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THE RESPONSIBLE ASIA FORESTRY AND TRADE (RAFT) ALLIANCE

FINAL EVALUATION



JULY 2011

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**NATURAL
CAPITAL
ADVISORS** LLC 

RESPONSIBLE ASIA FORESTRY AND TRADE (RAFT)

FINAL PROGRAM EVALUATION

Disclaimer: the authors' views do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Because the RAFT program will continue through September 2011, the data reported herein are subject to change, and therefore, should be treated as tentative. RAFT's final report will contain the actual figures for the life of the program.

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Cover Photo © Bridget Besaw (Measuring forest carbon, Berau District, East Kalimantan, Indonesia).

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Executive Summary

The biodiversity of Southeast (SE) Asia is threatened by deforestation and forest degradation, driven in part by unsustainable timber harvesting. These—often illegal—practices breed corruption and undermine governance. To address this problem, USAID’s Regional Development Mission for Asia funded the *Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade (RAFT) Alliance*.

Building upon the work of the USAID-funded *Alliance to Promote Certification and Combat Illegal Logging in Indonesia*, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) led RAFT in a five-year (2006–2011), \$14 million cooperative agreement (including \$11.2 million from USAID and a \$2.8 million contribution from TNC). **RAFT’s goals** were to:

- **Increase trade of timber products from legal sources**
- **Improve forest management practices on the ground**
- **Strengthen regional cooperation on forest management and related trade**
- **Enhance regional capacity to incorporate sustainable forest management (SFM) into efforts to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD+).**

RAFT operated in Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Thailand, and Vietnam to try to connect the different pieces of a global solution through:

- **Working as a Partnership** to strategically bring together existing networks and organizations to work towards a common set of goals, thus reinforcing expertise
- **Working Across the Supply Chain** to align the incentives to encourage SFM
- **Creating a Policy-Practice Feedback Loop** where practitioners inform policymakers about practical experiences and help turn regulatory drivers into SFM practices.

Thus, **RAFT was designed to influence the development and implementation of the public policies and corporate practices needed to improve forest management**, including using SFM techniques to reduce the amount of carbon emitted as compared to

conventional timber harvesting. In order to achieve the program’s objectives, RAFT worked with different actors along the supply chain to:

- Build the capacity of forestry concessionaires to become certified and use best practices such as *reduced impact logging (RIL)* and managing *high conservation value forests (HCVF)*
- Build private-sector capacity to track forest products through the supply chain
- Encourage responsible procurement policies that use these chain-of-custody tracking systems, as well as strengthen market linkages between certified suppliers and buyers
- Provide input to governments in their development of better regulatory signals
- Improve outreach and understanding of new legislation related to the legal trade in timber.

THE FINAL EVALUATION

Led by an independent consultant, Arthur G Blundell of Natural Capital Advisors, LLC, a team of evaluators from USAID and the US Forest Service (USFS) interviewed more than 60 RAFT stakeholders in Bangkok, Beijing, Shanghai, and Jakarta between June 13 and July 8, 2011. NGO and USG interagency meetings were also held in Washington DC to inform the evaluation. This information was supplemented with an online questionnaire offered in Mandarin Chinese, Bahasa Indonesia, Vietnamese and English (n=75 respondents).

The final evaluation had three major objectives (as per its *Scope of Work*):

- 1 “To **assess the program’s performance** and effectiveness against its goals...”
- 2 “To **recommend any strategies** that can potentially enhance program sustainability...”

- 3 “To identify strategic priorities and effective approaches that build upon activities ... and which USAID may support under follow-on ... efforts, including ... technical areas, programming approaches, geographic focus areas, and partnerships.”

EVALUATION RESULTS

Was the hypothesis of change valid?

RAFT’s *Theory of Change* was that the adoption of SFM would be stimulated by a) regulatory signals that compel better compliance; b) supportive markets demanding SFM; c) sufficiently strong institutions, including capacity in the forestry sector itself; and, d) an economically rational case for SFM. Once a critical mass of concessionaires became certified, regulators and operators would see the value of SFM and a cascade would begin with more and more operators adopting *best practices*.

These are valid, though not mutually exclusive, hypotheses to test. Likewise, RAFT’s main focus on Indonesia and China was sensible given that they represent the major timber producer and processor, respectively, in the region. There was room to broaden work in PNG had there been the political will within government to pursue SFM, and while forest-rich Burma could also have been considered important, programming USAID development assistance there is restricted.

RAFT’s sectoral focus on forestry was necessary in order to address threats to biodiversity and climate change. However, SE Asia’s plantation sector (such as for oil palm) has grown into one of the biggest drivers of deforestation and—through the burning of forests during land clearing—emitters of greenhouse gasses. Moreover, much of this land-clearing appears illegal. Until this sector is also targeted for reform, **a focus on forestry will be necessary, but alone it will be insufficient in tackling the threats to biodiversity and climate change.** However, a multi-pronged strategy, such as the model used by RAFT—working across the supply chain and with the whole suite of stakeholders—appears to be the most useful approach to tackling sectors like forestry, and other commodity chains, such as plantation-grown palm oil.

A comprehensive approach is necessary because weak governance, in particular lax enforcement, is a key obstacle to biodiversity protection and emissions abate-

ment. In 2008, many organizations, including some RAFT partners, successfully encouraged the US government (USG) to amend the *Lacey Act* to make it illegal to import illegal timber. In 2010, the EU passed a similar regulation requiring *due diligence* from its importers. Together **this legality legislation has had a dramatic effect on the sector. While consumer demand for certified products has generally been weak, importers can no longer rely on plausible deniability about the illegality of their products.** Thus, of the first two hypotheses of change—markets *vs.* regulations—the **regulatory signal sent by legislation has been far stronger than the market signals sent by a few discriminating consumers.** Unfortunately, RAFT has not yet fully described the economic case for SFM, and thus, it is difficult to evaluate RAFT’s final hypotheses regarding the decision-making of concessionaires. It may be that operators lack information and/or capacity, but **as yet there is insufficient evidence of a critical mass of certified operators;** indeed, although RAFT helped double the number of operators certified by the Forest Stewardship Council in Indonesia, the overall area certified has declined due to the suspension of other concessions.

CONFIRMATION OF RESULTS

RAFT reports that its **partners engaged companies to assist in the verification/certification that management had improved across more than 3.3 million ha** (achieving RAFT’s target), and that the RIL techniques **prevented the emissions** of an equivalent of more than an estimated **13 m tonnes of carbon dioxide** (on target). RAFT met or exceeded most its other targets:

- **Enabling conditions improved through USG assistance**
 - 104 pieces of policy/legislation implemented promoting SFM (24% above target)
 - 990 civil society stakeholders engaged in SFM & enforcement (26% below)
 - \$45.15 million in non-USAID funds mobilized and applied (on target)
- **Human and institutional capacity strengthened**
 - 2,962 people trained in SFM/biodiversity conservation (on target)
- **Regional platforms strengthened**
 - 14 regional environmental platforms created/strengthened (56% above)

- 34 new members in regional platforms (55% above).

As RAFT does not end until September 2011, these results are not yet final. While Section 4 of this report describes additional results, RAFT's *Final Report* will elaborate on its successes.

RESPONSIVENESS TO STAKEHOLDER NEEDS

As an excellent example of *adaptive management*, RAFT successfully responded to its *Mid-Term Evaluation*, incorporating many design improvements to the program, most notably:

- **Better coordination within the partnership**, in part to clarify the RAFT *brand*
- **Stronger communications strategy**, including internal—to better coordinate partners
- **Stronger liaison with USG agencies, such as the Department of State and the USFS**, e.g., to monitor performance of concessionaires in implementing SFM.

Stakeholders surveyed agreed that RAFT responded well to their needs. Most effectively, RAFT was able to respond to evolving legislation to inform USG policymakers during the development of, and then assist in implementation of, outreach for the *Lacey Act*. Moreover, RAFT collaborated with the *European Forest Institute* (EFI) to dovetail these activities into outreach for the EU's complementary *Due Diligence Regulation*.

MEETING AGENCY LEGISLATIVE AND FUNDING REQUIREMENTS

The vast majority (83%) of RAFT funding was from a Congressional earmark for biodiversity conservation. While conventional timber harvesting is often associated with a decline in biodiversity, the influence of RIL/SFM techniques needs more study. RAFT's earmarks for China and *Lacey* outreach were effectively met through close collaboration with the Chinese government and industry, and outreach through the *Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation* (APFNet) and the annual *Forests, Markets, Policy & Practices* conferences that had wide industry attendance. RAFT's approach to its climate change earmark was two-part:

- Develop methodology to estimate the reduction in emissions from RIL/SFM, then quantify the

reductions achieved by the concessionaires working with RAFT

- Develop a *Learning Network*, with associated workshops, to inform and empower stakeholders to participate in national and international negotiations surrounding REDD+.

PROGRAM SUSTAINABILITY AND TRANSITION

No single organization in Asia has RAFT's breadth—either in scope of partnerships or in work across supply chains—and is thus able to operate a network similar to RAFT where the sum is greater than the parts (e.g., RAFT's facilitating role that helped reduce redundancy among partners). Once RAFT ends, different organizations appear likely to adopt specific activities:

- *EFI* will continue outreach related to legality requirements, especially in the context of the *Voluntary Partnership Agreements* (VPA) in Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam.
- *RECOFTC* will continue its conflict mediation training and related *Learning Network*.
- *WWF* will continue its 20-year collaboration with the *Global Forest Trade Network* (GFTN) and *The Borneo Initiative* will financially assist concessions that want to become certified.
- *TNC's Berau Forest Carbon Program* will work with concessions and local government in East Kalimantan, Indonesia.

Even outside these initiatives, RAFT has helped alter the trajectory toward more responsible SFM by assisting in the development of **innovative approaches and technologies**, such as:

- **Learning Networks** that help transmit knowledge and lessons learned, like on REDD+
- **SFM techniques** like the *High Conservation Value Forests* (HCVF) *Toolkit* in Indonesia
- **Log tracking**—in 2015, ASEAN will require chain of custody/customs controls for timber. Systems such as Indonesia's *log tracking* may become widely adopted in the region
- **Carbon-monitoring** to quantify the reduced emissions from RIL/SFM techniques
- **Working with academia** to shape curriculum design to mainstream *best practices*, thus expanding RAFT's scope and helping scale up the adoption of SFM.

Further, the written and video materials developed by RAFT’s partners will become its “*institutional memory*” that practitioners can refer to, even once the program closes.

LESSONS LEARNED

Programmatic lessons applicable to the responsible management of commodity chains:

- **Importance of a conducive regulatory environment;** for timber in SE Asia regulatory signals were stronger than market signals
- **Importance of enforcement** to send the deterrent signal necessary to compel compliance with regulations and to provide a level playing field for responsible actors
- **Importance of speaking industry’s language** to understand their needs in order to better make the case for adopting best practices
- **Land clearing**, in part for plantations, is the biggest driver of deforestation in SE Asia.

Managerial lessons applicable to complex regional programs:

- **Importance of flexibility** in RAFT’s ability to respond to rapidly evolving regulations and markets and to extra-sectoral threats (like plantation agriculture)
- **Importance of regular monitoring and evaluation** to facilitate:
 - *Adaptive management* to ensure that activities are efficiently achieving project aims
 - Management of partners’ activities so they do not drift from the project’s aims
- **Importance of communication, cooperation, coordination & collaboration** to keep partners (and importantly, their activities) aligned with each other and with project aims
- **Compared to other initiatives, RAFT was relatively cost effective.** As examples:
 - *The Borneo Initiative* will pay \$2/ha for certification costs; RAFT spent less than an estimated \$1.18/ha on verifying legality and/or certifying SFM; (*caveat*: this does not include concessionaires’ own spending; nor does it include opportunity costs)
 - European markets are ~\$13/t CO₂e and US forestry offsets are trading up to \$1.5/t; RAFT spent

~\$0.38/t for the reduced emissions from SFM (but see *caveat* above)

- **Importance of USAID brand;** RAFT benefited from direct USG involvement:
 - *Greater credibility* with governments and industry, and goodwill for the USG itself
 - More direct linkage to USG policymakers and *vice versa*;
 - Greater donor cooperation, *e.g.*, with the EU over *Due Diligence Regulation* outreach
- **USAID funding allowed increased gender equity,** *e.g.*, RECOFTC was able to train more women in conflict mediation than would otherwise have been possible.

STRATEGIC PRIORITIES AND EFFECTIVE APPROACHES FOR FOLLOW-ON PROGRAM EFFORTS

- **Tackle other important drivers of deforestation,** especially plantation agriculture
- **Increase focus on strengthening enforcement,** to that end, follow-on work could:
 - Harmonize Customs actions, *e.g.*, with ASEAN on *chain of custody*
 - Develop *Mutual Legal Assistance* protocols, which will help *Lacey* prosecutions
 - Develop enforcement for REDD+ safeguards
 - Where appropriate, collaborate with the *ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network*
- **But maintain RAFT’s focus on partnerships, emphasizing flexibility and communication, cooperation, coordination & collaboration:**
 - Maintain a *strong USG role*—industry values improving relations with regulators
 - Stress the *policy-practice feedback loop* and internal communications
 - Invest in *strong monitoring & evaluation*, including baseline data
- **Maintain a regional approach** in order to tackle trans-boundary issues such as:
 - *Trade*—linking international buyers to responsible, certified producers
 - *Leakage*—where (illegal) actors move between jurisdictions to avoid enforcement

- *Political sensitivity* is sometimes easier in a regional setting where accusations of wrong-doing are less likely to be made against individual countries
- Encourage *peer-review* (which leads to healthy competition) among countries
- **Work across the supply chain, making the business case to adopt SFM:**
 - **Survey business** to better understand incentives and their decision-making
 - In their *Final Report*, RAFT should articulate the business case for certification
- **Develop cost-effective strategies** that promote SFM, through for example:
 - REDD+ carbon payments (especially when stacked with biodiversity offset payments) that compensate for reduced emissions under RIL/SFM operations
 - Regulatory relief for independently certified SFM operations, including:
 - Reduced government auditing
 - Reduced reforestation taxes commensurate with reduced impact
 - Preferential concession renewal (and access to new leases)
- **Reduce the cost of HC VF compliance** by developing regional conservation planning tools and processes; exploiting spatial data collected by other initiatives, *e.g.*, REDD+
- **Develop clear criteria for engaging (and importantly, disengaging) partners:**
 - There must be strong codes of conduct for all partners, including industry
- **Focus on conflict mediation**, for which market surveys indicate strong demand:
 - As the plantation sector expands, conflicts with displaced communities—already significant and often violent—are likely to grow. Moreover, REDD+ may create conflicts over forest use and benefits. Therefore, implementing REDD+ safeguards will require strong mediation skills, for which RECOFTC is well placed to deliver training
- **Continue to engage China**, which will continue to import timber for its processing industry and its growing domestic market. Given that the USA is a significant exporter of forest products to China (>\$3.5 billion in 2009), US industry and regulators

have a central interest in how China develops legality legislation for its worldwide imports.

CONCLUSION

New legislation in Asia's major markets now requires legality throughout the supply chain for forest products. This has had a profound effect on industry, as processors scramble for legal sources even as overall timber supply in SE Asia declines. Herein lies an opportunity for responsible actors to be rewarded with enhanced market access. The key is to keep the incentives aligned that favor SFM in order to mainstream responsible trade.

If possible, it would be optimal to continue funding the RAFT program to ensure the sector is able to consolidate the reforms made so far, lest industry question the deterrence of the new legislation, thus risking a loss of momentum. Failing this, the concession work conducted under RAFT could be left to existing programs (*e.g.*, *GFTN*) and a new USAID-funded regional program could focus on supportive processes, such as conflict mediation and strengthening the technical skills and management capacity of regulators.

Further, future program efforts could develop the financing opportunities—like compensating SFM through REDD+—that would promote the widespread adoption of best practices and responsible trade. Outreach will remain necessary to explain the purpose of legality legislation, as will enforcement, so as to level the playing field for corporate actors who comply with the law (both foreign and domestic). Future work could draw lessons from and engage the same networks used in the enforcement of wildlife trade: *e.g.*, customs, prosecutors, including those working on financial crimes, and the judiciary. Efforts to strengthen *mutual legal assistance* will aid US prosecutors litigating *Lacey Act* violations.

Finally, there is further opportunity, as well as need, to apply a regional strategy like RAFT's successful approach—working across the regional supply chain—to engage other commodities, like palm oil, which are now major drivers of deforestation and sources of greenhouse gas emissions, and thus a major threat to biodiversity.

Ringkasan Eksekutif (Indonesian Summary)

Kelangsungan keanekaragaman hayati di Asia Tenggara tengah terancam oleh deforestasi dan penurunan kualitas hutan. Ancaman ini sebagian didorong oleh pembalakan yang tak memerhatikan prinsip keberlanjutan hutan. Aktivitas yang umumnya ilegal ini memicu korupsi dan melemahkan tata kelola pemerintahan yang kredibel. Guna menyikapi masalah ini, Misi Pengembangan Kawasan USAID untuk Asia menyelenggarakan *Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade (RAFT)*.

Program ini merupakan bagian dari dana USAID untuk Aliansi Pembangunan Global untuk Mempromosikan Sertifikasi dan Pemberantasan Pembalakan Liar di Indonesia (*Alliance to Promote Certification and Combat Illegal Logging in Indonesia*) bekerja sama dengan *The Nature Conservancy* (TNC) menggelar RAFT dalam periode 5 tahun (2006-2011). Dana kerja sama sebesar USD 14 juta ditanggung masing-masing: USD 11,2 juta oleh USAID dan USD 2,8 juta merupakan kontribusi TNC. **Tujuan-tujuan** RAFT adalah:

- Meningkatkan perdagangan produk kayu secara legal
- Meningkatkan praktik-praktik tata kelola hutan
- Memperkuat kerjasama regional di bidang pengelolaan dan perdagangan produk hutan
- Meningkatkan kapasitas regional untuk menerapkan pengelolaan hutan lestari (PHL) / *sustainable forest management* (SFM) sebagai upaya mewujudkan komitmen pengurangan emisi dari deforestasi dan degradasi hutan dan penambahan hutan karbon di negara berkembang (*reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and enhancing carbon stocks in developing countries/REDD+*).

RAFT telah dijalankan di Kamboja, Cina, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Papua Nugini, Thailand, dan Vietnam dalam rangka menghubungkan upaya dari berbagai tempat sebagai bagian dari suatu solusi global melalui:

- **Bekerja dalam kemitraan:** secara strategis mendorong berbagai jaringan dan organisasi yang ada untuk bekerja sama mencapai tujuan bersama, dengan fokus pada kapasitas dan keahlian
- **Bekerja melintasi rantai pasokan:** menyelaraskan insentif guna mendorong PHL

- **Menyediakan ruang umpan balik kebijakan-praktik:** wadah para praktisi memberikan informasi kepada para pembuat kebijakan terkait pengalaman-pengalaman praktis sebagai bahan masukan dalam penyusunan peraturan perundang-undangan yang mendorong PHL.

Oleh karena itu, RAFT dirancang agar mampu memberikan pengaruh terhadap pembangunan dan pelaksanaan kebijakan-kebijakan publik serta praktik perusahaan yang dianggap masih perlu meningkatkan tata kelola kehutanan. Peningkatan tata kelola bagi perusahaan itu termasuk pemanfaatan teknik PHL dalam mengurangi jumlah karbon yang teremisi dibandingkan dengan praktik pembalakan tradisional. Agar tujuan-tujuan program dapat tercapai, RAFT telah bekerja sama dengan berbagai aktor yang terkait dalam rantai suplai untuk:

- Membangun kapasitas pemegang hak pengelolaan hutan (HPH) agar bersertifikat dan memanfaatkan praktik-praktik unggul (*best practices*) seperti pembalakan berdampak minimal (*reduced impact logging/RIL*) dan mengelola hutan bernilai konservasi tinggi (*high conservation value forests/HCVF*)
- Membangun kemampuan sektor swasta untuk melacak produk-produk hutan melalui rantai pasokan
- Memperkuat hubungan dalam pasar antara pemasok bersertifikat dan pembeli, termasuk mendorong pelaksanaan kebijakan pengadaan barang yang bertanggung jawab sesuai sistem lacak-balak (*chain-of-custody tracking*)
- Menyediakan masukan untuk pemerintah dalam mengembangkan peraturan perundang-undangan yang lebih baik

- Meningkatkan upaya penjangkauan dan pemahaman terhadap peraturan perundang-undangan baru terkait perdagangan kayu legal.

EVALUASI AKHIR

Dengan dipimpin oleh konsultan independen, Arthur G Blundell dari *Natural Capital Advisors*, LLC, sebuah tim penilai dari USAID dan Biro Kehutanan AS telah melakukan wawancara dengan lebih dari 60 pemangku kepentingan RAFT di Bangkok, Beijing, Shanghai dan Jakarta antara 13 Juni hingga 18 Juli 2011. Sejumlah pertemuan antara LSM dan antar-instansi Pemerintah AS juga telah digelar di Washington DC sebagai forum diseminasi hasil evaluasi. Informasi ini didukung dengan data dari kuesioner *on line* (n=75 responden) dalam bahasa Mandarin, Indonesia, Vietnam, Inggris.

Evaluasi akhir memiliki 3 tujuan utama (atau disebut juga lingkup pekerjaan):

- 1 “Menilai kesesuaian kinerja dan efektifitas program dengan tujuannya...”
- 2 “Memberi rekomendasi berbagai strategi yang berpotensi meningkatkan keberlanjutan program...”
- 3 “Mengidentifikasi prioritas strategis dan pendekatan efektif yang diterapkan dalam kegiatan ... seperti apa peran USAID dan upaya tersebut, termasuk bidang alternatif/baru yang memungkinkan, pendekatan pemrograman, wilayah fokus geografis dan kemitraan.”

HASIL-HASIL EVALUASI

Apakah hipotesis mengenai perubahan berlaku valid?

Teori Perubahan RAFT yang diadopsi dari PHL dapat dirangsang melalui a) peraturan yang memaksa kepatuhan lebih baik; b) pasar yang mendukung tuntutan PHL; c) lembaga yang cukup kuat, termasuk memiliki kapasitas dalam sektor kehutanan itu sendiri; dan, d) kasus yang secara ekonomi rasional untuk PHL. Sekali kelompok yang cukup besar para pemegang HPH bersertifikat, begitu para regulator dan operator menyadari atau memahami nilai PHL, maka akan berimbas pada semakin banyak lagi operator mengadopsi praktik-praktik unggul (*best practices*).

Meski tidak eksklusif satu sama lain, hipotesis ini valid diuji coba. Demikian juga fokus utama RAFT di Indonesia dan Cina cukup masuk akal mengingat mereka mewakili produsen dan pengolah kayu utama di wilayah Asia. Terdapat ruang untuk memperluas kerja sama di Papua Nugini seandainya ada kemauan politik dalam pemerintahan untuk mencapai PHL. Sementara itu, negara kaya hutan semacam Burma dapat juga dianggap penting, hanya pengembangan program bantuan USAID di negara itu masih dibatasi.

Fokus sektoral RAFT pada kehutanan diperlukan dalam rangka mengatasi ancaman terhadap keanekaragaman hayati dan perubahan iklim. Bagaimanapun kayu-kayu Asia Tenggara dan sektor perkebunannya (seperti kelapa sawit) telah tumbuh menjadi salah satu pendorong deforestasi dan—melalui pembakaran hutan saat membuka lahan—memperlebar emisi gas rumah kaca. Hingga sektor ini dijadikan sasaran reformasi, maka **fokus pada kehutanan tetap akan diperlukan, namun itu saja tidak cukup dalam menanggulangi ancaman terhadap keanekaragaman hayati dan perubahan iklim. Untuk itu, strategi multicabang, seperti model yang digunakan RAFT—bekerja di seluruh rantai pasokan dan bersama seluruh pemangku kepentingan utama—tampaknya menjadi pendekatan paling bermanfaat untuk menangani sektor-sektor seperti kehutanan dan rantai komoditas lainnya, semisal perkebunan besar kelapa sawit.**

Pendekatan komprehensif diperlukan, khususnya dalam penegakkan hukum, mengingat pemerintahan yang lemah adalah kendala utama dalam melindungi keanekaragaman hayati dan mengurangi emisi. Pada tahun 2008, sejumlah organisasi, termasuk diantaranya beberapa mitra RAFT, berhasil mendorong pemerintah AS untuk mengamendemen UU Lacey¹ yang kini membuat ilegal impor kayu ilegal. Pada 2010, Uni Eropa meloloskan peraturan serupa yang mewajibkan uji tuntas (*due diligence*) dari para importirnya. Secara bersama-sama **peraturan perundang-undangan memiliki dampak dramatis pada sektor ini. Walaupun permintaan konsumen untuk produk-produk masih bersertifikat umumnya lemah, importir tak lagi bisa mengandalkan penyangkalan logis (*plausible deniability*) tentang tidak absahnya produk-produk mereka.** Alhasil, hal pertama dari dua hipotesis perubahan—pasar vs peraturan perundang-undangan—**isyarat yang dikirimkan peraturan perundang-undangan jauh lebih kuat**

1 Dinamai sesuai nama anggota Kongres AS yang mendukungnya pertama kali, John Lacey dari Iowa, 100 tahun lalu.

dari isyarat pasar yang dikirim oleh beberapa konsumen yang terdiskriminasi. Sayangnya, RAFT belum dapat digambarkan sepenuhnya sebagai kasus ekonomi untuk PHL, dan dengan demikian, menjadi sulit untuk mengevaluasi hipotesis akhir RAFT mengenai cara pengambilan keputusan para pemegang HPH. Mungkin saja karena keterbatasan informasi dan atau kapasitas operator, tetapi tidak terdapat cukup bukti dari kelompok yang cukup besar para operator tersertifikasi; tentunya, sekalipun RAFT membantu menggandakan jumlah operator menerima sertifikat dari Dewan Pekerja Kehutanan (Forest Stewardship Council, FSC) di Indonesia, secara keseluruhan daerah yang telah disertifikasi menurun akibat konsesi-konsesi lain yang menghilangkan sertifikasi mereka.

KONFIRMASI HASIL-HASIL

RAFT melaporkan: kerja sama dengan perusahaan-perusahaan kayu berhasil meningkatkan pengelolaan lebih dari 3 juta hektar hutan tropis di Asia Tenggara (mencapai target) dan teknik-teknik RIL telah mencegah emisi setara dengan lebih dari yang diperkirakan, yaitu 14 juta ton karbon dioksida (mencapai target). RAFT pun berhasil memenuhi, bahkan melampaui, target-target kinerja lainnya:

- **Memungkinkan kondisi yang memberdayakan dapat meningkat melalui asistensi Pemerintah AS:**
 - Sebanyak 104 kebijakan/legislasi yang terlaksana mempromosikan PHL (ini berarti 24 persen melampaui target)
 - Sebanyak 990 pemangku kepentingan dari masyarakat sipil terlibat dalam PHL dan inisiatif penegakannya (26 persen di bawah target)
 - Sebesar USD 45,15 juta dana non-USAID termobilisasi dan terlaksana (sesuai target)
- **Kapasitas sumber daya manusia dan lembaga menguat:**
 - Sebanyak 2.962 orang terlatih mengenai PHL/konservasi keanekaragaman hayati (sesuai target)
- **Acuan kerja regional pun menguat:**
 - Sebanyak 14 acuan kerja lingkungan hidup di kawasan telah terbentuk/menguat (56 persen di atas target)
 - Terdapat 34 anggota baru yang bergabung dalam acuan kerja kawasan (55 persen di atas target)

Mengingat RAFT masih berlangsung hingga akhir September 2011, maka hasil-hasil di atas belum meru-

pakan pencapaian akhir. Bagian 4 dari laporan ini akan menggambarkan lebih lanjut, dan laporan akhir RAFT akan menguraikan lebih jauh mengenai kesuksesan program.

