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Analysis of USAID'S Capacity Development Program (CDP)

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of
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Capacity Development Program
(CDP)

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List of Acronyms

ACSI	Afghanistan Civil Service Institute
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy
ATVI	Afghan Technical Vocational Institute
CBU	Capacity Building Unit
CDIP	Capacity Development Implementation Plan
CDP	Capacity Development Program
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EC	European Commission
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HRM	Human Resources Management
IARCSC	Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDLG	Independent Department of Local Government
IT	Information Technology
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAIL	Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
MCIT	Ministry of Communications and Information Technology
MoEc	Ministry of Economy
MoEd	Ministry of Education
MoEW	Ministry of Energy and Water
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoHE	Ministry of Higher Education
MoLSA	Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MoUDH	Ministry of Urban Development and Housing
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIMA	National Institute of Management & Administration
ODG	Office of Democracy and Governance
OIEE	Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and Energy
OSSD	Office of Social Sector Development
PAD	Provincial Affairs Directorates
PAR	Public Administration Reform Program
PMP	Performance Management Plan
PRR	Priority Reform and Restructuring
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RASU	RIMU Advisory and Support Unit
RIMU	Reform Implementation Management Unit
SNG	Sub-National Government
STU	Scholarships and Training Unit
TC	Training Center
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
WB	World Bank

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This review of USAID'S Capacity Development Program (CDP) has been conducted in order to provide USAID programmatic recommendations to refocus the program on the most critical capacity building needs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Since March 2007, USAID has initiated comprehensive support to capacity building across Afghanistan, the design of which covered most categories associated with democratic and economic development. The idea was to address, in this $218 million contract, major bases of need that were not (then) being addressed by the rapidly evolving programs of the donor community, including USAID. This "gap filling" strategy, thus, required the scoping out of a very broad and flexible life-of-program work plan, which would identify both short- and long-term initiatives to be addressed within the framework of annually updated work plans.

The three objectives of the program have been:

- Building near-term capacity directly within target institutions, e.g., selected line ministries, local government, business associations and universities;
- Strengthening Afghan capacity building institutions in the public, private, NGO and educational sectors, allowing Afghans to provide sustained capacity building over the long-term; and
- Developing a critical mass of Afghans with management and other skills through state-of-the-art training, technical assistance, and participant training.

Within the above, rather expansive context, CDP has achieved reasonable progress on an exceptional array of capacity development initiatives. Implementation progress, defined as initiating highly relevant and appreciated activities across all five contractual categories and many sub-categories within the first 20 months, has been very good, and client satisfaction has been generally high. Most clients interviewed agreed, however, that the depth of support received from CDP was inadequate, owing to the project's expansive nature.

Notwithstanding the progress being achieved, the more critical issue is less one of implementation progress, and more of the striking the right balance between activity implementation and the right strategic approach to sustainable capacity development, given Afghanistan's current context. Implementation progress on an inappropriate, increasingly irrelevant or out-of-date strategic track, though impressive, significantly threatens the overall effectiveness of aid. Thus, the recommendations of this report are designed to refocus the CDP in line with the primary responsibilities of the manager/funder of the project, USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG).

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is now focused on building its capacity to deliver basic public services throughout the country. To do so, it must strengthen its accountability, transparency and efficiency. USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance is on the front line of assisting the GIRoA in achieving those goals. In a country with almost unlimited need for government capacity building, ODG must direct its own limited resources to those activities that can best advance GIRoA's reform agenda. Capacity development in financial management (budgeting, accounting,

auditing, procurement), human resources (structures, systems and skill sets) and program design/management (including monitoring and evaluation) are at the top of the list of Ministries needs and ODG interests. Other USAID technical offices and programs are more effectively positioned to support private sector, education and civil society initiatives.

Going forward, CDP should refocus its activities to:

1. **Build GIRoA Capacity to Implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy** (ANDS). ANDS represents a model of good governance in terms of planning and prioritizing the development of the country over the next 5-10 years. Core governance capacity building assistance with an emphasis on financial management, program management and monitoring and evaluation is critically needed.
2. **Synergize with key USAID Objectives/Initiatives**. Providing core public administration support to key Ministries/Agencies with which USAID partners can strengthen the foundation on which successful partnerships are built. CDP assistance will be needed, in particular, to facilitate the capacity of key Ministries to meet host country agreement requirements as part of USAID's Afghanization initiative. As well, a growing USAID governance objective and commitment relates to building governance capacities at sub-national government (SNG) levels. CDP can significantly contribute to this effort.

Key elements of the recommended refocusing strategy include:

A. **An immediate "cease and desist" on starting any new non-core public administration activities**. The proposed draft FY09 workplan included a number of soon-to-be-started activities under two newly titled initiatives; "Citizen Services Delivery" focused on several Education oriented activities; and "Expanding Workforce Infrastructure" the new programmatic home for private sector activities. In addition, there are several cross-cutting, non-core governance activities with a proposed FY09 start. These initiatives and supporting new activities should cease and desist.

B. **All current non-core public administration activities dropped, transitioned or phased out by the end of FY09**. The primary recommendation of the assessment team is for CDP to get out of the business of providing assistance for private sector workforce development, technical education engagement, and direct NGO capacity assistance. The goal is that by the end of FY09, CDP will be a much streamlined program, providing significant, coordinated high priority core public administration capacity building to key GIRoA partners at national and sub-national levels of government.

C. **Core public administration program to include a deeper package/wider choice of capacity building assistance for targeted Ministries and Sub-National Government entities**. As non-core governance activities are dropped from CDP, time, money, technical capacity and management attention can be focus on a more holistic approach to governance, one that addresses system-wide, organizational performance issues. Integrated and comprehensive capacity development targeted to fewer Ministries, but at a greater level of depth and across systems, structures and skill sets, can have synergistic effects that enhance aid effectiveness.

D. **Selection of ministries/agencies for CDP assistance to exploit synergies with key USAID objectives/initiatives**. For example, USAID is committed to advancing the certification of select ministries to take on more responsibility in program management as part of the Mission's "Afghanization" initiative. The Mission's certification reviews of partners for such agreements may identify the need for targeted institutional strengthening in areas tangential to CDP's core functional areas. In addition, CDP should continue to work with its three "umbrella" client organizations – Ministry of Finance, Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) – to provide flexible capacity building to Ministries/Agencies/Departments/SNG under the clients authorities and in compliance with their priorities, schedules, and standards.

E. **The possibility of expanding assistance to SNG (Sub-National Government) as LGCD ends**. CDP will soon begin to implement the program outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with IDLG, which includes capacity building assistance to seven provinces targeted by IDLG. CDP, if it properly manages its current IDLG assistance program, could be ideally positioned at that point to become a primary provider of capacity building assistance to sub-national government other than municipal government, which is expected to be addressed more directly in an upcoming USAID program.

F. **Salary support transitioned as per new USAID policy; supported employees trained to be retained**. Currently, CDP supports staff salaries for close to 500 Ministry of Education and other employees. Under the recent "Policy Approach to USAID Support to the Staffing Needs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)", approved July 28, 2008, line government employees must be transitioned to the Ministry's tashkeel and funded in the recurrent GIRoA budget or through the ARTF.

Proposed refocused core governance CDP activities would be designed/implemented to achieve two essential goals:

1. Providing near term direct capacity building of select public sector institutions such that by the end of the program they are substantially capable of delivering needed public services in a transparent and effective manner. This can be accomplished using two different if somewhat overlapping initiatives:
    a. The provision of a "Foundation Package" of core public administration activities flexibly directed to a limited (5-7) number of key Ministries/Agencies
    b. Continued CDP support for its three "umbrella" client organizations – MoF, IARCSC, IDLG – to provide targeted capacity building to Ministries/Agencies/SNG under the clients authorities and in compliance with their priorities, schedules, and standards, at both the national and sub-national levels of government

2. Developing the long term capabilities of GIRoA's capacity building institutions, e.g., the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute and CSC's outreach via Capacity Building Units (CBUs) within the ministries and regional training centers in the provinces.

A refocused CDP must be designed to complement not compete with other USAID TO programs/initiatives. CDP must also be closely coordinated with other ongoing capacity building interventions by the larger donor community and the GIRoA itself. A significant new direction for the CDP will be to proactively identify and prioritize critical GIRoA capacity building needs rather than simply filling gaps, which was the primary intent of the original bid.

CDP assistance must be focused but flexibly applied to be effective. Issues as to how to target key ministries/agencies for assistance, identify needs and custom the program accordingly, minimize possible duplication of effort while exploiting the potential for synergies, set preconditions for working with targeted clients, address priority concerns (i.e., ANDS implementation), and maintain focus on core public administration requirements are presented in detail in the main body of this report.

GIRoA requires a more coherent approach to comprehensive, long-term sustainable capacity-development. Efforts to centralized capacity building in the Civil Service Commission through its Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, (ACSI), its regional training centers (RTCs) and its Capacity Building Unit (CBU) training centers embedded in a number of ministries, lack the management capacity, technical expertise, and political buy-in to serve as a primary unit for critically needed capacity development throughout government. Capacity building to do capacity building may be needed. A new strategy has recently been introduced. It proposes to restructure the various training entities to become more independent. Such an approach could reenergize efforts to win donor support to build the sustainable long-term training capacity needed.

CONCLUSIONS

Through CDP, USAID has established a flagship program that, in less than two years, has gained wide spread recognition across Government and the donor community for being flexible, responsive and valuable in meeting clearly unmet capacity building needs across Afghanistan. Developmentally, a lot has occurred in the twenty fast-paced months since USAID launched CDP.

Less than two years is not long at all on the traditional development continuum. Therefore, no one can reasonably doubt the significance of such fundamental achievements in this short period. Neither can anyone doubt the need for well-timed, strategic adjustments in programs in the face of such rapid developments. Though CDP has been operational for only a short period, now is the right time for such an adjustment in USAID's strategic approach to capacity development via this program.

II. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Purpose and Methodology of the Evaluation

This review of USAID'S Capacity Development Program (CDP) has been conducted in order to provide USAID programmatic recommendations to refocus the program on the most critical capacity building needs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). The report addresses three strategic objectives:

- Enhance Aid Effectiveness through Refocusing. The thinly spread "grab bag" of activities which are largely dictated in the contract, has effectively reduced aid effectiveness. This has been accentuated by the continuing expansion of USAID's other technical programs and increasing overlaps or potential duplication of activities with CDP and other programs/initiatives.
- Address Audit Concerns. An audit conducted in the Spring of 2008 raised concerns related to CDP's cross-cutting/gap-filling approach to delivering capacity building assistance; the lack of internal USAID technical offices contributions for participant training funding as envisioned in the program design; the delays in overall work program and monitoring plans; and lack of clarity in the match between contract line items and work plan/budget activities.
- Better Integrate CDP with Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG) Core Mission. The ODG program targets improved good governance across government. This focus and the depth of capacity development needs in the area of public administration have come into sharper view in context of Government's desire to implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) in a transparent and effective manner.

The assessment team has collected information from written documents, i.e., annual and quarterly reports, work plans, program descriptions, performance management plans, etc.; interviews and discussions with program managers, implementers, participants, partners and stakeholders (more than 60 people have been interviewed and close to 30 organizations have been consulted); and observations by the assessment team of the circumstances and conditions regarding capacity building needs and initiatives in Afghanistan.

Description of the Technical Assistance Provided

Since March 2007, USAID has initiated comprehensive support to capacity building across Afghanistan, the design of which covered most categories associated with democratic and economic development. The idea was to address, in this $218 million contract, major bases of need that were not (then) being addressed by the rapidly evolving programs of the donor community, including USAID. This "gap filling" strategy, thus, required the scoping out of a very broad and highly flexible life-of-program work plan, which would identify both short- and long-term initiatives to be addressed within the framework of annually updated work plans.

The three objectives of the program are:

- Building near-term capacity directly within target institutions, e.g., selected line ministries, local government, business associations and universities;
- Strengthening Afghan capacity building institutions in the public, private, NGO and educational sectors, allowing Afghans to provide sustained capacity building over the long-term; and
- Developing a critical mass of Afghans with management and others skills through state-of-the-art training, technical assistance, and participant training.

The breadth of coverage is indeed considerable, and includes a wide range of targeted capacity development technical support to:

a) National and sub-national public sector entities, targeting the building of limited core competencies in a few key skills areas, and supporting public sector reforms and enhanced service delivery.

b) NGO institutional strengthening training, including training-of-trainers support

c) Private sector capacity development, including for-profit training institutions and professional associations

d) Tertiary education institutions, including the Ministry of Higher Education and private/public tertiary educational institutions

e) General participant training and technical support to local technical assistance providers and other USAID implementation partners

The original design of this "gap filling" program called for a variety of other capacity development initiatives to be explored, however, the Mission and contractor agreed on an initial, primary focus on the above activities.

The mix of technical assistance needed to meet such an expansive set of requirements (long and short-term; expatriate, national and regional; etc.) is considerable. The size and diversity of technical assistance must be flexible in response to rapidly evolving requirements that reflected the expansion of USAID's and other donors' programs.

Brief Overview of Project Implementation Progress

Within the above, rather expansive context, CDP has achieved reasonable progress on an exceptional array of capacity development initiatives. Implementation progress, defined as initiating highly relevant and appreciated activities across all five contractual categories and many sub-categories within the first 20 months, has been very good, and client satisfaction has been generally high. Most clients interviewed agreed, however, that the depth of support received from CDP was inadequate, owing to the project's expansive nature.

Key accomplishments include:

(a) Within the public sector:

i. Initial reform support targeting the establishment of modern human resource management (HRM) structures, systems and related skills in three ministries

ii. The development of program budgeting competencies in seven ministries (with 10 additional pending).

iii. The initial training of internal audit staff for the Ministry of Education; and the development and testing of course materials for the proposed training of internal auditors government-wide

iv. Coaching of procurement staff of six ministries to ensure the correct application of a new law governing public sector procurement

v. General capacity strengthening support to the Independent Administration for Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and its subsidiary training agency, the Afghan Civil Service Institute (ACSI)

vi. Targeted capacity building assistance in select provinces

(b) Mentoring and coaching for 150 non-governmental organizations active at the national and provincial levels and cutting across a wide sectoral range. This assistance includes developing trainer-of-trainer capacity within select organizations.

(c) Private sector capacity development in for-profit private sector organizations and professional associations, including construction and vocational educational institutions.

(d) Capacity development in the Ministry of Higher Education and tertiary private/ public educational and training organizations to enhance student services delivery, curb corruption and explore opportunities for academic accreditation.

(e) Participant training, including the management of J-1 visa applications, visa compliance, English language testing, medical reviews, pre-departure orientation, post-training follow-up and other related services. This program component also supports participant training requirements of several other USAID implementing partners.

Given the rapidity with which donor commitments and programs are growing, and are projected to continue growing (including rapid staffs turn-overs), CDP has coordinated extensively and frequently with other program initiatives across Afghanistan in order to ensure the "gap filling" nature of its large program.

The very nature, structure and duration of the program represent considerable challenges to achieving and sustaining implementation progress. For example:

- Carefully identifying and fashioning interventions to meet un-met capacity development requirements in a context of growing donor aid and projects requires such a high level of flexibility which itself threatens progress in that too much flexibility puts at risk CDP's ability to have meaningful impact.
- The need to assess and hopefully spin-off pilot initiatives "with potential" too soon puts at risk the quality and impact of interventions.
- Moreover, the challenge to structure and operationalize meaningful performance monitoring and impact measurement systems and indicators for such a large,

diverse and rapidly shifting set of interventions also threaten implementation progress.

- Finally, the heavily bureaucratic context within which the program is being implemented (both from the perspectives of the donor agency and the recipient organizations) represents a major challenge to achieving progress.

Notwithstanding the progress being achieved, the more critical issue is less one of implementation progress, and more of the striking the right balance between activity implementation and the right strategic approach to sustainable capacity development, given Afghanistan's current context. Implementation progress on an inappropriate, increasingly irrelevant or out-of-date strategic track, though impressive, significantly threatens the overall effectiveness of aid.

In the press to mobilize in late FY2007, CDP admittedly took some short-cuts in its strategic planning exercises by selecting initial interventions on the basis of summary dialogs with key counterparts rather than objective overview assessments. For example, this approach relied upon the familiarity of the political ranks within ministries with their priority capacity development needs, compared with the conduct of objective assessments of potential NGO clients to ascertain their capacity development requirements. Given the plethora of donor public sector projects, the initially-assessed ministry (MoHE) was reportedly suffering from "donor assessment fatigue," in which case it may have been politically risky to proceed with a full-fledged organizational assessment as planned. The only attempt to complete such a participative assessment resulted in a six-month delay in reaching decisions which, in the end, reportedly did not reveal any significantly new information. Thus, it is critical to strike the right balance between investigative analyses and the design of appropriate capacity development interventions. The combination of the reported donor assessment fatigue and the relatively low levels of competencies within Government may argue in favor of the less risky approach that CDP adopted, at least initially.

Overall, CDP embraced the challenges it faced with determination. As a result, it substantially achieved the target of launching activities across program categories within its initial year of operation.

III. ASSESSMENT OF THE CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (CDP)

ASSESSMENT OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

Public Sector – Description, Issues, Future Directions

Description

CDP is helping to improve government capacity-building mechanisms and services; improving the performance and quality of services in targeted ministries; and creating professional associations for public sector occupations. Across these categories, the project has launched an array of capacity development public sector activities. Many initial activities have successfully concluded, while others have been pilot tested and are now ready for expansion to other national level ministries and key government agencies, including continued extension to the sub-national levels (provincial, district and municipal). Following are the highlights of CDP's most significant continuing interventions.

A. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission is benefiting from an array of CDP support, including:

- Reform Implementation Management Units (RIMUs). Under the authority of the Commission and in cooperation with target technical ministries across government, CDP is supporting RIMUs in four ministries (and the World Bank is supporting five), targeting the establishment of modern human resource management (HRM) structures, systems and related skills; and proposes to expand its support to six additional ministries. HRM reform constitutes the initial step towards broader ministerial reforms under Government's Public Administrative Reform program (PAR), and includes the conduct of human resources needs assessments. It also provides the basis for the introduction within a ministry of Government's new Pay and Grading system which requires (1) the establishment, updating and re-grading of position descriptions, with pay increases; (2) the review of qualifications of current incumbents; and (3) the merit recruitment of new staff. RIMUs are in various stages of implementation. Assistance has included HR training on PAR objectives and requirements; merit-based interviewing and hiring techniques; and HR policies. CDP is also supporting the Commission's RIMU Advisory and Support Unit (RASU) to improve its overall coordination of RIMU teams in nine participating ministries, and to develop structures and procedures to monitor and apply lessons learned.
- Capacity Building Unit (CBU) and Training Centers. CDP has provided limited training-of-trainers support to staff of the Commission's Capacity Building Unit who are physically stationed in IARCSC Training Centers (TCs) in key ministries and in a growing number of provincial Training Centers. These trainers conduct core courses for civil servants across Government in basic English, information technology and basic management principles (the same set of core courses offered by ACSI. Concurrently, CDP is helping to establish four new provincial Training Centers and supporting their integration into the broader provincial government structures (see PAD below). In anticipation of a potential expansion of course

offerings by ACSI and TCs, CDP is training and expanding the number of Training Needs Assessments Teams (TNATs) within CBU (from two to eight); and is helping to expand the scope of work of these teams as they analyze civil service capacity development requirements at both the national and provincial levels.

- Afghan Civil Service Institute (ACSI). A team of three CDP staff is providing limited capacity strengthening to the management of ACSI, in concert with current assistance from the UNDP[1] and recent past assistance from the European Commission (EC). CDP has installed and operationalized a network within the mail building of ACSI's new facility (constructed by Korean aid), and is currently maintaining this system pending the appointment of a counterpart. This CDP team is providing pedagogical and methodological support to ACSI's instructors as well as to other CDP and other donor technical teams who use ACSI's training facilities to conduct courses for civil servants on a variety of topics (e.g., UNDP on emerging leadership, and DFID/Adam Smith International on basic accounting and financial management). In cooperation with the EC, CDP also supported the training of TC staff in several ministries, however, continuation of this activity is currently under review pending the recent (reportedly unsuccessful) conclusion of EC aid, and the difficulty of attracting trainers to proposed courses. The UNDP contributed to the development and review of ACSI's first five-year strategy, IARCSC's approval of which is pending. This strategy, and on-going efforts to improve the quality of senior management, will provide the basis for pending decisions on continued CDP support.
- Provincial Affairs Directorates (PADs). CDP is supporting seven regional offices of IARCSC's Provincial Affairs Directorate in conducting basic human resource needs and training assessments, improving staff functionality, mapping development projects, and strengthening regional and local coordination for improved governance. This assistance will dovetail with planned CDP support to the newly established Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) and other CDP and USAID projects targeting the reform of sub-national governance at the provincial, district and municipal levels.
- Employee Database. CDP is strengthening IARCSC's general administrative capacity and supporting the development and eventual roll-out of a new, government-wide employee database.

B. National Ministries. In addition to supporting RIMUs in four ministries through IARCSC, CDP has completed seven Training Needs Assessment within key national ministries and agencies to support their long-range planning and resource allocation. Concurrently, CDP is addressing financial management capacity development needs of several ministries under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Finance as they seek to:

- Adopt New Program Budgeting Protocols. With assistance from the World Bank, the Ministry of Finance is leading Government's move to embrace program

[1] With funding from the Government of Australia, Government of Germany, Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation, Government of Norway, UNDP Democratic Governance Thematic Trust Fund and UNDP core funds.

budgeting. CDP is supporting the roll-out of this initiative by supporting training-of-trainers within this ministry, and training key staff in all ministries and key agencies of government.

