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## **Agriculture for Children's Empowerment (ACE) Project Assessment**



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# Agriculture for Children's Empowerment (ACE) Project Assessment

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An Activity under the Supporting Transformation by Reducing Insecurity  
and Vulnerability with Economic Strengthening (STRIVE) Program

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Communities, and Time in Project..... 45

## ACRONYMS

ACDI/VOCA	An agricultural development non-governmental organization
ACE	Agriculture for Children’s Empowerment Project
AED	Academy for Educational Development
CARI	Central Agricultural Research Institute
DCOF	Displaced Children and Orphans Fund
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
GITCO	An agricultural produce wholesaler supplying UNMIL and private sector businesses in Liberia
GoL	Government of Liberia
IP	Input providers
IRIS	Research and Advisory Center, University of Maryland
LFC	Liberian Farms and Cooperatives
LIFE	Livelihood Improvement for Farming Enterprises
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NERICA	New Rice for Africa
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
STRIVE	Supporting Transformation by Reducing Insecurity and Vulnerability with Economic Strengthening
SUCCESS	Sustainable Cocoa Enterprise Solutions for Smallholders
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USDA	US Department of Agriculture

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Project Overview**

The four-year Agriculture for Children's Empowerment (ACE) Project has as its ultimate goal improvement in the welfare of children living in poorer rural areas of Bong, Nimba, and Montserrado Counties in Liberia. Improved child welfare will be achieved by increasing incomes and the availability of food in the farming households where the children live. The ACE program is helping farmers in the target households in vegetable production and potentially rice production using an integrated value chain approach that is private sector and market driven. The key interventions are improved market linkages, increased access to input supply, technical and business support, and the financing of the new inputs. The second part of the project is to magnify the impacts of the income and food increases on child well-being through (1) targeting ACE communities with public information campaigns about children's nutrition and the value of education and (2) working with local schools on education, farming, and nutrition.

Funding for the project comes from the Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), which is administered by the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). ACE is one of four field projects under the Supporting Transformation by Reducing Insecurity and Vulnerability with Economic Strengthening (STRIVE) project. Through STRIVE, the Academy for Educational Development (AED), heads a partnership of leading economic strengthening and child-focused organizations, which are implementing field projects in Mozambique, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, as well as in Liberia. The specific learning from each of these four projects is intended to contribute to the overall objective of STRIVE, which is to improve understanding of (and thereby, future programming) how market-based economic strengthening can improve the capacity of vulnerable families to provide more adequately for their children's needs. The STRIVE partners are collaborating to share what is learned from the respective field projects. In Liberia, the lead partner for the ACE project is ACDI/VOCA, which is supported by AED and the Research and Advisory Center (IRIS) at the University of Maryland. The latter provides technical support to the project concerning monitoring and evaluation. The principle local ACE partners are private sector agribusiness firms in input supply and crop wholesaling.

The ACE project was approved in September 2008 with operations starting in early 2009. To date, the hub of the ACE project has been value chain facilitation among smallholder farmers for high-value vegetable production. In May 2010, a team of three arranged by DCOF worked with ACE staff to carry out a mid-term assessment of the project.

### **Assessment Team and Methods**

This assessment was undertaken in mid-May 2010 by Lloyd Feinberg, USAID's manager for Special Programs Addressing the Needs of Survivors (SPANS, which includes DCOF); Jim Dempsey, consultant economist; and John Williamson, DCOF's senior technical advisor. The assessment document was written by Jim Dempsey with technical input and advice from the other team members. The team reviewed ACE reports and other background documentation, interviewed key informants, ACE staff, and Liberian smallholder farmers. The Scope of Work

for the assessment is in Appendix 1. The itinerary is included in Appendix 2. The list of key informants is attached as Appendix 3.

The team wishes to thank the many people who helped them gather information and learn about ACE for this assessment. The ACE staff and especially its chief of party, Mahawa Wheeler, were generous in their time and input on the history and experience of ACE in Liberia.

## **Findings**

The work through ACE to develop value chain interventions to increase smallholder production, income, and food has taken a successful set of initial steps. ACE has opened the value chain for high-value vegetable production and sale by smallholders. It is too early in the project to confirm success overall, but the fact that the achievements are positive at this early stage bodes well for future results, especially since the farmers are still recovering from the war's devastation.

The ACE staff has worked through four separate and individually challenging interventions: input supply, technical and business support, contract buying, and financing. In more normal economic circumstances, any one of these interventions might have been enough to expand smallholder production and incomes in a vegetable value chain. The ACE staff is to be commended for putting a four-part package together that is private sector and market driven. Several factors make this ACE achievement significant. The first is that Liberian farmers are in a recovery period where the history of humanitarian assistance and free farm inputs and support undermine efforts at private sector approaches. Secondly, Liberian farmers have a weakened set of commercially relevant farming skills and experiences to draw upon in both production and marketing. They were driven from farming by the war and many spent years as displaced persons. Traditional markets and market structures collapsed. Third, many farmers lack basic education and numeracy, in part because the war's turmoil robbed them of schooling opportunities.

The ACE input supply initiative has opened a small but growing number of farmers to the benefit of modern inputs with a good understanding of the cost and challenges of their use. Two local suppliers are committed to continuing to market and sell to smallholders. Although the experience to date on adding field agents to the input suppliers' business model has resulted in only one agent being hired, the precedent has been set. As input business grows for the providers, additional field agents are likely to be hired.

The ACE project decision to directly provide through its staff technical and business assistance to the project is bringing the farmers the knowledge to effectively use the inputs and understand the needs of the high-value markets. ACE efforts to use input supplier agents were commendable, but the move to direct provision was necessary.

ACE success in finding a buyer that would contract for the purchase of high-value vegetables was a significant achievement. The buyer's agreement to finance half the cost of inputs closed the loop on a package of interventions that enabled smallholders to produce high-value vegetables.

## Principle Recommendations

The assessment presents sixteen recommendations, the most important of which are listed below:

- ACE will need to continue to focus on the value chain of high-value vegetables. The ability of smallholder farmers to produce the vegetables is still quite limited. Building the capacity of the smallholders to respond to changes in the vegetable market and operate sustainably are goals to continue addressing.
- Although there are subsidy and policy issues that make the rice market a challenge, its central place as a staple food in Liberia and the opportunities presented by improved rice varieties justify that ACE begin active work in this value chain. Now that the vegetable value chain interventions are well underway, it is time for a rice initiative.
- ACE should begin technical support and experimentation with small farmers to determine the feasibility and financial attractiveness of higher-value traditional vegetable production.
- Given the various strategic structures and objectives found in ACE documentation, the ACE partners, with leadership by the ACE field staff, should establish and reinforce a common strategic or results framework among actors (ACE field staff, AED, and IRIS) and in project documentation.
- The ACE annual report should summarize progress in a comprehensive manner and relate it to the overall ACE goals and plans. ACE needs to prepare annual work plans, and the annual report should be a bridge between the previous year's annual work plan and the next year's plan.
- Looking at the timing of ACE evaluation plans in light of the slower-than-expected economic strengthening results, ACE and IRIS should consider adjusting the plans to reflect the fact that many important results will not come about until mid to late 2012.

## 1. Overview and Progress of the Agriculture for Children's Empowerment (ACE) Project

### a. ACE Objectives

ACE is one of four field projects under the Supporting Transformation by Reducing Insecurity and Vulnerability with Economic Strengthening (STRIVE) project financed by USAID's Displaced Children and Orphan Fund (DCOF). A five-year, \$16 million effort, STRIVE was developed to seek market-led economic strengthening initiatives that improve child welfare, and thereby generate learning that can be applied to future programming. STRIVE has funded four projects with differing economic strengthening interventions. The projects are located in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Mozambique, and Liberia (ACE). By tracking and documenting the impacts of these diverse interventions on child-level indicators related to both economic (financial), and non-economic (e.g., health, education, and nutrition) vulnerability factors, STRIVE aims to fill current knowledge gaps about effective economic strengthening approaches and their impact on reducing the vulnerability of children and youth.

DCOF's decision to initiate STRIVE was motivated by the recognition that most previous efforts to use family-focused economic strengthening to benefit children had failed to produce sustained results. In DCOF's view, this is often because such programming has not been based on adequate market and value chain analysis nor designed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated by personnel with adequate expertise and experience in both economic strengthening and programming for vulnerable children.

The four-year ACE project has as its ultimate goal improvement in the well-being of children living in poorer rural areas of Bong, Nimba, and Montserrado Counties in Liberia. Improved child welfare will be achieved by increasing incomes and the availability of food in the farming households where the children live. ACE is helping the farmers in the target households in vegetable production and potentially rice growing using an integrated value chain approach that is private sector and market driven. The key interventions are (1) improved market linkages, (2) increased access to input supply, (3) technical and business support to improve farming techniques and the use of the new inputs, and (4) financing. Other interventions may be added as needed to ensure production and income increases.

Farming parents and caregivers are the project's central participants. The project does not include integral roles for children (though some involvement with family farm activities is likely), but they are intended to be the ultimate beneficiaries. A research component implemented by the IRIS Center of the University of Maryland, including both qualitative and quantitative surveys, is being implemented to assess whether and how children benefit from increased household income and food availability. This is in addition to the project's own monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities, which focus primarily on its economic activities, outputs, and outcomes.

