optimistic outlook when it comes to improving their parties and their government rather than maintaining the status quo.

IMPLEMENTATION

The program was implemented through NDI and IRI who were able to execute a large number of projects during the evaluation period and reach a significant number of

BEST PRACTICES
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Developing the Women For Women's network with a well established and respected women's organization which ensured a professional implementation of training and sustainability of the network• Use of focus group research as tool for political parties and elected officials through program support activities• Targeting training for women as agents of (long-term) change and new leaders within the parties and elected government• Providing certificates after training. These were perceived as objects of accomplishment and pride by participants.• Developing synergies between the regional programs of IRI and NDI for activities undertaken within Morocco• Working directly at the local levels and developing open communications between NDI and IRI and these local level actors

beneficiaries throughout Morocco. This took a high level of commitment and organization. Just managing the number of different project agreements, donors, funding timelines, and reporting requirements was a feat. There were also a large number of factors, many of which were beyond the control of the donors or implementers, which affected the quality of implementation and the ability of the program to make sustainable changes.

In terms of implementation, the evaluation found **good relations** in general between IRI and NDI and with parties and government officials. During the mid-2000s, some of the parties did not want to work or be associated closely with the implementers because of U.S. foreign policy issues (most notably Iraq). This

included the PI and PJD. Relations have since improved and none of the parties interviewed seemed to think the USG party program, NDI, or IRI had an agenda, other than to help them build better parties. Although the PJD as a party still does not attend IRI/NDI functions, it allows its individual party members to attend trainings and workshops. At the time of the evaluation, the Team did not sense reluctance from these parties to work with IRI or NDI, and the issues they raised in regards to assistance were on targeting and the way some activities were implemented and not on the use of the two U.S. party institutes as implementers or the issue of it being USG funded. NDI and IRI also have more than a decade of experience providing this type of assistance in Morocco and have name recognition and a certain degree of trust built up with the parties and politicians.

The number of projects and the short term nature of many of those projects

negatively affected program continuity and the ability of the implementers for follow up. Although the diversity of funders enabled both IRI and NDI to maintain a presence and activities in Morocco throughout the evaluation period, there was not one cohesive –USG program.” Uncertainty over funding and working from agreement to agreement resulted in more disjointed activities than would otherwise be the case if longer-term agreements and funding were assured. IRI in particular has been affected by this. Its funding after the 2007 elections has been a third of that received by NDI. The limited funding and short-term nature of its donor agreements present some of the primary reasons that its activities have been reduced to a series of trainings and workshops rather than a more integrated program of party support.

LESSONS LEARNED

- Strengthening the political sector to be more democratic, responsive, and accountable is a long-term endeavor that requires strategic vision and a long-term commitment
- The underlying political system constraints to the democratic development of parties need to be addressed for capacity building of parties to be effective
- Reformers need moral support and guidance, which can be provided over the long-term through the development of multimultiparty and professional networks
- Building flexibility into programming enables implementers to be more responsive to party needs and build a sense of partnerships that can increase the likelihood of more sustainable results
- Training materials and methods need to be adapted to the specific context of the country to be more useful and to have their lessons internalized by the participants

Management and staffing issues increased the difficulties of implementing an effective program. Delays in contracting and receipt of funding disrupted planning and in some cases stopped activities--in particular with IRI in relation to the USAID/Morocco CEPPS Agreement (608-A-00-07-00016), which was contracted out of USAID/Cairo. IRI also appeared chronically understaffed and seemed to have frequent gaps and changes of its chiefs of parties. If NDI had these same issues, they were less visible to the evaluation team.

Good understanding by NDI and IRI of the political parties and political developments. Quarterly reporting usually included a useful background section that provided updated information on the broader context of the political environment and changes during the quarter. Donors find this useful. It also helps the implementers think through their activities and adjust their approaches to the context. For example, NDI says it is currently adapting a –more nuanced and paced approach to party engagement [because of] the changed political landscape”,⁵⁴ which included the consolidation of parties, problems within leadership, and the increased interest of PAM, PJD, and PI in program activities.

Some of the implementation issues faced by IRI and NDI in working with the parties included:

- **Interparty dynamics** and frequent changes of leadership, which left the implementers at times facing two camps, with some welcoming assistance and others not. As a result they received conflicting views of party priorities, which affected their ability to obtain agreement at the national level to work at the

⁵⁴ NDI, *Building the Capacity of Political Parties, Quarterly Report, January-March 2010, p 11.*

- regional and local levels. These interparty dynamics are contributing to the changing political landscape.
- **Entrenched mindsets**, party leaders, and vested interests bent on maintaining the status quo. A part of this involves the challenge of having participants find applications of new ideas or best practices to the Moroccan context themselves from exchanges rather than relying on experts to show them how these could be applied.
 - **Parties not using their own internal resources**, people, or funding to promote party development and capacity building of their members.
 - **Not offending cultural norms** due to the “culture of consensus” while pursuing issue-based party differentiation, which NDI identified as one of its major challenges.⁵⁵
 - **Regulatory factors**, such as the two week campaign period, which limited the ability of parties to put NDI/IRI teachings into practice, or the deposition of candidates two weeks before the campaign period so that the selection of persons for candidate training became a best guess.
 - **Impact of the electoral system** on party development, such as the PR list system on the campaign and candidate selection process, and the fracturing of votes that challenges efforts to develop platforms.

Some of the issues raised by the parties on IRI and NDI assistance:

Desire for a genuine partnership. There was a generalized perception that consultations on program activities were lacking and being presented with a prepackaged program that was not always relevant to their needs. This was directed toward both implementers, although to a lesser degree for NDI. Parties wanted a partnership, with each side contributing to the learning process, as with some of the work done in the women’s wings and in some of the local council governance training. Those who thought they had a true partnership were enthusiastic about the program and what it could do, while those who thought it was more of a didactic patronage than a reciprocal partnership were not. Many party officials said they had areas where they wanted assistance, but their particular needs were not part of the set program.

All wished for **more program flexibility.** Most of the parties identified the assistance provided by the German party foundations as the most useful. When this was probed, the parties said the Germans were more responsive and provided assistance they needed. The FNF told the Team that it would help a party to organize a conference on a topic raised by the King within 10 days. This meant the party was among the first to discuss a topical issue, which ensured good public interest and media coverage. Both NDI and IRI linked flexibility to funding and programming requirements. NDI has more flexibility currently

⁵⁵ This was defined as the *pervasive apprehension of leading political actors to take divergent stances on major issues or to directly challenge the King and to favor agreement over confrontation at any cost.* Latulippe, *Strengthening Political Parties’ Capacity to Campaign in National Elections*, p 15.

than IRI given the broader scope of work and larger funding levels in its current agreement with USAID.

Better context-appropriateness. A recurrent theme revolved around the point that Morocco was not Africa or the Middle East and that assistance needed to be better adapted to Morocco’s specific context. Moroccans contend that they have had political parties for 50 years and that their democracy was more advanced than the other Arab countries, except for Lebanon, and they did not want Arabs coming in to tell them about democracy. They felt they were more on the same plane as Spain. Parties also said they were each at different levels of development so they did not want to all be lumped into the same level of training. Generic training modules and some techniques were not perceived as useful, among these were some of the campaign techniques (“more appropriate in 50 years”) and the use of IT for party business and campaigning. Persons outside of the urban centers said neither their party offices nor militants had computers or internet. Another issue was the expectation that parties would attend multiparty trainings to discuss internally sensitive issues. This is an issue that has already been noted by implementers. NDI has started to reconfigure some of its sessions along broadly ideological and cooperative lines, holding separate workshops with the different groups.⁵⁶

M&E RECOMMENDATIONS

- Use of a **standardized index** of political party development to identify changes over time
- Use of **public opinion polling** to measure KAP changes over time, including level of citizen trust in parties and elected government, percentage of citizens who think politics are relevant to their daily lives, and percentage of citizens/party members who think parties represent their interests.
- **Tracking of program participants** over time to help determine impact of program activities

More comprehensive strengthening programs. Many said program activities were conducted piecemeal and lacked a strategic vision and follow-up. All asked for more follow-up and mentoring, especially among the women and elected officials. For some parties, this request for a more comprehensive program appeared to come from the institution rather than from an individual, which is a critical step in having a program that can make a difference at the institutional level. Party officials thought there had not been enough support to develop a critical mass within their parties necessary to institutionalize change. The parties also asked for better documentation from trainings for reference use afterwards. Both NDI and IRI discussed wanting to cultivate long term relationships by doing more comprehensive programs and providing follow-up but said this related back to funding and the priorities of the donors.

PERFORMANCE MONITORING

There was no one performance monitoring plan (PMP) for the USG program. Each of the 17 projects had its own results frameworks and PMPs. Between these projects there were more than 50 main objectives and hundreds of indicators, many of these listed on extensive PMP spreadsheets. USAID/Morocco also had a PMP for its 2004-2008 strategy, with indicators for political party activities that were largely elections-related for the lead up to the 2007 elections. For USAID/Morocco’s new party strengthening project in 2008, USAID worked with NDI to develop a PMP for this project, which was again

⁵⁶ NDI, *Building the Capacity of Political Parties, Quarterly Report, January – March 2010*, p 6.

altered after USAID adopted its 2009-2013 strategy. USAID/Morocco also reports annually on the USG mandatory indicators. Both implementers produced regular reports on their project activities that include reporting activities according to objectives. Yet, the evaluation team found it extremely difficult to find the data needed to determine the reach of this program, its results, and its contributions toward the achievement of the higher level USG objective.

The quality of these PMPs and indicators varied between the projects and for USAID over time. In general, the evaluation found a lack of baselines with subsequent comparison of progress over baseline from start to end of project, an absence of consistent indicators over the life of the program/project with cumulative information on project activities by year and against targets, and difficulty identifying the actual activities undertaken because activities tended to be repeated in different reporting. Most of the indicators are quantitative measures, such as the number of parties that have defined roles or adopted reform agendas. Some of the data are disaggregated, though much are not. The data do not give an idea of the extent of change or its effect, which results in uncertainty over what was actually accomplished, its quality, and whether the project's value was worth the investment. Polling, which was used to determine some baselines in earlier projects, was prohibited under the program after the 2005 IRI poll incident. This means that some of the end of project measurements were not taken and anticipated baseline polling was not done.

USAID/Morocco has been concerned with finding the right indicators to measure progress and has continued to work with NDI to fine tune and adjust the PMP for its current project. This agreement ended in September 2010, but the PMP was amended as recently as April 2010. PMPs need to be easy to use, consistent over time, and based on realistic and inexpensively measured indicators. These objectives and indicators give a project its purpose. If objectives or indicators are constantly shifting, it can easily result in an activity-driven project and a meaningless PMP can easily result. The level of effort to continually refine PMPs and find quality indicators can also detract from the main effort of a project, which should be to implement the activities and effect meaningful change.

Some of the PMP indicators and targets appeared unrealistic given the level of funding and actual activities undertaken. In some cases, PMPs mixed measuring party development with measuring project performance. They are not necessarily the same. In terms of measuring project results, indicators should reflect what the project itself could realistically achieve with respect to its anticipated objectives, rather than a more ideal end state for party development.

Much work has been done on measuring democratic change at the outcome level. For instance, the World Bank Institute developed its "Governance Indicators" measurements using data from existing sources, including Freedom House. There are also international polls that provide data across countries, such as Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer that measures the level of perceived corruption among institutions, including political parties, or the World Values Survey that provides information on public confidence in political parties. For more in depth information on the qualitative changes within a country, survey instruments that include knowledge, attitude, and

practice (KAP) questions that are repeated at various times during program implementation can provide extremely useful data to measure progress and compare results against the baseline and control groups. As requested by the SOW, a few illustrative indicators for each of the objectives, including some of the ones already found within the PMPs, are suggested in Appendix G. However, the Team recommends that USAID also consider developing a standardized Party Development Index along the lines of the CSO Sustainability Index or Judicial Reform Index to help measure the development of political parties in general and to enable comparisons of party development over time and across regions. Perhaps the new political party assessment tool being developed by DACHA/DG could be the basis for this type of assessment tool.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Morocco is a very old culture having a more recent Caliphate absolute monarchy dating back 1,200 years. From this long-term perspective, the extent of democratic change within the political environment in the past 30 years is striking. The legal and electoral frameworks have been changed to require and encourage more democratic practices within parties and to broaden the participation of women in politics. Opposition parties that once boycotted government and faced jail terms and torture are now part of the system and a major initiative for the devolution of power to the regional levels is underway. Although the main driver of change has been the public discourse by the King, USG democracy and governance support, including its political party assistance program, have contributed toward supporting this reform vision and building the capacity of political party beneficiaries to promote broader reforms.

