ACT

ANTI-CORRUPTION COUNTRY THRESHHOLD PROGRAM

Evaluation Report
Final

Centre for Justice Studies and Innovations
The Consulting House

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List of Abbreviations

ACA	Anti-Corruption Act
ACCU	Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda
ACD	Anti Corruption Division (of the High Court)
ACT	Anti-Corruption Country Threshold Program
ACU	Anti Corruption Unit (CID)
ADB	Africa Development Bank
ARD	Associates of Rural Development
ASSIP	Accountability Sector Strategic Investment Plan
AUCPCC	African Union Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption
CAO	Chief Administrative Officer
CHOGM	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CID	Criminal Investigations Directorate
CJ	Criminal Justice
CJSI	Centre for Justice Studies and Innovations
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Crime Scene Processing
DAGA	Development Assistance Grant Agreement
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DCC	District Coordination Committee
DEI	Department for Ethics and Integrity (GoU)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DOJ	Department of Justice
DPAC	District Public Accounts Committee
DPP	Directorate of Public Prosecutions
ECU	Economic Crimes Unit (CID)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FINMAP	Financial Management and Accountability Program
GAC	Government and Accountability Action plan
GAO	Government Accounting Officers
GFATM	Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria
GoU	Government of Uganda
HURINET	Human Rights Network
IAF	Inter-Agency Forum
ICIS	International Computer Investigative Specialists
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
IDI	In Depth Interview
IFMS	Improved Financial Management Systems

IG	Inspectorate of Government
IGG	Inspector General of Government
IGP	Inspector General of Police
IPPU	Institute of Procurement Professionals in Uganda
JLOS	Justice Law and Order Sector
KII	Key Informant Interviews
LABF	Legal Aid Basket Fund
LASPNET	Legal Aid Service Providers' Network
LC	Local Council
LG	Local Government
MACCO	Mayank Anti Corruption Coalition
MCC	Millennium Challenge Corporation
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Planning
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MTEF	Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NACS	National Anti Corruption Strategy
NDP	National Development Plan
NSA	Non-State Actors
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OAG	Office of the Auditor General
OPDAT	Office of Overseas Procurement Development Assistance Training
PAC	Public Accounts Committee
PAPA	Participating Agency Program Agreement
PDE	Procuring and Disposal Entity
POCA	Prevention of Corruption Act
PPDA	Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets
PSC	Public Service Commissioners
PSO	Private Sector Organization
PSU	Professional Standards Unit
RAC	Ruwenzori Anti-Corruption Coalition
RAID	Redundant Array of Independent Discs
RLA	Resident Legal Advisor
SIP	Strategic Investment Plan
SLEA	Suburban Law Enforcement Academy
SOW	Standards of Work
Swap	Sector wide approach
TA	Technical Assistance
TCH	The Consulting House (Nairobi)
TCP	Threshold Country Plan
TOR	Terms Of Reference
TOT	Training of Trainers
UDN	Uganda Debt Network
UNCAC	United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UPF	Uganda Police Forces
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VFM	Value For Money

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0Executive Summary

A. INTRODUCTION

The United States Government (USG) seeks to reduce global poverty and promote sustainable economic growth by providing Compact funding to Governments committed to reinforcing good governance, economic freedom and investing in people. Countries are eligible to receive this five year funding where they perform and achieve 17 third party indicators divided into three categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Economic Freedom (i.e. the "Eligibility Criteria"). Through the **Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)**, the USG seeks to support countries that are ineligible for Compact funding, but demonstrate a significant commitment to policy reform. The MCC currently operates 21 **Threshold Country Programs** (TCP) aimed at improving country performance on the Eligibility Criteria focusing on public administration and policy reform.

The Context of ACT: The Government of Uganda (GoU) and the United States Government (USG) have long partnered closely to enhance good governance and reduce poverty. In early 2007, Uganda's Anti Corruption Threshold Country Plan was approved by the MCC following a two year consultative process led by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development and involving anti corruption agencies and the civil society.

Overall purpose: the overall purpose of ACT was to positively impact on the MCC *Control of Corruption* Indicator so as enable Uganda meet the eligibility criteria for Compact Funding. According to the TCP[1] support aimed to:

a. Prevent corruption related to public procurement

b. Increase the rate of successful investigations and prosecutions of corruption related cases.

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[1] GoU; Millennium Challenge Corporation- *Uganda Anti-Corruption Threshold Country Plan*, July 2006. P.6

c. **Strengthen the 'watch dog' role of civil society in the fight against corruption.**

Six key GoU anti- corruption agencies were identified to spearhead the TCP including: Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA); Office of the Auditor General (OAG); Inspectorate General of Government (IG); the Criminal Investigations Directorate Fraud Squad (CID); the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP); and the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI) which played the coordination function. Civil society[2] was enjoined as a player from the 'demand side' of governance.

A **Development Assistance Grant Agreement** (DAGA) to support the implementation of the TCP was signed between the GOU and USAID on behalf of the US Government to the tune of $10.4million. The GoU counterpart contribution was to be US$ 2.2 million. Following a bidding process, Associates of Rural Development (ARD) was contracted to manage the implementation of the two year TCP in Uganda. USAID also entered into Participating Agency Program Agreements (PAPA) with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to support capacity building in police and prosecutions.

Evaluation Brief: The aim of this evaluation was fourfold (See TORs marked **Annex I**):

i) **Assess Program design:** Analyze the intervention hypothesis and assess the assumed link between the project inputs, implementation plans, and expected outcomes. In addition, review the link between individual projects and country performance on the relevant Eligibility Criteria and identify any weaknesses.

ii) **Assess implementation and program results:** to determine what activities were undertaken, with whom and with what results. Establish the measures of success, and whether outcomes were attained, and have been sustained to date. We were to establish what worked, what did not and why.

iii) **Lessons learned:** establish lessons on what went well and what did not so as to inform USAID, MCC and the GoU as regards future threshold or accountability Programs *vis a vis* Program design and implementation

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[2] By December 2010, 15 CSOs had benefited from the TCP

iv) **Recommendations:** to support future Program for most effective/sustainable activities in relation to Uganda's capacity to fight public sector corruption.

The Methodology: A team of 4 experts, assisted by 2 associates was deployed. The team extracted data using secondary and primary sources. The secondary sources included TCP design documents, workplans, progress, review and evaluation reports. Through document review, lessons were also drawn from other countries that are currently implementing TCPs and those that have met Compact Funding threshold such as Zambia. Details of reviewed literature are attached as **Annex II**.

The primary sources relied on Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KII) and In-depth Interviews (IDI). Respondents were drawn from four categories of stakeholders in four districts of: Kampala, Fort Portal, Mbale and Arua. A total of 128 respondents were interviewed. A detailed list of Interviews is attached as **Annex III.**

On April 23, 2010 the consulting team held a debrief meeting at the USAID Mission to present and validate their findings before stakeholders and discuss initial recommendations.

Evaluation limitations: This evaluation recorded three limitations.

a) The question of attribution: Where results were recorded, we were unable to determine a direct cause-effect relationship between the activities supported by ACT and the results, individual training and performance at work. To overcome this, we decided to use the 'contribution analysis' as opposed to the 'attribution analysis'

b) Inadequate record keeping and conflicting data sets e.g. on number of persons trained, number of investigations. What was provided by ARD was not always in tandem with the data we collected from the six institutions. This made it even more difficult to make attributions.

c) Tight timelines and inability to secure timely appointments with stakeholders during the evaluation mission in April 2010.

Overall, and in our assessment, the above limitations did not affect the findings of this evaluation.

B. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Overall Assessment-

a) Program Design:

The overall design basis was aimed at improving Uganda's performance on the control of corruption indicator so as to access compact status. This strategic goal linked in closely to the Uganda Policy on Zero Tolerance to Corruption with emphasis on Public Administration and Policy reforms. Focus was on preventing procurement related corruption with the assumption that where audits were conducted, they would form the basis for follow up of investigations and prosecutions. A number of design challenges emerge as outlined below:

i.   Although this program was constituted to motivate for Compact status, its engineering did not reflect this given that there was no causal relationship between the TCP intent and the MCC eligibility indicators. For instance, there was no direct link made between the audits, investigations and prosecutions in the work plans and in practice. This made it almost impossible for Uganda to work towards MCC Threshold.

ii. Stakeholder participation was limited at design phase especially for private sector and CSOs. Most of the participating institutions were not involved sufficiently at inception. This affected ownership and responsiveness. For instance, ACCU, Kampala was only involved in the 2nd half of 2009. Although they managed to produce the Fame and Shame Book, it largely exposed personalities from the Centre (Kampala), whereas sixty five (65%) of the cases reported to the IG's office are lodged outside of the Kampala area. With training, stakeholders were also not always involved in determining appropriate courses and content materials relevant to their work the Basic Computer Applications course did not include sessions on procurement-related corruption challenges.

iii. The benchmarking of expected results was quantitative (focusing on numbers e.g. number of audits, investigation) and indicators were not always useful in monitoring change over time e.g. attitudinal change, and outcomes e.g. implementation of recommendations from audit reports.

iv. In designing the program, results were pitched at the lower level of outcomes based upon institutional outputs. If ACT had borrowed from other MCC Threshold experiments like Kyrgyz Republic or Moldova, this would have changed. These countries

built the short-term MCC program on on-going reforms and were able to pitch the results at the level of impact.

v. The bi-furcated design and implementation of the DAGA and PAPA through ARD and DoJ was not efficient. The TCP should have been managed by one contractor. Sometimes the two advanced in less that efficient and almost at cross purposes e.g. in the deployment of technical assistance and the design of training programs.

b) **Implementation and program results:**

Numerous activities were undertaken ranging from training to audits to investigations and prosecutions in a number of cases. A large percentage of planned activities were undertaken and all components produced interesting experiments and some localized successes. However, while results were achieved to a reasonable level, these results were recorded in varying degrees within each of the components.

For instance, the procurement audits and training of auditees was viewed as successful by the recipients and through the procurement audits, inroads into deterrence and systems improvement were registered e.g. in Mbale reports of clean audits and rewards were highlighted under the Local Government Assessment Framework. Through Resident Technical Advisors in the Police and Prosecutions (under the PAPA agreement with the DOJ), a number of good practices were initiated. These include, *inter alia,* prosecution-led investigations; plea bargaining; exhibit management and chain of custody. These bear significant potential of increasing Criminal Justice system efficiency as evidenced by at least 5 successful prosecutions in the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM). On re-tooling and equipment, support to Anti Corruption Division (ACD) was most opportune as the completion of its design coincided with the ACT program and startup capital and equipment under the TCP helped to jumpstart its establishment. Similar support to the CID and IGG facilitated speedy investigations.

In Component 3, the program provided 15 grants to CSOs each on average $20,000 and hence the achievements of this component are in its innovative application of the meager resources. Most of the CSOs built their grants on existing campaigns, and hence they enjoyed 'economies of scale.' Successes were realized in some of the activities e.g. the Fame and Shame Book by ACCU, and the work of HURINET in jump-starting stalled corruption cases through awareness creation. Civil society has created a certain level of civic competence (defined as the ability in the citizen to exert influence on those in authority through civic actions), in the public to fight

corruption. Another achievement here is that a cadre of citizens- the Community Monitors, competent enough to handle corruption cases has emerged. They have earned the confidence of the public and are now entrusted with sensitive information for onwards transmission and action. This observation was also made by the USAID Final MCC/TCP Report of March 5, 2010.[3]

Limited results: In some instances however, results were limited e.g. The lack of significant progress on the follow up of audit findings was a critical challenge to the deterrence of corruption and a significant contributor to the growing culture of impunity. Some of the training such as the basic computer training was seen as unfocused and wasteful while the full functioning of the Anti Corruption Division of the High Court (ACD) was limited due to the issuance of a Practice Direction by the Principal Judge to refer all corruption cases to the ACD in Kampala. This impacted the spirit behind 'speedy prosecutions' especially at the regional level.

c) LESSONS LEARNED:

A number of lessons were learnt at both design and implementation level that can inform future programming.

Program duration and its impact on results: The implementation started late, ended strictly on schedule- the most affected component being the support to CSOs under which activities started less than 8 months to the end date. This had a bearing on the quality of results in this component. For instance training across the program was for the most part rushed and with no follow-up.

Limited **stakeholder engagement** at the design phase which affected ownership and responsiveness for instance with the private sector in preventing procurement related corruption. Stronger stakeholder engagement is critical to the success of such a program.

Consider no cost extension to enable follow up of key activities that were not completed e.g. in the Police, four (4) key documents to improve operating procedures of the Uganda Police Force, the Criminal Investigations Directorate and the Professional Standards Unit remain in draft form including a draft Manual of Procedures for Collection and Storage of Property and Evidence. The fourth document relates to management of corruption within the Uganda Police Force. Furthermore, through ACT, IPPU acquired a web-site without a copy of the design contract by Computer Frontiers Limited, a provider. By the time of closing the program, the web-site

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[3] At P.9

development had not been completed. IPPU was not in the know of the terms of the contract and how to manage the remaining scope of work without a copy of the contract.

In component 3, **fewer grants to strategic issues** (e.g. having a consortium of CSOs engaging on following up issues raised by the procurement audits) would have been more effective while the late start of the grants delayed progress. A 'no-budget, no-cost' extension should have been provided at the end to enable completion and follow through of some activities e.g. the Corruption Case Tracking.

A missed opportunity was evidenced in the failure of **ACT to dialogue with existing frameworks especially JLOS in a** systematic and strategic way. Linkages to JLOS would have secured the sustainability of the benefits of ACT interventions and would have multiplied the ACT reach through piggy backing on JLOS established structures. The Evaluation Team was not able to establish why the TCP was not designed to follow up on JLOS given that three of the key institutions- Judiciary, Police and DPP are in JLOS.

Also given the infrequency of meetings of the IAF, **key policy issues and reforms did not find their way into the national agenda.** Such include linkages with the National Public Accounts Committee of Parliament; addressing cross sectoral linkages with the Justice, Law and Order Sector, health and education sectors, motivating for timely release of GoU counterpart funding.

The need to invest in structures and systems and not actors alone given the numerous internal transfers and re-deployments of staff across the system that have eroded benefits and often meant fresh starts, e.g. the Director and Assistant Director of the Criminal Investigations Directorate of the Uganda Police Force were transferred midway into the program.

Training-Content and Trainers: In some instances, the content was not context appropriate for instance, the use of different terminologies and practical examples during role plays were often drawn from the USA where procedural differences apply from the Ugandan context. In addition where regional expertise by ex-service men for example prosecutors or investigation was utilized, there was a higher level of trainee satisfaction. The need to include local and regionally drawn expertise preferably from the Common law jurisdictions was highlighted.

Mode of Delivery: Combining CSOs and private sector under Component 3 was pioneering. However, there was little evidence of collaboration between the CSOs and PSOs which would have increased their collective voice and bargaining in the reforms.

Equipment: During project implementation PPDA requested and was not availed the cost of the equipment procured on its behalf by program management. This was for purposes of inclusion of the values of purchase in the institutional assets register. The reluctance to disclose was frowned upon by PPDA management. The need to enhance full disclosure of budget and breakdown per component was also raised by the program recipients.

There is need to **revisit USAID rules** on transferring title of property e.g. where equipment such as cars are purchased. Under the Bilateral Agreement between USG with the GoU, ownerships lies with the GoU and Title with USAID, Title can only be transferred by the Ministry of Finance providing concurrence after the close of the activity which is 90 days after the end of the activity. This posed difficulties for agencies e.g. PPDA attempting to include these assets on their registers for purposes of budgeting for recurrent costs. There is need for institutions to incorporate recurrent costs in budgets to support the functionality of equipment procured under the TCP.

The need to **revisit indicators** to include change and outcome indicators in addition to quantitative indicators was identified.