The second part of the project's original design concerns magnifying the impacts of the income and food increases on child well-being through (1) targeting ACE communities with public information campaigns about children's nutrition and the value of education and (2) working

with local schools on education, farming, and nutrition. The efforts with the schools have included the establishment or expansion of gardens as demonstration plots, introduction of a simulation game on farming as a business, and strengthening Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) as a means to raise the value of education in the community.

There are multiple uses and meanings of the term “value chain” that cause confusion in the discussion of projects such as ACE. It is most often used when the author wants to describe the sector in a comprehensive way with a focus on market and value-added chains or components in the industry or crop sector. The term value chain is used in this way in ACE. Value chain is also used to describe an analytical approach to increase competitiveness of a crop or sector, such as USAID’s Accelerated Microenterprise Advancement Project (AMAP) value chain model. ACE value chain interventions seek to increase smallholder share and returns within the value chain. No formal value chain analyses were completed for ACE, but a strong understanding of the rice and vegetable crops and markets underlies ACE interventions and decisions.

#### b. Project Organization and Structure

The Academy for Educational Development (AED), leads the STRIVE consortium, a partnership of leading economic strengthening and child-focused organizations that are collaborating to implement and share learning about effective, sustainable economic strengthening activities that benefit vulnerable children. The consortium members are ACDI/VOCA, Action for Enterprise, CARE USA, Mennonite Economic Development Associates, Save the Children US, and the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland. AED has a staff of four at its headquarters in Washington D.C. who coordinate the overall STRIVE program.

The lead partner and implementer for ACE is ACDI/VOCA, which has a professional technical staff of seven in Liberia. The present composition of the team is as follows:


<b>Name</b>	<b>Position</b>	<b>Location</b>
Mahawa Wheeler	Manager/Chief of Party	Monrovia
Laveto Forkpa	Deputy Manager	Gbarnga, Bong Co.
Albert Thompson	Crop Production Facilitator	Gbarnga, Bong Co.
Nathaniel Johnson	Farming as a Business Facilitator	Ganta, Nimba Co
Marvelous Queejay	Crop Production Facilitator	Ganta, Nimba Co.
Tommy Fofana	M&E and Business Coordinator	Monrovia
Joe Myenen	PTA Specialist	Bong and Nimba Co

The members of the field staff in Bong and Nimba were hired during the first quarter of 2010. Financial and administrative functions are carried out by three additional ACDI/VOCA personnel who share their time among all the organization’s projects in Liberia. IRIS is an ACE

partner whose role is to participate in and strengthen STRIVE’s learning components, and it works with the ACDI/VOCA staff on ACE M&E planning and implementation. IRIS has no permanent field staff in Liberia, but periodically sends technical personnel to consult with ACE staff on M&E. Iris has hired a local firm to gather needed data for M&E.

ACDI/VOCA used a participatory assessment method, as well as various measures of poverty, food insecurity, and child vulnerability to select target areas and farmer communities. ACE was working in three counties and fifteen communities at the time of the assessment. At least one other community had been dropped from ACE because of a lack of commitment. Map 1 shows the location of the districts where ACE is working. Appendix 4 includes detailed maps of the Montserrado, Bong, and Nimba counties with ACE communities identified.

Map 1



When doing the initial planning for ACE, ACDI/VOCA reviewed various crop value chains to determine which offered the highest potential to meet project objectives. The main criteria were potential sector growth, farm upgrading potential, extent of smallholder participation, vulnerable child impact, quick impact, and farm family nutrition. Based on its analyses, the vegetable and rice value chains were selected for ACE. ACDI/VOCA wrote in its proposal:

Rice is the staple food of Liberia. It is grown by over half of all rural households, but productivity is so low that families cannot grow enough to feed themselves, let alone sell surplus production. The vast majority of subsistence households (about 63 percent) produce rice exclusively on the uplands. Significant potential for irrigation exists (estimated at about 600,000 hectares), with less than 1 percent developed....

Vegetables are grown under nearly all farming systems to some extent. Typical crops include plantain and local vegetables, e.g., pepper and bitter balls (a local eggplant variety) as well as fruits such as bananas, pineapples, oranges and avocados. However, horticultural production is severely constrained by lack of transport and appropriate transport facilities. Post-harvest losses are high and pests pose a serious threat to product quality. The availability of and accessibility to essential production inputs such as seeds, fertilizers and pesticides are inadequate, especially for smallholders because of their relatively low investment capacities. Further, there are no reliable systems of market information and promotion to provide smallholders with market options.

The principle local ACE partner organizations are private sector agribusiness firms. The two input supplier partners are Green Farms and ANARCO, both of which are small local firms based in Monrovia. At an early stage, ACE also worked with T.R. Enterprises, another local distributor, but that firm decided to focus on the production and marketing of larger-scale agricultural and agribusiness machinery.

The two partner input suppliers have up-country operations that are convenient to ACE farmers. ANARCO has a store in Ganta in Nimba County, while Green Farms has one in Gbarnga in Bong County. The key partner among buyers is GITGO, an expatriate-run wholesale operation that buys fresh produce, which it sells to restaurants, supermarkets, and most importantly the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), which has approximately 11,000 military and civilian personnel. ACE has developed relationships with other buyers and input suppliers, but thus far, the only firms with which agreements have been facilitated with farmers are Green Farms, ANARCO, and GITCO.

The sale of fruits and vegetables through public markets is largely controlled by the Market Women's Association, known locally as "Gorba-chop" women. They work in wholesaling, retailing, transporting, and sorting of local fruits and vegetables. ACE staff have been working to build trust with the Gorba-chops, but to date have not found a place for their services in the project. The Gorba-chop women are closed about their businesses and their contributions to the value chain are not understood well. Most farmers believe that the Gorba-chops collude to keep prices low.

An important potential new partner is Liberian Farms and Cooperatives, which is owned and operated by a businessman from the American Liberian diaspora. This agribusiness firm is one of three principle growers of certified New Rice for Africa (NERICA) 14, an improved variety of upland rice seed that has a high yield and short growing season, and which is well adapted to local conditions. The short growing season for NERICA 14 means that potentially two rice crops could be grown during the rainy season. ACE is exploring distribution and marketing options for the NERICA 14 seed with the Central Agricultural Research Institute (CARI) and Liberian Farms and Cooperatives. ACE has also partnered with Cuttington University to provide some technical support from students and faculty to ACE farmers.

Finally, through the Ministry of Education's District Education Officers in Bong and Nimba counties, ACE has partnered with local schools to implement some activities for students,

teachers, and PTA members. An anticipated ACE initiative for radio announcements and programs on agricultural and education has not yet been implemented.

### c. Implementation and Interventions: An Overview

The ACE project was approved in September 2008, and operations in the field began in early 2009, which gave ACE just enough time to begin plans and support for the rainy season starting in March-April. Typically, the rains end and dry season starts in September. There was an input supplier focus from the project's beginning, given farmers' need to access the inputs of new seed, fertilizer, and chemicals for land preparation and planting for the first set of seasons. An ACE document reporting on inputs noted that prior to ACE, "inputs were available only in the capital city of Monrovia. Most input providers only worked with larger farmers and had limited interactions with the broader market base of rural and peri-urban Liberian smallholders. Additionally, input providers focused mainly on sales more than support services and developing long-term relationships with customers. Unless a smallholder farmer received inputs through a relief organization or could manage the costs (both financial and opportunity) of travelling from the rural areas to Monrovia or the other two major trading centers, options were limited to inputs received through friends and family networks, or sub-standard and unregulated inputs sold through informal markets."

Upgrading of farming systems started with the new inputs, but increasing farmer knowledge to use these inputs turned out to be a challenge. Farmer skills and knowledge proved to be lower than expected. A private sector approach to farmer upgrading, where the input provider included technical assistance through field agents to the farmers, was the plan. With both ANARCO and Green Farms, ACE funded for six months a technical advisor, who was called an intern, as a way to demonstrate to the firms the benefits of a field agent who both promotes inputs use and shows farmers how to use them. Subsequently, Green Farm did retain the field agent as a regular employee after the six months of ACE funding ended. ANARCO did not and does not have a field agent at present; however, in both companies, the store staff (Green Farms in Gbarnga and ANARCO in Ganta) provide some production advice.

Both firms carried out promotional events primarily at local markets where farmers gathered. ACE did collect information on twenty-two farmers (See Appendix 5) who bought inputs following promotional events. The results were positive and in some cases resulted in significant production increases. The farmers in this sample witnessed improvements from the inputs and had the benefit of field agent advice. These farmers grew traditional crops during the time when both ANARCO and Green Farms had ACE-supported field agents. The crops grown were generally the traditional vegetables of bitter balls, cabbage, hot peppers, and watermelon. This small sample reinforces the ACE staff position that farm inputs with appropriate technical advice will result in higher production and incomes for smallholder farmers.

Since there was only one new field agent for input providers and ACE had found the needs of smallholder farmers for technical and business advice were large, in the first quarter of 2010 the project added four personnel to its staff to serve as agricultural and business advisors in Bong and Nimba Counties. A field supervisor was also hired and centrally based in Bong County. ACE also worked to better understand the vegetable marketing chains and the key actors.

Identifying a buyer willing to provide forward contracts for the purchase of vegetables was a priority. A set of high-value vegetable crops were identified as offering the highest returns to the ACE farmer. A contract buyer, GITGO, which sells to a range of restaurants, supermarkets, and most importantly UNMIL, signed contracts with seventy-nine farmers working on fifteen farm sites.

