



**TERMINATION  
PHASE-OUT  
STUDY  
PUBLIC SAFETY PROJECT  
JAMAICA**

**FEBRUARY 1974**

**AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT  
OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20523**



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## ABBREVIATIONS USED

ACP	Assistant Commissioner of Police
CIB	Criminal Intelligence Bureau
CID	Criminal Investigations Division
DCP	Deputy Commissioner of Police
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (U.S.)
DSP	Deputy Superintendent of Police
GOJ	Government of Jamaica
IPA	International Police Academy
JCF	Jamaica Constabulary Force
JCSF	Jamaica Constabulary Special Force
OPS	Office of Public Safety
SSP	Senior Superintendent of Police
Telecom	Telecommunications
TDY	Temporary Duty
THC	Tetra-hydrocannabil (liquid extract from the marihuana plant)
TO	Table of Organization
USAID	Agency for International Development Mission



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

#### A. Terms of Reference

U.S. Public Safety assistance has been provided to the Government of Jamaica to develop the managerial and operational skills and effectiveness of its civil police forces. At the project's initiation and during its progress mutually agreed objectives and courses of action were established and at times adjusted to achieve the overall goals as well as to accommodate changing situations in the country. Both host government and U.S. resources were programmed and employed to jointly strive toward these goals.

Due to U.S. congressional action, the continued input of U.S. Government resources planned for this project must be terminated sooner than planned and prior to the achievement of the goals and objectives which were mutually established by the two governments.

It is therefore the purpose of this report to note the progress made thus far and to enumerate what remains to be accomplished in order to achieve the project goals. The report also includes recommended actions which the Government of Jamaica should take, employing their own resources, but under the circumstances excluding in-country assistance by the U.S.

#### B. Conduct of the Study

The team was composed of the following members:

Jeter L. Williamson, OPS/W  
Caesar P. Bernal, OPS/W

After reviewing pertinent background documents in Washington, the team arrived in Kingston on February 4, 1974, and remained until February 16, 1974, for its in-country survey. This evaluation was conducted by interviews and discussions with numerous persons from the U.S. Country Team, Jamaican Government officials and on site visits to Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF). These visits included all Kingston area installations and representative commands at area, division, head station and station level.

All persons contacted were frank and helpful in the discussions.

Prior to departure the team discussed findings of a general nature with officials of the Ministry, JCF, U.S. Embassy and the USAID.

## CHAPTER II

### SUMMARY

#### A. Internal Security Situation

The major threat to Jamaica's internal security is rising criminality, largely caused by population growth, movement to urban areas resulting in unemployment. Of significance is the rise in crimes of violence involving firearms.

A potential threat exists in the development of organized criminal elements becoming involved in marihuana traffic and extending to other fields of criminal activity. While not appearing to exist to any major proportions at present, it certainly will bear close scrutiny in the immediate future.

#### B. Observations and Conclusions

The minimal input of U.S. resources to the JCF have been used extremely well. The JCF is a competent, well run and effective force which enjoys the support and confidence of government leadership and the public in general.

Jointly planned goals and objectives were well conceived and the rate of achievement good until the most recent two year period. During that time the Public Safety Advisor, by direction, has devoted the majority of his time to matters which were narcotics enforcement oriented. This resulted in a slow-down in the rate of progress of other facets of the project activity.

Specifically identified in this category are training, criminal intelligence and central records. To overcome this condition the Public Safety Officer and the USAID, jointly with the JCF, developed a well conceived plan to utilize TDY assistance over a 3 month period.

An expansion of the JCF by 3000 men over the next 5 years is planned with the first increment of 600 already budgeted for the Fiscal Year beginning April 1, 1974. This makes the TDY concept even more important at this time.

C. Recommendations

Detailed recommendations for JCF consideration are to be found in section VI of this report. The major thrust of the recommendations is in 4 areas: organization, training, motor maintenance and narcotics. The major points of each will be discussed briefly in this summary.

(a) Organization

These deal with establishing an effective Planning and Research unit, updating and strengthening the Central Records and Criminal Intelligence Sections.

(b) Training

The team recommends JCF study and review training requirements, effectiveness and space. It also recommends increased emphasis on in-service training.

(c) Motor Maintenance

The team recommends expanded training for police drivers be conducted by the Transport and Repairs Division as an essential step to reducing an unusually high accident rate among drivers of police vehicles.

(d) Narcotics

The team recommends a revision of Jamaica's Dangerous Drug Law, expansion of the Narcotics Unit and better utilization of the Forensic Laboratory.

## CHAPTER III

### INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION

The major threat to Jamaica's internal security is that posed by criminality. Factors contributing thereto are population growth, unemployment and continued movement to urban areas. A very recent, but potentially heavily influencing, factor is the energy crisis brought about by scarcity and high pricing of petroleum products.

Jamaica is completely dependent upon imports for its petroleum and in a space of weeks prices more than doubled on the local markets. At the time of the team's visit this upward spiral was continuing and the end was not as yet in sight. Spin-offs from this condition are many, all of which affect the problem of criminality.

Crime is up in all categories, but that which shows the greatest increase is the category of crimes of violence. Attachment A reflects crime trends.

This is particularly true in those crimes involving firearms and the Jamaica Constabulary Force expresses grave concern over the rising number of firearms in the country. For example, in Fiscal Year 72/73 (April 1, 72 - March 31, 73) there were a total of 188 murders. Figures for the first 7 months of FY 73/74 reflect 147. Projection of these figures for the remainder of the FY yields a figure of 252, or an increase of 34%.

Using the same method of projection one must be concerned over an increase in shooting incidents of an alarming 60%.

Jamaica's role in the production of marihuana is covered in detail elsewhere in this report. It is worthy of mention here, however, due to its current and potential influence on other forms of criminality. Involvement of organized criminal elements from Canada and the United States in the marihuana traffic is sure to

develop similar criminal elements in Jamaica whose growth and potential involvement in other types of crime is cause for serious concern. Already the JCF is concerned over such possibilities as use of marihuana traffic routes and organizations being used for smuggling of firearms and other forms of drugs into Jamaica. While there is no hard evidence to support such activities in any magnitude at present, past history of organized crime forces one to look with concern at the possibility.

## CHAPTER IV

### JAMAICAN CONSTABULARY FORCE

#### A. Organization

The Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) has total responsibility for providing civil police services to all of Jamaica. History, roles and missions of the JCF are the same as described in the pre-project survey of 1966, and will therefore not be repeated here. Force strength and organization, however, have undergone considerable changes.

Authorized strength has increased 38%, up from 2634 to 3,636. At the time of the team's visit actual strength was 3417, distributed by ranks as shown below:

1	Commissioner
2	Deputy Commissioners
6	Assistant Commissioners
13	Senior Superintendents
18	Superintendents
20	Deputy Superintendents
27	Assistant Superintendents
122	Inspectors
244	Sergeants
482	Corporals
2356	Constables
126	Cadets
<hr/>	
3417	Total Constabulary Strength

Plans are underway to increase this figure by an additional 3,000 men over a period of the next five (5) years. Just how the figure 3,000 was arrived at is unclear, but budget estimates for the Fiscal Year beginning April 1, 1974, provide for the initial 600 man increment. There is little doubt that this 600 are necessary and one would hope that before another year the proposed Research and Planning Unit would be operational and available for in-depth studies to provide the bases for further increases.

In addition to the regular force the JCF is assisted by a Special Constabulary Force (JCSF) of 2008 personnel. This adjunct to the JCF was formed in 1938 for emergency use, but over the years their use became such that it has become a permanent organization.

They are invested with full police authority, but do not regularly work full time. Instead they are called upon as needed and paid an hourly rate for time worked. Pre-employment standards are somewhat lower than those for the regular force, they must attend a full time 10 week recruit training course before being assigned duty status.

The organizational structure of the JCF has progressively improved during the period under review. Under the old plan, although the diagram reflects 2 Deputy Commissioners, all matters funnelled through one (Attachment B). This proved to be cumbersome, hindered effectiveness and was therefore changed.

