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USAID SUPPORT TO SUDANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY MID-TERM EVALUATION

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This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Norm Olsen, Team Leader and Fred Whiting, Political and Legislative Specialist, Management Systems International.

USAID SUPPORT TO SUDANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

MID-TERM EVALUATION



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ACRONYMS

CEPPS	Consortium for Electoral and Political Processes Support
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DG	Democracy and Governance
GJD	Governing Justly and Democratically
GOSS	Government of southern Sudan
IRI	International Republican Institute
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MP	Member of Parliament
MSI	Management Systems International
NDI	National Democratic Institute
RCD	Resident Country Director
RPO	Resident Program Officer
SANU	Sudan African National Union
SSDF	South Sudan Defense Force
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSLA	Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly
TPM	Team Planning Meeting
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDSF	United Democratic Salvation Front
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAP	Union of Sudan African Parties
WBEG	Western Bhar El-Ghazal State

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Project Description

The USAID funded IRI program in Sudan has three objectives: 1) Political party organizational development; 2) Political party participation in elections; and 3) Strengthening party caucuses and specialized committees in the southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) that promote good governance. The project began September 17, 2004 and runs until December 31, 2011. To date, the IRI program focus has been on objectives one and three; hence, those objectives are the focus of this evaluation. The Evaluation Team anticipates IRI increasing emphasis on preparing political parties for participation in elections over the next six months. The total life of project budget is \$19.8 million. Life of project expenditures through March 31, 2008 is \$4.17 million or 21% of total budget. IRI is meeting the USAID/Sudan FY2007 PMP indicators targets of 40 persons trained in anti-corruption (actual 2007 - 262), and 270 political party trainees(actual 2007 - 333). IRI also achieved the targets of five mechanisms for external oversight of public resource use and assistance to seven political parties in articulating platforms and policies.

The overall purposes of all these evaluations are:

- To identify evidence of successes, lessons learned, and obstacles to progress in USAID-funded programs;
- To provide recommendations for any program adjustments that may be necessary to increase the effectiveness and improve the implementation and performance of USAID DG activities in Sudan; and
- To advise on the adequacy of currently collected program input, context, and performance indicators to enable robust end-of-program evaluations.

The objectives of this evaluation are:

1. Identify and, if possible, measure the impacts and successes of IRI's program activities to date vis-à-vis the program objectives, namely:
 - a. Building the organizational development of democratic political parties in southern Sudan;
 - b. Improving political party capacity to participate in elections; and
 - c. Increasing the effectiveness of the SSLA and strengthening party caucuses in specialized committees that promote good governance;
2. Assess the sufficiency of current IRI monitoring and evaluation system; and,
3. Make recommendations to:
 - a. Increase the impact of IRI activities in southern Sudan; and
 - b. Improve the collection of program input, context, and performance indicators to enable robust life-of-program performance monitoring and end-of-program evaluations.

Specific questions the Evaluation Team explored include the following:

1. IRI Performance to Date
 - a. What is the impact of IRI assistance on Political Party Organizational Development and elections preparations?
 - b. What impact has IRI assistance had on strengthening Party Caucuses and Specialized Committees in the Legislature to Promote Good Governance?

2. Monitoring and Evaluation
 - a. Is appropriate data on program inputs available to enable a robust impact evaluation at the end of the program?
3. Strategic Recommendations
 - c. What adjustments should IRI and USAID make to maximize the effectiveness of IRI's work with political parties and the SSLA on their organizational development and elections preparations?

The methodology:

The Evaluation Team adopted a mixed methodological approach specifically designed to meet the needs of the complex, post conflict, environment of southern Sudan. We initially reviewed the basic planning documents and then compared those documents, both quantitative and qualitative objectives, with actual activity reporting including quarterly and semi-annual reports, training materials, and training evaluations. We cross-checked the PMP indicators with the IRI work plan indicators and those in the CEPPS agreement. Then, to confirm the validity of the data, we cross-checked activity reports indicator data with data in the USAID/Sudan PMP. We conducted over 50 key informant interviews, concentrating on those with whom IRI had directly worked. Interviews included members of the SPLM Southern Sector Secretariat, State Governors, Women's League leaders, and Youth League leaders. The Evaluation Team observed two activities, the SPLM convention and a political party training course. We visited with state government officials and SPLM party members in Western Bahr El Ghazal State. Interviews also took place with other donors working in the sector.

The evaluation coincided with a number of political events that created logistical issues for the Evaluation Team. First, the 2nd SPLM National Convention and related activities effectively covered two of the Evaluation Team's three weeks in southern Sudan. The Evaluation Team was able to meet with a representative sample of state and Southern Sector SPLM political leaders at the convention; however, the convention also made scheduling time with SPLM politicians very difficult. In addition, the attempted military coup in Khartoum and fighting in Abyei raised questions about local safety and initially delayed the start of the convention. SPLM high-level officials were nearly impossible to reach as these events occurred at roughly the same time. The SSLA has not been in session during 2008, which limited access to members of parliament, committee chairs and committee staff. Of the five committees with which IRI work, only one Land Committee member was available for an interview.

Conclusions and Supporting Findings

Summary Conclusions

IRI works with the SPLM, seven smaller southern Sudan political parties, and five committees of the SSLA. The measure of the impact of the IRI program is whether the capacity of the southern Sudan political parties and SSLA is increasing. The SPLM is making significant progress in increasing its capacity and becoming an effective political party. Partly this increase in capacity is because of facilitation by IRI. Evidence of increased SPLM capacity includes having in place a democratic constitution, a strategic plan, departmental work plans, and departmental budgets. The SPLM also has 1.0 million new members. The smaller parties face greater obstacles and are less receptive to assistance from IRI. Their capacity is not increasing. The five SSLA committees, which IRI works with, have made some progress in reviewing budgets and in oversight of the Auditor Generals office. Overall, there has been no increase in the capacity of the SSLA. Accurately measuring the impact of the IRI program will require several more years of the SPLM and SSLA using the tools of democratic governance and a determination of the results from that use.

While the number of training courses conducted by IRI is lower than projected in the basic agreement and subsequent work plans, they exceed the goals in the USAID/Sudan PMP. According to the trainees, the quality of the courses is excellent and they are using the training in their work. In addition, according to interviews of both state and Southern Sector level political leaders, IRI is doing effective work mentoring southern Sudan political leaders. We note that for the most part these leaders are SPLM members. Overall IRI is having a positive impact on improving the capacity of the SPLM as it develops along democratic lines. Progress has been significantly slower with the SSLA. IRI is now in a position to increase its impact as southern Sudan nears the critical transitions points of the 2009 elections and the 2011 referendum. Increasing impact requires that IRI maintain the same high quality personnel now in place while substantially expanding their staff numbers.

A. Political Party Strengthening

The SPLM leadership is highly receptive to advice from IRI, resulting in a number of significant achievements including the following:

1. Trained and provided technical assistance to the interim SPLM National Committee in strategic planning that the SPLM directly applied to the SPLM member mobilization drive.
2. Facilitated drafting of the SPLM Women's League and Youth League constitutions. Both the Women's League and Youth Leagues now have democratic constitutions. Interviews with members of both leagues indicate those constitutions are being followed. Importantly, members of both leagues reported that the constitutions provide concrete guidance as to how the leagues should function in a democracy.
3. Facilitated drafting of the SPLM constitution and manifesto. The SPLM now has both a democratic constitution and manifesto. According to the delegates interviewed by the team, the SPLM national convention followed the basic procedures outlined in the constitution. A review of the completed constitution shows that it is a comprehensive document that covers almost all areas of operation. We are particularly impressed that the constitution calls for annual audits of the SPLM. If the SPLM carries out and publishes annual audits, it would be a major step forward for southern Sudan.
4. Facilitated the drafting of departmental work plans and budgets for SPLM Southern Sector. All departments in the SPLM Southern Sector now have departmental work plans and budgets. The Deputy Director General of the SPLM Southern Sector states that use of these tools has significantly increased her ability to manage the process.
5. Facilitated SPLM convention planning. The 2nd SPLM convention was a massive affair, the sort of gathering in which chaos often prevails; such was not the case in this convention, which appeared well planned and competently implemented. SPLM leaders reported to the Evaluation Team that IRI's help in planning was very valuable. Most importantly, delegates to the convention asserted that they were able to get through the agenda, following agreed to procedures, and completed all of their business.
6. Trained national convention protocol officers. In interviews, protocol officers affirmed the training provided by IRI was highly practical. We observed selected protocol officers handling difficult situations such as obtaining credentials for delegates and rooms for delegates without reservations with commendable efficiency and professionalism.

7. Facilitated a democratic dialogue between southern Sudanese political leaders. In addition, IRI facilitated a dialogue on the political party law, provided expert advice on the election law, and facilitated a conference on the role of the Sudan Diaspora in the development of the nation.

B. Legislative Strengthening

The SSLA to date is a relatively inactive legislature: thus, IRI legislative strengthening has progressed more slowly than direct work with the SPLM. Nevertheless, IRI has succeeded in the following:

1. Worked with the Chairpersons of five key SSLA oversight committees making modest improvements in the functioning of those committees.
2. Trained MPs in basic parliamentary skills at both the national and state levels.
3. Upgraded the skills of key SSLA staffers.
4. Advised re-drafting of the SSLA Women's Forum Constitution and strategic plan.

Supporting Findings

A. General

1. As observed by the Evaluation team, the IRI staff has excellent connections with the SPLM and SANU parties. This includes political party leadership, MPs, and SSLA staff. Interviews with political leaders at both the Southern Sector and state levels consistently yielded praise for and appreciation of the work IRI is doing. This was especially true of the SPLM and SANU leadership.
2. Without exception, everyone interviewed by the Evaluation Team who has received training from IRI, both political party and legislative strengthening, reported the training has been useful, and that they have been able to apply IRI training in their work. Examples of the impact of training on specific jobs are preparation of constitutions for the SPLM, drafting of budgets and strategic plans for the SPLM, and drafting of procedures for the SPLM. While the Evaluation Team had only a limited opportunity to observe, interviews from all levels of the SPLM Southern Sector, leaders to state workers, consistently support the view that the SPLM is making a good faith effort to adhere to the democratic thrust, an important part of the IRI training courses, that underpins the newly approved SPLM constitution, strategic plans, and procedure manuals. SANU leaders provided much the same testimony concerning IRI training.
3. While IRI is doing useful training, the number of training courses is less than projected in both its work plans and in the CEPPS/IRI basic agreement. The lesser number is attributable to the limited number of IRI staff in southern Sudan and the difficulty of providing training sessions in each of the ten states in the Southern Sector. The total number of trainees, 1900 in 2006 – 2007, exceeds the PMP indicators and is consistent with the CEPPS agreement as modified and IRI proposed FY 2008 work plan. Reliable training figures are unavailable for 2004 – 2005.
4. A review of the FY 2008 IRI work plan submitted to USAID/Sudan suggests to the Evaluation Team that the plan is overly ambitious for current conditions in southern Sudan and the personnel immediately available to IRI¹. Specifically we believe that IRI cannot complete its current work plan with its current staffing levels in the areas of state level training, election preparation, and

¹ Consortium for Elections and Political Process Strengthening (CEPPS)/International Republican Institute (IRI), Southern Sudan Political Party Development & Legislative Strengthening Program, **Work Plan for January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008**, USAID Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 633-A-00-04-00072-00,

assistance to the smaller parties. Logistics present a major difficulty in all activities. IRI needs to increase its logistical capacity if it is to effectively cover all of southern Sudan. While the smaller parties have been less receptive to training and other assistance than the SPLM, a RPO (Resident Program Officer) committed to assisting the smaller parties could facilitate increased commitment on the part of the small parties to becoming competitive. Because of its importance, the SPLM needs a single RPO committed to it. IRI needs to overcome its staff recruiting limitations if it is to assist effectively in holding the southern Sudan 2009 national elections and 2011 referendum. The ability of IRI to focus SPLM attention on other than election priorities is likely to be limited.

5. Communications between IRI/Washington, IRI/Sudan, and USAID need improvement, none of the three parties seems adequately informed of the challenges facing the other two. Specifically, the IRI semi – annual reports and work plans are of modest quality. While there has been significant improvement in the quality of the IRI semi-annual reports over the past 12 – 18 months, these reports still do not accurately reflect the extent to which IRI has (or has not) accomplished goals set out in work plans. Nor do they articulate the difficulties faced by IRI, the steps taken to overcome those difficulties, and the impact of IRI’s successes.
6. IRI faces substantial logistics challenges in providing training. Some of these challenges are: 1) recruiting sufficient numbers of appropriate Sudanese to train, 2) locating adequate training facilities, 3) transporting the trainees to the training sites, and 4) following up after completion of the training exercises. For a range of reasons, varying from an inadequate educational system to the disruptions of extended civil war, southern Sudan has limited numbers of people available for professional-level training. There is competition for their time, both from job commitments and from multiple offers of training by various donors.
7. The IRI data collection and record-keeping suffered start-up problems during the first two years, with the result that the Evaluation Team was unable to access documentation prior to March 2006. To enable robust program performance monitoring and end-of-program evaluation, IRI data collection and record keeping systems will require extensive upgrading and standardization.

B. Political Party Strengthening

1. The IRI level of effort is appropriate to the current ability of the SPLM to apply the training to its work. The SPLM is the critical factor in the democratization of southern Sudan. It is moving from being a liberation army to a political party. Simultaneously it is trying to establish a number of democratic institutions. In a situation in which the SPLM is trying to reach a number of ambitious goals-ranging from improved democratic governance to holding free and fair elections-with very limited experience and a modest managerial capacity, its attention span is likely to be limited. Thus, the IRI level of effort appears appropriate to the Evaluation Team’s assessment of the ability of the SPLM to implement the advice.

Based on interviews with the leadership of the smaller parties, the Evaluation Team came away with the strong impression that those parties have a limited current interest in moving forward towards becoming competitive political parties. The smaller parties played a limited role in the civil war, tend to represent more limited constituencies (geographic, ethnic, etc), and have difficulty raising funds. Their leadership was also suppressed during the civil war, which weakened their organizational structures. All of these difficulties contribute to their lack of commitment to becoming competitive. IRI statements concerning the difficulties it has arranging training with the small parties reinforce this impression. Thus, the Evaluation Team’s assessment

is that IRI's ability, with a small staff, to assist the smaller parties is greater than the smaller parties' abilities to apply that assistance.

2. The SPLM has significantly increased its capacity as it moved from being a military movement to becoming a democratic political party. Evidence:
 - a) *Work plans in place:* IRI facilitated the drafting of work plans and budgets for all Southern Sector SPLM departments. The SPLM leadership interviewed by the Evaluation Team at both the policymaking and operational levels state they are using the IRI facilitated work plans and budgets.
 - b) *Constitution drafted and approved:* IRI facilitated the drafting of the constitution that the national convention approved in May 2008.
 - c) *Manifesto drafted and approved:* IRI facilitated the drafting of the manifesto that was approved at the national convention in May 2008.
 - d) *Leadership democratically elected at all levels of the SPLM:* Media accounts and conversations with a representative sample of convention delegates confirm the delegates considered the elections to be democratic.
 - e) *National Convention successfully completed:* Both media and delegates confirmed the success of the convention.
 - f) *One million new members recruited:* The 1.0 million figure was the SPLM goal. The SPLM leadership affirm that they met the goal. State party leadership gave specific numbers of new members for their respective states. These numbers indicate the SPLM should have easily met the 1.0 million goal. We note there has been no independent audit of the numbers of old and new members. The SPLM has not permitted IRI to review its party membership rolls, a position that is consistent with the policies of most of the democratic political parties in the world. The SPLM leadership gives substantial credit to IRI for strengthening its strategic planning in preparation for the membership drive and believes this strengthening has been an important factor in the ability of the SPLM to reach its membership goal.
 - g) *Capacity measurement tool shows improvement:* The IRI capacity measurement tool, the Political Party Scorecard, shows a modest improvement in capacity on the part of SPLM. This tool is based on an annual self – assessment by selected SPLM leaders. To date, IRI has performed assessments in 2006 and 2007. A third assessment is planned for 2008.
3. Improvement in the capacity of the smaller parties: The Evaluation Team found no evidence that the smaller parties have increased their capacity. The main reasons for this are the lack of resources available to the smaller parties (in particular they lack financing) and the limited response IRI has received from the smaller parties in terms of participation in training.

