

REPORT OF THE FAISONS ENSEMBLE EVALUATION MARCH 2011

Submitted to USAID/Guinea

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report evaluates USAID’s Project “Faisons Ensemble (FE)” (Working Together) in terms of its achievements in furthering USAID/Guinea’s sole strategic objective and its intermediate results. Having attempted to assist Guinea in improving the basic health and education of its people with ever diminishing results in the early years of the new millennium, USAID came to the conclusion that only significant improvements in Guinea’s patterns of governance could make a difference. Without better governance Guinea was at risk of further political and economic decline, threatening stability at home and adding additional stress to a conflict torn region. It therefore framed its sole strategic objective as “Advancing Democratic Governance” with the expectation that doing so would “have a greater, longer lasting effect on its traditional sectors” (Annual Program Statement- APS).

USAID’s approach to achieving this goal was a multi-sectoral project in which health, education, agriculture and natural resource management would be integrated into a common system of training and resource provision emphasizing “democratic governance” practices on the part of both government and civil society associations as well as technical training in procurement, financial management, conflict resolution, and greater gender equality.

Responding to the APS, RTI (Research Triangle Institute) designed its Faisons Ensemble project. It was implemented through a cooperative agreement with RTI as the lead of a consortium consisting of four international and two national sub-grantees. Implementation of the March 2007 agreement began during the last quarter of 2007.

During the next three years the FE project operated in a highly unstable and violent political environment. In December, 2008 following the death of president Conté the military staged a coup état. This triggered the suspension of most US Government assistance to Guinea, but a number of aspects of the project were able to continue under the exceptions to the suspension.¹ The scope of assistance was further restricted following the massacre in September 2009, when USAID/Guinea was instructed to discontinue any remaining support to the national government in health and education, although it was still allowed to work with employees of the national government at the local level. By October 2009, political instability dictated the evacuation of foreign aid personnel for six months.

Desirous to understand what this multi-sectoral approach was able to yield, even in this difficult environment, USAID Guinea asked that a team be constituted to evaluate the project. The evaluation team—comprised of an independent team leader and four USG employees,

¹ The exceptions to the suspension were humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance, and assistance supporting “the political process.” Humanitarian assistance was interpreted to cover all health and education programs, which were permitted to operate as before the coup, including work with the national government in these areas. Election programs were not affected by the suspension. Furthermore, it was determined that FE’s governance work with local governments (CRDs and CUs) with elected leaders (decentralized services) could continue as it was “supporting the political process.” Work in the agricultural sector was suspended except for support for subsistence agriculture. All natural resource management work was suspended.

supported by USAID Guinea’s Democracy Advisor, its acting Health and Nutrition officer and several other Guinean staff members—conducted documentary research, telephone and in person interviews with those responsible for project implementation. In addition it conducted field work in all three areas where the project worked; the team interviewed local government officials, civil society leaders, independent radio station personnel, and beneficiaries of services.

The assessment centered around two key and interrelated questions. First, “to what extent and how (did) these ‘integrative approaches’ help advance *systemic democratic change*. At the same time the assessment was to address “whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective through democracy and governance-oriented interventions.”

The overall finding of this assessment is that within the limits of the constraints under which it operated the multi-sectoral approach of *Faisons Ensemble* (FE) proved to be effective in producing intended governance and technical results at the local level. In fact, the integration of political reform and social service delivery proved to be mutually reinforcing.

The evaluation team found that the FE Approach has had a significant effect on the local governments and civil society actors with which it has worked. The report cites ample evidence of changes in the way local government in Guinea functions in the project area even under governments largely elected under a non-competitive system and repressive regimes (Conté and the CNDD- Conseil national pour la démocratie et du développement). The project’s approach to improving governance centered around training and encouragement to apply existing legal codes, such as the Local Government Code (code des collectivités) which mandated that citizens have a greater role in participating in governmental decisions while encouraging elected and appointed officials to act in a more responsive and accountable manner. One result of this training that clearly emerged from field interviews was that elected local government officials were much more aware of the need to operate in a more transparent and accountable manner, holding open meetings and publicly posting budgets, fee schedules and minutes of meetings. While these changes are not yet institutionalized and have very little effect thus far on national politics they constitute a foundation for constructing a more democratic and better governed Guinea.

The evaluation team recommended that USAID Guinea continue with this approach, and in an extension of the project find ways to broaden its impact by covering all of the local government units in the country and extend it to the national level as political conditions continue to allow democratic governance reforms to take root.

At the same time governance reform has clearly contributed to the improvement of technical services critical to development. This has been particularly evident in the health sector where citizen participation and changing attitudes by health professionals have produced a far better environment for connecting communities to their social service providers. Positive results in the health sector were manifested by greater utilization of health services in general and increases in the number of Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) sites and through outreach, the numbers of people coming into the sites for VCT services. Other documented results included greater use of local tax revenues for supporting health centers and schools. It was also clear that training health workers in “good governance” encouraged them to work in partnership with health committees (COGES- Comité de Gestion de Santé ,CSH- Comité de Santé d’Hygiene) and

enabled them to work with the community and with other civil society groups to better mobilize resources to improve the operation of health centers.

Similar if less pronounced results occurred in citizen support of education. A number of APEAEs (Parent-Teacher-Friends associations) were reinvigorated through the work of FE, and many local governments designated support to education as a major planning priority and allocated funds to repair and expand schools and to hire additional contractual staff.

The impact of the project on the agricultural and natural resource management sector was very limited largely because the project had fewer resources to devote to these sectors, and because all activities in this area except for subsistence agriculture were suspended after December 2008. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the project did help strengthen some forest management groups and producer associations, principally in the Forest Region.

The impact on civil society was also apparent. The team found evidence that the project improved the capacity of many community-based and civil society organizations in terms of their ability to participate in local government planning, to monitor the work of technical service providers, to articulate their demands at the local government level (*plaidoyer*) and to develop their own plans for small grant-funded projects. A major reason for these positive results cited by members of civil society groups interviewed during the evaluation and in a two-phase survey conducted by a Guinean university was that the project contributed to greater trust and satisfaction with local government.

The FE project also worked with some intermediate civil society actors, such as unions and federations of producers and service monitoring committees (COGES, COGEF- Comité de Gestion de Forêts, APEAEs), adding to their capacity to function as interest groups. In terms of the 16 local NGOs that were chosen by the project as sub-grantees to implement many of its planned activities, these groups consistently stated that they had been strengthened by the project in terms of their internal organization and financial management.

The evaluation did identify some limitations in the implementation of the FE that are the subject of the recommendations and lessons learned listed in the report. First, results were limited to some extent by the absence of strong commitment to democratic political reform or “pull” at the national government level. USAID needs to continue pushing for national political reform and the full implementation of decentralization, including the holding of competitive and open local elections, and helping local authorities find ways to finance local development and service provision. Budget authority at the local level cannot be underemphasized.

More needs to be done as well to deepen the scope and nature of advocacy on the part of both civil society and local governments. In the short time that the project worked with these actors the scope of civil society advocacy tended to be limited to appeals for more resources within the existing system. It did, nonetheless, constitute a beginning to overcoming a culture of authoritarian rule and exclusion.

Strengthening civil society should be deepened making us of knowledge of simplified extracts of existing legal codes has been by extending this training to cover all of Guinea’s local

governmental units. This training should be complemented by further training in financial management, monitoring and basic auditing in order to provide citizens with the tools to more fully hold elected officials accountable and to discourage corruption, particularly in procurement.

More needs to be done as well to strengthen intermediary civil society such as federations and unions of interest groups, particularly those that are revenue producing, such as agricultural and forest management groups, as well as embryonic apex or national level interest groups such as the Association of Elected Officials. FE's strategy of allocating most resources to a limited number of already fairly well developed "champion" groups permitted those groups to make progress but did not affect a broader range of civil society critical to more effective interest-based advocacy.

Local NGO partners, while reinforced by their association with the project should be further strengthened by making fuller use of their existing strengths and by associating them more fully with the design and evolution of the project and assisting them to become more professional, thus moving them toward greater sustainability as development partners.

The evaluation also makes recommendations regarding the management of Multi-Sectoral governance-centered projects such as FE. It notes that the use of earmarked funds, particularly from health accounts, proved to be manageable and produced some notable health benefits as well as governance benefits, including strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations such as the COGES and some of the Health Insurance Mutuals to monitor the work of health professionals and to be better and more democratically managed internally. Projects like this, however, would still benefit from a much greater percentage of their budget from Development Assistance to give them greater flexibility.

Projects such as this which aim at altering deeply engrained patterns of authoritarian governance need to have longer time frames. For example the goal of the project to make anti-corruption efforts more effective needs to be viewed in the context of broader governance reform and corruption is not likely to be reversed or reduced rapidly when national political will is weak. In the conditions that existed during the life of the project addressing and preventing corruption was shown to be best accomplished through the adaption of such good governance principles as budget and fee transparency at the local level backed by close monitoring, rather than through media and communication campaigns.

Multi sectoral projects such as this also need to find methods of implementation that are not as cumbersome as the many layers of technical personnel and monitoring that this project featured, and need to promote the development of local partners who can take over many of these field management roles. To successfully undertake complex multi-sectoral assistance programs USAID must have professional managers at the mission level who are committed to an integrated approach that embodies governance reform across all activities. Discussions with mission staff during various phases of the project indicate that there was a remarkable level of commitment and coordination among technical staff prior to the coup. They also require strong leadership from USAID mission directors who are committed to the vision of the project. Fortunately, this was the case in Guinea.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADIC	Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Communautaires
AGUIEB	Association Guinéenne des Techniciens Biomédicaux
ADIC	Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Communautaires
ANLC	Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption
APIC	Association pour la promotion des Initiatives communautaires
APEAE	Association of Parents, Teachers and Friends of the School
APS	Annual Program Statement
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDL	Local Development Tax
CDM	Cadre de Développement Municipal
CENAFOD	Centre Africain de Formation pour le Développement
CENI	Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante de la Guinée
Code des Collectivités	Local Government Framework Law
COGEF	Comité de Gestion de Forêts (Forest Management Committee)
COGES	Comité de Gestion de Santé (Health Management Committee)
CNOSCG	Conseil National des organisations de la Société Civile
CNDD	Conseil national pour la démocratie et du développement
COP	Chief of Party
CRD	Rural Development Commune
CSH	Comité de Santé d'Hygiène
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DG	Democratic Governance
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys
DPS	Direction Préfectoral de la Santé
E&F	Service de Eaux et Forêt
ERO	Evaluation Rapide Organisationnelle des Cibles
GCSH	Global Child Survival and Health
GHCS	Global Health & Child Survival Account GNP
GNP	Gross National Product
GoG	Government of Guinea
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, German Technical Cooperation
IBGRN	Initiatives de Base pour la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles
IR	Intermediate Result
JHPIEGO	Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics
MCH	Maternal and Child Health
MOH	Ministry of Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
ENSK	Ecole Nationale de Santé de Kindia
PACEEQ	Community Participation for Equitable and Quality Basic Education
PRISM	Project Management Sciences for <i>Health</i>
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
IMR	Infant Mortality Rate

PSI	Population Services International
PUP	Parti de l'Unité et Progrès (Lansina Conté's party)
RPG	Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen (Alpha Condé's party)
REFMAP	Réseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano Pour la Paix
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of Work
UC	Urban Commune
UFDG	Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée
VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
VISFAD	Village Sans Frontière pour les Actions de Développement
ZALY-AC	Zaly Cole Animateurs Communautaires

I. INTRODUCTION

In the early years of the new millennium it was apparent that the Republic of Guinea was a state in crisis. Richly endowed with mineral wealth, hydropower, and a natural environment capable of feeding its people and exporting a surplus, Guinea is today one of the poorest countries in the world and its people are among the most ill served. In 2009 Guinea's economy sported some of the worst social and economic indicators in the world, ranking it 156th out of 177 countries on the United National Development Index. It's under 5 infant mortality rate (IMR) of 163/1000 (DHS, 2005), a shocking high maternal mortality rate (847/100,000), and with less than 40% of its population literate it could be classified as one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. Social services and physical infrastructure were actually deteriorating from an already very low level leading to unrest and discontent on the part of its citizens, especially its urban dwellers, labor unions and student groups. Compounding these problems was the fact that Guinea was in an unstable region with the highest concentration of conflicts anywhere in Africa leading to a massive refugee problem and on-going security threats first from Liberia and more recently from Cote d'Ivoire.

These trends persisted in the face of USAID's 15-year efforts to assist Guinea and help it achieve more acceptable levels of basic human services through its WAKILI project to train elected officials, and its PACEEQ and PRISM projects targeted at improving education and health care. USAID began to explore the question "where did the core problem lie?" Beginning in the late 1990s USAID authorized a series of studies (Wentling, Docking, Diallo) all of which pointed to the extreme vulnerability to conflict within the Guinean system. The 2005 Fragile State Assessment merely confirmed what was already clear—not only was Guinea a "fragile state," it was well on the road to becoming a "failed state." As the 2005 study concluded Guinea was a state characterized by authoritarian rule without order, ruled by an increasingly corrupt (kleptocratic) elite whose rapacious behavior and neglect of the needs of its people had reached proportions that threatened its very viability. U.S. foreign policy decision makers, moreover, believed that Guinea's failure would not only be a humanitarian catastrophe, it would further weaken and destabilize an already turbulent sub-region.

It was in this context that USAID formulated its new strategy for Guinea, recognizing that the main constraints on both political stability and on improving human services were to be found in its system of poor and authoritarian governance. Its response was to focus its aid program on the sole strategic objective of improving democratic governance. This led the issuance of the 2006 Annual Program Statement (APS) which for the first time attempted to integrate all of its prior strategic objectives into a single multi-sectoral program. According to the APS, "Improved governance is the transcending theme of the entire strategy." But it also expected that "by increasing the GoG's capacity, accountability and efficiency as well as strengthening civil society awareness of its rights and advocacy USAID Guinea will have a greater, longer lasting effect on its traditional sectors." (APS). The focus of the new strategy then would clearly be on governance reform because "before USAID can have an impact on

improved service delivery or improved livelihoods it must address the governance constraints that impede development in these areas.”

The result was the development of the multi-sectoral project that came to be known as *Faisons Ensemble* (Working Together). RTI applied and won the award in consortium with six other grantees, starting up its activities in the fourth quarter of 2007. It was initially scheduled to end in March 2010, but was extended for 18 months due in part to the extremely chaotic and difficult political and social context (detailed in the next section of this report) which included sanctions against the junta that took power in December 2008 and the six-month evacuation of most USAID personnel following the stadium massacre of September 2009.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this new strategy and project for the future viability of Guinea. In the minds of many, *Faisons Ensemble* (FE) represented a bold new attempt to help save Guinea by designing a foreign aid program for a context such as this. At the heart of the new strategy and therefore of the project was a basic hypothesis: “that strategic interventions in the social sectors, primarily focused on strengthening citizen participation while increasing transparency and accountability of government institutions, *could help advance broader DG goals*, and that such interventions could also result in improvements in the social sectors,” (SOW-Scope of Work).

USAID felt that given the importance of this project with its new approach it was vital to conduct an evaluation to learn its strengths and limitations as they might apply to future assistance programs in Guinea and potentially elsewhere. To this end USAID/Guinea commissioned this evaluation using an external team leader and four team members most of whom had been involved in some stage of the FE’s design and/or administration. The key question that this assessment was to address was “to what extent and how these ‘integrative approaches’ help advance *systemic democratic change*.” Could public support for democratic reforms in this case be advanced through tangible improvements in the social sectors (Health and Education for example). At the same time the assessment was to address “whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective through democracy and governance-oriented interventions.” (SOW)

The questions posed by this evaluation are complex and involve serious issues of establishing causality in an open system where several concurrent events and movements (see the next section) were going on. They also must confront the extremely short period in which the project was able to fully operate (May 2007 to December 2008) and the very unstable period that followed in which it could only operate at the local level.