- Establish Internal Audit Units. CDP has completed initial training of internal audit staff for the Ministry of Education; and developed and tested course materials for the proposed training of internal auditors across all national ministries and agencies. This assistance represents the first donor support to the development of internationally accredited internal audit skills within Government.
- Implement the New Procurement Law. CDP is providing mentoring and coaching support to the procurement staff of all ministries and key agencies in a move to reinforce initial training provided under a World Bank project with the Ministry of Finance. In this manner, CDP is helping to ensure the correct application of a new law governing public sector procurement. A pilot activity is providing assistance to the Ministry of Finance and a line ministry to help improve expenditure management through better procurement planning protocols.

C. Other assistance has been provided to:

- Enhance Provincial Level Education Management. CDP has hired nearly 500 security and management personnel to strengthen the capacity of Provincial and district Education Offices. Teams of CDP staff are training provincial managers, engineers, school protection officers and internal auditors. The Ministry of Education is currently planning to absorb these CDP staff members over the next two years.
- Improve Communications Networks and Strategies. CDP has supported improved communications within the Office of the President (OoP) by installing a telephone exchange for the Council of Ministers. This activity was in parallel with broader USAID ICT (information, communication and technology) support being provided to the OoP through the Support to the Center of Government project. Further, CDP has supported the editing of English versions of Provincial Development Plans which are integrated into Sector Strategies of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS).
- Enhance Diplomacy Training. English language training at the Institute of Diplomacy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is benefiting from the services of four CDP-funded English teachers. This activity is in cooperation with other USAID assistance supporting the broader reform of the Ministry.
- Meet Short-term Training Needs. CDP has supported short-term, third-country and US participant training programs for various public sector entities. These include a program in legal studies in the US and Ireland for staff of the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the Ministry of Justice; and ICT training in India and the US for staff of the Independent Elections Commission, IARCSC and the Ministry of Urban Development.
- Promote Establishment of Public Professional Associations. CDP has catalyzed the establishment of the Afghan Public Health Nurses Association – the first public sector professional association of its kind in Afghanistan. Work is underway to help catalyze the establishment of similar associations of mayors and university presidents.

Issues

The following set of key issues have constrained past, and will likely have potentially significant impact on future public sector initiatives.

1. Inadequacy of Support. Despite the number and mix of other donor capacity development initiatives, CDP is widely regarded as an important program with the level of flexibility and breadth of scope to respond to a variety of public sector capacity development needs. This is both a benefit and a significant issue for CDP. Nevertheless, the most prevailing issue threading through the public sector program is an inadequate amount and depth of assistance from CDP, because the needs across and downward through the ranks of the public sector – national and sub-national – are so great. Typically, donor interventions target one 'skill' or 'program' area, e.g., leadership development, financial management, etc. Rarely, if ever, are these interventions multi-sector in nature or flexible enough to address the differing requirements and challenges of working both nationally and sub-nationally – in provinces, districts and municipalities. While CDP has such breadth and has demonstrated such flexibility, it is currently spread too thinly across too many sectors to have substantially deep impacts within any sector – "a mile wide and an inch deep," as one interviewee expressed it.

2. National Capacity Development Strategy and Donor Coordination. When CDP was initiated, there was no clear Government strategy framework or functional structure for coordinating donor capacity development programs; for articulating common approaches to ensuring the sustainability of such programs; and for linking these programs to the challenges of implementing governmental strategy. The Government recently adopted its ANDS Capacity Development Strategy (June 2008), which includes a section on capacity development. As currently structured, capacity development related to ANDS implementation will be a joint responsibility of the Governance Coordinating Committee (GCC), the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economy. Each is in the process of building their respective staff and building a working relationship with the other partners.

   As well, there is a recent Presidential directive establishing the Inter-ministerial Commission for Capacity Development (ICCD), chaired by the Minister of Economy. This commission "will serve as a single reporting point for both government and donors … ensuring that capacity development needs are met in time and in an incremental but sustainable manner."[2] It is not yet clear to what role the ICCD will play in the coordination of capacity development assistance targeted to ANDS implementation. As USAID's primary capacity development project, and especially given the proposed re-focus of CDP presented in this report, USAID should determine its official position *vis-à-vis* the ICCD, including potential linkages to and contributions from CDP. This is an important element of the broader set of donor coordination issues (organization, structure, roles and responsibilities, etc.) which are beyond the scope of this assessment.

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[2] ANDS Capacity Development Strategy, March 2008, p. 4.
http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/sector_strategies/Capacity%20Development%20%20Strategy%20-%20English.pdf

3. Unavailability of Counterpart Staff. The availability of counterpart staff for capacity building is a problem in IARCSC, its Training Centers and ACSI. The same issue may exist within other government units, both at the national and sub-national levels. Proceeding with donor projects in the absence of serious counterparts is a waste of resources; frustrates both donor and recipient staff; effectively conditions recipient agencies not to take ownership of, and to remain disengaged from donor projects; and sets up the donor for post-project criticism for not sustaining the assistance. More effective strategies and approaches must be found to address this problem.

4. Under-utilization of Training Centers. Though problematic, IARCSC's approach (training centers embedded in ministries and provincial government units) may be the best example of inter-governmental coordination on sustainable capacity development. Its Training Centers and ACSI are under-utilized, with limited course offerings, and with shadow trainers who are paid full-time but who work part-time, and who use center materials in their personal, side-businesses. Early CDP assessments recommended an expansion of the curriculum and full-time use of available facilities; adding a resource unit to training centers; and an expansion in the number and scope of work of Training Needs Assessment Teams (TNATs), which CDP is currently assisting.

5. Inter-governmental Coordination on Capacity Development. The IARCSC Training Center approach is one model of inter-governmental coordination on capacity development. Perhaps other approaches should be tested, including developing sustainable skills in one ministry, and rolling the package out to other ministries. Given political sensitivities governing inter-ministerial relations, the receptivity of line ministries to this approach should be tested, thereby challenging the notion that each ministry must have its own direct, donor-financed capacity programs. This was one of the tenets behind IARCSC's original proposed approach to developing five core competencies in the public sector. This approach, however, also is not without problems.

6. Limited Donor Support for IARCSC and ACSI. These organizations are officially recognized as Government's primary agencies for building public administration skills, yet their core course offerings and delivery capacities are considerably limited – three courses in basic English, management principles and information technology, periodically delivered through ACSI and Training Centers in ministries and provinces. CDP has recommended and is supporting the strengthening and expansion of provincial training centers, both in numbers, staff capacity and the nature of these centers. The EC recently concluded its assistance program targeting the IARCSC and ACSI, including the expansion and strengthening of Training Centers.[3] The World Bank is supporting IARCSC's PAR programs, including RIMUs and the new Pay and Grading system. UNDP's assistance to ACSI (which functions as the key national level training center) is scheduled to end by mid-2009. ACSI's capability to implement its new five-year strategy, developed with UNDP support, is suspect, including its management and teaching capabilities. Moreover, in the face of these current issues and with

[3] EC representatives noted problems with lack of follow-through on commitments made by IARCSC and ACSI.

dwindling donor support, this strategy proposes an (unspecified) increase in core courses and a semi-autonomous status for the agency. USAID must determine whether it is up to the challenge of potentially being the only remaining donor for ACSI, and to what extent these agencies will be integrated into the continuation of CDP.

7. National and Sub-national Balance. CDP's support to national and local government needs to be carefully articulated and balanced. The needs are great on each side of the fulcrums, risking repeating the scenario of the project becoming too thinly spread (a mile wide and an inch deep). All CDP sub-national activities must be carefully dove-tailed with other current/planned USAID assistance at the provincial, district and municipal levels.

8. Objective Assessment Process. CDP experienced "donor assessment fatigue" during its initial organizational assessment (Ministry of Higher Education). Use of the Discussion-Oriented Self Assessment (DOSA) process was only partially successful, in part because of the ministry's "planning and assessment fatigue." As a result, CDP developed, pilot tested, and is currently using (with all client ministries) an alternative organizational assessment process -- the Organizational Capacity Rapid Review (OCRR), targeting a single or multiple ministry functions. This process "builds on the lessons learned from the initial DOSA process in that it targets key officials who are decision-makers rather than the entire management staff of the [targeted] ministry."[4] Thus, without an appropriate, objective assessment process, it is uncertain whether USAID investments have been those of the greatest potential benefit and impact. For the next stage of the project, CDP, USAID and the Government should agree on a more objective priority-setting process.

9. Single Function RIMUs. While the initial idea of RIMUs, as proposed by IARCSC, was to catalyze and support ministerial reform, the focus has been narrowed considerably to HRM, largely as a result of political issues concerning roles and responsibilities for ministerial reform. Thus, the RIMU approach may have limited utility or be dysfunctional as an approach for broad-based capacity development. As a result, other approaches may need to be determined to address capacity development needs. The overall effectiveness of the current approach needs to be assessed, which is beyond CDC's current support to the RASU to ascertain lessons learned. For example, a pertinent issue to be addressed by Government is whether "reform" should lead capacity development initiatives, or vice versa.

10. Linkages with USAID's Host Country Agreement Process. CDP is currently providing relatively narrowly-defined capacity development assistance to ministries in several functional areas addressed in USAID's certification reviews, namely internal audit and procurement management. Potential relevancy, relationship and linkages between CDP's future offerings and USAID's HCC requirements should be explored.

[4] CDP Third Quarterly Report for FY07, p. 4)

11. The Institute Approach to Sustainability. The Ministry of Economy and Central Audit Office (CAO) have, respectively, proposed the establishment of a Project Development Institute (within the ministry) and an Afghanistan Audit Management Training Institute (as a membership-fee-based, private entity) as an approach to meeting sustainable capacity development needs in these area. If the current donor approaches do not meet the needs for sustainable capacity (i.e., providing direct donor training or developing courses which can be incorporated into the curriculum of TCs and ACSI), then perhaps the institute approach should be considered for high-priority requirements. High quality, membership fee-based institutes may be an attractive approach to meeting sustainable capacity building requirements for the public, private and civil society sectors.

Future Directions

CDP's current public sector assistance focuses on a mix of functional skills development (e.g., program-budgeting, procurement and audit skills) and discrete program activities (e.g., establishing Training Centers, installing ITC networks, developing an employee database, supporting regional planning and training needs analyses, establishing a Public Health Nurses Association, etc.). Future directions for USAID capacity development assistance should focus building sustainable capacities through a deeper core, functional, public administration assistance package targeting the following skill sets:

1. Strategic Planning and Policy – Organizational Mission and Authority
2. Organizational Restructuring and Work Process Streamlining
3. Financial Management – Budgeting, Accounting and Auditing
4. Procurement and Contracting
5. Human Resources Development
6. Project Planning, Design, Management and M&E
7. Strategic Communications
8. "Good Governance 101" (Leadership, Ethics, Role of Officials, etc.)

A proposed shift of CDP focus comes with several challenges.

- The first challenge will be to maintain a clear, consistent focus on the skills sets being developed, and not on program outputs or deliverables such as those indicated above, even if such capacity development is provided within a "program activity" context. A focus on the skills sets will help ensure their sustainable capacity, as opposed to an overbearing focus on discrete program outputs.
- Another challenge will be to develop relevant and meaningful progress and impact indicators for sustainable skills sets. For example, such indicators may relate more to the organizational context or enabling environment within which skills are being developed and applied than to individual competencies, *per se*.
- Finally, it must be recognized that such a core skills competency approach may not necessarily yield "showcase" deliverables that can be easily highlighted during visits by Congressional delegations, etc.

Recommendations for the future directions of public sector capacity development are discussed in detail in Section IV. Recommendations.

Private For-Profit Business Development – Description, Issues, Future Directions

Description

The focus of CDP's assistance for Private For-Profit Business capacity development has been on support to two vocational training organizations: the public-private partnership of the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI); and the Construction Training Center (CTC) in Kunar Province, a joint effort of the provincial governor and the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). A variety of other assistance has been provided in support of the modernization of the construction industry in Afghanistan.

- Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI). Assistance to ATVI encompasses a multi-year, multi-million dollar program to support scholarships (more than 500 funded to date), management training, job placement services, and technical assistance for the institute's development, staffing and start-up functions. ATVI has requested additional assistance in FY09 to prepare its application for accreditation.

- Kunar Construction Training Center (CTC). The local government and community donated the land, the PRT provided the buildings and testing laboratory, and CDP has provided the training programs, trainers, materials and equipment, internet connection, and funding for the operation of the center.

- Other capacity building activities for the construction sector. CDP has supported the construction sector in Afghanistan with: a series of capacity building events (i.e., numerous roundtables and several industry conferences); support for the establishment of an International Standards Building Codes (IBC) association of construction, engineering and architectural professionals; technical skills assessments and sector studies; and operational plans for the Afghanistan National Standards Authority (ANSA) and a private hospital.

Issues

Initiatives under Private For-Profit Business capacity building component has been commendable. The two centers provide critically important training for the new generation of construction trades-persons required for the development of Afghanistan. CDP is working to develop the operational capacities and management required to sustain operations in the long term, but funding support will be needed in the interim.

Future Directions

As the Private For-Profit Business Capacity Building component is being phased out, support for the training centers will continue as an activity with funding provided through CDP and possibly other Mission sources. The administration of future support will continue to reside in CDP.

NGO's – Description, Issues, Future Directions

Description

CDP is helping to increase the quality and quantity of goods and services offered by local Afghan NGOs. It is developing and offering a comprehensive capacity building program aimed at meta-level NGOs with capability and potential to provide capacity development support to other NGOs. This includes a nationwide initiative to identify and pre-screen viable NGOs with potential to absorb an array of strategic capacity development assistance. The objective is to build both their capacity and increase their recognition as capacity building NGOs. Highlights of key accomplishments include:

- NGO Round Table Sessions, organized across the country to help introduce and catalyze interest of national and local NGOs to participate.
- An Advisory Committee, established to guide and ensure that NGO assessments, program design and training module content decisions are based upon participative partnerships and are responsive to Afghan needs and expectations.
- CDP Leadership Teams, established and trained to direct and coordinate a program planning, implementation and assessment.
- NGO Universe and Organizational Assessments, to define the national network of NGOs providing capacity building services nationwide; pre-screen, select and assess participating NGOs; jointly review assessment outcomes; and establish baselines for performance monitoring and assessment. CDP has selected 150 NGOs to participate in the capacity building program, categorized as highest functioning, mid-grade and lowest-grade NGOs.
- Training-of-Trainer and Course Materials, being developed, piloted, finalized, translated (into Dari and Pashto) and launched across seven core subjects (strategic planning, organizational governance, fundraising, integrating gender, financial management, project management, and report and success story writing); and additional trainer-of-trainer modules (follow-up mentoring, empowerment, leadership and communication). Training materials per course to include a Trainer Manual, Trainee Manual, Workshop Tools and Presentation. CDP is initially training both its internal trainers, who are, in turn, training both NGO trainers and providing direct training to other participating NGOs. As of June 2008, sets of materials have been completed and training is underway for –three - four courses for which translation into Dari and Pashto has been completed, impacting 86 of the targeted 150 NGOs in six provinces (327 participants), with face-to-face follow-up mentoring of trained staff.
- NGO Management Certificate Programs, being explored to provide training and certification of NGO managers, potentially in project and financial management, e.g., at the associate degree or equivalent level.

Issues

The following set of key issues impact on-going NGO initiatives.

- Likely the most significant challenges encountered in the NGO component of CDP relate to the language barrier, namely, translating English-based training

materials into Dari and Pashto; and the lack of training of Afghan trainers in their own languages. Because of the highly technical vocabulary of NGO skills enhancement programs, the translation process is slow and tedious, requiring frequent consultation with English trainers to ascertain intent and meanings of terms, phrases and concepts.

- NGO representatives appreciate and are benefiting from CDP's in-depth organizational assessments of their operations and staff. However, they recommend that similar post-training assessments be conducted to (a) verify their progress and the impact of USAID's investments and (b) help facilitate their own and CDP's efforts to promote utilization of their enhanced skills and organizational capabilities. CDP's current draft PMP excludes any post-training impact indicators addressing the NGO sector. Given the depth of capacity development assistance being provided and the country-wide coverage, this program warrants an appropriate level of impact measurement which will both inform USAID and facilitate any marketing of this enhanced capacity.
- While appreciating initial CDP support, NGO representatives roundly agreed that much more is needed over a longer time horizon in order to enhance their staff and organizational skills, especially in support of public sector core skills development. They understand that only three – four of CDP's targeted seven course modules have been developed and launched -- quite an achievement in less than 20 months. They emphasize the need for higher levels training in English and information/communications technology; and more continuous (6 – 12 month) training and coaching, noting that building high quality, sustainable capacity within NGOs cannot be done via short-term workshops.

Future Directions

The proposed future direction for the NGO program is based on the following:

- The proposed restructuring of the project presented herein will require a fast-track approach to completing planned training. Rather than continuing with direct training to all 150 NGOs, it is proposed that CDP select the top 20 meta-NGOs which are progressing well in current training programs, and fast-track their training-of-trainers courses. This should increase the capability of these organizations to take on the substantive responsibility of completing the training of the remaining 130 NGOs as this program is phased out o/a September 30, 2009, provided that adequate follow-up mentoring and coaching is provided to the trainers as they take on the considerable additional responsibilities.
- Critical to the successful implementation of the above fast-track approach is building and strengthening relationships among NGO networks to facilitate their receptivity to training from meta-NGOs and to promote use of their enhanced skills. During the focus group discussion, there was a resounding recommendation for USAID/CDP to help establish larger networks among NGOs to help market and facilitate application of their enhanced skills, not only to CDP's on-going work in capacity development within the public sector, but also to USAID programs more broadly, especially at sub-national levels (e.g., district/municipal levels and in PRT activities).

Higher Education – Description, Issues, Future Directions

Description

Technical assistance to build capacities of the Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE) and its client institutions of higher learning are being implemented by a separately funded network of alliances under USAID's Global Development Alliance (GDA) initiative. CDP has supported MoHE and GDA on several key initiatives:

- Reforming the National University Entrance Examination (Concours). CDP has worked closely with the MoHE to develop sustainable long-term solutions to the serious problems such as security; transparency and operational effectiveness in the system of registration; and scoring and dissemination of results for the Afghanistan university entrance examinations (Concours). The result was a contract awarded to an Afghan-based company in New Delhi, India (Virmati) to redesign and launch new software and hardware in time for the current cycle of Concours, which will conclude in March 2009. Over 100,000 students will register using the new system. CDP will oversee the work of Virmati to train MoHE staff to operate the new system without future CDP assistance.
- Support the National Commission on Academic Reform – Academic Credit System**.** In May 2008, the Minster of Higher Education requested CDP to assist the Ministry to establish an academic credit system. The assistance provided has included: briefing commission members on current international developments and best practices; training members to conduct an assessment of the current status, successes and challenges of the academic credits system in Afghanistan's universities and higher education institutes; and working with the commission to re-draft the ministry's policy and regulations for the academic credit system.
- Support the National Commission on Academic Reform – Assessment of Professors**.** CDP is assisting in the development of transparent, merit-based criteria for evaluating the quality of teaching and research by university faculty. CDP has briefed commission members on current international best practices and assisted in drafting a policy and strategic plan for a system of objective criteria and evaluation processes for the hiring, retention and promotion of faculty.

Issues

The Concours assistance is proving to be a critical success. CDP assistance will phase out over the next few months. However, long-term maintenance contracts will be required to sustain the new system.

CDP has helped to develop policy and plans for the academic credit reform process. At this point, CDP will phase-out this assistance in line with the refocused agenda. Other USAID technical programs are well positioned to implement the plan, which may take three – five years. Similarly, CDP's assistance in the assessment of professors has reach a stage where the ministry and commission can continue on their own, or possibly with support from other USAID technical programs.

Future Directions

CDP's potential future assistance to the Ministry of Higher Education will be limited to core public administration capacity building, as described later in this report.

Participant Training – Description, Issues, Future Directions

Description

CDP is supporting USAID's objective to develop a critical mass of Afghans with management and other skills through state-of-the-art training, technical assistance and participant training. The participant training component of the program addresses specific requests from CDP's technical teams, other USAID implementing partners (IPs), and USAID, in general.

Following are the highlights of accomplishments to-date:

- A Survey of Local and Technical Assistance Providers (LTAPs) has been completed.

- Participant Training programs have been successfully completed for a number of Afghans from across the public and private sectors, who benefitted from programs in-country, third-countries, and in the US. Many of the participants were sponsored by other IPs.

- Materials Support to USAID and Other Implementing Partners has included, for the Mission, the development of a USAID Participant Training Mission Order, and annual Training Plans (beginning in FY09) for the Mission; and for other IPs, a Pre-departure Orientation Module, a pending catalogue of all CDP training resources, and a new or streamlined Training Activity Approval Process and Training Request forms.

- Technical Assistance is being provided to other USAID IPs, for example::
  - Training Results and Information Network (TraiNet) Sites and a Training Tracker System have been established. TraiNet sites have been activated for 22 other USAID IPs, and TraiNet operators have been oriented/supported. CDP is using this USAID database to track and report all of its participant training activities, in-country, in third-countries and in the US.
  - The English Language Training program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Institute of Diplomacy has been strengthened by the provision of four English instructors, complementing other assistance to this ministry from USAID/Asia Foundation and the British Council.

