

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

USAID MISSION/GUATEMALA

REPORT ON PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

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P R E F A C E

This material was compiled by the Public Safety Division, USAID/Guatemala for presentation at the Public Safety Conference in Panama, Canal Zone, scheduled for December 11 - 14, 1963.

The information and statistics have been updated accordingly. It is believed that the contents will be useful in determining the scope and direction of the program within the total U.S. internal defense effort in Guatemala.

REPORT ON PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

I. BACKGROUND OF GUATEMALA

Geographical:

Guatemala, northernmost country in Central America, is bounded on the South by the Pacific Ocean, West and North by Mexico, and East by Belize (British Honduras), the Caribbean Sea, Honduras and El Salvador.

There are 1,050 miles of land border and 250 miles of sea coast.

Physical:

There are four general topographical areas; the hot, humid Pacific littoral, the equally hot and humid but smaller Caribbean shelf, the cool mountainous and high plateau central region, (where the Capital, Guatemala City is located) and the extensive, low, jungle covered plateau of El Peten, northernmost of the provinces, and which is relatively inaccessible.

More than one half of the land borders are located in sparsely settled forest or jungle terrain. Few roads crossing the border are capable of carrying heavy loads rapidly, but innumerable vehicular and foot trails readily lend themselves to small-scale smuggling.

There are two natural atlantic coast ports with modern facilities (Matías de Galvez and Puerto Barrios); the Pacific Coast has no natural harbors of consequence, although Guatemala's third port, San José is located there.

Guatemala is divided into 22 provinces. The largest, El Petén, is virtually inaccessible. Accessibility to the others varies from poor to excellent.

Population:

Guatemala has approximately 4,000,000 inhabitants, of whom nearly

half a million live in Guatemala City. The other two principal cities, Quezaltenango and Escuintla are the homes of nearly 50,000 other inhabitants.

The remainder of the population is largely rural and agricultural. It is suspected that a heavy percentage of border-area individuals engage in smuggling on a small scale.

Approximately 65% of the entire population are Indians and most of them do not speak Spanish. They are considered politically inactive. Illiteracy is estimated at 65%.

Economic:

Adequate statistical data is unavailable but per capital income is estimated at Q172. (172 Quetzales --now on par with U.S. dollars).

The cost of living index for necessities is based on 1946 at 100. In 1956 (beginning of the Public Safety Program) it was 137.8 and the latest available figures (1962) set it at 135.5. The cost of imported luxuries (mostly affecting the upper class structure) may have doubled or tripled in the same period of time.

Legal:

The 1956 Constitution (presently suspended, during the declared state of siege) establishes a republican form of government. Executive powers are vested in a president elected for six years. Self succession is prohibited, but a former president may be re-elected after 12 years (or two presidential terms).

A unicameral legislature (Congress) exercises the legislative power. The judiciary is composed of a supreme court, a court of appeals, courts of first instance; and minor justices with limited jurisdictions are set up to grant independent justice.

Each province has a governor who exerts control over all activities within his jurisdiction. The amount and quality of control varies. In remote areas, the municipal mayor exercises functions in criminal arraignments and adjudging of contraband.

Budgetary:

In calendar 1961, the economy produced a G.N.P. of some Q678 million. Customs collections --the greatest single source of "hard" recurring revenue-- totalled Q41.5 million (42%) of all government receipts and reflects the importance of anti-smuggling measures. It is estimated that only 6% of all smuggling is intercepted.

II. BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY

The Guatemalan political situation has shown marked instability since the overthrow of rightist Dictator Jorge Ubico in 1944. A brief resume of history will serve to illustrate the instability and the consequent threat to internal security which has been a permanent feature of the Guatemalan political landscape. Erratic, leftist, anti-American ex-President Juan José Arévalo (1944-1950) did manage to serve out his full elective term, but his reign was marked by abortive uprisings. One notorious assassination, and the growth of the influence of the communists and their chosen candidate to succeed Arévalo, Major Jacobo Arbenz. Some significant progress in the field of social development did take place during his regime, but while good in itself, this progress also served to fan the revolution of rising expectations, which neither the Arévalo government nor those which succeeded it have been able to satisfy. The basic pattern of high illiteracy, low income, and inadequate sanitation and housing for the vast majority of the population still exists. These factors, coupled with the "revolution" of rising expectations provide the fundamental cause of political instability and vulnerability to subversion.

Ex-President Arbenz's regime (1950-1954) was dominated by a small group of communist leaders and would have soon turned into an earlier Guatemalan version of the Castro regime had not Col. Carlos Castillo Armas overthrown his government in 1954. In the beginning, at least, he was very popular, especially in the Capital which had suffered much from Arbenz's repressive measures. Despite Castillo Armas' good intentions, his regime suffered from personal jealousies, and from

excesses on the part of some of his lieutenants. The communists were at a low ebb, but there were threats to internal security in the form of an abortive revolt on the part of the cadets at the Escuela Politécnica in 1954 and several leftist students were shot in 1957. When Castillo Armas was assassinated in 1957, he was, in the opinion of many Guatemalans, just beginning to govern well.

