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
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Nepal Program Evaluation, 2006-2009

Prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
United States Agency for International Development

Final Report

On behalf of the QED Group, LLC



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

CA	Constituent Assembly
CCD	Center for Constitutional Development
CDF	Community Development Fund
CM	Community Mobilizers
COP	Chief of Party
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPN-UML	United Marxist-Leninist party
CR	Country Representative
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DDC	District Development Center
DDR	Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration
EC	Electoral Commission
ESF	Economic Support Fund
FM	Fréquence Modulée (quality frequency radio)
GOCS	Grants Operations and Compliance Specialist
GON	Government of Nepal
INGO	International NGO
NA	Nepali Army
NC	Nepali Congress Party
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NMCCC	National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct
OFAC	U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, oversees adherence to restrictions on commerce with Terrorist Groups (including Nepalese Maoists)
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PA	OTI Program Assistant
PDO	Program Development Officer
PLA	People's Liberation Army, Maoist forces
PPR	Program Performance Review
PS	Procurement Specialist
PSA	Public Service Announcements
SMT	Senior Management Team
TI	Transitional Initiative funding
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Center
YCL	Young Communist League
YMC	Youth Management Committees

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Background

Following an 11-year armed insurgency, Nepal has achieved a transition from a monarchy to a federal democratic republic. Despite a well-observed ceasefire, public security and rule of law are tenuous. New conflict has risen, driven by unresolved social exclusion, marginalization of ethnic groups, economic disparities, political fractionalization and lack of state services.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists in 2006 created an opportunity for peace and reconciliation. An interim Constitution was promulgated and an interim parliament was elected. In the election, the Maoists won more seats than any other party, historically dominant parties suffered unexpected defeats, and new Madeshi parties (from the volatile southern region of Nepal) won significant representation. Nepal was declared a republic. The Constituent Assembly (CA) was tasked with drafting Nepal's new constitution while addressing significant social, economic, and political issues.

However, constitution drafting, re-establishment of the rule of law, and the addressing of historical grievances have seriously lagged; very few elements of the CPA have been resolved, most urgent being the integration of the military under civilian control. The long-standing inequalities that fed the original Maoist insurgency have come to a head in central and eastern Terai districts, where Nepal's landless poor and marginalized groups have long been denied equal access to social, economic, and political resources. Former cadres, new splintered political parties, and criminal gangs joined forces with disillusioned youth, inflaming historical grievances among frustrated groups in the Terai, and giving rise to a new wave of conflict in Nepal.

OTI Intervention

USAID Office of Transition Initiatives and its implementing partner, Chemonics International, commenced its three-year Nepal program in mid 2006, with the goal "to positively affect the current political transition in Nepal and help advance Nepal's transition to peace and democracy." The initial objectives were:

- *To increase information access and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition.*
- *To increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions.*

At first, OTI focused on national-level support to the peace process, including support to the National Monitoring Commission for the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the Electoral Commission, and the Ministry of Peace. In 2007, OTI opened a field office in Sunsari District to better understand local conflict dynamics, identify local organizations, and monitor activities. Following the 2008 CA elections, ethnic violence increased in the Terai, and the OTI program shifted focus to community-level peace building and conflict mitigation. The second objective was replaced with a new objective that reflected this change in emphasis:

- *To increase local level engagement and participation in the peace process.*

Over the three-year program period, \$20 million has been programmed in over 300 grants made in strategically identified sectors: community stabilization, media strengthening, key political institutions strengthening, elections, and social inclusion, as a cross-cutting sector. To increase awareness of the peace process and constitutional issues, OTI supported a wide range of local-level initiatives

and media activities. Equipment and training for local radio networks supported vernacular language broadcasts on the political transition. Toll-free call-in talk shows with local officials were initiated, and CA members and their constituents took advantage of new opportunities to air grievances and discuss local issues. Responding to the changing political situation, OTI worked to cultivate positive productive roles and resources for youth leaders in small-scale community development activities (Community Development Fund) through grants to partner Nepalese NGOs. Youth-managed, small scale projects (school and clinic rehabilitation, road repairs, latrine construction) have reached over 400 Village Development Committees in the Eastern and Central Terai. The OTI Program will continue at a reduced funding level, subsumed within USAID Nepal for an additional two years through 09/2011.

Excellent documentation of the OTI process and the Nepal program (maintained in the OTI Database) provides extensive reporting of the conduct of the program, adjustments made, and success stories. Internal reporting and documentation of program activities and outputs is thorough, extensive and timely. Reports of nine Quarterly Strategy Review Sessions and two Program Performance Reviews chronicle rolling assessments, critical events and action items which tell the story of the flexible, dynamic, and responsive program which exemplified OTI Operating Principles and conducted an efficient, well-managed and creative program in Nepal.



OTI Operating Principles and conducted an efficient, well-managed and creative program in Nepal.

Background to the Evaluation

This final evaluation was carried out in July 2009 by three independent consultants¹ to address OTI Nepal's effectiveness in adherence to OTI operating principles and review the outcomes and impact of the program in Nepal. The evaluation focused on broader, "so what?" questions of how the program impacts prospects for peaceful transition in Nepal. It also tested and applied evaluation methodologies that might strengthen OTI's own internal monitoring capacities. Using Significance of Impact and other evaluation methodologies, the evaluation team analyzed the impact of the OTI program on key conflict drivers, to evaluate the alignment of the program with the reality of the transition. The report aims to guide other current OTI programs, serve as a planning tool and to inform the public on OTI's work in Nepal.

Assessment of OTI Management

The OTI Nepal Program adhered closely to established OTI programming principles, as exemplified by its principles of operation.²

1. **Critical issues:** The program identified issues critical to the direction and durability of the transition. For example, the credibility of the CPA and CA process rested in public awareness and participation, so OTI empowered media to expand access to information and input in the peace processes.

¹ Ann Lewis, Emery Brusset, Chandrakishore Jha.

² As presented in the OTI Evaluation Powerpoint, June 10 2009, Washington DC.

2. **Transition, not development:** While short-term, fast, and flexible, the program dovetailed with and piloted USAID Democracy and Governance development assistance to contribute to longer-term sustainable development. Following the OTI lead, the USAID Nepal Government Citizen Partnership Project (NGCPP) helps the Government of Nepal (GON) re-establish legitimate and effective security and governance. The core objectives are to: (1) support strengthened governance to restore citizen confidence in public institutions; (2) implement quick-impact activities that ensure the public reaps the peace dividend, encourage job creation, and assist with reintegration; and (3) ensure marginalized populations feel connected to the national-level peace process.
3. **Support local capacities:** The program supported existing capacities, making grants to 175 local Nepalese NGOs, many of them never funded before. Basing a field office in the Terai allowed the program to focus on local processes better than most other donors. The evidence of strengthening of partner capacity was clear and constitutes an asset that can be handed over to USAID programming. Yet because of reliance on a large number of partners requiring management time, the program was less effective at cultivating community ownership, or reaching beyond the web of grantee NGOs to other parts of the polity: political parties, religious organizations and communities. Grantee NGOs tended to use tried and tested program concepts which they rapidly adapted to the OTI approach, while communities were given limited options for action. As a consequence the OTI program struggled to become outward-looking, tending instead to focus on output delivery, rather than on the critical relationship between partners and population.
4. **Process-driven, not sector-driven; impact defined in terms of attitudes, behaviors and perceptions.³ Committed to effects and outcomes as well as outputs.** Though committed to data gathering, monitoring, effects and outputs, the program was not fully able to articulate outcomes and impact or adjust those in innovative ways in relation to the changes noted in the rolling assessments. The Media Impact assessment documented positive changes in attitudes and behaviors; the importance of contributions in other sectors is less clear. This is because between the outputs and the broad changes monitored by OTI, a middle level of outcomes and critical conflict issues is missing.
5. **Get outside the capital, target local actors, move beyond ‘usual suspects,’ activate existing capacities:** The program was uniquely and effectively able to get outside the capital and target local actors, and was frequently able to move beyond “usual suspects”. The ability to engage in local procurement filled critical gaps in a unique way amongst USAID and donor instruments. There was a tradeoff between extent of interface and expediency, the emphasis on the latter reducing activation of endogenous energies.

Impact Assessment

The evaluation team conducted five conflict mapping workshops in Kathmandu and the Terai with diverse language, ethnic, and socio-economic groups to identify events and trends which increased the likelihood of, or negatively impacted, progress toward peace. The following key drivers (or critical issues) were elicited:

- The signing and partial implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
- A widening disconnect between State and population
- Increasing numbers of youth joining armed groups
- Impunity, looting, kidnapping, and high-level complicity
- Increasing use of violence for political or identity group purposes
- Identity politics and sub-identity group tensions
- Bandhs, closures, strikes, and disruption of normal life

³ OTI Operating Principles, OTI Evaluation Powerpoint, June 10 2009, Washington DC.

All these issues have been presented in varying degrees in the OTI assessments and in other conflict analyses. The mapping, however, provided an independent validation, as well as a rudimentary chronology allowing older “drivers” to be taken into account at the time of the intervention.

The evaluation team analyzed the alignment of OTI program outputs with these key drivers, assessing their relevance, extent/quality and timeliness/duration to determine program impact. **This analysis showed that the program’s outputs are clearly aligned to the key conflict drivers:**

- More effective institutions (the CA, EC)
- More diffuse media, with better quality information (through radio, drama, TV)
- Improved government/citizen linkages (through Citizens Charters, talk radio)
- Increased debate and community stability (through CDF, Youth Management Committees)

Early on, the program elaborated a strategy responsive to both foreign policy parameters and the situation in the country. Programmatic priorities have followed the evolution of the conflict (for example, the shift away from the CPA, Electoral Commission, towards a focus on the Terai conflict). Some programs were distinctive in their originality and creativity (Doko Radio, This I Believe, humorous PSAs). U.S. foreign policy objectives have been served by providing a richer array of tools which the Embassy and USAID can deploy to respond to requests, and reflect new priorities in a timely manner.

The strong relevance, scope, and timeliness of the influence of the OTI program have decreased as Nepal’s conflict has changed, beginning in 2008. The informal and opaque social dynamics that began to prevail in early 2008 are less-easily captured by existing procurement-driven monitoring, even when they are captured through strategic analysis. OTI responded to this by developing the community dimensions of the program, but the difficulty in tracking the relation between grantees and outcomes or community dynamics led to a lack of clarity in differentiating the nature of the grantees, how they are perceived in the communities, how program outputs are used, and what strategies the local population deploys to increase stability and peace.

Although the OTI Nepal program demonstrates an impressive understanding of overall dynamics, its grant-management processes require a focus on grantees, who are the primary interlocutors of the program. This is reinforced by a monitoring mechanism that concentrates on grantee data. This leads to a dependency on the grantees to reach the population.

OTI’s program performance was strong overall despite the possible hampering effects of this dependence. While the focus on filling gaps between central institutions and between the central government and the population in the first stages was highly effective, over time the OTI wave of short projects led to a decreased ability to respond effectively to the dynamics of unstructured conflict. This is because:

- There is a shortage of instruments to monitor local perceptions in the very diverse communities, and to advise partners directly on ways of strengthening their impact.
- The emergence of significant local interests linked to criminality and/or identity politics depends on greater contextual knowledge than is captured by present information-gathering processes, which focus on activities.
- This new context calls for coalitions and very local strategies that would have influence beyond the moment of program delivery. The current approach is more oriented to the

delivery of many individual initiatives.

Although clearly OTI is not about long-term impact, impact does depend on applying the right influence for the right period of time in the right place. Having identified the place and the type of influence is not enough if this influence is exerted for a time too short to make a difference. For example, supporting links to local government will require synergies with other local processes even during the delivery of outcomes (over the months of an activity, not the hours in which the partner is present on the ground). Addressing these dynamics requires a better understanding of stakeholders. While up to a third of grantees receive multiple rounds of funding, this tends to be considered rather in the same way as one-off projects.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The OTI Nepal program team demonstrated tremendous effort and dedication and deserves credit for the program's overall success. The critical assets of the program, beyond its staff, are its communication and assessment systems, the rapid procurement capacity of its geographic teams, and a very responsive management style. The intervention has been successful in fulfilling its objectives, and achieving a significant impact on the drivers of peace and conflict. The match between resources and needs was appropriate to the scale of the country. This effectiveness has, however, slightly dropped from 2008, for reasons that make OTI vulnerable to situations that are less structured and led by identity politics and crime.

The program is outward-looking in terms of its strategic orientation, and able to move close to the population. Paradoxically the programming remains to some extent inward looking as it tends to concentrate on the OTI partners, and not on the link between partners and population (which should be the direct targets). Most of the work gets absorbed in the management of the relation to grantees and not enough staff time can be dedicated to the community level of change and its connections to the accelerators of conflict.

OTI's monitoring and evaluation systems need to be altered to better acquaint the program with impact on key drivers of conflict. To achieve this, the program must look beyond its database for monitoring, since it offers no capacity for tracking outcomes. A middle level must be elaborated which includes the manner in which the population takes up the outputs, and the way in which this influences key issues in the conflict. This should be accompanied by an increasing level of staff time spent monitoring, which inevitably leads to higher operational costs – an inevitable requirement to maintain quality in fragile environments.

Since the process of grantee selection is nearly as important as outputs achieved by grantees, a more diversified approach at the grantee level would facilitate a more effective response to the rapidly changing conflict. OTI would benefit from a greater focus on grantees, and an increased use of grants (to complement in-kind donations) of more variable duration, amount, and outputs. OTI occasionally uses sub-grantees in some countries, and this allows it to tap into local dynamics and coalitions in a more discerning way than using more than a hundred direct grantees. Transparency, some use of open competition, and grants to and through “umbrella” organizations and NGO coalitions which include broad political and ethnic representation could be used more frequently. Finally, OTI should review its personnel policies to maintain its professional corps and build on local staff strengths.



1 BACKGROUND

1.1 OTI Mission and Approach

Since 1994, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has provided rapid, flexible, short-term assistance to countries in political transition. The decision to intervene is based on the response to the following questions:


1. Is the country important to US national interest?
2. Is there a window of opportunity?
3. Can OTI's involvement significantly increase chances for success?
4. Is the operating environment sufficiently stable?

As part of the US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, OTI supports US foreign policy objectives by helping local partners advance peace and democracy. OTI targets key political transition and stabilization needs and increases the likelihood of peaceful transitions by creating or strengthening links between and among people at the right time and in the right way. To activate these goals, an in-country team of one to three OTI staff are supported by a contractor team that can manage a large number of small grants (averaging US\$30,000), as required by the local situation.