TANGGAP TERHADAP KEBUTUHAN PEMANGKU KEPENTINGAN

RAFT dapat disebut sebagai contoh manajemen yang adaptif (*adaptive management*) karena kesuksesannya—tampak pada evaluasi tengah tahun—menggabungkan berbagai kemajuan rancangan program, terutama:

- **Koordinasi yang lebih baik dalam kemitraan**, sebagian untuk memperjelas ‘nama’ RAFT
- **Strategi komunikasi yang kuat**, termasuk untuk urusan internal—guna mengoordinasi mitra-mitra secara lebih baik
- **Penghubung yang kuat dalam instansi-instansi Pemerintah AS, seperti Departemen Luar Negeri dan Dinas Kehutanan**, semisal mengawasi kinerja pemegang HPH dalam melaksanakan PHL.

Para pemangku kepentingan yang disurvei mengakui bahwa RAFT mampu merespon kebutuhan-kebutuhan mereka dengan baik. Menurut mereka yang paling efektif adalah RAFT mampu menanggapi perkembangan peraturan perundang-undangan lalu menginformasikan kepada pembuat kebijakan dalam pemerintahan AS selama pembentukan, membantu pelaksanaannya, dan menjangkaukan kepada UU Lacey. Lebih dari itu, RAFT berkolaborasi dengan *European Forest Institute* (EFI) untuk mencocokkan kegiatan-kegiatan ini ke dalam penjangkauan guna melengkapi Peraturan Uji Tuntas Uni Eropa.

KEPATUHAN SYARAT LEGISLATIF DAN PENDANAAN

Sebagian besar anggaran RAFT (83 persen) dibiayai dana Kongres AS untuk konservasi keanekaragaman hayati. Manfaat teknik-teknik RIL/PHL perlu dikaji lebih lanjut selagi pembalakan tradisional sering dikaitkan dengan penurunan keanekaragaman hayati. Peruntukan RAFT bagi Cina dan penjangkauan Lacey terlaksana secara efektif melalui kolaborasi erat dengan pemerintah dan industri Cina, serta Jaringan Asia-Pasifik untuk Rehabilitasi dan Pengelolaan Hutan Lestari (*Asia Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation/APFNet*), juga melalui konferensi tahunan tentang hutan, pasar, kebijakan dan praktik (*The Annual Forests, Markets, Policy &*

Practices Conferences) yang banyak dihadiri oleh kalangan industri.

Pendekatan RAFT terhadap perubahan iklim terbagi atas dua bagian, yaitu:

- Mengembangkan metodologi yang dapat memperkirakan pengurangan emisi dari RIL/PHL, kemudian mengukur pengurangan yang telah dicapai pemegang HPH yang bekerja sama dengan RAFT
- Mengembangkan Jaringan Pembelajaran yang terhubung dengan lokakarya dalam rangka memberi informasi dan memberdayakan pemangku kepentingan untuk berpartisipasi dalam negosiasi REDD+ baik di lingkup nasional maupun internasional.

KEBERLANJUTAN PROGRAM DAN TRANSISI

Belum ada satu pun organisasi di Asia yang memiliki kedalaman pengalaman mengenai RAFT—baik dalam lingkup kemitraan atau dalam aktivitas di sepanjang rantai pasokan—sehingga mampu mengoperasikan jaringan serupa dengan jumlah akhir lebih besar dari bagian yang ada (misal, peran fasilitasi RAFT dalam membantu mengurangi kemubaziran di antara mitra kerja). Begitu RAFT berakhir, maka berbagai organisasi tampaknya akan mulai mengadopsi kegiatan tertentu, seperti:

- *EFI* akan melanjutkan upaya penjangkauan berkaitan dengan persyaratan legalitas, khususnya dalam konteks Kesepakatan Kemitraan Sukarela (*Voluntary Partnership Agreements/VPA*) di Indonesia, Malaysia dan Vietnam.
- *RECOFTC* akan meneruskan pelatihan mediasi konflik dan aktivitas terkait Jaringan Pembelajaran.
- *WWF* akan meneruskan 20 tahun kolaborasinya bersama *Global Forest Trade Network* (GFTN) dan Inisiatif Borneo (*The Borneo Initiative*), membantu secara finansial bagi pemegang HPH yang ingin bersertifikat.
- Program Karbon Hutan Berau *TNC* akan bekerja dengan pemegang HPH dan Pemerintah Provinsi Kalimantan Timur, Indonesia.

Selain inisiatif tersebut, RAFT telah membantu mengarahkan aktivitas kehutanan ke arah pengelolaan hutan lestasi (PHL) yang lebih bertanggung jawab melalui pendampingan dalam pengembangan teknologi dan pendekatan inovatif, berupa:

- **Jaringan Pembelajaran** yang membantu meneruskan pengetahuan dan pengalaman, terutama mengenai REDD+
- **Teknik PHL** seperti penyediaan ‘Perangkat Hutan Bernilai Konservasi Tinggi’ (*HCVF Toolkit*) di Indonesia
- **Pelacakan Kayu**—pada 2015 ASEAN akan memperlakukan kontrol lacak-balak untuk kayu pada kepabeanaan. Sistem pelacakan kayu seperti di Indonesia akan diadopsi dan diterapkan secara meluas
- **Pengawasan Karbon** untuk mengukur jumlah emisi terkurangi yang diperoleh dari teknik RIL/PHL
- **Bekerja bersama akademisi** untuk merancang kurikulum yang sejalan dengan arus utama praktik-praktik unggul, sehingga memperluas lingkup RAFT dan membantu mengukur pengadopsian PHL.

Selanjutnya, materi tertulis dan video yang dikembangkan oleh para mitra RAFT selayaknya menjadi “ingatan kelembagaan (*institutional memory*)” yang dapat dirujuk oleh para praktisi, dan bahkan tetap berlaku setelah program usai.

PEMBELAJARAN (LESSONS LEARNED)

Pembelajaran program yang dapat terapkan ke dalam manajemen tanggap terkait rantai komoditas:

- **Pentingnya sebuah lingkungan pengaturan yang kondusif**, isyarat pengaturan tampak lebih kuat dibandingkan isyarat pasar
- **Pentingnya pemberdayaan** untuk mengirimkan isyarat penghalang/pengendali yang penting guna mendorong kepatuhan terhadap peraturan dan menyediakan lingkungan kerja yang kondusif bagi para aktor
- **Pentingnya pemahaman bersama industri** dalam memahami kebutuhan-kebutuhan para aktor sehingga tercipta kondisi lebih baik dalam mengadopsi praktik-praktik unggul (*best practices*)
- **Pembersihan lahan**—sebagai bagian dari perkebunan—adalah **penggerak utama deforestasi** di Asia Tenggara.

Pembelajaran manajerial yang dapat diaplikasikan ke dalam program regional yang lebih kompleks:

- **Pentingnya fleksibilitas** RAFT dalam menanggapi cepatnya perubahan peraturan perundang-undangan dan pasar termasuk mengantisipasi ancaman di luar sektor (seperti perkebunan pertanian)
- **Pentingnya pengawasan dan evaluasi berkala** untuk memfasilitasi:
 - Manajemen adaptif guna memastikan aktivitas dapat secara efektif mencapai tujuan-tujuan program
 - Manajemen aktivitas para mitra sehingga program berjalan tidak melenceng dari tujuan-tujuan yang ditetapkan
- **Pentingnya komunikasi, kerjasama, koordinasi dan kolaborasi** untuk memastikan agar mitra kerja (dan terpenting, aktivitas mereka) tetap sejalan satu sama lain dan selaras dengan tujuan-tujuan program
- **Membandingkan dengan kegiatan lainnya, RAFT cukup relatif efektif dalam pendanaan**, sebagai contoh:
 - *The Borneo Initiative* akan membayar USD 2 per hektar untuk biaya sertifikasi; RAFT diperkirakan membayar kurang dari USD 1,18 per hektar dalam memverifikasi legalitas dan/atau sertifikasi PHL; (peringatan: ini tidak termasuk pengeluaran pemegang HPH sendiri, juga tidak termasuk biaya kesempatan)
 - Harga karbon di pasar Eropa USD 13/t CO₂e dan Dinas Kehutanan AS menargetkan perdagangan hingga senilai USD 1,5/t; RAFT menghabiskan ~USD 0,38/t untuk pengurangan emisih menggunakan PHL (namun lihat pengecualian di atas)
- **Pentingnya ‘nama’ USAID**; pelibatan pemerintah AS secara langsung memberikan manfaat bagi RAFT:
 - Kredibilitas yang lebih bagi pemerintah dan industri, serta kemauan baik bagi pemerintah AS
 - Memberikan akses langsung kepada pembuat kebijakan di pemerintah AS dan sebaliknya
 - Kerjasama donasi yang lebih meluas seperti dengan EU melalui penjangkauan Peraturan Uji Tuntas
- **Pendanaan USAID memungkinkan peningkatan kesetaraan gender**, misalnya RECOFTC mampu melatih perempuan dalam mediasi konflik lebih dari yang dimungkinkan sebelumnya.

PRIORITAS STRATEGIS DAN PENDEKATAN EFEKTIF BAGI UPAYA KEBERLANJUTAN PROGRAM

- **Mencegah pendorong lain deforestasi**, khususnya perkebunan pertanian
- **Meningkatkan fokus pada upaya penguatan**, berupa:
 - Harmonisasi langkah kepabeanaan, misalnya melalui rantai-balak ASEAN
 - Mengembangkan protokol bantuan hukum timbal balik (*Mutual Legal Assistance*) yang dapat membantu penerapan *Lacey*
 - Mengembangkan penegakkan bagi jaminan REDD+
 - Berkolaborasi dengan Jaringan Perlindungan Margasatwa ASEAN (*ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network*), sesuai dengan ketentuan yang berlaku
- **Namun dalam mempertahankan fokus kemitraan, RAFT perlu tetap menekankan fleksibilitas, komunikasi, kerja sama, koordinasi dan kolaborasi**:
 - Mempertahankan kekuatan *peran pemerintah AS*—industri akan lebih memperhatikan hubungan dengan pihak pemerintah
 - Menekankan *ruang umpan balik kebijakan-praktik* dan komunikasi internal
 - Investasi dalam aspek *pengawasan dan evaluasi yang kuat*, termasuk data paduk (*baseline*)
- **Mempertahankan pendekatan kewilayahan** untuk menghadapi isu-isu lintas batas, seperti:
 - *Perdagangan*—menghubungkan pembeli internasional yang bertanggung jawab, produsen yang bersertifikat
 - *Kebocoran*—di mana aktor ilegal bergerak di antara hukum guna menghindari peraturan perundang-undangan
 - *Sensitivitas politik*—di mana terdapat tuduhan terhadap suatu negara yang kemungkinan kecil terjadi
- **Mendorong evaluasi-sesama** (yang akan mendorong persaingan sehat) antar negara-negara. **Bekerja di seluruh rantai pasokan, dan mendorong dunia usaha lebih memerhatikan dan mengadopsi PHL**:

- **Survei bisnis** untuk lebih memahami insentif dan proses pengambilan keputusan di baliknya
- Dalam *Laporan Akhir*, disampaikan bahwa RAFT kiranya mampu menyuarkan kasus dunia usaha untuk memperoleh sertifikasi
- **Mengembangkan strategi hemat biaya** sehingga mampu mempromosikan PHL melalui contoh:
 - Pembayaran karbon REDD+ (khususnya ketika digabungkan dengan jumlah keanekaragaman hayati)
 - Penerapan peraturan perundang-undangan bagi operasi PHL bersertifikat independen, termasuk:
 - Mengurangi audit pemerintah
 - Mengurangi pajak penanaman hutan kembali beserta pengaruh yang dikurangnya
 - Pembaruan konsesi terpilih (serta akses kepada peminjaman baru)
- **Mengurangi biaya penerapan HCVF** melalui pengembangan perangkat dan proses perencanaan konservasi kewilayahan; pemanfaatan data spasial yang dikumpulkan oleh inisiatif lainnya, semisal REDD+
- **Mengembangkan kriteria yang jelas untuk pelibatan (dan yang terpenting melepaskan) mitra kerja:**
 - Harus membangun suatu kode etik yang jelas bagi seluruh mitra, termasuk industri
- **Fokus pada mediasi konflik**, sehingga survei pasar mengindikasikan permintaan yang kuat:
 - Seiring dengan perluasan sektor perkebunan, maka konflik dari masyarakat yang tergusur—sangat krusial dan sering berciri kekerasan—akan cenderung meningkat. Terlebih, REDD+ dapat menciptakan konflik terkait masalah pemanfaatan dan pembagian hasil, dengan demikian pelaksanaan pengamanan REDD+ membutuhkan keahlian mediasi yang kuat. RECOFTC, dalam kaitan ini, memiliki peran penting untuk memberikan pelatihan
- **Tetap melibatkan Cina** yang dapat terus mengimpor kayu untuk industri manufakturnya dan memenuhi kebutuhan domestiknya. Mengingat AS adalah eksportir produk kehutanan yang penting bagi Cina (lebih dari USD 3,5 miliar pada 2009), maka industri dan pemerintah (regulator) AS juga memiliki kepentingan utama dalam hal bagaimana Cina mengembangkan legislasi untuk impornya dari dunia.

KESIMPULAN

Peraturan perundang-undangan baru di pasar utama Asia kini memerlukan legalitas seluruh rantai pasokan untuk produk hutan. Hal ini sangat berpengaruh bagi industri, mengingat para produsen berlomba mencari pasokan legal ketika ketersediaan kayu di Asia Tenggara secara keseluruhan menurun. Di sini-lah peluang bagi aktor-aktor yang bertanggung jawab untuk lebih dihargai melalui penguatan akses pasar. Kuncinya adalah tetap memberi insentif yang sejalan dengan PHL demi pengarusutamaan perdagangan yang bertanggung jawab.

Jika memungkinkan, pendanaan RAFT dilanjutkan guna memastikan sektor ini mampu mengkonsolidasi reformasi yang telah dilakukan. Jangan sampai industri mempertanyakan aturan-aturan pencegahan yang baru ditetapkan dan selanjutnya berisiko kehilangan momentum. Kalau ini tidak mungkin, diusul maka upaya konsesi yang dijalankan di bawah kerangka RAFT nanti dijalankan dibawa program yang ada ditempat (misal: GFTN) dan didukung suatu program kewilayahan dengan dana USAID, misalnya untuk mediasi dan penguatan kemampuan teknis serta manajemen peningkatan kapasitas para regulator.

Selanjutnya, upaya program di masa datang dapat mengembangkan peluang-peluang pendanaan—seperti pemberian kompensasi biaya PHL melalui REDD+—yang mampu mempromosikan adopsi PHL dan perdagangan yang bertanggung jawab secara lebih luas. Penjangkauan tetap penting guna menjelaskan tujuan-tujuan pengesahan peraturan perundang-undangan, begitu pula dalam penegakkan hukum, sehingga dapat menyetarakan posisi aktor-aktor perusahaan yang patuh terhadap hukum (baik di tingkat internasional maupun nasional).

Pada masa mendatang dapat menarik pelajaran dari dan melibatkan jaringan yang biasa bekerja dalam penegakkan perdagangan margasatwa: seperti beacukai, jaksa penuntut—termasuk bidang kejahatan keuangan—dan peradilan. Upaya-upaya memperkuat bantuan hukum timbal-balik (MLA) dapat membantu jaksa penuntut AS memperkarakan pelanggaran terhadap UU Lacey. Akhirnya, terdapat peluang lebih lanjut, seperti yang dibutuhkan, untuk menerapkan pendekatan regional yang berhasil seperti RAFT—bekerja di seluruh rantai pasokan regional—bagi komoditas lain, seperti kelapa sawit, yang kini menjadi penyebab utama deforestasi dan emisi gas rumah kaca, yang berarti ancaman terbesar bagi keanekaragaman hayati.

综述 (Mandarin Chinese Summary)

东南亚的生物多样性正面临着滥砍滥伐和森林退化带来的威胁，某种程度上这是由于不可持续的木材采伐所致。这些行为往往有违法纪，它们导致腐败的滋生并破坏了林业管理工作。为解决这一问题，美国国际开发署 (USAID) 亚洲区域发展办公室资助实施了**亚洲负责任林业与贸易 (RAFT) 合作项目**。

在美国国际开发署资助的**促进印度尼西亚森林认证和打击非法采伐合作项目**的工作基础上，大自然保护联盟 (TNC) 与亚洲负责任林业与贸易项目签订了为期五年 (2006 - 2011年)、涉及1400万美元 (其中美国国际开发署投资1120万美元，大自然保护协会捐资280万美元) 的合作协议并负责对后者实施管理。亚洲负责任林业与贸易项目目标包括：

- 增加来自合法来源的木材产品贸易；
- 切实改善森林经营行为；
- 加强森林经营和相关贸易的区域合作；
- 增强亚洲地区在减少毁林与森林退化所致排放量 (REDD+) 工作中结合实施森林可持续经营 (SFM) 的能力。

亚洲负责任林业与贸易项目的实施国家包括柬埔寨、中国、印度尼西亚、老挝、马来西亚、巴布亚新几内亚、泰国和越南，希望能够通过以下工作方式将全球各种解决方案联合起来：

- 协同合作，有技巧地将现有各种的网络和组织联合起来，为了实现各种共同目标开展合作，从而能够强化所需的专业知识和技术
- 围绕整条供应链开展工作，综合利用各种激励机制鼓励开展森林可持续经营
- 创建政策实践互动反馈机制，在这种机制下，林业从业人员向政策制定者告知他们的实践经验并帮助将法规动因转化为森林可持续经营实践。

因此，亚洲负责任林业与贸易项目的目的旨在影响公共政策的制定和实施，集结所需行动来改善森林经营，包括利用森林可持续经营技术来减少相比较传统木材采伐而言属于额外排放的碳排放量。为完成项目目标，项目与供应链上的各种主体开展合作，目的在于：

- 为林业特许经营区开展能力建设，帮助它们通过认证并应用最佳的实践方法，如**减少对环境影响的森林采伐 (RIL)** 和**高保护价值森林 (HCVF)** 的经营

- 为私营部门开展能力建设，使它们能够在供应链上对林产品进行追踪溯源
- 加强通过认证的供应商和买家之间的联系，并鼓励实施运用监管链追踪系统的负责任的采购政策
- 向政府部门提供投入，帮助制定更为完善的法律信号
- 加强与合法木材贸易相关的新立法的推广并加强对这些法律法规的理解。

终期评估

2011年6月13日至7月8日期间，在自然资本顾问公司独立咨询专家Arthur G Blundell的带领下，由美国国际开发署和美国林务局的评估人员组成的评估小组访问了分别来自曼谷、北京、上海和雅加达的60多位RAFT项目利益相关者。此外，还在华盛顿特区举行了非政府组织和美国政府之间的机构间会议宣布有关此次评估的通知。另外还通过包括中文、印尼语和越南语三种语言版本的在线问卷调查收集信息 (70人回答了问卷)。

此次终期评估主要有三个目的 (根据其**工作范围**)：

- 1 “根据项目目标对项目的绩效和作用进行评估……；
- 2 “为增强项目的可延续性提供任何可行的策略建议……；
- 3 “在项目活动的基础上确定战略重点和有效方法……，以及美国国际开发署可能继续提供支持的一些后续工作，包括可能新出现的/发生变革的技术领域、规划方法、地理性重点领域和合作伙伴关系。”

评估结果

趋势假设能否成立？

RAFT的**趋势推测**认为，由于：(1) 法律信号强制要求守法更严；(2) 市场支持并呼吁进行森林可持续经营；(3) 机构制度建设充分有力，包括林业部门自身拥有充分的能力；(4) 森林可持续经营具有经济合理性，这些条件将刺激各国逐步采纳森林可持续经营。一旦一定数量的特

许经营区通过了认证,管理者和经营者将会看到森林可持续经营的价值所在,也将会有多如泉涌的经营者争相采用最佳实践方法。

虽然这些假设并不相互排斥,但是可以成立并进行试验的。同样地,RAFT明智地将重心放在印度尼西亚和中国,是因为这两个国家分别是亚洲地区的主要的木材生产国和加工国。但如果当时巴布亚新几内亚政府有促进森林可持续经营的政治意愿,这就应该存在空间可以拓展针对该国的工作,而且还应该对森林资源丰富的缅甸多加重视,美国国际开发署的援助计划在这些范围内受到局限。

为了应对危及生物多样性的威胁和气候变化,RAFT对于林业的重视是十分必要的。但东南亚的木材和农业种植业(如油棕榈)已然成为毁林的罪魁祸首之一,而且由于在开荒过程中焚毁森林,它同时也是温室气体的最主要排放源之一。此外,这种开荒手段在很大程度上是不合法的。除非同时针对这个行业进行改革,否则无论林业有多么重要,单纯关注林业也不足以解决危及生物多样性的威胁和气候变化问题。而采用多管齐下的策略将会是解决林业等行业和其他商品链如人工种植的油棕榈的问题的最有效方法,例如RAFT项目就采用了贯彻整条供应链与各方面的利益相关者开展合作的模式。

管理薄弱尤其是执法不严是保护生物多样性和减少排放的主要障碍,因此,必须采取一种全面综合的方法。2008年,包括RAFT项目的合作伙伴在内的一批组织成功说服美国政府对《雷斯法案》进行了修改,使进口非法木材变成了违法行为。2010年,欧盟通过了类似的法规,要求欧盟进口商遵守尽职调查制度。同时,合法性立法对林业部门产生了巨大的影响。虽然一般消费者对于认证产品的需求不高,但进口商不能再对其产品的违法性质进行推诿抵赖。因此,最初的两项趋势假设——市场和法规——立法发出的法律信号远比少数有辨别能力的消费者所发出的市场信号要强得多。遗憾的是,RAFT项目没有对森林可持续经营的经济层面进行充分论证,因此很难对RAFT项目关于特许经营者决策的假设进行评估。也许经营者的信息匮乏和/或能力不足,但根据不充分的证据显示,依然有一定数量的经营者通过了认证;的确,在RAFT项目的帮助下,印度尼西亚通过森林管理委员会(FSC)认证的经营者数量翻了一番,但由于其他特许经营区没有获得认证,总体的认证面积还是减少了。

成果认定

根据RAFT项目的报告,通过与木材企业开展合作,强化了东南亚600多万公顷热带雨林的经营管理(超出预期目标95%),而采用减少对环境影响的森林采伐(RIL)技术阻止了当量估计为1300万吨的二氧化碳排放(达标)。RAFT项目也完成或超标完成了其他大多数绩效目标:

- 通过美国政府的援助改善了有利环境:
 - 实施了104份促进森林可持续经营的政策/法令(超出预期目标24%)
 - 吸引了990个相关的民间团体/个人参与森林可持续经营和执法(低于预期目标26%)

- 吸引和动用美国国际开发署外部资金4515万美元(达标)

- 增强了人力资源和机构能力:
 - 为2962人次提供了森林可持续经营/生物多样性保护方面的培训(达标)
- 加强了区域平台建设:
 - 建立/进一步发展了14个区域性环境平台(超出预期目标56%)
 - 吸引了34个新成员加入这些区域平台(超出预期目标55%)

由于RAFT项目须到2011年9月才正式结束,因此上述成果并非最终成果。本报告第四部分将对其他成果进行介绍,RAFT项目的结题报告也将详细介绍这些项目成果。

对利益相关者需求的响应

作为适应性管理的杰出案例,RAFT项目在实施过程中调整改进了许多设计内容,对其中期评估成功进行了回应,主要体现在:

- 改善了合作伙伴关系的内部协调,某种程度上是为了明确树立RAFT的项目品牌
- 加强了沟通战略,包括内部沟通——为了更好地协调各合作伙伴
- 加强了与美国国务院和林业局等美国政府部门的联系,以便对特许经营区实施森林可持续经营的绩效进行监测。

受调查的利益相关者认为RAFT项目对他们的需求做出了很好的回应。最主要的是,RAFT项目能够根据不断变化的立法发展状况为美国政府的政策制定者制定《雷斯法案》推广活动提供信息并协助实施这些活动。此外,RAFT项目还与欧洲林业研究所(EFI)合作,共同将这些活动与欧盟推行的补充性质的尽责调查法案结合起来。

符合部门的法规要求和资金要求

RAFT项目的绝大部分资金(83%)来自于美国国会指定用于生物多样性保护的基金。由于人们经常将传统的木材采伐与生物多样性的减少联系起来,需要对减少对环境影响的森林采伐(RIL)/森林可持续经营(SFM)技术进行更多研究。通过与中国政府和企业的紧密合作,并通过亚太森林恢复与可持续管理网络(APFNet)以及每年一度吸引了广泛企业参与的森林·市场·政策·实践——可持续林业与市场发展国际研讨会的推广宣传,RAFT指定用于中国项目和《雷斯法案》推广活动的资金发挥了很好的作用。RAFT项目的气候变化资金有两种用途:

- 制定评估RIL/SFM减排情况的方法学并对与RAFT项目合作的特许经营区获得的减排量进行量化

- 建立研究网络并举行研讨会，通知利益相关者并使之能够参与国内外关于REDD+的谈判活动。

项目的可延续性和过渡

无论是从合作范围还是在整条供应链上所开展的工作而言，亚洲没有哪个组织在广度上可以媲美RAFT项目，而只有团结的力量大于各自为政的力量总和，才可以运行这个一个网络（例如，RAFT项目帮助和促进各合作伙伴去繁从简，减少重复劳动）。一旦RAFT项目终止，各个组织将会愿意具体承担一些有关工作：

- 欧洲森林研究所 (EFI) 将继续推进与合法性要求相关的推广活动，尤其是在印度尼西亚、马来西亚和越南的自愿合作伙伴协议 (VPA) 的框架下。
- 亚太地区社区林业培训中心 (RECOFTC) 将继续举办冲突管理培训并推进相关的研究网络的发展。
- 世界自然基金会 (WWF) 将继续与全球森林贸易网络 (GFTN) 开展为期20年的合作，婆罗洲倡议 (TBI) 将为希望通过认证的特许经营区提供资金协助。
- 大自然保护协会 (TNC) 贝劳森林碳项目将继续与印度尼西亚东加里曼丹的特许经营区及地方政府开展合作。

即使RAFT项目独立于上述行动之外，但它曾通过协同发展创新型的方法技术将它们的发展轨道转向更加负责任的森林可持续经营，比如：

- 有利于交流知识和经验的研究网络，如REDD+方面的知识和经验
- 森林可持续经营技术，如印度尼西亚的高保护价值森林 (HCVF) 工具书
- 原木追踪——2015年，东南亚国家联盟 (ASEAN) 将要求对木材进行监管链监管和海关监管，印度尼西亚的原木追踪系统等各种系统将会受到广泛应用
- 能够计算由于RIL/SFM技术获得的减排量的碳监测
- 与学术界开展合作，将最佳实践编入课程设计，借此拓展RAFT项目的范围并进一步促进森林可持续经营的应用。

此外，即使项目结束，由RAFT项目合作伙伴制作的文字和视频资料都将成为项目的“机构记忆”，可以为从业人员提供参考。

所获经验

适用于负责任的商品链管理的规划设计经验：

- 有利的法律环境十分重要，法律信号强于市场信号
- 执法十分重要，它能发出强制守法的震慑性信号，并为守法主体创造一个公平的竞争环境
- 为企业喉舌十分重要，了解企业需求才能进一步推动最佳实践的应用
- 土地开荒有一部分是为了建立人工种植，它是东南亚最主要的毁林动因之一。