In conducting this evaluation the team had to confront two other important realities that condition somewhat its findings and conclusions. First, overall Guinea is still a fragile state in crisis. Crisis and the near total failure of the Guinean state persisted and worsened during the life of this project. As its newly elected President, Alpha Condé

indicated in a recent interview that Guinea's economy was in tatters (BBC). The last military regime (CNDD) left the country totally bankrupt with an international debt equal to about 70% of its GNP, and with no agreed upon plan negotiated with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to begin righting this situation. Second, despite some technical gains, particularly in HIV/AIDs counseling and testing and in utilization of some local health services, it is unlikely that Guinea's economic and social indicators improved during the chaotic period following the initiation of this project.² The economy is still experiencing inflation, with price instability for basic commodities, and with an extensive parallel market ("black market") fostering both shortages and price gouging. On the ground, even within the project zone we still see terribly overcrowded schools, shortages of essential drugs, and unreliable electric service and water supply in the capital city, and virtually non-existent in rural Guinea. The selection of a new President who is committed to "change" in a generally acknowledged free election is a hopeful sign that this system can improve the lives of its people, but this is not yet apparent on the ground. The evaluation must therefore focus on the evidence for positive changes in governance in the very short time frame in which the project operated and examine whether these changes have the potential to "advance systemic democratic change."

II. BACKGROUND

In order to understand the context and specific environment which led to Guinea's classification as a "fragile state" and USAID's decision to redo its strategic objective for Guinea as a single overarching objective (Advancing Democratic Governance), it is useful to review recent past political history. This analysis and time-line could well go back to the colonial period and to the rule of Ahmed Sekou Touré. However, for our purposes we will only highlight major events and trends since the 1990s and focus on those political events that took place during the life of the Faisons Ensemble project. Guinea has been undergoing an extremely volatile period of political upheaval and intervention by its security forces for at least 25 years. It is in this extremely difficult environment that the project Faisons Ensemble started up and confronted ever increasingly difficulties from late 2007 until the last days of 2010. The project was initially designed to expire after 31 months in March 2010 and was extended until September 2011 by agreement with USAID/Guinea.

Political Environment of Guinea

Chronic mutinies and interventions by the security forces

Guinea has experienced repeated army mutinies and military interventions during the period 1985 to 2010 (notably in 1984, 1985, 1996, 2000-2001, 2008, and 2009). Many of these interventions were thought to be ethnic in origin. (the 1985 mutiny led by Malinké officers many of whom were subsequently purged from the army, the 1996 mutiny was thought to be a revolt against Sousou officers)

² The exact data for this observation will only be clear when the next DHS survey is conducted and reported.

Heightened Ethnic Tensions and Elections

Ethnic tensions were heightened during the Conté rule, especially after the destruction of Kaporo les Rails, a largely Fulani neighborhood in Conakry (which displaced over 20,000 people). The Conté regime was seen as being biased toward the President's own ethnic group and region (the Sousou of the Basse Côte). Elections were also seen through the lens of ethnic conflict as for example when during the 1993 election the government invalidated the results in Malinké strongholds. The 1998 Presidential election that installed Lansana Conté as a civilian elected president was bloody and rejected by the international community. This election intensified ethnic tensions with the largely Malinké opposition party (RPG) of Alpha Condé pitted against Conté's PUP. Following the election Condé was arrested and imprisoned on a trumped up charge.

Build up to the Demand for Political Change

In the early years of the new millennium there were a number of strikes and protests led by particular groups in civil society with grievances against the regime. In February 2006 labor and civil society called a nationwide general strike and organized a national consultation held in March that called for change and a political transition.

In April 2006 President Conté sacked a reformist Prime Minister and installed a hard line anti-reform cabinet engendering popular protest that transcended that of individual interest groups.

In June 2006 the unions called a nine day strike over the regimes failure to respect the commitments it had made to end the February strike. Violence and street protests followed.

In January and February 2007 popular discontent exploded into a virtual uprising of protests and over 200 people were killed. Following popular demands for change, unrest was quelled by the January 27 agreement which led to the appointment of Lansana Kouyaté as Prime Minister with limited powers and no constitutionally mandated role. In September 2007 an internal audit report was released regarding a number of ministerial departments and other branches of the administration. It found high levels of waste and corruption, including payments to over 13,000 fictitious or deceased civil servants.

In May 2008 Kouyaté was dismissed and replaced by Ahmed Tidane Souaré, a close Conté ally.

In December 2008 Conté died. His death was followed almost immediately by an army coup led by Moussa Dadis Camara with the establishment of the junta- the Conseil national pour la démocratie et développement (CNDD)

On September 28, 2009, the army's Red Berets led by Dadis' aide de camp, Aboubacar Toumba Diakite, perpetrated a massacre of peaceful demonstrators, killing at least 160 people, wounding many others, and raping scores of women.

In December 2009 Dadis Camara's aide de camp attempted to assassinate the coup leader, resulting in Dadis' evacuation from the country for medical treatment. The CNDD then appointed Sekouba Konaté as interim president.

In January 2010 Jean Marie Doré was named Prime Minister and de facto head of the transition government.

Although the first round of presidential elections held in June 2010 was relatively peaceful and fair, the second round was marked by high ethnic tension.

In November 2010 Alpha Condé and the RPG won the Presidential election in the second round. Several days of violence followed in the streets of Conakry and elsewhere with security forces attacking supporters of Cellou Diallo's UFDG. At least 12 people were killed in Conakry. With the ruling by the Supreme Court, President Alpha Condé was inaugurated on December 21, 2010, with Cellou Diallo accepting defeat, although his party (UDFG) continues to argue that many of its votes were thrown out.

Local Government

Since the FE project focused on local governments for much of its existence, it is perhaps useful to review several elements of this program. Decentralization was mandated in 1985 by the newly installed Conté military regime. Nothing much happened until 1991 when local governments actually acquired legal status in the new constitution. Local elections for 303 urban and rural governments (now 303 rural and 38 urban communes) were held in 1992 and were dominated by Conté's PUP party (Party for Unity and Progress). The constitution required that all local candidates be partisan (members of one political party) and that election of a slate of candidates meant that the winner took all. This effectively excluded the bulk of the population from participating in these governments. In 1999 the mandate of elected local government officials expired at which point the Conté government appointed new officials in violation of the constitution and then hurriedly attempted to legitimize this act via a new law which was eventually rejected by the parliament. Elections were held for local government officials in June 2000 but were considered of dubious fairness. Elections were held again in 2005 still under the old rules.

Under the new Constitution of 2010 some changes were supposed to take place including allowing independent candidates in local elections and setting maximum limits on the age of candidates. Both changes were reversed by the Committee National de la Transition (CNT) due to pressure from the political parties. The entire process of creating and ratifying the new constitution is in play as some political and civil society leaders have argued that it should have gone to a referendum. Supporters of the process

argue that the CNT functioned like a constitute assembly and was representative of the entire population.

With the advent of FE a new approach has been attempted to democratize local governments and to link them more fully to the “deconcentrated” technical services-essentially devolving the responsibility and management of local technical personnel to local governments, without transferring any new resources to them. The degree to which local governments are representative and inclusive, however, must be questioned given that the people who currently hold elective office were “elected” during the virtual monopoly of power by the Conté regime, under a voting rule which required that a single party’s list would be elected. In addition, the legal mandates of all these officials expired over a year ago. Many analysts and political actors believe the new multi-party elections for local councils and indirect elections for Mayors and CRD (Rural Development Communes) Presidents must take place in order for these governments to be considered legitimate and at least potentially more directly responsive to the whole community.

III. METHODOLOGY

THE TEAM

The team brought together to evaluate this project consisted of Robert Charlick, independent consultant and Team Leader; (Haute Guinée team)
William Bradley, Agriculture Officer USAID/Senegal; (N’Zérékoré team)
Anna Diallo, Democracy and Governance Advisor USAID/Guinea, (Haute Guinée team)
Danielle Nyirandutiye, Health and Nutrition Officer; USAID/Guinea(Urban Conakry team)
Steve Edminster, Governance Division Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID/DCHA; (Urban Conakry team)
Mary Harvey, USAID/AFR/SD-Health Officer; (Haute Guinée team)
Elizabeth Kibour, African Regional Lead, Country Support Unit, USAID/Global Health. (N’Zérékoré team)

The character of this team was unusual and reflected the multi-sector approach of the project with team members having specific sector skills and interests and bureaus within USAID. Apart from the team leader every member of the team was a USAID employee. A number had been involved in the design and management of the project at various times, including the current DG Advisor for USAID/Guinea, Anna Diallo.

The principal methods employed in this evaluation were

- Review of relevant USAID documents
- Review of project documents including annual work plans and quarterly reports
- Discussions by telephone with current and former RTI project managers (Steve Snook, EL Hadj Sow, Becky Gadell, and Dan Gerber).
- Discussions in Guinea with current FE staff and COP, as well as with regional coordinators in two of the projects regions (Faranah-Dabola, and KanKan).
- Discussions with USAID’s sector chiefs for Education and Health (Dr Baldé) and Democracy and Governance (team member Anna Diallo).

These methods were complemented by field work in Guinea consisting of interviews with national level Ministries (Health, Decentralization, and Audit and Financial Control, and ANLC (The National Anti-Corruption Agency) national NGOs, local NGO partners, FE consortium partners (CNOSCG, CENAFOD, World Education) and ultimate customers of the project in rural Guinea communities.

In addition, the team split up into 3 sub-teams to conduct interviews in the project zones of urban Conakry, N'Zérékoré- the Forest Region, and Upper Guinea (Faranah and Kankan) as well as a visit to the Kindia School of Public Health (ENSK). These field trips lasted from four to seven days depending on distance to the sites and mode of transportation available. An effort was made to include in each team one specialist in Democracy and Governance and one or more members with technical specialties (Health, and Agriculture). For the N'Zérékoré team the members both represented technical fields (Health and Agriculture) but had some prior experience with participatory development efforts. Two of the teams were seconded by members of the mission staff who served as both translators and local experts (Oumar Kallo, Mme Keita). Teams interviewed local government officials (mayors, council presidents and staff) in both specially designated rural and urban communes (the "*phares*" or lighthouse communities and organizations), local NGO partners, staff and committee members of schools and health clinics and health mutuals, and members and heads of other civil society organizations. In addition in a few instances they interviewed administrative officials (Directors of regional technical services and sous-prefets). They also interviewed the heads of four radio stations that were involved with the project.

Since the time available for interviewing was so compressed, the team could not get an in- depth understanding of each actor or verify their statements. It focused instead on their capacity, the relationship they had had with FE and its implementing partners, the types of training and other resources they had received, their capacity and actual exercise of advocacy, and their evaluation of the successes and weaknesses of the FE project. Where available, these interviews were complemented by reviewing documents that were posted (such as budgets, fees, local development plans, and investments).

Preceding the field work, the team jointly prepared a common questionnaire guide that was used for all interviews. Following the field work team members were asked to organize the information gained on common data organization forms. (See Annex 1 and 2 for questionnaire and data organization form).

Following the field work the team collectively reviewed the data gathered and formulated common findings based on the major questions posed by the Scope of Work. The team then discussed and formulated a series of Lessons Learned, Recommendations and suggested activities for the short and longer term.

These were all presented to the mission management and staff on March 25, just prior to the departure of all the Washington and Senegal based team members.

IV. PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND FINDINGS

A. What is the FE approach?

The FE approach is a combination of things-

- a consortium of international and national PVOs and NGOs combining a variety of skills and capabilities driven by sub-grants and funding;
- integration of good governance practices into all the technical sectors, and the harmonization of methods and management in a single team;
- partnership between government administration, technical services, local authorities, civil society actors, and the private sector;
- introduction of good governance principles and behaviors via the improvement of knowledge of the law and the stimulation of demand for better governance and services both of local governments and civil society actors (demand driven or push change);
- concentration of resources on better managed, more capable and more reform-minded actors (the champion approach). The champions approach was supposed to be a method of spreading the reform and mobilizing support for it from below;
- Initially, the project envisioned linking local and national reform through the selection and support of national champions. The link between national champions and local-level reform was supposed to constitute the “pull” or stimulation from the top. For a variety of political reasons, most notably the December 2008 coup d’état, this part of the FE approach was unable to be continued and will not be treated in this evaluation.

The FE Project was designed to improve democratic governance in Guinea while achieving positive impacts on USAID’s traditional sectors—health, education, agriculture and natural resource management. With USAID’s agreement the FE management developed a set of activities designed to promote democratic governance through the two intermediate results (IRs) and the four democratic governance targets (DGs) and indicators to measure progress in these areas. Six additional activities (called the “Core” activities) were added to the cooperative agreement, however, at the outset of the project largely because much of the funding for this project derived from earmarked funds, particularly in Health and USAID was required to utilize these funds as per the intent of Congress. In interviews with FE’s project managers it was clear that they considered that these additional activities had been “pushed” on them and that they did not necessarily constitute key elements in achieving the overarching theme- advancing democratic governance. The project nonetheless attempted to reconcile these six core activities with the promotion of better governance implementing these activities through sub-grants and memoranda of understanding both with members of its consortium and with other USAID/Guinea contractors. After the coup état in December, 2008 a number of US Government assistance programs were suspended but all health and education activities were considered “humanitarian” and USAID/Guinea was permitted to continue working on these even with the national government. Following that September 2009 massacre the USG cut off all work with national government agencies even in health and education. The only “core activity” that the USG was able to continue under these rules was the HIV/AIDS prevention and testing program. Programs to achieve the four DG goals were able for the most part to continue working at the local level, apart from the activities to strengthen agricultural and NRM civil society associations

Because the “core activities” had some governance implications this evaluation will examine success not just in the technical outcomes that they were able to produce, but in their governance results as well.

B. THE PROJECT’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS

The reporting of targets and achievements are organized according to the various project targets stated as SO level, IR level, and sub-IR level goals. In all there are 4 major goals under two IRs.

Since the time to ground truth these achievements in the field was very limited, this report relies heavily on the data provided by the FE staff in their reports, supplemented where possible by general impressions drawn from the field visits to the urban Communes (CU) and Rural Development Communes (CRD) targeted by the project (the “champion communities). Our observations therefore do not permit us to generalize conclusions outside the project area or in the local governments in regions not selected for treatment.

a. CORE ACTIVITY INDICATORS

FINDING 1 Apart from the HIV/AIDs program, the impact of the six core activities on the goal of improving governance has been very limited.

In the six core activities the HIV Voluntary Counseling and Testing program stands out for having achieved good technical results while making important linkages to improving governance in the health centers and in connecting to the community. The technical and governance impacts of the other core programs (creating a new curriculum for civic education and training secondary schools to make good use of it; improving the national pharmaceutical supply system; improving the curriculum, recruitment, management and legal standing of the National School of Public Health at Kindia (ENSK)-particularly its midwifery program, and supporting the Family Planning program with supplies are more difficult to evaluate in technical terms given their short life, and the links to the SO and project goals of improving democratic governance in Guinea are less clear.

1. HIV/AIDS program reinforced

The FE Chief of Party explicitly recognized in his Quarterly Reports that Health sector earmarked funds constituted the largest share of funding for the project and that it was therefore a high priority activity. For the most part the key indicators for this activity were quantitative input measures designed to indicate growing capacity, and intermediate results-- the number of labs capable of doing the test; and the number of people tested and counseled, and the number of people in targeted “champion” communities reached with behavioral change messages. These technical targets were exceeded for all measures.

There were significant governance results as well. Members of the Voluntary Counseling and Testing Centers (VCT) were trained in the good governance and management practices including more transparent inventory control and anti-corruption practices, and were encouraged to form closer relationships with the communities in which they worked. An important part of this program involved community outreach-taking the professional staff of the centers out into the communities to educate most at risk populations about preventing HIV/AIDs, recruiting local leaders (champions) to assist in this work, and encouraging local people to use the health facilities and to be tested. An additional benefit of this program was that health centers where VCTs were located were generally upgraded and made more patient friendly, resulting in high levels of utilization and greater willingness of communities and local governments to support health facilities. These outcomes were supported by the team's visit to the VCT of Urban Dabola and the Forest Region.