Context: United States goals for Nepal to 2013
US Department of State: Transformational Diplomacy Goal
<i>To help build and sustain a democratic, well-governed state that responds to the needs of its people, reduces widespread poverty and conducts itself responsibly in the international system.</i>
US Mission to Nepal Country Assistance Strategy: First goal for priority assistance
<i>Successful transition toward an effective, responsive and democratic constitutional government.</i>
United States Government Mission to Nepal: Strategic Vision for Nepal
<i>Measurable progress in expanding and deepening democracy, strengthening public and private institutions, and supporting policies to promote economic growth and poverty reduction.</i>
USAID Office of Transition Initiatives Mandate
<i>To support transition to democracy and to long term development in countries in crisis... include[ing] assistance to (1) develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and processes, (2) revitalize basic infrastructure, and (3) foster the peaceful resolution of conflict.</i>

OTI in Nepal: OTI contracted Chemonics International as the main implementing partner through a competitive bidding process at the request of, and in cooperation with the USAID Mission in Nepal. The program is housed separately from the USAID Mission, and staffed by 26 employees. A total of US\$ 20 million has been spent since its launch in August 2006.

The Approach: OTI maintains close operational and oversight control with its implementing partner, Chemonics International, in collaboration with Washington headquarters and field offices. Described as the 'Four Corners' or 'One Team' approach (an approach codified now for all OTI operations), communications are streamlined to flow along, but not traverse, the perimeter of a square that binds headquarters and the field of both OTI and the contractor. Application of this model reduces redundancy and confusion, and maintains authority lines.



At the time of the evaluation, OTI is in transition to a USG Mission-wide One Country Approach, retaining some of the OTI staff within the Chemonics structure, with a scaled down budget. This smaller program will continue until August 2011 under the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance. It should be noted that during the 2006-2009 time frame, the USAID Mission to Nepal funded nearly \$72 million in complementary and sustainable development programming under the Strategic Objectives of Governing Justly and Democratically, and Peace and Security.

1.2 The Transition in Nepal

Despite a gradual move toward peace and democracy, Nepal's current crisis arose from the same legacy of failed governance and development that spurred the Maoist war that preceded it. The legacy includes insufficient and poorly distributed agricultural land, corruption, disenfranchisement of women and low castes, and non-existent or unresponsive local government structures and services to historically neglected areas. Much of Nepal's population has long lived disenfranchised from Kathmandu governance. Genuine economic development has been minimal, and population pressures have led to environmental degradation, erosion, landslides, and flooding; the reduction of arable land and increased tilling of marginal lands; and reduced productivity. The resulting conflict is characterized by social fragmentation, a rise in identity politics, increased use of violence, interruption of economic activity, polarization of social institutions, and widespread frustration at state withdrawal and impunity.

During the Maoist insurgency, Nepal, and the Terai in particular, experienced rapid urbanization, combined with capital and foreign investment flight. Labor migration became a coping strategy, with considerable impact on social structures. Government resources were diverted to the military, small manufacturing industries and employment opportunities were lost, development activities were moribund, and deterioration of government capacities in the social sector included the reduction of health and education services.

When the OTI program began in 2006, Nepal's political situation was marred by a lack of government legitimacy; negotiation and disarmament commitments broken by both government and insurgents; fractured and disorganized political parties based on charismatic leadership rather than ideology; unfocused political debate; fragile civil society and media groups; weak security forces; and deteriorating rule of law.

A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in November 2006, as the Maoist Party and their cadres sued for peace and the People's Liberation Army (PLA) joined cantonments. Successful Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in April 2008 radically changed the country's political environment and power structure. The Maoists unexpectedly won more seats than any other party, although not an outright majority. Nepal's historically dominant parties, Nepali Congress and CPN-United Marxist Leninist (UML), suffered unexpected defeats, and new Madheshi parties won significant representation.

At the first sitting of the CA on May 28, 2008, Nepal was declared a republic. King Gyanendra was reduced in status from royal to general Nepali citizen. The CA was tasked with drafting Nepal's new constitution while addressing the country's significant social and political issues. A variety of groups with political and economic interests in the agriculturally and industrially crucial Terai region exploited the new opportunities to gain power. The Terai's underrepresented groups turned to effective Maoist tactics such as disruption of trade and bandhs (strikes and blockages), inflaming the general sense of grievance to pressure the nascent government to accede to political demands, including quotas, paid compensation for land, reparations, autonomy, and independence.

With competing parochial interests and transport bottlenecks in Nepal's southern bread-basket, new stakes for the transition were raised. Violent attacks increased daily; political and criminal interests converged, and "international interests," often code for India, played significant, if obscure, roles. This devolution has been identified by the US Embassy as a danger to US interests, possibly creating a case of those "ungoverned spaces" increasingly framed as a foreign policy priority, with clear sub-regional implications for illicit activity and instability.

1.3 OTI Nepal's Funding and Program Focus Timeline

The OTI assessment team that visited Nepal in 2003 concluded that the parties to the Maoist conflict lacked the political will to negotiate a peace agreement:

In the case of Nepal we are looking at a mid-conflict situation where there is no discernable democratic transition underway. Nor is there a plan for making the hard political choices that might help end the conflict.⁴

In 2006, however, after eleven years of armed insurgency, hope for peace and reconciliation in Nepal was marked by the November signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists, the promulgation of an interim constitution, and the formation of an interim parliament including Maoists.

OTI Nepal's Intervention

In early 2006, a second OTI assessment team, noting the fragile nature of these efforts towards transition to peace and democracy, recommended the establishment of a small initial OTI program in Nepal with \$2 million of Transition Initiative (TI) funds to support government communication, media support and civil society-focused programming. Although USAID Nepal had programs that could address longer-term development issues, they lacked OTI's capacity for quick response. An OTI program, on the other hand, could offer:

- A fast, flexible and decidedly political implementing mechanism to capitalize on unanticipated openings and network existing programs



⁴ OTI 2003 assessment.

- Sufficient staff to actively engage Nepalis to develop quick response interventions
- Sufficient funds to quickly address the scope, scale, and pace of peace, democracy and stability activities.

The recommended OTI program would pay special attention to local governance, be implemented in twenty locations in the Terai, the security sector, DDR and Peace Implementations, and use Quick Impact Projects designed “with good community participation to provide tangible deliverables and facilitate government citizen connectivity.”

Examples of OTI Funded Booklets and Posters

Within weeks of the 2006 assessment, a senior management team consisting of an experienced OTI Country Representative and Deputy and a Chemonics Chief of Party and Deputy were on the ground in Nepal. The first grant was signed in June 2006. OTI opened its Nepal program with the goal “to positively affect the current political transition in Nepal and help advance Nepal’s transition to peace and democracy. “Program objectives were to:

- Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition
- Increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions.



Through the provision of small grants (average \$37,000) to Nepalese organizations, primarily local NGOs, OTI would allow local organizations to promote a more stable and peaceful transition, on the basis of continual assessment. Grants focused on the following sectors:

- Social inclusion (including issues of ethnic tension),
- Elections,
- Key political transition agreements and processes,
- Community stabilization,
- Media strengthening (both training and equipment grants).

Funding

OTI successfully attracted and leveraged funding from several sources beyond initial TI funds. Additional support from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) more than matched the TI resources available in the 2009 fiscal year, and further very small funds from USAID and Department of Defense (1207) came in both initially and in 2008, when the program adjusted to the Terai. Program funding sources are detailed as follows⁵:

Approx. Fiscal Year	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	Total
AID-WID			\$130,000		\$130,000
ESF				\$3,050,000	\$3,050,000

⁵ Source: Chemonics Kathmandu

1207			\$500,000		\$500,000
USAID	\$256,000				\$256,000
TI	\$1,775,000	\$7,385,000	\$5,470,000	\$2,300,000	\$16,930,000
Total					\$20,866,000

The table total includes the contractor’s operational costs of \$6,625,732, leaving total program funds spent at \$14,009,865. To date, OTI Nepal has made over 300 grants, combining TI funding with USAID Mission funding and other US Government support. The Defense arrangement is worth noting as it shows that joint resources can be used by both OTI and USAID conflict programming (where the bulk of the budget line was used) to fund related but distinct security-related operations.

Program Focus History

June 2006 to August 2006


OTI supported the immediate needs of the newly formed National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct, then the Ministry of Peace, a proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and other national level institutions. Activities included technical support, rental of facilities, voter registration, and information dissemination. The program focused on filling gaps critical to the functioning of government institutions, and supporting informal peace process mediation.

August 2006 to January 2007

Preparations for upcoming national elections prompted OTI to adjust its strategy to a multi-pronged, media-focused approach. The program provided technical and training supports to both Kathmandu-based and local media, aimed to expand the evolving national dialogue and encourage a better-informed and engaged population.

February 2007 to August 2007

In early 2007 instability remained centered in the areas most affected by the Maoist conflict, as shown in this map compiled by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance:



Events in the Terai created pressure to focus on local-level dynamics of national politics, a departure from the program's originally more Kathmandu-centered objectives. Program funding shifted from central government elements of the peace process to local media and social inclusion grants. Assessments by OTI staff in May and August 2007 pointed to the need to establish an office in the Terai, where few other donors had field presence, playing to OTI's strengths.

August 2007 to January 2008

By early 2008 an Itahari OTI office and a Birgunj annex were rapidly staffed and functioning. Koshi River flooding forced a move from Itahari to Janakpur. Elections remained the principal programmatic focus, and new funding from the Department of Defense and USAID helped prepare for new forms of political engagement.

OTI Nepal's center of gravity continued to shift away from Kathmandu. There was consensus among program staff that despite the importance of key institutions and the will for democratic change among political leaders, they remained outside the sphere of influence of the program. Civil society and an informed citizenry, however, could play important roles in promoting accountability. The program's second objective, to increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions, was reformulated accordingly. Program objectives now were:

- to increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition
- to increase local-level engagement and participation in the peace process.

February 2008 to July 2008

The perception that Nepal was entering a new phase of conflict crystallized around January 2008. The evolving shape of the new conflict commanded programmatic focus as elections passed and progress in national level key institutions stalled. The January 2008 Strategy Review Session considered an overall revision of strategy and objectives, and an interest in "re-starting the three-year OTI clock" in light of the new conflict. OTI Washington expressed concern that the program might become involved in protracted development issues better addressed through USAID programming beyond the three-year timeframe. The review led to increased emphasis on monitoring through local staff, and the deployment of Community Mobilizers. OTI Nepal's initial central strategic elements, elections and transition institutions, began to receive less funding than inclusive media and, particularly, social activities.


August 2008 to January 2009

Portfolio management continued with renewed emphasis on local media. The possibility of phasing out the Terai office and handing over the whole program to USAID's development programs was reviewed, while the launch of a related USAID program in the Terai was delayed.

February 2009 to August 2009

The final phase of the program was shaped by the national rise of identity politics and the emergence of new political parties, while security incidents of unknown origin, often uncontrolled by any of the signatories of the CPA, continued. Bandhs and blockages effected performance. Programming focused on community education to improve popular understanding of the political transition, and on providing information to political leaders and local government officials about community concerns. This led to continued emphasis on media, but a predominance of community stabilization work.

The following graph plots the allotment of grants to OTI Nepal's five focus sectors over the course of the program:



It denotes in particular the gradual decrease of support to central level transition agreements and connections between state and society, to more focus on actual community dynamics, a shift that informs the performance of the program over time.

1.4 Evaluation Approach and Methodology

Under PDQ II task Order #6, The QED Group, LLC and American University recruited and contracted a team of three independent evaluators who shared responsibility for carrying out a final evaluation of the OTI Program in Nepal, 2006-2009.

Two members of the team travelled to Washington DC on June 10, 11, 12 for briefings at OTI, training in the OTI database and introductory meetings with OTI/W staff, Chemonics, and American University staff. The OTI and Chemonics field Missions provided background documents for the team. The team met in Nepal from July 5 to 31, 2009. A calendar is attached, as well as the list of persons met and some key documents referenced in this study.

The team reviewed the nature of the OTI mandate and documented accomplishments and lessons learned for the use of both USAID and the general public. This report guides other current OTI programs, serves as a planning tool, and informs the public on OTI’s work in Nepal. Significantly, it also tests and applies various evaluation methodologies for OTI to consider adapting to strengthen monitoring and evaluation capacities within OTI.


In Nepal the team employed evaluation methods appropriate for the time, participants, and the challenges of evaluating impact in a fluid conflict environment. The team conducted key informant interviews, visited sites and project areas (Kathmandu for national programs, others in the Terai, interviewed some 18 grantee organizations), consulted US Embassy and USAID personnel, appropriate GON officials, other donor agencies active in peace building and reconciliation, other international NGOs, local VDC members, representatives of the media, and a sample of beneficiary NGOs and their stakeholders. Care was taken not to carry out the same sampling as the program reviews, but instead to spend time with the indirect beneficiaries: the population. While considerable information existed about the grantees, it was felt that more insight into the population’s perspective was needed, which required seeing fewer grantees and spending more time in each location to go beyond the standard reporting discourse.

For impact, the team used the Significance of Impact methodology. Tracking the significance of the impact of OTI has to start from the conflict and tests the programmatic contribution drivers of the conflict (positive or negative). The five conflict mapping workshops identified seven key drivers to the present conflict:

- CPA signing and implementation
- State and population disconnect
- Youth in armed groups
- Impunity, looting, kidnapping
- Increased use of violence
- Sub-identity group tension
- Bandhs, closures and strikes

The focus of this evaluation is the connections between the drivers and the following the identification of the key drivers of the conflict and the OTI program outcomes.

The significance of the contribution made by OTI to the Nepal situation is defined by the interaction of the outcomes and the critical elements of the conflict.



To measure the contribution of the Program to the transition, we must ask: were the outputs relevant (aimed and focused at the right drivers), were they extensive enough (enough money, enough staff, enough coverage, and enough sectors) and were they of sufficient duration (starting at the right time, lasting long enough, ending when complete).

Five Conflict Mapping Workshops were conducted by the team to identify the critical issues, three in the Terai and two in Kathmandu. The results are summarized in Annex B. Case studies were undertaken with grants representing “cases”, from each of the major program areas and sectors. A Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) workshop method was used with Community Mobilizers in the field.

Documentation of the OTI process from the initial assessments, through quarterly reports, the database, nine Strategic Review Sessions, two internal Program Performance Reviews, trips notes, and special reports on monitoring and evaluation, media, the situation in the Terai, provide extensive and thorough reporting of the conduct of the program, challenges faced, changes made, success stories. Rather than condense and reiterate the excellent work of others, this team has gone beyond what is known, and focused on the broader “so what?” questions of impact of the program on the prospects for peaceful transition in Nepal.

2 MANAGEMENT

2.1 Appropriateness of OTI Focus and Structure

The OTI intervention was proportionate in scale and scope to the goal and objectives it identified. Nepal was fertile ground for successful OTI programming, given its unpredictable but continuous transition, mature civil society, population of 20 million people, and complex combination of cultures and remote geographical regions.

Until now the program remained relatively geographically-focused at national-level institutions and programming in the Terai. Exceptions include Doko Radio, Humla Radio, the national tour of “Frames of War” and “People’s War”, and journalists’ exchanges. In the Terai, programming has focused in 10 districts. With the opening of the USAID/ARD program based in Biratnagar, OTI has discussed greater concentration in the Central Terai, with ARD focusing on the East, location of the Terai’s major funded districts. At the end of the phase evaluated, there has been increasing need to take into account new areas and new dynamics of instability, including reports of flare-ups of secessionist and identity politics in the Hills.