The subsequent structure placed the 2 Deputy Commissioners on equal levels, both reporting directly to the Commissioner. This would appear to have improved force management, but it did include an inequitable distribution of workloads in that one deputy was responsible only for Special Branch, Immigrative and Mobile Reserve, all other functions reporting to the other deputy.

In recent months the workload has been redistributed between the two deputies, the Mobile Reserve was placed under the direct control of the Commissioner. This new reorganization is currently undergoing a trial period, prior to official adoption which is expected within a short period. (Attachment C).

Geographically the JCF is divided into 6 areas, each under the command of a Senior Superintendent of Police. Areas are further divided into 18 divisions. These divisions follow parish lines except that Saint Andrew Parish and Corporate Kingston each contain 3 divisions. These in turn contain a total of some 160 police stations of varying size. Area 6, originally a grouping of various service units, is in the reorganization, comprised of St. Thomas and St. Andrew South (Attachment D).

A new unit in the reorganization is a full time Public Relations Unit. What impressed the team about this unit is that it is not just concerned with press releases and publicity as is so often the case. To the contrary, it devotes much of its time to improving the police image across the board.

It has succeeded in increasing the recruit training time allotment from 2 to 10 hours, members of the staff participate in training at all levels, it prepares and presents radio, TV and press spots on helpful hints to citizens, etc. A speakers' bureau furnishes speakers and lecturers at civic clubs and schools. A relatively small unit consisting of an Assistant Superintendent and a staff of seven (7), it would appear to be a wise move.

An excellent additional step has been the development of job descriptions for all positions in connection with this reorganization. These too are expected to be effected by mid-year 1974. What all this reflects to the team is an awareness of need for constant reevaluation of organizational structures geared to changing needs as sound management.

The Table of Organization (TO) reflects a Research and Planning Unit. This is not actually in being at present, but the fact that it appears in the TO indicates an awareness of the need therefor. In fact at the time of the team's visit arrangements had been made to obtain the services of a British Police team to assist in its development. This is an important step forward and throughout this report reference is made to tasks which require the services of such a unit. Its development should be given priority.

The JCF may also want to consider formation of an Internal Affairs Unit with permanently assigned personnel. This unit would be charged with investigating all charges and allegations against members of the force, reporting directly to no lower than a Deputy Commissioner.

The JCF budget for FY 73-74 is 16.9 million Jamaican dollars, approximately 4% of Jamaica's total budget. It shows a 17% increase over the previous year which parallels the 16+% increase in the Government's overall budget. Exact budget figures are shown in Attachment E.

## B. Motor Maintenance

The Transport and Repair Division is responsible for maintenance and repair of all JCF vehicles. Its facilities consist of a main base shop in Kingston and small maintenance shops in areas 1, 2 and 3. These area shops perform only minor maintenance and repairs so this section of the report will deal only with the Kingston base shop.

U.S. assistance to this unit has consisted solely of participant training in the United States. There have been 2 such participants from the shop itself (one of whom is the Deputy Superintendent) and 3 in pursuit driving techniques. These 3 are not shop personnel, but are mentioned here as the use of their training will be discussed later.

The Kingston shop is clean, orderly, adequately equipped and staffed. The physical plant layout however, leaves something to be desired. There is insufficient space to accommodate the workload, the buildings were not originally designed for the purpose for which they are now used. Being inadequate for the current workload certainly causes one to have serious questions about the future as the force expands. In fact these growing pains are being felt now. For example, the current total is 897 vehicles of all types, this will grow to an expected 1028 by the end of 1974, an increase of almost 15% in the immediate future, to say nothing of what is to be expected as the force expands.

There is certainly every indication of need for serious consideration being given to expanding the facilities of this shop. Even now over 30% of the repair work is contracted out to garages in the private sector.

Total shop personnel numbers 123, broken down as follows: Police Personnel 48; Special Constables, 20; Civilian Personnel 45. All these are not assigned solely to vehicle repairs, the facility also operates woodwork and metal work shops. These are engaged in the production and repair of furniture, traffic signs and other commodities for JCF use. While no exact figures were available for comparison purposes, it is reasonable to assume that such activities result in considerable savings to the JCF budget.

Recruitment and training of skilled personnel is not without problems. Those desiring a career in the mechanical field are subjected to aptitude tests and if accepted then begin training, consisting largely of on-the-job type. For special skills such as body work, ignition systems, etc., they have on occasion been able to use facilities of large commercial facilities in the Kingston area. As a large number of the fleet consists of Ford vehicles, Ford Motor Company has sent its own technicians to conduct special training courses.

What all this adds up to is a continuing effort on the part of the Transport and Repair Division to develop and retain skilled personnel. This is indeed commendable. Usually in an operation of this type there is a problem of retaining police personnel who may feel that opportunities for promotion are lessened by being out of the mainstream of police work.

To overcome this a well conceived system has been adopted. Naturally the man who has been away from line experience finds himself at a disadvantage in taking competitive examinations for promotions. Prior to such examinations instructors from the force conduct refresher training for shop personnel to make the odds more even.

If the man is successful in his examinations he is promoted and remains in place, same job, new rank. They are not hampered by a pre-set table of organization which would limit the number of ratings assigned.

Thus we see that at present, while space is of concern, personnel presents no significant problem. Proposed expansion of the fleet could alter this. There is, however, one major problem which deserves serious and immediate study. cursory examination of records reveals that by far the major contributing factor to repair requirements is improper driving habits by members of the force. During Calendar Year 1973, there were 405 vehicles in for repairs as the result of accidents. Severity of damage runs the gamut from rather minor fender benders to total loss. (the team observed a sizeable number of the latter on shop property.)

This represents a 45% ratio of total fleet involvement in collision accidents, some 3 or 4 times what would be considered more acceptable. By far the largest ratio of collision involvement was in the Patrol Division. With a nation-wide inventory of 160 vehicles, 135 were involved in accidents. This is an 84% ratio.

When one considers the resultant factors such as tremendous financial loss, loss of manpower due to injuries, reduced coverage because of vehicles out of service and damage to the police image it becomes immediately clear that corrective steps are in order. Obviously the condition results from insufficient training of police drivers, so it is equally obvious that more and better training is needed.

At present driver training is conducted by the Traffic Division. While this in no way is to criticize that division's effort, the team feels that more in-depth training would be better placed in the Transport and Repair Division. Simple mechanical operation of a vehicle through use of steering wheel, pedals and knobs is not enough. The driver should understand basic principles of how the engine, drive train and other vehicle components work together to make the vehicle go. He must have full appreciation of the fact that, if improperly handled, a vehicle can become a very dangerous piece of machinery.

The team feels that development of a more comprehensive driver training installation complete with classrooms, shops, driving area, etc., would pay for itself in relatively short time. Such an installation should also include a pursuit driving area. Three members of the JCF have completed advanced training in the United States in this subject, they should be assigned full-time to conduct similar courses to other members of the force. The Transport and Repair Division would seem the logical placement of such an activity. Some elements of this training facility could serve a dual purpose by being utilized for mechanics training.

Another problem which was noted is in the area of purchase and storage of spare parts. Time did not permit extensive research into this rather complicated system. But it is clear that the system in use is based mainly on regulations some 20 years old and should be restudied and revised to meet more adequately today's condition. This is another excellent exercise for the proposed Research and Planning Unit.

### C. Training

Since inception of the Public Safety project a major thrust has been in the area of training. Material support has been token, consisting of a relatively few training aids. The Public Safety Advisor has devoted much of his available time to the training effort, both in country and in programming selected JCF personnel for training in the United States. This latter activity is covered elsewhere in this report.

Training within the JCF is conducted at several locations and by several divisions. All training however, is coordinated through the Office of the Assistant Commissioner for Administration. While such units as CID, Marine Police, Mobile Police, Mobile Patrol and Special Branch do conduct specialized training for personnel in their commands, all recruit and in-service training is done at the Port Royal Training Command. (The one exception to this is the Mobile Reserve, discussed elsewhere in this report.)