Efficiency: The overall price of delivering the results through the contractor was prohibitive. From the documents reviewed, out of the $10.4m Grant, less than $4m was directly applied to implementation of activities.

d) SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS

Key recommendations made here relate to future programming by the USG. Specific recommendations are highlighted in the different components in the main report.

i) **Build on Existing National Priorities as established in the Accountability Sector Strategic Plan (currently under review).** Future anti-corruption programming should advance from the identified priorities within government and the non-state sector. The USG should base its new programming on the policy thrust provided for addressing the governance bottlenecks identified in the NDP and objectives in the re-engineered ASSIP, the upcoming JLOS SIP III, the new NACS. Given that the USG does not do budget support, it can ensure that anti corruption strategies are mainstreamed in its sectoral Programs e.g. in Agriculture, Health, Education e.g. through anti corruption projects. Lessons can be taken from the World Bank and its

recently developed Governance Risk Assessments (GACs) in the Health, Roads and Agriculture sectors.

ii)   **Build on Existing Platforms**. For added value, future programming should piggy-back on on-going initiatives with the intention of providing new nuances. While follow up actions should be supported e.g. in strengthening the procurement audit function to conclusion (with reports adopted and action taken on recommendations), USG should also target priorities highlighted by both the GoU and the Development Partners. For instance, The Development Partners Accountability Working Group is developing a joint approach to corruption and has focused on test cases in NAADS, CHOGM, Drugs Management and Uganda AIDS Commission. USG should continue to support these initiatives and mainstream GAC in its own sectoral Programs.

iii)   **Target Strategic, not Operational Engagements:** Some of the support under ACT was at the operational level. In a sense, it provided some form of leveraging, at least administratively. This is how the ACD and the anti-corruption unit at CID were created. While this administrative leveraging should not be lost, USG future funding should target strategic engagements with potential for higher impact. Strategic support to litigation of targeted cases should for instance be a focus through provision of a USAID sub grant. The strategic follow up of cases under the GFATM yielded positive in terms of successful prosecutions and convictions in at least 5 cases) and recovery of up to Shs. 2.3bn results and should be emulated in other test cases. This has potential to ricochet across the nation, creating deterrence on the part of public officials and civic competence on the part of communities.

iv)   **Support prosecution-led investigations**. In order to achieve focus, USAID should consider empowering prosecution-led investigations by supporting cross institutional engagement and task forces (Police/ DPP/ IG). In the 'adjudication triangle', this is the critical loop, yet the weakest in the chain.

v)   **Support Sector-Wide Approach in Civil Society**. In order to 'collectivize' civil society voice and action, USAID should consider supporting an Anti-Corruption Non-State Actor Sector. This should include CSOs and private sector actors. If unified, their voice and engagements with government are bound to be more effective as other countries have shown.

vi)   **Mainstream the anti-corruption program in all the other USAID Strategic Objectives**. This is critical in expanding the reach of USAID governance intervention, offering administrative leverage

in supported sectors, and ensuring that USAID support is not counterproductive to the intentions of the governance program.

1 Design and Performance

1.1 Overall Design

At the time of TCP design (2005-6), Uganda had a broad framework to guide GOU and donor anti corruption efforts under the *National Strategy to Fight Corruption and Rebuild Ethics and Integrity in Public Office* (2004-2007). Anti Corruption agencies were loosely coordinated under the Inter Agency Forum (IAF) chaired by the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity. The wider Accountability Sector in Uganda was quite nascent under the lead of the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Development. There were a number of bilateral Programs in existence including DFID, Danida and ADB Anti Corruption Programs. A coordinated Accountability Sector Strategic Investment Plan (ASSIP) highlighting the sector goals and priorities was only concluded at the end of 2008.

The purpose of ACT was to positively impact on the MCC *Control of Corruption* Indicator so as enable Uganda meet the eligibility criteria for Compact Funding. Focus was on implementing public administration reforms with the underlying assumption that by improving institutional capacity to prevent, investigate, prosecute and adjudicate corruption cases, the incidence of corruption would go down.

The Evaluation Team finds that the ACT was a bold statement of intent from GoU to implement its policy of "Zero Tolerance to Corruption" and it has set a good basis for future anti-corruption reforms at the institutional and legislative levels. The ACT has been catalytic and has stirred up anti-corruption innovations. However, there are a number of issues regarding the link between its design and the MCC Threshold:

i)   **Eligibility Criteria** (*Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Economic Freedom*): The eligibility criteria were central to the origination of this program and a key question asked is whether the TCP was as such engineered with this intent in mind. The Evaluation Team however, found that in its design, there was no causal relationship between the TCP intent and the MCC eligibility indicators[4]. Similarly, there was

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[4] This is actually acknowledged apriori in the ACT literature.

an apparent disconnect between the strategic intent of the sector as seen in the back ground documents of the MCC and the operational interpretation of this intent. At the strategic level (e.g. within the MCC documentation and in the engagement with MoFPED), the eligibility intent was foremost. However, operationally this was not interpreted in the drafting of the TCP especially in defining the lower levels of results and the cumulative chain towards the eligibility in the annual work plans. E.g. in the Component descriptions and Institutional Annual Work plans. And following from this, the ARD/DOJ implementation strategies did not have an obvious 'eligibility focus.'

ii) **National Priorities**- a key issue was the need to ensure that the TCP reflected national priorities in the fight against corruption. As indicated above, while the *National Strategy to Fight Corruption and Rebuild Ethics and Integrity in Public Office* was in existence, and provided a broad framework. Indeed, weak institutional capacity of anti corruption agencies was a critical issue to be addressed if Uganda was to be successful in the fight against corruption. TCP responded directly to this challenge and by insisting on GoU counterpart funding aimed at supporting sustainable institutional reforms. However, the absence of a well defined ASSIP with clear priorities and costing not only limited the sharpness of interventions under the TCP but also the collective sectoral bargaining power for increased resources within the national planning processes.

Experiences from other Country Threshold Programs like Albania, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and Ukraine[5] show that the adoption of anti-corruption approaches to domestic priorities improved their likelihood of enjoying sustainable political will.   In Uganda, some other areas that have been identified by stakeholders as having been potential intervention areas include enforcement, more emphasis on private sector engagement and "soft" process reforms at institutional level and across sectoral dialogue on policy issues e.g. in resolving the procedural bottlenecks to the operation of the Anti Corruption Division.

iii) **Piggy-backing on existing Initiatives**. In designing the program, the results were pitched at the level of outcomes, not impact. And this is probably because the MCC programs are for the most part, two years. This limited timeframe necessitated the downgrading of results. But in the view of this report, the results could still have been pitched at the level of impact. To achieve these, implementation should have piggy-backed on existing platforms and initiatives such as the DANIDA, DFID and ADB Anti Corruption Projects, and the Justice Law and Order Sector reforms under its Strategic Investment

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[5] LESSONS LEARNED FIGHTING CORRUPTION IN MCC THRESHOLD COUNTRIES: THE USAID EXPERIENCE, November 13, 2009

Plan II (JLOS SIP II) instead of starting new ones. This was a missed opportunity.

iv) **Implementation Design:** key issues here included the late start of the implementation and yet conclusion was strictly on schedule leading to rushed implementation and leaving a number of projects incomplete especially on the civil society component.[6] In addition, the bi-furcated implementation through ARD and DoJ was not efficient. Sometimes the two advanced at cross purposes e.g. on training and deployment of TA. There was also a problem of appropriateness to context on the part of some of the TA provided by the DOJ given the different legal systems- civil law (US) and common law (Uganda). This was manifested largely in the training- role plays where terminology and examples utilized were not context appropriate e.g. using murder role plays for corruption cases.

v) The **overall price of delivering the results** through the contractor was quite high. Of the US$10.4m awarded under the contract, approximately $4m was spent on implementation of activities.

vi) **Stakeholder engagement at Design Phase.** TCP design was driven by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, which is the chair of the Accountability Sector. The Ministry worked with a consultant to develop the TCP intent. And although consultations were made with institutions, stakeholder ownership of the plan was limited. The length of time taken to design and approve the TCP (over 2 years) also impacted on ownership given the high turnover in the GoU implementing agencies (either through transfers or departure). Similarly, civil society was de-participated in its drafting. As a result, some CSOs saw their involvement at component 3 as 'tokenist'. This notwithstanding, design ownership did not affect the implementation in any material way. However, opportunities for better results were missed.

vii) **Design Benchmarking**; the result indicators were largely quantitative. While this is a good practice, it is challenged in a number of ways.

a) One, the indicators measured the outputs and outcomes only. By extension, therefore, they measured 'process' for instance numbers of cases sanctioned, prosecuted, convictions and not change[7]. This intention is captured *apriori* in the ARD interpretation of TCP. But the position of this report is that some changes, the magnitude notwithstanding, should have been anticipated. Qualitative

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[6] Emphasized in the De-brief Meeting with the grantees at the USAID Offices on April 23, 2010
[7] The rationale was that the plan was a step-gap initiative. However, the results had potential to provide systemic change in some instances. This should have been anticipated in the indicators.

indicators[8] to measure these changes should have been generated. The changes would constitute the entry point for future anti-corruption work. Under Component 1: Increased frequency of Central and Local Government Audits; in addition to the number of audits carried out we should also assess the quality of the procurement systems and core values of the PDEs in as far as they address prevention or reduction of procurement related corruption

b)   Two, the quantitative nature of the indicators presupposed the existence of <u>baseline</u> data. While this was, for the most part true, we were not persuaded by the expected <u>end line</u> data. The percentage (or quantity) change from the baseline to the end line appeared arbitrary. For instance, number of National Fraud Cases investigated increased from 18% to 29%. Or investigative follow-up action arising from audits increased from 45% to 57%. We could not get a rationale for these percentages from the implementing agencies in government. They attributed them in part to the Ministry of Finance, more so given the low participation of the implementing agencies at design level.

c)   Three, it is difficult to attribute expected results to the plan implementation. Instead of attribution, at least we can confirm an element of contribution. In our view, combining the quantitative and the qualitative indicators would have given the program a more realistic way of reading results.

Some Design Recommendations- From the aforementioned, four recommendations lend themselves.

Reverse-Engineering- Future USAID programming would do well to engineer its results from the end. That is, it should begin by defining the desired change and then work backwards to build the process of achieving it. Monitoring and evaluation should be based on this 'reverse-engineering' model. In the short run, it should monitor 'process' and in the medium to long run, monitor 'change'. While change refers to the destination, process is about the journey. Change indicators should therefore be separated from process indicators.

From Project to Process Support- ACT was designed as a program, but its implementation took a project approach. It had tight timelines, with new ideas and a tight budget. The result is limited sustainability due to the limited anchorage of the activities in existing strategies. In order to increase the value of USAID grants, therefore, we recommend that future initiatives

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[8] For the most part, change indicators are qualitative e.g. change in attitudes of the private sector.

be built on on-going processes. This should not preclude innovations. Where such innovations exist, and are built around existing platforms, they should be supported.

Stakeholder participation and Contractors. Future programming should engage the grant holders to the fullest extent possible. This participation should not only happen at conceptualization. It should be carefully built into the transition from inception to implementation by contractors. In the view of this report, major slippages occur during this transition. Special attention to this stage of the 'grant making cycle' is critical.

Administrative Leverage- ACT was most successful in places where the implementers had administrative leverage that allowed them to take major decisions. The ACD of the High Court was for instance created through a Practice Direction by the Principal Judge; the Anti-Corruption Units of CID were also created through administrative, rather than policy directives. Future programming should therefore target the policy level, but also the lower administrative levels where implementers have control and 'quick wins' can be banked.[9]

1.2 Component Design

1.2.1 **Component One**: *Preventing Procurement –Related Corruption*

This component was designed to supplement the existing institutional framework which focuses on ensuring compliance with procurement laws and regulations as expected of the public servants/PDEs. To a large extent, its design was effective especially in the area of procurement audits, which have now led to a need for preventive systems audits and regular quarterly audits especially at the district level. The ACT intervention was directed towards PPDA's on-going audit programs. PPDA was able to surpass its audit targets in one year. This is evident in the area of procurement audits, which have now led to a need for systems audits. With training, a manual was developed and institutionalized at the Institute of Procurement Professionals in Uganda (IPPU). However, a few issues emerge overall:

One, while the ACT design is relevant, **it falls short of detecting "organized corruption practices"** which cannot be traced when all the requirements of the regulations are adhered to. For example, in the Local Governments, some of the Councilors demand that their companies must be awarded contracts since they are the ones responsible for the wellbeing of their constituencies. Such practices may take the form of slanted statement of requirements and technical specifications to suit preferred providers, under-statement of requirements at the bidding stage, which after contract award are varied with a view to revision in negotiated and inflated prices,

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[9] Observation made by ARD Chief of Party and emphasized in the de-brief workshop

connivance between the contractors to win contracts in turns (anti-trust), undeclared inside trading by public servants, patronage, etc. More so, because organized corruption has a 'collusion thread' that runs from the first to the last phase of procurement covering its tracks.

Two, the design at the level of procurement was weak in involving the business sector. Yet procurement related corruption involves more than one party. **The business community** is a key stakeholder from which corruption is perpetuated in connivance with the PDEs. Hence, some interventions- including sensitization and training- should have been incorporated to involve/influence a change in behavior on the side of the private sector providers starting with the major suppliers e.g. in the roads, health and education sectors. The desired training/capacity building especially for the local providers should be in the area of:– Understanding of the instructions to bidders in the Bidding Documents, preparation of bids, rights and obligations during the bidding & bid evaluation processes and execution of contracts. These are the prime stages where some PDEs take advantage over the providers' deficiencies. Consequently, Providers in connivance with the PDEs choose to adopt corrupt means to secure the contracts.

Three, **CSOs were not incorporated in the procurement component** and yet these are closer to the ground where Government projects are implemented or where the corruption proceeds are sometimes invested by the beneficiaries. The findings of the program supported Procurement and financial audits for example are not channeled to CSOs for advocacy and onsite follow up of relevant issues. CSOs too need to be equipped with basic procurement knowledge, tendering procedures and interpretation of contractual obligations of the contracting parties especially for community-based projects such as road construction, schools building construction, health sector etc. With such knowledge and minor logistical facilitation, the CSOs would have been a viable partner.

Another potential partner that was not considered was **the Local Council 1 (Village Councils and the Village Development Committees)**. If linked with Component 2 and Component 3, these two stakeholders would have been useful at the investigation and whistle blowing stage. To operationalize the Access to Information Act, formal/statutory structures need to be instituted for accessing freely any public spending information relating to LG, Schools, Health Units, Road Sector and the other high spenders' budgets, procurement plans, contracts and development plans. Using their presence country-wide and the Local Councils and CSOs' networks, it would perhaps contribute significantly to the fight of the vice at an early stage before public funds are expended fully on shoddy work. Furthermore, from the preventive strategy, a number of officials interviewed (e.g. in Arua on April 15, 2010) expressed concern over influence peddling by officials in higher positions at the local government level e.g. the CAOs, LCV and RDCs. Possibilities here include mainstreaming the anti-corruption program in all the other USAID Strategic Objectives; entering partnerships with the Ministry of Local

Government with the Parishes as the intervention level country-wide; creating and facilitating platforms through the Local Government's Association for the Parish Local leaders (Not only the Chief Administrative Officers or Councilors) to exchange contract management experiences; publicize through the local newspapers the "Fame and Shame" replica for both public servants and contractors. Linkage can be made with PPDA since it is mandated to suspend or blacklist any provider among others.

1.2.2 Component Two: *Speedy Prosecutions*

Design Intent. The design of the component laid focus on the successful investigation and prosecution of the corruption cases. The assumption underlying the design was an equal need of support stretching from the investigations to prosecutions. The Anti Corruption Division of the High court was only emerging at the time of the design and was later included in the program at the time of implementation. The component design dealt with the multiple institutions charged with the investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases and delivered a package of interventions across this chain. The emerging thinking is that improvements in design should heavily weight support in favor of investigations than prosecutions and adjudication. This is premised in the realization that in the criminal justice chain the strategic entry point lies with the development of investigative capability to successfully conduct strategic investigations.[10]

Focus on actors and less on institutions- The focus of the ACP program was on strengthening the capacity of the actors and largely left intact the structures – training could have been institutionalized e.g. in the Curriculum of the Police Training School and at other institutions such as Universities and institutions offering short professional courses (e.g. on procurement), Law Development Center and the Judicial Studies Institute. Institutions should also have committed to bonding trained staff as per Public Service regulations.

