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# LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM PHASE III (LGP III) MIDTERM EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

## Final Report

August 2010

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■ The difference, proven

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### **DISCLAIMER**

The authors' views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

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Our reach to gain information and insights from the LGP III program recipients was greatly assisted through the efforts of PERFORM's local data collection partner, which carried out the survey of LGP III program recipients. The survey results and findings discussed with the Team were very helpful in gaining insight into the LGPIII program at the ground level.

We are honored to have had the opportunity to see first-hand the ongoing LGP III program. We very much support the program's efforts to strengthen Iraqi local governments and to better serve the many needs of the Iraqi people.

*Howard Edwards and Geoffrey Swenson*

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# ACRONYMS AND TERMS

<i>Amanat</i>	Baghdad City Mayoralty
ARDP	Accelerated Reconstruction and Development Program
BPR	Business Process Re- Engineering
<i>Beladiya</i>	Federal Directorate Office in <i>qada'as</i> and <i>nahiyas</i>
CAG	Community Action Group
CAP3	Community Action Program III
CDP	Civic Dialogue Program
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
COM	Council of Ministers (Cabinet)
COP	Chief of Party
COR	Council of Representatives (Parliament)
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DC	District Council
ePRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
GAPTIS	Government Accounting Project Tracking Information System
GIS	Geographic Information System
GO	Governor's Office
GoI	Government of Iraq
HCCP	High Commission for Coordination (among) Provinces
HR	Human Resources
ICERP	Iraqi Commander's Emergency Relief Program
ILGA	Iraqi Local Government Association
ISLGP	Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial Governance Program
IT	Information Technology
KIPA	Kurdish Institute of Public Administration
LGF	Local Government Fund
LGP	Local Governance Program
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MIS	Management Information System
MOF	Ministry of Finance
<i>Nahiya</i>	Sub-district
NDP	National Development Plan
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
OJT	On the Job Training
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PERFORM	Performance Evaluation and Reporting for Results Management Project
PMO	Prime Minister's Office
PMR	Performance Management Report
PPA	Provincial Powers Act
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
<i>Qada'a</i>	District (outside of Baghdad)
QED	The QED Group, LLC
RTI	Research Triangle Institute
TOT	Training of Trainers
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USA	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Iraq Mission assigned The QED Group, LLC's (QED's) PERFORM project the task of conducting a mid-term evaluation of their Local Government Program, phase III (LGP III) project, as well as to provide recommendations regarding future interventions in the local government sector in Iraq. Specifically, PERFORM was asked to:

- Review, analyze and evaluate the impact of LGP III as implemented by the Research Triangle Institute (RTI).
- Provide specific programmatic recommendations that could be used for the design of a follow-on program to local governments in Iraq.

PERFORM analyzed the progress made in the activities under all of the LGP III work-streams with the specific objective to identify gaps and opportunities, and recommend course of correction, if needed, to the current Scope Of Work (SOW) of the ongoing LGP III activity; and analyze recent changes in the local government sector, study lessons learned and best practices, and make applicable recommendations for future USAID local governance strengthening interventions in Iraq.

Findings and conclusions in regard to seven LGP III work streams are as follows:

## **Legislative Support**

LGP III's training of Provincial Councils (PCs) has been well-received. The majority of PC council members and their staff interviewed stated that LGP III training has helped them understand their function, improve their mandated roles, and write and approve legislation. Eighty-one percent of elected provincial officials said their ability to legislate had improved and 88 percent of these attributed some of the change to LGP III. Ninety-four percent of provincial employees interviewed indicated that their legislative function had improved and 94 percent stated LGP III training had contributed to this improvement. Were LGP III to stop working on this element, 65 percent of employees stated the changes would be sustainable, indicating PCs need more mentoring before they can legislate independently.

## **Planning**

LGP III has helped PCs and governors develop their Provincial Development Plans (PDPs). Such plans, only initiated two years ago, are intended to feed into the National Development Plan (NDP). Sixty-three percent of provincial elected officials said their planning function had improved, while 72 percent of these attributed improvements to LGP III. Eighty-two percent of PC staff said planning had improved in their provinces, and 94 percent of respondents attributed some of this improvement to LGP III. Only 59 percent of respondents felt this improvement is sustainable at this point, again indicating more mentoring is required before PCs can independently carry out planning functions.

## **Budgeting**

LGP III has helped provinces develop their provincial capital investment budgets, which feed into the National Capital Budget. Eighty-eight percent of elected provincial officials said their budgeting had improved, while 72 percent attributed this partially to LGP III mentoring. Ninety-three percent of PC staff respondents said their ability to develop provincial budgets had improved; 86 percent attributed some of this improvement to LGP III mentoring. However, only 71 percent felt this

change is sustainable. As above, this indicates PCs need more support to independently produce budgets.

### **Monitoring**

LGP III is designed to assist PCs to better exercise their monitoring role to assure that services are delivered in their provinces. Sixty-three percent of elected provincial officials said their monitoring role had improved, while 75 percent of these attributed this partly to LGP III. Ninety-three percent of provincial employees said their monitoring ability had improved; 100 percent of these employees attributed part of this improvement to LGP III, whereas only 65 percent said their ability is sustainable. PCs require more support before they can independently perform monitoring.

### **Organizational Development**

LGP III helps PCs organize their structure, processes, staff, and information. Seventy-nine percent of elected officials said their organizational functions had improved, while 67 percent of these officials said LGP III contributed to this improvement. Sixty percent of provincial employees interviewed said their organization had improved; 87 percent applauded LGP III efforts to foster this improvement; and 67 percent said these improvements were sustainable. PCs need more support before they are able to independently carry out organizational development activities.

### **The Amanat**

LGP III is designed to assist the Amanat, Baghdad's local government, in improving the financial management of capital projects, oversight and physical inspection of capital projects to improve public services. No one interviewed felt services had improved. LGP III has not yet had an observable impact in this area.

### **Iraqi Local Government Association (ILGA) and High Commission for Coordination among Provinces (HCCP)**

The LGP III element focuses on developing an effective Iraqi local government association and a coordinating High Commission. Fifty-seven percent of elected officials said these organizations had improved.

Although slightly more than half of the respondents saw improvement in these two institutions, they faced difficult political issues. The HCCP was particularly constrained because the national government had not yet been formed after the elections. With a Prime Minister needed to convene the HCCP meetings, there had not been any recent activity. The ILGA was in a better position to carry out their action plan under LGP III, and they hope to develop more support for decentralization through holding one or more national conferences on this issue.

### **Conclusions and Recommendations:**

Provincial administrative employees reported receiving a higher level of assistance than reported by elected officials. Part of this problem may be explained by comments made by a number of elected officials that LGP III Iraqi staff is not adequately qualified to mentor them, and that they do not have adequate expertise to provide PCs with new information or skills. LGP III apparently faced delays in staffing all their provincial teams and there also was considerable turnover of staff. In addition, interviews showed the seven component areas are not yet sustainable, and LGP III needs to devote its final year to assuring their sustainability.

## **Policy Matters/Project Management:**

- For the remainder of the project period, LGP III should seek to maintain full project staffing – turnover poses some problems at times in delivering services.
- LGP III should ensure staff background and experience is properly matched to the position when assigning staff.
- Security and transportation problems make face-to-face contact between senior advisors, counterparts and community members impossible. Some senior advisors indicated a level of discomfort and frustration as a result of not being able to have direct contact with counterparts and the community. LGP III should facilitate face-to-face meetings as soon as security permits.
- Every attempt should be made to include counterparts and beneficiaries in the development and review of work plans. Local governance programs need to refocus – even LGP III, for its remainder – on what clients say they need, as opposed to what they are told they need. One senior advisor stated candidly: “We are terrible as advisors here [in Iraq], and on LGP III in particular, we are full of know-it-alls who aren't interested in what the Iraqis already know and what they want.”
- LGP III should develop a program more capable of interacting with the PRTs. It was reported that, “Like it or not, [PRTs] are here and are operating in the same work space. We need to have some nominal ability to interact with them and not simply avoid them. Now all the USAID contractors seem unwilling to meet or collaborate.”

## **Future Projects in Local Government in Iraq**

In Iraq, high-level political support for decentralization and devolution is inconsistent, if not lacking altogether. However, Law 21, the Provincial Powers Act, garnered enough support to pass in Parliament, showing that provinces are pushing for increased authority and budgetary power. The success of Community Action Groups (CAGs) in USAID's Community Action Program (CAP), as well as in the Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP), illustrates that there may be a growing constituency at the local level capable of advocating for more local control. Consequently, there remain opportunities for USAID to further foster decentralization and improve service delivery at the local level.

Currently, there are gaps in the development of local government authority and financial capability in the Local Councils (LCs) and District Councils (DCs). Neither of these groups currently have legislative powers, nor do they have budgets. USAID could work to support these two councils as it pushes for legislation to provide them legal authority.

Iraq has progressed in decentralizing the capital budget and planning processes to the PC level. It is now an appropriate time to further decentralize this process so it includes DCs and LCs, as well as the local communities. USAID could viably work with Iraqi officials in the Ministry of Planning and PCs to assure the local level has official input into the NDP and Capital Investment Budget. More training in project selection, design, and feasibility studies is needed at the local and provincial levels.

LGP III mentoring in feasibility studies at the provincial level has not been as rigorous as, for example, Tatweer's training in feasibility studies with ministries. A future USAID project could formalize feasibility training at the provincial and local levels. A future project should collaborate with USAID capacity-building programs to formalize an Iraqi-approved approach to feasibility studies, including standardized software.

Iraqi Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) are growing in sophistication and influence, but they need more donor assistance to help them become effective



advocates. USAID could beneficially support coalitions of local NGOs who collaborate to advocate for legislation that would better support them and strengthen civil society. USAID currently does not have a project which focuses on strengthening CSOs at the community level (here we mean more formal organizations than CAGs), and such a project would provide support to the development of local government. Local NGOs could assist local governments in all aspects of providing services to the community.

Specific recommendations for areas in which USAID might consider working are included in the Appendix G of this report. These include papers on “Increasing Efficiency of Local Government basic Service Delivery,” and “Roles and Responsibility of Different Levels of Government.”

### **The Provincial Powers Act**

The Provincial Powers Act should be reviewed and revised to eliminate redundancies, provide clarity, remove contradictory articles and clearly describe the hierarchical roles and relationships among the tiers of local government. A legislative development and advocacy component should be included in any future Democracy and Governance (D&G) program of assistance to Iraq. It is strongly recommended that this component include emphasis on community organization and introduce a community and civic education program that addresses the power of the ballot.

LGP III should also consider developing landmark legislation that would decentralize the provision of public services to the people of Iraq. Clearly, the ministers have continued to use their power and authority in ways which are not helping the people. It is time for power and authority to be brought to levels of government where the needs are better known and understood, and with the direct participation of citizens in the development, implementation and monitoring of public services.

### **Capacity Building**

One possible solution for minimizing, if not eliminating, duplication of services, designing and implementing training and capacity-building curricula, and fostering activities that are sustainable and Iraqi led and directed, is to establish regional institutes of public administration. This was proposed in 2006 – in fact, it was at one point included in the LGP II work plan. Plans are reportedly underway for a National Civil Service Reform Institute. Also, such a regional Institute of public administration – the Kurdish Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) – is operational in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG.)

Such institutions would be tied together by a common oversight board, would use local trainers and educators, would be linked to the university-level institutions in Iraq, and could be supported by the international donor community through financial and technical resources.

### **Building Blocks to Democracy and Governance in Iraq**

USAID governance programs have been initiated in several countries, some with a great amount of success. Two programs that come to mind are the Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) program in the Philippines and the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) in Indonesia. It is instructive to note that the success of these programs was based on the presence of laws that made decentralization not only possible, but a requirement dictated by national policy. In both cases, the devolution of power and authority was carried out and implemented in a reasonable amount of time. These laws worked hand-in-hand with programs to mobilize the citizenry to participate through education and increased civic understanding.

It is believed Iraq could embark on the same kind of revolutionary approach to gain the involvement of people in government to improve the provision of security and much-needed public services. The discussion under the Provincial Powers Act recommendation suggested the need to develop the basic legislation for devolution of power and authority to local levels of government. USAID is

strongly urged to provide the necessary assistance to make this a reality. This would be the legal, structural basis for developing focused local governance programs in Iraq.

Equally important would be the development of local action groups in civil society that would develop the skills of people to fully and actively participate in a governance program. These two steps, assisting in the development of a decentralization law and the energizing of people in local communities would be an essential first step to developing a potent governance program in Iraq that would significantly improve the future of all Iraqi people.

### **Possible Need for a Constitutional Convention**

The Constitution needs review in terms of possible amendments, especially in those areas necessary to clarify elections criteria, candidacy and other items, such as review of terms of service for elected officials. Moreover, there is a need for a law that clearly defines the structure of government in order to avoid overlapping responsibilities, ambiguous division of power and authority, decentralization or devolution of powers, and authority and decision-making at each level. The best way to address these issues is through a constitutional convention. The time might be right, given the current levels of concern many Iraqis have about abuse of power and levels of corruption.

