OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

AUDIT OF USAID'S RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL FOOD CRISIS

AUDIT REPORT NO. 9-000-10-007-P
June 4, 2010

WASHINGTON, DC

June 4, 2010

MEMORANDUM

TO: AA/AFR, Earl Gast

FROM: IG/A/PA, Director, Steven H. Bernstein /s/

SUBJECT: Audit of USAID's Response to the Global Food Crisis (Audit Report No. 9-000-10-007-P)

This memorandum transmits our final report on the subject audit. In finalizing the report, we have carefully considered your comments on the draft report, and have included the comments in their entirety in appendix II of the report.

This report includes two recommendations for your corrective action. On the basis of your written comments, in which you describe actions taken or initiated to address our concerns, the audit considers that management decisions have been reached on both recommendations. Determination of final action will be made by the Audit, Performance and Compliance Division upon completion of the planned corrective actions for these recommendations.

I want to express my sincere appreciation for the cooperation and courtesy extended to my staff during the audit.

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CONTENTS

Summary of Results 1

Background 2

Audit Objective 2

Audit Findings 3

Unrealistic Targets Set for West African Food Development Programs 4

Offices Responsible for West African Food Development Programs Are Understaffed 6

Evaluation of Management Comments 10

Appendix I – Scope and Methodology 11

Appendix II – Management Comments 13

Appendix III – Scope of Review by Mission 14

Appendix IV – Selected Indicators, Targets, and Results 15

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

Development assistance from the Global Food Security Response (GFSR) is a $200 million supplemental appropriation available from October 1, 2008, until September 30, 2010, to address the global food crisis. After interagency collaboration and the subsequent congressional mandate, USAID designated $128 million[1] of the $200 million GFSR supplemental funding to West Africa and specifically to six USAID missions: Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and the West Africa Regional Mission.[2] With this GFSR funding, the missions extended their agriculture programs with the goals of increasing agriculture productivity and production, increasing regional trade in food staples, and promoting sound market-based principles. (See page 2.)

USAID's West African development assistance programs in response to the global food crisis are achieving their objectives. The results from the implementing partners are, for the most part, meeting or exceeding their targets, and according to the results reviewed and objectives assessed, the agriculture development programs are on track to meet their main goals. (See page 3.)

In the first year of funding, GFSR programs experienced challenges owing to the short timeframe in which USAID had to plan and implement the programs and the low staffing levels in the economic growth and agriculture offices. (See pages 3, 4.) Although GFSR programs are achieving their objectives, West African missions that received GFSR supplemental funding reported that many of their results were significantly different from the indicators' targets, indicating that the performance targets were not realistic. (See page 4.) Additionally, the West African mission offices that were given the GFSR supplemental funding are understaffed. As a result, mission staff is overextended, and with additional funding expected, their workload may be unsustainable. (See page 6.)

This audit recommends that:

- West African missions verify the validity of program targets set by the implementing partners. (See page 5.)

- The Africa Bureau implement a mission human capacity assessment prior to awarding additional GFSR funds. (See page 9.)

On the basis of the management comments, management decisions have been reached on both recommendations. Determination of final action will be made by the Audit, Performance and Compliance Division upon completion of the planned corrective actions. (See page 10.) Management comments are included in their entirety in appendix II.

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[1] The remaining $72 million was appropriated as follows: $50 million to local and regional procurement in East Africa, $20 million to research and development, and $2 million to USAID's Africa Bureau.

[2] The West Africa Regional Mission is in Accra, Ghana, and is jointly located with USAID/Ghana.

BACKGROUND

From March 2007 to March 2008, global food prices increased an average of 43 percent. These rising prices led to an increase in food insecurity among poorer populations. A number of factors contributed to this spike in food prices, including increased consumer demand, rising energy costs, and lower crop yields. Globally, the majority of countries facing food security crises are in Africa, with more than 120 million Africans suffering chronic hunger. In West Africa, eight countries have experienced riots and demonstrations related to high food prices, posing threats to peace and security.