2. Civic education curriculum (2,3)

FE Project managers listed education as their second largest source of funding and therefore placed high priority on three activities- —civic education in secondary schools, girls' education, and adult literacy. All three were undertaken by consortium partner, World Education. In terms of achievements, the civic education curriculum was revised and teachers were trained to present it (although only about 10% of this target was met); the number of local governments implementing a civic education campaign increased; the number of people reached with civic education messages; and the number of literacy centers created and reinforced and number of adults who participated in their programs.

According to FE Project documents the quantitative technical results of these programs in terms of numbers were impressive. The curriculum was developed. Nearly 3,000 secondary school teachers (about one-fourth of the target) were trained in it. Nearly 8,000 adults enrolled in project supported literacy courses. Over 4 million citizens were "reached in project targeted areas with civic education message(s)." The significance of these numbers and their link to improved governance, however, is mixed and at times problematic. No measures were reported, for example of the levels of literacy attained or of the material available to adult learners that could be significant in broadening political participation. Civic education messages involved messages about peaceful resolution of conflict and ethnic tolerance and in the 2009 a good deal of the program was devoted to encouraging voting. No outcome or results measures were provided, and the method of calculating the impact of the civic education messages (number reached) was based primarily on potential listening audience given transmitter with a specific range and not on actual listener surveys.³

³ According to the FE Monitoring and Evaluation specialist this was supplemented by a household survey conducted by the NGO partner, however, this data was not available to us and apparently did not include any questions about the impact of the messages. In addition the figure of 4,170,908 seems improbable given the total population of Guinea and the reach of radio. One recommendation of this study is that a detailed media study with impact measures be conducted.

4. Kindia Midwifery program and School Management

FE summary project achievement tables do not discuss this aspect of the project. It is discussed in a recent FE accomplishments narrative (FE, 2011). According to this document the Project, via its partner Engender Health, provided technical assistance to the National School of Health in Kindia to assist it and specifically assist its midwifery department to improve its curriculum, internal organization and the integrity of its recruitment. The project also assisted the school in obtaining legal status. It also claims to have been responsible at least in part for the reduction of fraud in school exams and admissions.

To the degree that this program was able to reduce fraud and corruption in recruitment and in grading it could be considered to have been part of a more visible anti-corruption program.

5. Central Pharmacy Supply Improved

FE project achievement documents do not refer to this core activity or provide indicators for it. By the end of 2008 work on this core activity slowed because of poor results and ceased altogether after September, 2009. Its link to good governance could have been the reform of the drug distribution system and the reduction of corruption and fraud in this process.

6. Family Planning Program Supported-

This program was carried out through a memorandum of agreement with ESD (USAID's Global Reproductive Health and Family Planning Project- Extending Service Delivery). It was to work through the National Health Ministry's Division of Health. Work with the Ministry of Health on this and other programs was suspended after the September 2009 massacre but continued at the local level with the provision of some commodities.. A related program in Maternal and Child Health was carried out by PSI with the participation of JHPIECO. The main indicator for this activity was the number of people who completed training in maternal/newborn health or child health. The targets for this were exceeded. There does not appear to be any clear connection between these programs and improving governance performance or instilling democratic governance behaviors and norms.


b. DG GOALS

1. SO LEVEL TARGETS

Originally the SO level was stated as "Advance Democratic Governance." As stated in the APS the focus of the new strategy then would be on governance reform because "before USAID can have an impact on improved service delivery or improved

livelihoods it must address the governance constraints that impede development in these areas.” (APS) It implied that governance patterns needed to be significantly improved through greater transparency and access to information; greater accountability of elected officials; more inclusive and broader citizen participation, and more meaningful citizen participation in decision processes in order for social service delivery to improve.

RTI reformulated the SO somewhat in its technical proposal (RTI, 2006) as follows:



This specified the areas where USAID would concentrate its reform efforts (APS,2006, 17) focusing on the democratization of social service delivery as well as governmental institutions (largely local government, especially after 2008). Although the objective was focused USAID/Guinea still posited that “strategic interventions in the social sectors...could help advance broader DG goals” possibly even contributing to “systemic democratic change.” (Scope of Work). The formulation of the SO and the project in these terms enabled USAID not only to focus its governance reform efforts more efficiently, but was probably a good way to promote political reform in a system that up to that point was non-competitive as the 2005 local government elections had taken place under the single party Conté regime.

This dual set of objectives is reflected in the kinds of indicators and targets that FE and USAID employed at the SO level. On the one hand these indicators were of public perceptions of service delivery. On the other they were of indicators of governance change and specific indicators of democratization. In assessing changes in both of these dimensions it should be acknowledged that the evaluation team was able to visit only a small percentage of the local governments and civil society actors and could not determine how generalizable the impressions they got were. The fact that the only systematic effort to measure some of these changes, the University of Sonfonia survey, came up with different answers points to the need to incorporate into the monitoring and evaluation plan a professionally conducted regular survey that can compare results in the target communities to those outside of it.

FINDING 2 Public satisfaction with local government in the provision of social services improved somewhat in the targeted communities.

Data from the two rounds of the University of Sonfonia survey indicate that satisfaction (favorable opinion) with performance of local government in social services improved, from 43.3% to 56.7%

2. IR 1 Accountability and Transparency in Governance Improved
IR 1.1 (DG1) Increased effectiveness of decentralized government and local service delivery

FINDING 3 The FE Project contributed significantly to the democratization and effectiveness of local governments through the training elected officials received in the core training package, particularly training in roles and responsibilities of elected officials, training on the requirements of the Code des Collectivités, training on financial management and resource mobilization.

The targets that FE set for this activity were unrealistically high. Under the circumstances even modest improvements have had an impact on both citizens and elected officials. Both the data which FE systematically collected and the observations of the evaluation team confirm that local governments made strides in the following areas:

Openness and Transparency: According to the University of Sonfonia survey more citizens polled believed that local government was open and transparent, and that they could get accurate information about the local government budget for public services. The change in opinion was a modest one—from 45% to 51%. The same survey found that only a tiny percentage of the population (4.5- 6.6%) reported that they had been consulted on community public service priorities, and that this percentage had not improved during the two year period covered by the two rounds of the survey. This data is difficult to understand given the information given by many civil society associations indicating that they were informed of local government meetings by radio and even through the personal invitation of council members.

In our discussions with civil society actors and our observations of what information local governments publicly posted the three project areas confirmed the view that both local government and the technical services were more open to public involvement and to disclosing information about budgets.

Elected officials in the urban and rural communities we visited affirmed that they had introduced new methods of sharing information with citizens such as hold open public meetings and forums and posting information about budgets and plans. In several of the communities the government had formed an informal advisory committee using the structure of the “cercle d’innovation” to help forge better relations between community and local government.

In the rural commune of Boola and urban communes of Faranah, Kankan, Nzérékoré, Beyla, and Matoto budgets and tax revenues were posted. Training in more transparent and competitive procurement seems to have varied and was not consistently done. In our field interviews we found that the urban communes of Kankan and Matoto (Conakry) and the CRD of Marella reported that they had received procurement training while the urban communes of Faranah and Dabola apparently did not.

Accountability

The training that FE provided to local governmental officials reportedly resulted in democratic elections of committee members in Health Committees (CSH) and Forest Management Committees (COGEF) giving the population greater control over these committee members. Some communities (Faranah commune) reported that the financial management training they received created new possibilities for monitoring and controlling expenditures. In some communities (Bissikrima) new mechanisms called citizens' commissions, were created to monitor local government expenditures. In others, like urban Kaloum, the mayor and his staff resisted efforts to make his budget decisions public.⁴

Management Capacity

Every local government that we observed reported that the training in planning and management enhanced their capacity to identify investment priorities and to formulate plans. According to FE's data 89% of the treated local governments took measures to create a current development plan as prescribed in the local government code. In urban Conakry the commune of Ratoma reported that it was able to develop an investment plan for the first time. The urban commune of Matoto reported that due to the FE training it was able to develop a plan and budget more responsive to citizen needs.

Revenue generation—The measure that FE reported is the percentage project supported local governments whose annual tax revenues increased. Over 82% of the local governments reported an increase. In our field interviews there were communities that reported increases of as much as 75% (urban Faranah and Nzérékoré) while rural Marella reported about a 7% increase. Apart from urban Conakry our field observations in a small number of local governments confirmed the view that revenues did increase except for some during 2009 when the political conditions were particularly unstable. In Conakry neither Ratoma nor Dixiin were able to report their revenue.

Inputs Delivered- several of the Project's indicators for this are inputs—number of people trained in planning, procurement, leadership, management skills. These data do not show increased capacity and effectiveness but they suggest that the tools were given to do so. In some specific areas training exceeded the targeted numbers.

Our discussions with local government authorities indicated that in general local governments were allocating a portion of their revenue to provide for services- usually health services where most reported knowledge of the norm that 15% of their budget

⁴ It should be noted that the newly formed government headed by Alpha Condé dismissed the mayors and councils of three of Conakry's commune including Kaloum.

should go for this service, and schools where classrooms and repairs are desperately needed. In urban Conakry all of the communes visited reported that they allocated nothing for the health centers. In Matoto, however, the commune allocated some funds for sanitation as a way of creating some employment for youth.

Conflict Resolution—The President of the Bate N’Fadji CRD stated that the training he received in conflict resolution helped him resolve several internal personnel problems. The mayor of Faranah made use of these tools to deal with conflicts with appointed regional officials. In urban Conakry several of the communes stated that they were able to reduce violent protest by using the training in conflict resolution to improve communication with youths. In Nzérékoré some conflicts were mitigated during a period of rising tension and instability after the near fatal injury of Dadis Camara. Project stakeholders held a round table discussion to allow the issues to be debated in public coupled with a call for peaceful resolution.

FINDING 4 For local government to achieve sustainable progress in its effectiveness and capability the national government will have to deepen the decentralization process, particularly in the areas of tax reform and income transfer to local level authorities

Our observations and discussions with local government elected officials and with the Minister of Decentralization confirmed the view that there are serious constraints, both legal and financial on how far local government can take on responsibility for many of the tasks it is now expected to fulfill. The most serious immediate problems are the lack of implementing legislation (*texts d’application*) and a system of fairly allocating funding to the local level and sources of revenue to make up for the cancellation of the local development tax (CDL).

IR 1.2 (DG2) Greater Visibility and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Efforts

FINDING 5 The anti-corruption program achieved some impact mainly through its work at the local level with both governments and civil society organizations. It probably also raised public awareness of corruption, although it is impossible to judge what the impact of this awareness might have been.

The targeted sub-goal of the Project to reduced corruption involved a number of activities, mainly designed to raise awareness of the public and governmental actors. FE provided assistance to the ANLC (Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption) in several areas-legal and communication. ANLC’s nationwide communication program featured media announcements, community debates, and messages targeted at public officials. It generated a lot of activity and exceeded the targets both in training of members of civil society associations and governmental officials. FE also helped with the training of journalists in anti-corruption investigating and reporting. Since the national level activities with ANLC were interrupted by the suspension they were undertaken mainly in 2008 and it is difficult to assess their overall impact.

The project has measured activities in this area largely with reference to the number of people trained in “anti-corruption tools.” Here the data show that they exceeded their targets. This says something about the visibility but little about the effectiveness of these programs. For example, the training of journalists in anti-corruption reporting did not include any analysis of how many stories were written or broadcast as a result of the training, or of what their impact might have been.

An important part of the anti-corruption program was the work that FE did with local governments, encouraging them to meet the requirements of the Code des Collectivités with regard to publishing local budgets, publishing accounts (expenditures and revenue), holding open meetings and allowing time for questions in those meetings, and posting fees for health and school services. FE’s targets for the results of these activities fell short of its highly ambitious goals set at 100% compliance. The levels of achievement of these goals observed by the team in particular sites in the field, could well have made a difference in corrupt practices at the local level.

Training members of civil society associations, especially the health committees (COGES) and school committees (APEAE) probably did make a difference in the practice of posting fees and therefore of reducing demands for extra-legal payments.

The Project also claims to have been responsible at least in part for the reduction of fraud in school exams and admissions (ENSK, for example). Evidence for this, however, is difficult to verify.

No systematic time series survey was done of the perception of corruption in order to learn how citizens perceived levels of corruption, particularly in provision of public services.

IR 2 Citizen Participation and Advocacy Strengthened

IR 2.1 (DG 3) Increased capacity and effectiveness of civil society working through strong CSOs and CBOs that are well managed and participate, demand accountability and transparency in service delivery, and advocate for good governance.

The DG goal was a statement of what FE intended to try to produce (better internal management, broadened participation, and improved advocacy capability), rather than a statement of only working with civil society associations that already possessed these characteristics. Given Guinea’s history of the suppression of civil society for over forty-five years at the outset of the project there were very few civil society associations that had these characteristics. Prior U.S. supported projects such as PACEEQ and PRISM laid a foundation for improving citizen involvement in health and education that could be built upon but overall the level was very low. What FE was to add was the reinforcement and deepening of civil society capacity and more focus on citizenship training and advocacy.

FINDING 6 The project worked with a broad range of civil society and community based associations.

In all, the project identified 2,943 civil society associations that were legally recognized and had bylaws. Of these FE worked with 902, distributed by type as shown in Table 1

TABLE 1 TYPES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS WITH WHICH FE WORKED

No	Categories of Civil Society and Community-Based Associations	Conakry	Faranah	N'Zérékoré	Kankan	Total
1	COGEF (Forest Management	0	25	3	28	56
2	Other Producer Groups	29	114	25	102	270
3	Unions of producers	0	2	20	6	28
4	Federations of groups	0	0	1	3	4
5	COGES (Health Management Committees	11	23	34	33	101
6	Health Insurance Mutuels	2	18	12	9	41
7	APEAE-Associations of Parents, Teachers and Friends of Schools	26	25	36	48	135
8	Federations of APEAE	6	12	16	13	47
9	Mothers of Students Associations	0	3	4	4	11
10	Equity Sub-committees	2	2	5	3	12
11	Youth Associations	25	15	21	24	85
12	Chambers of Commerce	0	4	20	18	42
13	Local Alliances	0	3	4	4	11

14	Student Associations	14	11	16	18	59
TOTAL		115	257	217	313	902

FINDING 7 The FE Project had a significant impact on improving the organization and functioning of the CSOs and CBOs with whom it worked

The FE Project provided a common core of training to the CSOs and CBOs with which it worked consisting of information on the local government law and good governance practices, improved internal management and financial management, and basic advocacy skills. Some of these associations got training in conflict resolution, but we found few that had gotten training in gender issues.

In general the measures employed by the FE Project are input indicators- number of civil society associations and leaders trained in relevant legal codes, and in financial monitoring, and number of associations that received technical assistance and project funded sub-grants. While these activities could lay the foundation for increased capacity and effectiveness they do not demonstrate actual increases in capacity or the result of these trainings.

The project did provide, however, several indicators that could be useful as outcome or results indicators, such as the number of civil society associations that actually “implemented elements of the Faisons Ensemble toolkit (regulatory statutes and legal registration, internal controls, regular election of leaders, accountability to members),” the number of CSOs/CBOs that have monitored local government budget processes, and the number of CSO/CBO leaders who lobbied local governments during their sessions for an issue of importance to their organization. By its own data the project fell far short of its targets in these areas. For example, FE’s monitoring data indicate that about two-thirds of the CSOs and CBOs with which the project worked “advocated during a CRD/CU government session on issues of importance to their organization.” Overall, according to its Monitoring and Evaluation System, FE affected the behavior of over 650 out of the 902 CSOs/CBOs with which it worked in at least some of these areas.