C. Legislative Strengthening

1. The IRI level of effort towards legislative strengthening is appropriate to the receptivity of SSLA to the IRI assistance. The SSLA is an appointed legislative assembly with many members receiving seats as a reward for their military service during the civil war. Based on interviews with SSLA members, these members seem to have a limited understanding of the role of a parliament in a democracy. In particular, documentation indicates SSLA members have

introduced very little legislation or actively engaged in oversight activities. Thus, there appears to have been only a limited increase in the capacity of the SSLA.

At the committee level, there is some evidence of growth. Evidence of increasing capacity includes:

- a) The SSLA established five oversight mechanisms including: 1) confirming of ministerial appointments, 2) approving ministerial budgets, 3) auditing government accounts, 4) approving ministerial budgets, and 5) removing from office corrupt or non-performing agents. In general, the SSLA has been slow to use the oversight mechanisms. According to IRI, at the end of the 2007 session, the SSLA was more proactive in reviewing ministerial budgets.
- b) The SSLA established a committee system that serves in part as legislative oversight of the Executive Branch. IRI is working directly with Legislation & Legal Affairs, Land-Natural Resources-Environment, Public Accounts, Information & Culture, and Energy, Industry, & Mining. IRI is training and mentoring of five key SSLA committee chairpersons and members. IRI believes performance has slowly improved. In particular, the Public Accounts committee has become significantly more active. Its activities are widely credited with the censure of the GOSS Auditor General and his ultimate removal from office.
- c) The SSLA established a sound set of rules (The Conduct of Business Regulations) covering procedures and conduct although compliance is often lax. The procedures also provide internal oversight mechanisms.
- d) IRI training for SSLA staff members resulted in the publication of August House magazine, planned as a quarterly publication covering the activities of the SSLA. The production of a publication covering the activities of the SSLA indicates both staff initiative and an increase in staff capacity. As demonstrated in other parliaments around the world, a sustained increase in staff capacity is likely to lead to an increase in both the capacity of the parliament as a whole, and participating caucuses and committees.
- e) The southern Sudanese Legislative Assembly Women's Forum (SSLAWF), with facilitation by IRI, adopted a strategic plan and is in the process of implementing it. The plan calls for the spread of women's caucuses to the state assemblies. The SSLAWF is organizing delegations of three assembly members to travel to each of the ten state legislatures over the next three to six months to facilitate the creation of state assembly women's forums.
- f) IRI has developed the Legislative Scorecard as an assessment tool to assess the baseline capacity of the SSLA. This is essentially a self-assessment tool for use by the SSLA members. The second application of the tool shows a slight decline in capacity, although this seems likely to result from a change in raters, rather than actual diminished capacity.

Recommendations

A. Political Party Strengthening

- 1) Concentrate programming on the SPLM because that party has the greatest level of commitment and in the near term will determine the success or failure of the southern Sudan's transformation to democracy.
- 2) Increase recruiting. As the elections and referendum approach, nine full-time Juba-based staff members are required to fulfill IRI's current commitment in southern Sudan. Below is a possible allocation of roles for the IRI southern Sudan program:
 - o Resident Country Director

- Deputy Resident Country Director
 - Resident Program Officer for the SPLM
 - Resident Program Officer for the SSLA
 - Resident Program Officer for the smaller southern parties
 - Resident Program Officer for women and youth programming
 - Resident Program Officer(s) for state -level trainings. State level training will need support from three to five-person Sudanese training teams; one person would be a full-time logistics specialist.
 - Resident Program Officer for campaigns
 - Logistics Coordinator
- 3) Continue to offer to train the small parties, but do not put a major effort into pursuing groups that are not committed to being fully competitive in a democratic political process, until such time as IRI has a small party specialist who can devote full time to the necessary development work.
 - 4) Shift programming emphasis to preparing for the 2009 elections. Coordinate the content of the basic political training with other donors doing similar activities.
 - 5) Make Western Bahr El Ghazal State a concentration state with an emphasis on training of trainers through which the SPLM and other political parties can provide basic political training throughout the state. We recommend Western Bahr El Ghazal State as a concentration state because it is functioning effectively, the Governor is highly interested, and the SPLM state secretariat, the Women’s League and the Youth League are very enthusiastic. Western Bahr El Ghazal State is readily accessible and offers an excellent chance at success that IRI can then replicate to other states.
 - 6) Upgrade the quality of the IRI data collection and record-keeping systems so that IRI/ Juba has systematic and readily retrievable access to performance data. In particular, develop more robust qualitative indicators to show actual impact. For example, a current indicator is “number of political parties and political groupings receiving USG assistance to articulate platform and policy agendas.” IRI is meeting the quantitative goal of seven parties receiving assistance. The Evaluation Team suggests as a further indication of impact adding a qualitative indicator: “SPLM adopts and follows a party constitution.” or: “Each Southern Sector SPLM department drafts and follows a budget and work plan.”
 - 7) Explore methods of increasing the skills of the politically interested in addition to formal training. To effectively reach the local level of all ten states, a training of trainers approach is needed. Distance learning, perhaps using CDs or other means of electronic communication, can reach politically active persons who have only limited opportunities for formal training. Seek out mentoring opportunities. Evaluate the results of these activities to determine what works best with what audience.

B. Legislative Strengthening

Until the election of a new legislature, de-emphasize formal MP training at the SSLA. Emphasize mentoring of high potential MPs and increasing the skills of SSLA staffers.

C. USAID

1. Change the IRI reporting requirement from semi annually to quarterly. Request that IRI/southern Sudan prepare the initial draft. Review each quarterly report with the IRI team. Use this process

as a basis for reviewing past activities and planning the next quarter's activities.

2. Approve the current IRI work plan after holding USAID – IRI discussions with the current team in which realistic objectives for the next six months are established.
3. Continue holding a monthly DG round table with all USAID DG partners.

Value for money

IRI under-spent for the initial period of the project. The failure to promptly fill IRI vacancies was clearly a deficiency that seems likely to have had a negative impact on initial implementation. Certainly, it is a factor in inadequate record keeping for 2004- 2005. The current four-person team is spending and achieving at a significantly higher rate. As the elections approach, a greater level of effort on the part of IRI will be required to achieve program goals.

From FY 2006 to 2007, IRI trained approximately 1900 southern Sudanese. This amount of training exceeds the quantitative goals in the USAID/Sudan PMP. IRI has also reached the qualitative goals for legislative oversight and political party capacity building. IRI total expenditures were approximately \$2.67 million in FY 2006 - 2007, yielding a per trainee cost of approximately \$1,400. That amount is consistent with other similar programs taking place in Africa. Thus, the assessment of the Evaluation Team is that USAID is receiving a reasonable return on its investment.

The basic question is not the cost of the training, but the value the trainees produce following the training. Specifically, did those trainees and the IRI program provide benefits to USAID's DG program supporting implementation of the CPA in an amount greater than the expenditures? Given Sudan's strategic importance, its history, and lack of democratic experience, the Evaluation Team believes USAID is receiving value in excess of expenditures. (This report as a whole discusses the progress made on which the Evaluation Team bases its assessment.) Currently, IRI is directly addressing two specific areas: 1) strengthening of political parties and 2) strengthening the SSLA and its committees. Based on the evidence to which the Evaluation Team had access, IRI is performing satisfactorily in southern Sudan. The SPLM is making solid progress towards becoming a functioning democratic political party. Progress has been much slower in the SSLA. USAID, through IRI, has significant influence on the development of the SPLM and solid potential for influencing the development of the SSLA.

I. INTRODUCTION

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordering nine countries, and has an estimated population of 40 million (the first census was conducted in April 2008, but has not yet been finalized and released). The southern Sudanese population is estimated at 10-12 million, with an estimated four million others displaced to northern Sudan or living as refugees outside the country as the result of the north-south conflict during the years 1955-1972 and 1983-2005 (said to be the longest civil war in African history). Underdevelopment, famine, drought, flood, displacement of families and division of communities compounded the devastation wrought by war. The war destroyed governmental infrastructure and prevented the emergence of successor governance institutions required for civil administration.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed in January 2005, provided for power-sharing by northern and southern Sudan in a Government of National Unity, with southern Sudanese representation in the national government based in Khartoum and the creation of a southern Sudanese government and state governments with appointed leadership pending elections to be held in 2009. Most critically, the CPA provides that after a six-year “interim period”, a referendum will be held in which the voters of southern Sudan will choose between unity of south and north or separation. The CPA also provided for resolution of conflicts in the oil-rich border regions between northern and southern Sudan (known collectively as the “Three Areas”); as of the date of this Report, the delineation of those areas remains in dispute and is the source of current conflict, putting the CPA at risk.

Southern political parties, of which the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement is predominant, face serious challenges in transforming themselves from armed movements and exiled groups into representative and accountable political organizations. The USAID/IRI democracy and governance (D&G) project, subject of this report, aims at securing public support for the CPA through the establishment of legitimate, democratic governance in southern Sudan. Key to this effort and the focus of IRI’s efforts is to (a) assist in the development of effective competitive political party organizations in southern Sudan, (b) strengthen the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) and (c) prepare the political parties in southern Sudan for the upcoming 2009 elections.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM AND USAID’S RESPONSE

Since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) has struggled to convert itself from a rebel/military organization to a broad-based democratically functioning political party. Additionally, the several smaller political parties that existed in southern Sudan prior to 2005, having become armed movements and exiled groups, have been struggling to resurrect their political legitimacy, to re-establish their membership bases, to train cadres and to develop effective organizational structures. The SPLM and the other southern political parties (SANU, SSSF, UDF, UDSF, USAP 1 and USAP 2) face the task of not only becoming representative and accountable partisan organizations, but also of creating and running the Government of southern Sudan (GOSS). The long years of war (1955-1972 and 1983- 2005) in opposition-controlled areas of Sudan had destroyed the existing governmental infrastructure and had prevented the emergence of successor governance institutions required for the provision of civil administration, security and the delivery of basic services.

The political, economic and social conditions prevailing at the time of the 2005 CPA placed at risk the ability of southern Sudan to create conditions amenable to the successful implementation of the CPA. Specifically at risk are the conduct of elections in 2009 and the potential change to new political arrangements that may follow the 2011 referendum on the North-South relationship (unity vs. separation) provided for in the CPA. Failure of the GOSS to establish effective, accountable institutions could lead to a resumption of conflict between North and South and/or among southern factions. The southern political leaders have been challenged with this enormous task of transition with virtually no legislative or executive experience. The development of these new political and governing structures will continue to require technical and material assistance from the international community.

USAID/Sudan designed its programs to support the implementation of the CPA and mitigate risks to the CPA. Within the DG portfolio, the specific focus is on securing and maintaining public support for the CPA through the fostering of legitimate, democratic governance. This, in turn, requires the establishment of political and governing institutions capable of bringing about the political, economic and social development of the South. To this end, USAID formulated the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) program. Implementation, in part, is through a Cooperative Agreement with the International Republican Institute (IRI), under the terms of a Leader with Associates (LWA) award with the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS), of which IRI is a partner.

Program Description²

IRI is to support USAID objectives of the GJD program in Sudan by:

- 1) Political party organizational development;
- 2) Preparations of political party participation in elections; and
- 3) Strengthening party caucuses and specialized committees in the southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) that promote good governance.

Political Party Organizational Development

IRI is undertaking political party organizational development by IRI working with all non-NCP political parties represented in the SSLA to strengthen their capacities to perform in the Sudanese political environment. This includes working with parties to strengthen their internal structures and to encourage democratic processes within the parties. This capacity building activity is taking place at both the Southern Sector and state levels.

Per the CEPSS/IRI Program Description dated, IRI extends its political party capacity building to five states by the end of 2007 (Central Equatoria, Lakes, Western Bahr El Ghazal, West Equatoria and Upper Nile). To date, political leaders from only the first three states mentioned have benefited from IRI training.

At the National level, there is a plan for monthly roundtables with party leaders to provide a private forum for political leaders to come together to discuss pressing issues in the Sudanese political sphere. Since program inception, only four roundtables have been held. In addition, the CEPSS/IRI Program specifies that IRI should provide multi-party trainings to Juba-based political party leaders and members, with subjects to be agreed upon in consultation with USAID and party leaders.

² Mid-term Evaluation Scope of Work & CEPPS/IRI, Program Description Dated 9/10/07 for the period 9/16/04 through 12/31/11.

Also, per the CEPSS/IRI Program Description, IRI should conduct an SPLM study tour to El Salvador in 2008 to provide an example of how a former rebel movement quickly and successfully transitioned to become part of a democratic process.

IRI political party training at all levels should provide participants (and through them, party members) with a clear understanding of the division between party and government, the role of parties as organizations, the role of parties in the political process, the necessity of support for pluralism both inside and outside each party and inter- and intra- party conflict resolution. IRI should work to support political party conventions in which delegates formulate party policy and elect party leadership.

Because historically men have dominated political leadership in Sudan, IRI training should give special emphasis to training for women and promotion of diversity. This strategy also applies to youth.

IRI should work with political parties on issue-based platform development, including providing the tools for engaging the grassroots to build voter-oriented platforms.

IRI should provide communications training to maintain a dialogue with the electorate on party issues. Training should emphasize both internal communications (between party levels) and external communications focusing on media relations.

Preparing Political Parties for Participation in Elections

IRI should hold regular campaign schools at the Southern Sector and State levels to prepare parties to compete effectively in free and fair elections. (Under the CPA, nationwide elections at all levels are scheduled for 2009). In preparation for the elections, IRI should assist the parties to conduct National Conventions, to promote internal elections and internal democracy as well as to establish party capacities to participate fully in elections. The above-mentioned CEPSS/IRI Program Description provides that IRI should endeavor to use all available and appropriate forums to prepare (SSLA) members for the 2009 elections.

Strengthening Party Caucuses through Specialized Committees in the SSLA to Promote Good Governance

IRI will provide each party in the SSLA with the vital skills required for the legislative process, including:

- policy analysis
- committee hearings and processes
- report writing
- research analysis
- policy making and analysis
- transparency and good government
- legislative processes (drafting, proposing, reviewing and enactment)
- oversight role
- role of committees in curbing corruption
- parallel control over ministry spending

IRI will provide workshops to the following specialized committees of the SSLA:

1. Land, Natural Resources and the Environment
 - Study of land policies and legislation

- Study environmental protection policies
 - Comparison of protection, conservation and sustainable utilization of natural resources laws
 - Forest and wildlife resources analysis
2. Public Accounts Committee
 - Interpretation of the Auditor General’s Report
 - Budget analysis
 - How to gauge government efficiency and effectiveness
 - Committee inquiry techniques
 - Development of a PAC manual
 3. Information and Culture Committee
 - Comparative study of media laws “best practices”
 - Comparison of public information laws
 - Importance of media freedom
 - Media and corruption
 4. Legislation and Legal Affairs Committee
 - Bill drafting techniques
 - Processes of reviewing and amending laws
 - Anti-corruption laws
 - Ethical codes
 5. Energy, Industry and Mining Committee
 - Study of the Wealth Sharing Agreement
 - Oil and corruption – Analysis of Nigeria
 - Study of existing laws that pertain to investment, mining and industrial development

III. PURPOSE & OBJECTIVE OF THE EVALUATION

A. Overall Purpose of this Evaluation

As described in the team’s scope of work (Exhibit 1), the overall purposes of this evaluation are:

- (i) To identify evidence of successes, lessons learned and obstacles to progress in this USAID-funded program;
- (ii) To provide recommendations for any program adjustments that may be necessary to increase the effectiveness and improve the implementation this of USAID DG activity in southern Sudan; and
- (iii) To advise on the adequacy of currently collected program input, context and performance data to enable robust end-of-program evaluation.

B. Objectives of this Evaluation

As IRI is now approximately halfway through the seven-year duration of its Cooperative Agreement, a mid-term evaluation will ensure that USAID and IRI can capitalize on lessons learned and successes. This evaluation will enable USAID to ensure that the program is clearly achieving results within the management capabilities of USAID and IRI and that the necessary results-oriented management tools are

in place going forward with this project. This evaluation will help to identify the unique difficulties experienced by the program and facilitate problem solving, which may entail actions by USAID, IRI or both. Thus the objectives of this evaluation are:

- (i) Identify and, if possible, measure the impacts and successes of IRI’s program activities to date vis-à-vis the program objectives, namely:
 - (a) Build the organizational development of democratic political parties in southern Sudan;
 - (b) Improve political party capacity to participate in elections; and
 - (c) Increase the effectiveness of the SSLA and strengthen party caucuses in specialized committees that promote good governance;
- (i) Assess the sufficiency of current monitoring, program input and program context data collection to inform a robust end-of-program evaluation; and
- (ii) Make recommendations, as needed and within the context of current program funding , to :
 - (d) Increase the impact of IRI activities in southern Sudan; and
 - (e) Improve the collection of program input, context and performance data to enable robust life-of-program performance monitoring and end-of-program evaluations.