Development programming with political parties is contextual, sensitive, and risky; nevertheless IRI and NDI successfully implemented the USG portfolio of projects and achieved a long list of project-level outputs. Although impact at the higher levels appears to be limited, both IRI and NDI succeeded at developing good working relationships with most parties and obtaining a certain degree of mutual trust and professional respect. This is a major accomplishment given the broader political context. It also provides the potential, based on interpersonal relationships, for deepening the program activities and addressing more sensitive issues and core problems in the sector. Key among them is the issue of the balance of powers between an elected government and the monarch, which will demand a more strategic and long-term approach than the discrete project activities that have been undertaken to date. It is also essential that the USG program maintain its long term strategic vision of increasing democracy in the Arab world at the same time as focusing on its project-driven results.

Support to parties as currently delivered is unlikely to provide sustainable results or change the major problems facing political parties and their constituents. Although the current context is not conducive to the individual party development approach for the reasons discussed throughout this report, opportunities exist for improving the efficacy of the program—in particular, through targeting drivers of change, structural constraints, and future leaders that can help to develop a more dynamic political competition and party system.

The evaluation recommends continuing a USG program of assistance in this sector. Remaining engaged with parties on a technical level would in part help the U.S. to maintain a strategic presence and build positive and productive political relationships. This fits the current U.S. Foreign Policy Objective of “Morocco as a Strong Ally and Partner to Address Global Challenges.”⁵⁷ Addressing the root problems within the party system would better enable the next phase of USG political party assistance to reach USAID’s anticipated results for 2013, which include “the enhanced ability of political parties to represent the interests of citizens, especially youth, and more effective local governance with increased participation, especially by youth, that is institutionalized.”⁵⁸ The evaluation findings also reflect the strategy’s position that “it is critical to ensure that political parties are able to play an active role in shaping, advocating, and communicating policy reforms to address citizen and constituent concerns, particularly those of youth.” The Team thinks a continued focus on empowering women leaders in the near term is an essential element. The number of women now in elected office positions seem well to be able to make significant changes to the nature of the political system if the enabling environment becomes further liberalized. USAID also anticipates developing an intermediate result around the reform priorities of the Moroccan government, which also meshes with the evaluation’s findings and recommendations.

USAID will need to design its next phase of party assistance because its current project ended in September 2010. To assist this process, the evaluation has the following recommendations for consideration:


- **Shift in program focus toward strengthening the party system** rather than individual parties, and **promoting political system reforms**. Although the primary partners would still be the parties and the work would be done within the existing system, the end focus should be oriented toward improving the electoral and political systems, the consolidation and restructuring of parties, and increasing the accountability and responsiveness of the parties and party system. This type of assistance should support government and party efforts for reform and not be externally driven. Synergies with governance and civil society programs should be developed to increase the effectiveness of the assistance, as well as multisectoral constituencies for reforms. Key issues include the electoral system (PR vs. first-past-the-post) and the incentive systems that constrain democratic development within parties. Strengthening local party efforts and the voice of local members would be part of this process and would help support the governmental policy of regionalization.
- **Identification of reformers and future leaders as target groups** to serve as agents of change, particularly through cross-party trainings and the building of multiparty networks for reform, similar to the multiparty group of women leaders. Training and mentoring of these emerging reform leaders, including women and youth, would take no account of their past, present, or future party affiliations. This should be conceived within the strategic framework of strengthening the party system and deepening reforms and not as an either/or focus of USG

⁵⁷ USAID/Morocco, *Assistance Objective*, May 2009 p 1.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p 6.

- programming assistance. Implementers should **track program participants** throughout the projects to provide a better sense of program impact.
- **Adoption of a long-term program approach** with continuing objectives and indicators, and gendered programming. Even if the program is implemented through short-term projects, having a clearly articulated vision of the desired end state of the program for 2020 would help ensure more integrated programming and synergistic efforts toward this ultimate strategic objective. This vision should be developed after consultations with the political parties, political leaders, civil society, women and youth organizations, and others to ensure buy-in, realism, and responsiveness to the needs perceived by the potential beneficiaries.
 - **Increased coordination and complementarity of programs** between implementers and greater synergies between the political party program and those of local governance and civil society. The USG has a mini-arsenal of projects and programs focused on improving democratic governance in Morocco. The programs of IRI and NDI also have very similar objectives and activities. These programs should coordinate closely and develop mutually supportive activities, which could help to increase impact for all of these projects. USAID may want to consider an integrated approach to prevent programs from being redundant. IRI and NDI should also ensure the frequent exchange of information with the German foundations to avoid duplication of efforts and to leverage activities where possible.
 - **Resumption of public opinion polling** and continued use of focus group research to strengthen program activities and measure their impact. Information gathered from polling can be used to strengthen dialogue and develop public policy. It provides insights into citizen needs and interests and helps parties and elected representatives identify critical issues and constituencies for reform. Polling information can also improve the targeting and effectiveness of program activities by identifying the problem areas in need of assistance. Polling data provides a fundamental tool for implementers to use in party strengthening activities focused on developing more responsive, internally democratic, and competitive parties. Polling over time also provides the data on changes of attitudes, practices, and knowledge that are needed for monitoring and evaluation purposes.
 - **Development of a standardized political party development index by USAID** along the lines of the NGO or Media Sustainability Index to facilitate the measuring and tracking of party development. This could be used as part of the program's performance monitoring plan as well as to identify the critical constraints to party development.

APPENDIX A: USAID/MOROCCO'S RESULTS FRAMEWORK (2004 – 2008)



Source: *USAID/Morocco, Country Strategy, 2004 – 2008, p*

APPENDIX B: USG-FUNDED PROJECTS INCLUDED UNDER THE EVALUATION AND THEIR OBJECTIVES⁵⁹

IRI			NDI		
Project	Objectives	Parties Locations	Project	Objectives	Parties Locations
<p>#1 Strengthening local elected officials</p> <p>NED (7980) 07/01/09-06/30/10 \$494,000</p>	<p>1. To provide municipal elected officials with skills to facilitate practices/initiatives that are responsive to citizen priorities.</p> <p>2. Encourage/facilitate elected officials & parties to gather CSO & other constituents input in local decision-making processes.</p> <p>3. improve communication between municipal elected officials & public.</p>	<p>Municipal Councils in Tangier, Rabat, Agadir</p>	<p>#9: Party strengthening & Parliamentary reform</p> <p>CEPPS/DC with MEPI 30/1/04 – 12/15/06 \$1,917,000</p>	<p>1. Help parties develop better understanding of citizen perceptions & overcome gap dividing parties from citizens; 2. Improve party members' access to skills & resources & communication within and between parties; 3. Build capacity of women & youth to participate fully in parties; 4. Build party capacity to campaign effectively in 2007 elections; 5. Bridge gap between MPs, civil society leaders and constituents; 6. Improve efficiency & effectiveness of MPs & party caucuses; 7. Promote dialogue/action among parties & caucuses on key democratic reform issues related to changing political landscape</p>	<p>19 parties; Rabat;</p> <p>Outreach & focus groups in various locations;</p> <p>national party training in Ifrane</p>
<p>#2 Party strengthening for municipal elections</p> <p>NED (7882) 09/12/08-03/31/10 \$323,325</p>	<p>1. To build the capacity of political parties to pursue reform platforms.</p> <p>2. Strengthen municipal leaders outreach to constituents</p>	<p>8 regions; 8 parties</p>	<p>#10 Supporting political parties in advance of the 2003 Municipal Elections</p> <p>USAID/Morocco (CEPPS) 03/1/03-10/7/03 \$515,000</p>	<p>1. Develop basic campaign skills of local party reps, especially women, to develop & execute successful campaign strategy, refine platform into messages voters understand & identify. 2. increase understanding of basic campaign methods for key parties; 3. Develop reference doc for PPs in Arabic. 4. Increase campaign skills for women candidates. 5. Increase understanding of voter opinions on municipal election result & parties</p>	<p>17 parties; Rabat; Fez</p>

⁵⁹ Numbered according to the project table in the Evaluation of Scope of Work

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

IRI			NDI		
Project	Objectives	Parties Locations	Project	Objectives	Parties Locations
<p># 3 Young leaders empowerment</p> <p>NED (7782) 09/12/08-12/31/09 \$110,000</p>	<p>1. Develop youth strategies & structures of PPs to attract younger membership, especially women.</p> <p>2. Encourage & motivate young leaders, especially women, to participate in the political process and compete in electoral contests.</p>	<p>Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakesh</p> <p>PPS, USFP, PAM, RNI, UC, MP, PI</p>	<p>#8 Supporting Emerging Leaders of Political Parties</p> <p>NED 10/01/06 – 9/30/07 \$224,988</p>	<p>1. Enhance capacity of emerging party leaders to take more significant roles in their organizations by providing them with relevant skills & practical experiences;</p> <p>2. Provide opportunities for young party members to engage in party activities & develop organizational skills to promote their continued involvement.</p>	<p>13 parties; Casablanca; Rabat</p>
<p>#4 Women's municipal program</p> <p>MEPI 02/01/09-06/30/09 \$305,815</p>	<p>1. Educate stakeholders on value of public opinion research in democratic governance.</p> <p>2. Build capacity of local partners to conduct public opinion research meeting international standards.</p> <p>3. Help PPs conduct targeted membership recruitment.</p>	<p>North, 8 cities 2,500 women</p>	<p>#3: Strengthen Women's Participation in Maghreb (S1); Strengthen Parties & Improve Transparency of Electoral Systems in North Africa (S0)</p> <p>MEPI 2/2009 - 2/2010 \$450,000</p>	<p>1. Enhance capacity of women to stand as candidates and mount effective campaigns for local elected office</p> <p>2. Increased electoral transparency (assistance to political parties in the preparation and deployment of party agents as poll watchers)</p>	<p>Women: South: 11 parties;</p> <p>Pollwatcher 10 parties; 11 regions</p>
<p>#5 Public opinion & civic participation</p> <p>NED 01/18/08-12/31/08 \$200,000</p>	<p>1. To educate Moroccan stakeholders on the value of public opinion research in democratic governance.</p> <p>2. To build the capacity of local partners to conduct public opinion research meeting international standards.</p> <p>3. To help parties conduct targeted membership recruitment.</p>	<p>UC, RNI, PPS, USFP, MP, PI</p>	<p>#6- Support to civil society in 2007 elections</p> <p>All objectives at end of chart, only relevant = #2</p>	<p>2. Increase the capacity of Moroccan women to create opportunities for candidacy and effectively stand in elections;</p>	<p>22 regional UAF offices</p>
<p>#6 Political party building for elections</p> <p>AID/Morocco, CEPPS</p> <p>02/01/07-07/31/07 \$800,000</p>	<p>Obj 1: PPs better understand their membership & how to effectively organize membership tracking & outreach. 2 IR's: conducted, recs made based on use of survey research)</p> <p>Objective 2: Political parties improve transparency and reduce corruption through better compliance with PP finance laws. (IR 2.1: Key party officials learn the details of PP finance laws and better complete Campaign Finance and Audit Reports).</p>	<p>Divided country into 4 geographic regions</p>	<p>#5 Strengthening Political Party Capacity for Election Campaigns</p> <p>USAID/Morocco (CEPPs w/MEPI)</p> <p>12/1/06-2/29/08 \$1,207,955</p>	<p>1. Increase capacity of PPs to campaign effectively in leg elections.</p> <p>2. Increase PP capacity to plan, design and implement strategic pollwatching initiatives nationwide to protect their political rights; and</p> <p>3. Enhance women's involvement as candidates in legislative elections.</p> <p>4. Promote improved electoral processes & deeper political reforms</p> <p>5. Enhance capacity of political parties to negotiate an effective ruling coalition.</p>	<p>14 parties total (4 focal)</p> <p>Rabat with focal groups various locations</p> <p>pollwatcher 11 cities</p> <p>women candidate training: Marrakesh</p>

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

IRI			NDI		
Project	Objectives	Parties Locations	Project	Objectives	Parties Locations
<p>#7 Political party building AID/Morocco, CEPPS 3/04- 3/08 \$1,473,776</p>	<p>1. Reform established PPs & strengthen nascent dem PPs to be more democratic, transparent, representative and effective. 2. Expand dem PPs & encourage more competitive multiparty systems. 3. Increase governance skills of pol leaders & reps in nat'l & local level bodies through training & strengthen parliamentary blocs or caucuses. Obj 1: Increase #s & skills of reform minded candidates for elected office through regional campaign schools Goal 1: Increase dialogue in the region on dem processes such as elections, campaigning, & PPs Goal 2: Provide PPs, candidates, & newly elected reps exposure to skills nec for successful, professional, & credible campaigns & develop & how to use skills at nat'l, regional, local level. Goal 3: Expose participants to models of good governance, coalition building, constituent outreach, message development, org management, & media relations so they are effective advocates for political change. Goal 4: Empower & include women in the pol process. Given....campaign schools concentrate on essential advocacy & campaign activity skills. Goal 5: Build tech capacity of local orgs to facilitate this type training in future.</p>	<p>Casablanca 3 arrondis</p>	<p>#1 Build the Capacity of Political Parties USAID/Morocco CoAg 04/17/08 – 9/30/10 \$2,4700,00</p>	<p>1. Increase the capacity of PPs to develop more democratic internal operations & promote broader reforms to enhance citizens' participation in the political process; 2. Build the capacity of PPs to communicate more effectively, both internally and externally; 3. Enhance ability of political parties to expand their bases of support and better conduct grassroots campaigns; a 4. Develop capacity of Moroccan women to effectively stand for and fulfill elected office.</p>	<p>9 parties (5 focal, many events open) Rabat, Casablanca, Fes, Oujda, Beni Mellal, Berchid, + others depending on party; TCAs: 3 regions Women's caravan: 18 cities, 14 regions Municipal councilors 2 regions</p>

