



USAID | **IRAQ**
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

EVALUATION OF USAID'S COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) IN IRAQ:

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSP MODEL AS A NON-LETHAL TOOL FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

JULY 22, 2009

This publication was produced for review by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). It was prepared by Russell W. Glenn, Colin Holland, Alasdair W. G. Mackie, Brenda Oppermann, Deborah Zubow Prindle and Myra Speelmans.

EVALUATION OF USAID'S COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) IN IRAQ: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSP MODEL AS A NON-LETHAL TOOL FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
8614 Westwood Center Drive
Suite 400
Vienna, VA 22182

with

AECOM
A-T Solutions, Inc.
International Resources Group

Contracted under Delivery Order 267-O-00-09-00508

DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

EVALUATION OF USAID'S COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) IN IRAQ: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSP MODEL AS A NON-LETHAL TOOL FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

DISCLAIMER

The author's views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
PROJECT SUMMARY	iv
ACRONYMS	v
FIGURE 1: MAP OF CSP SITES	viii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	ix
Scope of Work Core Objectives and Outcomes	ix
Does the Model Work?.....	ix
What components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective?.....	ix
Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime?.....	ix
Findings and Recommendations	ix
Concept and Methodolgy.....	ix
Coordination and Integration.....	x
Measuring Effectiveness.....	x
Program Oversight.....	x
Building on CSP: Considering Program Adaptation for Other Environments.....	xi
Concluding Observation	xi
I. INTRODUCTION	1
The Response to the Development Challenge	1
The Problem Statement.....	1
The Theory of Intervention.....	2
The Design of the Community Stabilization Program Model.....	2
CSP Implementation.....	3
“Short-term Employment Generation through Community Infrastructure and Essential Service (CIES) Projects”.....	3
“Long-term Job Creation through Business Development”.....	4
“Education, through Vocational Training and Apprenticeships”.....	4
“Engagement through Youth Activities”.....	4
II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION	6
III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY	7
IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CSP COMPONENTS*	8
Community Infrastructure and Essential Services	8
Business Development Program	9
Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Program (Vo-Tech)	10
Engagement through Youth Activities	12
V. OVERARCHING FINDINGS	14
Preliminary Note	14
Concept and Methodology	14
CSP is a viable program. It is highly desirable that it be employed in other theaters after modifications to its current form and adaptation to local conditions elsewhere.....	14

Beneficiary selection is vital to the success of CSP efforts.....	14
Coordination and Integration	14
Active intra-component coordination and synchronization would enhance program effectiveness.....	14
Institutionalizing both inter and intra-agency synchronization will increase program effectiveness and reduce reliance on personality driven success.....	14
Coordination with the host government is essential to the success of CSP.....	15
Measuring Effectiveness	15
While it is not possible to conclude a causative relationship exists between CSP and a reduction in violence, poll results show both beneficiaries and non-participants in the program perceived an improvement in security and government services during the lifespan of CSP.....	15
Measures of effectiveness should focus on outcomes or effects rather than outputs when addressing program objectives:.....	15
Security and CSP Relations with the Military	16
Partnering with the military enhances CSP effectiveness.....	16
Branding	16
A decision to limit branding of CSP is problematic.....	16
Corruption and Fraud	16
Efforts to reduce corruption and fraud are essential.....	16
Program Oversight	16
Oversight of CSP is inadequate.....	16
It is necessary to design sustainment and transition of CSP activities into program objectives.....	17
Understanding the capacity of HN governments is essential to achieving CSP objectives.....	17
VI. CONCLUSIONS	18
Does the model work? Did CSP's approach to create employment and employment opportunities reduce the incentives of individuals to support and/or participate in violent acts?	18
What programmatic components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective? Identify key lessons learned, both positive and negative	18
Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime?	18
How effective was CSP co-location with PRTs?	18
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS	19
Coordination and Integration	19
USAID Should View CSP Components as Part of a System, Considering Each as an Integral and Complementary Part of the Whole.....	19
USAID, State, and the Department of Defense Should Work in Conjunction with the National Security Council (NSC) to Design and Support a Management Capability Responsible for Synchronizing Interagency Activities.....	19
Develop Plans and Implement Programs in Keeping with a Comprehensive Approach to Operations.....	19
Retain the PRT concept as a decentralized coordinating and implementing body.....	19
Corruption and Fraud	19
Looking ahead to other CSP models, establish formal relationships between appropriate agencies to allow for exchange of intelligence and performance evaluations of CSP implementers.....	19

USAID Should Employ an Independent Fraud and Corruption Monitor.....	19
Oversight	20
Resource and adapt policies to allow USAID representatives on PRTs to better oversee USAID programs in their Areas of Operation.....	20
Measuring Effectiveness	20
Programs Should Provide Value-per-Dollar Accounting of Expenditures to Reflect the Extent of Funding Reaching Beneficiaries.....	20
Develop indicators that measure changes in the behavior and perceptions of residents of COIN-focused communities, which will serve as proxies for stability/security metrics.....	20
Security and CSP Relations with the Military	21
Rely on local program staff to the extent possible, thereby building social capital, providing enhanced access to local networks, and reducing security-related costs.....	21
Branding	21
Develop More Nuanced Approaches to Branding and Other Policies with the Potential to Favorably Influence Population Attitudes Regarding the Coalition.....	21
Sustainment and Transition to Iraqi Authorities	21
Design Sustainment and Transition into All Programs at Initiation.....	21
Population Segments Addressed by CSP	22
Expand CSP-Type Programs to Encompass Less Immediate and Vulnerable Audiences.....	22
Program Management	22
Better balance Agreement/Contract Vehicles to better address (1) requirements for flexibility in volatile COIN environments, (2) consistency of guidance to implementers, and (3) cost.....	22
Select those capable of facilitating cooperation for key program positions.....	22
Form a technical evaluation body to determine what adaptations to CSP are needed prior to its application to other environments.....	22
Capitalize on USAID lessons learned capabilities.....	22
Adaptation to Other Theaters	23
Evaluate the availability and suitability of other partners, to include other agencies, governments, NGOs, and IGOs.....	23
Establish an intra-USAID COIN education program.....	23
Encourage formation of a USG Interagency Staff College.....	23
Concluding Remarks	24
Endnotes	25
Bibliography	27
 ANNEXES	 31
A. Scope of Work	31
B. Counter-Insurgency (COIN) Primer	36
C. Research Design and Methodology	42
D. Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II	45
E. List of Persons Contacted/Interviewed	46
 TABLE OF FIGURES	
Figure 1: Map of CSP sites	viii
Figure 2: Clear-Hold-Build Phases of COIN	2
Figure 3: Size and Spread of Key Informant Interviews	7
Figure 4: Triangulation Components for Study Data	43

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors first and foremost thank the many individuals – American, Iraqi, and British – who kindly gave of their time and wisdom in granting interviews and whose names appear in Annex C of this work. Their input was invaluable to our efforts to provide study sponsors with a well-informed and substantiated work of analysis. The authors give special thanks to those who went to exceptional lengths in assisting us to meet others for interviews: Mark Urban on the Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), Dar Warmke in Basra, the

Baghdad IRD Business Development Program team, Christian Barratt on the Taji embedded PRT, and St. John Coughlan and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Copinger-Symes in the United Kingdom.

Several of the team was supported behind the scenes by our own organizations and other sponsors who recognized the importance of this undertaking. The U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center approved a hiatus from other

work, knowing that an improved understanding of the development perspective on counterinsurgency would further their own efforts to improve our nation's interagency cooperation.

PROJECT SUMMARY

The “Evaluation of the USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) in Iraq: Effectiveness of the CSP Model as a Non-Lethal Tool for Counterinsurgency” is being undertaken by International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI), which was awarded the competitively bid contract by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Delivery Order 267-O-00-09-00508 on April 16, 2009. This evaluation addresses USAID/Iraq's Strategic Objective 7, “Focused Stabilization; Reduce the Incentive for Participation in Violent Conflict.” Supporting sub-contractors are AECOM, A-T Solutions, and International Resource Group (IRG).

The team consisted of the following individuals whose area of expertise is shown parenthetically:

- Ajay Kalotra, IBTCI (Project Director)
- Cynthia Scarlett, IBTCI (Program Manager)
- Russell W. Glenn, A-T Solutions (Counterinsurgency)
- Colin Holland, IBTCI (Business Development)
- Alasdair Mackie, IRG (Civil Infrastructure and Employment Services)
- Brenda Oppermann, IRG (Vocational Education and Apprenticeship)
- Deborah Zubow Prindle, AECOM (Youth Activities)
- Myra Speelmans, IBTCI (Monitoring and Evaluation)
- Matthew Delaney, IBTCI (Administrative Support)

ACRONYMS


ACDI/VOCA	A private nonprofit organization
AFCEE	Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
AECOM	A-E Com, a commercial company
AIDAR	USAID Acquisition Regulation
AMIDEast	USAID implementer active in the Middle East
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AOTR	Agreement Officer's Technical Representative
A-T Solutions	Anti-terrorism Solutions
BCT	Brigade Combat Teams
BDP	Business Development Program
BG	Brigadier General/Battle Group
BOQ	Bachelor Officer Quarters
CA	Comprehensive Approach/Cooperative Agreement
CAP	Community Action Program
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CETI	Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq
CFE	Center for Excellence
CIES	Community Infrastructure and Essential Services
CIMIC	Civil Military Cooperation
CIPE	Center for International Private Enterprise
CO	Contracting Officer
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COP	Chief of Party
COTR	Contract Officer's Technical Representative
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Community Stabilization Program
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DAC	District Advisory Council
DCOP	Deputy Chief of Party
DfID	Department for International Development (British)
DG	Director General
DoD	Department of Defense
DoE	Department of Education
DOS	Department of State
EGY	Employment Generation and Youth
ePRT	Embedded Provisional Reconstruction Team
ERF	Emergency Relief Fund
ES	Essential Services
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EU	European Union
FATA	Frontier Areas and Tribal Areas
FOB	Forward Operating Base

FM	Field Manual
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSO	Focused Stabilization Office (USAID)
GAO	Government Accounting Office
GoI	Government of Iraq
GRD	Gulf Region Division
HN	Host Nation
HQ	Headquarters
IBTCI	International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc.
ICAP	Iraq Community Action Program
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
I-D-R	Issues-Discussions-Recommendations
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IG	Inspector General
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IR	Infrastructure Rehabilitation
IRAP	Iraq Rapid Assistance Program
IRD	International Relief and Development
IRG	International Resources Group
IRMO	Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
JIATF	Joint Iraq Action Task Force
JTERP	Joint Technical Economic Rehabilitation Project
JRAT	Joint Reconstruction Action Team
KII	Key Informant Interview
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LNO	Liaison Officer
LPG III	Local Governance Program
LT	Long-Term
M	Million
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEP	Monitoring Evaluation Plan
MEPP II	Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program, Phase II
MMPW	Ministry of Municipality and Public Works
MND	Multi National Division
MNF-I	Multi-National Forces-Iraq
MOBIS	Mission Orientated Business Integrated Services
MoC	Ministry of Culture
MoE	Ministry of Education
MOLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MOYS	Ministry of Youth and Sports
MSME	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises
NAC	Neighborhood Advisory Council
NDA	Non Disclosure Agreement
NDS	National Development Strategy

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSC	National Security Council
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
O&M	Operations and Maintenance
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OP	Opinion Poll
OPA	Office of Provincial Administration
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
PC	Provincial Council
PDS	Provisional Development Strategy
POD	Program Office Director
POO	Program Operations Officer
PERT	Program Evaluation and Review Technique
PRDC	Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSD	Personal Security Detail
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PWP	Public Works Program
QA/QC	Quality Assurance/Quality Control
QDR	Quarterly Defense Review
QRF	Quick Reaction Funds/Quick Reaction Force
RAMSI	Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOI	Sons of Iraq
SOW	Scope of Work
ST	Short-Term
STC	Save the Children
STRATEFF	Strategic Effects
SWET	Sewage Water Electric and Trash
TOC	Tactical Operations Center
U.S.	United States
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
USA	United States Army
USACE	United States Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USJFCOM	United States Joint Forces Command
USMC	United States Marine Corps
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
Vo-Tech	Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Program
VTC	Vocational Training Center
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

MAP OF CSP SITES

FIGURE 1: MAP OF CSP SITES



This map was produced as a reference aid only. The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) describes its Community Stabilization Program (CSP) as a non-lethal counterinsurgency program aimed at reducing incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at-risk youth, ages 17 to 35, in its many projects. As a three-year program designed to complement broader counterinsurgency efforts, CSP is unique and non-traditional for USAID. It nevertheless constitutes its largest cooperative agreement worldwide, with overall funding of \$675 million.

CSP has four primary components:

- Short-term employment generation through Community Infrastructure and Essential Service projects
- Long-term job creation through Business Development programs
- Education through Vocational Training and Apprenticeships
- Engagement through Youth activities

This evaluation focuses primarily on whether CSP is a suitable and useful component of a counterinsurgency (COIN) operation, i.e., does it perform satisfactorily as a model for a non-lethal COIN initiative? In order to gain a solid understanding of the program, identify its strengths and weaknesses, and provide substantive recommendations, the evaluation team closely examined CSP implementation practices and associated issues in addition to the program itself. To this end, the team also analyzed underlying assumptions, decisions, and policies since these, in combination with implementation practices, often influenced the level of success attained by the program. Given the number of COIN stakeholders in theater, the team broadened its analysis to touch on non-CSP projects implemented by other USG stakeholders. By taking such a

comprehensive approach to assessing CSP, the evaluation team believes that the resultant observations, conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations address overarching issues as well as nuances associated with this complex, fast-paced program.

Scope of Work Core Objectives and Outcomes

The objective of this evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the USAID Community Stabilization Program (CSP) and its impact in Iraq. Research and design methodologies for this report are found in Section III of the report.

Does the Model Work?

CSP was implemented in a variety of communities, each with its own history, social dynamic, and power relations. All suffered from violence, to a greater or lesser degree, during the period of implementation. CSP's success in given locations is a function of these factors: operational security; the level of cooperation with other stakeholders operating in the same operational areas; the political will and capabilities of local governments; and, numerous other variables. The same concerns inhibited the evaluation team's ability to establish causation between program initiatives and a reduction in violence.

What components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective?

Components were found to be effective to varying degrees depending on location, the issues listed above, coalition and Iraqi personalities, and additional variables. CSP was initially characterized by quick impact projects, seen as non-lethal complements to the military surge. Perhaps influenced by the publication and implementation of

the new U.S. Army and United States Marine Corps counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine in December 2006, the program evolved into one in which sustainability of the various components was given greater emphasis. This longer-term perspective, one that links program performance to ultimate coalition and Iraqi COIN objectives, is essential to success.

Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime?

All program components were appropriate during the course of implementation of CSP. However, sequencing and better coordination between components should be granted greater attention during future implementation of similar programs. Specifics in this regard receive considerable attention in the body of this report.

Findings and Recommendations

The main body of this report addresses all observations and recommendations in greater detail. Below are several observations and recommendations notable for the impact they had, not only on CSP, but also on their import vis-à-vis USG COIN efforts overall. This summary concludes with pertinent issues that USAID should consider adopting, including CSP-like programming, as part of its overall mission in the future.

Concept and Methodology

Finding: *CSP is a viable program, given changes.*

CSP experienced considerable success where program-internal coordination and broader integration took place.* 98% of CSP participants polled during this evaluation reported that their communities are safer today than in 2006. While the extent to which CSP

* For the purposes of this study, coordination is used in the context of coordination between CSP components. Integration is used in the context of integration of CSP with other USAID programs as well as other USG initiatives.

and aid programs in general are a part of this success cannot be determined given the number of variables influencing security, it is broadly accepted that aid, capacity building, training of local and national police and military forces, and other such activities are vital complements to direct action taken against an insurgent foe. CSP, as conceived, is a significant step forward in making this comprehensive approach reality. The changes necessary are addressed below and in greater detail throughout this analysis.

Recommendation: *With modifications to its current model and adaptation to other host countries, it is highly desirable that CSP-type programs be implemented in other COIN theaters.*

Coordination and Integration

Finding: *Coordination between CSP components is fundamental to the effectiveness of the overall program.*

Although there was a natural synergy among the various CSP components, and these components were meant to coordinate and complement each other according to the implementer's program description, this rarely happened. In fact, most of the time, each of the four program components operated independently.¹

Recommendation: *CSP components should be implemented as part of a system, considering each as an integral and complementary part of the whole.* While CSP's Program Description, dated July 29, 2007, underscores the importance of coordination between the components and outlines the complementarities between the components, key informant interviews (KIIs) noted that coordination between components did not occur in practice. Future CSP-like programs will require close oversight to ensure that program components work together to achieve their mutual ends, thereby allowing the

program to become a force that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Finding: *Effective inter- and intra-agency integration would increase the probability of CSP and broader USG success.*

CSP operations worked well when all stakeholders worked together at the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) level to develop a common strategy and utilize economies of scale to maximize United States Government (USG) resources.² CSP objectives also benefited from regular coordination meetings held in some locations by those implementing the Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Program, (Vo-Tech), meetings that included various relevant USG stakeholders. Such successes appear to be largely personality driven. Unfortunately, CSP, Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), and other initiatives were often not integrated; in some cases, interaction was so poor that CSP projects were completely unknown to other PRT and local coalition representatives.³

Recommendation: *Coordinate and integrate all USG activities via the development of a COIN strategy including planning its execution, implementation, and the departure of the counterinsurgent force/transition to local and national governments, thereby ensuring a comprehensive approach to operations.*

CSP-type programs should be internally coordinated and integrated with other relevant USG, multinational, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), inter-governmental organizations (IGO), commercial enterprises, and host government initiatives within an Area of Responsibility (AoR). Preliminary planning, training, and related activities to facilitate this integration should incorporate substantive participation on the part of these relevant participants and eventually include traditional and host government leaders.

Measuring Effectiveness

Finding: *Using a reduction in violence as an impact indicator for the success of a COIN program can be misleading.*

The number of confounding variables in a theater make any firm conclusions, with respect to correlation or causation between the implementation of CSP and the number of violent incidents, a potentially misleading one (e.g., the effect of similar programs like CERP on-going in the same Area of Operations (AO) or criminal activity not disaggregated from violent incident statistics). Interviewees questioned on this finding either believed no conclusion could be drawn given the amount of other aid and related ongoing activity, or personally felt that CSP aided in the reduction of violence, but they could not validate their impressions.

Recommendation: *Develop indicators measuring changes in behavior or perceptions of CSP-targeted community residents that serve as a proxy for stability/security.*

Developing metrics that more closely capture changes in attitudes and behavior, which indicate a return to normalcy, would assist in determining the attainment of the ultimate COIN objective: stability. Examples of these indicators include: the number of people in markets, tea shops, and other public spaces at different times of the day, and the number of children attending school, among others. These data could be collected through surveys, focus groups and key informant interviews.

Program Oversight

Finding: *Programmatic oversight of CSP activities is essential to assess project effectiveness.*

While concern that USAID personnel visiting CSP project sites may have security implications for contractors or other Iraqis associated with project efforts, it is restrictions regarding the safety of the USAID representative

himself that pose the primary limitation on field monitoring. The result is an over reliance on local staff who may suffer pressure from host nation government officials or other sources that potentially impede objectivity. In addition, the impact of corruption undermined CSP's effectiveness as it relates to and supports COIN.

Recommendation: *Decentralize program oversight to allow field representatives on PRTs to monitor development programs in their areas of operation.*

Train, resource, formally assign responsibility, and develop procedures to ensure that representative PRT members have the authority and responsibility to effectively oversee CSP-type programs. Further, USAID field representatives should report to an overarching monitor, who in turn would synchronize complementary USG/ Government of Iraq (GOI) programs.⁴

Building on CSP: Considering Program Adaptation for Other Environments

The following are expansions on two of the report's recommendations that the evaluation team consider to be particularly representative of challenges the USG will face as it contemplates implementing a program similar to CSP elsewhere in the world:

1. CSP components should be implemented as part of a system, considering each an integral and complementary part of the whole.

"Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities" is the second section in the *Counterinsurgency* manual, an indication of this concept's importance in the minds of its authors. Coordination must be improved *within* the components of programs such as CSP and integration must be improved *between* CSP and other USAID and USG funded programs, e.g., Iraq Rapid

Assistance Program (IRAP), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), and the host nation government efforts.⁵ There is an urgent need for internal management oversight of organizations responsible for ensuring that program components are consistently and constantly complementary. The evaluation team understands that USAID does not have the mandate to oversee other USG agency operations; however, given that it is the institutional expert for development, and non-lethal COIN activities may well transition to traditional development programs, USAID is the logical agency to provide leadership in this regard to ensure that these activities are synchronized and mutually beneficial.

2. Evaluate the Availability and Suitability of Other CSP Stakeholders

In addition to attaining a high level of situational awareness, it is critical to determine whether local officials have the capacity and will to accept responsibility for programs destined for transition to local authorities. Similarly, adaptation of a CSP-like program in the face of future COIN challenges in areas where there is little or no U.S. military presence might rest on the host nation's capability and will to protect those implementing the program. Program designers should solicit input from all possible stakeholders and subject matter experts to gauge the viability of initiating projects in a given nation or portion thereof. The ensuing analysis and decision whether or not to proceed must include consideration of whether the host nation government and security forces will ultimately be able to support a program in the manner required.

Concluding Observation

Much has transpired since CSP's inception in mid-2006. It is unfair to judge the program exclusively in light of what we know as it nears termination.

The release of the afore-cited *Counterinsurgency* manual came in December 2006, several months after CSP was designed and implementation started. Therefore, the question is not whether the program encompassed the doctrine's insights at origin, but rather, whether its managers and other participants later internalized and applied an improved understanding of COIN. Other factors are also critical to CSP and broader USG success; USAID, military, and implementer personnel short-term rotations among them. To paraphrase a long-time adage regarding U.S. presence in Korea, "We have been in Iraq six years one year at a time." Continuity is vital to program success; conditions in Iraq work against continuity.

CSP presents a viable and essential non-lethal COIN model that can play a leading role in assisting communities under siege from insurgents and other destabilizing influences to reestablish themselves as secure, law abiding, and economically healthy societies. Acting on the recommendations in this evaluation should serve to strengthen the CSP model, thereby improving its ability to realize intended effects.