OTI’s selection of grantees deliberately sought to avoid the caste or ethnic bias that predominates much of the international donor funding in Nepal. To move quickly and efficiently, OTI primarily selected established NGOs with strong links to communities and a track record of successful development programming, and also worked with a number of promising newly formed NGOs. The short duration of the grants and relatively small initial amounts allowed OTI to spread the risk of non-performance, while identifying and supporting some new and fragile institutions. OTI did well to step out of Kathmandu and engage with grantees that had never in the past received donor funds.

A review of the funding intensity shows that although some grantees received more than two grants, there is no pattern of larger grants at any point in time, indicating a good control of the selection process. Those grantees that did receive greater funding are national institutions, media organizations, and NGOs, which are in line with capacity considerations. This review highlights, however, that some of the NGOs enjoy a lead status in terms of partnership with OTI, which is not fully reflected or acknowledged in the reporting, and tends to ‘flatten’ grantee profiles. The top 30 grantees (defined here in terms of repeat funding of more than two grants) have received a third of the total disbursed. Most of these also receive funds from other sources, which are a point of interface with other donor programs. This is rarely acknowledged by OTI reporting or by the grantees themselves who tend to project a dedication to a single donor and project. Lead multiple grantees are:

	Grantee	# of Grants	Amount in \$
1	Antenna Foundation Nepal	10	586,280
2	Election Commission	10	544,086
3	Nepal-aya	7	572,639
4	Communication Corner	7	273,697
5	MaHa Sanchar	7	500,600
6	National Monitoring Committee on the Code of Conduct for the Ceasefire	7	48,413
7	Equal Access	6	130,367
8	Democracy and Elections Alliance	4	115,482
9	B. FM	4	27,508
10	Freedom Forum	4	85,606

Over the past three years, the OTI Nepal Program has made appropriate and timely adjustments to the program in response to the new and fluid conflict that arose predominately in the southern (Terai) region along the border with India.

The number and skill sets of the professional staff, who demonstrated high commitment and morale throughout the three years, a close collaborative style, and low turn-over (in spite of concerns about the potential phasing out in 2009⁶) in what has been an intense learning and team-development process was clearly an invaluable asset to the program. The close working relationships between and among the USAID, OTI and Chemonics offices are a credit to the professionalism of the individuals involved. The OTI/implementing partner mode of operation differs from standard USAID practice because of the “One Team” approach, and this was fully practiced by all over the program cycle. Meetings, both within OTI and at the Embassy, often included representation of personnel from all agencies, illustrating the recognition of mutual interests and shared objectives.

Although administratively heavy, information systems are proportionate to the requirements of the program. They include content oversight,⁷ in-kind procurement and distribution, regular political reporting, and rolling assessments. The evident confidence of the senior USAID and Embassy teams exemplified the success of the OTI principle of rapid response and making things happen.

OTI Nepal sectors were selected and amended through a collaborative “rolling assessment” and strategic program review process, which encourages participation and debate by all the geographically focused three-person Chemonics teams. Program emphasis and funding allocations shifted away from “key political agreements and processes” as progress stalled, and shifted toward community stabilization (and cross-cutting social inclusion), as the conflict in the Terai threatened national stability.

The decision in early 2007 to establish a field office in the Terai was a significant and distinctive change from the approach of other donors, most of whom remained focused on national-level institutions from Kathmandu-based offices. The strength of the field presence for program profile and credibility cannot be overstated. It allowed the staff to increase their access to situational information, and gave the organization a good degree of credibility in the wider donor community. US Ambassador Nancy Powell cited this move as “pioneering” and provided “pilot” programming for USAID and others to emulate.

Excellent international and Nepali staff contributed continuous updates as identity politics, the use of obstruction, and violence expanded. The move to Janakpur following the Koshi River flooding was a practical one which ensured continued access for the program, while the Birgunj branch office brought procurement procedures closer to local communities and sped up the already efficient process. Embassy-level coordination regularly increased over time as OTI became recognized as a dynamic instrument and was able to leverage and secure funding from non-TI sources including USAID/DG, WID, ESF (150 account), 1207, as well as TI funds -- another indicator of the confidence placed in OTI management.

⁶ It appears at the time of writing the evaluation that the entire national Chemonics team will be retained, while most of the internationally-recruited personnel of OTI and Chemonics will change.

⁷ This process includes the translation into English of the content of all media messages and publications, and the vetting of the participation of public figures in shows, to ensure balance and neutrality. Although it represented hours of work for many of the staff, it ensures a good monitoring tool.

2.2 Media

The program developed a very sophisticated media outcome, well-known and respected among Nepal elites (in the capital, but also in Districts). The TV component is not able to penetrate the general population, which remains focused on radio, and OTI has consequently used radio and street plays to compensate.

OTI contracted with New Era/MACRO, a respected Nepalese development consulting firm, to undertake a comprehensive Media Impact Assessment. Their draft report of July 2009 reports, “The effects of the new OTI programming and format changes have been overwhelmingly positive and effective” with “more robust effects than intended—helping shift the media environment to more outlets, greater interest in political and community programming, and new formats.” Using focus groups, surveys, sampling and interviews, the team found that OTI programming created new channels for citizens’ political discourse.

Although the New Era team was unable to find evidence that citizen’s behavior changed as a result of the popular programs, they reported a new self-awareness; not only for the general citizenry, but also for the marginalized and disadvantaged groups whose issues were highlighted in the new programs: “These new (communication) channels, including call in shows and the inclusion of uncensored citizen commentary in news programs, have created a new optimism and courage for a public which had apparently been too frightened to speak its mind during the reign of the monarchy.”

A striking effect of this new self-awareness is evident in reports of women having lost the fear of discussing politics with one another or even of openly disagreeing with their husbands. Increased self-awareness and improved self-confidence were also reported in marginalized groups, albeit to a lesser degree. Respondents of lower castes, for example, reported that teachers have begun introducing new social values against traditional attitudes by teaching children that “there isn’t such thing as difference or untouchables.” Some comments from marginalized groups expressed a “fatalistic disdain for politics or any of the encouraging rhetoric. Their needs were more immediate and basic (i.e., the need for food, education, and safety) than political capacity.” Respondents appreciated programs in which politicians are brought into direct contact with citizens (e.g., face-to-face interviews with them and call-in shows, in which listeners can directly pose their questions to politicians). This created a new sense of accountability in politicians.

The impact study recommended that OTI programs continue, and that they encourage new forms of political participation, such as running for public office, or the creation of civil society organizations. It also advised that OTI increase management training to counter the negative effects of poorly-managed stations.

2.3 Flexibility and Responsiveness

This section discusses whether the program was appropriately flexible and responsive to shifting political and contextual issues. The answer is paradoxical: while extremely adaptive and sensitive to the evolution of the situation, OTI did not give itself all the instruments it would have required to achieve the most significant impact.

OTI increases the likelihood of a peaceful transition by creating or strengthening links between and among people and institutions, filling critical gaps at the right time and in the right way. Appropriate to this approach, the initial program focus was limited and centrally targeted at national-level organizations and institutions. As the focus shifted to the Terai, there was a risk of unbalancing the entire process.

OTI's identification of links and gaps was premised on a central frame of reference of the nature of the evolution of the transition, and its central elements. By the end of 2007, the political landscape had fractured, and the OTI program became more reactive to outside proposals and responsive to requests than proactive in pursuing new linkages.

Early innovative programming such as Doko Radio and call-in shows with community radio were especially effective. New sectors added over time (social inclusion) stretched the professional expertise of the staff. OTI Nepal was able to call on an OTI Media expert in-country available to provide technical assistance in large national programs (CA Media center, etc). However, the ability to engage in truly participatory processes on the ground was more limited, due to constraints of time (high number of grantees and short-term time horizons).

By late 2008, programming had lost some of its original focus and tended toward repeat grants to known partners to continue what they had been doing, with some new elements. Rising issues of federalism, identity politics, and the conflation of criminal and political activities called for a better understanding than was available through the standard instruments of OTI, which, by the September 2008 Program Performance Review, was focusing on an exit strategy.

With the benefit of hindsight and the analysis provided by the conflict mapping, it is clear to the evaluation team that the nature of the conflict had changed into a kaleidoscope of aggrieved groups, organizing along ethnic and caste lines, loosely or closely affiliated with a similarly changing constellation of political parties. The program staff has identified these issues, and has been carrying out rapid assessments into new areas, speaking to new partners. But in the absence of a sufficiently large field presence (and the capacity for such a presence) the translation of these assessments into actual objectives and grants is very difficult.

In the Terai, community level OTI/Chemonics processes allow for the identification of key actors with established programs. This has advantages in terms of expediency, speed and confidence of proven programmatic ability. However, the targeted selection of grantees without a transparent, open process carries the risk of perceived favoritism in a politicized atmosphere where all NGOs have covert or overt allegiances to political parties.

There is also a risk that grantees will reflect precisely the strategies that hasty donors will seek: "The most able and well-connected of the (Nepali) graduates in the workforce joined nongovernmental organizations, coining slogans that could attract foreign funds. ... The catchphrases of today are 'social inclusion' and 'conflict resolution'... The international donors heard what they wanted to hear, and paid up."⁸ The evaluation team heard many presentations that were clearly rapid adaptations of similar presentations made to other donor representatives.

Although the program demonstrated an impressive ability to understand and adjust to the overall dynamics, it was decreasingly able to be responsive to the new dynamics of unstructured conflict because of its grant management processes and dependency on grantees to reach the population.

⁸ Thapa, M., "Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy", p. 114

2.4 Some OTI Approach Limitations

This section examines whether the analysis carried out to respond to locally-identified needs and the short-term, participatory style of activities were the most appropriate within OTI Nepal's strategic framework and overarching objectives.

The program deployed multiple assessment methods and a rolling program development and funding process. This created a responsive, context-driven strategy, clearly situated within the broad original objectives. The program structure is based on changes and events in the Nepalese situation, and aligned to its external environment. As a result, the foreign policy objectives of the US Government have been served with a richer palette of tools that can be called upon as necessary.

It could be argued that the ratio of number of staff to money spent is excessive, but this should instead be considered a strength, as it is precisely the intensity of the interaction with grantees and the close oversight achieved by the integrated three-person regional teams that affords the quality and timeliness of OTI outputs. Should more of these staff be deployed for monitoring, the program could gain considerably in strength.

There is, however, room for a broader range of intervention types, and a more diversified approach to recent events. This is due to two factors:

- monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems do not enable OTI to achieve a good understanding of interactions between grantee and society
- resource-driven delivery – predominantly activity driven contributions that require a constant flow of proposals reflecting a few standardized approaches – could be more open to adjustment and more tailored to very local situations.

Limitations of Monitoring and Evaluation Practices

The current M&E system creates vulnerability in terms of its limited outcome information role, and its weakness in providing notions of impact. OTI's primary interface with Nepalese society is through its national staff and is therefore both privileged and limited. Chemonics staff are neither sufficiently trained, nor given the time to undertake tracking of those key indicators situated beyond program outputs. There is a risk that narrative rolling assessments become repeats of previous discourse, and serve a pre-existing program intervention strategy (for example CDFs, where this may not always be relevant).

OTI's difficulty in gathering impact information is demonstrated at multiple levels of its operation. Interviews show that local staff believe that for Chemonics to have more direct access to indirect beneficiaries and to reduce reliance on grantee reporting, they would need to spend more of their time in field visits than their present administrative workload allows. Similarly, field report forms from staff, running from the Program Progress Reviews to the Community Mobilizers (a key group because they are tasked to review the link to the population, beyond the direct beneficiaries) show that their efforts to identify changes in a community before and after a grant are dogged by the persistence of the issues which the programs should address. These forms reveal that in spite of almost uniformly positive ratings given to grants, in the communities tensions, marginalization and incomprehension remain. Grantees' reports, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the physical aspects of rehabilitation, or the holding of meetings and training sessions. Very few are able to step away from the actual output and demonstrate community impact.

There is clearly a reporting disconnect between program outputs and program impact, and a considerable difficulty in relating the two. The prevalence of the database in OTI's monitoring is partly the cause of this disconnect. The worldwide database – with each grant coded and entered with monitoring data, field notes, reports, and success stories – is scrupulously maintained by in-country staff, and accessible to Washington DC staff with minimum time lag. Entries are extensive, detailed, in English (occasionally a complication), and form a repository of grant history and activity. While this constitutes an excellent reference for the activities being carried out, and a reliable support of internal communication, it contains no outcome tracking. The minute level of detail serves as a thorough recording of outputs -- one randomly selected grant printed out at 14 pages in small font -- but is of very limited utility to address the more global issues of program direction and impact.

Limitations of Resource-Driven Delivery Practices

The second vulnerability of OTI Nepal's practices is a focus on delivery that leads to a multiplication of short interactions with grantees. The program's application of standard program approaches is not conducive to maximize flexibility and local adaptation. Its administrative procedure reduces the exchange of information with partners, given the limited number of staff, and in effect creates a top-down mode of operation.

In Nepal the program operates through a web of social enterprises – NGOs – that use classical development methodologies to deliver interventions in as wide a range of sectors as there are donors. In this situation, a grant may distort some of the work of an organization for the duration of the grant; for example, a micro-finance organization led by women may claim to work to isolate youth from armed groups in order to attract funds. Furthermore, a long range dialogue with local partners is very difficult to have. A third of the funding goes to grantees that get repeat grants, and some OTI/Chemonics staff have moved on to create NGOs. OTI has deliberately avoided formulating its activities to be actor focused. This means that knowledge of grantees– their modes of operation, affiliations, contacts – is slightly out of focus, to the benefit of the speed and outreach of the outputs. Yet actors and the ability to reach sensitive issues are precisely the most important for the current drivers of conflict.

One option for better grasping program impact is to reconfigure program focus based on the actual types of changes which activities create. Such categorization would be based on program outputs, grouped into the following four outcome areas⁹:

- 1. Key national-level institutions function better** through support to the Electoral Commission (materials production and distribution), technology support for voter registration, Constituent Assembly Media Center support, press briefing room, and closed-circuit TV in chamber.
- 2. Publications and media inform the right groups** through technology, training, and content support to twenty-three FM community radio stations. Mobile Community Radio (“Do-ko”-basket Radio) reached remote areas of Nepal with programming regarding the CA and citizens rights and responsibilities. Nepalis of all ages, ethnicities, and regions shared their stories on the radio show “This I Believe” show, highlighting commonalities. Journalists were trained in ethical principles and responsible journalism. A remarkable photo exhibit about the conflict toured the country, stirring dedication to peace, and becoming a book and

⁹ The proposed categories have been discussed and tested with program staff and are recognized by them as being valid, even though not represented in the reporting.

a video. Animated figures and beloved comedians were used on TV public service announcements to encourage non-violent conflict resolution, and inform citizens of the CPA and the CA responsibilities.