An initial constraint was that farmers did not have the cash needed to buy the inputs required to grow these high-value crops. To address this, ACE made an arrangement with the contract buyer, GITCO, which agreed to finance about half the cost of the necessary inputs, with ACE providing the balance. GITGO and ACE will recover their respective input costs at the time of produce sale, when input costs will be deducted from payments to farmers for the contracted crops.

The rains started late in both 2009 and 2010, and the ACE-supported high-value vegetable crops for 2010 have required hand watering. The ACE project has bought treadle pumps to explore their use during the dry season and in periods when the rains are delayed; however, the pumps have not yet been used because hoses of the required diameter were not available in Liberia.

Looking ahead, ACE is pursuing the addition of other crop value chains to its program, most likely rice and traditional vegetables that do not require significant inputs. The staff is also building contacts and understanding of the local market traders, especially the “Gorba-chop” women who handle wholesale, sorting, and transport for local markets throughout Liberia.

#### d. Implementation and Learning: Interventions for High-Value Vegetable Value Chain

To date, the hub of the ACE project has been value chain facilitation among smallholder farmers for high-value vegetable production. ACE's experience, especially over the last six months as the project expanded to a larger group of communities, has been a slower-than-expected uptake of high-value vegetable production practices by farmers. As the staff explained, this is due to a number of factors, but especially to a donor dependence mentality (e.g., free handouts of inputs rather than commercial sales) that has pervaded Liberian agriculture. Other constraining factors are inherent trust issues in business relationships (likely exacerbated by the war), the limited opportunities for commercial contacts for inputs and sales, smallholders' lack of experience with contract-based farming, and the risk-averse attitude of market players. In addition, agricultural knowledge among smallholders is very low, and current market practices do not favor innovation in a subsidized market such as rice.

The number of farmers that are formally participating in high-value vegetable production is very small, only seventy-nine. These farmers are receiving technical support from ACE staff and input providers, as well as buyer-supplied credit for inputs. GITGO has signed contracts for the purchase of select high-value vegetables grown by these farmers. ACE reports that initially 1,000 farmers expressed interest in growing high-value crops, but most decided not to participate when they found that the project would not be providing free inputs.

There are other farmers who have purchased inputs and may be using improved farming techniques. These are farmers who purchased inputs as a result of promotional events by Green

Farm and ANARCO, which were facilitated by ACE. Their numbers are small, however, and ACE's impact on them is likely rather limited. There are also a few farmers that have benefited from ACE-facilitated market linkages. Both sets of farmers benefited from ACE during its first year as it experimented and learned about the vegetable value chains and before ACE selected the high-value vegetable market for a comprehensive set of value chain interventions.

The assessment team findings coupled with the recent IRIS focus group interviews with the core set of ACE-supported farmers are summarized below:

- Project smallholders have not found great potential for gain, given the low yield and production problems to date for what are being called high-value vegetables.
- The learning curve to grow high-value vegetables by all accounts is steep for the ACE farmers and the margin for error appears to be rather narrow. This is a significant concern since ACE selected the better farmers for the project who could serve as a model for other smallholders who are slower to adopt new crops and systems.
- The poor returns largely rest on technical production challenges that have emerged. Neither tomatoes nor eggplant has proven to grow well, even with the use of soil treatment for nematodes, fertilizer, and pesticide that suppliers have provided. This is particularly challenging because there does not appear to be capacity in-country to analyze and identify the specific reasons that these crops have failed.
- IRIS and ACE staff point out that the project has the potential to improve the economic well-being of farming households, both through actual production increases in target crops such as high-value vegetables, as well as through applying the knowledge transferred for the high-value crops to other crops. The IRIS team writes: "Project farmers are using the methods taught by ACE and implemented on group plots to improve their own fields or gardens, perhaps thereby expanding the amount of 'traditional' food that the family has to eat or to sell through local markets. For example, the IRIS team witnessed a project farmer measuring the distances between crop rows in the small garden next to his house, for planting hot peppers and cassava."
- Roads and distance to markets are concerns of all farmers but are not insurmountable.
- Input costs are seen as high by farmers, but given that free distribution was the norm during the immediate post-war recovery period, farmer price expectations are unrealistic. Donor dependency exists.
- IRIS found that there is confusion about who is "providing" the inputs. Many smallholders say that ACE is providing or delivering the inputs, as opposed to the input provider firms. The assessment team did not encounter this confusion.
- Farmers' concerns about the buyers centered on payment issues related to weight or measurement of product. Cabbage and lettuce were the crops where there were different opinions about what constituted the unit for which a price had been set.
- ACE is at the beginning of its second rainy season and it is the first with a clear program and a set of interventions based on a strong understanding of the high-value vegetable value chain. With the completion of this rainy season, ACE will have two years and thus only two rainy seasons and two dry seasons to affect change. Its time is short.

#### e. ACE Implementation and Learning: School-Based Activities

The original proposal for ACE included as a minor component incorporating “Farming as a Business” curriculum into schools. At an early stage of project implementation, ACE began to give even greater emphasis to the role of schools than had been indicated in the proposal. A March 2009 document that the STRIVE project manager shared with DCOF indicated the following:

The initial proposal did not take full advantage of the capacity of community schools to become vital service providers in their communities and catalyze greater value on learning within communities. The proposed ACE work plan applied recent lessons learned in re-crafting the approach and management tactics of ACE to maximize impact by leveraging schools to foster greater upgrading of on-farm production, while increasing the value proposition of child education. The key to achieving these additional and lasting benefits rests in fostering ownership of the behavior-change process and grounding the process in more effective relationships (within and between the value chain actors, communities, schools, and ME/farm actors).<sup>1</sup>

During the project’s start-up period October to December 2008, ACE staff visited two schools together with input providers and brokered the signing of sponsorship agreements between the schools and input providers to establish school gardens as demonstration plots for the input providers. During the same period, ACE also “engaged in participatory strategic planning sessions with seven schools, involving Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs), community leaders, and students. The schools agreed broadly to the following goals:

- Improving school performance;
- Establishing a school garden that generates revenue and provides learning opportunities for children and adults;
- Providing information on improved nutrition for children and adults; and
- Improving business understanding and skills in the community.”<sup>2</sup>

Also, during this period of project development, ACE “brokered a relationship between the West Africa Examination Council Liberia and the schools to intensify and improve the quality of the Council’s support to schools.” This collaboration was foreseen as a way to reduce anxiety about school exams and to improve performance.<sup>3</sup>

During the January-March 2009 quarter, ACE introduced input providers to communities through meetings organized by PTAs. ACE also helped schools organize events to recognize good academic performance by students and worked with them on organizing parent-teacher conferences. Two teachers and the principal of each school in the project communities were

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<sup>1</sup> “STRIVE (Supporting Transformation by Reducing Insecurity & Vulnerability with Economic Strengthening) - Program to Benefit Vulnerable Children,” March 2009, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid*, p. 2.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid*, p. 3.

trained in the use of a simulation game for promoting Farming as a Business. While the development of school gardens continued, their role as demonstration plots was de-emphasized, and greater attention was given to local farmer-owned farms as a more effective way to introduce high-value crops and the inputs and improved methods necessary to grow them. Some schools have also used their gardens as a way to teach and encourage better nutrition. In the first quarter of 2010, three out of five ACE-supported schools sold crops to local buyers. Crops include watermelon, hot pepper, okra, and rice, with a total value of approximately \$500.

One of the factors that lead to the project decision that school gardens would not be effective demonstration sites for high-value crops was the recognition that their effective cultivation requires labor-intensive effort. Such effort was not being applied to school plots. This level of effort is more feasible where farmers are cultivating their own land from which they expect to benefit directly from the crops produced.

In September of 2009 during a visit to Liberia, DCOF leadership made a decision that the project should focus on the value chain, economic strengthening aspects of ACE. The school, nutrition, and radio activities were to be deemphasized. Since economic strengthening has proven to be more challenging than originally thought, DCOF said that ACE should focus its efforts on food and income growth. It recognized that any efforts to “magnify” project impact through ancillary activities would fail unless households experience income and food production growth.

## **2. Assessment of Key Value Chain Interventions**

### **a. Input Supplier and Farmer Technical and Business Assistance**

Both the ACE proposal and the staff implementing ACE placed heavy emphasis on the market-driven, private sector provision of new and improved inputs to increase production and income for the target farmers. To achieve this end, ACE recognized that the free distribution of inputs by relief organizations was a serious challenge to the ACE plan to sell inputs. In the immediate aftermath of the war, free distributions of seeds and tools was an appropriate response to the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons who had lost all assets during the conflict and required basic inputs in order to return to farming. In principle, once the farmers were again producing at sufficient levels, free distributions should stop. However, what constitutes sufficient levels is effectively a matter individually determined by donors and NGOs. Clearly many farm households remain food insecure. While some farmers in the target counties have continued to receive free inputs, ACE has worked to promote the sale of private sector provided inputs. It has been successful in convincing some NGOs not to distribute free inputs and has influenced a limited number of farmers to purchase inputs.

One clear requirement then for the sale of inputs is that they deliver the high yields and income promised. The technical, management, and financial burdens of the purchased inputs are significant. Some crops, such as tomatoes and eggplant, have thus far failed commercially among nearly all ACE farmers who have tried to grow them. The reasons for this failure are not known, and the absence of soil and agronomic testing facilities in Liberia is an indirect cause of crop failure. Yet, some crops are proving to provide good yields and higher income. Hot peppers,

sweet peppers, and lettuce are growing well, and in the first quarter of 2010, ACE farmers received a total of \$2,600 from such sales.