适用于综合性区域项目的管理经验：

- RAFT项目应对迅速变化的法规和市场以及部门外威胁（如农业种植）的灵活应变能力十分重要
- 定期监测和评估非常重要，有助于促进：
 - 确保活动有效完成项目目标的适应性管理
 - 对合作伙伴的活动进行管理，确保不会脱离项目目标
- 沟通、合作、协调和协作非常重要，能够确保合作伙伴（十分重要的是，还有他们所开展的工作）协调一致并符合项目目标
- 与其他行动相比较而言，RAFT项目相对的成本效益较高。比如：
 - 婆罗洲倡议 (TBI) 的认证成本将会是2美元每公顷；RAFT项目花费在合法性认定和/或森林可持续经营认证上的成本估价少于1.18美元每公顷；（注意：这并不包括特许经营区的自身开销，也不包括机会成本）
 - 欧洲市场上每吨二氧化碳排放量的价格为~\$13美元，美国的林业补偿价格高达每吨1.5美元；RAFT为森林可持续经营减排支付的价格为每吨~0.38美元（注意事项同上）
- 美国国际开发署 (USAID) 品牌十分重要，RAFT项目得益于美国政府的直接参与：
 - 获得各国政府和企业更多信任，同时也表达了美国政府的友好
 - 与美国政府的政策制定者建立了更加直接的联系，反之亦然
 - 获得更多捐助合作，如与欧盟合作推广尽责调查法案
- 美国国际开发署 (USAID) 的资助提升了性别平等，如亚太地区社区林业培训中心 (RECOFTC) 能够为更多妇女提供冲突管理培训，这在以前是不可能的。

后续项目工作的战略重点和有效方法

- 解决导致毁林的其他重要动因，尤其是农业种植
- 增加对加强执法的关注，为此，后续工作应：
 - 结合海关行动，如和东盟进行监管链合作
 - 制订相互法律援助协议，这将有利于《雷斯法案》的检控工作
 - 促进REDD+保障制度的执行
 - 必要时与东盟野生动植物执法网络协同合作
- 但同时需要**继续保持RAFT项目对于合作伙伴关系的重视，强调灵活性以及沟通、合作、协调和协作**：
 - 继续发挥美国政府的强大作用——企业比较重视与管理部門的关系
 - 重视政策实践互动反馈机制以及内部沟通
 - 投入资金进行监测和评估，包括基线数据
- 为解决如下跨境问题，应稳定实施一种区域方法：
 - 贸易——在国际买家和负责任的通过认证的生产者之间建立桥梁
 - 渗漏——违法主体在不同的司法管辖区之间迁移，逃避执法
 - 政治敏感度——针对单一国家提出指控不太可行
 - 鼓励各国之间进行同行互审（这将促成健康竞争）
- 围绕整体供应链开展工作，推动企业采用森林可持续经营：
 - 开展企业调查，以深入了解有哪些激励因素以及企业的决策
 - RAFT项目在**结题报告**中应明确阐述企业参与认证的状况
- 通过如下方法，**制定成本效益较高的策略以促进森林可持续经营**：
 - 对RIL/SFM作业获得的减排量进行补偿的REDD+碳资费（特别是在和生物多样性补偿叠加的情况下）
 - 管理部门放开森林可持续经营作业的独立认证，包括：
 - 减少政府审核
 - 降低再造林税费并减少影响
 - 特许经营权续期优惠（并且可以获得新的租约）
- 通过制定区域保护规划工具和进程以及应用REDD+等其他行动收集的空间数据，**减少HCVF守法的成本**

- **制定开展合作（重要的是，以及解除合作）的清晰标准**：
 - 必须建立所有合作伙伴包括行业都应当遵守的有力的行为准则
- **重视冲突管理**，市场报告显示对此有强烈需求：
 - 随着种植行业的扩张，与被转移社区的冲突很有可能会呈现增长趋势，这些冲突已经非常突出而且通常十分暴力。此外，REDD+可能会导致关于用途和利益的冲突，而实施REDD+保障制度需要高明的调停技巧。亚太地区社区林业培训中心（RECOFTC）是提供此类培训的主要机构
- 继续在中国开展工作，中国将继续进口木材以满足加工业和日益增长的国内市场需求。假如美国成为中国主要的林产品进口国（2009年进口额超过35亿美元），美国企业和管理部門还须重点关注中国如何针对其从世界各国进口林产品制定合法性立法。

结论

目前，亚洲各大市场的新立法要求林产品在整条供应链上保持合法。由于导致各加工企业抢占合法来源，甚至导致东南亚的木材供应整体呈下降趋势，这对企业将产生深远影响。这就为负责的主体获得更多市场准入机会创造了机遇。关键是如何将有利于森林可持续经营的各种激励因素协调起来，推动负责任贸易的发展。如有可能，比较理想的是继续资助已成功了的RAFT项目，以确保林业部门能够巩固到目前为止已经取得的改革成果，以免行业质疑新立法对行业发展形成了阻碍，从而影响积极性。如果无法继续RAFT项目，在该项目框架下开展的特许经营区工作将由GFTN等现有项目继续承担，美国国际开发署资助的新的区域项目可以重点关注支持性进程，比如冲突管理和提高管理者的技术技能和管理水平。此外，将来的项目工作还应开发融资机遇，如通过REDD+对森林可持续经营进行补偿，这将有利于促进森林可持续经营和负责任贸易被广泛采纳。推广宣传对于阐释合法性立法目的以及执法依然必要，这能为守法的（国内外）企业主体创造一个公平的竞争环境。下一步工作应当从野生动植物贸易相关法律法规的执法机构吸取经验并与其开展合作，如海关、检控部门包括从事经济犯罪检控工作的部门以及司法部门。推进相互法律援助将有助于美国检控部门针对《雷斯法案》的违法行为提出诉讼。最后，有必要进一步应用RAFT项目已获成功的区域方法——围绕整个地区的供应链开展合作，并就其他商品链进行合作，如棕榈油，目前它已成为毁林的主要动因之一以及温室气体的主要排放源之一，因此它是生物多样性面临的一个主要威胁。

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List of Acronyms

AFP	Asia Forest Partnership
AG	Advisory Group
AMAF	ASEAN’s Ministers on Agriculture & Forestry (AMAF)
AOTR	Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum
APFC	Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission
APFNet	Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASIA-FLEG	Forest Law Enforcement and Governance for the Asia-Pacific Region
ASOF	ASEAN’s Senior Officials on Forestry
CIFOR	Centre for International Forestry Research
CITES	Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species
CO₂e	Carbon Dioxide equivalent
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
EA-FLEG	East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance
EFI	European Forest Institute
EIP	Economic Integration Program
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAO-FRA	FAO-Forest Resources Assessment
FAOSTAT	FAO Forestry Statistics
FCPF	World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Fund
FSC	Forest Stewardship Council
GDA	Global Development Alliance (USAID Public-Private Partnership program)
GFTN	Global Forest and Trade Network (WWF)
GIS	Geographic Information System
GOI	Government of Indonesia
ha	hectare (= 2.47 acres)
HCVF	High Conservation Value Forest
IFACS	USAID Indonesia Forestry and Climate Support
IFM	Improved Forest Management

ITTO	International Tropical Timber Organization
IUCN	The World Conservation Union
LEAF	RDMA's Lowering Emissions in Asia's Forests
m	million
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoF	Ministry of Forestry
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
n	Sample size (n = number)
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
PNG	Papua New Guinea
RAFT	Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade Alliance
RDMA	Regional Development Mission for Asia (USAID)
RECOFTC	The Regional Community Forestry Training Centre, Bangkok
REDD+	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation
RIL	Reduced Impact Logging
SE Asia	Southeast Asia
SFA	State Forest Administration (China)
SFM	Sustainable Forest Management
SL	Sustainable Landscapes
SVLK	Indonesian Timber Legality Standard (in its Indonesian acronym)
TFF	The Tropical Forest Foundation
TFT	The Tropical Forest Trust
TNC	The Nature Conservancy
TRAFFIC	The Wildlife Trade Monitoring Network (joint program of WWF and IUCN)
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNODC	United Nations Office of Drugs & Crime
UN-REDD	United Nations REDD Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFS	United States Forest Service
USG	United States Government
USTR	United States Trade Representative
VPA	Voluntary Partnership Agreement (between the EU and timber producing countries)

1 Introduction

1.1 PROBLEM

Southeast (SE) Asia’s biodiversity is threatened by deforestation and forest degradation, in part driven by unsustainable forest management and timber harvesting. Ironically, these forestry operations themselves are threatened—most of SE Asia has passed *peak timber* and production is in decline.² These regional trends are caught in the midst of global crises: natural capital is vulnerable to climate change and financial capital is endangered by global economic turmoil.

Furthermore, the forestry sector is struggling to respond to new regulations in consumer countries that require imported forest products to be legally obtained—*e.g.*, the amended *Lacey Act* in the USA and the EU’s *Due Diligence Regulation*. Meant to reinforce domestic law in producer countries, this legality-legislation has produced a regulatory environment across the supply chain that discourages illegal operators. The challenge now is to consolidate progress and implement legislation in both producer and consumer countries to ensure that the timber trade is responsible and environmentally sustainable.

Text box 1

Definition of illegal logging

Forestry practices that violate laws and regulations—harvesting without, or in excess of authority, and/or avoiding taxes and fees.

1.2 ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: THE RAFT ALLIANCE

The island of Borneo exported as much timber in the 1980s and ‘90s as all of South America and Africa combined.³ This production came at the cost of forest degradation, threatening biodiversity as well as the local people that rely on forests for their lives and livelihoods. In Asia “only 12% of the natural permanent forest is estimated to be under SFM and only 5% ... is certified as being sustainably managed”.⁴

Moreover, a pattern of land conversion for plantations (*e.g.*, rubber, pulp, and more recently oil palm) often follows in areas degraded by timber harvesting, dramatically increasing the detrimental effects on biodiversity and local communities.⁵

To address this problem, USAID’s Regional Development Mission for Asia (RDMA) funded a cooperative agreement: **The Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade Alliance** (RAFT; Figure 1, Table 1), which was designed to influence the development and

2 FAO. 2011. *Southeast Asia’s Forests and Forestry to 2020*.

3 Curran et al. 2004. *Lowland forest loss in protected areas of Indonesian Borneo*. *Science* 303: 1000-1003.

4 FAO. 2011. *Southeast Asia’s Forests and Forestry to 2020*.

5 Normile. 2010. *Saving Forests to Save Biodiversity*. *Science* 329: 1279.

implementation of the public policies and corporate practices needed to improve forest management and bring transparency to the timber trade in Asia. Led by The Nature Conservancy (TNC), RAFT is a **five-year** (2006-2011), **\$14 million** (including \$11.2 million from USAID and a \$2.8 million contribution from TNC) regional effort that built on a previous USAID-funded Global Development Alliance (GDA) program, *Alliance to Promote Certification and Combat Illegal Logging in Indonesia*.

RAFT was managed from Bangkok by TNC, and its core implementing partners were: IUCN, RECOFTC-The Center for People and Forests, the Tropical Forest Foundation (TFF), The Forest Trust (TFT), WWF, and TRAFFIC. In addition, RAFT collaborated with government, industry, and civil society organizations (CSOs), including non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academia, within SE Asia and around the world (Table 1). **RAFT's purpose was not to build an institutional presence that would remain long-term; rather it was to strengthen existing institutions and approaches that would themselves be perpetuated.**



Figure 1. Countries in which RAFT operated.

Table 1. RAFT's partners.

Category	Organizations	Roles	Rights	Responsibilities
Implementing Partners (General Memorandum of Understanding [MoU] required. Individual activities contracted, as current practice)	TNC WWF TFT RECOFTC TFF IUCN TRAFFIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project implementation, reporting, and communications Engage in work planning, meetings/ quarterly calls Representation in country, as defined Co-funding of project activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to most project documents Operate under a Cooperative Agreement, rather than a contractual status, with RAFT resources Enhanced participation in decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use RAFT branding in project communications and, as appropriate, in organization-wide communication Keep USG agencies informed of project activities in given country In certain instances, serve as “focal” point for RAFT in given country Provide for use of organizational logo
Collaborators (Notice of relationship required)	ASEAN XEROX, Home Depot DLH, ScanCom Processors & land managers engaged in RAFT-sponsored activities FAO, EFI Beijing Forestry University APFNet China State Academy of Forestry Administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participate in project implementation, as appropriate Devote resources financial, human, and/ or technical in pursuit of project objectives 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to a limited set of project documents Use of RAFT name and branding with approval Access to organizational documents, presentations and the like 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Understand the RAFT program mechanism Reference, as appropriate, RAFT and specific partner organizations in internal/ external communications Provide an annual update on activities pertinent to RAFT objectives
Contractors	Rainforest Alliance Forest Trends IGES GFS Individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement project in accordance with defined Scope of Work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Access to a limited set of project documents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Use RAFT branding in project communications

1.3 RAFT'S COLLECTIVE RESPONSE: PROGRAM OBJECTIVES

RAFT's initial aim was to "improve both the quality and extent of sustainable management of forest resources and biodiversity".⁶ In 2009, as Reduced Emissions [of greenhouse gases] from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) gained prominence in climate-change negotiations, an additional objective was added: "to improve forest management and trade practices, thereby reducing CO₂ emissions from deforestation and forest degradation".⁷ RAFT aimed to achieve these objectives through four integrated strategies:

- **Increase trade of timber products from legal sources** by promoting the development and use of credible national-level legality standards that can assure consumers that the wood they purchase comes from legally managed forests
- **Strengthen regional cooperation on forest management and trade of timber products** by catalyzing dialogue among government agencies and private sector enterprises, designed to strengthen policies and practices
- **Improve forest management (IFM) practices on the ground** by working with forest concessionaires to engage in practices such as: participatory planning, *Reduced Impact Logging* (RIL), management of conflicts with stakeholders, as well as the identification and management of *High Conservation Value Forest* (HCVF), in order to obtain verification of legality and independent certification of sustainable forest management (SFM)
- **Enhance regional capacity to incorporate SFM into REDD+ frameworks** by developing a *REDD+ Learning Network* to document and share emerging best practices and on-the-ground experiences, as well as to stimulate research

1.4 RAFT'S THEORY OF CHANGE

RAFT hypothesized that forest practices will improve: a) under appropriate regulatory signals; b) within supportive market environments; c) when the needed cross-cutting institutions are sufficiently strong, including when the forestry sector itself has sufficient capacity to manage responsibly; and d) provided there is an economically rational case for SFM (Figure 2).

In order to create the appropriate environment for change, RAFT intended to assist wood processors to develop and implement responsible procurement policies (*i.e.*, stronger market signals), which require linking progressive companies all along the supply chain from harvesting to timber buyers and processing facilities. RAFT also intended to assist regulatory authorities to pass laws and draft regulations, and then work with the authorities on implementation (*i.e.*, to create better policy signals).

Success in changing industry's behavior also required working with forest concessionaires to develop the skills and resources necessary so they could produce a supply of legal and sustainable forest products. Concessions managed through RIL and other SFM techniques would then lead to reduced carbon emissions.

RAFT assumed that assisting a small cadre of progressive forest concessionaires in becoming certified would create a *critical mass* that could demonstrate *proof of concept* to regulators and convince other operators of

⁶ USAID. 2006. *Cooperative Agreement No. 486-A-00-06-00016-00*. p. 8.

⁷ USAID. 2008. *Cooperative Agreement extension*. Attachment II.

the rational case for SFM. Further, this cadre would then expand the constituency of support for SFM, with the companies becoming champions, advocating

with RAFT for stronger regulatory and market signals favoring responsible trade.



Figure 2. **RAFT's Theory of Change** [From: RAFT's Presentation to the USAID Final Evaluation]. The behavior of *Forest Managers* is influenced by: i) the *regulatory environment* (i.e., the laws/regulations of Consumer through to Producer Governments); ii) *market signals* all along the supply chain from Wholesaler/Retailer(s) down; iii) *economic viability*, including financing; and, iv) the *effectiveness of these institutions* in delivering the appropriate signals and incentives.

1.5 RAFT'S PROGRAMMING APPROACHES

In order to achieve their objectives, RAFT operated according to key, cross-cutting principles:

- **Working as a Partnership**, RAFT strategically brought together existing networks and organizations to work towards a common set of goals, thus reinforcing expertise
- **Working Across the Supply Chain** to align the incentives needed to encourage SFM and responsible trade
- **Creating a Policy-Practice Feedback Loop** where *practitioners* inform *policymakers* with practical experiences and also help to turn regulatory drivers into SFM practices

1.6 RAFT'S SPENDING

Initially in 2006, RAFT's total budget was \$5.5 million from a *biodiversity conservation earmark*. In 2008, the total program budget was increased by \$6.7 million, and included an objective related to *climate change*. Finally, in 2009, the program's budget was further increased by \$1.8 million to include a *China earmark* and outreach for the newly amended *Lacey Act*. Thus, over five years, ending in 2011, RAFT received approximately \$11.2 million from USAID, which was matched with \$2.8 million from TNC, for a total program budget of about \$14 million.

Other than REDD+, which did not become an objective until the fourth year, spending was relatively even across RAFT's objectives (Figure 3). For *Trade*, spending was highest in China (reflecting, in part the *China earmark*), whereas spending was heavily weighted in Indonesia for the *SFM* objective.

TNC, as lead implementing organization, received the majority of RAFT resources (Figure 4). WWF, TFT, TFF, and TNC were the four organizations involved in assisting concessionaires implement IFM with the ultimate aim of becoming certified. RA (Rainforest Alliance) lead four industry outreach conferences in China. Although most of RAFT's core staff was located in Bangkok, some staff funding was directed to China (Figure 4).




Figure 3. RAFT's estimated spending by major objective. (Note: These figures are tentative as the RAFT program will not be complete until September 2011.) RAFT did not support work in Thailand until 2008, when sanctions were lifted following democratic elections.




Figure 4. RAFT's estimated spending among its partners. (Note: These figures are tentative as the RAFT program will not be complete until September 2011.)

2 Evaluation Objectives & Methodology

2.1 OBJECTIVES

In compliance with USAID’s new *Evaluation Policy*, RAFT’s *Final Evaluation* is meant to be part of a “complementary and reinforcing relationship with other efforts to focus projects on achieving measurable results”.⁸ Specifically, the evaluation’s three major objectives, as outlined in its *Scope of Work* (Annex 1), are:

1. “To assess the program’s performance and effectiveness against its goals, objectives, and performance targets...”
2. “To recommend any strategies that can potentially enhance program sustainability in preparation for program completion...”
3. “To identify strategic priorities and effective approaches that build upon activities to date, and which USAID may support under follow-on program efforts, including possible new/alternate technical areas, programming approaches, geographic focus areas, and partnerships.”

The first objective relates to *accountability*, requiring a focus on measuring project effectiveness, relevance, and efficiency, in particular “comparing performance to ex-ante commitments and targets”.⁹ To achieve the final two objectives, this evaluation tested fundamental assumptions underlying project design, provided systematic feedback, and made recommendations that explicitly link evaluation questions to future decision-making by USAID.

In particular, the *Scope of Work* articulated a set of key questions:

- **Was the Hypothesis of Change valid?**
Was RAFT’s logical framework for its multi-pronged strategy valid?
- **Confirmation of Results**
Was RAFT able to mainstream legal and sustainable timber into the Asian timber trade?

- **Responsiveness to Stakeholder Needs**

With respect to niche areas where USAID is expected to catalyze forest policy dialogue, did RAFT leverage program resources and dovetail with the work of others?

- **Meeting Agency Legislative and Funding Requirements**

Did RAFT meet requirements for the US Congressional earmark for biodiversity conservation, China, *Lacey Act* outreach, and sustainable landscapes/climate change?

- **Program Sustainability and Transition**

What actions, if any, are recommended?

- **Lessons Learned**

What lessons did RAFT and its partners learn, both technical and managerial, as well as RDMA’s key strengths and/or weaknesses in undertaking a regional forestry program?

- **Strategic Priorities and Effective Approaches for Follow-on Program Efforts**

What strategic priorities and effective programming should be adopted to address regional biodiversity, forest management and trade, and respond to US Foreign Assistance policies?

Further, in assessing the program’s effectiveness and potential areas of improvement, the evaluation was meant to consider:

- Implementation of geographically diverse activities through regional- and national-level activities with relevant NGOs

⁸ USAID. 2011. *Evaluation Policy*. p 7. (www.usaid.gov/evaluation)

⁹ USAID. 2011. *Evaluation Policy*, p 5.

- Supporting RDMA objectives to strengthen regional partners (*e.g.*, ASEAN, AFP, and APFNet) and to address transnational issues (such as sustainable trade)
- Ability to promote catalytic change through focusing on enabling conditions such as policy measures, institutional change, and field access to technical assistance
- The effectiveness of enhancing biodiversity conservation through the forest sector
 - The effect of emerging USG policies on forests and the interplay of USAID’s regional program in this dialogue
 - Opportunities for increasing buy-in to a potential follow-on activity, such as from USAID bilateral missions or other USAID or USG sources.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

An independent consultant, Arthur G Blundell, of Natural Capital Advisors, LLC, led a team of evaluators (Annex 2) from USAID and the US Forest Service (USFS). Between June 13 and July 8, 2011, the team met with RAFT partners, host country governments, donors, CSOs, industry, and other stakeholders (Annex 3) in Bangkok, Beijing, Shanghai, and Jakarta.

The team also attended the *Forests, Markets, Policy & Practices* conference held in Shanghai in July 2011. These meetings were supplemented by NGO and USG inter-agency meeting in Washington DC, and by telephone interviews. These interviews were followed with an online questionnaire (Annex 4), modified for industry participants and offered in Mandarin Chinese, Bahasa Indonesia, and Vietnamese.

Where possible, responses were verified with independent analyses of, for example, forest cover/loss and carbon emissions data (FAO FRA and ITTO); trade data (FAOSTAT and ITTO Market Information Service); timber production and consumption data (Indonesia Ministry of Forestry and US Department of Commerce); data on oil palm and timber plantations (CIFOR); and on certification (the Forest Stewardship Council [FSC]).

3 Was RAFT's Hypothesis of Change Valid?

This section examines three major aspects of RAFT's *theory of change*: a) its geographic focus; b) its thematic focus on the forestry sector; and, c) its multi-pronged regional strategy.

3.1 GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS

Given that RAFT's objectives relate to the role of deforestation and forest degradation on biodiversity and carbon sequestration, it is appropriate that a major focus of RAFT spending (Figure 3) was on forest-rich Indonesia, which contains the majority of tropical rainforest in SE Asia (Figure 5a), and on China, which is the largest processor (and thus buyer) of timber in the region.

Indonesia is also a major emitter of greenhouse gases: the equivalent of 256 million tonnes of CO₂ per year (*i.e.*, m t CO₂e; Figure 5a), and is thus a major player in REDD+ activities. Combined, China and Indonesia totaled 43% of RAFT spending (Figure 3). Given that regional activities consumed another 49%, other countries received only 8% of RAFT spending.

As Figure 5a indicates, very little of Asia's forests are sustainably managed, much less independently certified. As far as RAFT is concerned, this is very much the point: across the region, much is needed to raise the standards of management.

Given the low governance indicators for the region (Figure 5b), it is a safe assumption that, without assistance, the risk that Asia's forests will continue to be poorly managed is high. Moreover, development interventions in such countries with low governance also risk failure, given the low capacity and political will.

Unlike its forests, Asia's forest industry is more broadly dispersed (Figure 5c). While low on timber production, Thailand, China, and Vietnam all have large processing sectors. Malaysia is a major producer of both primary products (in part from plantations), as well as

processed products like furniture. Likewise, Indonesia also has significant processing industries, but legal timber production is now in decline—having passed *peak timber*.¹⁰ As Indonesia does, other sources of timber, like Papua New Guinea (PNG), are growing in importance. This probably warrants a greater focus on PNG, but given PNG's weak governance indicators, unless there is strong political will within government to engage on SFM issues, there is a high likelihood that efforts would not be as successful in PNG as similar efforts would be if spent elsewhere.

Although serious allegations of corruption and mismanagement of Cambodia's forests have been made by independent monitors¹¹ appointed by the government and by the World Bank Inspection Panel,¹² RAFT had no presence in Cambodia. This was a strategic decision based on the government's 2002 ban on logging that also restricted timber exports, which was RAFT's primary focus.

In Laos, RAFT found the opportunity to work with a community-managed teak plantation to become independently certified by FSC. The government has expressed a desire to replicate the model as part of their rural economic development strategy.

¹⁰ FAO. 2011. *Southeast Asia's Forests and Forestry to 2020*.

¹¹ Global Witness. 2007. *Cambodia's Family Trees: Illegal logging and the stripping of public assets by Cambodia's elite*.

¹² World Bank Inspection Panel. 2006. *Cambodia: Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project*.




Figure 5. **For the eight RAFT countries: a) Forest cover** (m ha; FAO FRA 2010). The darker green part of the bar represents the proportion in primary forest, the black lines at the base [barely seen] represent the amount certified, and the darkest green lines [also barely seen] represent the amount in SFM (ITTO 2011). The first set of numbers on the top of each bar is the annual rate of deforestation (% forest area/yr, 2005 to 2010; FAO FRA 2010), and the second number is the CO₂e emitted by deforestation and degradation (m t; FAO FRA 2010). **b) Governance indicators** (World Bank 2008) of: effectiveness of institutions; corruption; rule of law; and regulations. **c) Size of the forest sector.** The dark bars represent roundwood production (in million m³; FAOSTAT 2009), and the light bars represent the value of secondary processed wood products (in US\$ billions; ITTO 2009).

The only country in SE Asia with large forests that was not served by RAFT was Burma (Myanmar). Like Cambodia, there are serious allegations of illegal timber traded into China, India, and Thailand, generally

driven by the military.¹³ However, Burma was not eligible for support due to USAID restrictions on the programming of development assistance there.

3.2 THEMATIC FOCUS

In 1990, ITTO announced *Target 2000*, which established the year 2000 as “when all trade in tropical timber is to be supplied from sustainably managed sources”. Given the almost complete lack of SFM noted above (Figure 5a), much remains to be done. It was in this context that RAFT began.

RAFT’s focus on SFM was driven in part by the link between forestry, forest degradation, and threats to biodiversity; i.e., conventional timber harvesting is associated with reduced species-richness (for example, Figure 6). Moreover, it was assumed that many new plantations would be located on logged forests if these areas were left unmanaged, and that cleared forests are significantly more detrimental to biodiversity than even from previously logged forests.

Presumably the impact on biodiversity from SFM/RIL practices will lie between conventional “logged forest” and “primary (unlogged) forest”. However, “[t]here is little quantitative evidence about the long-term effects of certified forest management on biodiversity”.¹⁴ In general, SFM/RIL “appear to benefit biodiversity ... [But t]here is a very high variation, both in forest management practices associated with certification and in responses between and even within species.” Much more study is needed to understand the relation between SFM and biodiversity.




Figure 6. **Impact of conventional logging and plantations on biodiversity.** [From: CIFOR. 2009. *The impacts & opportunities of oil palm in SE Asia.*]

¹³ Global Witness. 2005. *A Choice for China: Ending the destruction of Burma’s northern frontier forests.*

¹⁴ All quotes in this paragraph from: van Kuijk et al. 2009. *Effects of forest certification on biodiversity.* Tropenbos.

As the relationship between biodiversity and forest degradation remains insufficiently understood, the relationship between logging and subsequent deforestation is becoming increasingly complex, as is our understanding of the drivers of deforestation (see Annex 5).

While other drivers of deforestation are growing, it appears that industrial timber harvesting in natural forests in most of SE Asia is in decline. When RAFT began, the timber industry in Indonesia reported consuming twice as many logs as the government reported being legally produced.¹⁵ Since then, the number of timber concessions has been falling dramatically. From almost 600 covering more than 60 million ha in the 1990s, now only about 300 concessions remain on just over 26 million ha.¹⁶ Apparently less than half of these are currently operating. At the same time that timber harvesting has been declining, plantation agriculture, particularly palm oil, was fast expanding, especially in Indonesia and Malaysia (Figure 7).