### **Local Government Institutes of Public Administration**

A thought regarding the suggested institutes of public administration: In time, the focus could be broadened to include implementing training programs and curricula designed to develop and focus on public-private partnerships. As such, some courses could be offered that produce both public (civil engineering) and construction management expertise. This might be done in coordination with the private sector and shared funding under the mantle of a system of institutes for public administration.

### **Community Participation**

Review the priorities of USAID programs with the Iraqi government and counterparts in order to ensure maximum buy-in, program effectiveness, and a more engaged partnership arrangement.

### **Media Relations**

The Iraqi people are in need of positive, informational radio and television programming, news, and public information. Accordingly, through a partnership with the private sector, LGP III could develop a national and local capability to prepare and disseminate informational and entertainment media programs throughout Iraq.

# PART I: PERFORMANCE AND IMPACT

## INTRODUCTION

This report presents the results of an independent mid-term evaluation of LGP III in Iraq, conducted from 18 June to 30 July, 2010. LGP III represents the third phase of programs that have attempted to address governance issues in Iraq since the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) took responsibility for leading Iraq towards stability and self-reliance. LGP III builds on the accomplishments of LGP I and LGP II. LGP I, initiated after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, focused on the restoration of basic services. This was later shifted to facilitating Iraq's transition to a sovereign state. In 2005, LGP II tackled similar objectives, but the mechanism to achieve them was through support to the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

### **Background**

#### ***LGP III Development Context***

In April 2003, the CPA and the U.S. Department of State pursued an ambitious program of reconstruction and nation-building with the aims of repairing infrastructure, restoring basic services, restarting the economy, redressing past injustices and establishing democratic governance.

The USAID program was tasked to provide assistance in the establishment of representative, responsive local institutions capable of addressing citizens' needs and desires. This objective evolved into the Support and Development Program, known as LGP. There have now been three LGP projects which have supported efforts to improve governance at all levels, and most recently, through technical assistance provided for implementation of the Provincial Powers Act.

LGP III was designed to build on the accomplishments of LGP I and LGP II. Along with the background and experience of these two projects, the design and activities of LGP III reflect the political and legal environment operative at the time LGP III was designed and began implementation. While many challenges and constraints were acknowledged, the basic concern for democracy and governance was the cornerstone to the nation-building process taken up by the US Government (USG). USAID was committed to helping Iraq through the challenging beginning stages of the implementation of federalism and to help Iraq establish a balance between local empowerment and national coherence.

During the period of direct Coalition control, governance support was provided through support for the sub-national governments, focusing on the PC level, but also providing assistance to the DCs and sub-district councils. The Election Law of 2005 mandated popular elections for membership on the PCs, but though PC elections were held, the district and sub-district elections did not take place. The provinces were given the task of programming a significant portion of the national capital budget, and the provincial councils took up this responsibility – but without much practical, technical knowledge as to how it should be carried out. It was evident that provincial governments, along with district and sub-district governments, required strengthening.

Eventually, this led to the passing of the Provincial Powers Act. This law was to set the stage for a focus on expanding the responsibilities of the provinces and also provided the opportunity to test the usefulness of a decentralization strategy in the nation-building process.

Based on the imminent implementation of the Provincial Powers Act, LGP III was designed to support the government and governance aspects of the law. The law included enhanced powers and responsibilities for the district and sub-district governments, but because council elections were only held at the provincial level, these never materialized. Since the law was based on the responsibilities of elected officials, the application of the law did not extend to the district and sub-district level.

Despite this expansion of responsibilities for the PCs, the overall system of providing public services to the citizens changed little. While the option to supplement the investment in provision of public services was put in place, the responsibility for the main public services – water, electricity, and public works – stayed with the national government.

The Provincial Powers Act gave the council the right to monitor the activities of the national ministries that had provincial offices to implement their national program, and the governor could “inspect” the activities of the national ministries, but the provincial council and governor had little power to do anything about issues or problems they discovered.

This lack of full mandate to manage all activities in the provinces made the provincial-level institutions much less effective in representing the identified needs of people in the respective provinces. Exacerbating the situation is the fact that provisions of the Provincial Powers Act were not applied to the district and sub-district levels.

### ***LGP III Task Environment***

While the limitations of the implementation of the Provincial Powers Act are recognized, LGP III recognized the need to build the competence of the Provincial Councils and Governor’s to carry out their given tasks and responsibilities under the act.

Along with LGP III, USAID initiated two other projects: Tatweer, intended to provide necessary support for the ministries at the national level; and CAP III, designed to support community based activities and bring about local participation as well as improve public services. This triumvirate of projects, all with different SOWs and modes of operation, were initiated to achieve an overall improvement in the capacity of government offices at the national and provincial level, along with local community organization and service improvement.

LGP III began even before provincial councilors were elected. But implementation of LGP III activities, in accordance with the Provincial Powers Act, could not begin until PC elections were held. Since these elections were held at differing times, LGP III activities began with a stutter, staggered over a number of months. Initially, 10 provinces were covered by LGP III, with the final four provinces added later. The Kurdish provinces also participate in LGP III.

The need to improve the skills and competence of the PCs was across all areas of their activities. LGP III made the decision to focus on five work elements that would be the basis for supporting the basic functions of the PCs. These work elements were:

- ***Legislative support:*** The legislative element was tasked with providing basic training in the functions of the PCs and to help the councils exercise power over areas not covered by national mandates or shared powers.
- ***Planning:*** Assist the PC and governor in developing the planning function, strategic plans that reflect the needs of the province, and annual plans that lay out the priority areas for capital investment – with funds provided for this purpose from the national government.

- **Budgeting:** Formulation of the budget is required for receiving allocation of funds by the national government. The process is laid out by the Ministry of Finance, and the provincial government was to be provided assistance for this process. The councils were to be supported in the review and oversight of budget development.
- **Monitoring:** The Provincial Powers Act gave PCs the function of monitoring the implementation of ministry programs and activities. The act also allowed the Governor the right to inspect ministry programs and activities. These functions were new to the Governor and Councils. LGP III was to support the capacity-building of these important functions.
- **Organization Development:** This element was formulated to address the lack of any training in public administration in Iraq. Along with training on management and leadership, assistance would be given for reviewing the current organizational structure and developing recommendations for more effective, efficient structures.
- **The Amanat:** Because of its unique legal status, special attention is given to the national capital of Baghdad, or the Amanat. Focus of the assistance to the Amanat is on improving financial management of capital projects, oversight, and physical inspection of capital projects. These activities are carried out to achieve the objective of improving public services to the Amanat.
- **ILGA and HCCP:** This element is dedicated to developing an effective IGLA and provides support to the HCCP.

# DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND RESPONSES

## LGP III Development Issues

The principal issues to be addressed during this evaluation were to include, but were not limited to, the following:

1. **Impact:** What progress is being made toward the annual and program targets for LGP III projects? To what extent did RTI coordinate with PRTs, as well as with other programs (Tatweer, CAPIII), and to what extent was their input utilized in program implementation? How can LGP III more effectively implement its sub-activities?
2. **Sustainability:** What are the prospects for sustainability of the end results produced by the program? How successful and sustainable is LGP III's investment into ILGA? How effective and sustainable is LGP III's investment in the standing-up of the HCCP? What measures should be undertaken to ensure future sustainability?
3. **Client Satisfaction:** What follow-on activities have beneficiaries viewed as necessary? How successful has the program been in helping with implementation of the Provincial Powers Act?
4. **Opportunities:** How can the intervention tie into other USAID, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), other donor and Gol efforts to leverage impact?
5. **Constraints:** What are the major constraints inhibiting local government development? What are the constraints for further legislative reform? Propose recommendations to address these constraints.
6. **Lessons Learned and Future Directions:** This assessment report will include a discussion of lessons learned and best practices that should be captured for consideration in the design of a follow-on local government strengthening program in Iraq.

# PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

As stated in the SOW, the purpose of the mid-term evaluation/lessons learned study is twofold:

- (1) Review, analyze and evaluate the impact of USAID's Local Governance Program, Phase-III (LGP III) as implemented by the RTI;
- (2) Provide specific programmatic recommendations that could be used for the design of follow-on assistance to local governments in Iraq.

This SOW was revised during the initial stages of the evaluation to include additional project deliverables, and to clarify areas where the evaluation team should place emphasis.

## Evaluation Objectives

The specific objectives of LGP III are to define, strengthen, and facilitate the operation of elected local government bodies. LGP III is a very different project than the LGP II; whereas the former was rather broad in focus and was principally a large training program, the latter operates more in a mentoring mode.

The project heavily relies on its large local staff of more than 600 Iraqi professionals, who are the key interlocutors between LGP III, project beneficiaries and counterparts in the field, and who mainly serve as "relationship managers." About 65 expatriate staff serve as Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), and these SMEs are called in their turn to coach and mentor the Iraqi staff.

Activities under LGP III include the following:

- Assistance to elected provincial officials in the development of long-range strategic plans, as required by the Ministry of Planning;
- Assistance to elected provincial officials in determining their capital and operating budgets in accordance with the annual federal budget law and instructions from the Ministry of Finance;
- Assistance to elected PC members in exercising their monitoring function and the governor in exercising his oversight functions, within the boundaries of the Provincial Powers Act and ministerial regulations;
- Enhancing the financial management and reporting of Accelerated Reconstruction & Development Projects (ARDP) to improve efficiency and accountability;
- Improving the ability of elected officials to write their strategic plans by introducing Geographic Information System (GIS) applications into select pilot provinces;
- Encouraging public outreach, women's leadership, and cross-ethnic reconciliation;
- Supporting professional and membership associations.

The activities of LGP III are divided into a set of work elements, each contributing to USAID Strategic Objective 9: Responsive and Effective Local Government Strengthened. The following is a

summary of major progress toward this objective. A more detailed summary of LGP III activities and their impact is contained in the program's Monthly Reports.

### **Provincial Council and Governor Orientation**

Under this set of activities, LGP III introduces PCs and the Governors they select to their functions under the Provincial Powers Act and the resources at their disposal. In 2009, LGP III advisors delivered 271 orientation sessions in all 14 provinces covered by the act. In attendance were PC members, governors and their staff. In a measure of the orientation modules' value to provincial officials, governors in several provinces have invited local representatives of central ministries to the sessions. In Babil, the governor held special sessions for this purpose, citing the need to increase awareness of the PPA among ministry representatives.

The orientation sessions have been an important tool in assisting provincial leaders, not only with the day-to-day work of establishing bylaws and committees, but also in their ongoing effort to realize greater autonomy from the central ministries and provide more responsive services to their citizens. In less stable provinces, like Ninewa, LGP orientation sessions, especially with PCs, have been enthusiastically received, in part because there is less competition for provincial officials' time. On the other hand, in areas where violence has largely abated, political wrangling and greater competition for PC members' time have tended to hamper orientation efforts.

For their part, Governors and their senior advisors have preferred to meet one-on-one with LGP III staff rather than attend the formal sessions. Nevertheless, they have been very receptive to the content of those sessions. Over the last six months, LGP III advisors worked with Governors' offices and PCs, on a demand-driven basis, to assist them in delivering the orientation sessions to more of their staffs as well as to representatives of central ministries, whenever appropriate.

### **Capital Investment Planning and Budgeting**

Under this set of activities, LGP III SMEs assisted provincial governments in refining their PDPs and developing a provincial budget to assist them in securing funds from the central government. LGP III advisors have assisted provincial governments in fostering expert understanding of the Provincial Powers Act and remaining committed to activities that support the law's implementation. The program also helped governments adapt those activities with an eye toward gradually changing – rather than simply accommodating – the habits of an historically centralized national government.

Given the volatility of political progress in today's Iraq, LGP III advisors remained nimble and results-focused, relying on their well-established relationships with key decision-makers in provincial government. Equally as important, the program had developed a thorough understanding of the legal frameworks that define – and sometimes complicate – the relationships between the central and provincial governments.

### **Oversight and Accountability of Services Delivery**

To this end, LGP III advisors have assisted PCs and governors' offices with developing performance measures for monitoring and oversight of local government services. In addition, the program has continued implementation of the Governorate Accounting and Project Tracking Information System (GAPTIS), which is now operational in all 14 provinces where LGP III works. LGP III advisors have secured a commitment from Baghdad officials to enroll 14 engineers from the Amanat, or the Mayor of Baghdad's office, in a systematic capacity-building effort that would begin with weekly individual assessments, on-site training, and a final evaluation to include recommendations for further training and hiring. The capital's unique legal status allows the Amanat to directly manage provision of public services – a responsibility that, in the rest of Iraq, remains the prerogative of national ministries.



This makes Baghdad a useful laboratory for Iraqi local governance in the 14 remaining provinces covered by the Provincial Powers Act. Beyond the city of Baghdad, where public services remain the purview of central ministries, LGP III advisors continued working behind the scenes to support a fledgling dialogue between representatives of ministerial departments and provincial officials. Governors in a growing number of provinces are using the LGP III orientation sessions for this purpose.

### **Organizational Development and Systems**

Under this work element, LGP III worked with PCs to assist in the development of bylaws, which contain the standard rules and procedures to upgrade PC members' capacity to implement the Provincial Powers Act and ensure the government applies identical standards among staff of each provincial governor. With LGP III assistance, all PCs have already passed bylaws for their respective councils; some even passed bylaws for individual committees dealing with everything from health to education to women's issues. In addition, LGP III advisors have disseminated a comprehensive organizational development manual to PCs and governors' offices, which has resulted in the streamlining of internal processes (e.g., payroll) and the development of job descriptions for key departments and their staff.