I. INTRODUCTION

Prior to the coalition's invasion of Iraq in March 2003, decades of war and years of international sanctions resulted in the near collapse of Iraq's economy and infrastructure. Coalition forces were unable to impose order in the months following the invasion of Iraq and the lawlessness that followed the demise of Saddam's regime. A number of foes, including former members of the Iraqi security services, Ba'ath Party loyalists, and others close to the Saddam regime, began to launch attacks on coalition troops. Insurgents targeted Iraqis who were serving the new state institutions, others who worked with those institutions or the coalition, and international organizations, in addition to coalition armed forces. Factional violence plagued Iraq as various groups struggled for control or influence. On February 22, 2006, two bombs exploded at the Al Askari Mosque, precipitating widespread sectarian violence across Iraq.

At the same time that Iraq seemed to be descending into civil war, USAID approved a three-year transition strategy aimed at: 1) stabilizing Iraq through supporting economic and social stabilization efforts in key areas affected by insurgent violence; 2) supporting capacity building and governance of local and national government; and 3) increasing economic opportunity. The first of these three areas formed the basis of "focused stabilization," whereby as a part of the Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, key strategic cities were targeted for a program aimed at contributing directly to the establishment of economic and social stability while coalition and Iraqi security forces provided security. The USAID program designed to support this strategy, CSP, was intended to complement the military surge.

The Response to the Development Challenge

CSP is described as a non-lethal COIN program aimed at reducing incentives for participation in violent conflict by employing or engaging at-risk youth aged 17 to 35 in its many projects.⁶ As a three-year program designed to complement broader COIN efforts, CSP is unique and non-traditional for USAID. It nevertheless constitutes its largest cooperative agreement worldwide, with overall funding of \$675 million.⁷

The Problem Statement

In COIN, one applies a combination of both kinetic and non-kinetic tactics. Kinetic tactics are the application of violence in the service of coalition and Iraqi objectives. Non-kinetic tactics are "softer" or "non-lethal", where aid, capacity building, and similar programs are tools in the important struggle to gain the tolerance, if not support, of the Iraqi people, while denying the enemy its most valued resource.

Annex B provides a concise primer on COIN for readers, but it is worthwhile to note, a succinct introduction to the model is taken from the U.S. Army (USA)/United States Marine Corps (USMC) *Counterinsurgency* manual. These are the Clear-Hold-Build phases where:


- Force is employed, **clearing** an area of the enemy.
- **Holding by physical occupation and presence** provides the population time to recover from the difficulties imposed by the insurgent force and intimidation.
- Assisting with the **building** of governance and social capacity, respect for the rule of law, delivery of essential services, and economic recovery, all of which are key to transitioning to a sustainable, safe, and secure environment.

A visual depiction of the phases appears in Figure 2.

The above analogy fails to encompass an important exception; however, rather than reacting to an established threat, the counterinsurgent would much rather prevent a threat from asserting itself. COIN can also be implemented to prevent an insurgency in its very earliest form during which it is virtually invisible to a host government, maintaining a low profile while building strength. Both kinetic and non-kinetic tactics have utility regardless of whether the threat has yet asserted itself or remains in hiding. As one of our interviewees noted, "These sorts of COIN activities are not just post-kinetic initiatives. They can also be used in the area of operations (AO) if the local population is beginning to turn against the U.S. government (USG) or coalition forces."⁹ The significance of "preventative COIN" may not be lost to coalition representatives in Afghanistan, where the Taliban is moving in and taking control of areas in which aid efforts are underway. Although we cannot determine whether the population's reaction is at least in part attributable to such initiatives, local people in Afghanistan are defending their villages and projects against the incursions.¹⁰

Whether seeking to overcome an active insurgency or forestalling the maturation of an embryonic one, stakeholders that employ both kinetic and non-kinetic resources must coordinate and synchronize their efforts. Force alone cannot single-handedly overcome an insurgency any better than aid organizations can survive unprotected alone in the midst of insurgents willing to employ violence against them, even in a population supporting their COIN initiatives.

FIGURE 2: CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD PHASES OF COIN⁸



The Theory of Intervention

CSP has its origins in the Iraq Transition Strategy Statement of November 2005. Noteworthy in that document are the stated objectives of the transition strategy: "USG objectives cannot be accomplished through security interventions alone. The USAID strategy provides a focused approach for addressing the non-security issues of governance and market-led growth. It is important to increase resources for these two vital areas which, in the short-term, will stabilize areas impacted by the insurgency and mitigate the appeal of insurgent recruitment efforts." Stabilization was an important platform for the strategy.

The concept of CSP is to focus on communities that are severely affected by insurgent action. The Transition Strategy Statement goes on to imply that specific implemented activities will achieve the desired stability, in turn leading to more traditional development programs. "USAID will focus on employment generation, infrastructure rehabilitation, youth programs, assistance to municipal governments and conflict mitigation" in the cities identified as being in strategic USG interest. It is presumed that following

the achievement of stability, these "cities will be integrated into USAID's longer-term development initiatives in health and education, agriculture, micro-credit and building the capacity of communities and civil society organizations for advocacy, and the capacity of local government to provide basic services."

Within USAID/Iraq's Transition Strategic Plan 2006-2008, the first of four strategic objectives delineated is "Focused Stabilization: Reduce the incentives for participation in violent conflict." This is the primary objective of the CSP. To help plan and manage the process of assessing and reporting progress towards achieving its strategic objectives, USAID/Iraq completed its Performance Management Plan (PMP) in August 2006. In the PMP document, consistent with earlier mission objectives, the strategy to reduce the incentives for participation in violent conflict is identified as Strategic Objective 7 (SO 7).

The Design of the Community Stabilization Program Model

The CSP is seen as a key element in transitioning Iraq to a stable, democratic, and prosperous country.

Toward this end, a Request for Application (RFA) number 267-06-001 was issued on January 2, 2006, seeking applicants to implement the "Focused Stabilization in Strategic Cities Initiative" (FSSCI). As defined in the RFA, the purpose of FSSCI (now the CSP) is to complement military security efforts and civilian local government development with economic and social stabilization efforts. The activities of CSP are intended to: 1) create jobs and develop employable skills with a focus on unemployed youth; 2) revitalize community infrastructure and essential services; 3) support established businesses and develop new sustainable businesses; and 4) help mitigate conflict in selected communities. By carrying out these activities, the CSP implementing partner should achieve measurable progress towards the Mission's SO 7. It should be noted that CSP in its initial design was not intended to be sustainable.

International Relief and Development (IRD) was awarded the cooperative agreement (267-A-00-06-00503-00) under the RFA on May 29, 2006, and is the primary CSP implementer. Per the Scope of Work, CSP is a:

“...[N]on-lethal, counterinsurgency (COIN) program that reduces the incentives for participation in violent conflict through creating employment and engaging youth. The Community Stabilization Program is a key element of the U.S. Government strategy to transition Iraq to a stable, democratic and prosperous state. CSP is a unique, non-traditional program for USAID. Rather than focusing on traditional long-term sustainable development objectives, CSP is a short-term COIN program concentrates on employing or engaging mass numbers of at-risk, unemployed males ages 17 to 35. CSP is implemented in close coordination with the military, provincial reconstruction teams, and with local civilian counterparts. While [at one time] active in 18 geographic locations throughout Iraq, CSP will be closing offices and implementing a three-phased consolidation plan in 2009”.¹¹

Community Stabilization Program
Evaluation Scope of Work

CSP Implementation

Initial funding under the CSP award limited activities to Baghdad. In the winning application, IRD specified its intention for the Baghdad area. In its application, IRD defined a “Baghdad city action plan” that includes projects to improve, revitalize, and expand small scale municipal services such as: neighborhood water and sanitation systems, trash removal and disposal, rehabilitation of schools, clinics, roadway and streets improvements, public market places, playgrounds and other community facilities. These municipal service projects are intended to generate employment opportunities for ordinary labor, artisans, skilled technicians, contractors, and other vendors.

IRD proposed a rapid-start (first 60 days) in Baghdad, leveraging over two years of Iraq Community Action Program (ICAP) experience to conduct meaningful pre-award activities to ensure rapid success. The rapid start program anticipated implementation of specific public works programs (PWP) and essential service projects immediately upon program startup. IRD has extensive experience in implementing a wide variety of PWP, utilizing skilled and un-skilled labor to provide a variety of physical infrastructure maintenance and refurbishment services. This rapid start was expected to jump-start the development of effective local government services by redirecting local energies toward productive economic and social opportunities, away from insurgency activities.

During the life of the program, CSP initiated operations in 18 locations across Iraq with obligated programmatic funding of \$675 million (USD), as of June 2009.¹²

Since inception in May 2006 and through June 2009, CSP has:

- Generated 524,628 person-months of work through short term employment;
- Engaged 336,928 youth in non-formal educational, youth and sports programs;
- Created or restored more than 51,772 long term jobs;
- Graduated some 41,443 students from vocational skills training programs;
- Provided business skills training to more than 15,138 potential entrepreneurs;
- Started or expanded in excess of 10,194 businesses grants;
- Placed approximately 9,932 youth in apprenticeship positions.¹³

CSP began phasing out operations by priority in the first quarter of 2009 in

most sites with inter-agency concurrence and closures beginning in the second quarter, according to USAID/Iraq. The program has been extended through February 2010 at two sites (Mosul and Baqubah).

The SOW for CSP identifies four program components as follows.

- **Short-term employment generation, through Community Infrastructure and Essential Service projects**, that support the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) ability to deliver basic services at the local level. Projects provide equipment and renovate facilities, which in turn provide healthcare, education, waste, and trash removal.
- **Long-term job creation, through Business Development programs**, that provide capital (in-kind) and training to micro, small and medium sized private enterprises, with a focus on those with high employment potential and those businesses destroyed by violence.
- **Education, through Vocational Training and Apprenticeships**, which allow Iraqis to gain employable skills, practical experience, and assistance with job placement, in careers such as carpentry, masonry, welding, and sewing.
- **Engagement, through Youth Activities** in sports, cultural events, skills training, public service campaigns and other activities designed to keep young Iraqis off the streets and connected in a positive manner with their culture and community.¹⁴

“Short-term Employment Generation through Community Infrastructure and Essential Service (CIES) Projects”

CIES has two primary elements, both of which involve the employment of personnel provided via Iraq’s Ministry Of

Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA):¹⁵

- *Essential services* require unskilled labor on quick-impact projects such as trash collection and irrigation canal cleaning. The short lead time needed to initiate this portion of CIES allowed it to serve as the spearhead for the CSP program, while providing high-visibility services evident to local government and community residents. Benefits include demonstration that these local governments exist and are capable of serving neighborhood needs. The duration and scope of employment is tailored to meet local needs and security conditions.
- *Infrastructure rehabilitation* relies on semi-skilled and skilled labor to assist with rehabilitation and construction projects of relevance to local citizens, e.g., health clinic refurbishment; school restoration; and improvement in the provision of electricity, sewage treatment, and water delivery services.

CIES serves as a CSP transitional component between startup and other aspects of the program, (although CIES has also continued throughout the program's duration). Project selection is ideal in conjunction with local government, PRT, and military cooperation, with an objective of complementing Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) and host nation spending. Ideally, the combination of essential service and infrastructure rehabilitation employment is sufficient to occupy potential insurgents and preclude their participation in violence while simultaneously legitimizing local governments.

"Long-term Job Creation through Business Development"

The objectives of the Business Development Program (BDP) are to provide long-term jobs to those in the focus population segment via provision of in-kind equipment, (rather than cash

grants), and training to micro, small, and medium-sized private businesses, particularly those hiring Vo-Tech and apprenticeship graduates. Entrepreneurs with businesses previously destroyed during violent episodes are a focus for the program.

BDP is to coordinate its activities with the other three CSP components to provide a robust framework for alleviating community unemployment and thereby meeting CSP objectives of complementing other COIN activities including reducing the propensity of the target population to participate in acts of violence.

BDP also seeks to enhance private sector knowledge of good business practices and thereby, stimulate successful commercial enterprises in both the formal and informal business sectors. Given the previous history of a controlled economy under the Hussein regime, BDP further seeks to reach out to communities and assist in establishing a platform to transition from short-term stabilization initiatives – such as those inherent in the CIES component of CSP – to a permanent, market-led private sector economy.

"Education, through Vocational Training and Apprenticeships"

The CSP Vo-Tech component was designed to "reduce the incentives for participation in violent conflict" by increasing employment with a particular focus on youth.¹⁶ The Vo-Tech program aims to achieve these objectives by creating jobs and developing employable skills for unemployed and at-risk youth.¹⁷

Vo-Tech provides vocational training, apprenticeships, and job placement. It does this by engaging young men and women via skills training offered in vocational and technical schools managed by MOLSA's Department of Vocational Education and assisting other youth to find work through

MOLSA's employment service centers. This initiative was also designed for integration with CSP's CIES Program so that Vo-Tech graduates and apprentices could be placed on CIES PWP's and CSP's BDP, in order to provide Vo-Tech graduates with information about self-employment and encourage them to apply for business development grants.

As part of its overall mission, the Vo-Tech program seeks to improve vocational education in Iraq by providing student stipends, toolkits to graduates, salary supplements to instructors, uniforms, classroom materials, and specific operations and maintenance support to Vocational Training Centers (VTCs). In addition, it engages in curriculum development with MOLSA, rehabilitates VTCs and industrial schools, and provides equipment when necessary.

"Engagement through Youth Activities"

The component that later became known as "Engagement through Youth Activities" was originally designated, "Help mitigate conflict in selected communities."¹⁸ The youth program was further described as consisting of "non-formal education programs...to provide alternatives to the insurgency and at the same time link skills development to longer-term employment opportunities."¹⁹ To do this, CSP is to support existing Ministry of Youth Services (MOYS), youth forums, and develop training in life skills, (civic responsibility, religious and ethnic tolerance, and health), conflict mitigation, and youth activism/advocacy. The original focus were young people ages 13-25 from different backgrounds and from all regions of Iraq, with special emphasis on out-of-school youth that were previously excluded from Youth Centers, (as they were known under the Ba'ath Party), as well as "orphans and juveniles from poor families, as they represent an

easy target for the insurgency.”²⁰ The age limits were later changed to include Iraqis ages 12 – 35.

The purpose of specific activities within the youth activities program is to “empower young people to think creatively and critically about themselves and their roles in society, and to give them the opportunity to participate more actively in the development process in Iraq.” CSP implementer IRD is to “invite local youth NGOs to design training aimed at developing conflict mitigation and management skills among youth, using a Training of Trainers methodology to improve the sustainability of conflict mitigation and management program interventions.”²¹ Communities were to be encouraged to choose their own set of activities. Illustrative examples of activities were provided, such as supporting local sport clubs in rehabilitation, supplying sports equipment, plays, poetry competitions, art exhibitions, and youth seminars. Young women were to be a focus for those indoor sports thought culturally acceptable for girls. Training at neighborhood centers was to include small business planning and entrepreneurship to enable unemployed, disengaged youth an opportunity to enter the workplace. Donations of equipment from the private sector and international NGOs were desirable.

If implemented as specified in the USAID-IRD cooperative agreement, youth activities would potentially have identified a cadre of youth leaders, groomed them for sustainable roles as trainers of trainers, and coordinated informal sector youth training with employment opportunities, programming and leadership in conflict resolution, preparation for roles in civic participation, and small business start-up opportunities.

II. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION

The purpose of this study is to qualitatively evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the USAID/Iraq CSP as a non-lethal tool for COIN. This evaluation will look at the design and impact of the program to determine its value as a COIN program in the context of the larger USG effort. The goal of the study is to answer three main questions:

- Does the model work? Did CSP's approach to create employment and employment opportunities reduce the incentives of individuals to support and/or participate in violent acts?
- What programmatic components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective? Identify key lessons learned, both positive and negative.
- Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime? What were the merits and demerits of CSP's implementation/methodology? How can USAID better verify whether its efforts have a direct and indirect impact of reducing violence? How could CSP be improved?²²

Additional issues identified as significant by the team also receive attention throughout portions of the study.

Although the focus of this report is the CSP, USAID sponsors have made it evident that this analysis is both a study of CSP and a consideration with respect to proof of concept, should there be interest in adopting a similar program elsewhere. The authors of this report retain these dual objectives in the pages that follow.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN AND EVALUATION METHODOLOGY*

Relevant documents were used as a backdrop for discussion and analysis throughout the evaluation period. Significant data sources and other relevant sources appear in the Bibliography, Annex A of this report.

A major constraint in determining the impact of CSP became evident at the initial stages of the team’s research. IRD implemented CSP activities through local nationals under conditions that specified no branding of projects as products of (USG), IRD, or other program participants. Therefore, direct beneficiaries were often unaware of the program or its true sponsors. As such, interview and polling questions posed to members of the Iraqi population were generally couched in terms that described the types of projects offered, in addition to referring to CSP explicitly. Thus, this evaluation can only address whether a CSP-type intervention had the desired impact rather than directly associating responses with the Community Stabilization Program.

The team developed two data collection tools in addition to its extensive review

of the relevant literature, (1) a public opinion poll (OP) of Iraqi perspectives conducted by two Iraqi polling organizations, and (2) a key informant interview (KII) questionnaire used during sessions with selected key Iraqi, U.S., and British informants.

The questions contained in the KIIs cover the areas of coordination and integration of activities; Iraqi participation in CSP; individual program components; and the assessment of the CSP concept as a complement to other COIN operations, one that reduces the propensity for members of the target population to participate in acts of insurgent violence. A total of 155 key informants were interviewed, to include USAID management, military personnel, PRT staff, CSP front line personnel, local Iraqi leaders, and others with knowledge of the program or with pertinent experience/expertise.


The two opinion polls (OPs) were developed to gather information at the local level regarding (1) the perceived effectiveness of CSP or similar CSP-type activities, (2) community needs as

addressed by such programs, and (3) level of “buy-in” to these offerings. A total of over 1,300 respondents participated in either the CSP participant or non-participant poll.²³

Seven CSP operated sites were selected for in-depth coverage: Basra, Fallujah, Kirkuk, Mosul, Ramadi, western Baghdad, and Sadr City. These locations were selected on the basis of their representativeness in terms of different ethnic/religious composition, security status, and coalition partners involved (i.e., U.S. and British).

To enhance their validity and comprehensiveness, the team’s findings, conclusions and recommendations have been triangulated using the information gathered from the literature review, KIIs and the OPs.

FIGURE 3. SPREAD AND SIZE OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS COVERAGE



* Annex D provides a thorough discussion of the methodology used in this evaluation

IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING CSP COMPONENTS*

Community Infrastructure and Essential Services

The overall impression of CIES is that it played a significant and valuable role in CSP. It did have a significant impact as it achieved its aim to first and foremost employ large numbers, while assisting in legitimizing host nation governments. This was demonstrated in Abu Ghraib, for example, where there was no functioning provincial council when essential services (ES) activities were first moved in. As CIES terminated its activities there, people were approaching the reestablished provincial council with projects and requests for utilities that they should undertake. These ranged from water pipe repairs to sewage network restoration.

The two methods of implementation, ES and infrastructure rehabilitation (IR), often complemented each other and achieved the initial objective of employing large numbers to keep members of the target population occupied. It is not possible to gauge the extent to which this employment precluded acts of violence by those who might otherwise have become involved in insurgency activities. Future, similar programs could assist in such a determination via the use of biometric data, employment records, and other materials/measures to identify the extent to which those hired are arrested or otherwise found to be supporting violence.

Finding: *The speed of implementation and integration of activities with all USG assets and local government in the AO is essential to the success of this component, as with all others. Timing of implementation will differ by*

AO, depending upon the situation on the ground.

Although the Clear phase of a counterinsurgency consists primarily of kinetic military action, CIES activities can be started during this phase. This is particularly true of initial coordination with local government entities conducted to determine baselines regarding essential services, government procedures, priorities and host nation (HN) regulations for project implementation. CIES involvement in the Hold phase involves hiring large numbers of unemployed individuals in areas sufficiently clear of the insurgent threat, the objectives being (1) to provide employment and thereby offer an alternative to involvement in insurgency activities, while (2) simultaneously legitimizing host nation governments. During the Build phase, CIES focuses on rebuilding key infrastructure and related facilities, i.e. roads, health clinics, and schools, while continuing to take such actions as are possible to legitimize government through improved delivery of services.

CIES project selection should always be done in conjunction with the HN government, PRT (where available), and security forces. The rapid implementation of ES makes such coordination particularly difficult; the pressure to generate large scale employment quickly and by any means tends to bypass the necessary steps in coordination. Nonetheless, rapid implementation of ES should be undertaken to the extent possible. The rehabilitation of community infrastructure, in contrast, is initiated later in a counterinsurgency. Therefore, there should be sufficient time to complete all facets of coordination prior to implementation, to include more

substantive interactions with local government officials. Coordinating with sub-national level governments is essential to ensure their relevance to local citizens²⁴ while legitimizing those governments and complementing Commanders Emergency Relief Program (CERP)** and host nation spending. During the Clear phase of COIN, CSP must continue to negotiate with the host government, PRTs and military/police to identify projects that will generate employment and otherwise benefit communities in the near and longer terms.

Recommendation: *Speed of implementing CSP projects should be appropriate to the AO. Consider sequencing responsibility for CIES-type activities. Particularly during the Clear phase of a COIN operation, it might be more appropriate for the military to implement CIES-type projects rather than USAID, at least initially. Close attention should be paid to the conditions in individual AOs where CSP-like projects will be implemented.*

Finding: *Project selection and coordination should follow a set format to the extent possible. Standard procedures for implementation should be in place across all USG agencies in the AO from project selection, procurement processes, and implementation through completion for both CIES components. There should be a natural alliance between CSP and PRTs that facilitates synchronizing operations with host government and coalition military forces. Too often this was not the case in Iraq. There were rarely formal procedures or sufficient established guidance for this to happen which resulted in poor coordination with potentially complementary entities.*

* Note that findings are based on triangulated data. Some recommendations are "stand alone" in that they are not supported necessarily by triangulated data; however, the evaluation team believed they were of enough import to include in this report for consideration in the design of future CSP models.

** Funding provided by the Department of Defense to commanders to implement projects within their area of operation.

The shortfall was not universal, fortunately, as good integration appears to have occurred between CSP and the PRTs in Basra, Babel, and Mosul in the later months of the program.²⁵ However, these successes appear to be personality-driven rather than institutionalized.

Recommendation: *Provide a set process for CIES project selection that requires integration with relevant stakeholders, including local governments.*

The CSP-model works best when all stakeholders within an AO have a common strategy and uniform procedures in place for project implementation. This will help to mitigate duplication of efforts and decrease costs while gaining buy-in from local governments. It should also help to legitimize those governments as USG stakeholders work to address both coalition priorities, (e.g., stabilizing the community), and HN priorities, (that will frequently differ from those of international representatives).