The functions and internal organization of the institutions are more significant to increasing rates of successful prosecutions than the individuals through whom it operates. This challenge has been most visible in the internal transfers and re-deployments of staff across the system that have eroded benefits and often meant fresh starts. The institutional structures, systems and processes dictate the management of staff, performance measurement systems, and training needs among others - all of which have a significant bearing on overall institutional performance.

Function definition of Corruption cases. Clarity on the intention of the component existed in the program document and with program implementers urging a focus on procurement related corruption cases. At

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[10] Focus Group Discussion in Mbale District Coordination Committee comprising of investigators, prosecutors, adjudicators, lawyers in private practice and civil society representatives, April 2010

the level of implementation and drawing upon the field visits the clarity is absent, largely as a result of the existence of multiple sources of definitions in the various laws including POCA (1970), Leadership Code, the IGG Act and the Penal Code. A review of cases handled by the Anti Corruption Desk in Fort portal revealed a complete blur of scope to the extent of causing confusion between existing departments particularly those dealing with general crime including theft. Similarly in the discussion with Mbale stakeholders,[11] reference was made to the newly enacted Anti Corruption Act that shifts a number of offences from the Penal Code. The recent enactment of the Anti Corruption Act (ACA) simplifies matters by widening the scope and definition of corruption. However, this is one area that would have benefited from inter-institutional dialogue and coordination through forums such as the Inter Agency Forum and Integrity Forums at district level had they been fully operational. The TCP components should have responded to such emerging challenges, in this case by supporting stakeholder dialogues to discuss and seek solutions to topical issues.

ACT and the JLOS Framework: As mentioned above the increase in rates of successful prosecutions benefit significantly from the policy and legislative framework and the entire criminal justice procedures and practices. Currently reforms in criminal justice administration are undertaken under the Justice, Law and Order Sector wide approach (Swap) framework. JLOS draws together 13 institutions involved in the administration of justice to reform criminal, commercial, land and family justice administration in Uganda. Three of the institutions targeted under this component i.e. DPP, CID (UPF) and ACD (Judiciary) are part and parcel of this program. JLOS rationale is to collectively identify and drive policy and practice reforms. The MoFPED assumed that cross sectoral coordination of activity will happen- an assumption that did not obtain. It should also be noted that even though the JLOS sector formation is more advanced than the accountability one, inter sectoral coordination in both sectors is still weak.

Though this component squarely falls under the JLOS ambit, the design process had little to do with the JLOS framework. Inter-sector Coordination, drawing synergies from ongoing JLOS initiatives envisaged by MOFPED did not happen.

The missed opportunity here lies at two levels- one is securing the sustainability of the benefits of ACT interventions and two multiplying the reach through piggy backing on JLOS established structures. For example a number of good initiatives under the ACT program have not realized their intended benefits- for instance an operational manual designed for by CID investigators has to date not received institutional approval and thus not disseminated; the Strategy on fighting corruption within the Uganda Police Force is not implemented. Ongoing JLOS Initiatives where such ACT intentions would have been anchored and driven include the JLOS Anti

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[11] Meeting held on March 16, 2010

Corruption Strategy, the Uganda Police Review; the Case Backlog Reduction Strategy among others. All is not lost however. There is room for engagement with the JLOS sector to integrate TCP innovations into ongoing reforms as appropriate. This has happened for the Anti-corruption division of the High Court- similarly should happen for prosecution led investigations and anti-corruption support to prosecutions and investigations.

Across Component Dialogue: To successfully deliver on this component a logical approach lay in determining in a system wide manner what a chain linked response to the low levels of prosecution rates should be. Particularly providing an answer to the question of the manner in which investigations, prosecution and adjudication practices needed to be modified to meet the circumstances of procurement related corruption. Active prosecutions and adjudication capability may be important, but at the heart of strategic prosecutions are investigations and a number of complementary interventions that may be best be brought to the fore through inter-institutional mechanisms for exchanging information and coordinating policy and action among different actors. Whereas the Task Force provided room for discussion of operational issues, the discussion of strategy did not happen.

1.2.3 Component Three: *Civil Society Strengthening*

Component Intent: The five elements of this component were appropriate and had the potential to pioneer new methodologies of fighting corruption. Combining CSOs and private sector under this component was also pioneering. It incubated the possibilities of creating an Accountability Non-State Actor Sector. From the design, some lessons can be learnt.

Design Origination- Civil society involvement in selecting areas of engagement was limited. Their participation in its design was insignificant and so was the ownership of the plan. This was made worse by late implementation for instance though the program started mid 2008, the small grants program did not start until mid 2009, approximately six- eight months to the close of the TCP. In the view of this report, involving the non-state actors (NSAs) in a program of this magnitude is a *condition sine qua non* for its success. Future programming should make this participation meaningful, not 'tokenist' as was noted by the NSAs through early and more structured involvement from the design to the implementation phases.

Inter Agency Forum. The view expressed by CSOs met is that Civil society was included in the forum as a 'junior partner' with space, but no 'voice' in the prioritizing of issues at the IAF. From interviews with CSO respondents there exists a narrow definition of their role by the IAF. This is limited to service as community monitors and raising the flags at the IAF. CSOs intentions to contribute to priority setting and strategy development were not acknowledged. Its lack of voice at the national level had to do with the overwhelming presence of government and civil society's own inability to 'collectivize' their position. At the district level, the design had tremendous potential. More so because the anti-corruption regional networks have more presence in their localities compared to the national ones in Kampala.

Civil Society Synergy: CSOs were brought together under this component on institutional basis. The existence of multiple national anti corruption CSO frameworks such as the Anti Corruption Coalition of Uganda (ACCU) and the Uganda Debt Network that did not consistently collaborate to agree on cross cutting priorities further weakened their position and voice. Many of the CSOs were also faced with key internal institutional challenges such as high staff turnover and low funding that impacted on their capacity to effectively engage on corruption issues. Yet had the CSOs and Private Sector Organizations (PSOs) 'collectivized' their actions and voice, they would have approached anti-corruption as a sector. Although this was a lost opportunity, it nevertheless planted the seed for a sector-wide approach amongst the accountability non-state actors. Lessons can be taken from the Legal Aid Services Providers Network (LASPNET)that is accessing funding under the multi donor funded Legal Aid Basket Fund (LABF) to address agreed priorities in the justice sector.

Recommendation: Since civil society is weak, we recommend that future engagements with CSOs be done from the sector-wide approach with additional support for institutional strengthening. A non-state actors' accountability sector should be nurtured building upon institutional strengths of the various CSOs engaged on anti corruption issues. This forum should bring together the anti-corruption CSOs, the Private Sector and other players from the 'demand side'. This will increase their visibility and voice in the face of an 'empowered' government. Since the Private Sector have one foot in the government space in terms of influencing, and have respect as professionals or business people in government circles, this would give CSOs a good launching pad.

2 Component Analysis

2.1 The Performance Analysis - Overall

2.1.1 Defining Results

In assessing performance, three levels of results concerned us. The three are also linked to each other through a cumulative chain. The first level includes the **outputs**, which we define as the immediate, tangible and logical consequences of ACT activities. The question we asked is this: <u>What did ACT do?</u> **(see Annex IV)** We assessed the tangible results and their cumulative potential to the next level of results. The second level of results is **outcomes,** defined as the short-term/medium-term effects of a combination of activities carried out by the funded institutions under ACT. These also include the **cumulative effects** of a combination of outputs. And the question we asked here is this: <u>What Happened?</u> I.e. after the ACT interventions, how did the 'intervention site' (GoU agencies and departments) respond to the program?

In the view of this report, the results stopped at the level of the outcomes. The final level of results, which is **impact**, was not reached. And this refers to tangible changes in behavior arising from the funded anti-corruption activities under ACT. At this level, the question we asked is this: <u>What changed?</u> And our benchmark here was the indicators in the TCP. Although we could not measure this level of results, we note the existence of potential for results, especially in some areas as discussed below.

2.1.2 ACT Implementation Performance

Under implementation performance, we assessed four parameters: **effectiveness, efficiency**, **responsiveness** and **sustainability**.

Effectiveness: Here, we were interested in ascertaining the extent to which results have been achieved, and the <u>cause-effect relationship</u> between the

results and the ACT support. For instance, the procurement audits and training of auditees was recorded as effective while some of the training to staff of the six agencies e.g. basic computer training was not focused.

Efficiency: We looked at the ACT 'value-for money' and teased out lessons on how resources could have been 'applied better'. Support to component three was probably the most efficient. Most of these organizations increased the value of their grants through creative application of resources. RAC and Apac, for instance plugged the grants into on-going activities though this was the exception and not the rule.

Regarding the other two components, some efficiency was recorded though cases of wastage were also noted. In Mbale and Fortportal, we were told that of cases of "capacity constipation" where some who had already been trained on similar courses were 'over trained'. At the centre, the car pool managed by ARD (applying standard USAID rules for use of equipment under which the ownership was retained and control exercised by the contractor and not the institutions) was cited as an example of inefficient application of resources. The inability to budget and maintain cars and equipment is a pointer to inefficient application of resources on the part of the GoU institutions.

Responsiveness: We defined this as the extent to which the ACT program anticipated and responded to the peculiar challenges in anti-corruption with timely and appropriate action as they emerged. This is critical for any anti corruption Program given the versatile nature of the corruption industry and the corruption mutations e.g. the changing nature of procurement related corruption from collusion to outright diversion. The OAG's recommendation to shift focus from forensic audits to 'value for money audits' is a response to audits frustrations arising from corruption mutations such as 'advances'

Sustainability: building sustainability is about 'continuing the benefits' of the ACT program as opposed to 'maintaining the investment'. As such, we were interested in potential for continued benefits arising as opposed to the sustainability of the 'investment' that contributed to the attainment of ACT benefits. But on this account, our focus was on the relevance of results and in particular whether the effects of the support continue to make "sense" in terms of the conditions and problems the ACT program is meant to respond to. The fact that this was a catalystic program means that most of the benefits were not designed to be sustainable e.g. some of the training in the DPP's office. However, where the benefits arising from the program were built around existing platforms, potential for sustainability and ultimate impact exist. This is particularly true in the judiciary where the investment in ACD was in an on-going interest. The establishment of this division has catalyzed a process which is irreversible and whose continuation is guaranteed.

2.2 CORRUPTION RELATED TO PROCUREMENT: *Component One*

2.2.1 The ACT Intent

Capacity Building: This component sought to enhance capacities in the conduct of audits of public entities. It further sought the promotion of professional regulation amongst procurement professionals and placing administrative measures to monitor performance of government contractors. The TCP viewed this component as the primary control of corruption by addressing flaws in systems and procedures so as to increase compliance and transparency in resource utilization. In addition the component expressly recognized the multiplicity of stakeholders- both State and Non State Actors and the need for their coordination through the Inter Agency Forum (IAF). Within the procurement function, the Program sought to improve procurement systems through training, system development, equipment and retooling and support to procurement regulation. To promote interagency collaboration the Program catalyzed periodic interaction between institutions in the Accountability sector, promoted the replication of the model at district levels and inter sector collaborations.

Improving Procurement Systems: This aimed at reducing corruption in government procurement by strengthening the capacity of the PPDA to fulfill its oversight and audit functions. In addition, it was to ensure that other Procuring and Disposing Entities (PDEs) in Central and Local Government are able to fully adopt the new public procurement system. Five activities were required to support this objective, i) improvements in the Financial Management System, ii) increase frequency of Central Government and Local Government Audits, iii) improve follow up action on audit findings, iv) initiate the certification and accreditation of procurement professionals and v) establish a providers' register.

Component Implementation: *What was Done?*

PPDA/IPPU: The Program envisaged linking of selected Local and District Governments in the adoption of and implementation of the new procurement and financial systems reforms. Tracking systems were to be developed to include computerized databases and/or hardcopy records which record every step of the Government's procurement and transaction process. It was also planned that under the new system, financial information of those selected entities was to be made readily available and be linked to PPDA and OAG. The intention of the latter was to ease procurement tracking across national and district level entities, hence make corruption difficult to hide and easier to detect. The MoFPED –led expansion of the IFMS did not happen at the pace envisaged due to factors external to the program. However, as discussed above and mainly due to the collusion tendencies, procurement related corruption is way above the traditional paper-work auditing. A combination of skills and experience-based strategy need to be deployed and enshrined in the functions of the accountability

sector oversight bodies and these bodies need to work more closely by sharing information.

By the time of the evaluation, the selected entities, the PPDA and OAG were not linked to IFMS. 12 graduate trainees in procurement were recruited to constitute a resource for the professional conduct of procurement audits. The number of procurement audits conducted with the support of the program was 22- a substantial boost from the 16 baseline audits per year. The actual conduct of the procurement audits was outsourced to an external consultancy firm- AH Consulting. PPDA already had an ongoing plan to increase its coverage of entities. On its own motion coupled with TCP support, the audits rapidly increased to 72 in two years far exceeding the targets set. Among the field work sites, Arua, Mbale and Fort Portal benefitted from district level procurement audits. A follow- up on Audit Findings Database was developed. In addition, an <u>Audit Training Manual</u> and an <u>Audit Methodology Manual</u> were developed though by the time of evaluation, these two documents had been finalized by the contractor and were pending PPDA approval. **Post the TCP, there is need to for USAID and PPDA to follow up on the effective utilization and implementation of these outputs.**

Retooling and Equipment: institutions were retooled with much needed equipment- PPDA received 1 new station wagon vehicle (during the project execution period), 2 vehicles (at the end of the project), 4 Laptop computers, 6 Desk top computers, 3 used laptops (at the end of the project), 2 Digital Cameras,1 Photo Copier, 1 LCD projector and 1 generator set.

The Institute of Procurement Professionals (IPPU) received 2 Containers (converted into office facilities within PPDA premises), Office furniture, resource materials, 1 printer and 1 photocopier, 3 Desk top computers during the project implementation, 1 desk top computer and 1 server at the closure.

2.2.2 Component Achievements

Value Proposition: Respondents attested to the added value of the equipment received in enhancing their institutional efficiency. A functional providers' register was a statutory requirement that PPDA was able to attain under the ACT. The increase in number of procurement audits boosted PPDA performance. The recipients of the audits in Mbale were positive of the contribution of the audit process to their level of procurement knowledge and internal systems improvement.

In the words of the Deputy Chief Administrative Officer,

"One procurement audit was conducted, we secured and responded to the report, a follow up audit was done – we have concerns with the approach but overall there has been a significant reduction in procurement queries

*over the period. The Inspectorate of Government used to have a base here-
it was a weekly interface with the IG, but due to the procurement audit,
trainings and our internal policy of zero tolerance to corruption, we see less
and less of the IG's personnel here."*[12]

2.2.3 Component Challenges

Postmortem Audits. Five key challenges are identified.

i)   **Postmortem nature of audits. By their nature audits are** conducted
after the act is done. Lack of significant progress on the follow up of
audit findings is a challenge related to the design of the TCP as
discussed above. TCP Program document highlights this as the
greatest risk to deterrence of the corrupt and a significant
contributor to the growing culture of impunity in public affair
management. By the close of the program discussion was on to open
up linkages with the Public Accounts committees at national level to
improve follow ups. The PPDA move towards systems audits will
serve to stem as well as respond to procurement system corruption.

ii)   **Influencing Procurement.** The second challenge is the influence
peddling in procurement contracts by politicians and officials from
higher offices and lack of courage to expose culprits without
victimization or patronage by the PDE staff. The whistleblowers Act is
a new law (enacted in 2009) that is yet to be operationalised.

iii)   **Private Sector De-participation.** Thirdly, under involvement of the
private sector in the public sector procurement reform aspects
especially to change of attitude and create an environment that
assures the business community that it is possible to win contracts
on merit without corrupt tendencies.

iv)   **Re-tooling Challenges:** The fourth regards re-tooling and equipment-
three key issues emerged: - a) the lack of transfer of title of the
vehicles procured and handed over during Program implementation
was expressed by the PPDA and IG as a challenge. The vehicles
remain in the names of the Contractor and pose difficulties in their
inclusion into the Authority's asset register. Under the Bilateral
Agreement with the GoU, ownerships lies with the GoU and Title with
USAID. Title can only be transferred by MoFPED providing
concurrence after the close of the activity which is 90 days after the
end of the activity; b) the lack of access to information relating to
assets values, and c) the audio recorders procured and handed over
to the IGG's office have a very low sensitivity level and were not
effective in procuring evidence during investigations.