As important as committees are to the work of PCs, it seems clear that many of these committees run the risk of being duplicative or, worse, ineffectual. Although LGP has not become involved in determining the legislative agenda of PCs, advising against overly-complicated committee structures contributed to the overall aim of improving organizational development. In addition to continuing to advise PCs and governors' offices on ways to streamline their organizations, the LGP III policy team continued to encounter requests for legal research around issues that impact provincial governments' independence.

The project has been asked, for example, to address concerns by several PCs that the Iraqi parliament, or Council of Representatives (COR), might try to overturn or override PC decisions. Some of these concerns emanate from a growing desire to identify and secure local sources of revenue, while others refer to a province's perceived right to engage in redistricting.

### **Development of Sustainable National Institutions**

LGP III is supporting the ILGA by advising its organizational development and by developing the capacity of its secretariat and members. On an as-needed basis, and in close coordination with the Prime Minister's office, LGP III is also supporting the creation of the HCCP and its coordination with the ILGA.

With LGP III assistance, all provinces covered by the Provincial Powers Act have appointed their representatives to the ILGA, thus signaling their participation and active support of the body. In addition, the newly appointed representatives have agreed on a way forward for registering the ILGA as a formal body under Iraqi law.

For its part, the HCCP has secured support from the Prime Minister's office, which took a leading role at a conference of governors facilitated by LGP III, thus indicating its readiness to engage provincial leaders and listen to their concern. The enthusiasm with which the Prime Minister's office has engaged in the development of provincial government has hastened the need to ensure corresponding development of the ILGA and HCCP. This development must include careful coordination with LGP's provincial teams to make sure the issues and concerns encountered in their day-to-day work with provincial leaders are included in the national-level deliberations.

# EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN

Field work for the evaluation was conducted from 18 June to 30 July by Howard Edwards (team leader), Geoffrey Swenson and a PERFORM M&E specialist using a structured evaluation methodology. Prior to arriving in Baghdad, the team spent a week reviewing project documentation and other relevant materials. Upon arrival, the team developed the methodology to be used for the evaluation, determined the people to meet for discussions, and developed a schedule for travel and meetings to obtain the necessary information to fulfill the objectives of the evaluation.

The methodology involved two parts: direct interviews with individuals working on LGP III or related to its implementation, such as USAID, other USAID projects (CAP III and Tatweer), and government officials at the provincial level; and the development of two survey questionnaires to be administered by a local contractor to interview government officials, council members at the provincial level and beneficiaries of the program.

## **Evaluation Process**

The elements that follow constituted the evaluation process:

- Desktop Review of Project Documentation (off-site);
- Fine-tune the SOW and Evaluation Plan;
- Hold planning meetings and distribute workload;
- Prepare data collection instruments and schedule site visits;
- Conduct site visitation (two streams of activity);
- Analyze data and information collected; build consensus on results;
- Prepare summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations;
- Develop and propose an action plan for implementing recommendations;
- Prepare and submit project reports.

## **Methodology: Mixed Methods**

A “Mixed Methods Approach” was used to conduct this evaluation:

- Rapid Appraisal Methods
- Key Informant Interviews
- Focus Group Interviews
- Community Group Interviews (limited use, primarily by IRI field team)
- Direct Observation
- Mini-surveys
- Case Studies

The evaluation process was participatory by nature and included a broad-based approach involving a wide range of participants including:

- USAID representatives
- National and Provincial elected officials
- Ministry and Provincial Department officials
- Non-governmental organizations and other organizations such as the ILGA and HCCP

- A sample of Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) team leaders, and community groups such as the Association of NGOs.

## Evaluation Survey

In most cases, the security situation in Iraq and resulting limitations on movement of expatriates precluded the evaluation team from having direct contact with LGP III beneficiaries. To overcome this challenge, LGP III engaged a local contractor to administer surveys to program beneficiaries. The survey measured the response to the program among high-level provincial officials (38) and the staff working under their leadership (68).

The survey generally supported the belief that LGP III has improved the five main work elements. Seventy-five percent of provincial officials indicated the program elements had been improved with LGP III help, while 93 percent of their staff believed the program was having positive results.

Significantly, the response to the Amanat (work element 6) did not get any positive responses when asked if the public services had been improved overall or because of LGP III assistance. This does not necessarily mean that the work element was a failure, but there were many structural, political and security issues that made any progress on service improvement for the Amanat problematic, if not impossible.

ILGA and HCCP assistance showed somewhat more positive results – about half of the respondents saw improvement in these two institutions – but they also face difficult political issues in trying to effect positive change through their programs. As mentioned above, the HCCP is particularly constrained because the national government has not yet been formed after the elections. Because the Prime Minister convenes HCCP meetings, there has not been any activity without a new Prime Minister being named. The ILGA is in a better position to carry out their action plan under LGP III, and they are hopeful of developing more support for decentralization through holding one or more national conferences on this issue.

The original data supporting this result and responses to other questions about sustainability and program needs can be seen in the accompanying CD containing all data recorded from this survey.

The survey team had relatively good access to provincial officials, with the exception of the governors, who require a longer lead time for appointments, making interviews impossible. The survey team had good access to the provincial councilors and the staff under the governor and councilors. It should be noted, however, that about 25 percent of PC members do not have positive views of LGP III's activities, for political reasons. These council members refused to be interviewed, stating they do not work with American organizations because the organizations are involved in intelligence gathering activities.

The evaluation team met with surveyors after the completion of data collection to gain their insights about the issues surrounding LGP III implementation. These observations, though not supported by measurable data, are nevertheless very instructive on LGP III's implementation. Some issues were:

- The project is mostly identified as “the RTI program” instead of LGP III. This had a politically undesirable effect on provincial councilors.
- The presence of LGP III staff among provincial officials was insufficient to make the recipients of the program aware of what the program included and the reasons for the design. This lack of understanding created confusion during implementation.
- Until recently, LGP III was not fully staffed at the provincial-level. There were many instances of provincial staff covering more than one work element, and some staff were shared between provinces.

## **Evaluation Limitations**

With security tightened throughout Iraq, the evaluation team could not move freely to meet as many people as would have been desired. Under these conditions, much planning and effort was used in setting up schedules and logistics for meetings in Baghdad, as well as visits to the Hilla and Basra regions.

The team worked with USAID and RTI to select locations for site visits that would expose the evaluation team to LGP III management and staff, as well as scheduling meetings with Gol beneficiaries. Site visits were made to three regional offices: Baghdad, Hilla and Basra. Each of these visits began with a review of the program with the Regional Team Leader. Meetings were then arranged with other project management and staff as well as meetings with the governor, if available, and Council members from the province where the regional office was located. In the meantime, surveys were conducted to get more information on the results of the LGP III implementation.

## **List of Contacts**

A Microsoft Access database was developed for use in capturing detailed contact information for all persons contacted and interviewed during this evaluation. A total of 188 persons were formally interviewed during the evaluation process. The persons interviewed included: LGP III headquarters staff; LGP III expatriate and national senior advisors; LGP III administrative staff; PC members and staff; Governor's Office (GO) staff and consultants; members and staff of the Amanat, representatives from other USAID programs and Iraqi institutions such as CAP III (COP and Deputy COP), Tatweer, ILGA and HCCP; former heads and staff of PRTs from around the country; and other persons familiar with LGP III's program of services.

# FINDINGS AND OBSERVATIONS

## Documents Review

Evaluators reviewed documents off-site from June 7 to June 18, 2010. Over 168 LGP III Project documents were assembled and reviewed:

- Approximately 39 project reports were reviewed that directly involved previous LGP projects and related activities;
- Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial Governance Project (ISLPG) files – historical Development of PRTs;
- Recent Evaluation Reports of Selected Programs: Tatweer, CAP III, and Institutional Capacity Building Programs;

Given the number and frequency of reporting progress, statistics, and other materials produced by the project, it is doubtful that much more than a cursory review of the materials by project managers and staff occurs. Some data and information is useful to project staff in making mid-course adjustments to their work plans, but other uses are minimal. This brings into question the cost-effectiveness of this level of reporting.

## LGP III Technical Assistance Model

One of the distinct characteristics of LGP III is its technical assistance model, diagrammed in Figure 2. The unique feature of this system is the fact that international management and senior advisory staff have little direct contact with the program recipients. This is perhaps an inevitable result of the ongoing security problems in Iraq, and the contractor's desire to not take risks with expatriate staff.

This policy comes at a heavy cost. As shown in Figure 1 below, Iraqi project staff have access to project sites in spite of the security barrier that keeps international staff from working with (or even meeting with) Iraqi program recipients. Iraqi provincial advisors work with provincial employees and officials on a daily basis. Their work is supplemented by periodic visits from Iraqis by Iraqi regional senior advisors. This system of operating has been described as project implementation by "remote control."


Expats work at a distance from program recipients. This sometimes results in the expats lacking a complete understanding of the environment and results of field activities, and the resulting remoteness detracts from the ultimate program impact.

As shown in Figure 1, the Iraqi staff gains access to project recipient locations despite the security barriers that effectively keep international staff from working with or even meeting Iraqi provincial officials and staff. Other characteristics of the LGP III technical assistance model include:

- A process for developing work plans and action plans carried out by project staff themselves, with no direct input or discussion with provincial officials or staff. This internal development of the work plans does not get important input, consensus, and buy-in from clients. In the long term, this practice may lead to implementation of activities and provision of services that may not be needed or wanted.

- The “remote control” system also contributes to some apparent gaps in understanding by program recipients of the program’s objectives and activities. Because a formal relationship may not be established between expat staff and program recipients, there may be a lack of attention in terms of keeping clients sufficiently informed about LGP III.

**Figure I: LGP III Technical Assistance Model**



### Results of Interviews with LGP III Recipients

A survey of program recipients was used to gain a better understanding of recipient’s feelings and attitudes about LGP III. The evaluation team reviewed and analyzed the 113 responses resulting from the survey administered. The respondents were divided into two groups: provincial officials and provincial staff managed by provincial officials. The survey results were further divided into three sections: a direct indication of the acceptance of LGP III; observations about why the program was good or bad; and measures of unfulfilled needs from LGP III.

### Acceptance of LGP III

A summary of the tabulated results of the survey of 113 responses to the effectiveness of LGP III is shown in the following two tables. The first table shows the results of the responses from provincial officials (Provincial Councilors and Deputy Governors) with a total of 58 respondents. This table presents answers to the question of whether LGP III elements have improved operations in the province, with the follow-up question of whether the improvement was directly attributable to the provision of LGP III technical assistance.

The second table tabulated the responses of the provincial staff under the leadership of the PCs and governors’ offices, also answering the questions: did implementation of LGP III program elements

improve operations in the province, and what role did LGP III play in that improvement; did the respondent believe there would be a continuation of the LGP III activities after program completion?

**Table I: Measures of LGP III Effectiveness–Provincial Officials**

Work Element	Overall Improvement of Element		Improved by LGP III	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>Number of Observations</b>				
Legislative	13	3	15	2
Planning	10	6	13	5
Budgeting	14	2	13	5
Monitoring	10	6	12	4
Organization Development	11	3	10	5
Baghdad Amanat	0	4	0	0
ILGA /HCCP	8	6	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Proportion of Total Observations</b>				
Legislative	81%	19%	88%	12%
Planning	63%	38%	72%	28%
Budgeting	88%	13%	72%	28%
Monitoring	63%	38%	75%	25%
Organization Development	79%	21%	67%	33%
Baghdad Amanat	0%	100%	-	-
ILGA /HCCP	57%	43%	-	-
<b>Total</b>	<b>74%</b>	<b>26%</b>	<b>75%</b>	<b>25%</b>

Based on questionnaire results, evaluators concluded there is belief among service recipients that LGP III has had positive impact in improving things addressed by the five main work elements. A total of 75 percent of provincial officials indicated the five program elements had been improved with LGP III help, while 93 percent of their staff believed the program was having positive results.

As noted above, the response to the Amanat did not get any positive responses; there were many structural, political, and critical security issues that made service improvement for the Amanat problematic, if not impossible.

ILGA and HCCP responses showed somewhat more positive results – about half of the respondents saw improvement in these two institutions – but these two institutions also face difficult political

issues in trying to make positive effects happen through their own programs. As stated above, the HCCP was particularly constrained because the national government had not yet been formed. The ILGA is in a better position to carry out its action plan under LGP III, and they are hopeful of developing more support for decentralization through holding one or more national conferences on this issue.