All NDI					
Project	Objectives	Parties Locations	Project	Objectives	Parties Locations
<p>#2 Sustaining Parliamentary Internship Program NED 10/01/09 -9/30/10 \$115,800</p>	<p>1. Enhance the capacity of MPs & parliamentary caucuses to conduct their daily operations as prescribed by the constitution. 2. Provide opportunities for youth to develop, enhance their legislative and organizational skills while engaging in parliamentary activities.</p>	<p>Rabat 9 parties</p>	<p>#4 Parliamentary Internship Program NED, 3/1/08 – 2/29/09 \$115,000</p>	<p>1. Enhance capacity of MPs & parliamentary caucuses to conduct their daily operations as prescribed by the constitution. 2. Provide opportunities for youth to develop, enhance their legislative & org skills while engaging in parliamentary activities.</p>	<p>Rabat 6 parties</p>

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

All NDI					
Project	Objectives	Parties Locations	Project	Objectives	Parties Locations
<p>#6 Support Civil Society in 2007 elections</p> <p>USAID/Morocco Co Ag 12/21/06-12/31/07 \$1,151,000</p>	<p>1. Enhance capacity of & provide increased opportunities for Moroccan civil society to promote greater citizen participation in the 2007 elections;</p> <p>2. Increase capacity of women to create opportunities for candidacy and effectively stand in elections;</p> <p>3. Build the capacity & facilitate opps for CSOs to advocate for priority policy concerns, to influence political party platforms & promote greater competition among parties;</p> <p>4. promote increased opportunities for citizens, particularly youth, to engage more in political dialogue leading up to the elections</p>	<p>Debates: 12 parties Rabat, Casablanca, Ouda, Marrakech, Agadir, Fes, Tangier, Meknes, Ksar El Kebir</p> <p>Platform/Promise Monitoring:: n/a for parties CSOs: Fes, Meknes, Mohammedia, Marrakech, Ksar El Kebir</p> <p>Young Voter national caravan: Casablanca workshops</p>	<p>#7 International Observation of 2007 Legislative Elections in Morocco</p> <p>MEPI, 8/1/07 -5/31/08 \$580,000</p>	<p>1. Promote transparency & integrity of Morocco's electoral process through international assessment of the pre-election, election-day & immediate post election periods;</p> <p>2. Strengthen electoral process by identifying strengths & real or potential problems, & suggesting how problems might be resolved, as well as offering recs for how the electoral process can be built upon to deepen democratic development in Morocco.</p>	<p>Deployed to 26 locations around country</p>

APPENDIX C: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Introduction

USAID/Morocco seeks technical assistance to undertake a political party program evaluation. The evaluation will be focused on political party programming undertaken since 2005 and is expected to provide analysis and recommendations that will assist USAID in developing future political party programming in Morocco.

Background

A. Political Parties in Morocco

The Moroccan electoral landscape is defined by a multiparty system reflecting a wide range of political interests, values, and networks. It is currently organized into 32 formal and legally established party organizations⁶⁰. The established parties reflect a varied history that is typically characterized by factionalization and fracturing based on politics of personality. There is only a limited definition of party identity based on mission, vision, and broad socio-economic policy orientation. Moreover, despite recent political reforms, political parties remain weak and have been unable to internally democratize.

Since the 1990s, Morocco has made steady, significant, and substantial progress in elaborating and implementing democratization and good governance reforms. These reform processes build on the country's history of formal and informal political pluralism, its diversity of consensus-based governance structures and its traditions of citizen participation in public life. The United States has supported the democratic development of Morocco through diplomacy and foreign assistance programming and continues to provide targeted assistance to assure a democratic and well-governed Morocco. This USG priority is matched by the commitment of the Moroccan government to expanding the political space and encouraging citizen participation in governance.

In the last decade, Morocco has witnessed a rejuvenation of its political party and parliamentary life and has focused considerable attention on empowering local level actors through increased devolution of authority and decentralization of decision-making. The November 1997 elections signaled a new era in Morocco's move toward democratic reform when Moroccan citizens directly elected 325 representatives to the lower house of the newly bi-cameral Parliament. Even though the electoral process was met with criticisms of fraud and irregularities, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) won a plurality of seats with 14 percent of the House (though it remained a minority party as measured against the electoral results of the parties of the center and the right).

⁶⁰ Number of Political Parties has varied over time. Previously, 38 were reported, but current information suggests they have been reduced to 32. It is expected the number may reduce further over the coming few years.

Some five months later in March, 1998, Abderrahmane Youssoufi, a leading opposition figure during the early days of the regime of Hassan II and a leader of the USFP (though not a member of parliament), was invited by the late king to serve as prime minister of a new government called the “government of the opposition” in recognition of the minority status of the USFP in parliament. This action extended an olive branch to the leftist political classes that had disrupted the Moroccan political scene of the 1960s, 70s and early 80s and toward whom the dark actions during the years of political repression (“the years of lead”) had been directed. It further reflected a level of comfort among the ruling elites (the “makhzen”) with broader political participation in governance and can be considered an important step forward.

The run-up to the parliamentary elections of 2002 and the 2003 municipal elections was a period marked by high hopes for democratic reforms in the governance of the kingdom. Morocco's political environment was now being defined by a new monarch, Mohammed VI, who took steps in the early days of his reign to set the stage for a more liberal political atmosphere. The King gave the Interior portfolio over to the leadership of a technocrat, Driss Jettou, in September, 2001. Jettou was specifically charged with preparing and managing a free and fair electoral process for the September, 2002, elections.

The 2002 elections were generally recognized as having been the most free and fair in the Arab world to that date. Moreover, the informal agreement that had been reached among all the political parties contesting the election to reserve their national list seats for women candidates meant that Morocco leapt to the front in the representation of women legislators among all parliaments in the Arab world.

Subsequently, the 2007 parliamentary elections were also deemed free and fair. The results, moreover, were seen as credible and a legitimate reflection of citizen interest in the political process. Although only 37 percent of the registered voters cast their ballots, the authorities played a passive and neutral role in order not to interfere with the process and affect the outcome of the election results as they had in previous elections under the reign of King Hassan II. Given the importance of what this election represented in terms of Morocco's commitment to reform and democracy, international observers were authorized for the first time in the electoral history of the country. Moreover, King Mohammed VI directed the Consultative Council for Human Rights (CCDH) to supervise the election process, a domain previously reserved to the Ministry of Interior.

The progress represented by the 2007 parliamentary elections in setting the stage for further and deeper democratic development was significant. In the run-up to the election, several political parties invested heavily in publicizing their political platforms to attract more voters. This represented some tentative first steps toward modern campaigning based on party programs rather than persons. Furthermore, the King took four key decisions that established key precedents for tying elections to democratic governance practices and raising the relevance of the process in ways that should, in future contests, lead to increased citizen participation and voter turnout.

For the first time in Moroccan history, a change of government has been directly tied to the seating of a new parliament. No formal dissolution of the government is required in advance of elections or immediately thereafter. Nevertheless, the Jettou II government was dismissed in keeping with the timing of parliamentary elections. This action established a precedent of defining a term of office for a government that coincides with the electoral cycle. This is effectively analogous to a constitutional reform representing democratic progress.

The second key reform driven by the 2007 parliamentary election was the pledge of the king to tie the leadership of the new government to the results of the election. Prior to the September vote, the king indicated that he would appoint a new prime minister from the party that won the most seats in the new parliament. With the appointment of Abbas El Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal party, the king kept his promise and thereby set a precedent. For the first time in Moroccan history, electoral results were directly and immediately relevant in the formation of the government. This was, in effect, another key constitutional reform toward democratic practice established by royal action independent of any formal constitutional amendment.

Thirdly, the new Prime Minister Abbas al Fassi is an elected member of parliament. Representing the citizens of the constituency of Larache on the Atlantic coast between Rabat and Tangier, al Fassi is the first prime minister in Moroccan history to serve as a member of parliament while holding the Prime Minister position. This is a key step that has established a precedent for future appointments to the position and further contributes to the relevance of participatory governance through political parties.

Finally, during the negotiations that led to the formation of the new al Fassi government, the king added an additional connection between elections and governance. Under the formal constitution, the king appoints ministers that are proposed by the prime minister and whose names he agrees to. No restriction is made for such appointments and no qualifications are established. However, in the formation of this new government, the king disallowed the nomination of any person who had run for parliament and lost, thereby adding an additional connection between elections and governance and creating a new, constitutionally relevant qualification for service in the government.

These four non-formal —constitutional reforms”, though intimated or expressed, were untested before the elections. In addition, they were not constitutionally required and will be difficult to turn back from in future election cycles. Nonetheless, the low turnout of the Moroccan electorate could be seen as an expression of limited trust on the part of citizens that such promises made by the makhzen would be honored. The popular perception of the relevance of electoral processes to the governance system can only now catch up with the top-down initiatives undertaken by the king to bring meaning to citizen participation in governance. The king’s actions have sent a significant message to non-voters (63 percent of registered voters) that electoral outcomes are indeed relevant to Moroccan governance. Political parties will have to respond to this widened space for participation with improved capacities to lead, advocate and organize in order to achieve

policy objectives on behalf of those Moroccan citizens who support them as members and/or with their votes.

The 2007 parliamentary elections exposed weaknesses within most (if not all) of the country's political parties. Key political parties, such as the USFP, have struggled to overcome divisive internal arguments, while the recently merged parties that now form the Popular Movement (MP) grappled with party lists and candidate selection and whether or not to take a role in government. The National Assembly of Independents (RNI), the fourth largest party in parliament following the elections, experienced a contest for leadership in the months leading up to the elections.

More recently, the Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), a party with strong perceived support from the monarchy, emerged following the 2007 Parliamentary Elections. The party was founded by Fouad Ali El Himma, a close associate of the king and former Deputy Minister of the Interior, President of the urban commune of Benguerir, and President of the provincial council of Kelaa Sraghrna. El Himma was elected as an independent candidate to Parliament in 2007 for the first time and quickly established a civil society association, called the Movement for All Democrats (MTD). Several months later, he founded the PAM, a party that is perceived by many to represent the interests of the King and the makhzen. El Himma has expressed plans of leading significant reforms to the Moroccan political landscape.

Since being founded roughly two years ago, the PAM has been very successful in attracting smaller parties and/or their elected representatives to join its Parliamentary coalition and has emerged as an important political actor. In the lead-up to the June 2009 local elections, PAM attracted a number of leading local political leaders in various regions to join their party. The PAM also was one of the first parties to understand how the women's list would function and was very skillful in fielding popular women candidates on both the main and the women's lists. As a result, PAM won the most seats in local government nationally, getting roughly 20% and is now become one of the leading five or six political parties in Morocco. In the coming months as the series of elections for provincial, regional, unions, professional chambers, and the Upper House of Parliament take place; the PAM will likely be positioning itself to have strong representation in each body with the aim of securing the Presidency of the Upper House.

With the next national elections three years off, it is unclear what the emergence of PAM and the apparent decline of a number of the traditional parties like the USFP will mean for the Moroccan political landscape. It is unclear how the evolving political landscape will affect the role political parties play and the level of confidence they enjoy from the Moroccan people. As a result, future political party programming will need to be flexible and able to adapt to a changing environment and seize opportunities as they arise.

B. Challenges for Political Party Programming

The development challenge of working with the political parties is overcoming the status quo and finding leaders of reform in each party that are willing to take the necessary steps

required to transform their parties into internally democratic parties with a defined platform and a strong support base. Change in Morocco's political system is slow, faces resistance from vested interests but is critical, nonetheless, to Morocco's path of democratic reform.

All of Morocco's political parties face both external and internal challenges. Given the constitutional authorities of the king, power remains centralized in the Fes-Rabat-Casablanca corridor, the so-called "Maroc utile" vs. the "inutile" interior of the country. The reforms of the new political party law have not invigorated the political party scene with significant changes to organizational behavior and practices as had been hoped or intended by the changed law. Regional party activists remain discouraged by their marginalized roles in party direction and leadership and frequently lament the lack of transparency in party management. Lower-level activists, especially in the absence of any formal definitions of party membership and in the absence of any democratic structure based on the expressed views of such a formal membership, have few opportunities to impact important party decisions. Party partisans and local party leaders (themselves not formally constituted or democratically vested in their positions) cannot play a guiding role in communicating the concerns of the local base without formal channels of two-way communication with party leadership. Party leaders remain, for the most part, unaccountable for their actions or for the achievement of political results.