The Training Command located at Port Royal appears to be a well run institution, competently staffed, but hampered by insufficient space to meet the demands placed on it. Its present capacity is 228 students and at the time of the team's visit that was exactly the number of students in the current recruit class.

Located in a former military installation, the buildings are old, but clean and well kept.

Currently underway is a construction program which will expand the capacity to 360. This should be completed within 30-60 days, there are plans for further expansion to increase capacity to 500 over a period of the next 12 months. This expansion is essential if the proposed JCF total force expansion of up to 3000 additional personnel over the next 5 years should become a reality.

In fact even this may prove to be inadequate. The 600 per year to meet the force increase proposal plus an annual attrition figure of from 200-300 will certainly strain the facility to capacity limits. In recognition of this fact there is currently under study a proposal to reduce the recruit training time from 21 to 16 weeks in order to accommodate the required numbers.

The team feels that a trade-off of recruit training time to save on construction costs may not be the best bargain. If economy dictates against further facility expansion it may be a wise course to slow down the rate of force expansion. The team would not presume to recommend categorically on this point with its limited knowledge of the many factors involved, but it does feel strongly that it is a decision which deserves considerable in-depth study by JCF officials.

The system currently used in bringing in the recruits in groups of from 40 to 80 and having them progress through cycles is sound and has many advantages over bringing in an entire group at once. For example, at the time of the team's visit three cycles were represented in the current 228 recruits under training. One was at 18 weeks, one at 14 weeks and the other at 4 weeks. Already there is a group waiting to start when the 78 graduate in 3 more weeks.

The subjects taught appear on the surface to represent a well rounded course for police recruits (Attachment F). The team did not attempt any analysis thereof, such a task would involve considerably more time than that available. Once the proposed Planning and Research office is functional an excellent move would be to task it with such a study. The study should encompass all types of performance by constables, comments from supervisors, citizen complaints, courtroom performance, conviction rates, interviews with the constables after 6 months or more on street duty, and all other such actions which would reflect on the individual's training. It would then reveal whether or not the training is meeting its objective of developing a well rounded policeman and, if not, indicate where curriculum changes would be of benefit.

Staff of the Port Royal Training Command is at a very conservative level which gives no indication of wasted personnel. Organized along simple lines designed to meet the needs with a minimum of personnel (Attachment G). It consists of a total complement of 53, comprised of 3 officers, 3 sergeants, the remainder corporals and acting corporals. Thirty six of these perform instructional duties, an excellent ratio. The proposed increase in student population will require a proportionate increase in staff, particularly instructors.

Plans should be made now to accommodate such increase and a course in instructor techniques for those selected would appear in order. The forthcoming Office of Public Safety Training Team could perhaps be of assistance in this endeavor.

Another very important responsibility of this training command is the Basil Robinson Training Center which conducts in-service and specialized training for the JCF. This type of training is extremely important to the success of the force and is currently being done with a minimum of both space and staff.

A major part of its task is training for Inspectors, Sergeants and Corporals and it is hard pressed to meet current demands. If the proposed force increase is implemented, and if the present ratio of these 3 grades apply, it would mean an approximate additional 700 such personnel to be trained at the center. This will most certainly require additional space and staff; the time for planning for these needs is now. A projection of training at the advanced center for the current year is shown in Attachment H.

While advanced and in-service training is provided for Corporals, Sergeants and Inspectors, there is no regular program to update and retrain constables. As in any police force these men are in its main line of public contact and their training should not be neglected.

There are two processes which immediately come to mind to meet this need: Mobile Training teams and roll call training. The planned OPS TDY Training Team has as its prime objective the development of just such activities. With an assigned complement of JCF training command personnel as counterparts the team will assist in the development and implementation of a Mobile Training Team concept which would then presumably continue to engage in scheduled visits to all area commands for periodic in-service training of both constables and first line supervisors.

This is an important process and the JCF should make maximum use of the team during its assigned time.

#### D. Records

In 1966 an Office of Public Safety Records Advisor performed a comprehensive study of records procedures, identified problem areas and submitted recommendations for improvement.

The team found that, for a variety of reasons, conditions identified in the 1966 survey for the most part still exist. A treatise on the necessity of good records for sound police management is not required. Suffice it to say that present leadership of the JCF recognizes the value and has identified it as a priority area.

Present procedures are such that there is no dearth of reports and information. Problems lie in failure to channel all information to a central repository, retrieving information and making maximum utilization thereof.

To this end a Record Management Advisor from OPS/W is scheduled to arrive in Jamaica in early March and remain for a period of 90 days to devote full time in assisting the JCF update its records processes.

Therefore the team felt that little would be served in devoting an inordinate amount of the time available in delving beneath the surface of the subject. This will be done by the TDY Advisor.

#### E. Criminal Intelligence Bureau

The JCF proposed the creation of a Criminal Intelligence Bureau to function initially as a repository of criminal related information and disseminate this information to specific elements within the police for their action, and in 1971 created such a unit. In June 1972, at GOJ request, OPS provided the services of a TDY specialist to conduct an assessment of the unit and develop recommendations for improvement. The team found that unfortunately little has been done to upgrade what is potentially a very important investigative aid.

Presently, the 7 men unit is commanded by a Detective Inspector who appears to possess the initiative and drive necessary to make the unit function. However, he is confronted with resistance in his attempts to develop the conduits for the inward flow of information vitally essential for a centrally coordinated intelligence effort. The CIB is organizationally structured under the Criminal Investigations Division which is commanded by an Assistant Superintendent under Operations and Services.

During the discussions with the CID senior staff officers, the Evaluation Team was informed there was a dearth of mature, experienced, and qualified detective investigators as approximately 70% of the JCF had less than 5 years of service. This situation was underscored as a prime factor for the general lack of appreciation accorded a criminal intelligence repository. After the discussions with the CIB personnel to determine progress in conjunction with a review of the 1972 Report, the team concluded that little had been accomplished since then.

This sub-project has been identified as a priority and the Public Safety Division's phase-out schedule has proposed remedial measures through use of the TDY Training Team. One member of the team will devote minimal time to reviewing office procedures, use of the system by field personnel will be included in the in-service training. This should emphasize total participation through both submitting information and using the information in the system as an aid to investigation.

#### F. Communications

Jamaica's size permits nation-wide radio coverage with FM equipment, utilizing 7 automatic repeaters. The equipment is a mix of Motorola and Canadian Marconi, consisting of a total in excess of 900 transceivers as shown below:

Fixed Stations	275
Mobile Sets	661
Spares	79+

U.S. assistance in commodities has been minimal, the vast bulk of equipment having been purchased with JCF budget funds. Total U.S. funds expended during the life of the project has been \$167,010. With the exception of one VHF-FM base station this total amount was used to procure portable FM-1 sets and Mobile FM-5s.

The most pronounced U.S. assistance to the JCF Communications Division has been in OPS training in the United States for their personnel. Over the entire project life 7 such personnel have received U.S. training. This includes the current Superintendent of Telecommunications and the Inspector in Charge of Maintenance. Additionally, in the early years of 1966 and 1967, an OPS Telcom Advisor was sent to Jamaica for short TDY periods on a total of 5 occasions.

Receptivity to and application of this training was evident to the team in its visit to the telecommunications facility.

Maintenance and repair of communications equipment is performed at the major base shop in Kingston and 3 smaller shops in Montego Bay, Mandeville and Highgate. There is a total of 27 personnel assigned to these four shops, 21 of whom are at the main Kingston facility.

The Kingston facility was found to be well equipped, orderly and well run, parts and supplies well organized and stored. The technicians and on-the-job trainees appeared well organized and business-like in their work.

Recruitment and training of telecommunications technicians is a problem deserving serious study. With the planned force expansion and the attending increase in communications equipment the problem could become acute unless addressed now. All technicians and maintenance personnel are regular members of the force, there are no civilians so employed. The JCF constable who aspires to become a communications technician must first, on his own, enroll either in a technical school or correspondence course to acquire basic theory knowledge. This would certainly indicate ambition.