**Table 2: Measures of LGP III Effectiveness and Expected Sustainability – Provincial Staff**

Work Element	Improvement in Element Area		Improved by LGP III		Continue Activities after LGP III	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
<b>Number of Observations</b>						
Legislative	15	1	16	1	11	6
Planning	14	3	16	1	10	7
Budgeting	13	1	12	2	10	4
Monitoring	14	1	17	0	11	6
Organization Development	9	6	13	2	10	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Proportion of Total Observations</b>						
Legislative	94%	6%	94%	6%	65%	35%
Planning	82%	18%	94%	6%	59%	41%
Budgeting	93%	7%	86%	14%	71%	29%
Monitoring	93%	7%	100%	0%	65%	35%
Organization Development	60%	40%	87%	13%	67%	33%
<b>Total</b>	<b>84%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>93%</b>	<b>8%</b>	<b>65%</b>	<b>35%</b>

*Based on results of LGP III questionnaire administered to program recipients (group B, government staff)*

### Observations on LGP III Effectiveness

The general response to the level of effectiveness of the LGP III assistance was quite positive for the five basic program elements. Details of the responses can be found in Appendix C: Observations on LGP III Effectiveness and Overall Quality Assessment by Provincial Officials. The only negative comments regarded the planning element, which failed because of lack of communication between some LGP III staff and PC members, and the monitoring element – not all committees performed their monitoring role adequately and needed to improve staff capacity.



Notably, there were no responses for the Amanat, ILGA or HCCP work elements. This is consistent with the completely negative rating of the Amanat element in the previous section, as well as the 50 percent approval of the ILGA/HCCP element. In all probability, Iraqis with negative opinions of LGP III will choose silence over sounding too critical.

### **Measures of Unfulfilled Needs from LGP III**

The provincial employee respondents in the PC and GO were asked if they had any needs left unfulfilled by LGP III. The summary of responses is given in Appendix D, which is categorized by work element and need. Some general inferences can be made from this information:

- There is a strong desire for more training. In some cases, responses indicated the training could be at a higher echelon. Every work element includes training for their particular area of work but also for more general training in administration and management. There is also a sprinkling of interest in training on how decentralization could be implemented in Iraq. This idea should be supported as much as possible.
- Every work element shows great interest in getting more manuals to support them in their work. LGP III should seriously consider making sure program recipients are supported by useful documentation, which is a critical part of achieving some level of sustainability.
- Communications between LGP III and program recipients are generally considered quite good. There are a few exceptions. One commenter said the communication was once good but has since deteriorated. There must be an underlying reason for this, as the vast majority sees communication as good, and most wish to have more contact with the LGP III team.
- Respondents requested computer hardware and software, and communicated a need for a stronger administrative structure at the provincial level. This is an important recognition of the need to pay more attention to the capacity building of government staff, as opposed to just government officials. This is a positive sign that the staff recognizes the need to improve their skills as well as the fact that there is a much greater turnover in elected officials than the government employees.

### **Overall Findings**

While there is a significant amount of variation between respondents, the following findings are considered to be important.

1. There is a strong acceptance of LGP III's five main work elements, and there is an abundance of positive comments about LGP III, as compared to the number of negative comments.
2. The work elements of the Amanat and ILGA and HCCP do not enjoy the same level of acceptance or respect for their accomplishments. There are important non-project reasons for this, including political issues, security problems, etc. But a continued investment in these areas may not give high returns. The caveat to this statement is the possibility of the ILGA to become a strong voice for decentralization and governance.
3. The training of provincial employees should be increased vis-à-vis the provincial officials, as they represent a more sustainable outcome from the project.
4. As stated above, recipients are eager for more manuals.

The training provided appears to be at relatively rudimentary levels. For example, the budgeting work element focuses on getting budgets prepared and submitted on time. This is a critical issue, but it doesn't give the staff any new tools, nor does it build their capacity. Performance budgeting is

not a common term, and several other areas of financial management such as performance measurement, asset management, auditing and double-entry accounting have yet to be explored by LGP III. Again, there are many constraints that make the introduction of new methods complicated, but the collective skill level is still relatively low.

### **PRT Mini-Survey: LGP III Impact**

The evaluation team made a survey of select PRT staff from Aug. 5 to Aug. 10, 2010. A sample group of seven people were taken from a list of names received from USAID of PRT staff members. A 12-question survey requesting a date and time to conduct a telephone interview was attached to an email and sent to the sample group. In light of marginal telephone services in Iraq and the prohibition of using Skype, respondents were allowed to fill out and return the subject questionnaire.

Five of seven people invited to participate in the survey responded. Another PRT member who heard about the survey contacted the evaluation team and requested to participate as well. His involvement brought the total number of responses to six. Of the six surveyed, three were interviewed and three completed and returned questionnaires. A questionnaire and a Summary of Responses Matrix appear as Appendix E.

Following is an analysis of questionnaires received from respondents:

- **Contact with LGP III Staff and Management:** Except for one respondent, all other respondents reported having had some contact with LGP III staff. Several reported being new to their respective PRTs and indicated that interaction was minimal. One respondent said they were not permitted to interact with local staff without the express permission of LGP III management. Another said their experience covered several PRT assignments and that experience were different at each depending on the competence of the staff and willingness to communicate.
- **Satisfaction with LGP III Services and Assistance:** For the most part, PRT staff reported satisfactory opinions of LGP III services, information, and assistance. A respondent described their experience as being somewhat negative because they were unable to access LGP III staff directly. They described the problem as a “lack of transparent interaction.” This respondent also stated that the services were viewed by the provinces – GO and PCs – as useful. All four respondents felt services and information were satisfactory; one reported being more than satisfied, one responded negatively, and one marked “Not Applicable.”
- **Frequency of Contact:** Answers to this question varied widely from “daily” to “as needed.” One said LGP officials seemed to have no fixed schedule; another said they met daily with the LGP Coordinator and quarterly with local advisors. Two said meetings occurred weekly. One said they were scheduled as-needed, and the last said “Not Applicable.” All felt communication needed some improvement beyond reporting and periodic meetings.
- **Meetings Scheduled or Ad Hoc:** Four reported meetings being both scheduled and ad hoc, one reported all meetings are scheduled, and one responded “Not Applicable.” Most felt a more informal approach to meetings would be more effective and productive. All receive reporting weekly, but feel face-to-face contact is better.
- **How should PRTs and LGP III work together:** As expressed by the respondents, the working relationship between the PRT and LGP III should be collaborative, well coordinated and complementary. One respondent described the current relationship between the two programs as “a work in progress.” This answer basically recognizes the respondent’s lack of

time on the job. Three respondents felt there should be a proactive move on the part of both sides to effect a more collaborative work effort and cooperative environment. One respondent said some PRT members are disruptive and argumentative, and lack the knowledge and experience to address local government problems and issues. The representative from Erbil felt a modified LGP III with a lesser emphasis on the Provincial Powers Act would be useful in IKR.

- **Current Problems/Issues in the Working Relationship:** Three problems were mentioned: LGP III inflexibility in its control of staff interaction with PRT; use of military convoys to attend meetings and the reluctance to use them because of “high visibility;” and one respondent’s perspective that good relationships between PRTs/LGP III are hampered as a result of PRT staff lacking the necessary knowledge, skills and abilities to do the job in local governance. This last comment is an expression of concern regarding the effectiveness of selection and staffing procedures used in the PRTs.
- **Views on the Effectiveness of LGP III:** Responses ranged from “too soon to say” to “excellent”. Because there is no program in their area, one respondent said “Not Applicable.” Specific responses: “Too soon to say, but we welcome their presence and assistance;” “They are useful – good reports from the provinces;” “Meets the development needs of GOs and PCs;” and, “Very effective in targeted areas: finance, budgeting, training.”
- **What’s needed to improve LGP III:** Items suggested include:
  1. Better oversight by expats of local field staff.
  2. Need to trim number of expats at regional hubs or put them in the field.
  3. A stronger Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) function, spearheaded by meetings through COTRs.
  4. More sharing of work products to eliminate duplication of effort and mixed signals in technical products.
  5. Need to expand program to include provinces in the Kurdish regions.
  6. Need to consolidate governance programs to enable broader response to cross-cutting issues/problems.
- **Is Iraq making progress towards Decentralization and Establishing Local Governance in Iraq:** Most respondents felt that there has been some progress made in decentralization and local governance, but it is not readily obvious. A lot of factors working against decentralization and local governance, especially the Council of Ministers (COM) and other national-level institutions working against it. Respondents indicated that delegation of responsibility to lower entities may be merely substituting one form of centralization for another, and those at the lower levels are less qualified.
- **Other Issues Raised:**
  1. More Iraqi staff should be used by both USAID and partners in delivering services, but they should be highly competent and monitored closely in order to avoid performance issues and corruption.
  2. If partners can’t function in a security-challenged, hostile environment like Iraq, they should leave.

### **Views from the Iraqi Community**

The below statements are distilled from comments received from informal, random interviews with Iraqis. Many of the concerns expressed are similar to what is reported as findings and observations

by the evaluation team, based on formal interviews with beneficiaries, senior advisory staff, and partners. The team views much of what is stated below as verification of some of its own perspectives. In many cases, the content has been translated from Arabic into English.

- Iraqi citizens are asking if the election process is intentionally targeting the wrong people as candidates, since, by their estimate, 90 percent of the elected Provincial Council members are not qualified, skilled, or educated people. Moreover, some of them did not match election criteria (for example, they do not have a graduation certificate or are directly nominated by their parties and are sometimes thought to be put forward directly by Iran).
- USAID did not monitor, evaluate, or test programs results as systematically as they should have. For example, with LGP III, Iraqis want to know who are the end-users and/or ultimate beneficiaries of USAID's programs. This is frequently unclear.
- Some Iraqis suggest it would be useful to have Iraqi professionals help design, develop and implement appropriate evaluation tools to measure program impact. This would make the process more participative and would further training of Iraqis in the monitoring and evaluation process.
- It is believed by some Iraqis that USAID develops its programs without consulting and sharing with its Iraqi constituents. Such a perception can lead to a complicated relationship and affect program implementation, client satisfaction and program sustainability. This is especially true if Iraqis begin to feel that their interests and priorities are not being served.
- Building capacity in a politically unstable, post-conflict, developing country is difficult, if not impossible. People in power control everything, and they halt any programs or activities that threaten their personal interests. Many Iraqis ask: what's the point in building the capacity of people who cannot implement what they have learned?
- Large amounts of money, effort, and years have been dedicated to capacity building in Iraq, but the level of services delivery fail to show any appreciable improvement. Therefore, the USG should consider altering its strategy in helping the Iraqi people by focusing on helping reestablish essential services: energy, water/wastewater treatment, sanitation, etc. After addressing the Iraqi people's basic needs, the foundation is set to bring about democracy and good governance in a real, meaningful way.

### **Local Government Legislation**

Several pieces of local government legislation have been promised, such as Law 25; whether these bills will be enacted into law is a big question. It appears the potential dilution of power at the national level is a political threat to those now holding the decision-making power as it relates to service delivery.

A recent federal court decision makes decentralization and/or devolution illegal until such time as the Iraqi Constitution is amended to permit someone other than the Prime Minister to introduce legislation or until the bill is reintroduced by the appropriate person using the appropriate process as stated by law.

### **Recommendations**

- For the remainder of the project period, LGP III should seek to maintain full project staffing. Turnover poses problems in delivering services.

- When assigning staff, the program needs to ensure staff background and experience is matched to the right position.
- Security and transportation make face-to-face contact by senior advisors with counterparts and community members nearly impossible. Some senior advisors indicated a level of discomfort and frustration with not being able to have direct contact with counterparts and the community. LGP III should facilitate meetings as soon as security permits.
- Every attempt should be made to include counterparts and beneficiaries into the development and review of work plans. There is a need to refocus the local governance programs – even LGP III, during its remaining life – on what clients are asking for, as opposed to LGP III telling them what they need to know and do.
- A program more capable of interacting with the PRTs should be developed. It was reported: “Like it or not, they are here and are operating in the same work space. We need to have some nominal ability to interact with them and not simply avoid them. Now all the USAID contractors seem to sneer at the mention of them and are unwilling to meet or collaborate.”

### **Lessons Learned**

The following is a summary of “Lessons Learned,” both as reported by persons interviewed and based upon observations by evaluation team members.

- One of the successes of LGP I and II, and the same will be true of LGP III, is how many young Iraqis the program has trained and introduced to a range of new ideas. When you meet staff from other programs – both Iraqi and expats – it is remarkable how many started with RTI. This will continue to be an ongoing legacy of LGP.
- The emphasis on budgets and projects training, in an attempt to give local government legitimacy in the eyes of the people, has resulted in PC staff seeing this as their primary duty. This tendency is reinforced by the PC, which wants to limit their responsibility and the possibility of them being directly responsible for meeting the people’s needs.
- There is need for more expat interaction in the form of mentoring and coaching, providing a Trainer of Trainers (TOT) to develop Iraqi capacity is not the same as bringing on an experienced expat, who can add some authority to the process and nurture an advisor-advisee relationship. We can continue to develop a cadre of skilled Iraqis to provide consulting to Governor and PC staff, but the PC members may not be convinced; many trained Iraqi staff went to college with PC members they are now trying to mentor. Some project staff are therefore viewed as equals, not as subject matter experts.

# PART II: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

## **The Future of Local Government in Iraq**

The future of local government in Iraq is uncertain, at best. The majority of 2010 passed without a national government, and by all appearances, that government seems to be moving towards recentralization; neither forecasts a bright future for decentralization, let alone devolution of authority and responsibility to provincial and other sub-national levels. It may take the awakening and action of CSOs through organization and training to turn the tide.