This limited production success has come not just with the new seeds, fertilizer, and chemicals, but also with the critically important technical skills provided with the inputs. This technical support is coming from several sources. As previously discussed, ACE-funded field agent trials for the input suppliers successfully demonstrated to Green Farms the commercial viability of a field agent to promote and sell inputs with follow-on technical support to client farmers. This is an attractive market-driven technical support solution. ACE also supported junior- and senior-level agriculture students from Cuttington University to work with project farmers to provide technical support. By all accounts, the seventeen students who were assigned to work with a small group of farmers provided hands-on technical assistance that came at a critical planting time in the production cycle and before the ACE field staff was hired. Cuttington staff supervised and helped direct student work and technical support for the farms. The success of the Cuttington program has led ACE to plan for additional student field support programs.

A significant adjustment to ACE has been the addition in the first quarter of 2010 of five field staff for both technical and business support to farmers. Two Farming as a Business Facilitators are teaching farmers to keep records of costs, yields, and revenue so as to better understand the factors and trade-offs in production and profit. Agronomic and technical support provided by the other field staff is building farmers' capacity to grow and market additional high-value vegetables.

The original ACE proposal anticipated collaboration with several local agricultural extension organizations to provide technical assistance to ACE farmers. The plan was initially to fund these services through a grant, which would decline over the life of the project as the relevant organizations developed appropriate fee-based services and farmers grew to understand the value of these services. As indicated in the proposal, ACDI/VOCA has had experience in such arrangement in more than ten countries. However, such an arrangement has not proved viable for Liberia.

#### b. Buyers and Forward Contracts

The ACE marketing interventions to date have centered on the sale of high-value vegetables bound for a select group of local consumers. The marketing chain is short for these vegetables. Local producers sell to wholesalers who distribute to end markets, basically supermarkets, UNMIL, and some restaurants. At present, most of the vegetables for this market are imported from neighboring countries or Europe. Top quality is a requirement, and local producers must meet this quality standard. Throughout the value chain there is clear recognition that local production has enormous potential which, in time, will substitute for imports. ACE has facilitated a relationship for the farmers with an important buyer, GITGO, which has provided, not only forward contracts for farmers, but also has partially financed input for the farmers through direct payments to input suppliers. At this early stage, having only one buyer is adequate and may be the only feasible option given the low level of farmer production. That GITGO is providing financing is evidence of the business potential of such a relationship. Very small

amounts of high-value vegetables have been sold to a few supermarkets on a trial basis, but if production by ACE farmers increases, additional buyers will be needed.

### c. Financing Input Supply

ACE's experience with finance is limited to date. GITGO's provision of partial financing of inputs for high-value vegetables is the only intervention to date. The buyer financing was matched by what could be called a no-cost loan to the farmers paid to the input supplier by the ACE project itself. The loan is secured by the farmer's contract with the buyer, who has committed to deduct the loan amount to repay ACE once the contracted vegetables are sold. Discussions with both Green Farms and ANARCO during the assessment identified a potential willingness on the part of both to finance ACE farmer inputs through an agreement with the contract buyer for payment from farmer revenues.

### d. Overall Findings: High-Value Vegetable Package

The work under ACE to develop value chain interventions to increase smallholder production, income, and food has taken a successful set of initial steps. ACE has opened the value chain for high-value vegetable production and sale by smallholders. It is still early in the project to confirm success overall, but that the achievements are positive at this early stage bodes well for future results, especially since farmers are recovering from the war and the devastation that it brought to Liberia.

The ACE staff has worked through four separate and individually challenging interventions: 1) input supply, 2) technical and business support, 3) contract buying, and 4) financing. In more normal economic circumstances, any one of these interventions might have been enough to expand smallholder production and incomes in a vegetable value chain. The ACE staff is to be commended for putting the four-part package together that is private sector and market driven. Several factors make the ACE achievement remarkable. The first is that Liberian farmers are in a recovery period where the history of donor assistance and free supplies undermine efforts at a private sector approach. Secondly, since Liberian farmers were forced off their land and out of local markets for a great part of the war years, their farming skills and marketing contacts are now weak. Also, many farmers lack basic education and numeracy because schooling opportunities, never universal, were further constrained by the war.

The input supply initiative has introduced a small but growing number of farmers to the benefit of modern inputs, along with a good understanding of the costs and challenges of their use. Two local suppliers are committed to continuing to market and sell to smallholders. Although the experience to date on adding field agents to the input suppliers' business model has resulted in only one agent being hired, the precedent has been set. As input business grows for these firms, additional field agents are likely to be hired.

The ACE project decision to directly provide through its staff technical and business assistance is teaching farmers to effectively use the inputs and understand the needs of the high-value markets. ACE efforts to use input supplier agents were commendable, but the move to direct

provision was a necessary interim step to establish smallholders' links to the value chain of high-value vegetables.

ACE success in finding a buyer that would contract for the purchase of high-value vegetables was a significant achievement. That the buyer agreed to finance half the inputs, closed the loop on the package of interventions and enabled the smallholder to produce high-value vegetables.

### ***Recommendations***

Continued Support Regarding High-Value Vegetables: ACE will need to continue to focus on the high-value vegetable value chain. The ability of smallholder farmers to produce such vegetables remains a challenge. Building the capacity of the smallholders to respond to changes in the vegetable market and operate sustainably are important longer-term goals for the project.

Exit Strategy for Technical and Business Support: The ACE team must keep its planning directed toward an exit strategy from the business and technical assistance that it provides the smallholders. It is central to the success to date, and its withdrawal at the end of ACE could be a major setback if a workable exit strategy is not found.

Financing: Given the limited ACE interventions to date, ACE farmer financing needs are small. An obvious step at present is to end ACE direct financing, perhaps through input suppliers taking on the ACE share of input cost. As the project expands, the need for financing will grow. For example, the use of treadle pumps by farmers may be a production upgrade for vegetables. ACE should consider financing options for such pumps at the start of their introduction to again signal that ACE is not a free input provider.

Input Supplier Production Innovations: Although the high-value vegetable value chain has required a four-pronged set of interventions, other crop value chains may benefit from a simpler set of interventions or even a single input that a supplier could offer to farmers at a profit. Improved rice seed is an example, although for now, GoL policy and plans are likely to keep this from happening. Future supplier input interventions need to track sales and sample and test farmer input use to measure impact on farm-level production and income. The ACE staff has started to develop a basic system for such tracking.

### **3. Other Potential ACE Value Chain Interventions**

#### **a. The Rice Value Chain**

The ACE proposal identified the rice value chain as a priority given the high number of smallholder rice producers, the importance of rice as the staple food of Liberia, and the potential to market local rice as a substitute for imported rice. Also, families stand to benefit because increasing their rice production should make available more rice to consume, and it should reduce or eliminate their cash expenditures for rice, freeing household resources for other purposes. On average, 25 percent of total household expenditures in Liberia are for rice alone.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> *Comprehensive Food Security and Nutrition Survey*, Republic of Liberia, October 2006, p. 23.

The downside of engaging in the rice value chain is that imported rice is sold at a subsidized price, thus undermining the market for locally produced rice. The justification for the subsidized imports is that this low-priced rice is a critical part of the economic safety net for the urban poor. There are no indications for the present that the GoL will change the rice subsidy policy as the fear of a return of urban unrest and rice riots remains large.

The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Ministry of Agriculture estimate that that Liberians consume about 350,000 MT of rice per year, with about half grown locally and the rest imported. Rice production in Liberia is largely an upland crop grown during the rainy season. Slash and burn methods are used with the upland rice, and traditionally the rice is grown mixed with other local vegetables, such as hot peppers, bitter balls, and eddo. A perennial recommendation in Liberia for rice has been to shift from upland rice to paddy production. The potential benefits are: slash and burn of forest land will end, paddy yields will be much higher than upland, and the growing of rice will not be limited to the rainy season. Unfortunately, efforts over the last thirty years have not led to a significant move to paddy production.

In terms of upland production, there have been significant improvements in rice seed. Practically no new seed varieties have been introduced in Liberia in the last twenty years. However, a group of recently developed seeds known as NERICA offers tremendous advantages over the local varieties now used. The seeds are well adapted to local conditions, resist lodging and shattering, and give high yields. NERICA 14 was selected by the Ministry of Agriculture as the most attractive of the NERICA rice varieties because it not only has the resistance characteristics and produces high yields, but it also has a very short growing season of seventy-five to eighty days. This makes it possible for two rice crops to be grown during the rainy season.

The Ministry of Agriculture through the CARI has arranged for local commercial farmers to multiply and certify NERICA 14 for distribution. One of the farms, Liberia Farms and Cooperatives (LFC), produced about eight metric tons. To gauge small farmer interest, the owner of LFC with ACE staff visited project farmers and found a “huge demand” among ACE farmers to purchase the new seed. ACE and LFC commercial seed distribution and sales project is a viable and sustainable one for smallholder farmers in Liberia. However, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) has no seed policy at this point and plans for seed distribution are still taking shape. The likely scenario is for free distribution conditional on farmers returning a set amount of the rice to CARI and/or passing NERICA 14 rice as seed on to other farmers in the community.

### ***Recommendation***

Rice Seed Intervention: Although there are subsidy and policy issues that make the rice market a challenge, its central place as a staple food and major expenditure in Liberian households justifies ACE work in this value chain. Now that the vegetable value chain interventions are under implementation, it is time for a rice initiative. ACE’s decision to look at rice seed as an entry point is attractive given the potential high yields and the short growing season for NERICA 14. ACE’s predilection for private sector seed distribution may not be achieved given government plans and lack of seed policy. However, the underlying private and market approach

are principles that need to be carried into whatever program ACE can work out with the GoL. Discussion between the government and ACE on a conditional seed distribution and return program for small farmer exchange of NERICA 14 offers a potential channel to proceed.