The subsequent interregnum was marked by, among other things, a short-lived (less than 48 hours) military junta, two presidential elections (the first was nullified because of the threat of revolution) and the interim regime of Guillermo Flores Avendaño, the Second Presidential Designate. Normal activity took a back seat to partisan campaign politics. In the second election, General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes obtained a plurality and was subsequently elected in a run-off election in the national legislature.

Ydígoras' popularity, relatively high at the time of election, dropped steadily due to a variety of factors, chief among them being a worsening economic situation due in part to dropping coffee prices, mal-administration, corruption which came to be endemic, and a talent for Machiavellian maneuver which served him well but which in the end proved his undoing. Plotting against his government by both left and right increased with time. In mid 1960 the government declared a state of seige following a series of terrorist bombings which culminated in the deaths of three persons in a down town theater. In November 1960, there was a serious attempt at a military revolt which, however, did not take hold in the capital and was subsequently squashed, not, however, without difficulty. In July 1961, there was another abortive attempt

at a military coup and from that time on rumors of coups became endemic. The communist party's (PGT) (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo) strength began to grow during the Ydígoras' regime, in a sense abetted by the President, who although anti-communist, especially in international matters, found them to be a convenient pawn (he was fond of calling any and all anti-government movements "communist-backed") in his game of political chess. In addition, a home-grown leftist, ex-president Arévalo, began to grow in stature, with some assistance from Ydígoras, who used the former in the President's private feud with moderate-leftist Mario Méndez. The example of Castro served as a stimulus to Guatemalan extreme leftists to try to do likewise.

In December of 1961, following a Congressional election which many believed marred by fraud, non-communist opposition staged street demonstrations against the elections. The police controlled these demonstrations, with a considerable assist from public pressure for a peaceful Christmas. In March 1962 university students began a strike against the inauguration of the "fraudulent" congress which quickly degenerated into violent and dangerous street demonstrations by secondary and university students. These demonstrations were backed by non-communist and communist students alike, and the latter and their allies were deeply involved. These demonstrations lasted well into April, an estimated 50 or so people were killed, and the Ydígoras government almost fell. Probably the specter of Castro and fear of the communist forces which were in part back of this "headless revolution" saved Ydígoras from a military coup.

Limited and inconclusive guerrilla activity had begun in February

1962 under the leadership of Lt. Marco Antonio YON Sosa, whose groups were also apparently responsible for the death by assassination of hated Chief of the Judicial Police, Ranulfo ("Siete Litros") Gonzalez Ovalle. Yon Sosa, who was a minor member of the November 1960 uprising and who took over the "Thirteenth of November Movement" name for his own group, received some assistance from the communists as well as from extreme rightists. Subsequently, when the demonstrations were at their height a PGT (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo) backed group headed by extreme leftist inactive Lt. Col. Carlos Paz Tejada, attempted to start another guerrilla front. About a dozen of these men were killed by the GOG. Yon Sosa's group ceased its limited activity and dropped from sight.

After demonstrations ceased in late April of 1962 the political atmosphere remained uneasy and sporadic terrorist bombings continued --some were no doubt set by the GOG itself in order to preserve a certain climate of tension which Ydígoras wished for his own political ends. Fear of moderates and rightists over the possible return to the presidency of Juan José Arévalo grew. Rightist groups opposition political parties, and other elements began to press the military forces to take action to remove Ydígoras who they felt might permit or connive at the return of Arévalo to power. The PGT (Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo) continued agitation and subversive activity, hoping either to infiltrate the successful Arévalo campaign or spark once again rioting which would be aimed at the overthrow of the Ydígoras government, and the substitution of some sort of popular front type government. In November 1962 extreme rightists in cooperation with certain elements of the Air Force staged

an attempted coup, which did not receive the expected cooperation of other elements of the military and was squashed.

During the first months of 1963 tension sparked by the pending return of Arévalo (announced for March 31) increased considerably and rumors of coups, guerrilla activity, etc, were rife. There was an attempt by extreme leftists in early March to arouse students to commemorate violently the previous year's events. This tactic, partly due to student apathy and in part due to a realization that such a movement would probably lead to a right wing coup, was abandoned in favor of supporting free elections in which, presumably, a compliant Arévalo would be elected. In the meantime it had become clear that Ydígoras was presenting the country with the alternative of voting for his personal choice, Roberto Alejos, who represented the continuation of corruption and Machiavellianism, or for Arévalo. Arévalo's clandestine arrival in Guatemala at the end of March, in all probability with the tacit approval of Ydígoras despite his public announcements against the ex-President, sparked the successful military coup of March 30, 1963. The military hierarchy took over the government and proclaimed Minister of Defense, Col. Enrique Feralta Azurdia as new Chief of Government. The take-over was backed by non-communist opposition parties and private initiative. Rumors of a massive popular uprising by supporters of Arévalo proved utterly unfounded.

In most aspects the situation here since the coup has been much less tense and much quieter than before. Nevertheless, the PGT backed Yon Sosa in a re-initiation of guerrilla activity in March. While the government has not been able to capture or put out of action many of

the guerrillas (whose numbers are variously estimated, but in all probability do not reach more than 100), neither have the guerrillas been able to take any significant action. At the time of the writing of this report they seem to be inactive. The Government's capture of lists of Communist Party members of guerrilla activities has apparently impeded their plans for future activity, but the incipient threat remains. The university student have been quiet and an attempt to bring about strikes and demonstrations in the secondary schools was effectively quashed by the Government.