In fall 2008, after an interagency collaboration, the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252) provided $200 million in development assistance funding to USAID, for fiscal years (FY) 2009 and 2010, in order to address the global food crisis. The goals of this multiyear response were to support actions to increase agriculture productivity and production, increase regional trade in food staples, and promote sound market-based principles. USAID's Africa Bureau administered the supplemental Global Food Security Response (GFSR) funding and allocated $128 million[1] of the $200 million to provide agriculture development assistance regionally to West Africa. GFSR funding is expected to continue providing agricultural program support well into FY 2010.

Prior to the global food crisis funding, USAID's agriculture funding for offices and programs in West Africa was relatively low. The supplemental funding allowed them to expand programming. The Africa Bureau allocated funding within West Africa to the Ghana, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and West Africa Regional[2] missions, as these countries were determined by the Africa Bureau to have the potential to significantly increase their output of staple foods and increase related economic growth in the region. (See appendix III for the funding amount by country.) The missions that received supplemental funds used the additional funding to expand existing agriculture programs or initiate new ones. Each program, from policy to production, sought to increase access to food for the poor and stimulate private investment needed to sustain the growth process and build resilience to economic shocks. Though GFSR efforts are ongoing, this audit covers the period from initial GFSR planning in 2008 through the conclusion of audit fieldwork on December 17, 2009.

AUDIT OBJECTIVE

This audit was included in the Office of Inspector General's FY 2009 annual plan and was conducted to answer the following question:

- Are USAID's West African development assistance programs in response to the global food crisis achieving their objectives?

Appendix I contains a discussion of the audit's scope and methodology.

AUDIT FINDINGS

The Global Food Security Response (GFSR) development assistance programs are achieving their overall objectives that align with the goals of: (1) increasing agricultural productivity and production, (2) increasing regional trade in food staples, and (3) promoting sound market-based principles.

All six participating missions worked with implementing partners to establish or continue agricultural programs that directly support GFSR objectives. Four of these six missions reported results that met or exceeded indicator targets in 15 of 16 sampled instances (programs sampled in 2 remaining missions have not yet had sufficient time to produce results). The missions made gains despite challenges caused by the short timeframe in which USAID had to plan and implement programs and the low staffing levels in the missions' economic growth and agriculture offices. Because it has been only a year since GFSR was initially funded, it is too early to determine the long-term impact of the development assistance programs on the food crisis in West Africa. However, this is not to say that program activities have not produced meaningful and measurable results that align with GFSR objectives and are on track to meet their main goals.

Examples of the results achieved in the first year of GFSR and their projected impact include the following:

- **Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM):** During fiscal year (FY) 2009, the IICEM program funded land resource management projects in the Sikasso and Mopti regions. One project used water-harvesting technology to develop dams in regions where flooding occurred during the rainy season. A second project financed and installed water pumps in a region where cultivatable soil existed with limited access to sustainable irrigation. In total, these projects increased farmable land by 2,784 hectares, which supports the GFSR objective of increasing agricultural productivity and production.

- **Maximizing Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted Sites (MARKETS):** MARKETS, a program in Nigeria, provided short-term agricultural sector productivity training to 33,060 individuals in a number of regions. Training covered improved technologies, management practices, and administrative systems. Training in crop processing, plant maintenance, manufacturing practices, and fish marketing and hatchery techniques provided local farmers with the capacity to increase agricultural productivity and production, which is the first GFSR goal.

- **Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP):** USAID/West Africa Regional's ATP project increased the number of regional Market Information System users by 8,000 individuals. This system provides bid and offer prices, information on contracts, and alerts on stock flows in and out of a number of agricultural commodity warehouses. Management information system transaction volume can potentially increase regional trade in food staples, which is a GFSR goal.

Appendix IV presents selected indicators, targets and results from the GFSR programs in each participating country.