Recent political reforms, such as the 2006 political party law, aim to clarify the role and responsibilities of Moroccan political parties and encourage their engagement in the political process. A number of the provisions found in the party law, such as regular party congresses, increased representation of youth and women in the party structures, development and periodic publication of party platforms, and use of transparent financial accounting procedures, are key first steps in reforming how parties function and a number of parties have made some progress in these areas. Nonetheless, there remains considerable scope to deepen these efforts and take them further to strengthen parties' internal democratic nature and build their credibility with their constituents.

C. USG Political Party Programming

Both the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) have been active in Morocco over the past decade conducting a wide range of work in a number of areas. At the start, they had wide ranging programs that touched on a number of areas. More recently, in the past three to five years, their programs have become more focused. Typically, their projects have worked on one to two-year cycles, and their funding sources included USAID (both Mission and Washington), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and the State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL).

USAID/Morocco's current Political Party program is implemented by NDI. This \$2.47 million program, "Building the Capacity of Political Parties," was awarded in 2008 under

an open request for applications (RFA) and runs through September 30, 2010. Its primary objectives are the following:

- Increase the capacity of political parties to develop more democratic internal operations and promote broader reforms to enhance citizens' participation in the political process;
- Build the capacity of political parties to communicate more effectively, both internally and externally;
- Enhance the ability of political parties to expand their bases of support and better conduct grassroots campaigns; and
- Develop the capacity of Moroccan women to effectively stand for and fulfill elected office.

Prior to this, USAID/Morocco had funded both NDI and IRI to conduct programs focusing on the 2007 Parliamentary Elections. IRI programming had focused on strengthening political parties at the local and grassroots level while NDI's programming focused on national level campaign issues and included support for domestic election observers and party poll watchers. Both Institutes received MEPI funding to support the training of women candidates for the June 2009 local elections. Currently, IRI is active in Morocco with NED funding focused on linking political parties to economic development and strengthening municipal officials' public service practices and responsiveness to constituent needs following the June 2009 municipal elections.

Both Institutes conducted a range of other programming prior to this and concurrently with these programs. A table of each institute various political party programs will be provided separately to assist the evaluation and assessment teams.

Purpose:

The purpose of this evaluation is to assess the results and impact of political party programming to date, using this analysis to draw lessons and make recommendations for future USAID political party programming.

This evaluation will be followed immediately by a political party assessment conducted by the University of Pittsburgh Political Party Analysis team. They will conduct an in depth analysis of the current political situation and build on the finding furnished from this evaluation.

The following are key questions for the evaluation team to address:

- Have USG-funded programs achieved their intended results? Why or why not and to what degree?
- What factors contributed to success or failure?
- To what degree was sustainability of the interventions achieved? Have new practices been institutionalized?

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

- What were major constraints hindering success, if applicable?
- What has the impact been of political party programming?
- What lessons can be learned?
- What are the strengths and weaknesses of programming to date?
- What is political party leaders' impression of the program? Are they satisfied? In which areas do they think U.S. assistance was most effective?
- What M&E measures have been the most successful? What M&E lessons can be learned? What suggestions can be made for future M&E programming?

USG Funded Projects Included in the Evaluation:

#	Name of Project	Funder	Agreement Number	Time Period	\$ Amount
1	IRI: MOROCCO: STRENGTHENING LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS	NED	7980	07/1/09-06/30/10	\$494,000
2	IRI: MOROCCO: PARTY STRENGTHENING FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS	NED	7882	09/12/08-03/31/10	\$323,325
3	IRI: MOROCCO: YOUNG LEADERS EMPOWERMENT	NED	7782	09/12/08-12/31/09	\$110,000
4	IRI: MOROCCO: WOMEN'S MUNICIPAL PROGRAM	MEPI	CA-284-S0	02/01/09-06/30/09	\$305,815
5	IRI: MOROCCO: PUBLIC OPINION & CIVIC PARTICIPATION	NED	7584	01/18/08-12/31/08	\$200,000
6	IRI: MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTY BUILDING FOR ELECTIONS	USAID/Morocco (CEPPS)	608-A-00-07-00016	02/01/07-09/30/07	\$800,000
7	IRI: MOROCCO: POLITICAL PARTY BUILDING	USAID/Morocco (CEPPS)	DGC-A-00-01-00004-00 (Project 7091)	March 2004 – March 2008	\$1,473,776

#	Name of Project	Funder	Agreement Number	Time Period	\$ Amount
1	NDI: Build the Capacity of Political Parties	USAID/Morocco (Full & Open)	608-A-00-08-00044	<u>04/17/08 – 09/30/10</u>	\$2,470,000
2	Sustaining Parliamentary Internship Program	NED	NED Core Grant 2009 (09047)	10/01/09 - 09/30/10	\$115,800
3	NDI: Strengthen Women's Participation in the Maghreb (SI)	MEPI/Washington	S-NEAPI-06-CA-173	2/2009 - 2/2010	\$450,000
	Strengthen Political Parties and Improve				

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

	Transparency of Electoral Systems in North Africa (S0)				
4	Parliamentary Internship Program	NED	NED Core Grant 2008 (08020)	3/1/2008 - 2/29/2009	\$115,000
5	NDI: Strengthening Political Party Capacity for Election Campaigns	USAID/ Morocco (CEPPS Associate with MEPI support)	608-A-00-00015	12/01/06-02/29/08	\$1,207,955
6	NDI: Support Civil Society in 2007 Elections	USAID/ Morocco (Full & Open)	608-A-00-00006	12/21/06 - 12/31/07	\$1,151,000
7	NDI: International Observation of 2007 Legislative Elections in Morocco	MEPI/ Washington	S-NEAPI-07-CA-249	8/1/2007 - 10/31/2007	\$450,000
			S-NEAPI-06-CA-173	9/1/2007 - 05/31/2008	\$130,000
8	NDI: Supporting Emerging Leaders of Political Parties	NED	2006-266 UU (06049)	10/1/2006 - 9/30/2007	\$224,988
9	NDI: Party Strengthening and Parliamentary Reform	USAID/ Washington (CEPPS Leader with MEPI support)	DGC-A-00-01-00004-00	3/01/2004 - 12/15/2006	\$1,917,000
10	NDI: Supporting Political Parties in Advance of the 2003 Municipal Elections	USAID/ Morocco (CEPPS Associate)	608-A-00-03-00032-00	3/01/2003 - 10/21/2003	\$515,000

Proposed Approach:

The evaluation team should propose an approach that addresses the following needs:

- The evaluation team has a firm handle on Morocco's democratic development with a focus on the political environment, understanding all important changes in legislation, array of political parties and their evolution, and subtle nuances of Morocco's evolving political climate;
- The evaluation team understands all elements of the projects to be reviewed, including how the projects evolved over time, what changes in the political environment they were responding to, and whether any modifications were made to respond to specific changes.
- The evaluation team is able to collect needed information from a wide variety of informants both in the US and Morocco that could include US and other relevant donor officials in Washington and Morocco, political party members, elected officials at national and local levels, civil society, and government representatives.
- The evaluation team is able to explore structures that link parties from the local to the national level, understand how parties function at both local and national levels, how they function specifically in Parliament, and have an understanding of their membership. This would include gathering the perspectives of party leadership, including members of political bureaus, party committees and commissions, local party structures at regional, provincial, and community levels, and members of party caucuses in Parliament.
- The evaluation team is able to understand the varying perspectives of different political parties in Morocco. There are over 30 existing political parties in Morocco of which eight are considered to be very relevant to the political party situation in Morocco. This includes the National Rally of Independents (RNI), Constitutional Union Party (UC), Istiqlal Party, Social Union of Popular Forces (USFP), Justice and Development Party (PJD), Progress and Socialism Party (PPS), Popular Movement Party (MP), and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM).
- The evaluation team has a firm handle on the monitoring and evaluation data and other information against which results and impact can be measured. This could include relevant polls and focus groups that the evaluation team believes could be used to measure results and impact;
- The evaluation team develops a list of illustrative indicators that speak to the intended impact/goal of the USG-funded programs. The list could be short. These indicators should not be process or output indicators, but rather **outcome** or **impact** indicators that can provide a good view into what were the consequences of USAID's election and political processes efforts in Morocco. To that end, the evaluation team (ET) should carefully review the program documents and even the available strategy documents to help identify these indicators. If the ET comes back reporting that the targeted number of people trained was achieved, but does not attempt to assess the impact of the training, then the evaluation effort will be superficial at best. Proposals need to show the importance of developing appropriate OUTCOME/IMPACT indicators that are linked to each program's goals and objectives.

- The evaluation team is able to identify how key stakeholders view the overall changes in the political party sector since 2005, and then, without focusing on or even mentioning USAID, try to assess what were the factors that played a role in these changes. The evaluation team may then ask what, if any, role USAID played in the changes. This exercise can be very helpful to see how prominent USAID programs were in the changes that occurred. For this exercise, the evaluation team can gather information on the main changes in Morocco's political party arena so that they are aware of these and can potentially bring them up during interviews.

Literature to be Reviewed:

- USAID Country Strategy, 2003 – 2008
- USAID PMP, Strategic Objective 13
- Monitoring and Evaluation Plans and Data for each project
- Program Descriptions and subsequent modifications for each project
- Available Work Plans for each project
- Available Quarterly and Annual Reports for each project
- Any other reports, publications (guides, etc) ,and/or documents developed under the projects above
- Final reports on each project
- Written briefings materials on the programs, activity reports, success stories and any other documents regarding political party programming in Morocco
- Other reference or historical documents which might be identified by USAID and others

Deliverables:

- Evaluation proposal will include a methodology to be used by the evaluation team
- Upon arrival in Morocco, the team will submit a detailed work plan along with the schedule of field work specifying (1) tentative appointments and (2) how the information will be collected, organized and analyzed to meet the information need specified in the SOW.
- In-brief with USAID staff including Mission Director on arrival
- An oral out-brief with preliminary key findings and recommendations for the USAID.
- A written draft report (as near to final as possible) to be presented as part of the out-brief session. The Mission will have 10 working days to provide comments on the draft report.
- Meetings with in-coming political party assessment team in the final week of the evaluation to brief them on findings and provide suggestions of contacts, issues to explore, etc.
- A written report not to exceed 30 pages excluding Appendixes. The written report should contain the following sections:
 - Executive Summary, not to exceed three pages in length, composed of evaluation findings, best practices identified, conclusions and key recommendations;

- Brief Description of Methodology;
 - Overview of Political Party Programming in Morocco, listing all party programming over the period;
 - Analysis of Findings;
 - Best Practices Identified and Key Recommendations;
 - Conclusion.
- After receipt of any comments from the Mission, the Assessment Team will have ten working days to finalize and submit the final report. It is estimated that a final report will be delivered within 30 calendar days following the departure of the team from Morocco.

Special Provisions:

- The team is responsible for its transportation, office space and communications.
- Six day work week is authorized for this evaluation.

APPENDIX D: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

Political Party Program Evaluation April - May 2010 Work Plan

The Political Party Evaluation Team will undertake desk and field work to collect and analyze the data for the evaluation of the USG-funded political party program in Morocco and to prepare the evaluation report. As part of this process, the Team will:

- Review the documents provided by USAID and others during the process, including: USAID's Strategic Objective 13; monitoring and evaluation reports for the political party assistance projects; and, the annual and final reports for each of the projects;
- Meet with USAID/Morocco for an in-briefing, and discuss the SOW requirements and USAID priorities for persons and organizations for Team interviews;
- Meet with representatives of other USG donors, including MEPI and NED. Representatives in Washington will be interviewed by phone and by e-mails;
- Meet with the USG implementers of its political party assistance, in particular with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republic Institute (IRI) for briefings on their projects and their assessment of political party development and the impact of their programming. Collection of additional documentation and data from NDI and IRI;
- Interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders of the USG-funded political party programs on democratic and political party developments and their experiences with party assistance programs. These will include a broad range of political party members, including leadership, members in party committees and within parliament, and local party leaders and members;
- Interviews with a broader range of actors and institutions at the national and local levels with expertise and experience in democratic and political party developments including elected officials, civil society, and government officials;
- Visit party headquarters and local offices, party caucus premises and other locations where political parties are active;
- Collect existing data that can be useful to assess party developments, such as political polling, focus groups and other relevant survey data;
- Discuss initial findings with USAID's Political Party Assessment Team and suggested contacts for their mission;
- Debrief USAID at the end of the field work on key findings and recommendations; and,
- Use the information and data collected through interviews and document reviews to write the evaluation report for USAID review. In particular, the Team will ensure the report addresses:
 - Achievement of USG-funded programs;
 - Factors contributing to their success or failure;

- Sustainability of changes;
- Major constraints to political party programming;
- Lessons learned;
- Programming strengths and weaknesses;
- Impressions of political party leaders of the program; and
- Quality of program monitoring and evaluation.

As part of this process, the team has developed two worksheets based on the SOW that it will use to organize its findings and direct its interview questions. The worksheets will be completed with the team's initial findings as the field work progresses, with the objective of having team consensus on the major findings of the evaluation by the end of the field work and before report drafting starts. The worksheets are attached to the end of this work plan.