- 3. Government and citizens are linked through new ties.** Local level government officials and citizens' groups studied and re-drafted Citizens' Charters, outlining their respective rights and responsibilities in the interest of transparency, cooperation, and reduced suspicion and corruption. Copies of the Citizens' Charters and Interim Constitution were distributed and discussed. Community groups leveraged funds with VDC development funds for priority small infrastructure projects. CA members took part in Nepal's first live call-in radio shows to answer questions about the constitutional process.
- 4. Local-level participation and debate is increased.** Chemonics hired Community Mobilizers, youth facilitators and youth leaders were identified in each of the program area wards and, following training, led Youth Committees to assess local needs, identify priority projects, leverage other funds where possible and propose projects for the Community Development Fund. Small-scale projects such as school painting, latrine repair, road repair, and beautification were supported through in-kind contributions of materials. Youth peace groups were trained to encourage debate and non-violence at the community level. Visible practical improvements at the local level encouraged youth to become involved in civic improvements, and gave war-weary communities tangible symbols of hope.

While these outcome areas may resemble existing program descriptions, they present the advantage of being more verifiable, and achievable through a number of types of grants. For example, increasing participation and debate can be promoted through media, social inclusion, or public participation grants, and progress can be verified independently of the actual grant, without requiring a baseline. Explanation of impact assessment continues in the following section.




3 PROGRAM IMPACT

This chapter examines the significance of OTI program impact on Nepal’s transition from conflict to peace. As outlined in 1.4 (Evaluation Methodology), Significance of Impact analysis tests the connection of program outputs and activities to the most important trends and events of the present transition. Evaluation research identified seven key drivers of peace or conflict in Nepal’s current situation, suggesting four outcome categories that would indicate improved peace in the country. The program’s impact on the transition was measured by examining the relevance, extent, and duration of its contributions to these outcomes.

The figure below summarizes these connections, with outcomes on the right, and transition drivers on the left. These can be seen chronologically, with older outcomes and drivers at the top, and subsequent ones unrolling over the years.

From Conflict Mapping to Performance Assessment

Significance of Impact starts from the conflict, testing program contribution to key drivers of change



3.1 Relevance of the Impact

Were program outputs aimed and focused at the right drivers?

Program relevance was high in terms of the following drivers of the conflict:

- *Youth tending to join criminal and politically-linked armed groups:* the program provided numerous tangible projects and community-based opportunities for youth, countering the strong pull of greed and grievance of political parties and armed groups.
- *Impunity:* the program improved information, accountability, and access to justice through assistance to Village and District Development Centers (VDC/DDC) and Citizen’s’ Charters. A VDC Secretary reported his satisfaction with the Citizens’ Charter on his wall: it better enabled him to explain both the limitations and possibilities of local government services. A Saferworld study on perceptions of security in Nepal showed that a large proportion of people will turn to the VDC for justice and security concerns. OTI’s focus on these institutions is highly appropriate, particularly as police and judiciary remain outside its sphere of influence.

Relevance was bolstered by the program's strategic revision of focus areas in light of changes in Nepal. For example, social inclusion was added as a cross-cutting issue in all sectors in 2008, rather than a stand-alone sector. Initial program support to some key institutions (Ministry of Peace, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, NMCCC) was modified when OTI was asked to respond to include immediate needs at the Electoral Commission, without which CA elections may not have taken place. OTI procurement of technical assistance was of a nature and quantity that few other donors could have provided; the ability to quickly import equipment and print and disseminate information for the elections proved particularly helpful. Relevance continued as programmatic priorities followed the evolution of the conflict in the Terai.

The program's media assistance also demonstrated relevance. Media messages were timely, well-targeted, professionally prepared, and diverse, from film, TV, photographs, and vernacular print media, to community radio and street drama. Media use proved both well-selected in relation to key drivers, and culturally appropriate for targeted populations, who identified easily with the characters and messages. The popular claymation figures, the clever use of a celebrity comic, mobile Doko radio, and "A People's War" and "Frames of War" programs stand out as excellent examples.

3.2 Extent of the Impact

Were program outputs allotted enough money, staff, coverage, and sectors to affect large parts of the critical groups, or the right people?

The extent of program impact was limited by the amount of funding and personnel, and comparative advantage and coordination of other donors. The program began with nationwide coverage, focusing on key institutions, the peace agreement, and then national media. Participants of the conflict mapping workshops in the Terai, however, made little or no mention of the Peace Agreement, national elections, or the Constituent Assembly when identifying the most important events of the current transition¹⁰.

The program's strategic geographic focus was an asset, especially on events in the Terai region. Both senior US Government officials and International Crisis Groups reports have noted the security threat presented by the region's instability. Withdrawal of government services, unresolved demobilization and integration of Maoist soldiers and a rise in lawlessness and impunity in the Terai threatens a stranglehold on Nepal's economy, and creates the potential for a power vacuum, even an "ungoverned space," along the open India-Nepal border. Situated amidst the complex dynamics of Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan relations, rumors of movements by drug and arms cartels further increase the relevance of the Terai region for US foreign policy.

The program made commendable efforts to seek out and support new NGOs and those who have not previously received donor funding. OTI reports that of 151 of its grantees (which includes some repeats), eighty-eight have not worked with other donors directly. However, many prominent and repeat grantees are known development actors, or are newly-created off-shoots supported with salaries, materials, training, and in-kind contributions to carry out program activities for a short period of time. The OTI approach favors expediency over the capacity-building dimension of the work, which it considers a welcome secondary or by-product, rather than central to the program. This makes monitoring and understanding impacts at the level of the relationship between community and grantee very limited.

¹⁰ Recorded in notes and photos from conflict mapping workshops, July 16, 17, and 18, 2009.

Although OTI is proud of its reach into communities, there is a wariness of political parties, a distrust of local government, limited interaction with religious groups and a propensity to establish a dialogue with certain partners and respondents only – often those originating from those classes and professions best prepared to talk to donors. Chemonics framed this as a “strategic decision that [they] do not need to prop up a highly corrupt local government system or legitimize the power of parties to control everything at the local level”¹¹. Furthermore, some administrative restrictions (particularly OFAC, the counter-terrorism guidance of the US Government) prohibit outreach to non-elected Maoists. The resulting approach excludes some key actors and organizations (political party leaders, local government leaders, religious leaders), reduces OTI’s access to information and understanding of the social and political dynamics of the transition, and ultimately limits the program’s effectiveness. It leaves program outcomes overly dependent on grantees, and their assumptions about the program’s objectives and theory of change.

3.3 Duration/Timeliness of Impact

Were program outputs sufficiently durable? Was the decision to establish an OTI program in Nepal made at the right time? Was three years long enough to support the transition, and is the continuation of OTI support within the USAID DG office for two more years sufficient?

The commencement of the program was based on thorough assessments and was well-timed to critical events. Early interventions, especially with regards the electoral commission, were very timely, and sound decisions were made rapidly in the media sector. From 2008, however, the program’s relevance and extent were higher than its duration, for three reasons:

1. The choice of grantees is by definition hasty, and not always based on proven thematic strengths.
2. Grantees become essentially instrumental: they implement the OTI program for the duration of the grant, but do not necessarily capture, internalize, maintain or carry on program messages after the funding period. For example: what impact can one expect from a three-day training in conflict mitigation, when existing communities rely on religious authorities and group mediation?
3. OTI’s adherence to a standard timeframe (now three years) for transitions creates a reluctance to change at the end of the period, aligned neither with OTI’s principal of flexibility nor the specific needs of Nepal. The decision to continue support through the USAID DG program is a sound one, given the changing conflict dynamics in Nepal.

In the early phase of the intervention, OTI assisted conflict protagonists in securing the key milestones that have so far enshrined the peace process: the NMCC and Peace Commission, the CPA and its attendant elements (such as the Code of Conduct for demobilization), the elections and the Constituent Assembly. These were by no means assured, and the support of OTI enabled the whole country to benefit for many years (this could be understood as the sustainability of OTI’s outcomes, even though this is not particularly sought by OTI).

Later on, shifts in the conflict environment were identified, but this was not fully reflected in programmatic shifts, which remained defined by four to five basic formulas. Assessments remained strong, even though in some cases subtleties of very local distinction and links between political and criminal activity were not well accounted for in political reporting, and political dimensions of pro-

¹¹ OTI/Chemonics Comments on draft evaluation report. August, 2009.

tests and violence may have been overlooked or dismissed as criminality. Some good programs (Peace Volunteers) are today at risk of being replicated and extended into new districts without careful attention to changing local circumstances, in particular the changing attitude to local state authorities that arose alongside a broad (and ill defined) aspiration to federalism.

More importantly, however, as the shift to community programs became stronger, the connections (and occasional disconnects) between grantees and population, were neither fully grasped nor fully bridged. For evaluation and assessment purposes, OTI receives images of communities painted by grantees, who have a clear interest in portraying success and gaining future grants, and tend to consider outputs. Field monitoring mechanisms such as Community Mobilizers exist, but are underutilized for real ground-up information and participation.

Such a situation creates distance between donors and NGOs, NGOs and the population, and amongst different NGOs, which can become an issue at a time when more sensitivity is required in community dynamics. This distance could be reduced by giving preference to grantees who propose to work cooperatively in network structures, with broad change objectives defined by grantees and their affiliates themselves. It should be noted that this might require greater use of cash grants than has been the case in the program. Several such NGO coalitions and networks were supported by OTI Nepal, but more might have been encouraged.

3.4 Conclusions on Impact

OTI's Nepal intervention was well-targeted to the majority of the critical drivers of the transition, and avoided waste or dissipation of resources. Its selection of a geographic focus is a significant strength, but the breadth of its influence on the population is limited by an incomplete knowledge of the role, stature, and reputation of grantees within their communities. The lasting impact of the intervention is good, but partly limited by the speed of turnaround of grants and a lack of focus on capacity. Overall, however, the impact of the program is significant, and the reservations expressed should not obviate its contribution to the transition, especially until the beginning of 2008. In terms of impact the program has met the goals set for it.

Yet program impact could have been greater had a new orientation been taken at the end of 2007, when new dynamics began to overshadow the previous Maoist-state conflict in national importance. While the previous conflict is by no means over, there are a number of donors engaged in the kinds of long-term state-focused issues for which OTI does not have a comparative advantage. It is precisely more recent trends and events (increase in violence, sub-identity politics, bandhs, and strikes) that call for the versatile, targeted interventions for which OTI is known. Far from withdrawing, OTI should continuously review its role in Nepal to support a peaceful and unfinished transition.

4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 Lessons to be Learned

This section identifies strengths and potential risks of the approach taken by OTI in Nepal. The program's practice is to continually identify existing key players and actors and provide support, building up existing staff and structures by providing short-term salaries, training, materials, and other urgently-needed support (bikes, motorbikes, laptops, cell phones). The program is eminently adaptable and able to adjust the level of intervention in little time, allowing the US Government quick access to established community networks, media, and state institutions. However as the program shifted to a social focus, these strengths have come to limit performance. This could not have been addressed within the life of the program for the most part (albeit more could have been done on monitoring and review), as it relates to the OTI modus operandi, so the following conclusions are mostly aimed at future OTI programs, as well as the new phase of the program managed by Chemonics as it is handed over to USAID.

Current practice has two major inherent risks. First, there is the risk that selection of grantees is perceived as opaque. While staff do recognize that "how we do it is more important than what we do," there seems to be a need for better understanding of underlying perceptions which could reduce the impact of the program. Second, given that all NGOs are politically-aligned, there is a constant risk that OTI will unwittingly select grantees of predominantly one party or another. This risk is reduced by the good use of local staff, but it is not eliminated, especially as dynamics become increasingly complex and activity focus (including in geographical terms) necessarily expands.

Nepal's development reality is that thousands of small NGOs have proliferated in response to donor priorities, often organized around a charismatic and dynamic leader (in the Terai, often a Brahmin), with agile flexibility in adopting their profile to fit the 'cause du jour' (human rights, micro-credit, HIV/AIDS, women's literacy). Some of these are very able partners who get the job done, but many lack connections to the grassroots.


Connections at a grassroots level could be improved in two areas. First, in the present OTI Community Development Fund model, Community Mobilizers are paid staff. The grantee partners choose facilitators, who in turn select the members of the Youth Management Committee (YMC) that represent each ward. Community Mobilizers highlight YMCs as a key ingredient in successful projects, and can identify members selected through favoritism from those selected on merit. In terms of transparency and the flow of information, however, it would seem more promising to let facilitators be chosen as part of a consultative process within communities rather than hand-picked.

Second, local impact can also be improved by strengthening social and civic institutions at the lowest level. In the absence of local government in Nepal's rural regions, local NGOs, political parties and religious groups are key organizations. OTI, in its avoidance of two of these three recognized organizational structures, is not doing all it could to empower citizens and strengthen their relationship to local and national structures.

A different lesson applies to OTI as both an organization and centre of a professional community (of both national and international staff): capacity should be envisioned in a broader and longer-term sense. While the quality and mobilization of the personnel deployed is clearly a central element of program success, few employees have clear long-term career paths with OTI or related operations. The program has defined the professional horizon, and staff retention has been exceptional, but there is no reason for OTI not to consider the needs of these persons after the handover – in effect a

broader Bull Pen¹² -- to further enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This would include consequently not just OTI personnel but also contractor personnel, complementing what is practiced there.

OTI's assets, and the corresponding risks can be captured as follows:



4.2 Recommendations

The program has performed well. However, the following recommendations indicate possible ways of further improving performance:

A. Keep aware of the effects, achievements and consequences of the program.

Place the effects of the program in greater focus. Identify outcomes, results, and consequences as a mid level framework of analysis situated between the database that tracks outputs and the rolling and strategic assessments. Hone the assessment methodology by turning the rolling assessment method into a tracking tool to identify transition drivers (actors, areas, trends and events), anticipate new ones, and allocate resources to address them. This process would connect standard reporting tools with the database, deepening the program's impact.

Create a field-oriented M&E capacity: Consider establishing a roving team of "super" Community Mobilizers empowered to track the relationship of partner to population, travelling to all locations to ensure cross-fertilization between programs, application of lessons learned, and rapid response. The database currently tracks grantee outputs (e.g. 35,000 copies of the CC distributed), but such information needs to be translated into terms that allow a verification of how the population reacts to and uses the outputs. Outcomes should become the center of gravity of the program. Mo-

¹² This expression is used to describe a standby mechanism to deploy experienced consultants who have frequently worked with OTI, operating on a retainer basis.

bilizers could carry out outcome to conflict driver analysis, and report on the adequacy of the grantees for the tasks. Look ahead to design M&E structures and capabilities that will synch with the USAID “F” process of common elements and indicators.

Better document strategic-level aims and achievements to communicate and foster progress more clearly with all stakeholders. SRS reporting memos for example are very good at distilling developing strategic discussion; consider sharing them more widely and tracking critical issues in a short list for impact assessment. The success stories stored in the database and on the website are snapshots, not documentation, and tend to neglect the valuable learning from failure. Overall program objectives are too general, while the database is too activity-focused. A middle level of M&E is required.