As mentioned above, during the first year of GFSR funding, the missions had some challenges related to staffing. As evidence of these challenges, situations such as the following arose:

- As of the end of fiscal year 2009, USAID/Ghana had not established targets or indicators, or reported results for the Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement program. Partly because of a lack of staff in the mission's Trade, Agriculture, and Private Sector Office and contracting office, the agreement was signed late, in July 2009, thereby limiting program development time.

- Some of the missions receiving GFSR supplemental funding did not have the personnel in their agriculture or economic offices to properly plan and implement the expanded programming, and as a result had to use temporary-duty support.

Although the GFSR programs are achieving the objectives laid out for them, the following two issues require management attention if USAID is to continue GFSR program achievement: (1) reevaluation of indicator targets, which in 2009 were not realistically set; and (2) analysis and adjustment of staffing levels in the offices responsible for GFSR programs, which were understaffed in 2009.

Partners Set Unrealistic Targets for West African Food Development Programs

Summary: USAID policy states that both the implementing partners and the USAID missions have a responsibility to set, review, and assess the relevance and appropriateness of indicators and established targets. West African missions that received Global Food Security Response supplemental funding reported that many of their results were significantly higher or lower than the indicators' targets, indicating that the performance targets were not realistic. The variance in results was due to conflicting interpretations of the indicators and to timing issues, including an expedited Global Food Security Response planning period and differing agriculture seasons. Use of unrealistic indicators and targets will not assist in achieving overall program objectives or measuring program success.

Both the implementing partners and the USAID missions have a responsibility to appropriately set indicators and targets and to review and assess their relevancy on a periodic basis. According to Performance Monitoring and Evaluation TIPS No. 8, "Establishing Performance Targets," a publication by the USAID Center for Development Information and Evaluation, and a supplemental reference from Automated Directives System (ADS) chapter 203, "Assessing and Learning," targets should be based on analysis of what is realistic to achieve, given factors such as the stage of program implementation, resources available, and country conditions. Additionally, ADS 203 states that, "USAID Missions/Offices should use performance information to assess progress in achieving results and to make management decisions." Moreover, ADS 200.2, "Primary Responsibilities," states that USAID missions must develop the capacity to manage foreign assistance programs and ensure that teams have the necessary expertise, authorities, resources, and support to achieve their objective.

Finally, according to most GFSR contracts, implementing partners are expected to ensure that indicators are adequately defined to allow for measurement and to assess, as necessary, the baselines and targets for the program indicators.

However, five of the six West African missions that received GFSR supplemental funding reported indicator results that were significantly higher or lower than their targets, suggesting that the performance targets set during the program planning process were not realistic.[3] In a review of the largest programs at USAID/Liberia, USAID/Mali, USAID/Nigeria, USAID/Senegal and USAID/West Africa, 15 of 20 sampled indicators met or exceeded their targets, in several cases by more than twice the amount. In one example, USAID/Mali's Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali program, a target established for FY 2009 was to train 400 individuals on the trade and investment environment. The partner reported providing training to 1,968 individuals, an almost 400-percent achievement rate. Other program indicators fell short of their targets. For example, USAID/Liberia's Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II planned to add 2,333 hectares to land under improved technologies or management, but added only 1,864 hectares. Additionally, all four of USAID/Senegal's reviewed targets were unmet as of the fiscal yearend, as the program was still in the implementation stage. Appendix IV contains a list of selected indicators, their targets, and their results.

The timeframe for planning and implementing GFSR programs throughout West Africa's six missions was limited, which led to a hastened process for setting and reviewing program targets. According to some missions and their implementing partners, some differences between targets and results were attributed to conflicting interpretations of indicator meaning. However, as those same officials acknowledged, other differences were plainly the result of timing issues. They include programs initiated later in the year that did not yet have meaningful activity results, and variances caused by the misalignment of the agricultural and fiscal year calendars.