The future course of this country's internal security problems is difficult, if not impossible, to predict. Nevertheless, it can be said with certainty that the PGT and its allies will continue to support and encourage guerrilla activities, manifestations of popular discontent, etc., and will be eager to take advantage of any missteps by the new government.

III. HISTORY OF PROGRAM

The government of Guatemala originally requested aid in the field of Public Safety in 1956, and the Government of the United States and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) responded by initiating a general survey of the National Police force's effectiveness as a law enforcement agency as well as of its deficiencies and needs. Mr. Fred Fimbres who conducted the survey, in his report dated April, 1956 noted that, "the National Police is performing a good job in maintaining a high degree of preparedness against subversive activity and attack. Its fulfillment of its police functions is at best to be rated as fair."

The objectives of the Public Safety Program were specified as follows, in the first Project Agreement signed June 1957:

- "1. Strengthen internal security of Guatemala by improving the organizations of the National Police of the Ministry of Government and training them in better methods of investigating and controlling subversives.
- "2. Make more effective control of Guatemala's borders with adjacent countries by the Police (now called Border Patrol) of the Ministry of Finance by improving methods for controlling illegal entries and contrabands.
- "3. Improve law enforcement by the National Police of the Ministry of Government, by establishing a records bureau, and training supervisory personnel in analysis and study of crime and traffic accidents, with a view to more effective assignment of personnel.
- "4. Improving present methods of crime detection and prevention by

the National Police of the Ministry of Government by improving the crime laboratory and training personnel.

- "5. Improve traffic control by the National Police through promotion of safety education, installation of traffic control devices, training of supervisors, etc."

To implement the above objectives, Public Safety was to furnish to the Guatemalan police agencies technical assistance, limited commodity support, and participant training for selected personnel.

The agencies covered by the Public Safety Program were originally only the National Police and Border Patrol. Since the Judicial Police is only an investigative body, intimately linked with the National Police, it too was covered by the Project Agreement. The Project Agreement 60-9 made it possible for the Public Safety Program to assist the Volunteer Firemen's Corp, under the same specifications as the other agencies: limited commodity assistance, technical advice, and training.

Since the inception of the program, the following Public Safety technicians have been stationed in Guatemala:

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Date</u>
POPA, John	Public Safety Advisor	8/27/56	2/28/59
LAUGHLIN, David L.	P.S. Adv. Traffic (Chief)	10/20/56	6/11/60
LONGAN, John P.	P.S. Adv. Training	10/6/57	6/16/60
MORRIS, Rex D.	P.S. Adv. Traffic (Acting Chief)	5/3/59	5/3/61
CRISCOTOMO, D.L.	P.S. Adv. Chief	1/17/61	to date
SEATON, Mark R.	P.S. Adv. Communications	6/27/62	to date
JONES, Marvin J.	P.S. Adv. Training	6/1/63	to date

Technicians on TDY Assignment in Guatemala

<u>Name</u>	<u>Specialty</u>	<u>Date</u>	
MARSHALL, E. DeWitt	Border Patrol	May/57	10/31/57
KEOUGH, Howard R.	Security Advisor	9/9/57	11/26/57
BENNETT, James V.	Survey of Prisons	1/10/58	2/1/58
DIAZ-SANTANA, Porfirio	" " "	10/17/58	11/7/58
GOIN, L.J.	Criminalistic Facilities	8/22/60	8/24/60
MURPHY, E.	Records of National Police	2/15/61	2/20/61
LAUGHLIN, D.L.	PSD/Guatemala	6/3/61	6/10/61
STAHL, Eric E.	Fire Consultant	6/17/61	9/15/61
SALCEDA, Michael	Riot Control	5/11/62	6/9/62

Technicians under Special Contract

George W. Barton and Associates - Traffic Lights 12/1/59 12/16/59
by J.M. KENEIPP and Marvin GARBER

Throughout the program, an important phase of its assistance to the Guatemalan police agencies has been based on studies and surveys made by various technicians and contractors on different problems of the police forces, as follows:

<u>Subject of Survey</u>	<u>Author</u>	<u>Date</u>
National Police	E. Fimbres	1956
Border Patrol	E.D. Marshall	1957
Security Police	H. Keough	1958
Prisons	J. Bennett and P. Diaz-Santana	1958
Traffic	Barton & Associates (J. Keneipp & M. Garber)	1960
Criminalistic facilities	L.J. Goin	1960
Records	E. Murphy	1961
Communication needs	R.D. Morris	1961
Police Transportation	LaBruzza	1961
PS Program/Guatemala	D.L. Laughlin	1961
PS Program/Guatemala	D.L. Crisostomo	1961
Fire Protection	E. Stahl	1961
Riot Control	M. Salseda	1962
PS Program/Guatemala	D.L. Crisostomo	1963
National Police-Escuintla	M.J. Jones	1963

The Public Safety Program has developed three long range goals in Guatemala: Organization and Administration, Communications and

Training, In all three of these goals, a moderate measure of success may be claimed.