B. Modify the implementation modality – i.e. ways of doing business

Strengthen field presence. Maintain the flexibility to multiply the Janakpur field office model as dictated by events (Far Eastern Nepal?) and in cooperation with USAID NGCCP and others. Reduce Kathmandu-based programming and procurement as the program shifts to a more local level. Consider adding a mobile team (GMS, PDO, and PS) which could deploy to hot spots for weeks at a time, when conflict and tension increase.

Consider adopting a two-tier partner structure, as OTI has done elsewhere. Through some limited use of open competition (complemented by a targeted selection), identify several mature Nepalese NGO implementing partners, and empower them to extend outreach further into communities. To an extent that needs to be defined on the merits of the case, organize sub-granting, re-granting, and pass-through organizations with adequate financial management capacity to take on grants management function and reduce OTI management units, freeing time for ground level monitoring. This could replicate sub-grant arrangements elsewhere, based on OTI Nepal experience with both RICOD and the Madheshi NGO Forum. Strengthened NGO partners would offer support and training to CBOs and newer, smaller partners, and allow for closer community-level contact. Increase oversight of the two tiers of local partners and allow for more latitude in grants and sub-grants, with emphasis on building NGO coalitions and umbrella organizations, in order to reduce the risk of obscure partisanship and make the program more transparent and Nepalese.¹³

Continue to replicate key ingredients of the SWIFT model and the Nepal OTI program in other countries – elements such as the ‘four corners’ model of client-contractor communication, geographic teams, local procurement, field orientation, continual situation tracking. Chemonics’ geographically-focused, co-located three person teams (PDO, GMS, PS) are a particularly strong element in the effective management of the program.

Review personnel policies (USAID, Chemonics). Personnel management should be given greater priority. Senior US Staff and Nepalese Staff both reported negative impacts of OTI contracting policies. Chemonics staff cited pay inequities and, particularly, frustration with the application of the USG SF 1420. This should be explained, addressed or changed; a real investment has been made that deserves to be captured to ensure more value for money.

C. Maintain and improve the partner-driven focus of interventions

Consider using a range of grant types, including cash grants where appropriate and feasible. Vary grant amounts and duration to enable longer or shorter term funding, continuing to promote imagi-

¹³ Though we acknowledge there are limitations on ESF funds and OFAC license restrictions.

native and locally-defined proposals. Support more workshops for grantees to develop new activities with multi-ethnic or multi-party coalitions and umbrella organizations.

Conduct open competition for some grants in some defined cases to reduce the perception of favoritism, while maintaining the capacity for targeted projects when rapid and selective interventions are needed. Ensure ethnic, language, geographic, religious, and gender diversity among grantees. Try existing, simplified procurement tools (Annual Program Statements). Keep in mind OTI's operating principle that how things are done is as important as what is done.

Continue and strengthen the Community Development Fund, which is the heart of the on-going program. Structure means of allowing communities to nominate youth leaders in a consultative manner with a stronger Community Mobilizer system. Expand activities to include "camps" (not just trainings) of longer duration which build cooperation and allow for fun (sports, music, drama) as well as meaningful discussion and dialogue. OTI's present CDF model has proven successful in carrying out very small, short term projects with available youth committee members: latrine building and repair, road repair, school painting. The small amount of money involved in these in-kind projects both limits size and scope and reduces the exposure of OTI/Chemonics to extortion, misappropriation and theft. At Nepalese Rupees 25,000 (approximately US\$333), little can be accomplished without additional input from other donors or investors; this approach thus both positively involves community participation and leverage of funds, and negatively limits the scale and scope of what can be accomplished.

Continue to promote more projects that involve teamwork and coalitions, not just delivery of goods. For example: environmental clean-up, sports facility improvement, childcare, first aid training, emergency preparedness, and skills training: entrepreneurial, computer, language, agricultural (4H-type).

Consider the whole community: Reconsider the strategic decision to by-pass programming to and with political parties, local level government and religious organizations. Seek out and listen to alternative voices. Possibilities for cooperation will increase as the USAID ARD expands its programmatic reach. Given the importance of political parties, especially in the Terai, and the imperative for strengthening and supporting local government, OTI should reach out and include these critical players in the community.

Annex A: List of Persons Met

Washington DC

Josh Moga	Program Director, Chemonics
Kavita Sangani	Program Manager, Chemonics
Holly Flood	SWIFT Director, Chemonics,
Daniel Ver Schneider	Associate, Chemonics
Rick Swanson	Program Officer
Adam Reisman	Monitoring and Evaluation, OTI
Eleanor Bedford	Bullpenner
Stephen Lennon	Asia Team Leader
Justin Sherman	Acting Director, OTI
Kimberly Maynard	Bullpenner
Karen Kaplan	Bullpenner, former Chemonics Chief of Party

Other Donors

Lars Peter Christensen	Danida (HUGO)
Stephanie Gauger	German Development Center
Larry Taman	International Project Manager, (SPCBN)
Larry Altre	SAFERWorld
Subindra Bogati	SAFERWorld
Aruna Pant	UNDP
Guy Banim	UNDP Recovery Advisor
Anjali Sherchan Pradhan	UNICEF Nepal

Other

Ambika Shrestha, Kathmandu	Business leader
Bijay Rajbhandari	President CE Construction
Shyam Milan Shrestha	CE Construction
Magee Shah	Community activist, TEWA Foundation, Kathmandu
Bina Pradhan	Economist, Researcher, Fulbright Scholar UC Berkeley
Raghav Raj Regmi	DECC
Akhilesh Upadhayay	Editor, Kathmandu Post
Bhed Prakash Upreti	Former GON Senior Official, Anthropologist
Nick Langton	Country Director, The Asia Foundation
Sagar Prasai	The Asia Foundation, Deputy Country Director, Nepal
Sarah Levit-Shore	The Carter Center Nepal
Stephanie Gauger	Advisor, DED
Larry Attree	Team Leader Asia, Saferworld

Government of Nepal

Manohar Bhattarai	Act. Secretary General/Constituent Assembly
Neel kantha Upreti	Election Commissioner
Mukunda Sharma	Joint Secretary & spokesperson for the Parliament

Man Bahadur BK	National Manager (CCD)
Md Satar Manshur	Village Development Committee

Grantees

Nirmal Rijal	Equal Access
Dil Bhushan Pathak	Interface
Dipendra Khaniya & Shikha Bhatti	Radio Audio
Narendra Kansakar	MaHa
Sushma Joshi and Daulat Jha	PAILA and former staff
Gopal Guragain	Communication Corner
Tara Nath Dahal	Freedom Forum
Kunda Dixit	Himal Media
Makwanpur, Parsa, Bara Partners	
Ram Hari Ghimire	RICOD - Lalitpur
Basu Dhakal	SSK - Makwanpur
Shambhu Singh Karki	Radio Palung - Makwanpur
Arjun Kushwaha	Sahakarya - Parsa
Om Prakash Thakur	DEUC - Parsa
Rajesh Jha	RRPK - Sarlahi
	CDS - Siraha
Meera Datta	Janakpur Women's Development Center
Prem Mishra	Janakpur Women's Development Center
Pavi Keshi	Journalist (PAILA)
Deependra Khaniya	Managing Director, (Radio Audio Pvt. Ltd.)
Indradev Yadav	MCDC
Prabhu Narayan	MCDC
Ramlagan Mandal	MCDC
Sarwan Kumar Chaudhary	MCDC
Shyamkant Chaudhary	MCDC
Sumita Chaudhary	MCDC
Suraj Singh	MCDC
Ritesh Tripathi	Member NGO Federation, Parsa
Shunil Malik	MINAP
Daulat Jha	PAILA (Former Chemonics Staff)
Sushma Joshi	PAILA Former Chemonics Staff
Shikha Sharma	Program Coordinator, (Radio Audio Pvt. Ltd.)
Dharmendra Jha	Radio Janakpur
Dipnarayan Yadav	Radio Janakpur
Gunja Rai	Radio Janakpur
Navin Mishra	Radio Janakpur
Sangita Shrestha	Radio Janakpur
Sital Shah	Radio Janakpur
Manohar Dhakal	Radio Palung

Sambhu Singh Karki	Radio Palung
Ram Hari	RICOD
Chandra Narayan Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Jibachha Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Ramanand Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Sambhu Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Sant Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Satyanarayan Chaudhary	Samad Radio
Anu Gupta	Youth Group Member, Sahakarya Nepal
Madhu Acharya	Antenna Foundation
Shikha Prasai	Director, Interface
Upendra Aryal	Equal Access
Bindu Acharya	Former Chemonics Staff
Dilbhushan Pathak	Interface
Kunda Dixit	Journalist and OTI grantee
Madankrishna Shrestha	MAHA
Narendra Kansakar	MAHA
Arpan Sharma	Nepal-aya
Kiran Shrestha	Nepal-aya
Binaya Guragain	Program Manager, Equal Access

USAID/Chemonics/OTI Nepal

Adam Kaplan	Media Advisor, OTI
Audra L. Dykman	Chemonics Chief of Party
Carolyn Coleman	Acting Mission Director USAID
Darlene Foote	USAID Nepal Democracy and Governance
Laila D Mehta	former Central Terai Program Manager
David Billings	Director, Office of Democracy and Governance
Denver Fleming III	INL/USDOJ/ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement Officer
Shankar Khagi	USAID General Development Officer
Sharada Jnawali	USAID Nepal Democracy and Governance
Amy Para	USAID Nepal Program Officer
Ted Glenn	USAID Nepal, Democracy and Governance
Sandra Mikel	USAID, Acting Deputy Mission Director
Melissa Rosser	Country Representative OTI
Sarah Oppenheim	OTI Deputy Country Representative
Shama Pande	USAID Nepal OTI
Ryan Smith	Chief of Party, Chemonics
Rebecca Talaga	Deputy Chief of Party/Chemonics
Thibault Marcresses	Director OTI/Chemonics Janakpur Office
Md Isha Rain	Community Mobilizer
Mithlesh Yadav	Community Mobilizer
Ram Ashish Yadav	Community Mobilizer

Tabrej Ahmad	Community Mobilizer, Birgunj
Nilmani Pokhrel	Procurement Specialist Chemonics
Ali Saleem	Consultant to Chemonics/OTI
Brent Willey	Former M & E Co-ordination adviser
Raju Kandel	Information Officer, Chemonics
Sabita Pokharel	Office Manager, Chemonics
Nilu Basnyat	Project development Officer, Chemonics
Pramita Dhungana	PDO Chemonics
DB Sunwar	Chemonics Grants management specialist
Sanjay Gupta	Program Development Officer OTI Janakpur
Samsher Bahadur Gurung	Chemonics
Tek Lawati	Chemonics

Kathmandu

Amb. Nancy Powell	US Ambassador
Jeffrey Moon	Chargé d’Affaires

Annex B: Conflict Mapping

The aims, method, sources, and outcome of the **Conflict Mapping method** are worth noting, since the method may be the least common of those used by the evaluation team. These workshops provided information that was instrumental in the intervention assessment, and could be useful for future internal monitoring and evaluation strategies of OTI or similar programs.


The Conflict Mapping method **aims** to identify the events and trends that have played the most important roles in the transition to or away from peace. These most important events and trends, or “key drivers,” are those that either accelerate or impede the peace process.



The **method** is as follows: A large area of paper is attached to a wall, and sticky notes in two colors are available. Workshop leaders ask participants to identify events and trends that have impacted the country’s history of conflict and peace. The group determines the time span of the conflict; one group began in 1715, but most focused on the period from 2002-2010. Each event or trend is recorded on a sticky note (events in one color, trends in another) and posted on the area of paper on the wall in approximate chronological order. Next, participants are asked to identify connections between trends and events, and any trend or event that has influenced another is connected with a directional line/arrow. This aspect is dynamic, participatory and lively. Finally, the number of lines entering or exiting each trend or event is counted. The trends or events intersected with the most lines are thus identified as the most influential in the progress of the country’s transition. A step by step description follows.

Thus the **sources** from which these key drivers are elicited are the workshop participants themselves. The five workshops conducted by the evaluation team, which ranged in size

from seven to 30 participants, gained the perspectives of 77 participants in total. Participants included USAID and Chemonics program staffers, scholars, business actors, external stakeholders, multiple language and ethnic groups, and a mix of men and women. Three workshops were held in the Terai, and two in Kathmandu. Participants represented at least 6 language groups, and comments were translated and written in Nepali, Maithili and English.



The **outcome** of this method is a list that ranks numerically what workshop participants consider the most influential drivers of the transition to peace. The map itself is photographed, and left on the wall as a tool for further discussion. From this evaluation’s five workshops, seven events or trends were identified as key drivers in Nepal’s transition, listed on page 3 of this evaluation report.

The tool is designed to enable users to efficiently capture a high degree of complexity, while at the same time deriving a manageable number of priority issues. It is an ideal tool for enabling busy managers to grasp the fundamental dynamics of a situation and identify the priority drivers of conflict and instability, and incorporate priority issues into the decision-making process for designing community development programs. Unlike more static approaches, this tool examines conflict as a fluid, dynamic system of interrelating trends and events occurring over time, and projecting into the future. Hence, it is also an appropriate tool for monitoring the evolution of a situation and is highly compatible with a participatory public consultation process.

<i>When to use this tool</i>	In the design phase of community development interventions. It can also be useful for project evaluation purposes
<i>Time required</i>	3 workshops of three hours each, with a different group of stakeholders, plus analysis of findings. Alternatively, all three workshops could be run consecutively in one space, with more facilitators.
<i>Who should participate</i>	Cross-functional team including technical staff and external stakeholders such as local community members, government or civil society
<i>Resources required</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 overall facilitator who may need to be independent of the project team • 1 additional facilitator to focus on the participants and to check the analysis
<i>Material required</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meeting room with a wall you can stick large pieces of paper on • Approximately 8 large sheets of paper to stick on the wall • Post-it notes in two colors • Markers

Notes on using the tool

- Contact stakeholders personally using means appropriate to the context and convene a group of about ten people.
- Define terminology used in the exercise: *conflict* – in a way which is relevant to the exercise; *events*–defined as something that happened in a short time frame (for example, within a few hours or a day) and *trends*–more long-term processes or sequences of events.

Notes on Running the Exercise

- Ask participants to state the first events that mark a conflict, or the fragility of a situation. This can be in general or specifically in relation to the extractive project/area in question. Facilitators should help participants focus on a recent period of relevance to the analysis where possible. The first half hour will usually generate a flow of events, with some trends beginning to appear.
- Write down both events and trends onto individual post-it notes and stick these onto the sheets of paper on the wall. As the exercise develops, these should be arranged in chronological order from left to right. At some point it becomes useful to mark the years of events and trends at the top or bottom of the sheet.
- Draw arrows between events and/or trends after roughly twenty minutes, once the new ideas are less forthcoming. The participants should specify what

those are, and the facilitators will only mark them when there is some degree of consensus. Each link represents the fact that a particular event or trend increases the probability of another event or trend to occur.