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[12] In-depth interview with Mbale District Leadership Team, April 15, 2010 in Mbale

v)   **DEI/OAG/IAF.** DEI convened the Inter Agency Forum Coordination meetings at which CSOs were expected to participate. However, CSOs indicated that they were infrequently invited and their participation all but petered out as the Program was rolled out. As discussed before, CSOs engagement was affected by a number of factors including the late start of the Component activities. The situation was much better at the regional level. DEI also convened Regional workshops to introduce and roll out District Integrity Forums. Through the technical and logistical support from the program, the relationship of the anti-corruption agencies under the Accountability Sector of Government and the CSOs improved in carrying out anti corruption work through community monitors who registered successful mobilization and exposure of corruption-related cases at that level (Arua/MACCO and Rwenzori).

Office of the Auditor General (OAG): A total of 1,176 participants from both the Lower and Higher Local Governments were trained to better interpret and react to the audit reports. A total of 160 staff from PPDA and OAG were trained to build capacity in understanding and utilizing the current revised laws, regulations and standards regulating operations of Local Governments. 12 fresh Graduates were trained as Procurement Audit Trainees and deployed into the local firms that provide procurement related audit services. During the training, ACT provided legal reference materials to participants. These included 1) The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda; 2) National Audit Act, 2008; 3) Public Finance and Accountability Act, 2003; 4) Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003; 5) LG Act, 1997; 6) LG Finance & Accounting Regulations, 2007; 7) Income Tax Act, 1997 and many other relevant laws of Uganda

Achievements: District PACs and Executive Committees of Councils appreciated and have a better understanding of the audit reports and have been able to increase the number of discussions resulting in a reducing backlog of audit reports pending debate. There is increased interaction with the CSOs e.g. Rwenzori and Arua (MACCO). Audit service delivery has greatly improved as reported by the Deputy Auditor General during the consultative meeting held in the OAG, Kampala on April 20, 2010. The equipment provided 25% extra coverage for about 200 technical; over 90% of technical staff of OAG received the laptops both at the centre and regions. The digital cameras have improved gathering of audit evidence. The reference materials such as the PPDA Act, 2003 enabled the auditors to quote in the audit reports the relevant procurement regulations violated by the PDEs and thus better able to ground their findings in the applicable laws.

Challenges: There was a delay in the starting of the program. The Evaluation Team was informed that the first ACT Program management team was insensitive to the OAG needs. For instance ACT sought to do the baseline survey with limited regard to the OAG's earlier inputs/views. It took the

Consultancy firm GTX & Company a long time to agree with the OAG on the relevant training approaches to be adopted. There was lack of cohesion of training timetables and the schedule of activities of the OAG in some instances. Hence, the participants lacked concentration as sometimes they had to be recalled back to their duty stations to attend to urgent official work. While the program hit its target numbers, only 33 out of 100 technical staff in the Local Government Directorate were trained implying the need for additional and continuous training to bring all staff on board in future.

In addition the tenure of office of some of the trained Council members is expiring. New ones will be elected in the year 2011 during the general elections and will need fresh training. None of the 940 entities (Sub-counties) received training. This was not a target for the TCP but given the high spending levels and increased corruption at the local government level, this is a critical entry point for the next program.

The basic Computer training undertaken was not very relevant to investigation of procurement related corruption given the complexity of computer based crime. Training in cyber crimes would have sufficed. The Chairman of Arua DPAC asserted that his Council was not aware of the ACT program and he does not receive the District's plans and budgets in advance. They only receive audit reports and start their work. A key recommendation is that the Local Government policy concerning dissemination of information need to be reviewed.

Frequency and Timeliness of Auditor General Reports: Auditor General reports are annual and as respondents pointed out a "post mortem" exercise. The administrative processes of approvals are lengthy and sometimes defeat the purpose of the audit. External audits conducted upcountry are forwarded to the national office for quality assurance and approval. Upon approval the reports are forwarded to the national level Public Accounts Committee with copies to the respective Districts. The DPAC members of Fort Portal opined that quarterly/bi-annual reports from the external auditor timely disseminated are likely to have a more significant preventive effect than the current annual reports. There is a higher likelihood of positive district management response in in-year reports as opposed to matters that have become obsolete either due to transfer of staff implicated, poor record keeping etc.

Mutation and Pervasive Nature of Corruption: From discussions with respondents in the field it was clear that corruption mutates and has the ability to pervade the procurement and financial paper audits. According to the Resident Auditor in Mbale collusion between Procurer and contractor at all levels pose a major challenge to the current audit practices[13]. Anomalies become harder to detect in the absence of whistle blowers. The recommendation here is to make a gradual shift to higher level value for

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[13] Meeting with Resident Auditor Mbale, April 18, 2010

money audits. The ability to conduct VFM audits was currently constrained by a combination of the overwhelming staff workload, operational logistics and the strict statutory timelines for completion and submission of audit reports.

Overall Assessment The component produced interesting experiments and some localized successes. Inroads into deterrence and systems improvement were registered through the procurement audits e.g. in Mbale reports of clean audits and rewards under the Local Government Assessment Framework were testimony to this. The success of the Audit components both financial and procurement was attributed to the fact that these interventions, though one offs, were conceptualized as part of a larger vision and longer term plan for Public Financial Management Reforms in the country. Even with the end of the TCP, increased number of procurement audits and VFMs are to happen under the FINMAP. The provision of tools and equipment, the register of providers and the support to the institute of procurement professionals were all components that were either statutory requirements (provider's register) or already identified cogs in the wheel of financial management reform. The Procurement providers' register sets the platform upon which to identify and engage with major service providers in the private sector.

Recommendation: Alongside the procurement audits, we recommend support to systems audits and quarterly reports presented to the District PACs at the district level, to deal with issues in a timely and responsive manner. Emphasis should also be laid on capacitating OAG to carry out 'value-for-money' audits.

2.3 PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION CASES: *Component 2*

The Intention: To increase the rate of successful prosecutions, the ACT program intervention was intended to happen at three levels. One, the program imparted knowledge, engaged in skills development and promoted exposure to good practices in investigation, prosecution and adjudication of corruption cases. Over 30 training sessions were envisaged with over 600 trainees across the system. The activities undertaken are discussed below.

Second was the retooling and equipping of the system with basic tools of the trade to ensure optimal performance.

Thirdly the Program intended to develop institutional operational capacity and offer training to institutional actors. The program intended to ensure sustainability of benefits in three ways, one was to create a pool of trainers within institutions, secondly review and integrate new ways of doing things into the function standard operating documents and thirdly, through the provision of reference materials. The Program also intended to unclog bottlenecks in the legal and policy framework through legislative review and reform.

Training: A total of 9 trainings were undertaken within the Criminal Investigations Directorate with a total of 313 participants. Training content included financial fraud investigations, (basic, 60 trainees, intermediary 60 trainees and 20 for advanced financial fraud training). Also included was Anti- Corruption Instructors training in the CID (15), basic computer training (53) computer applications (46). Public finance management in local governments (93) and 14 were trained in public corruption, money laundering and asset forfeiture. In the Anti-Corruption Division a cross institutional team participated in a study tour of the United States Court system. Private sector advocates from the Uganda Law Society benefitted from the study tour as well.

2.3.1 Achievements

Joint Training Approach Training was delivered through a joint approach incorporating representatives from the various actors. This was found to be most appropriate in fostering system wide relationships, learning and collaboration. The Inspectorate of Government appreciated the delivery of legal training for investigators and vice versa pointing to an increase in Criminal Justice system wide appreciation by trainees[14].

From Acquisition of Skills to Work place Improvements and boost in Public Trust and Confidence. In the words of the CID Director:

> *"The officers trained have gained knowledge and skills in finance, treasury, transfer of funds, public procurement procedures at Central and Local Governments, computer knowledge, record keeping and management of information, manipulation, retrieval of information, interpretation and presentation of evidence. The skills and knowledge gained have been very significant in the successful investigations and prosecutions of the Global Fund cases, the NUSAF, the Parliamentary Account Committee probe of government Ministries/ departments/ parastatal bodies and local governments. Public trust and confidence in the CID is gradually beginning to show as more and more successful investigations lead to more arrests and prosecutions of the big fish implicated in corrupt offences"*

A number of implementation challenges were identified at three levels, the timing of the training; participant selection criteria; sequencing and modes of delivery.

Regarding timing, training happened too late into the project period- many police officers were trained in the last half of the Program implementation period. The selection criteria was an institutional challenge with training content not meeting urgent training needs for a number of respondents.

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[14] Meeting with Permanent Secretary, IG and ACT Focal Point Officer, April 8, 2010

Prosecutors upcountry were trained in corruption prosecution which knowledge and skills they could not readily utilize following a practice direction could only refer corruption cases to the ACD in Kampala. A more fundamental challenge is the follow up as most training was designed in a one-off manner. **According to trainees, future training programs should be sequenced in a modular manner, delivered over sufficient periods of time and through the utilization of local and regional expertise.**

Overall, some capacity was created as a result of training. However, the extent of its sustainability and in some cases, its appropriateness, is in doubt. Sustainability relates particularly to the fact that this training was not mainstreamed in curriculums of existing institutions e.g. the Police Training School or the Law Development Center and Judicial Studies Institute. These are the duty bearers that offer refresher training. The appropriateness refers to training in basic computer applications and/or cyber crime detection when investigations officers upcountry are not equipped with computers.

Retooling and Equipment: Institutions received vehicles, motorcycles, and a wide spectrum of equipment ranging from filing cabinets, fax machines, laptop, digital cameras, desk tops, voice recorders and video cameras.

Achievements: Gains have been registered from the retooling and equipment given to the institutions under this component. The 2 motor vehicles and 10 motorcycles received by the Criminal Investigations Directorate significantly increased the geographical reach of the investigators. Allocation of motorcycles in CID was needs driven with incidence of corruption cases utilized as the key criteria for allocation. Historically under resourced, the Directorate of Criminal Investigations registered visible improvements through this support through their ability to follow up on witnesses e.g. in the GFATM cases. Similarly support to the Anti Corruption Division ACD was most opportune as the completion of its design coincided with the start of the ACT program. The startup capital investments along with a years' office rent was provided under ACT. In addition the two full time Judges and Registrar received office furniture, furnished court rooms, recording equipment, computers, printers, copier machines, legal reference materials. The IG received 5 motor vehicles, 2 motor cycles, 5 printers, 28 laptops, 5 photocopiers, 5 fax machines, 15 digital cameras and (once to twice) supply of computer consumables.

Two challenges emerge: One has to do with maintenance of the investments due to inadequate recurrent expenditure allocation within the supported institutions. It is critical that future USAID Programs ensure that GoU commitment includes recurrent expenditure to support functionality/ operation of equipment purchased. As discussed in the design section anchoring the program intervention under JLOS would to a large extent have taken care of this challenge. Two is the timing of delivery of equipment- Even after close of the Project in December 2009; Police/CID expects a consignment of motor cycles to fulfill its intended allocation. The networking

and linking of regional-to headquarter computers in CID is yet to happen and it is not clear whether it will happen. This means that capacity challenges were not alleviated in time to support the program intentions.[15] There is need for USAID to follow up on these post TCP output deliverables.

Systems Strengthening: Within the CID, the ACT Program intended to identify standards policies and procedures and best practices for review and incorporation into UPF Standing Orders I&II, develop a new case management/ criminal intelligence management system, establish a data base that will allow investigators and prosecutors to enter information about suspects, documents and electronic data into a data base for storage, further analysis and court presentation; and establish/strengthen systems to manage internal institutional corruption. Resident technical assistance was procured under the PAPA with the Department of Justice to support investigations and prosecutions in DPP, Police and the IG.

Achievements: All respondents were positive about the need for robust internal systems review to increase institutional efficiency. Indeed through Resident Technical Advisors, a number of good practices were initiated for instance prosecutions led investigations; plea bargaining; exhibit management and chain of custody etc. These bear significant potential of increasing Criminal Justice system efficiency.

Challenges: Four (4) key documents to improve operating procedures of the Uganda Police Force, the Criminal Investigations Directorate and the Professional Standards Unit remain in draft form[16] and their completion should be expedited by the Police. The fourth document relates to management of corruption within the Uganda Police Force. This has undermined the contribution of the technical advisory services and the intended impact of such materials on program implementation. In a Focus Group Discussion with the Fort Portal Anti Corruption Unit of the Criminal Investigations Directorate revealed lack of guidance on the scope of work, operating guidelines and standards for the desk. **Police should take the process forward to institutionalize these documents and practices therein and to train staff in their content.**

The second challenge relates to appropriateness of technical advisory services to the Ugandan context e.g. Respondents expressed difficulty in fully utilizing the TA services due to differences in legal systems; and lack of appreciation of the Ugandan legal and operational context by selected TAs. For purposes of continuity, respondents recommended local counterpart attachment to expatriate TA in future programs and identification of national or regional level TA where expertise can be identified.

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[15] Discussion with the Inspectorate of Government
[16] Including a draft Manual of Procedures for Collection and Storage of Property and Evidence

Number of Investigations Completed and Prepared for Prosecution. A comparison of the IG Reports for July –December 2008 and January to June 2009 shows a decline in the total number of complaints investigated and completed from 603 to 288.[17] Complaints referred to other institutions also reduced from 230 to 73.[18] In contrast the CID reports an increase in cases reported to its Anti Corruption Unit from 6 in 2008 to 108 in 2009. Worth noting is the attrition rate of cases at the level of investigations. Out of the 108 cases reported to the Anti Corruption Department in 2009, only 18 cases were taken to court, 88 are pending inquiry, 2 cases were closed without further action 3 cases are with DPP and none has resulted into a conviction. Out of the 94 reported to the Economic Crimes Unit of CID in 2009, 14 cases were taken to court and 80 are pending inquiry. This registered a decline from 2008 baseline performance where out of 166 cases reported, 21 cases were taken to court, 136 were pending inquiry, 7cases put away and 5 resulted into convictions.

Adjudication: The Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court (ACD) was officially launched in July 2008 and accepted its first two cases in late December 2008, which involve the first suspects in the Global Fund scandal. Under the ACT the ACD conducted a countrywide assessment of all pending corruption cases to determine which could be handled by the ACD. Several high-profile cases were lined up for prosecution. By the time of the evaluation the ACD had registered a total of 12 corruption cases, completed 8 and 4 remained pending. Of the 8cases completed 7were convictions with one (1) acquittal. The bulk of the workload of the ACD are miscellaneous applications at 310(registered), 274(completed) ad 36(pending). The ACD registered 19 criminal appeals and 11 criminal revisions completing 8 and 4 respectively.

Attaching meaning to the Data. In sum the investigation targets of increasing number of National Fraud Squad cases reaching prosecution stage from 18% to 40% was not met by the CID. No data existed to enable measurement whether an increase from 45% to 57% was registered in investigative follow up actions initiated out of audit reports. The IG expressed inability to track performance against the indicator examining number of procurement related corruption cases investigated and prosecuted to completion; number of investigations completed with recommendations made for disciplinary or remedial action etc.