Another important indicator that FE used is the number of CSO and CBO federations revitalized in the project area. The project started with very modest targets in this area but now claims that there were 23 such intermediary associations. Our analysis suggests that this one of the potentially most powerful ways to improve governance through the fostering of more powerful lobby/interest groups.

The evaluation team supplemented these indicators with a series of observations and discussions with relevant actors in the three project areas. Its findings are illustrated below with a few of the examples noted.

Capacity

The training given by FE through its NGO partners reinvigorated a number of APEAEs. For example the APEAE coordinating committee of Faranah stated that prior to FE they didn't even know about their role. A number of COGES reported that they were reinvigorated and trained in management, finance, budget development, HIV/AIDS and now co-management of health centers in partnership with health center directors.

All the CSOs that we interviewed in all three regions, such as the union of Farmers of Boola (Organisation Paysanne de Boola), stated that they benefited from an understanding of their roles and responsibilities and the management, financial and advocacy training.

Civil society groups benefited from the training to be able to set priorities, formulate action plans, and apply for external grants.

In some instances the newly reinvigorated associations, such as several of the APEAEs that the team visited, raised funds to take on expenses of paying part-time teachers and expanding school facilities to address the extreme overcrowding of classrooms.

The groups that received mini grants as a result of their enhanced planning capacity were able to test and develop their management skills through a practical opportunity to manage a grant. Through its NGO partners, FE monitored this process and provided technical assistance where needed.

FE's training and grant supervision helped groups like in the Fish and Rice Producers association of N'Zérékoré mobilize additional resources from other donors.

Most of the CSOs, like the COGEF of Marella, were able to get legal recognition through the support of the project after several years of frustration in achieving this. Most were able to establish bank accounts and manage their finances much better.

Enhancing Accountability

Because CSOs were trained on the Local Government Code they were able to better monitor the functioning of local government officials. Specifically, civil society groups in Marella were able to monitor the local government budget (CRD).

The training that FE did with COGES enabled some, like the COGES of the CRD of Bissikrima, to more effectively monitor the supplies of drugs. The enhanced capacity was not always sufficient, however, as in some communities, like Baté N'fadji, the drug monitoring process was thwarted by the prolonged absence of a key health center official.

Participation

The team noted that the governance training that was given to all civil society associations did result in a significant democratization of their internal governance. Members of the COGES and new CSHs reported that their members were now elected. With health committees this is mandated by national level decrees which require that one member of the committee be an official from the local government. In other groups, such as APEAEs and Community Forestry Groups (CEGEF) however, leaders are now routinely elected.

CSO and CBOs report that they are able to participate much more fully in local governmental affairs because they are informed of the meetings and invited to attend. There are even instances, such as the CRD of Boola in the forest region, where local elected officials go out to the villages (district and sector level) to inform people of the meetings and to solicit their priorities participatory planning

Advocacy

All the civil society groups that we interviewed stated that they had gotten some training in basic advocacy strategies and tactics and had found it useful. The information that the evaluation team was able to gather indicated that a large number of civil society groups reportedly engaged in advocacy campaigns and had used the training they had received from the project in doing so. For example, FE assisted an agricultural producer group, the Organisation Paysanne de Boola, to improve its advocacy skills.

There is some question, however, about the effectiveness of civil society advocacy. The data from the Sonfonia survey found that less than 10% of civil society associations supported by the project reported that their advocacy campaigns during the past year (2008) resulted in favorable policies decisions by any level of government. This is a very high threshold measure since the time frame was very short particularly during the highly disrupted year in question, and the translation of a lobbying effort into policy often difficult to achieve and can be slow.

For its part, the evaluation team was somewhat surprised to hear of a number of instances where local level civil society associations, associations of CSOs and even local governmental officials attempted to influence decisions and policies, and some instances in which they had had a positive result. There is no indication, thus far, however, that these cases can be generalized or said to constitute the basis of systematic change.

Some Limitations of the Civil Society Strengthening Program

The impact on community-based associations (CSO and CBO) that received internal organizational training, Planning and Grant preparation training, legal status assistance, advocacy training and resource management training has been difficult to measure but seems to have been significant, especially in terms of encouraging links to local government and enhancing their capability and sustainability.

The most significant issue is strengthening a civil society that is the product of local needs and decisions. Over one-third of the associations considered to be “civil society” (such as the SCHs and the APEAEs) are the product of national level decrees, often as a result of international agreements such as the Bamako Initiative, rather than local initiatives. The project should continue to develop and support groups which are expressions of local needs and priorities, even if their self-defined objectives do not coincide with the service delivery objectives spelled out in the project.

There is also an issue of the degree to which some of the associations that do work in technical sectors of interest to the project are able to participate meaningfully in the formulation of their actions. This seems to have been the case of forest management groups like the NGO- Forêt Communautaire de Orana (Boola), whose forest management convention with the government Forestry Service seems to have been based on a boiler-plate form.

On the other hand, where local civil society groups attempt to negotiate with powerful economic interests such as the mining companies (Valé and Rio Tinto), the project needs to offer professional advice to help guide the process both for CSOs and local governments.

Another problem that is common to CSOs in many less developed societies is the over reliance on a single leader, making such groups vulnerable to control and collapse. Our observations point to the fact that this seems to have been the case of the Association des Jeunes et Amis de Kissidougou. The brother association in Beyla seems to have developed a much better and more democratic internal organization. The Project needs to encourage this kind of exchange and sharing of knowledge in an effort to strengthen civil society beyond the organizational training it has been giving them.

Finally, FE did find several ways to enhance women’s economic participation through support to women’s food producer groups like the Groupement Feminin Wakila (Dabola) and through a micro financing program to help other women’s small businesses. Overall, however, gender training and the participation of women in decision making roles did not receive sufficient attention in the work that the Project did.

IR 2.2 (DG4) Increased citizen access to more diverse sources and types of information

FINDING 8 The multiplication of sources of media, particularly radio, has the potential to become a powerful force for awakening citizens and mobilizing them to advocate and act for better governance.

The main vehicle for this aspect of the program was the encouragement of community and privately owned independent (non-governmental) radio stations. Over the life of the project eleven such stations, including Radio Communautaire de Bissikrima which we

visited, were supported, mainly with equipment. Three new stations went on the air as a result of project support (Radio Liberté, Horizon FM, and Radio Bambou-FM)

Our field observations confirmed the potential importance of private and community radio. A number of CSO members told us that they got information about local government meetings from the radio. Elected officials in the urban commune of N'Zérékoré stated that radio was indispensable for disseminating information about meetings and for encouraging participation, the setting planning priorities and making budget decisions.

Issues with Media Diversification

The principal issues that we observed during our field visits were twofold. The media need to find ways to survive financially, and this may mean appealing to a wider audience with more diverse programs than the messages determined by donor projects. Radio Bissikrima, for example, has excellent equipment but lacks the funds to even run the generator needed to supply the electricity that the station requires to broadcast. At the same time private radio must find a balance between freely broadcasting what is topical and important to local people and exercising self-censorship when its ownership may judge certain programming to conflict with its commercial interests and with the interests of those in power. During our visit to Kankan we noted an instance in which the director of radio Horizon FM made a decision to cancel a program perhaps out of just such a consideration.

While radio no doubt “reaches” many Guineans there is little evidence to date as to what its impact has been. We recommend that a serious study be conducted of the media in order to determine what the messages are and how they are received and acted upon.

V. OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN THE SCOPE OF WORK

ISSUE 1 What was the Impact of the FE Approach on Service Delivery in the Technical Sectors?

Technical impact

FINDING 9 Service delivery and technical outcomes improved during the life of the project in the Health Sector.

Many of the technical indicators have been discussed above in the section on the Core Activities. Indicators of improved technical outcomes involve both statistical outcomes and behavioral changes. Overall, the Sonfonia survey indicates that the general level of satisfaction with health services seems to have improved somewhat over the two year period surveyed, which could well indicate that service delivery has improved at least in the health sector.

In terms of the technical targets for the HIV/AIDs program, these targets were met or exceeded (number of individuals tested and counseled in the VCT centers, number of laboratories capable of performing AIDs tests; number of people trained in VCT and in lab activities).

In addition, where Voluntary AIDs Counseling and testing Centers were installed or upgraded by the project community outreach and awareness increased; and the utilization of other health services associated with the health centers increased.

A number of local governments have increased their support for health by prioritizing these investments in their annual investment budget plans, and even undertaking some salary support to part-time school instructors and for maintenance work. In several cases the communes visited had added budget lines to finance, for example, the work of midwives in the clinics. None of the urban communes in Conakry, however, allocated funds to support health centers in their commune.

Even so, most of the health centers visited including all but one in urban Conakry appeared to be functioning well, usually with the support of the COGES. Project support to Child Health programs for the eradication of polio and measles seems to be bearing fruit since no new outbreaks have been reported since the end of 2009. FE is now also supporting the training of the newly elected members of the Community Health and Hygiene Committees (CSH) which should link the public even more closely to the technical services.

FINDING 10 There have been some technical results in the delivery of education, mainly through the civic education and literacy programs.

The core activities in education were restricted to the development and promotion of the civic education curriculum, the extension of the adult literacy program, and the promotion of girls' education. FE measured these results in terms of the number of teachers trained to present it, and the number of people "reached" by civic education messages. Largely because of lack of funding and lack of apparent results in the Project's work with the Ministry of Education work in this area was greatly curtailed even prior to the September 2009 massacre. As a result assistance to the teaching of the civic education program fell far below the expected target. On the other hand FE's measure of the number of local governments that supported civic education campaigns (74%) does seem to indicate a relationship between improved governance and the promotion of the civic education program. In addition, a number of communities made education a high level investment priority investing some of their revenues in expanding and repairing school facilities.

FINDING 11 There has been very little measurable impact of the FE program on Agriculture and Natural Resource Management.

FE does not report any indicators for this sector. The major activities planned were the retraining of the national agricultural extension service that had virtually ceased

to function (though EVW), and the experimental promotion of an improved variety of rice. The strengthening of the extension service ended abruptly with almost no achievement when assistance to agriculture, apart from subsistence agriculture, was suspended in December 2008. In addition, all natural resource management programs were suspended. A small agricultural activity involving food production- improving rice promotion, involved FE giving 6 tons of seed and 30 tons of fertilizer to 60 CBOs in the project area. This activity does not appear to have had any connection to the rest of the project and had no apparent governance implications

Democratic Governance

FINDING 12 The relationship between technical service providers and the local population has changed as a result of the FE Project Interventions.

Some change has occurred in the behavior of “deconcentrated” technical services at the sous-prefectoral and perhaps prefectoral levels. This is particularly noticeable in the health centers. We noted a number of cases where Health Center Directors (CRD of Marsella) were working much more openly and collegially with health committees, and several cases where forestry agents (Eaux et Forêts) and Agriculture agents assisted community groups in producing technical results, often in association with their small grant projects.

ISSUE 2 Is a different approach needed to be successful in producing the desired results in DG and Service Delivery in urban Conakry?

FINDING 13 The FE Ensemble program was less successful in Conakry than elsewhere, but this because the political and economic context is so different.

In terms of its goal of improving governance and introducing more democratic practices, the FE project met with mixed results in Conakry. The four (out of five) communes visited ranged from highly resistant to the FE approach (Kaloum) to very responsive and accepting of the need for more transparency and accountability mechanisms (Matoto).

Conakry is a highly politicized environment vital to national decision makers. It is also different in its relationship to the technical services. In urban Conakry health centers are generally not considered part of the community and are not supported by communal budgets. COGESs are significant actors and in some communes they support the health centers. In others (COGES Boulbinet- Kaloum) political disputes around the election to the COGES seem to have limited its functioning.

Another important factor involving Conakry is the political reality of youth crime and violence associated with unemployment and dissatisfaction with the government. In this environment communal governments may have to allocate more resources to creating

employment for youths thereby reducing motivation for violence and will therefore have fewer resources to invest in social service delivery.

Given these differences, it is difficult to know whether the FE approach must be adapted to the realities of Conakry or whether support for democratization and an improved economic climate at the national level can render this approach more successful.

ISSUE 3 To what degree has FE resulted in systemic changes in democratic governance and in the technical sectors?

FINDING 14 The impact of FE thus far has been local. It is too early to judge whether it can serve as an effective demander (pusher) beyond

There is clear evidence that the good governance training, especially through the use of the Law on Local Government (Code des Collectivités) produced significant changes in the behavior of many of the 113 local governments in the project area (see results section IR 1.1) including changes that promoted participation, transparency and accountability and citizen empowerment. Some changes in the behavior of local level service agents have occurred as well, as deconcentrated agents have had to integrate at the sous-prefectoral level.

Beyond the local level the evidence for an impact of the FE approach is very limited.

In the course of the field observations the team noted several cases where local government officials challenged administrative authorities at higher levels over specific issues (Baté Nafadji) and other cases in which the actions of local groups resulted in the changing of administrative and elected officials. There are also interesting cases within the project area where these challenges cannot be attributed to FE training (Federation of Growers of Rice for example). These may have had spread affects. FE's plan to hold forums in 2011 designed to engage regional officials on policy, performance and services may intensify this process, but it is far from common or systemic at present.

ISSUE 4. To what degree has FE facilitated or hindered local capacity development and the substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming?

FINDING 15 Local NGO partners have been strengthened by the FE program but could be strengthened further to become direct grantees or contractors in the future

Local NGO partners benefited from the organizational diagnosis (ERO-Evaluation Rapide Organisationnelle)) and from the targeted training they received. They were also strengthened in terms of their professionalism and advocacy capacity. NGO partners, however, were not fully involved in key aspects of the program such as policy, design, or sub-grant management.

We interviewed 8 of the 16 Local NGO Partners (4 in Upper Guinea, 2 in the Forest Region, and 2 in Conakry). Some were quite well developed and advanced in their experience. All had a particular area of specialization. All had had prior experience working with other donors on a variety of projects.

Several (CJMAD, ZALY-AC) stated that the FE good governance training had helped democratize their internal management and become more transparent. All of the partner NGOs interviewed contended that they benefited from the organizational diagnosis and subsequent management and financial training. Through the efforts and training of FE several NGOs (INAASPO, for example) were able to receive legal recognition from the government of Guinea.

Several of the NGOs interviewed contend that the FE training and experience helped them develop new or improved technical capabilities, including experience of working in a consortium (AGUITWB), a higher level of professionalism in dealing with other donors (ZALY-AC), and new areas of competence (CJMAD) in the field of anti-corruption.⁵

Several of the NGO partners (AGUITEB, IBGRN) emphasized how they have been undertaking advocacy campaigns, or encouraging their members associations to make demands on local government using techniques they learned from the FE training. Another (ZALY-AC) is leading an effort to form an NGO forum in order to be more effective in their advocacy programs.

While FE strengthened their local NGO partners in some ways it did not make full use of their existing strengths as full partners (IBGRN, ZALY-AC, VISFAD) in the design of training and other activities and in decisions about the management of sub-grants. This stemmed in part from FE's desire to "harmonize" evaluation and training approaches and to rely on its own staff and at times consortium partners like World Education⁶ to adapt them to local conditions. Given that some of these NGOs had been operating successfully for over 20 years and have intimate knowledge of the areas in which they work, more could be done to delegate decisions to them or to assist them in becoming direct partners in the project.

ISSUE 5. Was the use of earmarked funds to achieve results both in the technical sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture and Forestry) and in achieving the four overarching DG goals an efficient choice?

FINDING 16 The fact that most of the funds for the programs were earmarked did present management challenges to FE but these were manageable.

⁵ This NGO stated that it was unusual for a donor to encourage a partner NGO to work in a field other than its initial area of expertise

⁶ Note that in an interview with World Education they contended that the FE project contracted with them to executive the program and did not allow them

Given political events in Guinea the use of earmarked funds from Health produced mutually advantageous outcomes. On the one hand, DG activities could continue in all four target goals of the project using Global Child Survival and Health (GCSH) funds, and important health activities could continue as locally oriented humanitarian activities.