FIELD WORK SCHEDULE

The Team will sequence its meetings to maximize its time in country and collection of information.

- **Week One:** the Team will focus on gaining a solid background on the USG party assistance programs and on the state of democratic and party development in Morocco. This will include meetings with USAID, its implementers (NDI, IRI), political analysts, and civil society watchdog groups.
- **Week Two:** the Team will meet with political parties and others in government and politics for their assessment of political party development and impressions of USG programming. Interviews at the local levels outside of Rabat will be undertaken in week two, with the locations to be determined in coordination with USAID. One of these areas is expected to be Casablanca.
- **Week Three:** the Team will finish up interviews of parties and other key actors and undertake follow up meetings as needed. It will also work as a team to develop its initial findings and recommendations and produce the materials required for the out-brief with USAID.

Most of the names of the persons for the interview schedule were provided by USAID, IRI and NDI. This list will be prioritized as the schedule progresses to ensure the Team has a good overview of all different aspects and positions as it may not be possible to meet all of the persons recommended. The organization that recommended each contact is provided in parenthesis after the person's name.

April 19 – 21, 2010

Travel of the two international experts to Morocco.

April 21 – 24, 2010

- USAID - in-brief and meetings with DG office
- NDI
 - Jeffrey England, Resident Director
 - Fatiha ait Oulaid, Program Officer
 - Siham Borji, Women's Project Coordinator
- IRI
 - Derek Luyten, Resident Country Director
 - Mohieddine Abdellaoui, Deputy Director
 - Noura Hammouch, Program Coordinator
 - Sara Ait Lmoudden, Program Coordinator
- Political analysts
 - University of Mohammad V
 - Abderrahimin el Manar Esslimi (NDI)
 - Nidar El Moumni, (NDI)

April 26 – May 1, 2010

- U.S. Embassy, Political Officer (to be organized in coordination with USAID)
- Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (NED)
 - Ulrich Storck, Director
 - Merin Abbas, Program Manager
- Political Parties: (to be determined in coordination with USAID)
 - National Rally of Independents (RNI):
 - Mohamed Hadadi, MP, member Casablanca city council (IRI)
 - Ms. Saadia Ouhanou, Member Khemisset city council (IRI)
 - Ms. Naima Thaythay, RNI/WHW, MP, Party Leader (NDI)
 - Redouan Benaini, regional Youth Leader/TCA, Oujda (NDI)
 - Tayeb Bencheikh, Partly Leader, Coordinator campaign 2007 (NDI)
 - Naima Farrah, Advisor to SG, Coordinator 2007campaign (NDI)
 - Rachid Talbi Alami, MP, President Council of Tangier, (USAID)
 - Constitutional Union Party (UC)
 - Houain El Hamiani, Party Leader/ TCA, Casablanca (NDI)
 - Istiqlal Party
 - Fihri Fassi Fihri, Coordinator in Sidi Belyout (IRI)
 - Social Union of popular Forces (USFP)
 - Driss Lachgar, Minister of Relations with Parliament, ex-MP, Party Leader (NDI, USAID)

- Hanane Riahb, Youth Leader, candidate for youth wing head 2010 (NDI)
- Leila Amili, Parliamentary Group Chief of Staff (NDI)
- Fatima Maghnaoui, USFP/UAF (WHW), Party Leader, VP of UAF (NDI)
- Nouzha Alaoui, USFP/UAF (WHW), MP, former head of UAF, Head of WHW (NDI)
- Rachida Benmassoud, Women's network (USAID)
- Said Chba?tou, MP, President Local Council, President of Regional Council of Meknes Tafiladet and Head of Association of Regional Presidents (USAID)
- Oudour, President of Local Council (USAID)
- Justice and Development Party (PJD)
 - Lahcen Daoudi, MP, Deputy Leader (NDI)
 - Jamila Mossali, Women's Network (USAID)
- Progress and Socialism Party (PPS)
 - Ismail Alaoui, Secretary General (NDI)
 - Nouzha Skali, ex-MP, Minister of Family and Social Development (NDI)
 - Ghizlane Mamouri, Party Leader Tangier (NDI)
 - Mohamed Grine, Party Leader (NDI)
 - Anas Doukali, Rabat city council member (IRI)
- Popular Movement Party (MP)
 - Ms. Zahra Chagaf, MP, Women's Section Head (IRI and NDI)
 - Hakima Haite, MP, Party Leader (NDI)
 - Mohammed Ouezzine, MP, Secretary of State (NDI)
 - Abdelhamid Mekaoui, MP, Advisor to SG/TCA (NDI)
 - Lahcen Hadadd, MP, Party Leader, Coordinator for 2007 campaign (NDI)
 - Mohand Laenser, MP, Secretary General, Minister (NDI)
- Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM)
 - Ahmed Brija, MP, Vice President Casablanca city council (IRI)
 - Ms. Khadija Hadadi, MP, Member Agdal-Rial arrondissement council (IRI)
 - Driss Errazi, President Hassan arrondissement council (IRI)
 - Milouda Hazeb, Municipal President, Marrakech, (NDI)
 - Amina Latine, Commune President, Casablanca (NDI)
- PI (NDI)
 - Mohamed Bensassi, Group Chief of Staff (NDI)
- Elected Officials

- Fatna Lakhiel, Elected, President Rural Commune Arbaoua, Women's Network (AID)
- Amina Latnine, Elected Communale, Casablanca, Women's Network (USAID)
- Outside travel for interviews, TBD in coordination with USAID.
- Midterm meeting with USAID DG (or at start of May 3 week depending on travel and meeting schedules)

May 3 – 8, 2010

- NDI follow up
- IRI follow up
- Parties follow up
- Remaining political analysts and civil society
 - University of Mohammad V
 - Abderrahimin el Manar Esslimi (NDI)
 - Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)
 - Abdulwahab Alkebsi, Regional Director, MENA & Africa (NED)
 - Ibn Rochd Center (NED)
 - Maati Monjib, Director
 - Mediator for Democracy and Human Rights (NED)
 - Khadija Marouazi, President
 - Association Adala (NED)
 - Abedlilah Benabdesselam, Executive Director, is also VP of Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH)
 - Le Matin newspaper
 - Al Massae independent daily paper
 - 2007 Daba, Casablanca (Ahmed)
- Other donors
- Political party assessment team

May 10 -11, 2010

- Team meetings and drafting
- Remaining essential meetings
- USAID debrief (May 11)

May 12, 2010

- Departure of the international experts

REPORT SCHEDULE

Drafting by Team, May 13 – May 20, 2010

DI formatting and editing May 21, 2010
Delivery draft report to USAID, oob May 24, 2010

USAID comments: 10 working days
Finalize report: 10 working days

U.S. Contacts (via phone and e-mail as necessary)

- NED:
 - Laith Kubba, Senior Director, MENA
 - Gregory Houel, Program Officer, Middle East and North Africa

- Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED)
 - Andrew Albertson, Executive Director

**Team Worksheet
Parties and Political Party Sector**

Issue	Findings
Political party and party system changes since 2000 (+ defining moments)	
Biggest issues for political parties	
Biggest issues for the political party system	
Future trends	
Party administration and internal management	
Linkages (communications) and difference between national and local levels parties	
How parties function in parliament	
How parties function in local government	
Who do parties represent?	
Party outreach	
Enabling environment, political dynamics for more democratic, responsive parties	
Election-related issues	
Role women & youth in parties	

**Team Worksheet
Political Party Assistance Programming**

Question	General Findings	Specific to NDI	Specific to IRI	Other
Criteria for selecting parties/actors to work with				
Biggest issues with political party assistance & how overcome				
Implementer's approach & any changes along the way & why				
Most effective interventions?				
Least effective interventions?				
Parties impressions of pp assistance, which areas best, least				
Project-level intended results achieved? Why/why not				
Unintended results				
Sustainability (ie: permanent changes)				
Program impact				
Lessons Learned				
Implementer management issues that affected program				
Donor issues that affected program (different funding				

MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION

sources, managers, ST programs (CEPPS-DC/Rabat, MEPI, DRL, NED)				
M&E issues				
Best indicators				
M&E Lessons learned				

APPENDIX E: PERSONS MET

POLITICAL PARTIES

Constitutional Union (UC)

Mohamed Tamaldou, Director, Casablanca
Driss Aladil, Party Coordinator (and journalist), Fes
SiMohamed Atech, Fes

Istiqlal Party (PI)

Hamid Chabate, Mayor of Fes, Political Bureau Member
Fihn Fassi Fhri, Member of Casablanca City Council, Coordinator in Sidi Belyout
Mohamed Chabab, Economics Professor and former vice mayor, Fes
Fatima Dhibat, Local Council Member, Fes
Zohra Lyadri, PI Member, Fes
Lacen Bensassi, PI Group Chief, Parliament

National Rally of Independents (RNI)

Tayeb Bencheikh, former Member of Parliament and Minister, Member of the Political Bureau
Naima Farah, Advisor to the Secretary General, Member of the Political Bureau
Najia Taytay, Member of Parliament, Member of the Political Bureau
Hanane Keddari, President of RNI regional women's section, Fes
Mohamed Bourzouk, RNI Office President, Fes
Oughanou Saidia, Secretary of the municipality of Khemisset
Talbi Alami Rachid, President of the RNI Group, Member of Parliament, Member of the Political Bureau
Naima Kheraouch, Member of National Council
Salima ElBessau, Secretary-General for the Women's Section, Fes-Medina
Abdesslam Ghanzi, Secretary General of the Arrondissement Merrimide
Ali Rmich, Member of the Chamber of Commerce of Fes-Boulmane
Laraoui Abdelwahad, Secretary General of Arrondissement Sous
Dr. Mohhamed Laraoui Housseini, Coordinator

Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM)

Hamid Narjiss, Member of Parliament, Member of the Political Bureau
Ahmed Brija, Member of Parliament, VP City Council, Casablanca
Khadija Haddadi, Municipal Council, Rabat

Party for Justice and Development (PJD)

Mzdaoui Hassan, Vice President, Commune Hassan

Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS)

Anas Doukali, Rabat City Council Member
Mohamed Grine, Member of Political Bureau

Bali Hamid, Khemisset
Mohamed Boutaleb, Tiflet
Mme. Ghizlane Mamouri, Partly Leader, Tangier
Fatima Rabbouz, Communications Head

Popular Movement (MP)

Mohand Laenser, Minister d'Etat, President of the Party
Loubna Amkhair, Advisor to Ministre d'Etat, Mr. Mohand Laenser
Adil Chtioui, Member of Youth Union Executive Board
Zahra Chagaf, Member of Parliament, Women's Section Head
Lahcen Haddad, Political Bureau Member
Ibrahim Chahbane, Charge de communication, Fes
Hilali Fatouma, Women Section Head, Fes
Askour Lamharzi Fatima, Rural Women's Association, Fes
Said Mansouri, Second Vice President of the municipality of Khemisset
Fatima Daaif, Femmes Harrakics (Women's Section)
El Hassan Hajij, Association of World Mountain Populations, Fes

Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)

Said Chbaatou, Member of Parliament, President of Mekness Tafilalt Region
Khedouri, Ex Member of Parliament
Omar Abbadi, Head of Communications, USFP
Adil Azhan, Coordinator, Fes
Leila Amili, USFP Group Chief of Staff, Parliament
Omar El Hayel, Fes Medina Office

Socialist Party

Ahmed Aliraki, Former Minister of the Environment, Member of Political Bureau

Workers Party (PT)

Rachida Ait Himmi

GOVERNMENT OF MOROCCO

Department of Youth and Sports, Fes

Saber Hassan, Inspector

Ministry of Interior

Najat Zarrouk, Directrice de la formation des cadres administratifs et techniques du
Minist?re de l'interieur, membre du comit? des experts de l'administration publique de
l'ONU

CIVIL SOCIETY

Association de l'union de l'action féminine (UAF)

Nouzha Alaoui, Former President

Ouadiaa Alami, Regional Coordinator for Women for Women (USFP), Fes

Leila Bennis, Member of Women for Women (independent), Fes

Association Moultaqa des Jeunes Pour Le Developpement, Fes

Sabyr Lahcen, President

Derwa Bouchra, Social Assistant

Chafi Mohammed, Deputy

Fatima Zohra Bechar, Social Assistant

Citizenship Forum, Casablanca

AbdelAli Mestour, President

Center for Human Studies and Research, Casablanca

Mr. Mokhtar Bennabdallaoui, Director

Media

Koukas Abdelaziz, Journalist

Tammia.ma

Murad Jourouhi, Executive Director

University Mohamed V

Dr. Abderrahimin el Manar Esslimi, Political Science Professor (Rabat)