- Ask participants to identify other events and trends that were overlooked at first. Different individuals, and the groups by consequence, will tend to focus in more detail on certain things. For example, while one group will have as a trend “escalation of acts of violence” another group will specify the key acts that trigger other events and trends. As there is no need to agree, and as the events and trends are generally well known to all, the exercise will move very swiftly to the present.
- Encourage participants to continue identifying “potential events and trends” that will have plausible consequences in the future, such that the exercise can be used for predictive purpose.
- Each “map” represents a unique analysis from a specific viewpoint and helps capture to a certain extent the viewpoint of each group. Many of these across workshops are related to the same event or trend but use different language to describe it or present it in a slightly different context.
- Certain trends and events emerge as particularly significant “nodes,” indicated by a concentration of linking arrows.
- These nodes are ranked on a separate sheet by the facilitators based on the number of links or arrows made to and from them, and using, as far as possible the words chosen by the participants. This helps to identify key issues as identified by each workshop, and behind them the actors that drive or will drive the dynamics of conflict and peace in the area.
- In total over 30 different nodes can be identified in the workshops. The facilitators analyze the patterns emerging from the different “maps” to identify commonalities, to capture the unique perspectives emerging from the different groups, and to locate the key issues to the conflict.
- Only five to ten issues deserve analysis in terms of targeting, or relevance, to the objectives of any community development program aimed at reducing tension and seeking sustainable development.

Annex C: OTI Mission Statement

a) Did the program support U.S. foreign policy objectives? If yes, did it accomplish this by helping local partners advance peace and democracy?

The program was a direct contribution to US foreign policy by helping secure a key element of this policy in Nepal, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its implementation. It worked through like-minded local grantees in a broad variety of sectors, most particularly media.

b) Did OTI work on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs?

The program served in a rapid and highly responsive way to address the dynamics of the transition, addressed through an ongoing contextual assessment and a very strong grant management database. It did not achieve its full potential however when the conflict shifted to a more diffuse and unstructured dynamic, where criminal, sub-regional and political forces converged in a new configuration. This would have called for a better introduction in certain parts of civil society which OTI's forceful grants management process did not allow.

c) Did the program adapt, as necessary, to ongoing political developments/milestones relevant to the premises of the OTI program in Nepal? Put another way, did OTI's program seize critical windows of opportunity?

The evaluation would not use the expression 'seizing windows' but would state that the interventions achieved a highly relevant impact, extensive in terms of the levels of intervention, although less durable than they could have been due to the changes in the dynamics. These were fully understood, but considerations about handover prevailed against a deeper adaptation to the new circumstances.

d) Did the program, within 18 months of startup, that is, by December 2007, have a clear strategy and plan for continuation of activities/actors that were relevant to the specific objectives of the OTI program in Nepal?

By December 2007 the program had grown and achieved sufficient maturity to advance into new areas (the Terai region, a linchpin of security and development, adjacent the Indian border), to reformulate its objectives, and to reach a high level of credibility and coordination with the US Embassy and USAID Mission.

e) Does the evaluation find significant impact in strengthening democratic processes and/or increasing momentum for peaceful resolution of conflict?

The answer to this question varies with the phases of the conflict and transition in Nepal. While the impact was strong in terms of its targeting the right issues, achieving a very broad change (given a US\$20 million budget), and good sustainability of effects in the first phase, its performance dropped slightly in a later phase.

This phase is characterized by greater complexity and the need for a more transparent and consultative process, accompanied by capacity building. More importantly it required a clear conflict mapping and alignment of the drivers to the desired outcomes. The nature of Monitoring and Evaluation in OTI does not currently allow for this alignment to take place easily.

Annex D: Scope of Work

INTRODUCTION

After eleven years of armed insurgency, a window of opportunity for peace and reconciliation opened in Nepal with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists in November 2006; the promulgation of an interim constitution; and the formation of an interim parliament that includes the Maoists. Successful Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, which followed in April 2008, have radically changed the country's political environment and power structure. The Maoists, for example, unexpectedly won more seats than any other party, although they did not secure an outright majority. The historically dominant parties, Nepali Congress and CPN-United Marxist Leninist (UML), suffered unexpected defeats, and the new Madheshi parties won significant representation. At the first sitting of the CA on May 28, 2008 Nepal was declared a republic and the status of then-King Gyanendra was reduced from a royal to a general Nepali citizen. The CA was then tasked with drafting Nepal's new constitution while also addressing significant social and political issues.

BACKGROUND

Although much progress has been made in implementing some components of the CPA over the last two years, the most contentious issues of the peace process are still unresolved and have the potential to reverse the gains made to date. Political consensus is elusive on integration of the People's Liberation Army into the state security services, the executive and federal structure of the New Nepal, local governance structures, return of land and transitional justice. Trust between the major political parties is at an all time low, as illustrated by the recent collapse of the Maoist-led coalition government after just nine months in power. The coalition fell apart over the Maoists' insistence that the Nepal Army's Chief of Staff be dismissed, despite objections from its own coalition partners as well as the majority of CA parties to this action.

The unilateral actions of the Maoists and the reaction from other power centers in the government, most notably the office of the President, created a constitutional crisis which is still unresolved at this moment. The fighting amongst the major political parties and the correlated inability to create an effective and stable national government has slowed the progress on drafting the new Constitution and also has impacted the progress of normalization and peace building at the local level. Rampant political interference in the administration of justice has created a culture of impunity that has dramatically decreased public security in many parts of the country. The Terai region in particular has been affected by a corrosive combination of crime, corruption, and identity politics that has crippled freedom of movement and threatens freedom of the press and the formal market economy. The state has essentially ceded control of the Terai, the most diverse and densely populated area of the country, to criminal gangs and their political patrons, creating the conditions for a failed state within Nepal.

PURPOSE

OTT's program in Nepal started in June 2006, with the purpose of supporting the peace process and conflict mitigation in response to the political transition that began with the countrywide mass demonstrations that led to the King stepping aside in favor of popular rule in April 2006, the reinstatement of parliament, and a ceasefire between the Maoist rebels and the Government of Nepal.

To accomplish this, OTI sought to:

- Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition.
- Increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions.

While initially focused on national-level support to the peace process, including support to key transition institutions such as the National Monitoring Commission for the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the Peace Secretariat (and later the Peace Ministry), and the Election Commission, the OTI program began to shift its focus to community-level peace building and conflict mitigation in response to a deteriorating situation in the volatile Eastern and Central Terai region characterized by growing ethnic tension and violent protests by minority groups. In July 2007,

OTI opened a field office in Sunsari District to better understand the local conflict dynamics, identify effective partners, and monitor activities. In June 2008, OTI formally changed its objectives to reflect this new emphasis on local level engagement in the Terai. The new objectives sought to:

- Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition.
- Increase local-level engagement and participation in the peace process.

To meet these objectives, OTI has supported efforts to increase awareness of the CPA, the CA elections, and constitutional issues through local-level initiatives and wide-reaching radio and television programs and messaging targeting different groups of Nepali society. Media strengthening has also been an important area, with OTI supporting the establishment and growth of local radio station networks and local language programming with the aim of increasing the Nepali public's access to information about the political transition, particularly in remote and underserved areas.

For example, a key activity supports local radio stations in gathering public questions and input through toll-free, call-in programs and connecting communities with their local government officials, political party officials, civil society members, and Constituent Assembly representatives. These programs provide local communities with a peaceful outlet for concerns as well as a platform to engage in dialogues about the political transition and offer input into the process.

Following the Constituent Assembly election in April 2008, the OTI Nepal program shifted to community stabilization activities in the volatile Eastern and Central Terai districts. This was in response to the rise of identity-based politics and lawlessness enticed increasing numbers of youth into violent and criminal activities. Field Office grants began focusing on programs to motivate youth to invest their time and energy in the development of their communities through small-scale projects. Strong community responses to the youth-managed activities resulted in substantive contributions of both funds and labor, and led OTI Nepal to expand this programming in the Terai. Youth-managed small-scale development projects have now reached 540 Village Development Committees (VDC). Activities include improvements to community libraries and early childhood development centers, and rehabilitation of roads and schools (repairing roofs, painting, etc).

Now in its third year, the OTI program, implemented by Chemonics International, has awarded over 260 grants worth over \$ 9million. The grants are spread across four sectors: media strengthening, elections, key political processes and agreements, and community stabilization. Chemonics contract was recently extended and will be handed over the USAID/Nepal to manage at the end of fiscal year 2009.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of this task order are to conduct an independent evaluation of the Nepal program implemented between June 2006 and August 2009. The nature of OTI's mandate, including its short-term objectives, shall be a driving factor in the evaluation. The evaluation shall document accomplishments and lessons learned for the use of both USAID staff and the general public. The final evaluation report shall assist the USAID Mission in Nepal as it intends to take over parts of the program in September 2009, guide other current OTI country programs, serve as a tool for planning similar programming in Nepal and elsewhere, and inform the public on OTI's work in Nepal.

The evaluation should address the following questions:

1. Were areas of programmatic focus appropriate and effective for OTI? Below are a list of focus areas that should be addressed; however this question is not restricted to only these topics:
 - Geographic, such as which regions, which locations within each region.
 - Social strata, youth, nationwide audiences, Kathmandu vs. regions.
 - Types of activities, such as civil society, information dissemination, promoting and diversifying debate, Constituent Assembly, elections, and linking citizens with the government.
 - Style of activities, i.e., short-term, participatory implementation, and locally identified needs.
 - Strategic framework, assessing the overarching goal and objectives.
2. Was the program appropriately flexible and responsive to shifting political and contextual issues?
3. In the Terai, where numerous small-grant activities were supported over an extended period of time, is there evidence of a significant impact related to OTI's overall aims and objectives in Nepal?
4. Were media – public, private, alternative – activities used appropriately and effectively to further OTI's overall goals and objectives?
5. What specific recommendations can the evaluation team offer about what elements of OTI's strategy and methods - if any - can support or enhance the USAID/Nepal Mission's ability to effectively design and implement future conflict-sensitive programming?

In a brief annex, address the following questions concerning OTI's Mission Statement and the Nepal Program. This annex of the final report should not repeat facts, observations, or findings from the first section. Rather it should specifically answer the questions and justify each answer with a summary, referring back to the main body of the report if necessary. The responses will be utilized in the compiling of OTI's Annual Report and for other internal and external reporting needs.

- a) Did the program support U.S. foreign policy objectives? If yes, did it accomplish this by helping local partners advance peace and democracy?
- b) Did OTI work on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs?
- c) Did the program adapt, as necessary, to ongoing political developments/milestones relevant to the premises of the OTI program in Nepal? Put another way, did OTI's program seize critical windows of opportunity?
- d) Did the program, within 18 months of startup, that is, by December 2007, have a clear strategy and plan for continuation of activities/actors that were relevant to the specific objectives of the OTI program in Nepal?
- e) Does the evaluation find significant impact in strengthening democratic processes and/or increasing momentum for peaceful resolution of conflict?

LEVEL OF EFFORT

The evaluation team, under the direction of the Team Leader is responsible for the follow Level of Effort:

1. Develop, in coordination with OTI, an appropriate methodology (including questionnaires) for the evaluation. Training in OTI's M&E methods/practices will be provided.
2. Evaluate the performance and impact of the Nepal program through:
 - a. A literature review of documentation on the Nepal program. Relevant documentation and database access will be provided electronically by OTI; OTI will also provide database training;
 - b. Interviews in Washington DC with current OTI staff, as well as staff from partner Chemonics International, Inc.;
 - c. A field review with interviews with OTI staff; USAID Mission Nepal staff; US Embassy and other USG personnel as needed; Government of Nepal representatives; implementing partners; and program beneficiaries at project sites where feasible.
3. Provide an out-briefing to OTI in Nepal before departure from Nepal.
4. Provide a briefing to OTI in Washington upon completion of the field visit, but prior to drafting the report.

DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team, under the direction of the Team Leader is responsible for the following Deliverables:

1. Provide a brief outline of methodological approach for assessments, including proposed itinerary, schedule for interviews, and identification of all logistical support needs.
2. Draft the evaluation report, not to exceed 25 pages single-sided with Arial 12 point (or equivalent) font, plus additional annexes (report and annexes to be submitted electronically). Examples of past evaluations are available on the publications section of OTI's website. The format of the report is flexible. However, the report shall include photographs (to be taken by the evaluators and/or to be selected from OTI and Implementing Partner's photograph collections). The following sections are recommended for the final report: Table of Contents, Acronyms, Executive Summary,

Background (OTI's mission and general approach to programming, country context, evaluation objectives and methodology, overall observations, findings [answers to questions in scope], conclusions, recommendations.

3. All Deliverables that are to be delivered to OTI must be submitted to QED for review, comment, and marking and branding. QED will make all submissions, draft and final, to OTI.
4. Submit the final evaluation report, deliverable no later than two weeks after receipt of all comments from OTI on first draft. A total of 20 bound copies should be delivered to OTI in addition to an electronic copy in Microsoft Word format.
5. Present a final Power Point presentation electronically with the final report.

Annex E. Conflict Mapping Workshop Results

Conflict Mapping Workshops	Kalaiya, Bara District,	Mahuli Community Development Center Bakadhuwab, Mahuli, Saptari District	Women's Development Center Janakpur,	External stakeholders Kathmandu	USAID/OTI/Chemonics Kathmandu
Ranking of key drivers of the conflict (number of arrows linking event or trend)	(8) increasing armed activity (7) impunity (5) increasing numbers of youth are joining armed groups for money (5) shops and business closed by strikes/bandhs (4) people leaving because of violence (4) Fewer opportunities for youth	(4) Singh formed JMT (3) suppressions of madheshis by State (3) Terai armed groups form (3) extortion of money (3) community protects NGOs (3) increasing violence/ attacks	(9) strikes, road closures (5) anarchy (5) looting, criminal activity increase (4) kidnapping, crime increase (4) tourism, visits drop (4) rise in influence of the political parties (4) Maoists move into the cities (4) houses visited by female cadres (4) Maoists move into Terai	(7) Disconnect between rural population and center (7) rising impunity (6) signing of CPA (6) govt services not available	(10) Terai increasing armed group activity (8) rise of Tharu, Limbu ethnic militia (7) CPA signed (6) increased ethnic tension in the Terai (6) increasing recourse to violence (6) absence of security sector reform increasingly obvious
Participant profile	30, 24 men, 6 women	7, 5 men, 2 women	16 women, including 4 language, ethnic groups	8 men, 2 women: donors, INGO, scholars, business	14 USAID, Chemonics, staffers
Features	2006-09 2 distinct, unconnected conflicts	2003-09: 2 conflicts now-no connection	2000-2009, focus on economic impact on Terai	Focused on root causes from 1715 on	Focus on Terai, not Maoist conflict

Annex F: Concepts Behind Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation aimed in part to assess the extent to which OTI program outputs have enabled impact. To identify verifiable indicators of impact requires defining the changes one is seeking to achieve, and to define changes one must define the chain of results. This report defined the different levels of program results in the following way:

Outputs are the deliverables (products or services) provided by the program.