Then, upon passing a written examination administered by the Telcom Division, he begins on-the-job training to learn the practical work. This is a long process with little future reward in sight. It would seem that only loyalty to the force causes him to stay on the job and, while such dedication is commendable, one must wonder how long it will continue. Unfortunately, in today's world loyalty and dedication in general do not seem to prevail in the degree they once did. The fact that this is not a problem now in the JCF does not guarantee the future.

In an Organization as small as the Telecommunications Division opportunities for promotion are rather slim. It would therefore seem logical to adopt other means of inducement designed to attract and retain qualified technicians. The first which comes to mind is a system of a graduated scale of technical specialist levels which carry additional pay increments to be added to the man's base JCF pay scale.

Another possibility would be the use of civilian technicians. When this possibility was discussed there were two objections voiced by the officials with whom the team talked. One was the 'security' aspect, the other was difficulty in enforcing discipline. In all candor the team can not see these objections as being really valid. There is no reason why good pre-employment screening, proper orientation and effective supervision would not overcome these objections. There is, however, the potential problem of a disparity in pay between civilians and policemen which would have to be considered and studied.

#### G. Ordnance

The JCF operates a rather modest, but well run, facility for maintenance and repair of all its weapons. The team was impressed with the orderliness of this operation, particularly the storeroom.

The only Public Safety input has been in U.S. training for one weapons maintenance specialist and one man in the reloading of .38 calibre ammunitions for pistol range training. Using hand operated equipment the facility is currently reloading 500,000 such rounds per year at a sizeable savings to the GOJ.

This very small U.S. expenditure for the training of these personnel has achieved excellent results.

#### H. Patrol Division

##### History:

The pre-project survey conducted by the Office of Public Safety at the request of the GOJ surfaced significant problem areas related to the patrol activities performed by the JCF. Notably amongst the findings were the shortage of manpower and equipment, lack of overall planning and coordination of patrol activities, and the mixing of staff and line functions within the Traffic Division which was at the time the parent organization of all patrol functions in the corporate area of Kingston.

The initial Public Safety program addressed itself to certain priority sub-projects and identified the upgrading of the Patrol Division in the corporate area as one of immediate concern. This sub-project, as others in Jamaica, was harnessed to written agreements which impelled the GOJ to invest as "self help" collateral money resources in the development of the Patrol Division. The USG provided a modest level of commodity support limited essentially to demonstration equipment, provided U.S. training for selected participants who would be the prime movers in the sub-project and provided the technical assistance of the resident advisor. The rate of development of the project proved to be slower than expected due to the lack of appreciation for the vital role of an effective patrol force. This concept had to be instilled at senior staff level and allowed to filter down to all divisions, bureaus and stations.

The Mission's Project Appraisal Report (PAR) termed the corporate area sub-project activity as 100% completed in late 1973. Based on discussions, observations, and on-site inspections, the Evaluation Team is in total accord with the appraisal.

The Patrol Division is now commanded by a Senior Superintendent as a separate division similar to Traffic and Marine Police under the Assistant Commissioner of Operations. The Division's strength consists of 235 constables and non-gazetted officers, with a motor fleet of 126 modern, fully equipped patrol vehicles in the Kingston area. The Patrol Division headquarters is located at the Elleston Road Police compound under a very functional layout which lends itself for future expansion.

The following comments reflect some of the significant accomplishments discerned by the Evaluation Team:

- A general attitude of recognition and appreciation throughout the JCF for an effective patrol force which is now the mainstay of all patrol activity.
- The centralization of the dispatching procedures through the Operations center which also monitors and coordinates all patrol functions.
- The pervasive patrol vehicle presence throughout the corporate area both day and night.
- The development of the designated 18 patrol districts predicated on crime incidence, population, type of area, and the development of statistics charts on peak hours of activity.
- The coordination of patrol efforts with the stations and sub-stations whose patrol functions are now marginal and rely heavily on the Patrol Division.
- The field supervisory control function exercised by 3 Patrol Sergeants per shift.
- The practical 8 hour shifts of 3-11-7 with one hour stagger to allow patrol coverage during rotation periods.
- The special in-service training for patrolmen consisting of one hour daily afternoon sessions for 5 months.

- The beginning of 6 week driver training course conducted at Patrol Division Headquarters.
- In sum, the establishment and acceptance of a viable Patrol Division as a vital operation in the JCF's law and order responsibilities.

During the Evaluation Team's one day visit to the area I region which consists of four parishes in the northwestern sector with headquarters located in Montego Bay, some observations were made on the overall JCF activities outside of the corporate area of Kingston.

The urban area of Montego Bay has a population estimated at 100,000 with a high density along the entire northern half of St. James Parish which draws a heavy percentage of the tourist trade. The tourist flow is continuous the year round peaking in the months of December, February and during the week of Easter. The Immigration authorities informed the team that the week day tourist flow during the peak months will average at 1,500 arrivals per day increasing to a level of 2,500 to 3,000 on Saturdays and Sundays. A peak monthly average may go as high as 50,000 however, the tourist flow very seldom drops under half during the entire year. These points are made to illustrate the special problems posed for this area in providing police services conducive to attracting this tremendous flow of tourists so vital to their economy. The importance of a pervasive radio patrol presence has been given priority by the Area Commander. Presently, they have a fleet of 15 modern radio patrol vehicles and are in the process of renovating a two story structure to house their Operations Center. The Operations Center has separate frequencies for their area operations and integrates the JCF Telecommunications System with the Operations Center in Kingston.

Additionally, Divisions, Stations and Sub-stations which comprise area I, provide radio patrol coverage in their sectors of responsibility. In those instances where the patrol vehicles do not have permanently installed radios, the patrol officers are provided portable transceivers to maintain contact with their station.

The concept of radio patrol functions and its importance in police operations has been instilled in the constabulary and a solid base for future expansion and extension exists.

The two large urban areas depend heavily on the Patrol Division as their mainstay in the prevention and repression of criminal activity.

The only factor which impedes the JCF from developing viable radio patrol divisions in other high density urban areas in the interior or along the coast may be attributed to the lack of manpower and equipment. There is a significant problem of unskilled drivers which is covered elsewhere in this report.

#### I. Mobile Reserve

After independence was obtained in 1962, the Jamaica Constabulary Force established the Mobile Reserve to serve as a specially selected, equipped and trained tactical unit tasked to handle all types of civil disturbances. Although there is no immediate insurgency threat, the JCF, through its Mobile Reserve, is considered by the GOJ their best response against insurgent activities. The Mobile Reserve is commanded by a Deputy Commissioner of Police who reports laterally to the Commissioner.

The Mobile Reserve has grown from an 80 men unit since its inception in the early sixties to its present strength of 444 men. An additional 150 men will complete their mandatory 6-month training course in July 1974, and will augment the unit's strength to an unprecedented level of 600.

Upon inception of the police assistance program in the first quarter of FY 67, A.I.D.'s Office of Public Safety through the Public Safety Division/Kingston, initiated a modest program with priority accorded to one of the sub-projects which addressed the upgrading of an effective, well trained, properly equipped tactical unit. To this end, the Public Safety Division has provided a modest amount of basic equipment, training at the International Police Academy and technical assistance through the one resident advisor.

The Mobile Reserve has primary responsibility in control of civil disturbances and is considered a useful and well functioning unit to provide forces for such special duties as riots, demonstrations, assist in special roadblocks and other activities requiring supplementing manpower.

Unfortunately, during periods in which there is no requirement for their services as a unit there appears to have developed a trend toward using it as a manpower pool for unrelated duties.

There is no argument with using their personnel for augmenting patrols, foot or mobile, and other similar duties; in fact this would seem to be an excellent use. However, the practice of drawing on the unit for static guard duty is questionable and in the team's judgment should be reviewed.

In its quest for unit identity, the Mobile Reserve has succeeded in establishing its own basic training school consisting of a 6 month residency course conducted at Harman Barracks. Generally the course follows the 21 week training syllabus given at the Port Royal Training Command Recruit Course. The Mobile Reserve defends their position by stressing that certain disciplines essential to a riot control unit must be imparted by their own cadre with major emphasis on training tactics and techniques designed for maximum physical and mental conditioning. On balance they agree that this type of training is an adjunct to the ordinary recruit course but they prefer to maintain their training autonomy. There are deficiencies noted under this duplicity in training effort. Given the GOJ's austerity campaign, in conjunction with the crowded and inadequate facilities prevailing at Harman Barracks, the rationale for separate and autonomous training would seem to diminish. Additionally, training cadres are duplicated in certain topics, audio-visual equipment needs are doubled, training concept uniformity is lost and the overall quality of training suffers.