**b. Traditional Vegetables Value Chain**

ACE is exploring traditional vegetable value chains for possible production changes or upgrades to produce more or sell into higher markets. Improved seeds and some fertilizer use may be a way to improve production for some farmers. The sample of twenty-two farmers who received inputs and some technical support during the ACE-supported input provider (IP) field agent trials (See Appendix 5) needs to be further analyzed to determine the level and type of technical support provided. Additional trials with farmers growing traditional vegetables are needed to find a commercially viable mix of inputs and technical support that smallholder farmers can afford.

ACE staff believes that an even stronger opportunity may lie in adjusting the growing season to have crop harvest during the dry season when the availability of the vegetables is low and the price is high. Farmers have knowledge and experience with traditional vegetables that do have these price cycles, most importantly bitter ball and hot pepper. Again the requirements for technical assistance and changes in the cropping system are few. Presented in Table 1 below are some preliminary findings from ACE on seasonal variation in the pricing of hot pepper and bitter ball.

**Table 1: Wholesale Prices for a Standard Bag of Vegetables, in Liberian Dollars**

Type of Vegetable	Dry Season Price	Rainy Season Price
Hot Pepper	L\$6500-7500	L\$2200-1300
Bitter Ball	~L\$2000	~L\$150

One aspects of producing bitter ball and hot pepper in the dry season is finding adequate water for crop growth. Production in wet lowlands or treadle pump irrigation are options to explore.

***Recommendation***

Higher-Value Traditional Vegetables Production: Bringing the traditional vegetables to market at times of relative scarcity and higher prices is the basis for a potentially higher return to the small farmer. Higher yields may also be possible with improved seeds. ACE should begin technical support to small farmers and explore with them the feasibility of increasing incomes through traditional vegetable production and marketing.

**4. Multiple Versions of ACE Strategy**

Different versions of the ACE project’s strategic approach have been produced at different stages, which undermine effective planning and management. There are different formats (strategic framework, causal model, logical framework) as well as variations in the objectives and achievements (called by various names: results, intermediate results, outcome, impact, outputs). No ACE reports or documentation were found during the assessment that selected a

particular version or revised or consolidated the various versions into a common strategic approach.

Listed below are five “strategic plans” that exist for ACE. For each, their proposed highest level of impact or objective is presented to provide a demonstration of substantive differences in them.

- 1) The original ACE STRIVE proposal uses a causal model with inputs, outputs, outcomes, and results at the highest level. At this top level, the results are improved child well-being and increased economic security for participating households.
- 2) The October 2008 draft M&E Plan presents a strategic framework similar to that used by USAID, rather than a causal model. The highest level in this strategy seeks improved child well-being through economic security for smallholders.
- 3) The quarterly and annual reports use the following description of ACE goals:
  - a) Increase local production of key staple foods by strengthening the vegetable and paddy rice value chains in Liberia’s Bong and Nimba counties.
  - b) Magnify impacts on child well-being by targeting communities with public information campaigns about children nutrition and the value of education.
  - c) Cultivate the next generation of Liberian farmers by working with local schools to introduce the Farming as a Business curriculum ....
- 4) The April 2010 M&E document uses a causal model with the highest level of impact being: improved household income, improved child educational outcomes, improved child nutrition, and improved child health.
- 5) The ACE field staff has prepared a variant of the logical framework for project planning, which has seventeen impact areas for economic strengthening and nine for social areas to improve child well-being.

The examples above show the substantive difference in the top level of the strategies. The differences become greater as one moves down the causal chain/strategic framework to lower-level result, outputs, and inputs.

Although there are multiple strategic approaches described in ACE documentation, its field staff has taken a very pragmatic approach using basic interventions that at this early stage of the project fit within the various strategic descriptions that exist for ACE. This fortunate circumstance will not continue as ACE matures and grows more complicated.

### ***Recommendations***

Common Objectives and Strategic Framework for ACE: Given the various strategic structures and objectives, the ACE partners with leadership by the ACE field staff should establish and reinforce a common framework among actors (ACE field staff, AED, and IRIS) and in project documentation. This framework will need to be in line with STRIVE objectives and recent DCOF guidance on the priority of increasing farmer incomes and food production. The importance of a commonly held and understood set of objectives and planned results should not be underestimated. It is important for motivating staff, directing the project, and learning in the professional field.

Continuing ACE Project Adjustments: Once a single strategic framework is accepted by all, it is important to establish strong processes to adjust and redirect the strategy as the project evolves. The ACE project will evolve because the Liberian economy and institutions are changing fast, as is smallholder learning about farming systems and crop markets. The likely additions of rice and traditional vegetable production as new interventions suggest coming changes.

ACE Field Staff Leadership: ACE field staff must be proactive in redirecting and setting the course for ACE interventions and their inevitable adjustment as the project adjusts to changes among smallholders and the country generally.

## **5. Monitoring and Evaluation**

Value chain program impact on household or business incomes are being measured across a wide range of countries, sectors, and programs. STRIVE's special place is in measuring changes in the well-being of farmers' children as income and food supply grow. There are important contributions that ACE monitoring and IRIS research and evaluation can make to measure child well-being.

### **a. Monitoring**

There is a need for robust monitoring that is focused on ACE-facilitated changes in farm income and food. Given that the path to increased incomes and food through farming is not clear in Liberia, ACE must be thorough, diligent, and timely in measuring the income and food impact of its value chain interventions. To achieve this, ACE monitoring must:

- 1) Gather basic farm business data on specific value chain interventions to quantify farmer expenses, revenues, and profit or loss; and
- 2) Quickly judge the effects of interventions and adjust activities to improve returns, reduce cost, or increase yields for farmers.

### **b. Evaluation**

According to the April 23, 2010, version of the ACE M&E Plan,<sup>5</sup> IRIS will gather quantitative data at only one point during the life of the project, during the second quarter of 2011. Given the fact that ACE interventions are taking time to develop and the project continues to try new approaches, the IRIS M&E plans, although methodologically sound, are unlikely to measure the effects of new initiatives during the second half of ACE. Any new value chain work, say in rice or local vegetables, will only be in its early stages when the quantitative survey is proposed to take place, and the project will still be in a learning phase regarding high-value vegetables, with low or even negative returns. It seems quite likely that ACE may not achieve significant results until near the end of the project in 2012.

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<sup>5</sup> STRIVE Liberia: Current, Pending Additional Information from Field Work (26 April – 14 May).

## **Recommendations**

Monitoring: ACDI/VOCA, with input from IRIS, should systematically collect more data on farm business and income generation that will help direct ACE operational interventions and decisions. The April 2010 IRIS draft monitoring plan presents a good start toward a business review of ACE farm production. ACDI/VOCA may be able to select some monitoring data and indicators from its logical framework document that provides indicators for ACE achievements.

Evaluation and Results Reporting: Considering the timing of ACE evaluation plans in light of the slower than expected economic strengthening results, ACE and IRIS should adjust the plans to reflect the fact that many important results will not come about until mid to late 2012. The adjustment is not just a matter of adding a quantitative survey in 2012, but rather a rethinking of the evaluation and results reporting timeframe to capture results, even those that come at the end of the project.

Three-Month Extension of the Project: ACE is scheduled to end in September 2012, which coincides with the end of the 2012 rainy season. Adding three months to the life of ACE would give the project time to ensure marketing of 2012 rainy season crops, as well as provide an opportunity for a final review of the income and food impacts in the ACE farm households. Some of ACE value chain interventions may be achieving their first significant impacts in 2012. The extra time could give IRIS more opportunity to evaluate late-starting interventions, as well as additional time to assess the project's effects on child well-being.

## **6. Reporting and Work Plans**

The content and structure of present quarterly and annual ACE reporting does not describe and present interventions and progress clearly. ACE reporting is consolidated with the other STRIVE field projects into a single document with a section on ACE. After considering feedback from DCOF on early reports, STRIVE began submitting quarterly reports that for each field project, including ACE, include a series of bullet points presented under the headings:

- Project Description
- Activities
- M&E Update
- Results
- Successes
- Challenges
- Key Learning
- Plans For Next Quarter

Although the project has made significant strategic adjustments over time (e.g., changes in engagement with schools), its description has remained the same from one report to the next. The distinction between “Results” and “Successes” is particularly unclear, and it is difficult for

readers to sort out the relationships between the project's activities on the one hand and the consequent results, successes, or challenges on the other. It is also difficult to understand where a particular activity fits within the logical progression of the project.

No coherent story of implementation flows from the reports. "Successes" are most often operational achievements, tasks completed, or delivery of inputs. "Results" include all levels of project achievements including changing attitudes. There is sometimes a lack of continuity between reports, for example, the ninth quarterly report provided details on a forward contract signed with a buyer, but the subsequent report does not include details on the outcome.

The most significant shortcoming is that there is no overview of project progress and status. The STRIVE 2009 Annual Report just includes the ACE quarterly report bullets reorganized. Given the fast changing work and priorities of the project, which are followed closely by the field staff, the ACE periodic reports need to describe the changes and their effects on the project. DCOF is looking to ACE to learn about economic strengthening for improved child well-being. Therefore, strong reporting of adjustments and learning in ACE are critically important to DCOF's understanding.