Finding: *Baseline assessments are essential. They should provide a basis for development of local aid strategies that include host nation government participation during creation and implementation.*

Development strategies and corresponding work plans should incorporate the priorities of the local population and government as identified during preliminary (and ongoing), assessments. While the majority of CIES projects had some degree of Iraqi participation, the level attained was at times inadequate.²⁶

Recommendation: *Ensure that baseline assessments are conducted in every AO prior to significantly engaging in CIES projects.*

While it is understood that CSP, as a complement to COIN by nature, must implement projects quickly, rapid assessments should be completed

prior to the start of short-notice programming. These assessments should not only include collecting baseline data from which to set metrics, but should also include pertinent aspects of the environment, local leadership (both informal and formal), priorities of the population, ethnic and/or tribal issues, and others. These assessments should be ongoing throughout the life of the program to determine program impact and inform strategy changes as needed.

Finding: *Oversight of construction projects conducted during the Hold phase of a counterinsurgency may be hampered by security considerations.* Oversight of large-scale employment projects was hampered as the ability to visit and monitor projects was subject to security restrictions. Close oversight is needed to mitigate corruption to the extent possible and otherwise ensure projects are completed to standard.

Recommendation: *Involve host nation and third-party entities in the implementation of the CIES projects either by Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) or monitoring.*

Several KIIs noted value in the use of government departments, (municipalities and provincial offices of line ministries), to help monitor aid projects as such participation would have gone a long way to help legitimize host nation officials and potentially reduce corruption.²⁷ It is recognized that government representatives may themselves be corrupt, thus necessitating close oversight on the part of coalition authorities in addition to that conducted by local or national authorities.

Business Development Program

BDP was designed to coordinate its activities with other CSP components; provide a robust framework to alleviate unemployment; and improve local

economies by offering services and assistance, strengthening local businesses, and encouraging the establishment of new ones. The program envisions increasing the private sector knowledge base and activities in both the formal and informal sectors in high risk conflict areas.

Through its training and outreach to business owners, entrepreneurs, and government representatives, BDP supports short-term stabilization and facilitates creation and maturation of a structured private sector and market-led economy. By working directly with prospective and existing local business owners and government entities to attain these ends, the program should also support the COIN objectives to legitimize the host nation government and satisfy the economic needs of the population, (thereby serving to enhance security and stability).

Finding: *BDP grants help to attain COIN objectives and appear to be the most sustainable of the four CSP components.*

Based on several interviews with senior BDP staff members and other program participants, there was unilateral agreement that the principles of the BDP grant plan were necessary in a COIN environment. Moreover, these interviewees saw the grant program as one means of addressing Al Qaeda offers of money to conduct acts of violence. Several expressed the belief that Al Qaeda influence would return in the absence of a sustained BDP grant program.²⁸ An independent BDP grants survey found that 98% of grantee businesses were still operational one year after receiving their grants.²⁹

Recommendation: *Design BDP grants to capitalize on both immediate and long-term benefits in the service of counterinsurgency objectives.*

USG stakeholders have had changing views of the CSP model during the life

of the program. Initially, it was designed to implement short-term, quick impact projects that would complement the military's surge activities. This would be accomplished by engaging people in a variety of activities (BDP included) with a focus on keeping at risk youth from supporting the insurgency. The issue of sustainability was not initially addressed. Studies of BDP show that it may have been the most sustainable of the CSP components, while also addressing the short-term needs of COIN in the early stages.³⁰

Finding: *Providing training to BDP grantees is important to the long-term success of the business owner.*

The great majority of businesses that received BDP grants and requisite training remain in business one year later.³¹ In addition, KII responses provide evidence that business skills training instills confidence in new and existing business owners.³² When business owners thrive, their success feeds the community and improves community members' perception of their lives. The *Counterinsurgency* manual reinforces the importance of this chain of events by noting that

“restoring production and distribution systems can energize the economy, create jobs and growth, and positively influence local perceptions.”³³

Recommendation: *Ensure there is a robust business training program provided to BDP grantees during future CSP-type programs.*

Often, those most at risk for joining an insurgency have limited education and few prospects for generating income. Providing this segment of the population with grants to start or enhance a fledgling business and the necessary basic business skills training enhances the likelihood of their succeeding.

Recommendation: *Integrate BDP grantees into other USAID development programs.*

Properly designed BDP grant programs should both promote long-term sustainability of grantee businesses and provide incentives for them to hire those participating in Vo-Tech or other CSP program components. USAID/Iraq's micro-finance *Tijara* program would have better addressed this latter aspect had the program been designed with longer-term sustainability in mind and had CSP been obliged to integrate program beneficiaries into *Tijara*, where applicable.

Recommendation: *Consider expanding coverage of the business grant program during future CSP-type programs.*

Most BDP grants were awarded in urban and peri-urban areas, as these were the areas targeted in Iraq for implementation of CSP. While rural areas may have less opportunity for industry and manufacturing, business development and/or income generation activities are important in these areas as well. An insurgency is fueled by these underdeveloped, under-resourced, and often poorly informed segments of the population just as is the case with those residing in urban areas. Building long-term sustainability in rural areas with agricultural or niche market products therefore, supports COIN short- and long-term goals.

Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Program (Vo-Tech)

The original intent of CSP as it related to the non-lethal complement of COIN operations for this component was to provide vocational training and job placement assistance to improve long-term employment opportunities for Iraqi men and women in the target age group of 17 – 35.³⁴

Ninety-five percent of Vo-Tech graduates surveyed by USAID/Iraq's independent Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II (MEPP II) noted that this program had improved their lives and provided them with useful skills.³⁵

Finding: *The sequencing of Vo-Tech in terms of CSP's implementation might be more appropriate in the “build and transition” phases of COIN during an active insurgency.*

While coordinating between CSP and MOSLA may have at times delayed the speed of decision-making, as would be the case whenever additional organizations are involved in a program, the benefits in terms of capacity building and reaching the right audiences more than outweighed possible drawbacks.

Recommendation: *Include Vo-Tech concerns in preliminary and ongoing assessments to facilitate proper timing regarding its introduction and, to the extent possible, identify members of the community at risk for insurgent recruitment.*

While Vo-Tech produced excellent numbers in terms of students and in the short-term this met COIN objectives, in the long-term, a CSP-type model should seek out those most likely to be recruited for participation in an insurgency. This process takes time and would likely not be implemented during the Clear phase of COIN, but rather during the latter hold-build/transition phases. While the team is aware that USAID cannot by law work with armed groups, it can work with other stakeholders who might be working to disarm and demobilize armed groups and, as they are disarmed and demobilized, help them reintegrate into normal society by providing skills training to these groups. Members of the Sons of (SOI) would be an appropriate focal population for

USAID programming should they be officially disarmed and demobilized.’ Integration of former militia personnel, members of national armed forces, and other armed group representatives is a recurring and inevitably difficult COIN challenge. U.S. policy and program design should facilitate transitions in this regard. To do otherwise is to leave the seeds of instability intact that can later germinate to spur renewed violence in the aftermath of the counterinsurgent’s departure.

Finding: *Courses taught in the Vo-Tech program should be demand driven.*³⁶

In an effort to legitimize the government of Iraq, CSP worked through various ministries, primarily MOLSA, to quickly identify students as well as develop the curriculum for the courses taught.³⁷ These demands for quick implementation and working through Iraqi government authorities inhibited the USG’s ability to conduct baseline studies to determine which courses taught would lead to marketable skills for the students. One study determined that 86% of Vo-Tech graduates were working in their area of study, but were not necessarily in formal employment or realizing a steady income.³⁸ Vo-Tech courses, in some cases, raised the expectations of students that were not realized, as employment could not always be found in their course of study.³⁹

Recommendation: *Undertake a needs assessment prior to designing Vo-Tech training courses.*

Even if working with HN government entities prior to implementing Vo-Tech programs, it is incumbent upon the USG to ensure that the HN government undertakes a needs assessment to ensure that skills being taught are marketable. A one size-fits-all program typically will not work on a national

level, particularly one involving both urban and rural programming.

There is a natural link between CIES projects and students graduating from Vo-Tech classes, just as there is a natural link between Vo-Tech graduates and business development. Coordination between these relevant CSP program components should be required and better coordinated.

Finding: *Working through HN ministries contributes to establishing legitimacy but comes at a price.*

COIN efforts focus on supporting the local populace and the HN government.⁴⁰ “A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success without the HN government achieving legitimacy,”⁴¹ and “local legitimacy is frequently affected by the degree to which local institutions are perceived as independent and capable in the absence of external (e.g. coalition) support.”⁴²

The CSP Vo-Tech component was designed for integration with MOLSA so that it would support and strengthen the GoI as called for by counterinsurgency doctrine. Integrating Vo-Tech initiatives into MOLSA was also in line with USAID/Iraq’s transition plan to support longer-term development and assumption of program activities by the HN.⁴³ The drawbacks of working closely with MOLSA dealt primarily with the ministry’s lack of capacity. According to one CSP staff member, while it made sense to integrate Vo-Tech into MOLSA to support the GoI and have a permanent entity to hand over to when CSP terminated, it detracted from achieving the program’s COIN objectives of encouraging stability in the short term. MOLSA was not well established when CSP started. In order to work with them, the official noted:

“We had to rebuild their centers, train staff, work on curriculum, pedagogy, etc. Working through MOLSA slowed down our ability to jumpstart CSP. They weren’t doing anything. There were no active centers that could assist CSP. There was a lot of bureaucratic tape to work through as well. It took about 18 months to achieve a good working relationship in terms of competency.”⁴⁴

This was supported by a USAID/Iraq FSO staff member who commented:

“While CSP made every attempt to work closely with MOLSA to develop 1-3 month intensive skills training programs, ultimately, USAID and CSP’s ability to control and manage the program was limited.”⁴⁵

Recommendation: *Link CSP transition to government capacity building programs. To support successful transition, develop Vo-Tech indicators that measure (1) progress training and placement of Vo-Tech graduates and apprentices, and (2) HN government capability to assume program responsibilities.*

Developing indicators for tracking the success of this component is particularly important given that the USG does not have a direct hand in its implementation and oversight. These indicators should be developed in collaboration with the ministries involved in the project with stringent QA/QC measures in place to ensure – to the best of the implementer’s ability – that the program is addressing common objectives and will be successfully perpetuated after the departure of international representatives, (given HN desire and resources to continue program activities).

* The genesis of the SOI or the “Awakening” began in August 2006 when the Sunni tribal sheikhs in Anbar province turned against the brutality of al-Qaeda, and began arming themselves in self-protection, forming an alliance with the US Military. By spring 2008, two-thirds of Iraq’s provinces had formed similar groups, with roughly 80% being Sunni. It was estimated that nearly 91,000 of these volunteers were under contract to coalition forces and were being paid approximately \$300/month for their efforts to help stabilize the country.

Engagement through Youth Activities

From the start of CSP until June 27, 2009, CSP reported 336,928 short-term youth engagements, many lasting just a few hours.⁴⁶ The major CSP youth activities were sports events for males. Examples include:⁴⁷

- High profile soccer tournaments
- A “Fun Run” across the bridge in Adhamiya for 913 men and one woman
- The Ring Game known as “Mahabus,” one of the first Taji night events for youth, played by teams of 30.

To a much lesser extent than soccer, males also participated in other sports events including basketball, boxing, wrestling, martial arts, and swimming. A significantly smaller number of youth participated in the additional youth activity categories, (life skills and culture), that included Arts Academy events with a reconciliation theme, such as poetry, calligraphy, and a song festival; community theatre through the Iraqi Union of Artists and Basra mobile peace theatres;⁴⁸ an annual showing of videos with reconciliation themes for college age youth; and beautification.⁴⁹

There were limited sports programs for girls in the more urban and progressive areas where this was culturally acceptable, e.g., indoor volleyball and basketball. Widows were identified for sewing training and equipment grants. A very limited amount of computer training and some cosmetology training was also given to females.⁵⁰ Mentally challenged youth, also a socially isolated group sought out by the insurgency, was not specifically addressed by CSP.⁵¹

Pre-existing MOYS youth centers and sports clubs were the institutional focus of sports activities. Training in life skills; including first aid, computer, job search and Arab literacy; was provided at

some youth centers as a partnership between the Ministry of Education and MOYS.⁵²

Finding: *Wherever feasible, CSP should track program participants.* Collecting data is vital to being able to determine what impact these activities have had on youth attitudes towards ethnic and religious conflict and diversity or willingness to participate in the insurgency. Without contact information these data cannot be collected, assessed, or analyzed.⁵³

Recommendation: *Conduct exit polls or focus group surveys.*

The evaluation team understands that it isn't always feasible to obtain contact information from everyone attending youth programs. That said, CSP must make an effort to track attitudinal changes in participants. Local NGOs or schoolteachers could be taught to undertake these surveys so as not to compromise participant security.

Finding: *It is desirable to specifically target at-risk groups.*

While there is evidence that engaging youth at large events, such as soccer tournaments, was successful in bringing young people together peacefully, there is no evidence that these types of events mitigated conflict in the long-term. Training in conflict mitigation and reconciliation was only attempted on a very small scale with no overall strategy late in the program, (e.g., Baiji scout camps, Baquba peace seminars, and some Baghdad debates).⁵⁴ These efforts were most evident in 10-day “peace camps” conducted in Iraq's Northern Province for groups of up to 50 college-age participants from Baghdad University, the College of Art, the Arts Union, and other institutions. The camps were not followed up by further initiatives.

Recommendation: *Specifically target young people in groups with historical antipathies or who are otherwise*

particularly vulnerable to insurgent influence.

Developing additional programs promoted mutual understanding and the reduction of factional antipathies.⁵⁵ Given the propensity of youth to use electronic media, cyber mediums installed in schools and libraries may be one means of broadening access in this regard, despite the risk of these facilities being used for purposes counter to coalition and host nation objectives.⁵⁶

Recommendation: *Link youth organizations to other democracy-promoting institutions.*

Such institutions include community organizations and business associations. Another avenue could be to use youth organizations and civic education in schools and creating parent-teacher associations as a way of affecting attitudes of youth and children regarding tolerance for ethnic and religious diversity and for getting messages to parents to solicit their buy-in to stabilization efforts. Concurrently, seek to identify promising youth leaders to assist in designing and conducting programs involving conflict mitigation, civil society/ democracy training, public service, and employment-related training and job placement. At-risk youth should be specifically sought in this regard, e.g., internally Displaced Persons (IDP), orphans, the physically and mentally challenged, and others who may be particularly vulnerable to insurgent recruiting.⁵⁷

Recommendation: *Use preliminary assessments to determine effective ways of accessing target populations.*

Women in some cultures can be particularly difficult to involve in counterinsurgency programs. Identifying locations open to women in day-to-day life, e.g., health clinics in Iraq can provide access to otherwise isolated members of such populations.

Recommendation: *CSP should resource youth programs with more intense activities and work toward sustainability.*

Youth centers as equipped during CSP were not sustainable. More attention must be given to transitioning such facilities to HN governments and communities. As one former USAID informant told us, “Expectations for program results from COIN operations need to be ratcheted down to realistic and achievable levels. We are not going to change a whole society in 6 years of engagement.”⁵⁸

V. OVERARCHING FINDINGS

Preliminary Note

The following are findings drawn from a review of relevant literature and the 155 interviews conducted both in the United States and Iraq during May and June 2009. They are presented in the following sequence of topics:

- Concept and Methodology
- Coordination and Integration
- Measuring Effectiveness
- Security and CSP Relations with the Military
- Branding
- Corruption and Fraud
- Program Oversight

Concept and Methodology

CSP is a viable program. It is highly desirable that it be employed in other theaters after modifications to its current form and adaptation to local conditions elsewhere.

CSP experienced considerable success where program-internal coordination and broader integration took place. This not only directly benefited Iraqi communities in areas most “at risk” but also supported USG counterinsurgency efforts in the country. Jobs were created and income has been generated for families; efforts were made to rebuild infrastructure; youth programs created a sense of “normalcy” among those who participated and the population at large. Evidence supports a conclusion that these efforts likely contributed to program objectives; however, the presence of numerous additional variables makes a definitive conclusion in this regard unfeasible.

The goals of CSP appear to be practical and attainable. Unfortunately, the results of this evaluation repeatedly brought particular issues to the fore that must be addressed when designing any similar non-lethal COIN

initiative in the future. These include the need to expand the focus population; obtain a better understanding of HN structures, systems, and policies; integrate activities with other relevant programs and integrate CSP components to the extent possible; and, finally, attain a solid understanding and a common vision among implementers and other stakeholders.

Beneficiary selection is vital to the success of CSP efforts.

An immediate reduction in insurgent violence is an honorable objective. It is a stopgap measure, however, since COIN is a long-term undertaking, (although this does not preclude the value of short- and medium-term initiatives integrated into a well conceived long-term strategy). As CSP matured, the age groups targeted for various components were changed according to perceived need and it was recognized that long-term COIN objectives – to include the eventual transition or handover of CSP activities – was necessary. While these changes reflect an admirable flexibility in CSP, an even more nuanced approach to beneficiary selection will be appropriate in future CSP designs. For example, CSP may better serve its COIN objectives by recognizing such factors as women’s stabilizing influence on children and youth in some environments. Other potentially vulnerable groups include young children (candidates for fundamentalist madrassas in some countries) and former militia members, once formally disarmed and demobilized.⁵⁹

Coordination and Integration

Active intra-component coordination and synchronization would enhance program effectiveness.

The four components of CSP frequently operated virtually autonomously, i.e., activities were usually not effectively coordinated with other elements of the program. Coordination, when it took place, appears to have been driven by personalities rather than institutionalized procedures. For example, in one province, CSP personnel “identified the most motivated and competent [Vo-Tech] graduates and offered these graduates business development grants,” however, the evaluation team did not find this to be a common practice.⁶⁰ Synergy should have been the goal; autonomy was instead the reality.

Institutionalizing both inter and intra-agency synchronization will increase program effectiveness and reduce reliance on personality driven success.

Unsurprisingly, given the inherently greater complexity of the multi-agency environment, integration of efforts between CSP and other programs poses even greater challenges than coordinating activities within CSP. Fortunately, there are notable successes here as well. The liaison officer (LNO) structure within USAID was cited as having been helpful in providing interlocutors between USAID and the military,⁶¹ (a liaison officer is an individual sent by one organization to another to coordinate activities between the two). Cooperation between State, USAID, military, and CSP representatives is exceptional in some locations, Ninewa Province in mid-2009 being one notable case. Brief citations from both a Department of State representative and a member of the U.S. armed forces in Ninewa demonstrate an extent of integration that should serve as a starting point for future operations both in Iraq and elsewhere:

“There is no difference between the agencies of the U.S. government here... I’ve spent much more of their [the military’s] money than they’ll ever spend of mine. We meet regularly at every level. We consider that our funds and capabilities are common to our efforts... My advice to my successor is “Get in good with your military counterpart... The military has a force of something like 12-13,000 here. I have 30-35 military and an equal number of civilian. They have tens of millions of dollars. I don’t. I don’t have the right to go down and demand to be in charge. But I can work with them.”⁶²

PRT leader

“My command came in with the attitude that knowing that we are the supporting arm to the PRT is number one. In the spectrum of operations, we are... transitioning to Phase 5 (turning over to the host nation). The military is here simply to provide security.”⁶³

Military staff member

Unfortunately, such close integration of efforts is far from the norm. A considerable number of those interviewed noted that ongoing CSP, CERP, and other initiatives in a given area were often unknown to each other. Redundancy and waste can be the result, causing CSP to spend funds for efforts the burden of which could be shared. The problem is a chronic one, not limited to USAID or the CSP program. A study by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the State Department changed the focus of an infrastructure program without informing the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); the latter developed in excess of 100 projects before becoming aware of the change.⁶⁴ Tools that should synchronize efforts are too vague to assist at lower levels (the Iraq Joint Campaign Plan being specifically cited). As was repeatedly found in instances where activities are

effectively integrated, synchronization is a matter of personalities rather than institutionalized policy or procedures.⁶⁵ Integration has been no less elusive when other nations or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are involved, both of which are likewise potentially cost saving and otherwise valuable partners.⁶⁶

Coordination with the host government is essential to the success of CSP

Best practice demonstrated in the field requires consultation with a wide range of stakeholders to triangulate local, regional, and ministerial priorities; assure that any facilities will meet established standards and be adequately staffed and maintained; and will serve their roles as designated in district, municipal, regional, and national plans and budgets. Effective coordination can also reduce the risk that resources will be co-opted by special interests or through corruption. In addition to HN officials, consideration must be given to outreach efforts seeking the involvement of “informal” leaders who will have varying degrees of influence throughout the community. The importance of gaining consensus from these individuals and groups must not be discounted.

Measuring Effectiveness

While it is not possible to conclude a causative relationship exists between CSP and a reduction in violence, poll results show both beneficiaries and non-participants in the program perceived an improvement in security and government services during the lifespan of CSP.

The majority (84%) of CSP-type program participants believe their community is safer today than in 2006 because of CSP, (as contrasted to 70% of non-participants).⁶⁷ Similarly, 69% of participants’ perceived improvements in

government services and 60% thought relations between religious and ethnic groups were better due to the program. These values contrast with 29% of respondents to the non-participant poll attributing improvements in government services and 51% believing religious and ethnic relations were enhanced as a result of aid programs. However, the number of confounding variables in Iraq at the time of CSP implementation [e.g., the effect of similar programs like CERP on-going in the same area of operations (AO) or criminal activity not disaggregated from violent incident statistics] make any firm conclusions with respect to causation between the implementation of CSP and the number of violent incidents or government legitimacy a potentially misleading one. Key informant interviewees questioned on the issue either believed no conclusion could be drawn given the amount of other aid and related activity ongoing or personally felt that CSP aided in the reduction of violence but could not validate those impressions.

Measures of effectiveness should focus on outcomes or effects rather than outputs when addressing program objectives:

OMB’s [Office of Management and Budget] argued that the number of schools rehabilitated would be a good indicator for progress in the education sector. But the idea of counting buildings was anathema to USAID, whose subject-matter experts insisted that the percentage of children in school would be a more accurate measure of progress toward primary-education goals. The number of schools became the benchmark.⁶⁸

Hard Lessons:
The Iraq Reconstruction Experience

CSP is not a typical USAID development program, a factor that may have played a role in the difficulties experi-

enced in identifying effective measures of performance. Measures employed by those responsible for CSP, (and at times imposed on them, as the quote immediately above makes clear), too often reflected outputs rather than the extent to which program components impacted coalition and HN objectives.