Use of unrealistic indicators and targets will not assist in achieving overall program objectives or accurately measure program success. Performance targets should be recalibrated for the second year of GFSR, taking into account funding levels, previous targets, and actual results for program activities. Without a reevaluation of program targets, it will be difficult for the missions to manage the GFSR program toward realistically achievable results and to accurately evaluate the performance and impact of the program going forward.

> ***Recommendation 1:*** *We recommend that USAID/Africa Bureau require the West African missions that received Global Food Security Response supplemental funding in fiscal year 2009 reevaluate and document the validity of existing targets on the overall success of program activities.*

[3] For the selected program, USAID/Ghana had not yet established indicator targets or reported results as of the fiscal yearend, due to that program agreement's late signing in July 2009.

Offices Responsible for West African Food Development Programs Are Understaffed

Summary: Strategic objective 1 and 2 of the USAID *Human Capital Strategic Plan FY2009–FY2013* states that the Agency should strategically align, ready, and mobilize staff with Agency priorities. In addition, the AID Food and Agriculture Strategy document emphasizes the importance of the availability of experienced employees for agriculture development assistance. However, the West African missions' offices that were given GFSR supplemental funding are overextended. The GFSR participating offices became overextended when staffing levels did not increase in line with the GFSR supplemental funding, therefore making these offices understaffed. Assessing the staffing levels of offices receiving large amounts of supplemental funding, and adjusting obligations as needed, are crucial aspects of program success. Without an understanding of staffing capability, USAID cannot expect sustainable program development from missions receiving GFSR funding.

According to USAID's *Human Capital Strategic Plan's FY2009–FY2013* strategic objective 1, the Agency should strategically align staff with Agency priorities. According to strategic objective 2, the Agency should increase staff mobility and readiness to rapidly meet emerging priorities. These objectives include procedures for maintaining the appropriate Agency size with appropriate competencies and leadership ability; increased readiness to respond to high-need areas; constant work on recruitment; and policy flexibility to help fill gaps across USAID. Additionally, the AID Food and Agriculture Strategy document emphasizes the importance of having trained and experienced people available for food and agriculture development assistance, and also states that all operational units involved in food aid development should give the highest priority to establishing and maintaining positions with qualified staff.[4]

However, despite this criteria and the emerging focus on agriculture development, all six West African offices given GFSR supplemental funding noted that their agriculture or economic offices were overextended, and this audit concurs that these missions have been working at unsustainable levels due to staffing challenges. For example, USAID/Ghana had no direct-hire staff on its Economic Growth team at the time the supplemental funding was announced. Therefore, a year after the GFSR program was initiated, USAID/Ghana's largest program is not yet able to report results; it needed additional planning time to hire capable staff, thus pushing back the program's start date.

The GFSR participating offices became overextended when staffing levels did not increase in line with the GFSR supplemental funding. Even at staffing levels at or near their approved number of positions, missions noted that demands resulting from an increased GFSR workload were a serious concern. Specifically, in FY 2009, three of the participating missions had unfilled positions. In September 2009, USAID/Ghana's Trade, Agriculture and Private Sector Office had only 5 of 8 positions filled; in July 2009, USAID/Liberia's Economic Growth Office had only 7 of 9 positions filled; and in October

[4] Aid Food and Agriculture Strategy is an 'Additional Help' document referenced in both Automated Directives System 200.5 and 203.5, originally dated 1983, and last updated in 2000. Though currently under revision, the content referenced is not anticipated to change significantly.

2009, USAID/Mali's Agriculture and Economic Growth Office had only 8 of 16 positions filled. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1. Mission Staffing Levels, 2009



Note: Staffing figures were obtained from Washington and mission personnel. Specific audit procedures to validate the accuracy of the figures were not performed.