ACE provided the assessment team with an annual work plan for 2009, but none for 2010. The annual and quarterly reports did not discuss work plans in relation to actual implementation and achievements.

### ***Recommendations***

Improved Periodic Reporting for ACE: STRIVE reports need to be adjusted to tell more clearly the implementation story of ACE. One approach is to structure the periodic report format to identify and describe activities and inputs by crop or value chain. Subcategories may be needed, and generally a narrative will be required to tell the implementation story. This first section can be followed by outputs and various levels of results achieved per intervention and with an indication of how these relate to the overall strategic framework. A section could be added on management issues.

Annual Progress Reporting and Work Plan: The annual report should summarize progress in a comprehensive manner and relate it to the overall ACE goals and plans. ACE needs to prepare annual work plans and the annual report should be a bridge between the previous year's work plan and plans for the next year. Results achieved can be set out with a description of how they were accomplished. How and why work plans have changed over the year will be an important area of discussion in the annual report as well. The annual report should include progress toward agreed upon indicators. Annual targets could be assigned. The next year's work plan should flow from the annual report.

## 7. Additional Issues

### a. Economic Growth Learning and ACE Results

While ACE is intended ultimately to benefit vulnerable children, it is a value chain project with much of its technical learning and results in the economic growth area. ACE is presently monitored by USAID Liberia's Health Office because its source funding is DCOF. The Liberia Mission's Economic Growth office is moving forward with a new solicitation that includes agricultural development and value chain approaches. ACE's experience and learning in high-value crops and rice offer the mission opportunities to learn and help jump start its new program.

#### ***Recommendation***

USAID/Liberia's Monitoring of ACE: DCOF should propose to the Liberia Mission that USAID's agricultural officer in the Economic Growth section be added as a mission liaison for ACE along with the Health Office representative.

### b. An Opportunity for Learning in the Liberian Cocoa Sector

The US Department of Agriculture through Public Law 480 supports the Livelihood Improvement for Farming Enterprises (LIFE) cocoa program implemented by ACDI/VOCA in Liberia. This program is rehabilitating cocoa sector production by smallholder farmers in Bong and Nimba countries, who are similar in socioeconomic terms to ACE farmers. As with ACE, it is reasonable to assume that increases in household income potentially will positively impact vulnerable children in these households.

#### ***Recommendation***

STRIVE Evaluation of Improvement in Child Well-Being from the LIFE Cocoa Program: DCOF should request that STRIVE, ACE, and IRIS explore the feasibility and cost of measuring the effects on children of increased incomes among households participating in the LIFE project. If this seems feasible, one of the steps necessary would be to seek US Department of Agriculture (USDA) permission as well as approval and funding from DCOF.

## **APPENDICES**

## **Appendix 1: Scope of Work**

The Liberia ACE project, under the STRIVE award, has as its goal economic strengthening through development of the agriculture sector to increase household income and improve educational and nutritional outcomes for children. ACE is implemented by ACDI/VOCA. It seeks to develop entrepreneurship and bring smallholder farmers into profitable value chains to increase household income, improve children's nutrition and school participation, and enable caregivers to better support their children.

ACDI/VOCA has refined its ACE approach from the original proposal. It has sought to encourage agricultural upgrading in target communities by increasing the value placed on education. ACE has sought to integrate value chain system and facilitation tactics with educational methodologies in order to foster incentives and relationships that result in on-going upgrading.

The project aims to:

- Increase local production of key staple foods by supporting paddy rice and vegetable development in four communities in Bong and Nimba counties, and vegetable production in two communities in Montserrado County;
- Magnify impacts on child well-being by targeting communities with public information campaigns about children's nutrition and education, and the potential dangers of child labor; and
- Cultivate the next generation of Liberian farmers by working with local schools to introduce the Farming as a Business curriculum, which provides students with the skills and information they need to successfully engage in farming as a primary livelihood strategy.

By increasing household income and making farming more attractive to caregivers and youth through ACE, ACDI/VOCA aims to have a significant and sustainable impact on the well-being of Liberian children and the economic viability of their households and communities.

### **I. Purpose of the Assessment**

This assessment will review and critique the methodologies used in relation to the vegetable and paddy rice value chains, as well as the causal model currently guiding the ACE project in Liberia, assessing appropriateness and effectiveness.

The objectives of this assessment include:

1. Assess the operational and economic viability of value chain interventions.
2. Assess the adequacy of the project's ongoing monitoring and evaluation activities and its evaluation strategy in terms of measuring the effectiveness of project interventions in relation to the project's causal model.
3. Map or describe the two value chains, identifying key actors and potential points of intervention.

4. Identify and assess the value chain interventions made in relation to the range of interventions that would be or would have been possible. Do interventions make sense in terms of the causal model? Are there potentially important opportunities that may have been missed?
5. Assess the adequacy and appropriateness of the project's current focus on interventions in each of the value chains.
6. Assess the current and potential role of school interventions in relation to the project's economic aims. To what extent have these interventions facilitated or detracted from economic results?
7. Make practical recommendations that would increase the chances for economic viability and growth, profitability, and sustainability of smallholder agriculture within the two value chains.
8. Recommend any changes that may be appropriate for monitoring, reporting, and planning evaluation activities.

## **II. Preparation, Process, and Methodology of the Assessment**

The assessment will be initiated in accordance with the agreed Scope of Work. A consultant will be recruited by the Displaced Children and Orphans Fund to undertake the assignment.

The Consultant's tasks include:

1. Conducting a desk review of pertinent reports prior to travel, including project progress reports and any other documents or materials considered relevant to the assessment.
2. Drawing up a plan of action and timetable for carrying out the various components of the assessment.
3. Carrying out field visits and consultation with beneficiaries.
4. Developing appropriate tools and instruments for data collection.
5. Consulting with suppliers and providers of marketing, supply, and/or financial services.
6. Interviewing and consulting with relevant stakeholders and counterparts including beneficiaries and community members, project resource persons and consultants, and other relevant entities/persons.
7. Consulting with USAID/Washington, Displaced Children and Orphans Fund.
8. Consulting with ACDI/VOCA ACE project staff and consultants.
9. Consulting with the Chief of Party for the STRIVE Program.
10. Participating in a technical meeting for dissemination of results and findings to key stakeholders.
11. Preparing and ensuring timely delivery of an analytical report synthesizing the findings and outcome of the assessment and presenting practical recommendations.
12. Providing USAID/Washington with electronic and hard copies of the final report.

The Consultant will provide updates on progress made during the various stages of the consultancy to USAID/Liberia and USAID/Washington if requested, and the ACE project director.

The ACE office in Liberia will provide assistance and support to the consultant. It will make available required and relevant documentation and reports. It will also provide the consultant with names and coordinates of contact persons for meetings and field visits, and will organize and facilitate such meetings as appropriate and necessary.

***C. Provide Recommendations that Include***

1. The timeframe for implementation of each recommended task.
2. Party responsible to implement each recommended task.

**IV. Reports/Deliverables**

1. A three-page briefing note with key recommendations to be presented to USAID/Liberia and ACDI/VOCA prior to departure for review and comments. The assessment report will present the methodology, findings, and recommendations of the assessment.
2. Summary meeting notes for all meetings conducted with individuals or groups, and a list of individuals met during the course of this assessment (with addresses and telephone/fax numbers). These may be included as annexes to the assessment report or a separate document.
3. A draft report to be submitted within 10 days of the completion of the visit to Liberia, and a final report to be due within 10 days after receipt of comments on the draft (to be submitted in electronic form in Microsoft Word..

**V. Assessment Team**

The assessment will be conducted by someone from USAID Displaced Children and Orphans Fund, and one professional with experience and expertise in value chain development, economic strengthening, small- to medium-business enterprises and community development with experience and interest in attending to the needs of disadvantaged and disempowered individuals.

**VII. Level of Effort:**

Total Level of effort is no more than 13 working days. (working days include desk review, travel, field activities, and report writing).

## Appendix 2: Itinerary for ACE Assessment

Date	Location	Activity	Purpose	Key Contacts
5/17	ASDI/VOCA office	Initial briefing and discussion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Present overview of project</li> <li>- Exchange and review documents</li> <li>- Discuss and finalize plans for the assessment</li> </ul>	Mahawa Wheeler (MW), Laveto Forkpa (LF), Tommy Fofana (TF), Veronica Sonpon (VS)
		Discussion	- Discuss NERICA 14 and approaches to multiplication and distribution	Eric Nimely, MW
5/18	Travel to Bong County			MW, LF
	Palala School	Met school principals	- Discuss ACE involvement with schools	Mr. Guinidolo Mr. Bono
	Quayee School and garden, Zebay	Visited school garden and discussed ACE involvement	- Gather information on ACE's work with the school	
	Boakai Sheriff's farm	Visit field and met with farmer	- Discuss production activities and expectations	Boakai Sheriff, Mathew Swintheh
	Rainbow Farmers' Association	Visit field and met with farmers	- Discuss production activities and expectations	Joseph Woah and other group members
	Cuttington University	Discussion	- Discuss the role of Cuttington student interns who worked with schools and farmer groups	Joseph Makain
	Gbarnga Diocese Guesthouse	Discussion	-Discussion with ACE team and Green Farms field agent	Albert Thompson, Nathaniel Johnson, Joseph Myenen, Mathew Swintheh
5/19	Travel to Nimba County			MW, LF
	ANARCO	Observation	- Discussion with store manager	Doris Georges