IV. METHODOLOGY

A. Research Design

This mid-term evaluation employed a mixed methodological approach to address the key issues and questions put forth in the scope of work. The Evaluation Team identified impact to date and appraised the successes of the IRI democracy and governance program in southern Sudan. A review of current monitoring and evaluation strategies associated with IRI activities led to an assessment of 1) the methods and sources of data collection; 2) the link between program inputs and projected outcomes; and 3) the quality of reporting. Evaluators also made recommendations—within the context of programmatic parameters—on how to improve IRI’s approach to monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the Evaluation Team developed recommendations on how IRI could increase the impact of its activities.

B. Methodology of Data Collection

Document review, key informant interviews and direct observation were the primary modes of data collection. The timing of the evaluation also afforded evaluators the opportunity to interact with recipients of IRI assistance during their participation in the SPLM Second National Convention.

Document Review

During the team preparation meeting, (TPM) in Washington, DC, evaluators gathered and organized relevant source materials and performed an initial review of the IRI program. Proposed program goals were compared to the yearly work plans and reported activities. From this exercise, a basic sketch emerged of how IRI activities evolved with respect to the ever-changing political landscape in southern Sudan. Copies of weekly, quarterly and semi-annual reports, proposals, program descriptions, performance management plans, participant surveys, work plans, budgets, training presentations and participant lists were furnished by IRI. USAID staff also supplied data quality surveys and relevant performance correspondences. Evaluators continued to consult these source materials during the in-country fieldwork phase of the project, comparing the content of IRI reports with interviews from training recipients and other relevant informants (see Exhibit 2 for list of documents consulted).

Key Informant Interviews

The majority of field activities involved identifying, locating and interviewing individuals who could provide information about the design, implementation and utility of IRI's political party and legislative strengthening assistance program. The list of informants interviewed is provided in Exhibit 3. To better understand the written materials received prior to the start of the fieldwork, the Evaluation Team met with IRI staff and USAID in Juba. From there, interview subjects fell into three major categories: training recipient, non-recipient and non-IRI democracy and governance implementing organization. These interviews were conducted on both a personal and group basis. Evaluators developed a basic interview questionnaire based on the key issues and questions identified in the scope of work. To encourage informal and frank discussions between interviewees and evaluators, the questionnaire was administered orally, which facilitated both some quantitative and qualitative data.

Direct Observation

To verify further, reported activities and testimonials, the Evaluation Team observed IRI staff interaction with political party members, elected officials, community leaders and other organizations in the development community. During the course of the evaluation, team members also attended portions of the 2nd SPLM National Convention to observe the work of SPLM protocol officers who had received training from IRI. In addition, the IRI staff organized a weeklong training for members of the Sudan African National Union (SANU), which evaluators were able to attend.

C. Summary of Methodology

Evaluation Objectives	Data Type	Data Source
1.) Measure Impacts & Successes of IRI Program Activities		
a.) Build organizational development of political parties in southern Sudan	Major steps in developing competitive and democratic political parties	Key Informant Interviews Party Documents (constitutions, work plans, etc.)
b.) Improve political capacity to participate in elections	NA	NA
c.) Increase effectiveness of SSLA	Laws passed. Oversight actions taken. Committee reports issued	Key Informant Interviews Committee Documents (legislation, work plans, etc.)
2.) Assess efficiency of current monitoring	Data quality assessment	Review of files
3.) Recommendations		
a.) Increase impact of IRI program	Assessment of impact	Review of documentation. Key informant interviews
b.) Improve collection of program inputs, context and performance	Data quality assessment	Review of documentation

The evaluation coincided with a number of political events that created logistical issues for the Team. First, the 2nd SPLM National Convention was useful from an observational standpoint, but it also made scheduling time with SPLM politicians very difficult. In addition, the attempted military coup in Khartoum and fighting in Abyei raised questions about local safety. SPLM high-level officials were nearly impossible to reach as these events occurred at roughly the same time.

The SSLA has not been in session during 2008, which limited access to members of parliament, committee chairs and committee staff. Of the five committees with which IRI work, only the Land Committee was available for an interview.

In the original plan, it was expected that the Evaluation Team would conduct fieldwork in Juba, Rumbek and Wau. Due to shifts in the SPLM National Convention schedule (four days of postponement) followed by an extended convention, the Rumbek field visit was cancelled. Evaluators conducted fieldwork in Bahr El Ghazal State and focused on identifying and interviewing informants from other States who were in Juba for the convention.

D. Team Composition

The Evaluation Team consisted of one evaluation expert (Norman Olsen); one legislative expert (Fred Whiting); and one political party expert (Dara Francis). Norman Olsen is an international development consultant with more than thirty years of experience. His varied background includes considerable work implementing and evaluating democracy and governance programs. Fred Whiting served in the South Dakota State Legislature from 1993 to 2003 chairing several committees, including those focused on health and human services, state affairs and commerce. Mr. Whiting has worked in business and legal roles with multinational companies. Dara Francis is an independent consultant specializing in the role of civil society in democracy promotion. Previously, she was a Program Officer at the International Republican Institute in Washington, DC, where she designed and managed programs on local governance, election preparations, civic participation and conflict mitigation in sub-Saharan Africa. A locally hired communications specialist (Edmond Yakani) accompanied the team on field visits.

V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUPPORTING FINDINGS

A. Strengthening Political Parties

Conclusions

IRI's Performance to Date. IRI has suffered from early staff departures and slow replacement of those departing personnel. These staff changes and vacancies have contributed to planning that is overly optimistic in targets given the level of personnel available to achieve those targets. Nevertheless, IRI has met the targets established in the USAID/Sudan PMP. While it is difficult to draw a precise link between training and improvements in performance by the SPLM, both leaders and members interviewed by the Evaluation Team credit that training for much of their improvement. As measured by the IRI Political Party Scorecard evaluation tool, there has been a modest increase in the capacity of the SPLM. Events of the past six months, not yet measured by the scorecard, indicate that further improvement is taking place. The SPLM held a national convention, which its delegates felt was highly positive. They approved a comprehensive party constitution that meets democratic norms. More importantly, the convention followed the democratic procedures outlined in the party constitution. As a result, the delegates' stated to both the Evaluation Team and the media that they are happy with the outcomes and believe the convention obtained those outcomes democratically. The SPLM also concluded a highly successful membership drive, which they state increased membership by 1.0 million persons. The SPLM in interviews with the Evaluation Team credits IRI training and mentoring as having been very helpful in meeting that target. IRI has also worked with the SPLM Southern Sector Secretariat to facilitate each department in the secretariat in producing work plans and budgets.

IRI has been significantly less successful in working with the small parties. That seems largely because of the lack of commitment on the part of those parties to becoming competitive, to their limited popular appeal compared to the SPLM, and to their lack of resources that IRI cannot address.

IRI has made an impact on the SPLM corresponding to the amount of resources it actually used. Per above, the assessment of the Evaluation Team, at this time in southern Sudan, the creation of framework, including constitutions, work plans, and budgets, and the procedures to implement the framework represent impact. That they are in place is an impact. That they meet reasonable standards for democratic procedures is an impact. That the SPLM, according to its leaders and members, is following these procedures, is an impact. The measurement of impact, either qualitative or quantitative, is at this stage of southern Sudan's state of political development primarily a matter of qualitative evaluation. Based on evidence available to the Evaluation Team, it is the assessment of the Evaluation Team that the creation of basic documents that begin to form a framework for democratic governance, such as constitutions, work plans, and budgets, and the procedures to implement those documents do represent impact. The measurement of level of impact will take several years and the sustained use of the basic political tools to determine. The SPLM convention just approved the constitution. The work plans and budgets have been in place for only several months. If the SPLM consistently follows the procedures in its constitution through the next several years, those actions will represent a substantial qualitative impact. If the SPLM departments reasonably follow their work plans and budgets, and if in so doing SPLM operations improve, those actions will represent substantial increase in capacity and impact.

Supporting Findings - Political Parties

1. Level of effort: The IRI intensity of effort is appropriate to the current capacity of the SPLM Southern Sector management to apply that training to their work. Based on discussions with IRI and SPLM leaders, it appears to the Evaluation Team that there is substantial competition for the time of the Southern Sector leadership. A further constraint is competing priorities for management time in which to use the skills learned during training. On this basis, we believe the IRI intensity of effort is appropriate to the current capacity of the SPLM Southern Sector leadership. Based on field observations we believe that IRI can do more at the state level.

Concerning the smaller parties, typically, in states in which the voters see one organization, for example the ANC in South Africa, as responsible for liberation, that organization, as a political party, enjoys an enormous electoral advantage. According to the NDI focus groups, such appears to be the case in southern Sudan: the SPLM is favored; the smaller parties, marginalized. To some degree, this may account for the seeming demoralization of the smaller parties and their lack of commitment to becoming competitive. Based on contacts with both small party and SPLM leaders, the Evaluation Team found the SPLM leaders far more enthusiastic, committed, and realistic about the difficulties of electoral competition than the smaller parties. The small parties do not seem to be reaching out to seek new members, or to reach potential voters. They report they anticipate losing seats in the legislative assembly. At least in conversations with the Evaluation Team, the small parties seem to be basing their electoral strategy on the hope that "the SPLM will give us a few seats". The lack of resources available to the smaller parties, in particular a lack of financing, compounds these impediments. IRI is not able to offer the resource that the small parties most need: material support. What IRI can offer is training and advice. Regrettably, and in great contrast to the SPLM, the small parties are lackadaisical in their responsiveness to IRI's offer of training. One manifestation of this is the difficulty in arranging training. This adds up to a limited ability for IRI to assist the small parties in increasing their capacities.

2. Work plan: The current IRI work plan is overly ambitious for current conditions in southern Sudan and will require a significant increase in IRI staff for successful implementation. Currently IRI has on station four officers. The goals for the present proposed work plan include:

- Work closely with the SPLM Southern Sector secretariat.
- Conduct a joint USAID/IRI assessment of the non-SPLM parties.
- Conduct an assessment of the Three Areas to ascertain political party development.
- Evaluate SPLM state level organizational systems.
- Continue the policy writing and analysis training consultations.
- Continue party round tables
- Build the SPLM Southern Sector Secretariat capacity by providing training in planning, budgeting, and report writing. Build internal party training structures. Increase the capacity of the SPLM Southern Sector Research and Planning Department.
At the state-level, with the SPLM, conduct twenty trainings, two per month that focus on office management, fundraising, accounting, and membership recruitment.
- Hold 10 two-day party building seminars. Hold 10 follow up trainings.
- Hold 16, two-day capacity building seminars. These trainings will cover membership recruitment & mobilization, office organization, planning, report writing, internal/external communications, fund raising, and accounting.
- Train five SSLA committees (Public Accounts, Legislation & Legal Affairs, Land-Natural Resources-Environment, Energy-Industry—Mining, and Information/Culture) members and staff with an emphasis on bill drafting and oversight.
- Hold, primarily for the SPLM, three campaign schools of three weeks each in separate locations in southern Sudan.

The total number of projected trainees in all areas is 1455. That target seems ambitious given the conditions (the year is half-over and rainy season has started), the plan is not yet approved, and there are only four persons available to implement it. The chief obstacles that the Evaluation Team sees are logistical and organizational. Overcoming those obstacles is very labor-intensive work.

3. Logistics: IRI faces substantial logistical challenges in providing training. Road transport is slow and in the rainy season often impossible. Air transportation is limited and expensive. Telephone and other forms of electronic communication are improving but still occasionally unreliable. There are limited facilities for training in southern Sudan; in many Southern Sector states, IRI reports there are no facilities at all. That USAID/Sudan routinely holds its off-site events in Kenya illustrates this limitation. Equally daunting are the difficulties in recruiting adequate numbers of appropriate trainees. The education system of southern Sudan produces only limited numbers of persons with professional level skills. Competition for these persons is keen.

4. Increased SPLM capacity: The SPLM has significantly increased its capacity as it has moved from being a military movement to becoming a democratic political party, as evidenced by:

- IRI facilitated the drafting of work plans and budgets for all Southern Sector SPLM departments. The Deputy Secretary General of the SPLM and her senior staff informed the Evaluation Team that each department now has a detailed work plan and budget. She reported that all Departments are following both the budgets and work plans. Given that this is a recent exercise, it is too soon to observe any impact on performance. The responsible IRI/RPO has seen the work plans but was

not allowed to keep a copy, which the SPLM considers classified, so that copies were not available to the Evaluation Team.

- IRI provided training in techniques of democratic funding-raising. According to the Deputy Secretary General, use of these techniques is one of the reasons for the increase in contributions to the SPLM. The SPLM keeps all fund raising data confidential so actual data is unavailable; again, such confidentiality is not unusual in many nations. A number of key informants at both the Southern Sector and state levels mentioned the usefulness of the training.
- IRI facilitated the creation of the SPLM Women's League and Youth League constitutions and outreach/ membership development training. In Western Bahr El Ghazal, leaders of both the Women's and Youth Leagues stated the training had been useful in recruiting new members. The Women's League reported on several occasions other donors have used the Women's League as a vehicle to implement outreach programs in health and education to the women of Western Bahr El Ghazal. The Women's League leaders stated the IRI training, especially in planning, was useful in implementing these programs.
- IRI hosted a southern Sudan State leaders' conference. This was the first such conference, and for many delegates, the first time they had met their counterparts from other Southern states. The major impact to date appears to be stimulation of dialogue between the state leaders, which the Evaluation Team observed during the SPLM national convention.
- IRI encouraged and assisted state branches to organize and implement outreach programs. In Western Bahr El Ghazal, the Evaluation Team observed that this is happening. Encouragingly, other donors are using the SPLM Women's League as an outreach platform for women's development programs.
- IRI facilitated the drafting of the SPLM constitution and manifesto approved by the May 2008 SPLM National Convention. The Evaluation Team reviewed a copy of the new SPLM constitution and found the document is comprehensive in its coverage and seems to reflect considerable thought as to how to blend the developing political culture of Sudan with best constitutional practices from around the world. The document spells out the duties of each major office. Checks and balances are in place. Critically, SPLM electoral practices conform to democratic norms. We note that, according to the delegates to the convention, the convention followed these practices. In a significant number of cases, this resulted in the election of persons not supported by the senior SPLM leadership. Encouragingly in a nation that ranks near the bottom in most corruption indexes, the constitution calls for annual independent audits. Clearly not all of this is attributable to the work of IRI, but the fact that IRI worked actively with the SPLM on the process, and the process produced a positive result is evidence of a positive impact.

IRI also provided research in support of key policy proposals presented in the SPLM platform for convention approval. This included advice on addressing the referendum issue due for a vote in 2011, which is the single biggest southern Sudan political issue. Because of the sensitivity of these high level issues, and the need for the documents to be clearly seen as southern Sudanese, during key informant interviews we did not enquire as to the specifics of the advice, nor did the SPLM leadership volunteer such information, other than to state IRI's inputs were very valuable.

- IRI provided technical input to the SPLM National Convention organizing committee on budgeting and suggested potentially less expensive options for addressing key needs of the

Convention. According to the Deputy Secretary General, the SPLM adopted many of these suggestions and did reduce expenditures.