- Assessment and Impact Monitoring efforts have been initiated to determine the effectiveness and impact of participant trainings. The Scholarships and Training Unit (STU) conducts post-training reviews upon completion of training, and six months following completion of each training program (for CDP participants only; not for other IPs). The latter includes input from the trainee's supervisor to assess whether/how newly acquired knowledge and skills the trainee gained during the training program are being applied; whether the trainee has received additional responsibilities, been promoted or otherwise recognized for enhanced, on-the-job performance, etc.

Issues

- The CDP contract anticipated a large, full-service, mission-wide participant training "one-stop shop," addressing all pre- , during, and post-training requirements for a large cohort of trainees in long- and short-term programs, academic and non-degree, in-country, in third-countries and in the US. CDP is also required to identify and strengthen (with TA and commodity support) viable local training and technical assistance providers countrywide in a bid to support increased in-country training across the entire USAID portfolio Moreover, CDP was required to develop self-designed courses in USAID-relevant capacity building topics to be offered as "off-the-shelf" packages; and develop a set of appropriate post-training support services and programs; and much, much more. These expectations were based on the assumption that all USAID technical offices would buy-into CDP to manage most if not all their training requirements. Thus, a significant amount of the budget (about $80 million) was anticipated buy-ins.
- Buy-ins did not kick-in until year two, requiring CDP to fund training request from other technical offices (using core DG funds). As the Mission's portfolio expanded, other technical offices and their implementing agents increasingly elected to manage training programs directly. This, plus the late or non-start (cancellation?) of the LTAP and other element result in a situation in which CDP's Scholarships and Training Unit (STU) was significantly overstaffed (nine persons, including five expatriates). Thus far, CDP has processed a variety of training requests for only five IPs.
- Clearly, the role and responsibilities of CDP's STU need to be clarified vis-à-vis training programs of all other IPs.
- Though the qualitative post-training impact information being collected by STU has yielded valuable insights, some of which have been worthy of capturing in success stories, these are not currently integrated into the broader Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) for CDP, and thus, are not regularly reported. Additionally, STU is also performing select, extended follow-up tracking of participants (though not systematically).
- Security concerns have multiplied as CDP pushes to broaden its geographic scope.
- Language issues have been ubiquitous and significant, impacting the quality of materials development as English materials are translated into Dari and Pashto; and the training-of-trainers.
- The inadequate availability of quality trainers and well-equipped training facilities in-country has required a extra emphases on training trainers and providing targeted assistance to address facility constraints.
- Venues for third-country and US training have presented significant travel and visa issues for Afghans.
- The availability of qualified women participants remains a challenge.

Future Directions

USAID is working to identify a more permanent "home" for the processing of participant training programs mission-wide. Until this issue is resolved, CDP will continue to process all training requests. However, CDP will fund requests only related to CDP participants in core governance positions.

FACTORS THAT MAY HAVE HINDERED PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Management Issues

USAID Management Issues. CDP was designed as a gap-filling, cross-cutting activity to be managed in the Mission's Program Office, with funding from across USAID's budget categories, either as direct infusions (obligations) from the Program Office and Strategic Objective teams or indirect contributions (sub-obligations) from mission IPs. From the beginning, however, implementation responsibility was delegated to the Democracy and Governance (DG) office, with funding exclusively comprising DG funds. This arrangement presented a number of management problems:

- Project Design. From a design perspective, the main management issue and challenge for CDP is one of an overly ambitious, overly-prescriptive, rolling design, gap-filling program in which the gaps change annually.
  - This five-year program targeted an unmanageable number activities (e.g., in 26 national public sector entities), including significant intervention at sub-national levels, and a requirement to mobilize substantive interventions across all five components in year one, based on comprehensive institutional and training needs assessments, capacity building road maps, stakeholder workshops, etc.; and to expand successful activities in years two-five.
  - In many respects, the overly prescriptive, detailed contract effectively locks the contractor onto fixed tracks in an environment where flexibility, admittedly, is a premium.
  - Rapid changes in the project environment shortly after the program was launched rendered some elements of the design obsolete or suspect (e.g., growth of Mission's programs; shift of mission management responsibility; decisions of most other IPs to manage participant training directly; IARCSC's proposed approach to building core public administration skills; etc.)

- Steering Committee. The DG office lacked both the authority and responsibility to establish and direct a cross-cutting steering committee, as called for in the CDP contract. As a result, while CDP's activities were to be gap-filling and cross-cutting in nature, they were not clearly managed as such within the Mission. This placed an extra burden upon the CDP contractor to facilitate cross-cutting dialogs within the Mission and among its various implementing partners.

  As USAID's program has grown (including the addition of new strategic objectives), more activities have been approved and launched which target development issues being tangentially (and thinly) addressed by CDP. This includes an increasing focus on sub-national governance and capacity development in inherently more technical domains. The absence of a Mission steering committee or other appropriate forum to discuss and decide upon the relative allocation of work at sub-national levels opens the door for potentially decreased effectiveness of aid. Also, USAID technical offices are increasingly concerned about CDP's interventions into their program areas.

- Advisory Committee. The absence of a steering committee or other cross-sectoral working group(s) to direct CDP's program and identify pivotal issues that could only be resolved at higher levels has lessened the effectiveness and utility of the

advisory committee. Minutes of the two advisory committee meetings suggest its performs principally a 'show and tell' function, with no substantive decision-making. This is fine if this serves a valid purpose. Otherwise the terms of reference for this committee should be revised in context of a new management structure; or alternatively, the committee should be disbanded.

- Buy-ins. The funding of activities in other, non-DG technical areas (i.e., participant training, private sector and higher education) may be contrary to the purpose for which congressionally appropriated DG funds were allocated to Afghanistan. This issue was addressed, in part, when other technical offices were required to fund their own, discrete participant training activities which would continue to be processed by CDP. While this is an improvement, the issue remains the use of CDP staff to process inherently non-DG participant training activities; and design/implement an expanding set of non-DG technical activities.
- Aid Effectiveness. Many of CDP's "technical" activities in non-DG sectors lack a substantive strategic home among USAID's technical offices and their strategic objectives. As a result, many activities are left without a good "strategic fit" and the benefits from a closer association with relevant technical managers outside of the DG office. Thus, these activities are not measurably contributing to the achievement of related strategic objectives of USAID's other technical offices. This situation, along with continuing expansion of other technical programs and increasing overlaps and potential duplication of activities with CDP, effectively decreases the effectiveness of aid.

  Potential opportunities to enhance CDP's aid effectiveness may have been missed as a result of inadequate coordination between Mission support offices (controller and contracting) and CDP. This relates to the issue of relevancy of CDP's public sector training and mentoring activities in financial management, procurement and audit, to USAID's broader consideration of Afghanization of its programs, i.e., direct funding of public entities via host country agreements.

  Specifically, USAID has identified several ministries and governmental agencies to consider for potential direct funding, and has already signed a program agreement with one, Ministry of Public Health. Others are currently being reviewed to certify their capabilities and systems in procurement, financial management, audit and program management. CDP is currently providing public administration training in the key areas that are generally related to USAID's host country certification reviews (with courses in audit, financial management/budgeting, and procurement, with planned courses in accounting), but the assistance would need to be further targeted to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements. However, this capacity development work is not directly supporting the Mission's objectives to Afghanize its program via host country agreements. CDP advised the current assessment team that CDP was "still awaiting Mission guidance" on this issue. Delays in exploring potential linkages in this area may represent a potentially missed opportunity for CDP public sector training to enhance aid effectiveness, especially since building capacity supportive of HCA is an objective in the contract.

- National – Sub-national Focus. With a growing part of the Mission's portfolio addressing sub-national capacity development, CDP's balance between a national

and sub-national focus needs to be well articulated, and fit within a well defined Mission framework for capacity development that is synergistically reinforcing.

- Reporting Requirements. CDP has reportedly produced several iterations of most, if not all, major programming documents (life-of-program work plan; annual work plans; PMP; etc.), along with producing a large number of regular reports (weekly, quarterly, semi-annual portfolio, annual, success stories, and *ad hoc*). The program would benefit from a fresh review of its reporting requirements in order to (i) streamline reporting requirements within a clearer, more manageable design; (ii) allow a more concerted focus on implementation of this large, complex program; and (iii) develop strategies for minimizing costly iterations of programming documents.

Contractor Management Issues. As designed, CDP required a Contractor who could essentially perform all of the core functions of a fully-fledged USAID mission, including being very broad technically; highly flexible and responsive in a fast-changing environment; and more efficient than the average mission may be. The Contractor's responses to these challenges presented a few problems:

- Prior Management Structure. In response to tightly defined contractual requirements (i.e., many activities/sub-activities under five, broad components), CDP initially adopted a "stove-pipe" approach to management – one office per component, with sub-teams corresponding to program areas, and with little-to-no cross-linkages in program design and management. This resulted in varying levels of duplication and overlapping of key functional areas, as managers were heavily focused on a myriad of different interventions within their own program components. This approach may have blinded CDP management regarding the skills sets involved in core functions required to launch and carry out activities, and of opportunities to achieve "economies of structure" in managing important cross-cutting functional areas.

- Current Management Structure. CDP recently reorganized and reassigned staff in support of a streamlined matrix management structure. This purportedly addresses the need "to be more concise and to more clearly define and connect project activities …*[in support of]*…increased Afghanization, more focused and connected activity implementation, and more effective cross-cutting technical support services." (FY2009 Draft Work Plan, p.1) The recent push to Afghanize the staff and the scarcity of educated and experienced program development/management staff, in general, have required the appointment of Afghans to relatively senior positions somewhat beyond their levels of experience. In response, CDP proposes increasing (a) the intensity of supervision provided by remaining expatriate managers, (b) in-staff training and mentoring activities for Afghan professional staff; and (c) interactions between line supervisors and senior expatriate managers to ensure adequate integration of activities into cross-cutting themes. CDP's articulation of the proposed matrix management structure in the draft FY09 Work Plan has raised a new set of management concerns, both among the CDP staff and within USAID. For example, rather than clearly identifying relevant functional areas that cut across and support program categories, the proposed new structure identifies several sets of program categories that are duplicative and have no apparent cross-cutting nature; with a list of sub-categories

at the center of the matrix. The broader issue is how line staff will effectively manage their activities, with what appears to be dual supervisory oversight roles, to achieve desired levels of effective implementation and cross-fertilization. CDP staff members are justifiably confused. The current management structure reflects the complex, multi-sectoral and expansive nature of the CDP, and the need to provide increased supervision, mentoring and cross-fertilization guidance to Afghan staff who are being empowered. These issues should diminish if not evaporate in response to a substantive streamlining of the program, as proposed herein.

- Institutional Assessments. To meet unrealistic demands for substantive start-ups across all five components, CDP initially took some short-cuts, apparently skipping, for example, critical "gap analyses" within USAID and across the donor community, and thorough institutional assessments in targeted ministries – steps required to define an objective, clear, rational path for its interventions. As a result, decisions on initial interventions were based upon interviews with top decision-makers within ministries (ministers and deputy ministers and other senior staff), who identified their top priority capacity development requirements. CDP's activity design "assessments" then closely addressed only these proposed areas. In essence, the institutional and capacity development assessments called for in the contract were transformed into narrowly-focused, pre-design analyses of very discrete intervention proposals largely from political appointees. Thus, (at least within the public sector) CDP lacks the objective data to substantiate selection of USAID investments over other, potentially equal or more valuable investments. CDP is currently applying a modified version of the Discussion-Oriented Self-Assessment approach to ascertain institutional requirements of targeted ministries and agencies.

- CDP Institute. In response to its contract, CDP recently proposed the establishment of a CDP Institute as an internal unit that would serve as its "staff development arm", initially addressing the increasing, basic training needs of its staff , which needs have increased in response to a push toward Afghanization. [5] Subsequently, the CDP Institute would morph into a more substantial consultancy unit serving other interested USAID implementing partners, in accordance with contractual requirements; possibly serve non-core clients on a fee-basis; and could even evolve into a sustainable, post-program entity, according to some CDP staff. The selection of this approach was reportedly influenced by a stream of requests for training, training materials and capacity development support from non-core clients. However, it is unclear whether CDP actively considered alternative models for meeting its internal needs (other than with project funds) and perceived external opportunities for capacity development services – fee and non-fee based -- that may potentially better fit the Afghanistan context. This approach would appear to compete with both ACSI and CDP's core NGO and private sector provider clients which are being trained as trainers. For example, ACSI's new strategic plan (approval of which is pending) calls for the development of fee-based training services to NGOs and the private sector by 2010. As a part of its

[5] The appropriateness of allocating direct program resources to contractor staff training perhaps should be reviewed and clarified.

sustainability strategy, CDP might consider directly spinning off relevant elements of its units/departments to core clients (NGOs and private sector organizations) which may be interested in expanding their core services.

- Counterpart Shortages. In some areas, CDP is proceeding with "capacity development" work in the absence or shortage of local counterparts, e.g., support to ACSI. Such situations are adequate grounds for flagging specific issues to USAID for intervention; and may be grounds for activity re-design or termination.

- Lessons Learned. While CDP's quarterly reports dutifully discuss challenges and issues, there appears to be no systematic summary of key lessons learned, in accordance with usual practice. Such summaries would provide the evidence that technical staff are indeed reviewing program performance and building lessons learned into their management approaches and systems; and would also build a solid base for sharing these lessons more broadly (e.g., with Government and other donors in-country; and CDIE in the close-out report).

- CDP Portal. A key management objective of a refocused CDP should be to "work smarter," not harder, based upon streamlining – the program objective and focus, the number of sectors, beneficiaries and activities, performance monitoring system and plan, the staff, and the work plan and reporting processes. An aggressive restructuring of the CDP Portal may offer significant opportunities for streamlining program management. Current use of the Portal is simply for storage of some documents that have been formally submitted to USAID in hard copy. This misses the opportunity to structure and use the portal for more systematic communication to both USAID, core partners, stakeholders and the broader public via establishing the web site with gradated public and private access points. Adding a database capability to the portal (e.g., Microsoft Access) would open the door for integrating the program's vast database, with capability to generate reports on-line through queries; download of select data for manipulation in other programs such as MS Excel and MS Word; and facilitate more effective information sharing with other donors and especially with emerging structures to increase Government's role in coordinating donors' capacity development programs.

- Reporting Requirements. Establishment of a clearer, more strategic program design may open the door for streamlining of CDP reporting requirements, "working smarter," not harder. CDP staff have noted timeline conflicts in the current schedule of reports. Beyond this, there may be opportunities to collapse some reports and possibly eliminate others. For example, collapsing the fourth quarterly report into the annual report may prove cost-effective (if required, quarterly financial data can still be attached). Similarly, eliminating semi-annual reports may make restructured quarterly reports more meaningful and useful. To help minimize iterations and facilitate more timely approvals of major program documents, consider the advantages of (a) first reaching agreement with the CTO on outlines; and (b) then reaching agreement on annotated outlines before "putting pen to paper" on major narrative reports. It is far easier and more cost-effective to iterate on annotated outlines than to do so on extensive narrative.

- Staff Afghanization. As noted above (CDP Institute), the increased pace of Afghanization of CDP's staff may have triggered the need to promote and hire

Afghans who do not possess the full complement of requisite skills. This understandably has, *inter alia*, increased the need for staff development and closer levels of supervision by qualified staff. Staff qualifications are critical to achieving implementation success of a program that *itself* provides high level capacity development support nationwide to key agencies of Government, the NGO community, private sector and the tertiary education sector. Therefore, the need for high-level expatriate skills must be carefully balanced with the desire for Afghanization of the staff. Moreover, staff Afghanization must be driven by the demonstrable application of the same kinds of modern HRM protocols that CDP *itself* is proffering to its clients. Anything less than this will trigger unnecessary and detrimental "back firing" from among the program staff, across the beneficiary community, and possibly beyond the program as is currently reported.

Future Program Management. Many of the USAID and Contractor management issues noted above would be addressed with a streamlined, re-focused and more efficiently managed CDP. Final decisions upon a future management structure and approach will emerge from:

a) a revised Section C of the contract (a draft of which is presented in Annex A), to which the Contractor will formally respond with a proposal and transition plan, leading to a negotiated/executed contract amendment;
b) a revised life-of-program work plan;
c) a final FY09 work plan; and
d) a final Performance Management Plan (PMP).

It is not within the purview of the assessment team to specify a particular management structure, *per se*. In Annex A, "Section C Restatement", a generalized management approach and an outline for the requirements of a management structure is proposed. In addition, this assessment does help identify pivotal issues and opportunities that need to be addressed and considered in order to reach agreement on a valid management approach. In fact, given the breadth of transitions and modifications that are proposed, and which must be carefully examined and decided upon, reaching agreement on an acceptable management approach may be more important and useful than positing a particular management structure. In light of this, Annex B presents a proposed scenario of pivotal management steps and responsibilities required to achieve enhance planning, decision-making, implementation and reporting of/on a core, public administration capacity development program – specifically leading to approved revised LOP and FY09 work plans, and, hopefully, timely implementation of the refocused CDP program and activities.

Performance Monitoring and Measurement

The contract requires "a Results Monitoring Plan for all core activities and tasks that is consistent with the Mission's Performance Management Plan." (p. C-16). CDP's draft PMP includes several indicators which attempt to capture higher level impact results from a set of activities, with data to be collected quarterly or semi-annually. These include institutional score cards of perceived improvements in ministerial operational capacity; a performance index for task completion by the Civil Service Commission; an index on ministerial financial management capacity and host country contracting capability; and

number/value of USAID procurement awards to CDP's NGO and private sector beneficiary organizations. Beyond these, the M&E strategy reflects a "bean counting" approach to tracking the progress and assessing the impact of the program.

CDP's approach to M&E reflects (i) the relatively late (o/a August 2008) establishment of a three person M&E unit; (ii) the part-time availability of the senior M&E director (three weeks per quarter); (iii) the reported lack of integration into the broader M&E system of attempts to ascertain higher level impacts of participant training; and (iv) the low/no-cost approach to data collection. These points suggest missed opportunities to achieve a more holistic, concerted and meaningful performance monitoring and evaluation system. For example, CDP's approach misses the opportunity to:

- integrate more relevant, higher-value, "M&E thinking" and planning into the design phase of activities in lieu of relegating M&E to a post-design afterthought; and
- help establish or strengthen within key beneficiary/stakeholder agencies a foundation for building an increased awareness of, and capability to manage performance monitoring and evaluation.

The latter point is important in context of the view that *"effectively, all the moves under the CDP umbrella, to some extent, is or should be capacity building."* In essence, with relatively little evaluative and impact analysis planned for such an expansive program, the M&E team may be more of a monitoring unit that formally and principally reports bean-counting data from technical units.

As part of the transition, USAID and CDP should discuss which elements of the pre-transition program may require minimal continued PMP reporting. For example, given the depth of capacity development assistance being provided and the country-wide coverage of the NGO activity, this program warrants an appropriate level of impact measurement which will both inform USAID and facilitate marketing of this enhanced capacity.

ASSESSMENT OF CLIENT SATISFACTION

Public Sector Entities. Senior representatives of public sector entities expressed great appreciation for assistance received from CDP, and in the same breath firmly stated that their agencies required and expected more from USAID. They appreciated the breadth, flexibility and general responsiveness of the program. A few noted assistance approaches that did not result in any sustainable impact, but based upon feedback, this may have related to problems with the availability of any or qualified ministerial counterparts which is oft reported. Public sector agencies also appreciate the ability of CDP to work both nationally and sub-nationally, in recognition of the increasing devolution of responsibilities sub-nationally. The Minister of Economy specifically accentuated his hope for substantial engagement of USAID and other major donors in the recently established ICCD, which he chairs, including material aid and technical assistance to establish a secretariat and launch the work of the Commission.

NGO Community. During a focus group session, representative NGO clients, roundly appreciated assistance received to-date from CDP, comparing it as being heads and

shoulders above other capacity assistance programs (fee and free) their organizations have benefited from. They also underscored the need for additional longer-term support. As discussed above (Section III. 2.c. NGOs – Issues), principal concerns of NGOs are to receive longer-term capacity development support (6 – 12 months) to deepen their skills; to encourage CDP to help build NGO network to facilitate the use of their enhanced skills in broader CDP activities; and to facilitate marketing of their enhanced skills to other USAID programs.

Private Sector. The assessment team interviewed one representative from the private sector – ATVI. This vocational school deeply appreciates the three-year program of support with CDP. The school has established a second (of a planned seven) campus in eastern Afghanistan, and eventually plans on becoming an Asia-regional center of excellence in vocational education. Continuing support from ATVI is an integral element of its plans to transition into an NGO, seek accreditation, and increase student fees as a step towards self-sustainability. The school is also exploring possible linkages with, and assistance from PRT.

Higher Education Community. The Ministry of Higher Education has expressed sincere appreciation and high satisfaction for CDP assistance to introduce a new Concours system. This was the highest priority program for the MoHE. Its early success has raised expectations that Afghanistan's new system for accessing a university education will provide a transparent, fair, and efficient service to future registrants.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING

The following recommendations are designed to refocus the CDP in line with the primary responsibilities of the manager/funder of the project, USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG).

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) is now focused on building its capacity to deliver basic public services throughout the country. To do so, it must strengthen its accountability, transparency and efficiency. USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance is on the front line of assisting the GIRoA in achieving those goals. In a country with almost unlimited need for government capacity building, ODG must direct its own limited resources to those activities that can best advance GIRoA's reform agenda. Capacity development in financial management (budgeting, accounting, auditing, procurement), human resources (structures, systems and skill sets) and program design/management (including monitoring and evaluation) are at the top of the list of ministries needs and ODG interests. Other USAID technical offices and programs are more effectively positioned to support private sector, education and certain civil society initiatives.