#### J. Narcotics

Under the Narcotics Project Agreement which was signed June 22, 1973, U.S. funds to date has been a modest total of \$97,000. This input has been used for commodity support and training of JCF personnel. The resident Public Safety Advisor

has for the past two years devoted three-fourths of his time to this project and JCF participation has been excellent.

During the Evaluation Team's visit, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) assigned one of their special agents on extended TDY so the Public Safety Officer could devote his entire efforts to other project responsibilities and effect the orderly phaseout of the Public Safety Program in Jamaica by the end of FY 74.

Progress has been continuous as inroads have been made in developing narcotics training courses as part of the JCF training syllabus, U.S. training of four selected Jamaican Customs Officers as part of a plan to motivate Customs participation, training of two sensor dog handlers (includes providing the specially trained dogs), training of Jamaican Constabulary Force (JCF) personnel both at the DEA International Training Institute and at the OPS International Police Academy, training of a Forensic Chemist in the U.S., providing laboratory equipment essential for the identification of suspect substances, conducting in-country narcotics training courses and initiating procurements for essential investigations equipment consisting mainly of vehicles and radios.

On balance, the GOJ has responded to the USG initiatives through the intensive enforcement efforts undertaken by the JCF which has accounted for an increase in arrests and seizures of significant proportions (Attachment I). Notably among these investigations was a record seizure (possibly worldwide) of 86,000 pounds of marihuana in July of 1973.

Situation:

The total estimated annual production of marihuana, if any such figure exists, escaped the Team's knowledge as the estimates from the enforcement elements indicate extreme fluctuations between 2,000 and 5,000 tons per year. It was pointed out that production had quintupled in the last five years due to the increase of U.S. demand. Local authorities estimate that domestic consumption accounts for only an approximate two percent of total production. It was ascertained that bulk shipments

of 1,000 pounds or more delivered on the U.S. mainland are currently bringing \$115.00 (U.S.) per pound while the price in Jamaica fluctuates in the \$16 to \$32 (U.S.) bracket. However, according to JCF/Criminal Investigations Division (CID) as recent as September 1973, ganja could be bought in bulk lots for as little as \$5 (U.S.) per pound. Suspected marihuana producing areas are shown in Attachment J.

### Enforcement:

The several JCF and related GOJ entities engaged in narcotics law enforcement are briefly discussed below.

#### 1. JCF/CID Narcotics Unit

Although a JCF/CID Narcotics Unit consisting of nine men was created in April 1973, to specialize in narcotics investigations under the present Jamaican laws all JCF personnel are authorized to detain, search and arrest for any violation of their present Dangerous Drugs Law. Other elements of the JCF frequently make arrests and/or seizures related to marihuana use and trafficking. In this respect, the Evaluation Team has nothing but high praise for the tremendous strides taken by the JCF in their enforcement efforts in the past three years. Additionally, the cooperative efforts of the JCF assisting USG enforcement agencies in the interdiction of international traffic has been optimum. Other enforcement units of the GOJ including the Immigration and Marine Police which are part of the JCF as the Coast Guard, indicated their willingness to cooperate with the enforcement elements of the CID Narcotics Unit as has been demonstrated in the past. There are no indications this pattern of cooperation will be disrupted. Thus far the narcotics situation in Jamaica has been limited to marihuana. There were, however, two cases involving cocaine investigated during the past 2 years.

#### 2. Marine Police

The Marine Police provides the JCF a water patrol capability in the port areas and the waterfronts. There may be overlapping areas of jurisdiction between the Marine Police, the Coast Guard and the Customs Service, but there are no indications

of rivalry which hamper their responsibilities. Both the Coast Guard and the Customs call upon the Marine Police for support or to provide detention authority when needed. The Marine Police is commanded by an Assistant Superintendent with two Inspectors and thirty-seven other men under his command. Organizationally, the Marine Police joins Patrol and Traffic in the Operations Division of Operations and Services.

### Mission

The mission of the Marine Police may be categorized as follows:

1. Inspect ship crews and fishing boats
2. Rescue of small crafts in the harbor
3. Investigate waterfront crimes.
4. General security of harbor and port areas

Basically, the Marine Police consists of three branches which are assigned specific functions within their overall mission. The Uniform Branch handles land patrols along the waterfront, the launch crews man the patrol boats and the Criminal Investigations Unit is tasked to investigate the acts of criminality. Presently, the Marine Police have boats with crews assigned to the port areas of Kingston, Montego Bay, Port Antonio and Ocho Rios. However, they have docking facilities and intend to expand their coastal stations to include Rocky Point, Black River, Savanna-la-mar and Lucea along the south coast. The GOJ has been procuring U.S. manufactured 31 foot Bertram boats in increments of four, five and six. The Marine Police fleet presently consists of nine boats with the other six expected within a two year period.

The Marine Police are not limited to their areas of specific responsibility because as members of the JCF they are authorized and adequately equipped to perform other police functions. Since they share common interests with the Coast Guard and the Customs in the ports, they compliment and support each others activities.

The well dispersed assignments of their units along the north coast extending from Montego Bay to Port Antonio puts them in a most favorable position to patrol the coast waters where marihuana traffickers have been taking on their loads.

### 3. Immigration

The Commissioner of the JCF is the Chief Immigration Officer of the country with a Senior Superintendent actually in charge of the Immigration Section. The Immigration Section is structurally organized under the Security Division of Administration and Security in the JCF. There are a total of forty-eight non-gazetted officers assigned to the section.

The Immigration Section's responsibilities may be categorized as follows:

1. Issuance of passports.
2. Alien control and registration.
3. General Immigration procedures at ports, airport and other points of entry.
4. Check crew lists of all arriving airplanes, ships and boats.

Special entry cards are required of all persons coming to Jamaica which are compiled in a control registry at the Office of Immigration for monitoring their length of stay. Additionally, this information is used by the Special Branch and other government agencies concerned with the flow of visitors.

Having the Immigration Section within the enforcement community is a practical matter in the case of Jamaica. It tends to simplify the control of foreigners provided the administrative system is adequate. The GOJ's concern in the past to tighten up their controls is apparent.

### 4. The JCF/CID Forensic Laboratory

At the behest of the Latin America Interagency Narcotics Control Committee, the Office of Public Safety conducted a study of the JCF Forensic Laboratory in last quarter of 1972 to ascertain: 1) effectiveness of the scientific practices currently used by the GOJ

to identify suspect substances in the enforcement of their Dangerous Drug Law and 2) the feasibility of developing drug identification capabilities with the JCF Forensic Laboratory; and the staffing, equipment and training requirements to meet current as well as expected future caseload. Since that time, the USG has complied with the recommendations by training a Forensic Chemist in the U.S. and initiated procurement for the laboratory equipment. However, there are two major areas which must be addressed and resolved by the GOJ if the full benefits from the study are desired. These areas are categorized into legislation and procedures and addressed separately.

### Legislation

The Jamaican Dangerous Drugs Law (JDDL) April 15, 1948 (Chapter 90) consists of six paragraphs which are entitled:

- I. Interpretation
- II. Raw Opium and Coca Leaves
- III. Prepared Opium and Ganja
- IV. Cocaine, Morphine, etc.
- V. Control of External Trade
- VI. General

A review of the present legislation surfaces a deficiency which allows Amphetamines, Barbiturates, and all types of hallucinogenic substances to escape control. More significant is the fact that the Jamaican Dangerous Drugs Law only requires a qualitative analysis (identification) of the suspect material and it must be shown that the marijuana fragments are from the pistillate (flowering part of the plant). The JDDL prohibits the female flowering portion but not the other parts of the plant. To further compound the enforcement problem, the Tetra-hydrocannabinol (THC) extract in liquid form has never been legally contested and under interpretation of the current JDDL also escapes control. The Forensic Chemist contacted by the Evaluation Team stated that this legal loophole is common knowledge amongst his professional colleagues. In the judicial processing of cases, the Law Reform Act (mandatory sentences) passed by the Senate in August 11, 1972, abolished the mandatory sentence and delegated the authority to impose a sentence, a fine or both to magisterial discretion. In accordance with the Law Reform Act, Article 22,

in Paragraph VI of the Jamaican Dangerous Drugs Law which formerly dealt with offenses and penalties was abolished. According to the JCF enforcement and investigations elements most directly involved with the JDDL this discretionary policy has resulted in disparities.