Although the reorganization of the Police forces has not been accomplished, just a few days ago (November 29, 1963) the Government Official for Technical Cooperation Affairs requested that the Public Safety technicians confer with him on the possible reorganization of the police forces. It is encouraging to note that after many unsuccessful attempts by U.S. Technicians to convince the concerned GOG officials on the importance of reorganizing these agencies, the present regime is now taking active interest in this long overdue course of action.

Communications were non-existent when the program began, and in October 1963 the Border Patrol country-wide communications network was inaugurated. The National Police network has received considerable assistance in the form of technical advice and commodities. In December 1963 the relocation of the main transmitter receiver to a more advantageous point will be completed. With that, and the relocations of several radio units, the National Police country-wide network will also be a reality.

The three police agencies established training academies under the Public Safety Division tutelage, although only the National Police Academy is now functioning, training approximately 240 men a year, in three-month courses.

The local training program has been largely augmented by an ample participant program.

IV. ACHIEVEMENT OR PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM

Communications:

The status of the communications project, as of December 5, 1963, is as follows:

1. There are 24 FM base stations (all National Police). Of these, 22 are operating and 2 are deadlined for lack of parts. Under the new communications plan some re-shuffling of radios will be necessary. Six radios will be exchanged between existing sites. Seven existing radio sites will be discontinued and seven new installations made. The end result will be 24 FM base stations operating at 17 existing sites and 7 new sites.
2. There are 32 SSB base stations (1 Casa Presidencial, 19 Border Patrol, 2 National Police, 10 reserve). Of these, 18 are installed (1 Casa Presidencial, 2 National Police and 15 Border Patrol).
3. There are 42 FM vehicular radios (all National Police). Of these, 26 are installed and 16 are deadlined for lack of parts.
4. There are 11 SSB vehicular radios (2 Casa Presidencial, 7 Border Patrol and 2 National Police). Of these, 5 are installed (1 Casa Presidencial, 1 National Police and 3 Border Patrol).
5. 14 Provinces enjoy coverage.

A Radio-Electronics and Maintenance class is presently in progress at the Instituto Técnico Vocacional (ITV) where instruction is being given to 7 participants from the National Guard of El Salvador, 7 National Policemen and 4 Border Patrolmen.

Training:

Eighty two participants have been trained --44 in the United States,

12 in Puerto Rico, and 26 at the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama. Of them 40 are on active duty, 10 are working in other capacities for the Guatemalan Government. 5 officers are currently attending the Internal Security Seminar (Nov. 4 through Dec. 11) at the Inter-American Police Academy in Panama.

The National Police Academy reports a grand total of 2,539 men trained, both in basic police courses, and in specialized techniques since its creation in 1956. The Border Patrol has reported a total of 674 men trained in its academy (which is not functioning at present) specializing in Riot Control techniques. The Judicial Police has trained approximately 200 men in criminal investigations, crime detection and basic police subjects.

Public Safety Division has given the local academies technical advice, commodity assistance, and training materials. Class materials are translated from English originals, reproduced and given to the academies.

Riot Control:

Riot Control techniques have been given emphasis in the Public Safety Program since 1962, after Guatemala City suffered rather serious civil disturbances. Mr. Michael Salseda was assigned on TDY for 6 weeks in Guatemala, and personally supervised the training of 41 selected officers in Riot Control techniques with non-lethal weapons. The instructors' cadre thus formed has continued training men. There has also been ample commodity assistance to equip the Riot Control units formed by the police agencies.

A recent inspection showed the riot control capabilities of the

Police agencies in Guatemala City as follows:

National Police

Capability: Good

Officers trained: 150

Units to be called on emergency during riots:

2 units of 60 men - 120
3 units of 10 men - 30

TOTAL: 150 men

Equipment on hand:

Sickening gas grenades	312
Tear gas grenades	615
Gas masks	98
Batons, 26"	2900
Riot guns	18 in good condition 6 broken at the butt
Shells for riot guns	325
Megaphones (portable)	20
Helmets	1221 (present whereabouts could not be determined)
Tear gas batons	12
Tear gas capsules	12

Estimated time to assemble and lead for action: immediately.

Judicial Police

Capability: Fair

Officers trained: 30

Units to be called on emergency during riots: 1 unit of 30 men

Equipment on hand:

Tear gas grenades	68
Gas masks	6
Batons, 26"	18
Helmets	75
Riot guns	none
Megaphones	none

Estimated time to assemble these units and lead for action: immediately.

Border Patrol

Capability: Good

Officers trained: 674 (now on active duty 432)

Equipment on hand:

Tear gas grenades	none
Gas masks	75
Batons, 26"	none
Riot guns	25
Shells for riot guns	1500
Megaphones	5
Helmets	504

Estimated time to assemble and lead for action: immediately.

Commodity Assistance:

Commodity assistance to the Police agencies of Guatemala to date, total \$673,182.70, the main items contributed are: vehicles, \$451,205.00, communications equipment, \$117,683.78, boats, \$24,778.23, and arms and ammunition, \$32,667.20. Other commodities include: criminal laboratory equipment, clerical equipment and traffic enforcement equipment.

Administration:

Since the inception of the program, administration and procedures of the police have been improved as follows:

1. Personnel recruitment procedures, such as institution of personnel backgroundchecks, and written and oral tests.
2. Inspection procedures
3. Institution of report forms for accidents, investigations and offenses.
4. Staff conference methods
5. Creation of a National Traffic Council to assist the police in traffic matters.