Thus the refocusing of CDP must start with the consolidation of the four broad open-ended themes which have guided the program's substantive activities to date: Public Sector, Private Sector, Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), and Higher Education. Going forward, CDP should refocus its activities to:

1. **Build GIRoA Capacity to Implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy** (ANDS). ANDS represents a model of good governance in terms of planning and prioritizing the development of the country over the next 5-10 years. Core governance capacity building critically needed assistance with an emphasis on financial management, program management and monitoring and evaluation.

2. **Synergize with key USAID Objectives/Initiatives**. The objective is to provide core public administration support to key ministries/agencies with which USAID partners can strengthen the foundation on which successful partnerships are built. CDP assistance will be needed, in particular, to facilitate the capacity of key ministries to meet host country agreement requirements as part of USAID's Afghanization initiative. As well, a growing USAID governance objective and commitment relates to building governance capacities at sub-national government (SNG) levels. CDP can significantly contribute to this effort.

Ultimately, Afghan citizens will judge their democracy, not on its pledged allegiance to principles of good governance, but rather on whether it works, and whether it delivers essential public services – food, security, water, energy, roads, jobs, schools. The key question in this evaluation has been what preconditions must exist in order for good governance assistance to have the impact needed and expected. The answer is a strong core governance public administration capacity that will enable GIRoA to plan effectively for people's needs, design relevant program activities, manage resources and deliver services.

REFOCUS STRATEGY

The sprawl of objectives and deliverables required in the CDP contract award to BearingPoint in February, 2007 has resulted in a broad program of dispersed activities across a wide universe of clients without benefit of strong prioritization methodology or effective linkages, factors which taken all together have weakened aid effectiveness.

CDP needs to be refocused if it is to become a smarter, more effective program to deliver capacity building assistance consistent with ODG's primary objectives. Key elements of the recommended refocusing strategy include:

A. **An immediate "cease and desist" on starting any new non-core public administration activities**. The proposed draft FY09 workplan includes a number of soon-to-be-started activities under two newly titled initiatives; "Citizen Services Delivery" focused on several education oriented activities; and "Expanding Workforce Infrastructure" the new programmatic home for private sector activities. In addition, there are several cross-cutting, non-core governance activities with a proposed FY09 start. These initiatives and supporting new activities should cease and desist. As well, low priority non-core governance activities that may have only recently begun but which have yet to fully operationalize, should be stopped before any additional expenses are incurred. A list of these activities, culled from the draft proposed FY09 Workplan (September 14, 2008), is presented with discussion later in this report under the section "Transitions and Exit Strategies".

B. **All current non-core public administration activities dropped, transitioned or phased out by the end of FY09**. The primary recommendation of the assessment team is for CDP to "get out of the business" of providing assistance for private sector workforce development, technical education engagement, and direct NGO capacity assistance. The goal is that by the end of FY09, CDP will be a much streamlined program, providing significant, coordinated high priority core public administration capacity building to key GIRoA partners at national and sub-national levels of government.

   Time will be needed to sort through and make decisions as to the status of such activities. In the interim, direction is to be provided by USAID as to which core public administration and other committed activities should continue.

   Following are the proposed decision guidelines for determining which activities are dropped, phased-out, transitioned, continued with prior written interim approval, or continued/started as part of the forthcoming revised FY09 workplan (following this evaluation):

   - **Dropped**: Ongoing non-core governance activities which do not represent a significant ministerial/agency commitment (as represented in a signed MoU or other formal mechanism), and which are not expected to produced early deliverables should be brought to a timely conclusion. For instance, further assistance on the Academic Credit Reform technical program is expected to take three – five years to complete. CDP has worked with the Ministry of Higher Education to develop a general approach. USAID's Office of Social Sector Development (OSSD) may have an interest in transitioning elements of the program to one of its ongoing projects which is well positioned to take on the activity. At this point, there is no reason to continue CDP support for this initiative.

- **Phased-out**: Priority, non-core governance activities which may or may not be transitioned, but which can produce a discreet result by September 30, 2009 should be phased out accordingly. The critically needed "Concours" initiative to revamp the college entrance examination system is underway. In the next few months, the project will have introduced, tested and rolled-out the new system for the coming examinations. Except for a long-term system maintenance requirement, which may be transitioned, the project can be phased out prior to September 30, 2009. Another example is the NGO capacity building effort. Initially scheduled to continue over the next three years, a new approach to transfer training capacities to a core group of NGOs and allow them to train the remaining, targeted NGOs will allow this important non-governance program to be phased out by (date)..
- **Transitioned:** Discussions with USAID technical offices (TOs) regarding the transitioning of certain proposed initiatives are summarized later in this report. For each activity considered a priority for another USAID TO, that TO will have to define the specifics of a program and identify a mechanism, funding source, and timeframe for the transition. TOs may wish to discuss CDP's intent and progress to date for such activities in order to smooth the transition.
- **Continued with interim approval:** USAID will provide direction (via an Implementation Letter to the contractor) on interim public sector activities, pending the review and approval of the revised, final FY09 workplan
- **Continued/Started New**: High priority core public administration activities for full CDP and implementation are identified later in this report.

C. **Core public administration program to include a deeper package/wider choice of capacity building assistance for targeted ministries and sub-national government entities**. As non-core governance activities are dropped from CDP, time, money, technical capacity and management attention can be focus on a more holistic approach to governance, one that addresses system-wide, organizational performance issues. Integrated and comprehensive capacity development, targeted to fewer ministries, but at a greater level of depth and across systems, structures and skill sets, can have synergistic effects that enhance aid effectiveness.

D. **Selection of ministries/agencies for CDP assistance to exploit synergies with key USAID objectives/initiatives**. For example, USAID is committed to advancing the certification of select ministries to take on more responsibility in program management as part of the Mission's "Afghanization" initiative. USAID has tentatively identified seven ministries (Ministry of Communication and Information Technology; Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development; Ministry of Energy and Water;; Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Higher Education; and Ministry of Public Works) for consideration of possible host country agreements. The Mission's certification reviews of partners for such agreements may identify the need for targeted institutional strengthening in areas tangential to CDP's core functional areas. In addition, CDP should continue to work with its three "umbrella" client organizations – Ministry of Finance, Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) and the Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) – to provide flexible capacity building to ministries/agencies/departments/SNG under the clients' authorities and in compliance with their priorities, schedules and standards.

E. **The possibility of expanding assistance to SNG (Sub-National Government) as LGCD ends**. CDP will soon begin to implement the program outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with IDLG, which includes capacity building assistance to seven provinces targeted by IDLG. In addition, CDP will assist the IDLG central structure in developing action plans and strengthening its human resource function. Much of the provincial capacity building assistance is similar to that currently being provided under USAID's Local Governance Community Development (LGCD) program which ends in September 2009 and whose follow-up program is not expected to have a governance component. CDP, if it properly manages its current IDLG assistance program, could be ideally positioned at that point to become a primary provider of capacity building assistance to sub-national government, other than municipal government, which is expected to be addressed more directly in an upcoming USAID program.

F. **Salary support transitioned as per new USAID policy; supported employees trained to be retained**. Currently, CDP supports staff salaries for close to 500 Ministry of Education and other employees. Under the recent "Policy Approach to USAID Support to the Staffing Needs of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)", approved July 28, 2008, line government employees must be transitioned to the Ministry's tashkeel and funded in the recurrent GIRoA budget or through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). CDP is in the process of enhancing the skills of these employees so they will be prepared to meet PRR requirements for "pay and grade" upgraded salaries when transitioned to ministries' payrolls. This is a critical requirement if competent employees are to be retained within ministries. Salary support provided through CDP should be stopped at the end of FY09.

A refocused CDP must be designed to complement, not compete with other USAID TO programs/initiatives. CDP must also be closely coordinated with other ongoing capacity building interventions of the larger donor community and the GIRoA itself. A significant new direction for CDP will be the proactive identification and prioritization of critical GIRoA capacity building needs rather than simply filling gaps, which was the primary intent of the original contract.

Refocus Rationale

As noted earlier, there is significant unmet need for core public administration capacity building. For instance, the very successful CDP program budgeting assistance has to date graduated two ministries, and eleven additional ministries are currently undergoing the training and mentoring package. This is out of a total of 45 ministries/agencies that require such assistance. And these numbers do not represent the provincial levels of the ministries, which are much in need of the same training in all 34 provinces. This is also true for the offices of provincial and district governors as well. This level of assistance is needed for all core public administration and project management capacities.

There are other reasons for consolidating CDP. USAID technical offices have expressed concerns about CDP's purpose, methodologies, priorities, and incursions into their technical areas. At the same time, because the TOs did not have to fund CDP activities in their respective areas, technical activities outside of core governance were not well screened for their importance, value added or cost effectiveness. Essentially, such activities were "freebies" to the TOs at the expense of ODG's core program.

The multiple objectives of the original contract have significantly complicated CDP management of CDP. The program has been pulled in many directions by its *ad hoc*/gap-filling nature, and by the ever changing demands of the Mission. Given the broad outlines of the scope of work, it has been difficult to say no to individual requests for assistance. As with any such open ended funding mechanism, individual activities have proven to be of some merit, but the sum of activities has not been as effective as it might have been with a more focused, disciplined approach. A narrower (fewer clients), deeper (full package of assistance targeted only in the public sector) program could result in sustainable, long term capacities to govern effectively.

The timing of this evaluation provides a good opportunity to change the direction of CDP. Many new, non-core governance activities were program to start at the beginning of the FY09 workplan. These can be stopped before significant costs are incurred. As well, there is ample time for the TOs to prepare FY10 budget requests to transition to their portfolio ongoing, high priority CDP technical activities that TOs are willing to embrace.

Revised Program Description

Figure A below provides a snapshot of current and proposed CDP activities:

Figure A: CDP Consolidation

Current	Proposed
• 5 broad themes: Public Sector, Private Sector, NGOs, Education, Participant Training	• 2 overarching themes: ANDS Implementation, USAID Synergies
• 7+ CB activities for 150 NGOs	• Foundation Package of core governance capacity building provided for 5-7 Ministries
• 15+ ad hoc private sector activities	• Continue support for various initiatives under the three umbrella clients, MoF, CSC, IDLG
• 10+ education technical activities	• SNG program broadened in scope/location
• 13+ public administration activities in 15 Ministries/Agencies	• Transition process begun, phase out/exit strategies dated and implemented
• 11+ SNG public administration activities in 7 provinces	
• 5+ Miscellaneous activities	
• 500+ IRoA Staff Supported	
• Participant training for various TOs	

Proposed refocused core governance CDP activities would be designed/implemented to achieve two essential goals:

1. Providing near term direct capacity building of select public sector institutions such that, by the end of the program, they are substantially capable of delivering needed public services in a transparent and effective manner. This can be accomplished using two different, if somewhat overlapping initiatives:
    a. The provision of a "Foundation Package" of core public administration activities, flexibly directed to a limited (five - seven) number of key ministries/agencies
    b. Continued CDP support for its three "umbrella" client organizations – MoF, IARCSC, IDLG – to provide targeted capacity building to ministries/agencies/SNG under the clients' authorities and in compliance

with their priorities, schedules, and standards, at both the national and sub-national levels of government

2. Developing the long term capabilities of GIRoA's capacity building institutions, e.g., the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute and IARCSC's Training Centers within the ministries and in the provinces.

This dual track approach should focus CDP's future programming as follows:

- Program activities should engage partners in the full spectrum of capacity building assistance and training related to enhancing structures, systems, and skill sets.
- CDP should focus its activities on the preconditions for good governance, that is to say, core public administration. While USAID's ultimate goal is to build the capacity of GIRoA to deliver needed public services, ODG's role is help strengthen and enable the public sector, core governance capabilities, not to design/implement specific service delivery programs themselves. Such are the purview of the other USAID technical offices.
- The Foundation Package of core public administration assistance should be holistically designed as an integrated package, and proactively negotiated with ministry/agency partners.
- The new SNG program negotiated in a MoU with IDLG should, it if shows early success, be considered for expansion into additional provinces, and in greater depth of assistance, including as needed, all elements of the Foundation Package.
- The selection of partner organizations should follow explicit criteria as described later in this section.
- CDP should conduct rapid but comprehensive organizational assessments of partner ministries/agencies to achieve a better match of activities to needs.
- CDP should conduct "gap analyses" to ensure that activities do not overlap/duplicate other donor programs.
- CDP should initiate proactive strategic negotiations with partners to ensure that the assistance offered has their strong commitment for the life of the assistance.
- CDP should work with USAID ODG and other TOs to address "push back" concerns of ministries/agencies denied desired assistance, or for which planned assistance is reduced or terminated due to lack of cooperation or performance of agreed commitments.

Foundation Package: Core Public Administration Skills/Systems

USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) program supports the establishment of a broadly accepted national government that promotes national unity and effectively serves the needs of the Afghan people.

Program emphases focuses on strengthening institutions for good governance, and support a range of target Government institutions to improve their ability to: provide basic services nationwide; recruit competent and credible civil servants based on merit; and establish more accountable and transparent public administration systems.

CDP was designed as a cross-cutting program to be managed in USAID's Program Office, with the support of a cross-sectoral Steering Committee. During year one, however, responsibility was transferred to the Office of Democracy and Governance, with the expectation that other technical offices would eventually buy-in, i.e., contribute support or provide input to program design and implementation. This arrangement would not only achieve the original objectives of the program, but would enable the DG Office to continue its cross-sectoral support to building public administration capacity in a growing list of government and civil society institutions.

The combination of a far-reaching contract and the lack of full engagement of other technical offices in the management of CDP, has meant that the nature of its activities began to blur lines of distinction between CDP and the expanding programs of other offices. Thus, while most CDP activities retained their strategic fit with the DG program, some were only tenuously linked via the long umbilical cord of "capacity development."

The DG program targets improved public administration across Government. This focus and the depth of capacity development needs in this area come into sharper view in context of Government's initiative to devolve authority to sub-national levels – the needs are vast. As a result, there is a considerable impetus to sharpen the focus of CDP. This impetus was reinforced during the April 2008 audit by the Regional Inspector General's Office (RIG).

Thus, the assessment team proposes that CDP consolidate program activities into a "Foundation Package" of core public administration activities related to Institutional Strengthening, Transparency, and Anti-Corruption, as follows:

1. **Strategic Planning and Policy – Mission/Authority**

   Government organizations are often unsure about their core purpose, their authority to take action, or even the beneficiaries they are meant to serve. Strategic Planning and Policy can help ministries, their departments and sub-national government entities think through and better define their mission, and better understand and develop the require legal and policy frameworks to enable them to carry out its mission.

2. **Organizational Restructuring/Administrative Work Process Streamlining**

   New organizational structures, roles and responsibilities are required of most ministries. Organizational development assistance implemented in ministries committed to change could reinforce the change management culture with new structures, and to provide a plan to guide/mentor employees through the organizational change. Alternatives approaches may have to be developed to deliver this assistance. Prior efforts to work with the IARCSC via the RIMU (Reform Implementation Management Unit) program have been difficult, largely due to the perception of the ministries involved that the IARCSC was using the program to interfere with ministry responsibilities to restructure.

Direct assistance from CDP to a ministry may prove more palatable and ultimately more effective. Work process assessment/improvement should generally be limited to administrative processes. Where a client requests assistance to revamp a technical process (i.e., how to deliver student services at MoHE, or how to design/implement a regional employment center), CDP must consult with the CTO and relevant TO for approval to proceed. Such assistance should be limited to high priority GIRoA and USAID objectives. As local government is assigned increasing responsibility for the development of Afghanistan, there will be a significant need to develop new structures and streamline work processes. CDP assistance would be invaluable.

3. **Financial Management – Budgeting/Accounting/Auditing**

   The Ministry of Finance has led GIRoA efforts to achieve significant upgrading in systems and professional skill sets in all aspects of financial management. CDP's contributions in program budgeting, accounting, and internal audit assistance are critical to this effort and must be continued.

4. **Procurement/Contracting**

   An increasingly critical element of capacity building as it especially relates to the implementation of ANDS is procurement technical assistance and training. As well, and as noted earlier, such assistance will be needed to upgrade targeted ministries for consideration of potential USAID host country agreements".

5. **Human Resources Development**

   All GIRoA ministries/agencies have essentially the same needs related to the development and implementation of modern HRM systems, including continued management development, policy development and implementation of the PRR program. This effort is led by the IARCSC. CDP has made significant contributions in the development of training materials and in the provision of regional advisors for IARCSC. This assistance is critical and should continue.

6. **Project Planning/Design/Management /M&E**

   Representatives of every ministry with whom the assessment team spoke rated program/project management and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) skills development as one of their highest priorities. This area of capacity building assistance is a critical need for ANDS implementation.

7. **Strategic Communications**

   An area of growing importance to Afghan ministries/agencies is how to develop and disseminate messages relating to ongoing development and progress towards reconstruction and democratization. It is generally recognized that the interests of the media and the general public awareness of development progress demand increased attention to communication, both on a day-to-day basis and in planning for larger initiatives and events. As well, there is a growing understanding that communication is a specialized discipline which requires specialized support to be incorporated in training for key ministry officials. CDP assistance has been requested and could prove an important element of the Foundation Package.

8. **Good Governance 101 (Leadership, Ethics, etc.)**
   This element would focus on building the capacity of newly elected officials to govern. Examples of governance capacity building for elected officials include an orientation training, and assistance in public outreach, and generic, but high level, training in leadership and ethics.

Participant Training in Public Administration. "Participant Training" – USAID's terminology for a variety of out-of-country professional development including exposure visits, short term certificate technical or management courses, and masters and other advance professional degree programs – should be provided as a complement to the Foundation Package of assistance to reinforce critical skill sets for key public officials and managers in core public administration.

Working with Umbrella Clients

CDP has developed a strong working relationship with three GIRoA organizations whose mission is to guide "umbrella" capacity building assistance. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has led the initiative to identify needs and negotiate donor assistance to strengthen financial management capacities, i.e., budgeting, accounting, auditing and procurement, across all GIRoA's 40+ ministries/agencies. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) has been responsible for orchestrating assistance throughout government related to human resources development. The Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG) was established just over a year ago to build capacities of provincial, municipal and district levels of government. Continued assistance from CDP will be critical to these ongoing efforts.

Ministry of Finance (MoF)

The Ministry of Finance is leading GIRoA's efforts to embrace program budgeting, to ensure the correct application of a new law governing public sector procurement, and to coordinate programs to develop internationally accredited internal audit skills. CDP has developed training materials, supported training-of-trainers, conducted substantial training of key staff, and provided mentoring and coaching assistance. These activities are fundamentally important to the primary objective of enhancing core public administration systems and skill sets, and should have a high priority in CDP's workplan going forward.

Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)

The Commission has been assigned the authority to undertake the Government's Public Administrative Reform (PAR) program. Much of the work has focused on the development of modern human resource management (HRM) structures, systems and related skills, and the implementation of the Priority Reform and Restructure (PRR) and its "Pay and Grading" initiatives to rationalize job descriptions and pay scales. The Commission's Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) program was designed to assist in organizational restructuring as a basis for HRM reforms. CDP has provided significant assistance in all areas of IARCSC activity. However, the RIMU approach, as noted earlier, has been problematic. CDP support for IARCSC's more successful HRM initiatives should continue, whereas RIMU support should be phased out. Organization development and restructuring can be provided via direct assistance to targeted ministries as discussed earlier in this report.

IARCSC has a significant role in GIRoA's internal long-term capacity building plans. This is discussed later in this report.

Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG)

The importance and interest in developing the sub-national levels of government in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is becoming increasingly apparent. There is a strong belief that empowering these levels of government will help solve some of the political, social and economic problems facing the country in a time of insecurity and conflict. Currently, capacity development assistance is provided through USAID's "Local Governance and Community Development" (which comes to an end September 30, 2009) and "Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program" projects. CDP is about to undertake a modest SNG program as negotiated through a MoU with IDLG, the elements of which focus on capacity building of provincial and district governors' offices. If this program is successfully implemented, it could position CDP to expand its assistance in both scope and location, subject to the availability of resources.

Application of Assistance: Selection Criteria, Preconditions, Technical Concerns

CDP assistance must be focused but flexibly applied to be effective. Relevant issues are discussed below concerning how to target key ministries/agencies for assistance, identify needs and tailor the program accordingly, minimize possible duplication of effort while exploiting the potential for synergies, set preconditions for working with targeted clients, address priority concerns (i.e., ANDS implementation), and maintain focus on core public administration requirements.

Selection Criteria to Target Ministries/Agencies for Assistance

The chart below outlines an approach to be used to determine which ministries/agencies should be selected for full CDP Foundation Package assistance. A nuanced approached is needed. No single simple formula exists to guide the decision. However, the approach should be something more than "I'll know it when I see it", but something less than a long, well researched comprehensive thesis on best choices.

Figure B: Selection Evaluation



Ministries/agencies categorized into Box #1 are clearly high priority potential clients, and if they meet considerations of USAID synergies (the ministry is on the list for a potential host country agreement or is engaged with USAID in successfully implementing a key project) will likely be added to the list of targeted ministries/agencies to be offered the full Foundation Package.