Without a people's movement in support of decentralization and devolution, things look bleak.

There is, however, another school of thought that says a "people's movement" is highly unlikely primarily because of a kind of passivity resulting from 40 years of dictatorship, a political Stockholm Syndrome. It is said that the Iraqi people are conditioned to accept whatever is given – or more realistically, not given – to them by a corrupt and ineffective government. This position is supported by the fact that the Iraqi people have generally accepted a lack of basic services for the past 7 years.

## **Key Issues Affecting Local Government Development**

Following are the key issues to address when attempting to answer the question about the health and future of local government in Iraq.

- Political will to decentralize or devolve services to subunits of government;
- Local government legislation;
- Organizational structure and authority of sub-national units of government;
- Need for fiscal autonomy;
- Capacity building issues;
- Security;
- Delivery of essential services;
- Need for better coordination of USAID programs;
- Other donor programs: need for unity of approach and effective communications;
- Critical assumptions bearing on new assistance interventions;
- Critical factors in developing criteria for selective geography on future assistance.

## **Findings:**

### ***Political Will to Decentralize or Devolve Services to Subunits of Government is Lacking***

The political will to decentralize or devolve services downward to a district or sub-district level in Iraq is clearly not present at this time – Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently said the Provincial Powers Act was a mistake, and should never have been passed. However, parliament is passing new laws – Law 25, for instance – that would end traditional, yet informal, levels of local government active in Iraq since the 1970s. There are strong indications that the national Iraqi political machinery is intent on preventing meaningful development of subunits of government beyond what it has already approved.

### **Coordination among USAID Contractors Involved in Governance Programs**

Some partners comprising the D&G suite of programs – Tatweer, LGP III, CAP III – report facing problems from restrictive provisions of SOWs that limit their ability to complete certain work activities that require discussion and consultation with entities and/or individuals who are the focus of attention of other partners. The territorial behavior and attitudes of some has led to the abandonment of activities that could normally be undertaken in order to accomplish a mutually beneficial outcome.

See the PRT mini-survey results reported below, which were also mentioned by two of the Partners comprising the Democracy and Governance Suite of Programs group. This finding was a recurring message with recommendations to “tweak the current system” or at least consider fixing the problems in the future design of follow-on local governance assistance.

### **PRT Mini-Survey – LGP Future Program Needs**

Several questions in the PRT Mini-survey questionnaire asked respondents what they believe the local governance program needs will be in the future. PRT staff responses to those questions are presented and discussed below.

- **What work elements should be included in any local governance follow-on program?** There was a consensus among respondents that the current local governance program needed to be improved in several ways. First, program staff should assist Iraqis in developing initiatives that reflect their primary interests and priorities, but their involvement should be closely monitored to ensure the appropriateness of program activities.
- **What should be incorporated in a follow-on program?** Any further local governance program should be “holistic,” and transcend and involve all levels of government in order to avoid gaps in service delivery. The program should allow flexible program implementation and abandon the canned-program approach currently used. Respondents said such a program should include:
  1. More TOT programs to insure optimal training delivery;
  2. Public education outreach programs;
  3. Better explanation of program structure, roles, and responsibilities
  4. Legislative advocacy component to assist in the harmonization of law at the national and local government levels;
  5. Include better, more coherent reporting and product development that is shared among all partners;
  6. The Erbil representative recommended the program be extended to the KRG, and that the program for the Kurdish Region not focus on the Provincial Powers Act, which is not applicable in the KRG. Nevertheless, similar issues surrounding decentralization exist and training – including mentoring and on-the-job training – is also needed in the area of finance, budgeting, and local government structuring.
  7. Expand program to sub-national levels of government in order to broaden the understanding of the new (and future) Provincial Governance laws
- **How should a new program of governance assistance be structured?** Several respondents felt the current structure still had relevance, particularly the mentoring relationship and process; it -just needs tweaking so that it is better understood. It is felt that the process takes time, especially to understand the exact meaning of reports and products. Again, respondents stressed the need for the structure to be flexible and allow for transcending all levels of government: national, provincial, and sub-national levels.

- **How could effective coordination and communication be assured in a future program of assistance?** The following are suggestions mentioned by some respondents:
  - Weekly reports need to be proofread by a native speaker, and terms must be standardized. Sometimes the same budget is referred to by different names, causing confusion.
  - Having routine bi-weekly or monthly meetings with other USAID governance programs would ensure coordination and minimize, if not eliminate, duplication of effort.
  - “Regular USAID/PRT/Partner M&E review and discussion meetings, perhaps via teleconferencing, if available.
  - Use of the media, national and local, to report USAID program accomplishments and recognition of Iraqi efforts.

There was consensus that there should be some kind of follow-on local governance program, despite the lack of progress in decentralization and other local government development. If nothing else, those persons trained and mentored will hopefully become better government employees, embracing principles of good governance. All concluded – including the representative from Erbil – that future program work elements should include budgeting, finance, and legislative assistance.

### **Shortcomings of Local Government Legislation: The Provincial Powers Act**

The Provincial Powers Act does not meet its original purpose – to have democratically elected, local government representatives duly empowered at each tier of local government. After the rigorous political reviews and massaging by various interests and entities, the resulting law is but a shell of what was originally drafted. The current law is considered by many to be more confusing than useful. Some of the act’s shortcomings include:

1. Legal problems:
  - a. COR can monitor council activities. This is not a COR responsibility listed in the constitution.
  - b. The Provincial Powers Act does not adequately lay out the responsibilities of the Governor vis-a-vis the Council. In the overall design of the functions of government at the provincial level, the law could have better delineated what are the responsibilities of the governor, as head of the executive branch, and how the council works with them. While the act says the governor will prepare the budget, there is no structure given for the executive branch to show where or by whom the budget would be prepared.
2. Governorates cannot include budgets of federal ministries that carry out programs and activities in the province – this means the province does not have control over the provision of services which are provided through the federal ministries. Yet the public often demonstrates in front of governor or council offices, holding them responsible for lack of public services, even though they have no authority to provide these services.
3. There has been no devolution or decentralization of basic public services such as health, education, transportation, environment, and public works (water and sewage). This issue is related to the above, but even without the devolution of public services,



the law could have provided stronger input, monitoring, and control over the public services by the governor and/or council.

4. The Provincial Powers Act covers the councils at the district and Sub-district levels. But since the act's implementation depended on the election of councils, the law has not been implemented at the district and sub-district levels. This was a serious oversight. It would have been prudent to keep the election of council members a separate issue and not prevent the functions of district and sub-district councils from having a similar legal basis.
5. Overall, the Provincial Powers Act places too much emphasis on strengthening the council and too little attention to the functions and responsibilities of the executive branch of government. The election of the council was an important achievement in the movement to a democratic system of government, but the implementation of the Provincial Powers Act does not go far enough in improving the functions of government and provision of better public services.

### **Recommendations:**

Following is a summary of recommendations formulated from the observations, interviews, and surveys conducted during the evaluation. As stated in the Executive Summary, Appendix G contains two papers which USAID can consider for further work in local government. One is titled "Increasing Efficiency of Local Government Basic Services," and the other is titled "Roles and Responsibilities of Different Levels of Government."

#### ***Create a System of Institutes of Public Administration***

There should be a coordinated effort to standardize training program curricula, management styles, methods, and techniques in order to avoid the confusion reported in this regard. The discussion below regarding establishing regional or area institutes of public administration provides a possible solution to the problems mentioned. (Some work in this regard may have been done by the Tatweer Project at the national level.) See Appendix F for details of the proposed program.

In any event, Tatweer's efforts will not address the training needs of governments at the Provincial level. The creation of a system of institutes for public administration is not a new concept. There is currently a successful model in the Kurdistan Institute for Public Administration (KIPA). A brief summary of the program follows:

Kurdistan Institute of Public Administration (KIPA) is a nonprofit organization which was established through a USAID/LGP I grant in 2004. KIPA is established to build the capacity of government officials, senior managers and administrators in the government and a number of commissions and authorities and also to provide for sustained professional development of senior managers and administrators. It has staff and a focused management structure under the Chief Executive Officer reporting to Board of directors jointly appointed by the Government in partnership with Salahadin University.

From November 2004 to March 2005, KIPA was funded by USAID/LGP; from March 2005 to present by the Kurdistan Regional Governorate (KRG). Despite uncertain beginnings, the Institute has become relatively successful in finding patronage for its rental needs from the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). In return, KIPA provides free training and capacity building activities to KRG civil servants. Through these reciprocal arrangements – rent in exchange for

training – KIPA was able to build solid foundations and to develop quality reputation. But by the same token, the ease and comfort of the relationship between KRG and KIPA may have quarantined the Institute from preparing, financially, to face the future without a strategy to obtain longer term support. This situation can be changed if KIPA developed a long term strategic plan.

(Kurdistan Institute of Public Administration Brochure, 9/16/2006)

This brief statement illustrates what can be done successfully on a limited budget. The KIPA program still operates and provides a proof of concept. The proposed expansion of the program into four additional regions seems prudent, and is recommended as a high priority item.

### ***Back to the Basics: Improving Essential Services Delivery Systems***

While this observation falls outside the purview of this current assignment, and there is no expectation that current technical assistance programs address the situation now or in the future, the evaluation team feels that the Gol's failure to deliver essential services to its citizenry is a problem that could have a serious, negative impact on all future development and reconstruction programs in Iraq, regardless of the donor source.

The need to return to improving basic services delivery is undeniable. After 7 years of development assistance, essential services – potable water, electricity, sanitation, fuel – have not been fully restored. Why?

One reason might be the government's approach to reestablishing essential services. Activities focused on large, ambitious projects, rather than smaller, more practical endeavors. In the case of electricity, national grid projects were undertaken when it might have been more advisable to pursue more modest projects covering regions, or even community-based systems. A new effort needs to be made to meet the promises made in the past.

The expected impacts by 2012 are noble goals for the D&G component of the USAID strategy statement, but they do not reflect the critical need to fulfill basic needs for the Iraqi people now. Having a basic level of quality of life is a key requirement for ensuring the ongoing stability and political development of Iraq. Dissatisfaction with the quality of life could eventually sow the seeds of discontent, even a citizen's revolt.

See Appendix G, Program Paper: "Increasing Efficiency of Local Government Basic Services Delivery," which outlines what the evaluation team feels can be realistically accomplished under the banner of the Office of Democracy and Governance. The program described suggests an incremental approach to decentralization.

### ***Involve Iraqis at the Local Government Level in Program Design***

Based on responses from a variety of people interviewed – including USAID Representatives from PRTs – it is generally felt Iraqis should be more involved in determining the content of programs offered to them, applying the principles and processes of self determination. Currently, institutions of the Gol and provinces are given a menu of programs and asked to choose from among the items listed. Iraqis accept programs, but do not necessarily feel what is offered meets their priorities or immediate needs.

### ***Organization Structure and Authority of Sub-national Units of Government***

Current laws do not prescribe the organizational structure or grant authority to sub-national units of government, such as Qada'a and Nahiya Councils. A number of laws are pending or being contemplated that would address local autonomy, but these seem unlikely to be enacted.

It is estimated that the support for local governance is fifty-fifty. However, political leadership is rethinking its position. It is thought that the idea of establishing units of government below the PC level has lost its momentum and will not move forward in the foreseeable future.

It is suggested that a legislative advocacy component be incorporated in the possible follow-on assistance contemplated. This may seem unrealistic, given the legislative role and lack of demand for such services that exist at the provincial level. Nevertheless, it would be another arrow in the quiver, should the need arise.

### **Need for Fiscal Autonomy**

Fiscal autonomy is a necessary condition for decentralization. Every effort should be made to expand current training/mentoring activities at the provincial government level. Some think training and mentoring activities are shallow, and need upgrading; however, with the provincial takeovers, the basic budgeting training programs are essential in making sure staff at the provincial levels have the necessary budgeting, accounting and finance skills.

Without these courses, budgeting and financial tracking will not occur. Advanced training in these areas should be developed and introduced as soon as recipients are capable of absorbing the content. The ongoing training in this area should continue and expand to the extent appropriate. Simply put: More of the same is needed.

### **Capacity Building Issues**

Unifying and standardizing training and capacity building efforts in Iraq is needed. As discussed above, there is a need to organize and expand collaborative means among internal and external donors for training and capacity building activities. A regional/area system of institutes of public administration, providing a standardized curriculum of training and capacity building, might be the solution. Such an approach was presented as part of the PRT program design effort in 2006-2007.

- Ongoing or existing capacity building programs should be continued to ensure training of a cadre of government staff that continues to turn over in ever growing numbers; Special Immigration Visas are currently responsible for a considerable amount of turn-over.
- Programs of service should be reviewed periodically to identify potential and/or real problems with the content of materials used for training. For example: to make sure multiple models are not being used to establish finance and budgeting systems.
- Assure training programs are consistent with existing laws and regulations, and verify those trained are capable of implementing skills and knowledge gained. A certification mechanism would also be useful.
- Explore coordination opportunities with international donors through the proposed network of institutes for public policy.

### **Development Challenges: Security**

The cost of security and the limited ability to travel freely to project sites has developed an approach to development Administration referred to as “implementation by remote control.”