6. School safety patrols.

Volunteer Firemen:

A short-term technician was contracted from the Los Angeles Fire Department to assist the Volunteer Firemen Corps, and his assistance resulted in the following:

1. Improved organization and staffing
2. Training program for firemen
3. Procurement of needed equipment
4. Institution of fire prevention procedures

Special Assistance:

Special assistance has also been given in the following fields:

1. Prison Administration: A short term technician made a survey of the Guatemalan prison system which included recommendations for improvement such as the institution of rehabilitation program, prisoner segregation, and personnel training.
2. Secret Service (Presidential Protective Unit): In-service training courses were given for the personnel attached to this unit by a U.S. technician. Several participated in training programs in the United States. An Operations and Procedures manual was developed and given to the agents for their guidance.

V. CURRENT PROBLEMS

The principal problem in all three police agencies is that of administration, lack of proper organization and low caliber personnel.

The definition and specification of it in the original National Police survey, of 1956, is still applicable. It reads:

"Administrative deficiencies noted are a lack of professional training, unwieldy spans of control, absence of executive management, poor budgeting practices, poor personnel administration coupled with lack of concept of human relations in management, very low morale and lack of esprit de corps, improper deployment of line personnel, lack of adequate and centralized records, inadequate office equipment and housing facilities and lack of preventive maintenance and care of motorized equipment."

The high turnover of top echelon personnel has made it impossible to implement long range projects.

From the problem in administration stem a series of problems, such as lack of mobility, and poor maintenance of equipment.

Lack of funds for preventive maintenance of equipment make it inevitable that a high percentage of vehicles be out of operation at any given time. Lack of proper control of the garage facilities of all three agencies aggravate the problem.

The high attrition rate among the rank and file make a rise in the level of personnel training virtually an impossibility. The police agencies lose more men than they can train, every year.

USAID has provided technical assistance, commodities and on-the-job and participant training since FY 1957. The effect of this assistance,

while it undoubtedly contributed to a prevention of deterioration of the civil police forces has failed to result in major improvements. The lack of high level support has been and continues to be the crux of the problem.

As mentioned, there has been what might be termed a complete lack of improvement in the organization, administration and management of the police agencies. Budget provisions for the three bodies have either remained unchanged (from what was judged inadequate at the inception of the program) or have been reduced. Lack of over-all administrative changes and in budget structure has resulted in little more than a holding operation.

VI. FY 1964 AND FY 1965 PROGRAM PLANS

FY 1964

In view of past problems and developments, an all-out effort must be made to secure GOG moral and financial support of the police agencies.

To be effective, this support should include:

1. Personnel wage increases and improvements in working conditions.
2. Adequate budgets to meet operational and maintenance needs.
3. Reorganization of forces so that they may adequately fulfill their functions.
4. Careful selection and retention of command personnel.

Public Safety Division plans to conduct the following surveys in order that it might conclusively demonstrate to the GOG that such support is essential to the best interests of the country:

1. Personnel and Training Survey.
2. Analyze past, present and anticipated crime problems.

3. Evaluate investigative effectiveness of the National and Judicial Police.
4. Evaluate patrol effectiveness of the National Police.

With the completion of these surveys, it is planned to:

1. Work closely with the GOG to effect the reorganization of the police forces.
2. Complete the country-wide communications networks of the National Police and Border Patrol.
3. Implement refinements on the National Police Records and Identification systems, on a country-wide basis.
4. Improve patrol and traffic control effectiveness.

BUDGET BREAKDOWN FOR FY 1964

Staffing Requirements

1 Chief Public Safety Advisor	\$ 20,000
1 Training Advisor	20,000
1 Communications Advisor	20,000
1 Investigations Advisor	<u>10,000</u>

\$ 70,000

Commodities

Communications and riot control equipment	\$ 30,000
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Participants

40 Inter-American Police Academy, Panama	\$ 22,000
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Other Costs

Local personnel	\$ 21,000
Local Travel	3,000
Visual aids, textbooks, printing, translation of films, etc.	<u>5,000</u>
	\$ 29,000

GRAND TOTAL \$ 151,000

FY 1965

Assuming success in an effort to secure the active support of the GOG, the following will be the major efforts during FY 1965:

1. Administration: Establishment of a Planning and Research Unit in each of the police agencies, and refinement of the National Police Records and Identification system.
2. Establishment and refinement of National Police Patrol tactics.
3. Refine investigative capabilities of the Police forces.
4. Launch a country-wide, intensive program of traffic education, safety and enforcement.
5. Implement the reorganization of the Border Patrol.
6. Intensify both local and participant training programs in all areas.