#### Procedures

The Ministry of Public Health has a Government Chemist's Laboratory which presently has the sole authority to conduct scientific identification of drugs exercised through a Chemist who has been vested with the official title of Government Analyst. Acutally, this office is responsible for chemical analysis to monitor commercial preparations and is not directly concerned with examinations related to criminal law enforcement. In addition to this particular function, the Government Analyst provides toxicological examinations for the JCF.

The only other GOJ institution that handles forensic scientific analyses is the JCF/CID Forensic Laboratory, currently headed by a certified Government Forensic Pathologist. Of the seven laboratory technicians assigned to the JCF/CID Forensic Laboratory, only two have certificates with judicial recognition and Public Prosecution approval which qualifies them as expert witnesses, but not in the field of drug identification. During the Evaluation Team's discussions with the JCF/CID Forensic Laboratory senior staff, it was revealed that the Forensic Laboratory now has the technical expertise to conduct all suspect drug tests including a modest supply of precursor ingredients used to prepare the reagents.

There is lack of professional appreciation within the JCF for the contribution which scientific aids can make as a tool in modern police investigations, according to Forensic lab personnel.

The case load imposed by the accelerated enforcement efforts of the JCF was severely taxing the capability of the Ministry of Health's Government Chemist's Laboratory eighteen months ago and predictably, this situation has become more acute, based on the increase of arrests and seizures.

According to conversations the TDY consultant had during his Forensic Lab Study with the representatives from the Director's Office of Public Prosecution it was determined that the matter of judicial recognition for the JCF/CID Forensic Laboratory Chemist (including the Public Prosecution Office's approval) could be handled administratively with no amendments necessary to the present law. The court-qualified forensic technician would share the same title, Government Analyst, and would also be permitted to submit his findings in certificates to the courts for prosecution purposes.

A new laboratory building is in the planning stage and lab personnel expressed the feeling that a new facility was a necessary prerequisite to their assuming the full responsibility recommended. The team feels that, while new facilities are needed, present capabilities are sufficient to take over the responsibility now.

#### 5. Jamaican Coast Guard

The Jamaican Coast Guard performs those functions traditionally associated with this type of organization but within the GOJ's purview it is considered a service element of the Jamaican Defense Force as opposed to an enforcement element. The Commander of the Coast Guard Service reports directly to the Commander of the Jamaican Defense Force and is organizationally structured under the Ministry of Defense. At the present time the GOJ recognizes a twelve mile limit on its jurisdictional territorial waters.

The Coast Guard Service depends on a fleet consisting of three 81 foot cutters manned by a crew of eleven. For security reasons due to the proximity of Kingston port area, one cutter must always remain docked in the Coast Guard's Port Royal Base. The GOJ is in the process of procuring a 105 foot ship which will enable the Coast Guard to expand and extend their operations.

The Jamaican Coast Guard Service does not have arrest or search authority although full compliance of its responsibilities would necessitate these powers due to the risks involved in the discharge of their mission. Their responsibilities are:

1. Search and rescue service
2. Anti-smuggling (narcotics are included under

- the general description of contraband)
3. Illegal immigrants
  4. Sea and coast surveys

Since Jamaica is the regional coordinator for an extensive rectangular area in the Caribbean Sea for search and rescue operations, the Jamaican Coast Guard Service maintains continuous radio contact with its U.S. counterpart in Miami and with the Air Search and Rescue Unit based in North Carolina. Additionally, the Jamaican Coast Guard Service maintains radio contact with the Marine Police Stations located along the coastline.

#### Narcotics Interdiction Assistance

The Coast Guard Service enjoys good rapport in its interagency relations and accords cooperation to the JCF enforcement units through an expedient channel which enables the JCF to request Coast Guard assistance through the Senior Staff Officer in the Jamaican Defense Force. The Coast Guard Commander averred that requests in the past have always been accorded a positive response and no change in this procedure is envisioned.

When a request is received for assistance and approval has been granted for a specific enforcement operation dealing with narcotics interdiction or any other illicit activity, the Coast Guard cutter assigned to the mission will take on board JCF elements concerned with the case. If time does not permit, the cutter could intercept the suspect craft under orders and provide "escort" to the nearest Marine Police Station or JCF station. Once the suspect craft has docked, the Coast Guard disengages itself from the operation and any subsequent detentions, searches, seizures and processing becomes an enforcement responsibility.

The Coast Guard cutters are equipped and have provisions to stay out at sea for a maximum period of seven days, however, their turn-around time to refuel, change crews, take on provisions and perform basic maintenance is four hours. The cutters are equipped with modern electronic equipment conducive to navigation, communications and all weather continuous search operations. Each cutter is armed with two deck-mounted heavy calibre machine guns for any contingency.

During the period the Evaluation Team was visiting the Port Royal Coast Guard facilities, the possibility of an imminent request for their assistance was discussed with the Commander due to an ongoing narcotics case involving a Miami-based boat under surveillance in a Jamaican port. He quickly responded there would be no problems once the order was given as his response would be immediate.

#### 6. Jamaican Customs Service

The Jamaican Customs officials are empowered with the basic responsibility to enforce the laws on the import of all goods. Generally speaking, the Customs Service consists of three operational branches tasked with the responsibilities of inspections, searches, and investigations. The major workload of the investigations branch is focused on the fraudulent aspect related to compliance and regulatory controls.

The Customs Service has an approximate strength of 500 men, is commanded by a Collector General and is organic to the Ministry of Finance. Customs personnel are stationed at both international airports in Kingston (Manley Airport) and Montego Bay (Sangster Airport) including the port areas in these two cities plus Port Antonio.

Given the USG's efforts in the international control of dangerous drugs, the current plan encompasses the training of selected personnel from the Jamaican Customs Service. Initially, the recently returned participants who received five-weeks of training in the U.S. Customs Enforcement Mid-Management Course will provide training for their own personnel at the Jamaican Customs School in Kingston. Once the training has been developed and implemented, the projections are to establish a small narcotics enforcement unit within the Customs Service which would specialize in narcotics investigations within their respective area of activity.

On the question pertaining to the responsibility of in-bond shipments being used as a conduit for the introduction of dangerous drugs into the U.S., the Jamaican Customs look upon this potential as extremely remote given the negligible level of in-bond shipments transmitting through their ports. Although the Customs officials are

authorized to detain, search and seize on suspicion or information they are not inclined to question in-bond shipments if the documentation appears authentic. Additionally, the Collector-General informed the Evaluation Team that they do not have in-bond storage areas as there has been no apparent need for this type of facility.

The Customs officials feel that recent interdiction efforts along the north coast have resulted in a shifting of traffic patterns in the illicit off-shore loading of bulk marihuana. Official speculation in the north coast indicate the shift has been to the western and southwestern coastal areas (Areas I and IV). This information has yet to be substantiated by actual seizures of major proportions.

The Customs Service can and should participate in the interdiction efforts of all dangerous drugs. The only restraint discernible is that traditionally (as in the U.S.) most customs services are primarily concerned with revenue gathering and protecting their country from excesses and/or abuse in importation.

#### 7. Other Observations

The Evaluation Team surfaced certain problem areas for GOJ consideration and USG concern. One of these problems is related to U.S. citizen's abuse of drugs in Jamaica and the other two address legislation but they are inter-related.