The GFSR participating offices were additionally overextended when staffing levels did not increase in line with the GFSR supplemental funding. For example, from FY 2008 to FY 2009, funding to USAID/Mali's Agriculture and Economic Growth Office increased by more than $33 million, from roughly $5 million to $38 million, but its staff increased by only two employees. For the same year, funding in Liberia increased approximately threefold, while the number of positions filled in the office increased by only two. With the exponential increase in FY 2009 funding, the offices' workload increased through additional strategic, programmatic, administrative, contracting, and monitoring and evaluation activity. (See Figure 2.)

Figure 2. Funding/Staff Movement at Participating Missions



Note: Staffing figures were obtained from Washington and mission personnel, and funding figures were obtained from Agency databases. Specific audit procedures to validate the accuracy of the figures were not performed.

Figure 2. Funding/Staff Movement at Participating Missions—continued



Note: Staffing figures were obtained from Washington and mission personnel, and funding figures were obtained from Agency databases. Specific audit procedures to validate the accuracy of the figures were not performed.

In FY 2010 and onward, increases in agriculture development and GFSR programs are anticipated. The current workload, as of FY 2009, may be unsustainable at the current staffing levels. If assessments and appropriate adjustments are not made, ineffective programming may result. If not for the exemplary efforts of mission staff, first year GFSR programs might not have achieved their objectives.

Assessing the missions' personnel competencies, abilities, and readiness and adjusting funding or resources as needed are aspects of program success that should be taken into consideration during the planning phase for future appropriations. This audit concludes that without appropriate assessments, USAID cannot expect sustained program development from missions receiving GFSR funding.

> ***Recommendation 2****: We recommend that USAID/Africa Bureau develop and implement a plan to assess each mission's personnel competencies, abilities, and readiness prior to the obligation of any future Global Food Security Response development assistance funds, and adjust funding or resources to properly support sustained program development.*

EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

In response to the draft report, USAID's Africa Bureau concurred with both recommendations to support Global Food Security Response (GFSR) programs in achieving their objectives. Upon evaluation of management's response to the draft report, received May 20, 2010, this audit determined that management decisions have been reached on both recommendations. An evaluation of management comments follows.

Recommendation 1: The Africa Bureau concurred with the recommendation. The Bureau will request that missions update their previously established fiscal year 2010 targets against approved budget allocations by September 30, 2010. This updating will allow mission staff and partners to verify target validity and update targets as necessary. A management decision has been made, and final action can occur once the Africa Bureau has completed the planned actions as indicated in management comments.

Recommendation 2: The Africa Bureau concurred with the recommendation and noted that the Bureau has conducted staffing reviews of all GFSR operating units. By September 30, 2010, the Africa Bureau will develop a plan to address the identified staffing needs. A management decision has been made, and final action can occur once the Africa Bureau has completed the planned actions as indicated in management comments.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

Scope

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

This audit covered the $128 million in development assistance funding provided to six USAID missions in West Africa under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, Public Law 110-252, also referred to as the Global Food Security Response (GFSR). (See appendix III for funded amounts by country.) This audit focused on the degree to which the goals for USAID's development assistance programs aligned with those of the overall GFSR and the degree to which programs achieved their objectives for fiscal year (FY) 2009.

This audit covers the period from initial GFSR planning in 2008 through the conclusion of audit fieldwork on December 17, 2009. Audit fieldwork was conducted from September 28 through December 17, 2009, from USAID/Washington. Field visits to the Bamako, Mopti, and Sikasso regions in Mali were completed between September 28 and October 16, 2009. Field visits were not performed in other countries.

In planning and performing the audit, the Office of Inspector General gained an understanding of planned program objectives, of both missions and Agency, and the programs' projected outcomes as of the end of FY 2009. In addition, the audit team reviewed relevant regulations and USAID policies and procedures related to development assistance programming. Furthermore, the audit team assessed management controls for ensuring compliance with laws, regulations, and policies regarding monitoring and evaluation. This information was gathered primarily from participating missions through interviews. Additional inquiry and observation procedures were performed during the Mali field visits to assess internal controls.