Most senior advisory staff look at the practice of serving clients using the “remote control” as frustrating, and in some instances view it as a hurdle because of the inability of technical project staff to know and work with counterparts and clients on a face-to-face basis.

## **Building Blocks to Democracy and Governance in Iraq**

USAID local governance programs have yet to address and have a meaningful impact on issues of local governance development in Iraq. LGP I and II projects were overly ambitious in their scope and the programs tried to be “all things to all people.” The programs provided responses to emerging issues or problems of the day – which, of course, were many and varied, creating a moving target for the program. Lessons learned contributed to the eventual design of LGP III.

LGP III was created to provide technical assistance and mentoring within the limits of implementing the Provincial Powers Act. Having to hold elections was a precursor to providing the assistance to PCs. Accordingly, they were provided assistance at different times – staggered start-ups. For the most part, the assistance provided since the program’s inception has not brought the PCs closer to local governance, with decentralized services or devolution of powers at the provincial level.

While LGP III is being implemented in a very efficient manner, the outcomes will have limited value for developing models of local governance to be used at sub-national levels of government within Iraq. Clearly a different paradigm based on the lessons learned during LGP III should be considered in developing a follow-on program of assistance; it might have a better chance of succeeding in establishing the traditional “text book” model of local governance that would hopefully better serve the Iraqi people.

## **Critical Factors in Developing Criteria for Selective Geography on Future Assistance**

Critical factors in developing criteria for selective geography related to a future program of local governance assistance include the following:

### ***Commitment to Change***

In selecting sites, organizations, or institutions for participation in assistance local government assistance program, eligibility should be based on demonstrated commitment to change and leadership thereof should have the basic qualities of a change agent. Knowledge of and adherence to the basic principles of good governance and decentralization should be a must.

### ***Trend of Improving Security***

In order for a program to be viable, the environment in which it is executed should be uncomplicated and safe. Security must be manageable, instead of being the major factor in determining what the project can or will do.

To the extent possible, sites trending towards improved security should be selected. This is important for two reasons: one, security is very expensive, accounting for as much as 45 to 50 percent of a program’s operating budget; two, it is important that program assigned to the field have the capability to move about freely. Without this freedom to move about, a program can be severely hampered in performing its tasks and meeting its mandated goals and objectives.

### ***Capacity and Integrity of Government Employees***

The capacity and integrity of government employees is key to program success – without it, there can be little trust and honesty, and the threat of corruption will be ever present. With competent and honest staff, great works can be performed; without it, little, if anything, will be accomplished, and the program’s reputation may suffer at other locations as a result. Sites, organizations, and institutions should be screened closely to meet this criterion.

### ***Elected Officials Commitment to Ethical Behavior***

This criterion is at least as important as the others discussed above – possibly more. Elected politicians set the stage for a given jurisdiction’s integrity, honesty, corruption, and ethics. This criterion should also be a major screening factor for the selection of program participants. Because pertinent information is often received third- or fourth-hand, translated and retranslated, such determinations may be difficult. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to confirm or dispel rumors of unethical behavior.

### **Opportunities and Risks Related to Future Assistance Programs**

Certain perpetual risks could have a negative impact on the implementation of future local governance programs:

- The level of insurgent and criminal activities in parts of Iraq could escalate spontaneously, delaying program activities and increasing the need for extending planned service periods already under contract. In the worst-case scenario, the project would have to cancel all activity under “force majeure” – the unforeseeable advent of insurmountable difficulties.
- Project delays may also occur as a result of weather, labor disputes, religious holidays, and declared government holidays.
- Newly elected councils may exercise their authority to make major changes in legislation related to local government operations and services that contravene previously accepted program agreements.

### **Lessons Learned**

- There is no sustainability in most training courses delivered by donors. For example: many strategic planning courses delivered by Tatweer, LGP III and other donor partners did not leave behind the ability to prepare useful plans.
- Another example: Primavera software is important in planning and managing projects. Many courses were delivered to ministries and their employees presented by “non-expert” advisors unfamiliar with the software. Consequently, Primavera is used ineffectively to orchestrate multi-million dollar projects.
- A lack of coordination in delivering similar courses presented by multiple donors to the same end users has resulted in confusion and uncertainty about whose message was correct.
- Some donors provide different perks to attract participants – computers, international study tours, etc. This practice causes distortion in the importance of the training being offered.
- Without satisfying needs for basic services, LGP III runs the risk of losing any and all gains in democratic governance and decentralization made to date.
- The basic problem that needs to be addressed is rooted in the behavior of Iraqi elected officials who do not carry out the mandates of their positions. For instance, it was reported by a “monitoring group member” that approximately 70 percent of the COR members never attend any meetings. Most are engaged in travel abroad and personal pursuits.
- There is a complete lack of commitment of elected officials and Ministers to bringing about positive change. This is evidenced by the lack of results of their work efforts and lack of positive change.

## **Summary of Recommendations**

### ***The Provincial Powers Act (High Priority)***

USAID should provide support for reviewing, revising, and or amending the Provincial Powers Act in order to eliminate redundancies, provide clarity, remove contradictory articles, and clearly describe the hierarchical roles and relationships among the tiers of local government. A legislative development and advocacy component should be included in any future D&G program in Iraq. This component ideally should include emphasis on community organization and introduce a civic education program that informs citizens of how their government is structured, how to access services, and addresses the power of the ballot.

Consideration should also be given to developing landmark legislation that would authentically decentralize the provision of public services to the people of Iraq. Clearly, the ministers have continued to use their power and authority in ways that are not addressing the public's needs. Power and authority should be brought to levels of local government where the needs and issues of citizens are better known and understood, with the direct participation of citizens in the development, implementation and monitoring of public services.

### ***Building Blocks to Democracy & Governance in Iraq (High Priority)***

USAID governance programs have been initiated in several countries, some with a great amount of success. Two examples are the GOLD program in the Philippines and the Local Governance Support Program (LGSP) in Indonesia. It is instructive to note that the success of these programs was based on the presence of laws that made decentralization not only possible, but a mandated requirement through national policy. In both cases, the devolution of power and authority was carried out and implemented in a reasonable amount of time. These programs worked hand-in-hand with laws, and also had components that provided civic education and mobilized citizens to participate in their newly-found access to participation and control over their lives and future. Iraq could embark on the same kind of revolutionary path to secure involvement from people in their government so government makes the provision of security and public services a national priority.

Equally important would be the development of local, civil-society action groups that would develop the skills necessary to fully participate in a governance program. Three steps would help develop a real governance program in Iraq; a decentralization law; educating Iraqis in governance and civic participation; and energizing people in local communities.

### ***Possible Need for a Constitutional Convention (Low Priority)***

The constitution needs review in terms of possible amendments, especially in those areas necessary to clarify elections criteria, candidacy, and other items such as the review of terms of service for elected officials. Moreover, there is a need for a law that clearly defines the structure of government in order to avoid overlapping responsibilities, ambiguous division of power and authority, and the processes and structures for decentralized or devolved powers, authority, and decision-making.

The best way to address these issues may be through convening a constitutional convention. The time for such an initiative might be right, given the current concern of many Iraqis about corruption and abuses of power.

### ***Local Government Institutes of Public Administration (High Priority)***

The establishment of schools, academies, or institutes of public administration, directed at enhancing the capacity of government officials and civil service officers at national, regional, and local

government levels is not a new concept. In fact, the National Academy for Public Administration was established in 1967 to provide every branch and level of government with trusted, expert advice in dealing with issues and challenges confronting public administration. Internationally, the need for such advice and assistance was recognized as early as 1928 with the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA). The IPAA is the only professional association in Australia that provides the focal point for all three sectors of government—Commonwealth, State, and Local-- in addressing common areas of interest in public administration and public sector reform.

Similar organizations and institutions exist in most countries throughout the developed and developing world, i.e., Malaysia, Ireland, Ethiopia, UAE, and Canada, to name but a few. Such an institution is needed in Iraq to insure the enhancement of managerial skills within Iraqi public service now and into the future.

The purpose of the proposed institute in Iraq is to develop human resources in the public sector through the provision of quality training, consultancy services, publications, and to serve as a repository of current literature, studies, best practices, and research in public administration and public sector reform. A detailed description of the proposed program is in Appendix F.

### **Stakeholder Participation (High Priority)**

LGP III should review the priorities of USAID programs with the Iraqi government and counterparts in order to ensure that there is maximum buy-in, program effectiveness, and most importantly, that programs are in keeping with Iraqi needs and priorities.

### **Media Relations (Medium Priority)**

The Iraqi people are in need of positive, informational radio and TV programming, news, and information. Accordingly, through a partnership with the private sector, LGP III should develop a national and local capability to prepare and disseminate public informational and news media programs throughout Iraq, that are entertainment-based such as many successful talk-show programs airing throughout the world.

### **Project Description Papers**

Project description papers have been prepared based on the questions and issues presented respecting the preliminary “Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations” briefing paper previously submitted. While these descriptive papers are not intended to be project designs, they do provide sufficient detail to develop a full project design if so desired.

The document related to establishing Institutes of Public Administration is appended hereto as Appendix F. Other handouts and materials for suggesting potential project activities were distributed informally. Additional materials are in varying stages of preparation and will be included in the final report.

# ANNEX A: DOCUMENT INVENTORY AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

- LGP III Approved Annual Work Plan
- LGP III Work Plan Executive Summary – English and Arabic
- LGP III Annual Gantt Chart – Arabic
- LGP III Concept of Operations
- LGP III “ About LGP”
- LGP III “One Pager”
- LGP III Deliverables 2009
- LGP III Progress Comparison Charts, May 27
- LGP III Q2 10 Work Plan – Updated -0527-2010- National
- LGP III Deliverables 2010
- LGP III Monthly report March 2009
- LGP III SOW draft
- LGP III Annual Implementation Plan, January 1, December 2009
- LGP III Provincial GANTT Charts
- LGP III Quarter 4 W.P. 09/21/2009
- LGP III Quarter 2 Implementation Plan Revised
- LGP III Quarter 3 2009 Work Plan Final
- LGP III Implementation Plan – Q.2 - 2010
- LGP III Addendum for COTAR v2 FINAL
- LGP III Work Plan 12/15/2009
- LGP III Q3, 2009, Quarterly Report
- LGP III 09/03/2009 Update on Status Progress
- LGP III Summary of Activities by Work Element
- LGP III Re-Aligned PMP
- LGP III Q1. January-March 2010 FINAL
- LGP III Q4. Oct to Dec, 2009 – FINAL with PBs
- LGP III Quarterly Report, January- March, 2009 FINAL



LGP III Quarterly Report Q2-2009-FINAL  
LGP III September,09 Monthly Report  
LGP III April 2010 Monthly Report  
LGP III August 09 Monthly Report  
LGP III February 2009, Monthly Report  
LGP III February 2010, Monthly Report FINAL  
LGP III January 2010 Monthly Report FINAL  
LGP III January2010 Monthly Report  
LGP III July 2009Monthly Report  
LGP III June 2009 Monthly Report FINAL  
LGP III April 2009 Monthly Activities FINAL  
LGP III Monthly Report May 2009 FINAL  
LGP III Monthly Report May 2009  
LGP III March 2010 Monthly FINAL  
LGP III Nov 09 Monthly Report  
LGP III Oct.09 Monthly Report  
LGP III Best Practices May 09 FINAL  
LGP III Best Practices Report Dec.2009  
LGP III Quarter I 2010 PMR 2010  
LGP III First Quarter M&E Report. January March 2009  
LGP III FINAL PMR Quarter 3  
LGP III PMR Quarter 2  
LGP III PMR Annex B National Performance Data  
Performance Monitoring Plan 06/29/2009  
LGP III Performance Monitoring Plan  
LGP III Scope of Work- Final

# ANNEX B: OBSERVATIONS REGARDING EFFECTIVENESS

Element	Selected Provincial Official responses	Provincial staff summary responses
<b>Legislative</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LGP III helped Provincial Councils pass law on removing Ba'ath party members from official positions</li> <li>Created consulting committee for PC</li> </ul>	<p>Assisted by providing information, methods, training on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Internal legislative processes &amp; systems</li> <li>Analysis of laws and their implications</li> <li>Developing data system for laws</li> <li>Drafting legislation</li> </ul>
<b>Planning</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>LGP III helped prepare drafts for strategic planning in timely manner, development of investment plans, and how to effectively use resources.</li> <li>Failed because of lack of communication between some of the LGP III staff and PC members.</li> </ul>	<p>LGP III assisted by providing information, methods, and training (mentoring and coaching) on Specific Subject Matter Involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Long-term, strategic planning</li> <li>Developing annual plans</li> </ul> <p>Understanding projects being planned</p> <p>Collecting and presenting information</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information systems</li> <li>Need to continue LGP III to maintain knowledge growth and productivity</li> <li>Data bases will be sustained, but other aspects may not be sustained because of low staff capacity</li> </ul>
<b>Budgeting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>PC was able to develop a comprehensive budget depending on the population density in collaboration with the City Council, departments, and concerned parties.</li> <li>LGP III helped by explaining the importance for not wasting resources and giving attention to most strategic projects according to what we have gained of</li> </ul>	<p>Assisted by LGP III and their organization by providing information, methods, and training (mentoring and coaching) on Specific Subject Matter Involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Budget process and Finance Ministry requirements</li> <li>Capital and operating budgets</li> <li>Getting budget submitted on time</li> <li>How to work with GO staff on</li> </ul>