The FE Project combined funding from both the USAID Development Assistance fund (DA) and the Global Child Survival and Health (GCSH) accounts. The total life of Project Budget including the extension period was approximately \$31,000,000 (28,927,938 obligated to date.) Of this amount \$16,838,128 came from the GCSH account and \$12,089,600 was from Development Assistance. Funds from the GCSH were utilized mainly for HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health (MCH), and Family Planning. Funds from, DA were mainly used for education and NRM with \$1,427,137 from DG.

In 2008 USAID allocated \$500,000 of FY 2009 funds to FE to support outreach and awareness activities related to the upcoming elections. These funds were used to support the communication strategy of the National Electoral Commission (CENI) and to train journalists in the role of the media in elections. The bulk of FE's local government and civil society activities in 2008 and 2009 was funded from GHCS (Global Health & Child Survival) account. In 2009, GHCS funds were able to be used for work at the local level in health enabling critical governance activities to continue in all of the technical sectors including DG. At the same time important results in health were achieved—increasing the number of Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV/AIDS sites from 17 to 31; improvements to health facilities associated with the VCTs such as the building of incinerators, and repairing rooms; and the revitalization and training of 101 of Guinea's 400 health center management committees (COGES), the initiation of training for the new community based Health and Hygiene committees (CSH).

ISSUE 6. Was the use of the Champion approach an effective way to achieve the major goals of the project?

FINDING 17 The use of the “Champion approach” in the first two phases of the FE project has not contributed significantly to the results it has produced.

The champion approach was based on two principles or assumptions—that it is a better use of resources to start with those actors most interested and ready to participate, and that the champions would inspire others by their example or by the natural drive of human beings to compete and be recognized as outstanding. Champions were defined simply as anyone or any organization committed to reform, making things better. The project advertised for champions at the national and local levels, combining recognizing outstanding individuals as well as groups and local governments. Candidates were solicited whose commitment to improve was limited to the four technical areas or other social services of concern to the project. Candidates were supposed to explain how they saw these activities improving good governance. They were also required to prepare a proposal for activities to be undertaken compatible with the goals of the project. Candidates at the local level were then selected by commissions appointed by regional

Governors that included representatives of government of civil society and the media, run by the Governor's Chief of Staff.

In the first phase of this project, scores on the rapid assessment tool (ERO) and the applications from local governments were so poor that none could be designated as "champions." As a result FE accepted all of the CRDs and CU in the priority prefectures. This made the notion of champion completely moot. It also designated as champions individuals and departments within government ministries, including those such as the Health Ministry known from the audits conducted in 2007 to be highly corrupt. The idea here was to engage and support a core of reformers who could influence national level decisions and behavior. This proposition was largely abandoned even prior to the halting of all assistance to the national Ministry of Health in October 2009 because the results of working with the national ministry were so poor. The approach to getting results by working with individual "champions" even within corrupt ministries was not only disappointing, it was unsustainable because of its over reliance on particular people in particular positions.

In the extension phase of the project more emphasis has been put on mobilizing communities as "champions" or peer-communicators, from among the more outstanding "Lighthouse" (*Phare*) communities. Again the assumption is that in modeling good governance and its technical benefits others would emulate. This approach seems to have been motivated both by efforts to reduce the costs of extension and by the belief that competition and trusting the opinions and experiences of others would spread the message more quickly. There is no data thus far on the results that this has produced.

As for champions in civil society, often individuals were so designated, or CSOs that were essentially dependent on a single leader. This again raised the issue of sustainability.

ISSUE 7. Time Frame-- Is the time frame an important factor? Do some interventions require more time than others?

FINDING 18 Governance change, the issue at the heart of USAID's SO and this Project needs to be programmed over a longer period of time.

It is not amenable to quick technical fixes. It involves changes in long standing habits and attitudes. Changing these requires new mentalities and new motivations, as well as new legal and institutional structures. There are always strong interests in a society that resist change. If USAID is serious about affecting Guinea's governance patterns it must be able to program for at least 5-10 years.

MANAGEMENT ISSUES

ISSUE 8 What has the effect been of having the project organized as a big consortium?

FINDING 19 The large and heterogeneous consortium led to management difficulties and difficulties harmonizing interests and approaches, overcome only by extraordinary leadership.

The Faison Ensemble project was based on a cooperative agreement between a Prime (RTI) and six sub-grant partners including two Guinean partners (CENAFOD and REFMAP). This proved to be a difficult arrangement to manage. RTI's method of "harmonizing" the approaches had the merit of being participatory among the partners, but it also took a lot of energy and time and engendered a great of conflict at the outset. People we interviewed were clear that it was only due to the extraordinary skills of the project's first Chief of Party that the consortium was finally able to come together. Such skill is not always present. Subsequent changes of leadership (three additional COPs in 2 years) presented additional challenges. Finally, uneven capability and differing objectives within the consortium led to several of the partners being dropped in the 18 month extension phase, further weakening the overall effort in critical areas such as gender, conflict resolution and education.

VI CONCLUSION: THE KEY QUESTIONS:

A critical assumption underlay USAID/Guinea's strategy, this project and this evaluation: that advancing democratic governance in Guinea could allow for development to proceed. A second critical question was whether and to what degree FE's multi-sectoral approach could advance democratic governance in Guinea:

OVERALL FINDING: The Multi-sectoral approach of Faisons Ensemble (FE) has proven to be effective in producing intended governance and technical results at the local level.

The conclusion of this evaluation is that despite a very unfavorable national political environment, particularly in Conakry, and a very short time frame of effective implementation, the FE Approach has been able to have a significant effect on the local governments and civil society actors with which it has worked. There is ample evidence of changes in the way local government in Guinea functions in the project area even under governments largely elected under a non-competitive system and repressive regimes (Conté and the CNDD). While these changes are not yet institutionalized and have very little effect thus far on national politics they constitute a foundation for constructing a more democratic and better governed Guinea.

At the same time, governance reform has clearly contributed to the improvement of technical services critical to development. Thus far we have only been able to see the

effects clearly in the health sector where citizen participation and changing attitudes by health professionals have produced a far better environment for connecting communities to their social service providers.

The integration of political reform and social service delivery has proven to be mutually reinforcing, at least for this technical sector. This evaluation gives support to USAID/Guinea continuing with this approach, and hopefully being able to extend it to the national level as political conditions continue to allow democratic governance reforms to take root. This will require, however, a more development assistance (DA) to balance the funding from the earmarked health accounts.

VII LESSONS LEARNED

A. Strategic and Programmatic Lessons

1. Improving DG improves the legitimacy of local governance and its ability to provide technical service
2. Understanding and using Local Government Law (Code de Collectivités) and the Forestry (Code de Forêts) is a good way to improve DG because it is grounded in law
3. Training of Civil Society organizations in good governance is a good way to enhance their ability to participate in the government
4. Good governance training of local government officers to accept and use communities' input, improve financial management systems, improve transparency and oversight is an effective way to enhance the legitimacy and support for local government.
5. Training of service providers (e.g. Health workers) in governance provides an opportunity to mobilize resources, and seek partnerships.
6. Improving local governance needs to be complemented by the national level political will (e.g. Policy, directives, resources)
7. Success of a multi-sectoral project depends heavily on sectoral actors and partners focusing on a common objective with demonstrated leadership, good management, and democratic governance internally

B. Management Lessons

1. The greater number of consortium partners (grantees), the more complex the management, and less control one has.
2. Multi actor consortia require clear reporting relationships to the prime.
3. Multiple layer consortia are less cost efficient
4. Multi sectoral programs require a closely integrated multi-sectoral management team at the USAID mission level
5. Multi sectoral programs require strong financial tracking system at USAID project level

6. Multi sector programs with a strong emphasis on improving democratic governance require more time to deliver results and should be programmed for at least 5 years.

ANNEX 1 DATA GATHERING FIELD GUIDE

QUESTION SET FOR LOCAL LEVEL INVESTIGATION OF THE ACTIVITIES AND IMPACT OF THE FE PROJECT

NOTE: Depending on the type of organization interviewed you will use only part of this questionnaire. You can use the same questionnaire for several different organizations. Just make sure each is labeled.

I. Questions for the Technical Services

I.A. Common Questions for Technical Services

1. Since this project began what changes, if any, have taken place in the way your service makes programmatic decisions and the way it provides services?
2. Did the support you received from the project help you improve the delivery of your services? How?
3. Did you personally or your service receive training in how to connect with the local population in a more participatory manner?
4. Did you find this training useful? How?
5. Did the approach of the FE project create difficulties for you or your service? How?
6. Do the CRDs and CUs work more closely with your technical service now? Do they provide financial support for some of your activities in their budget? What kind?
7. Did the training you received from the FE project help you to understand the organizational issues within your own service? Did your organization change at all due to this capacity for organizational diagnosis? How?
8. Did the training help you to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS? Improve maternal and child health.
9. How did your service work with the communities and organizations selected as “champions”? Did they help you improve the delivery of your services? If so how?
10. Did the training in leadership and management provided to your service through the FE Project lead to you doing an organizational diagnosis and the development of a PAPC?
11. Did this help improve the functioning of your service and improve the delivery of your services?
12. Does your service now publicly display service fees?

I.B. TECHNICAL SECTOR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS

--the ones listed here are in the current activities and indicators. We will need to develop some similar questions for education, agriculture and natural resource management.

I.B.1 HEALTH

1. Did the use of the champions program help you change behavior relative to the prevention of HIV/AIDS. How did it help spread the message?
2. Did the FE Project help your service offer HIV testing and counseling? How?

3. Did it improve your delivery of maternal and newborn health care? How?
4. (Addressed to the Midwifery Department of ENSK).
 - a. Did the FE Program Strengthen the Administrative Systems of your Department? How did this contribute to your being able to improve the delivery of these services?
 - b. Did the training and administrative support offered to you improve your ability to deal with corruption in admissions and grade fraud and corruption? How?
5. Did your service participate in the organization and running of conferences with religious leaders and collectivities to promote community-based health services? How did these conferences affect your ability to deliver health care to the base-level?
6. Did any officials or employees of your health center receive training in anti corruption tools and practices with FE project support? Did this training result in a reduction of corruption at your level? Did this help your center deliver health services more effectively and fairly?.
7. Did members of the COGES associated with this center receive training in monitoring the use of public resources?

I.B.2 EDUCATION

1. Questions on the Impact of support to Civic Education Programming on the broader effectiveness of schools to delivery education
2. Did the FE Project support or work with School Management Committees and APEAEs? What was the impact of this support?
3. Did the FE Project support or work with School Management Committees ? If so, what was the effect on the quality of education offered?

I.B.3 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Questions on the use of Forest Management Committees and their relationship with Projects and with Eaux et Forêts (A Champion Service)

II. QUESTIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CSO LEADERS/Members, and CBO leader/members

IIA.. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVED DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

II.A. 1 QUESTIONS on Improving Governance Performance Through Improved Capacity

To ask citizens and/or local level civil society members

1. What is your opinion of the performance of your local CRD/CU in health, education, agriculture and natural resource management in the past year?
2. Did the FE project provide training to your CRD/ CU? What Kind?
3. Did the training include methods for connecting with the local population in a more participatory manner?
4. Did you find this training useful? How?

5. Does your CRD/ CU work more closely with the technical services, such as the Health or Education Services now?
6. Does your CRD/CU allocate some of its local budget to provide technical services? What kind of services? Who identified this need?
7. Has the local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)?
8. Did the officials in your CRD/CU receive training in gender and conflict resolution?
9. Did they receive any training through the FE Project in management of the local government?
10. Specifically, did they receive any training in planning, budgeting, procurement, or monitoring? Which, if any?
11. Did this training result in any decisions considering the way local government functions in this collectivity?
12. Does the local government have any staff? How are they selected? Appointed by whom (ask specifically about the *precepteur* (tax collector)
13. Have the responsibilities of local government changed in the past 3-5 years??? Are these changes authorized in the law on decentralization?
14. Is your local government authorized to collect specific taxes for local use? Which ones?
15. What is the rate of recovery of national taxes, and local revenues in this CRD/CU? Has it changed in the past 3-5 years?
16. Has the local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)?

To ask local government officials

- 17 Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in Code des Collectivités, Code Foncier or Code Forestier?
If so, has this led to changes in way local government deals with these issues (decentralization, land management, forest management?)
- 18 Has your local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)?
- 19 Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in participatory diagnostics and planning methods? If so, what is anything has changed in the way local government plans and involves citizens?
- 20 Have officials in your CRD been trained in procurement of goods and services? If so, has this changed the way they award markets?
- 21 Have official in your CRD/CU been trained in leadership and management to improve the provision of basic public services? If so, has this improved the provision of those services?
- 22 Has your CRD/CU undertaken a civic education campaign?

II.B. Questions on Improving Governance Through the Introduction of Democratic Governance Principles in Local Government

1. Since this project began what changes, if any, have taken place in the way your CRD or CU is managed?
2. Specifically, how are local councilors and Mayors selected? Do councilors represent all of the communities in the CRD?

3. Have the number of women councilors and Mayors increased in this CRD/ CU since the beginning of this project? (inclusion)
4. When was the last election at this level? Was there any competition for these positions? Did any of the office holders get replaced. (Competition)
5. Does your local government hold meetings that are open to the public?
6. Do representatives of CSOs including health and education committees attend these meetings?
7. Does the local government keep records of its meetings? Are they readily available for the public to see?
8. How does your local government construct its annual budget? Does it consult CBOs in the commune as to their needs?
9. Does the budget take these needs into consideration? How (inclusion and responsiveness)
10. Does your CRD/CU publicize its budget (publish it? Discuss it on local radio? Other means) (transparency). Has it begun doing this since the FE Project started?
11. Has the way the local government makes other programmatic decisions such as its expenditures changes since the FE project began? (empowered participation)
12. Have the revenues of your CRD/cu increased during the past year?
13. During the past year were you consulted by local government representatives about community public service delivery priorities in education, health, agriculture or natural resource management?
14. Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in participatory diagnostics and planning methods? If so, what is anything has changed in the way local government plans and involves citizens?
1. Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in anti-corruption tools and practices? If so, has this reduced the amount of corruption in local government?

II.C Questions on Improving the Capacity and the Democratic Governance of Civil Society Actors

II.C. 1 Capacity and Autonomy

1. Is your civil society association a voluntary and autonomous organization
2. Was it formed by government or by a project?
3. Does the government provide financial support or other forms of logistical support to the CSO?
4. Is this CSO legally recognized? By which Ministry?
5. Has the FE Project supported this CSO in improving and its internal management? If so how? (Board of Directors, regular and open meetings, regular financial reports? Dues paying members?, Women on the Board?)
6. Does your CSO have staff (paid, or voluntary), an office/ telephone or internet connection
7. Have members of your CSO/CBO received training on improving your internal governance and/or organization?
8. How did the internal organization and governance of your organization change as a result?

9. Did your organization request and receive training from the FE Project in financial management, civism, awareness of the law of local governments?
10. If so did this training or technical assistance result in the way your organization performed these functions?
11. Has your CSO received a grant from the FE Project or one of its partners?

QUESTIONS 11-12: Particularly for particularly for youth and student associations, and women's associations)

12. Did your association receive training in civic education, conflict resolution, or HIV/AIDS prevention?
13. Did members or officials of your CSO receive training on the Code des Collectivités, Code Foncier, Code Forestier?
14. If so, did this training help them participate and influence the making or implementation of policies in these areas?

II.C. 2 Advocacy Capacity

15. Has the FE Project supported the CSO in improving its advocacy capacity? How specifically?

16. Has the CSO/ CBO met with officials from the deconcentrated services within the past six months to discuss a service or management issue?