Determination of effects requires disaggregation of data by population segments, (e.g. gender, age, and location), to facilitate improved performance measures regarding correlations between CSP activities and program objectives regarding specific components of target populations. Data must also be compared with data of nearby areas that do not benefit from the program in question to increase confidence in observations and analysis regarding correlations. Design of measures and their definitions must be easily understood by both those in the field and users at higher echelons in order to avoid confusion and multiple interpretations.

Security and CSP Relations with the Military

Partnering with the military enhances CSP effectiveness

Those interviewees with close ties to the military found their relationships extremely beneficial in terms of security provided or complementary funds/capabilities availability, noting CSP could not have been implemented without the assistance of the military.⁶⁹ Given the requirement that USAID personnel move around areas outside of coalition bases or other secure facilities only in State Department personal security detail (PSD) vehicles or with military units, armed forces units were generally the only means of moving to projects for monitoring work. This restriction was a particularly significant barrier to such monitoring prior to the 2008 relaxation of the project branding

prohibition given the desire to not associate the program with the coalition as the presence of military vehicles would compromise that status, (see more on this under “Branding” below).

Despite generally positive views of civil-military interactions, others interviewed were concerned that military leaders at times focused too greatly on immediate results and therefore showed impatience when working with CSP and other USG COIN stakeholders.⁷⁰

Branding

A decision to limit branding of CSP is problematic

An exception to USAID branding policy initially prohibited overtly linking CSP project work to the coalition. Branding rules changed in 2008 to allow branding “appropriate to the security situation.”⁷¹ Individuals interviewed disagreed when it came to the necessity of avoiding association with international representatives. A considerable number of individuals in high-violence prone regions believed that branding would not have posed a risk while others thought the exception essential. Benefits in not overtly crediting coalition representatives for CSP activities include building HN government legitimacy.⁷² This lack of association nonetheless comes with costs. In at least one documented case, the local USAID representative misguidedly believed the branding prohibition extended to not informing PRT colleagues of the program’s existence, a failure that precluded integration with another aid program. In addition, not informing Iraqis of coalition involvement prevents HN citizens from appreciating the services provided by international representatives, who they therefore see only as perpetrators of violence. This acts counter to the COIN objective of winning support for the counterinsurgent while denying it to adversaries.

Corruption and Fraud

Efforts to reduce corruption and fraud are essential

There is nearly uniform concern among USAID, CSP, and military personnel that corruption significantly undermines CSP (and other aid program) effectiveness in Iraq. The same is true in Afghanistan. Interaction with HN government officials and other authorities – formal and informal – is highly desirable from the perspective of project ownership, effectively addressing needs, and reinforcing the legitimacy of governments. Yet judgment and precautionary measures will be required when these objectives conflict with minimizing corruption and fraud.

Program Oversight

Oversight of CSP is inadequate

While concern that USG personnel visiting CSP project sites may have security implications for contractors or other Iraqis associated with the efforts, these restrictions pose limitations on field monitoring. Site visits by PRT USAID representatives are rare or nonexistent in some locations; a CSP team leader noted during his interview that there had been no such visits during his two and one-half years in that position. Design of other internal oversight mechanisms is too narrow in scope or otherwise inadequate. The result is a lack of oversight or over reliance on Iraqi staff that may suffer pressure from government officials and other sources that impede objectivity.

Understanding the importance of third-party monitoring, USAID awarded a contract to International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. to monitor the USAID program portfolio in 2005. This program, Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II (MEPP II) has conducted over 10 studies for the Focused Stabilization Office on the various components of

CSP. (See Annex E). This monitoring however, does not address financial matters and therefore has little effect on mitigating fraud and corruption.

Coordination with other USG assets may provide occasional relief in this regard. One innovative USAID representative, for example, requested and was provided unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support that supplied overhead images allowing him to monitor contractor progress.

It is necessary to design sustainment and transition of CSP activities into program objectives

We have noted that it is unfair to criticize CSP too harshly for not incorporating COIN fundamentals when the new relevant military doctrine appeared only in December 2006. Yet the shortcomings identified nonetheless offer a number of lessons for similar future programs. These include the (1) need for a long-term perspective during program design and implementation, (2) requirement to develop government and wider community capacity to assume responsibility for such programs (to include introduction of populations to the volunteer concept where it is lacking), and (3) development of effective procedures for assisting individuals in attaining sustained economic self-reliance rather than merely short-term effects. USAID implements a variety of long-term development projects in Iraq. Many potentially complement CSP activities.

Understanding the capacity of HN governments is essential to achieving CSP objectives

Governance capacity is essential to the HN effectively assuming management and financial responsibilities related to "soft" counterinsurgent programs. Maintaining the advantages reaped from program execution and avoiding a resurgence of insurgent influence will

be impossible in the absence of this transition. It is essential that program managers coordinate and synchronize efforts with other USG agencies and implementers responsible for host nation capacity building.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Does the model work? Did CSP's approach to create employment and employment opportunities reduce the incentives of individuals to support and/or participate in violent acts?

The model, with incorporation of relevant recommendations below, is widely thought to be workable by those interviewed despite the initial scope of CSP being too narrow in terms of age groups, gender, and in terms of other at-risk groups. However, causation between program initiatives and a reduction in violence cannot be definitively established due to confounding variables and impossibility of isolating specific variables of interest.

Given better internal coordination and integration with external programs, implementation of CSP-like programs comprise a major step towards a comprehensive approach to operations in the service of COIN. Similar programs envisioned in other environments should likewise seek to incorporate all pertinent organizations – governmental or otherwise, international or host nation – in addressing counterinsurgent objectives. The character of such programs and the extent to which they are comparable to CSP, as implemented in Iraq, will considerably rely on the nature of the human, physical, and infrastructure systems present in other locations.

What programmatic components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective? Identify key lessons learned, both positive and negative.

All components were found to be effective to varying degrees. Intra-CSP

coordination, integration with other programs, appointment of personnel possessing requisite talents, and a number of additional factors identified throughout this report are notable in their impacting effectiveness. Key positive lessons learned include: (1) the need to achieve both coordination and integration; (2) assignment of those willing and able to make both coordination and integration a reality; and (3) appropriately balancing the sometimes opposing demands of involving HN government authorities in projects while reducing opportunities for fraud and corruption. Less positive lessons include: (1) inadequate program oversight; (2) lack of initial assessments of local needs and conditions, and (3) the unaddressed necessity of maintaining a long-term perspective and transitioning program elements to host nation authorities was not appropriately addressed.

Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime?

There is little reason to question whether the four primary CSP components were well conceived. All contributed to the overall success of the program, to a greater or lesser degree, although much has been learned during the lifespan of the program regarding how similar future programs can be more effective in addressing COIN objectives. For example, there are many other reasons, aside from poverty and unemployment that motivate violent and insurgent acts. Violence related to vengeance and Iraqi religious, tribal, and ethnic loyalties are well documented. Better understanding of insurgencies and the effects of these other factors on the likelihood of CSP-type program components will facilitate effectiveness, given initiation of such programs.

How effective was CSP co-location with PRTs?

Co-location of interdependent COIN capabilities fundamental to good counterinsurgent operations.⁷³ The effects of that co-location depend on the willingness of key personalities, (e.g., USAID PRT representatives and CSP team leaders), to coordinate. Evidence reflects that CSP leader co-location with PRTs is sufficient, i.e., the entire CSP team does not need to be at the same geographic location as the PRT (a condition in any case impractical given the requirement for PRTs to remain on forward operating bases (FOBs) while CSP tends to have a large number of Iraqi personnel who must consistently interface with community and government leaders. Co-location of entire CSP teams with PRTs was further unfeasible given the original USAID branding policy seeking to delink CSP from affiliation with coalition forces).

One member of the evaluation team felt that co-locating the CSP team leader with the PRT was unadvisable due to the risk of the program's association with the coalition. However, it is generally accepted by counterinsurgent experts that Gerald Templer's policies in post-World War II Malaya regarding co-location of key personnel, (in his case, police, military, and political representatives at every level), was fundamental to the eventual British success in that theater. The policy has been emulated during other counterinsurgency contingencies since, and was likewise found to be beneficial.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

Coordination and Integration

USAID Should View CSP Components as Part of a System, Considering Each as an Integral and Complementary Part of the Whole

“Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities” is the second section in the *Counterinsurgency* manual, following only the introduction, an indication of the concept’s importance in the minds of its authors. USAID must dramatically improve both the internal coordination of activities *within* programs such as CSP and *between* those programs and others, e.g., USAID’s traditional development programs and CERP. There is an urgent need for interagency synchronization.

USAID, State, and the Department of Defense Should Work in Conjunction with the National Security Council (NSC) to Design and Support a Management Capability Responsible for Synchronizing Interagency Activities

While this topic certainly need further analysis, USAID and State should champion the creation of a USG-wide oversight entity with the responsibility for and authority to integrate programs that span multiple departments, e.g., aid, military, and capacity building undertakings in Iraq and Afghanistan. This entity – whether a new agency or extra-departmental organization – cannot be on the same level as departments but must instead have the authority to ensure appropriate orchestration of efforts when it comes to matters of inter-departmental and interagency integration. Headed by USAID, it should answer directly to the NSC or President. USAID should also continue to facilitate integration between multinational and NGO/ IGO

initiatives at all relevant levels. In addition to the creation of this entity, review, and as necessary, revise existent funding procedures to facilitate complementary program spending between agencies while reducing waste resultant in having to “spend out” funds in a given period, e.g., a fiscal year (as is currently the case with CERP funding).⁷⁴ Such changes obviously exceed the present authority of USAID to implement and would require Congressional action."

Develop Plans and Implement Programs in Keeping with a Comprehensive Approach to Operations

As repeatedly noted above, the CSP model is, in theory, viable. Pending creation of an organization as described in the recommendation just above, USAID should facilitate CSP-type program integration with other USG, multinational, and NGO/IGO organizations during planning and in-field operations to the extent possible within the bounds of its authority and willingness to facilitate inter-departmental/organizational cooperation. Preliminary planning, training, and related activities to facilitate this integration should incorporate substantive participation on the part of all potential relevant participants and eventually include traditional and host government leaders.

Retain the PRT concept as a decentralized coordinating and implementing body

“The PRT model is a proven one,” one interviewee noted; “The problem is the people that are in it. People from USAID, DOS, [and] DoD are not seeing the same goal.”⁷⁵ Continued refining of PRT organizations, responsibilities, and authorities to meet coalition objectives and provide the flexibility required is necessary to integrate programs and

projects at local levels. All USG agencies should establish personnel selection and performance evaluation policies to institutionalize assignment of those with the requisite characteristics to PRT positions.

Corruption and Fraud

Looking ahead to other CSP models, establish formal relationships between appropriate agencies to allow for exchange of intelligence and performance evaluations of CSP implementers

The evaluation team concurs with the USAID Office of the Inspector General “that USAID/Iraq meet with appropriate officials from the Community Stabilization Program, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and the United States military to improve coordination and discuss the feasibility of vetting potential Community Stabilization Program contractors through military intelligence databases.”⁷⁶ We expand this recommendation to suggest including other U.S. and partner nation organizations, NGOs, and IGOs in the vetting process as applicable and appropriate. USAID, military, and other efforts in this regard to date begin to address the need, but formal procedures, the establishment of shared databases, and policies facilitating further cooperation are needed.

USAID Should Employ an Independent Fraud and Corruption Monitor

Employ independent fraud and corruption monitoring capabilities for each program. The Government Accounting Office or an organization similar to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) would possess the requisite independence to performance this oversight.

Oversight

Resource and adapt policies to allow USAID representatives on PRTs to better oversee USAID programs in their Areas of Operation

Train, resource, formally assign responsibility, and develop procedures to ensure USAID PRT members have the authority and responsibility to effectively oversee CSP-type programs. Direct that these individuals report to an overarching monitor responsible for evaluating the integration of potentially complementary programs within USAID and, ideally, other USG, multinational, and private organizations.

The evaluation team suggests the USG evaluate policies for their impact on effective monitoring; e.g., DOS/USAID policies requiring USAID representatives to use only internal PSD or military transportation directly conflicted with monitoring responsibilities in light of (1) the scarce availability of internally available transport, and (2) the need to preclude military presence at CSP sites due to non-branding and program safety considerations. The USG should look at revising policies as necessary to permit effective monitoring, e.g., those precluding USAID personnel sharing PSD support with implementers. Current chief of mission policies that directly impinge on the ability to effectively oversee U.S. aid expenditures require reevaluation and, as necessary, allocation of resources to overcome current obstacles precluding such oversight.

The original group of contracts for Alternative Development Programs in Afghanistan provides a model that could be considered as a means of partially addressing challenges involving the geographic allocation of implementation responsibilities and decentralization of USAID's

management oversight. Afghanistan's more rural character and the division of the theater into three primary parts provide an operational situation quite different from that in Iraq. The three areas (South, East and Northeast Afghanistan) each had a different implementation contractor that was competitively selected. USAID then hired three personal services contractors, one as the COTR for each of these contracts, and based each of them in the regional PRTs that was in the same city as the implementers' headquarters for that region (Khandahar for the south, Jalalabad for the east and Faisabad for the Northeast) rather than Kabul. These three COTRs reported to the USAID Agriculture Office Director and his deputies (who were USAID direct hire FSOs) based in the Mission in Kabul that had ultimate responsibility for the entire agriculture portfolio (that these contracts were part of). The FSOs needed to be based in Kabul as they had sector-wide policy-making and strategic responsibility and a number of other nationwide agricultural projects to oversee.

Measuring Effectiveness

Programs Should Provide Value-per-Dollar Accounting of Expenditures to Reflect the Extent of Funding Reaching Beneficiaries

There are concerns that the percentage of CSP funds reaching beneficiaries is well below what is acceptable. It is understood that conditions (e.g., security) require expenditure of program funds uncharacteristic in benign environments. The evaluation team is nonetheless concerned that not more of the allocated funding is reaching those for whom it is intended. The team therefore recommends that, as is required of U.S. and UK charities, that USAID and other USG organizations conducting aid and capacity-building programs establish policies and procedures requiring the reporting of

what percentage of program funding directly benefits target audiences and what portions are instead allocated to program oversight, security, and other supporting functions. This will assist these organizations in comparing the efficiency of their programs internally and across departments. The team believes that a robust monitoring/auditing function would in the long term ensure greater value-for-dollar spending despite the costs involved in maintaining such measures.

Develop indicators that measure changes in the behavior and perceptions of residents of COIN-focused communities, which will serve as proxies for stability/security metrics

A more viable set of impact indicators is needed to assess CSP effectiveness and causal/correlative linkages (attribution) between CSP projects and program objectives. These indicators will likely vary according to local conditions and the level of security in place. The set of impact indicators for CSP needs to be commonly agreed from the on-set by its three main USG partners (DOD, DOS, USAID) at field (PRT) levels with a view towards transition and eventual handover of each CSP component to the local authorities concerned.

Easily verifiable indicators that measure change need to be used to determine CSP cost-effectiveness and impact on other goals. These will often be subjective in character. A number of impact indicators were offered to the evaluation team throughout its interviews, to include:

- Street Activities: children playing, women shopping, families promenading
- School Attendance Records: absenteeism, increased after-school and PTA activities

- Market Activity: increased flow of goods, market stalls, clientele, women shopping/selling
- Activity and Number of Events in local parks, social cultural events, side-walk cafés
- Clean neighborhoods
- Free Movement within the neighborhoods, from one area of the city to another,
- Reported Violent Incidents in public gatherings and in multi-ethnic/mixed gender events
- Reported Violent Incidents in the area/community
- Photos and GSP Images before and after completion of roads, canals, schools, hospitals, community centers, etc.
- Linkages to CIES: increased health and educational facilities opened to the public, increase in number of clients served at health clinics, increased hours. of electricity
- Linkages to EGY: pre and post-evaluation of the acquired skills/ knowledge/attitudes of participants
- Linkages to BDP: increased number of businesses, imports and flow of goods into the area
- Take Over (buy-in) at Different Levels: government, community groups, families, new business
- Voting Levels (disaggregated by age, gender and geography)
- Increased Number of Returnees
- National Identity and Peace Seeking Campaigns Sponsored by Civil Society Groups
- Tracking Change through Opinion Polls and Local Surveys:
 - Change in youth appearances, behavior, group alliances, attendance at sports events, peace camps, etc.
 - Decrease of social tensions within the community
- Number of Companies Bidding for Contracts (if only the same ones are bidding time and again, it implies that the community is not yet open for competition).

The list is far from complete and could be enlarged to encompass other factors that denote normalcy in a community. They cannot be standardized for all areas in a country as experience has shown that conditions tend to differ by location even within single cities or provinces. The one-size-fits-all mentality does not work when assessing human behavior, particularly not in a CSP/COIN environment where religious, tribal, ethnic, and political factors are being used to leverage power and destabilize communities.

Security and CSP Relations with the Military

Rely on local program staff to the extent possible, thereby building social capital, providing enhanced access to local networks, and reducing security-related costs

USG preliminary assessments should seek to identify members of local populations with requisite skills to assume program management, provide technical skills, and otherwise support operations. (This was done in many instances during CSP.) Conduct on-the-job, (and, as necessary, off-site), training to enhance the skills of those hired, thereby promoting improved program effectiveness and successful sustainment during and after the transition of projects to local authorities. Such a policy would also reduce security costs as the presence of military forces would be less called-for given the lower profile of local residents.

IRD hired a large number of Iraqis to assist in the execution of CSP. It is suggested that even greater reliance on qualified local nationals to handle such sensitive tasks as project oversight could both increase program effectiveness and mitigate instances of fraud and corruption. However, it would

be necessary to not allow such increased reliance on local capabilities to impinge on effective program management and oversight by expatriate IRD and USAID personnel who would meet those responsibilities by reviewing IRD host nation representative reports and performing on-site inspections as necessary to validate those reports.

Branding

Develop More Nuanced Approaches to Branding and Other Policies with the Potential to Favorably Influence Population Attitudes Regarding the Coalition

Seek ways to balance security and opportunities to promote coalition COIN objectives pertaining to influencing population behaviors and perceptions. Denying population support to the insurgent requires effective information, education, and propaganda campaigns. Denying coalition association with CSP projects sacrifices opportunities to favorably influence populations, leaving HN citizens with a skewed view of U.S. and partner services rendered. Innovative approaches, e.g., promoting projects as local or GoI initiatives while citing “assistance from the American people” potentially casts coalition efforts in a more positive light without undue security risks. More analysis regarding the balancing of security concerns with those involving activities appropriate to gaining locals’ support for coalition activities is called for.

Sustainment and Transition to Iraqi Authorities

Design Sustainment and Transition into All Programs at Initiation.

Design sustainment – the continued effectiveness of programs – and transition to local government/ communities into all aspects of CSP. Projects and programs that do not

appear sustainable or capable of transition should not be initiated unless the effects generated in their limited lifespan outweigh the transient character and negative consequences of termination on broader COIN objectives. Such evaluations should include consideration of the impact of termination on local residents' belief that counterinsurgents (international or HN) will maintain a posture of perpetual presence to protect citizens from insurgent retribution (e.g., through near-term presence of security forces and, in the long term, the existence of capable and trusted police/HN military personnel as necessary). Program design should include linkage to other USAID or agency/NGO projects whose objectives include government capacity building; CSP and similar programs will eventually either have to be terminated in a satisfactory manner or handed over to Iraqi government/community representatives.

Population Segments Addressed by CSP

Expand CSP-Type Programs to Encompass Less Immediate and Vulnerable Audiences.

CSP was, by design or default, primarily a program with transient impact. This is in part a function of having not fully incorporated sustainment and transition into it at initiation. It is also a function of its target audiences as defined by program policy. Addressing only the specified age group and limiting coverage to the four components neglected other vulnerable or vital population segments that should in addition be incorporated as elements in similar future programs as appropriate, for example:

- Children and younger youth otherwise vulnerable to unchallenged fundamentalist teachings
- Mothers and wives responsible for and with influence over vulnerable

segments of the population

- Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
- Government and other community leaders who would assume responsibility for programs or support their continuance, e.g., via formation of volunteer programs

Specifics regarding what groups are appropriate for targeting through programs such as CSP will differ by country and within country depending on the nature of the insurgency, cultural factors, and other variables. Identification of such groups should be a primary component of preliminary and ongoing program assessments.

Program Management

Better balance Agreement/Contract Vehicles to better address (1) requirements for flexibility in volatile COIN environments, (2) consistency of guidance to implementers, and (3) cost

Modern insurgencies, especially urban insurgencies, tend to evolve rapidly regardless of theater. As was found to be the case in 2006-2007 in the southern Philippines and continues to be a challenge in other theaters, the original value of programs with long-lead times may be overcome by events. Agreement and contract vehicles need to be adaptive without undue disruption or increases in cost. This can be achieved via insightful project selection; reliance on smaller, short-term efforts; and decentralization of decision-making and funds allocation.

Select those capable of facilitating cooperation for key program positions

USAID/CSP internal personnel issues hinder the effectiveness of operations in the field. More careful selection of USAID/CSP personnel for assignment to PRTs and field assignments is necessary, as is close monitoring of those chosen for key implementer

positions. Personnel evaluations should include consideration of interpersonal skills, knowledge of external organizations, and a linkage to the collective performance of organizations of which the rated individual is a part, e.g., a PRT. Mission first (supporting program objectives), not personal performance or career enhancement, should guide USAID/CSP evaluation policies. This requirement, one shared by military and other agencies as well, has received very little study to date. Further analysis is called for.

Form a technical evaluation body to determine what adaptations to CSP are needed prior to its application to other environments

Adaptation of CSP to another theater, (or introduction of a revised program at a future date in Iraq), will require both significant changes to the basic model and modification to meet the unique demands of those locations where it will be employed. Create an evaluation body to ensure adaptation of pertinent recommendations from this and other references. This would ideally be an interagency body tasked with designing an effective system of complementary aid and capacity-building programs that are in turn funded with appropriately fungible funding vehicles of requisite duration. Barring creation of this ambitious entity, USAID should form an agency-internal capability to address needs within and across its programs. The capability would ideally coordinate with other agencies to enhance inter-program effectiveness to the extent feasible given the absence of an interagency body.