Dr. Nadir el Moumni, Vice Dean, Faculty of Law

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Ulrick Storck, Director

Merin Abbass, Project Officer

Friedrich Naumann Foundation

Abdelwahed Bougrine, Project Coordinator

International Republican Institute

Derek Luyten, Resident Director, IRI

Mohieddine Abdellaoui, Deputy Director

National Democratic Institute

Jeffrey England, Resident Director

Siham Bojji, Responsable principale des programmes

Fatiha Aitouaid, Women's Programs

Youssef Ajnah, IT

U.S. Embassy

Brian Shott, Deputy Political Counselor

Jimmy Mauldin, Second Secretary

Gregory Thome, Political Officer

US Agency for International Development

Ted Lawrence, Director DG Program

Idriss Touijer, DG Advisor

Tahar Berrada, Governance & Urban Development Program, Program Officer

Carol Sahley, USAID Political Party Assessment Team

APPENDIX F: REFERENCES

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE

Project 1: Morocco: Strengthening Local Elected Officials, NED, 7980

- *Proposal*, Undated
- *Narrative Report, October 2009 – March 2010*

Project 2: Morocco: Party Strengthening for Municipal Elections, NED, 7882

- *Proposal*, Undated

Project 3: Morocco: Young Leaders Empowerment, NED 7782

- *Reprogramming Request (from Kuwait 2007 -330G)*
- *Narrative Report, September 2008 – December 2009*
- *Final Evaluation Report*, Undated

Project 4: Morocco: Women’s Municipal Program, MEPI, CA-284-SO

- *Proposal*, undated
- *Women’s Campaign Training Launched Press Release* (with NDI), March 21, 2009
- *IRI-NDI Women’s Campaign Training Launch, March 21, 2009*
- *Quarterly Report: January – March 2009, February – March 2009*

Project 5: Morocco: Public Opinion and Civic Participation, NED 7584

- *Proposal*, Undated
- *Cooperative Agreement No. 608-A-00-007-00016*, February 13, 2007
- *Extension Proposal*, Undated
- *Quarterly Reports for: January – March 2007, April – June 2007, July – September 2007*,
- *Final Evaluation Report*, Undated
- *Survey results for: PI, USFP, UC, RNI, PPS, MP 2008*
- *Party Empowerment Initiative Morocco, Report on Survey and Focus Groups*, by Nader Said, August, 2008

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- *Cooperative Agreement No. 608-A-00-007-00016*, February 2007
- *IRI Morocco Funding Timeline*
- *IRI Extension Proposal*, Undated
- *Quarterly Reports for: January – March 2007; April- June 2007; July- September 2007;*
- *Final Report*

Project 7: Morocco: Political Party Building, USAID/Morocco (CEPPS) DGC-A-00-01-00004-00 (Project 7091)

- *Cooperative Agreement, Program Description*
- *Quarterly Reports for: July – September 2004; October – December 2004; January – March, 2005; April – June 2005; July – September, 2005; October-December 2005; January – March 2006; April – June 2006; July – September 2006; October- December 2006; January – March 2007, January – March 2008;*
- *Reprogramming authorization from CEPPS, Undated*
- *IRI Poll 2, Internal Political Party Presentations*
- *IRI, sondage d’opinions, Tableaux des resultants globaux, November 8, 2005*
- *Article: Sondage & elections: Les Liaisons dangereuse from L’Economiste*
- *Final Report, Undated*

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- *Proposal for Municipal Elections Assistance – Morocco*
- *Workplan, December 1, 2003 – March 4, 2004, December 2003*
- *Get-Out-The-Vote, Action Plan*
- *Agreement for Services between the International Republican Institute and Citizenship Forum, April 1, 2003*
- *Addendum to Agreement for Services between the International Republican Institute and Citizenship Forum*
- *Program concept for IRI-Citizenship Forum Cooperation, 2003*
- *Final Report*

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- *Morocco Overview, www.iri.org*
- *Proposal: Morocco: Developing Democratic governance, July 2010 to June 2011 (to NED), undated*
- *The 2002 Parliamentary Elections, Attitudes and Expectations of the Moroccan Public, Maroc 2020, 2002*
- *Press Release: Historic Moroccan Public Opinion Poll: Good for Democracy, Bad for Politicians, December 13, 2001*
- *Quarterly Report: Jul – September 1999, USAID Cooperative Agreement No. AEP-5468-1-00-5038-00, Strengthening Political Parties at the Local Level*
- *IRI International Trainers, 2003 – 2010, May 2010*

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Project 1: Build the Capacity of Political Parties, USAID/Morocco Agreement No. 608-A-00-08-00044

- *Proposal, February 19, 2008*
- *Workplan and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan*
- *Modifications (#1-7)*
- *Add-on Request*
- *Quarterly Reports for: April-June 2008; July-September 2008; October-December 2008; January-March 2009; April-June 2009; July-September 2009; October-December 2009, January – March 2010*

- *PMP* (undated excel chart)
- *IR13.2. Performance Indicator Reference Sheet*
- *La Passerelle: NDI Welcomes New Director*, Vol 2, November 15, 2004

Project 2: Sustaining Parliamentary Internship Program, NED Core Grant 2009 (09047)

- *Proposal*

Project 3: Strengthen Political Parties and Improve Transparency of Electoral Systems in North Africa, MEPI S-NEAPI-06-CA-173 (SO)

- *Proposal*
- *Original Algeria Proposal*
- *Supplement Proposal – Morocco portion*
- *Quarterly Reports for: January-March 2009; April-June 2009; July-September 2009; October-December 2009*

Project 4: Parliamentary Internship Program, NED Core Grant 2008

- *Proposal*
- *Narrative Reports for March 2008; April-September 2008; October 2008-December 2008; April-June 2009*
- *Final Evaluation*

Project 5: Strengthening Political Party Capacity for Election Campaigns, USAID/Morocco (CEPPS) 608-A-00-00015

- *Proposal*
- *Cooperative Agreement*
- *Cost extensions: through June 2007; through November 2007; through February 2008*
- *Workplan and*
- *PMP, undated chart*
- *Quarterly Reports for: January-March 2007; April-June 2007; July-September 2007; October-December 2007*
- *Final Report, undated*
- *Strengthening Political Parties Capacity to Campaign in National Elections* by Latulippe

Project 6: Support Civil Society in 2007 Elections, USAID/Morocco 608-A-00-0006:

- *Proposal*
- *Cooperative Agreement No. 608-A-00-07-00006, Promoting Citizen Engagement in the Electoral Process in Morocco*, January 5, 2007
- *Workplan and Monitoring and Evaluation Plan, undated*
- *Modification*
- *Quarterly Reports for January-March 2007; April-June 2007; July-September 2007; October-December 2007*
- *Final Report*

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- *Proposal*
- *Preliminary Report on the Moroccan Legislative Elections, September 7, 2007, (pre-publication copy) 2007*
- *Final Report*

Project 8: Supporting Emerging Leaders of Political Parties, NED Core Grant 2006:

- *Proposal*
- *Narrative Reports for: October-December 2006, January-March 2007, April-September 2007, October 2007-March 2008*
- *Final Report*

Project 9: Party Strengthening and Parliamentary Reform, (USAID CEPPS) DGC-A-00-01-0004-00/DC

- *Proposal, undated*
- *Proposal Extension, June 2004*
- *Activity Matrix*
- *PMP Plan and reports for April- June 2007; July-September 2007;*
- *2007 DABA Caravan Overview, April – June 2007+ GOTV regional activities*
- *UAF Regional Candidate and Advocacy Trainings*
- *Quarterly Reports for: July-September 2004, October-December 2004, January-March 2005, April-June 2005, July-September 2005, October-December 2005, January-March 2006, April-June 2006, July-September 2006, October-December 2006, January – March 2007*
- *Press Clippings*
 - *Les alliances sur fond de fusion (February, 2005)*
 - *Constituency Outreach – Fes (January, 2006)*
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 - *The People’s Mirror Focus Group Report*
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 - *Morocco Electoral Law Reform Background*
 - *MP Outreach Brief*
 - *Freedom of Information Presentation*
- *Final Report, Undated*

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- *Assessing Women’s Political Party Programs: Best Practices and Recommendations, Morocco 2008*
- *A Positive Step toward Electoral Success*
- *The Story of my Success with NDI, Lalla Zineb Idrissi Ismali, draft Undated*
- *Winds of Change, Undated*
- *Training Women Candidates, Reprogramming Request, May-December 2001*

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- *Strategy Document, January 2002*
- *Strategy Document, January 2007*

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- *Democracy and Governance Assessment of Morocco, ARD, 2006*
- *Democracy and Governance February 2009 Portfolio Review*
- *Report on the End of Project Review and Assessment of the Parliamentary Support Project 2004-2006, June 2009*
- *Request for Proposals Program Description for Project #1 (NDI)*

- *USAID's Assistance Strategy for Morocco 2004 - 2008*
- *USAID/Morocco, Assistance Objectives, May 2009*
- *USAID/Morocco DG Results – Indicator Sheets, Political Party Program (FY10)*
- *Index of Political Party Capacity to Represent Citizen Concerns*
- *IRI-NDI Programming Team Worksheet (with objectives)*
- *Matrix of Past Programming*
- *Matrix of Political Party Capacity for Defining Roles and Responsibilities (Results Indicator 1.1.3)*
- *Matrix of Political party Capacity for Effective communications, Results Indicator 1.1.2*
- *Matrix of Political Party Capacity Building for Management of Supporter Information, Results Indicator 1.1.5*
- *Morocco Country Assistance Strategy, December 2008*

OTHER DOCUMENTS

- *AFROL, Enhancing Women's Political Participation in Morocco, 2001*
- *European Union, Morocco, Strategy Paper, 2007 – 2013, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 2007*
- *Freedom House: Freedom in the World, Morocco (2009)*
- *International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Public Funding of Political Parties: The Case of Morocco, by Dr. Elobaid Ahmed Elobaid in Public funding solutions for Political parties in Muslim-Majority Societies,*
- *International Foundation for Electoral Systems, Morocco: A Technical Analysis and Needs Assessment of the Electoral System, June 2005*
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- *Project —Middle East Democracy" Country Backgrounder Series: Morocco*
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- *U.S. State Department, 2009 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Morocco, March 2010*

APPENDIX G: ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS

The evaluation scope of work requested a list of illustrative indicators that speak to the intended impact/goal of the USG program. Changes at this level are difficult to capture as many are qualitative or process changes that are not easily measured through the use of quantifiable output indicators. As noted in “Performance Monitoring”, polling and KAP surveys probably provide the best means to track qualitative change over time (assuming the same questions are used over time and against a control group). The use of existing indexes that measure democratic change or the development of a standard index specific to party development also offers a way to capture these changes.

Below are illustrative indicators that could be used to measure the impact of a political party program at the outcome or goal level. Some of these are indicators that have already been used by the program. Others are indicators suggested by the evaluation team. These are geared toward the current USG program and when a new program is designed and objectives determined, indicators will need to be developed with definitions and measurements that can capture the results of that design.

Strategic level

Related to strengthening political parties to promote democratic reforms and assure the policy interests of Moroccan people in electoral processes and governing:

- Improved scores on standardized index
- Increased levels of citizen trust in parties and elected government (as measured through public opinion polling)
- Increased percentage of citizens who think politics are relevant to their daily lives (polling)

Intermediate results level

Related to strengthened internal party democracy, accountability, and responsiveness:

- Increased percentage of citizens who think parties represent their members’ interests (polling)
- Increased levels of satisfaction by party activists on the state of internal democracy within their party (compared against baseline and with unassisted parties). Anonymous polling should be used as previous surveys indicate members often reported “good” or “medium” for most questions, yet 82 percent thought their party needed major reforms.⁶¹ Internal party surveys should also be disaggregated-- central leadership, rank and file, location age, sex, and other standard statistical polling variables.
- Increased percentage of women and youth in party leadership positions at national and regional levels (outside of the youth and women’s wings)

⁶¹ IRI *Party Empowerment Initiative Morocco, Report on Survey and Focus Groups*, 2008.

- Number of targeted political parties using democratic processes of consultation and vote to change leadership on a regular basis and to make key party policy decisions.
- Improved knowledge, attitudes, and practices (KAP) scores by 1) members within parties assisted by project; 2) elected officials assisted by project; and 3) local council/parliamentary staff assisted by project (compared against baseline and control groups).

Related to strengthened party communications:

- Increased number of users on websites and social networking/blogs/YouTube (compared against baseline and between assisted and non-assisted parties)
- Improved results on public opinion surveys for awareness of the main messages of assisted parties
- Increased level of citizen confidence in parties (compared against baseline for all parties and by parties assisted and against control group of other major parties not assisted)
- Increased percentage of regional party offices with messages that are consistent with the national party message (compared against baseline, control groups in locations not assisted by project, and with other main parties who do not get program assistance. Data should be collected bi-annually by project staff calling these offices to find out what their main messages were and then comparing these with the main messages at the time from the party headquarters.)