Number of Convictions of all corruption cases sanctioned. The Anti Corruption Division of the High Court meted convictions in 7 out of the 8 cases decided. This is half of the picture though. In 2008 DPP sanctioned a total of 91 embezzlement cases; 24 corruption cases; 3 of causing financial loss, and 2 of abuse of office. In 2008, a total of 446 corruption related

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[17] Inspectorate of Government Semi Annual Reports to Parliament

[18] The low number of investigated cases during the period is partly attributed to the controversy and uncertainty that surrounded the re-appointment of the Inspector General of Government which directly impacted on the performance of the office.

cases were in the CJ system (346 embezzlement, 72 corruption matters, 12causing financial loss, and 16 on abuse of office[19]). This corresponds with the views from upcountry that a bigger number of corruption cases stagnate in the regular court system outside the ACD.

2.4 STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY *Component Three*

2.4.1 The ACT Intent.

The intention of this component had five sub areas.[20] i) The inclusion of CSOs in the IAF and other government-led anti-corruption efforts at the national and sub-national level; ii) support to CSOs in identifying, monitoring, exposing, and securing public redress against corrupt civil service practices; iii) Using CSOs and the media to raise public awareness and to inform the public of their rights and obligations; iv) to provide legal aid and other practical avenues of recourse against improper conduct by civil servants; v) to raise risk of exposure to deter private sector involvement in corrupt practices through the establishment of Integrity Pacts and other anti-corruption Charters.

2.4.2 Component Implementation: *What Was Done*

Implementation was done through 15 grants to CSOs and private sector organizations; capacity building in the areas of public expenditure tracking, strategic advocacy, support to media campaigns; and 'bridge-making' between GoU and CSOs.

Inter-Agency Forum (IAF): The intention of this forum was to allow civil society to engage in 'civic action' as opposed to 'activism' with government. This was to be done by availing a space for CSOs to dialogue with the six government agencies participating in this program. At the national level, civil society involvement was limited largely due to inadequate engagement, fragmentation at national level and internal weaknesses. At the sub-national level, the Integrity Forums (DEI) were for the most part not rolled out limiting space/ opportunities for CSO engagement with local leaders at the district level. According to one participant at the USAID De-brief meeting *"...the speed of the ACT program was too high for the District Integrity Forums to be put to effect"*[21] There were however some positive developments with partnerships between CSOs and Police in reporting and following up of corruption cases. By the end of FY2009, CSOs had published 50 reports following the IAF meetings.

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[19] DPP Annual Prosecution Performance Report 2008 www.dpp.go.ug
[20] GOU, TCP *op.cit*
[21] Consultant De-brief Meeting at USAID. April 23, 2010

Recommendation: It is the Evaluation Team's view that the Integrity forums are a critical platform for civic engagement between the demand and the supply sides of accountability. Future support should target strengthening it. But fundamentally, training should focus not only on CSOs, but government as well.

Mobilizing Civil Society: In this component, 15 grants were issued, 500 people were trained in PETS, strategic communications, and strategic advocacy. Training Manuals were produced and linkages between civil society and GoU institutions created.[22] This, in our view, was probably the most successful element of this component. Although small, the grants catalyzed or enhanced civic action against corruption.

Raising Public Awareness: through various forms including engagement through the IAF Joint Communication Strategy. In the view of the Evaluation Team, however, the most significant of these is the public awareness carried out by the regional networks. These networks use the 'Principle of Percolation' in which a group of animators are trained and then dispatched to their localities to 'percolate' the training. This was noted in the Rwenzori region and in the area covered by Apac Anti-Corruption Coalition. The use of community anti-corruption monitors and 'forum theatre' was noted as a good practice with potential for sustainability. The concept of 'market days' or what some grantees called 'anti-corruption hearings'[23] was also an effective platform for public sensitization.

Public Activism and Recourse: Three elements things were done under this aspect of component three; i) the Book of Fame and Shame released by ACCU in December 2009. Ii) The Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys; Iii) The Public Awards aimed at affirming good practices.

Engage Private Sector: For the first time in the anti-corruption war, the private sector joined the government and civil society through this program. Professional codes of conduct, ethical business manuals and Awards are among the things that were done under this component. Critical, in our view, is the idea of Integrity Pacts. Although all the regions we visited noted that these Pacts are yet to be signed, the idea was welcome by private sector and government. In fact, the Ministry of Water and Environment indicated an interest in piloting these Integrity Pacts during the current financial year[24].

2.4.3 **Achievements and Challenges:** *What Happened*

2.4.3.1 Achievements

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[22] Henry Muguzi, ACT Close-out Report on Civil Society Strengthening (December 15, 2009)
[23] Focus Group Discussion with RAC monitors, Mbale (April 13, 2010)
[24] Indicated in its Policy Review Paper of 2009

Catalyzing Transformation: The single-most achievement of the support to civil society is that it acted as a catalyst to innovations and new methodologies in the fight against corruption. A case in point is the <u>Fame and Shame Book</u> by ACCU and the 'ground-working'[25] methods of HURINET in jump-starting stalled corruption cases. 27 such cases were reinstated against a target of 15. And although these cases have not reached full hearing, this is an indication that engaging with the system can bear fruit.

Creating Civic Competence: civil society has created a certain level of civic competence through awareness creation, in the public to fight corruption. In the past, there was a fear that 'whistle blowing' could land them in trouble. In most of the districts we visited, this has reversed. By working with groups of community monitors at the district level, there is a competent, knowledgeable, and vigilant public - especially in monitoring public funds. Another achievement here is that a cadre of citizens, competent enough to handle corruption cases has emerged. Unlike in the past when corruption was reported to the government alone, this cadre has earned the confidence of the public and is now entrusted with sensitive information for onwards transmission and action[26]. For instance, in 2006, CSO reports indicated that less than 1000 cases of corruption were recorded with them. By 2009, this had gone up to 3,801 for the ACT grantees only.[27] In our view, this is a show of public confidence in the anti-corruption competence of these CSOs.

Grass 'rooting' Anti-Corruption: The use of corruption community monitors on the ground provided CSOs with a rapid response mechanism. The local councils, including the IG, and OAG on the ground noted that they depended on these networks in the highlighting of corruptions in the remote settings. Two such networks were noteworthy: The Apac Anti-corruption Coalition and the Ruwenzori Anti-corruption Coalition. These organizations are on record as having worked to build a civic anti-corruption groundswell at the district level. They have also made attempts at Integrity Pacts with the district and local authorities. But what is significant about them is that they have empowered smaller groups in community with anti-corruption skills like theatre and funds tracking. Some of these groups have become self-reliant.

Social Noise and Deterrence: In Mbale, a full DCC meeting told us that the only way to fight corruption is to create 'social noise'. This noise will in turn create a sense of 'deterrence' amongst public servants. And this is what the ACCU <u>Fame and Shame Book</u> did. It opened up new frontiers of fighting corruption at the national level. Although the results of this publication are difficult to gauge,[28] there is consensus that it created some form of 'noise' and discomfort. The sum effect of this is <u>deterrence</u> on the part of public officials for fear of being 'shamed' in the subsequent publications.

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[25] Concept developed by the Slum Dwellers movement in India and Africa. It is about working the system, and also creating a situation of *quid pro quo* between the system and the CSO

[26] This observation was also made by the USAID Final MCC/TCP Report of March 5 2010, p.9

[27] Ibid., p.9

[28] It was only released in December 2009

2.4.3.2 The Challenges.

Meager Resources: The resources provided for the work of the CSOs was limited. Those who could not build on their other work were unable, therefore, to achieve significant results.

Short Implementation Period: The implementation period was too short at 8 months. As such, no impact (significant) can be attributed to this support. It was established that concurrence was provided by USAID for 13 grants on July 11, 2008 – 18 months before the close of the activity. The team was not able to establish why there was a lengthy delay by the contractor in awarding the grants and releasing funds.

Scattered Action: The actions of civil society were scattered. As such, they could not present a harmonised voice on key issues at the IAF and in their engagements with the supported 'supply side' within government.

3 Lessons Identified

3.1 General Lessons identified

The lessons identified here are meant to guide USAID with future programming. They represent a summary of the Evaluation findings.

Lesson 1. Build on Existing National Priorities. Successes in TCP were more visible in the first and partly in the second components. In component one PPDA exceeded its targets and OAG was able to meet its set target of timely production of annual audit reports of all public entities. It is evident from the legal framework, PPDA and OAG institutional strategies and action plans that these were already identified national level priorities in the accountability sector. TCP, along with other funders and institutional resources catalyzed their implementation towards attaining successful results.

It is also a lesson learned that national priorities will yield yet better results if they bear a system wide as opposed to institutional focus. A unified response in Component One would have recognized and built upon the synergies of procurement audits, financial VFM audits, Civil Society and Parliamentary Accounts committee actions in one component. As it happened the successes happened at institutional and not system-wide level- a factor that lessened overall impact of the program. In a similar manner as system wide response to the prosecution of corruption related cases may have brought to the fore strategic entry points for instance prioritization of corruption case investigations and also offered system support intervention under the JLOS Sector in ways that institutional responses could not.

System wide responses are documented in national and sector strategies. The Accountability and Justice, Law and Order Sectors are in the process of developing new Strategic Investment Plans, thus proving an opportunity for US engagement on definitions, responses and roles.

Alignment with national priorities also relates to **alignment of Programs with National Planning and budgeting cycles**. This lessens the administrative burdens of reporting and eases resource flow constraints.

Lesson 2: Some support under TCP was at the operational as opposed to the Strategic level. In a sense, it provided some form of leveraging, at least

administratively. This is how the anti-corruption unit at CID were created. The lesson learned here is that administrative level improvements have limited impact. Public interest litigation of targeted cases should for instance yield higher level results than support to improvements in general case management. A Strategic approach bears potential for higher impact. In addition tackling three components of prevention, response and advocacy could have yielded better results within strongly capacitated institutions. As the situation is a combination of the wide scope of the program and the infancy of sector arrangements constrained dialogue and engagement towards transformative changes.

Lesson 3: Longer term engagement for Governance and Accountability Reforms

Yet another lesson learned is that Governance and accountability reforms are not one off but require longer term engagement with institutions. Even within the longer term program designs should pay attention to the capacity of institutions to implement and level expectations accordingly. As mentioned previously the two years of TCP implementation only prepared the ground for further engagements. The expectations in the design were higher than what could be achieved in 2 years of program implementation, nI fe

Lesson 4: Civil society bears potential only if Voices and Action are Collectivized (e.g. through enabling CSOs to engage collectively on thematic issues) and institutional support is provided to address internal capacity gaps of CSOs. Stronger partnerships between CSOs and the Private Sector should be supported.

3.2 Program Interventions

3.2.1 Training

The design, delivery and training plans need to aligned to the Institutional/ sector training framework to ensure that the selection, management and deployment of trainees and course content all support identifies priorities. E.g. CID manuals and training developed under ACT should be integrated into the Police Training School Curricula. The adoption of joint training approaches draws the sector institutions together, promotes collegiality and is in itself a self monitoring and evaluation mechanism

3.2.2 Equipment

For equipment procured to support program results, its purchase should be timely, and in the case of co-funding by government, should be on budget as opposed to of budget. On-budget presupposes that planning and integration of co-funded activities within the institutional budgets and workplans.

Secondly full disclosure of information between the contractor and recipients cements relationships between implementers and program managers and should be seen as an integral part of program accountability, Full information relating to equipment procurement contracts, values, warranties and post–program responsibilities should be available and clearly laid out.

3.2.3 Technical Assistance

The choice of placement and selection of Technical assistance is important if the program is to attain maximum utility from the intervention. Preference should be given to regional and national level TA with requisite skills and understanding of the Common law system. Program design should lay emphasis on identifying high impact areas for TA placement.

3.2.4 Systems M&E and Demand for Accountability

A sound results based management framework designed and implemented at the outset facilitates program management, supports dialogue with multiple actors and fosters program accountability. In its absence there is minimal room for accountability on all fronts, program managers, oversight mechanisms and contractors.

4 Recommendations

4.1 Overall Recommendations

US Programming: It is our recommendation that future anti-corruption programming should advance from the identified priorities within government and the non-state sector. In government, USAID would do well to base its new programming on the policy thrust provided for in the re-engineered ASSIP the upcoming SIP III, the new NACS and the NDP as these bear system as opposed to institutional responses.

Considering that USAID does not provide budget support, it should ensure that its projects contribute directly to priorities identified at national level. The Accountability Sector Strategic Investment Plan (ASSIP) is currently under review and should provide guidance on sectoral priorities going forward.

In addition to direct support to the Accountability Sector, a second and complementary window of support for US is advancing the Governance and Accountability agenda within the sectors of US priority. Mainstreaming anti-corruption work in Health, Education and all relevant US supported sectors prepares the ground for the interventions of the Accountability sector and provides a strong leverage for compliance. We recommend that US m**ainstreams the anti-corruption program in all the other USAID sector support**. This is critical in ensuring USAID support is not counterproductive. Practical measures of mainstreaming may include integration of Governance and Accountability Action Plans into Sectoral program documents, empowerment of Sector Managers with knowledge and skills in governance and accountability mainstreaming and implementation of strategies to influence Governance and Accountability Action Plan implementation at sector levels.

 To address the possibility of overstretch; US **should consider targeting and partnerships**. For instance, whereas US may choose to take the lead on Governance and Accountability in one Sector, in other sectors US may participate for instance in the ongoing development partner initiative to develop a joint approach to corruption. This addresses sector level corruption, starting with a few test cases in CHOGM, NAADS, Drugs management and Uganda AIDS Commission.

Narrow and Deepen Approach: We recommend a strategic longer term approach to future programming. The strategic approach will entail both narrowing and cultivating depth in the selected interventions.

Stakeholder Participation: In order to 'collectivize' civil society voice and action, USAID should consider supporting an Anti-Corruption Non-State Actor Sector. This should include CSOs and private sector actors. IF unified, their voice and engagements with government are bound to be more effective as other countries have shown.

4.2 Specific Recommendations

4.2.1 Reverse-Engineering. Future USAID programming would do well to engineer its results from the end. That is, it should begin by defining the desired change and then work backwards to build the process of achieving it. Monitoring and evaluation should be based on this 'reverse-engineering' model. In the short run, it should monitor 'process' and in the medium to long run, monitor 'change'. While change refers to the destination, process is about the journey. Change indicators should therefore be separated from process indicators.

From Project to Process Support- ACT was designed as a program, but its implementation took a project approach. It had tight timelines, with new ideas and a tight budget. The result is limited sustainability. In order to increase the value of USAID grants, therefore, we recommend that future initiatives be built on on-going processes. This should not preclude innovations. Where such innovations exist, and are built around existing platforms, they should be supported.

Stakeholder participation and Contractors- Future programming should 'participate' the grant holders to the fullest extent possible. This participation should not only happen at conceptualization. It should be carefully built into the transition from inception to implementation by contractors. In the view of this report, major slippages occur during this transition. Special attention to this stage of the 'grant making cycle' is critical.

Audits- Alongside the procurement audits, we recommend support to systems audits as well as quarterly reports for the District PACs. Emphasis should also be laid on capacitating OAG to carry out 'value-for-money' audits.

Training- Future training should be sequenced in a modular manner, delivered over sufficient periods of time and through the utilization of local and regional expertise. Similarly, focus of training should be more on technical skills as opposed to knowledge acquisition.