- IRI provided advice regarding internal party rules, in particular by providing examples of effective practices from democratic parties in other nations. All delegates that the Evaluation Team interviewed stated they believe the rules adopted for the SPLM national convention followed democratic norms. The incident cited by many was the election of a Secretary General in which a non-SPLM invited guest presented himself as a candidate. The convention as a whole seemed to view this action as an unwelcome intervention. The current Secretary General, who was running for reelection, came down off the speaker's platform, stood by the invitee, and stated all delegates to the convention, including invitees, were welcome to stand for election. In countries with established democratic traditions and practices, many observers would regard the actions of the SPLM Secretary General as unimportant grandstanding. Within the context of Sudan, where the government or its agents have historically repressed even gadfly confrontations with power, the delegates regarded it as a significant step forward.
- The convention democratically elected the SPLM leadership at all levels of the SPLM. Media accounts and random conversations with SPLM National Convention delegates confirm that the delegates considered the elections democratic.
- The May 2008 SPLM National Convention was successfully completed. The SPLM Convention was the most important political event in southern Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Media and delegates confirmed the success of the Convention, primarily because it actually took place, it adopted a democratic constitution, and the democratic election of officers occurred. In addition to its facilitation of the drafting of the basic documents and planning, IRI trained 50 protocol officers to facilitate the Convention. This training addressed the roles of the protocol officers, the establishment of orders of procedure, establishment of seating protocols, and the design of operational protocols. All of which appeared to work effectively during the convention. The Evaluation Team observed the protocol officers in action. They performed effectively, including resolving a difficult reservation issue that the protocol training had specifically addressed.
- One million new SPLM members have been recruited since January 2007, partly the result of strategic planning mentoring from IRI. SPLM operational leaders stated to the Evaluation Team that the training was very helpful on goal setting, strategic planning, logistics, fundraising, and management in preparing for and conducting the membership mobilization campaign. In addition, several interviewees cited the post training follow up and mentoring as being helpful. IRI was able to focus management attention on the logistics necessary to have the membership cards available and to facilitate the establishment of adequate record keeping procedures so that SPLM accurately recorded the name and location of each individual. In particular, key informants cited IRI's identification of the availability of sufficient membership cards as a major obstacle to success. The campaign was a major success for the SPLM as approximately one million southern Sudanese signed on as SPLM members at a cost of SP 15 per member (US\$ 7.50). The SPLM met the 1.0 million target. The Evaluation Team did not physically see the membership lists, however we note that the state officials we interviewed were all able to quote specific numbers in terms of memberships and those numbers seem to indicate that the SPLM Southern Sector membership fully met its recruitment goals.

5. IRI creditability: A key factor in implementing a successful DG program is ready access to the political leadership. As observed by the Evaluation Team, the political leadership of southern Sudan

welcomes IRI, is open to their advice, and appreciates their assistance. In interviews conducted by the Evaluation Team, the leadership of both the SPLM and SANU consistently expressed gratitude to the assistance of IRI. They were particularly appreciative of the training. The two state Governors we interviewed stated the planning training they received helped them in their jobs. In Wau, the capital of Western Bahr El Ghazal state, we personally observed the benefits of planning, for which the Governor partly credited IRI training, in terms of cleaner streets and better roads. Significantly, the Governors expressed the hope that IRI could greatly expand its training at the state level.

At the Southern Sector level, leaders stated they are using the planning training and that IRI's advice was useful in preparing basic documents such as the SPLM constitution and manifesto. We had the opportunity to directly observe the performance of the Resident Program Officers at the SPLM national convention and were impressed that the SPLM protocol officers sought out the RPOs for advice. The RPOs provided assistance to the convention organizers in activities as varied as credential verification to obtaining medical assistance to delegates who fainted in the heat of the unairconditioned auditorium. Encouragingly, SSLA Speaker James Igga thanked IRI for its excellent training courses in his May 28, 2008 speech opening the first session of the SSLA for the year 2008. That the Speaker specifically mentioned the usefulness of the training courses, rather than a general all purposes thank you, was further verification of the usefulness of the trainings. Given the sensitivity of policy issues such as drafting of a new constitution, one would not anticipate mention of that type of assistance.

6. Training: The primary request of the SPLM for assistance is in training. As noted above the SPLM is pleased with the training and other support provided by IRI and believes IRI responds to their needs. The smaller parties want material support that IRI statutorily cannot provide. The SPLM wants more training; specifically the SPLM wants lower level (boma, payam, county and state) training in all ten states in southern Sudan. The SPLM leadership in Western Bahr El Ghazal wants more training for the Women's League and the Youth League in its state.

In terms of gaps, the major concern of most party officials interviewed by the Evaluation Team is that the training is in some cases too short. Party officials also suggest that IRI should extend the training to all of the states, and that there are needs to repeat training frequently to ensure that the training reaches more of those who can profit from it. Reaching the levels in the states desired by the SPLM leadership will require a training-of-trainers approach, probably in close coordination with other donors to ensure wide coverage. No past trainees interviewed have mentioned changing training subjects. Those who anticipate being candidates for election in 2009 have indicated that they would like candidate training.

Without exception, everyone interviewed by the Evaluation Team who has received training from IRI, either political party or legislative, stated that the training is useful and that they have been able to apply the training in their work. Examples of the impact of training on specific jobs are preparation of constitutions for the SPLM, drafting of budgets and strategic plans for the SPLM, and drafting of procedures for the SPLM. The Evaluation Team did not have the opportunity to see any of the budgets and work plans; it is not unusual for political parties to hold their planning documents confidential. The RPO in charge of that training did see the documents (although she was not able to retain copies) and assessed the plans and budget as adequate working documents, a view strongly supported by the senior SPLM leadership. The RPO stated she was encouraged that a number of the SPLM officers doing the actual drafting continue to consult her during the implementation phase.

The SPLM state level leadership reported that the organizational training, especially in planning, was very helpful in organizing the 2008 membership drive. Because of the planning training, the SPLM, with the specific assistance of IRI, identified the greatest potential impediment to reaching its quantitative goals, namely, the availability of adequate amounts of membership cards. Prior to the planning training, it is unlikely that the SPLM would have either identified this constraint or addressed it and, according to the

SPLM organizers, there would have been a significant short fall. Instead, the constraint was addressed and there were adequate amounts of membership cards available.

Beyond the increase in technical and managerial skills, a number of trainees stated that the more philosophical training in democratic practices has greatly enhanced their understanding of the roles of political parties, the legislative branch, and civil society in a democracy. While it is impossible to measure the immediate impact of such enhanced understanding, that it seems to be occurring is vital to the development of democratic institutions in southern Sudan. The Evaluation Team was encouraged that trainees we interviewed remembered the substance of the training 12 to 24 months after receiving the training. For example, in Western Bahr El Ghazal the SPLM leadership stated the training has been helpful in conducting the membership mobilization campaign and in fund raising. They also stated that the theoretical training was responsible for their recognizing that, in a democracy, other political parties are not enemies but competitors and that imposes limitations on electoral tactics.

IRI has demonstrated flexibility in overcoming the formidable challenges of working in southern Sudan. For example, in 2006, IRI responded to a request from the SPLM, to provide specialized training to the 60 senior members of the SPLM Secretariat that was supporting the SPLM Interim National Committee. The training emphasized various aspects of strategic planning (mission statements, SWOT analysis, goals and objectives and record keeping). This type of training was an important part of the political transformation process of the SPLM.

IRI responded to requests for state level training by providing state level party training during March and April 2007 to three states: Central Equatoria, Lakes and Western Bahr El-Ghazal. This training focused on the practical aspects of party organization, including creation of job descriptions, internal and external communications, and included discussion of issue-based vs. ideological-based politics. It also included a basic orientation to the roles of multiple parties in functioning constitutional democracies. Field observations in Western Bahr El-Ghazal and key informant interviews with SPLM members from all three states credit the IRI training with significantly increasing the capacity of the SPLM in those states.

The Evaluation Team finds it particularly noteworthy that several state level party officials testified that the “democratic philosophy training” that IRI provides was exceptionally useful in furthering their transformation from militant military movement to committed political democracy. While the impression of the Evaluation Team, based on key informant interviews, is that the understanding of democratic processes is modest and may not survive the first truly competitive electoral challenge, that SPLM leaders express the need for democracy and some understanding of its intellectual underpinnings is encouraging and could ultimately result in an important impact. (See key informant Interview Notes – Exhibit 2 for specific statements crediting IRI training for its role in increasing the capacity of their respective political parties and legislative bodies).

IRI has been less successful with the smaller parties, at both the state and Southern Sector level, primarily because the needs of the smaller parties are significantly greater than the resources available to IRI, and the lack of responsiveness on the part of the smaller parties.

7. IRI responsiveness: IRI has responded to the basic needs of the SPLM with training in political and managerial basics. Impact has been proportional to the number of personnel available to IRI and the basic level of southern Sudan politics.

8. Reporting: While there has been significant improvement in the quality of the IRI semi – annual reports over the past 12 to 18 months, those reports still do not fully or accurately reflect the extent to which IRI has (or has not) accomplished its goals as set out in the work plans. Nor do the reports convey the difficulties faced by IRI, the steps taken to overcome those difficulties, nor the impact of IRI’s

successes. To more fully and accurately report its activities, the Evaluation Team suggests that IRI change to quarterly reports and that IRI Sudan draft those reports in the field.

9. The IRI capacity measurement tool: (Political Party Scorecard) shows modest improvement in capacity on the part of SPLM. IRI has completed two assessments of the capacity of the SPLM; one in October 2006; the second in April 2007. The assessment uses a three-point scale in answering seven questions concerning the SPLM. The questions include: 1) Party constitution and by-laws are drafted and approved in a participatory manner, 2) Rules provide for democratic processes within the party, 3) Leaders are elected and removed within the party, 4) Branches/chapters of the party are established and developed, 5) Measures are taken to recruit and retain active party members, 6) Broad - based membership is fostered that is representative of gender, ethnicity, religion and region, and 7) Party develops and utilizes a functional external communications plan. The 2006 score was 9 of 21, the 2007 score of 10 of 21. Five assembly members representing three political parties [the Southern Sudan Defense Forces/Democratic Forum (SSDF); the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); and the Sudan African National Union (SANU)] completed questionnaires.

B. Strengthening Party Caucuses and Specialized Committees in the Legislature to Promote Good Governance

Conclusions

That southern Sudan has established a parliament that meets periodically, has established procedures, and a committee system in progress - of a sort. That the SSLA meets irregularly and does not function very actively when in session demonstrates that progress in this area is limited. Major progress is not likely until after the 2009 elections that will provide southern Sudan with its first democratically elected parliament.

Supporting Findings

The democratic political development of southern Sudan is very basic, nowhere more so than in the Southern Sudanese Legislative Assembly (SSLA). There is little tradition of either policymaking or legislative oversight in southern Sudan. The SPLM, which provides 70% of the members of the SSLA, is in the process of transforming itself into a democratic party from a revolutionary army. The small parties in many cases have existed for longer but tend to be very small, have little popular support and less organizational strength. Most of the politically active personalities in the SSLA, either from the SPLM or small parties, have multiple positions so that it is difficult to arrange training - either in groups or in one-on-one follow-up. For example, according to the IRI staff, during 2008 to date several planned training programs have been cancelled due to SPLM (and minor party) time constraints.

Level of effort. The IRI intensity of effort towards legislative strengthening is appropriate to the current receptiveness of the SSLA. The SSLA is a new legislative body in a nation and region with little experience having an active democratic parliament as a co - equal branch of government. The SSLA is an appointed body and many members apparently lack a direct connection to their constituencies. Most of the members of the SSLA have limited political body experience and no experience at all being members of parliament. Seventy percent of the members are from the SPLM. As a result, they are very much inclined to take the direction from the GOSS in terms of both policymaking and oversight. Chronic absenteeism, shifting committee assignments, and near constant appointment and removal of SSLA members result in a backlog of bills and slow passage of legislation. Moving beyond being a subordinate body will take time and probably several elections.

Progress. Within specific areas, there has been a limited increase in the capacity of the SSLA reflected in the following progress.

- The SSLA established five oversight mechanisms including: 1) confirmation of ministerial appointment, 2) approving ministerial budgets, 3) auditing government accounts, 4) approving ministerial budgets, and 5) removing from office corrupt or non-performing agents. In general, the SSLA has been slow to use the oversight mechanisms. According to IRI, at the end of the 2007 session the SSLA was more proactive in reviewing ministerial budgets.
- IRI training and mentoring of five key SSLA committee chairpersons and members (see Annex VI for a listing of the trainings) resulted in the improved performance of those committees. In particular, the Public Accounts Committee became significantly more active. The major result of this increased activity was an investigation of the GOSS Auditor General resulting in a vote of no confidence and his ultimate removal from the position.
- The SSLA established a sound set of rules (The Conduct of Business Regulations) covering procedures and conduct although compliance is often lax. The procedures also provide internal oversight mechanisms.
- The southern Sudanese Legislative Assembly Women's Forum (SSLAWF), with facilitation by IRI, adopted a strategic plan and is in the process of implementing it. The plan calls for the spread of women's caucuses to the state assemblies. The SSLAWF is organizing delegations of three assembly members to travel to each of the ten state legislatures over the next three to six months to facilitate the creation of state assembly women's forums.

Training. IRI has provided SSLA staff members with significant amounts of in-service training. One result of the training is greater initiative on the part of the staffers. For example, IRI training for SSLA staff members resulted in the publication of the initial edition of *August House* planned as a quarterly publication covering the activities of the SSLA. The February 2008 introductory issue had a press run of 750 copies, distributed mainly within government. The second issue will focus on anti – corruption and is to have a wider distribution. After reading the initial issue, the Evaluation Team believes that *August House* compares favorably in both style and content with the better East African parliamentary publications. IRI is facilitating the creation of *August House* by financing the initial two issues and by providing training and mentoring to the magazine staff. *August House* is a high risk but relatively low cost investment. While it may not work, it is encouraging evidence of initiative on the part of both IRI and SSLA staff. After the initial two issues, it is to be self-financing. If successful, it should be self-financing through advertisements and should provide a document that is widely read in the political community. Often journals of this type have only a limited readership. We believe that *August House* can achieve a significant readership within the political community because it offers a means of dialogue within the political community, focuses on issues of concern to parliament and can present parliament as a vital part of government. It also offers means for MPs to present themselves to their constituents, much as the Congressional Record does in the United States. Few persons outside of the US Congress and media actually read the Congressional Record, but Representatives and Senators alike often cite their being mentioned in the Congress Record to their constituents as evidence of their effectiveness. We do not anticipate a wide popular readership throughout southern Sudan. We note that the SSLA staff members responsible for *August House* are reaching out to the states. In that *August House* begins to voice the concerns of southern Sudanese voters, it presents a means for constituents to put pressure on the MPs to perform their legislative and constituent representation functions.

Several key informants noted that, following the national elections scheduled in 2009, there is likely to be a significant turnover in SSLA members and this will require repeating training already given to currently sitting MPs, for the benefit of the new MPs.

Capacity Assessment Tool. IRI has developed a Legislative Scorecard to use as an assessment tool for measuring the capacity of legislatures (Legislative Scorecard³) and applied it to the SSLA for use as a base line for analysis. The first use of the tool in April 2007 covering 2006 yielded a baseline score of 11 out of 18. A second application of the scorecard in April 2008 covering 2007 yielded a baseline score of 9 out of 18. The decline in scores seems primarily attributable to different raters not to a decline in capacity. The modest scores indicate the SSLA members doing the rating were making a good faith effort to accurately evaluate the SSLA.

IRI randomly selected five members of the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) to complete the questionnaires. Included in the random selection were three committee chairpersons. Captured are views of legislators representing three out of the seven parties in the SSLA: the Southern Sudan Defense Forces/Democratic Forum (SSDF); the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM); and the Sudan African National Union (SANU). Members representing other parties either did not respond or were not available for questioning. While the vast majority of legislators are male, IRI sought to ensure that women's voices were included; two of the seven respondents were female. Limited availability of SSLA members due to lengthy recesses and travel outside of Juba reduced the number of completed questionnaires. A three point rating scale is used. Six questions focus on the degree to which the committee system of the GOSS is fully functioning. Specific questions include:

- 1) Representative composition of committee membership (i.e. reflecting diversity among legislators, particularly politically as well as ethnicity, gender, region);
- 2) Codification of committee procedures;
- 3) Frequency of committee hearings;
- 4) Committees' review of legislation;
- 5) Committees' conduct of legislative oversight of the executive branch;
- 6) Committees' engagement of the public as they consider committee matters.

C. Monitoring and Evaluation System

Conclusions

The Evaluation Team is of the view that the IRI – Juba M&E system for monitoring and managing is adequate for daily management purposes but is not robust and needs to be up-graded. Without doubt, IRI-Juba management is attentive to program performance, but the Evaluation Team could detect no systematic monitoring and management tools that IRI uses to monitor, measure and assess overall program and individual activity performance and outcomes. The current modus operandi appears to be reasonably successful on an ad hoc basis because of the high-quality personnel now at IRI-Sudan and because southern Sudan's needs are extensive and basic. For the higher levels of performance that will be necessary for IRI to have a significant impact on the 2009 election and 2011 referendum, IRI needs to put into place a more systemized and effective monitoring and management systems.

Supporting Findings

IRI monitoring/evaluation data collection and recording suffered start up problems in the project's initial two years, with the result that the Evaluation Team was unable to access documentation regarding activities prior to March 2006 (the program having commenced in September 2004). To a degree, IRI's informal data collection process is understandable within the context of the impediments to program implementation. There were, and still are, significant security concerns in southern Sudan. While IRI

³ IRI, Sudan Legislative Evaluation Summary Report, April 30, 2008) – Legislative Assembly Scorecard.

was establishing itself in southern Sudan the emphasis was on getting things up and running, not on data collection on any consistent basis.