Capitalize on USAID lessons learned capabilities

USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse should provide a place on its website for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned from USAID's COIN and other irregular

warfare operations and otherwise actively solicit contributions from field savvy and other sources. This would provide a forum for inputs of documents and individual observations regarding operations by USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USAID/ Washington global contracts (such as the Instability, Crisis and Reconstruction Indefinite Quantity Contract), and mission-funded COIN projects that were completed in Liberia and are now underway in Sierra Leone, Pakistan, and other places. Links should be provided to other relevant COIN lessons learned resources at the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/ CRS), U.S. Joint Forces Command, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), as well as those on the websites of U.S. Institute for Peace (USIP), the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Institute, other relevant civilian and military organizations. Compilation, analysis, and dissemination of such lessons learned is a significant factor in attaining a better educated force and more responsive training capability, an asset of no little import given our previous discussion of the rapid rate of evolution during counterinsurgencies. Appropriate sharing protocols would have to be developed, the objective being to allow the widest possible dissemination to potential users while ensuring anonymity to the extent necessary to encourage broad participation in the form of inputs and comments that expand on those inputs.

Adaptation to Other Theaters

Virtually all of the above recommendations are pertinent to an adaptation of a CSP-type program to other theaters. Those below additionally merit consideration.

Evaluate the availability and suitability of other partners, to include other agencies, governments, NGOs, and IGOs

As highlighted in the context of pre-operation environmental assessments above, it is critical to determine whether local officials are capable of effectively accepting responsibility for programs destined for transition to government and other authorities. Similarly, adaptation of a CSP-like program in the face of future COIN challenges may require reliance on other-than-U.S. forces for security. The feasibility of the program may rest on that military's capabilities to protect those conducting or otherwise supporting the program. Planning, program design, and the decision to proceed must take this requirement into account much as it must evaluate whether that force and the local government will ultimately be able to support a program or its projects in the manner required.

Similarly, synergies are possible through integration of efforts with other U.S. government and multinational aid providers, NGOs, and IGOs such as UN organizations. Evaluating the capabilities of these potential stakeholders and determining the feasibility of relying on them to provide essential services potentially offers promise for freeing USAID to focus on other demands.

Establish an intra-USAID COIN education program

It was evident during several interviews that some USAID and implementer personnel had a limited understanding of COIN theory and practice. A senior USAID official concluded, "CSP is about sustainable stability rather than sustainable development." As such, it is in some ways fundamentally different than the typical USAID program. Many of the design and execution shortfalls highlighted herein can be attributed to

this lack of knowledge, (e.g., early failure to sufficiently incorporate sustainability and ultimate transition of the program, shortcomings in linking employment and training programs to those promoting long-term employment for participants). In the future, USAID should aggressively seek immediate training opportunities for key employees, (e.g., attendance at the COIN Center for Excellence in Taji, Iraq). In the longer term, an internal training program should either be established or contracted for to prepare USAID and selected implementer representatives prior to deployment. Note that this training program could instead be created as an interagency/ civilian-military offering of short duration for those preparing for deployment, the objective being to both educate with respect to COIN and the interagency relations essential to its successful execution, (as a lack of understanding regarding the demands of a successful counterinsurgency are not limited to USAID alone).

Encourage formation of a USG Interagency Staff College

The general absence of inter-departmental understanding of procedures, missions, constraints, and other organizationally unique characteristics suggests that a far more in-depth course of instruction is also called for. Competent individuals diminish the negative impact of interagency and multinational misunderstandings. It is important that the success of programs like CSP not rely on personalities alone. The USG must, to the extent possible, put the conditions in place to institutionalize success. Formation of an interagency staff college for mid-level managers – one ideally also open to our multinational and NGO/IGO partners – would be a significant step toward improving understanding of the culture of coalitions and their daily workings.⁷⁷ Subsequent interagency exchange postings for graduates would

further abet pre-planning and field operations.

Concluding Remarks

Our success will require innovative thinking, a spirit of cooperation, dedication, hard work and sacrifice. Our nation and its men and women deployed in harm's way deserve no less.⁷⁸

General James N. Mattis
Commander, USJFCOM

The metaphor of a coin is at times used to capitalize on its verbal similarity to the acronym for counterinsurgency (COIN). One can envision the analogy referring to one side of a coin representing the application of force while the reverse symbolizes the employment of non-lethal approaches. Alluring as it is, the representation is ultimately a flawed one. The two sides of a coin are forever destined to be separate and completely isolated from one another. The tools of force and those employing a "softer" approach should be something else entirely. They are ideally more akin to a system in which each part facilitates and enhances its all others. Such were the objectives of the Community Stabilization Program.

It is in the spirit of making those objectives attainable that the authors of this report offered this analysis. The effective orchestration of lethal and non-lethal tools is essential to the success of a counterinsurgency. While at times seemingly involving independent actions, they are in truth indelibly linked to eventual success. CSP stands as a potentially dramatic component of future COIN strategies, one that will only be fully realized through internal coordination of its activities, integration with

complementary programs, and innovative policies, procedures, and leadership across much of the U.S government.

Endnotes

- 1 Interviews 6,9,11,29,31,34,36,45,60,61,62,63,69.
- 2 Interviews 1,5,6,7,10,13 19,20, 26, 31, 33,37,38.
- 3 Interviews 2,3,8,9,12,14,17,18,26,32, 36,38,39,40,53, 58, 60,61,62,63,69,71,75,81.
- 4 This recommendation is made despite the evaluation team understanding that currently USAID does not influence who oversees field operations of other USG programs.
- 5 IRAP are funds provided directly to the PRTs for use in local project implementation.
- 6 Original program documentation specified a focus on 17-35 year old males (13-25 in some sources, age 12 being included in others, females also being included in select documents). A number of subsequent documents expanded coverage. This report generally refers to the 17-35 span given that it appears in the scope of work documentation for this evaluation, as does reference to “at-risk, unemployed males.” We have nonetheless chosen to include women in our discussions given their frequent mention in interviews, written documentation, and *de facto* inclusion in CSP.
- 7 Figures derived from “CSP Year One, Two, and Three Performance Indicator Outputs,” CSP M&E Office, Baghdad. Another \$32M is scheduled to support of extending the program in Mosul and Baquba through February 2010.
- 8 Adapted from *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, pp. 5/18-5/23.
- 9 Key Informant Interview 1.
- 10 Key Informant Interview 31.
- 11 CSP Scope of Work, United States Agency for International Development, undated, p. 1.
- 12 Initial estimates drawn from the in-progress MEPP Youth Study. Numbers are taken from the CSP Tracking Sheets for Completed and Closed out projects only.
- 13 Figures from “CSP Activity Report dated June 21 – 27, 2009.
- 14 CSP Scope of Work, United States Agency for International Development, undated, p. A-1.
- 15 CSP Program Description, July 29, 2007 Section 1.3.4.1
- 16 Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex, p. 4, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006; CSP CA#267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 23. It should be noted that USAID/Iraq’s Strategic Objective 7 and Intermediate Result 7.1 call for “unemployment decreased with a focus on young men” rather than simply “youth.”
- 17 CSP CA#267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 27.
- 18 CSP CA # 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 23.
- 19 CSP CA # 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 36.
- 20 CSP CA # 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 37
- 21 CSP CA # 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, “CSP Program Description,” September 26, 2006,, p. 37
- 22 CSP Scope of Work, United States Agency for International Development, undated, p. A-2. (Emphasis in original)
- 23 E.g. Employment, Credit, Business Development, Youth Culture/Sports, Public Services, Youth Training.
- 24 Key Informant Interviews 1, 5, 8, 11, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 32, 34, 37, 45, 58, 60, 62, 63, 69, 71, and 81.
- 25 Key Informant Interviews 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11,16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 32, 37, 45, 60, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 71, 81, and 93.
- 26 Key Informant Interviews 6, 19, 21, 26, 34, and 81.
- 27 Key Informant Interviews 19, 21, 26, 63, 75, 81, and 93.
- 28 Key Informant Interviews 5, 7, 8, 15, 20, 31, 52, 62, and 63.
- 29 MEPP II Special Study of BDP Grants – 2008.
- 30 MEPP II Special Study of BDP Grants – 2008.
- 31 MEPP II Special Study of BDP Grants – 2008.
- 32 Key Informant Interviews 9, 34, 59, and 62.
- 33 *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 3-12.
- 34 CSP Program Description, July 29, 2007.
- 35 MEPP II Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Study, May 2009 p. 6.
- 36 Key Informant Interviews 47,5,10.
- 37 Key Informant Interview 47; MEPP II Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Study, May 2009.
- 38 MEPP II Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Study, May 2009 p. 6.
- 39 Key Informant Interview 47.
- 40 *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-1.
- 41 *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 1-22.
- 42 *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-4.
- 43 Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex Pages 4, 5, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006.
- 44 Key Informant Interview 24 (Vo-tech) (CSP Frontline Staff – non-Iraqi).
- 45 USAID/Iraq FSO comment.
- 46 Though “short term engagement” was defined by IRD as up to 3 months, the engagements of over a day were usually for apprenticeships, vocational training, and/or infrastructure jobs rather than youth activities. Based on Key Informant Interview found in MEPP II Weekly Report.
- 47 Key Informant Interview 85 [CSP Frontline Workers (3)-Iraqi and (1) US].
- 48 Key Informant Interview 70 [Gol Representatives].
- 49 Key Informant Interview 85 [CSP Frontline Workers (3)-Iraqi and (1) US].
- 50 Key Informant Interview 85 [CSP Frontline Workers (3)-Iraqi and (1) US] and Key Informant Interview 90 [Gol Representative (1) and Non-Gol Leaders (3)].

51 Key Informant Interview 40 [Non-Gol Leader].

52 Key Informant Interview 85 [CSP Frontline Workers (3)-Iraqi and (1) US] and Key Informant Interview 70 [Gol Representatives (3)].

53 Key Informant Interview 85 [CSP Frontline Workers (3)-Iraqi and (1) US].

54 Key Informant Interview 29 [CSP Frontline Worker-Iraq].

55 Based on the work of The Harvard Conflict Management Center, Harvard University Law School Professor Roger Fisher, and that of Dr. Gelman in the Harvard University Psychology Department where he has conducted face-to-face research with leaders of the Arab-Israeli conflict for several decades.

56 Key Informant Interview 70[Gol Representatives] and Key Informant Interview 69 [Agency Representative, PRT].

57 Key Informant Interviews 84 and [PRT Representatives] and Key Informant Interview 40 [Non Gol Leader].

58 Key Informant Interview 71 [Agency Manager].

59 For example, see Key Informant Interviews 4, 24, and 41.

60 Key Informant Interview 24 [Vo-Tech (CSP front line staff, non-Iraqi)].

61 Key Informant Interview 1.

62 Key Informant Interview 6.

63 Key Informant Interview 7.

64 The failure to coordinate involved the Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee program. See "Rebuilding Iraq: Improved Management Controls and Iraqi Commitment Needed for Key State and USAID Capacity-Building Programs," Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, June 2009, p. 4.

65 Key Informant Interview 1.

66 Key Informant Interviews 8 and 13.

67 Note that though the non-participant poll targeted those not involved directly with CSP, 11% had participated in a CSP or other aid program.

68 *Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience*, Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction, February 2, 2009, 22.

69 For example, see Key Informant Interviews 6, 7, and 32.

70 For example, see Key Informant Interview 15.

71 Key Informant Interview 19.

72 Key Informant Interview 26.

73 See for example, discussions of this issue in the forthcoming Russell W. Glenn, *Band of Brothers or Dysfunctional Family? A Military Perspective on Coalition and Alliance Challenges During Stability Operations*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, (to be published in 2009); and John Cloake, *Templer: Tiger of Malaya*, London: Harrap Limited, 1985.

74 For further discussion, see Hans Binnendijk, and Patrick M. Cronin, ed. "Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations: A Preliminary Report," Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, December 2008, pp. x-xii; "Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Stabilization Program," Audit Report No. E-267-08-001-P, USAID Office of the Inspector General, March 18, 2008, p. 10; Key Informant Interviews 10, 20, and 41.

75 Key Informant Interview 32.

76 Key Informant Interview 6.

77 Note that more senior managers should be able to attend curricula at the National Defense University: "DOD codified its plan for interagency education in the 2006 QDR [quadrennial defense review], a congressionally mandated examination of DOD roles, missions, and capabilities. The 2006 QDR stated: 'The Department will also transform the National Defense University, the Department's premier educational institution, into a true national Security University...tailored to support the educational needs of the broader U.S. national security professional.'" Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, Ed. "Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations: A Preliminary Report," Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, December 2008, p. 135.

78 "USJFCOM Irregular Warfare Vision," Attachment to General J. N. Mattis memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command, Subject: Irregular Warfare Vision, March 11, 2009, p. 6.

Bibliography

- "A Civilian 'Surge' for Iraq," Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, January 30, 2009.
- Al-Muthanna Province Development Strategy, 2007-2009.
- Annexes to Maturity Model Handbook (5LOAS only).
- Arnudova, Diana and J.J. Kryschtal. *Samara Assessment: Causes of Tension, Capacities for Peace and Recommendations for Stability*. Iraq Community Based Conflict Mitigation Program. August 14, 2008.
- Arnudova, Diana and J.J. Kryschtal. *Tikrit Assessment: Causes of Tension, Capacities for Peace, and Recommendations for Stability*. Iraq Community Based Conflict Mitigation Program. August 10, 2008.
- "Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Stabilization Program," Audit Report No. E-267-08-001-P, USAID Office of the Inspector General, March 18, 2008.
- Babel Provincial Development Strategy, 2007 - 2012
- Bell, Richard and Michael S. McBride and Mark P Hertling. *Joint Common Plan*. Headquarters Multinational Corps, Iraq. June 2008.
- Bowen Jr., Stewart. Iraq Reconstruction: Quarterly Report, Semi-Annual Report to the United States Congress. Rep. no. Quarterly Report, Semi-Annual Report to Congress. Washington, DC: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2009.
- Butenis, Patricia A. and K.J. Glueck Jr. *Strategic Framework to Build Capacity and Sustainability in Iraq's Provincial Governments*. September 7, 2008.
- Center for International Private Enterprise, Business Attitudes Towards Political and Economic Reconstruction in Iraq, February 29, 2009
- Center for International Private Enterprise. "Business Attitudes Towards Political and Economic Reconstruction in Iraq." 29 Feb. 2008.
- Center for International Private Enterprise. The Future of Iraq: Survey of the Iraqi Business Community. Raw data. 28 Sept. 2005.
- Christoff, Joseph. "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq." Letter. Oct. 2008. Office of International Affairs and Trade, Washington, DC.
- Cole, S. *Maturity Model Handbook Revised*. 2008.
- Cole, S. *Planning Assessment User Guide Revised*. November 21, 2007.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex p. 4.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex Pages 4, 5, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex Pages 4, 5, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex, p. 12, 13, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex, p. 4, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006;
- CSP CA#267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 23.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex, p. 4, USAID RFA No. 267-06-001, May 15, 2006;
- CSP CA#267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 23.
- Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Program Description, Technical Annex., p. 5.
- Community Stabilization Program-IRAQ: Business Development Program Fact Sheet. Issue brief. International Relief and Development, 2007.
- "Commence DEPSEC Sullican Pushes KPG to Boost Transparency, Combat Corruption". Telegram: Baghdad 00002258. July 2008.
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 1, September 30, 2006
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 2, October 9, 2006
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 3, October 26, 2006
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 4, January 31, 2007
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 5, April 24, 2007
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 6, May 11, 2007
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 12, September 18, 2008
- Cooperative Agreement 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification 14, February 19, 2009
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 1-22.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-1.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-2.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-2.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-3.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24, p. 2-4.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24., p. A-6.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-1.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-1.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 2-1.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-19.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-20 to 5-21.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-20.
- Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. ix.
- CSP CA # 267-A-00-06-00503-00, Modification No. 01, p. 28.
- D3 Systems, and KA Research Ltd. Iraq Poll. Raw data. Feb. 2009.
- Department of Defense - Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 as amended through October 17 2008, p. 268.
- Department of Defense - Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 as amended through October 17 2008, p. 130.

Dhi Qar Provincial Council, Development Strategy of the Dhi Qar Province, Dhi Qar Strategic Plan, 2007-2009
 Doc. No. USAID for International Development-Fragile States Strategy (2005).
 Dorman, Shawn. "Iraq PRTs: Pins on a Map". Foreign Services Journal. March 2007.

Fouk, Vincent. *Presentation: Corruption in Iraq*. The Anti-Corruption Coordination Office. U.S. Embassy. January 22, 2009.

General George S. Patton, Jr., July 8, 1941, in an address to the men of the 2nd Armored Division, *The Patton Papers*, Vol. II, 1974, as cited in Charles Q. Brown, "Developing Doctrine for the Future Joint Force: Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams," U.S. Air Force Air University paper, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2004, p. 9.

Hackett, Tamra. "Iraq Community Based Conflict Mitigation (ICCM)." [Baghdad, Iraq]. Relief International.
 Hans Binnendijk, and Patrick M. Cronin, ed. 'Civilian Surge: Key to Complex Operations: A Preliminary Report,' Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University, December 2008
Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, Special Inspector General, Iraq Reconstruction, February 2, 2009
 Harvey, Herr, and Mohammed Zaydy. Business Development Projects in Kirkuk: Monitoring Business Development Projects from the Community Stabilization Program. Rep. no. Final Report. Baghdad, Iraq: IBTCI, 2007.
 Helf, Gavin. Democracy and Governance Advisor. "Key Informant Interview Questions: Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Evaluation Mission." Interview with Cynthia Scarlett. 8 May 2009.
 Herr, Harvey and Rich Mason and Mohammed Zubaidy. *Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Business Development Program Special Study*. Draft Final Report. IBTCI. December 14, 2008.
 Herr, Harvey and Rich Mason and Mohammed Zubaidy. *Report on Business Development Projects in Baghdad*. IBTCI. October 31, 2007.
 Herr, Harvey and Rich Mason. *Community Stabilization Program Rapid Programmatic Assessment*. Monitoring and Evaluation Program Phase II (MEPP II). November 14, 2007.
 Herr, Harvey, and Rich Mason. *Community Stabilization Program: Rapid Programmatic Assessment*. Rep. no. Final. 2007.
 Herr, Harvey, Rich Mason and Mohammed Zubaidy, *MEPP II Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Study*, International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc., May 6, 2009.
 Holy Karbala Province Council, HOLY KARBALA PROVINCE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY, 2007-2012
http://www.telegrams.state.gov/posts/view_telegram.cfm. Anti-Corruption Cable-Baghdad 00000022. January 2009.

IBTCI, MEPP II, Report on Business Development Projects in Kirkuk, Monitoring Business Development Projects from The Community Stabilization Program, Final Report, September, 6, 2007
 ICCM Offices & Conflict Assessment Communities
 ICCM Youth Component Project Briefs, August 28, 2008
 Initial Benchmark Assessment Report, July 12, 2007
Initial Impressions Report: Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Operation Iraqi Freedom. Center for Army Lessons Learned. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. December 2007.
 International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI). "Community Stabilization Program: Performance Indicator Data Table." Chart. 2008.
 International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI). Assessment of the USAID/IRAQ Program and GOI Priorities to Inform Future M&E Performance Project, Phase II (MEPP II) Programming. Rep. no. Final Report. Vienna, VA: IBTCI, 2009.
 International Organization for Migration. Monitoring and Needs Assessments. Assessment of Iraqi Return. 2008.
 International Organization for Migration. Returnee Monitoring Needs Assessments. Rep. no. Tabulation Report. Baghdad, Iraq: Ministry of Displaced and Migrants, 2009.
 International Relief and Development, Application in response to Request for Applications No. 267-06-007 issued by the United States Agency for International Development, May 15, 2006
 International Relief and Development. Community Stabilization Program: Al Anbar, April 15-21. Rep. no. Weekly Report #15. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. Community Stabilization Program: Al Anbar, April 15-21. Rep. no. Weekly Report #35. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. Community Stabilization Program: Al Anbar, July 8-14. Rep. no. Weekly Report #27. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. Community Stabilization Program-Iraq: Mosul and Kirkuk, April 15-21. Rep. no. 15. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. Community Stabilization Program-Iraq: Mosul and Kirkuk, March 11-17. Rep. no. 30. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. July 20-26. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. July 6-12. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. June 15-21. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. June 1-7. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. June 22-28. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. CSP Activities Report. May 18-24. Rep. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. IRAQ Community Stabilization Program-Cooperative Agreement #267-H-00-06-00503-00, April 1-June 30. Rep. no. Quarterly. 2008.
 International Relief and Development. IRAQ Community Stabilization Program-Cooperative Agreement #267-H-00-06-00503-00, January 1-March 31. Rep. no. Quarterly 3. 2007.
 International Relief and Development. IRAQ Community Stabilization Program-Cooperative Agreement #267-H-00-06-00503-00, October 1-December 31. Rep. no. Quarterly. 2007.
 "Iraq Agriculture and Budget Program Overview". Information Management Unit. May 12, 2008.
 "Iraq Agriculture and Irrigation Overview". AG Report. Information Management Unit. July 13, 2008.
 Isser, Deborah, and Peter Van-Der. Land, Property and the Challenge of Return for Iraq's Displaced. Rep. no. 221. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2009.

Klein, Bridget and Richard Meyer and Alfred Hannig and Jill Burnett and Michael Fiebig. *Better Practices in Agricultural Lending*, NO.3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. December 1999.

Kramer, Franklin, Richard Megahan, and Henry Gaffney. Stabilization and Economic Growth Workshop. Rep. no. Initial Draft. Ed. Joseph Gregoire. Washington, DC: US Government, 2008.

Kramer, Franklin, Richard Megahan, and Henry Gaffney. Stabilization and Economic Growth Workshop. Rep. no. Interim Report. Ed. Joseph Gregoire. Washington, DC: US Government, 2009.

Lenton, Alexandra. *Identifying Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Youth Conflict Mitigation and Violence Reduction*. April 10, 2009

Lenton, Alexandra. *Identifying Best Practices and Lessons Learned in Youth Conflict Mitigation and Violence Reduction*. Issue brief. 2009.

Lester Grau, "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual," Book review in Military Review, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/bookrevu/fm3-24.html> (accessed May 26, 2009).

Lincoln Group. "Abu-Ghraib: Community Stabilization Survey 1 Year Study." Rev. of Baghdad, Abu-Ghraib. Mar. 2008.

Lincoln Group. "Babil: Community Stabilization Survey." Review. Apr. 2008.

Lincoln Group. "Basra: Community Stabilization Survey 6-month Follow-up." Review. Feb. 2009.

Lincoln Group. "Beiji: Community Stabilization Survey 1 year study." Review. Feb. 2009.

Lincoln Group. "Karada: Community Stabilization Survey 1 Year Study." Rev. of Baghdad, Karada. Mar. 2008.

Lowry, Keri. "IRAQ: PRTs." Chart. Washington, DC: US Agency for International Development, 2007.