Land clearing for plantations now provides almost two-thirds (60%¹⁷) as much wood as the legal supply reported from timber concessions in Indonesia. Moreover, the legality of the logs from land clearing is highly suspect. When the Ministry of Forestry examined 976 land clearing operations in Kalimantan, they found that 92% did not have legal permits.¹⁸ Furthermore, in 2009, Indonesia reversed a ban on the use of natural forests for pulp, thus affecting at least 7 million ha of natural forests, while at the same time the Ministry permitted the export of plantation-grown pulp logs because of low prices paid by domestic processors.¹⁹ Presumably, with low cost fiber from the conversion of natural forests, the Indonesian domestic market was not willing to pay the international price for plantation-grown timber.



Figure 7. Palm oil production. [From: CIFOR. 2009.]

15 Based on industry and Ministry of Forestry reporting; Human Rights Watch. 2009. *Wild Money*.

16 Indonesia Ministry of Forestry. 2009. *Bina Produksi Kehutanan*. Table IV.1.1.

17 Indonesia Ministry of Forestry. 2009. *Bina Produksi Kehutanan*. Table IV.2.2.A.

18 Jakarta Globe. 2011. *How hunger for palm oil profits drives the razing of Kalimantan*. p. A6. (July 4, 2011).

19 ITTO Market Information. Jan 1–15 2009 and Feb 1–15 2009.

The rise in plantations is driven in part by the strong global demand for crops such as rubber and for pulp. And as climate-change policies favor biofuels to combat greenhouse gas emissions, palm oil looks to continue its strong performance (Figure 7). Indonesia expects to plant another 3 million ha of oil palm by 2015.²⁰ This agro-forestry expansion looks to dwarf the impact on biodiversity, not to mention CO₂ emissions, that timber harvesting currently has, especially if the plantations continue to be sited on peat soils with large carbon contents that are burned during land clearing.

While RAFT's focus on forestry was necessary—given the role of timber harvesting in forest degradation

causing biodiversity loss, as well as harvesting's role in the chain of events causing deforestation—it appears increasingly that a focus on forestry alone is insufficient to combat threats to biodiversity. This is not to say that RAFT alone—or its successor—must tackle the growing importance of plantations (or the other drivers of deforestation), but RAFT should at least be able to identify how these issues are being resolved and by whom. Moreover, future programs should understand the financial tradeoffs between competing land uses—SFM *vs.* palm oil, for example. Otherwise, even when RAFT succeeds in achieving its immediate objectives, the greater goal of sustained biodiversity may be lost.

3.3 MULTI-PRONGED STRATEGY

As outlined in the next section (§4), RAFT has been successful at achieving its four major objectives. Working at multiple levels simultaneously across the supply chain allowed RAFT to align incentives and link actors to make connections that favored responsible operators and that built partnerships and trust that did not previously exist.

A more narrow focus on a single part of the supply chain,²¹ or on a single actor, would have been less effective at achieving strong market and better policy signals. Similarly, a broader mandate—on forests, rather than forestry, for example—probably would have been overwhelming, with a loss of focus.

Regarding RAFT's *Theory of Change* (Figure 2), there was strong evidence (§4) that regulatory signals were far stronger than market signals. The final hypotheses—that helping a group of progressive companies become certified will create a critical mass to tip the balance in favor of SFM—remains insufficiently tested. RAFT's partners argue that it is actually cost-effective

to implement RIL/SFM (Text box 2), but RAFT has yet to articulate a clear business model for adopting SFM and becoming certified that could serve to convince a generic concessionaire. Moreover, there was no formal survey to understand industry's decision making to better design incentives for adoption of SFM. It may be that concessionaires remain to be convinced, but as yet there is no evidence of a *critical mass* or a *tipping point*. Indeed, the number of FSC-certified forest management operations in Indonesia has actually decreased, in part due to suspensions, since RAFT began (Table 2)—this despite RAFT's efforts to help certify four new concessions.

20 World Bank. 2010. *Indonesia Oil Palm Synthesis—Discussion Paper*.

21 Perhaps more could have been done to work strategically with the retail sector, but RAFT partners WWF/GFTN, TFT, and TFF were already working with retailers, albeit outside the formal RAFT partnership.

Table 2. The number and area of FSC-certified concessions in SE Asia. [From: FSC August 2011.]

	FSC-certified area (ha)			# FSC-certified operations		
	June 2006	April 2008	August 2011	2006	2008	2011
Indonesia	739,368	903,020	567,294	5	7	8
Malaysia	71,664	49,692	742,849	3	4	7
Vietnam	9,904	9,904	15,641	1	1	3
PNG	19,250	29,892	0	1	2	0
Laos	44,985	44,985	81,704	2	2	2
TOTAL	885,171	1,037,493	1,407,488	12	16	20

Text box 2

Cost-effectiveness of SFM. [Based on: RAFT Story of Change: IFM]

RAFT’s message is that two developments offer windows to improve the ways that forests are managed: the market demand for legal and sustainable wood products; and the worldwide recognition of the importance of healthy forests in the struggle against climate change. Furthermore, laws that make illegal logging increasingly risky increase the potential gains from ensuring a legal timber supply. “During the 1990s the markets were not concerned about timber being certified,” explains Handjaya of the Indonesian timber producer and processor Alas Kusuma Group. “But now, due to demand in markets for certified products, more and more timber producers are making changes in the way they manage forests.”

Art Klassen of TFF sees RIL as a critical first step down the road toward certification. “Bottom line: RIL saves money while reducing impact... The business logic of this can be an important first step for companies to seek timber certification... Once the engagement on an activity such as RIL begins to demonstrate

benefits, while at the same time not posing a threat to the management, the complexity of the engagement grows naturally and leads the management to aim for increasing standards of excellence.”

For example, in 2009, in order to facilitate SFM in Indonesia, TNC got permission to trial the use of the monocable, a motor-driven winch system that pulls one log at a time from the stump to the stacking area, thereby damaging far fewer trees compared to conventional harvesting that uses heavy equipment. After watching it in operation, the Ministry of Forestry is eager to remove the monocable from its list of banned tools and see it expanded to other concessions. And so far, along with its lighter footprint on the forest, the monocable promises more local jobs, many for ex-illegal loggers. “Now we are working full-time without feeling guilty,” said Ami Daud of his new job managing monocable crews at Belayan River Timber concession in East Kalimantan.

4 Confirmation of Results

4.1 OVERALL FINDINGS

Under its *Performance Monitoring Plan*, RAFT reported on eight indicators across five Intermediate Results (Table 3). Given RAFT’s objectives, these appear to be suitable indicators of performance. However, measuring the actual improvement of management to areas of biological significance and measuring the actual quantity of greenhouse gas emissions reduced due to improved forest management proved to be a challenge (§4.2).

Not all the concessions engaged by RAFT succeeded in becoming independently verified as having produced legal timber, nor certified as implementing SFM (§4.2.2). Nonetheless, a number of concessions claim progress in meeting requirements consistent with those for legality, HCVF, RIL, and certification, albeit without achieving independent confirmation of success. Annex 7 outlines for each timber conces-

sion the progress that they claim in these areas. In this Final Evaluation, however, only independently confirmed performance is considered as having ‘achieved’ improvement in forest management. Note also, that as RAFT is not yet completed, the results reported herein should be considered tentative. RAFT’s Final Report will contain the actual results achieved through the life of the project.

4.2 SPECIFIC FINDINGS BY OBJECTIVE

This section outlines some findings for each of RAFT’s four main objectives. The purpose is not to describe in detail RAFT’s achievements—the program’s own *Final Report* should provide a comprehensive narrative. Rather, the purpose here is to provide an analysis for each objective, evaluating whether or not the specific context and approach was valid and effective, especially in managing the impact of external constraints.

4.2.1 Objective 1: *Increased trade from legal sources*

4.2.1.1 Context and Approach

RAFT promoted the development and use of credible national-level legality standards, which can assure consumers that the wood they purchase is from legally managed forests.

RAFT—and its predecessor program, the *Alliance to Promote Certification and Combat Illegal Logging in Indonesia*—assisted the creation of an Indonesian timber legality standard (that goes by its Indonesian acronym, *SVLK*). The *SVLK* was developed through a joint effort of the Government of Indonesia, its Ministry of Forestry, the timber industry, and civil society, most recently through the Multi-stakeholder

Forestry Program. RAFT’s partners have also been piloting a chain of custody system that will reinforce the *SVLK*. In the countries with large processing capacity (especially China and Vietnam), RAFT also worked with industry to establish chain of custody procedures.

In China, RAFT assisted the *State Forest Administration* (SFA) in their development of *A Guide on Sustainable Overseas Forest Management & Utilization by Chinese Enterprises* so that Chinese enterprises might “play a positive role in sustainable development of global forest resources”. RAFT also played a catalytic role in bringing together government and the private sector through, for example, the annual *Forests, Markets, Policy & Practices* conferences held in China that had wide industry attendance.

Table 3. **USAID indicators under RAFT's Performance Monitoring Plan.**

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE (SO): IMPROVED RESPONSE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGES IN ASIA

Intermediate Results (IR):

IR 1 Enabling Conditions Improved

- IR 1.1.1 # of policies, laws, agreements or regulations promoting sustainable natural resource management and conservation that are implemented as result of USG assistance
- IR 1.2.1 # of NGO and CSO stakeholders engaged in natural resource governance, management and associated law enforcement efforts
- IR 1.4 Amount of funds from non-USAID sources mobilized and applied

IR 2 Human and Institutional Capacity Strengthened

- IR 2.3.1 # of people receiving USG supported training in natural resources management and/or biodiversity conservation

IR 3 Model Actions Demonstrated

- IR 3.3 # of hectares in areas of biological significance under improved management as a result of USG assistance

IR 4 Regional Platforms Strengthened

- IR 4.1 # of regional environmental platforms created or strengthened
- IR 4.2 # of new members in regional environmental platforms

IR 5 Quantity of greenhouse gas emissions reduced

- IR 5.1 Quantity of greenhouse gas emissions, measured in metric tonnes CO₂ equivalent, reduced or sequestered as a result of USG assistance

4.2.1.2 Validity and Effectiveness of Approach

Weak enforcement of legislation is a key obstacle to SFM and a responsible timber trade. Thus, strengthening the national policy environment to increase regulatory capacity and enforcement is a valid approach. Likewise, working with secondary processing industries to use chain of custody systems to purchase only legal wood will reinforce the regulatory signals with a strong signal from the marketplace. RAFT's engagement with Indonesia, China and Vietnam, in particular, was effective, especially because both industry and government were responding to changes in legislation in consumer markets.

4.2.1.3 Impact of external factors

Efforts to increase implementation of national legislation and improve legal trade were strengthened by the passage of legality legislation in both producer and consumer countries. For example, in Indonesia, the passage of the EU's *Due Diligence Regulation* helped the successful negotiation of the bilateral trade agreement, known as a *Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)*²². Indeed, Indonesia made the passage of the EU regulation a requirement before signing the VPA. (The EU is also negotiating VPAs with Malaysia and Vietnam.)

22 Under the VPA, Indonesia will institute a legality assurance system, with independent oversight, to license all timber exports to the EU as complying with Indonesian law; this aims to ensure the sustainability and legality of timber production and improve the perception in Europe of tropical timber from Indonesia.




Figure 8. RAFT's cumulative progress for Performance Monitoring Plan indicators. Solid lines are actual achievements as reported by RAFT; dotted lines are targets (see Table 3; left column: IR 1.1.1; IR 1.2.1; IR 1.4; IR 2.3.1; and right column: IR 3.3; IR 4.1; IR 4.2; and IR 5.1, respectively). (Note: these data are tentative as the results are as reported to June 2011, whereas the RAFT program will not be complete until September 2011.)

4.2.1.4 Confirmation of Results and Performance

RAFT trained approximately 800 companies in six countries on their domestic laws and importer-country legality-legislation, such as the amended *Lacey Act*. Compliance with these laws should help the companies protect (or even expand) their market access. In particular, RAFT worked directly with 14 processing companies to achieve FSC chain of custody certification: six in China, five in Indonesia, two in Vietnam, and one in Laos. RAFT's partners also entered into agreements with major processing-industry associations, including the 350-member *Handicraft and Wood Workers Association* of Ho Chi Minh City, and the 1000-member *Lao PDR National Chamber of Industry and Commerce* to work with members to develop clear timber supply chain management systems.

In Indonesia, RAFT assisted the Ministry of Forestry (MoF) develop a field-based curriculum for SVLK training. Through RAFT's facilitation of their bilateral dialogue, China has been studying Indonesia's SVLK as a model for their own *Legality Verification System*.

4.2.2 Objective 2: Improving forest management practices on the ground

4.2.2.1 Context and Approach

As mentioned in §3.3, RAFT assumed that assisting companies in becoming certified could tip the balance and lead to widespread adoption of SFM. To test this, RAFT worked with 37 companies in Indonesia and 16 in Malaysia, representing about 15% of the industry (Annex 7). RAFT conducted most of this work through four NGO-partners, each with their own approach. Thus, their interventions represent an 'experiment' where different 'treatments' can be used to compare variation in implementation strategies. Their approaches are outlined briefly here:

- *TNC-Indonesia* & *WWF-Malaysia* are primarily conservation organizations and as such they chose companies based on the biodiversity values of the concession areas, as well as the concessionaries' commitment to SFM. The focus of the assistance was geared towards conflict mediation with local communities, identification of HCVF and the development of management and monitoring plans for these HCVFs. *WWF* used mainly Malaysian experts, whereas *TNC* operated with a large multinational staff.

- *TFT*'s mission is to help companies deliver responsible products. They work across the supply chain to match producers with retailers looking for a reliable source of certified wood. *TFT* worked with timber companies intensively, locating staff within the concession to directly assist their progress towards certification.
- *Tropical Forest Foundation's* (*TFF*) mission is to promote SFM as the best way to preserve renewable resources and natural habitats within tropical forests. *TFF* provides a fee-for-service model, although most of its staffing costs are derived from donor funding. *TFF* provides regular on-site demonstration and training. In a more step-wise approach to certification, rather than being located at the concession, *TFF* returned to work with concessionaires as performance benchmarks were reached. *TFF* operates with a small staff, contracting out work on social aspects and HCVF assessments as necessary.

4.2.2.2 Validity and Effectiveness of Approach

Engaging concessionaires was a valid approach for testing the hypothesis that building a cadre of certified operators would tip the balance in favor of the widespread adoption of SFM and certification. However, this *Final Evaluation* had insufficient information (such as money spent per concession and relative progress made) to judge the efficacy of the different approaches used by the different partners. RAFT should be encouraged to conduct such an evaluation in their *Final Report*.

In order to scale-up the adoption of certification, the *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommended that RAFT's partners evolve from the intensive one-on-one engagement with concessionaires to an approach that involves "creating a cadre of local experts within the industry... [and] develop a group of local SFM service providers in each country" so that it "institutionalizes SFM in industry practice and in the minds of government officials." RAFT's partners are yet to fully establish such an approach, although RAFT's collaboration with training programs (with, for example, Indonesia's MoF), academia (incorporating SFM into curricula), and its *Learning Networks* have helped build the capacity for more widespread outreach and adoption of SFM.

Table 4. **The area of timber concessions engaged by RAFT’s partners, and as comparison, the total area certified by FSC.** (Note: as RAFT is not yet complete, these totals may change. RAFT’s *Final Report* will contain the actual area engaged, improved, verified for legality and FSC certified for the life of the program.)

	Area (ha) that RAFT helped			Total FSC area (ha)	
	Engage	Verify	FSC Certify	2006	2011
Indonesia	4,206,521	1,396,245	697,928	739,368	567,294
Malaysia	1,703,793	655,878	587,002	71,664	742,849
Vietnam	99,174			9,904	15,641
PNG	16,000	16,000		19,250	0
Laos	13,000		86	44,985	81,704
TOTAL	6,038,488	2,068,123	1,285,016	885,171	1,407,488

4.2.2.3 Confirmation of Results and Performance

RAFT engaged 59 forest concessionaires (Annex 7) operating across more than 6 million ha of SE Asian tropical rainforest (Table 4) in order to build their capacity in participatory planning, RIL, identifying and managing HCVF areas, and managing conflicts with stakeholders. Of these concessionaires, more than 2 million ha were independently verified as legal (and other SFM practices) and more than 1 million ha were independently certified to the standards of FSC.

4.2.2.4 Constraints and challenges

RAFT’s initial assumption was that working with these companies would tip the balance in favor of widespread adoption of certification. There is, as yet, little evidence of this. In total, only about half of the concessionaires RAFT engaged became independently verified or certified; indeed the total area of FSC certification in Indonesia and PNG has declined since RAFT began. This decrease might be expected given the downturn in the global economy that coincided with RAFT’s activities; but at the same time Indonesia and PNG was declining, the rest of SE Asia was increasing (Tables 2 & 4). However, some of the suspensions of the Indonesian and PNG operators may be due to logistical issues. For example, RAFT found that Indonesia had an insufficient number of auditors to certify companies in a timely manner.

For its *Final Report*, RAFT should investigate the factors responsible for concessionaires’ decisions whether or not to become FSC certified. Indeed, it would have been useful if RAFT had conducted a systematic survey of industry to better understand the incentives that favor SFM. While almost all of the CSO/government respondents (>90%) to this evaluation’s online survey perceived legislation to be the main driver for SFM, less than 10% of the industry representatives agreed. Moreover, all seven of the companies that responded to the question “What is the biggest obstacle to SFM?” agreed that it was government corruption (Table 5; note: most respondents skipped the question in the online survey). Of the seven industry respondents to whether RAFT had an impact on these obstacles, five believed RAFT had at least a moderate impact, whereas two believed RAFT had no impact. While the sample size is small, it suggests that assistance to industry would be more efficient if it was better tailored to their needs.

With respect to training, industry respondents perceived their needs to be varied (Table 6). Given the low sample size, caution must be used, but these needs may also reflect the fact that RAFT already successfully provided training in a number of these areas.

Table 5. **Obstacles to SFM as perceived by industry.** (sample size [n] = 7)

Obstacle	# respondents
Need to tackle corruption	7
Need for training	6
Need for greater participation by local communities	6
Need to mediate conflict over land tenure	5
Need for coherent government policies	5
Need for land use planning	4
Need for greater markets for legal timber	4
Need for data	3
Need for government policies that favor SFM	3
The cost of certification	3
Need for proper allocation of logging concessions	2
Competition from other land uses (e.g., agriculture)	2
Lack of legal supply	1

Note: most respondents skipped this question

Table 6. **Training needs identified by industry.** (sample size [n] = 7)

Training Issue	# respondents
Trade Policy	6
Certification	5
Reduced Impact Logging	4
Chain of Custody	4
Conflict Management	4
REDD	3
HCVF	3
Legality Verification	2
Social Agreements with Local Communities	2

Note: most respondents skipped this question

4.2.3 Objective 3: *Strengthening regional cooperation on forest management & trade*

4.2.3.1 *Context and Approach*

Given the international nature of the timber trade in Asia, regional cooperation is necessary, for example, to implement customs controls, as well as address forest management and trade more broadly. To that end, RAFT participated in multiple regional forums in order to influence and strengthen policy development, including the dissemination of lessons learned, and to translate these policies and lessons into practice.

Initially, RAFT analyzed six regional initiatives in order to guide its engagement strategy:²³

- the *East Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (EA-FLEG) Process*
- the *Asia Forest Partnership (AFP)*
- *FAO’s Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission (APFC)*
- the *International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO)*
- the *Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN)*, whose work on forestry issues is guided by the *ASEAN’s Senior Officials on Forestry (ASOF)*
- the *Asia-Pacific Network for Sustainable Forest Management and Rehabilitation (APFNet)*.

As a result of this analysis, RAFT chose to focus on two:

- *AFP*: due to its multi-stakeholder nature, AFP is able to bring the voices of CSOs and the private sector into what is normally a government-to-government dialogue. RAFT co-sponsored three of AFP’s annual meetings (including one in 2009 on the linkages between SFM and REDD+). RAFT was also a member of AFP’s Steering Committee.
- *APFNet*: due to its potential to engage and influence China’s commitment to SFM and legal trade, which was viewed as a way to similarly encourage China’s major trading partners. RAFT worked with APFNet to develop its strategic plan, specifically around the components on training and policy dialogue.

4.2.3.2 *Validity and Effectiveness of Approach*

RAFT’s approach has been to “focus on adding value

to existing regional fora rather than creating new mechanisms.” Given that no single platform existed that worked to strengthen responsible timber trade in the region, RAFT chose the valid approach of engaging AFP and APFNet. RAFT worked with the other initiatives as opportunities presented.

While regional cooperation is necessary to promote the responsible timber trade, it is, in itself, insufficient in the sense that it does not deal with illegal logging from areas outside of designated production forests. However, RAFT’s *Theory of Change* was that an approach that dealt with international trade would also influence domestic markets. Working with the larger, better-capitalized exporters to help them adopt SFM was more likely to succeed than working with purely domestic actors. These higher profile, export companies would then contribute to a constituency for change that would eventually spill over to the domestic industry. However, this assumption remains insufficiently tested. Monitoring is warranted to ensure that illegal logging does not simply ‘leak’ from the export-supply chain into [perhaps] less discriminating domestic consumption instead.

4.2.3.3 *Impact of external factors*

Most notable of the external factors was the passage of legality legislation in consumer-countries. Further, the Greater Mekong Subregion’s *Economic Integration Program (EIP)*, supported by the Asian Development Bank) and ASEAN’s EIP appear to be strengthening regional cooperation. But these EIPs may also be increasing the challenges to forest management as the trade in forest products opens (in terms of both volume and a reduction in regulations)—but opens in a context of weak governance and ineffective regulation. Given the international context of these factors, RAFT’s regional nature gave it the ability to act “in an independent and flexible way in the most important producer and trade countries of the region while working synergistically with related efforts of the USG[overnment]”.²⁴

4.2.3.4 *Confirmation of Results and Performance*

RAFT facilitated a regional study and workshop on *Enhancing Customs Collaboration to Combat the Trade in Illegal Timber*, which led to recommendations for measures to promote technical and legal cooperation

²³ RAFT. 2007. *Asia-Pacific Regional Forestry Policy Engagement Strategy Review*.

²⁴ RAFT *Mid-Term Evaluation*

through the inclusion of forest products in *Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Agreements*. These recommendations must still be implemented, however.

RAFT also reinvigorated the *Technical Working Group* collaboration between Indonesia and China to improve the implementation of their 2002 *MoU between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of the People's Republic of China Concerning Cooperation in Combating Illegal Trade of Forest Products*. This work could eventually be linked to the US bilateral MoUs with Indonesia and China and a trilateral *Working Group* formed.

RAFT was also instrumental in ASEAN's adoption of regional chain of custody guidelines that all its member states will be required to use in 2015. The guidelines were developed through RAFT support to ASOF and ASEAN's Ministers on Agriculture & Forestry (AMAF), and as a component of the *Pan-ASEAN Timber Certification Initiative*. RAFT then supported the Laos Department of Forestry to develop a national chain of custody system based on the ASEAN guidelines. Likewise, RAFT helped Indonesia develop its chain of custody system.

RAFT also assisted in the development of a *HCVF Resource Network* and HCVF toolkit in Indonesia.

As a regional multi-stakeholder platform capable of bringing together civil society, governments, industry, and academia, RAFT has played an uncommon role in Asia. This also provided a useful platform for engagement with USG agencies, including the US Forest Service, US Trade Representative, and the Departments of State and Justice on technical and policy issues.

4.2.3.5 Constraints and challenges

The linkages between the regional cooperation objective and RAFT's other objectives could have been stronger; *i.e.*, the links between the SFM work on the ground and regional organizations appear weak. In general, most of the activities under this objective were implemented by TNC. Other implementing partners appeared to have little knowledge of or involvement in these activities, thereby creating some disconnect with overall program activities. Similarly, coordination with USAID's *Forest Legality Alliance* could have been more effective.

Moreover, RAFT's regional cooperation could have been even more strategic, through more proactive engagement with regional organizations (*i.e.*, working with the *World Customs Organization* and similar organizations), who could have been included in RAFT partner meetings and strategic planning sessions. This might have increased their ownership and involvement in the process, and brought the organizations together around a common regional platform and agenda.

4.2.4 Objective 4: Incorporating SFM into REDD+

4.2.4.1 Context and Approach

Objective 4 built logically on RAFT's SFM strengths: *i.e.*, quantifying the carbon benefits of the various IFM approaches used by the companies engaged in Objective 2. RAFT did not explicitly articulate a development hypothesis for this objective, however, implicit in their analysis of the incentives required to prevent forest conversion is the recognition that revenue from the sale of carbon credits and a mix of other financial incentives (perhaps stacking biodiversity offset credits) might make SFM a strong economic alternative to other uses, such as plantations. Such an alternative 'use' is critical for maintaining forest cover, as it appears unlikely that carbon payments alone will be sufficient to pay for conserving forests.

As a first step, RAFT conducted research to estimate the carbon benefits of SFM to determine whether or not significant emissions reductions could be achieved while still maintaining timber harvest volumes (Figure 9). Outreach was accomplished, in part, through a *REDD+ Learning Network*.

4.2.4.2 Validity and Effectiveness of Approach

Given the serious threat of land clearing for plantations, an explicit analysis of the economics among various land-use scenarios seems critical to develop effective strategies in favor of maintaining forests. Preliminary analyses through RAFT indicate that FSC/SFM can reduce CO₂ emissions while still maintaining the volume of timber harvested. (Note: if SFM does lead to lower harvests, loggers may be tempted to compensate by harvesting elsewhere, *i.e.*, leakage.)

The President of Indonesia's commitment to reduce emissions by 26%²⁵ (the vast majority of which must

25 And up to 40% reduction with outside donor assistance.




Figure 9. Carbon emissions related to forest management practices. (Mg = tonnes) [From: Griscom.]

come from a reduction in burning forests for land clearing, especially on peat), plus the possibility of REDD+ financing for SFM, offer an entry point to re-evaluate land use decisions. However, there is still work to be done to better quantify the costs and benefits of various SFM techniques and to develop a cost-effective strategy that includes a role for carbon financing to tip the balance towards SFM *vs.* competing land uses. Likewise, a rigorous understanding of the decision-making architecture used by local/regional/national governments in land-use planning is necessary in order to identify the strategic leverage points that are available to influence decisions that will minimize deforestation. (Indeed, RAFT contracted such an analysis in Kalimantan [Indonesian Borneo].)

4.2.4.3 Impact of external factors

The REDD+ debate is driven largely by international negotiations, *i.e.*, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and in particular the agreement on REDD+, which led to action by the World Bank's *Forest Carbon Partnership Fund* and the United Nations-REDD program (UN-REDD) to help countries develop their REDD+ strategies. These engagements have heated up debate and raised expecta-

tions. RAFT helped to frame this debate through its *REDD+ Learning Network*, which sought to prepare a cross-section of stakeholders, including forestry ministries, NGOs, and journalists (Text box 3).

4.2.4.4 Confirmation of Results and Performance

RAFT essentially met their target for estimated CO₂e emissions reductions (Figure 8) note, however, the calculations are not yet based on field measurements in the relevant concessions. Although RAFT did work on calculating carbon emissions from SFM techniques including RIL, they are not yet complete. Eventually, these analyses will be used to compare carbon emissions between conventional harvesting and RIL/SFM. Once finalized, RAFT's approach aims to provide a scientifically robust, compelling methodology that can be scaled up to calculate forestry's contribution to REDD+ commitments at national and/or regional levels.

For a new concept like REDD+, there is a need for extensive outreach and a forum for discussion. The *REDD+ Learning Network* was meant to provide this through a two-prong approach. The first convened five regional workshops over two years to discuss a series of issues related to REDD+ and SFM. The summary

Designed to meet the immediate needs of delegates preparing for the UN climate negotiations, RAFT's *REDD+ Learning Network* also prompted more active participation in the development of national and sub-national REDD+ programs.