17. Has your CSO advocated on an issue of importance to their organization at a CRD/CU meeting?

18. Has it undertaken an advocacy campaign in the past six months? What issues? What technique employed? What result?

19. Has it undertaken a mobilization or lobby campaign? How often? What issues?

20. Has it undertaken a collective activity with one or more other organizations (women's groups, youth, APEAEs, COGES, local government, other local NGOs)

21. Has your CSO monitored the budget process at the level of local government?

22. Has the FE Project supported a CSO or CBO federation in any area of interest to your organization? If so, has the lobbying capacity of this federation increased in the last several years?

Additional Questions to be Asked at the Local Level Regarding Increased citizen access to diverse sources and types of information

Capacity

(To ask people in the media)

1. To your knowledge has the FE Project assisted in the opening or supported independent radio stations?
2. If so, do they help people understand and influence policies of importance to you?

3. Have you been trained in the concepts of good governance and improvement of delivery of public services?

III. MEDIA IMPACT

(Ask local level people or officials)

1. Have you heard media (radio?) broadcasts on good governance principles and on citizen obligations (voting, paying taxes)
2. Have you heard any broadcasts about improving local social services and using specific services (such as AIDs counseling and testing)?
3. Have you heard any broadcasts about corruption?
4. Have you heard any broadcasts about local government meetings?
5. If so, as a result of these broadcasts have you or your local government taken any steps to adopt the behavior being promoted on the radio?
adopt democratic governance principles?

ANNEX 2 ORGANIZING THE DATA

Instructions: Following your field work review your notes and organize the information on this form inserting all the relevant information for the particular question or issue posed in the Scope of Work. We will then synthesize this data into a set of findings supported by the field observations.

- I. Overall Issues: Assess FE's multi-sectoral to advancing Dem Governance, while achieving changes in specific sector impacts
Really three issues
 1. What was the FE approach?
 2. What evidence is there that FE approach helped advance democratic governance
 - a. At level of local government units (CU CRD)
 - b. At level of local civil society CSOs and COBs
 - c. At level of methods of technical services (deconcentrated)
 - d. Possibly at level of the Administration (prefets/ sous prefets)
 - e. Evidence that FE helped change specific sector impacts (positively??)
 3. To what degree did work at local level result in systematic democratic and sectoral changes in project area and possibly beyond?
 - a. Is there any evidence that FE produced change beyond the local level? If so specify
 4. To what degree did FE make progress in meeting deliverables as described in annual work plans, Which?
 5. To what degree did FE help or hinder local capacity development and substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming
Data from interviews with local NGO partners
 6. Does DG approach work better in some sectors than others (health, education, agriculture, NRM?)
Field evidence of how it worked in different sectors, including Governance (local government)
 7. What was the impact of FE on civic participation, civic education
Evidence of changes in way citizen relate to the governance process;
 8. Was the use of the Champion approach efficient (how chosen, how effective?)

ANNEX 3 SCOPE OF WORK

REVISED 1/11/11

USAID GUINEA

FAISONS ENSEMBLE

Project Performance Assessment and Lessons Learned*

Scope of Work

Summary

In 2005, USAID conducted a fragile states assessment in Guinea. The assessment revealed the country's inherent fragility and identified poor governance as the principle cause of the development problems facing Guinea: Endemic corruption, low economic-growth rates, weak political and civil society institutions, and inability or unwillingness to deliver effective public goods and essential services. At the time of the assessment, USAID/Washington required Missions in countries that were considered fragile to design country strategies aimed at addressing the sources of fragility. The Mission therefore embarked on a strategy and program design process focused on a single Mission objective, Advancing Democratic Governance, working not only through the Democracy and Governance (DG) sector, but also through the social sectors.

The assessment and country strategy discussions also led to the hypothesis that improvements in the governance setting could lead to improvements in the socioeconomic development of Guinea. The above two assumptions, that strategic interventions in the social sectors, primarily focused on strengthening citizen participation while increasing transparency and accountability of government institutions, could help advance broader DG goals, and that such interventions could also result in improvements in the social sectors, drove the innovative design of the *Faisons Ensemble (Working Together)* project. The premise of the latter hypothesis is that through mechanisms of transparency, citizen participation in decision-making, and improved local and other targeted government structures and systems, existing and supplemental resources will be used more efficiently leading to improved socioeconomic conditions. The DG hypothesis was that with limited space in the national arena to advance democratic reforms, a long-term approach of strengthening citizen participation and civic awareness, primarily by addressing transparency and poor governance through the social sectors, and promoting government accountability and transparency where feasible, were the most viable options for addressing fragility at that time in Guinea and laying the foundations for a more democratic society. The Mission was also faced with the challenge that the majority of its funding was earmarked at that time.

The FE project has been cited in Thomas Carothers' article, "The Elusive Synthesis" (October 2010) in which he calls *Faisons Ensemble* Project a good model of a new USAID "cross-cutting program" focus. Other members of the DG community have also recently been promoting the concept of collaboration with other development sectors in order to lay the seeds of democracy and good governance and achieve public support for democratic reforms through tangible improvements in the social sectors; however, it remains uncertain to what extent and how these 'integrative approaches' help advance systemic democratic change. At the same time, there have been questions from the social sectors about whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective through

* Note: An Addendum follows the Faisons Ensemble SOW: Democracy/Governance Follow-On Assessment SOW. A mini DG assessment would be geared heavily towards establishing programmatic recommendations that can be used by the Mission.

democracy and governance-oriented interventions. With three years of programming in Guinea, the time is right to assess the project by reviewing the assumptions that shaped its design, and evaluating what have been the sector-specific and project-wide impacts. It is also hoped that the evaluation will also greatly contribute to the larger discussion of cross-sectoral collaboration and integration.

The implementation of the *Faisons Ensemble* development approach has coincided with an incredibly dramatic and insecure period for Guinea. The project began in March 2007, just two months after government security forces brutally repressed protesters in a general strike in January, resulting in at least 137 deaths and some 1,700 injured. A military mutiny and clashes with the police force in May and June 2008 resulted in additional deaths and injuries, albeit not on the scale of January 2007. These events were followed by a military coup in December 2008, a brutal massacre of pro-democracy supporters in 2009 that shocked the country, and finally a transition to the first freely elected president in Guinea's history in 2010. The political and security context has unavoidably affected the implementation of *Faisons Ensemble* by changing the terms with which the partner was to interact with the Government of Guinea as well as simply through restricting movement and activities during times of unrest. And after the December 2008 coup, in accordance with USG's guidelines on suspending assistance in Guinea, USAID instructed the partner to halt all DG related assistance to the central government. DG assistance to CRD's and communes with locally elected officials was permitted to continue. USG policy also permitted humanitarian assistance to continue. This included work in the health and education sectors where the project was permitted to continue to engage the central government and support for subsistence agriculture.

The evaluation will validate FE's approach to achieve both DG results as well as results in the social sectors. . The evaluation will also analyze the *Faisons Ensemble* execution of the project, the impact of the political context in Guinea, and the lessons that can be learned from implementing a program with its new and different approach.

Introduction

The Republic of Guinea is located on the West Coast of Africa and bordered by six countries, of which four (Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Liberia) have experienced periods of major instability and sometimes conflict in recent years. (Ivory Coast, Guinea's neighbor to the south-east is in chaos today, sending hundreds of refugees to Guinea.)

Guinea is a stark example of the impact of poor governance. It is abundantly rich in natural resources, yet its people live in poverty. Guinea possesses over one-third of the world's known reserves of bauxite, which is used to produce aluminum, and a considerable quantity of gold, diamonds, uranium and iron ore. In addition, Guinea's soil, water and climatic conditions give the country enormous agricultural potential, yet barely a fifth is being exploited.

Guinea's population is estimated at 10 million, with 70% living on less than \$1.26 per day. Life expectancy, literacy rates, and child and maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world, Guinea ranks 160 out of 177 countries according to the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index. Access to primary education has improved markedly during the past ten years, but there exist significant shortfalls in children's completion of primary school. The Guinean education system is increasingly unable to meet the growing demands of its population, and there are significant deficiencies in the quality of schools, and their gender equity.

2010 has been a year of remarkable political transition for Guinea. On September 28, 2009, a pro-democracy rally ended with the senseless massacre of more than 150 Guineans by soldiers of the

military government. In December, an attempt on the life of the coup leader removed him from an active role in Guinea, and a transition government emerged, spawning a hopeful political future for Guinea. This set the stage for presidential elections, which became the major focus of USG assistance to Guinea in 2010. While the conduct of the first round in June 2010 was less than perfect, the process garnered the stamp of approval from the international community. By the end of the fiscal year, efforts to organize the second round resulted in the successful election on November 7, 2010 of Guinea's first democratically-elected president in history, with the new President's peaceful inauguration on December 21, 2010.

2010 ends with the prospect of democracy for the first time in Guinea's 52 year post-independence history. However, the new government, and Guinea, inherits a host of problems rooted in decades of poor governance and mismanagement: weak public institutions and little management of public finances, lack of accountability and transparency, widespread corruption and absence of the rule of law, and an army accustomed to operating without control and with its fingers in many aspects of the economy. These factors have hindered progress on decentralization of services, local governance and provision of adequate social services at the community level.

“Faisons Ensemble” Background

In 2005, USAID conducted a fragile states assessment in Guinea. The assessment revealed the country's inherent fragility, and cited poor governance as the principle cause of the development problems facing Guinea: endemic corruption, low economic-growth rates, weak political and civil society institutions, and inability or unwillingness to deliver effective public goods and essential services. Informed by the fragile state assessment and other findings, USAID/Guinea took a bold step of designing a strategy that had a single strategic objective (SO): “Advance Democratic Governance”. The strategy has four DG Goals, two per each of the two intermediate results: “Improved Effectiveness, Accountability and Transparency of Government of Guinea Institutions in the Productive and Social Sectors”, and “Strengthened Citizen Participation and Advocacy”. Under its new strategy, USAID used earmarks and social sector funding to advance democratic governance while meeting the goals of the other sectors.

The Mission designed a multi-sector bilateral program, Faisons Ensemble, (“Working Together”) to implement its unique strategy. Faisons Ensemble is a seven-member consortium including two Guinean non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The cooperative grant agreement with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) is valued at \$31.9 million and initiated activities in March 2007. The project currently ends in Sept 2011. The project was slightly delayed due to political instability in the country and to logistical challenges in getting the implementing partners onboard.

The RTI consortium's technical interventions support outcomes across targeted sectors (democracy and governance, health services, education and agriculture, and natural resources management (NRM)). USAID/Guinea's four DG goals are:

1. Improved Effectiveness of Government Institutions and Decentralization and Local Service Delivery
2. Greater Visibility and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Efforts

3. Increased Capacity and Effectiveness of Civil Society, working through strong CSOs and CBOs that are well managed and participate, demand accountability and transparency in service delivery, and advocate for good governance.
4. Increased Citizen Access to More Diverse Sources and Types of Information

The project targets the regions of greater Conakry, Upper Guinea and Forest Guinea and set out to directly impact 113 rural development committees, 620 civil society organizations (CSO) and more than 400 community-based organizations (CBOs), plus independent media within these jurisdictions. The program as designed also targeted 10 vanguard ministries or ministry services, national institutes, agencies and commissions and was expected to reach thousands of national, regional and local CSOs by working through CSO networks, coalitions, federations, and umbrella organizations.

In 2009, the USG imposed restrictions on official development assistance to government ministries in reaction to the military coup of late 2008. In early 2009, the USG suspended all assistance to the Government of Guinea except for assistance supporting elections and the political process and humanitarian assistance. While it suspended all DG assistance other than elections assistance to the central government, USG suspension guidance permitted the *Faisons Ensemble* project to continue its DG work in CRDs and communes with locally elected leadership as it was deemed that this supported “the political process”. The USG interpreted “humanitarian assistance” to include assistance in the health and education sectors. Accordingly, USAID partners, including *Faisons Ensemble*, were permitted to continue to engage with the central government in these sectors, although work with the central government in these sectors was substantially scaled back in practice and ended (except for work with government employees of deconcentrated services at the local level) after the September 28 massacre.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide USAID/Guinea with sufficient information to make critical programmatic and budgetary decisions regarding the future strategic and programmatic direction of the *Faisons Ensemble* program. It also aims to identify the lessons learned of this cross-cutting/multi-sector approach for future Mission programming decisions. To achieve this, the evaluation will document progress achieved by *Faisons Ensemble* to the present, identify key lessons learned and make recommendations on the most effective and cost efficient path forward for future activities. The evaluation also will provide insights on the current strategic approach taken by the Mission and make recommendations for potential future directions. Finally, it is envisioned that the lessons learned from the *Faisons Ensemble* program may prove beneficial to other Missions interested in such approaches. The evaluation will be led by an external consultant with expertise in evaluation, democracy and governance, and cross-sectoral programming, with participation from USAID representatives from different sectors.

Objectives of the evaluation:

1. To assess *Faisons Ensemble's* multi-sector approach to advance democratic governance, USAID/Guinea's single strategic objective, while achieving changes in specific sector impacts.

2. To assess the extent to which local level and sector interventions may have resulted in systemic democratic and/or sectoral changes in the project areas and possibly outside those areas.
3. To assess the relevance/applicability of the Mission's current strategic objective and vision under the current political realities with their inherent instability. Is this the best model for Guinea right now and in the near future?
4. To assess use of earmarked funds in achievement of results at both the sector level and the four overarching DG Goals. (This is particularly important with respect to the health account.)
5. Make recommendations for :
 - a. Short term: identify strategic and programmatic adjustments that would improve performance in alignment of mission strategy and sector targets in the remaining period of the agreement.
 - b. Long-term interventions and adjustments, particularly in relation to the relevance of the Mission's strategic vision for Guinea under the political realities and deeply entrenched governance issues.
6. Identify key lessons learned in planning, implementation, monitoring, coordination, and managing an integrated and multi-sector program, with special attention to the operational models and mechanisms that were utilized (i.e., having one large mechanism with a consortium of members, selection of key personnel to manage the program, etc.). What are the challenges of a multi-sector integrated program? What are the benefits and opportunities? What are the sector budgetary implications?
7. To assess *Faisons Ensemble* progress to date in meeting the deliverables as described in the annual work plans and in the cooperative agreement.
8. To assess the extent to which the *Faisons Ensemble* model facilitated or hindered local capacity development and the substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming. This is important as the Mission is interested in exploring how to more directly and effectively engage with local partners in the future.
9. To make practical recommendations on future programming of *Faisons Ensemble* (or of a *Faisons Ensemble*-like program) for USAID/Guinea.

ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED

The following questions should assist to investigate specific issues to fulfill the assessment objectives:

Strategic Issues

1. Project Design

The fragility analysis of Guinea in 2005 identified poor governance as a blockage to the development of Guinea. This analysis led to the base assumption of *Faisons Ensemble*, improving governance should allow for development in Guinea to proceed. This central assumption has been tested for three years and should be an important component of the assessment. It is also critical to assess the extent to which the *Faisons Ensemble* approach helped to advance democratic governance.

2. Sectoral Impacts

The *Faisons Ensemble* project targeted the sectors of democracy and governance, health, education, agriculture, and natural-resource management. Is there a difference in the impact of governance programming across these sectors? Are some sectors more suitable for such interventions than others? What were similar positive outcomes across sectors? What were similar challenges?

3. Connection Between Local and National Governance

In what ways have democracy and governance activities conducted at the local level impacted democracy and governance issues currently at play at the national level or outside the target regions? Was there any sustainable change in the national government through programming prior to the imposition of aid restrictions? Did local governance programming impact national governance conditions? If not, did it lay the groundwork for governance improvements nationally and in the relationship between national and local governments? Was it possible to effectively organize local governance programming during Guinea's political crisis and transition? Has the central Government of Guinea played a role in supporting local governance initiatives?