IRI seems to have collected at least some of this data, which the officers responsible for implementing the specific activity filed electronically. Regrettably, when those officers departed, they appear to have taken that data with them. That for much of the time the IRI officers worked out of Nairobi increased the problem. IRI told the Evaluation Team that for security reasons, most files from this period are in Nairobi. It is possible that much of the missing data is available in Nairobi, but the Evaluation Team did not have access to it. We did review all of the weekly reports submitted by IRI/Juba to IRI /Washington. These reports mainly cover immediate activities and occasionally provide interesting stories about activities. They shed little light on actual in-puts, outputs, or potential impacts. Nor did these reports ever look back at past activities and assess impact.

The semi - annual reports are more informative and have improved over time. Still too often, those reports enthusiastically discuss activities proposed for the next reporting period and when the next report appears, the proposed activity has disappeared. Further, there is little discussion of impact in the semi – annual reports. A more disciplined approach that clearly outlines problems and progress would yield better results.

IRI/Juba has since March 2006, recorded substantial amounts of data relating to its training activities. Included in this data are training program invitation lists, attendance lists, agendas, presenters' notes, power point presentations, pre and post-training exams, trainee evaluations, training reports. The Evaluation Team notes, however, that there is a lack of consistency regarding training program data collection and storage. Data for some programs, particularly those involving political parties, is reasonably complete; for other programs, data is limited. There appears to be little uniformity in the form or content of the data. Individual trainers have employed their own standards and styles. The Evaluation Team did not find evidence of any standard reporting or data collection protocols. Data storage appeared to the Evaluation Team to be highly individualized and lacking in organization. IRI/Juba was able, with some effort, to provide the Evaluation Team with substantial data concerning 2006 – 2008 training activities. It was apparent that this data came from various sources, including the IRI/Nairobi office and computer data recorded and maintained by individual IRI/Juba staff, rather than from any centralized data collection system. Under present data collection circumstances, it is possible that, when the present IRI/Juba staff members depart, access to data concerning their programs will become unavailable.

No financial records (other than budgets for some training programs) were available to the Evaluation Team in Juba. We were able to obtain budget information from IRI/Washington upon our return. It would have been useful for the Evaluation Team to have had access to IRI/Juba operating-cost information as well as individual and collective training program costs. One assumes this information would be even more vital to IRI/Sudan. Notwithstanding the above-described situation, the data provided to the Evaluation Team for the period 2006 – 2008 was ultimately sufficient to indicate that adequate effort and foresight went into the training programs presented during that period. Past trainees interviewed by the Evaluation Team, consistently stated that the training had been excellent and they have been able to apply much of what they learned to their work. However, IRI/Juba has not systematically documented training impact. Evaluation Team comments in this report regarding program impact are derived from trainee interviews and observable accomplishments of the target trainee organizations.

Subject to the comments in the above section regarding inconsistencies in data collection and lack of a systematic data storage system, the Evaluation Team believes that there is currently available sufficient data to enable an evaluation of the program from March 2006 through March 2008. Whether there will be sufficient program performance data available to enable a robust end-of-program impact evaluation depends on future data collection and storage systems and practices. If the present systems, which are

highly dependent on the individual RPOs, and practices are continued, it is problematical as to whether sufficient data would be available for an end-of-program evaluation.

As to an end-of-program evaluation of program impact, IRI obviously needs to measure the impact of its training programs over time to determine if such training is the most appropriate training for the accomplishment of the objectives of the trainee target groups. IRI/Juba has developed tools for measuring the capacity of political parties and legislatures. The political party scorecard indicates that the SPLM is increasing its capacity. The legislative scorecard established a base line against which to compare future improvements by the SSLA. For an effective end-of-program measurement of impact, it will be necessary for IRI/Juba to develop and expand its impact measurement, documentation and recording tools. At this point, evidence of impact is, to a substantial degree, anecdotal. As to the SSLA, emphasis should be on assessing the effectiveness of the five key legislative committees on which IRI is concentrating (e.g., bills drafted, hearings held, bills introduced, laws enacted).

VI. STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Improve reporting.* It is apparent to the Evaluation Team that IRI is doing a better job and achieving greater impact than is reflected in its semi – annual reports. Too often, activities mentioned in one report as planned for the next period disappear without a mention in the next semi-annual report. This lack of reporting continuity creates an impression of insufficient concern by IRI. Contrastingly, the Evaluation Team has a highly positive impression of the current IRI-Juba team. Open and candid reporting of the difficulties encountered would serve IRI far better than ignoring those challenges in their reports. Any reader of those reports, realistically familiar with the difficulties of working in southern Sudan, should recognize that some activities will inevitably be postponed, or even cancelled, because of changing circumstances. Thus, candor is an imperative for effective management and reporting.

The Evaluation Team notes an improvement in reporting since September 2006. This improvement needs to continue. The Evaluation Team recommends quarterly reports by IRI/Juba. Southern Sudan is a very dynamic environment, both positively and negatively, where events change rapidly. Waiting six months to report is too slow, both for effective management and for timely and accurate reporting. IRI/Juba should write the initial draft of such reports, involving the entire IRI/Juba team, rather than IR/Washington as at present and, optimally, that draft would go directly to USAID/Sudan. There are several reasons for this. One, the field has (or should have) the data and is in the best position to interpret it. Second, it is a useful management exercise for the entire IRI/Sudan team. Third, it places responsibility where it should be --- with the field team. All members of the core IRI/Juba team should participate in the drafting of the reports and should receive a copy of the final report. We are surprised that this is not now the case.

2. *Stay healthy.* Sudan is a very unhealthy environment. Almost every American staff member of IRI/Juba has suffered an illness that kept him/her out of work for two or more weeks. Determining what it takes to stay healthy in southern Sudan and sticking to the appropriate protocols is essential to project success. This level of illness seems to afflict most of USAID's partners.
3. *Improve planning.* While the Evaluation Team notes, based on its review of training documentation, that the quality of IRI-Juba planning appears adequate, it is important that accurate estimates be made as to the time and resources necessary to fully implement activities.
4. *Change recruiting practices.* Recruitment of persons with hands-on experience in US elective politics is certainly desirable, but perhaps not essential. IRI should consider persons with experience

in other areas of the political process. The ability to work in the challenging environment of southern Sudan is equally important. IRI should cast its net wide enough to locate such individuals.

5. *Expand the modes of technical assistance.* Short-term training courses should not be the exclusive mode of assistance. More direct on-the-job mentoring contacts are recommended. IRI is now doing some of this with limited staff. With a larger staff, IRI should expand this approach. Training of southern Sudanese trainers should be a priority in order to reach the grass roots level. So too is exploring various methods of electronic knowledge transfer such as CDs.
6. *Evaluate past trainings to increase the effectiveness with which new MPs (following the 2009 Election s) and staff are trained.* IRI should also make provision for up-grading of the skills of previous trainees through more advanced training. In order to reinforce the limited knowledge of, and commitment to democratic practices, virtually every training presented by IRI should have a unit dedicated to the theory and practice of democratic government.
7. *Concentrate programming on the SPLM.* As the SPLM has the greatest level of commitment and in the near term will determine the success or failure of the transformation to democracy, IRI's major efforts should focus on that party.
8. *Shift programming emphasis to preparing for the elections.* Coordinate the content of the basic political training with other donors engaged in similar activities. If southern Sudan is to successfully transform itself into a stable functioning democracy in the mid-term, two events critical to the future of southern Sudan must be addressed -- the 2009 national elections and the 2011 referendum. Insofar as it is possible to identify them, recruit into candidate schools, the candidates that appear to have the greatest potential as both candidates and SSLA members. This as an opportunity to establish rapport and an understanding of what additional training IRI can provide to elected MPs to increasing their effectiveness. Also, use the candidate schools to help parties identify candidates who seem to have potential to be especially effective legislators.
9. *Make Western Bahr El Ghazal a concentration state, with an emphasis on training-of-trainers, focusing on both the Women's & Youth Leagues.* The leadership of this state appears eager to progress and to be reasonably well organized. Western Bahr El Ghazal offers USAID and IRI an excellent opportunity to determine if a training-of-trainers approach can effectively provide basic political training to the grassroots level. Not having visited all ten states in southern Sudan, we cannot definitively declare Western Bahr El Ghazal is the absolute best choice. We confidently assert it is an excellent choice and rather than spend additional resources seeking out the "perfect choice", which we suspect would still be Western Bahr El Ghazal, it would be much better to get on with it. Using the experience gained in Western Bahr El Ghazal, IRI can then extend state level training to other states.
10. *De-emphasize formal training of SSLA members until the election of a new legislature.* Do emphasize mentoring of high potential SSLA members and condition in-service training of SSLA staffers. The SSLA is relatively inactive and many observers anticipate a high turnover in members in the 2009 elections. Work with the high-potential members and key staffers on an individual basis, but reserve the main effort for the new parliament. IRI should continue to focus on the same five core SSLA committees, perhaps making common cause with other donors who are assisting other committees. IRI should provide mentoring for the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee and the Woman's Forum because they are likely to be the most receptive. The focus should remain on those with the greatest interest and demonstrated potential. For example, IRI has identified the current chair of the Public Accounts Committee as one of the most effective chairs in the SSLA because of his commitment to transparency and good governance. As a member of one of southern Sudan's smaller

parties, his popularity offers hope that the SPLM will not completely dominate during upcoming elections. Addressing the needs and weaknesses of high-performing elected officials (particularly as these needs pertain to election preparations) is a good way to increase the impact of IRI programming.

11. *IRI work plan.* Complete the assessments but substantially reduce the training targets in the IRI work plan for 2008 to those in the USAID/Sudan PMP. Focus on capacity building in from three to five key states and the three candidate schools. Do not try to cover the entire Southern Sector with just four persons.
12. *Other southern parties.* *Continue to offer training to the small parties, but as a lesser priority.* At its current staffing levels, IRI/Juba should not put a major effort into pursuing people and parties not committed to being fully competitive in a democratic political process. The small political parties appear to be largely following in the lead of SPLM and are not committed to becoming distinctive parties offering policies and programs competitive to the SPLM. Offering of IRI training to the smaller parties is essential (if only to remain impartial), but making a major effort to engage unreceptive parties is not the best use of IRI/Juba's limited resources. If a full time small party specialist becomes available to do the necessary development work, the recommendation would change.
13. *Monitoring and Evaluation.* To develop a robust monitoring and evaluation system that will enable an accurate assessment of impact, we recommend the following specific steps:
 - Establish a central files system where all basic data and documents are readily accessible.
 - File attendance sheets and post-training participant evaluation sheets.
 - Draft post-training evaluation narratives.
 - Conduct pre and post-testing for participants.
 - Develop trainee follow-up plans.
 - Conduct annual capacity assessment of political parties.
 - Conduct annual capacity assessment of SSLA committees.
 - Develop a standardized reporting format for all training activities.
 - Change to a quarterly reporting system in which IRI/Sudan prepares the initial drafts.
 - Upgrade the quality of IRI periodic reporting by tracking activities from beginning to end. Clearly state the problems IRI is facing and the steps IRI is taking to resolve those issues.
 - Establish more indicative and robust impact indicators, using as a basis the long-term results projected in the IRI 2008 work plan.

VII. LESSONS LEARNED

The Evaluation Team found no lessons learned unique to southern Sudan that one could reliably apply to differing countries or programs. Rather we found that the general principles that apply to sound development management and implementation of DG programs also apply to southern Sudan and the IRI program. To wit:

- 1) DG programs are intrinsically labor and management intensive. In particular, effective DG programs almost inevitably involved sustained personal contact between the implementing partners and the appropriate host country nationals. This is difficult to do with short officer tours, slow replacement of departing officers, and frequent absences due to either illness or out of country travel. The lesson for IRI is that personnel need to spend the majority of their time on station, promptly filling vacancies is essential, and longer tours should be strongly encouraged, perhaps through a tiered financial incentive.
- 2) Illness is a major risk in southern Sudan. The number of illnesses suffered by IRI (and other DG partners) has decreased the effectiveness of implementation.
- 3) Work plan objectives need to be realistically achievable in southern Sudan, taking into account the environmental impediments and available time, resources, and personnel. Security, logistics, and overall inefficiency are major factors. Implementing partners need to factor into all planning these impediments. Logistical personnel become critical to success and should play a larger roll in the IRI team.
- 4) USAID restrictions have prevented all but very minor material aid. IRI says it would be useful to provide material assistance to the SSLA; for example, vehicles to assist members and staffers to reach out to constituents. The Evaluation Team believes the restriction on providing material assistance is a useful one because it prevents the political parties from besieging IRI or other DG partners with requests, most of which they cannot fill. It would be useful for IRI, in conjunction with its DG partners, to seek out donors who can fill such basic material requests.

EXHIBIT I. SCOPE OF WORK - EVALUATION OF USAID SUPPORT TO SUDANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SOUTHERN SUDANESE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (SSLA)

Background

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, borders nine countries, and has a population estimated at 40 million on the eve of the first census to be conducted in decades, now scheduled for April 2008. The current southern Sudan population is estimated at 10-12 million people, with an estimated four million others displaced to northern Sudan and living as refugees outside the country. Southern Sudan has suffered from decades of underdevelopment, war, famine, drought and flood, resulting in the devastation of the South's economic, political and social structures. The southern Sudanese people lack basic health and education services and the infrastructure needed to build a thriving economy and functioning state. Since the mid-1990s, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), and international humanitarian relief agencies became the prime providers of an array of much needed services.

After decades of civil war, parties to Sudan's north-south civil war signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January of 2005. The CPA is comprised of six interlocking agreements related to wealth and power sharing, the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU) that provides southern Sudanese with representation in the national government, a resolution of conflicts in the oil-rich border regions between northern and southern Sudan (known collectively as the "Three Areas"), the creation of a southern Sudanese government and state governments with appointed leadership until elections in 2009, and the establishment of a six-year interim period after which the citizens of southern Sudan will vote on whether to remain a part of unified Sudan or secede to create an independent state. Since the signing of the CPA, and despite the death of former SPLM leader and GNU First Vice President John Garang, the country has taken giant steps toward peace, reconciliation and good governance, although progress has been slower than most had hoped. Garang's successor, Salva Mayardit Kiir, currently serves as the First Vice President of Sudan and President of Southern Sudan.

Southern political parties (SANU, SPLM, SSDL, UDF, UDSF, USAP 1 and USAP 2) have continued to face serious challenges in transforming themselves from armed movements and exiled groups into representative and accountable political organizations, while simultaneously establishing an effective Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS). After the signing of the CPA, southern political party leaders have been faced with the daunting task of creating and running the GOSS and state governments with no previous experience as lawmakers and civilian administrators. The long years of war in the opposition-controlled areas of Sudan had also prevented the emergence of governance institutions required for civil administration, security and delivery of basic services. The lack of such administration had been one of the greatest hindrances in the recovery and rehabilitation of these areas of Sudan. The development of these new political and governing structures will continue to require considerable technical and material assistance from the international community.

USAID/Sudan believes that public support for the CPA can be secured only through legitimate, democratic governance. Failure of the GOSS to establish effective, accountable institutions could easily lead to a resumption of conflict, yet the sheer size of the South and its lack of infrastructure have made it difficult for the leaders of southern Sudan to communicate with constituents. USAID is working with the GOSS to assist the formation of core government institutions and systems and transparent budget and funding mechanisms. Assistance is also provided to prepare for and conduct the upcoming census, support anticorruption reform, and foster dialogue between government and citizen groups. In preparation for the 2009 elections, USAID assists in developing and strengthening political parties, improving

officials' methods for addressing citizen views, increasing participation in conflict mediation and resolution, and promoting a strong, vibrant civil society.

Program Description

USAID's support to Sudanese political parties and the SSLA is implemented through a Cooperative Agreement with the International Republican Institute (IRI), under the terms of a Leader with Associates (LWA) award with the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS), of which IRI is a partner.

As described in the CEPPS Program Description, the IRI program aims to support the implementation of the CPA by strengthening the institutional capacity of southern opposition parties. The assistance is focused on three areas:

1. Political party organizational development;
2. Political party participation in elections; and
3. Strengthening party caucuses through specialized committees in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) that promote good governance.