"We work with poor, forest-dependent people in Vietnam," explains Vu Thi Bich Hop, a network participant. "We know about SFM and livelihoods, but we did not know anything about REDD+. Learning about other countries' experiences with REDD+ is what built my confidence to participate both in the international climate negotiations, and in Vietnam's national REDD+ program."

It was through the *REDD+ Learning Network* that Ms. Vu first met Bholu Bhattarai, a fellow participant from Nepal and a member of the global climate advocacy group, *The Accra Caucus*. Mr. Bhattarai encouraged Ms. Vu to join the caucus as one of the few representatives from Asia. This led to additional support for

Ms. Vu to attend the UN climate meetings in Bonn, Bangkok and Copenhagen, where she fed her practical experience working with local communities in Vietnam into global advocacy efforts for just and effective solutions to climate change.

Media Training

ABC Radio Australia Khmer aired interviews from the *REDD+ Media Training* workshop to explain to Cambodians how journalists will use their newly gained knowledge to cover climate change and REDD+ news. After the workshop, a journalist from *China Dialogue* offered to translate into Chinese RECOFTC's *Indonesia Voices of the Forest* film that was used during the training. In addition, a journalist working for Thailand's *Public Broadcasting Service* approached RECOFTC to help create a 'community forestry and climate change' documentary. The film would visit community forestry sites and interview RECOFTC's Thai Country Program staff.

publications and workshop debates helped prepare people to participate in UNFCCC negotiations and also better prepare them for national debates on REDD+ strategies and issues. Workshop participants included staff from national NGOs, forestry ministries, universities, and other stakeholders. Topics of the *Decoding REDD* series of workshops included:

- *Issues of Scale* (March 2009, Bangkok)
- *Addressing and Assessing the Second "D"* (May 2009, Bangkok)
- *Negotiating Forest Land-use Change* (July 2009, East Kalimantan)
- *Restoration in REDD+* (October 2009, Bangkok)
- *Effective REDD+ Safeguards: lessons from forest certification* (April 2010, Sabah).

The second approach was to educate national and regional journalists on REDD+ and SFM through media workshops (Bangkok, November 2010 & Jakarta,

April 2011) with supporting personnel from various stakeholder groups such as forestry ministries, regional research organizations, the UN-REDD program, and government working groups on REDD+. The workshop in Indonesia was co-organized with the *ASEAN Social Forestry Network*. Three policy briefs were prepared for the media workshops:

- *People, Forests and Climate Change*
- *Digging Deeper—Decoding REDD+*
- *Trouble in Forests: Carbon, Conflict and Communities*.

4.2.4.5 Constraints and challenges

RAFT must finalize the accounting methodology, using protocols consistent with that of the *Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, before the above estimates of the carbon reduction—either for individual SFM techniques or the performance of RAFT's partners and the forestry concessions where they worked—can be considered robust.

Table 7. The status of additional deliverables for *Objective 4: Climate Change*.

Deliverable	Status	Comments
Document CO₂ emissions from harvesting in Borneo with an analysis of the financial incentives required to keep forest in timber concessions <i>vs.</i> transforming to oil palm	Winrock completed research to measure differences in emission due to harvesting techniques ²⁶	TNC is refining analyses to develop a protocol to calculate differences in carbon emissions between conventional harvesting and a series of RIL practices such as leaving standing hollow trees, use of monocable logging, and reducing width of roads. This work will contribute to reference baselines (to be completed in 2012) and protocols for the TNC's Berau Forest Carbon Program
Permanent sample plots to measure above- and below-ground carbon stocks for Adelberts Conservation Community Forest Areas (via contract with PNG Forest Research Institute)	Not done	Instead RAFT provided assistance to the community forest operations in land use planning, boundary marking, and organizational strengthening. The area was identified by the Government of PNG as a REDD+ pilot site. Funding proposals have been submitted for follow on work
REDD Learning Network , including a website, and two RECOFTC personnel to attend various international REDD+ meetings	Target has been met: English, Mandarin Chinese, and Bahasa Indonesia publications disseminated at climate change meetings	Media briefs and summaries from Decoding REDD workshops

4.3 CONCLUSION

It appears that RAFT was able to better mainstream legal and sustainable forest products into the Asian timber trade. With respect to:

- **Policy:** RAFT achieved a better signal through, for example, assistance in the formulation and *Outreach* of legality legislation.
- **Regional efforts:** in 2015, ASEAN will require all countries to implement chain of custody trade regulations; RAFT's efforts to help develop *Chain of custody* systems (*e.g.*, in Indonesia) will likely bear fruit across the region.
- **Markets:** RAFT achieved a stronger signal through, for example, increasing chain-of-custody certification among secondary processing companies, which should increase demand for certified product.
- **Capacity:** much more is needed—as is the will to operationalize SFM and responsible trade—but

RAFT worked with countries and organizations to build their capacity to scale up adoption of best practices, for example, working with Indonesia's Ministry of Forestry to develop a curriculum on RIL and other harvesting techniques (many of which are also meant to be low-carbon).

In conclusion, RAFT claims to have engaged more than 6 million hectares in SE Asia, of which more than 3.3 million hectares are now independently verified/certified to be under improved forest management, which, as a result, prevented the equivalent of more than an estimated 13 million tonnes of carbon dioxide in emissions.

²⁶ winrock.org/ecosystems/files/Winrock_TNC_logging_report_TNC_06-9-2011.pdf

5 Responsiveness to Stakeholder Needs

This section evaluates how responsive RAFT was to: a) evolving market and policy environments; b) project-related monitoring and evaluation, in particular the *Mid-Term Evaluation*; and, c) RAFT’s own partners and stakeholders. The first two issues are in the context of *adaptive management*—how effective RAFT was at monitoring and, based on the subsequent evaluation (both RAFT’s own and the mid-term’s), adapting its management plans to better deliver on its objectives. The third is in the context of program delivery: that is, RAFT’s effectiveness in tailoring its services to its partners and stakeholders.

5.1 ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT TO CHANGING MARKETS AND POLICY ENVIRONMENTS

As mentioned in Section 4.2, the almost universally acknowledged ‘game changer’ in the sector was the passage of the US *Lacey Act* amendment and the EU’s *Due Diligence Regulation*. Similar measures added to this impact, for example, Japan’s *Procurement Policy*, as well as corporate social responsibility actions like Walmart joining the GFTN.

When RAFT was designed in 2006, the proponents could not have predicted such a profound change to the regulatory environment. Yet RAFT was able to respond quickly to provide field-based input to the USG on the impact of *Lacey* in the region. RAFT was then able to assist the USG in its outreach to educate stakeholders, including industry, about the implications of the legislation. Likewise, RAFT was able to react to changing attitudes in China, both within the government and the private sector (§4.2.1.1).

Initially, RAFT had planned to work with the financial sector to promote SFM through screening investments to favor timber companies that use best practices. However, RAFT learned that the large financial companies that use environmental and social screens, like the *Equator Principles*,²⁷ rarely finance timber concessionaires, preferring to engage with forestry through the plantation sector. Consequently, RAFT abandoned this line of programming, shifting its resources to other more productive avenues.

More difficult than working with stakeholders has been responding to ‘shocks’ like those presented by dramatic changes in the global economy. During the five years RAFT has existed, the market for timber (and for other agricultural commodities) has swung from record highs to financial crisis and back. In times of financial crisis, governments may look to the exploitation of natural capital to fill revenue gaps. In Indonesia, politicians appear to turn to forests prior to elections as a source of campaign financing—deforestation rates have been related to election cycles.²⁸ Given the low governance scores common to SE Asia (Figure 5b), forests remain at risk. It is within this context that RAFT sought to build capacity to address these governance gaps.

Outside financial crises, forests are susceptible to other shocks, such as climate change. Here too, improvements in governance will have positive impacts, for example, in the ability of countries to adapt to the impacts of climate change on lives and livelihoods. In contrast to society and the economy, forest ecosystems are less able to adapt, and thus, actions to mitigate climate change

27 equator-principles.com/

28 Burgess et al. 2011. *The Political Economy of Deforestation in the Tropics*.

through emissions reductions should remain a priority. Here, as REDD+ became a major issue within the UNFCCC, RAFT was able to adopt a fourth objective on

climate change aimed at reducing emissions through more sustainable forest management.

5.2 RESPONSE TO THE MID-TERM EVALUATION

RAFT's *Mid-Term Evaluation* in 2009 was comprehensive, making many recommendations (Annex 6). In the context of adaptive management, RAFT tackled the following major issues that the evaluation had identified:²⁹

- **Better coordination within the partnership**
RAFT better defined the roles and responsibilities of partners (Table 1), which meant some organizations with limited involvement were no longer considered partners. This helped clarify the RAFT *brand* and what it represented.
- **Establish a stronger and more purposeful communications strategy**
RAFT recruited a *Communications/Partnership Manager*, whose job it was to develop written and video outreach material, but also to increase dialogue among partners. These internal communications helped better coordinate RAFT's activities, and helped build collaborative, instead of competitive, relations among partner NGOs.
- **Broaden engagement**
RAFT's response produced mixed results. As mentioned above (§5.1), RAFT worked to improve outreach-coordination with the USG as well as to broaden engagement with the Government of China. Likewise, RAFT chose strategic engagement with other institutions, for example, foregoing coordination with ITTO (which was seen as too far outside the region—in Japan—and too narrowly focused on smaller projects) in favor of APFNet, who's Director credits RAFT with assisting in the development of their Strategic Plan.
- **Liaise with the US Forest Service (USFS)**
The USFS engaged effectively with RAFT, mainly through in-country technical assistance. James Halperin was located in Indonesia from 2008-2010 and provided a flexible point of engagement in a number of strategic collaborations, such as working with RAFT to monitor and evaluate concessionaire progress towards certification, as well as engaging Indonesian organizations, such as the Ministry of Forestry, to develop training materials, professional

exchanges to the USA, and advice on HCVF, RIL and other best practices for SFM. (Similarly, relations with the Departments of State and Justice, and the US Trade Representative, were strengthened after the mid-term and as the *Lacey Act* rose in importance.)

- **Build a critical mass of legitimate producers**
The *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommended that RAFT scale-up the development of legally verified and certified timber producers, but the demand from industry has mainly risen since *Lacey* and the EU *Due Diligence Regulation*. RAFT failed to respond fully to the recommendation that they better understand the market constraints that drive industry. For example, RAFT did not conduct a full market analyses, including trade flows for both certified and uncertified timber; although this was in part to avoid duplication of an on-going EFI study. So, the business case for adopting best practices (RIL, for example) remains under-developed. While forest concessionaires will want to understand these costs/benefits on a case-by-case basis, there remains room for a general case to be made by a trusted actor, like RAFT. Certainly, RAFT, and its implementing partners in particular, could have conducted a systematic survey of industry to better understand their needs.
- **Better monitoring and reporting**
While RAFT met its USAID-reporting requirements, RAFT's monitoring could have been improved, especially in evaluating the impact of partners and their activities. Without robust monitoring and evaluation, it is difficult to know what has actually changed 'on-the-ground' due to activities such as workshops and trainings, and how these activities should have been modified to make them more effective. And without a better understanding

²⁹ Just prior to the mid-term evaluation, RAFT received a new Chief of Party and this change in leadership probably facilitated other fundamental change as it allowed for a 'fresh start' in which the executive could look to the evaluation recommendations as motivation for change.

of the impacts of activities, it is difficult to evaluate the ultimate success of RAFT. But even more importantly, without such an understanding of its

impacts, it was difficult for RAFT itself to practice more effective adaptive management.

5.3 RESPONSE TO PARTNERS & STAKEHOLDERS

As part of this evaluation, a questionnaire was sent to more than 150 individuals familiar with RAFT. One line of questioning asked these stakeholders about their perceptions of the responsiveness of RAFT to their needs. The results indicate that almost all partners and stakeholders felt RAFT was ‘very’ to ‘moderately’ responsive (Table 8). Only one respondent perceived RAFT to be ‘unresponsive’ (with respect to working with other funders).

Table 8. **Stakeholder perceptions of the responsiveness of RAFT.** (n=38 respondents; 37 respondents skipped the question)

Aspect	Median Score (1-4, 1 being highest)	Distribution of responses (Very • Mod • Low • Unresponsive)
Collaboration (coordinating partners)	1.35	
Working with the private sector	1.48	
Technical assistance	1.52	
Communication strategy	1.68	
Input to policy	1.69	
Collaborating with other funders	1.73	
Working with local/indigenous communities	1.81	

6 Meeting Agency and Funding Requirements

After the initial set-up, RAFT did not program significant funds until 2008 (Figure 10). Over the life of the program, the majority (83%) of funding came from a biodiversity earmark. RAFT claims success in improving forest management on 3 million ha of tropical rainforest in SE Asia—one of the world’s 34 biological hotspots (i.e., globally these hotspots contain 75% of the world’s most threatened terrestrial mammals, birds, and amphibians, while covering just 2.3% of the Earth’s surface).

However, as mentioned (§3.2), further work is required to understand the relative impact on biodiversity of RIL/certified operations *vs.* conventional timber harvesting. Likewise, more research is needed to quantify the relative impacts of various harvesting and forest management techniques on carbon emissions (§4.2.4.5). The effectiveness of forestry’s carbon-management practices is particularly important, as future funding for RAFT-like engagement(s) will likely come from climate change/sustainable landscapes earmarks.

RAFT also worked closely with USG agencies in providing outreach, particularly in China. This collaboration was instrumental in sensitizing the Chinese processing industry in how to comply with the US *Lacey Act* (§5.1). Moreover, this outreach was done in close collaboration with the EU in providing a parallel explanation of their complementary *Due Diligence Regulation*.




Figure 10. USAID funding obligated to RAFT by earmark source. (Note: These figures are tentative as the RAFT program will not be complete until September 2011.)

7 Program Sustainability and Transition

7.1 TRAJECTORY OF RESPONSIBLE FOREST TRADE IN ASIA

While the RAFT program is closing in 2011, many of RAFT’s partners are sanguine about the trajectory of responsible forest trade in Asia. For example, RAFT’s former Chief of Party, David Cassells, believes there is finally a “conducive regulatory environment” related to ensuring legality in the sector.

That is, requirements like the legality legislation and procurement regulations, but also achievements like Indonesia’s requirement for independent auditing of legal compliance (SVLK, see §4.2.2) and the broad engagement of the Government of China, have all come together to create an environment where industry perceives that they must operate in compliance with the law, rather than ‘business as usual’.

It remains to be seen whether or not such optimism is warranted, but success will require a mix of engagements similar to that RAFT delivered, but with a greater emphasis on substantive enforcement activities to provide a continued deterrent effect.

7.2 PROGRAM CLOSE-OUT AND TRANSITION OF RAFT ACTIVITIES TO OTHER PROGRAMS

Although some aspects of RAFT’s work are likely to be adopted and continued by program partners, it is unlikely that any single institution will take over all of RAFT’s operations. The usual organizations for such a major role are considered unable to work across all the stakeholder groups that RAFT engaged. Of the options, *APFNet* is the most intriguing.

Having arisen from APEC, lead by the Governments of China, USA and Australia, APFNet is located in Beijing, with the Government of China providing funding. APFNet is trying to diversify this funding by setting up a *Green Fund*, with proceeds from industry, but APFNet remains heavily identified with China. Moreover, as a new institution, it is unlikely to have the administrative capacity to manage a program as complex as RAFT in the near future.

A more likely scenario is that different institutions will adopt the activities for which they share complementary mandates. For example:

- *European Forest Institute* (in collaboration with the EU) will continue outreach related to legality requirements, especially in the context of the *Voluntary Partnership Agreements*³⁰ in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam.
- *RECOFTC* will continue the conflict mediation training and *Learning Network* (Text box 4).
- *The Borneo Initiative* will work—and provide \$2/ha to cover the costs—with forest concessions in Kalimantan, Papua, and Malaysian Borneo that want to become certified. At present they have partnered with 13 of the concessions that worked with RAFT (§4.2.2.3).

³⁰ VPAs are bilateral trade agreements requiring licensing to provide assurance of legality for timber shipments; EU customs agents reinforcing producer-country rule of law by prohibiting import of any unlicensed shipments.

- TNC's *Berau Forest Carbon Program* will work with concessions and local government in Berau District of East Kalimantan, Indonesia. They overlap with six of RAFT's concession partners (§4.2.2.3).
- USAID's *Indonesia Forestry and Climate Support* (IFACS) program and RDMA's *Lowering Emissions*

in Asia's Forests (LEAF) program may be able to build upon RAFT efforts and continue supporting SFM in production forests in Kalimantan and Papua in Indonesia (IFACS) and in Malaysia and PNG (LEAF).

Text box 4

Conflict Mediation [from: RECOFTC's *Conflict in the Region*]

Conflict over land and forests in Asia is widespread: in Indonesia, an estimated 12–20 million people are affected by forest conflict; in Thailand, there are conflicting claims to at least 1.3 million ha of land classified as under formal protection; and in 2009, in Cambodia, there were 236 land disputes, 45% of which escalated to threats or violence. Conflict management intersects with forest governance, stakeholders' rights and the distribution of benefits from forest products and services.

Conflict generally affects the weakest stakeholders the most. Strategies to accommodate the multiple claims over forests are often developed without proper consultation with the 450 million forest-dependent people in the region. 'Solutions' are sometimes imposed through coercion and violence.

However, conflict can provide a starting point for positive change. Managing conflict is vital for more sustainable and equitable forest management.

The broad goal of RECOFTC's *Conflict Program* is to reduce the incidence and negative impacts of natural resource conflict in the region and tackle the root causes of conflict.

Sound analysis of the causes, impacts, and management of forest conflict guides and informs RECOFTC's capacity building services. Further, communication on the critical importance of forest-conflict transformation, especially for local people, is used to mainstream the awareness and capacity for conflict mediation. Between 2008 and 2010,

eight case studies from six countries generated lessons that have been communicated in various publications and at international conferences. They will be integrated in future trainings.

RECOFTC's main products include:

- An issues paper *Conflict over forests and land in Asia – Impacts, causes and management*, and a poster and series of banners based on the paper
- A CD-ROM repository of case studies, management tools and theory, and a range of peer-reviewed scientific articles
- A *Conflict Management Learning Network* with members from RAFT partners, government, CSOs, academia and industry from lower Mekong Countries, China, Indonesia, Malaysia and PNG who participated in a phased approach that included training, action research, networking, communication and training of trainers
- *Collaborative Conflict Management for Enhanced National Forest Program* set up a regional training of trainers program in five countries that empowered 13 participants—three can now conduct regional-level training, and four can conduct national-level training
- *Advanced Mediation Training* including the Media Brief *Trouble in the forest: Carbon, conflict and communities*
- *APFNet*: RECOFTC helped organize training for members of forestry faculties to facilitate a further integration of conflict management in university curricula.

7.3 INSTITUTIONAL MEMORY

Fortunately, RAFT responded positively to the *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommendation that they produce a “stronger and more purposeful communications strategy” (§5.2). As one partner noted, the written and video outreach materials will “become RAFT’s *institutional memory*” that practitioners from region (and indeed, around the world) will be able to refer to even once the program closes. While many documents are available at RAFT’s website,³¹ more could be done to ensure that all partners’ outreach materials are available in a single place.

7.4 BUILDING CAPACITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

RAFT’s purpose was to strengthen existing institutions and approaches and to that end, RAFT was able to align NGOs into a coordinated program, and in some cases, even a truly collaborative effort, like running the annual *Forests, Markets, Policy & Practices* conferences in China (§4.2.1.3). The success of this relationship building is undoubtedly due to the personalities of those involved, and the commitment and the leadership they have shown, which was appreciated by the partners interviewed in this evaluation.

In addition to successful relationship building, RAFT also invested in building local institutions. Perhaps the best example is RECOFTC (see Text box 4), which is now better able to scale-up its conflict mediation training (as well as strengthen its international accounting practices, which are necessary to accept financing directly from donors such as USAID).

Less clear is how well RAFT—and any subsequent program (see §9)—will be able to build the capacity of government at the local level to more responsibly manage forests and related trade. In part this is because

capacity is really the other side of the coin from ‘political will’. If the local government has little will to implement more responsible management, there is little RAFT, or any other development program, can influence. However, as stated above (§7.1), it appears that the regulatory environment, at least internationally, is beginning to align with a constituency demanding more responsible management. At a higher level, partners anticipate that government-to-government dialogue improved under RAFT will continue, certainly between China-Indonesia and the USA.

7.5 APPLICATION OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATIONS TO CHANGE BEHAVIOR

Another way that RAFT has helped alter the trajectory to more responsible management is by assisting in the development of innovative approaches and technologies. If these become more widely adopted, they may sustain and even build on RAFT’s successes.

³¹ Available on-line at: responsibleasia.org/

Learning networks

As mentioned above (§4.2), as a result of its *Mid-Term Evaluation*, RAFT increased the development of various *Learning Networks* that help transmit knowledge and lessons learned, thus, building capacity for better management. Some of RAFT's partners have turned to social media as a way to make the networks more accessible and to facilitate sharing of experiences. If widely adopted this will help scale up outreach.

Conflict mediation

Conflicts between communities and forest concessionaires, and increasingly with plantations (like oil palm), are widespread and sometimes violent. RECFOC's training program for conflict mediation should help improve these relations (Text box 4). Moreover, under REDD+ there is the possibility of conflicts over the denial of access-rights to forests and the sharing of benefits. Here too, conflict mediation will play an important role in responsible forest management.

Reduced impact logging (RIL) techniques

RAFT's partners have been working with Indonesian industry in particular to develop harvesting and SFM techniques that will have less impact on forests and associated biodiversity. For example, RAFT assisted in the development and publication of an *HCVF Toolkit* in Indonesia. RAFT also introduced low-impact, monocable techniques to the legal forestry sector (Text box 2). RAFT partners should do more to document the cost-advantages of RIL as a way to pull more concessionaires into adopting these best practices.

Log tracking

As part of Indonesia's legality assurance system (*SVLK*, §4.2.1.3), RAFT's partners have been helping develop, and implement through training, a log tracking system able to follow individual logs throughout the supply chain from harvesting. Once ASEAN's chain of custody requirements begin in 2015, systems such as Indonesia's may become widely adopted throughout the region.

Carbon-monitoring

Section 4.2.4.3 discussed RAFT's role in helping inject SFM into the dialogue of how countries can achieve REDD+. One of the major challenges in the adoption of SFM projects is in monitoring the reduction of emissions through the various RIL techniques. Here RAFT has made progress in developing protocols for such carbon accounting, as well as better elucidating some of the constraints of remote-sensed data (*e.g.*, from satellite images). Once finalized, and if adopted widely, these protocols can strengthen the case for RIL/SFM practices in reducing emissions under national REDD+ frameworks, which could result in greater incentives to help make SFM more economically viable. If SFM becomes sufficiently profitable, this may help drive a sustainable change from conventional management and harvesting practices to best practices RIL/SFM.

Asia Pacific Forestry Forum Forestry Week

In 2008, the *Asia Pacific Forestry Commission* adopted a *Forestry Week* in its meetings. RAFT helped change the dynamic of the meetings by involving CSOs in addition to the usual government delegates. This helped educate CSOs about what policymakers require in terms of information, making CSO engagement more effective. This multi-stakeholder *Forestry Week* has now been adopted at the *European Forestry Commission* meetings.

Working with academia

In conjunction with APFNet, RAFT helped organize a conference of Forestry Deans from universities around the Asia-Pacific region. Through this interaction, RAFT is hoping to influence curriculum design to mainstream, for example, SFM techniques like RIL, thus expanding RAFT's scope and helping scale up the adoption of best practices.

8 Lessons Learned

Programmatic lessons learned

8.1 IMPORTANCE OF A CONDUCTIVE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

The demand from forest concessionaires for assistance in becoming certified was low when RAFT began, but with new legality legislation, this is changing. However, in the end, RAFT's partners found that for timber producers and processors, the regulatory signal requiring legality is a much stronger signal than any market signal (§7.2).

8.2 IMPORTANCE OF ENFORCEMENT

To maintain the strength of the regulatory signal, and for the legislation to continue to act as a major driver of reform, the forestry industry must believe that compliance is necessary. This will require a strong deterrent effect, thus making enforcement a major priority, both in the producer countries and in the consumer countries. Achieving enforcement will require strengthening governance and building political will, not just building the capacity of enforcement agencies (Text box 5).

8.3 IMPORTANCE OF USAID BRAND

In explaining to stakeholders the evolving regulatory and market environment, RAFT's close relationship with the USG was invaluable and, apparently, reciprocal. Aside from the USAID funding and program support, direct USG involvement brought:

- *Greater credibility to RAFT and its activities.* It is unlikely, for example, that the Governments of China and Indonesia, and their domestic industries, would have been as willing to engage with RAFT and its partners had there not been the close connection with the USG.
- *Input to policy.* If RAFT was not funded by USAID, it is unlikely that USG agencies would have worked so directly with RAFT. Likewise, without RDMA, RAFT would have been less credible in linking regional to national initiatives and the region to Washington DC, thus losing the input used in decision-making surrounding the implementation of *Lacey*, as well as USA-Pacific trade negotiations.
- *Donor cooperation.* Likewise, it is unlikely that the EU would have worked so closely with RAFT to coordinate outreach on their *Due Diligence Regulation*.
- *Goodwill towards the USG.* This would not have been as strong if the US was not the major funder of RAFT.
- *Additional benefits.* USAID funding was especially important as it meant that RECOFTC, for example, could train more women in conflict mediation than participating institutions would have paid for and sent otherwise.

Although Indonesian law stipulates up to 15 years in jail for buying, selling, or receiving illegal timber, offenders are most likely to receive light jail sentences or small fines. In 2006, 294 illegal logging cases were brought to court, but by 2007 the volume seized had decreased by almost half, to 4,726 m³, although the number of cases rose to 345.³² In 2011, *Indonesian Corruption Watch* estimated that 71% of alleged illegal loggers were acquitted and 14% were sentenced to less than one year.³³ This despite President Yudhoyono instructions to the *Anti-Mafia Task Force* to investigate such court cases. “We have set 2010 as the year of law enforcement in the forestry field. In the first phase, investigations will focus on alleged forest crimes in North Sumatra and Central Kalimantan,” Aulia Ibrahim, forest investigation and protection director of the *Directorate General of Forest Protection and Nature Preservation*. Given the lack of progress,

Forestry Minister Zulkifli Hasan complained: “I don’t understand why efforts to enforce the law are running very slowly. We have fielded a joint team and a task force but forest crimes that happen in front of our very eyes seem so difficult to solve.”³⁴ The Ministry says illegal logging, land clearance, forest fires and mining has devastated Indonesian Borneo and cost the country an estimated Rupiah 311.4 trillion (US\$36.4 billion).³⁵ Based on figures supplied by district heads and governors, the Ministry, estimated 1,236 mining firms and 537 oil palm plantation companies were operating illegally in Kalimantan. However, Minister Hassan said the names of the companies, including a number of large operations with thousands of hectares of concessions, were not being released because they were still under investigation by the ministry in conjunction with the *Judicial Mafia Eradication Task Force*.

8.4 IMPORTANCE OF A REGIONAL APPROACH

Market signals go beyond national borders, as does outreach for regulations related to international trade, like *Lacey* and the *Due Diligence Regulation*. Thus, it was appropriate for RDMA to scale up the original Indonesian GDA into a regional program.

8.5 IMPORTANCE OF SPEAKING INDUSTRY’S LANGUAGE

There appears to be more scope for engaging more directly with industry across the supply chain, not just at the concession level. As the *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommended, it is now time to scale up efforts to facilitate wider adoption of best practices. Conferences, like those on *Forests, Markets, Policy & Practices* in China, helped deepen RAFT’s outreach, and therefore its impact.