	<p>experience from LGP III. Most of our projects were random and resources are wasted in these projects carelessly but now we see the most useful project to be executed to be given priority this in all led to improve preparing the budget in an optimum way.</p>	<p>budgeting issues</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Use of computer software, especially accounting</li> <li>• Have acquired skills and will continue using them after LGP III</li> </ul>
<b>Monitoring</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• LGP III assisted in training committees to coordinate monitoring and oversight functions. Several committees work together for monitoring and follow up on the execution of projects and the work of ministerial departments. In spite of these efforts, the province needs to overcome the infiltration of administrative and financial corruption.</li> <li>• Procedures were put in place for monitoring ongoing projects.</li> <li>• Not all committees performed their monitoring role adequately. While the social welfare committee found unspent funds – other committees did not report any important findings.</li> </ul>	<p>Assisted by LGP III and their organization by providing information, methods, and training (mentoring and coaching) on specific subject matter, involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Clarification of PC role in monitoring</li> <li>• System for monitoring implementation of projects</li> <li>• Evaluation of monitoring performance measures</li> <li>• Will continue activities with improved capacity and knowledge – but depends on own efforts</li> <li>• Still need help to improve capacity of staff – may not be able to continue without LGP III assistance</li> </ul>
<b>Organizational Development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changes in the departments' frameworks were made after the organizational structure was studied and general flaws were found. The needed structural changes were made to facilitate the administrative and technical work more efficiently</li> <li>• Learned how committees should prepare proper reports.</li> </ul>	<p>Assisted by LGP III and their organization by providing information, methods, and training (mentoring and coaching) on Specific Subject Matter Involving:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provincial Council structure development</li> <li>• Management</li> <li>• Will continue to use skills and methods learned, but depends on cooperation between PC members – some feel methods not applicable</li> </ul>
<b>Amanat</b>	No comments	N/A
<b>ILGA/HCCP</b>	No comments	N/A

# ANNEX C: LGP III UNFULFILLED NEEDS

Summary of Responses Regarding Unfulfilled Needs from LGP III	
Legislation	
Need	Stated need
<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Archiving work of committees</li> <li>• Special training on international and local laws</li> <li>• Lecturer's method too classic, not interactive enough</li> <li>• Non-centralized (decentralized) management</li> <li>• Non-centralized (decentralized) political systems</li> <li>• Additional training on legislating provincial laws</li> <li>• Monitoring and supervising projects</li> <li>• More training on budgeting</li> <li>• Study</li> </ul>
<b>Manuals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Handbooks for all fields, especially legal training</li> <li>• Preparing O&amp;M budget and local budgets</li> <li>• Law modifications</li> <li>• Books/articles on the Provincial Powers Act</li> <li>• References on legislation systems in democratic countries with federal system of government</li> <li>• Legal articles on constitutions of advanced countries</li> </ul>
<b>Communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Desire to increase/improve communications with government employees.</li> <li>• Communication continuous but staff often absent during LGP III visits</li> <li>• More accessible communication with LGP III</li> <li>• Need continuous meetings between LGP III and committees regarding the preparation of legislation articles.</li> <li>• Current communications are effective</li> </ul>
<b>Other</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for a stronger administrative structure (at provincial level)</li> <li>• Need computers</li> <li>• Consultations with consultants from US or Britain to give advice</li> </ul>
Planning	
<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• More training courses on planning</li> <li>• GIS</li> <li>• Business management</li> <li>• Administration</li> </ul>
<b>Manuals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic planning</li> <li>• Business management</li> <li>• Project management</li> <li>• Administration planning</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GIS</li> <li>• GAPTIS software program</li> </ul>
<b>Communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good communication with LGP III staff, but would like to have more contact with them to better develop the planning skills of staff</li> <li>• Good communication but limited to work plan subjects</li> </ul>
<b>Other</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need follow-up planning of PC committees</li> <li>• Need to transfer successful systems from other countries – applied to Iraqi conditions</li> <li>• Should have more effort to work with council employees</li> <li>• Need computer hardware, laptops, printers</li> </ul>
<b>Budgeting</b>	
<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data processing</li> <li>• Accounting</li> <li>• Database development</li> <li>• GAPTIS software program</li> <li>• Clarification on decentralized finance and relationship to the Provincial Powers Act</li> <li>• Workshops for employees at their work level</li> <li>• Computer training</li> </ul>
<b>Manuals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparation of budgets</li> <li>• Accounting</li> <li>• Fundamentals of public finance and local administration</li> <li>• Specialized budgets and economic strategies</li> </ul>
<b>Communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Already have good communication with LGP III staff</li> </ul>
<b>Other</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to share and learn from other countries' successful experiences in updating and preparing the budget</li> <li>• Need to be officially introduced to LGP III staff assigned to give us help in order to have better contact with them</li> <li>• Increase the number of LGP III staff</li> <li>• Need study tour(s) of other countries to learn from their experience</li> </ul>
<b>Monitoring</b>	
<b>Training</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Advanced courses on computer software</li> <li>• Administration</li> <li>• Public management</li> </ul>
<b>Manuals</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Planning and monitoring with Iraqi expertise but using international mechanisms</li> <li>• Workshops and conferences on monitoring role of PC</li> <li>• Foundations of modern monitoring systems, and the principle of integrity and transparency in dealing with government staff</li> <li>• Advanced and continuous courses in GIS</li> </ul>
<b>Communication</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Good communication and good cooperation with LGP III team but looking forward to better communication.</li> <li>• Need to strengthen communication with monitoring team of LGP III staff</li> <li>• Communication used to be good and continuous, now we have none.</li> </ul>

<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Other</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need to be informed of systems and experiences of other countries that are similar to our government system</li> <li>• Need for engineering software such as 3D Max, STAAD PRO, AUTOCAD</li> <li>• Need some logistical supplies, such as GPS devices, GIS system and computers</li> <li>• LGP III does not always select the relevant participants for the development training</li> <li>• Need highly experienced consultants and trainers on a continuous basis</li> <li>• Many needs submitted to LGP III but not provided because outside of work plan</li> </ul>
<p><b>Organizational Development</b></p>	
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Training</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• How to develop our capacity, personal and practical capabilities, to develop institutions</li> <li>• Develop the vocational skills and training about official correspondences</li> <li>• Preparing data, electronic archiving, upgrading HR, and accounting</li> <li>• Workshops about organizing the contracts and bids starting from announcement stage till referral and implementation stage.</li> <li>• Make and operate internal networks, training on GIS program and the training need to be including all specialists from all over Iraq. Also training for designing and running websites</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Manuals</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manuals on form of CDs in field of fiscal and budget execution program</li> <li>• Legal aspects, especially the civil service law, retirement law and employment law</li> <li>• Financial affairs and contracting</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Communication</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Communication is already good and hope it will be sustained, should be an effective mechanism for ongoing support even after completion of LGP III.</li> <li>• Want more communication with LGP III</li> <li>• Need better communication with LGP III consultants to use their skills in the future</li> </ul>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b>Other</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Need for concentrating on decentralization in administration and other fields</li> <li>• Need courses in English</li> <li>• Lack of computers, printers, and internet connection to facilitate work</li> <li>• Need financial support to institutionalize attendance records through finger print method for signing in and out</li> <li>• LGP III should study the current situation of the PC to get familiar with the obstacles and deficiencies to be able to make an effective training and capacity building plan</li> </ul>

# ANNEX D: PRT INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESPONSES

Name of Interviewee: \_\_\_\_\_

Title: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_ Time: \_\_\_\_\_

PRT Location: \_\_\_\_\_ Cell Phone/VOIP: \_\_\_\_\_

Skype address: \_\_\_\_\_

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

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## Questions:

1. Have you received services, information, or assistance from, or interacted otherwise with members of the LGP III project team in carrying out duties at your PRT? Please describe the purpose of contact(s).
2. If yes, were you satisfied with the results and quality of the services, information, or assistance received?
3. How frequently do you have contact or meet with the LGP III Program? Daily? Weekly? Monthly?
4. Are contacts/meetings scheduled, conducted ad hoc, or both?

5. How do you think the PRT program and LGP III program should work together?
6. Are there any problems/issues with your working relationships with the LGP III program?
7. How do you view the effectiveness of the LGP III program?
8. From your perspective, what can be done now to improve the LGP III program?
9. If there is a follow-on Local Governance program of assistance, what work elements should be included?
10. How should a new program of assistance be structured?
11. How could effective coordination and communication be assured in a future program?
12. Is Iraq making progress towards decentralization and governance in Iraq? If so, what is your measure of progress? If not, why is no progress being made?



**PRT Questionnaire Response Matrix, August 5-10, 2010**

	<b>R1</b>	<b>R2</b>	<b>R3</b>	<b>R4</b>	<b>R5</b>	<b>R6</b>
<b>Q1</b>	Worked at 2 PRTs; occasional meetings	Yes. Meetings regularly	Yes	Yes (plus weekly Reports)	N/A –PRT in Kurdish Region	Yes. Frequent meetings.
<b>Q1</b>	In general, satisfied	Lack of transparent interaction; but useful	Appears adequate	Generally satisfied, better communications needed	N/A	Yes, more than satisfied
<b>Q3</b>	No fixed schedule	LGP Coordinator daily; local staff quarterly	Scheduled as needed,	Weekly	N/A	Weekly
<b>Q4</b>	Both	Both	Scheduled	Both	N/A	Both
<b>Q5</b>	Relationship is a work in progress	Need more collaborative relationship	More proactive on both sides and collaborative	PRTs can be disruptive, experts not qualified	Review and evaluate regional laws, structures	Need to expand already good collaboration
<b>Q6</b>	Relationship is satisfactory	LGP III control of staff interaction	Military convoys hamper meeting	Good relationship is hampered by lack of PRT staff abilities (KSAs).	N/A	None
<b>Q7</b>	Too soon to say. Welcome presence and assistance	Useful, good reports form Provinces	Meets development needs of GO and PCs	Works very well in targeted areas: finance, budgeting, etc.	N/A	Excellent
<b>Q8</b>	Needs better oversight of local staff by expats	Trim number of expats or put in the field	Stronger M&E; meetings with COTR	Sharing work products is needed, branding issues	Expand program to serve IKR provinces	Need to consolidate governance programs
<b>Q9</b>	Iraqi self determination, development by Iraqis	Holistic approach; cross-government communication and coordination	Expansion of the program to include Kurdistan	Institutionalize program, another cycle of training, stronger local staff commitment	Train officials in IKR, public education	Expand training on the Provincial Powers Act, budgeting to departments
<b>Q10</b>	Not sure	Governance program must cover all parts of government	More TOT, public education and training	More coherent reporting, better explanation of structure/roles	Allow flexible program implementation	Need to harmonize laws at national and governance levels
<b>Q11</b>	USAID partners need to be more collaborative	USAID reps should have direct contact with local staff	Regular USAID, PRT, Partner M&E reviews	Better edited reports, more frequent meetings	No Suggestions	Monthly/bi-weekly coordination meetings of partners
<b>Q12</b>	Arguments both sides, GOI giving lip service, little progress	Some progress, politics at national and provincial hinder progress	Some progress being made	Some progress, institutionalization through an empowered institute	No obvious progress , in some instances going backward	Some progress; COM working against Decentralization

*Q indicates question number on questionnaire; R indicates number assigned to the respondents.*

# ANNEX E: PROJECT PAPERS

## **Regional Institutes of Public Administration in Iraq**

### ***Findings and Observations***

Capacity-building efforts in Iraq must unify and standardize training methods. There is also a need to increase collaboration among internal and external donors for support of training and capacity-building activities lead by Iraqi professionals.

### ***Recommendation***

The establishment of a regional system of institutes of public administration might fulfill the need for a sustained technical, consultative, and academic resource for upcoming public administrators.

Such an approach and recommendation was presented as part of the LGP II “ISLGP Accelerated Base Year Work Plan” (submitted November 2005) and later in the PRT program design effort in 2006. This activity is a subset of the work element entitled “Capture Learning through Systematic Study and Reflection.” The recommendation was accepted before being tabled for reasons unknown.

## **The Institutes of Public Administration Program Described**

The following discusses international history, provides other background information, and describes the program content as recommended.

### ***Background***

The establishment of schools, academies, or institutes of public administration, directed at enhancing the capacity of government officials and civil service officers at national, regional, and local government levels is not a new concept. In fact, the National Academy for Public Administration was established in 1967 to provide every branch and level of government with trusted, expert advice in dealing with issues and challenges confronting public administration. Internationally, the need for such advice and assistance was recognized as early as 1928 with the establishment of the Institute of Public Administration Australia (IPAA). The IPAA is the only professional association in Australia that provides a focal point for all three sectors of government – Commonwealth, state, and local – in addressing common areas of interest in public administration and public sector reform.

### ***Purpose***

The purpose of the proposed institutes of public administration in Iraq is to develop human resources in the public sector through the provision of quality sustainable training, consultancy services, publications, and to serve as a repository of current literature, studies, best practices, and research in public administration and public sector reform.