Box #2 represents the situation in which the work of the ministry is critically important, but its commitment to reform is suspect. There are examples in which capacity building has been provided to increase understanding of capacity building and to break the logjam of a ministry/minister who may be suspicious or who lacks understanding of the requirements and possible benefits of capacity building assistance.

Box #3 requires more careful assessment. If the ministry has a strong commitment to change and reform, but a borderline important program, albeit one that is innovative and could be used as a model, then a modest assistance effort should be considered.

Selection decisions will ultimately have to be decided by USAID in consultation with CDP management. Ministries currently proposed for consideration of a host country agreement and thus which should be on the initial list for consideration for CDP Foundation Package assistance include:

1. Ministry of Communication And Information Technology
2. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
3. Ministry of Energy & Water and agencies therein, ie., National Electricity Utility
4. Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
5. Ministry of Education
6. Ministry of Higher Education
7. Ministry of Public Works

Institutional Assessments

In order to match capacity building assistance to needs, CDP has developed/conducted a number of general and specific assessments using various assessment tools including "Discussion Oriented Self-Assessment" (DOSA, recommended initially by USAID), Organizational Capacity Rapid Review (OCRR), Ministerial Capacity Scorecard (MCS), Ministry Capacity Development Index (MCDI), and in conjunction with IARCSC RIMU activities, the Key Functions Competencies Framework (KFCF). Each tool has its own advantages/disadvantages.

For GIRoA ministries/agencies/SNG targeted for the full Foundation Package (FP) of core public administration capacity development, it is critical that assistance be preceded by an objective assessment of the organisational, administrative and managerial framework of the institution. The assessment should serve as the basis for discussion, common understanding, and agreement between CDP and the targeted organization as to the specifics of the program of assistance, that is to say, the assessment should be designed to identify specific needs that could be addressed by one or another of the nine components of the FP..

The assessment must be rapid and focused in order to avoid "assessment fatigue syndrome", yet be comprehensive in nature. It should evaluate at a general level the capacities of an institution to: develop strategies for reform based on the its vision,

mission, goals and objectives; lead the implementation of reforms; develop/operate an organizational structure in line with core functions; produce baseline performance information; monitor and evaluate improvements to service delivery; and ensure quality control of all activities.

This approach is more proactive that generally used by CDP to date, but it is critical if the more comprehensive FP assistance is to be executed effectively.

Gap Analyses and Coordination for Synergy

To minimize duplication of technical assistance and training by the various donors, CDP has been conducting "gap analyses" – informal surveys of who is doing what – which are used in discussions with other donors to clarify respective roles. Going forward, a potentially more valuable approach would be to coordinate for synergy. Gaps may not be "as evident" with this new approach. The point should not be for CDP to find a gap and fill it, but to do organizational assessments to identify skills competency deficits that constrain organizational performance and productivity, and then develop, in partnership with relevant stakeholders (including other donors) a responsive capacity development plan, accentuating skills development. "Synergy" accentuates making a contribution that improves the whole of the organization, including support being received from other donors.

Conditionality of Assistance

CDP should work with USAID ODG to develop a set of preconditions for providing CDP Foundation Package of assistance, including sanctions for non-performance of agreed terms of assistance (components fall away if the institution does not follow through on its commitments). Such an approach should be flexibly applied to all major CDP investments. Pre-conditions to success should include, at a minimum, an agency's commitment to engage actively at the highest levels in terms of time, openness to self-evaluation, critical thinking and sincere effort. Results-oriented performance programming should be linked to an agency's commitment to restructure and institutionalize change management. The specifics should be included in the Capacity Development Implementation Plan (CDIP) or assistance Memorandum of understanding (MOU) negotiated with each client. CDP should seek to standardize these program documents.

ANDS Implementation

Under the current ANDS implementation structure, facilitation, technical coordination, and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) functions are delegated to the Ministry of Economy, while coordination of aid funding and financial management tasks are assigned to the Ministry of Finance. A Secretariat is being formed to oversee all activities related to ANDS implementation. Strong input from the Office of the President (OoP) may be required to ensure these activities are focused and well managed.

A key issue is how to identify/evaluate bottlenecks slowing implementation and target capacity building assistance (structures, systems and skill sets) accordingly. The Ministry of Economy (MoEc) would like to develop a capacity within its M&E unit just for such

purposes. CDP assistance to develop this capacity may be required. When this capacity is operational (and no matter where it is ultimately located), CDP should develop a rapid response capability to provide the technical assistance and/or training needed to resolve bottleneck problems. However, this must be done within the framework of CDP's core public administration priorities and commitments to targeted clients. For instance, if MoEc identifies construction management within the Ministry of Education (MoEd) as an implementation bottleneck, and MoEd is a CDP client, assistance can/should be provided. Concerns related to ministries/agencies not on CDP's target list or to non-core public administration needs will have to be addressed through other donor programs.

Capacity building assistance to advance ANDS implementation does not have to be restricted to white collar professions. There will, be for many years to come, a significant need country-wide for skilled members of the construction trades. CDP support for the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI) should continue to contribute to this successful public-private venture which is training a new generation of skilled construction workers.

Crossing The Technical Divide

A concern in refocusing program activities is the question of where/when/how to draw the line on providing technical assistance that crosses the divide of core public administration assistance, into the technical responsibilities of USAID's other TOs. Several examples are given below to guide future deliberations.

An issue was raised by CDP as to the circumstance in which the Ministry of Higher Education requests assistance to streamline its procedures related to student services, in particular, the provision of diplomas and transcripts. On the surface, assistance called for generic organizational development expertise which could be provided by CDP. However, the reality was that the ministry was trying to consolidate its control of this function which is counter to OSSD's view that the Ministry should "get out of the business" of directly handling this service. Thus, where an activity is technical in nature or relates to an important underlying policy that is the concern and purview of one of the TOs, assistance should not be provided. Providing generic assistance to facilitate work process streamlining while a permitted and indeed important core public administration activity, must not cross the line of providing technical assistance that is inconsistent with USAID intent. This guideline should be sufficiently flexible to allow assistance if there is: prior consultation and approval by the relevant TO (s) as to the importance, scope and substance of the activity; CTO concurrence on these matters; and, whether the ministry is targeted for CDP's full Foundation Package of capacity building assistance.

Another example relates to a request by the Ministry of Education (MoED) which is in need of substantial capacity building assistance for its managers. Since the fall of the Taliban, the Ministry has seen school enrollment rise from 800,000 to 6 million. Many hundreds of new managers are required to meet the explosion in demand for basic public education. While generic "Management 101" training can be very useful at the lower management levels, MoED wants management capacity building for higher level managers to have an education content, thus the assistance will require advisors from an education management background. While technical in content, the primary focus management assistance in this case is core public administration and could be provided by CDP.

It is beyond the scope of this review to identify every possible breach of the technical divide. Suffice to say, consultation with the CTO and TO representatives is critically important whenever there is doubt. Indeed, the default should be that it is on the contractor to ensure that CTO approval to proceed is given in writing for any activity that is technical in nature.

Development of GIRoA's Long-Term Capacity Building Systems/Programs

GIRoA requires a more coherent approach to comprehensive, long-term, sustainable capacity-development. Currently, donors are frequently confronted with conflicting ideas and requests from multiple sources. Essentially, short-term needs drive ad-hoc demands. Efforts to centralized capacity building in the Civil Service Commission through its Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, (ACSI), Training Centers embedded in a number of ministries, lack the management capacity, technical expertise, and political buy-in to serve as a primary point-of-entry with which donors could synchronized assistance, or as a central unit for critically needed capacity development throughout government.

The Commission has shown little ability to advance the reform agenda it proposed in its December 2007 strategy. Capacity building to do capacity building may be needed. A new strategy has recently been introduced. It proposes to restructure the various training entities to become more independent. Such an approach could reenergize efforts to win donor support to build the sustainable, long-term training capacity needed. CDP assistance to ACSI in implementing the "Capacity Development Plan for the Civil Service in Afghanistan" strategy could start with capacity development of ACSI's management, a critical need if the strategy is to be successfully implemented.

An additional CDP initiative is its NGO "training-of-trainers" program to strengthen 150 Afghan NGOs to provide various capacity building services to government, other NGOs and even the private sector. This is discussed in more detail in the following section.

TRANSITIONS/EXIT STRATEGIES

As noted earlier, non-core governance activities ongoing or proposed in the draft FY09 Workplan will need to be dropped, phased out or transitioned out of CDP in order to focus resources on the core program described earlier. Recommendations for transitions/exits are presented below.

Components/Activities that Should Not be Started, of if Started, Dropped Immediately

The following activities, as described in detail in the draft proposed CDP FY09 Workplan (September 14, 2008), should cease, desist, or if already started, immediately be dropped from the project. As noted later in this section, some of these activities may in time be absorbed or supported by other TOs. However, going forward, it should be made clear that any such activity by name or by similar description/intent shall not constitute an USAID approved activity.

1. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.1/ Sub-Activity 2.1.2-Pilot MoHE Service Delivery (Diplomas, etc.)
2. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.1/ Sub-Activity 2.1.3 - MoHE Student Services Center
3. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.1/ Sub-Activity 2.1.4 – Employment Services Center
4. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.2/ Sub-Activity 2.2.1 – Private Sector Service Delivery
5. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.2/ Sub-Activity 2.2.1 – Business Degree Programs/Private Universities
6. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.2/ Sub-Activity 2.2.2 – University Consulting Services
7. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.2/ Sub-Activity 2.2.2.1 – Consulting Services to University Faculty
8. Initiative 2.0/Activity 2.2/ Sub-Activity 2.2.4 – Expert Advisors Teaching in Local Universities
9. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.1 – Workforce Planning Program
10. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.1/ Sub-Activity 3.1.1 – Workforce Experts Working Group
11. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.1/ Sub-Activity 3.1.2 – Research Center Support Program
12. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.1/ Sub-Activity 3.1.3 – Joint Research Center and Publication Series
13. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.2/ – Training Center Support Program
14. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.2/ Sub-Activity 3.2.1 – Competitive Procurement Program
15. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.2/ Sub-Activity 3.2.3 –Services of the CDP Institute
16. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3/ Sub-Activity 3.3.1 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/Accounting & Business-Afghan Banks
17. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3/ Sub-Activity 3.3.1 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/Accounting & Business-Private Associations
18. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3/ Sub-Activity 3.3.2 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/NGO Service Center
19. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3/ Sub-Activity 3.2.4 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/SEDP Construction Education
20. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3/ Sub-Activity 3.3.5 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/ ICT-Connect Kabul
21. Initiative 3.0/Activity 3.3 – Sector Support Design and Consulting Program/Women's Associations and Business Activities

Phased Out Components/Activities

NGO Assistance. The initial design of the NGO capacity building component of CDP was to provide seven modules of capacity development assistance to all 150 NGOs identified as having capacity to absorb the assistance and commitment to work with CDP. At this point, it has been decided that a different approach could better achieve multiple USAID objectives including advancing its Afghanization agenda, and addressing issues of program sustainability. Thus CDP has proposed a component phase-out as follows:

- Afghanize NGO capacity building by completing Training of Trainers (ToT) for 20 core NGOs in the seven CDP modules of assistance by end of March 2009

- Organize follow-up training by the 20 core NGOs for the remaining targeted 130 NGOs by end of September 2009
- Develop a strategy to promote NGO services to CDP, USAID, other donors, GIRoA, other NGOs and the private sector
- Develop a modest support program to provide practice for newly trained NGOs, e.g., a $2,000-10,000 per activity, competitive purchase orders with clear deliverables, simple pricing, and minimum paperwork

Ministry of Education (MoED) Staff Salary and Training. As noted earlier, CDP currently supports the salaries of close to 500 Ministry of Education employees who work in the provinces, largely in construction or security. Clearly, such support is no longer in compliance with recent USAID policy. Salary support should be phased out as current commitments expired (these commitments are staggered for different groups of supported staff, the first commitment expires June, 2009, the others by end of FY09). In the interim, training should be provided to upgrade the skills sets of these employees in order to meet "pay and grade" standards that will enable them to be retained as civil servants.

"Concours" Reform. The initiative to restructure the national university entrance examinations (Concours) system is on track, and by all accounts is a critical success as it has resulted in significantly improved security, transparency and operational effectiveness. The contract to install the new system and train its operators (with support from Virmati, an Afghan company based in Delhi, India) continues through the end of March 2009. Additional support to ensure system maintenance may be required, but can be phased out by the end of September 2009.

ATVI/Kunar Center Technical Assistance. In additional to significant financial support provided in the form of scholarship subsidies, CDP has provided significant technical assistance to build management and operational capacities at ATVI and to establish and provide operational support for the Kunar Training Center. Given the success of the programs and their ability to train the construction workforce required to implement ANDS development projects, CDP or other USAID financial assistance should continue into FY10 with an understanding that in the interim an exit strategy will be developed to phase out assistance, and to implement strategies to sustain operations..

Transitioned Components/Activities

The overarching guiding principle for transitioning non-core CDP activities to other TOs is the simple question put to the TOs:

> "Would you want this activity if your program had to pay for it ?"

For those activities for which there is an expressed interest by one or more TOs to transition technical activities to their agenda, it will be necessary to identify a mechanism, funding source and timeframe for the transition. The resulting activity may be smaller in scale and different in nature than envisioned by CDP. Consultations with CDP may prove insightful as the TOs work to develop a specific transition strategy for each activity. Activities rated high or medium priority for transitioning under the prior two program components are listed below.

Education Related Technical Activities – Medium Priority (Requires further deliberation)

Academic Credit Reform (OSSD-HEP)
Student Services Centers/Career Counseling Program (OSSD)
University Internship Program (OSSD)
University Business Courses/Degrees (OSSD)
Public Private Partnerships/Global Alliances (OSSD)

Private Sector Technical Activities – High Priority (TOs will assess how to incorporate)

Workforce Experts Working Group (OEG)
Employment Service Centers (OEG)
Business Degree Programs (OEG, OSSD)
Private Sector Business Training (OEG)
University Consulting Services/Think Tank Centers (OEG)
Private Associations (OEG – i.e., accounting)

Private Sector Related Technical Activities – Medium Priority (Requires further deliberation)

Vocational Training Centers (OIEE) (OSSD-OEG CB only)
Outsource Training for Private Companies (OEG)

CONTRACT MODIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Given the extent of the required contract amendment, the assessment team proposes a complete re-write and a much-streamlined Statement of Work (SOW) rather than a typical section-by-section amendment. A revised draft SOW is presented in Annex A.

In summary, the revised SOW includes the following highlights:

- Collapsing of the current objectives into one, "To build sustainable capacity to develop capacity in core public administration skills"
- Summarizing the Background and Rationale for the proposed modification
- Including an appropriate definition of "capacity development"
- Outlining the refocused, streamlined program
- Updating deliverables requirements
- Describing the national – sub-national focus
- Explaining the need for synergy with other USAID programs
- Updating the M&E section
- Updating management objectives
- Updating the activity design approach

SUSTAINABILITY OF THE ASSISTANCE/ADVANCING AFGHANIZATION

The CDP contract includes a tripartite focus on capacity development: (i) building near-term capacity; (ii) strengthening capacity for long-term, sustained capacity building; and (iii) developing a critical mass of trained Afghans. While contributions from the first and third areas are "sustainable," *per se*, in the persons being trained, the primary emphasis on sustainability should be sustainable, institutional capabilities to build capacity. Without a clear vision and set of clear sustainability objectives, it may be difficult to "draw the line" between the first and second focus areas, thus, the distinctions between building near-term training and developing sustainable capacity to build capacity are often blurred among CDP's interventions.

Often, donor capacity development initiatives are launched, targeting individuals within an organization, listing the "institutional leave behinds" (i.e., what the institution plans to do with its enhanced capacity) in the "assumption column" of activity designs. More often the case, a donor capacity development initiative will end with a quick transfer of all training materials to an authorized, responsible capacity development entity (e.g., ACSI) which itself was not directly involved in the initiative, either at the planning, execution, monitoring and assessment phases, yet it is expected to "do something with" all of the materials received. While such an *ex post facto* link to a capacity building institution sounds like sustainability, it is clearly not, but rather building near-term capacity with an attached "data dump" at the end of the activity.

As a part of the sustainability mix, and probably in response to the FY08 audit, the FY09 Work Plan emphasizes "activity exit strategies" and "Afghanization." References to Afghanization within CDP relate primarily, but not exclusively, to allocating more responsibilities, across the board, to its Afghan staff. While these are laudable and "necessary" steps towards achieving some levels of sustainability, they may not exclusively be "sufficient" to achieve the sustainability of complex development interventions, especially those in a severe capacity-constrained environment such as Afghanistan.

In this context, Afghanization typically refers to the human resource elements of interventions – putting Afghans in decision-making, management roles. Sustainability of such interventions, however, embraces this, plus a wide range of other critical factors supportive of continuing an institution's capacity-building functions. Other factors address the "enabling environment," and include financial/revenue streams supportive of capacity building; inter-organizational structure; lines of reporting and communication; roles and responsibilities; intra-organizational relationships; the legal and regulatory framework for continuity; and systems to ensure access to a stream of capable human resources; and more.

CDP assistance will need to incorporate sustainability plans and strategies in all capacity development implementation plans. As well, CDP should work to develop an implementation plan for ASCI's proposed Institutional Development Strategy. Training materials, and their accompanying assessments/follow-up reports should be designed in conjunction with ASCI should it begin to show a capacity to absorb and make use of the materials. Assistance as well will be needed to: promote intra- and inter-organizationally coordination across government; support champions of reform; better prepare trainers; address lines of communication and authority; identify lead and focal point counterparts;

establish forms/templates; apply comprehensive training methodologies; and offer refresher training and mentoring/coaching services.

Staff Retention. A more difficult challenge is how to retain key staff members who have been trained in new systems and processes, who are motivated to perform at higher levels, and who are comfortable with the change management ethos required for continual reform and improvement. For the long-term, a set of career path incentives must be developed and implemented which provides a level of reward and satisfaction to make work in the public sector competitive with other sectors. Merit promotion/pay and/or "Superscale" pay upgrades are a must, as is the provision of a full menu of education offerings and initiatives to speed the career ladder. These could involve retrenchment and the establishment of new positions as an element of restructuring.

Institutionalizing Training Capacities. Sustaining education/training capacities in the long-term requires an institutional home, the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI), discussed earlier in the recommendations chapter. As well, it may be necessary to establish linkages with private service providers, a number of which provide training. CDP development and dissemination of a provider database as required in the original contract would be valuable.

Host Country Agreements. USAID is committed to advancing the certification of select ministries to take on more responsibility in program management as part of the Mission's "Afghanization" initiative. USAID has tentatively identified seven ministries for consideration of possible host country agreements. The Mission's certification reviews of partners for such agreements may identify the need for targeted institutional strengthening in areas tangential to CDP's core functional areas. Assistance provide to upgrade minimum capacities in financial management and procurement would be expected to be narrowly targeted to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) requirements, and may run simultaneously with other capacity building assistance.

SYNERGIES WITHIN USAID

Capacity development is a significant cross-cutting theme in almost all USAID programs. In a recent proposal to develop a coordinated framework for capacity development activities ("Integrated Capacity Building Activity Design"**)**, an approach was outlined to coordinate USAID capacity development objectives and activities (ongoing and/or planned) including those of other donors." The deliverable will include a set of clear recommendations for an optimal project implementation approach that will make the most efficient and effective uses of the various delivery modalities, financial resources, and expertise related to capacity building, to include technical training, management training, utility commercialization, and other similar and/or capacity building related activities." CDP engagement in this approach for various elements of capacity development in its Foundation Package – particularly in developing competencies in policy formulation, organizational development, and program and project planning/design/management – could prove invaluable in synergizing USAID capacity building assistance.

CONCLUSIONS

Through CDP, USAID has established a flagship program that, in less than two years, has gained wide spread recognition across Government and the donor community for being flexible, responsive and valuable in meeting clearly unmet capacity building needs across Afghanistan. Developmentally, a lot has occurred in the twenty, fast-paced months since USAID launched CDP. For example:

- Government generally has demonstrated a much tighter grip on its commitment to lead and has:
  - Completed its five-year development strategy (ANDS) and attracted impressive donor commitments for its implementation
  - Launched an ambitious local development initiative

- IARCSC, demonstrating its commitment to serve, has:
  - Launched nine RIMUs, representing a significant first step toward ministerial reform, while trying to learn from its mistakes along the way
  - Activated a new Pay and Grade scale across the entire civil service, in recognition of the need to streamline the grading structure and increase salaries in order to attract and retain skilled civil servants
  - Established ACSI as Government's "primary engine" of capacity development

- ACSI has taken a quantum leap within its initial 18 months of existence, and has:
  - Completed an impressive physical plant, including offices, classrooms and male/female dormitories, and support facilities
  - Established a nascent, core training staff, curriculum and supporting materials
  - Developed and strengthened its relationships with national level ministries and agencies, and also with emerging provincial structures, thereby strengthening its platform for increasing the delivery of responsive, capacity building services
  - Finalized and submitted for pending approval a five-year strategic plan which proposes increased autonomy, an expanded curriculum government-wide, and much more

- The Donor Community has responded to these and other impressive developments and has:
  - Increased the magnitude and breadth of its program and resource commitments
  - Begun to support Government massively to achieve its expansive local governance and development initiatives
  - Preliminarily embraced Government's moves to lead donor coordination, initially in capacity development programs and, potentially broader

- USAID, in particular, has expanded it program:
  - Deepening its technical and cross-cutting themes programs
  - Launching impressive initiatives to help develop local governance
  - Initiating the Afghanization of pivotal and potentially increasing elements of its program

Less than two years is not long at all on the traditional development continuum. Therefore, no one can reasonably doubt the significance of such fundamental achievements in this short period. Neither can anyone doubt the need for well-timed, strategic adjustments in programs in the face of such rapid developments. Though CDP has been operational for only a short period, now is the right time for such an adjustment in USAID's strategic approach to capacity development via this program.