Related to strengthened ability for electoral competition:

- Increased consistency in messages and platforms between national and local levels of parties during campaigns in areas targeted by project (as compared to a control party or location that did not receive assistance).
- Percentage of program trainees elected to public office and the percentage of those who were then elected to a position of leadership within their party and in public office (as compared against the percentage of non-program assisted candidates.)
- Increased awareness by citizens on main messages of parties assisted (compared against baseline and unassisted parties)
- Percent of eligible voters who vote

Related to strengthened participation of women and youth:

- Increased percentage of women who win election on the regular party lists
- Percentage of women who won office on the quota list who then ran on the regular list in the next election and which candidates were successful
- Increased percentage of women and youth in positions of leadership within parties (outside of the women's and youth wings)

- Increased percentage of youth who respond favorably to questions about political participation and political parties on surveys (compared against baseline, different parties, and control group)
- Improved KAP scores for male party leaders on the participation of youth and women (compared against baseline and control group)

Related to strengthened capacity of parties for governance, policy development, and constituent outreach:

- Increased levels of citizen satisfaction with parties and government (polling)
- Improved party scores on standard index for issues related to policy making and governance
- Reduced perception of corruption for parties and elected offices assisted (polling and standard barometers on corruption)

APPENDIX H: PARTICIPATING PARTIES IN THE USG PROGRAM

Party	2004		2005		2006		2007		2008		2009		2010	
	NDI	IRI												
Democratic Union (UD)	✓		✓		✓									
<i>Al Ahd (Socialist Alliance Coalition)</i>	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓					
<i>Alliance of Liberties (ADL)</i>	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓		✓					
Citizen's Forces (FC)							✓		✓					
Citizen's Initiative for Development PICD	✓		✓		✓									
Constitutional Union (UC)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Democratic and Social Movement (MSD)							✓		✓		✓		✓	
Democratic Party (PD)											✓		✓	
Democratic Socialist Party (PSD) (<i>Socialist Alliance Coalition</i>)	✓		✓		✓									
Front for Democratic Forces (FFD)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	
Istiqlal (PI)	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Justice and Development Party (PJD)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	
Moroccan Union for Democracy	✓		✓	✓	✓				✓					
<i>National Democratic Party</i>	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓			
National Ittihad Congress (CNI)	✓		✓		✓									
National Rally for Independents	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

(RNI)														
<i>National Popular Movement (MNP)</i>	✓		✓	✓	✓									
Party of Authenticity and Modernity PAM									✓	✓	✓	✓		
Popular Movement (MP)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Progress and Socialism Party (PPS)	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Reform and Development Party (PRD)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓					
Reform and Equity Party (PRE)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓			
Renewal and Virtue Party (PRV)										✓				
Social Equity Party (PES)										✓			✓	
Socialist Unified Party (PSU)	✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓				
Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP)	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Democratic Society Party (PSD), <i>formed 2007</i>										✓			✓	
Worker's Party (PT) <i>formed 2005</i>										✓	✓	✓		

Parties in italics are no longer in existence
Shading with ✓ are core program parties

APPENDIX I: STUDY TOURS UNDER PROGRAM

NDI Study Tours:

Project # & Dates	Location	Participants	Purpose & Notes
# 5 March 17 – 27, 2007	Canada	Mohammed Jaouad, MP	Campaign observation for political party members in political bureaus and national campaign management teams In partnership with Rights and Democracy (Canada)
		Youssef Belal, PPS	
		Kaltoum El Hihi, PPS	
		Najib Loubaris , RNI	
		Abchir Mouloud, RNI	
		Benaissa El Ouerdighi, USFP	
		Fatima El Maghnaoui, USFP	
# 2 October 5-17, 2009	France	Said Abbou	Exposure to comparative parliamentary operations for advanced parliamentary interns At request and in partnership with the Embassy of France and French National School of Administration (ENA)
		Siham Belkhadir	
		Leila Ouchagour	
		Nizar El Kadiri	
		Adil El Moutaqi	

IRI: No Study Tours reported to Evaluation Team

APPENDIX J: SUBGRANTS UNDER PROGRAM

NDI Subgrants:

Project #	Organization	Dates	NDI Amount	Grantee In-Kind	Purpose
1	Union de l'Action Feminine (UAF)	July 1, 2008 - December 31, 2009	\$100,000	\$ -	Advocacy for more women on municipal councils, formation of non-partisan advocacy group, training of women candidates
6	Union de l'Action Feminine (UAF)	February 15- November 30, 2007	\$65,000	\$ 17,287	Advocacy for more women candidates on district lists, training of women candidates, GOTV materials targeting women
6	Daba 2007	March 1-October 31, 2007	\$260,000	\$ 116,927	Support for voter education and mobilization, including national caravan, GOTV training, materials development,
6	Le Collectif D?mocratie et Modernit? (CDM)	April 15-December 15, 2007	\$80,000	\$ 19,299	Promote interaction between civil society and political parties with national and local debates, advocacy training and platform monitoring

IRI: No Subgrants Reported

APPENDIX K: TECHNICAL EXPERTS PROVIDED UNDER THE PROGRAM

National Democratic Institute

Project #	Name	Country	Affiliation	Date	Purpose
5	Abbas Abou Zeid	Lebanon	Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections	Aug-07	Poll watcher training
9	Latifa Akharbasch	Morocco	Higher Institute for Information & Communication	Oct-04	Media Training for MPs
8	Sameera Ali	U.S.	Democratic Party	Mar-07	Youth Leadership Seminar
1	Cathy Allen	U.S.	Center for Women in Democracy; Connections Group	Jun-09	WFW Post-electoral Consultations
6				Mar-07	UAF Media Relations Workshop
1	Kelli Arena	U.S.	former CNN	Mar-10	Media Relations WFW
9	Mohamed Asloun	Morocco	Higher Institute for Information & Communication	Oct-04	Media Training for MPs
1	Abed Awad	U.S.	Arab American Democratic Caucus	Feb-09	Fundraising and Advocacy Workshop - WHW
6	Awad	U.S.	Arab American Democratic Caucus	Feb-07	GOTV TOT
9	Armen Balian	Lebanon	Lebanese Conflict Resolution Network	9/04/, 4/05, 5/05, 7/05, 12/05	Conflict Resolution & Negotiation Skills; Political Party Youth & Women Academy & follow-ups
5	Hatem Bamehriz	Yemen	NDI-Sudan	Aug-07	Poll watcher training
9	David Banisar	UK	Privacy International	Dec-05	Seminar on Right of Access to Information
9	Joel Barkan	U.S.	University of Iowa	Apr-05	Electoral Law Forum
9	Mohamed Belghouate	Morocco	Independent	Apr-05	Political Party Youth and Women Academy; Media Training for MPs
9	Michel Bellehumeur	Canada	Quebec Court	Nov-06	Electoral Legal Processes Training
9	Mohamed Berdouzi	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Jan-06	Political Party Law Forum
9	Michelle Betz	U.S.	Knight International Press Fellow	May-05	Press Communications
5	Martine Biron	Canada	Radio Canada	Jul-07	Media Coverage
5	Kjell Magne Bondevik	Norway	Oslo Center for Peace and Human Rights (former Christian Democratic Prime Minister)	Dec-07	Role of Opposition Parties; post-election analysis of observation
6	Dominique Braeckman	Belgium	Ecolo Party	Mar-07	UAF Advocacy Plan Workshop
5	Livia Caputo	Italy	Il Giornale; Forza Italia	Sep-07	Coalition Development
3	Abdellaoui Chakib	Morocco	University Mohamed V	March-May 2009	Women Candidates Workshops
1	Souad Chentouf	Morocco	Independent	ongoing	Municipal Councilor Workshops
3	Chentouf	Morocco	Independent	3-5/09	Women Candidates Workshops
6	Lauren Colleta	U.S.	Common Cause	Apr-07	Electoral Promise Monitoring
9	Luis Alberto Cordero Aria	Costa Rica	Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress	Jan-06	Political Party Law Forum
1	John Dale	Norway	Liberal Party of Norway	Jun-08	Party Structure a& Operations Conference, Consultations
6	Daouda Diop	Senegal	Independent	Mar-07	UAF Advocacy Plan Workshop
2	Abdel Ilah El Abdi	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Nov-09	Parliamentary Intern Training
4	El Abdi	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Jul-08	Parliamentary Intern Training
9	El Abdi	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Nov-05	Parliamentary Intern Training
3	Mohammed El	Morocco	University of Marrakech	April-May 2009	Poll watcher workshops

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

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3	El Ghazal	Morocco	Univesrity of Laayoune	March-May 2009	Women Candidates Workshops
6	Najib El Khadi	Morocco	Cabinet of President of House of Representatives	Apr-07	UAF Training of Trainers for Women Candidate Training
5	Ihsane El Mansouri	Morocco	independent	July-August 2007	Women Candidate Training
3	Mohammed El Mouhtadi	Morocco	University of Marrakech	March-May 2009	Women Candidates Workshops
1	Nadir El Moumni	Morocco	University Mohamed V	ongoing	Municipal Councilor Workshops
3				4-5/09	Poll watcher workshops
6	Jeffrey England	U.S.	NDI-Washington	Jun-07	Youth Engagement Online
1	Abderrahim El Es Slimi	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Ongoing	Municipal Councilor Workshops; TOT, Advocacy Workshop - WFW
2				Nov-09	Parliamentary Intern Training - Legislative Research
3				3-5/09	Women Candidates & Pollwatcher workshops
4				Jul-08	Parliamentary Intern Training - Legislative Research
5	Normmand Forest	Canada	Qu?bec Democratic Action	12/06; 2/07; 5/07	Campaign Planning
1	Younes Foudil	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Jul-08	Youth Structure Conference
2	Abdel Ilah Fountir	Morocco	General Secretariat	Nov-09	Parliamentary Intern Training - Legislative Drafting
4				Jul-08	
3	Johann Hamels	Belgium	European Green Party	May-09	Poll watching strategy consultations
1	Ahmed Hamza	Morocco	independent	4-5/09	External Communication Assessments
3				3-4/09	Women Candidates Workshops
3	Abdelwahid Hamza	Morocco	independent	3-5/09	Women Candidates Workshops
1	Driss Issaoui	Morocco	independent	Jun-08	Party Structure and Operations Conference and Consultations
9	Jason Kenney	Canada	Conservative Party	Jul-06	Organizing and Managing National Election Campaigns
1	Allyson Kozma	U.S.	NDI - Washington	Mar-10	Strategy Consultation with Women Helping Women
1	Marc Lavigne	Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	4-5/09	External Communications Strategy; Youth Structure Conference
4				May-09	Parliamentary Intern Gathering
9	Patrick Leblanc	Canada	Montreal Economic Institute	Aug-06	Creation of Party Think Tanks
9	Enrique Linde Cirujano	Spain	Socialist Party of Spain	Jan-06	Political Party Law Forum
1	Sonja Lokar	Slovenia	Gender Equality Stability Pact of Southeast Europe	Mar-10	Strategy Consultation with Women Helping Women
2	Miloud Loukili	Morocco	University Mohamed V	Nov-09	Parliamentary Intern Training - Parliamentary Behavior
4	Mohamed Loukili	Morocco	Parliament	Jul-08	Parliamentary Intern Training - Parliamentary Communication
5	Fatema Loukili	Morocco	Radio FM	Jul-07	Media Coverage
6	Reckya Madougou	Benin	International Key Consulting	Apr-07	Electoral Promise Monitoring
5	Line Maheux	Canada	Conservative Party	Jul-07	War Room
1	Olivier Marcil	Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	Jun-08	Party Structure and Operations Conference and Consultations
6	Afaf Marei	Egypt	The Egyptian Association for Community Participation Enhancement	2/07, 4/07	GOTV TOT; UAF Training of Trainers for Women Candidate Training
5	Serge Martel	Canada	Qu?bec Democratic Action	Jun-07	GOTV and Election Day Strategy
1	Mohammed Haj Masoud	Morocco	University of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences	Mar-10	Training of Trainers - WHW
3			University of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences	April-May 2009	Poll watcher workshops
4			University of Legal, Economic and Social Sciences	Mar-09	Parliamentary Intern Training - Electoral Code and Communal Charter