32 Jakarta Globe, April 5, 2010.

33 Jakarta Post, June 22, 2011.

34 Antara, December 5, 2010.

35 Jakarta Globe, April 28, 2011.

Managerial lessons learned

8.6 IMPORTANCE OF BROAD PARTNERSHIPS

RAFT learned that its unique style of engagement across the supply chain brought about novel partnerships. RECOFTC, for example, believes that RAFT helped introduce the private sector to their work. Such partnerships, which should persist after RAFT, will broaden the impact of the program.

RAFT also learned that these relationships take time to develop. Real leadership is required to convince staff that cooperation is worth the expense (and the sharing of financial resources). RAFT's leadership should be especially commended for this commitment.

8.7 IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBILITY

The rapidly evolving regulatory and market environments required RAFT to exercise flexibility to take advantage of emerging opportunities. Likewise, the State Department was nimble enough to provide additional financial resources to allow for flexibility related to *Lacey* and China outreach.

Similar dynamics played out as the importance of REDD+ emerged within the UNFCCC, and USAID was able to program additional resources. However, RAFT was less able to expand its REDD+ activities, in part because efforts to develop a carbon monitoring protocol faltered on methodological challenges (§4.2.4). USAID and RAFT also used the US Forest Service to advantage, providing a flexible mechanism for engagement that could respond quickly to partner and stakeholder requests for assistance (§5.2).

8.8 IMPORTANCE OF REGULAR MONITORING AND EVALUATION

However, a tension in allowing flexibility is that partners may pursue activities that are not directly tied to the program's overall objectives, but rather relevant to their own, more narrow, mission. This reiterates the importance of regular monitoring and evaluation to avoid such 'drift'.

8.9 IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATION → COOPERATION → COORDINATION → COLLABORATION

While monitoring is reactive, proactive steps are equally important to ensure that partners' objectives are aligned with project objectives in the first place. This stresses the primary importance of communication—so that partners understand their specific role in achieving the program's overall goals. If the potential partner's own mission does not overlap with the programmatic work that they are assigned, then they should probably be discouraged from participating in order to avoid mission creep within their organization.

Indeed, RAFT chose partners based on missions/mandates that were complimentary with the goals of the program. However, the RAFT *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommended better internal communications to outline the specific roles and responsibilities of partners. Such communication was vital in developing the agreements needed to forge cooperation among the partners. This cooperation was then the basis for partners to coordinate activities. Then, based on the hard work of their

leadership and with sufficient trust built, collaborations could develop where reciprocal responsibilities allowed partners to achieve more than they could alone.

That is, purposeful communication leads to agreement for cooperation, which further leads to coordination within a program like RAFT, and ultimately to collaboration among partners, where possible.

8.10 IMPORTANCE OF A COMMON PLATFORM

Certainly RAFT's voice was stronger than any single organization's on its own—as evidenced from RAFT's dialogue with the USG agencies. Likewise, the 'sum was greater than the parts' as partners could share knowledge through RAFT's *Learning Networks*.

8.11 SOME SPECIFIC LESSONS LEARNED FOR EACH OBJECTIVE

8.11.1 Objective 1: Increasing Legal Trade

- Business in China is responsive to the US/EU's regulatory environment, and is demanding their government establish policy to comply with the requirements.
- To better ensure a supply of legal timber, some Indonesian processing companies are integrating vertically and obtaining more timber concessions.
- However, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between vertical integration and desire for certification. Having a foreign buyer may be sufficient motivation to become certified, even if the concessionaire has no processing capacity. (More work is still needed to better understand industry's motivations with respect to certification).
- Despite the growing interest in certification, industry still has many gaps in their capacity to respond.
- Likewise, government capacity remains low (perhaps reflecting low *political will*). Ministry of Forestry officials admit that Indonesia's *SVLK* legality assurance system would not be as developed without the assistance of RAFT and its main partner, TNC.
- Where government capacity is low, outsourcing can be an effective option for quickly building regulatory capacity—in Indonesia, private sector, accredited auditors will conduct *SVLK* audits.
- But there remains a lack of accredited auditors, which is hampering FSC certification and which will undermine implementation of the *SVLK*.

8.II.2 Objective 2: Increasing SFM

- As mentioned above (§8.1), currently the regulatory signal appears to be much more important to industry than the market signal. Prior to RAFT, NGOs working in SFM were almost competing to partner with the only Indonesia forest concessionaire seen as progressive enough to pursue certification (PT Suka Jaya Makmur). RAFT ends with having worked with almost 40 concessionaires (*i.e.*, ~15% of the industry) in Indonesia.
- However, not all concessionaires are equally likely to succeed in achieving certification. RAFT learned that criteria can be used to differentiate between companies likely to act responsibly and those that are less likely to do so.
- Moreover, strong codes of conduct are necessary to identify unacceptable behavior that would warrant disengagement. For example, PT Sumalindo's processing operation was caught with illegal logs, but RAFT did not have had a process for determining whether or not to continue the collaboration. These codes should apply to the entire company in order to align incentives for responsible behavior. Otherwise, companies may be using the association with RAFT merely to improve their image.
- Industry behavior is unlikely to be driven by 'ethical' investment, because the large financial institutions that use screens do not typically lend to timber concessionaires.

8.II.3 Objective 3: Increasing Regional Cooperation

- Working with China will increase the program's footprint in promoting SFM because China has such large overseas direct investment in the forestry sector. Improvements to governance in Asia may be adopted, therefore, in Africa and South America.
- Network-style learning and exchange can be useful in scaling up activities, but access is a real issue for local people, especially those outside urban areas. These restrictions relate not just to lack of access to the internet or even mobile communications, but access to learning material in local languages.

8.II.4 Objective 4: Increasing SFM through REDD+

- Most of the resources (financial, research, *etc.*) available for the development of REDD+ as a tool in combating climate change have focused on the monitoring and evaluation of carbon emissions. Indeed, if REDD+ is to be performance-based it will require rigorous quantification of the carbon benefits of specific emissions-reducing techniques. However, what is missing from the debate is greater attention to designing the specific, practical emissions-reduction strategies themselves. Here, RAFT was useful in injecting into the debate a discussion about the role of SFM as part of a REDD+ framework, *i.e.*, when timber concessionaires employ 'carbon conservation' management procedures, like RIL, they should be compensated for the decreased emissions as compared to legal, conventional harvesting. The payment for the environmental service (especially if stacked with other credits, such as for biodiversity) could then help pay for the opportunity cost incurred in using RIL techniques.
- Despite the potential emissions reductions associated with SFM and other carbon-management practices, there still remain methodological issues, including accounting protocols, the limitations of remote sensing technology, and the challenges of field-based methods for monitoring emissions at the level of the forestry concessions.

8.12 COST EFFECTIVENESS OF RAFT ENGAGEMENT

8.12.1 Certification costs

RAFT's partners claim to have engaged forest management across more than 6 million ha of tropical rainforest (Annex 7) of which 12 concessions with almost 1.3 million ha have been certified by FSC as implementing SFM. Assuming that RAFT's entire budget for SFM was allocated to assisting these 12 concessionaires, then certification costs could be estimated at approximately \$2.11/ha. But RAFT also worked to independently verify that a further 14 concessions of more than 2 million ha were of legal origin (as well as adopting other SFM best practices; Annex 7). Including these concessions, total RAFT spending was approximately \$0.81/ha. (If, however, you also include overhead costs and TNC's matching funds,³⁶ then the spending was \$1.18/ha certified or verified.) On the face of it, this estimate would represent the cost of improving forest management to the point of it being legal and/or sustainable.

Note, however, that estimating these costs is complicated, in part because it is difficult to establish attribution for the various activities. Moreover, the figures may be an underestimate because it is not clear how much individual concessionaires spent (in cash or in kind) in implementing RIL and other SFM techniques. Further, it is not clear how much other donors/partners spent outside of RAFT (or before RAFT began). Conversely the figures may overestimate because money was also spent engaging concessionaires that became neither verified nor certified (*i.e.*, more than half of all concessions RAFT engaged; Annex 7). Further, these figures may overestimate as much of the spending was one-time costs (like workshops to develop generic protocols). Note also that these costs do not represent the opportunity costs of foregone harvest volumes (if any).

But all these same issues exist in calculating costs for other projects assisting concessions to become certified. For the sake of comparison, *The Borneo Initiative* will pay \$2/ha once certified for any incurred costs (although the payments will be made to the contractors that assisted in certification, not the forest concessionaires themselves; and the \$2/ha does not include any of *The Borneo Initiative's* overall operating costs).

8.12.2 Carbon costs

RAFT also claims that the 3.35 million ha of IFM prevented an estimated 13.46 million tonnes of CO₂e from being emitted. Again, if all the SFM costs are considered necessary expenses, then carbon abatement costs were approximately \$0.2/t. When including the SFM and climate change objectives share of overhead and matching costs, then the price is \$0.3/t; and when also including all of RAFT's climate change spending (most of which was one-time, however, such as developing protocols and *learning networks*), the price is \$0.38/t. All of which compares to the current market price for CO₂e in Europe of \$13/t and in the US market,³⁷ forestry offsets are trading between \$0.6 and \$1.5/t. However, again, the caveats noted in the section above (§8.12.1) are relevant, as are the methodological limitations noted in §4.2.4. Therefore, conclusions regarding cost should be made with caution.

³⁶ That is, the 24.2% share of these budget items that was attributable to the SFM objective (see Figure 3).

³⁷ *Chicago Climate Exchange* quotes.

9 Strategic Priorities and Effective Approaches for Follow-on Program Efforts

Historically, the forestry sector in Asia has been stigmatized by a widespread lack of demonstrable legality. At the time RAFT began, Indonesian statistics indicated that industry used at least twice as much timber as the legal supply. The amount of unreported, illegal logging certainly made this ‘legal gap’ even greater. However, interviews for this evaluation were almost universal in perceiving that a corner has been turned.

Most respondents agree that the passage of legislation requiring legality has been the major driver in the sector, consolidating incentives that favor the legal forest trade. Many in the market are responding responsibly, signaling to timber producers that legality is a requirement. However, much of the legislation is new and institutions remain weak. Thus, implementation is likely to be problematic. Moreover, industry behavior appears to be driven in part by the deterrent effect of the legislation and thus, backsliding is likely if operators perceive that the laws will not be enforced or can be averted. Therefore, it is important and timely to maintain the momentum and consolidate the achievements, rather than step back and risk losing the gains already made.

As important as maintaining this positive momentum is ensuring that other major drivers of deforestation and forest degradation are also addressed. To that end, any future program must first conduct a rigorous risk assessment to ensure that its strategic approach includes activities that are both necessary and sufficient to achieve USAID’s overall objectives. This section outlines some recommendations and possible opportunities that follow-on programmatic work can take to combat the biodiversity loss/climate change crises.

9.1 RISK ASSESSMENT

The first step of any follow-on work is to conduct a risk assessment that evaluates both the likelihood and impact of threats to achieving USAID’s overall objectives. It is likely that an assessment of the current threats to deforestation and forest degradation would highlight the role of land clearing for plantations as being both widespread and having a large impact, and thus a major driver of forest loss and carbon emissions. Any future programming will, therefore, likely require a modified approach to that taken by RAFT; *i.e.*, one that also addresses plantation-based commodities, such as palm oil and pulp, in addition to timber.

This is especially true in Indonesia where, if President Yudhoyono is to meet his commitment to reduce emissions by 26%, authorities must revise land use decisions that allow clearing for plantations, in particular on peat swamps. For example, there may be room for future USAID programming to help the Government of Indonesia implement its recent moratorium³⁸ on land clearing of primary forests and peatland. This would

include a rigorous analysis of the decision-making architecture used by local-, provincial-, and national-level governments in order to identify strategic leverage points where capacity building would help yield better land use decisions. This Indonesian analysis could serve as a model for the region and as the basis to harmonize best practices in decision-making related to land use planning.

9.2 MAINTAIN A REGIONAL APPROACH

RAFT's *Mid-Term Evaluation* recommended clarifying its regional strategic approach. This remains valid, recognizing that international trade is inherently regional and requires a multilateral approach. In this case, working with commodities like timber and palm oil at the regional scale has the additional benefits:

- *Avoiding leakage*—where (illegal) activities move to locations to avoid enforcement. Leakage is a serious problem within the forest sector where there is still a large market that is relatively indiscriminating about the source and legality of supply. Regional programs can work across jurisdictions to harmonize enforcement efforts.
- For jurisdictions with high *political sensitivity*, discussing politically fraught issues, like illegality and corruption, is easier within a multilateral setting where accusations are less likely to be made towards individual countries.
- For many institutions it seems safer to *work in partnerships* to tackle complicated issues, thus reducing the sense that the problem is overwhelming.
- A regional program can use *healthy competition among countries* to encourage governments and industry to improve practices. Likewise, peer-review within the region can avoid the appearance of an external agenda.

9.3 CONTINUE CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN POLICY FORMULATION & CAPACITY BUILDING

It would be optimal to continue the successful RAFT program to ensure that the forestry sector is able to consolidate the reforms made so far, lest industry question the deterrence of the new legislation and thereby risk losing the positive momentum. Failing this, the concession work could be left to existing programs (*e.g.*, *GFTN* and *The Borneo Initiative*) and a new USAID-funded regional program could focus on supportive processes, such as conflict mediation and strengthening the technical skills and management capacity of regulators. But now that a “conducive regulatory environment” exists—and to avoid backsliding—a concerted effort should be made by producer-, processor-, and consumer-countries to ensure that their laws are enforced and that the forestry trade in Asia is indeed responsible.

38 tblog.cifor.org/3272/indonesia's-forest-moratorium—analyzing-the-numbers

9.4 EXPAND FOCUS ON ENFORCEMENT

To that end, future programming should broaden its focus to include activities aimed at holding forestry operators accountable for adhering to the law, including their concession-specific management plans and reporting requirements. As the major end-consumers that have driven the new regulatory environment, the USA and the EU in particular should be encouraged to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to enforcing their own laws and regulations, and to take steps to ensure that their nationals do not undermine rule of law when operating abroad. Within Asia, follow-on work to build upon RAFT could include activities that harmonize best practices across the region and build the capacity of regulatory agencies.

9.4.1 Harmonize Customs Actions

Capitalizing on RAFT's outreach, future programming could engage Customs authorities in Asia and their counterparts in importing countries to ensure that they are 'linked' so that the sort of learning networks pioneered by RAFT can be used by agents to learn from each other on how best to implement legality legislation. Given that Customs agents are more likely to spot fraudulent documents than be able to identify tree species, the focus should be on working with responsible industry to develop effective customs procedures, harmonizing tariff schedule codes for specific timber species if necessary. Then enforcement agencies should enforce these procedures, penalizing noncompliance.³⁹

9.4.2 Chain of Custody in ASEAN

Future work could assist ASEAN in preparing member states for the 2015 deadline for implementation of the chain of custody requirement for regulating trade. To that end, engagement could help develop best practices, based, for example, on Indonesia's chain of custody system, which could serve as a model for the region.

9.4.3 Mutual Legal Assistance

If the US Department of Justice is to prosecute *Lacey Act* violations, prosecutors must develop evidence of criminality in the foreign jurisdiction where the illegal logging and/or processing occurred. This requires cooperation with authorities abroad to obtain the needed forensic evidence. In order to facilitate this cooperation, USAID should consider working with enforcement agencies in the region to develop best practices in *mutual legal assistance*.

9.4.4 Enforce financial legislation

It may be more pragmatic to tackle criminality in the forestry sector by building a case for the laundering of the proceeds of crime rather than trying to directly prosecute the forestry-related crimes themselves. Therefore, USAID assistance should not ignore financial crimes, where legislation across the region is strong and prosecutorial capacity relatively more developed. For example, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), as well as the US Department of Justice, are working in Indonesia to build the capacity of authorities responsible for enforcement in the forestry sector (Text box 6). It may be possible to scale up these efforts within the region.

39 For example, each year, customs officers could check a randomly selected 8 shipments for each im-/exporter. If the real illegal rate for the company was 10%, then a sample size of 8 would allow for an accurate estimate of the illegal rate with a $\pm 20\%$ error. For a given shipment, if the company cannot demonstrate legality, then the shipment would be confiscated (as the *Lacey Act* allows). The next year, the inspection rate for that company would increase, with the additional cost of inspection borne by the company. This way good actors are rewarded, bad actors punished, and illegal wood kept from the market.

The sample size is calculated as for a binomial probability: $N = (p^2q + q^2p)/E^2$; where $p = P(\text{legal})$, $q = P(\text{illegal}) = 1-p$, $z = 1.96$ (i.e., 95% confidence interval), and $E = 0.2$ (i.e., error is $\pm 20\%$).

(Blundell. 2007. *Developing a system to implement CITES Appendix II for mahogany*. Ecol Appl.17:332).

Text box 6

UNODC activities to improve enforcement in Indonesia

- Enhancing general law enforcement capacity to detect, apprehend and prosecute perpetrators of forest crimes
- Strengthening cooperation between relevant law enforcement agencies
- Empowering civil society to counter forest crimes through “barefoot investigators”.

And from an anti-corruption perspective:

- Focusing on building the capacity of Indonesia’s anti-corruption agencies, police, prosecutors and judges
- Use of the anti-money laundering regime to target the kingpins behind forest crimes.

9.4.5 Enforce REDD+ safeguards

As noted in Section 4.2.4, REDD+ is emerging as a major component of climate change mitigation strategies. To ensure that REDD+ does not jeopardize local people’s rights and livelihoods, as well as the environment more broadly, UNFCCC has developed a set of broad safeguards (Text box 7). Many of these safeguards focus on forest governance and so are consistent with RAFT’s overall goal of improving biodiversity through SFM and are consistent with RAFT’s specific objective related to implementing REDD+. Follow-on programming could help the region develop a harmonized process for countries to identify their own criteria and indicators for the safeguards.

9.4.6 Collaborate with the Wildlife Enforcement Network

Another possible area for engagement with existing programs is to share learning between forestry officials and those working on wildlife enforcement, where relevant—as was envisioned in the early RAFT planning documents.⁴⁰

9.5 MAINTAIN A FOCUS ON PARTNERSHIPS, EMPHASIZING FLEXIBILITY AND COMMUNICATION → COOPERATION → COORDINATION → COLLABORATION

Unfortunately some of the individual relationships built during RAFT will be lost when the program closes in September 2011, but future program(s) should try to maintain the flexibility and strong communications that RAFT built.

⁴⁰ USAID. 2006. Cooperative Agreement No. 486-A-00-06-00016-00.

When undertaking REDD+ activities, the following safeguards should be promoted and supported:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Actions complement or are consistent with the objectives of national forest programmes and relevant international conventions and agreements (b) Transparent and effective national forest governance structures, taking into account national legislation and sovereignty (c) Respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and members of local communities, by taking into account relevant international obligations, national | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> circumstances and laws, and noting that the UN General Assembly has adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (d) The full and effective participation of relevant stakeholders, in particular, indigenous peoples and local communities... (e) Actions are consistent with the conservation of natural forests and biological diversity... (f) Actions to address the risks of reversals (g) Actions to reduce displacement of emissions. |
|---|---|

9.6 WORK ACROSS THE SUPPLY CHAIN, MAKING THE BUSINESS CASE

As noted above (§3.3), more work is needed to make the business case at all stages in the supply chain for the adoption of best practices. This requires a better understanding of industry's needs; for example, do they care more about profitability or cash flow, and/or are they limited by access to capital for initial investments needed for RIL? Moreover, before directing donor resources to further capacity building of forest concessionaires, there is a need to better understand industry's own willingness-to-pay for services associated with SFM and certification. It may be that once industry understands the value of SFM, they will be willing to pay the transaction costs themselves.

Further, expanding outreach to retailers may better facilitate linking responsible buyers to producers. Rather than finding new supply chains, industry generally prefers to improve their existing suppliers. There may be room for future programs to do both. Just as

the RAFT-supported workshops in China were useful in linking industry, a focus on outreach at trade shows and industry-association meetings may better link up the supply chain.

9.7 MAKE THE CASE FOR REGULATORY RELIEF FOR SFM

Certainly more can be done to build incentives for best practices and responsible trade. From the producer's end, follow on programming could work with governments to develop incentives for SFM that might include regulatory relief for independently certified operators:

- Given that certified operators have already been audited, there would be no need for further government audit (for example, in Indonesia, certified companies might then be able to forgo the *SVLK* audit)
- Given that RIL/SFM reduces damage to the forest, certified companies could warrant appropriately lower reforestation fees (in Indonesia, *dana reboisasi* [DR])
- When concession leases expire, certified operators could be given automatic extensions, thus reducing the risk of losing their concessions
- When concessions are retired or otherwise become available, certified operators could be offered preferential access in the first round of bidding.

Ideas like these may be crucial in aligning the incentives to favor certification, and thus scale up SFM. Future programs could work across the region to create a level playing field favoring responsible operators.

9.8 REDUCE THE COST OF HCVF COMPLIANCE

Another incentive for SFM would be reducing the cost of conservation management within forestry concessions. It appears that the cost of implementing HCVF regulations is high (interviewees in Indonesia reported fees in excess of \$100,000/concession). As effective conservation necessitates transboundary, landscape-level planning, a regional program could help with spatial planning to identify large forest areas of high conservation value.

Industry could then focus management-level planning within the concession without having to spend resources on obtaining data at the larger spatial scale. For example, the *Heart of Borneo* transboundary HCVF database, which focuses on landscape aspects, could be used to streamline site-based assessments. Further, HCVF could also be a useful avenue to introduce conflict mediation to community-company negotiations around timber concessions.

Likewise, harmonizing the interpretation of FSC criteria and indicators within a country will reduce audit costs. Interviewees complained that in Indonesia each auditor must define themselves how to verify compliance with FSC standards. Future programming could assist in the development of standardized auditing procedures.

9.9 COORDINATE INFORMATION

Just as a regional program could coordinate transboundary conservation data, a regional program could also coordinate data from various initiatives. Undoubtedly planning for REDD+ and other climate/sustainable landscape initiatives will produce data relevant to landscape-level conservation planning that could be used by forestry operations. Any relevant information will help reduce the costs of planning, especially for HCVF, and thus improve the financial status of SFM more broadly.

9.10 MAKE THE CASE FOR SFM WITHIN REDD+

Future coordination between SFM and climate initiatives should extend to promoting SFM as a key strategy in REDD+ frameworks (see §4.2.4), bridging the gap between policy and on-the-ground experience. Any carbon payments for RIL will help improve the financial status of SFM, and providing the payments are performance-based, presumably improve the quality of remaining forest. Indeed, there may be large opportunities for pursuing such a strategy in PNG, as they are founders of the *Coalition of Rainforest Nations* that remains engaged in UNFCCC debates.

9.11 MAINTAIN A ROLE FOR THE USG

RAFT benefited from both its relationship with the USAID (§8.3) and from the strong involvement of and interest by USG agencies in RAFT's activities. The role of technical assistance from the US Forest Service allowed for more direct government-to-government dialogue than an NGO-only program could provide. Future work should tie in more directly with the USFS and other USG forest-related efforts, such as the *Forest Legality Alliance*, which may also help strengthen linkages at the retail end (§9.6).

9.12 IMPLEMENT ROBUST MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

Adaptive management requires M&E to understand what is and what is not working. Moreover, ascertaining lessons learned and developing recommendations, including at final evaluation, are facilitated by on-going monitoring through the life of a project. Impact evaluation, which requires rigorous counter-factuals to determine the influence of a project's interventions on its stated goals, also require strong baseline information.

USAID could be more proactive in requiring regular M&E for such adaptive management from all partners, not just from the lead implementers in their *Performance Monitoring Plan*. To that end, USAID could help move rhetoric to practice by requiring all partners to include M&E in their annual workplans and, especially, in their budgets. The USAID *Evaluation Policy* recom-

mends 3% of budgets for independent final evaluation, but partners could be required to include USAID's recommended *c.*10% of budgets for regular monitoring. (Although, USAID should also be flexible, as not all projects will require this level of effort, whereas some may even require more.) RAFT had no explicit line item in its budget for M&E.

9.13 DEVELOP CRITERIA FOR ENGAGING & DISENGAGING PARTNERS

RAFT has now developed criteria for identifying progressive timber companies interested in certification. Such criteria should be used by future programs in selecting partners. Then performance-based criteria directly related to overall program goals should be used to independently monitor their progress. Insufficient progress should lead to suspension. Future programs should also identify codes of conduct for corporate behavior, *e.g.*, processing companies will not purchase illegal logs, and violations would then warrant expulsion from the partnership. In order to have maximum leverage in promoting responsible practice, these codes should have been applied to the entire company, not just the branch working with RAFT. Without this three-step, independent evaluation of conduct, programs like RAFT risk partnering with companies that have no intention of improving management, but only want to bolster their reputation by appearing to collaborate with more responsible companies.

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Annexes

ANNEX 1. SCOPE OF WORK

1. Title

Final Program Evaluation of RAFT Program – USAID/RDMA

2. Statement of Work

2.1 Background

USAID/RDMA's Regional Environment Office (REO) intends to conduct a Final Program Evaluation of the Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade (RAFT) Program during June–August 2011, with field visits during June–July 2011. The evaluation will (1) assess program performance and effectiveness against its goals, objectives, and performance targets; (2) provide recommendations for strategies that can enhance program sustainability; and (3) identify strategic priorities and effective approaches that build upon activities to date, and which USAID may support under follow-on program efforts. In line with USAID's new Evaluation Policy,⁴¹ this performance evaluation is also intended to help RDMA meet its responsibility as a public financed entity by providing **accountability** to stakeholders and in order to improve effectiveness through generating **knowledge and learning**.

A Cooperative Agreement was awarded by RDMA to The Nature Conservancy (TNC) in September 2006 to implement the RAFT Program. The Cooperative Agreement was initially established for a three year period, and was later extended for an additional two years, ending September 2011. Total program budget is approximately \$11 million.

Since the program is approaching the final stage of implementation, RDMA would like to conduct a final program evaluation to assess program performance and effectiveness, recommend approaches to enhance sustainability of program outputs, as well as identify new strategic opportunities for follow-on activities to increase and scale up impacts of current USAID

investments. Since the program began, there have been significant changes in the forestry sector, including: changing global markets and new trade regulations in the US, EU, and other countries; the emergence of and momentum around a global Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) mechanism; and the development of new forestry, trade, and climate change programs around the region, including for example, the EU's Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Program as well as new USAID programs (*i.e.* Indonesia Forestry and Climate Support (IFACS) Program).

The RAFT program is funded primarily with biodiversity funds and as such, addresses an important threat to forest biodiversity related to illegal and unsustainable logging and associated trade. The approach followed by the RAFT program is to develop policy and market-based solutions that will lead to improved forest management and legal timber trade. The program plans, develops, and assists in the implementation of these solutions using a partnership approach—working in tandem with regional and national actors and stakeholders. The program takes a fundamentally regional approach, bringing together stakeholders both virtually and physically in order to address and solve common problems related to sustainable forest management and timber trade. The program's target countries are China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Thailand, and Vietnam

To date, RAFT has supported the following program objectives:

- Increased regional timber trade from legal sources
- Measurably improved sustainability of forest management on the ground

41 www.usaid.gov/evaluation/

- Strengthened regional cooperation on forest management and trade
- Contributing towards climate change abatement by reducing CO₂ emissions for forest loss and degradation and enhancing regional capacity for sustainable forest management through the emerging international REDD+ framework.

Additional details on the RAFT program can be found at: www.responsibleasia.org.