Mains, Steven. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Tactics, Techniques and Procedures*. Handbook No. 07-11. January 2007.

Mains, Steven. PRT *Playbook*. Handbook No. 07-34. September 2007.

Mamadou Sidibe, "Analysis of the Number of Daily Insurgent Attacks in CSP Cities in Iraq," International Relief & Development, December 2008

Management Systems-International Corporate Offices, Blue Richard, and Molly Hegeboeck. "Constructing an Evaluation Report." 14 Apr. 2006.

Mason, Rich and Mohammed Zubaidy. *Report on Business Development Projects in Kirkuk*. Final Report. Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program (MEPP II). IBTCI and USAID. September 6, 2007.

Mason, Rich and Mohammed Zubaidy. *Report on Community Infrastructure and Essential Services Projects in Mosul and Kirkuk*. Draft Final Report. Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program (MEPP II). IBTCI and USAID. August 10, 2007.

Mason, Rich and Mohammed Zubaidy. *Report on Employment Generation and Youth Project in Ninewa*. Draft Final Report. Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II (MEPP II). IBTCI and USAID. October 2, 2007.

Maturity Model Handbook. November 24, 2008.

Maysan Provincial Development Strategy

McCallister, William S. *Corruption in Iraq: Exploiting Market Behavior as a Form of Irregular Warfare*. <http://www.smalljournal.com>. 2008.

McCary, John A. "The Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives." *The Washington Quarterly* 32 (2009): 43-59.

Mcfarin, Dan. Country Director, Iraq ECCI, and Ed Henson. Former In-Country Officer of AFCEE Iraqi Construction Program. "CSP Questions for ECC." Interview with International Business and Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI). May 2009.

Memorandum of Agreement Between US-Mission Iraq and the Multi-National Forces-Iraq for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq. February 2, 2007.

MEPP II Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Vocational Education and Apprenticeship Study, "Gauging the success of the program against this benchmark tells us that the results of the program are not encouraging.." p. 5, May 06, 2009.

Ministry of Agriculture Approach and Prime Minister's Initiative.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plan For the Iraq Community Stabilization Program, July 1, 2007

National PDS Implementation Conference
Baghdad, Iraq
May 11-13, 2008

Ninewa Provincial Reconstruction Team Update, May 9, 2007

Office of the Inspector General. Audit of USAID/Iraq's Community Stabilization Program. Audit Rep. no. E-267-08-001-P. Baghdad, Iraq: US Government, 2008.

Office Of the Inspector General. Audit of USAID/Iraq's M&E Performance Program. Audit Rep. no. E-267-08-004-P. US Government, 2008.

Perito, Robert M. *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq: Special Report 185*. United States Institute of Peace. March 2007.

Powers, Phyllis M. *PRT/ePRT Assessment Tool Information Memorandum*. November 24, 2007.

Presentation: Corruption and Local Government in Iraq, Arabic version. The Anti-Corruption Coordination Office. U.S. Embassy. January 24, 2009.

Press Conference, National Press Club, Full Transcript (Draft): Current Situation in Iraq, October 2, 2007

Processes for Project Identification, Selection and Approval (source unknown)

Prospects for Iraq's Stability: Some Security Progress but Political Reconciliation Elusive Update to NIE;
Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, August 2007

Provincial Maturity Model Overview, June 2008

PRT Conference Brief: SAD PRT/3 BCT 82nd ABN DIV: Salah Ad Din Province Overview. November 2007.

PRT Salah Ad Din: Initiatives and Accomplishments. November 7, 2007.

"Rebuilding Iraq: Improved Management Controls and Iraqi Commitment Needed for Key State and USAID Capacity-Building Programs," Washington, D.C.: Government Accounting Office, June 2009.

Relief International and Columbia University's Center for International Conflict Resolution, Iraq Community - Based Conflict Mitigation (ICCM) one pager Rep. No. USAID/IRD Community Stabilization Program Communications Agreement-267-A-00-06-00503-00 (2009).

Russell W. Glenn, "A Tale of Two Countries: Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building in the Pacific," *Small Wars Journal*, posted June 12, 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/print/a-tale-of-two-countries/> (accessed May 29, 2009).

Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Lessons from Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. (This document is not available to the general public.)

Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.

Schnittker, John M. *Agricultural Coordination Conference*. Provincial Reconstruction Team. Baghdad, Iraq: March 10, 2008.

Scotto, Mike. *PRTs & CF: Mutual Support: Salah Ad Din PRT*. June 24, 2008.

Shaw, Robert, Jerry Roberts, and Tyler Maulding. "On the Ground: Efforts Continue." *DefenseLink* 6 Feb. 2009. 24 Apr. 2009
 <<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=52985>>.

SOW for Iraq Vocational Training and Apprenticeship Program Study. USAID. March 11, 2009.

SOW for USAID Community Stabilization Program Youth Engagement Study. USAID. March 12, 2009.

Strategic Framework to Build Capacity and Sustainability in Iraq's Provincial Governments, August 15, 2008

Strategic Planning for the Ninawa Province

Summary of September 2007 Iraq Benchmarks Report

Summary of September 2007 Iraq Benchmark Report

Tarnoff, Curt. *Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance*. Rep. no. CRS Report to Congress. Washington, DC: Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division, 2008.

Tarnoff, Curt. *Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq*. Rep. no. CRS Report to Congress. Washington, DC, 2008.

"Testimony of Ambassador Saloom." Interview with House Budget Committee. 30 Jan. 2007.

The Future of Iraq: Survey of the Iraqi Business Community. Center for International Private Enterprise Zogby International Poll, September 28, 2005.

"UN Lays Groundwork for Iraq Anti-Corruption Program". Telegram: Baghdad 00000258. January 2009.

United Nations. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Humanitarian Update: Iraq, No.5." Press release. Washington, DC. Mar. 2009.

United States Agency for International Development. "USAID/IRAQ Bi-Weekly Update." Press release. USAID GOV. 27 July 2006. <www.usaid.gov/iraq>.

United States Government. The White House. "Fact Sheet: Helping Iraq Achieve Economic and Political Stabilization." Press release. WhiteHouse.gov. 8 Jan. 2008. <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2008/01/20080108-4.html>>.

United States. Department of State. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Bureau of Public Affairs. *Funding Iraq's Transition to Self-Reliance and Stabilization in the President's 2007 Supplemental and 2008 Requests*. 11399th ed. Washington, DC, 2007.

United States. *Measuring Security and Stability in Iraq*. Cong. Rept. 2008.

United States. Office of the Inspector General. *Executive Summary of Activities in Iraq*. Washington, DC, 2009.

United States. The Brookings Institution. *Foreign Policy. Assessing Counter-Insurgency and Stabilization Missions*.
 By Jason Campbell, Michael O'Hanlon, and Jeremy Shapiro. 14th ed. Washington, DC, 2009.

United States. The World Bank Group. Iraq Country Management Unit. *Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Iraq for the Period MID FY09-FY11*.
 By International Finance Corporation. 2009.

United States. USAID. *Community Stabilization Program: IRAQ. Branding Implementation Strategy and Marketing Plan*. Vol. 267-A-00-06-00503-00.

USAID, *Constructing and Evaluation Report*, April 14, 2006

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Community Stabilization Program - Business Development Program*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Community Stabilization Program - Vocational Training and Apprenticeships*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Community Stabilization Program*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Democracy and Governance*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Economic Governance II Project*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Economic Growth and Agriculture*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Humanitarian Assistance in Iraq*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Inma Agr business Program*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Iraq Rapid Assistance Program*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Marla Ruzicka Iraqi War Victims Fund*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Microfinance in Iraq*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: National Capacity Development*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Private Sector Development*, April 2008

USAID, *Fact Sheet: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq*, April 2008

USAID. *Iraq Stabilization Program. "Community Stabilization Program Communications Protocol"*. Press release. Washington, DC.

USAID/Iraq Organizational Chart, October 2008

USAID/IRAQ. *CSP Program Description*. Rep. no. 267-06-001. IRD, May 15, 2006.

USAID/IRAQ. *IRAQ RFA- Focused Stabilization in Strategic Cities Initiative*. Rep. no. 267-06-001. USAID, January 2, 2006.

"USJFCOM Irregular Warfare Vision," Attachment to General J. N. Mattis memorandum for U.S. Joint Forces Command,
 Subject: Irregular Warfare Vision, March 11, 2009.

Wall-Technical Director, Iraqi Task Force, David M. "Key Informant Interview Questions:
 Community Stabilization Program (CSP) Evaluation Mission." Interview with Brenda Oppermann, Colin Holland, and Russell Glenn. 7 May 2009.

Wasit Province Development Strategy, 2007 - 2012

ANNEXES

Annex A: Scope Of Work

Background

In reaction to the deteriorating security situation of Iraq in 2005, the USG Interagency in Iraq created a non-military program to complement security and stabilization efforts. USAID formed the Focused Stabilization Office (FSO) to oversee stabilization activities and coordinate those activities with other USG initiatives to encourage a peaceful and stable Iraq. USAID/Iraq, with interagency guidance and concurrence, created the Community Stabilization Program to meet this urgent need.

The USAID/Iraq Community Stabilization Program (CSP) (2006-2009) is a non-lethal, counterinsurgency (COIN) program that reduces the incentives for participation in violent conflict through creating employment and engaging youth. The Community Stabilization Program is a key element of the U.S. Government strategy to transition Iraq to a stable, democratic and prosperous state. CSP is a unique, non-traditional program for USAID. Rather than focusing on traditional long-term sustainable development objectives, CSP is a short-term COIN program concentrates on employing or engaging mass numbers of at-risk, unemployed males ages 17 to 35. CSP is implemented in close coordination with the military, provincial reconstruction teams, and with local civilian counterparts. While currently active in 18 geographic locations throughout Iraq, CSP will be closing offices and implementing a three-phased consolidation plan in 2009.¹

CSP has four program components:

- Short-term employment generation, through Community Infrastructure and Essential

- Service projects that support the Government of Iraq's (GoI) ability to deliver basic services at the local level. Projects provide equipment and renovate facilities which in turn provide healthcare, education, waste, and trash removal.
- Long-term job creation, through Business Development programs that provide capital (in-kind) and training to micro, small and medium sized private enterprises, with a focus on those with high employment potential and businesses destroyed by violence.
- Education, through Vocational Training and Apprenticeships that allow Iraqis to gain employable skills, practical experience, and assistance with job placement in careers, such as carpentry, masonry, welding, and sewing.
- Engagement, through Youth activities in sports, cultural events, skills training, public service campaigns and other activities designed to keep young Iraqis off the streets and connected in a positive manner with their culture and community.

CSP is USAID's largest cooperative agreement worldwide with overall funding of \$644 million during the life of the three-year project. CSP is implemented by USAID's partner, the non-profit organization International Relief and Development (IRD). CSP supports USAID/Iraq's Strategic

Objective 7, Focused Stabilization: reduce the incentives for participation in violent conflict, and Intermediate Results 7.1 (Unemployment decreased with a focus on young men); 7.2 (Conflict mitigated through increased civil society organization and community activities); and 7.3 (Community infrastructure revitalized and essential services provided by local government).

Statement of the Objective

This evaluation is being conducted due to the size and political importance of the Community Stabilization Program. As the USG continues to work in the area of COIN, it is crucial that lessons learned are documented from previous efforts. It is necessary that the successes and failures of the CSP program are studied and documented so that future COIN efforts can benefit. This evaluation is intended for wide dissemination to contribute to USG COIN efforts. It should be noted that the CSP will be ending and further programming of this nature in Iraq is not expected.

Scope of Work

USAID/Iraq's CSP program will be closing in 2009. The purpose of this study is to qualitatively evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the USAID/Iraq Community Stabilization Program as a non-lethal tool for COIN. This evaluation will look at the design and impact of the program to determine its value as a COIN program in the context of the larger USG effort. The goal of the study is to answer three main questions:

- Does the model work? Did CSP's approach to create employment and employment opportunities reduce the incentives of individuals to support and/or participate in violent acts?
- What programmatic components, methodologies, etc. worked and which were less effective? Identify key lessons learned, both positive and negative.
- Were the program components appropriate for the program's lifetime? What were the merits and demerits of CSP's implementation/methodology? How can USAID better verify whether its efforts have

¹ CSP will close the most stable locations first with the majority of resources directed at priority COIN sites in Northern Iraq. Phase I sites (Baghdad proper, Hit, Haditha, Habbaniyah, Al Qaim) are in close-out as of January 31st; Phase II sites (Baghdad Qadas, Ramadi, Fallujah, North Babil, Kirkuk) are estimated to close March 31st; and Phase III sites (Sadr City, Basra, Baqubah, Samarra, Tikrit, Beiji, Mosul/Tal Afar) are estimated to close May 31st.

a direct and indirect impact of reducing violence? How could CSP be improved?

Due to the size of the CSP program and the programs integration with the USG's effort in Iraq, the study will not only be for the use of USAID to evaluate the usefulness of the program but also look at the program's place in the U.S. Government's effort in Iraq. This study will also distill lessons learned on project design and implementation to guide future USAID or U.S. Government COIN initiatives projects in conflict-affected environments.

This evaluation will qualitatively evaluate the CSP program on how it impacted and complemented the overall COIN effort of the USG in Iraq. The FSO expects the evaluation team to be able to give insight into the impact of CSP program. The team should be able to evaluate the program in a way that comes to a conclusion of the effectiveness of the program in reaching its goal of decreasing the incentives for the selected population to support and/or participate in violent acts? The team should then be able to provide guidance in how the program could be improved. The study should not just be limited to USAID but look at the CSP's role in the greater USG Iraq stabilization effort. The evaluation should have input from all levels of activity and the multiple stakeholders involved with the program.

I. Objectives

The objective of this evaluation is to look at the impact of the USAID/Iraq Community Stabilization Program on the stabilization of Iraq. The effectiveness and complementarity of the CSP model as a non-lethal tool for counter-insurgency and for contributing toward stability in conflict situations will be evaluated. The team will derive lessons learned on project design and implementation to guide future USAID or U.S. Government COIN programming in

conflict-affected environments. The result of this evaluation will contribute to the USG's understanding of the non-lethal side of COIN and to the greater debate on creating stability.

II. Tasks

Research: This evaluation will first undertake a research phase where the team will learn CSP's part in the USG's stabilization of Iraq policy. The team will need to acquire a big picture understanding of the CSP program before they arrive in country. Due to the complexity and scale of the USG effort in Iraq, it will be crucial for the evaluation team to have an understanding of all stakeholders. The different components to be looked at are as follows:

- The US military's operations in Iraq on both the kinetic operations and their stability effort in using Commander Emergency Reconstruction Project (CERP) funds.
- The State Department's Provincial Reconstruction Team structure and mechanisms will be considered in relation to CSP.
- USAID/Iraq's strategic plan under which CSP is implemented.
- CSP's place under the Joint Campaign Plan.
- USAID's PRT representative mechanism as project facilitators and their relationship to the PRTs and the Military.
- IRD's operational approach and how they worked to implement the program interfacing with the military, PRTs, USAID (FSO & PRT reps), GoI, and the recipients/beneficiaries.
- Other USAID/Iraq and USG programming that may have been used in conjunction with CSP at the field level.

Evaluation: Once an understanding of the CSP program is attained, the evaluation will then provide an action

plan on how to evaluate the CSP program. The action plan will address how to answer the following questions:

- Did CSP achieve overall program objectives to reduce the incentives for participating in the insurgency? Did CSP employment and engagement activities for young men contribute toward short- and long-term stability? (sub questions should include but not be limited to)
 - How effective was CSP in reducing the number of security incidences (overall and broken down by specific locations)?
 - How effective was CSP in increasing Iraqi citizens' acceptance of the legitimacy of the GoI?
 - To what extent did CSP support the surge and overall coalition efforts in Iraq, including secondary impacts of saving U.S. soldiers' lives?
- **Lessons Learned:** What positive and negative lessons were learned on CSP project design and implementation that could be applied toward future USAID or USG projects in other conflict or post-conflict environments? (sub questions should include but not be limited to)
 - To what extent did CSP achieve its goals? Was the CSP approach the best approach for achieving non-lethal COIN objectives? Would a different project design or program component be more effective in achieving these objectives?
 - Was one program component more effective and cost-effective than another (BDP, CIES, EGY)?
 - How effective was CSP's method of implementation (e.g., utilizing local Iraqi staff, branding, low profile)?
 - How effective was USAID field representative collaboration and monitoring oversight from the

- PRTs/ePRTs?
- How effective was CSP co-location with PRTs?
- How effective were IRD's security methods?
- How effective were project identification methods?
- What was learned about coordination with the military?
- How could CSP be improved? (sub questions should include but not be limited to)
 - What mechanisms could have been put in place to measure the impact of CSP?
 - Would USAID's Branding policy as applied to CSP, and the resulting identification of CSP as a USG funded program have helped or hurt as a COIN instrument?
 - How could the military interface have improved?

Methodology: The contractor will develop the methodology for the evaluation. The methodology will be presented as part of the draft work plan as outlined in the deliverables below. The evaluation team will be able to base their analysis on a variety of project implementation documents, including program descriptions, work plans, performance monitoring plans, quarterly reports, external International Business & Technical Consultants Inc. (IBTCI) evaluation reports, external audit reports, and weekly reports and project trackers. The evaluation team should conduct key interviews with USAID/Iraq staff (including Baghdad International Zone and PRT staff), the U.S. Multi-National Forces Iraq (Division, Brigade Combat Teams, Civilian Affairs Teams), Department of State Team Leaders, CSP expatriate staff in the Baghdad headquarters and in the field offices, the USAID/Iraq Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program, GoI national, provincial, and municipal counterparts, and select project

beneficiaries, as appropriate. In order to make comparisons, the team will gather cursory information on non-lethal, counterinsurgency-related programs in other countries (if they exist) and those supported by the USG in Iraq, such as the U.S. Military's Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP), the U.S. Military's Joint Technical Economic Rehabilitation Project (JTERP), State Department's Quick Response Fund (QRF) and USAID's Quick Response/Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (QRF/IRAP) program, and USAID's predecessor project from the Office of Transition Initiatives. The evaluation team should consider the collection of data from the beneficiaries of the CSP program. This could be data previously collected or designing a survey to be taken during the evaluation. USAID is open to primary analysis (e.g. surveys, other quantitative assessments) where appropriate.

III. Deliverables

The team shall:

1. Develop a draft work plan and methodology to be approved by USAID/Iraq prior to arrival in Iraq.
2. Hold an initial briefing on strategy and methodology prior to fieldwork. Discussion of lists of potential interviewees and sites.
3. Hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment and potential challenges and emerging opportunities.
4. Hold a final debriefing for USAID/Iraq at the end of the fieldwork, present key findings, and provide a report outline before the team's departure from Iraq.
5. The draft evaluation report should be submitted to USAID with the agreed timeframe under the delivery schedule below. The report will address each of the issues identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation.

Any such factors can be included in the report only after consultation with USAID. The report should be in English, no more than 30 pages (excluding attachments), Times New Roman 12 point, single space, consistent with USAID branding policy, consisting of:

Table of Contents:

- Table of Figures and/or Tables
- Acknowledgements - optional
- Acronyms
- Executive Summary (Max. 5 Pages)
 - I. Introduction (body of the report I-VII should be no more than 30 pages)
 - II. Purpose of the Evaluation
 - III. Research Design and Evaluation Methodology
 - IV. Findings
 - V. Conclusions
 - VI. Recommendations
 - VII. Lessons Learned
 - VIII. Annexes (Unlimited pages)
 - A. Evaluation Scope of Work
 - B. Bibliography of documents consulted
 - C. List of persons contacted/consulted

IV. Government-furnished Property

USAID will help facilitate meetings with implementing partners, GOI, and USG officials. When possible, USAID will coordinate with Forward Operating Bases to facilitate work in the field.

V. Place of Performance

The main duty station is in the International Zone in Baghdad, Iraq. Travel to the red zone and to Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and/or embedded-PRTs (e-PRT) in other locations in Iraq will be required.

The evaluation should visit and perform evaluation of the several of the areas CSP has been and is operational. These sites are listed and outlined in the documents provided.

VI. Period of Performance

It is anticipated that the evaluation will commence in late April 2009. The assessment team will be expected to spend a period of time: 1) in Washington reviewing relevant documents; 2) in Iraq conducting the assessment; 3) drafting the report; and 4) addressing and incorporating responses to USAID/Iraq comments on the draft final report. All performance hereunder is anticipated to be completed no later than June 30, 2009.

IX. Personnel

A. Management

The evaluation team will report to Robert McKenney, Advisor, USAID/Iraq Focused Stabilization Office.

B. General Guidance on Personnel

The proposed staff and staffing plan shall show experience working in conflict zones and understanding the operation in such environments. The team shall have the expertise to evaluate the micro economic implications and strategies of the CSP program to deter violence. The team shall have expertise to evaluate the management structure of the program and the interaction of the program with the US Military and USG on a whole. Overall, the team shall have a strong background in monitoring and evaluation of large, USG integrated, politically high profile, programs.

Work in Iraq is a logistical and administrative challenge and as such, any personnel assigned must be capable of working in a demanding and difficult environment. Personnel must have strong project management experience and field operation experience to be effective in Iraq. The Contractor shall ensure that the services being provided are in accordance with FAR 37.101. The table below contains an illustrative list of positions to be filled by the contractor during the period of this contract. Contractor shall designate a

Project Manager as indicated below. This individual will serve as the designated contact person for the USAID/Iraq COTR.

Overtime Policy: contractor personnel assigned to Baghdad may be authorized up to a six-day (48 hour) workweek. Actual workweek length will be specified in each task order placed under the contract.

Fixed hourly rates: The order, if awarded, shall specify separate fixed hourly rates that include wages, overhead, general and administrative expenses, and profit for each category of labor (see FAR Part 16.601(e)(1)).

Summary of key differentiating characteristics: The USAID COTR will compare each proposed position description against the minimum required qualifications and characteristics shown below as a means to support the proposed compensation level and appropriate classification.

Each team member must meet minimum education and experience requirements as shown below:

Project Director/ Project Manager

Description: Performs day-to-day management of contract support operations, possibly involving multiple tasks and groups of personnel at multiple locations, on a single project. Demonstrates skills in the scope of work encompassed by the task order; provides technical guidance to the project team in performance of the work, and reviews the quality of all work products. Organizes, directs, and coordinates the planning and production of all contract support activities. Responsible for staffing, project planning, project financials, and staff direction and oversight. The Project Manager maintains and manages the client interface at the COTR levels of

the client organization. Assists the Program Manager as required in managing contract performance.