During the Team's visit to the northwestern coast in Area I, which consists of four parishes including the city of Montego Bay, the local enforcement officials expressed their concern on a "floating" hippie community which generally numbers in the vicinity of 500 young U.S. citizens of both sexes. Apparently, a drug culture haven has developed in the western tip of Jamaica in the vicinity of Negril and is attracting a sector of the U.S. visitors arriving in Montego Bay. Since the present GOJ Dangerous Drugs Law does not encompass Amphetamine, Barbiturates and the esoteric hallucinogens, the police only take action in cases of overt violations of marihuana use. There are reports of LSD use, however, the haven provided by the numerous coves and dense growth makes detection difficult. Some elements of the official community, according to the police, have expressed concern on the possible introduction of a drug culture to the area student residents. Reportedly, the police describe these young U.S. citizens' attitude as passive whenever confronted by the police.

first 21 months of the project. These, and their tenures, are shown below:

1. John Lindquist August, 1966 - July 1968
2. Edward Ames September, 1966 - September, 1971
3. Jon Kindice October, 1971 - September, 1973
4. James Cretecos August, 1973 - Present

The USG, through AID/OPS, has over this period responded to requests for TDY services to address specific conditions which required such expertise. These for the most part were of short duration, averaging 16 days. There have been 11 such TDYs for a total of 180 days (Attachment L).

## 2. Commodities

Total expenditures for commodities over the 7 year period have been \$233,000. The largest single category of commodities has been in communications, the remainder largely for demonstration and training.

Of this total \$214,686 in commodities were procured through OPS/W's Technical Services Division. A breakout by year and by category is shown in Attachment M.

## 3. Participant Training

This component of the project, while costing only a total of \$173,000 in USG funding, has perhaps had the greatest impact on the project. As of January 20, 1974, a total of 100 JCF personnel have received training in the United States through Public Safety programming. Of the total, 47 received training at the International Police Academy, the remaining 53 in specialist fields outside of, but arranged by, the IPA.

The mix of specialized skills involved has covered a wide spectrum designed to meet an equally wide need in a force with diverse responsibilities such as the JCF. The degree to which the JCF and the Public Safety Advisor identified needs and planned training to meet them are reflected in the types of training programmed. These are identified in Attachment N.

## CHAPTER V

### THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

#### A. Description

As the result of a mid-1966 pre-project survey a Project Agreement was signed in July, 1966, establishing a Public Safety project for FY 67. A resident Public Safety Advisor arrived in August, 1966, to begin project activities with the Jamaica Constabulary Force.

From inception to the present, in terms of USG inputs, this has been a very modest program with funding over the 7 year period totaling \$664,000. Of this total 38.9% has been for technicians' salaries, 26% for participant training and 35.1% for commodities. A complete breakout of funding is reflected in Attachment K.

On balance the U.S. effort in assisting the JCF has been effective. When viewed in light of inputs, very much so. It is patently obvious that any attempt to have far reaching effect on a 3600 man force through such minimal effort was out of the question. Therefore, in consort with JCF officials, a mutually agreed upon course of action was followed which concentrated on those functions which would have a more widespread impact. Each of these was reviewed by the team and are commented on in the respective preceding sections of this report.

This section will deal primarily with the conduct of the project itself, its resources and their utilization in realizing goals and objectives.

#### 1. Technicians

During the entire life of the project there has been only one resident Public Safety Advisor at any period except for the

Utilization of returned participants is excellent. Of the 100 total, 33 are currently occupying administrative or command level positions in the JCF (including 2 of the 3 top level positions). Those who received training in technical skills such as vehicle maintenance, communications, ordnance and reloading are in corresponding technical positions.

#### 4. Host Country Contributions

From the foregoing it is obvious that major expenditures in implementing mutually agreed upon projects were not from USG funding. All such costs were borne by the GOJ. Over the life of the program a total of \$3,021,868 were so used in project related activities for construction, commodities and travel costs of participants.

#### B. Observations and Conclusions

With the exceptions noted below, goals and objectives of the project have in the main been on target. Each of the major goals will be discussed briefly, more detailed discussion is in the respective section of this report.

1. The telecommunications network has been completed as planned, there is a capability to operate, maintain and repair the equipment in use.

2. The goal of developing, training and equipping a 300 man force for crowd control has been exceeded. By the end of 1974 this force will number 600.

3. A mobile patrol force for the Kingston area is operational. Increased personnel and procurement of additional vehicles continues to provide expansion of this activity to other corporate areas. Over half of these will be covered by the end of 1974. Some additional training is in order, this is being addressed by the use of TDY assistance.

4. The Training Command is in the process of expanding its Port Royal Training Center to meet increased demands brought about by the planned force expansion. There is a need for increased effort in the area of in-service training which is also being met through TDY assistance to develop a mobile training team concept.

5. The Police Records and Criminal Intelligence Unit objectives have not been met. These too are to be assisted through TDY advisors.

6. The narcotic enforcement activity has performed extremely well. However, there is an immediate need for revised legislative and also a need to unsnarl the bureaucratic entanglement over use of the JCF Forensic Laboratory facilities in the examination of suspected materials and preparation of reports thereof for subsequent court use.

### Comments

Host country performance during the life of the project would appear to have been excellent. All project planning was done on a bilateral basis and every effort made to adhere to scheduled achievement of mutually developed goals.

In those instances where slippage occurred in attaining objectives constraints imposed by manpower and funding were at least partially responsible. Although it should be noted that for the most part government support of the JCF has been good during the term of the project and budgetary support on an ascending scale.

Another factor affecting to some degree the rate of objective achievement has been a loss of the resident Public Safety Advisor's time to those elements of the project. For the immediately preceding two years the advisor has been required to devote up to 75% of his efforts to the one facet - narcotics enforcement. While no one would argue against this priority, at the same time it should be recognized that all others suffered proportionately.

The plan to utilize TDY assistance in the final months of the project makes sense as an intelligent method for recouping the lost time and bringing the project into an on-schedule basis at termination.

## CHAPTER VI

### RECOMMENDATIONS

Based upon observations contained in preceding sections of this report, the team offers the following recommendations for JCF consideration.

It is recommended that:

#### Organization

1. The JCF give priority to establishing an effective Planning and Research Unit and thereafter make maximum use of such a unit.
2. Continued recognition be given the proposed updating of the Central Records Office and the Criminal Intelligence Section.

#### Motor Maintenance

3. Plans be developed to expand and update the physical layout of the central maintenance and repair shop in Kingston to better serve anticipated increases in workload.
4. Such plans include sufficient space, both building and ground, for training of mechanics and drivers.
5. Transport and Repair Division be assigned responsibility for redesigning and conducting more extensive driver training including a pursuit driving area. Once this is operational all police drivers both currently and future assigned, be required to complete this training.
6. Inventory the entire force for personnel who have received advanced training in such fields as driver training, pursuit driving, etc., and assign these men full-time to the driver training institute.

7. Conduct a study into the entire area of purchase and storage of spare parts and update the system where indicated by such a study.

### Training

8. The JCF do a complete and in-depth study of its training requirements both immediate and long range.
9. This give priority attention to space requirements at Port Royal with a view to the proposed force increase.
10. Requirements for additional instructor and other staff personnel be reviewed, potential instructors be identified, assigned and receive training in instructor techniques. An inventory of personnel returned from training abroad should be prepared and maximum use made of them in the instructor training.
11. Any decision to reduce the total recruit training time should await completion of this study.
12. Review the expanding requirement for advanced training and take appropriate steps to expand accordingly the Basil Robinson Training Center facilities and staff.
13. The JCF utilize to the maximum the TDY training team to develop Training Command personnel in the employment of mobile training teams and roll call training techniques as a means of upgrading constables and other ranks throughout Jamaica.
14. A follow-up study be conducted to evaluate the training effectiveness, looking at the factors mentioned in the body of the report. This should then provide the data base for reviewing the curriculum and effecting any changes which may be thusly indicated.

### Communications

15. A study be directed to address the subject of recruiting and retaining qualified technicians. This should include in-depth treatment of Technical Specialist, incentive pay for police personnel, and the possibility of employing civilian technicians.