	store, Ganta	and discussion	about sales	
	Nyiansin School	Met with PTA and visited school garden	- Discuss with PTA their experience with ACE and purchases from ANARCO - Visit school garden	Mr. Dahn and members of the PTA, Marvelous Queejay (MQ)
	Kypeytuo 2 Farmers' field	Visited field and met with farmers	- Discuss production activities and expectations	Eight members of farming group, MQ
	Kypeytuo 1 Farmers' field	Visited field and met with farmers	- Discuss production activities and expectations	Seven members of farming group, MQ
	Travel to Gabarnga			
	Gbarnga Diocese Guesthouse	Discussion	- Discuss the team's main observations	MW
5/20	Cuttington University	Discussion	- Discuss Green Farm involvement with ACE  - Heard perspectives of former interns on the technical assistance roles that they had played.	Ian Yhap, 10 former student interns with ACE
	CARI	Discussion	- Discuss CARI's role in introducing improved rice varieties in Liberia	Dr. Kai [sp?], Jobson Momoh [sp?]
	Travel to Monrovia			
5/21	ACDI/VOCA office	Discussion	- Discuss ANARCO involvement with ACE	Mabel Lamadine
		Discussion	- Discuss possible future areas of focus for ACE	MW
	Harbel Supermarket	Discussion	- Discuss the purchase and sale of vegetables in Monrovia	Mr. Najib
	Stop& Shop Supermarket	Discussion	- Discuss the purchase and sale of vegetables in Monrovia	Robert

	ACDI/VOCA office		- Discuss GITCO's approach to the purchase and sale of vegetables and its activities related to ACE	Siva Prasad
		Debriefing	- Discuss the team's main observations	MW, LF, TF, VS
	USAID Liberia office	Discussion	- Discuss the team's main observations  - Discuss potential role of the Mission's Economic Growth Office in relation to ACE	McDonald Homer

### Appendix 3: List of Key Informants

#### ACE Personnel

Name	Position	Where Based
Mahawa Wheeler*	Project Manager	Monrovia
Laveto Forkpa*	Operations Coordinator/Deputy Manager	Bong
Albert Thompson*	Crop Production Facilitator	Bong
Nathaniel Johnson*	Farming as a Business Facilitator	Bong
Leonna Zeonen	Farming as a Business Facilitator	Nimba
Marvelous Queejay*	Crop Production Facilitator	Nimba
Tommy Fofana*	M&E and Business Coordinator	Monrovia
Veronica Sonpon*	Farming as a Business Coordinator	Monrovia
Joseph Myenen*	PTA volunteer	Bong & Nimba- has a temporary contract for 6 months
Dominic Kennedy*	Driver	Monrovia
Emmanuel Sherman*	Driver	Monrovia
Georgia Brownell	Office Manager	Monrovia
Lawoi Tokpah	Finance Assistant	Monrovia
Garmeih Jerrimiah	Administrative Assistant	Monrovia
Tito Konnah	Cleaner	Monrovia

\* Contacts during assessment


## Other Contacts

Name	Affiliation
Ian Yhap	Green Farm
Mathew Swintheh	Green Farm
Mabel Lamadine	ANARCO
Doris Georges	ANARCO
Siva Prasad	GITCO
Joseph Makain	Cuttington University, Agricultural and Development Studies
Dr. Kai [full name/spelling?]	CARI
Joseph Momoh [spelling?]	CARI
Mr. Najib	Harbel Supermarket
Eric Nimely	Liberia Farms and Cooperatives
Robert	Stop& Shop Supermarket
Mr. Dahn	Nyiansen Public School
Mr. Guinidolo	J.S. Milton Public School
Mr. Bono	Quayee Elementary School
Joseph Quenah	Kpanta Kpai District- Bong County
McDonald Homer	Economic Growth Office, USAID Liberia

**Appendix 4: County Maps of ACE Project Locations**



## Bong County ACE Project Sites



Group	IHH Heads
Palala- Women Assoc.	50
Tomato Camp- Assoc.	40
Palala (Sharif)	22
Gbenekole- (Piipala)	50
Gbenekole- Agro (promo)	50
Gbenekole- Sengbe Town	25
Sonoyeah Town (Toungban)	22
Gbonota (Kwapaigeh)	64
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>323</b>

Schools	Boys	Girls	TOTAL
J.S Milton	227	146	373
Quayee Public School	117	112	229
Suakoko Public school	234	132	366
Gbenekole Public School	263	201	464
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>841</b>	<b>591</b>	<b>1,432</b>



### LEGEND


- Capital/Major Town
  - Town
  - Schools
  - Primary Road
  - Secondary Road
- CROPS**
- Carrot
  - Tomatoes
  - Cucumber
  - Squash
  - W. Melon
  - C Cabbage
  - Lettuce
  - Cabbage
  - Egg Plant

10 0 10 Kilometers

Source: ACDI/VOCA  
November 2009

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACDI/VOCA

# Montserrado County ACE Project Sites



Group	HH Heads
Fendell	33
Mt Barclay	20
Cburg-VOA	15
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>68</b>

School	Boys	Girls	Total
Kendeja	869	842	1711



## LEGEND

- ⊕ Capital/Major Town
- ⊗ Town
- Schools
- ⚡ Primary Road
- ⚡ Secondary Road
- CROPS**
- 🥕 Carrot
- 🥬 Lettuce
- 🥦 C Caobage
- 🍅 Tomatoes
- 🌶️ S. Pepper

Source: ACDI/VOCA  
November 2009

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACDI/VOCA

# Nimba County ACE Project Sites



## LEGEND

- Capital/Major Town
  - Town
  - Schools
  - Primary Road
  - Secondary Road
- CROPS
- Cucumber
  - W. Melon
  - Egg Plant
  - Tomatoes
  - Bitterballis
  - KK Cabbage
  - H Pepper
  - S. Pepper
  - Okra
  - Lettuce

20 0 20 Kilometers

Source: ACDI/VOCA  
November 2009

The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on the map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by ACDI/VOCA

Group	HH Heads
Maiplay (Zekwado)	56
Gbloulay Town (Buu-yao)	220
Bunadin Town (Tapelloseh)	60
Karnwee Town (Kwakerseh)	23
Garwonpa (Veg Ass)	25
Garwonpa (Farmer Assoc.)	25
Loyee Town (Loyee Assoc.)	40
Guawin Town (Guawin Assoc.)	90
Kpaytuo Town (Kpaytuo Assoc.)	48
Kpaytuo Town (Francis)	10
Nyansin Town, (Koffi)	10
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>607</b>

School	Boys	Girls	Total
Nyansin Public Sch	150	193	343
Beah Vaye Pub Sch/Loyee	438	304	742
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>588</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>1,085</b>

## Appendix 5: Production Results of Farmers Who Bought Inputs

Input Provider: Green Farm

Customer	Date	Description	Expense (\$)	Crop	Production (bags)		
					Before	After	Change in Production
1	Apr-09	Fruit Master	10	Cabbage	33	42	9
2		Fungicide	10	Bitter balls	27.5	35	8
		NPK 15	39				
3	May-09	NPK 15	39	Bitter balls	20	26	6
		Fruit master	10				
4	May-09	NPK 15	39	Bitter balls	47.5	62	15
		Insecticide	10				
5	Jun-09	NPK 15	39	Hot pepper	7	11	4
		Fruit Master	10	Bitter balls	8	11	3
		Furadyne	10				
6	Jun-09	Synpfros	10	KK Cross	11	28	17
7	Jul-09	Hot pepper seeds	20	Hot pepper	50	66	16
		NPK 15	39				
		Insecticide	10				
8	Oct-09	Hot pepper seeds	20	Hot pepper	42	45	4
		Fungicide	10				
9	Sep-09	Bitter ball seeds	22	40 Bitter balls	14	20	7

		NPK 15	39				
10		Insecticide	10	Bitter balls	18	22	4
		Fruit master	10				

Observation  
: Labor cost  
not included

Input Provider: ANARCO

Observation: labor cost not included

Customer	Date	Description	Expense	Gross profit LD	Gross profit USD	Production (kgs)
1	Mar-09	Watermelon seeds	2700	25300	422	
2	Apr-09	KK Cross cabbage seeds	6570			
		NPK 15	5400			
		Dusban	1400	136630	2277	
3	May-09  (same person as #2)	KK Cross cabbage seeds	3360			
		NPK 15	2700			
		Furadyne	300	164440	2741	3720
4		Sweet Corn seeds	30			
		Grass killer	20			
				79950		
5	Jun-09	Hot pepper seeds	850			
		Bitter ball seeds	11250			
		NPK 15	1050			

		Hot pepper		68100	1135	1240
		Bitter balls		5700	95	930
Year 1			\$594		\$6,670	
6	October-09 (same as #4)	Bitter ball seeds	675	64325	1072	3100
7	Nov-09	Cucumber seeds	1000	31000	517	31000
8	Dec-09	Lettuce seeds	3500	71500	1192	
9	Jan-10	KK Cross cabbage seeds	3360			
		NPK	5250			
		Furadyne	300			
		Chen	3200	147890	2465	5270
10	Feb-10	KK Cross cabbage	5850			
		Dusban	1200			
		NPK 15	1575	207375	3456	5394
11	Mar-10	KK Cross Cabbage	6720			
		Chem	3050			
		Furadyne	300	139930	2332	4216