Though the donor community has reportedly spent over $1.8 billion on capacity building over the past four years, concerns have been mounting throughout Government and the donor community regarding the absorptive capability, especially of Government, to sustain the benefits of such program investments. Moreover, such concerns call into question the validity of traditional donor programs which typically target well-defined "program deliverables", rather than accentuate the underlying competencies required to sustain delivery capacity. The proposed strategic modifications in CDP resulting from this assessment aim to address this need. Though the program may have less well-articulated, future "leave behinds", the firm belief is that, enabling the Afghan public sector to "build sustainable capacity to build capacity," by emphasizing core, public administration skills development, will significantly enhance aid effectiveness now, and yield rich dividends well into the country's future.

Annex A: Section C Restatement of Work

The assessment contract calls for a re-write of Components 1 and 2, and an accompanying monitoring and evaluation plan with a results framework. Component 2 – "Private For-Profit Business Capacity Component" is being dropped from CDP. The restatement of Component 1 – "Public Sector Component Strategy" and the Monitoring and Evaluation Plan are presented following.

Note: The Mission will be responsible for addressing issues related to(references to original Section C in parentheses):

- Key personnel (Section F)
- Contract budget line items (p. C-13)
- GeoBase reporting, if this remains relevant (p. C-14)
- Participant training and related reporting, as participant training is not addressed in the transition plan (pp. C-46 – 59)

The Mission also should decide and specify which elements of the original 59 page Section C are being amended and which elements remain valid and in force. Alternatively, the Mission can copy and paste into this amendment all non-addressed elements of the original contract that remain valid. If this alternative approach is selected, then the purpose of this amendment is to replace Section C.

REVISED SECTION C – SCOPE OF WORK

Purpose of Contract Amendment

The purpose of this contract amendment is to revise and streamline the Capacity Development Program (CDP). These revisions reflect strategic USAID decisions flowing from a Regional Inspector General audit of CDP in the spring of 2008, and a mid-term, external evaluation in the fall of 2008. This amendment confirms the results of discussions with CDP's senior management team concerning a substantive streamlining of the project.

Background

Since March 2007, USAID, through CDP, has initiated comprehensive support to capacity building across Afghanistan, the design of which covered many categories associated with democratic governance and economic development. The idea was to address, in this $218 million contract, major bases of need that were not (then) being addressed by the rapidly evolving programs of the donor community, including USAID. This "gap filling" strategy, thus, required the scoping out of a very broad and highly flexible life-of-program work plan, which would identify both short- and long-term initiatives to be addressed within the framework of annually updated work plans. The three objectives of the program were:

- Building near-term capacity directly within target institutions, e.g., selected line ministries, local government, business associations, and universities;
- Strengthening Afghan capacity building institutions in the public, private, NGO and higher educational sectors, allowing Afghans to provide sustained capacity building over the long-term; and

- Developing a critical mass of Afghans management and others skills through state-of-the-art training, technical assistance, and participant training.

The breadth of coverage has been considerable, and includes a wide range of targeted capacity development technical support to:

a) National and sub-national public sector entities, targeting the building of limited, core competencies in a few key skills areas, and supporting public sector reforms and enhanced service delivery
b) NGO institutional strengthening training, including training-of-trainers support
c) Private sector capacity development, including for-profit training institutions and professional associations
d) Tertiary education institutions, including the Ministry of Higher Education, and private/public tertiary educational institutions
e) General participant training and technical support to local technical assistance providers and other USAID implementation partners

CDP was audited in the spring of 2008. The findings questioned this "broad, ambitious, cumbersome, and often confusing" gap filling approach. A major conclusion was that the program needed to be better defined and focused on government capacity building. The primary recommendation of the audit was that "a complete rewrite of Section C (Statement of Work) is necessary so that synergies are created among the components and duplication of efforts is minimized".

USAID has recently conducted a mid-term evaluation and re-design of the program. The intent is to refocus the program on core governance capacity building to provide a program of support to current GIRoA needs which emphasize building a sustainable capacity to deliver basic public services throughout the country. To do so, the program must strengthen its accountability, transparency and efficiency; and build sustainable capabilities to build capacity in core public administration skills areas. This will be critical to the successful implementation of the country's new five-year development plan and strategy, Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which was recently approved for implementation beginning in the Government's FY1387 (2008). In support of ANDS implementation, monitoring and reporting, the Government has identified a number of entities to facilitate coordination of capacity development initiatives. These are the:

1. Governance Coordinating Committee (GCC). GCC replaces the ANDS Oversight Committee, and will be responsible for overseeing ANDS implementation. GCC comprises eight key ministries and several key Presidential advisors, and reports directly to the President. Support is provided through a secretariat directed by the Senior Economic Advisor to the President.
2. Ministry of Finance (MoF). MoF has been designated coordinator of aid funding. As well, MoF will continue to provide oversight on all issues of financial management, the will continue to serve as an umbrella coordinator of capacity building for program budgeting, accounting and internal auditing activities.
3. Ministry of Economy (MoEc). MoEc will house the Monitoring and Evaluation function for ANDS implementation. They will gather and verify data from the

implementing ministries, and analysis the data against a set of progress indicators to determine progress and identify problems requiring resolution.

4. Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), and its subsidiary training agency, the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI), is responsible for overseeing government-wide capacity development priorities, policies and programs; and for developing and conducting a package of basic training programs in core public administration skills for all civil servants.
5. Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), responsible for improving the capacity of sub-national government institutional (at the provincial, district and municipal government levels) to coordinate local development programs and bring government closer to local people.

Concurrent with these developments, USAID's program in Afghanistan has expanded significantly since the signing of the CDP contract. This has resulted in an increase in Mission-supported capacity development programs in an increasing number of technical offices, and has led to the actual and potential increase in overlapping interests with CDP's broad and expanding activity base. Moreover, use of available democracy and governance funds to support CDP's broad base of activities in other, non-DG sectors is unsustainable, and diminishes the potential impact of CDP's contributions to the Mission's democracy and governance strategic objective.

USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance is on the front line of assisting the GIRoA in achieving its objectives. In a country with almost unlimited need for government capacity building, the Mission's democracy and governance program must direct its own limited resources to those activities that can best advance IRoA's reform agenda and support ANDS implementation. Capacity development in financial management (budgeting, accounting, auditing and procurement), human resources (structures, systems and skill sets) and program design/management (including monitoring and evaluation) are at the top of the list of the needs of key government entities, and also reflect interests of the democracy and governance program to support core public administration capacity building. Other USAID technical offices and programs are more effectively positioned to support private sector and higher education initiatives.

Public Sector Capacity Development

Going forward, CDP will:

A. Build IRoA Capacity to Implement the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). ANDS represents a model of good governance in terms of planning and prioritizing the development of the country over the next 5 - 10 years. Core governance capacity building assistance, with an emphasis on financial management, program management and monitoring and evaluation, is critically needed.

B. Synergize with key USAID Objectives/Initiatives. CDP will provide core public administration support to key ministries/agencies in synergy with the programs of other USAID partners. This will help strengthen the foundation on which successful partnerships are built. CDP assistance will be needed, in particular, to facilitate the capacity of key ministries to meet host country agreement

requirements as part of USAID's Afghanization initiative. USAID's governance objective is increasingly helping to build governance capacities at sub-national government (SNG) levels. CDP can significantly contribute to this effort.

In support of the above over-arching themes, the Contractor shall design and implement approved core governance CDP activities that will meet the following strategic objectives:

1. Develop the long term capabilities of GIRoA's capacity building institutions, e.g., the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) and its outreach via Training Centers (TCs) within the ministries and in provinces; and
2. Provide near term direct capacity building of select public sector institutions such that, by the end of the program, they are fully capable to deliver needed public services in a transparent and effective manner.

Discussion

There is significant unmet need in Afghanistan for core public administration capacity building. For instance, out of a total of 45 ministries/agencies that require such assistance, the very successful CDP program budgeting activity has to-date graduated two ministries, and 11 additional ministries are currently progressing through the training and mentoring package. These numbers exclude the large number of provincial agencies across all 34 provinces which also need this training. This same level of assistance is required across a full set of core public administration competencies.

The core public administration program shall include a deeper package/wider choice of capacity building assistance for targeted ministries, agencies and sub-national government entities in select provinces. This will enable a more holistic approach to building governance capacity, one that addresses system-wide, organizational performance issues. Such an integrated and comprehensive capacity development, targeted to fewer ministries but at a greater level of depth and across systems, structures and skill sets, will have synergistic effects that enhance aid effectiveness.

Within this framework, the Contractor shall:

- Design and implement a program of capacity development activities that comprise a "Foundation Package" of core public administration activities directed to a limited number of key ministries and agencies at both national and sub-national levels of government in targeted provinces
- Ensure that program activities complement rather than compete, and are appropriately coordinated with other ongoing capacity building programs, initiatives and interventions of USAID, the larger donor community and the GIRoA
- Ensure that, as a significant new direction, program activities are based upon the proactive identification and prioritization of critical GIRoA capacity building needs, rather than simply "filling gaps" as required in the original Statement of Work
- Ensure that program activities engage partners in the full spectrum of capacity building technical assistance and training related to enhancing structures,

systems, and skill sets in a manner that promotes the sustainability of the benefits of program interventions

- Develop a Foundation Package of core public administration assistance that is holistically designed as an integrated package; proactively targeted to and negotiated with a maximum of seven key ministries and agencies partners, and their relevant SNG entities; and includes the nine core public administration competency areas discussed below
- Continue to work with its three "umbrella" client organizations – Ministry of Finance, Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), and Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) – to provide targeted capacity building to targeted ministries, agencies and sub-national governance (SNG) entities in select provinces under the clients' authorities and in compliance with their priorities, schedules, and standards
- Expand the new SNG program negotiated in a MoU with IDLG into additional provinces, with greater depth of assistance, including all elements of the Foundation Package, as needed, provided that this program demonstrates success in the current phase of programming.
- Conduct objective, rapid but comprehensive, pre-intervention organizational assessments of partner ministries, agencies and their SNG entities to ensure the best possible match of activities to demonstrated needs; and conduct appropriate levels of post-intervention assessments to ascertain of the impact of capacity development assistance
- Proactively negotiate with targeted partners to ensure that the assistance offered has their strong commitment for the life of the assistance
- Work cooperatively with USAID to address "push back" concerns of partners denied desired assistance, and whose assistance may be prematurely reduced or terminated for lack of adequate cooperation

Foundation Package: Core Public Administration Competency Areas

Following are the core competency areas of the Foundation Package. The Contractor shall provide assistance to partner agencies in these areas via a full spectrum of flexible and tailored capacity building approaches, i.e., comprising direct technical assistance; core course modules with full sets of participants' and trainers' modules; mentoring; and coaching.

1. **Strategic Planning and Policy – Organizational Mission and Authority**

   Government organizations are often unsure about their core purpose, their authority to take action, or even the beneficiaries they are meant to serve. The Contractor shall provide strategic planning and policy assistance to help ministries, agencies and their sub-national entities in select provinces think through, better define and understand their mission, and develop requisite legal and policy frameworks to carry out their mission.

2. **Organizational Restructuring and Work Process Streamlining**

   New organizational structures, roles and responsibilities are required of most ministries and agencies. The Contractor shall carry out organizational development assistance in entities committed to change, by helping to

reinforce the change management culture with new structures, and by guiding and mentoring employees through organizational change processes.

3. **Financial Management – Budgeting, Accounting and Auditing**

   The Ministry of Finance has led GIRoA efforts to upgrade significantly systems and professional skill sets in financial management. The Contractor shall continue CDP's successful contributions in program budgeting, accounting, and internal audit assistance.

4. **Procurement and Contracting**

   Procurement technical assistance and training are increasingly critical element of capacity building as they especially relates to implementation of ANDS. The Contractor shall continue CDP's successful assistance in these areas, and shall also work cooperatively with USAID to upgrade targeted ministries for consideration of potential USAID host country agreements.

5. **Human Resources Development**

   All GIRoA ministries and agencies have essentially the same needs related to the development and implementation of modern human resources management systems, including continued capacity development, policy development and implementation of Government's Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program, led by the IARCSC. CDP has made significant contributions in the development of training materials and in the provision of regional advisors for IARCSC. The Contractor shall continue this critically needed assistance.

6. **Project Planning, Design, Management, and Monitoring and Evaluation**

   A higher level of staff competency in program and project management is a high priority for every ministry, and is critical for ANDS implementation. The Contractor shall develop, implement and assess appropriate interventions to respond to these needs in targeted ministries, agencies and their sub-national counterparts in select provinces.

7. **Strategic Communications**

   An area of growing importance to Afghan ministries/agencies is how to develop and disseminate their messages of current developments and progress towards reconstruction and democratization. It is generally recognized that the interests of the media and the general public awareness of development progress demand increased attention to communication, both on a day-to-day basis and in planning for larger initiatives and events. It is also recognized that strategic communication is a specialized discipline which requires specialized support and which also should be incorporated into training for key ministry officials. The Contractor shall develop and implement flexible activities to develop strategic communications capacity as an integral element of the Foundation Package.

8. **Good Governance 101 (Leadership, Ethics, etc.)**

   The Contractor shall design relevant, responsive interventions that build the capacity of newly elected officials to govern. Examples of governance capacity building for elected officials include an orientation training program; skills development in public outreach; and generic but high level training in leadership and ethics.

Participant Training in Public Administration. "Participant Training" – USAID's terminology for a variety of out-of-country professional development including exposure visits, short term certificate technical or management courses, and masters and other advance professional degree programs – should be provided as a complement to the Foundation Package of assistance to reinforce critical skill sets for key public officials and managers.

Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI)

In addition to offering the Foundation Package to Government entities that are critical to ANDS implementation, the Contractor shall support developing the long-term capabilities of the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) and the Training Centers embedded in a number of ministries, and at provincial levels. ACSI was formally established in April 2007 and is thus, a very young organization. It has recently developed a draft five-year strategy (pending approval) which proposes, *inter alia*, increased autonomy and an expansion in core capacity building course offerings at its main campus and through the Training Centers. Though the Institute's facilities are being used increasingly by donors, including USAID's implementing partners, to conduct training courses, ACSI's staff and cadre of instructors are not fully integrated into the programs, and therefore remain limited in their capacity and familiarity with much of the training materials left by donor programs. Within this context, the Contractor shall continue its current efforts to explore innovative opportunities to help the Institute implement its "Capacity Development Plan for the Civil Service in Afghanistan". For example, such may include:

- Strengthening the management capacity of ACSI, potentially including helping to develop an implementation plan for the new strategy, upon its approval
- Identifying creative ways and means to engage the training cadre of ACSI and Training Centers more fully in an expanding program of capacity development
- Potentially engaging relevant and interested members of this cadre in implementing the proposed Foundation Package in ministries and agencies and their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces. For example, this may include selectively promoting the participation of representative ACSI instructors and staff in the processes of pre- and post-intervention institutional assessments; training needs analyses; development and delivery of course modules and materials, including those for training-of-trainers; and strategies for effectively collaborating with donor programs that use ACSI's facilities

The application of such approaches may help begin to "turn the tide" from the current general lack of engagement of ACSI's staff in donor capacity development programs; build their familiarity with teaching materials produced by these programs; and help them to analyze selectively donor materials for potential incorporation in the emerging curriculum of the Institute.

Partner Selection Criteria

The Contractor shall develop and propose to USAID a set of criteria for selecting partners to participate in the refocused CDP. Subject to resource availability, the Contractor shall apply the approved set of criteria to not less than five, and potentially seven ministries or agencies, including their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces. However,

should the results of institutional assessments and priority setting negotiations with partners reveal that less-than-anticipated investments in some partners are required, the Contractor shall propose to USAID an increase in the number of targeted partners.

Illustratively, the Contractor's proposed criteria should capture and reflect the following principles:

- Importance to ANDS implementation. ANDS targets the increased delivery of public services to local populations by ministries, agencies and their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces that are reforming, service-oriented, increasingly efficient, and technically competent.
- Commitment to Reform: Such commitments extend well beyond policy pronouncements, to include tangible evidence of reform-mindedness, and actively extending this commitment to sub-national levels as authority and responsibility is devolved/delegated. Importantly, leadership's commitment to reform must be demonstrably and effectively communicated across organizational ranks, otherwise, it remains an ineffectual policy pronouncement.
- Synergy with USAID Programs: The rapidly expanding USAID program is increasingly engaging with select ministries, agencies and their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces which lack the foundational core competencies to be effective partners in development. USAID technical programs support the development of technical capacities which, without core, foundational public administration competencies, may be less effectively applied. Also, USAID has tentatively identified several ministries (see list below) for consideration of possible host country agreements. The Mission's certification reviews of partners for such agreements, however, may identify the need for targeted institutional strengthening in areas tangential to CDP's core functional areas. In such situations, the Contractor shall flexibly tailor current or develop new CDP interventions to respond to USAID's requests for targeted support to identified partners, thus increasing synergies with USAID program objectives, and enhancing aid effectiveness.
- Requiring Donor Support: Admittedly, capacity development in Afghan's public sector is a crowded field, and is likely to continue being so as Government devolves more authority and responsibility sub-nationally. Donor capacity development activities proliferate across Government; are not yet properly coordinated; have varying approaches to meaningful sustainability; are most likely supply-driven; and all have varying demand for key counterparts from Government. This places considerable stresses upon nascent governmental structures, decreasing the effectiveness of aid and putting at risk the development of valued, sustainable outcomes. CDP is already encountering problems of counterpart shortages which seriously constrain progress and require donor advisors to perform largely line functions. This could result in criticisms of donor initiatives when these programs end and the line functions they have been performing also end.
- Acceptance of Phased Approach: Within its remaining life, CDP cannot afford a "business as usual" approach to capacity development in which program activities continue, but are crippled to achieve their objectives due to low or non-performance of partners of the negotiated terms of assistance. This will likely require the Contractor to negotiate with the leadership of targeted partner agencies

phased approaches which will enable joint (Contractor – Partner) assessments of progress, and joint (USAID and Partner) decisions on a way forward when progress is lacking or threatened due to non-performance. Such an approach will allow for the flexible application of available resources to other priority partners, ensuring the effectiveness of aid.

- Acceptance of the Nature of CDP's Assistance: Perspectives on capacity development (what it is and how it may best be achieved) may vary considerably, especially among the short-term, political leadership ranks of Government. CDP has already encountered preferences for the more tangible evidence of capacity, including physical facilities, equipment, degreed training and educational programs, and salaries for staff expansion. Therefore, sustained acceptance of the nature of CDP's assistance options, thus, may need to be included in the selection criteria.
- Effective Delegation of Authority: Investing to develop the capacity of staff to whom a partner's leadership will not or is unable to delegate substantive authority is ineffectual. CDP is already encountering such situations which effectively reduce aid effectiveness.

List of Indicative Partners and Provinces for Intervention

Partners

Ministries currently under consideration by USAID for possible host country agreement are listed below. The Contractor shall collaborate closely with USAID in finalizing the list of partners (which may also include agencies) based upon the final, approved set of criteria.

- Ministry of Communication And Information Technology
- Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
- Ministry of Energy & Water and agencies therein, ie., National Electricity Utility
- Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Higher Education
- Ministry of Public Works

Provinces

USAID is currently determining/reviewing its provincial strategy in an effort to increase program synergy and aid effectiveness. The Contractor shall collaborate closely with USAID in finalizing the list/number of provinces in which CDP shall concentrate its sub-national activities. Provinces currently under consideration by USAID for more synergistic interventions across its programs are:

- Badakhshan
- Farah
- Herat
- Bamyan
- Paktika
- Baghdis
- Ghazni

Program Objectives, Outcomes and Activities

The over-arching strategic objective (SO) of USAID's DG program, and thus, the goal of the refocused CDP activity, along with other USAID activities, is:

"Strengthening GIRoA Institutions for Good Governance"

To contribute to this SO and goal, the Contractor shall design, implement and assess the impacts of discrete, core governance, CDP activities leading to the achievement of the following two program objectives:

Objective 1. To provide near-term, direct, capacity building of targeted public sector institutions such that, by the end of the program, they are substantially capable of implementing ANDS and delivering needed public services in a transparent and effective manner

Objective 2. To develop the long term capabilities of GIRoA's capacity building institutions, e.g., the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute and IARCSC's Training Centers within the ministries and in select provinces

Outcomes and Activities

The Contractor's set of discrete, core governance CDP activities shall be implemented in a manner to promote the successful achievement of six, key outcomes, namely:

- *1.1: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved via Foundation Package of Assistance*
- *1.2: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved via Umbrella Clients (MoF, IARCSC)*
- *1.3: Capacity of Non-Municipal Sub-National Governments Improved*
- *1.4: Vocational Training Capacities Enhanced*
- *2.1: Capacity of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) Developed*
- *2.2: Capacity of Selected National and Provincial Training Centers (TCs) Developed*
- *2.3: Non-Government Organizations Capacity to Do Capacity Building Developed*

Below is a discussion of each outcome. Table 1,following, summarizes the desired results, illustrative activities, required, minimum deliverables, and indicators of performance.