BUDGET BREAKDOWN FOR FY 1965

Staffing Requirements

1 Chief Public Safety Advisor	\$ 20,000
1 Training Advisor	20,000
1 Communications Advisor	20,000
1 Investigations Advisor	20,000
	<u>80,000</u>

Commodities

Clerical equipment, identification and investigations equipment, vehicles and parts, police arms and ammunition, and personal police equipment	\$ 72,000
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Participants

40 Inter American Police Academy, Panama	
5 International Police Academy, Washington	\$ 33,000

Other Costs

Local Personnel	\$ 20,000
Local Travel	5,000
Visual aids, textbooks, printing, translation of films, etc.	10,000
	<u>35,000</u>

GRAND TOTAL \$ 220,000

VII. GENERAL COMMENT ON PROGRAM

In spite of the evident deterioration in some of the progress achieved to date, the Public Safety Program in Guatemala, in our judgement, is, to a certain extent, contributing to the overall internal security of the country.

With the recent active interest of the present Government in reorganizing the civil police agencies in Guatemala, our Public Safety effort should be intensified as it will also be in the best interest of our total internal defense program.

VIII. COMMENTARY ON OUR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE EFFORTS


There is a tendency on the part of many people including some of our own technicians to underestimate how long it takes to accomplish significant results through our program of assistance. It has been said that when you are dealing with the accumulated problems of many years, perhaps centuries, it takes more than a couple of years to start a steady progression of advancement. An important fact is that we are not dealing primarily with problems of economics - it is necessary to deal with the organization and functioning of a society in every aspect of its existence. Our Public Safety effort directly or indirectly touches on each of these aspects.

The most important aim in our effort, I think, is the necessity of transmitting ideas and attitudes and having them accepted, and along with this is the building of institutions and the training of individuals to carry on the process of development or self powered growth. This is a sound approach but it takes time, effort, and money. Some years may be devoted to institution building and training

before dramatic results are seen, either by us or by the people we are helping. Progress comes through a process of conflict, sometimes peaceful, sometimes not. A certain degree of dissatisfaction is essential to progress, but it cannot be controlled and channeled - it takes time and discipline for this dissatisfaction to direct itself into proper perspective. We must remember this and not lose patience. Above all, we must not feel that our efforts to help others improve themselves have failed, merely because they do not produce immediate, steady and cataclysmic progress toward the goals we are pursuing.

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12/6/63


ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY FORCES




N O R M A L P E R I O D

AGENCY	NUMBER OF PERSONNEL
National Police	3,155
Judicial Police	202
Immigration Police	26
Rural Guard (mobile)	164
Border Patrol	847
Military Police	192
Forestry Police	36
Forestry Police (FYDEP)	106

ORGANIZATION OF SECURITY FORCES



ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE NATIONAL POLICE



NATIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL

PROVINCE OF GUATEMALA (Divisions) NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

First Corp,	739
Second Corp	362
Traffic Division	175
Radio Patrol & Motorized Agents	66
Prevention	44
Counties	74
Police Headquarters (Technical Support, Special Services, Laboratory, Academy, Filing Section, etc.)	<u>62</u>
	1,522

PROVINCE OF GUATEMALA (By Ranks)

Director General	1
Deputy Director	1
Third Chief and Inspector General	1
Secretary General	1
Deputy Chiefs (1st and 2nd Corps)	2
Office Assistants (Civilians)	12
First Sergeants	16
Inspectors	35
Deputy Inspectors	72
Officers	1,272
Deputy Chiefs (Sub-stations)	14
Office Personnel (Headquarters)	<u>95</u>
	1,522


PROVINCES (By Ranks)

Chiefs	20
Deputy Chiefs	20
Lieutenants	16
Sergeants	25
Deputy Chiefs (Sub-stations)	117
Inspectors	120
Officers	<u>1,315</u>
	1,633

NATIONAL POLICE PERSONNEL:

PROVINCE OF GUATEMALA	1,522
PROVINCES	<u>1,633</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>3,155</u>

ORGANIZATION GRAPH OF THE BORDER PATROL



BORDER PATROL PERSONNEL

PROVINCE OF GUATEMALA (By Ranks) NUMBER OF PERSONNEL

Director General	1
Deputy Director and Inspector General	1
Third Chief	1
Secretary General	1
Attorney at Law	1
Medical Doctor	1
Office Personnel (Civilians)	6
Officers	<u>115</u>
	127


PROVINCES

Chiefs (Provincial stations)	9
Deputy Chiefs (Provincial stations)	7
Second Chiefs (Provincial substations)	32
Officers	<u>672</u>
	720

BORDER PATROL PERSONNEL:

PROVINCE OF GUATEMALA	127
PROVINCES	<u>720</u>
<u>TOTAL:</u>	<u>847</u>

ORGANIZATION GRAPH OF THE JUDICIAL POLICE




JUDICIAL POLICE PERSONNEL

<u>CAPITAL CITY</u> (By ranks)	<u>NUMBER OF PERSONNEL</u>
Chief	1
Second Chief	1
Third Chief & Inspector General	1
Secretary	1
First Official	1
Second Official	1
Third Official	1
Fourth Official	1
Inspectors .	10
Officers	184
	<hr/>
T O T A L	202
	<hr/>