### Mobile Patrol

16. A comprehensive study be made of all reports of accidents involving patrol vehicles to determine major causes of these accidents and the information thusly developed be used in future training courses.

### Mobile Reserve

17. A review be made of current use of this unit's personnel, they be relieved of assignments of a static guard nature and the men so released be used for patrol duties in areas of high crime incidence.

### Narcotics

18. The Narcotics Unit be expanded in size sufficiently to assign permanent elements to areas of priority outside Kingston.
19. The JCF take the initiative in pressing for a revision of Jamaica's Dangerous Drug Law, redefining ganja to include oil and other forms, and to include other dangerous drugs such as the hallucinogens, amphetamines and barbiturates, etc.
20. The role and status of the JCF Forensic Laboratory be restudied with a view to having all suspected substances submitted to it for examination and its reports thereof be that which is submitted to the courts.

# MAJOR CRIMES REPORTED


(FYs: April 1 - March 31)

	FY 71/72	FY 72/73	FY 73/74**
Murder	145	188	252
Robbery	2595	2715	3016
Rape	464	500	699
Shooting w/intent	589	517	828
Burglary	NA	2047	2470
Other breakings	NA	3021	3491


\*\*As the fiscal year ends March 31, 1974, complete figures are not available. Last available figures are through October, 1973. Figure shown is an estimated projection for the FY based on the monthly average for comparison and trend purposes.

ATTACHMENT A

# PREVIOUS TABLE OF ORGANIZATION




# CURRENT TABLE OF ORGANIZATION



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11

# JAMAICA CONSTABULARY FORCE AREA BOUNDARIES



## AREA 1

TRELAWNY  
ST. JAMES  
HANOVER  
WESTMORELAND

## AREA 2

PORTLAND  
ST. MARY  
ST. ANN

## AREA 3

ST. ELIZABETH  
MANCHESTER  
CLARENDON

## AREA 4

KINGSTON CENTRAL  
KINGSTON WESTERN  
KINGSTON EASTERN  
ST. ANDREW CENTRAL

## AREA 5

ST. CATHERINE  
ST. ANDREW NORTH

## AREA 6

ST. THOMAS  
ST. ANDREW SOUTH

ATTACHMENT - D

JAMAICAN CONSTABULARY FORCE BUDGET

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>National Budget</u>	<u>JCF Budget</u>
71/72	\$300,648,072	\$12,017,991
72/73	372,645,774	14,475,484
73/74	432,032,208	16,907,600

FY 73/74 Breakout by Class

Personal Services	\$13,280,250
Equipment	1,038,100
Capital Expenditures	1,497,000
Other	1,092,250
TOTAL	<u><u>\$16,907,600</u></u>

(All figures in Jamaican dollars: U.S. \$1.00 = J \$0.88)


ATTACHMENT E

## RECRUIT TRAINING SYLLABUS

<u>Subject Matter</u>	<u>Hours</u>
1. Legal	
Includes criminal laws, laws of evidence, arrest, search and seizure	138
2. Rules and Regulations	
Includes departmental regulations and procedures	121
3. Police Procedures and Responsibilities	
Includes duties and actions in various situations, crimes, public relations and other	187
4. Physical Training	
Includes conditioning, agility and defensive tactics	150
5. First Aid	43
6. Firearms	74
7. Miscellaneous	
Includes history, geography, sociology, relationship with other agencies and visits to various facilities	82
	TOTAL 795

ATTACHMENT F

# PORT ROYAL TRAINING CENTER ORGANIZATION



ATTACHMENT - G

IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROJECTIONS - 1974

<u>Courses</u>	<u>No. of Courses</u>	<u>Duration</u>	<u>Approximate Date</u>
1. Junior Officers (A. S. P. & D. S. P)	2	1 week	14th January
2. Inspectors' Refresher	2	6 weeks	11th February
3. Sergeants' Refresher	3	6 weeks	1st April
4. Corporals' Refresher	3	6 weeks	to be fixed
5. Acting Corporals' and Constables' Refresher	3	6 weeks	to be fixed
6. C.I.D. Refresher (Detective Constables, Corporals & Sergeants)	3	6 weeks	21st January
7. Basic C.I.D.	3	8 weeks	11th March
8. Firearms Training	10	2 weeks	21st January
9. Immigration Refresher	2	2 weeks	to be fixed
10. Marine Training	2	6 weeks	to be fixed
11. Instructor Training	2	4 weeks	to be fixed
12. Divisional Training Sub-Officers	1	3 weeks	to be fixed
13. Office Clerks	2	2 weeks	to be fixed
14. Finance Clerks	2	1 week	to be fixed
15. Dog Handlers	?	?	to be fixed
16. Seminars (Gazetted Officers)	2	?	to be fixed


ATTACHMENT H

MARIHUANA ARRESTS AND SEIZURES

1962 - 1973

<u>Year</u>	<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Seizures (pounds)</u>
1962	894	4,876
1963	1,023	1,526
1964	473	No Record
1965	552	80
1966	919	1,150
1967	1,310	1,200
1968	1,369	200
1969	1,285	450
1970	2,084	1,250
1971	2,154	8,750
1972	2,343	33,000
1973	3,049	128,195
TOTALS	17,455	180,677

ATTACHMENT I



Base 58782 11-68

### SUSPECTED MARIHUANA PRODUCTION AREAS

PUBLIC SAFETY FUNDING FY 1967-1973  
(\$000)

	<u>Technicians</u>		<u>Participants</u>		<u>Commodities</u>		<u>Total</u>	
	Obl.	Exp.	Obl.	Exp.	Obl.	Exp.	Obl.	Exp.
FY 67	47	47	22	15	97	80	166	142
FY 68	48	48	24	16	125	100	197	164
FY 69	28	28	30	25	30	25	88	78
FY 70	30	30	31	26	-0-	-0-	61	56
FY 71	30	30	30	26	10	8	70	64
FY 72	35	35	40	35	20	15	95	85
FY 73	40	40	35	30	10	5	85	75
TOTALS	258	258	212	173	292	233	762	664

ATTACHMENT K

TDY ASSISTANCE TO THE JCF

<u>Date Begun</u>	<u>Purpose</u>	<u>Time</u>
September 11, 1966	Training	60 days
October 25, 1966	Mobile Reserve Training	14 days
November 13, 1966	Records	14 days
January, 1967	Communications	7 days
May 4, 1967	Communications	6 days
October 30, 1967	Communications	15 days
December 6, 1967	Communications	15 days
June 15, 1968	Immigration	14 days
June 18, 1972	Criminal Intelligence	14 days
August 2, 1972	Airport Security	14 days
October, 1972	Laboratory	7 days
	TOTAL TIME	180 days

ATTACHMENT L

COMMODITIES PROCURED THROUGH OPS/TSD

FY 1967	Communications equipment, misc. riot control gear	\$97,000
FY 1968	Communications equipment	70,010
FY 1969	Vehicles, training aids, misc. police equipment	26,340
FY 1970	Gas masks	3,000
FY 1971	Non-toxic tear gas equipment	2,000
FY 1972	Training aids, misc. police equipment	6,605
FY 1972	Training aids, misc. police equipment	9,731
	TOTAL	\$214,686

ATTACHMENT M

PARTICIPANT TRAINING

Through January 20, 1974

1. International Police Academy	
Senior Officers Course, 13 weeks.....	2
General Course, 17 weeks.....	45
2. Non-IPA	
Police Executive.....	11
Technical Specialist.....	42
	TOTAL 100

Technical Specialist Training By Types

Criminalistics	1	Immigration	1
Questioned Documents	1	Counterfeiting	1
Firearms Identification	2	Narcotics	7
Telecom Management	2	Unarmed Defense	2
Advanced Telecom	1	Auto Repair	1
Telecommunications	4	Weapons Maintenance	1
Records Management	2	Mechanic Maintenance	1
Police Records	1	Reloading	1
Maritime	3	Pursuit Driving	3
Traffic Administration	2	Audio Visual	2
Investigations	2	FBI Academy	1

ATTACHMENT N