The audit team was able to review targets and results for only five of the six West African missions that received GFSR funding: USAID/Liberia, USAID/Mali, USAID/Nigeria, USAID/Senegal, and USAID/West Africa. USAID/Ghana secured its first program contracts in July 2009, had only limited time for implementation, and as of fiscal yearend had not set indicator targets.

Methodology

To answer the audit objective, the Office of Inspector General conducted interviews with USAID's Africa Bureau staff, staff from the agriculture or economic offices of all missions receiving GFSR supplemental funding, and with implementing partners for USAID/Mali based in Washington, DC, and in Mali. The audit team reviewed documentation from the implementing partners, missions, and the Africa Bureau, including planning documents; contractual agreements; and progress, monitoring, and results reports.

The audit team conducted interviews with the Africa Bureau staff and reviewed available documentation to understand and evaluate the GFSR planning process. The audit team then selected the partners that managed either the largest GFSR-funded program or the earliest GFSR-funded program for each mission. The audit team then selected the largest GFSR-funded program run by the selected implementing partner. Then, rather than basing indicator selections on a materiality threshold, the team used a risk-based approach to judgmentally select four indicators from each selected program deemed to be representative of the entire population. These were then compared with the corresponding results to assess program progress. Following the review of results, program indicators were aligned with the missions' indicators as shown in planning documents. The mission indicators were aligned with the overall GFSR goals, as explained in the *45 Day Report to Congress*.[5] While a statistical sample was not used, the results of the analysis are important and pervasive enough to bring to management's attention.

[5] The *45 Day Report to Congress* is a report required by the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008, that was due to Congress 45 days after the issuance of Public Law 110-252. The report was incorporated the Government's interagency approach to GFSR, which included the response framework, supported the regional and country focus, and stated funding objectives.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

MEMORANDUM

TO: IG/A/PA, Steven Bernstein

FROM: DAA/AFR, Franklin Moore /s/

SUBJECT: Response to the Audit of the USAID's Response to the Global Food Crisis (Audit Report No. 9-000-10-XXX-P)

On March 5, 2010, the Africa Bureau received the draft report on the subject audit. The draft audit report contains two recommendations. The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a management response on each of the two recommendations.

Recommendation No.1: Unrealistic Targets Set for West African Food Development Programs

Response to No.1: While recognizing the vagaries inherent in establishing more realistic targets and indicators especially under the "hastened" Global Food Security Response (GFSR) development process, the Africa Bureau concurs with the assessment and recognizes that some of the current targets for these programs are problematic. Missions set their FY 2010 targets last November as part of the Performance Plan and Report (PPR), but prior to finalization of the Agency's FY 2010 appropriations. Once FY 2010 budget allocations are approved by F, Washington staff will request that missions update their 2010 targets against their FY 2010 approved budget allocation and submit their revised targets by September 30, 2010. This exercise will provide mission staff and partners an opportunity to verify and validate existing targets, where applicable, for the West Africa food development programs and, where necessary, to establish more realistic targets.

Recommendation No. 2: Offices Responsible for West African Food Development Programs are Understaffed

Response to No. 2: Noting that all GFSR funds have already been obligated, the Africa Bureau agrees with the second recommendation. To address this need and successfully move forward with the Feed the Future Initiative (FTF), the Africa Bureau has conducted management audits on all operating units participating in FTF to identify staffing needs. Washington staff, led by senior management and with consultation from the Agency's Human Resources Office, will develop a plan to address the identified increased staffing needs by September 30, 2010.