*Programs offered
but not spent due to
all problems*



TOTAL COSTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

In \$000's




OBLIGATED

PROGRAMMED



In \$000's

COST OF TECHNICIANS




OBLIGATED,
Direct Hire


OBLIGATED
Contract Services

PROGRAMMED
Direct Hire


COST OF PARTICIPANTS TRAINING





COMMODITY EXPENDITURES FOR THE POLICE AGENCIES



OTHER COSTS




OBLIGATED


PROGRAMMED

PARTICIPANTS

Fiscal Year	United States	Puerto Rico	Panama	Total
1955	10	2	None	12
1956	4	None	None	4
1957	6	None	None	6
1958	11	5	None	16
1959	4	None	None	4
1960	1	4	None	5
1961	None	1	None	1
1962	5	None	5	10
1963	3	None	21	24
1964 As of Nov. 30,	None	None	5 Now in training	5
TOTAL	44	12	31	87

RECAPITULATION OF PARTICIPANT TRAINING --PUBLIC SAFETY

GOG Agency	Trained in USA	Trained in Puerto Rico	Trained at IAPA (Inter-American Police Academy)	Now on Active Duty	Deceased	Resigned or Fired	Working in other GOG Agencies	Privately Employed	Imprisoned	Whereabouts unknown	Total number of men involved in training program
National Police	22	7	12	18	1	22	4	8	2	8	47
Border Patrol	11		5	9		7	5	2			16
Judicial Police	2	5	9	11		5		4	1		16
Presidential Protective Staff	3					3	1	2			3
Secret Service	1					1		1			1
Bureau of Investigation of Subversives	1					1				1	1
Immigration Service	2			1		1		1			2
National Security	1					1				1	1
Penitentiary Official	1			1							1
TOTALS	47	12	26	40	1	41	10	18	3	10	82

TOTAL COST OF PARTICIPANT TRAINING SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM, TO DATE (November 1, 1963): \$ 92,000

COMMODITIES

<u>PIO/C #</u>	<u>\$ Value</u>	<u>Commodities</u>	<u>Date</u>
5-70004	20,000.00	Boat	8/22/57
5-70109	206,043.83	Vehicles, arms & ammunition, crime lab. equipment, cameras, traffic equipment, communications	8/8/57
4-70110	540.00	Films	8/27/57
5-70111	10,437.68	File cabinets	8/8/57
5-70174.1	6,400.00	Boats	5/5/58
5-70174.2	23,082.00	Vehicles, communications, films	5/5/58
5-80107	5,000.00	Additional funds for 70174.2	7/21/58
5-80117	23,328.00	Communications	11/6/58
5-80120	14,400.00	Vehicles, parts & tires	11/24/58
0-80127	1,042.00	Laminating machine	9/17/58
5-80128	1,100.00	Additional funds for 70174.2	11/13/58
0-80129	851.60	Audio-visual equipment	11/12/58
0-80130	1,200.00	School patrol belts	11/21/58
0-70209	500.00	Electric plants	11/5/59
0-70211	1,100.00	Mimeograph, projector, screen	1/12/60
5-70212	3,600.00	Crime lab. equipment, speed-meter, audio visual, vehicle repair cameras & flash	2/11/60
5-70213	1,400.00	Gas grenades	2/11/60
5-70216	11,000.00	Crime lab. equipment, communications, vehicle repair parts	5/10/60
5-00081	8,500.00	Fire fighting equipment, vehicles	7/20/61
5-10076.1	258,960.00	Vehicles, arms, communications	9/15/61
5-10076.2	7,800.00	Gas masks and grenades	9/15/61
5-20028	7,000.00	Revolvers	5/28/62
5-20040	8,000.00	Helmets	6/18/62

PIO/C #	\$ Value	Commodities	Date
5-10079	3,240.00	Additional funds for 5-20040	8/3/62
0-10080	6,400.00	Communications	11/29/62
5-30030*	22,000.00	Arms, vehicles	2/11/63
5-30030**	26,000.00	Vehicles	
0-30036	6,000.00	Communications	2/28/63
8-30069*	6,500.00	Arms	5/27/63
8-30070*	26,000.00	Vehicles	5/27/63
8-30071	2,500.00	Megaphones	5/27/63

2

* Arms - Pending Import License from GOG
 Vehicles - Pending new specifications from USAID/G

** Vehicles - Pending procurement action by USAID/G

RECAPITULATION OF PARTICIPANT TRAINING --PUBLIC SAFETY

GOG Agency	Trained in USA	Trained in Puerto Rico	Trained at IAPA (Inter-American Police Academy)	Now on Active Duty	Deceased	Resigned or Fired	Working in other GOG Agencies	Privately Employed	Imprisoned	Whereabouts unknown	Total number of men involved in training program
National Police	22	7	12	18	1	22	4	8	2	8	41
Border Patrol	11		5	9		7	5	2			16
Judicial Police	2	5	9	11		5		4	1		16
Presidential Protective Staff	3					3	1	2			3
Secret Service	1					1		1			1
Bureau of Investigation of Subversives	1					1				1	1
Immigration Service	2			1		1		1			2
National Security	1					1				1	1
Penitentiary Official	1			1							1
TOTALS	44	12	26	40	1	41	10	18	3	10	82

TOTAL COST OF PARTICIPANT TRAINING SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM, TO DATE (November 1, 1963): \$ 92,000