In implementing the program, IRI is guided by four key principles:

- To work with all political parties represented in the SSLA, with the exception of the National Congress Party (NCP), which USAID and its partners are barred by U.S. law from supporting. Newly formed political parties are to be evaluated for possible assistance as the need arises.
- To integrate attention to diversity into program design, implementation and monitoring. IRI seeks to ensure adequate participation from a cross-section of society, paying attention to such issues as gender, socio-economic status, ethnicity, geography and partisanship.
- To ensure that program activities entail sufficient follow-up with Sudanese partners to strengthen their ability to apply lessons learned and effect meaningful change.
- To consult closely with USAID's other Democracy and Governance implementing partners in order to ensure that IRI's efforts address the needs of Sudan's evolving political climate and build synergies across programs where possible.

The CEPPS/IRI Program Description presents a detailed explanation of the activities associated with these objectives and principles (the document will be provided to the evaluation team by MSI).

USAID/Sudan's Evaluation Agenda for Democracy and Governance

The USAID/Sudan Democracy and Governance (DG) Team has requested this evaluation as one of a series of program reviews and assessments to be conducted during FY 2008 of key USAID-funded programs under the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) Foreign Assistance Objective. USAID support to Sudanese media, civil society, and public administration will likewise be evaluated during the coming months using a variety of contractual task orders and other analytical instruments.

The overall purposes of all these evaluations are:

- To identify evidence of successes, lessons learned, and obstacles to progress in USAID-funded programs;
- To provide recommendations for any program adjustments that may be necessary to increase the effectiveness and improve the implementation of USAID DG activities in Sudan; and
- To advise on the adequacy of currently collected program input, context, and performance data to enable robust end-of-program evaluations.

Purpose and Objectives of this Evaluation

IRI's political party and legislative strengthening activities are taking place within the context of Sudan's ongoing political transition, which is fraught with complexities and challenges. The first phase of IRI's program, as well as most of USAID's overall engagement in Sudan, has focused on supporting the southern Sudanese in developing the capacity to govern their own affairs and implement the terms of the CPA. For political parties, the main challenges have been transforming themselves from former rebel movements and exile groups into civilian political organizations and reducing tensions among the various political forces in southern Sudan. For the SSLA, primary challenges have included establishing a legislative assembly from scratch, with appointed, rather than elected, members, the majority of whom had little or no legislative background and many of whom may not have had the opportunity for formal education during the war years.

The evaluation timing is opportune for several reasons. First, IRI is approximately halfway through the seven-year duration of its Cooperative Agreement, so a mid-term evaluation makes sense now, to ensure that USAID and IRI can capitalize on lessons learned and successes. Second, USAID wants to ensure that the program is clearly achieving results within the management capabilities of USAID and IRI and that the necessary results-oriented management tools are in place going forward with this project. Finally, given the endless series of changes and unique challenges to working in Sudan, USAID and its partners have had to repeatedly adapt as circumstances have changed, calling into question initial assumptions and approaches. As IRI's Sudanese partners are the actors at the heart of these on-going political developments, its program faces unique difficulties. This evaluation can help identify those difficulties and facilitate problem solving which may entail actions by USAID, IRI or both.

Thus, the objectives of this evaluation are:

1. Identify and, if possible, measure the impacts and successes of IRI's program activities to date vis-à-vis the program objectives, namely:
 - a. Building the organizational development of democratic political parties in southern Sudan;
 - b. Improving political party capacity to participate in elections; and
 - c. Increasing the effectiveness of the SSLA through strengthening party caucuses in specialized committees that promote good governance;
2. Assess the sufficiency of current monitoring, program input, and program context data collection to inform a robust end of program evaluation; and,
3. Make recommendations, as needed and within the context of current program funding, to:
 - a. Increase the impact of IRI activities in southern Sudan; and
 - b. Improve the collection of program input, context, and performance data to enable robust life-of-program performance monitoring and end-of-program evaluations.

The evaluation team will ensure that the evaluation is fully compliant with the terms for Project Evaluations contained in the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS) Series 203 and other relevant regulatory requirements, as may be determined by USAID. Additionally, the team will utilize MSI's "SUPPORT Evaluation/Special Study Quality Management Guide." The Guide will be presented to the team members prior to their initial MSI briefing in Washington.

Methodological Approach

The USAID/Sudan DG team is seeking to increase the rigor of its monitoring and evaluation practices through the integration of principles of experimental design, where practical. These principles include adoption of robust before and after comparisons as well as comparison of groups who received assistance

with like groups who did not receive assistance. This approach requires strong data collection and management protocols so that adequate baseline, input, context, and change information is available.

USAID/Sudan seeks a mixed methodological approach for this evaluation. In the first instance, evaluators should compare program baseline and end state information as collected by IRI in the program performance management plan. This information should be analyzed in conjunction with available program input and context data to determine the impact of activities vis-à-vis stated program objectives.

In the second instance and to the degree feasible, evaluators should compare the end state of groups assisted by IRI with those not assisted by IRI.

In the third instance, evaluators should gather additional evidence of change through key informant interviews and other data sources as available.

Issues and Questions to Be Addressed

The Purposes and Objectives section above describes the key issues that the evaluation team should explore in its field work and address in its analysis and recommendations. The questions below correspond to these issues. The organization of the questions is provided to suggest an outline for structuring the evaluation report. The questions should guide the team's analysis, but do not need to be addressed sequentially in the report. With the concurrence of the USAID/Sudan DG Office, the team may decide to add, refine or delete questions, or modify the proposed structure, if they believe it would highlight key findings or otherwise add value to the analysis.

1. IRI Performance to Date

a. Political Party Organizational Development and Elections Preparations

- What have been the key impacts of IRI's assistance to the SPLM?
- What have been the key impacts of IRI's assistance to other parties in southern Sudan?
- How has IRI crafted its program to respond to the variety of needs and priorities identified by party leaders and members?
- To what extent do political parties with which IRI has been working believe that the program has responded to their needs?
- What gaps, if any, do party officials identify in IRI's training program?
- What problems has IRI experienced in implementing its party assistance activities? How can IRI better prepare for similar issues in the future? To what extent could USAID facilitate addressing such issues?
- To the extent observable, has the IRI political party assistance program made efficient use of human and financial resources? Does the program provide sufficient value for the costs associated with it?
- Has assistance been provided at an intensity sufficient for achieving impact, within the absorptive capacity constraints of the SSLA?

b. Strengthening Party Caucuses and Specialized Committees in the Legislature to Promote Good Governance

- What have been the impacts of IRI's assistance to the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA)?
- How has IRI crafted its program to respond to the variety of needs and priorities identified by caucus and committee leaders? How do these needs relate to the objectives of strengthening the capacity of parties and committees to perform their role in governance and executive oversight?
- To what extent do SSLA members and staff with whom IRI has been working believe that the program has responded to their needs?

- What gaps, if any, do SSLA members and staff identify in IRI's training program?
- To the extent that the SSLA, target committees, and/or caucuses have strategic plans for capacity building and/or institutional development, how have IRI activities contributed to achieving the goals outlined in these?
- What challenges has IRI experienced in implementing its legislative assistance activities? How can IRI better prepare for similar issues in the future? To what extent could USAID facilitate addressing such issues?
- To the extent observable, has the IRI assistance to the SSLA made efficient use of human and financial resources? Does the program provide sufficient value for the costs associated with it?
- Has assistance been provided at an intensity sufficient for achieving impact, within the absorptive capacity constraints of the SSLA?

2. Monitoring and Evaluation

- Is appropriate data on program inputs available to enable a robust impact evaluation at the end of the program? If not, what data is not available (e.g., funding levels, program activities/interventions)?
- Is the program performance data currently collected sufficient to enable a robust end-of-program impact evaluation (e.g., before and after capacity measures, data on parliamentary committees receiving assistance and not receiving assistance)?
- Are there gaps in data currently being collected that would need to be filled to enable a robust end-of-program impact evaluation?
- Is the current M&E system sufficient for monitoring and managing program performance?
- Could the M&E system more effectively integrate principles of experimental design to enable more rigorous evaluation? If so, how?

3. Strategic Recommendations

Given the above analysis, what programmatic adjustments should be made to maximize the effectiveness of IRI's work with political parties in Sudan? What changes, if any, to the level and orientation of IRI's human and technical resources will be required to implement the program, as recommended?

- a. What programmatic adjustments should be made to maximize the effectiveness of IRI's work with political parties on their organizational development and election s preparations?
 - SPLM
 - Other southern parties
- b. What programmatic adjustments should be made to maximize the effectiveness of IRI's work with the SSLA?
 - Strategic focus of assistance
 - Target groups, committees, &/or caucuses
 - Illustrative activities
- c. What adjustments should be made to performance monitoring, program input, and program context data collection to enable a robust end of program evaluation?

REQUIRED TASKS AND WORK PLAN

Tasks (All team members unless otherwise noted)	Work Days (6-day weeks)	Timeline for Completion
Initial Preparation Review advance background documents, attend MSI Team Planning Meetings (TPM), make travel preparations, provide feedback on SOW and SUPPORT Project's Evaluation Quality Management Guide, conduct other Washington meetings, and travel days.	7	April-May 2008
In-Country Evaluation Initial briefings, meetings, field visits, and debriefings.	15	April-May
Report Preparation in U.S. Draft report preparation, submit for review, incorporate collective Sudan feedback, complete final report, and submit to USAID DG Team Leader.	4 each and 6 for team leader	Draft due 2 weeks after completion of field work Final due NLT 10 work days after receipt of USAID comments on draft report
Total for each Evaluation Team member	26	
Total for Evaluation Team Leader (2 additional days)	28	

Team Composition, Activities and Timing

Team Composition

The team requirements will be: one evaluation expert (the likely team leader); one political party expert, and one legislative expert.

In addition, the team will be accompanied on all site visits and meetings (to the extent practical) by a locally-hired communications specialist who will produce the following for purposes of USAID monitoring, reporting, and evaluation:

- Tape interviews with key informants (a brief testimony of impressions of the program, if positive);
- GPS coordinates of each site observed, accompanied by a brief description of what it represents;
- Photographs of the area and anything that captures the USAID activity there; and
- Other items relevant to telling the USAID/Sudan assistance story.

Note: The CTO and other USAID staff will be encouraged, when practical, to join the evaluation team. In so far as the CTO or other USAID staff join the team, MSI will be responsible for their arrangements (travel, housing in the field, etc.). Lastly, MSI will be responsible for arranging all meetings for the team, in conjunction with the USAID/Sudan Juba office.

Activities and Timing

The USAID/Sudan Mission requests that the entire team arrive in Juba at the same time (i.e., fragmentation of team member's arrivals is unacceptable) for the initial briefings and discussions with USAID's DG Team Leader and other Mission officers, as well as IRI, GOSS, and political party representatives. Subsequently, the teams will commence field trips and meetings. (Note: The DG Team Leader maintains offices in both Khartoum and Juba and may be in and out of Juba during the course of the evaluation.)

During the initial meetings in Juba, the evaluation team leader will present in writing and orally the team's proposed work plan for the entire period of the team's presence in Sudan as well as thereafter with respect to the submission of the draft and final reports, i.e., draft due two weeks after completion of field work and final due no later than ten work days after receipt of the Mission's final comments on the draft report. The work plan will also include a schedule for periodic USAID meetings/progress reports and possible submissions of specific work products, as determined by the two parties.

While subject to change with the acceptance by both parties, it is envisioned that all three team members will be in Sudan the entire duration of the evaluation's in-country component, i.e., two and a half weeks (six-day work weeks are authorized). Besides travel days, an additional three days are provided for each team member for purposes of the team's initial U.S. preparations and an additional four days for report drafting and finalization. The team leader will be provided a total of six additional days back in the U.S. to ensure the completion and transmission of the final report as well as the closure of any outstanding matters. (See above graphic presentation.)

The team leader will be totally responsible for managing the team members, organizing its work, and ensuring quality control and delivery of the required report as agreed by both parties.

Deliverables

Deliverables will include the out-briefing and supporting documents and the final report.

A detailed written outline and oral de-briefing of the conclusions, supporting findings, and recommendations of the evaluation team will be presented to the USAID/Sudan DG Team Leader prior to the departure of the team. Briefings for other USG and/or Sudanese officials will be provided as determined by USAID.

The final report, in MS Word, will not exceed 40 pages (excluding executive summary and annexes). Single line spacing and 11 point font are acceptable. The report should include:

- I. Executive Summary (not to exceed 10 pages, which can be used as an independent briefing paper)
- II. Introduction
- III. Methodology
- IV. Conclusions and Supporting Findings
 - A. IRI's Performance to Date
 - i Political Party Organizational Development and Election s Preparations
 - ii Strengthening Party Caucuses and Specialized Committees in the Legislature to Promote Good Governance
 - B. Monitoring and Evaluation System
- V. Strategic Recommendations
 - A. Political Party Organizational Development and Election s Preparations
 - B. Strengthening Party Caucuses and Specialized Committees in the Legislature to Promote Good Governance
 - C. Monitoring and Evaluation Recommendations
- VI. Annexes: This section may include, *inter alia*, an annex of data sources utilized, key informants interviewed, and listing Useful Tools and Products that could be repackaged and produced for

wider distribution to other USAID-funded implementing partners in Sudan or USAID-funded political party or legislative programs in other countries.

The draft report shall be due two weeks after the completion of field work. Following receipt of USAID/Sudan comments, the team will address questions and incorporate any requested additions or changes in the draft document. The final report will be submitted 10 work days after the team leader's receipt of USAID's final written comments on the draft report. The Mission will receive ten paper copies of the final report as well as an electronic version.

EXHIBIT 2. LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

- Various IRI Weekly Activity Memos
- Various Quarterly & Semi-Annual Reports
- The Basic Cooperative Agreement Award Document
- Various IRI Sudan Work Plans
- CEPPS/IRI Program Description Dated 9/10/07 for the period 9/16/04 through 12/31/11
- CEPPS/IRI, Southern Sudan Political Development & Legislative Strengthening Program Work Plan for January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2008
- CEPPS/IRI, Budget Report
- IRI budget 2004 - 2008
- IRI, Training Participants (representative sample), September 2006 – April 2007
- South Sudan SSLA Women’s Forum Launch Seminar Agenda for October 25-26, 2007, Juba, Sudan
- IRI, Good Governance PowerPoint presentation. Presented to the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA), Bill Drafting Training, Juba, Sudan November 12, 2007
- IRI, Sudan Political Party Evaluation Summary Report, April 24, 2007 – Political Party Scorecard
- IRI, Sudan Legislative Scorecard April 2007 and April 2008
- SPLM Constitution
- Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly Women’s Forum Constitution and Rules

EXHIBIT 3. LIST OF INFORMANTS & INTERVIEW NOTES

Government of southern Sudan

- Simon Kun, SSRC

SSLA Members

- Honorable Colonel Abany Nathaien Anyi - MP
- Dr. Toby Madut Parek Machar - SANU Caucus leader
- Honorable Gabrel Matar - (SANU), Chairman Land, Natural Resources & Land Committee
- Honorable Esther Ikere Eluzai – MP
- Honorable Sebit W. Abbe – MP, Deputy Chairman Regional & International Corporation (Foreign Affairs)
- Honorable Bongout Ammun Ochech – MP, Chair SSLA Women’s League
- Honorable Martin Tako Moi – MP (USDF)
- Honorable Angelina Nyamoka – MP

SSLA Staff

- Paul Yoare Bonju – Director, Public Relations & Protocol; Director, August House magazine
- Emanuel Levi Hassan – Secretary, Public Accounts Committee

SPLM national leadership and staff

- H.E. Dr. Anne Itto – SPLM Deputy Secretary General for Southern Sector
- Ayuel Monyual Aluou, SPLM Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs and Mobilization
- Gabriel Alaak, SPLM Secretary of Finance
- Morris James Lukudy – SPLM National Convention Protocol Officer; SPLM Youth League member
- Atak Deng Akol, SPLM Secretary of Administration
- Zalson Khor, Director, SPLM Secretariat of Research and Planning
- CDE Mading Deng Kuol, SPLM Secretary of Information and Culture
- Bukulu Edwards, SPLM Deputy Chairman of Western Equatoria State
- Akuoch Ajang Nyanhom, Political Officer, Deputy Secretary General Office
- Henry Wani Rondyang, SPLM Secretary of Research and Planning

SPLM State leadership and staff

- H. Gama – SPLM Secretary, Central Equatoria State
- Paul Hassan Dimo – SPLM Secretary General Western Bhar El—Ghazal State (WBGS)
- Hanafi James Killa – SPLM Director of Accounts, Central Equatoria State
- Kamil Wana Uraj – SPLM State Secretary, WBGS
- James Giir Wol – Former SPLM Secretary of Political Affairs, WBGS
- Mrs. Naima Abbas – SPLM Press Officer, WBGS
- Hassen Jalab – Chairman, Raja County SPLM
- Belo Daniel Suliman – member SPLM Council, WBGS
- Luka Anthony Ubur – Chairman, SPLM Youth League, WBGS
- Peter Anolal Martin – SPLM Youth League, Secretary for Political Organization, WGS

- Meban Fatur Alrhaman, SPLM Youth League, Finance Secretary, WBGS
- Silvio Manyual, member SPLM Youth League, WBGS
- Anthony Robulf Wodelrif, SPLM Youth League, WBGS

Minor Party leadership

- Dr. Beiar Deng – SANU National Secretary General

State Government/ Assembly

- General Mark Nyipuoch Ubong – Governor Western Bhar El---Ghazal State
- LTG Daniel Awet Akol – Governor, Lakes State
- Ishag Elias Ibrahim – Acting Governor; Minister of Local Government & Law Enforcement; Chairman, State SSDF
- Paul Lefano – Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Eastern Equatoria State
- Dr. Ghada James Killa, Chair for Information, Culture & Youth. Central Equatoria State Assembly

Cooperating Partners

- Dr. Shyam K. Bhurtel – UNDP-Juba, Chief, Governance Division
- Monodu Dibba – UNDP-Juba, Program Manager, Support to the States Program
- Anselme Sadiki -- UNDP-Juba, Program Specialist, Support to the States Program
- Susan Stigant, NDI-Juba, Deputy Chief of Mission
- Philip Mutai, Project Officer, Canadian Parliamentary Center

Government of southern Sudan:

Key Informant Interview - Simon Kun, MP, Commissioner of Political Affairs, SPLM

Interviewers: Dara Francis, Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen

We met with the Honorable Simon Kun in his office at approximately 1:00 PM on Monday May 26, 2008. Mr. Kun is a senior level SPLM leader who has worked with IRI since IRI began operations in Sudan in 2004. He has taken several IRI courses and is familiar with the benefits training has had on transforming the SPLA from an army with a political agenda to an emerging democratic political party – the SPLM. In particular, Mr. Kun mentioned the benefits of the theoretical training in providing SPLM cadres with a basic understanding of democratic practices and the need to follow those practices if southern Sudan is to develop into a democracy. His statement “We now know that opposition parties are competitors not enemies” seemed to indicate that at least Mr. Kun understood the point.