Figure C: Capacity Development Program Outcomes Framework



Guiding Principles

1. Based upon its experience during the initial two years of CDP, the Contractor may propose to USAID an alternative activities/approaches and an expanded set of deliverables that reflect its contributions to the sustainable development of core public administration skills within the Afghanistan civil service.

2. During the initial two years of CDP, the Contractor encountered "assessment fatigue" among targeted partner agencies. To address this concern, the kind of assessments that the Contractor shall now conduct will accentuate staff competencies in core public administration skills, rather than broad-brush institutional assessments – representing a different focus from traditional donor assessments.

3. Moreover, the Contractor shall emphasize joint, participatory assessments, in which partner agencies learn along with the assessment team. This approach is expected to catalyze their interests, not only in the outcomes of the assessments, but also in the process, as skills enhanced during their participation will likely be perceived to be valuable and broadly useful. Thus, while the *process* of conducting rapid, joint, objective institutional assessments of national and sub-national public entities is beneficial and also "capacity-developing" in nature, a high quality assessment report *itself* is undoubtedly a valuable, *tangible output* of this process.

4. Upon concurrence by USAID's CTO and the leadership of partner agencies, the Contractor shall share CDP (a) pre- and post-intervention institutional assessment reports and (b) Capacity Development Implementation Plans (CDIPs) with other key stakeholder entities, including other donors engaged in capacity development within that partner agency, ACSI, IARCSC, relevant GIRoA donor coordinating entities such as ICCD, and other relevant USAID technical offices.

5. The Contractor's required participatory, pre-intervention assessment of core skills competencies in partner agencies shall provide adequate baseline for performance monitoring and impact. The Contractor shall propose to USAID's CTO two practical sub-sets of the assessment instrument and protocols to be used for (a) on-going monitoring and reporting requirements and (b) post-intervention impact assessment. In this manner, the consistent use of the same assessment instrument and protocols, and sub-sets thereof, will ensure internal consistency of derived data and knowledge, and therefore, a more meaningful impact statement.

6. To increase overall aid effectiveness, the Contractor shall appropriately demonstrate and apply lessons learned during its initial two years of managing CDP, particularly including, but not limited to, the inadequate or non-availability of key counterparts in partner institutions. As necessary, the Contractor shall apply a phased approach to all future CDP's assistance, building upon increasing demonstrations of the partners' commitment and cooperation, in the absence of which, the Contractor shall promptly inform and advise USAID for consideration of remedial interventions or, if necessary, termination of elements of agreed work plans, CDIPs and MoUs with approved, targeted partners.

7. The Contractor shall develop and translate all formal training materials in Dari and Pashto, and shall promote and facilitate the full integration of these materials into the curriculum the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute and Training Centers, as appropriate and relevant to the strategic objectives of these entities. As a critical sustainability objective, the Contractor shall minimize, if not eliminate, the development of formal training materials and courses that will not be sustainably applied to on-going capacity development initiatives across Afghanistan.

8. For the negotiated set of priority areas of intervention, the Contractor shall clearly specify, in the CDIPs and MoUs, its agreed, discrete deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID

Cross-Cutting Activity – Participant Training

The Contractor will continue to provide services and deliverables related to participant training support. USAID is working to identify a more permanent "home" for the processing of participant training programs mission-wide. Until this issue is resolved, CDP will continue to process all Mission training requests. However, CDP will fund requests only related to CDP participants in core governance capacity building assistance activities.

This activity is different from other program activities in this statement of work because it is demand generated by the CDP program and requires flexibility to respond quickly to specific needs. This is a multi-year participant training program that can involve:

- All aspects of participant training processing, including: training needs assessments; planning through post-training follow-on and record-keeping; the management of J-1 visa applications and visa compliance; English language testing; medical reviews; pre-departure orientation; and other related services.
- A variety of in and out-of-country professional development including exposure visits, short term certificate technical or management courses, and masters and other advance professional degree programs.

The participant training activity should be provided as a complement to other CDP assistance to reinforce critical skill sets for key public officials and managers in core public administration.

The Contractor shall pre-package services as appropriate to reduce the Mission's design workload and administrative ineractions with the Contractor and to ensure cost-effective, predictable costing of services.

The basic purpose of this activity is to provide a one-stop full-service center that can respond to general participant training needs for CDP. The ultimate goal is to use participant training to reinforce capacity development of key officials, managers, technicians in core public administration positions.

Outcome 1.1: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved via Foundation Package of Assistance

Desired Results

Up to seven, targeted partner ministries and/or agencies are demonstrating the application of measurably enhanced, core, public administration competencies in CDP-assisted skills areas provided in the Foundation Package (FP)

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

- Conduct two participatory, institutional assessments of each ministry or agency and their sub-national counterparts (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core public administrations skills deficits.

  Deliverables. Two objective, participatory institutional assessments of each partner ministry, agency and their sub-national entities (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills.

- Negotiate a CDIP targeting priority assessment results; for currently assisted ministries, carefully integrate relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework.

  Deliverables. CDIPs and MoU (latter to be signed between USAID and each partner) identifying priority areas for enhancing core, public administration competencies per partner.

- Implement activities as per the approved MoU. Illustrative areas of potential focus include: targeted technical assistance to address areas of limited skills deficits; courses and relevant materials, developed in concert with ACSI and Training Centers, to address standardized, continuing skills deficits; follow-up mentoring and coaching to help assure the successful application of principles presented in courses; general participant training programs. Foundation Package core governance topics for technical assistance/training/mentoring include:
  - Strategic Planning and Policy – Organizational Mission and Authority
  - Organizational Restructuring and Work Process Streamlining
  - Financial Management – Budgeting, Accounting and Auditing
  - Procurement and Contracting
  - Human Resources Development
  - Project Planning, Design, Management and M&E
  - Strategic Communications
  - "Good Governance 101" (Leadership, Ethics, etc.)

Elaboration

Assessments. The Contractor shall conduct rapid, objective, pre- and post-intervention institutional assessments of all proposed partner entities (i.e., ACSI, Training Centers at the national and provincial levels, and five-to-seven ministries or agencies of Government, including their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces). The

Contractor shall ensure that assessments build upon lessons learned during the initial phase of CDP; are participatory; and are shared with other relevant stakeholders in order to promote transparency, synergy and donor coordination, subject to approval by the CTO and the respective partner agency.

CDIPs and MoUs. Based upon assessment results, the Contractor shall develop and pre-negotiate a summary Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and detailed, attached Capacity Development Implementation Plan (CDIP) for each of the targeted, five-to-seven ministries and agencies of Government, including their provincial counterparts in select provinces. For the negotiated set of priority areas of intervention, the Contractor shall clearly specify, in the CDIPs and MoUs, its agreed, discrete set of deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID. In the event that targeted partners in this phase of the program are also among CDP's list of current partners (from its initial, two-years of operation), the Contractor shall carefully phase and integrate on-going with proposed new CDP activities for that partner. This may require either an amended or new CDIP and MoU.

Outcome 1.2: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved via Umbrella Clients (MoF, IARCSC)

Desired Results

- GIRoA's three "umbrella" capacity building organizations – Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) – are demonstrating measurably increased and flexible capacity to enhance the capabilities of ministries, agencies and relevant sub-national entities under their authorities, and in compliance with relevant priorities, schedules, and standards (NB: IDLG is discussed below in Outcome 1.3)

Ministry of Finance:

- MoF has completed its roll-out orientation and training packages to select ministries and agencies which are demonstrating enhanced competencies to implement Government's new program budgeting protocols commensurate with the requirements of the annual budget process
- MoF has completed its roll-out orientation and training packages to select ministries and agencies are competent to implement Government's new Procurement Law
- MoF's Internal Audit Department has a veritable internal auditing capability operating at internationally-recognized standards; and has orchestrated the development of similar capacities, with CDP support, in select ministries and agencies

IARCSC:

- IARCSC's general management capacity is strengthened; and its roll-out of human resource management reforms under the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program are substantially completed in four ministries
- Government's new employee database system is rolled-out on a pilot basis in select ministries and agencies.

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

Ministry of Finance:

- Program Budgeting: Support MoF's provision of training, mentoring and coaching to support the continued roll-out of new Government guidance and protocols on program budgeting in select ministries and agencies
- Procurement: Support MoF staff to provide training, mentoring and coaching to select ministries and agencies in support of the continued roll-out of new Government guidance and protocols on procurement planning and management training
- Internal Audit: Provide training, mentoring and coaching to the staff of the Internal Audit Department

  Deliverables: Course materials for participants and training-of-trainers in program budgeting; procurement and internal audit.

IARCSC:

- Strengthen IARCSC's general management capacity; and substantially within four ministries the Commission's roll-out of human resource management reforms under the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program
- Government's new employee database system is rolled-out on a pilot basis in select ministries and agencies.

  Deliverables: Modern human resource management systems, policies, protocols and capabilities introduced and established within four ministries

Elaboration

CDP has developed a strong working relationship with three GIRoA organizations whose mission is to guide "umbrella" capacity building assistance. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) has led the initiative to identify needs and negotiate donor assistance to strengthen financial management capacities, i.e., budgeting, accounting, auditing and procurement, across all GIRoA's 40+ ministries/agencies. The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) has been responsible for orchestrating assistance throughout government related to human resources development. The Independent Directorate of Local Government (IDLG; discussed in Output 1.3 below) was established just over a year ago to build capacities of provincial, municipal and district levels of government. The Contractor shall continue CDP assistance to these critical on-going efforts.

Ministry of Finance (MoF). MoF has been designated coordinator of aid funding for ANDS implementation. As well, MoF provides oversight on all issues of financial management, and as such, will continue to serve as an umbrella coordinator of capacity building for program budgeting, accounting and internal auditing activities.

The Ministry of Finance is leading GIRoA's efforts to embrace program budgeting, to ensure the correct application of a new law governing public sector procurement, and to

coordinate programs to develop internationally accredited internal audit skills. CDP has developed training materials, supported training-of-trainers, conducted substantial training of key staff, and provided mentoring and coaching assistance. These activities are fundamentally important to the primary objective of enhancing core public administration systems and skill sets. Thus, the Contractor shall continue these high priority activities:

- Program Budgeting. With assistance from the World Bank, the Ministry of Finance is leading Government's move to embrace program budgeting. The Contractor shall continue to support the roll-out of this initiative by supporting training-of-trainers within this ministry, and training of key staff in all ministries and key agencies of government.
- Internal Audit. CDP has completed initial training of internal audit staff for the Ministry of Education; and developed and tested course materials for the proposed training of internal auditors across select national ministries and agencies. The Contractor shall continue this assistance which represents the first donor support to the development of internationally accredited internal audit skills within Government.
- Procurement Management: CDP is providing mentoring and coaching support to the procurement staff of select ministries and key agencies in a move to reinforce initial training provided under a World Bank project with the Ministry of Finance. In this manner, The Contractor shall continue its support to help ensure the correct application of a new law governing public sector procurement, including support to a pilot activity which is providing assistance to the Ministry of Finance and a line ministry to help improve expenditure management through better procurement planning protocols.

In support of the above priority areas of intervention with the Ministry of Finance, the Contractor shall amend current or negotiate new CDIPs and MoUs, for USAID review and approval, and shall clearly specify its agreed, discrete deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID.

- Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC): The Commission has been assigned authority to orchestrate the Government's Public Administrative Reform (PAR) program. Much of the initial work has focused on the development of modern human resource management (HRM) structures, systems and related skills, and implementation of the Priority Reform and Restructure (PRR) and its associated "Pay and Grading" initiatives to rationalize job descriptions and pay scales. The Commission's Reform Implementation Management Unit (RIMU) program is designed to assist in organizational restructuring as a basis for HRM reforms, and is initially operational on a pilot basis in nine ministries.
- CDP is providing significant capacity development assistance to IARCSC in several areas, including general strengthening of its management capacity; support to RIMUs in four ministries, and to RIMU oversight coordination; development of a government-wide employee database and its roll-out to ministries on a pilot basis; support to its subsidiary training agency, the Afghan Civil Service Institute (ACSI; discussed below in Outcome 2.1); and support to the Commission's Training Centers nestled within most ministries and also in an increasing number of provinces (discussed in Outcome 2.2 below). However, the RIMU approach

has been problematic. Thus, the Contractor shall continue on-going CDP support to strengthening IARCSC's general management capacity, and to the more successful HRM initiatives, but shall appropriately phase-out RIMU support to the current four ministries. In the event that CDP's current RIMU partners are also among the final list of targeted partners in this refocused phase of CDP, the Contractor shall carefully phase and integrate on-going with proposed new CDP activities for that partner. This may require amending or negotiating new CDIPs and MoUs for such partners. In lieu of the unsuccessful RIMU approach, the Contractor shall provide organization development, restructuring and HRM capacity building support, including for HRM, via direct assistance to targeted ministries via the proposed Foundation Package.

Outcome 1.3: Capacity of Non-Municipal Sub-National Governments Improved

Desired Results

- IDLG Central Structure strengthened in order to better manage and deliver capacity building assistance to sub-national governments
- Public Administration Reform (PAR) program effectuated in IDLG's central structure and x# targeted provincial and district Governors' offices
- X# provincial and district Governors' offices strengthened in administrative capabilities in order to better manage basic service delivery
- X# Provincial and district Governors' offices communications capacities strengthened

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

IDLG's Central Structure

- Assess IDLG Central Structure to identify capacity development needs and priorities

  Deliverables. Assessment report

- Provide technical assistance through workshops, training, mentoring and/or coaching to strengthen IDLG's human resource management capacity
- Provide assistance to build IDLG capacity to develop program action plans
- Design and assist in the establishment of an IDLG capacity to monitor capacity development initiatives
- Strengthen through coaching/mentoring and/or training of IDLG's central staff its budgeting, management and service delivery capacities
- Provide technical assistance to develop HR policy/guidelines

  Deliverables. HR Policies and Guidelines Report

Provincial and District Governors' Offices

- Provide technical assistance to formulate, develop, and administer personnel programs (merit- based, transparent, and open-competition appointments; vetting procedures; and performance-based reviews based on the Priority Reform and Restructuring program) related to provincial and district appointments
- Provide technical assistance to develop a comprehensive gender sensitive management framework
- Provide Foundation Package core governance skills capacity development assistance, including pre/port assistance assessments, to x# targeted provincial and district Governors' offices
- Provide assistance to set-up internet service for x# district centers

  Deliverables. Functional internet connections.
- Provide technical assistance to develop e-governance applications in x# of targeted provinces/districts

  Deliverables. E-governance system.

Elaboration

The importance and interest in developing the sub-national levels of government in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is becoming increasingly apparent. There is a strong belief that empowering these levels of government will help solve some of the political, social and economic problems facing the country in a time of insecurity and conflict. Currently, capacity development assistance is provided through USAID's "Local Governance and Community Development" (which comes to an end September 30, 2009) and "Afghanistan Municipal Strengthening Program" projects. CDP is about to undertake a modest SNG program as negotiated through a MoU with IDLG, the elements of which focus on capacity building of provincial and district governors' offices. If this program is successfully implemented, it could position CDP to expand its assistance in both scope and location, subject to the availability of resources.

For the negotiated set of priority areas of intervention, the Contractor shall clearly specify, in the CDIPs and MoUs, its agreed, discrete deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID.

Outcome 1.4: Vocational Training Capacities Enhanced

Desired Results

- Vocational training centers graduating skilled workers in construction and other trades required for development implementation

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

- CDP shall continue to provide the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI) with operational support through the end of FY09 via the funding of scholarships. Subsequent assistance shall be contingent upon USAID funding, which may derive from other than CDP sources.
- CDP shall continue to provide technical assistance and/or training in management and development (business plans including fundraising via public-private partnerships) through the end of FY09 in order to build ATVI capabilities to sustain their operations over the long-term.
- CDP shall assist ATVI to become accredited.

  Deliverables. Accreditation application.
- CDP shall continue to support ATVI career counseling and job fair initiatives.

  Deliverables. Job fairs and career counseling plans.
- CDP has provided considerable support to help establish the Construction Training Center (CTC) in Kunar. To sustain the initial success of CTC, it is suggested that its operations be incorporated into the ATVI, thus providing a sustainable ownership/management structure to which USAID contributions (in the form of scholarships funding) can be directed. CDP assistance to advance this idea, including the design of a merger plan, would be critical.

Elaboration

In additional to significant financial support provided in the form of scholarship subsidies, CDP has provided significant technical assistance to build management and operational capacities at ATVI and to establish and provide operational support for the Kunar Training Center. Given the success of the programs and their ability to train the construction workforce required to implement ANDS development projects, CDP or other USAID financial assistance should continue into FY10 with an understanding that in the interim an exit strategy will be developed to both phase out assistance, and to implement strategies to sustain operations.

Outcome 2.1: Capacity of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) Developed

Desired Results

- ACSI is on target in implementing priority, CDP-assisted components of its long-term strategic plan (subject to timely approval by IARCSC in 2008)
- Increasingly, senior civil service managers in Grades 1 - 2, government-wide, have effective and efficient access to grade-based competency training that is relevant and of high-quality, delivered by qualified ACSI instructors, within a well-managed national training facility
- ACSI's core curriculum at ACSI is being regularly assessed, upgraded and expanded to meet the higher level demands of Afghanistan's rapidly growing senior civil service
- Consistent with ACSI's new strategy, relevant elements of CDP-assisted courses and training materials (including training-of-trainer materials) in targeted public

administration skills for senior executives, are fully integrated into ACSI's growing curricula at the national and provincial levels

- ACSI's training cadre has been oriented, trained, mentored and coached in the delivery of select CDP-assisted courses that are integrated into ACSI's curriculum for senior civil servants in Grades 1 – 2 civil servants

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

- Conduct two participatory, institutional assessments of ACSI (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core public administrations skills deficits

  Deliverables. Two objective, participatory, pre- and post-intervention, institutional assessments of ACSI, emphasizing core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills; the competencies of its cadre of instructors; and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for senior civil servants

- Negotiate a new Capacity Implementation Development Plan (CDIP) targeting priority assessment results, and carefully integrating relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework

  Deliverables. A new CDIP and MoU (to be signed between USAID and ACSI) identifying priority areas for strengthening core, public administration competencies; training skills; and training materials, including training-of-trainer materials for courses targeted at senior civil servants

- Develop a MoU for USAID approval and implement approved activities. Illustrative areas of potential focus within the context of ACSI's new strategy include core competencies that support: general management, organizational development, training needs assessment, training-of-trainers nationally and in provinces, results-based curriculum development and assessment, staff evaluation, provincial level Training Center development, standardization, oversight and quality control, grade-based competency profiles

  Deliverables. Specific, to-be-determined deliverables per the USAID-approved CDIP and MoU; and Foundation Package core courses and materials in targeted public administration skills areas

Elaboration

ACSI Capacity Development Implementation Plan (CDIPs). Upon approval by IARCSC of ACSI's new, five-year strategy, the Contractor shall organize and conduct an objective, participatory, pre-intervention, institutional assessments of ACSI, emphasizing core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills; the competencies of its administrative management, cadre of instructors, and resource professionals charged with curriculum and materials development and management; and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for senior civil servants.

Based upon this participatory assessment, the Contractor shall negotiate a revised or new CDIP and MoU for expanded capacity building support to ACSI. The CDIP and MoU shall clearly identify priority areas of intervention based upon CDP's past experience; other donor assistance; and other pertinent developments within ACSI. For example, the plan might include the joint development of a management plan and approach for implementation of the five-year horizon strategy (if approved). It might also include temporary (e.g., 12 – 18 months) support (salary and operational costs) for a new position such as a Deputy Director for Program Management and Administration (or equivalent position), charged with overseeing and directing the achievement of strategic goals, which position would become fully integrated into the Institute's tashkeel and operational budget.

To increase aid effectiveness, the Contractor's CDIP for ACSI shall appropriately demonstrate and apply lessons learned from prior support to the Institute, including the non-availability of counterparts. As necessary, the Contractor shall apply a phased approach to CDP's assistance, building upon increasing demonstrations of the Institute's commitment and cooperation. Upon concurrence by USAID's CTO and the leadership of ACSI, the Contractor shall share the approved CDIP with other key stakeholder entities, including other donors engaged in capacity development within IARCSC, relevant GIRoA donor coordinating entities such as ICCD, and other relevant USAID technical offices.

As ACSI is about to initiate a four - five year horizon strategy which, subject to approval, will likely run longer than the remaining current timeframe of CDP, the Contractor shall ensure that all CDP contributions to ACSI are clear, discrete contributions which can indeed be completed within the remaining program timeframe, but which are meaningful, sustainable contributions to the Institute's long-term development.

Foundation Package Core Courses and Materials. As noted above, the Contractor's mix of capacity development tools shall comprise a full spectrum of flexible and tailored capacity building approaches, i.e., comprising direct technical assistance; core course modules with full sets of modules for participants and for training trainers; mentoring; and coaching. Based upon the results of institutional assessments and follow-up negotiations of partners' priorities for intervention, the Contractor shall determine which of the nine core public administration skills areas require formal courses, training-of-trainers, etc., and which ones may best be addressed by other approaches, recognizing that the latter group may vary from partner-to-partner.