A training workshop, a school, a road, a food delivery.

Outcomes are the use made of the outputs by beneficiaries.

Application of the skills learned at a training; the planting of distributed seeds.

Impact is the consequence of outcomes in the environment of operation, either for the target group or the whole general population.

Better management after using new skills; better access to food after planting.



This diagram shows how these levels of result link cause and effect. Output is the beginning of the chain, leading to outcome, and impact is the further end of this chain. The activity carried out by OTI (for example the construction of the school, an output) then allows us to see the outcome (for example how much the school is used) which then leads to the impact (the consequence for the people using the school in their lives). Impact can be almost immediate or can take years to take effect. The further one moves down the results chain, away from outputs, the less control OTI has, and the greater the influence of other factors becomes.



Annex G: Program Timeline

DATES	CRITICAL EVENTS	OTI PROGRAM MILESTONES
2005		
Feb	King Gyanendra assumes absolute power, dismisses parliament, limits freedoms	
Nov	Maoists (CPN(M)) and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) sign 12 point agreement in New Delhi: joint commitment to multiparty democracy	
2006		
Feb	Failed municipal elections: seen as no confidence vote for Monarchy	
May	Parliament curtails King's powers, removes his authority over Army, and declares Nepal a secular state Bilateral peace talks: Ceasefire Code of Conduct signed	OTI Nepal assessment team report
		OTI start up manager in place
June	Seven party alliance (SPA) and the Maoists sign 8 point agreement	Chemonics wins bid for Nepal Transition Initiative
July		OTI program commences, signs first grant
Nov	Ten-point Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist chairman Prachanda sign the accord bringing the decade-long armed insurgency to an end NMCCC dissolves	OTI supports Peace Secretariat
Dec		First TBS is held, later renamed Strategy Review Session (SRS) Decision to focus on media, discussion of OFAC implications (Maoist-Terrorist designation) Decision to contribute to peace process, not addressing long-help grievances
2007		
Jan/Feb	Interim (Draft) Constitution promulgated and Interim Parliament formed Violence erupts in Terai when a man from the Madhesi People's Right Forum (MPRF) is killed by a Maoist cadre Madhesi Agitation/Andolan I: violence in Terai Maoist leader Dahal (Prachanda) delivers his first public address in 25 years, promising a federal republican structure, a mixed-economy, and radical land reforms	
March	People's Liberation Army in cantonment, YCL militias	Strategy Review Session #2: use of rolling assessments to keep current Voter registration, possibility of opening field office
April	Government formed with the involvement of Maoists	
May	Increased Young Communist League activities Voter registration begins	Team decides to focus on youth activities Decision is made to open a field office in Itahari Management review team
June	PM's comment that YCL was a "young criminal league" draws sharp reactions from the Maoists Strike in eastern Terai called by Madhesi Tigers Election Law passed Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction unveils a three-year relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction plan to mitigate effects of the decade-long conflict Maoist noncompliance with CPA	Strategy Review Session #3 OTI new goal: support peaceful transition to democracy, 2 objectives; public debate, key institutions Look to support local peace committees LPC OTI determined grants will be made in the following sectors: social inclusion (including issues of ethnic tension), elections, key political transition agreements and processes, community stabilization, media strengthening (both training and equipment grants)
July		Itahari Terai office established
August	Rise in ethnic tensions; Limbuwan, Khumbuwan movements, increased violence in the Terai	Strategy Review Session #4 : added staff; visioning exercise
Sept		OTI PPR review I

October	Government postpones polls; Election Commission cancels all poll related activities UNMIN completes second round of arms registration and combatants verification in four of the cantonment sites	USAID's Office of Food for Peace and OFDA provides \$6.8 million to the UN World Food Programs operation to support the peace process and to provide food, aid and livelihood support to the conflict-affected people in Nepal
Nov	Comprehensive Peace Agreements and monitoring agreements signed	
Dec	Four Madheshi leaders, including senior NC party member Mahanta Thakur, resigned from their parties and the Parliament, citing government indifference to Madheshi demands	
2008		
Jan	Madheshi Andolan II (second Madheshi agitation in the Terai) In February, 16 days of strikes in the Terai cut off supply lines to Kathmandu. Shortages of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, water, and other commodities became acute. Nine people, including a police officer, were reported killed. Allegations of state brutality and police excesses included reports of police attacks on protestors inside hospitals. Government appointed special task forces in 8 Terai Districts—no mandate. Increased youth gangs.	SRS#5: OTI begins to shift sector emphasis from key political transition agreements and processes to conflict mitigation and peace building. Community Mobilizers program planned. Community Development Fund activity planned. Itahari field office begins to pilot Community Development Fund (CDF) activities focusing on youth.
Feb	Madhesh-based parties continue with strike in Terai districts demanding the government to fulfill their demands of implementing their 22-point demands.	SMT decision to hire Community Mobilizers in 10 key districts.
April	Constituent Assembly Elections peacefully conducted nationwide. Final result CPN-M secured 220 and the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal—United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) secured 110 and 103, respectively. The Madhesh-based parties did better than expected, securing 83 seats from the Terai region, with the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) winning a majority of those seats.	
May	May 28, first seating of CA, Republic declared.	
June	General lawlessness in the Terai has been punctuated by an alarming increase in extortions, kidnappings, shootings, and killings, and much of this activity is not being reported at the national level. Armed groups operating in the Terai have proliferated and splintered and have targeted local business people, kidnapped village officials, bombed government offices, and threatened journalists and media outlets for reporting on the violence and broadcasting in Nepali.	Strategy Review Session #6 New objective#2: increase local level engagement and participation in the peace process. OTI changes objective#2 to "increase local-level engagements and participation in the peace process"
July	Yadav (Nepali Congress) becomes the first President of Nepal. PM Koirala officially tenders his resignation to President Yadav. Madheshi VP uses Hindi language during oath taking. Protests sweep throughout the nation.	Scale-up Community Mobilizers <i>Youth engagement</i> To specifically address ethnic tensions among youth in the Terai, OTI provides parallel training to 20,000 Madheshi and Pahadi youth peer educators in conflict resolution and community peace building. OTI's youth mobilization committees are engaging youth to develop their Village Development Committees (village areas or VDCs) through the use of community development funds (CDFs).
August	Pushpa Dahal (Prachanda) – CPN (M) is elected PM with overwhelming majority (464 of 577 votes). Constituent Assembly (CA) installed. Koshi River in Eastern Nepal floods—more than 500,000 people displaced from their homes in the Sunsari District, where the OTI field office is located.	First CDFs grants with DOD 1207 funds cleared. 4 grants covering 75 VDCs in Bara, 15 VDCs in Rautahat, and 30 VDCs in Saptari for approximately \$240,000.

Sept		OTI PPR review II OTI Nepal moves Terai field Office to Janakpur following Koshi floods The Birgunj satellite office opens with one Procurement Specialist and a Procurement/Admin Assistant
October		OTI Annual Report submitted
Nov	Other Backward Class (OBC) Federation calls Terai strikes for four consecutive days, demanding the recognition of OBCs as ethnic groups CA regulations passed—new constitution to be written within 82 weeks through the formation of different CA committees Political party youth wings grow, lack of progress in security sector, esp integration	USAID begins implementation of ARD program Strategy Review Session #7: participation by USAID DG, portfolio review, view to increase activities around CA progress, anticipation of continuation of OTI under Mission, review M and E activities
Dec	Continued insecurity, interruption on basic services, erosion of confidence in GON-corruption increase	
2009		
Jan	UNMIN's term extended by an additional six months Increasing difference between the Defense Ministry and Nepal Army over the new recruitment drive of Nepal Army Special committee to address issues of army integration reconstituted with Prachanda (Dahal) heading the committee Increased attacks on Journalists in the Terai	OTI Program Extension from September 09 through August 15, 2011
	Government withdraws from administrative centers in four Terai districts	
March	Tharu violent agitation in the Terai Supreme Court orders the government to reinstate army generals Increasing bandhs, strikes interrupt commerce Ongoing shortages Tharu, Muslim ethnic movements grow Industries closing some move to India	Strategy Review Session #8: focus on ethnic identities and sub-groups Rolling assessment Departures of SMT announced, Smith to become COP USAID Action Memorandum Handover OTI to USAID/DG: CO and COTR authorities transfer
April	Local government bodies to be formed based on a system of proportional votes - Seven major political parties in the CA reached a consensus to form local bodies based on a system of proportionate votes in the national elections Bi-election in 6 constituencies	Strategy Review Session #9 Program receives a contract modification with an extension until August 15, 2011 Maximum ceiling is raised to \$25 million and contract is obligation to \$20.6 million
April	Govt seeks clarification from Army chief on issues related to recruitment in Nepal Army, retirement of generals and boycotting of National Games Nepali Congress and other major coalition partners oppose the move of Maoist-led government	
May	PM Dahal (CPN-M) unilaterally sacks Army chief and replaces a second in commander—UML quits the government Demonstrations in Kathmandu for and against this government decision President directs the army chief to remain in the position Following national political crises, Tharus pull off strike PM Dahal resigns to protest presidential move as unconstitutional Except Maoists, 22 political parties support president's move 22 parties out of 25 total CA parties support MK Nepal as a prime ministerial candidate—MK Nepal elected unopposed	SITTA:M and E consultant:YMCs SITTA: Political analyst on Terai political assessment
June		USAID Mission Director Paige departs
July	UNMIN term extended by an additional six months	COP Audra Dykman departs, Ryan Smith takes over as Chemonics COP, Final Evaluation team fielded US Ambassador Powell departs,
August		SRS , Final Evaluation Report
September		OTI transfer to USAID

Annex H: Commonly Used Nepalese words

Bandh:	Strike, closure, obstruction, cessation
Andolan:	Agitation or movement
Madheshi:	People from the lowlands, caste Hindus, some Muslims, many ethnicities
Pahadi:	Hill people, numerous ethnicities, caste Hindus and Newari Buddhists
Tharu:	A Nepalese ethnic group located along the southern border of Nepal
Terai:	The low-lying Deccan Plateau which spreads east-west along the border with India. Pre-1950-sparsely populated (Tharus), rich agricultural land and forests. Site of demographic upheaval due to malarial eradication, industrialization and “colonization” policies of the Mahendra era. Now 50% of Nepali population resides in the Terai.
Dalits:	Low caste Hindus
Zamindars:	Large land-owner, holders of royal land-grants, usually Pahadis
Khamaiyas:	Indentured laborers

Annex I: A Sample of Grants included in the Case Studies

	Grantee	Sector	Purpose	Amount
1	Antenna Foundation Nepal	Key political transition agreements and processes: Support to initiate live radio talk show and phone in program	This radio program will promote democracy by bringing local and national voices to a single platform.	\$157,002
3	Antenna Foundation Nepal	Media strengthening: Linking Humla's Remote Population to the Transition Through Radio	To establish a community FM radio station as a means to give Humla some voice in and influence on policy decisions at the center (Kathmandu).	\$48,500
4	Antenna Foundation Nepal	Community stabilization: Mero Jindagi" - My Life: Articulating Core Values & Beliefs in Nepal	To develop a multi-media campaign called "Mero Jindagi" based on "This I Believe" that will engage Nepalis in speaking, writing, sharing and discussing core values and beliefs that guide their daily lives.	\$130,400
5	Dalit Ethnic Upliftment Center (DEUC)	Community stabilization: Youth for peace: Conflict resolution in central Terai	to provide youth in Bara district with community peace building skills and conflict resolution skills to positively engage them in the peace process through trainings and dialogues.	\$18,518
6	Dalit Ethnic Upliftment Center (DEUC)	Community stabilization: Actively Engaging Bara District Youth in Community Stabilization	Train and mobilize youth in their respective communities to increase the awareness of their peers and other residents on the CPA and CA, constitution-making and local development processes, good governance, and conflict management in 30 VDCs in Bara District.	\$74,911
7	Madhesi NGO Federation	Community stabilization: Stronger Together: Improving Civil Society Organizations in the Terai	Targets local organizations in need of advocacy and organizational management skills through a Training of Trainers program. The second activity will focus on organizations that use street dramas as a technique for dissemination of information.	\$46,212
8	MAHA Sanchar	Key political transition agreements and processes: Raising awareness to facilitate positive peace process through comedy	Supports the production of twelve, 45-minute television episodes addressing a variety of post-conflict and transition issues.	\$90,500

9	MAHA Sanchar	Elections: Voter Education: Famous Comedians for Information Dissemination	The EC is coordinating with MAHA to disseminate critical elections-related information at the grassroots level	\$36,000
10	Mahuli Community Development Center (MCDC)	Community stabilization: Engaging Youth Positively: Youth Working to Stabilize their Communities	To train youth and mobilize them in their respective communities to increase the awareness of their peers and other residents on the CPA and CA, local development processes, good governance, and conflict management.	\$69,082
11	Nepal-aya	Community stabilization Taking "A People War" on the Road	To remind and educate the people of Nepal about the costs of war through a traveling exhibit of photographs taken by Nepali photographers from across the country. These photographs document the impact of the eleven-year conflict on the people, buildings and psyche of the country.	\$201,354
12	Nepal-aya	Community stabilization Visualizing the Terai situation: A Documentary Film	To produce an independent documentary film of the second phase of the photo exhibition "A People War" along with the political context in the Terai. The film will be screened at film festivals, and possibly on television and theatres.	\$17,164
13	Nepal-aya	Community stabilization A People War-Traveling Exhibit: Far West, Mid-West & West Regions	To expand the traveling exhibit of photographs taken by Nepali photographers from across the country to ten locations in the regions of the Far West, Mid-West and West.	\$111,000
14	Nepal-aya	Community stabilization Youth and the Pros: Kickoff for Peace Bara	To re-introduce sports as a politically neutral medium to engage and attract youth of the country. A football (soccer) tour featuring a prominent national-level team will travel to eight locations around the country to play friendly matches with young people in those areas.	\$103,599
15	New Young Star Club	Key political transition agreements and processes: Peace Volunteers Democratizing the CPA in the Central Terai: Bara District Bara	Training and support of community-based "peace volunteers" in Bara District who can educate and encourage people within their own communities for informed participation in the CPA processes including the CA elections.	\$23,566