Mr. Kun was particularly generous in his praise of Stephanie Blanton, describing her as “very tough.” By which he seemed to mean she is highly competent, energetic and resourceful. Mr. Kun gives IRI high marks for holding trainings throughout southern Sudan, for hiring high quality consultants and showing the SPLM how to turn process into practice.

Mr. Kun believes that south Sudan is now going through a period of democratic refreshment in which a number of new candidates are likely to emerge at all levels of the party. He also noted that the National Liberation Council (NLC) will make final selection of candidates. Mr. Kun is planning on running for a

seat in the SSLA. Mr. Kun believes that if elections take place as scheduled the SPLM will win 80% to 90 % in the south and 20 % to 30% in the north. He is concerned about the slow progress in passing the electoral law, hoping the national assembly in Khartoum will pass the bill by August.

SSLA Members

Key informant interview – Honorable Col. Abany Nathaien Anyi May 12

Col Anyi is an officer in the SPLA and is their representative to the SSLA. The interview was an impromptu one after we were introduced in the halls of parliament. Col. Anyi had attended two IRI trainings, one on parliamentary development, and a second on women. She found both useful. In particular, she has been able to use the knowledge gained at the women’s training to sensitize her fellow Army officers to the needs and rights of women in the military. She would like more training from IRI. In particular she would like training for women NCOs on how to handle their duties in prisons and when acting as police officers.

Notes from Interview with Gabriel Matar, Chairman, Land, Natural Resources & Environment Committee (LNR&E) and Dr. Toby Madut, Member LNR&E Committee; SANU Caucus Leader, South Sudan Legislative Assembly 12 May 2008

SSLA members Matar and Madut are members of SANU. They declared, “SANU is the mother of SPLM.” They stated SANU’s major policy is federalism, which they prefer over independence. Currently there are four SANU members in the SSLA. SANU party has 100,000 members spread throughout the country. The two members stated SANU needs training in new member recruitment, fundraising, and working with media.

In terms of *POLITICAL PARTY ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT & ELECTION S PREPARATION*, they stated that IRI’s timing is good – the training course “came at a time when MPs and party secretaries were much in need of training.” Personally, they participated in the first political party training in May 2007 with 70 other participants. They also stated it is “No problem having other parties in training.” They would like to see state and county party workers receive similar training (88 counties).

In terms of, *STRENGTHENING PARTY CAUCUSES AND SPECIALIZED COMMITTEES IN THE LEGISLATURE TO PROMOTE GOOD GOVERNANCE* both members have participated in IRI training courses on: 1) Role of Parliament, 2) Role of Chair Person – how to manage committees & conduct meetings, and 3) the Legislative Process. Each of these courses was useful. In particular they cited the “The South Africa MP was very useful – re anti-corruption.”

They would like the LNR&E staff to receive training, in particular the Committee Secretary and the Office Manager. LNR&E needs specific training in Land Law, which IRI has scheduled. The committee also needs in legislative bill drafting. It is the hope of the two members that following Land Law and bill drafting training, the Committee will draft and introduce legislation as a private (MP) bill. The Evaluation Team notes that the committee has yet to draft any legislation. Thus, this would seem to be a high priority project for IRI. Not only is land law (including land titling) extremely important, but introduction of this legislation by the Committee would establish a much-needed precedent for Assembly vs. Executive bill drafting and tabling.

Honorable Esther Ikere Eluzai, Secretary of Women's Forum

Honorable Eluzai attended the Women's training in Nairobi. Topics included message development, communications and bill drafting. The last training she attended was in October 2007. The Women's League cannot review and finalize their draft constitution because the SSLA is not in session. IRI is also unable to offer follow-up assistance for the same reason. Eluzai believes that IRI should provide women's training at the state level (for parliamentarians). She says that IRI training has helped her reach out to her constituents.

Honorable Sebit Abbe, SSDF

Honorable Tako rated IRI trainings as excellent, but he complained that the length of individual activities was too short. He also mentioned that it would cost-effective to train outside of Juba (in Nairobi for example). As for important assistance priorities, Abbe mentioned that the SSLA could use a library and more emphasis must be paid to civic education. Abbe also believes that there should be international electoral observers. He has attended a parliamentary training. From the training, he gained knowledge of the CPA. According to Abbe, many politicians are not familiar with the details of the CPA and how it affects their work. There is no government-funded political party financing. All international assistance to southern Sudan is controlled by the GoSS, which is SPLM dominated. He also mentioned that there would be considerable interest in continuing the political party roundtables.

Honorable Bongout Amnum Ochech, Chairman of the SSLA Women's Forum (SPLM)

Honorable Ochech is not familiar with USAID or their activities in Sudan but she has worked with IRI in relation to the SSLA Women's Forum. In all, she has attended three IRI training courses: one in Nairobi and two in Juba. The trainings focused on basic leadership skills to introduce female SSLA members to elected and appointed politics, particularly because most of the participants had never been involved in politics before serving in the legislature. Training topics included strategic planning; the role of women in politics and bill drafting, all of which she has used in her work as chair of the Women's forum. Some state level parliamentarians also attended the trainings.

Honorable Martin Tako Moi, UDSF

Honorable Tako complained that international assistance groups should focus more on elections. In fact, campaign preparations should have begun last year. He also feels that IRI works too closely with the ruling party. Tako is unaware of IRI activities that do not focus on the SPLM. He also agrees with Honorable Eluzai's comment that IRI should work more at the state level.

Honorable Angelina Nyamoka

Honorable Nyamoka echoed many of the sentiments of her two colleagues. She added that IRI is not providing enough training.

SSLA Staff

**Notes from Interview with Paul Yoare Bonju, Director, Public Relations & Protocol; Director of *August House* & Emmanuel Levi Hassan, Public Accounts Committee
12 May 2008**

The interview took place at Mr. Bonyu's office at parliament. Present were Dara Francis, Senator Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen. Also present was Mr. Emmanuel. Levi Hassan. Mr. Hassan is also a parliament staff member.

Mr. Bonju has participated in three IRI trainings: 1) a writer's workshop, 2) an editing workshop, and 3) a communication workshop. He benefitted from all three. In particular, he cited the editing segments of the training as being especially beneficial, noting that this training is a key reason that he was able to put together the initial edition of *August House*. Mr. Bonju stated that IRI is the donor of choice for all communications issues, he observed: "IRI has done a very commendable job;" because of their work "I have made tremendous improvement in my writing." Mr. Bonju also has attended IRI seminars on bill drafting, although he has not been able to use that training directly.

August House is a quarterly that covers the South Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA). It had an initial press run of 750 copies. The official launch of the magazine is delayed until the SSLA Speaker can preside over the launch. Mr. Bonju worked closely with Justin Stigman of IRI in development of the magazine. The second issue of *August House* is to concentrate on anti-corruption issues.

Mr. Bonju is also planning a face book for members of parliament. He sees this as one aspect of an overall outreach program for parliament.

Mr. Bonju would like training on an ongoing basis to continuously upgrade the competence of SSLA members and staff, and to provide basic skill training to new staff. Specific areas of needed training: layout, graphics, interview techniques and headline writing. He would like to expand *August House* coverage to all ten State Assemblies. He would like to have a dedicated reporter. He also stated the greatest need is materials such as recorders, cameras, vehicles and transport to the states. We uttered the standard protests and suggested that Mr. Bonju seek assistance in this domain from another donor.

SPLM National Leadership and Staff

**Notes from Interview with Dr. Anne Itto, SPLM Deputy Secretary General; Gabriel Alaak, SPLM Secretary of Finance; Ayul Aluou SPLM Assistant Secretary for Political Affairs and Mobilization
26 May 2008, 12h00-12h50**

From 1994-1998, Dr. Itto worked on a community-based rehabilitation program that sought to work with peaceful areas within southern Sudan that could perhaps be developed economically. The project was funded by USAID.

For Dr. Itto, the main issue with respect to the southern Sudanese political process is that the electorate must gear up for elections but are completely unfamiliar with how they work. She also believes that the smaller parties lend political support to the SPLM. "They are behind us," she says.

There is currently a debate between the SPLM and NCP over the election law, says Dr. Itto. The SPLM wants a mixed system (part direct suffrage, part proportional). Agreement has not been found regarding the percentages for the proportional voting. There's also a debate about setting aside seats for women.

She said that her experience observing elections in Kenya was the most meaningful experience IRI has given her. She said her colleagues would be more helpful with information about trainings

Gabriel Alaak added there is a need for a lot more civic education activities. Ayuel Aluou mentioned fundraising, strategic planning, referendum preparations and protocol trainings as important contributions that IRI has made. The secretariat has applied these trainings directly to the work of the secretariat. Dr. Itto noted that each department now has a work plan and a budget, which makes the job of managing the secretariat significantly easier.

Key informant interviews – Morris James Lukudy SPLM convention protocol officer and Youth League member.

Dara Francis and Norman L. Olsen met Mr. Lukudy at the New York hotel where he served as a protocol officer for the SPLM national convention. Mr. Lukudy mentioned that he received two trainings from IRI – one as youth league member in conjunction with the women’s forum and the second as a protocol officer. Mr. Lukudy expressed appreciation for both trainings and noted he is particularly benefitting from the protocol training. He stated the practical exercises are proving especially valuable. He noted that one of the exercises was what to do when, arriving at a hotel with a VIP, the hotel claims it does not have a reservation. Mr. Lukudy stated he experienced exactly this problem on several occasions and followed the recommended procedures - seat the VIP comfortably, talk to the manager explaining the problem while requesting a solution be worked out, if it is not worked out, start calling ones colleagues at other locations. Following this practical protocol, Mr. Lukudy was able to resolve the issues satisfactorily..

**Notes from Interview with Atak Deng AKOL,
Director, SPLM Secretariat for Administration
23 May 2008, 12h20-12h40**

Mr. Akol attended a week-long training on good governance in Nov 2007. The activity was useful because it contributes to how he conducts day-to-day activities at SPLM headquarters. More specifically, the training gave participants a better understanding of the need for transparency and accountability in government service.

In total, Mr. Akol has been a part of three IRI training classes. Topics included budgeting, planning, technical writing and CV writing. He hopes that there will be more training for administrative staff, particularly in professional writing.

**Notes from Interview with Zalson Khor,
Director of SPLM Secretariat on Research and Planning
23 May 2008, 12h00-12h10**

Mr. Khor, along with other mid-level SPLM cadres, spent a week learning about how to develop budgets and work plans. The experience was useful because it focused on topics that he uses in his job, especially budgeting and planning. His only critique is that the trainings should take place over a longer period of time (i.e. a month or more).

**Notes from Interview with Mading Deng Kuol,
SPLM Secretary of Information and Culture
23 May 2008, 11h30-11h50**

Prior to the finalization of the CPA, the SPLM had a very different internal structure. Mr. Kuol was involved in the Political Affairs Commission of the organization and participated in six IRI training classes. Though he did not remember exactly when each one occurred (the trainings took place over the last four years), he remembered that issues such as drafting manifestos and constitutions; strategic planning and general party-building was covered during the sessions. During 2004 training in Nairobi Mr. Kuol noted participation from individuals who are now high up in the party (Riak Machar, Wani Igga and the current 1st Minister to the GoNU).

In the future, Mr. Kuol hopes that IRI will focus on capacity building for ministries, junior staff, office managers and protocol officers. Governmental officials also need training on monitoring and evaluation.

**Notes from Interview with Bukulu EDWARDS,
SPLM Deputy Chairperson of Western Equatoria State
23 May 2008, 12h40-13h00**

Mr. Edwards has participated in four IRI training classes [Yei (1), Rumbek (2), Juba (1)]. He couldn't remember dates but the earliest training was in 2004. The first was an intensive course on party management, fundraising, maintenance of party machinery, how parties win, use of SWOT analysis and election s preparations. The trainings were helpful because they provided a basic understanding of how democracies function. The fundraising unit has also been helpful in that aspect of Mr. Edwards work. Future trainings should focus on election preparations and campaigning.

**Notes from Interview with Dr. Henry Wani RONDYANG,
SPLM Secretary of Research and Planning
23 May 2008, 12h45-13h00**

Dr. Rondyang participated in a budget training in Feb 2008. He also participated in a strategic planning session on referendum and popular consultation in April 2008. The budget training helped prepare the convention budget and the strategic planning training helped with the post-convention planning. According to Dr. Rondyang, both training sessions were very helpful in preparing for the convention he thinks the party needs some time to figure out what trainings should take place in the future.

**H.Gama , Secretary, SPLM Central Equatorial
State. August 14**

Interviewed by Dara Francis, Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen
Mr. Gama was recently elected as SPLM Secretary for Central Equatorial State. He received training from IRI as had several members of the SPLM State Secretariat. Mr. Gama stated he is finding the training in planning very useful. Specifically it has been very useful in the membership drive as the State Secretariat was far more effective in bringing together the various elements of the total program including recruitment, issuing of membership cards, and establishing a data base of all SPLM members in the state.

Minor Party Leadership

IRI Party Caucus training for SANU. Thursday May 23, 2008

Dara Francis, Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen observed two sessions of SANU party caucus training conducted by IRI. Approximately 40 persons attended the sessions including Honorable Esther Ikere MP, Honorable Dr. Toby Madut Parek MP and Chairman of SANU, Dr. Beiar Deng, SANU National Secretary General Dr. Ghada James Killa MP, and Honorable Thomas Emilio Batu MP State Assembly Weston Baku El Ghazal State (Wau)

The trainees responded well to the two sessions, for most it was their first training by IRI. One session covered party procedures, a second covered how to get elected and become an effective MP. In discussions with the trainees at both the morning break and lunch, the impression of the Evaluation Team is that the SANU trainees are not as politically sophisticated and prepared, as are potential SPLM candidates. It was very difficult for most of the trainees to explain the SANU platform and or manifesto. Equally most of the SANU trainees could not explain any significant differences between SPLM policies and those proposed by SANU.

Three of the potential woman candidates did have a reasonable idea of campaign strategy. SANU as a whole sees their electoral salvation in an alliance with the SPLM, basically they hope that SPLM will “give” SANU a few seats. A potential opening may be in woman’s empowerment. SANU estimates that approximately 30 % of voters are likely to be women.

Conversation with Dr. Beiar Deng, SANU National Secretary General (from Bor), at lunch during IRI seminar /training May 22, 2006

Deng is a medical doctor in Bor – joined SANU at the time of its formation in 1964.