2.2 Evaluation Objectives

The objectives of this performance evaluation include:

1. To assess the program's performance and effectiveness against its goals, objectives, and performance targets
2. To recommend any strategies that can potentially enhance program sustainability in preparation for program completion; and
3. To identify strategic priorities and effective approaches that build upon activities to date, and which USAID may support under follow-on program efforts, including possible new/alternate technical areas, programming approaches, geographic focus areas, and partnerships.

2.3 Scope of Evaluation and Key Questions

The evaluation team, led by an independent external consultant, must assess the performance of RAFT activities from inception of the program through the present. This effort should build upon the RAFT mid-term evaluation conducted in March 2009. While the evaluation should evaluate past performance, REO is particularly interested in forward-looking recommendations on possible strategies for enhancing sustainability of program efforts to date, as well as recommendations on existing and/or new technical areas and programmatic strategic approaches that should be addressed by a new follow-on program. The consultant and evaluation team should apply robust social science evaluation methods and tools to avoid evaluator specific judgments and incorporate both qualitative and quantitative measures to this evaluation.

The program scope of work requires the lead consultant and associated team to gather information on the program, analyze that information, and provide answers to the following key performance areas and related questions:

1. **Validity of "Hypothesis" (Effectiveness of Programmatic Strategic Approach):** Has the hypothesis for the RAFT program's multi-pronged strategy and programmatic approach remained valid for achieving stated goals and objectives? Is the causal model or logical framework on which this program was based valid? If not, what have we learned?
2. **Confirmation of Results:** What progress has been made toward achieving the program goals of increasing sustainability of forest management, etc.? In other words, to what extent has the program been able to mainstream legal and sustainable timber into the Asian timber trade? What progress has been made toward achieving overall program performance targets? Are the results valid and consistent with the overall program strategic approach?
3. **Responsiveness to Stakeholder Needs:** How responsive have RAFT activities been in meeting needs of partners and stakeholders in the region (including national governments and other country counterparts, USAID Missions, and others), particularly with respect to "niche" areas where USAID is expected to have catalytic impacts that significantly leverage program resources? How is this dovetailing with the work of other donors or actors in the region? How have RAFT activities and results (either independently or in conjunction with other efforts) advanced forest policy dialogue in the region, including USG-related goals?
4. **Meeting Agency Legislative and Funding Requirements:** RAFT has been supported by US Congressional earmark funding related to primarily biodiversity conservation, but also China, Lacey Act outreach, and sustainable landscapes/climate change sources. To what extent has RAFT met the technical criteria for these earmarks? How could a follow-on forestry investment build upon what RAFT has done and more effectively fulfill Agency requirements, if gaps were found?
5. **Program Sustainability and Transition:** Are effective strategies in place that will ensure program sustainability after program close-out, as well as a smooth transition to follow-on activities? If not, what actions by the partners and RDMA are recommended to ensure effective sustainability and transition?
6. **Lessons Learned:** What are the lessons learned from program implementation, including both technical and implementation/management con-

siderations? What are RDMA's key strengths and/or weaknesses in undertaking a regional forestry program? What areas or approaches should be dropped, expanded, or modified, if any, given RDMA's role, or given the role of other players, including other donor programs?

- 7. Strategic Priorities and Effective Approaches for Follow-on Program Efforts:** What activities should be carried forward, expanded, or modified for a new follow-on program? What are the strategic priorities and effective programming approaches that should be considered and possibly adopted in a follow-on program to effectively address regional biodiversity conservation, and forest management and trade challenges and respond to US Foreign Assistance policies and priorities?

In assessing the program's effectiveness and potential areas of improvement, the evaluation team will also consider the following:

- Challenges and opportunities in implementing geographically diverse activities through a combination of regional- and national-level activities and by working through the ongoing operations of existing international and regional NGOs active in the program area;
- Supporting RDMA regional program objectives to strengthen regional partners (*e.g.*, ASEAN, AFP, and APFNet) and to address transnational issues (such as sustainable regional/global trade);
- Ability to promote catalytic change through focusing on enabling conditions such as policy measures, institutional change, and field access to technical assistance;
- The effectiveness or potential effectiveness of enhancing biodiversity conservation by addressing issues in the forest sector;
- The role of emerging USG policies on forests in the region and the interplay of USAID's regional program in this policy dialogue as well as the effect of USG policy positions on program activities;
- Opportunities for increasing buy-in to the follow-on activity, such as from USAID bilateral missions or other USAID or USG sources; and
- A statement in the final report of any difference in opinion or findings within the evaluation team members as required by the USAID Evaluation Policy.

2.4 *Scope of Work and Roles of the External Consultant*

The independent external consultant, with support from a technical evaluation team comprised of representatives from USAID (RDMA and Washington), the US Forest Service, and potentially other US Government agencies will lead this evaluation. A total contract length of 40 calendar days (including travel days) of full-time effort is anticipated for the consultant to carry out the evaluation responsibilities outlined here.

The consultant must work in conjunction with the evaluation team and coordinate with RAFT implementing partners to plan and implement the proposed evaluation. While the evaluation team will be heavily involved with design, planning, and logistics, the consultant must provide significant leadership and direction, and has the final responsibility for the following major duties:

- Leading the overall coordination, planning, preparation, technical discussion and completion of the evaluation
- Preparation of an interview guide that includes questions to be asked during consultations
- Synthesizing and finalizing, with input from the evaluation team, the draft evaluation report and the final report addressing the evaluation objectives and scope described above and including specific findings and recommendations
- Preparing, with input from the entire team, a Power Point presentation summarizing initial evaluation findings and conclusions to be delivered to RDMA at the conclusion of the field consultations
- Participation in the field consultations in, at least, Indonesia, China, and Thailand, and potentially other locations.

Responsibilities of the entire evaluation team members, including the external consultant team leader, include:

- Signing a conflict of interest disclosure form at the outset of the evaluation process
- Determining the organizations and people to be consulted and developing the specific evaluation questions
- Reviewing the program cooperative agreement and subsequent modifications/additions, annual Work Plans, the Performance Management Plan (PMP),

progress reports, Success Stories, program technical reports, and other program documents

- Developing the evaluation schedule and making appointments with respective parties
- Performing the evaluation, which may include, but is not limited to, interviews with parties involved, site visits, and other activities
- Based on the evaluation results, making recommendations to RDMA for future strategic directions and program activities
- Based on the evaluation results, identifying lessons learned from the program as well as key strengths and weaknesses of RDMA in developing forest management and trade program activities, and contributing to policy dialogue in the region
- Prepare initial presentation of preliminary evaluation results to the RDMA/REO Director, program Agreement Officer's Technical Representative (AOTR), and other RDMA staff
- Preparing the draft and final evaluation reports addressing evaluation objectives and scope provided above.

Stakeholder Consultations

Key stakeholders/organizations to consult with during the evaluation should include, at a minimum those listed below. Specific organizations and contacts will be further elaborated together with the evaluation team and program partners.

Bangkok:

- USAID/RDMA Regional Environment Office, Mission Director and/or Deputy Mission Director, and Program Development Office
- World Bank
- FAO
- Relevant donor organizations
- Relevant national government agencies and institutes (e.g. Forest Industry Organization)
- Selected private sector partners, including forest management companies and industry associations, where feasible
- RAFT program partners: TNC, RECOFTC, IUCN.

Beijing/Shanghai:

- US Embassy Beijing Environment, Science, Technology, and Health (ESTH) staff
- USAID Development Counselor at US Embassy Beijing
- Relevant donor organizations
- Relevant national government agencies and institutes (e.g. State Forest Administration)
- Selected private sector partners, including forest management companies and industry associations, where feasible
- Regional organizations including APFNet
- RAFT program partners: TNC, WWF GFTN, and The Forest Trust.

Jakarta:

- USAID/Indonesia
- Relevant national government agencies and institutes (e.g. Ministry of Forestry)
- Selected private sector partners, including forest management companies and industry associations, where feasible
- Regional organizations including ASEAN and AFP
- RAFT program partners: TNC, RECOFTC, WWF GFTN, The Forest Trust, Tropical Forest Foundation
- Other civil society organizations, e.g. The Borneo Initiative
- Relevant donor organizations.

Washington, DC:

- Environment/forestry staff with USAID's Asia Bureau, Climate Change Team (EGAT/ESP/GCC) and Forestry/NRM Team (EGAT/NRM) in Washington
- State/OES Forest Team
- White House Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Environment Division
- US Forest Service, International Programs, Policy Division
- US Department of Justice

- World Resources Institute, Environmental Investigation Agency – Forest Legality Alliance.

Telephone interviews may be arranged to minimize travel, potentially with:

- USAID/Vietnam, USAID/Cambodia, and USAID/India environment staff
- European Forestry Institute (Kuala Lumpur)
- Selected private sector partners in Malaysia, including forest management companies and industry associations, where feasible
- RAFT program partners in Malaysia (if travel not possible): WWF Malaysia, The Forest Trust, and Tropical Forest Foundation.

2.5 Deliverables

Results of the evaluation will be in the form of findings and recommendations to the USAID/RDMA REO Director and the Agreement Officer’s Technical Representative (AOTR) of RAFT. The consultant is expected to ensure timely completion of all deliverables, including a summary of results to the RDMA in the form of out-briefing and an evaluation report responsive to the scope of work stated above.

The deliverables for this request for proposal are as follows (and further explained below):

1. Attend the evaluation Kick-Off meeting in Bangkok, Thailand on o/a **June 13, 2011**.
2. Out-briefing to RDMA on initial findings in Bangkok o/a **July 8, 2011**.
3. Draft written report submitted to RDMA for comments o/a **July 22, 2011**.
4. Final report incorporating all comments received o/a **August 5, 2011**.

The consultant must provide a summary of results to RDMA in the form of an out-briefing (at the end of field consultations) and draft evaluation report in two sections. The main report must consider points 1–6 listed above under III. Scope of Evaluation and Key Questions. The consultant must prepare a summary of “Opportunities for a Potential Follow-on Regional Forestry Program”, addressing point 7 above, as a separate document. In the spirit of transparency and following USAID’s new Evaluation Policy the main evaluation report will be shared with the public including all RAFT partners. The section describing point

7 will be used internally only and not shared outside of the US Government. The consultant must provide the draft reports to RDMA in an electronic version in Microsoft Word format. RDMA will also upload the main evaluation report onto USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) website.

Within 7 days of receipt of the draft report, USAID will provide to the consultant its comments and suggestions for additions or modifications. These will be discussed collegially with the consultant for incorporation in the final version, as appropriate. As a guideline, the draft report should have a minimum of 30 pages and a maximum of 50 pages using standard one-inch margins, single-spaced text, paragraphs separated by 12 points of space, and 12-point Times New Roman font (or equivalent sized font).

Within 7 days of receipt of USAID’s comments and suggestions, the consultant must submit to the Regional Environment Office, USAID/RDMA an electronic version in Microsoft Word format and via expedited delivery 5 bound sets of the final reports. As a guideline, the final report should have a minimum of 30 pages and a maximum of 50 pages.

2.6 Government Furnished Information

Background briefings shall be provided by the RDMA technical officers and The Nature Conservancy. Additional documents to review include:

- RAFT Cooperative Agreement and modifications
- RAFT Annual Reports and Workplans
- RAFT Performance Management Plan
- RAFT Mid-term Evaluation Report
- RAFT ‘Theory of Change’ presentation
- RAFT program technical documents/reports and outreach materials (e.g. Customs Collaboration/IGES, Asia-Pacific Forestry Sector Outlook Study II/FAO, etc.)
- Compilation and synthesis of timber trade flow data during RAFT timeframe (USFS, with potential participation from EFI, Forest Trends, ITTO, etc.)
- RAFT budget summary by component/country/earmark/year
- USAID Evaluation Policy: www.usaid.gov/evaluation/

2.7 *Proposed Evaluation Team Members (Roles and Responsibilities)*

1. Team Leader (Independent Consultant) – Evaluation team lead and lead author; focus on overall program and strategy issues.
2. USAID/RDMA Regional Biodiversity Conservation Advisor – AOTR, program performance and management, overall program and strategy issues.
3. USAID/RDMA Program Development Specialist – logistics, information collection and distribution, and overall program and strategy.
4. USAID/RDMA Program Officer – knowledge-sharing and strategic partnerships, selected technical areas, and evaluation process.
5. USAID Climate Change Advisor – forestry and climate change, REDD.
6. USAID Forestry Advisor – forest management, biodiversity conservation, private sector approaches, USAID policies.
7. USAID Indonesia Forestry Expert – forest policy and management in Indonesia
8. USFS Forest Management Expert – sustainable forest management, timber trade
9. US Department of State Forest Policy Expert – policy issues, particularly involving US, China, and Indonesia

The list of potential team members is tentative and dependent on participants’ schedules, availability, and travel budget support. All participants will likely not be able to participate in the entire evaluation due to the extended timeframe, so it will be important that the lead consultant coordinate their inputs and contributions effectively.

3. Period of Performance

The period of performance of this contract is on or about (o/a) June 3, 2011 with the consultant working in Asia region beginning on or about June 6, 2011, and close out no later than August 5, 2011 with the 40 days level of effort from the contractor.

The evaluation will be performed during June–August 2011, and field consultations will take place during June–July. Team members must visit (together, in smaller groups, or individually) selected RAFT pro-

gram staff, partners, and stakeholders in Bangkok, Beijing, and Jakarta, and possibly another city (potentially Kuala Lumpur or Hanoi), to be finalized in conjunction with RDMA and the team members. Consultations may also be conducted in Washington by Washington, DC-based team members, as well as via teleconference involving all team members, at some point during the evaluation.

Estimated LOE for the Team Leader Consultant is 40 days, calculated as follows:

- Preparations, Review of Documents and In-briefing in Bangkok (o/a June 3–15, 2011) 3 person days
- Consultations within RAFT countries (o/a June 16–July 1, 2011) 16 person days
- Synthesis and Out-briefing at RDMA (o/a July 5–9, 2011) 4 person days
- Draft and Final Report Preparation (o/a July 11–August 5, 2011) 17 person days

TOTAL **40 person days**

Tentative Travel Schedule

Following is tentative travel schedule. The Contractor and team members shall work with the AOTR to finalize the travel plan.

- *Travel to Bangkok, June 11–12, 2011*
- **Bangkok:**
 - Coordination and planning at RDMA, June 13–14
 - Orientation with The Nature Conservancy, June 15
 - Consultations in Bangkok, June 16–17
- *Travel to Beijing, June 19 with team members*
- **China, Beijing and Shanghai:**
 - Consultations, June 20–21; travel to Shanghai *on June 21*
 - Attend Forests, Markets, Policy & Practice Conference in Shanghai, June 22–24, and consultations
- *Travel Beijing to Jakarta, June 25–26*

- Jakarta (*Arrive on June 26*):
 - Preparation and consultations, June 27–July 1
- *Travel from Jakarta to Bangkok on July 2*
- Bangkok (*Arrive on July 4*):
 - Synthesis, July 5–7
 - RDMA presentation of initial findings, July 8
- *Travel from Bangkok, July 9*

ANNEX 2. FINAL EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS

Arthur G. Blundell, PhD (Natural Capital Advisors, LLC) is the former Chair of the *Panel of Experts on Liberia* monitoring sanctions for the UN Security Council. Art has worked with DfID(UK) and the European Commission in Liberia’s VPA negotiations. Previously, Art served as a Fulbright scholar in Indonesia, and as an AAAS Science-Diplomacy Fellow with both USAID and EPA. He worked with the Africa Development Bank to incorporate forestry into the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative; with FAO on forest governance monitoring; and with Transparency International on anti-corruption monitoring. Art now lives in Vancouver; he received his PhD from Dartmouth College and BSc (Hons) from the University of British Columbia.

Rebecca Butterfield, PhD is a Senior Forestry Advisor for USAID/EGAT, office of Natural Resource Management. She is the AOTR for the USAID-USFS Inter-Agency Agreement and provides support on Sustainable Landscape and REDD programming. She has over 27 years of experience in tropical forestry and agroforestry, spanning Latin America, West and Southern Africa and SE Asia. Previously she worked for Rainforest Alliance building a program to support community and indigenous forest enterprises through increased competitiveness and access to markets. She also pioneered an evaluation and research unit for Rainforest Alliance, quantifying impacts in forestry, agriculture and tourism programs. During her 6-year tenure with the consulting firm ARD, Rebecca worked on forest policy reform design programs for the Asia Development Bank in Cambodia and Sri Lanka, and developed new business with the Inter-American Development Bank. As an independent consultant for CARE International, she provided project design and evaluation for agroforestry projects in the Amazon and West African Sahel. Rebecca has a PhD in Forest Management from North Carolina State University, a Master of Science from the University of Washington

in Forest Management and a BA in Environmental Geography from the University of Washington. She is fluent in Spanish, intermediate in French and can read Portuguese.

Maria Chen joined RDMA as the China Environment Program Coordinator in January 2011. Prior to joining USAID, Maria was a Senior Manager and the Director of Sustainable Buildings Programs at ICF International’s Beijing office. Maria has 18 years of experience in climate change, energy, and environmental consulting in US and China. Maria received her Bachelor of Science in Industrial Engineering from Columbia University, and her Master of Arts in International Development and Economics from the Elliott School of International Affairs of George Washington University.

Jennifer Conje For the past decade, Ms. Conje has worked as a policy advisor for the US Forest Service (USFS) International Programs Office. Ms. Conje works on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues, including forest governance, illegal logging, forest trade, biodiversity, and protected areas. She is the USFS liaison to several multilateral organizations, including the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO), the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), and the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In addition to having participated on several expert panels reviewing projects and developing guidelines for different organizations, Ms. Conje was Chairperson of the ITTO’s Committee on Reforestation and Forest Management in 2005 and currently holds the position of Spokesperson for the consumer caucus within ITTO. Ms. Jennifer Conje holds a Bachelors degree in East Asian Studies from The College of William and Mary; and a Masters Degree from The George Washington University in International Affairs and Development.

Barry Flaming joined RDMA in August 2008 and is the Regional Biodiversity Conservation Advisor, managing the Regional Environment Office's biodiversity conservation and forestry programs with Apichai Thirathon. Before joining RDMA, he was a Program Manager for CARE Thailand, implementing forest conservation and livelihood development initiatives with upland minority communities. Previous experiences include conducting Environmental Impact Statements for stateside US Government agencies, as well as serving as a Peace Corps volunteer in Thailand. Barry holds a MSc in Forestry from the University of Washington, where he researched carbon and nitrogen cycling and sustainable management of production forests.

James Halperin is an Asia Region Forestry Advisor with the US Forest Service International Programs. From his current base at CIFOR in Indonesia, he is supporting a number of US government and other programs supporting REDD+ readiness across the region. Prior to this, he provided technical assistance to USAID/RDMA's RAFT Program, where he developed monitoring and evaluation tools for concessions in Indonesia and Malaysia, assisted in the development of standard operating procedures for improved forest inventory practices, and developed forest inventory methodologies to document carbon dynamics under varying forest management strategies. Previous work has included an assignment with the Pacific Northwest Forest Inventory and Analysis Program and work in the Chugach National Forest in Alaska. He served as a Peace Corps volunteer in Togo, West Africa from 1995–1997 working on agro-forestry projects and received a MSc in Forestry in 2002 from NC State University, with field research in Tanzania.

Jedsada Taweekan joined RDMA in January 2008. He provides guidance in strategy formulation, activity design, and performance monitoring and evaluation. He is the Program Development Office's representative to the Regional Environment Office guiding the team in developing a comprehensive results framework for validating the continuing relevance of the overarching development hypothesis and underlying assumptions that have to be satisfied in order to achieve program objectives. He is also a gender officer providing technical guidance on gender-related issues and in accordance with Agency policies to ensure that program benefits will accrue to women and men. Prior to joining USAID, he was program specialist at the Asian Disaster Preparedness Center where he was responsible for the Enhancing Community Resilience

to Natural Disasters in South East Asia and End-to-End Multi-Hazard Early Warning Systems. He was involved in partner coordination for end-to-end early warning institutional mechanism development, training to build capacities of national and local level institutions, and community-based risk assessment and risk reduction. Prior to that, Jedsada worked in private sector for three and a half year as a project manager and environmental specialist.

Apichai Thirathon, PhD joined RDMA in November 2005 as the Senior Program Development Specialist (Biodiversity Conservation) for the Regional Environment Office. Prior to this position, Apichai was a Consultant to the Rockefeller Foundation-Southeast Asia Regional Office, working on the Upland Communities in Transition program to improve food security and livelihoods of ethnic groups living in protected areas of the Greater Mekong Sub-region. From 1994–2001, he was a Senior Lecturer and Associate Dean for the Faculty of Agricultural Production at Maejo University in Chiang Mai where he was involved in a number of projects supported by bilateral donors to improve the sustainable management of natural resources. Prior to that position, he was Chief of the Technical Section of the Thai-Australia and World Bank Land Development Project under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Apichai received a PhD in Agriculture (Agronomy: Crop Physiology) from the University of Queensland and MAgric (Crop Science) from the University of Sydney, Australia. He obtained a BSc (Soil Science) from Kasetsart University in Bangkok.

ANNEX 3. CONSULTATION MEETINGS (JUNE – JULY 2011)

Jack Hurd	Director	RAFT
Cole Genge	Dep Chief of Mission	RAFT
Tint Thaug	Partnerships	RAFT
Allison Bleany	Communications	RAFT
Chen Xiaoqian	Forest Policy Advisor in China	RAFT
Muhammad Rao	Finance & Grants Mgr	RAFT
David Cassells	Former Director	RAFT
Achmad Edi Nugroho	INA Co. Director	MFP
Ade Soekadis	Forest Prog Operations Dir	TNC Indonesia
Agung Wiyono	Manager	The Forest Trust (TFT)
Aimi Lee Abdullah	Policy Analyst	EFI Asia
Andjar Rafiastanto	Kalimantan Regional Manager	Fauna and Flora Intl (FFI)
Andy Roby	FLEGT / Indonesia VPA	EU
Annie Ting	Sr Mgr	Sarawak Timber Assoc
Bambang Sukmananto	Sec Dir Gen	Min of Forestry, Indonesia
Bambang Wahyudi	RIL Mgt	TNC Indonesia
Ben Jarvis	Independent Consultant	Indonesia
Ben Stoner	Sr Env Advisor	USAID Indonesia
Carey Yeager	Sr Env Specialist	USAID Indonesia
Celina Yong	REDD Learning Network Off	RECOFTC
Chen Yong	Deputy Director	SFA
Charles Barber	OES	US Dept of State
Cynthia Mackie	Intl Programs	USFS
Damayanti Buchori	Dir of Conservation	TNC Indonesia
David Hulse	Indonesia Rep	Ford Foundation
David Zhao	Vender Assessment	Kingfisher
Dicky Simorangkir	Direktur Kehutanan	TNC
Ellen Shaw	OES	US Dept of State
Emily Tibbot	Washington DC	TNC
Fu Jianquan	Dir, Devlp Plan & Fin Mgmt	SFA
Gerald M Britan	Dir, Sr Evaluation Advisor	USAID
Gunawan Wicaksono	Governance & Partnership	TNC

Hartono Prabowo		The Forest Trust (TFT)
Hasbillah	Forest Mgmt	Tropical Forest Fdn (TFF)
Hong Fan Li	President	China Wood Intl, Inc; Intl Wood Industry Magazine
Helmi Basalamah	Head, For Ed & Training Ctr	Min of Forestry, Indonesia
Jason Xue	Sr. Vendor Assessment	Kingfisher
Jeremy Broadhead	For Policy Adv	FAO Asia Pac
Jin Zhonghao	GFTN-China Manager	WWF
Junchang Liu	Dir, Intl Relations Office	Beijing Forestry University
Kerry Ceasareo	Director of Forest Program	WWF
Lex Hovani	Forest Carbon Advisor	TNC Indonesia
Liu Xueyan	Sr Forest Prog Officer	IUCN
Lu De	Director	APFNet
Maidiward	Dep Dir for Wood Industries	Min of Forestry, Indonesia
Mary Melnyk	Sr Advisor NRM	USAID
Michael Thiemann	Training Mgr	Rainforest Alliance
Paul Hartman		DAI
Richard Donovan		Rainforest Alliance
Robert Tansey	External Affairs Dir, N Asia	TNC
Shelby Legg	OES	US Dept of State
Sheldon Xie	Beijing City Director	Clinton Foundation
Su Ming	Deputy Director General	SFA
Tamara Scott	2nd Secretary	US Embassy Beijing
Tom ter Horst	Communications	EFI Asia
Toon de Bruyn	Sn Prog Officer	RECOFTC
Vincent van den Berk	Prog. Coordinator	EFI Asia
Wahjudi Wardoyo	Sr Adv, Intl For Carbon Policy	TNC Indonesia
Wim Ellenbroek	Prog Director	The Borneo Initiative
Xie Na	Forest Prog Officer	WWF
Yurdi Tasmi	Mgr, Cap Bldg & Tech Services	RECOFTC Regional & Country Analysis & Support
Zhixin Deng	China Country Mgr	TFT
Zhu Changling	President	China Ntl Furniture Assoc

ANNEX 4. ONLINE SURVEY & RESULTS

Distributed to ~150 stakeholders, 75 responded to an online survey, including 33 from the private sector. The actual text of the survey and the results are presented below. Questions marked with a * were required of all respondents and those marked with a † were asked of the private sector in an abridged version available in English, Mandarin Chinese, Bahasa Indonesia, and Vietnamese.

Text of Survey:

Introduction to RAFT

Five years ago, The Nature Conservancy developed the Responsible Asia Forestry and Trade (RAFT) program to promote responsible timber trade and sustainable forest management in the region.

Its major funder—the USAID Regional Development Mission for Asia—is now evaluating RAFT’s performance and designing possible future engagements. Your forestry experience is invaluable to this evaluation.

The evaluation is being led by an independent company, Natural Capital Advisors. The survey will only take about 20 minutes. Please know that your confidentiality is assured. NCA will not share individual responses with USAID; only aggregated data will be reported. If you would like further information on this policy, please contact the Evaluation Team: raftevaluation@yahoo.com or the Team Leader at: artblundell@yahoo.com

Your participation will help USAID and RAFT promote responsible timber trade and sustainable forest management, not just in Asia, but around the world. Thank you!

***I. Describe your organization (choose one)**

	# of responses
Gov’t: policy	0
Gov’t: technical assistance	2
Gov’t: manager	0
NGO: conservation	25
NGO: community-oriented	4
NGO: human rights	0
Private sector: logging	0
Private sector: plantation	0
Private sector: processing	0
Private sector: im-/export	0
Private sector: retail	1
Other (please specify)	11

For the loggers survey (†), they were asked whether their business was:

	# of responses
Logging	9
Transportation	3
Processing	6
Export/import	7
Retail	4
Other	10

*†2. **How old is your organization?**
(indicate # of years or “don’t know”)

median = 35 years; range = 2 – 66 years

†3. **How long has it been working in the forestry sector?**

median = 24 years; range = 1 – 66

†4. **How many full-time employees does your organization?**

median = 100; range = 2 – 100,000+(a government respondent)

†5. **How many full-time employees work on forestry issues?**

median = 50; range = 2 – 10,000

[†: **How big is their concession?**]

median = 206,250 ha; range = 97,500 – 600,000

*†6. **Where does your organization work?**
(check as many as apply)

	# of responses
Cambodia	19
China	28
Indonesia	38
Laos	26
Malaysia	24
PNG	20
Thailand	21
Vietnam	22
Japan	8
Elsewhere: Asia	18
USA	18
Elsewhere: Americas	19
EU	18
Elsewhere: Europe	12
Africa	23
Australia/Pacific	22

†: **Did you suffer in the recent economic crisis? (Most skipped the question)**

	# of responses
Significantly (> 20% drop)	3
Moderately	4
Not at all	2
Increased	0

†: **Have you recovered?**

	# of responses
Fully	3
Moderately	3
Not at all	0
Declined further	1

RAFT aims to tackle threats to biodiversity and the climate (*i.e.*, reducing greenhouse emissions from forestlands and facilitating adaptation to climate change). It aims to do this by increasing the legality of the timber trade.