Annexes

Annex I: TOR
Annex II: List of Literature Reviewed
Annex III: List of Interviews Conducted
Annex IV: Performance Analysis by Component

Annex 1: Statement of Work

EVALUATION OF THE UGANDA ANTI-CORRUPTION THRESHOLD PROGRAM 2007-2009

1. PURPOSE OF EVALUATION

USAID/Uganda requires an Evaluation Contractor (the "Contractor") to design and implement an evaluation of the Uganda Threshold Country Program (TCP). The evaluation will serve the following purposes: (1) provide lessons learned for USAID, the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and, the Government of Uganda (GOU), and other development partners supporting the accountability sector; (2) assess the existing and/or potential ability of key successes to be replicated, (3) uphold an institutional commitment of measuring program results; and (4) provide practical lessons for current and future threshold program partners in developing and implementing threshold program activities. Uganda's Threshold Country Program was reviewed in February 2009 as part of a mid-term review process. This evaluation should provide critical input for future programming. USAID and MCC will share evaluation results, positive or negative, with USG partners, development partners, government partners, and the general public.

The Contractor will be responsible for developing work plans and instruments for program evaluation. The Contractor will provide direction on technical and methodological approaches, evaluation design and be responsible for executing the evaluation. USAID will provide the Contractor flexibility in arranging the work plan and division of labor, but will provide final approval on any arrangements.

2. BACKGROUND

Corruption in public procurement and service delivery poses a serious obstacle to economic and social development in Uganda. The GOU and Ugandan civil society acknowledge the seriousness of corruption and recognize that corruption has led to "significant losses of public funds through mishandled procurements and outright embezzlement." In July 2004, to help fight corruption, Uganda launched the National Strategy to Fight Corruption and Rebuild Ethics and Integrity in Public Office (2004-2007). The strategy provided a framework to guide GOU and donor interventions and actions in the fight against corruption in the context of the GOU's policy of "Zero Tolerance to Corruption."

The GOU's Directorate of Ethics and Integrity (DEI) coordinates the work of the six agencies at the core of the GOU's anti-corruption effort. These agencies are the Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority

(PPDA); the Office of the Auditor General (OAG); the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG); the Criminal Investigations Directorate's (CID) Fraud Squad; the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP); and the DEI itself. These and other GOU agencies and leading civil society organizations are affiliated through an Inter-Agency Forum (IAF), which reviews Uganda's progress on the anti-corruption front.

Since 2004, the USG has partnered closely with the GOU on the Threshold Country Program (TCP). The GOU's Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development, anti-corruption agencies and civil society organizations worked closely with USG representatives to develop a TCP proposal that was approved by the MCC Board of Directors on February 14, 2007.

3. MCC PROJECT OVERVIEW

The Millennium Challenge Corporation is a United States Government (USG) corporation that aims to reduce global poverty through the promotion of sustainable economic growth. MCC is based on the principle that aid is most effective when it reinforces good governance, economic freedom and investments in people. To become eligible to receive five-year Compact funding, the MCC analyzes a country's performance on 17 third party indicators divided into three categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Economic Freedom (i.e. the "Eligibility Criteria").1

MCC's Threshold Program assists countries that are ineligible for Compact funding, but demonstrate a significant commitment to policy reform. The MCC currently operates 21 threshold programs that seek to improve country performance on the Eligibility Criteria to improve their chances of becoming eligible for Compact funding. Threshold programs typically last for two years and often focus on public administration and policy reform.

4. THE UGANDA ANTI-CORRUPTION THRESHOLD COUNTRY PROGRAM - ACT

The $10,446,180 TCP Development Assistance Grant Agreement (DAGA) was signed on March 29, 2007, between the GOU and USAID on behalf of the US Government. Program implementation began on August 15, 2007, and is slated to end on December 31, 2009. USAID contracted ARD, Inc. to implement the program and entered a Participating Agency Program Agreement (PAPA) with the Department of Justice (DOJ) to support DOJ assistance to police and prosecutors.

The overall goal of ACT is to **build Uganda's capacity to fight public sector corruption, particularly in public procurement.**

In order to achieve the overall objective the program partners agreed on the following key result:
a) Prevent corruption related to public procurement in Uganda;
b) Increase the rate of successful prosecutions; and

c) Strengthen the role of civil society in the fight against corruption.

The aims of the program were to:
Coordinate and improve enforcement mechanisms;
Strengthen the legislative and regulatory frameworks;
Involve the public in the fight against corruption;
Address agency staffing and other institutional issues; and
Encourage political support for anti-corruption efforts.

The program has worked to modernize procurement and audit practices; successfully initiate and conclude investigations and prosecutions; and enhance the capacity of civil society to demand greater transparency and accountability.

Component 1: Prevent Corruption Related to Public Procurement

Objective: To reduce corruption by (1) developing the capacities of the PDDA and the OAG to conduct better audits, to prepare better procurement reports, and to communicate this work more effectively to civil society and the public, thus increasing the quality of the audits and reports and enhancing the chances that effective administrative and legal action may be taken against corrupt officials or those undertaking improper procurement actions, and (2) making more functional and effective the IAF, which reviews Uganda's progress on the corruption front, the Public Accounts Committees (PACs), the Government Accounting Officers (GAOs), and the Public Service Commissioners (PSCs).

Component 2: Increase the Rate of Successful Prosecutions

Objective: To strengthen the GOU's ability to investigate and prosecute effectively corrupt individuals by providing technical assistance and effective, hands-on mentoring to the CID, the DPP, the IGG, and the Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court to improve their abilities to detect, investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate corruption cases quickly and successfully, especially those related to public procurement. In this regard, the anti-corruption effort was to be extended to local government, where a considerable amount of corruption is known to occur in procurement and tendering processes.

Component 3: Strengthen the Role of Civil Society in the Fight Against Corruption

Objective: To build the capacity of Ugandan civil society organizations to increase public awareness of corruption, to enhance civil society organization and citizen capacity to fight corruption more effectively and to participate more efficiently in governmental and non-governmental anti-corruption forums and activities.

PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS

The Program has supported the GOU's and civil society's fight against corruption by addressing critical gaps. The Program has had mixed results. Achievements include the establishment of the Anti-corruption Division of the High Court and its first three Global Fund cases in which the DPP has secured convictions. The efforts of this Division will be vital for more effective adjudication of corruption cases, and for changing broader public perceptions on the GOU's willingness and ability to fight corruption in Uganda. Other successes are the comprehensive capacity building and training program for over 450 government officials of PPDA, OAG, local government, prosecutors and police investigators to improve audits, investigations and prosecutions of corruption in public procurement, the enactment of the Audit Law, and the passage of the Anti-Corruption Act.

Despite these efforts, Uganda's capacity to deal effectively with corruption has been hampered by an inability to enforce and implement existing laws and policies. Corruption therefore has continued to constrain severely public policy execution and public service delivery. Although serious challenges exist at various levels and in a variety of sectors, corruption within the public procurement process continues to represent a particularly acute concern and a major threat to the economy. Moreover, failure to bring offenders to justice in the past has led to a perception by the public that corruption is condoned in Uganda. Uganda did not qualify as MCC Compact eligible for 2009. Uganda's exclusion from 2009 MCC Compact status reflected its failure to score above the median on three of five MCC "Investing in People" indicators, all of which are outside the specific mandate of the Uganda TCP.

Uganda passed the MCC Control and Prevention of Corruption indicator with a score of 51%, but overall performance was largely unsatisfactory. Since 2004, Uganda's performance on the MCC anticorruption indicator has fluctuated above and below the median with no demonstrated upward trend. In contrast, other countries like Zambia and Liberia have substantially improved their performance on corruption and have been rewarded as a consequence - Liberia as a new threshold country and Zambia as compact eligible. Uganda's future prospects for eligibility for MCC Compact Status in 2010 and beyond are contingent on substantial improvement on the Control and Prevention of Corruption Indicator in addition to improvement in other policy areas such as those related to investing in people. Further, there has been little progress on legislative reforms for controlling and preventing corruption. Key laws (such as Qui Tam and Whistle Blower laws) agreed to in the TCP have not been enacted. These laws are essential to supporting the Anti-Corruption Division, and to making Uganda's strategic goal of "zero tolerance to corruption" a reality. Other areas of slow progress include completion of civil service remuneration policies for anti-corruption agencies as agreed and the failure of the GOU to provide the total agreed counterpart funding of $2.2 million dollars.

The TCP lays down the detailed program purpose and action plan that ACT was mandated to implement over the two year period of the program. USAID

is interested in understanding if the intended program outcomes and goals, as identified in the TCP and the DAGA, were realized through the ACT program.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

USAID is seeking a Contractor to carry out an evaluation of the ACT Program. The Contractor will be responsible for accomplishing the following objectives: The Contractor will evaluate the program by collecting data and analyzing it to assess program effectiveness in achieving its intended results at output, outcome and impact level. In particular, the following should be addressed:

1. Implementation and program results: Using the TCP Program Description, DAGA and PAPA, the Contractor will explore the extent to which:
> a) Activities were undertaken;
> b) Activities were fully implemented;
> c) Key measures of success were achieved;
> d) Implemented activities led to outcomes (or meaningful changes in knowledge, attitudes and practices); and
> e) Implemented activities and outcomes have been sustained to date, and the likelihood that they will be sustained over the short- and long-term.

2. Problem identification: Analyze the intervention hypothesis for the program and assess the assumed link between the project inputs, implementation plans, and expected outcomes. The assessment of program design should also review the link between individual projects and country performance on the relevant Eligibility Criteria. Since the Eligibility Criteria are not linked in a causal manner to isolated program activities, the objective of this element will be to assess the link between threshold program focus and weaknesses revealed by
the Eligibility Criteria (and *not* to measure the program's precise effect on the Eligibility Criteria).

3. Lessons learned: What lessons can USAID, MCC and the GOU obtain from this program? What went well and what did not? How can these lessons be applied in future threshold or accountability programs *vis a vis* program
design and implementation? In addition, the Contractor should collect anecdotal information from different government, project implementers, USG partners and other stakeholders' views on the extent to which the two year timeframe and Compact incentive hindered or accelerated policy improvements and implementation of activities.

4. Programming Recommendations: Based on analysis of data and lessons learned, provide recommendations for areas for further support for most effective/sustainable activities in relation to Uganda's capacity to fight public sector corruption

TASKS

7.1 Phases:

Phase One: The Contractor will be responsible for proposing a work plan and division of responsibilities. The Contractor will provide direction on technical and methodological approaches and be responsible for the quality and timeliness of deliverables. The Contractor shall conduct a desk review of available documents and work with USAID, and the program implementers to develop an evaluation methodology and detailed work plan, including a timeline and budget for implementing the evaluation of the ACT program. The proposed methodology should be based on consultation with USAID and meetings with other key stakeholders including the GOU.

All evaluation activities will be conducted in close collaboration with USAID, the GOU and implementing entities. USAID must be consulted prior to initial conversations with the ACT implementers.

Phase Two: Upon USAID approval of the evaluation methodology and implementation plan, the Contractor shall implement the evaluation, analyze and present evaluation results according to the Phase One work plan. USAID will provide the Contractor flexibility in arranging the work plan and division of labor, but will provide final approval on any arrangements. To conduct the evaluation, USAID anticipates the Contractor will rely on existing program records and GOU agencies' administrative data as well as interviews with government counterparts, implementers and beneficiaries. In some cases, qualitative and quantitative data collection methods may be necessary, such as surveys or focus groups. The Contractor may be asked to reconstruct baseline information and/or consider credible counterfactual scenarios, where feasible.

7.2 Evaluation Design:

The following specific tasks shall be addressed during *Phase One*.

Task 1: Project Background Review

Develop and present a detailed work plan to USAID for Phase One. This work plan should be completed within the first ten days of the contract and must be approved by USAID. The work plan should include specific activities, timing of each activity and planned outreach to program implementers, GOU counterparts and USG agencies involved in program implementation for both *Phases One and Two*. The format for the final evaluation report must be agreed upon between USAID and the Contractor.

Meet with USAID program managers (and where applicable MCC program managers), and implementers to understand the ACT program design, program theory and collect program details, including program reports.

Review ACT documents and data provided by USAID, MCC and implementers.

Identify the program logic and the intended links between activities, outcomes, and improvement on MCC Eligibility Criteria.

Based on desk review, submit an evaluation design document that incorporates the program logic analysis, a list of meetings, proposed evaluation questions and associated methodological approaches.

Discuss prioritization of activities for the evaluation. This task should be completed before any field visits and within fifteen days of the contract.

Task Two: Refine the Evaluation Design

Solicit feedback from USAID and GOU counterparts in Uganda on important hypotheses to consider. Meetings should be held with both USAID; relevant ACT and GOU agencies and ministries.

Assess data availability and quality of data created and/or used by project implementers, USAID managers, and relevant GOU offices. Identify other sources of data – from other development partners, citizen groups or others that are relevant to the evaluation questions. Given available data, assess the feasibility of proposed evaluation methodologies and where necessary, identify alternative methodologies. Discuss potential opportunities to recreate or otherwise compensate for lack of baseline data and establish a credible source of data.

Identify new data collection needs for assessing program results at the outcome level. Create plan to collect necessary data during *Phase Two* in coordination with USAID.

At the end of *Phase One*, update the evaluation design and work plan reports, as needed. Include specific evaluation activities, data collection strategy (including data collection needs and associated costs) and relevant timing for *Phase Two*. If relevant, propose activities to be prioritized as part of the evaluation.

7.3 Phase Two

The following tasks shall be addressed during *Phase Two*.

Task Three: Analysis and Presentation of Findings

Consolidate and analyze any relevant data.

Prepare a final Evaluation Report on the TCP and present to USAID. Timeline and content of the final reports

will be agreed upon by USAID and the Contractor as part of the *Phase One* Work Plan.

Present findings of the evaluation to USAID, MCC and other key stakeholders. Timeline and content of

presentations will be determined by USAID and the Contractors.

If relevant, identify opportunities to identify new outcomes or assess sustainability of observed outcomes in *Phase*

Three.

8. DELIVERABLES

8.1 Phase One Deliverables

The following deliverables shall be provided during Phase One. The outline, format (including length) and

content will be agreed with USAID as part of Phase One.

Phase One Work Plan

- Plan for completing the evaluation design, including strategies to obtain additional data and dates and scope

for in-country travel. This should be completed by the end of the third week of the contract.

- Preliminary proposal for evaluation design and data collection needs. This should be accompanied by a

preliminary assessment of proposed methodologies with details regarding time and cost implications. This

must be completed within the first two weeks of the contract.

Evaluation Design Report

- Detailed description and outline of proposed methods and main questions to be addressed.

- Detailed description of the data to be used in the evaluation including a data collection plan for new data

collection (sources, methods, timing for data collection, and a quality review process) and strategy for

collecting data where necessary.

8.2 Phase Two Deliverables

The following deliverables shall be provided during Phase Two. The outline, format (including length) and

content will be agreed upon by USAID and the Contractor as part of Phase One.

Phase Two Work Plan

Outline plans for data collection and identify methodologies for the evaluation. Include details regarding travel, time and cost implications.

Interim Progress Report

Provide interim progress report(s) on findings, outcomes and mid-course corrections.

Final Report Outline

1. Cover page with title of program evaluated, date of the evaluation and the recipient's name and those of the members of the evaluation team
2. Table of contents
3. List of Acronyms
4. Evaluation Summary (brief description/synopsis of purpose of the evaluation, its primary activities, findings and recommendations)
5. Main part of the Evaluation Report:
5. Introduction
6. Methodology (should include analytical tools and assessment method)
7. Background (program background information and actors)
8. Assessment of the implementation and program results
9. Lessons learned
10. Findings and Recommendations
11. Annexes

9. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

The effective date of this contract will be the date of the USAID Contracting Officer's signature. The tasks must begin as soon as practical thereafter. USAID anticipates 40 days is sufficient to complete the activities of this activity as illustrated below.