4. Impact of Civic Participation, Civic Education and Media Interventions

How were civic participation and education activities integrated into social sector activities? What was the impact of these interventions? Did local level citizen participation and awareness raising interventions have reverberations at other levels of society? If so, how? What was the impact of the media component of *Faisons Ensemble* on advancing democratic governance and on achieving other sector results?

5. Funding Allocations

An important reason for the design of the project was to have maximum impact and sector resources (especially earmarked funds) of the program on the ground. Was this programmatic choice an efficient use of sector-specific funds? What lessons can be learned from combining sector funds under one project?

6. Use of Select 'Champion' Examples

Faisons Ensemble made a strategic decision to target 'Champions' within government and among target communities. How were the 'champion communities' and government 'champions' chosen and how well was this done? How effective has this approach been? Has the distribution of 'Champions' been done efficiently? Were resource limitations the principal reason for the use of champions rather than program design? What was the regional distribution of 'champion communities' and how did this choice affect programs?

7. Time Frame

Is the time frame across the different strategic questions an important factor? Do some interventions require more long-term intervention than others? Is the three to four year project period a reasonable amount of time to achieve the anticipated change in democratic governance?

Programmatic Issues

1. Political and Security Challenges

Faisons Ensemble has been implemented in a time of tremendous uncertainty, political crisis, and instability in Guinea. To what extent has the programming been affected by the crisis? Is the impact limited to delayed activities or have there been more substantive changes to the project design due to conditions within the country? Are there lessons learned or risk mitigation measures that would be useful for a similar project in the future?

2. Program Flexibility

How flexible was *Faisons Ensemble* in adapting to the shifting political reality? To what extent was the program able to effectively adapt to new political circumstances? What were the limitations and how could they be addressed through future programming?

3. Work Plan

Has the program achieved set targets/output/outcomes as described in the USAID operational plan and PMP? What were the challenges and successes? Were the indicators appropriate for measuring sector impact? Do they reflect USAID OP indicators (e.g. no indicators for immunization coverage or for some of the cross-cutting indicators like youth, donor coordination, and gender).

Management Issues

1. Implementing Partner Activities and Management

Faisons Ensemble had a slow start-up period and has had several changes in management in Guinea. What has been the effect of these issues on the project? Are there lessons learned or risk mitigation measures that would be useful for a similar project in the future?

2. Implementing Partner Organization

Was the use of multiple sub-grantees under one implementing partner a suitable mechanism for the program? How effective was local organizational capacity building through the *Faisons Ensemble* structure? To what extent were local partners able to substantively contribute to the program? Are there lessons learned that would be useful for a similar project in the future?

What are the management structures in place within *Faisons Ensemble* and the Mission to manage this complex multi-sector program? Are they adequate? How did personnel decisions affect program implementation (i.e., targeting key personnel with specific professional backgrounds, etc.)?

What measures has the Mission taken to manage the program (i.e., combined field visits, regular meetings across sectors)?

METHODS AND PROCEDURES

The evaluators should consider a range of possible methods and approaches for collecting and analyzing the information required to assess the evaluation objectives. The methodology will include, but not be limited to: document review, key informant interviews (including

USAID/Guinea staff, new GoG officials, and other Donors/International Agencies), participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques within the target communities, site visits, and observation.

Existing Data Sources

- Field Data:
 - Local budgetary information
 - Local medical system information
 - Other locally available data from government agencies related to health, education, agriculture (in lieu of a baseline analysis, this might help understand increased enrollment, clientele visits, etc.)
- *Guinea Fragile States Assessment and other assessment materials*
- *Mission Strategy Paper 2006-2008*
- *APS and FE proposal, 2006*
- *Cooperative Agreement RTI*
- *MSI 2006-2008 Baseline Survey for USAID Guinea Strategy of Advanced Democratic Governance*
- *Faisons Ensemble annual work plans*
- *Faisons Ensemble annual and quarterly reports*
- *Faisons Ensemble monitoring and evaluation plan*
- *Government of Guinea Transition Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2010-2011)*

Data collections

Key informant interviews will include but not limited to the following sources.

Key Stakeholders in Field

- Relevant local government officials in greater Conakry, Upper Guinea, and Forested Guinea
- Local leaders (official and informal) of target communities, especially in ‘champion’ communities
- Community members of target communities, especially in ‘champion’ communities
- Local clinic, education, and other government services staff at the targeted community level
- NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, and relevant informal organizations present at targeted community level
- FE beneficiaries in target areas

Faisons Ensemble-connected Sources

- RTI program managers and sector specialists in the US
- First RTI COP, Steve Snook (now at ARD)
- MSI staff involved in the baseline assessment
- USAID/Guinea senior management, USAID/Guinea technical team members, USAID/W staff familiar with the program in Guinea and/or the fragile states assessment that was conducted
- RTI-cooperating local partner representatives

- GoG counterparts from health, education, NRM: Note: since FE has not worked with government agencies or local entities for nearly two years, and a new government will be in place soon, what is the utility of these contacts?
- Staff from selected partner NGOs of FE (CENAFOD/MANORIVER)

Other International Donors and Partners

- Donors (World Bank, AFD, GTZ, Spain, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA)
- Project directors for other USAID projects such as ESD, Engender health, Pathfinder, Jphiego, World Education, IFES, NDI, Search for Common Ground.

IMPLEMENTATION

Team Composition:

The evaluation team will comprise a team leader with strong skills in evaluation, democracy and governance, and analysis of cross-sector development programs; a proven track record supervising teams in the field and producing high-quality and concise reports; and extensive experience working in Africa and similar fragile/post-conflict settings. At least an FSI-tested R-3, S-3 level in French is required. Experience working in Guinea is very desirable. The team leader will:

- Finalize and negotiate with USAID/Guinea the evaluation work plan;
- Establish evaluation team roles, responsibilities and tasks;
- Develop data collection instruments and questionnaire;
- Facilitate all necessary meetings in the U.S. and in Guinea;
- Ensure that the logistics arrangements in the field are complete;
- Coordinate schedules to ensure timely production of deliverables;
- Coordinate the process of assembling individual inputs and/findings for the evaluation report and finalizing the evaluation report;
- Lead the oral and written preparation and presentation of key evaluation findings and recommendations to USAID/Guinea and USAID/Washington;
- Local-hire logistics expert.

Other members of the team will include USAID staff members from Washington, including two public health specialists, a democracy and governance specialist; and an agriculture/ natural resources specialist. The team will include USAID/Guinea staff and, perhaps, depending on the status of the assistance restrictions, some GoG representatives. (Assume the USAID/Guinea staff will serve as the “local Guinea expert/s” or do we need to specifically bring on board a local expert? Also, we should discuss if GOG representatives should be involved in the actual evaluation or serving as key informants/interviewees.)

Levels of effort and tasks to be completed

Tasks	Duration	Time for completion⁷
Initial preparation Review of documents, travel preparation, feedback on the PD, meetings in Washington, etc	one week	Feb 28-Mar 2, 2011
Travel to Guinea and field work Travel days, briefing with Mission, stakeholders, etc..		Mar 3-4, 2011
Field visit Data collection, analysis, briefing	2 weeks	Mar 6-19
Drafting of document	4 days	Mar 21-24
Briefing of Mission team and stakeholders	2 days	Mar 25 & 28
Finalizing report	1 week	Mar 28-Apr 1
Total days required	30 days (work days, including travel time)	

Scheduling and logistics:

USAID/Guinea Assistance Objective Team office and/or local facilitation contractor will be responsible for arranging and providing logistical support to the team, including scheduling meetings and interviews, making copies of key documents and drafts, making travel plans, etc. If required, local enumerators will be hired to collect field level data.

Involvement of Stakeholders

Local NGOs, CSOs and CBOs, and possibly representatives of the new GoG (see previous comment) will participate in the evaluation.

DELIVERABLES

Work Plan (week one)
Presentation of Findings to USAID (week four)
Draft Report (week four)
Final Report (week five)

Reporting Requirements

The format for the evaluation report is as follows:

Executive Summary
Table of Contents
List of Acronyms
Introduction
Background

⁷ Assume March start-up (these dates subject to adjustment depending on schedules of personnel from USAID/Washington). This is the schedule set forth by the original drafter last year, but I think this is too tight.

Methodology
Finding & Issues
Conclusions
Recommendations (to include recommendations on future programming directions)
Lessons learned
References
Annexes
List of people and organizations consulted

ANNEX 4 LIST OF PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED

USAID

Baldé, Maladho. Acting chief of Education and Democratic Governance Sector, USAID/Guinea
Diallo, Anna. Acting Head of Democracy Sector
Estes, Nancy. Mission Director
Kallo, Oumar

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Fakan, Stephen. Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Guinea.
Moller, Patricia, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States to the Republic of Guinea.
Ofrecio, Albert. Political Officer, Human Rights and Justice, 67-10-43-22

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Ackebo, Felix. Chef de Cabinet- UNICEF
Diallo, Dr Ahmed Tidiane- Deputy Representative, UNICEF
Yansane, Dr Mohamed Lamine, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene
Zitsamele-Coddy, Renee. Health Specialist, WHO

FAISONS ENSEMBLE CONSORTIUM PARTNERS

World Education, Barry, Mamadou Saitou- Interim Director, Barry, Mme Sonaré Oumar
Koultonmy, Filloi, Moise
CENAFOD (Centre Africane de Formation Pour le Développement), Sylla, Aboubcar. Executive, Director. 224-60-29-98-44/ 64-40-47-16, Touré, Abamba Demba. Assistant Executive Secretary of CENAFOD)
RTI- Steve Snook, former Chief of Party of FE; Becky Gadell, former chief of party and governance specialist

FAISONS ENSEMBLE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL STAFF

Diallo Ibrahima Sona	Coordinateur, Dabola
Barry Mamadou Lamine	M&E , Dabola
N'Diaye Sekou	Democracy and Governance, Dabola
Bah Alhassane	Health Specialist, Dabola
Sarah Lament	Agricultural Specialist, Dabola
Baldé, Mamadou Aliou-	Faisons Ensemble- Regional M&E officer for Conakry
Diallo, Ibrahima.	Regional Coordinator of Faisons Ensemble for Faranah and Dabola.
Gerber, Dan.	Chief of Party, Faisons Ensemble Conakry.
Sow, El Hadj.	Chief of Section of Democratization. Faisons Ensemble.

We met with the entire staff of FE in Kankan

NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA

Condé, Alhassan. Minister of Decentralization, Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la
Decentralisation 64-27-98-19, 60 72 15 79, 62 49 67 94
Koulibaly, Aboubacar. Minister of Audit, du Controle Economique et Financier.
Yansane, Dr Mohamed Lamine, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene

Decentralized Administration

NAME	LOCATION	POSITION	Telephone
Cardiné, Baijo.	Bate Nafadji	Sous-prefet	
Diallo, Djondjonba.	Bissikrima	Sous-prefet	
Lamine Tounkara	Bissikrima	Deputy Sous-prefet	65-28-35-11
Fode Moussa Toure	Bissikrima	DSSE	65-76-82-63
Seck Farba Samba	Bissikrima	Chief of Military Quarters	65-76-74-85
Diawara Karifa	Bissikrima	Deputy chief of Forestry Service	65-80-86-25
Alimou Barry	Bissikrima	Chief of Development Service (?)	65-64-23-81
Haba, Anglinr,	Beyla	Water and Forestry Service	
Keda N'aonandian	Beyla	Water and Forestry Service	
Haba, Anglinr,	Beyla	Water and Forestry Service	
Keda N'aonandian	Beyla	Water and Forestry Service	

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

FARANAH URBAN COMMUNE

Name	Location	Position	Telephone #
Alimou Barry C	Commune Urbaine	Mayor	60-28-84-80
Mamadou Ben Oulare	Commune Urbaine	1 st Vice Mayor	60-44-21-03
Sire S Oulare	Commune Urbaine	2 nd Vice mayor	60-35-62-07
Leno Jean Claude	Commune Urbaine	Secretary General	60-27-63-86
Mamadi Traore	Commune Urbaine	Councillor	60-26-25-03
Seybou Camara	Commune Urbaine	Councillor	64-30-90-99
Daouda Kourouma	Commune Urbaine	Councillor	60-35-62-54
Daouda Kourouma	Commune Urbaine	Councillor	66-38-56-26
Bangaly Conde	Commune Urbaine	Councillor	62-44-78-56
Hawa Keita Education		D CEE	60-54-59-69
Sekou Keyra		Member-cercle d'innovation	60-37-56-41
Alpha Bachiru Barry	Commune urbaine	Communal tax collector	67-36-23-13
Lancine Camara	RENACOT	Chief Trainer	60-58-49-26
Ansoumane Kouyate	Commune urbaine	C.S. Finance	60-46-86-59
Mamady Kaba	Sire quartier	President	60-58-14-36
Mamadou Camara	Assatou quartier	President	
Alhadj Sekou Kourouma	Sirikila quartier	President	
Elhadj. mamady Conde	Tnkolonko quartier	President	60-20-16-44
Ousmane Oulare	Abattoire quartier	President	64-35-45-82
Aminata diawara		Sectary of the	60-36-28-33

Issa Camara	Abattoire quartier	AFF.S President	
Ibrahima Keita	Bandaya quartier	President	66-66-64-84
Karamo Oulare	Mosque quartier	President	66-68-64-84
Sayba Conde	Market II quartier	President	
Elhadj M'Bemba Dansoko	Market I quartier	President	60-57-44-79
Abdoulaye Cisse	Chamber of Agriculture	Member	64-24-37-79
Lancine Camara	Chamber of Agriculture	Member	60-63-94-36
Mory Conde	Commune urbaine	Civil Registrar	60-98-58-55
Sekou Douno		Teacher	
Gnanea Douno	Forestry Service	Environmental guard	60-58-49-07
Fatoumata Kourouma		Cercle d'innovation	60-27-65-54

URBAN COMMUNE OF DABOLA

NAME	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Lamine Morodou Diakite	Mayor's Office	Secretarty General	64-44-70-48
Ibrahima Fofana	Mayor's Office		64-75-27-35
Alphadio Conde	Mayor's Office/ FONDENG		64-77-03-85
Elhadj Anssoumane Traore	Heremakono quartier	Quartier chief	64-09-99-60
Manma Barry	Sincery quartier	Quartier chief	60-36-21-50
Aboubacar Demba Sankhon	Mayor's Office	Mayor	62-39-58-23

**URBAN COMMUNE OF KANKAN **

Name	Position	Telephone
Elh. Djenabou Mouss Diare	Mayor	64-88-87-77
Ibrahima Fofana Calva	Secretary General	60-57-07-92
Mamadi Kapo Kaba	1 st Vice Maor	65-52-54-46
Amara Bayo	Council member	62-42-44-13
Sidiki Keita	Council member	60-30-64-35
Mamadou Djouldet Barry -	Council member	67-48-00-27
Anssoumane Conde	Council member	62-27-20-32
Assata Kante	Council member	68-12-21-26

LOCAL GOVERNMENT URBAN COMMUNE OF BISSIKIRMA

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Sidiki Traore	Mayor CUD	65-70-79-67
Mamadou Aliou Diallo	Council member	65-51-30-45
Madjou Bah	President of the S/C	67-34-98-71
Souleymane Conde	Council member	65-32-18-10
Lamine Bah	Member civil society	65-65-48-30
Mamadou Saliou Diallo	Manager Mutual	67-26-53-92
Fanta Batilou Kaba	Council member CUD	65-66-40-57

URBAN COMMUNE OF BEYLA

Name	Position
Bamy, Mamnoh	Mayor
Camara, Menidjon	1 st Vice Mayor
Kalisa, Mara.	2 nd Vice Mayor
Truama, Alphonse	Council Member
Sona, Jules Nema.	Secretary General
Haba, Albert	Youth delegate
Lamah, Fasson.	Tax collector

LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF Marella (CRD)