7. **Listed below are RAFT’s program objectives. Please rank their importance in your view for addressing climate change and the threats to biodiversity in Asia. (1 to 4; with 1 being most important)**

	Average ranking
Increasing the proportion of the regional timber trade from legal sources	1.79
Improving sustainable forest management (SFM) of natural forests	2.73
Strengthening political cooperation within the region on SFM & trade	2.64
Reduced emission from deforestation & degradation (REDD) in the region	2.76

8. If there are additional objectives that must be met to tackle climate change and conserve biodiversity, please list those your organization considers most important:

- Improve governance
- All the above as inter-linked, therefore the ranking is somewhat arbitrary.
- Missing objectives are clear: Securing local community rights and livelihoods
- Contributing to poverty reduction
- Development of scheme to provide direct incentives (financial) for good actors
- Free Flowing Mekong
- Need to understand the dynamics of the supply chain and market to develop solutions that make sense for business - current solutions don't address this well.
- Complex set of relationships, where addressing any one objective in isolation is unlikely to succeed. The positive effect to date of certification, etc has been at best marginal—not been significant enough to reverse trends. Responsible purchasing and associated public commitments needs to be widespread across all significant domestic and international markets. Governments, through legislative processes and aid support need to create conditions where the lowest level performers are removed from the game. Carbon related funding is necessary as will be the only reliable income stream for SFM.
- Community-based forest management, linked with improved land tenure.
- Poverty reduction; Low Carbon growth
- Local communities involvement, livelihood aspects are important to engage the people in SFM, climate change and conservation of species and ecosystem. Greater transparency of legal framework and trade is important to ensure proper procedures and legal framework are known widely and followed. Enforcement actions is vital to stop illegality.
- Branding of SFM does not and will not provide enough incentive to reduce deforestation. The focus must be better enforcement (tough penalties consistently enforced) and through ensuring there is enough government and industry awareness and capacity to implement standards. The key issue with biodiversity loss is that governments are not regulating the process of forest conversion adequately. REDD is a great concept but many organizations (including several RAFT partners, let me say RECOFTC for one) are pulling REDD in too many directions i.e. ensure FPIC of local people, ensure government capacity first, and ensure carbon benefit is accurate - there is no leakage and ensure permanence - all of which takes a HUGE amount of TIME and MONEY. REDD must be kept VERY SIMPLE and focus on specific sites.
- Land use planning on the carbon value forest.
- Land tenure security
- Empowering local community
- Community forestry and managing forest resources for optimum social, economic, and environmental benefits
- Governance improvement - Reform of spatial and land use planning - Community involvement in decision making processes

†9. **What are the major obstacles in Asia to tackling climate change and threats to biodiversity?**

	#	# from industry
Need for training	36	6
Need for coherent government policies	36	5
Competition from other land uses (<i>e.g.</i> , agriculture)	35	2
Need to mediate conflict over land tenure	34	5
The cost of certification	34	3
Need for data	33	3
Need to tackle corruption	33	7
Need for greater markets for legal timber	33	4
Need for greater participation by local communities	32	6
Need for proper allocation of logging concessions	28	2
Lack of legal supply	25	1
Need for land use planning		4
Need for government policies (<i>e.g.</i> taxes) that favor SFM		3

10. **What other obstacles (if any) are necessary to overcome?**

- A leader who understand the environment.
- Capacity of forest managers.
- Critical mass of responsible actors
- Demographic pressure and socio-economic development.
- Enforcement
- Enforcement.
- Enforcement.
- ESIA on infrastructure development projects.
- Independent monitoring of ecosystem services.
- Lack of “FLEGT type” process in Asian countries.
- Increasing domestic markets without responsible practices.
- Lack of government procurement policies
- Local rules and requirements are unclear; poor outreach.
- Organizations need to work more collaboratively.
- Weak leadership, both political and technocratic.
- Weak civil society.

†II. How have the most critical obstacles changed in the past 5 years?

	#	# from industry
Made things worse	6	3
Stayed the same	7	2
Improved	24	2

*†12. Did RAFT have an impact on these changes?

	#	# from industry
Major positive impact	7	2
Moderate positive impact	22	3
Little positive impact	4	0
Negative impact	0	0
No impact	1	0

*†13. Rank the major changes that had an impact on efforts to increase legal timber trade over the past 5 years:

	#	# from industry
The US Lacey Act	33	1
NGO campaigns and public relations concerns	33	6
EU Due Diligence Regulation	32	2
EU Voluntary Partnership Agreements (VPAs)	30	1
Increasing demand for legal timber	30	7
REDD	25	1
Chinese legality policy	24	1
Changes in local government policy	24	2
Corporate Social Responsibility	24	5
The recent financial crisis	20	4

14. Any other major changes that have affected the responsible timber trade?

- It is interesting to note that no cases have been brought under the Lacey Act, etc. so it may become 'toothless' and lose its influence. The biggest challenge is that developing country markets are growing reducing the importance of US and EU markets.
- Government's realising it is worth doing something about illegal logging through better enforcement, anti-money laundering, awareness raising, and independent auditing of their forestry sector with civil society monitoring.

- Increased communication and access to information
- Log export bans have changed the nature of the trade especially to China and have encouraged overseas investment in forest concessions.
- Responsible industry is not set up to deliver cost effective solutions.

15. Please select areas where your programs overlap with RAFT’s objectives and principles?

	Working through partnerships	Working across the supply chain	A feedback loop between Policymakers & Practitioners
SFM	30	18	16
Policy Cooperation	23	14	21
Legal Trade	20	16	14
Climate Change	24	9	18

†16. What are your organization’s training needs? Please select all those appropriate.

	#	# from industry
Social Agreements with Local Communities	15	2
Trade Policy	15	6
Legality Verification	13	2
REDD	13	3
Reduced Impact Logging	12	4
Chain of Custody	12	4
Conflict Management	12	4
HCVF	11	3
Certification	9	5

‡: Which sectors are most likely to pursue SFM now & in the future?

	Now				Future			
	High	Med	None	Opposed	High	Med	None	Opposed
Logging	3	0	1	1	3	2	1	0
Transportation	1	1	3	0	1	2	1	0
Processing	3	3	0	0	4	3	0	0
Im-/export	4	2	0	0	6	0	0	0
Retail	2	2	0	0	4	1	0	0

†17. Did you document any ‘lessons learned’ or ‘best practices’ from these programs?

	SFM	Policy Cooperation	Trade	Climate Change
Scientific/technical papers	15	11	6	13
‘Popular’ articles	11	13	12	10
Conference presentations	20	18	15	19
Field visits	19	10	14	9
Comm through local governments	12	12	9	7
Communication through USAID	9	9	8	4
Press release to the media	17	13	14	14

*†18. Were you already familiar with RAFT?

Very familiar	19
Moderately	14
Only slightly	3
No	1

<If the respondent answers ‘No’, then the survey skipped to the end.>

*†19. How responsive has RAFT been at providing:

For results see Table 8.

†20. Is your organization a RAFT partner?

Yes	24
Don’t know	7
No	13

<If the respondent answers ‘No’, then the survey skipped to the end.>

21. How important was RAFT funding to your organization?

	Very important	Important	Useful	Unnecessary
No-one else would fund this work	10	9	2	1
Leveraged funding from other partners	12	10	1	0
Brought in private sector partners	7	4	7	0

†22. In addition to financing, how important was RAFT?

	Very important	Important	Useful	Unnecessary
Developed strategic partnerships	14	6	2	0
Engagement with the private sector	11	7	4	0
Facilitated learning networks	11	5	7	0
Engagement with policymakers	10	9	3	0
Arranged meetings/workshops	9	8	4	1
Improved project design	8	7	4	1
Improved project management	7	8	6	0
Provided training centers	6	5	4	1
Improved evaluation systems	5	11	6	0
Improved communications strategy	5	14	3	0
Introduced novel techniques	5	9	7	0
Arranged site visits	5	10	6	0

†23. How useful was your participation in RAFT Learning Networks?

	Very useful	Moderately useful	Unhelpful	We did not participate
REDD	11	5	1	2
Conflict Management	10	7	0	2
Reduced Impact Logging	9	6	0	3
Certification	9	6	0	3
Trade Policy	7	8	0	3

†24. Do you have any suggestions to make the Learning Networks more effective?

- Work through the REDD Learning Network.
- The operational level that includes partners, private, community, local government.
- Support national learning networks and arrange for M&E at regional level.
- We need further specialization and continue to think how we can attract people to participate.
- Social networking.
- More activities that involve active participations from all members.
- Link download center for all information and training, workshop results.
- It should be 'up front' from the beginning of the project.
- HCVF (although it varies among countries).

†25. **Did you benefit from any training associated with RAFT?**

	Adopted new practices	Intend to adopt practices learned	Not useful
Certification	7	4	0
Conflict Management	7	5	1
Reduced Impact Logging	6	5	0
HCVF	6	4	0
Chain of Custody	5	5	0
Social Agreements with Local Communities	5	6	0
Legality Verification	4	7	0
REDD	4	5	1
Trade Policy	4	5	1

†26. **In the interest of ‘lessons learned’, do you have any examples of significant impacts that you obtained from training?**

- Conflict Management: becoming an important tool to have to resolve core social issues regarding land tenure and land claims.
- Methodology for evaluating RIL implementation.
- Focus should be day-to-day training of government and industry by full time employed capacity builders in country, not ‘training events’.

27. **Did your relationship with the private sector improve through RAFT?**

Yes 20
No 2

†28. **Did you adopt any ‘best practices’ due to RAFT related to:**

SFM activities 11
Policy cooperation 9
Climate change 7
Legal trade 6

†29. **In addition to funding, what value did USAID add to RAFT?**

Direct link to US government policymakers	18
Credibility with the private sector	18
Credibility with producer-country governments	17
Technical assistance	14
Credibility with consumer-country governments	13
No added value	1

30. **Did you have a Performance Management Plan with the following:**

Data collected frequently during implementation	11
Baseline data	10
Key evaluation questions identified at the outset of your project	7
Data from ‘control’ sites	5

*31. **How did RAFT perform compared to other projects?**

	Very Effective	Effective	Average	Below Average
Collaboration (coordinating partners)	8	9	3	1
Prompt delivery of funding	8	8	2	2
Reporting requirements	7	8	4	1
Technical assistance	7	7	3	1
Proposal process	6	6	4	2
Evaluation requirements	5	10	4	1
Communication strategy	5	8	6	2
Input to policy	5	11	4	2

32. **Is there any other information you would like to share?**

If you prefer, we can arrange for an individual interview over the telephone to discuss these issues further, either at: raftevaluation@yahoo.com or artblundell@yahoo.com

33. **We will make sure you receive a copy of the final evaluation if you would like.**

Your name: Your organization: Your email:

Thank you very much for your time. We appreciate your response.

ANNEX 5. DRIVERS OF DEFORESTATION

The amount of forest in SE Asia is decreasing due a variety of factors:

- Conversion to agriculture, especially industrial plantations, due to:
 - High commodity prices
 - Bio-fuel ('green carbon')
*"Expansion of oil-palm plantations is particularly relevant to forest in SE Asia given ... the status of Malaysia and Indonesia as the world largest producers"*⁴²
 - Subsidies
 - In Indonesia, a decision banning use of natural forests for pulp manufacture was reversed due to a lack of plantation supply⁴³ (affecting at least 7 million ha of natural forests), while at the same time permission was given for export of plantation-grown pulp logs because of low returns from domestic consumption⁴⁴
 - Failing to internalize environmental costs
- Fire, disease & pathogens
 - Exacerbated by drought and increased temperature associated with climate change *"accelerating ecosystem degradation"*⁴⁵
 - *"The ASEAN Trans-boundary Haze Agreement followed fires in 1997/98 in Indonesia that affected 11.7 million ha"*; entered in force in 2003, it *"has, however, not been ratified by Indonesia"*⁴⁶
- Declining "governance scores ... suggest that in the future, forestry development may be guided to a greater extent by local-level exigencies, private sector development and civil society action"⁴⁷
 - Lack of participation
 - *"Failure to garner greater participation in the policy process inevitably weakens policy implementation and leads to a lack of general enforcement support ... Presently the question of how important forests are to local livelihoods is rarely put to those directly affected."*⁴⁸
- Poor protection of property rights
 - Unrecognized tenure of indigenous populations
 - Can lead to conflict with private sector and government
- Decentralization
 - In Indonesia, state-owned forests *"were progressively degraded through timber exploitation and pulp and paper production ... followed by oil-palm plantation establishment beginning in the 1990s. Throughout, there has been little recognition of local-level rights and while the regime change in 1998 and subsequent decentralization was expected to provide benefits to forestry and rural communities, the situation has worsened"*.⁴⁹
- Corruption
 - Licenses given out to fund election campaigns
 - *"In almost all countries, business-government coalitions, often with military support, have dominated forestry"*⁵⁰ in SE Asia.
 - Indonesian military budget was augmented by industry

Conversely, other drivers are increasing the amount of forest:

- Rural migration, as poor move to cities leaving agricultural life
- Reforestation, driven in part by:
 - Incentives under *Clean Development Mechanism* and REDD+ projects

42 FAO Outlook 2020; p 120

43 ITTO 2009a

44 ITTO 2009b

45 Curran et al 2004

46 FAO Outlook 2020; p 27

47 ibid, p 131

48 ibid, p 178

49 ibid, p 83

50 ibid, p 125

However, demand for forest products puts pressure on forests:

- SE Asia has passed “peak timber production” and production is falling due to:
 - “Declining resource availability (depletion of forest resources/forest protection/lack of establishment of plantations
 - “Out-of-date technology and low conversion efficiencies
 - “Increasing wage[s]...
 - “Inefficient policy and institutional frameworks combined with poor governance.”⁵¹
- But demand is growing:
 - Increasing consumption patterns, coupled with increasing populations, including in SE Asia with their robust economies
- Illegal logging:
 - Exacerbated by overcapacity in processing facilities that need a supply of wood that exceeds that legally available

Nevertheless, emerging trends are moderating the effects of the forestry sector:

- Regulations that demand legality, including legal origin and harvest
 - The US *Lacey Act* that prohibits importation of illegally obtained goods
 - The EU’s regulation that requires ‘due diligence’ to ensure legality
 - *Voluntary Partnership Agreements* (VPAs), which are binding bilateral trade agreements that require all imports to the EU to be licensed based on a legality verification system
- Corporate Social Responsibility
 - Such as voluntary codes of conduct
 - “Cambodia is on the only country where implementation of a national code of harvesting practice is mandatory ... [A]lthough evaluation is undertaken by Forestry Administration, results have not been made public”⁵²

- *Public procurement policies and corporate decisions will provide parallel motivation.*

- Certification of good practices
 - In Asia “only 12% of the natural permanent forest is estimated to be under SFM and only 5% ... is certified as being sustainably managed”⁵³

All of these factors are influenced by overarching policies that influence the rate of deforestation and degradation:

- Law enforcement, including prosecution, if effective serve as a deterrent: “Discussing illegal logging and trade is not enough and improved laws and vigorous law enforcement are needed”⁵⁴
 - Corruption, especially the conflict of interest when the government and military are involved, undermines such enforcement
- Education and awareness shape opinion and behavior
- Stakeholder involvement empower civil society to manage the resource
- Institutional capacity if not corrupt should have a positive effect on the management of natural resources:
 - Adaptive management benefits from proper planning, monitoring and evaluation
 - Conflict mediation encourages effective management

Fundamentally, *political will* is necessary to ensure that these factors are managed in a manner consistent with good governance, and thus, desired environmental and social outcomes.

Ultimately however, effective management must be sufficiently flexible to withstand unpredictable shocks:

- Financial crises that undermine management and limit institutional capacity
- Environmental disasters, such as climate change, that overwhelm the responsiveness of institutions, limiting the ability to adapt

51 *ibid*, p 19

52 *ibid*, p 25

53 *ibid*, p 98

54 *ibid*, p 98

ANNEX 6. SUMMARY OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS FROM RAFT'S MID-TERM EVALUATION⁵⁵

- Better coordinate with partners
 - More collaborative strategic work planning
 - Create more ownership & transparency in the process
 - *e.g.*, consistent conference calls (~every 2 months)
 - Build mutually beneficial linkages with other initiatives
 - Especially regional forums (*e.g.*, APFNet)
 - Devise strategy for engaging USG (including Mission & Embassies)
 - Engage more closely with USG policy process
 - Provide outreach re: *Lacey Act*
 - Demonstrate cost-efficiency to argue for more REDD+ \$
 - Seek opportunities to work with other donors
 - Build on collaborative (instead of competitive) NGO relations
 - Increase linkages between target concessions & processors/retailers
 - Work with financial world
 - ITTO: closer cooperation, but avoid duplication of data collection
 - Engage through Trade Advisory Group (AG) or Civil Society AG
 - ASEAN: monitor, build awareness of RAFT, avoid duplicating ASEAN's knowledge networks & clearinghouse mechanism
 - Get USFS to:
 - Assist in envisioned learning networks / professional exchange
 - Organize study tours to learn about extension services
 - Act as additional expert:
 - Liaison in Indonesia
 - HCVF work, SFM, wood technology
- Broaden engagement (if warranted) to cover all target countries
 - With forest-rich PNG (and as appropriate Laos & Cambodia)
 - With producers China & esp. Vietnam, and increasingly with Thailand
 - Increase engagement with national policy process in China
 - Initiate national policy engagement Vietnam, PNG, & Laos
 - In Indonesia, observe and only intervene if requested by Government of Indonesia
 - Overall: clarify regional strategic approach
 - Move from 'retail' to 'wholesale' strategy
- Get clarity in membership
- Review RAFT objectives (especially due to evolving policy and economic climate)
 - Identify key policy obstacles faced by legit producers & strategically pass those on to policy-makers, NGOs, USG, etc.
 - Build a critical mass of legit producers
 - Interventions should complement USAID programming
 - Convey accumulated knowledge/lessons learned to policymakers
- Improve monitoring & continuously updated reporting
 - Establish stronger & more purposeful communications strategy
 - Technical knowledge must be captured & communicated
 - *e.g.*, through a writer's workshop
 - Revise reporting formats (correct past reports where necessary)

⁵⁵ USAID RAFT Mid-Term Program Evaluation (22 February–13 March 2009).

- Determine the best mechanism to employ ‘joint learning’ (e.g., RIL/HCVF)
 - Operationalize ‘learning networks’ (incl. schedule/costing)
 - Strengthen REDD+ Learning Network
 - In PNG, develop link between REDD+ policy & SFM in forest
- Monitor the impacts of markets and incentives
 - (Esp. arising from evolving policy and economic climate)
 - Conduct market analyses (non+certified) & trade flows
 - Understand economics of competing land uses (e.g., oil palm)
 - Use USDA Foreign Ag Service data
 - Use these analyses to focus on trade linkages
 - Maintain clearer articulation of supply chain & value chain
- Scale-up Chain of Custody activities in China, Vietnam, Lao, & ~Thailand
- Continue conflict management training
- Create a SFM Training Center in Kalimantan
 - Institutionalize SFM to mainstream training & practices

ANNEX 7. LIST OF RAFT PARTNER-CONCESSIONS

Concession name, country and province (Kal = Kalimantan [Indonesian Borneo]), the area of concession (ha; this area may be greater than the amount of the concession that was actually verified/certified), date of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed with RAFT; the RAFT partner that engaged the concessionaire; and progress towards SFM (% of criteria completed for legality; high conservation value forest management (HCVF); reduced impact logging techniques (RIL); and certification); the verification/certification program the concession has completed

(FSC = Forest Stewardship Council; COC = chain of custody; VLO = Verification of Legal Origin (a step-wise approach to FSC); SVLK = Indonesian legality assurance system); and the programs that the concessionaire will remain active in after the close of RAFT (BFCP = TNC’s Berau Forest Carbon Partnership; TBI = The Borneo Initiative). Note: these numbers are tentative as the RAFT program is not yet complete. Note also: Erna Djuliawati was initially FSC-certified in 2005, but RAFT’s partnership helped the concessionaire remain certified.

Name	Country	Province	Area (ha)	MoU	Partner	Legality %	HCVF %	RIL %	Certification %	Completed	Active programs
Narkata Rimba.	Indonesia	East Kal	68,000	9-Jan-09	TNC	95	100	50	93	FSC	TBI, TNC
Kostajasa	Indonesia	Centr Java	122		TFT	100				FSC	
Sari Bumi Kusuma	Indonesia	Central Kal	274,300		TFF	100	100	84	100	FSC/COC	
Erna Djuliawati	Indonesia	West Kal	184,206		TFF	100	100	100		FSC/COC	
Suka Jaya Makmur	Indonesia	West Kal	171,300	24-Dec-08	TFF	100	100	70	95	FSC/COC	TBI
Balikkapan Forest Indust	Indonesia	East Kal	140,845		TFF	0	0	0	0	FSC COC	
Sumalindo LJ IV	Indonesia	East Kal	100,000	15-Jan-08	TFT	73	95	73	68	FSC COC	
Sarminto Parakantja,	Indonesia	Central Kal	216,550	1-Aug-07	TFF	100	100	84	76	RIL/SVLK	TBI
Inhutani I, Tepian Labanan	Indonesia	East Kal	138,210	27-Jan-09	TNC	83	0	26	49	SVLK	BFCP/TNC
Gunung Gadjah Abadi	Indonesia	East Kal	81,000	19-Jan-10	TNC	0	0	0	5	SVLK	TNC
Sindo Lumber	Indonesia	Central Kal	76,925	17-Mar-08	TFF	100	95	83	0	VLO	
Indexim Utama Corp	Indonesia	Central Kal	52,480	1-Mar-06	TFF	100	0	83	81	VLO	TBI
Wapoga Mutiara Timb II	Indonesia	Papua	196,900	15-Dec-09	TFF	80	0	0	0	VLO/SVLK	TBI
Gema Hutani Lestari	Indonesia	Maluku	148,450	1-Mar-06	TFF	100	0	36	21	VLO/SVLK	TBI
Belayan River Timber	Indonesia	East Kal	97,500	17-Jul-09	TFF	100	100	71	64	VLO/SVLK	TBI
Rodamas Kal Timber	Indonesia	East Kal	110,030	1-Jan-07	TFF	100	36	78	41	VLO/SVLK	TBI
Akates Plywood	Indonesia	Central Kal	94,380	26-Feb-10	TFF	51	0	0	0		
Carus Indonesia	Indonesia	Central Kal	73,281	1-Feb-06	TFT	98	28	73	0		
Dwima Jaya Utama	Indonesia	Central Kal	127,300	15-Jan-09	TFT	98	83	89	71		TBI
Graha Sentosa Permai	Indonesia	Central Kal	44,970	26-Nov-07	TFF	100	0	17	0		
Kayu Tribuana Rama	Indonesia	Central Kal	98,765	26-Feb-10	TFF	51	0	29	0		
Sinergi Hutan Sjati	Indonesia	Central Kal	68,980	26-Jan-10	TFF	51	0	0	0		TBI
Sarang Sapta Putra	Indonesia	Central Kal	49,500	27-Mar-09	TFF	85	68	0	56		TBI
Inhutani I, Unit Meraang	Indonesia	East Kal	70,700	27-Jan-09	TNC	82	0	21	4		BFCP/TNC
Inhutani I, Unit Samarata	Indonesia	East Kal	106,020	27-Jan-09	TNC	83	0	21	49		BFCP/TNC
Aditya Kirana Mandiri	Indonesia	East Kal	42,700	3-Oct-07	TNC	83	5	8	31		BFCP/TNC

Name	Country	Province	Area (ha)	MoU	Partner	Legality %	HCVF %	RIL %	Certification %	Completed	Active programs
Amindo Wana Persada	Indonesia	East Kal	43,680	1-Oct-07	TNC	88	59	39	21		BFCP/TNC
Kemakmuran Berkah Tbr	Indonesia	East Kal	72,000	27-Nov-07	TNC	90	36	69	71		TBI, TNC
Mardhika Insan Mulia	Indonesia	East Kal	47,495	15-Jan-08	TFT	0	88	0	0		
Ratah Timber	Indonesia	East Kal	97,690	15-Jan-08	TFF	95	82	68	87		TBI
Timberdana	Indonesia	East Kal	76,340	21-Apr-08	TFF	100	0	35	0		
Wana Bhakti Persada Utama	Indonesia	East Kal	41,969	3-Oct-07	TNC	81	0	20	4		BFCP/TNC
Mamberamo Alas Mandiri	Indonesia	Papua	691,700	5-Feb-10	TFF	100	0	30	0		
Manokwari Mandiri Lest	Indonesia	Papua	83,240	8-Aug-07	TFT	88	68	83	38		
Mondialindo Setya Pratana	Indonesia	Papua	94,800	24-Jan-07	TFT	68	0	53	26		
Pangkar Begli	Indonesia	West Kal	30,195	1-Nov-10	TFF	51		30			
Civika Wana Lestari and Sarana Trirasa Bhakti	Indonesia		94,000		TFF	51	0	0	0		
Luang Prabang Community Teak	Lao PDR	Luang Prabang	13,000	1-Jun-08	TFT	100					FSC/VLO
Perak Integrated Timber Complex	Malaysia	Perak	10,000		TFT	100	100	85	93		FSC
Hijuan	Malaysia	Sabah	25,000	1-Aug-07	TFT	95	0	0	83		FSC
Sabah Forest Department (FMU 17A)	Malaysia	Sabah	42,000	15-May-07	WWF	100	100	54	90		FSC
Sabah Forest Department (FMU 23,24)	Malaysia	Sabah	180,000	1-Oct-10	WWF		95				FSC
Ulu Segama Malua Forest Reserve	Malaysia	Sabah	240,000	29-Sep-08	WWF	100	90	55	90		FSC
Durung Timber Complex (KPKKT)	Malaysia	Trengganu	108,900	16-Sep-08	WWF	93	75	74	100		FSC
Sabah Forest Industries	Malaysia	Sabah	276,623		WWF	95	100	85	85		FSC/COC
Ta Ann Sdn. Bhd. (Raplex & Pasin forest)	Malaysia	Sarawak	72,500	8-Dec-09	WWF	80	0	45	25		VLO/ FSC COC

Name	Country	Province	Area (ha)	MoU	Partner	Legality %	HCVF %	RIL %	Certification %	Completed	Active programs
Yayasan Sabah (FMU 15 & 16)	Malaysia	Sabah	188,610	1-Oct-08	TFT	93	54	60	63	VLO	
Ta Ann Tanjong Manis	Malaysia	Sarawak	125,000	8-Dec-09	WWF	78	0	36	25	VLO	
Ta Ann Pasin	Malaysia	Sarawak	49,858	8-Dec-09	WWF	90	90	36	25	VLO	
Yay Sabah (FMU 23)	Malaysia	Sabah	52,040		TFT						
Yay Sabah (FMU 24)	Malaysia	Sabah	107,060		TFT						
Ta Ann Borlin	Malaysia	Sarawak	32,023	8-Dec-09	WWF	65	0	26	25		
Ta Ann Woodley	Malaysia	Sarawak	101,730	8-Dec-09	WWF	80	0	35	25		
Ta Ann Plantation	Malaysia	Sarawak	92,449	8-Dec-09	WWF	95	0	0	20	VLO	TNC
Madang Aidleberg Proj	PNG	Madang	16,000		TNC						
Annemite Concessions	Vietnam	Gai Lai	32,500		WWF						
Dak Rong	Vietnam	Gai Lai	15,981	1-Jan-08	TFT	0	0	0	0		
Tram Lap	Vietnam	Gai Lai	10,541		TFT	0	0	0	0		
Truong Son	Vietnam	Quangh Binh	40,152		TFT	0	0	0	0		

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