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

6	Tara McGuinness	U.S.	Americans Against Escalation in Iraq	Jun-07	Youth Engagement Online
9	Kamal Mesbahi	Morocco	University of Fes	Jan-06	Political Party Law Forum
9	Svetlana Milenkova	Macedonia	Center for Institutional Development	Oct-06	Political Party Trainer TOT
9	E.M. Miller	U.S.	National Conference of State Legislatures (VA)	Nov-05	Parliamentary Intern Training - Legislative Research
1	Adam Miron	Canada	Liberal Party of Canada; Pondstone Communication	Apr-10	New Media in Outreach Strategies; Youth Section Strategies
1	Michael Moffo	U.S.	Democratic Party	Dec-08	Popular Movement Youth Congress
3	Mohamed Moufid	Morocco	University of Fes	April-May 2009	Poll watcher workshops
4	Multiple	Morocco	Professional Training and Development Office (OFPPT)	Feb-09	Parliamentary Intern Computer skills training
1	Najem	Lebanon	Social Media Exchange	Apr-10	New Media in Outreach Strategies
6	Jamal Eddine Naji	Morocco	Higher Institute for Information and Communication	Apr-07	UAF Training of Trainers for Women Candidate Training
5	Yara Nassar	Lebanon	Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections	Aug-07	Poll watcher training
1	Hasnaa Ngadi	Morocco	independent	Feb-Apr 2010	Website Assessments
9	Pierre Claude Nolin	Canada	Conservative Party	Feb-05	Party and Caucus Mergers Forum
5	Niamh O'Connor	Ireland	NDI-Bosnia-Herzegovina	Jun-07	GOTV and Election Day Strategy
1	Geraldine Pelzer	Belgium	Ecolo Party	Mar-09	Training of Trainers - WHW
3				Mar-09	Training of Trainers - Women Candidates
5				7-8/07	Women Candidate Training
8	Lilah Pomerance	U.S.	Democratic Party	Mar-07	Youth Leadership Seminar
1	Ruari Quinn	Ireland	Labour Party of Ireland	Jan-10	Party Operatoin and Merger Consultations
2				Jan-10	Parliamentary Intern Gathering
1	Michel Rochette	Canada	Liberal Party of Canada	Jan-09	Internal Communications Structures
9	David Rose	UK	Progressive Unionist Party (Northern Ireland)	Feb-05	Party and Caucus Mergers Forum
3	Caroline Roufosse	Belgium	independent	Mar-09	Training of Trainers - Women Candidates
6				Apr-07	UAF Training of Trainers for Women Candidate Training
9	Pierre Paul Roy	Canada	Bloc Quebecois	Sep-06	Electoral Program Development
3	Youssef Sadik	Morocco	University of Agadir	March-May 2009	Women Candidates Workshops
1	Pedro Sanchez Castejon	Spain	Socialist Party of Spain	Mar-10	Municipal Councilor Workshops (Errachidia; Rabat)
1	Ian Schuler	U.S.	NDI – Washington	Oct-08	Technology Change Agent (TCA) Training of Trainers and party consultations
1	Gaby Senay	Canada	National Democratic Party	10-11/09	New Media Technology Introduction
2				Nov-09	Parliamentary Intern Gathering
8	Michael Simon	U.S.	Democratic Party	Mar-07	Youth Leadership Seminar
5	Ruth Steinmetz	U.S.	Democratic Party	July-August 2007	Women Candidate Training
9	Zoran Stojkovski	Macedonia	Center for Institutional Development	Oct-06	Political Party Trainer TOT
9	Pepper Strum	U.S.	National Conference of State Legislatures (Nevada)	Nov-05	Parliamentary Intern Training - Legislative Research
9	Avinye Tansung	Turkey	Turkish Campaign for Freedom of Information	Dec-05	Seminar on Right of Access to Information
8	Marija Todorova	Macedonia	independent	Mar-07	Youth Leadership Seminar
9	Hanif Vally	South Africa	Truth and Justice Commission	Jun-05	Forum on Media's Role in Preventing Rights Abuses
9	Elizabeth Weir	Canada	National Democratic Party	Apr-05	Political Party Youth and Women Academy

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

International Republican Institute

Project #	Name	Country	Affiliation	Date	Purpose
7	Dan Gurley	U.S.	Served both as executive and political director of the North Carolina Republican Party, chief of staff for a United States Congressman, campaign trainer for the Republican National Committee (RNC), and Deputy Political Director and the National Field Director of the (RNC).	2/05 1/06	Feb05_Political Party Training: Party structure and organizational planning, message development, volunteer recruitment, and voter outreach. Audience: Municipal elected officials and party officials. Jan06_Political Party Training: Grassroots organizing, local party organization and campaign finance reform. Audience: Political party officials and political party activists.
7	Eric Sutton	U.S.	Directed election campaign efforts from the State House to the White House, serving as executive director of two state Republican parties.	2/05	Political Party Training: Party structure and organizational planning, message development, volunteer recruitment, and voter outreach. Audience: Municipal elected officials and political party officials.
7	Brian Christianson	U.S.	Decision Makers, Inc. a government relations & political consulting firm. Served as field director for the National Republican Senatorial Committee & directed the state Republican Party in Wisconsin.	2/05	Political Party Training: Organizational planning, party structure, communications outreach, message development, and electoral list development. Audience: Political party officials and local coordinators.
7	Christine Dudley	U.S.	Served as the Midwest Regional Political Director for the RNC; Executive Director for the Illinois Republican Party; campaign manager for races in Indiana, Iowa, CT; Special Assistant to Sec of Labor in Office of Congressional & Intergovernmental Affairs	2/05	Political Party Training: Organizational planning, party structure, communications outreach, message development, and electoral list development. Audience: Political party officials and local coordinators.
7	Terrence Pfaff	U.S.	Served as Chief of Staff to New Hampshire House Speaker and was the New Hampshire delegate to the RNC in New York	5/05	Political Party Training: Party structure & organizational planning, internal communications, message development, media strategy and voter outreach in anticipation for 2007 elections. Audience: National, regional and local elected officials.
7	Karen Hanretty	U.S.	Communications Director for the California Republican Party		
7	Kent Martin	U.S.	President of Third Coast Consulting; marketing and management firm.	7/05	Political Party Training: Building internal party communications, strengthening organizational structures, particularly at regional level, & basic message development . Audience: Local elected officials, party activists.
7	Kathleen Summers	U.S.	Regional Representative for the Department of Labor.	9/05	Political Party Training: Building internal party communications, strengthening organizational structures, particularly at the regional level, and basic message development. Audience: Local elected officials and party activists.
7	Scott Adkins	U.S.	Former state legislator; Scott Adkins Consulting, Inc.	9/05	
7	Brendan Fitzgibbon	U.S.	IRI Program Officer, Iraq Division. Supervised work with over 40 of Iraq's political parties representing all regions of country.	1/07	Youth Party Activists Training: New reform regulations for increased youth representation in political party structures. Audience: Young "up and coming" political party activists.
7	Richard Marceau	Canada	Member of Canadian Parliament, House of Commons	1/07	
7	Derek van Homme Luyten	U.S.	Field and Coalitions Director_Jim Gerlach for Congress Committee; Special Assistant to the U.S. Treasurer.	1/07	Economic Policy Development Conference: Create ways of expressing a concrete plan for job creation and economic development for the upcoming campaign; Develop strategy to implement policies right after the election. Audience: Political party officials.
7	Martin Bruncko	Slovakia	Former senior advisor to the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic.	1/07	
7	Jesse Manzan-	U.S.	Logistics and political coordinator for Lieutenant Governor; Executive director of International Council in Mayor's Office; Deputy Director of International Affairs, Governor's office.	2/07	Plaza Follow-up Consultations to Trainings: Internal party organization, communication, political party reform law. Audience: Potential candidates and political party activists
7	Chris Sands	U.S.	Economic policy expert from the Hudson Institute.	7/07	Economic Policy Development Conference: Create ways of expressing a concrete plan for job creation & economic development for upcoming campaign; Develop strategy to after the election. Audience: Political party officials
7	Nader Said	Lebanon	Director of the Arab World Center for Research & Development (AWRAD) and former director of the Development Studies	11/07	Conducted Focus Groups: Tracking and development of party membership/support. Audience: Representative cross-section of each political party.

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

			Program at Birzeit University.		
Tunisia 7087	Ronald Bell	U.S.	Professional trainer working with professionals, volunteers, elected representatives on topics ranging from message development and delivery to campaign planning.	7/04	Women's Regional Campaign Conference: Coalition building -essential elements of building a coalition of organizations around a cause. Convey stronger media presence and more effective message delivery. Audience: 60 participants from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; mid-level women leaders in political parties, non-governmental organizations, academic institutions or journalism.
	Tunisia Kimberly Fuller	U.S.	Deputy Press Director for Vice President Dick Cheney; Producer for NBC news broadcast in Oklahoma.		
	Jim Arnold	U.S.	Strategy Group for Media; Managed Lieutenant Governor of Texas; Western regional campaign director for the National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC).		
	Donna Zajonc	U.S.	Three-term Oregon State Representative and House Minority Leader.		
	Gina London	U.S.	Communications director for CRLAssociates Inc.; former CNN		
	Brooks Kosvar	U.S.	Chief of staff for Congressman; Managed voter contact for Congressman campaign		
	Kirsten Dietz Voinis	U.S.	President of Voinis Communications; Communications Director for Texas State Senator		
	Abdelkrim Hizaoui	Tunisia	Assistant professor at the Institute of Press and Science of Information at the University of Manouba; a lead journalist at the Tunis-Africa-Press Agency.		
	Souleima Majeldi	Tunisia	Journalist and expert on the condition of Arab women; written for Arab Regional Resource Center on Violence Against Women.		
	Raja Ben Slama	Tunisia	Researcher at the Center for Arab Women for Research and Training based in Tunis, Tunisia.		
	Mary Lou Crane	U.S.	Mary Lou K. Crane was a regional administrator for the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the Clinton administration.	6/05	Women's Political Participation Training: Discussed role of women in political parties, the advantages and disadvantages of women's political branches, fundraising, recruiting new members, and developing coalitions. Audience: 37 Moroccan parliamentarians, local elected officials and party activists
6	Anne Mervenne	U.S.	Member of Michigan Governor's senior management team- specifically director of appointments. Executive director of the Michigan Women's Commission. Served as primary liaison to elected officials, corporate, community and civic	6/05	
6	Amata Radewagon	U.S.	Republican National Committeewoman for American Samoa, a ranking member on the RNC, a former White House Commissioner for Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders.	1/06	
8087	Christina Burt	U.S.	President, CQB & Associates, Inc	4/07	Campaign Communications Training: Voter targeting, message development and candidate selection. Audience: Political party officials.
8087	Chris Reid	U.S.	New Hampshire Governor's Judicial Selection Panel; New Hampshire Governor's Legal Counsel; Member -State of New Hampshire House of Representatives; Senior assistant Attorney General, New Hampshire Department of Justice; Deputy social council, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.	4/07 - 6/07	Regional Coordinator and Campaign Consultant: TA for political party campaign strengthening programs for core regional groups of local coordinators, key activists/candidates in preparation for 2007 election. Focus: external communications & voter outreach, organizational planning, grassroots activities, message development, voter targeting. Assisted parties in implementing newly created regional election plans based on parties' national electoral strategy, including setting election timelines, calendar goals to structure election activities, gather membership lists, potential voter lists, hold regular voter outreach efforts and recruit local activists. Audience: Candidates and members of political party members-varying levels

**MOROCCO POLITICAL PARTY PROGRAM
EVALUATION**

8087	Steve Pier	U.S.	Former director for one of Texas's economic development agencies.	4/07 8/07	April 07_Economic Policy Development Conference: Demonstrated how to create a concrete plan for job creation and economic development for the upcoming campaign. How to begin implementing campaign promises immediately after an election. Audience: Political party officials. August 07_Political Party Campaign Strengthening: Campaign management, communication techniques, and grassroots strengthening. Audience: Local political party activists.
8087	Daniel Grabauskas	U.S.	General manger of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority	5/07	Economic Policy Development Conference: Set practical and achievable goals that will connect to the campaign message. Audience: Political party officials.
8087	Gabriel Zinny	U.S.	Senior fellow at the Atlas Foundation and Senior Associate at Dutko Worldwide		
8087	Jamie Fisfis	U.S.	President, Chariot LLC; Campaign director, communications director and press secretary for three consecutive legislative leaders of the Republican Caucus of the California State Assembly, and was the communications director for California's 2002 Republican nominee for Governor	8/07	Political Party Campaign Strengthening: Aided participants in practicing voter contact methods-listening to the voter and crafting a message that would resonate at the local level. Audience: Campaign teams
5	Nader Said	Lebanon	Director of the Arab World Center for Research and Development (AWRAD) and former director of the Development Studies Program at Birzeit University.	2/08 9/08	Feb08_Conducted Focus Groups (shared with 7091): Presentation on survey research methodology and applications. Trained local facilitators to conduct focus groups; Oversaw focus groups. Audience: Political party officials. Sept08_Conducted Focus Groups: Held workshop on the results of the public opinion research conducted. Conducted individual consultations regarding data. Audience: Political party officials.
2	Lisa Gable	U.S.	Started a brand management firm advising executives at companies such as Oracle and Cadence ;advisor to the Secretary of Defense; U.S. Ambassador to the 2005 World's Fair in Japan	4/09	Economic Policy Development Conference: Discussed regional branding and marketing, gave various examples of the elements needed for local governments and business people to succeed in attracting international investment. Audience: Political party members - varying levels.
1	Ambassador Victor Ashe	U.S.	Former U.S. Ambassador to Poland; Tennessee State Representative; Mayor of Knoxville, Tennessee	10/09	Municipal Governance Training: Emphasized importance of promoting one's region & using local resources, such as a chamber of commerce or civil society organizations, to assist in economic development efforts. Included exercises on creating local development plans. Audience: Locally elected officials.
1	Anna Escobedo Cabral	U.S.	Former U.S. Treasurer; President and CEO of the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility; Deputy staff director for the Senate Judiciary Committee.	1/10	Economic Policy Development, Governance, Women's Political Participation (In partnership with MOI): Discussed experience as a public official, especially as a women, & best practices to address public concerns. Audience: Locally elected women.
			International TA no used for Projects No. 3 and 6489 (MEPI)		

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