Experience & Education: Minimum of 12 years experience and Bachelors Degree

Subject Matter Expert

Description: Senior expert with extensive, enterprise-wide knowledge and experience in one or more designated functional and/or domain areas. Provides insight and advice concerning strategic direction and applicability of up to date, industry standard solutions. Is responsible for providing high level vision to program/project manager or senior client leadership to influence objectives of complex efforts. The Functional/Subject Matter Expert is primarily utilized on projects for their specific expertise, not in a managerial capacity, in support of the creation of comprehensive methods for describing current and/or future structure and behavior of an organization's processes, systems, personnel and organizational sub-units, so that they align with the organization's core goals and strategic direction. The Functional/Subject Matter Expert is typically a former high ranking military or civilian official and recognized by industry as an expert in their specific field.

Experience & Education: Minimum of 12 years experience and Masters Degree

Functional Specialist 2

Description: Senior expert with extensive knowledge in designated field or discipline. Provides insight and advice concerning task or project strategic direction and outcomes.

May contribute to the evaluation, analysis, and development of recommended solutions. Resolves complex problems, which require an in-depth

knowledge of subject matter related to the designated field or discipline. Applies principles and methods of the subject matter to specialized solutions. Generally possess demonstrated ability and experience in management consulting and cross-team facilitation at the senior management level. Other areas of expertise may include, but is not limited to, business process reengineering, statistical process control, individual and organizational assessment and evaluation, process modeling an simulation, strategic and business planning, change management, organizational development, and the development of leadership/management skills. Directs the activities of Specialists 1 and Specialists, or other staff as necessary on activated related to the specified field or discipline.

Experience & Education: Minimum of 12 years experience and Masters Degree

Analyst 2

Description: Senior expert with extensive knowledge and experience developing and applying analytic methodologies and principles, and is recognized as a leader within MOBIS functions. Leads the application of analytic techniques and helps define project objectives and strategic direction. Is responsible for providing leadership and vision to client and project teams around the methodology. Resolves complex problems, which require an in-depth knowledge of analytic methodologies and principles. Directs the activities of more junior Analysts or other staff as necessary on activities related to the application of analytical techniques and methodologies. Demonstrated managerial and supervisory skills.

Experience & Education: Minimum of 5 years experience and Bachelors Degree

Support Staff

Description: Depending on the functional specialty, support the program management staff in the preparation of deliverables, internal reports, briefings, and drawings associated with the project being supported.

Experience & Education: Minimum of a HS Diploma

X. Delivery Schedule:

The contractor shall provide the following to the COTR and CO:

Deliverable Delivery Schedule

1. A draft work plan and methodology to be approved by USAID/Iraq before field data collection and the in-brief begins. Due prior to deployment.
2. Hold an initial briefing on strategy and methodology prior to fieldwork. Discussion of lists of potential interviewees and sites. Draft prepared pre-deployment, and final must be delivered upon arrival in Iraq.
3. Hold a mid-term briefing with USAID on the status of the assessment and potential challenges and emerging opportunities.

Mid Term

4. Hold a final debriefing for USAID/Iraq at the end of the fieldwork, present key findings, and provide a report outline before the team's departure from Iraq.

To Be Scheduled – prior to departure from Iraq

5. A draft evaluation report based on the agreed timeframe. The report will address each of the issues identified in the SOW and any other factors the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the evaluation.

To Be Scheduled

6. In accordance with the AIDAR

clause 752.242- 70, Periodic Progress Reports; bi-weekly progress reports will also be required.

Bi-Weekly

7. Contractor shall provide Trip Reports per COTR direction for significant trips when the COTR determines this is necessary.

As Required

8. Final Report and Assessment - June 28, 2009

Annex B: A Counterinsurgency (COIN) Primer

Author: Dr. Russell W. Glenn

Introduction

This brief appendix seeks to address the essential elements of a successful counterinsurgency. It can serve as no more than a drop on the tongue in quenching a real thirst for understanding these complex undertakings; true understanding can come only with a commitment to deep and extensive contemplation of history and topic theory. It is hoped, nonetheless, that this concise offering provides readers some context as they consider the demands inherent in a counterinsurgency undertaking.

Insurgency, “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict,” is a substantive component if not the primary threat element confronting U.S. and coalition personnel in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines, and elsewhere worldwide.ⁱ It is by no means merely a modern phenomenon; American colonists’ long and successful struggle to replace the government of King George III in 1776-1781 surely constitutes the most important insurgency in United States history; only the Confederacy’s failed attempt to replace the government of the United States in the South approaches its impact on our nation’s history. A counterinsurgency is “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency.”ⁱⁱ

Insurgency is fundamentally a political entity.ⁱⁱⁱ The authors of the

Counterinsurgency manual observe,

Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government’s rule. Achieving this condition requires the government to eliminate as many causes of the insurgency as feasible....

COIN thus involves the application of national power in the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure fields and disciplines. Political and military leaders and planners should never underestimate its scale and complexity; moreover, they should recognize that the armed forces cannot succeed in COIN alone.^{iv}

It is apparent that denying insurgents support of the population and eventually gaining popular support for a host government are essential components for counterinsurgent success. Building social and governmental capital will be fundamental to this dual objective. That entities other than the military are not only necessary but are at times the primary vehicles for their accomplishment should be readily apparent. The essentiality of effective aid and capacity building programs is undeniable. The potential positive impact of United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Community Stabilization Program (CSP) is no less so.

Fundamental Components of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations: Addressing the Primacy of the Population

What is so special in the new [FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency] manual? First, there is a strong emphasis on gaining civilian support by protecting them. Civilian protection is the most important aspect of the counterinsurgency mission. This emphasis runs counter to the decades of increasing U.S. force protection policies that came at the price of endangering the civilian populace. U.S. combatants need to assume more risk and often not react to provocation.... Second, the solution to a counterinsurgency is not military—it is political and economic.... Successful counterinsurgency requires that the civilian actors and agencies become fully engaged in the field alongside combat forces.^v

Lester W. Grau, U.S. Army
Foreign Military Studies Office

Every insurgency poses unique challenges. Some, those in Malaya and Kenya after World War II (WWII) for example, involve actions against only sitting colonial or national governments; there is no outside foreign power involved as was the case in post-WWII Vietnam or as is now the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan. It follows that every counterinsurgency, necessarily tailored to overcome those challenges, is similarly one-of-a-kind. Among the approaches to COIN identified in FM 3-24’s non-exhaustive list is “clear, hold, build,” and it is this conceptualization that is used herein and throughout this report as a vehicle in our analysis of the Community Stabilization Program – and aid more generally – as a component of COIN. The three phases, described below, together provide insight regarding the nature of the approach as a whole. It is vital to remember that the phases overlap both in time and space; there is no sharply delineated line between them. The extent of a population’s support for a national government and weakness of the insurgency in one part of a country may suggest that successful transition from clear to hold or hold to build is at hand even while in a given moment another city or rural location struggles to make initial progress against insurgent groups. Nor is consistent counterinsurgent progress assured. Insurgents may withdrawal to safe havens to regroup, recruit, train, and regain strength, later emerging to reassert themselves, thereby causing the counterinsurgent to suffer frustration as areas thought to be in the hold or build stages suffer setbacks. Such regression poses a particular danger for the counterinsurgent; future commitment to the government’s cause will be much more difficult to attain if those members of the population who supported the established government suffer retribution at the hands of the resurgent enemy. Counterinsurgent victory is less a condition than a promise. Thus we find, for example, Australia repeatedly willing to send military forces into Timor Leste and

Solomon Islands during the past decade when eruptions of violence threatened slippage from the hard won “build” phase back to “hold” or “clear.”

Clear

Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance in an assigned area. The force does this by destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of insurgent combatants. . . . These offensive operations are only the beginning, not the end state. Eliminating insurgent forces does not remove the entrenched insurgent infrastructure. While their infrastructure exists, insurgents continue to recruit among the population, attempt to undermine the [host nation] government, and try to coerce the populace through intimidation and violence. . . . If insurgent forces are not eliminated but instead are expelled or have broken into smaller groups, they must be prevented from reentering the area or reestablishing an organizational structure inside the area.^{vi}

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Though activities during the clear phase will be militarily dominated, government civilian agencies and other organizations will have much to occupy them. Intelligence collection and analysis should seek to identify key social nodes and population needs so that complements to lethal operations are readily available and effective to the extent feasible. Intelligence priorities must also grant resources to those efforts supporting influence operations so that the citizenry is kept abreast of the benefits of supporting the counterinsurgent in lieu of alternatives. Influence activities should also educate, informing noncombatants and threat elements alike how they can best support counterinsurgent objectives.

Non-military organizations cannot afford to wait for the completion of clearing operations to begin their own. The necessary resources for providing aid and building capacity must be ready to move into cleared areas immediately so as to capitalize on and sustain the advantages that follow armed forces success. In the case of CSP, this means that the human infrastructure and supporting materiel should be positioned to begin operations as soon as possible.

Hold

The success or failure of the [hold] effort depends, first, on effectively and continuously securing the populace and, second, on effectively reestablishing a HN [host nation] government presence at the local level. . . . Command themes and messages to the population should. . . emphasize that U.S. and HN security forces will remain until the current situation is resolved or stated objectives are attained. This message of a persistent presence can be reinforced by making long-term contracts with local people for supply or construction requirements. . . . Major actions occurring during this stage include. . . environmental improvements designed to convince the populace to support the HN government, participate in securing their area, and contribute to the reconstruction effort.^{vii}

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

Lethal COIN activities during the hold phase seek to provide a population protection; clearing insurgents from a region and then departing is abandonment unlikely to be forgotten by a citizenry for a long time to come. Departure can also be a death warrant for those amongst the people who stepped forward to assist counterinsurgent efforts. Insurgents will seek to intimidate others from doing

likewise by eliminating individuals interested in supporting alternatives to what the threat offers. Key to rejection of the insurgent and acceptance of the host nation government: the population must believe that the security provided is a permanent state of affairs. Denial of assistance to the insurgent will for most be granted only when they are convinced that the counterinsurgent and host nation government will prevail. Survival instincts and common sense dictate no less. Counterinsurgent competence, steady progress in improving daily life via aid and other initiatives, and demonstration of future promise will be key to convincing the hesitant of the permanence and eventual perseverance of those who largely cleared their neighborhoods of insurgent threats.

Build

Tasks that provide an overt and direct benefit for the community are key initial priorities.^{viii}

FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency

While aid and other initiatives must begin in the clear and hold stages, it is in the build phase that they firmly take precedence over security operations and the application of force. Competently planned, well conceived, and effectively synchronized activities address population needs establish a firm foundation for success that will continue after the inevitable transition of all responsibility to the host nation government. Agencies other than the military will significantly impact whether peace and stability are long lasting. CSP and similar efforts act to diminish the motivations that spurred the birth and maturation of the insurgency. They also provide the people a reason to choose stability over continued violence.

Goals in Support of Clear-Hold-Build

Several goals serve both military and civilian organizations addressing the challenges inherent in separating the insurgent from a population. Among those most prominent are the following, each of which receives attention in turn:

- Seek Traction with the Local Population
- Establish and Convey Perpetual Presence
- Assist in Building Government Legitimacy
- Separate the Insurgent From the Population
- Transition Responsibilities to a Capable Local Government

Seek Traction with the Local Population

Relations with a population can be viewed in terms of friction, both positive and negative. Overly aggressive military operations, poorly executed aid programs, and failure to assess the real needs of the man and woman on the street all are negative forms of friction. The counterinsurgent whose actions are predominantly of this form does more harm than good. Such shortcomings grate on a citizenry as a file grinds stone, the outcome being further sparks of resistance. Better conceived and executed operations instead promote traction. A counterinsurgency force sensitive to religious and other cultural mores that consistently demonstrates basic courtesies during interactions with the population has taken a significant step toward this end.

Well-synchronized programs involving preliminary local inputs are significant in causing each of a coalition's steps to take both outsiders and local residents firmly toward shared objectives while denying insurgents the support they need to survive amongst the population. The insurgent is unlikely to surrender

this support without a struggle. He will do all possible to cause the counterinsurgent to slip. The lubricant of choice is often the citizenry's blood rather than oil. The result is justified fear amongst the locals, a fear that very likely causes them to continue supporting the insurgent cause, however grudgingly.

The intelligence essential to the counterinsurgent is not forthcoming in the face of such intimidation. The counterinsurgent's potentially most effective ambassadors – those providing aid – are thereby denied access to the people who can tell them what aid is needed and how best to provide it. Without such information, USAID officials and their representatives cannot conduct the preliminary assessments key to successfully designing programs like CSP. Vital information, e.g., that regarding what training would best deny the insurgent recruits or identifying officials so corrupt that working with them would squander both valuable resources and public good will toward the host nation government.

Protection of the population must be accompanied by security forces that offer a preferable alternative to the insurgency. The appropriate way of cultivating popular support is to ensure the counterinsurgent has good leadership, practices superb individual discipline, and demonstrates willingness to live and work amongst the population. This is true whether the representatives are military or civilian. Two notably good historical examples in this regard are the ongoing Australian led Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and U.S. interagency efforts in the southern Philippines.^{ix}

Establish and Convey Perpetual Presence

The quotation opening the above discussion of "Hold" alludes to the value

of "persistent presence." No less important is convincing the population that such presence is perpetual – everlasting and unceasing in character and thus as great an assurance of continued security that a population can gain from a host nation government and the counterinsurgent supporting it.^x Commitment to perpetual security places a heavy burden on the international representative; it does not, however, imply that an international force will remain in a troubled region forever. It does presume commitment of outside resources toward the establishment of an effective government, one that is in time backed by its own security forces and a police capable of guaranteeing the safety of the population. This will require (1) long-term commitment to training police and (with the rare exception) an armed forces, and (2) achieving the above-noted condition of having addressed local society's concerns that were the causes of the original insurgency.^{xi} Much of this second task will lie with aid and capacity-building organizations.

Assist in Building Government Legitimacy

No amount of aid, however well executed; no extent of military action, regardless of effectiveness; can compensate for a government incapable or unwilling to legitimately represent the interests of those it is to serve. Thus aid and security operations must consider their impact on local and national governing officials when conducting their operations. Giving credit to local authorities only exacerbates the causes of insurgency if those benefiting use the results for personal gain or otherwise fail to serve effectively. Synchronizing projects and programs therefore must become more than merely a function of ensuring that intra-coalition activities dovetail appropriately; all must also both individually and collectively work toward preparing local representatives so that they

possess the capacity and motivation to govern effectively.

Separate the Insurgent From the Population

All three of the above are necessary but not sufficient ingredients in addressing an insurgency. All likewise are fundamental underpinnings in achieving the constant aim of denying the insurgent popular support. As we have noted, this support is essential to an insurgent force seeking the intelligence necessary to strike forces in support of the host nation government. Yet such intelligence is merely one of many forms of support on which an insurgent relies. He likewise requires food, shelter, labor, and – at a minimum – the people’s turning a blind eye to his activities. Denying the enemy such necessities is a counterinsurgent fundamental during all three phases of clear-hold-build. That denial is a function of both influencing the perceptions and behaviors of the public and directly countering the insurgent’s ability to operate effectively. In both instances the relationship between reducing grievances and imposing costs for resisting counterinsurgent initiatives is significant. Mitigation of grievances should be a constant theme for those seeking citizens’ favor; as previously addressed, the counterinsurgent-local government team must not only achieve population-insurgent separation in the short term. It must also sterilize the seeds whose growth will otherwise continue to feed the disgruntlement that allowed the insurgency to flourish initially. Programs such as CSP ideally play a consistent part both in attaining the initial population-insurgent separation and in convincing the population that continued rejection of the insurgent better serves the people’s welfare.

A key in removing the insurgent from the field and denying him a source of

recruiting is therefore to reduce grievances in the community by whatever acceptable means are available. Some of these means will involve providing benefits to insurgents choosing to surrender. Land reallocation, employment, and removal of unfair practices might be among them. There must also be an increase in the cost of continued resistance for those who do not respond to the carrot: denial of resources, isolation from families, or the killing or other form of neutralization of those who insist on continued conflict. A similar if less severe approach applies to members of civilian communities. Some should receive few if any benefits. Corrupt officials are an example. Their grievances are likely to be few; bringing them to justice removes an obstacle to progress and acts to bolster government legitimacy. The reverse will generally be true for those victimized by insurgents or simply frustrated with a previously inept or corrupt government: more benefits and application of fewer, carefully designed and applied costs will hold the greatest promise. Achieving these ends is beyond the capabilities of USAID, military, or other organizations alone. A cooperative, comprehensive approach is called for, one of which CSP is ideally a fully integrated part.

Transition Responsibilities to a Capable Local Government

The counterinsurgent must ever focus on his eventual departure. However, the surrender of responsibilities to local governments at each echelon should come only after officials demonstrate the capacity to govern wisely while continuing to ensure the population remains secure against a potentially resurgent insurgency. Capable host nation security forces are essential. So too are an administration’s capacity to retain the support of those it governs. This suggests not only that the counterinsurgent prepare officials to fulfill their responsibilities capably. The

citizens must themselves be able to collectively sustain the society of which they are a part. The economy has to be viable and supported by functioning judicial, financial, and other systems without which long-term stability is difficult to accomplish. Programs have to encompass elements that address the ultimate objective of preparing local representatives for the counterinsurgent’s departure. These programs must likewise contain the elements necessary to sustaining the progress achieved to the point of departure. It is essential that the design of programs such as the CSP include consideration for their eventual handover or demise because they have succeeded to the point of self-extinction. The success of COIN is not gauged by conditions as the counterinsurgent departs. It is instead measured by the state of affairs in the years and decades thereafter. As noted in the discussion preceding that on the clear, hold, and build phases, attaining a state of complete counterinsurgent victory is elusive. The individual successes that in compilation comprise that victory can be equally ephemeral. When have efforts in the “build” phase achieved enough that an international counterinsurgent can cease its capacity building and depart, thereby fully transitioning responsibility to the host nation government? The borders between clear, hold, and build are wide, blurred, and overlapping; the signs that such a decision is at hand are similarly unclear. Chances are good that some areas of the host nation government will be able to assume responsibility before others. Transition should thus be a staggered rather than one-point-in-time event. And decisions to transition should not be irreversible ones. As the Australians demonstrated in Timor Leste and Solomon Islands, transition is no more a guarantee of success achieved than is apparent progression from one stage of a counterinsurgency to another. Just as Australia’s army has had to return to

prevent back slipping, so also must other counterinsurgents' military, aid, and capacity building organizations stand ready to return to reinforce hard won previous successes when conditions demand.

The Counterinsurgency Orchestra

If the band played a piece first with the piccolo, then with the brass horn, then with the clarinet, and then with the trumpet, there would be a hell of a lot of noise but no music. To get the harmony in music each instrument must support the others.... You must each of your own volition see to it that you come into this concert at the proper place and at the proper time.^{xii}

General George S. Patton, Jr.,
Address to the men of the 2nd
Armored Division

General Patton was addressing the challenges inherent in synchronizing the actions of an army's combined arms. His was the simpler task, for the men and women comprising those arms lived and trained together and served under a single authority. Counterinsurgency provides no such simplicity. Instruments include those military, often to include multinational military representation, but they also encompass representatives from many other diversely motivated U.S. and coalition partner agencies. The ideal COIN undertaking would in addition orchestrate relevant nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations as well as local governments, members of their population, and commercial enterprise representatives as appropriate. Mere participation serves little purpose. Ill or uncoordinated efforts can work at cross purposes and undermine efforts to gain a citizenry's confidence, a confidence that is basic to denying the insurgent popular support.

The urban character of much of the competition in Iraq combines with modern rapid means of communication to ensure that insurgent adaptations to environmental challenges take place in days or weeks. FM 3-24 notes, "In COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly—the better learning organization—usually wins."^{xiii} Smaller organizations inherently have an advantage in this process; leaders can more rapidly disseminate lessons learned and solutions discovered when the distances to organizational outer edges is less. On the other hand, coordinating mechanisms between agencies within the U.S. government are often nonexistent at the echelons needed. They suffer further impediment when these organizations possess dissimilar means of communication or have worthy initiatives blocked by bureaucratic agendas.

Yet disadvantages need not foretell defeat. Better discipline, training, planning, leadership, and technologies all offer potential means to mitigate the advantages possessed by even the most adept of insurgent adversaries. Achieving this highly desirable state of affairs remains a largely outstanding challenge. Plans that incorporate truly substantive input by all relevant participants would be a first step toward a solution. Organizations' participants would have to possess sufficient authority to make key decisions regarding resource allocations, personnel commitments, and transitions of responsibility during an operation if such planning is to be other than only an exercise in cooperation. Bureaucratic boundaries have to fall; better cooperation in committing funds to common causes is called for, their allocation being based on accommodations during decision-making that avoid the fragmentation and overlap of efforts that less well orchestrated approaches precipitate. Compromise will be

essential; goals sought by host nation officials and those of international counterinsurgent governments will vary just as do those within an international coalition and the various agencies in each of its member governments. As in a piece of music, some instruments will dominate a given phase as the military is likely to do during that in which clearing is the primary focus. Others may have their preeminent moment later. Some will remain in a supporting role throughout. Every counterinsurgency is a new piece of music, each demanding an orchestra with capabilities, sequencing, and shifts in responsibility unlike any before.

- i *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 as amended through October 17 2008, p .268.
- ii *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 12, 2001 as amended through October 17 2008, p. 130.
- iii *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-1.
- iv *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 1-1.
- v Lester Grau, "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual," Book review in *Military Review*, <http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/bookrevu/fm3-24.html> (accessed May 26, 2009).
- vi *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-19.
- vii *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-20.
- viii *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. 5-20 to 5-21.
- ix Those interested in further reading on these two contingencies might find the following of interest:
 - Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency in a Test Tube: Analyzing the Success of the Regional Assistance Mission, Solomon Islands (RAMSI)*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2007.
 - Russell W. Glenn, *Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building: Lessons from Solomon Islands and the Southern Philippines*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008. (This document is not available to the general public.)
A short synopsis of the material in these reports is also available in Russell W. Glenn, "A Tale of Two Countries: Counterinsurgency and Capacity Building in the Pacific," *Small Wars Journal*, posted June 12, 2008, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2008/06/print/a-tale-of-two-countries/> (accessed May 29, 2009).
- x Phrases akin to "a government and the counterinsurgent supporting it" are not meant to imply that the government and its representatives (e.g., the army, police, and other service providers) are not part of a counterinsurgent effort. The opposite should unquestionably be the case. The discrimination in the phrasing is merely a means of emphasizing that both parties exist as key participants during a counterinsurgency.
- xi Regarding the exception pertaining to armed forces, some nations (e.g., Solomon Islands) do not have a military.
- xii General George S. Patton, Jr., July 8, 1941, in an address to the men of the 2nd Armored Division, *The Patton Papers*, Vol. II, 1974, as cited in Charles Q. Brown, "Developing Doctrine for the Future Joint Force: Creating Synergy and Minimizing Seams," U.S. Air Force Air University paper, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, April 2004, p. 9.
- xiii *Counterinsurgency*, Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 2006, p. ix.