### ***Target Group***

Initially, the target group would include supervisors, middle-level and senior managers, administrators and officers – both elected and civil servants, from among the various government institutions at the all levels of government in Iraq – regional and local levels of government. Specifically, provincial and other sub-national councils, regional directors general, provincial and sub-national government department heads, managers, and supervisors. In time, the courses and programs could also be made available to emerging organizations such as NGOs, CSOs, and private sector partners.

### ***Organization Structure***

The structure for the Iraqi institutes of public administration would be country-wide in scope. However, it would be built up through the establishment of regional institutes and would culminate

in the establishment of a National Board of Directors (NBD) that would oversee and coordinate the national program. The NBD would place emphasis on ensuring the uniformity of basic core program components and continuity of approach throughout the system nationwide.

### **Program of Services**

As envisaged, the IPA program would:

- Provide training to regional, and local government institutions, organizations, and agencies on varied areas of training, i.e., roles and relationships, leadership skills, policy development, budgeting, TOTs, strategic planning, financial administration, IT systems management, project oversight, project prioritization, and technical skills training, to name but a few.
- Conduct research, collect information on best practices, and provide a forum for the discussion of common and/or emerging issues and problems confronting the public sector in general and local government in particular.
- Provide consultancy services to assist local government organizations and agencies resolve specific or unique administrative and/or operational problems.
- Serve as a repository of current literature: books, pamphlets, articles, studies, research, best practices, and the like, and to make such information available to interested parties through the dissemination of hardcopies of documents and, to the extent possible, via online web services.

### **Domestic and International Linkages**

The program would endeavor to link domestic and international institutions of higher learning, other national institutes of public administration, international associations of institutes of public administration – International Institute of Administrative Sciences (Brussels, Belgium) and the International Public Management Network, and international donor agency training institutes to insure the organization has the broadest-based information sharing program possible.

The program would also help facilitate the design and execution of international study programs through organizations such as the International Visitor Service and similar organizations throughout the world. Monies now spent by international donor agencies on haphazard programs could be funneled into the Institute and assure relevance to national and local government priorities.

Ultimately, the program would provide the long-term strategy for sustaining capacity-building measures initiated through the international donor community, including specific items as technical and vocational training, coaching, and mentoring programs.

### **Program End State**

The Iraqi National Institute for Public Administration would assume the overall responsibility for the maintenance and continuation of all core training modules developed under LGP and other international donor training and capacity building programs. It would serve as a center of excellence for the overall supervisory, managerial, and administrative development of human resources and technical assistance in the Iraqi public sector.

### **Program Assumptions and Risks**

Following are some assumptions and risks that could have an impact on program initiation and success:

- The Prime Minister and/or National Assembly would include legal provisions for the PCs to actively decentralization/devolution/delegation of responsibilities and funding such and enterprise.
- International funding sources would be available to assist undertaking the initiatives; i.e., availability scholarship funds for international study tours
- Assumes a peaceful environment that would permit such a program to operate.
- Rejection of the concept by the National and Provincial level governments

### ***Specific Tasks/Activities***

At a minimum, the program would undertake to do the following:

- Design framework for establishing institutes of public administration
- Conduct a pilot projects in south-central and southern regions
- Secure contributions for the effort from PCs and other international donors and contractors; share costs with provinces, or require a land/facility contribution
- Establish reference libraries and assist in setting up LG websites
- Establish cooperation with universities, institutions, scholars on decentralization and devolution
- Conduct panel discussion forums
- Help establish new LGAs for all levels of local government
- Acquire models from international organizations on decentralized financial systems
- Educate the educators
- Train the trainers
- Conduct pilot projects as necessary

### ***Indicators and Targets***

Indicators and targets might include such things as:

- Presence of an enabling environment that permits a structure of locally elected institutions that can oversee technical institution and permits local government power and authority over such kinds of services.
- Local government institutions at the PC level that are knowledgeable and capable enough to exercise those powers and authority granted.
- No. of institutions formed (4)
- No. of workshops and events held
- No. and amount of grants-in- aid provided (in US dollars) in support of these tasks and activities.

### ***Monitoring Mechanisms***

Effective monitoring mechanisms might include such things as:

- Policy and occasional papers
- Local Government Assessment Study
- Monitoring and evaluation reports
- Monthly Reports, Interim and Final Reports
- Quarterly Implementation Plans
- A Performance Monitoring Plan

### ***Inputs***

The project would likely require the following inputs:

- A project budget: the amount TBD, but would be based on some kind of cost-sharing arrangement and/or contributions by the international donor community
- International consultants: a reasonable number of technical specialists with experience establishing institutes of public administration necessary to provide adequate technical assistance and advisory services.
- Local consultants: to assist in the establishment of the institutes, develop learning materials, and other related input as required.

## **Increasing Efficiency of Local Government Basic Services Delivery**

### **Background**

The Gol's failure to deliver essential services to its citizenry is a problem that could have a serious consequences and negative impact on all future development and reconstruction programs in Iraq regardless of the donor source. The need to return to seeking to improve basic services delivery is undeniable. Essential services – potable water, electricity, sanitation, and fuel--still are not available to most Iraqis after over 7 years of development activities in Iraq by multiple donors.

The expected impacts by 2012 of the democracy and governance component of the USAID Strategy Statement are noble goals, but they do not reflect the critical need to fulfill basic needs for the Iraqi people now. Quality of life, even at its most basic level, is needed to ensure the ongoing stability and political development of Iraq.

Based on responses from a variety of people interviewed – including USAID representatives from PRTs and partners, it is generally felt that the absence of basic services complicate development efforts. Any future program of services delivered under the local governance banner should include pursuing meaningful local government involvement in overseeing and decision-making respecting the delivery of basic services its constituency, especially those services cited above.

Suggestions for a program for addressing the needs and interest of local government and that would hopefully lead to the long-term goal of local government autonomy and self determination with their respective geo-political areas outlined below.

### **Purpose**

The purpose of the proposed program is to provide and enabling environment that creates a structure of locally-elected institutions at the provincial level that would oversee technical departments and permit local government power and authority over some services. Additionally, the program would seek to build the capacity of local government institutions that are knowledgeable and capable enough to exercise those powers and authority granted to them to support the development of democratic local governance by working primarily on the enabling environment and building the capabilities of provincial and sub-national governments.

### **Assumptions/Risks**

The following assumptions and risks could have an impact on the outcome of such a program as described herein.

- Future legislation will support the legal establishment of local governments and decentralization/devolution of local government activities to PCs and sub-national governments.
- Communities, NGOs and private sector organizations will actively participate in seeking the decentralization of authority and responsibilities to PCs and sub-national governments
- Enabling environment
- Risk of governors not being unencumbered politically and will not serve as change agents
- Having access to ministries and National Assembly
- Availability of resources (staff, expertise, and money)
- Willingness and desires for decentralization from both sub-national and central governments

### **Target Group**

Initially, the target group would include provincial governments – Provincial Councils and GOs. Eventually supervisors, middle-level and senior managers, administrators and officers – both elected and civil servants, from among the various government institutions at the national, regional, and local levels of government. Specifically, ministries, provincial and other sub-national councils, regional

directors general, provincial and sub-national government department heads, managers, and supervisors. In time, the courses and programs can also be made available to NGOs, CSOs, and private sector partners.

### **Organization Structure**

It is envisioned that the structure for carrying out the suggested program would be through contract, cooperative agreement, or other mechanism determined by USAID with a partner selected for its experience in providing such technical assistance, training, and consultancy services.

### **Program of Services**

At a minimum, the program would include the following tasks:

- Development of a baseline information system – hardware and software – that tracks existing service delivery inputs from the central government
- Additional service delivery inputs as a consequence of projects implemented special projects emanating from ARDP and other funding sources
- Information disseminated to public on service delivery inputs
- Procedures for project selections adopted and implemented
- Open hearings and public participation in the allocation of resources
- Reporting the reporting the number and monetary amount of grants in support of these tasks and activities.
- Providing trainings on how to use infrastructure information to track service delivery Improvements
- Technical assistance to conduct technical assessments of selected departments
- Technical assistance in PCs' procedures
- Training in developing prioritization and division of labor
- Training in oversight role of PCs
- Design and conduct selected pilot projects: finance, decentralization, and others
- Provide assistance to committees, departments, and other agencies of Provincial government:
  - Conduct conferences leading to drafting a local government code
  - Develop a model resolution for delegating legal authority
  - Identify and collect promising organizational entities, their best practices, and produce monographs citing findings
  - Develop stakeholders participation core training program(s) and related materials

### **Domestic and International Linkages**

To the extent possible, international donors and local groups such as CSOs and NGOs would be invited to participate in program activities, including funding key program elements such as training, community outreach, and the like. Additionally, local media – print and broadcast – would be engaged to report regularly on program progress and accomplishments, as well as to carry out one of its basic functions: monitoring government activities and expenditures in the public interest.

### **Program End State**

Ultimately the program would result in local government autonomy with respect to providing basic services to its constituency. However, given the political climate in Iraq respecting local government, particularly issues surrounding decentralization and devolution, any program pursuing local government autonomy will have to proceed incrementally. Accordingly, success in accomplishing program goal and objective will have to be viewed in terms of incremental success in achieving local autonomy—continued positive movement toward the ultimate goal.

### **Inputs**

The project would likely require the following inputs:

- A Project Budget: amount TBD
- International consultants: a reasonable number of technical specialists with experience in the delivery of basic services necessary to provide adequate technical assistance and advisory services.
- Local consultants: required, to develop and deliver trainings/learning materials, and other related input; would be the link to providing services in the field using the TA model developed by LGP III.

## **Roles and Responsibilities of Different Levels of Government**

### **Background**

The history of PC performance in some provinces is described by many as severely lacking. Based on field observations in the field and comments made by people interviewed – including LGP III field staff, USAID Representatives from PRTs, and other sources – strongly suggest some PCs are floundering because they understand neither their responsibilities nor their role in conducting council business. Reportedly, there are some councils where members never show up for business – they only show up to collect their paychecks.

There are instances where there are not enough people at council meetings to constitute a quorum, and consequently, no business is conducted. Some of the offending councilmen are considered incompetent or political hacks, while others are said to shy away from attending council meetings because they do not know or understand their role, duties and responsibilities respecting council participation. A program is clearly needed to address this problem. If done in a positive way, the training and development could develop a work ethic that might eliminate the problem. If not, those who are serious about representing their respective constituencies may be large enough to dismiss the incompetent.

A program to provide training/mentoring for strengthening adherence to good governance principles among provincial elected and administrative staff participation is outlined in the sections following.

### **Purpose**

The purpose of the proposed program is to provide an enhanced program that goes beyond merely an orientation, focus on ethics and anti-corruption as key training (or mentoring as the case may be). While the elected officials are targeted, other provincial staff and officials are probably offenders as well. Such a program would also extend to them as well.

### **Target Group**

The target group for this program of services would include provincial government's elected and administrative staff – PCs, Governors, PC staff, staff comprising the GO, supervisors, mid-level and senior managers, administrators and officers from the various government institutions at the regional (KRG should they be invited to participate) and provincial levels of government. Other sub-national councils, regional directors general, provincial and sub-national government department heads, managers, and supervisors could be included in the program as they may be given "legitimate" local government status.

### **Organization Structure**

It is envisioned that the structure for carrying out the suggested program would be through contract, cooperative agreement, or other mechanism determined by USAID with a partner selected for its experience in providing such technical assistance, training, and consultancy services.

### **Program of Services**

At a minimum, the program would include the following tasks:

- Provide workshops on the roles and relationships, duties and responsibilities of elected and administrative personnel
- Conduct an ethics training program
- Introduce an anti-corruption training course
- Hold national conferences for PCs, Governors, and Provincial Government officials to discuss government employee performance and ethics issues
- Providing workshops on existing, proposed, and future legislations
- Developing lobbying skills
- Mentor elected and administrative officials on time management
- Prepare white papers on government structure – define duties and responsibilities for each branch of provincial government; define service responsibilities; and determine authority of each branch

### **Assumptions/Risks**

The following assumptions and risks could have an impact on the outcome of such a program as described herein.

- An enabling work environment will be available
- Availability of adequate resources (staff, expertise, and money)
- Willingness and desires for participation in training/mentoring program
- Future legislation will support the legal establishment of local governments and decentralization/devolution of local government activities to PCs and sub-national governments.

### **Domestic and International Linkages**

To the extent possible, international donors would be invited to participate in program activities, including funding key program elements such as training and other key program activities.

### **Program End State**

The program would result in a more informed, understanding, and professionalism of elected and administrative staff with regard to servicing their respective constituencies. Hopefully, such a program will help bring about better participation of elected officials in the processes of government, improve work performance through establishing a work ethic, and minimize corruption.

### **Inputs**

The project would likely require the following inputs:

- A Project budget: amount TBD
- International consultants: a reasonable number of technical specialists with experience in the delivery of basic services necessary to provide adequate technical assistance and advisory services.
- Local consultants: as required, to develop and deliver training materials and other related input; would be the link to providing services in the field using the TA model developed by LGP III.



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