Document review, preparation for field work and Inception Report-10 calendar days

Field work- 14 calendar days

Data Compilation, report writing and preparations for submission to USG Mission-7 calendar Days

Oral Debriefing and Presentation to USG Mission, GOU, ACT

Staff and other stakeholders- 2 calendar Days

Final draft report to USG Mission for Review and Comments -2 calendar Days

Final report writing and submission to USG Mission- 5 calendar Days

Total 40 days

10. REPORTING AND RELATIONSHIPS:

The client for this Purchase Order is USAID/Uganda. USAID/Uganda is responsible for responding to any inquiries regarding this evaluation. The Program Coordinator for the USAID/Uganda office is Ms. Lyvia Kakonge, COTR. The USAID/Uganda mission may meet with the assessor at the beginning of the review to explain any financial/compliance areas of concern contained in the statement of work and to provide any advice concerning the performance of the review

11. INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE REPORT

The work plan, review program (including detailed review steps) and the draft report will be subject to approval and acceptance by USAID/Uganda. USAID/Uganda is responsible for assuring that the work performed complies with the agreed scope of work.

Annex II: List of Documents Reviewed

1. Anti Corruption Coalition Koboko (ACCK); (2008), *Monitors Training Report*, October 2008
2. ACT Activities update October 2009
3. Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court; (2009), *Minutes of the Meetings of the Anti-Corruption Division Users' Committee of the High Court February, July, October 2009*
4. Anti-Corruption Division of the High Court; A Paper Presented by His Worship John Eudes Keitirima- Deputy Registrar Anti-Corruption Division During the Skills Development in Managing Anti-Corruption District Units Organized by ACT
5. Directorate of Ethics and Integrity(DEI) ACT Activities Update (January 2009)
6. Development Assistance Grant Agreement No. 617 – AO8 Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program: *Development Assistance Plan Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Uganda* (March 29, 2007)
7. Director, The Criminal Investigations Directorate; (2009) *Report on the Contribution Made by the Anti-Corruption Threshold Country Program(TCP) Millennium Challenge Corporation(MCC) under The United States of American Government to The Criminal Investigations Directorate (Uganda) to fight corruption*
8. Directorate of Public Prosecutions Fort Portal; (2008 – 2009) Monthly Returns
9. Government of Uganda; (2008-2009), Anti- Corruption Threshold Program : *Annual Revised Rolling Work plan August 2008 – December 2009*
10. Inspectorate of Government; (2009), *Statement from the Inspectorate of Government on the Anti-Corruption Country Threshold (ACT) Program*, presented by Focal Point Person ACT-IG, Jules Rwereza
11. Makanga Chris; (2009) Anti-Corruption Country Threshold Program: *Strengthening Capacity to Fight Corruption in Uganda – Project Completion Review – Comments and Observations from the Office of the Auditor General*, Republic of Uganda 15th December 2009
12. Mayank Anti Corruption Coalition; (2009), *Report on the West Nile Regional Water Stakeholders' Interface Meeting* held at Arua Catholic Centre Cafeteria, Wednesday, 17th June, 2009
13. Mayank Anti-Corruption Coalition; (2008 -2009), *Transforming West Nile Sub – Region into a Model for Zero Tolerance to Corruption*: Annual Report 2008 (February, 2008- February, 2009)

14. MCC/USAID Uganda Threshold Country Program(TCP) End –Term Evaluation
15. MCC/USAID/DOJ, ICITAP; (2009), *Success Rate of Individual Activities Conducted under Component 2 of the ACT Program*, 2009
16. Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Program Uganda FY 2008 3rd Quarter (April –June 2008)
17. Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Program Uganda FY 2008 1st Quarter (October - December)
18. Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Program Uganda FY 2007 4th Quarter (July-August)
19. Millennium Challenge Account Uganda Threshold Country Program FY 2008 4th Quarter (July-September 2008)
20. Millennium Challenge Account Uganda Threshold Country Program FY 2009 1st Quarter (October – December 2008)
21. Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Country Program (TCP) Uganda Quarterly Narrative Report October 1 – December 31, 2008
22. Office of the Auditor General, Republic of Uganda; (2010), MCC/ACT Support to OAG (20th April, 2010)
23. Public Procurement and Disposal of public Assets Authority(PPDA); (2009), *Extension of Support to PPDA under ACT – USAID Supported Programs*, Letter from PPDA to USAID dated 15th September 2009
24. Reviewing the collaboration between the Interagency Forum and Civil Society Organizations October 9th – 12th 2007
25. Summary of ACT Program Activities
26. Summary of ACT program activities, 25 March – 4 April 2008
27. The Republic of Uganda; (2009 – 2013), *National Strategy to Fight Corruption and Rebuilding Ethics and Integrity in Uganda 2009-2013* (Directorate of Ethics and Integrity- Office of The President Uganda)
28. The Republic of Uganda; (2009), Inspectorate of Government (IGG): *Report to Parliament, January – June 2009*
29. Uganda Debt Network; (2009), *Newsletter,* September – October 2009
30. Uganda Debt Network; (2009), *Civil Society Petition over the Poor Road Works In Katakwi and Amuria Districts* presented to The Minister of State in Charge of Relief and Disaster Preparedness December 2, 2009
31. Uganda Debt Network; (2009), *Civil Society Statement on the Call for Improved Service Delivery of Universal Primary Education and Primary Health Care in Uganda*: presented to the Parliamentary Committee on Social Services, 8th December, 2009

32. Uganda Debt Network; (2009), *The Fight Against Corruption in Uganda: Is Government Starting to Bite?* Research paper presented at a public dialogue on the international Anti-corruption day, 9th December 2009

33. Uganda Debt Network; *Procurement Challenges*, Document Review

34. Uganda Governance Indicators

35. Uganda MCC TCP QNR as of *12/31/2008*

36. USAID MCC/USAID Uganda Threshold Country Program Status Report; Presentation to Oversight Committee Meeting, May 7th 2009

37. USAID Uganda; (2008), Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Country Program (TCP) Uganda Quarterly Narrative Report October 1 – December 31, 2008

38. USAID Uganda; (2007), Anti – Corruption Country Threshold Program, *Procurement of Material for the Agencies*, Letter to Focal Point Persons

39. USAID Uganda; (2007), *Strengthening Capacity to Fight Corruption in Uganda (Anti – Corruption Country Threshold Program)* First Quarterly Progress Report 15th August – 31st December 2007

40. USAID Uganda; (2008), Anti- Corruption Country Threshold (ACT) Program. Third quarterly progress report April 1st – June 30, 2008

41. USAID UGANDA; (2008), Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Country Program Uganda FY 2008 3rd Quarter (April – June 2008)

42. USAID Uganda; (2009) *Anti- Corruption Country Threshold (ACT) Program: Training Impact Evaluation Report May 2009*

43. USAID Uganda; (2009) Anti-Corruption Country Threshold Program, *Progress Report on ACT Program Component Two*, April 13, 2009

44. USAID Uganda; (2010), Anti-Corruption Country Threshold (ACT) Program Final Narrative Report

45. USAID Uganda; (2010), *Final Report for the Millennium Challenge Corporation Threshold Country Program*, March 5, 2010

46. USAID; (2009), *Anti-Corruption Country Threshold Program National Close – out Workshop* 15th December 2009

47. USAID; (2009), *Lessons Learned Fighting Corruption in MCC Threshold Countries: The USAID Experience*, November 13, 2009

48. USAID; (2009), *USAID Oversight of the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Threshold Country Program (TCP)* Annual Report for Financial Year 2009

Annex III: List of Persons interviewed

Name	Designation	Institution	Contact
1. Aidah Wetungu	Executive Director	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	0772-626714
2. Akullo Elizabeth	Grade 1 Magistrate	Mbale	
3. Alpha Ogwang	State Attorney		0712-574856
4. Anatoli Byaruhanga	Inspectorate Officer	Inspectorate of Government, Mbale	
5. Andima Robert	Ag. DPC	CID Arua	
6. Andrew Colburn		USAID	
7. Anguyo Richard	SPO	Procurement and Disposal Unit Arua	0775-993652
8. Anguzo Lino	Resident State Attorney		
9. Anjuzu Eric	PO	Procurement and Disposal Unit	0782-789522
10. Atayo Amati Victor	I/C Anti-corruption desk	CID, Arua	
11. Atingu .B. Stella	Grade 1 Magistrate	Mbale	0772-998448
12. Barry Wojega		USAID	
13. Birabwa Sauda		IGG Fort Portal	0772-576605
14. Bivanju Sarah	State Attorney		0782-058029
15. Bwango Jessy Smart	Secretary	PAC Kabarole	
16. Bwangu D.	Member	District Public Accounts Committee(DPAC)	
17. Bwayo Patrick	SPO/Head PDU	Mbale Local Government	0712-937512
18. Byangwa Angela	Regional Coordinator	Rwenzori Anti Corruption Network (RAC)	0772-558363
19. Byaruhanga David	D/C	CID Fort Portal	0782-675796
20. David Bakibinga	Resident State Attorney	Fort Portal	
21. David Eckerson	Mission Director	USAID	
22. Draku Sam	APO	Procurement and Disposal Unit,Arua	0773-907143
23. Eldad Ayebale	Head of office	Auditor General, Mbale	
24. Etum Levi	State Attorney		0772-003133
25. F. Akyaire	Assistant Director	Office of the Auditor	0772-976310

	Name	Designation	Institution	Contact
26.	Harriet Muwanga		USAID	
27.	Isaiah Kaya	Member	District Public Accounts Committee(DPAC)	
28.	John Mark Winfield	Ag. Mission Director	USAID	
29.	Justice Winy Dollo	Resident Judge	Fort Portal	
30.	Kafuuma Felix	Program Manager, Information and Communication	ACCU Kampala	
31.	Kagaba Cissy	National Coordinator	ACCU	0772-628129
32.	Kamugisha Joseph	I/C Anti-corruption	CID Fort Portal	0712-427050
33.	Kande Sabiiti		PPDA Headquarters	
34.	Keitirima John	Deputy Registrar	ACD High Court	
	Name	Designation	Institution	Contact
35.	Keto Kayemba	Assistant Auditor General	Office of the Auditor General	
36.	Kiggundu Musa	Ag. Manager IT	PPDA	
37.	Kimali Jackson Ambrose		IGG Fort Portal	0773240809
38.	Kisembo Silver	D/SGT	CID Fort Portal	0773-356392
39.	Kule Ibrahim	D/C	CID Fort Portal	0772-983780
40.	Kunya Noah	State Attorney	Fort Portal	
41.	Kyamulesire Hussein	Secretary	District Public Accounts Committee(DPAC)	
42.	Lyvia Kakonge	Governance, Reconciliation and Recovery Advisor	USAID	
43.	Makanga C	Senior Principal Auditor	Office of the Auditor	0772-527824
44.	Manyonga David	Research and Advocacy Advisor	ACCU Kampala	0782-959622
45.	Masokoyi Ali Waswaku	Field Officer	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	
46.	Mawanga Abdul	Vice Chairperson	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	
47.	Mbonimpa Emmanuel	District CID Officer	CID Arua Office	0714-667912
48.	Mpaata Colline	Ag. Executive Secretary	IPPU	
49.	Mr. Ntale Francis	Regional IG Officer	Fort Portal	
50.	Mudhasi Cissy	Chief Magistrate	Mbale	0772-468325
51.	Muhabwe Martin	External Audit Office	Fort Portal	
52.	Mukanza Robert	Grade 1 Magistrate	Mbale	0772-896336

No.	Name	Designation	Institution	Contact
53.	Mutahebwa Damian	Chairman	District Public Accounts Committee (DPAC)	
54.	Mutebe Tom Moses	Chairperson	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	0782-612881
55.	Muthabali Augustine	Advocacy Officer	Rwenzori Anti Corruption Network, Fort Portal	0782-220956
56.	Nabende Badiru	Vice Chairman	Mbale District Public Accounts Committee	0772-957250
57.	Namakhola Rajab	AO/ Member CC		0782-767567
58.	Namakoye Catherine	Resident State Attorney	Mbale DPP office	0782-430100
59.	Namono Faith	Private Advocate	Mbale LC	0753-946986
60.	Namunga Archesophery Davies	Accountant	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	
61.	Nanjobe Martha	Ag. Director of Programs/Senior Program Officer Governance and rights	UDN	0774-880585
62.	Nelson Katabula		UMEMS	
63.	Nyakahuma Lightson	External Auditor	Fort Portal	
64.	Nyeko Paul	Regional CID Officer	Arua CID Office	
65.	Ochom Edward	Director	CID,UPF	
	Name	**Designation**	**Institution**	**Contact**
66.	Okau George Wieland	Investigator	CID Mbale	0782-442909
67.	Okello Alex	Permanent Secretary	DEI	0414-342316
68.	Okurim Reuben	PC	CID Fort Portal	
69.	Olupot Cyprian		CID Mbale	0752-981447
70.	Onyeme Celestine	Investigator	CID Mbale	0772-830161
71.	Opit Samuel	Deputy District CID Officer	CID Mbale	0772-373284
72.	Otto Michael Gulamali	Chief Magistrate/Registrar High court Arua	High Court	0752-939161
73.	Paul Gadenya	Senior Technical Advisor	Justice, Law and Order Sector	
74.	Peter Magera		HURINET	0782-500041
75.	Richard Batamanye	Principal Inspectorate Officer	Inspectorate of Government, Mbale	0772-652970

76. Sabiiti Cornelia	Ag. Executive Director	PPDA	
77. Salube Francis	D/CPL	CID Fort Portal	
78. Sam Agaba	Inspectorate Officer	Inspectorate of Government, Mbale	
79. Semyano Faridah	Deputy Regional Inspectorate Officer	IGG Fort Portal	0712-699591
80. Shumbusha Patrick	D/C	CID Fort Portal	
81. Solomon Ossiya	Chief of Party(former)	ARD	0772-749311
82. Ssentamu Bitali	D/ASP, OC CID	CID Fort Portal	
83. Turamye Benson	MPAI	PPDA Headquarters	
84. Twikirize K Charles		Mbale Local Government	0712-978405
85. Wamburu David	Secretary	Mbale Public Accounts Committee	0782-966450
86. Wolayo Erasto	General Secretary	Eastern Uganda Anti Corruption Network, Mbale	
87. Yoga Henry	S/Prosecutor		0772-544966

Summary of institutions/ individuals consulted per component

Component	KII
Component 1: Prevent Corruption Related to Public Procurement	Auditor General PPDA IGG DEI PAC (Local Govt) IG
Component II: Increase the Rate of Successful Prosecutions	DPP UPF/CID Judiciary/ACD DEI
Component III: Strengthen the role of Civil society in the fight against corruption	DEI/IAF ACCU UDN RAC Eastern Region Anti-Corruption Network
Program Management Evaluation and Cross Component Linkages	ARD Inc Chief of Party
Other Actors at National Level	MoFPED Dev. Partners JLOS USAID Mission Team PAC

Annex IV: Detailed assessment of implementation and results per component

Component 1: Prevent Corruption Related to Public Procurement in Uganda

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
Skills development			
Increased frequency of central and local Government procurement audits	• To make capacity development plan for PPDA • Prepare and have approved paper on interventions • Develop SOW of audit team (approved by PPDA) • Contract audit team • Train 13 auditors • Propose, pilot and apply new simplified audit methodologies • Develop new reporting and follow up planning formats • Develop media events at various stages of audit activities	• Follow up framework was developed • 13 graduates were trained(according to PPDA) 20 audit interns (according to ACT final report) • Follow up framework was developed • Radio shows, messages to the public, road signs • PPDA was able to audit 17 entities using ACT support	• Follow up framework still in draft form pending PPDA approval • Created a pool of competent people to conduct audits, 8 of the trainees have got jobs with private procurement audit firms • Increased number of procurement audits per year from 27 to 50 and now PPDA has planned for 68 • Follow up reports are being produced based on audit recommendations • Government entities that were audited implemented 80% of the audit recommendations (follow up action)
Training and audit sensitisation of District PACS and executives	• Form training coordination committee • Develop manuals for trainers and participants • Organise TOT	• 3 training manuals were developed i.e. audit recipient training for higher local governments and for lower local governments and training for OAG and PPDA staff • Total number trained was 315	• Appreciation of audit reports by District PACs and executive committees of Councils • more audit reports being discussed and • Backlog is reducing • Changed and more proactive attitude by the audit recipients towards the auditors
Training and building capacity of OAG and PPDA staff	• Develop training manuals on the current laws, regulations and operation of local governments • Train OAG and PPDA Staff	• 33 OAG staff were trained on current changes and reforms in public sector finance management	• This provided and insight in the new changes in legal reforms in Public Sector financial management • Reduced back log especially with local government audits
Training and audit sensitisation of lower local governments' executives and staff	• TOT for private consultants and 10-20 OAG staff • Solicit support to roll out to additional districts	• TOTs course was conducted for private consultants • Total number of Local government officials and staff trained was 887	• Better understanding of audit reports
Technical knowledge			
Effective follow up of audit activities	• Develop SOW for working group global follow up • Identify follow up organisational issues	• OAG and PPDA staff trained • Received vehicles, reference	• Procurement audit manual and an auditor training are in place but awaiting PPDA