12	Apr-10	Watermelon seeds	2800	17200		
Year 2			\$646		\$11,034	

**Appendix 6: Farmers and Farmer Groups Who are Part of the ACDI/VOCA (ACE Project), Families, Communities, and Time in Project**

No.	Name of Farmers/Farmer groups	Sex	Age	Name of spouse	No. of Children	Location/Community	Time in Project
<b>A.</b>	<b>BONG COUNTY</b>						
<b>I.</b>	<b>Boakai Sheriff's Farm</b>						
1	Boakai Sheriff	M	44	Comfort Sheriff	4	Palala	Feb.2010-present
<b>II</b>	<b>Agro Promoters</b>					<b>Gbenequelleh</b>	
2	D. Stanley Martin	M	31	Theresa Martin	2	Gbenequelleh	July 2009-present
3	James Katakpa	M	37	Bendu Flomo	3	Gbenequelleh	July 2009-present
4	Koryor S. Flomo	M	60	Yamah Flomo	10	Gbenequelleh	July 2009-present
5	James S. Ghokolah	M	42	Joana Ghokolah	5	Gbenequelleh	July 2009-present
6	Juniour Sulonwanah	M	28	Makpah Sulonwanah	3	Gbenequelleh	July 2009-present
<b>III</b>	<b>Kilikpalah Farmers' Association</b>					<b>Gbenequellen</b>	Feb.2010-present
7	Joy B. Flomo	M	26	Sarah Flomo	2	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
8	Jerry Paipah	M	43	Oretha Paipah	5	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
9	David Nyernie	M	68	Mary Nyernie	8	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
10	Steven Flomo	M	54	Gomah Flomo	5	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
11	Peter Togbah	M	32	Mamie Kekula	2	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
12	John Shilling	M	22	Keena Shilling	2	Gbenequellen	Feb.2010-present
<b>IV</b>	<b>Rainbow Town Farmers Association</b>					<b>Rainbow Town</b>	
13	Joseph Woah	M	30	Alice Togbah	1	Rainbow Town	Feb.2010-present
14	Isaac McGill	M	29	Yatta Benda	3	Rainbow Town	Feb.2010-present
15	Amos Sonnie	M	29	Korpu Sonnie	3	Rainbow Town	Feb.2010-present
16	Alex Kollie	M	19	Esther Korto	2	Rainbow Town	Feb.2010-

							present
<b>V</b>	<b>Sengbeta Farmers Association</b>					<b>Sengbeta</b>	
17	Marshal Margai	M	37	Esther Margai	5	Sengbeta	July 2009-present
18	Juniour Margai	M	35	Gbarngo Margai	5	Sengbeta	July 2009-present
19	Gorkkin Daniel	M	36	Mamie Kollie	2	Sengbeta	July 2009-present
20	Peter Sulonwanah	M	71	Yongor Sulonwanah	5	Sengbeta	July 2009-present
21	Harrison Margai	M	28	Oritha Margai	2	Sengbeta	
<b>VI</b>	<b>Improved Vegetable Farmers</b>					<b>Tamayta</b>	
22	J. Sulon Sonnah	M	55	Hannah P. Sonnah	4	Tamayta	Feb.2010-present
23	Larry Menplay	M	50	Theresa Menplay	4	Tamayta	Feb.2010-present
24	Aaron Sonnah	M	45	Comfort P. Sonnah	5	Tamayta	Feb.2010-present
25	Roberson Kenah	M	55	Esther P.Kennah	6	Tamayta	Feb.2010-present
26	Ezekiel Felepai	M	49	Tutu Felepai	4	Tamayta	Feb.2010-present
<b>VII</b>	<b>Tomato Camp Women Association</b>					<b>Tomato Camp</b>	
27	Kebbeh Duncan	F	37	Single	1	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
28	Theresa Tucker	F	33	Benson Tucker	7	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
29	Yei Dinikor	F	42	Corneh Alagee	5	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
30	Martha Gbopaye	F	45	James Gbopaye	9	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
31	Alice Wama	F	32	Oliver Wamma	4	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
32	Miatha Mulbah	F	32	Henry Mulbah	8	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present
33	Getrude Kollie	F	31	Single	5	Tomato Camp	July 2009-present

B.	MONTERRADO County	Sex	Age	Spouse	no.of Cildren	Location/Community	Time in Project
I	<b>Mounth Barclay United Farmers Association</b>					<b>Mount Barclay</b>	
1	Jimmy Gbovehtai	M	47	Nancy Gbovehtai	5	Mount Barclay	July 2009-present
2	Daniel Gbovehtai	M	20	Single	0	Mount Barclay	July 2009-present
3	Rancy Vaimennee	M	38	Martha Sumo	4	Mount Barclay	July 2009-present
4	Danel Sumo	M	18	Single	0	Mount Barclay	July 2009-present
II	<b>Fendell Farmers Group</b>					<b>Fendell</b>	
5	Samuel Livingstone	M	41	Rebacca Yah	5	Fendell	Feb. 2010-present
6	Alex Mohyanna	M	48	Garmai Mohyanna	7	Fendell	Feb. 2010-present
III	<b>VOA Green Farm Farmers Association</b>					<b>VOA/Caresburg</b>	
7	Samuel Y. Kweyie	M	34	Christiana Moses	4	VOA/Caresburg	Sept.2009-present
8	James Tarweh	M	19	Single	0	VOA/Caresburg	Sept.2009-present

C	NIMBA COUNTY	Sex	Age	Spouse	no.of Cildren	Location/Community	Time in Project
I	<b>Gawonpa Farmers Association</b>					<b>Gawonpa</b>	
1	B. Nelson Martor	M	30	Kou Martor	2	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
2	Joseph Gbato	M	72	Luolay Gbato	14	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
3	Ruth Yarkpa	F	53	David Dahn	7	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
4	Beatrice Duo	F	48	Morris Duo	7	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
5	Oretha Guambah	F	49	Peter Guambah	6	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
6	Victoria Momliala	F	32	Adam Guambah	4	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
7	Mamie Gbanquoi	F	36	Blah Viah	4	Gawonpa	July 2009-present

8	Kou Gian	F	50	Gian Viah	7	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
9	Samuel Lempekeh	M	68	Rebecca Lempekeh	5	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
10	Annie Zenion	F	40	Single	1	Gawonpa	July 2009-present
<b>II</b>	<b>Guawin Farmers Group</b>					<b>Guawin</b>	July 2009-present
11	Nenway M. Saywon	M	38	Yah Saywon	5	Guawin	July 2009-present
12	Rufus Gartie	M	37	Betty Gartie	6	Guawin	July 2009-present
13	Aruthor Gartie	M	60	Annie Ganlah	7	Guawin	July 2009-present
14	Josephus Wonseakeh	M	40	Lucy Wonseakeh	5	Guawin	July 2009-present
15	Samuel V. Bie	M	35	Laydia Bie	6	Guawin	July 2009-present
16	Gabriel Tokpa	M	39	Deepeh Tokpa	3	Guawin	July 2009-present
17	Racheal Waygbeh	F	36	Johnson Waygbeh	5	Guawin	July 2009-present
18	Isaac Boyee	M	33	Kou Boyee	4	Guawin	July 2009-present
<b>III</b>	<b>Loyee Farmers Association</b>					<b>Loyee</b>	<b>July 2009-present</b>
19	Johnson Wieh	M	54	Mary Wieh	6	Loyee	July 2009-present
20	Edith Mah	F	54	James Mah	7	Loyee	July 2009-present
21	Edith Lamie	F	58	Author Lamie	7	Loyee	July 2009-present
22	Esther Zuon	F	50	Jackson Zuonh	6	Loyee	July 2009-present
23	Mary Viel	F	52	Single	0	Loyee	July 2009-present
24	John Viel	M	47	Gbikey Viel	4	Loyee	July 2009-present
25	Eric Soghalay	M	44	Mary Soghalay	6	Loyee	July 2009-present
26	Becca Lamie	F	30	Single	4	Loyee	July 2009-present
<b>IV</b>	<b>Kpeytuo Farmers # 1</b>					<b>Kpeytuo</b>	<b>July 2009-present</b>
27	Wayee Kargbea	M	47	Rebecca Kargbea	4	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
28	Betty Quoi	F	48	George Quoi	6	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present

29	Martha B. Teah	F	50	Samuel Teah	5	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
30	Elizabeth Kargbea	F	38	Augustine Kargbea	6	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
31	Lucy Dukago	F	46	Vesgo Deh	4	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
32	Emmanuel George	M	19	Single	0	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
33	Justin Brown	M	20	Single	0	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
<b>V</b>	<b>Kpeytuo Farmers # 2</b>					<b>Kpeytuo</b>	<b>July 2009-present</b>
34	Richard Duo	M	40	Martha Togba	8	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
35	Alfred Wiah	M	60	Veon Dahn	10	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
36	Richardson Duo	M	26	Single	1	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
37	Felecial Kerkula	F	20	Single	0	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present
38	Jeffred Togba	M	15	Single	0	Kpeytuo	July 2009-present

SUMMARY:							
	County	No. of Farming groups	Total no of farmers	Total males	% Males	Total Females	% Females
1	Bong	7	33	26	78.8	7	21.2
2	Montserrado	3	8	8	100	0	0
3	Nimba	5	38	20	52.6	18	47.4
	<b>G.Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>68.4</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>31.6</b>

NB: We decided to add the ages of farmers we are working with so that it gives us a clear understanding of the age group that are participating in the project. The number of the children of the participating farmers have also been added, because we believed that as the project progresses, the ripple effect of the project will positively affect their lives.

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