Name	Type of Group	Position	telephone
Bandian Kourouma	Administration	Assistant Sous prefet	
Fore Camara	Administration	Secretary	66-11-80-80
Abdoulaye Sow	CRD	Vice President	
Elhadj Boubacar Sow	CRD	Council member	66-16-14-33
Sadio Diakite	CRD	Council member	
Mamadou Cire Barry	CRD	Council member	24-70-82-4
Therno Ousmane Barry	CRD	Council member	64-27-84-74
Mamadou Doumbouya	COGES	COGES member	66-16-17-90
Fatoumata Mossou Camara	Groupe S. Diakite	Member	
Ousmane Barry	Agricultural Group	President	64-37-85-41
Mamadou Moussa Diakite	Agricultural Group	Treasurer	66-96-99-59
Mamadou Doumbouya	COGES	member	66-16-17-90
Amadou Doumbouya	COGEF	Secretary	
Ousmane Thiam Barry	Sory Group	member	66-16-15-27
Moussa Sidibe	COGEF	President	24-45-85-49
Therno Sanousy Barry	GAF	President	66-84-49-60
Fatoumate Conde	COGEF	Member	66-07-74-97

Alpha Kabala Keita	CSO	Member	
Mamadou Bhoeye Barry	Humanism Group	Secretary	66-11-74-60
Mamadou Thiouto Sidibe	Humanism Group	President	24-73-07-29

LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRD OF BATE NAFADJI

NAMES	INSTITUTION	POSITION	TELEPHONE
N'Faly Moba Kaba	CRD	PRESIDENT	68-27-05-81
Mohamed Naby Soumare	CRD	Secretary	62-39-97-86
Ibrahima Kalil Diane	CRD	Treasurer	68-89-40-89
Amara Kaba	CRD	Council Member	
Fanta Tounkara	CBO	Member	
Sire Tounkara	CSO	President	
Sadou Sanoh	CSO	Member	60-30-98-40
Moussa Kabine Toure	COGES	Secretary for Information	62-42-47-79
Kabine Ii Kaba	COGES	Treasurer	62-08-40-48
Sitan Alpha Kaba	APEAE/College	Vice President	62-39-46-98
Sayon Toure	COGES	Administrative Secretary	62-22-62-47
Conde Souleymane	COGES	Information Secretary	62-54-28-81
N'Faly Kaba	Benkadi Group	Member	62-54-37-19
Amadou Kaba	Benkadi Group	Member	62-21-25-63
Lancine Kaba	CIGES/ CSH	Member	62-69-42-04
Diaka Kaba	Health Mutual	Treasurer	62-94-66-58
Houmou Kaba	CSO	member	
Diakoussou Kaba	CSO	Vice President	
Ladji Kaba	CSO	member	62-54-30-02
Iya Madi Kaba	Health Mutual	President	

BOOLA RURAL COMMUNE (CRD)

NAME	INSTITUTION	POSITION
Gbananian, Zaoro	CRD	President
Kouracimas, Siamy Manradi	CRD	
Sylla, Amadou-	CRD	Secretary General
Diallo, Halassane	Agricultural Service	Chief of Agriculture Sector
Madiou, Balde Mamadou-	CRD	Tax collector
Keita, Lounceny	CRD	Treasurer

LOCAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNER

AGUITEB (Association Guinéenne des Techniciens Biomédicaux) ,KANKAN

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Boubacar Biro Barry	President	64-50-51-78
D'Issa Camara	President	68-13-97-51
Laye Conde	Animateur	62-29-28-94
Aliou Camara	Animateur	64-44-73-32
Moussa Dioubate	Animateur	63-10-34-24
M'Saran Doumbouya	Secrétaire Comptable	60-27-22-12
Mme. Sow Houssanatu	suivi evaluation	67-30-55-28
Niouma Serge Leno Dr.	Executive	68-71-23-33
Mamady Diakite	AS	66-15-72-90

IBGRN (Initiatives de Base Pour la Gestion des Ressources, Faranah

Name	POSITION	Cell Phone
Macky diallo	Coordinateur	62-44-37-98
Djba fofana	Animateur	66-73-76-78
Hawa Barry	Secrétaire Comptable	68-10-59-94
Moussa Mosquee Camara	Animateur	64-94-52-58
Ousmane Diallo	Animateur	64-00-16-61

APIC (Association pour la Promotion des Initiatives Communautaires), Faranah

NAMES	POSITION	Cell Phone
Bangaly Oulare	Stagiaire	60-60-19-41
Mamady Conde	Secrétaire	64-84-49-76/60-92-35-20
Mamady Bintou Oulare	President	60-27-65-69/68-28-50-60
Fadou Mara	Vice President	60-40-53-96
Amadou Nala Kourouma	Animateur	60-31-65-90
laye Oulare	Animateur	60-32-38-20
Karifa Oulare	External Affairs	60-32-38-36
Diallo Amadou Bailo	A.S.	68-20-02-16/30-32-32-47
Baba Traore	Secrétaire Comptable	60-63-79-92

ADIC (Association pour la promotion des Initiatives Communautaire), KANKAN

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Nainy Conde	Coordinateur	64-45-30-49
Mamady Kaba	Vice President	62-43-12-01
Ibrahima Kourouma	Animateur	67-24-87-86
Mamady Kaba	Animateur	64-30-16-84
Aissatou Barry	Animateur	62-40-25-40
Ansoumane Conde	Animateur	64-64-65-79
Manty conde	Animatrice	66-43-69-03
Fani Lama	Animatrice	60-57-81-20/66-13-99-54

NGOS/ CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION

National NGOs

CNOSCG (Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne)

Cissoko, Ibrahima Sory (Dr). President

Diop, Aziz. Executive Secretary 224-62-40-44-26/ 64-35-84-75

Poirier, Rodolphe, Technical Assistant to CNOSCG. 62-90-73-23/
rodolphepoirier@LAPOSTE.NET (French Technical Assistant).

CENAFOD (Centre Africane de Formation Pour le Développement)

Sylla, Aboubcar. Executive Director. 224-60-29-98-44/ 64-40-47-16

Touré, Abamba Demba. Assistant Executive Secretary of CENAFOD)

CSO COGEF (Forest Management Committee) Marella , Faranah

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Mamadou Bhouriya Diallo	President	
Doumbouya amadou	Secrétaire	
Barry amadou	Member	64-37-85-41
Thiwto Sidibe	Member	
Doumbouya Seny	Member	

OTHER COMMUNITY BASED GROUPS AT MARELLA.

Name of the Group

Groupement AGRICOLE BENKADI
Groupement AGRICOLE DE FITABA
AGROPASTORAL DARESSALAM
HUMANISME FITABA
COGEF
COGES
AGRICOLE BOUSSOURA
KONKOBA
AGRICOLE YENGUISSA
Gardening Group SORY DIAKITE
HEALTH MUTUAL MARELLA
APEAE

COORDINATION OF APEAEs, FARANAH

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Toure Doura	President	60-32-33-55
Kande Mamourou	Vice President	67-42-34-02
Dambele Mamadou	Tresorier	60-58-79-91
Oulare Bakary	Secrétaire	60-79-43-81
Moussa Toure	Secrétaire Organisation	68-36-18-87
Sory Oulare	Tresorier	60-32-31-03

COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION

AJDEL/BISSIKIRMA

Name	POSITION	Cell Phone
Sory Conde	President	67-66-72-53
Madjou Bah	Membre	67-34-98-71
Balla Keita	2em Secetaire org.	65-84-77-02
Karamo Marigo	1er Secetaire org.	67-40-11-94
Tati Dioubate		65-32-17-03

AJAK- CSO- Beyla

Name
 Guemou, Jean
 Loua, Theodor
 Guizima, Zouo
 Selemou, Marcer
 Camara, Cécé
 Sagno, Duo-Duo
 Sakouogui, Siné

APEAE Beyla**FUDRORIZ (Fédération des Unions des Producteurs de Riz) KANKAN**

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Mamadi Kakoro	President	64-32-38-53
Facamoudou Traore	Coordinateur	62-15-36-47
Lansany Fofana	Consultant	64-71-44-03
Djbril Diallo	Stagiaire	64-93-55-97
Nmanian Doumbouya	Stagiaire	67-49-05-10
Yaya Doumbouya	Stagiaire	62-42-44-53
Denda Toure	Comptable	65-33-41-54

HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTEES (COGES, CSH, HEALTH MUTUAL) OF BISSIKRIMA

NAMES	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Aguibou Diallo	Mutuelle	Ex. PCG	65-65-43-30
Lamine Bah	Mutuelle	Secetaire	65-65-48-30
Mamadou Saliou Diallo	UPMS	Manager Union	67-26-53-92
Ibrahima Konate	CSH	Vice President	65-60-45-01
Abdoulaye Keita	AC	President	65-70-80-74
Fode Kourouma	AC		67-01-05-90
Souleymane Conde	CSH	President	67-01-05-90/65-32-18-10
Marck Ouamouno	C.S.H.	Tresorier	65-80-56-94
Pierre Leno	P.E.V.	Charge	67-72-95-65
Slain Guilavogui	CCS		65-52-29-73

VOLUNTARY COUNSELING AND TESTING CENTER (CDV HEREMAKONO REGIONAL HOSPITAL , KANKAN

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
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Dr. Issa Camara	Responsible	68-13-97-51
Dr. Camara Mamoudou	Laboratin	60-63-70-54
Mme. Gnamakoro Conde	Conseiller 1	67-70-33-07
Mme. Marcel Seny	Conseiller 2	68-97-89-06
Mme. Nan Djema Keita	Conseiller 3	60-30-74-60
Ibrahima Diallo	DGA	60-41-68-48
Mamadi Kourouma	Head Doctor	60-58-05-07

DEPARTMENTAL HEALTH SERVICE (DPS), KANKAN

NAMES	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Dr. Daff Boubacar	DPS	Directeur	64-88-50-09

HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTEES AND HEALTH MUTUAL OF KABADA, KANKAN

Names	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Mory Bamba	Mutual	President	67-00-67-49
Daouda Doumbouya	Mutual	S, Formation	62-03-02-49
Setiqui Conde	Mutuak	S. Organisation	63-18-93-74
Maimouna Camara	Mutual S.	Aff. Sociale	
Keita Balla	COGES	S/Admin.	
Kaba Conde	COGES	s/Organisation	
Mamadi Conde	COGES	President	
Cheick Conde	CSH-Hygiene	President	
Mariama Camara	CSH-Hygiene	Matronne	
Billy nankouman	CSH-Hygiene	Trearsuer	
Hawa Keita	Mutual	Tresorier	60-46-51-86
Karifa Tounkara	Mutual		60-27-25-80
Adama Turpin	CSH-Hygiene	Laboratin	60-23-36-23
Fanta cherif	CSH-Hygiene	Midwife	
Maimouna Diallo	CSH-Hygiene	Pharmacienne	67-27-28-98
Doussou Kourouma	CSH-Hygiene	CPC	62-54-08-01
Fanta Diane	CSH-Hygiene	CPN	63-58-08-01
Sitan Camara	CSN-Hygiene	Injection	64-47-17-92
Naguoma Sidibe	CSH-Hygiene	accueille	62-28-71-31
Maimouna Traore	CSH-Hygiene	C. Souvi	63-18-95-35
Doussou Diawara	Hygiene	A/PEV	62-45-50-90
Fatoumata Kaba	Hygiene	C. Souvi	60-30-62-22
Djenabou Sow	Hygiene	C. Souvi	60-46-58-03
Rosaline Tonguiano	Hygiene	Accueille	66-04-01-21

CSO COGES, Health Mutual , Marella/Faranah

Names	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Moussa Sidibe	COGES	President	24-45-85-19
Sere Toure	COGES	Chef Centre	66-57-80-42
Oye Guilavogui	COGES		66-70-73-89
Mamadou Doumbouya	COGES	Secretary	66-16-17-90
Bandian Kourouma	COGES	Adj. S/G	64-01-40-03
Kiya Cherif	COGES	Organisation	64-34-37-55

Fatoumata Conde	COGES	Information	66-07-74-97
Ansoumane Traore	COGES	Laborantin	64-85-86-93
Mamadou Yero Keita	Mutuelle	President	
Salioudjan Bah	Mutuelle	Organisation	66-29-28-99
Alphadio Diallo	Mutuelle	Membre	
Sousany Sonamou	Midwife		66-11-84-53
Fanta Keita	Midwife		

HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTEES, HEALTH MUTUAL OF DABOLA

Names	INSTITUTION	POSITION	Cell Phone
Ibrahima Fofana	CSH-Comite d'hygene	President	66-75-27-35
Mamadou Bilo Diakite	Comite d'hygene		62-31-42-67
Fode Mamadou Kaba	Comite d'hygene		64-81-07-65
Abdoul Aziz Diallo	Comite d'hygene	mobilisation	66-49-36-13
Elhadj Kabine Barry	COGES	Tresorie	65-31-22-18
Ramata Diakite	Mutuelle	mobilisation	62-04-05-76
Katherine Koulibaly	Mutuelle		65-80-58-04
Baba Alimou Barry	COGES	President	64-62-63-70
Satala Balde	COGES	Vice President	60-36-21-91

VOLUNTARY COUNSELING AND TESTING CENTER, SALAMANIA, KANKAN

NAMES	POSITION	Telephone
Aissata Bah	ATS	67-04-66-38
Sidiki Konate	ATS	67-27-25-79
Dr. Laye Nabe	Chief of Laboratory	63-73-56-78

CSO UGAD(UNION DES GROUPEMENTS DES AGRICULTEURS DE DABOLA

Karfala Mara	Sabary S.	Administration	62-50-78-43/67-36-31-68
Hawa Mara	Sabary	President	66-85-34-72
Noumousso Bamba	Babiliya	Treasurer	66-70-27-47
Mouctar Barry	Horoya	Vice President	64-57-39-85
Ibrahima Doumbouya	Hankilimaya	Chief of	65-30-10-26
Hankilimaya		Production	
Daouda Toure	BenKadi	Social Affairs	64-09-99-17
Karamo diaby	Benkadi	watchman	64-36-96-45/62-04-06-17
Safin Dabo	Hamana	Information	64-04-25-07
		Communication	
Karamo Doumbouya	Katiya	Monitoring	64-36-24-47
		evaluation	
Kounta Kaba	Heremakonon	Information	65-80-57-97
		communication	
Bintou Conde	Sabary	Literacy	65-83-11-20

CBO WAKALI OF TINKISI, DABOLA

Names	POSITION	Cell Phone
Koumba Keita	President	62-41-31-60
Saranba Mara	C.C	
Fanta Camara	Treasurer	
Gnama Camara	Vice President	
Aye Camara	Organization	
Nantenen Diakite	Secretary	66-85-14-94
Aissatou Camara	Member	
Fanta Sonkon	Council member	
13 other women		

AJEABSO-CSO Beyla

Condé, N' Vakassama
 Kané, Firano
 Cone, Falinkou
 Koné, Abdoulaye
 Koné, Zoumana
 Koné, Mamdi Bintou

RADIO STATIONS---

Station Name	Person's Name	Position	Telephone
RADIO Communautaire de Bissikrima, Kalley	Fatoumata Bamba	Director	67-76-59-87/62-87-23-35.
RADIO Communautaire de BAMBOU FM Faranah Centre			
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Elhadj Sarbou Keita	Director	
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Ibrahima Fofana	Technical Director	67-58-41-90;
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Rosine Batchyli	DAAF	62-39-83-75,
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Victor Faya Ifono	Head of Programming	68-68-02-31
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	; Fabou Koulibaly	Chief writer	62-93-98-99,
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN			
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Balla Keita,	Reporter	67-54-79-20
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Michel Pir,	Reporter	68-46-63-73
RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN	Lamine Dabo FM	Reporter	62-46-43-43
RADIO LIBERTE FM, N'ZEREKORE			
RADIO Communautaire de Dabola Centre			

ANNEX 5 REFERENCES

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