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	• Develop and get approval by PPDA of SOW for audit advisor • Review audit follow up • Contract audit advisor • Develop generic standardization follow up action and reporting system by IAF • Develop organisation of audit follow up	materials, laptops • SOW developed by the technical working group that was made by PPDA and ARD	approval • Backlogs or previous years have been cleared
Certification and accreditation of procurement professionals	• Develop business plan and budget to be used as basis for discussing sustainability issues • Award small grant • Recruit members • Establish institute and hold first workshop • Develop code of conduct and open it to member authentication	• IPPU established, members recruited, workshop held, 230 members beating target of 200(According to PPDA) and 228 falling short of 250 target (according to USAID ACT final report) • Members were published in the New Vision • IPPU received UGX 42 million to develop code of conduct(This was developed) • IPPU received start up assistance in form of equipment, reference materials for the resource centre • Development of website, training of maintenance staff were also funded	• IPPU code of conduct has helped to enhance the image of the institute • Reassure the public that procurement is done ethically
Establishment of a providers' register	• Carry out consultations and compile system for providers' register • Hold workshop on providers and develop work plan • Establish MOU and commitment of verification partners • Identify appropriate banking arrangements and modalities for fee collection • Prepare SOW for systems provider and consultant • Process prequalification and shortlist consultants • Undertake bid process and make contract proposal • PPDA to approve contract • Contract providers • Develop system and documentation	• A web based Registry of providers was developed and launched. • Sustainable plan was developed where by providers pay a fee to register • ACT provided support for planning and implementing communication activities for the launch.	• Provide ready information about existing providers for works, services and supplies and a record of current and past contracts performance

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	• Train consultant staff • Conduct campaign to encourage providers to register • Test and approve system • Launch system • Establish providers' register, put database on website		
Systems improvement			
Improved financial management systems	• Link PPDA to IFMS • Determine requirements of IFMS procurement module • Get commitment from FINMAP towards customization of procurement module	• Efforts towards this linkage were made •	
Improved audit systems			
Baseline survey of audit outcomes	• Collect audit outcome data at the regional branches • Enter data and organise it in a database • Establish capacity gaps	• ACT provided support in the collection of baseline survey data on audit outcomes • OAG identified training needs and proposed a scope of training with focus on local governments	
Legal reform and review			
	• Conduct workshop on new laws and regulations	• 2 day workshop was facilitated involving all 350 OAG staff to discuss staff regulations, working conditions, corporate values and swearing in of staff	• This workshop provided support to OAG implementing the National Audit Act 2008

Component 2: Increase the Rate of Successful Prosecutions

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
Skills Development			
Financial fraud skills development	• Specialised training courses for investigators from CID ECU, ACU and CID trainers • Develop anti- corruption investigative manuals • Train 60 participants in basic financial fraud investigations • Train 60 participants in a two-week intermediate fraud investigations course • Train 20 participants in One iteration of advanced financial fraud investigations course	• Training courses were conducted, 55 officers were trained in anti-corruption techniques	• Officers have gained knowledge and skills in finance, treasury, transfer of funds leading to improved quality of investigations • Items received have led to improved quality of investigations • Fast tracking of corruption cases and reduced case backlog • Skills and knowledge have already been significant in successful investigations of Global fund cases, NUSAF, PAC probe on government.
Train the trainers	• ICITAP to work with GOU partners to develop a cadre of Ugandan police and prosecutor instructors to train their replacements before being reassigned • Recording , training and placing training material on CDs and DVDs so that a library can be developed to allow others to get training on these topics		
Development of CID's training capacities	• Train 25 participants in a four- week instructor development course for CID instructors	• 15 were trained in Anti-corruption instructors development	• The directorate will now focus on building and strengthening specialized teams of professional investigators to be specifically within the domains of Anti-corruption and Economic Crimes • A small base of cadres to train others has been built
Crime Scene Processing	• Assist CID to develop a basic crime scene processing		

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
and evidence handling for investigations	and evidence handling course for investigators (through mentoring 25 CID staff in CSP procedures)		
Computer based evidence, computer forensics and preserving and presenting digital evidence	• 25 investigators who have proficiency with computers to receive specialized training in basic computer forensics, recovering, preserving and presenting computer based evidence • 2 candidates to be trained for 2 months in the US as computer forensic examiners	• 2 were sponsored for International Computer Investigative Specialists (ICIS) Conference in Germany	
Questioned Document analysis development	• 3 forensic experts to be trained in identifying and detecting forgeries, fraud, handwriting and signature identification	• 5 Officers attended a 3 weeks course on document examination/analysis(according to CID) 6 forensic experts trained according to (CT final report)	• Number of handwriting experts has increased, skills in investigating questioned documents have been acquired
Training of police witness in courtroom testimony and trial advocacy training for prosecutors	• 20 prosecutors from IGG, DPP and 5 CID investigators to participate in a trial advocacy training • Newly trained investigators to partner with US experts to train another group of prosecutors and investigators • 5 Ugandan prosecutors to be trained in the US • 4 trial advocacy workshops for both investigators and prosecutors who handle corruption cases • In total , 85 to be trained in the three events		• Joint training has improved collaboration with other agencies involved in fighting corruption
Basic computer training	• Basic computer training for approximately 100 to enable them prepare reports, analyze data and present electronic reports of investigations	• 53 Officers were trained in basic computer skills • 46 attended computer application course	• This is facilitating record keeping, information management, manipulation, retrieval and interpretation and presentation of evidence
Public financial	• To train 200 in public expenditure, accounting,	• 93 were trained in public	

	What did they intend to do?	**What did they do?**	**What changed?**
management training	procurement and auditing aspects	finance in central and local government	
Technical Knowledge			
Training in combating, identifying and prosecuting economic crimes and challenges in public corruption prosecutions	• 25 to be trained on basic principles, best practices and strategies in investigating and prosecuting economic and financial crimes • 35 senior investigators and prosecutors from PSU, ECU and ACU, DPP and IGG to be trained		
Training in combating public procurement/economic crimes, money laundering and asset forfeiture	• 25 to get skills on how public funds are laundered	• 14 officers were trained on public corruption, money laundering and asset forfeiture	
Systems Improvement			
Professional standards unit development	• Develop an operational and investigative manual for the PSU • On the job training for investigators for the unit	• PSU trained to develop skills necessary to conduct internal investigations • SLEA drafted a manual on policies and procedures for operation of the CID and an agency in-service training manual. • SLEA provided the Inspector General of Police (IGP) with a draft policy and procedures manual	
Task Force Development	• OPDAT and ICITAP to provide expertise		

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	and mentor CID, IGG and DPP in establishing the framework and MOU(s) to establish the taskforce • 30 prosecutors and investigators to visit operating task forces/public corruption units to study best practices and upon return implement these practices in their task force		
Managing of cases for investigators and development of best practices	• 30 senior CID Managers to get skills to identify standards policies and procedures and best practices • SLEA to work with UPF and CID managers to review and incorporate these best practices into UPF Standing Orders I&II • ICITAP and OPDAT to assist DPP, IGG and CID in developing a new case management / criminal intelligence management system	• 26 ACD staff trained in Case management	
Litigation support software and training	• 60 to be trained in software • to establish a database that will allow investigators and prosecutors to enter information about suspects, documents and electronic data into a database for storage, further analysis and court presentation • interline regional offices to Headquarters via internet	• 17 staff from CID, DPP, IGG trained in litigation software	• Prosecutorial agencies now have access to electronic case management systems (RAID) • Most offices have legal references e.g. case reports, revised laws of Uganda • This has led to reduced case back log and more cases being brought to closure
The Anti Corruption Division of the High Court and related	• Each of the judges to have computers, printers and copy machines and legal	• ACD was officially established and is now	• 8 cases have been heard with 1 acquittal

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
training	reference materials • Training in case management, Ugandan procurement regulations and practices, fraud, white collar crime, money laundering, electronic crime and computer crime forensics, money laundering and asset forfeiture, judicial ethics and exposure to international practices in adjudicating public corruption cases	operational • Judicial officers received training including tours to the USA • Training done jointly with other actors e.g. police, DPP	• The court holds court users' meetings quarterly • The ACD has become the primary forum for hearing corruption cases
Legislative review and reform			
Review of the Anti Corruption Act and Implementation Assistance	• RLA to continue to share the commentaries for revisions with appropriate GOU and other stakeholders • RLA to continue to monitor the bills' progress in parliament	• RLA made contributions to the Anti Corruption Act by reviewing the bill before it was passed to ensure compliance with UNCAC and AUCPCC	• Uganda now has a revised Anti-corruption Act 2009
Whistle blower/witness protection		• RLA reviewed the whistle blower protection bill	• Public trust and confidence in the CID is gradually beginning to show because of successful investigations, encourages members of the public to report more cases (whistle blow) • Parliament is in the process of passing legislation for the protection of whistleblowers
Administrative case handling procedure	• To introduce and institutionalise plea bargaining • To add this to any other relevant training under the Program	• Plea bargaining was introduced	• It has received positive response as it reduces case backlogs and irrelevant cases
Review and revision of the	• DOJ OPDAT to work with the relevant	• RLA Reviewed the evidence	

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
Evidence Code	GOU institutions to review and propose update provisions to the Evidence Code	code	
Tools and equipment			
PPDA	• 2 vehicles • 6 desktops • 4 laptops • Special software • Connectivity • 1 Printer colour • 4 filing cabinets • 4 tape recorders • 2 digital cameras • 10 other equipment	• 4 laptops • 2 digital cameras • 6 dell desktops • UPS • Photocopier • 3 old laptops (received at the end of Program) • LCD projector • 2 vehicles	• Increased their asset portfolio • Direct linkage between assets and results e.g. vehicles facilitated transport to do audits
OAG	• 4 vehicles • 10 desktops • 5 laptops • Connectivity • 10 printers black and white • 10 photocopiers • 2 tape recorders • 10 digital cameras • 10 other equipment	• 51 laptops • 10 canon digital cameras • 10 UPS APC 650a • 10 TFT Monitors • 10 System units Dell Optilex • 10 pieces 1GB flash Discs • 10 Wireless Network cards • 200 pieces Imation Flash Discs • 2 station wagon vehicles (with government counterpart funding)	
IGG	• 8 vehicles • 10 motorcycles • 26 desktops	• 8 computers • 8 video cameras • printers	

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	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	21 laptops 1 special software - Connectivity 4 printers black and white 1 printer colour 5 photocopiers 5 fax machines 20 filing cabinets 20 tape recorders 15 digital cameras 8 video cameras 5 law reports - Other reference material 10 other equipment		
CID	4 vehicles 60 motorcycles 20 desktops - Connectivity 12 printers black and white 3 printers colour 15 photocopiers 5 filing cabinets 20 tape recorders 20 digital cameras 10 video cameras 5 law reports 10 other equipment	20 filing cabinets 5 fax machines 24 laptops 20 digital cameras 40 system units for computers 40 monitors 40 key boards 20 voice recorder pieces 4 video cameras	- Improved storage of information on computers - Access to internet for easy communication and sourcing vital information - Improved timely preparation of case files and charge sheets

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
DPP	2 vehicles 11 desktops 10 laptops - Connectivity 14 printers black and white 14 photocopiers 12 fax machines 21 filing cabinets 10 tape recorders 1 digital camera 2 video cameras 5 law reports 3 other reference material 10 other equipment		

Component 3: Strengthen the Role of Civil Society in the Fight against Corruption

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
Mobilising Civil Society			
Improve capacity of CSOs to participate in IAF	- Representation/ active participation of CSOs in IAF quarterly meetings - Representation/participation of CSOs and PSAs in the regular IAF management Committee	- Active participation in IAF for a while. - DEI established District Integrity Forums which replicate IAF at district level	- CSOs stopped receiving invitations to the meetings - Some members were absconding - Issues raised but not acted upon
Regional training courses	- Undertake TOTs for PETS - Undertake Strategic Communications training	Trained 500 people in PETS, Strategic Communications,, strategic advocacy, e.g. in West	Linked civil society and the budget monitoring and Accountability unit

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	• Undertake Strategic Advocacy campaign management • Undertake training on integrity pacts and codes of conduct	Nile • Trained 111 religious leaders • Developed training manuals on PETS, Integrity Pacts, Strategic Advocacy Campaign management and strategic communication	• Sharpened their approaches to engaging in constructive policy dialogue with local governments
Engage the Private Sector			
Develop Codes of Conduct	• Develop professional codes of conduct •	• Developed professional codes of conduct – PSFU, IPPU, UMA	• Engagement of private sector was achieved and their commitment to promote ethical business practices – codes of conduct
Introduce integrity pacts	• Establish islands of integrity • Form integrity pacts and institutionalise operational private – public partnerships	• Integrity pacts were started (reported by RAC in Fort Portal) • District Integrity forum in Kyenjojo between RAC, CAO, Police, IGG	• The Ministry of Water and Environment plans to pilot integrity pacts in the water sector in the next financial year •
Assessment of ethical business practitioners	• To be done by Federation of Uganda Employers	• Developed ethical business manual • Award ceremony for the most ethical business association of the year – Uganda Insurers Association	
Raising public awareness			
Publication of anti-corruption inquiries	• Publicise anti-corruption inquiries • Training in strategic	• Skits were acted in Kabarole in front of big audiences e.g.	• Increased exposure of public corruption

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
	communications/public awareness campaigns • Design, conduct and evaluate public awareness campaigns • Advocacy campaign	market days, they had suggestion boxes, PAFs(Public Accountability Forums) • Radio Programs, press conference with government officials, and press releases • Public Accountability Forums	• Linked Civil Society with Police CID Anti- corruption unit in Apac, Oyam, Lira, Hoima • Increased rate at which media is reporting and investigating corruption scandals • Increased citizen awareness of their rights and responsibilities to combat corruption.
Conduct baseline survey on public perceptions	• Set baseline	• Baseline survey was conducted	
Second National Public Procurement Integrity Survey	• Undertake 2nd inquiry		
Public activism and recourse			
Public Awards for Anti-corruption champions	• Make awards	• National Integrity Awards Ceremony officiated by the Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity	•
National Book of Shame	• Draft, publish and disseminate Book of Shame	• Book of fame and shame was produced by ACCU and launched by the Minister of Ethics and Integrity	• Increased debate among the public through radio talk shows and other media
Independent inquiries of emerging scandals	• Award grants • Undertake inquiries	• 15 grants were issued to CSOs and PSAs • Koboko, Teso, Apac and Rwenzori Anti Corruption coalitions received support to	• Led to investigations and arrests of high profile local government employees and politicians in the Districts of Apac, Oyam, Lira and Hoima. Altogether, 18 district officials were arrested,

	What did they intend to do?	What did they do?	What changed?
		conduct PETS • Training of trainers course in PETS • One CSO conducted inquiries on two national scandals • One CSO conducted inquiry into corruption in the district chief magistrate's office	produced in court and remanded, pending trial in the ACC • In West Nile region, anti-corruption clinics have been introduced, complaints are received by CSOs and referred to accounting institutions for recourse