COMMODITIES
RELEASE AGREEMENTS

<u>Number</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Commodity</u>	<u>Date</u>
20-A	4,000.00	Office supplies and equipment, laboratory supplies, radio repair parts, paint, fluorescent tubes, etc.	Dec. 1960
20-B	977.00	Desks	Aug. 1961
21	20,450.00	Boats	Aug. 1960
66	20,000.00	12 radio patrol cars	Oct. 1961
75	70,000.00	8 compact cars, 12 radio patrol cars, 12 motorcycles, communications equipment, laboratory equipment, overcoats, etc.	Nov. 1961
87	3,600.00	Riot batons, shields and portable battery charger	Feb. 1962
99	4,200.00	Uniforms	July 1962
101	1,340.00	Vehicle repair parts	Sept. 1962
106	12,000.00	Electric plants (diesel)	Nov. 1962

RECAPITULATION OF VEHICLES PROVIDED TO POLICE AGENCIES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM --PUBLIC SAFETY

Recipient Agency	Vehicles Given	Date Given	Location in Guatemala		Operating Condition							
			Capital	Provinces	Excellent	Good	Operable Need Repairs	Operable Need Tires	Inoperable Need Repairs	Inoperable Need Tires	Useless	
NATIONAL POLICE	24 Motorcycles	Jan. 1958	24							14		10
	18 Jeeps	Jan. 1958		18						10		8
	18 Radio Patrol Cars	Mar. 1958	18					8				10
	2 Ambulances	Mar. 1958	2				2					
	2 Buses	Mar. 1958	2			1				1		
	1 Tow truck	May 1958	1					1				
	7 Jeeps	Oct. 1958		7				7				
	1 Pick-up truck	Oct. 1958	1									1
	3 3-Wheel Motorcycles	Oct. 1958	3					2		1		
	12 Radio Patrol Cars Release Ag. 66	Oct. 1961	Assigned on loan to Ministry of Defense									
	12 Radio Patrol Cars Release Ag. 75	Nov. 1961	12				11			1		
	12 Motorcycles Release Ag. 75	Nov. 1961	12				12					

RECAPITULATION OF VEHICLES PROVIDED TO POLICE AGENCIES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM --PUBLIC SAFETY

Recipient Agency	Vehicles Given	Date Given	Location in Guatemala		Operating Condition						
			Capital	Provinces	Excellent	Good	Operable Need Repairs	Operable Need Tires	Inoperable Need Repairs	Inoperable Need Tires	Useless
NATIONAL POLICE	4 Volkswagens Release-Ag. 75	Nov. 1961	4			4					
	21 Jeeps	Oct. 1962	2 +/	19						19	
	4 Carryalls 4Wd	Oct. 1962	4			4					
	2 Carryalls 2Wd	Oct. 1962	2			2					
	2 Pick-up trucks	Oct. 1962	2			2					
	1 2-1/2 Ton truck	Oct. 1962	1		1						
	4 Carryalls (Grant-in-Aid)	Aug. 1963	4							4	

+/ Transferred to the Judicial Police by GOG.

RECAPITULATION OF VEHICLES PROVIDED TO POLICE AGENCIES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM -- PUBLIC SAFETY

Recipient Agency	Vehicles Given	Date Given	Location in Guatemala		Operating Condition						
			Capital	Provinces	Excellent	Good	Operable Need Repairs	Operable Need Tires	Inoperable Need Repairs	Inoperable Need Tires	Useless
BORDER PATROL	12 Motorcycles	Jan. 1958	12			4			2		6
	16 Jeeps	Jan. 1958	4	12		12					4
	2 Trucks	Jan. 1959	2			2					
	18 Jeeps	Oct. 1962	(J.P.)* 2	16		16					
	4 Carryalls 2Wd	Oct. 1962	4			4					
	2 Carryalls 4WD	Oct. 1962	2			2					
	1 Pick-up 3/4	Oct. 1962	1			1					
	1 2-1/2 ton Truck	Oct. 1962	1			1					
	2 Carryalls (Grant-in-Aid)	Aug. 1963	2			2					

* Transferred to the Judicial Police by GOG.

RECAPITULATION OF VEHICLES PROVIDED TO POLICE AGENCIES SINCE THE INCEPTION OF THE PROGRAM --PUBLIC SAFETY

Recipient Agencies	Vehicles Given	Date Given	Location in Guatemala		Operating Conditions						
			Capital	Provinces	Excellent	Good	Operable Need Repairs	Operable Need Tires	Inoperable Need Repairs	Inoperable Need Tires	Useless
JUDICIAL POLICE	9 Jeeps	Oct. 1962	9			6					3
	1 Pick-up truck 3/4 ton	Oct. 1962	1						1		
	4 Volkswagens (Release Ag. 75)	June 1963	4			4					

Recipient Agency	Vehicles Given	Date Given	Location in Guatemala		Operating Condition						
			Capital	Provinces	Excellent	Good	Operable Need Repairs	Operable Need Tires	Inoperable Need Repairs	Inoperable Need Tires	Useless
VOLUNTEER FIRE- MEN CORPS	1 Automobile '55	Nov. 1961	1						1		
	1 Firetruck	Nov. 1961	1								1 +/
	6 Pick-up trucks	Mar. 1962	3	3		5			1		
	2 Carryalls (Grant-in Aid)	Aug. 1963	2			2					

+/ Fire truck was totally destroyed in an accident August 4, 1962. Insurance money bought the one presently in use, and in good shape.