Dr. Deng expressed his pleasure at the training and said that this was the first time that so many SANU leaders had come together at the same time and place. He had not attended previous IRI training sessions.

How does SANU distinguish itself from SPLM? – Dr. Deng’s answer was very limited (as were several other SANU members at the seminar), to wit, —that “SANU is the historical father of SPLM” – that the SPLM broke off from SANU during the war and has more of a military image than SANU. He described the fate of William Deng who was a SANU party leader at the time of the war who favored dialogue with the north and was assassinated by the SPLA for his “treason.” The implication seemed to be that SANU is now more willing than SPLM to work for unity rather than separation.

Will SANU and SPLM candidates face each other in the 2009 elections?

Yes – But it is possible that SPLM will agree to give some seats to SANU (The Evaluation Team does not see any compelling reasons for the SPLM to do this – unless to maintain the illusion of a competitive multi-party system and thus prevent a political backlash).

SPLM State Leadership and Staff Western Bahr El Ghazal

State Government Officials

1-Mr.Ishag Elias Ibrahim,

Acting Governor and Minister of Local Government- Western Bahr El Ghazal State Wau,
Chairperson/ southern Sudan Democratic Forum- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau.

Tel: +249 919518777.

- 2- Paul Hassen Dimo,
State secretary General- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau,
Tel: +249 122773334.
- 3- Mr. Justin Abo Salah,
Press Secretary for the Governor of Western Bahr El Ghazal State-Wau,
Tel: +249 121065764 or +249 918021692.

State SPLM list

- 4-Mr. Kamil Wana Uraj
State SPLM Secretary- Western Bahr El Ghazal State Wau,
Tel: +249 121535106,
Email; urakuana@yahoo.com.
- 5- Mr. James Giir Wol,
Former Secretary for Political Affairs,
SPLM/ Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau, (attended IRI trainings in Wau and Juba),
Tel: +249 911750312 or +249 126150775 or +256 477184789.
- 6-Mr. Hassen Jalab
Raja county SPLM/ Chairperson, Western Bahr El Ghazal State
Tel: +249 10420819.
- 7- Mrs. Naima Abbas,
Press officer,
Western Bahr El Ghazal State SPLM Libration Council-Wau,
Tel:+249 122351431.
- 8-Mr. Belo Daniel Suliman,
Member of Western Bahr El Ghazal State -SPLM Liberation Council,
Tel: +249 122492919.

State SPLM Youth League list.

- 9-Mr.Luka Anthony Ubur
Western Bahr El Ghazal State - State Youth League chairperson,
Tel: =249 122469240.
- 10- Mr. Anthony Robulf Wodelrif,(attended IRI trainings in Wau and Juba)
Secretary Western Bahr El Ghazal State - SPLM youth league,
Tel: +249 122443317.
- 11-Mr.Mebam Fotur Alrhaman (attended IRI trainings in Wau and juba)
Acting .Finance secretary- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau, State Youth League.
- 12-Mr. Silvio Manyual.
Member Western Bahr El Ghazal State - Youth League
Tel: +249 12147897.
- 13- Mr. Peter Anolal Martin,
Political organization- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau-SPLM Youth League,
Tel: +249 122184857.

Western Bahr El Ghazal Interview Summaries

Participants: Fred Whiting and Norman L. Olsen

The evaluation team interviewed 20 persons in a total of seven meetings. These meetings included: 1) with the acting Governor, 2) with the press secretary, 3) with the SPLM Secretariat, 4) with the SPLM Youth League Secretariat, 5) with the Woman's League Secretariat, 6) with the manager of the Bank of South Sudan, and 7) with the manager of the River Lodge.

Mr. Ishag Elias Ibrahim, Acting Governor & Minister of Local Government- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau, Chairperson/ southern Sudan Democratic Forum- Western Bahr El Ghazal State -Wau was very helpful in setting up meetings. He had little knowledge of IRI or the trainings provided by IRI. It is interesting to note that Mr. Ibrahim regularly services as acting Governor even though he is the leader of one of the smaller opposition parties.

Based on these meetings and personal observation, we can confirm that General Mark Nyipuoch Ubang, Governor of Western Bahr El Ghazal State is correct in his assertion that the roads in Wau are better, the services more reliable, and the sanitation far superior to Juba. The Governor appears to be highly regarded in the business community for articulating a clear set of rules and then insisting that all follow those rules. The improvements are there for all to see. Perhaps his most interesting innovation is involving the entire community in a regular Tuesday morning town clean up.

Most of the members of the SPLM secretariat participated in the IRI political party training in April 2007. Over a year later, they clearly remember what they were taught; specifically, the role/behavior of political parties in a democracy, the need for strategic planning, and the techniques for effective communication. SPLM in Western Bahr El Ghazal State has approximately 290,000 members. Of this number, approximately 100,000 joined during the recent membership mobilization.

The General Secretariat wants more training, specifically candidate training, and training of trainers so that they can take the training to the grass roots level throughout Western Bahr El Ghazal State. They would also like books on politics and are open to the use of distance learning, but clearly, their highest priority is people to people to training.

The Youth League is similarly energized; several had attended IRI youth leadership training in Juba. They found that training very valuable, especially the specific leadership techniques. As with their colleagues at the General Secretariat, the Youth League leadership would like further training, specifically in leadership so that they can move up while serving the public welfare.

The SPLM Women's League has approximately 20,000 members led by an 11-woman leadership council. The Women's League is clearly serving as a platform for general development in Western Bahr El Ghazal State. UNDP has used the league for several trainings designed to improve women's health and welfare. Several of the women had attended IRI training in Juba. Somewhat surprising, their recall was less complete than the men. They are excited about the possibility of running women candidates in the 2009 election with the State Assembly being the main target.

They complained about the lack of financing. In answer to a question about getting use of the SP 15 (\$7.50) membership card fee they said the funds are never accounted for, they do not have access to them, and there is a near total lack of transparency in how the funds are expended. The woman also complained that the men are not supportive of increasing the role of women in the political process. They are enthusiastic about IRI providing specific training to women candidates for the elections and in having training for the Women's League Executive Council.

All three sections of the SPLM were impressive. They have clearly benefited from the training and have a highly positive view of IRI, USAID, and the United States. Based on first impressions, the Evaluation Team suggests that IRI seriously consider making Western Bahr El Ghazal State an area of concentration. We suggest that IRI start by having separate two day leadership/organization training for the Women's and Youth Leagues, then close with a separate two-day combined session for the party leadership as a whole. We also suggest using Western Bahr El Ghazal State as a test case of training of trainers. Similarly, immediate implementation in Wau will put the newly trained trainers can be out on the road come the dry season. Follow this up in 2009 with specific candidate training for women and youth.

State Government/Assembly

Key informant interview – Lt. General Mark Nyipuoch Ubang Governor Western Bahr El Ghazal state - Wau

We (Dara Francis, Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen) met General Mark Nyipuoch Ubang Governor Western Bahr El Ghazal state - Wau on May 21, 2008 at 0830 at the New York Hotel - Juba. Governor Ubang is also a retired General in the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA).

The Governor has personally received two training sessions from IRI, one as an executive, the other as a SPLM leader. In his own words: "IRI training has been very helpful to us as we try to get our feet on the ground after the war and [is] very relevant to our work". The trainings took place in Rumbek Sept. 22-24, 2006 and WAU April 26-28, 2007. Both emphasized the aspects of strategic planning. The Governor was particularly appreciative that IRI framed the training in a manner directly relevant to working in southern Sudan. His staff members and SPLM cadres received similar training, which the Governor attributed as one of the items responsible for building the capacity of both the state government and the SPLM in Western Bahr El Ghazal state. He felt the length of sessions used by IRI were about right for this type of training. The Governor also noted that UNDP provided budget training to state government staff that has been quite useful.

We discussed the challenges of working as Governor. His priorities are water, electricity, and roads. The Governor's organizing principle is self-help. Each of the priority areas has apparently significantly improved during the Ubang administration. There are now public water points for the first time in over ten years. By finding donor financing, the Governor was able to bring electricity to the Wau grid. The Governor addressed road renovation and reconstruction through appropriate use of pick and shovels, and by innovative acquisition of equipment. One of the major pieces of self-help was eliminating 10,000 ghost workers from a total state government work force of 19,000. Equally innovative was the granting (free) of 99 year land leases to businesses willing to establish in Western Bahr El Ghazal state.

The census was completed successfully but has not yet been published. The census is to be the basis of establishing Parliamentary constituencies. The Governor anticipates running for election and is looking forward to receiving candidate training from IRI. He would also like to see IRI continue with party building training. He acknowledged that there would be a big turnover in MPs in the 2009 election. To illustrate his point, the Governor pointed out the large change-over in elected positions that occurred at the SPLM convention.

The Governor welcomes small parties although he does not anticipate their doing well in the 2009 election s. He cited as an example of his commitment to democratic principles the reception for a national leader of a small party opposition leader in Wau. There are eight parties represented in Wau including the SPLM. All are free to hold rallies and their premises are undisturbed. The State Minister for

Local Government is a small party leader who also frequently serves as acting Governor in the absence of General Ubang.

Key informant interview – Lt General Daniel Awet Akot, Governor of Lakes State

We (Dara Francis, Fred Whiting, and Norman L. Olsen) met Governor Daniel Awet Akot of Lake States on Tuesday May 21, 2008 at 0915 at the Hotel Juba. Governor Akot is also a retired Lt. General in the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army.

Governor Akot received leadership training from IRI in Nairobi in 2004. Governor Akot commented very favorably on the leadership training provided by IRI. The Governor was a little vague about the type of training he and his staff received.

The Governor is clearly somewhat of a visionary alternately talking about the need for southern Sudan to throw off the yoke of 1000 years of oppression and then about the need for national unity. He is clearly very pro-American, noting that a major reason for America's greatness is our unity. He also noted that it took us some 200 years to achieve this unity.

The Governor credited his visit to the US in 1984-85 with providing him the leadership training necessary to be an effective military officer with the Sudanese Peoples' Liberation Army (SPLA). It was not clear what type of training he received but it clearly motivated him to contribute to the liberation of southern Sudan. He joined the SPLA in Addis in 1986.

Lake States illustrates the difficulties in implementing development programs. It is located 295 kilometers from Juba but takes 9 hours to travel by road. There are approximately 1.0 people and 3.2 million cattle in the state. The census was completed but the results are not yet out. The Governor anticipates Lake States will get five parliamentary constituencies from the census.

Governor Akot anticipates that the SPLM will gain seats in the 2009 election in Lake States. The SPLM has approximately 250,000 members in Lake States. (5 million nationwide, according to the Governor). The Governor believes no small party has more than 1,000 and they lack financial resources. He said that half of the small party members have come over to the SPLM. Never the less the Governor welcomed the smaller parties and a multiparty system. Personally, he seems to prefer an option where two major parties emerge as in the US. He definitely wants campaign training for both SPLM and minor party candidates at each of the four levels in his state. In addition to party organization training, he would also like leadership and civic training for all 250,000 SPLM members in Lake States. He thought NDI and IRI joining forces might best achieve this goal. From his description, a combination of voter/civic education would seem to best describe the training the Governor wants for party members.

Key informant interview – Paul Lafano Minister for Parliamentary Affairs Eastern Equatoria State – Torite May 12

Mr. Lafano is a delegate to the SMPL national convention. Mr. Lafano was interviewed at the New York hotel awaiting the opening of the convention. He had heard of USAID, but was unaware of IRI. However, he had received training in parliamentary procedures at a state level training held in Juba sponsored by UNDP. A Ugandan parliamentarian provided the training. The training was very helpful; because if it, Mr. Lafano and fellow members of the state assembly came to recognize that the then speaker of the state assembly was not performing satisfactorily. Mr. Lafano organized a vote to replace the speaker, Mr. Adelino Opin that was successful. The person who replaced the disposed speaker, Mrs. Sabina Dario Lukulu, was the first woman state assembly speaker in the history of south Sudan.

Cooperating Partners

Notes from Interview with UNDP Governance Unit 16 May 2008, 15h30-16h30

Attendees: Norm Olsen, Dara Francis, Edmond, Anselme Sadiki, Mamodou Dibbi, Shyman Bhurtel

Interviewees:

- Anselme Sadiki, Program Specialist
- Mamodou Dibbi, Program Manager, Support to the States Program
- Shyman Bhurtel, Senior Governance Advisor

The UNDP Governance Unit is involved in three main areas of assistance in southern Sudan:

- GoSS
 - Support to the presidency (work with the executive)
 - Planning
 - Good governance, equity in political participation (includes women's empowerment)
- State-level
 - Support to state programming
- County-level
 - Local government recovery (decentralization)

Support to State Programming (Mr. Dibbi's portfolio)

UNDP works with the local government boards, which are the county-level entry points for GoSS activities. The assistance consists of helping with development planning and budget preparations and management. Also, there is capacity-building training for the state legislatures.

Organizations Engaged in Democracy & Governance Assistance

UNDP, NDI, IRI, USAID, UNMIS, World Bank, NGO Forum, Joint Donor Office, SNV, PACT, Carter Center.

UNDP was unaware of IRI's political party program in Sudan. In fact, Dr. Bhurtel was unfamiliar with IRI's work in and outside of Sudan. He stated there is very little coordination among the many groups that are currently engaged in democracy assistance.

Technically speaking, UNDP is not working with the SSLA although they have been trying to make inroads with the Speaker's Forum. They have also worked with the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs and women legislators within the SSLA.

Notes from Interview with Susan Stignant, Deputy Chief of Party, NDI 13 May 2008

1. IRI/NDI Relationship ---NDI has a "strong relationship" with the several implementing partners in South Sudan with which there are project synergies, including a "good relationship" with IRI.

In connection with NDI's polling and focus groups, IRI has given NDI time in various seminars to present its findings. "NDI gets information in and IRI helps get it out (to SSLA and the parties)." In some cases, IRI and other implementing partners have assisted NDI in formulating the polling and focus group issues and questions.

NDI has made presentations in IRI seminars re the drafting of the South Sudan constitution and drafting of the election law.

Ms. Stigant spoke favorably regarding IRI's South Sudan program and personnel.

2. The NDI Program in South Sudan – Main thrust is bridging the gap between citizens and government through:
 - consensus building
 - access to information – 250,000 radio distribution program
3. NDI Public Opinion Polling
 - to address the problem of little opportunity for citizens to express views
 - begun in 2004
 - finding re priorities – peace and economic development
 - people in South feel left behind re national development – blame NPC
 - re unity vs. separation – "99%" favor separation

(Stigant comment: As steward of CPA, SPLM must give lip-service to the goal of working to make unity possible and effective. There is some sympathy for unity among SPLM members in the North.)
4. NDI South Sudan Staffing
 - 12 – 15 expats (one US)
 - 35 nationals
 - 18 field locations (staffed by nationals)
5. 2011 Referendum – no referendum in Blue Nile and North Kordofan-only "Consultation"

**Notes from Interview with Philip MUTAI, Program Officer, Canadian Parliamentary Center / Former IRI Trainer for SSLA
22 May 2008, 12:20 – 13:00**

Attendees: Dara Francis, Philip Mutai

Mr. Mutai has conducted two trainings for IRI, both in 2007. The first training took place over a four day period and was for MPs in the SSLA and covered bill drafting and policy analysis. Although MPs will not actually draft legislation, IRI thought it was important for MPs to be familiar with the procedures. Approximately 25-30 MPs participated in the training.

The second training was a month-long workshop for SSLA staff members. These trainings were more in-depth in nature than the activity for the MPs. There were approximately 25 participants.

Mr. Mutai felt that the trainings were well-structured and the participants seemed to appreciate the information. Many of the MPs spoke English, but Arabic translation was required for both types of training. The most useful portion of the trainings was the breakout sessions with interactive exercises.

Mr. Mutai feels that the IRI trainings were useful because in his current capacity he interacts with many of the MPs that received IRI trainings. According to Mutai these MPs were still able to draft motions without any assistance. In other words, they remember what they'd learned from last year's training.

Overall, Mr. Mutai feels that the IRI SSLA program is becoming increasingly more targeted, as far as focusing on particular areas within the legislature (as opposed to trying to do it all). He also thinks that two to three day trainings are insufficient. Trainings should be over longer periods, particularly if there is no immediate follow-up.

As for the broad democracy assistance community in southern Sudan, Mutai feels that there should be more coordination between groups like AWEPA, the Parliamentary Center and IRI so that the work is more meaningful.

The Canadian Parliamentary Center does peace-building and other support to the SSLA. They also work with the National Assembly and with the Khartoum-based Council of States.