16	New Young Star Club	Community stabilization: Actively involving Central Terai Youth in the Peace Process	This activity will build the capacity of youth through training, IEC material, youth peace network & youth listener group, and public hearing. The target audience for this activity includes local youth, high school students, teachers, civil society members, and VDC and municipality residents.	\$57,137
17	Rastriya Rojgar Prabardhan Kendra (RRPK)	Community stabilization: International Youth Day: Engaging Youth for Peace and Development.	To organize a number of activities over two days to engage youth in community dialogue, foster youth participation at the community level and build on our grantees' accomplishments to disseminate messages of peace and communal harmony.	\$7,681
18	Rural Institution for Community Development (RI-COD)	Key political transition agreements and processes: CPA Training Awareness Building for Remote Villages in Lalitpur	Lalitpur district focus on the distribution and explanation of the CPA to ensure that these constituents understand a key document. A three-day Training of the Trainer (TOT) session will be conducted for 23 participants from each of the VDCs. Following this orientation, these trainers will return to their areas to train mobilizers at the VDC level. The training program will be organized in close coordination with district- and village-level government bodies thereby increasing engagement between local government and communities.	\$10,675
19	Rural Institution for Community Development (RI-COD)	Key political transition agreements and processes: Preparing Local NGOs to Educate on the CPA Kathmandu	Conduct a five-day orientation for the five NGOs who will be conducting a CPA awareness-raising campaign in five districts in the central Terai.	\$1,895
20	Rural Institution for Community Development (RI-COD)	Community stabilization: Participation Now! Promoting Democratic Practices in Local Institutions	To facilitate transparency of local institutions and increase engagement of rural people in local development processes, the institutions need to be trained in and adopt democratic practices that involve all sections of society in their processes.	\$14,609

21	Sahakarya, Nepal	Community stabilization Citizen's Charters	To bring all district-level officials and concerned stakeholders of Bara, Parsa, and Rautahat into a common forum, where they can identify, discuss, and revise their Citizen Charters. The CCs will then be made available to district-line agencies, concerned stakeholders, and communities through district-level orientations, training, orientations at the VDC level, advocacy campaigns, and mass information dissemination through posters.	\$37,377
22	Sahakarya, Nepal	Community stabilization Engaging Urban Youth: Peace Building in the Central Terai.	To train urban youth in two municipalities of central Terai districts on conflict management and peace building to discourage youth from joining such groups, to educate them of peaceful ways to manage conflict and to create a network of peace volunteers who can be mobilized as per the political context. This activity will train 33 peace volunteers to be mobilized in each of the municipal wards of Bara and Parsa Districts. The peace volunteers will, in turn, train 660 youth, who will also be engaged in "peace advocacy" campaigns and social work.	\$21,259
23	Sahakarya, Nepal	Community stabilization Accessing Space for Sharing: Information Centers in the central Terai	Sahakarya aims to establish five Youth Information Centers (YICs) in Bara, Parsa, and Rautahat which will contain educational materials on the CA and local government services as well as newspapers and other information. The center can also be used as a venue where various community-level discussions on community-based issues can be conducted.	\$54,019

24	Samad FM	Community stabilization Youth Voices: Positive Engagement through Community Radio	To produce and broadcast two weekly radio programs - one recorded and one live - targeting youth in Siraha and Saptari districts to increase their awareness on the role and functions of the CA and on current political issues and to engage them positively in the peace process. All dialogues will be recorded, edited and combined with the recorded views of local political analysts, government officials, and civil society leaders.	\$10,949
25	Shanti Samaj Kendra	Key political transition agreements and processes: Democratizing the CPA in the Central Terai	To provide training and support to community-based “peace volunteers” in portions of Makwanpur District who can educate and encourage people within their own communities for informed participation in the CPA processes including the CA elections.	\$13,975
26	Shanti Samaj Kendra	Community stabilization: Youth Participation in the Peace and Reconciliation Process	To provide youth in Makwanpur District with training on community peace building and reconciliation processes, good governance and human rights to positively engage them in the peace process. The target audience for this activity includes local youth, youth clubs, high school students, teachers, street drama artists, civil society members, and VDC and municipality residents.	\$49,190

ANNEX J: OTI/Nepal Final Evaluation Team Schedule July 5th – July 31st, 2009

Sunday, July 5

Arrival in Nepal

Transfer to Radisson Hotel

Monday, July 6

- 9:00 Meeting with OTI Nepal Team (**Melissa Rosser, Sarah Oppenheim, and Shama Pande**) at Embassy
- 10:00 Mission Management In-Brief **Acting Mission Director, Carolyn Coleman and Acting Deputy Mission Director, Sandra Minkel**
- 10:30 Meeting with OTI Media Advisor, Adam Kaplan
Location: Room Number 3008
- 11:30 Depart Embassy to Chemonics (15 minutes)
- 11:45 **Chemonics Team Meeting for introductions to staff and Lunch**
Location: Chemonics Conference Room
- 1:00p Depart Chemonics to Casa de Cass (45 minutes)
- 1:45p Meeting with Ali Saleem, Consultant and OTI STTA - confirmed
- 3:00p Depart to Dhokaima Café (Patan Dhoka) (15 minutes)
- 3:15p Meeting with Kunda Dixit, Journalist and OTI grantee – confirmed
Contact No: 9802030525

Tuesday, July 7

All Day at Chemonics meeting with **CII staff** and interviews

- 8:30 Audra Dykman, Chief of Party
- 9:30 Rebecca Talaga, Deputy Chief of Party
- 10:30 Brent Willey, former M&E Coordination Advisor
- 11:30 Lunch – free time
- 1:00p Pramita Dhungana, Program Development Officer
- 2:00p Nilu Basnyat, Program Development Officer
- 3:00p Raju Kandel, Information Officer
- 4:00p Bindu Acharya, former Program Development Officer

Wednesday, July 8

- 8:30 Meeting with OTI Nepal
Contact: Shama Pande – 400-7200 x 4482
- 9:00 Meeting with US Ambassador and DCM Location: Ambassador's Office
- 9:30 Meeting with USAID/Nepal Democracy and Governance (David Billings, Shanker Khadka, Bishnu Adhikari, and Sharada Jnawali)
- 10:30 Meeting with US Embassy Political/Economics Officers
- 11:30 Meeting with USAID/Nepal 1207 funding partners (ODC, INL, GDO) - confirmed
- 12:30p Lunch: Afternoon meetings with Kathmandu-based grantees and partners
- 2:00p Antenna Foundation (Madhu Acharya, mobile: 98510-38035) \
- 3:45p Nepa~laya (Kiran Shrestha and Arpan Sharma, mobile: 98510-26266)
- 5:00p Meeting with OTI/Nepal at Radisson

Thursday, July 9

- 8:00 Meeting with USAID DG Officer Darlene Foote
- 9:00 Meeting with MAHA (Narendra Kansakar, mobile 98510-41567)
Meeting with Bindu Acharya, former Chemonics staff
- 10:00 Meeting with PAILA (Daulat Jha and Sushma Joshi [former Chemonics staff members], mobiles: 9841-080185 and 9841-147656 respectively)
- 10:45 Depart Chemonics to ICC
- 11:30 Walk through briefing of CA Media Centre – accompanied by Mr. Mukunda Sharma, Joint Secretary and Spokeperson for the Parliament
Tour led by Adam Kaplan, OTI Media Advisor - confirmed
Location: International Convention Centre (ICC)
Contact: Adam Kaplan – 9851107091
- 12:00n Depart ICC for lunch with Adam Kaplan. Melissa Rosser
- 2:30p Ann Visit to the Centre for Constitutional Dialogue and meeting with Larry Taman of UNDP –
Location: CCD at Alpha Beta Complex

Contact No: 9851109975

Friday, July 10

- 9:00 Meeting with Audra at Chemonics
- 9:50 Depart BBC/WST to Communications Corner
- 10:00 Meeting with Communication Corner in Sanepa (Gopal Guragain, mobile 98510-25008)
- 11:00 Depart Communications Corner to Singha Durbar (30 minutes travel time)
- 11:30 Meeting with CA Secretariat Manohar Bhattari – confirmed
Location: Singha Durbar
- 12:00n Lunch and travel to Chemonics' office for afternoon meetings –
- 1:00p Chandra & Emery: Meeting with Radio Audio (Shikha, 4781571)
- 2:00p Chandra & Emery: Meeting with RICOD (Ram Hari, mobile 9841-304304)
- 3:00p Meeting with Interface (Dil Bhusan and Shikha, mobiles 98510-10710 and 98510-37701 respectively)
- 4:00p Whole team: Equal Access (Upendra Aryal, mobile 5013509)
- 5:00p Ann Lewis meets Sarah Levit-Shore at Carter Center

Saturday, July 11

- 1:00p Lars Peter Christensen, Head of HUGO, Danish Human Rights and Governance program

Sunday, July 12

- 10:00 Depart Radisson for the Election Commission
- 10:15 Meeting with Neel Uprety, Nepal Election Commission
- 4:00p Meeting with Guy Banim, Peace-Building and Recovery Advisor, UNDP

Monday, July 13

- 9:20 Fly KTM to Simara - Buddha Air 551
- 9:35 Arrive in Simara
- 9:45 Drive to Hetauda (approximately 1 hour)
- 10:45 Meeting with SSK program staff and facilitators (Navaraj Thapa, mobile 98450-27443)
- 12:45p Meeting in Hetauda with Radio Palung (Shambhu Karki and Manohar Dhakal, mobiles 98450-70555 and 98450-72077 respectively)
- 2:00p Depart for Birgunj
- 5:00p Meet with NGO Coordinators tba Chandra Jha
Overnight in Birgunj in Vishuwa Hotel (Ph number - 051-524065)

Tuesday, July 14

- 8:00 Meeting with Tabrej Ahmad (community mobilizer) at Vishuwa Hotel (mobile 98450-59675)
- 9:15 Meeting with Mamata Chaudhary (procurement/admin specialist, Chemonics satellite office) at satellite office (mobile 98451-84863)
- 10:00 Meeting with Sahakarya Nepal (Arjun Kushwaha, mobile 98415-15616)
- 12:15p Drive to Kalaiya, Bara. Enroute stop at CDF activity sites for Motisar and Sishaniya VDCs, implemented by DEUC
- 1:45p Meet with DEUC program staff at DEUC office (Om Prakash, mobile 98451-89342)
Workshop Participatory Conflict Mapping
- 5:15p Return to Birgunj, overnight at Hotel Vishuwa

Wednesday, July 15

- 11:00 Follow-on Meeting with Tabrej Ahmad (community mobilizer) at Vishuwa Hotel (mobile 98450-59675)
- 11:00 Meeting with journalist, Janakpur radio station
Drive from Birgunj to Bataura VDC
Meetings with Satar Mansour, VDC Secretary, and community
Drive/Overnight in Birgunj

Thursday, July 16

- Morning drive to Janakpur
- 12:30p Lunch with Ryan Smith, Thibaut RPM
- 2:30p Meet with DB Sunuwar, GMS, Sanjay Gupta, PDO, Nilmani Pokharel, PS
- 4:00p Ann Janakpur Women's Development Center (JWDC), Manju Mahara,
Overnight in Janakpur in Manaki Hotel (Ph number- 041-521540)
- 5:00p Meeting with Ryan Smith and Thibaud Marcesse (new RPM)

Friday, July 17

- 8:00 Drive to Saptari (3 hours from Janakpur)
- 11:00 Lunch
- 12:00n Visit MCDC CDFs (2 off of E-W highway), Shyamkant Chaudhary, Chairperson
Workshop and stopover with community
Overnight in Lahan, Siraha

Saturday, July 18

- Meetings in Lahan, Siraha
- 8:00 Radio Samad FM, Jibachha Chaudhary, Station Manager (9743015743, 033 – 561007)
- 9:30 Community Mobilizers, Md.Isha Rain (9741150018), Ram Asish Yadav (9842836333), Jitendra Mandal (9804700913), and Mithilesh Yadav (9842821920). (Isha and Ram Asish are based in Siraha and Jitendra and Mithilesh are based in Saptari districts)
Drive to Siraha Municipality
Overnight in Janakpur in Manaki Hotel (Ph number- 041-521540)

Sunday, July 19

- 10:00 Depart Janakpur on first flight

Monday, July 20

- 8:30 Review of notes, team meeting
- 3:30p Meeting with Melissa Rosser and Sarah Oppenheim

Tuesday, July 21

- 8:30 Team Meeting in Dwarikas
- 9:30 Meeting with Melissa and Sarah at Chemonics office
- 10:30 Meetings with OTI staff: PS, Raju, PDO, etc... to be improvised based on availability of staff
- 4:00p Emery meeting with Barnaby Willitts-King, WFP VAM

Wednesday, July 22

- 9:00 Team meeting, location tbd
- 12:00n Meeting with Mr Akhilesh Upadhaya, Editor, Katmandu Post, ex-NDI
- 1:00p Meeting with Johan Sorensen, Danish Embassy, Governance Advisor
- 5:00p Workshop on conflict analysis with external stakeholders

Thursday, July 23

- 9:00 Emery meets with Larry Attree, Saferworld Asia Director
- 9:00 Chandra/Ann meeting with TAF/press in Kathmandu
- 11:00 Team Power point
- 2:00p Workshop on conflict analysis with Chemonics, OTI

Friday, July 24

- 9:00 Emery- Raju; Ann-Ryan
- TBA Meeting with RoddyChalmers, Simon Arthy 0985 10 38 351, DFID Governance/conflict advisers, Win-rock rep Darryl.

Saturday, July 25

Free Day

Sunday, July 26

- 8:30 Outbrief with OTI / Chemonics team at Melissa's

Monday, July 27

- 10:30 – 12:00n Outbrief with Acting Mission Director/Embassy Chargé d'affaires
- 2:00p Outbrief with Chemonics staff, at Chemonics
- 6:00p Emery Brusset departs

Tuesday 28 July

- 11:00 Meeting with Dr. Bina Pradhan, Senior Economist, Fulbright Fellow UC-Berkeley
- 6:00p Meeting with UNICEF/Community initiatives, Anjali Sherchand

Wednesday 29 July

- 10:00 Meeting with Dr. Bhed Prakash Upreti, retired GON senior official , retired UNDP senior officer
- 2:00p Meeting with Dr. S. Prasai, The Asia Foundation,
- 6:00p Meeting with Magee Shah, TEWA Foundation

Thursday,30 July

- 11:00 Meeting with USAID/ DG office
- 4:00p Meeting with Ambika Shrestha, Regional President, Business and Professional Womens Club

Friday 31 July

- 9:00 Wrap up at Chemonics; staff comments
- 11:00 Ann Lewis departs

Annex K: Key Documents, Partial Bibliography

USAID/OTI Media Impact Assessment in Nepal, (DRAFT) Report July 2009, New-Era/MACRO

“Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process” Asia Report No 163- 19 February 2009, International Crisis Group

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Dykman, Audra, Chemonics Chief of Party MEMORANDUM TO FILE, USAID/OTI Nepal Community Mobilizer and Assessment, February 6, 2008

Thapa, Majushree “Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy” Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2005

Saleem, Ali for USAID/OTI , “Central and Eastern Terai Districts’ Trends Analysis: Opportunities & Challenges” A study of Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha, Saptari, Sunsari and Morang, December 2008 to May 2009

USAID OTI Transition Initiatives Annual Summary Reports, 06-07, Oct 2007 – Sept 2008

Nepal Transition Initiatives, Quarterly Reports, Oct 06 - March 2009

OTI Nepal website: for reports, success stories:

http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/nepal/nepal_rpt_index.html

Aplon Jason, Kaplan, Adam, Hryshchyshyn, Michael USAID/DCHA/DG Nepal Transition Assessment, June 15, 2006

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Willey, Brent, Field Report-Sunsari and Morang Districts, Evaluation, YMCs, May, 2009

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