SCOPE OF REVIEW BY MISSION

The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-252) provided $200 million in development assistance funding to USAID for fiscal years 2009 through 2010. USAID's Africa Bureau allocated $128 million[1] of the $200 million to provide agriculture development assistance to West Africa. This appendix further details the Global Food Security Response (GFSR) supplemental funding received by each West African mission, the implementing partner/program, and GFSR funding by program that was selected for review during this audit.[6]

USAID Mission	Total GFSR Funding	Selected Implementing Partner	Selected Program and GFSR Funding
Ghana	$25 million	Agricultural Cooperative Development International and Volunteers in Overseas Cooperative Assistance	Ghana Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement, a Farmer-to-Farmer Program $12 million
Liberia	$10 million	Development Alternatives, Inc.	Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II $5 million
Mali	$20 million	Abt Associates, Inc.	Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali $8 million
Nigeria	$25 million	Chemonics International Inc.	Maximizing Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted Sites $23 million
Senegal	$23 million	International Resource Group	Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness $11 million
West Africa Regional	$25 million	Abt Associates, Inc.	Agribusiness and Trade Promotion $1 million

[6] Each mission had multiple implementing partners/programs that received GFSR supplemental funds. The implementing partners listed were selected for review because they managed either the largest GFSR-funded program or the earliest GFSR-funded program for the respective mission. As each partner may have implemented more than one program for the mission, only the relevant GFSR program was selected for review.

SELECTED INDICATORS, TARGETS, AND RESULTS

This appendix details, by mission, the indicators selected for review during this audit. The results listed were reported by the implementing partners for fiscal year 2009.[7]

Ghana

Program: Agricultural Development and Value Chain Enhancement (ADVANCE)

The agreement for this program was signed in July 2009. As of fiscal yearend, indicators and targets had not yet been established.

Liberia

Program: Liberia Community Infrastructure Project II (LCIP II)

Indicator	Target	Result	Variance (%)
Number of additional hectares under improved technologies or management practices	2,333	1,864	-20
Number of persons participating in workforce development program	2,910	4,531	56
Number of farmers trained in agricultural sector productivity	2,970	3,506	18
Number of microenterprises receiving business development services, including for example, value chain	1,110	3,832	245

Mali

Program: Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM)

Indicator	Target	Result	Variance (%)
Number of additional hectares farmed using improved technologies or management practices	2,500	2,784	11
Number of rural households benefiting directly from U.S. Government assistance	3,000	4,757	59
Value of the U.S. Government-supported special funds loans issued this year (in millions of West African francs)	565	673	19
Number of participants in the training sessions on the trade and investment environment	400	1,968	392

[7] Targets and results were obtained from mission and implementing partner reports. Specific audit procedures to validate their accuracy were not performed.

Nigeria

Program: Maximizing Agricultural Revenue and Key Enterprises in Targeted Sites (MARKETS)

Indicator	Target	Result	Variance (%)
Number of farmers, processors, and others who have adopted new technologies or management practices as a result of U.S. Government assistance	27,000	97,039	259
Area under improved management	27,500	27,592	0
Number of individuals who have received short-term agricultural sector productivity training with U.S. Government assistance	18,000	33,060	84
Number of bank and Microfinance Institution loans facilitated for clients	30,000	83,304	178

Senegal

*Program: Support for Accelerated Growth and Increased Competitiveness (SAGIC)**

Indicator	Target	Results	Variance (%)
Number of individuals who have received U.S. Government-supported short term agricultural environment enabling training	20	0	-100
Number of women's organizations/associations assisted as a result of USAID intervention	50	0	-100
Number of public-private partnerships formed as a result of a USAID assistance	2	0	-100
Number of rural households that benefited directly from U.S. Government assistance	3,000	0	-100

*Owing to late agreement signing in the fiscal year, no activity results were available.

West Africa Regional

Program: Agribusiness and Trade Promotion (ATP)

Indicator	Target	Result	Variance (%)
Number of institutions/ organizations making significant improvements in their clients based on recommendations of ATP-supported assessments	3	3	0
Number of users of regional market information system	5,000	8,000	60
Number of institutions/ organizations undergoing capacity/ competency assessments as a result of U.S. Government assistance	4	23	475
Number of individuals who have received short-term agricultural enabling environment training as a result of U.S. Government assistance (men and women)	250	468	87

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