Annex C: Research Design and Methodology

Introduction

The IBTCI evaluation team (hereafter “IBTCI team”) was asked to “qualitatively evaluate the CSP program” concerning: (a) “its impact on the stabilization of Iraq,” and (b) the effectiveness and complementarity of the CSP model as “a non-lethal tool for COIN and for contributing toward stability in conflict situations.

All questions, as specified in the IBTCI team’s scope of work (SOW), have been addressed in this report including ad hoc questions raised during the USAID in-brief meeting in Baghdad. Additional topics thought to be of relevance to either CSP future operations or USAID have, as far as possible, been covered in the report.

Background Information Used

Essential reading documents served as the basis for discussions throughout the evaluation. Quantitative data and qualitative reports from existing monitoring and evaluation (M&E) databases and other sources at IRD, USAID, and MEPP II have been compared during the evaluation. Data sources and documents cited are noted in the bibliography presented in Annex B of the report.

National statistical data regarding Iraq is unsurprisingly frequently out-of-date and contradictory, e.g., unemployment figures from concerned ministries vary from 30-48% and population data has been estimated since 2003. Reliance on such sources has been nominal and does not impact on the validity of the results in this report.

The latest information available on CSP activities was requested from IRD

headquarters during the first week of the evaluation. Despite repeated subsequent requests, only overall Year 1, 2 and 3 CSP performance data was provided to the team. No sub-program-related data (contained in the Tracking Sheets for each component) was received during the ensuing five to six weeks. Consequently, sub-program data presented in this report was obtained via various sources, often documents kindly provided by interviewees.

Design of the Research and its Approach

The CSP model was described in USAID SOW as a “non-lethal COIN mechanism” that supports traditional (lethal) COIN operations by: (a) addressing the immediate needs of its target population, i.e., youth aged 12-35, and (b) bringing stability to areas in which the program operates. Research into the overall effectiveness of CSP in achieving these desired ends guided the team’s fieldwork and the design of two standard questionnaires.

Constraints on Attributing Results to CSP Operations

In keeping with current counterinsurgency doctrine and theory, and after initial delays, CSP has been increasingly implementing its activities through local actors such as local councils and GoI representatives with little if any USG or CSP branding of projects. As a consequence, it was not possible for the team to determine whether specific outcomes such as a decrease in violence or improved community relations were attributable to CSP. Moreover, other on going USG’s initiatives and extensive kinetic operations by military forces additionally introduced a large number of externalities, further making anything other than general correlation of CSP outcomes unfeasible. In sum, this

evaluation can only discuss the impact of CSP-type of interventions on counterinsurgency operations in general terms.

Additional Information Collected to Assess CSP Effectiveness

Given the limited time available and the difficulties foreseen in assessing CSP on-site activities and participants, the team developed two additional data collection tools that would assist in measuring the achievement (or progress made towards) COIN/CSP objectives: a) a public opinion poll (OP) carried out by Iraqis for Iraqis, and b) a Key Informant Interview (KII) Questionnaire used by the team to interview key informants, both expatriates and Iraqis.

Scope and Size of KIIs

KIIs were structured interviews designed to gather opinions, experiences, and provide examples of CSP activities, implementation challenges, and best practices.

The questions contained in the KIIs were wide-ranging. They included the coordination and integration of activities, Iraqi participation individual program components, and the assessment of the CSP concept as a means to reach its goal of stabilization. Subsequent questions covered CSP effectiveness with regard to issues such as security, corruption, branding policy, civil-military interaction, and sought suggestions on CSP’s potential for transfer into other areas.

Twenty-one (21) categories of key informants were identified for the interviews and the opinion poll. The sample was not meant to be a random statistical sample of CSP coverage. It was instead intended to be a representative sample of CSP stakeholders and end-users large enough to cover the various categories of stakeholders

involved in CSP in two headquarters sites (Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq) and seven CSP local offices and CSP operations sites in Iraq.

KIIs therefore covered headquarters staff in Washington D.C and Baghdad as well as front line personnel and local leaders in Iraq. In excess of 100 informants were interviewed representing agency and military management, PRT staff, front line agency and military staff, and local traditional, community, government, and business leaders. Both coalition and Iraqi personnel participated in the interview process. Gender distribution reflected the limited presence of women in the program's management and implementation in Iraq, and it is also the reflection of Iraqi society.

Six (out of the total of 18) CSP sites were selected for in-depth coverage via opinion polls and/or KIIs. These were Basra, Fallujah, Kirkuk, Mosul/Tal Afar, Ramadi and western Baghdad/Sadr City. They were selected on the basis of their representation of and actual differences concerning ethnic/religious composition, security status, and coalition partners involved. Five of the

sites were covered by the evaluation team using the structured interviews of the KIIs. All six sites were covered by the opinion poll.

Spread and Sample Size of the Opinion Poll

The opinion poll was developed to gather information at the local level on (1) the perceived effectiveness of CSP or similar CSP-type activities, e.g., “employment/credit schemes or youth programs” (questions 1-2 and 5-6), (2) community needs as related to specific CSP components (question 4), and (3) level of or potential for transfer of CSP-type activities to local institutions (question 3).ⁱ OP results included perspectives from both the targeted polling groups and a control group of non-CSP participants in the same areas. Almost 1,400 respondents were covered by the two opinion polls that were conducted in Arabic by reputable and independent Iraqi polling companies.ⁱⁱ

- **Opinion Poll:** Random Sample of CSP End-Users & Service Providers (628)
- **Opinion Poll:** Random Sample of On-Site Population (701)


OP findings provide evidence of CSP's perceived positive impact vis-à-vis the security of targeted hot spots and, to a lesser extent, improvements in quality of life.

Triangulation of Data Sources

To enhance their validity and comprehensiveness, the team's findings, conclusions, and recommendations have been triangulated to the extent possible via (1) other sources of statistical data, CSP performance data, agency reports, and relevant non-CSP sources of information, (2) key informant interviews and opinion polls, and (3) the team's own direct observations and assessments. (See Figure 4 below.)

An example of this can be the ‘quotes’ used in the body of the report. Each quote represents a recurrent assertion among the informants interviewed. This has been further investigated by the Team during its field visits and through the review of relevant documentation. Similarly, the evaluation findings, conclusions, recommendations, and lessons learned in this report are products of interactions involving the above elements.

FIGURE 4: TRIANGULATION COMPONENTS FOR STUDY DATA



The information flow for the validation & support of Findings



Constraints and General Comment on Results

The duration provided for this evaluation (approximately seven weeks, including report writing and presentation) was too short to provide a comprehensive evaluation of all pertinent issues, a number of which were identified during the conduct of KIIs or as a result of polling. To provide a complete analysis of a program of this size and importance and its integration with other USG stakeholders in relation to COIN, the evaluation team believes an in-depth study is in order which should likely take 4 – 6 months. The initial 10-day period dedicated to document review set the stage for the broader view of CSP objectives but left the team with little insight into the real challenges being faced in-country. Interviews conducted during this initial period in Washington, D.C. were more helpful but were limited in number due to initial USAID constraints on contacting prospective interviewees.

Other than the difficulties confronted in scheduling interviews on such short notice (a constraint in part overcome thanks to exceptional support from several individuals – see Acknowledgements), the main challenge faced was gaining access to the intended program “beneficiaries” and front line staff. Limited access was mainly due to security concerns, related movement policies (e.g., PSD rules and transport protocols), and resistance on the part of some USAID staff. Excessive time was lost in efforts to arrange interviews due to not receiving the official letter of introduction of the evaluation from USAID/Iraq until the

day prior to deployment (which inhibited the team’s ability to gain access to key informants while in the US) as well as in some cases, poor coordination among USAID representatives and staff in the field.

The team nevertheless conducted over 150 KIIs. USAID, PRT, and military representation in KIIs was satisfactory. CSP staff and community leaders contacted were also considered sufficient although not entirely representative of the broad range of activities in CSP components. The result, despite coordination and administrative difficulties, is a valuable compilation of multiple perspectives and experiences concerning the benefits of CSP and CSP-type programs in Iraq.

- i CSP-type activities/benefits identified in the opinion polls included employment, credit, business development, youth culture/sports, public services, and youth training.
- ii The two polling companies assigned to carry out the field work were Independent Institute for Administrative and Civil Society Studies and Qualitative & Quantitative Research Ltd. Co.

Annex D: Monitoring and Evaluation Performance Program II

The objective of MEPP II is to provide regular performance monitoring and reporting and periodic review of USAID/Iraq's program in its entirety as well as periodic review of the program's specific activities, in addition to an overall evaluation of the impact of the program.

Under its contract with USAID/Iraq, IBTCI is called to provide the Mission with long and short-term technical and advisory services, data analysis, and reports for monitoring and evaluation of USAID/Iraq's portfolio. IBTCI has been the prime contractor for MEPP II since May 2005. The following are services and/or reports MEPP II has provided to the Focused Stabilization Office regarding CSP activities. It should be noted that this evaluation was conducted under a separate contracting mechanism than that of MEPP II.

The reports listed below may be found on USAID's Development Experience Clearinghouse, (DEC) <http://dec.usaid.gov/>

- 1 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): RAPID PROGRAMMATIC ASSESSMENT
- 2 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): DATA QUALITY ASSESSMENT (DQA)
- 3 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): MONITORING SELECTED ACTIVITIES IN BAGHDAD
- 4 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND SERVICE PROJECTS (CIES) IN RAMADI AND FALLUJA
- 5 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES PROJECTS (CIES) IN MOSUL AND KIRKUK
- 6 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES PROJECTS (CIES) IN BAGHDAD
- 7 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): ASSESSMENT OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN BAGHDAD (BDP)
- 8 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): SPECIAL STUDY ON VOCATIONAL EDUCATION AND APPRENTICESHIP (VO-TECH)
- 9 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND YOUTH PROJECTS (EGY) IN NINEWA
- 10 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (BDP) IN KIRKUK
- 11 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): SPECIAL STUDY ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (BDP) COMPONENT
- 12 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (BDP) IN MOSUL
- 13 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND YOUTH PROJECTS (EGY) IN BAGHDAD
- 14 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT AND YOUTH PROJECTS (EGY) IN KIRKUK
- 15 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): REVIEW OF THE COMMUNITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND ESSENTIAL SERVICES (CIES) PROJECTS IN KIRKUK
- 16 USAID IRAQ COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) COUNTERINSURGENCY (COIN): AN EXAMINATION OF THE YOUTH ENGAGEMENT
- 17 EVALUATION OF USAID'S COMMUNITY STABILIZATION PROGRAM (CSP) IN IRAQ: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CSP MODEL AS A NON-LETHAL TOOL FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY

Annex E: List of Persons Contacted

Last Name	First Name	Title / Position	Representative of:
Abbas	Ali	Chairman	Taji Council
Abbas	Ralim	Manager	Taji Council
Abbas	Wahab	Construction Committee	Tal Afar
Abd	Obid	Sheikh, Representative	Farmer Federation
Hamed	Mohammed	IT Engineer	Fallujah MMPW
Abdul	Aamal	Chief Engineer	Ministry of PW Basra
Abid	Ahmed	Chief Engineer	Gol
Ahmed	Batool	Manager, CSP/BDP Training	IRD/Iraq
Ajmi	Salam	Sheikh, Spokesperson	Fallujah Council
Akvee	Alah	Dr., Manager	Gol
Al Agha	Anees	Chairman	Ninewa Business Union
Al Brusaw	Hammed	Dr., Chairman (retired)	City council
Al Deen	Alaa	Chairman	Basra Provincial Coun.
Al Mashadany	Subhi	Chairman	Bagd. Rural Serv.
Al Mudhahlur	Summer	Grants Manager, CSP/BDP Basra	IRD/Iraq
Al Rubaie	Mohamed	DAC, Karada	Baghdad Sadr City
Al-Hamadani	Salam	Supervisor, CSP Baghdad	IRD/Iraq
Al-Jiboury	Iqbal	DPOO/ CSP/EGY, Baghdad	IRD/Iraq
Alwan	Rhudhair	Manager	Ahmudiya VTC Center
Anderson	Stephen	Office Provincial Affairs	DOS
Anward	Basil	Senior Manager, CSP Rusafa Sidr	IRD/Iraq
Attebury	David	USAID Rep ePRT 1 Baghdad (former)	USAID/Iraq
Auld	Todd	LTC, 2/1ID S9	USAM
Awad	Sa'ad	Mayor	Fallujah
Bailey	Bruce	DTL ePRT 4 Baghdad (former)	USAID/Iraq
Bailey	David	USAID Rep PRT SAD (former)	USAID/Iraq
Baker	Saad	CSP/BDP Manager, Kadina	IRD/Iraq
Barber	Mohammed	Youth Program Officer, Mosul	IRD/Iraq
Barratt	Christian	USAID Rep, Taji PRT	USAID/Iraq
Bassak	Robert	DCOP, CSP	IRD/Iraq
Batson	Howard	Program Dev. Specialist	USAID/Iraq
Beckert	Christopher	LTC, Deputy Commander	DoD/2nd HBCT/1ID
Bennett	John	Ambassador, TL, West Baghdad PRT (former)	DOS/Iraq
Birgells	Ed	Director PMO (former)	USAID/Iraq
Birkenes	Robert	Sr. Adv., MNF-I CJ3 JIATF	USAID/Iraq
Bonner	Karla	Chief, Iraq Program	IRD/HQ
Campbell	Jason	Research Associate	Brookings Institute
Cook	Matthew	LTC, Econ Dev. Planner, MNF-W	DoD/USMC
Corliss	Glenn E.	Senior Econ Advisor	DOS
Crihfield	John	USAID Rep ePRTs Basrah/Baghdad (former)	USAID/Iraq
Crow	Diane	Public Diplomacy Officer	DOS/Iraq
Dobson	Jim	USAID Rep, PRT Baghdad	USAID/Iraq
Dockery	Mike	Country Director	IRD/Iraq
Donahue	Katie	Office of Assessments, OPA	DOS/Iraq
Doyle	Brent	Desk Officer, OPA	DOS/Iraq
Elkins	David	CSP, COP (former)	IRD/Iraq
Anward	Basil	Sr. CSP/CIES Engineer, Rusafa Sidr	IRD/Iraq
Fadhil	Asel	CSP Project Engineer	IRD/Iraq

Last Name	First Name	Title / Position	Representative of:
Fitzgerald	Ingrid	Chief Admin Officer	IRD/HQ
Fitzpatrick	Dennis	Chief (former)	Nat'l Unity
Gartner	Travis	PRT Anbar (former)	USAID/Iraq
Gerlaugh	John	TL, Anbar (former)	DOS
Goebel	Jeff	Director, FSO	USAID/Iraq
Grady	Brian	CSP Program Operations Officer	IRD/Iraq
Hagerstrom	Kristin	TL, Anbar PRT	DOS/Iraq
Halmrast	Tamra	Director PRT Office	USAID/Iraq
Hameed	Awad	Director General	Ministry of Health
Hameed	Feras	Dr., Head of the Building	Tech. Research Centre
Hammadi	Ahmed	Sheikh, Council Member	Fallujah Council
Hamood	Hassan	Manager	Sadr City VTC
Hashim	Hamed	Sheikh, Chairman	Fallujah Council
Hasnawi	Talib	Sheikh, Deputy Chairman	Fallujah Council
Hassan	Salman	Chairman, Educ. Committee	Taji Council
Helf	Gavin	Dr., CAP II COTR (former)	USAID
Henry	David	QRF Program Mgr, OPA	DOS/Iraq
Henson	Ed	COL OIC, AFCEE	DoD/U.S. Air Force
Herr	Harvey	COP, MEPP II	IBTCI
Herrera	DJ	POD, CSP Baghdad	IRD/Iraq
Himelfarb	David	PRT Rep, Mosel (former)	USAID/Iraq
Hmeed Ali	Ahmed	Engineer in Municipality	Fallujah MMPW
Holt	Justin	British/Afghan PRT Rep	British Foreign Office
Hunt	Peter	Project Manager	Mott MacDonald Co.
Hussain	Alaa K.	Manager, CSP/CIES	IRD/Iraq
Hussein	Atreesh	Head	Tal Afar Jud. Council
Hussein	Muthar	Asst. Council Chairman	Taji Council
Ibrahim	Shatha	Manager, CSP/EGY	IRD/Iraq
Ismaeel	Barzan	Director, CSP/EGY	IRD/Iraq
Jachim	Robert	Economic Section Chief, PRT Ninewa	DOS/Iraq
Jasm	Hattam	Manager	Shuala, VTC
Kassaz	Mohammed	Director General	Ministry of Education
Kasser	Mohammed	Dept of Fullajah Education	Fallujah MoE
Keys	Arthur	CEO / President	IRD/HQ
Khalil	Aziz	Director of VTC	Training Center
Kinney	Gary	Director, IRD Contracts & Grants	IRD/HQ
Koengeter	Linda Marie		DOS/Iraq
Kusamoto	Dominic	Bde S9, 3-1 Cav BCT	DoD / U.S. Army
Kwyish	Mohammed	Contractor	Fallujah Council
Laskaris	Alex	TL, PRT Ninewa	DOS/Iraq
LeBar	J. Max	Senior Econ Officer, PRT Ninewa	DOS/Iraq
Leigh	Richard	Contractor	Aegis
Lutz	Miriam	Liaison Officer to MNC-I	USAID/Iraq
Mahmood	Firas	Head	Al Hadbaa College
Mahmood	Muwafaq	Manager	CSP EGY
Marrow	Mary	Contractor, Melik al Misk Co.	DoD / USACE – Iraq
Mason	Richard	Analyst, MEPP II	IBTCI
McFerrin	Daniel	Country Director	ECC / AFCEE
McKee	Erin E.	Dir. Office of Acquisition	USAID/Iraq
McKenney	Robert	Program Advisor, FSO	USAID/Iraq
Megbel	Mohamed	Engineer of building schools	Fallujah MoE
Mercado	Tamra	LTC, DTL, PRT Ninawa	DoD / U.S. Army

Last Name	First Name	Title / Position	Representative of:
Mingus	Matthew	Governance, ePRT, Taji	RTI
Minott	Geoff	PRT Rep Anbar (former)	USAID/Iraq
Mohamed	Dr.	Director, Taji Clinic	Taji Council
Mohsin	Hussein	QA/QC TL, CSP Basra	IRD/Iraq
Noori Al	Malik	Program Operations Manager, CSP Basra	IRD/Iraq
North	Chris	Program Mgr, SBC Int'l	DoD/CTC MiTT
Nuir	Abmusa	Priest	St.Paul's Church
Omar	Raad	Business Trainer, CSP	Iraqi-American CoC
Osner	Sean	PRT Rep (former)	USAID/Iraq
Parker	Keith	Sr. Public Health Advisor, ePRT Taji	USG
Pastor	Claudia	USAID Program/Admin Asst., CSP (former)	IRD/HQ
Powell-Willingham	April	Office Const. & Legis. Affairs	DOS/Iraq
Pryor	Jeanne	Iraq Program Team Lead	USAID/W
Rahman	Abdul	Businessman	Fallujah
Raid	Mr.	Contractor	Baghdad Sadr City
Raid	Al Obaidy	DG, Youth and Sports	Ninewa Province
Ramirez	Humberto	Deputy District Engineer, Basra	DoD/U.S. Army
Ray	Sunimal	Program Advisor, CSP/BDP	IRD/Iraq
Redha	Rushad	Manager	Jafraney VTC
Reist	David	Brig. Gen., Cdr, Anbar (former)	DoD/USMC
Rizos	Mario	Engineering	IRD/HQ
Roscoe	John	POO CSP (former)	IBTCI
Rushing	Kevin	Fallujah PRT Rep	USAID/Iraq
Salih	Mohammed	Manager, CSP/BDP Mosul	IRD/Iraq
Salih	Qutbeldin	Manager, CSP/CIES Mosul	IRD/Iraq
Salman Alkam	Ra'ad	Manager, CSP/CIES Basra	IRD/Iraq
Salmon	Andrew	MG, Commander	MND-SE
Sauers	Robert	COL, MNC-I / USAID LNO	DoD/U.S. Army
Scheckler	Christine	DTL, ePRT 6 Baghdad	USAID/Iraq
Sidibe	Mamadou	Director of M&E, CSP	IRD/Iraq
Silvey	Heidi	USAID/OTI Country Rep (former) COP, IRAP (current)	DAI
Smale	David	Rep ePRT 1 Ramadi (former)	USAID/Iraq
Soroko	David	USAID CSP COTR (former)	IRD/HQ
Spasojevic	Yana	PRT Field Coordinator	USAID/Iraq
Specht	Linda	TL, ePRT Taji	DOS/Iraq
Staal	Tom	USAID Director	Middle East Bureau/W
Taha	Anwa	Chairman, Educ. Committee	Tarmiya Council
Taha	Yassin	Chairman	Mosul Artist Union
Taher	Reheem	School Buildings Manager, Basra	Ministry of Education/Iraq
Thomson	Jane	CSP, COP (current) DCOP (former), POD (former)	IRD/Iraq
Tikka	Jennifer	AOTR, CSP	USAID/Iraq
Tolmie	Wayne	Program Director, CSP/BDP	IRD/Iraq
Urban	Mark	TL, PRT Rep Mosul	USAID/Iraq
Wall	David	Director Economic Growth	USAID/Iraqi Reconstruction Office/W
Weeks	Warwick	Water Sector Specialist, PRT Basra	USG
Wilhelm	Will	Sr. Adv, CSP, Vo-Tech (former)	USAID/Iraq
Yousif	Isaam	Manager, CSP/BDP	IRD/Iraq
Yousif	Mohammed	Sports Section Chairman	Basra Prov. Council
Al Bakhaty	Yaqoub	DAC, Council Chairman	Baghdad Sadr City
Zuhair Fadhil	Asel	Project Engineer, CSP/CIES	IRD/Iraq

U.S. Agency for International Development

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20523

Tel: (202) 712-0000

Fax: (202) 216-3524

www.usaid.gov