Based upon lessons learned in the former CDP NGO Component, the Contractor shall develop and translate all formal training materials in Dari and Pashto, and shall promote and facilitate the full integration of these materials into the curriculum the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, as appropriate and relevant to its strategic objectives. This is a critical step to help break the current approach in which donor training materials are routinely "dumped" onto ACSI's shelves, without requisite efforts to integrate the materials into the Institute's programs. The Contractor shall assess and determine the need for modifications of CDP training modules (e.g., less than full versions) that are more pertinent to capacity development at sub-national levels where needs may be much more basic than at the national level. Based upon such assessment and determination, the Contractor shall develop modified training materials accordingly, and promote/facilitate their integration into ACSI's curriculum.

For the negotiated set of priority areas of intervention, the Contractor shall clearly specify, in the CDIPs and MoUs, its agreed, discrete deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID.

Outcome 2.2: Capacity of Select National and Provincial Training Centers (TCs) Developed

Desired Results

- ACSI is on target in implementing priority, CDP-assisted elements of its strategic plan that address Training Center development (subject to timely approval by IARCSC in 2008)
- Increasingly, civil servants at Grades 3 - 8, in targeted ministries and in select provinces have effective and efficient access to basic training in ACSI's core curriculum skills areas that are relevant and of high quality, delivered by competent instructors in Training Centers that are well-integrated into ACSI's program of basic capacity development
- ACSI's core curriculum for Training Centers in targeted ministry and select provinces is being regularly assessed, upgraded and expanded to meet the increasing demands of Afghanistan's rapidly growing civil service in Grades 3 - 8
- At least four, and not more than seven Training Centers in seven select provinces have been established or rehabilitated, and are fully functional
- Consistent with ACSI's new strategy, relevant elements of CDP-assisted courses, and training materials (including training-of-trainer materials) targeted at Training Centers, are fully integrated into ACSI's growing curricula at the national and provincial levels
- The training cadres of Training Centers in targeted ministries and select provinces have been oriented, trained, mentored and coached in the delivery of select CDP-assisted courses that have been integrated into ACSI's curriculum for civil servants in Grades 3 – 8

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

- Conduct participatory, institutional assessments of each Training Center targeted for upgrading, emphasizing management's core public administrations skills deficits; and competencies/adequacies of the instructor cadre and training materials

  Deliverables. Two objective, participatory, pre- and post-intervention, institutional assessments of each Training Center in targeted ministries and select provinces, emphasizing the management's core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills; the competencies of the cadres of instructors; and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for civil servants in Grades 3 - 8

- Negotiate a new or amended Capacity Implementation Development Plan (CDIP) with IARCSC (current owner/funder of Training Centers) targeting priority assessment results, and carefully integrating relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework

  Deliverables. An overarching CDIP and MoU (latter to be signed between USAID and IARCSC) identifying priority areas for strengthening/improving core, public administration competencies; training skills; and training materials, including training-of-trainer materials for relevant courses targeted at civil servants in Grades 3 – 8 (MoU for TCs may be an amendment to existing MoU)

- Develop/amend a MoU for USAID approval; and implement approved activities. Illustrative areas of potential focus for Training Centers (within the context of ACSI's new strategy which calls for the transfer of all Training Centers to ACSI) include core competencies that support: Training Center management, training needs assessment, training-of-trainers nationally and in provinces in ACSI's expanding curriculum, training assessment, staff selection, training and evaluation

  Deliverables. Specific, to-be-determined deliverables per the USAID-approved CDIP and MoU with IARCSC

Elaboration

For Training Centers nestled in the targeted, five - seven ministries and agencies, and also for Training Centers located in the seven select provinces, the Contractor shall organize and conduct an objective, participatory, pre-intervention, institutional assessments, emphasizing core competencies in FP pubic administration skills; the competencies of the centers' administrative management, cadre of instructors, and resource professionals charged with curriculum and materials development and management (unless all curricula and training materials are fully dependent upon ACSI); and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for civil servants.

For the negotiated set of priority areas of intervention, the Contractor shall clearly specify, in the CDIPs and MoUs, its agreed, discrete deliverables per component of intervention area. The Contractor shall also reflect and elaborate these deliverables in annual Contractor work plans, as appropriate, for review and approval by USAID.

As a key element of its long-term strategy, ACSI is proposing the transfer and integration of all Training Centers in ministries and provinces from IARCSC to ACSI. Should such transfer and integration occur during the period of CDP assistance to Training Centers, the Contractor shall promptly assess and inform/advise the CTO of such a significant modification, and clearly identify the full set of implications for on-going CDP assistance to both ACSI and Training Centers. As necessary, the Contractor shall negotiate relevant modifications to its CDIP and MoUs with both IARCSC and ACSI.

Outcome 2.3: Non-Government Organizations Capacity to Do Capacity Building Developed

Desired Results

- CDP trained NGOs engaged in providing capacity building assistance to CDP, USAID, GIRoA, civil society and private sector businesses

Activities and Deliverables

To achieve the above result, the Contractor shall design and implement the following illustrative activities and complete the indicated deliverables:

- Implement a fast-track approach for the completion of planned training of 150 NGOs. Rather than continuing with direct training to all 150 NGOs, CDP shall select the top 20 meta-NGOs which are progressing well in current training programs, and fast-track training-of-trainers courses in order to increase the capability of these organizations to contract with CDP to conduct the training of the remaining 130 NGOs. CDP should ensure that adequate follow-up mentoring and coaching is provided to the trainers of the 20 meta-NGOs as they take on the considerable additional responsibilities.

  Deliverables. The training materials for the seven NGO capacity building modules.

- Critical to the successful implementation of the above approach is the building and strengthening of relationships among NGO networks, and the development and implementation of a marketing strategy, to promote use of the trained NGOs enhanced skills. CDP can help establish larger networks among NGOs to help market and facilitate application of their enhanced capacities to provide training and technical assistance (i.e., assessments), not only to CDP's on-going work in capacity development within the public sector, but also to USAID programs more broadly, especially at sub-national levels (e.g., provincial/district/municipal levels and in PRT activities), and to GIRoA institutions, Afghan civil society and private sector businesses.

  Deliverables. A detailed marketing strategy. An active "NGO Network" of 150 organizations with intra-network marketing capacities.

- To help build early successes, CDP should establish a modest NGO "Support Fund" to provide newly trained NGOs with initial "practice" contracts. The Fund would provide modest $2,000-10,000 purchase orders to conduct assessments and/or trainings through streamlined paperwork and processes to build the NGOs contracting/capacity assistance delivery capabilities.

  Deliverables. A NGO Support Fund.

Elaboration

CDP is helping to increase the quality and quantity of goods and services offered by local Afghan NGOs. It is developing and offering a comprehensive capacity building program aimed at meta-level NGOs with capability and potential to provide capacity development support to other NGOs. This includes a nationwide initiative to identify and pre-screen viable NGOs with potential to absorb an array of strategic capacity development assistance. The objective is to build both their capacity and increase their recognition as capacity building NGOs. Based on focus group discussions, the program has proven very successful. The refocus strategy proposes to phase speed up training of the NGOs such that direct assistance is phased out o/b September 30, 2009. However, to sustain the successes, once the 150 NGOs are trained, CDP should continue to provide support through the marketing strategy and Support Fund.

Reporting Deliverables

During the remaining period of the CDP contract, the Contractor shall complete the following minimum deliverables. Based upon its experience during the initial two years of CDP, the Contractor may propose to USAID additional, relevant deliverables that reflect its contributions to the sustainable development of core public administration skills within the Afghanistan civil service.

1. Pre- and Post-Intervention Institutional Assessments: The Contractor shall conduct rapid, objective, pre- and post-intervention institutional assessments of all proposed partner entities (i.e., ACSI and five-to-seven ministries or agencies of Government, including their sub-national counterparts in targeted provinces). While the *process* of conducting rapid, joint, objective institutional assessments of national and sub-national public entities is beneficial and also "capacity-developing" in nature, a high quality assessment report *itself* is undoubtedly a valuable, *tangible output* of this process. Upon concurrence by USAID's CTO and the leadership of partner agencies, the Contractor shall share CDP pre- and post-intervention institutional assessment reports with other key stakeholder entities, including other donors engaged in capacity development within that partner agency, ACSI, IARCSC, ICCD, and other relevant USAID technical offices. The data and underpinning knowledge in these assessments shall serve as acceptable base lines for performance monitoring and impact assessment. (See Performance Monitoring below). The Contractor shall propose to USAID's CTO (two) practical sub-sets of the assessment instrument and protocols to be used for (a) on-going progress monitoring and (b) post-intervention impact assessment. In this manner, the consistent use of the same assessment instrument and protocols, and sub-sets thereof, will ensure internal consistency of derived data and knowledge.
2. ACSI Capacity Development Implementation Plan (CDIPs): Upon approval by IARCSC of ACSI's new, five-year strategy, the Contractor shall negotiate a revised CDIP for ACSI, clearly identifying priority areas of intervention based upon CDP's past experience; other donor assistance; and other pertinent developments within ACSI. For example, the plan might include the joint development of a management plan and approach for implementation of the five-year strategy (if approved). It might also include temporary (e.g., 12 – 18 months) support (salary and operational costs) for a new position such as a Deputy Director for Program Management and Administration (or equivalent position), charged with overseeing and directing the achievement of strategic goals, which position would become fully integrated into the Institute's tashkeel and operational budget. To increase aid effectiveness, the Contractor's Capacity Development Implementation Plan for ACSI shall appropriately demonstrate and apply lessons learned from prior support to the Institute, including the non-availability of counterparts.. As necessary, the Contractor shall apply a phased approach to CDP's assistance, building upon increasing demonstrations of the Institute's commitment and cooperation. Upon concurrence by USAID's CTO and the leadership of ACSI, the Contractor shall share this CDIP with other key stakeholder entities, including other donors engaged in capacity development within that partner agency, IARCSC, ICCD, and other relevant USAID technical offices.
3. Other Partner Capacity Development Implementation Plans: The Contractor shall negotiate and develop CDIPs for each of the five-to-seven ministries and agencies of Government, which plans shall extend to their provincial counterparts in select

provinces. Upon concurrence by USAID's CTO and the leadership of partner agencies, the Contractor shall share these CDIPs with other key stakeholder entities, including other donors engaged in capacity development within that partner agency, ACSI, IARCSC, ICCD, and other relevant USAID technical offices.

4. Foundation Package Core Courses and Materials: As noted above, the Contractor's mix of capacity development tools shall comprise a full spectrum of flexible and tailored capacity building approaches, i.e., comprising direct technical assistance; core course modules with full sets of modules for participants and for training trainers; mentoring; and coaching. Based upon the results of institutional assessments and follow-up negotiations of partners' priorities for intervention, the Contractor shall determine which of the nine core public administration skills areas require formal courses, training-of-trainers, etc., and which ones may best be addressed by other approaches. Based upon lessons learned in the former CDP NGO Component, the Contractor shall develop and translate all formal training materials in Dari and Pashto, and shall promote and facilitate the full integration of these materials into the curriculum the Afghanistan Civil Service Institute, as appropriate and relevant to its strategic objectives. This is a critical step to help break the current approach in which donor training materials are routinely "dumped" onto ACSI's shelves, without requisite efforts to integrate the materials into the Institute's programs. The Contractor shall assess and determine the need for modifications of CDP training modules (e.g., less than full versions) that are more pertinent to capacity development at sub-national levels where needs may be much more basic than at the national level. Based upon such assessment and determination, the Contractor shall develop modified training materials accordingly, and promote/facilitate their integration into ACSI's curriculum.

5. NGO Network: Based upon CDP's capacity development work with 150 local NGOs, the Contractor shall facilitate the establishment of an appropriate, functional NGO Network. The Contractor shall ensure that such a network:

   a. Includes a functional, web-based database that adequately describes the participating organizations and the full range of their interest areas, and their technical and administrative competencies to contribute meaningfully to capacity development initiatives across the public sector

   b. Has appropriate organizational, administrative, regulatory, financial, communications (internally and externally) and maintenance structures to ensure sustainability

   c. Is made broadly available, as an "NGO Network," to all USAID offices (technical and non-technical) and their implementing partners; the donor community, in general; all ministries and agencies of Government; and all key provincial governance structures (e.g., governorates). The Contractor shall also integrate this NGO Network into its broader database of local technical assistance and training providers (LTAPs), per the original contract.

6. A Restructured, More Serviceable CDP Portal: A key management objective of a refocused CDP is to "work smarter," not harder, based upon streamlining – the program objective and focus, the number of sectors, partners and activities, performance monitoring system and plan, the staff, and the work plan and

reporting processes. The Contractor shall substantially restructure the CDP Portal in support of streaming program management. Current use of the Portal is simply for storage of some documents that have been formally submitted to USAID in hard copy, missing the opportunity to structure and use the portal for more systematic communication to USAID, core partners, stakeholders and the broader public. To facilitate this, the Contractor shall establish the web site with gradated public and private access points; add appropriate links to integrate CDP's vast database, with capability to generate reports on-line through queries; download select data for manipulation in other computer programs (such as MS Excel and MS Word); and facilitate more effective information sharing with other donors and especially with emerging Government structures such as ICCD, charged with increasing coordination of donors' capacity development programs.

7. Program Reports: Establishment of a well focused and more strategic program design, as outlined herein, presents opportunities to streamline CDP reporting requirements, "working smarter", not harder. Aggressive restructuring of the CDP Portal, as required above, will facilitate streamlined reporting and should also minimize, if not eliminate, timeline conflicts in the schedule of reports.

   To help minimize iterations and facilitate more timely approvals of these major program reports, the Contractor shall discuss and reach agreement with the CTO initially on report outlines and subsequently on annotated outlines prior to drafting major narratives. In this manner, it will be much easier and more cost-effective to iterate, as necessary, on annotated outlines than to do so on extensive narrative products.

   The Contractor shall produce and submit to USAID the following reports:

   a) Remaining Life-of-Program Work Plan: Within XXX days of signing this contract amendment, the Contractor shall submit to the CTO a remaining life-of-program work plan that succinctly describes the approaches, methodologies and anticipated resources required to achieve the objectives of the redesigned CDP.

   b) Annual Work Plans: Within XXX days of signing this contract amendment, the Contractor shall submit to the CTO a revised FY09 work plan that elaborates the first year of the Remaining Life-of-Program Work Plan.

      The Contractor shall submit to the CTO subsequent annual work plans and any required updates of the remaining life-of-program work plan by not less than XXX days prior to the beginning of the new, upcoming program year.

      The Contractor shall ensure that annual work plans provide sufficient detail to provide a working guide to approved activities, services and deliverables that the Contractor will provide during the year. It shall describe the services and deliverables required, and include limits, both in terms of cost and level of effort, for each program component. The Contractor shall determine the details and format of the annual work plan through consultations with relevant USAID staff, led by the CTO, who will determine the final content and format for the work plans. In order for a work plan to be considered completed as required by this section of the contract, it must be approved in writing by the CTO.

As the situation in Afghanistan remains subject to rapid and unforeseen changes, work plans may be modified during the year with the written approval of the CTO. The CTO shall approve all modifications of work plans in writing.

c) Quarterly Reports: Within XX days following the close of the first and third quarters, the Contractor shall submit to USAID Quarterly Reports, comprising:

i. A quarterly program report on "progress this quarter," juxtaposed against approved annual work plan targets, covering all elements of the approved work plan; highlighting challenges/issues encountered and plans to addresses these in following quarters; and summarizing key lessons learned during the reporting quarter.

ii. A quarterly financial review, including a summary of financial flows and a pipeline analysis of funds obligated, actual expenses and accrued expenses. This financial report shall break out funds by funding category and by year of obligation. It shall also report and attribute to outcomes/results the quarterly and cumulative levels of effort of personnel by hours as well as cost and category. *(NB: Mission Controller should review and finalize this language)*

iii. A quarterly tracking report on approved results monitoring indicators, as established in a revised Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP; see below)

iv. A quarterly TraiNet report, summarizing all participant training data for the reporting quarter. *(NB: The Mission should elaborate this section, as necessary.)*

d) Semi-Annual and Annual Reports: The quarterly reports for the second and fourth quarters, and the semi-annual and annual reports are hereby collapsed as follows. Within XX days following the close of the second and fourth quarters, the Contractor shall submit to USAID, respectively, a semi-annual and annual report. In addition to meeting the above requirements of the quarterly reports, these two reports shall be modified to meet USAID's additional requirements for portfolio reviews and end-of-year reporting, as follows:

i. The semi-annual report shall include….. (NB: Mission to specify the minimum extra reporting requirements related to its first portfolio review)

ii. The annual report shall comprise both fourth quarterly and annual reporting of program, financial and TraiNet information and data; and also shall include….. (NB: Mission to specify the minimum extra reporting requirements related to its second portfolio review)

e) Demobilization Plan: Within not less than six months prior to the contract completion date, the Contractor shall submit to the CTO a demobilization plan for approval. This plan shall include:

i. An illustrative Property Disposition Plan

ii. A plan for the phase-out of in-country operations

iii. A delivery schedule for all remaining reports or other deliverables required under the contract

iv. A timetable for completing all required actions in the Demobilization Plan, including the submission date of the final Property Disposition Plan to the Director, Office of Acquisitions and Assistance (OAA)

f) End-of-Program Report: By not less than 30 days after program close-out, the Contractor shall submit to the CTO an end-of-program report.

g) GeoBase Reports: *(NB: Mission to update/insert requirements, if this is still relevant)*

Management Approach and Structure

Approach

Technical director for CDP will be provided by the USAID Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO). In addition, the CDO will lead and facilitate the Contractor's interactions with other relevant elements of USAID to ensure proper and adequate levels of synergy are achieved between CDP and the programs and activities of other USAID offices. The method and approach for such interaction shall be determined by the CTO and may include (i) the establishment of a Mission Steering Committee for CDP; (ii) periodic, individual meetings with Mission strategic objective teams or technical teams; and/or (iii) meetings with a Mission cross-cutting team which may include capacity development as a potentially standing agenda item.

The Contractor shall propose a revised, unified management team and structure that ensures coordination and collaboration among program elements to create and capture synergies, combine best practices, build on relationships established, and provide continual input for process and program improvement. The Contractor's team shall reflect an appropriate balance between the use of expatriate and Afghan staff, consistent with USAID's policy that promotes and encourages "Afghanization" of its programs, namely, ensuring appropriate and increasing levels of Afghans in key decision-making roles, while ensuring the quality of the overall program. Additionally, the Contractor's team must have systems, policies and procedures in place that:

1. Effectively communicate with USAID, various elements of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), the NGO community, and local private sector providers of technical assistance and training
2. Coordinate with other donors to avoid duplication and take advantage of complementary activities
3. Establish collegial working relationships with USAID and Afghan partners, and maintain a strong customer focus
4. Deliver quality training and technical assistance tailored to Afghan needs and respectful of their customs and beliefs, including gender issues

The Contractor may propose to USAID the formation of an Afghan Advisory Committee and relevant working groups comprising representatives of relevant Afghan counterparts public sector entities and other stakeholder groups (e.g., NGOs and local training and technical assistance providers) provided that such committee and groups have (i) clear, meaningful terms of reference (ToR) to ensure added-value to program management; (ii) clear leadership roles; and (iii) are approved in writing by the CTO.

Structure

The Contractor shall provide all general management and administrative support necessary to perform the Contract. The services authorized by this section include, but are not limited to:

1. Management structure to provide coherent, holistic management hierarchy of Objectives/Outcomes.
2. Overall management and administration of the Contract, including both expatriate and home office support and administrative services. The Contractor shall provide both the key personnel specified in the Contract and additional personnel, both long-term and short-term, necessary to meet recurring general management and administrative support needs under the Contract.
3. The procurement or lease necessary facilities, supplies and services as necessary to perform the Contract.
4. General advice regarding planning for CDP, including all reporting deliverables specified herein.
5. Oversight, quality control and general technical support of all services and deliverables provided pursuant to the Contract.
6. The proper, efficient and uniform use of modern management and administration, accounting practices, information technology (IT), communications, reporting, human resource management, property control, security, records and other administrative processes and systems required under the Contract.
7. Appropriate security for all contract personnel, facilities and equipment.
8. Management of the overall database and reporting needs of the program as specified in the Contract and developed in work plans in cooperation with the Cognizant Technical Officer.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plan

1) <u>Performance Management Plan (PMP)</u>

The Contractor shall prepare a revised Performance Management Plan (PMP), consistent with the Missions Performance Management Plan, and which captures the Capacity Development Program Results Framework (See **Figure C**, below). The Contractor, in developing its PMP, may propose adjustments to the illustrative indicators (see **Table 1**, below), while ensuring that there are sufficient standard indicators approved by the Department of State's Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance, or any successor entity, to meet the Mission's reporting requirements. The **Contractor** shall include in the PMP indicators, baselines, and targets for the goal, objectives, sub-objectives, and proposed tasks and activities in

the **Contractor** workplan sufficient for the **Contractor** and the Mission to monitor **CDP** progress and outcomes; and providing sufficient information for the **Contractor** and the Mission to make timely decisions on modifications to the **CDP** to achieve the program's broader goal and objectives. The Contractor shall also provide Data Quality Assessments for all indicators proposed in the PMP.

The Contractor shall submit to the Mission a complete revised PMP within XX days of the contract modification. The Mission will review and approve the PMP or provide instructions for modification of PMP within 30 days of receipt of the PMP from the Contractor. The Contractor shall incorporate changes requested by the Mission and resubmit the PMP for final Mission approval.

The Contractor shall incorporate appropriate indicators and targets in the Contractor's work plans, and shall update the PMP annually when it submits the annual work plans. Should the Mission modify the Contract during the year, the Contractor shall submit a revised PMP to the Mission within 30 days of the effective date of such modification. The Contractor shall update all work plans, as required, to reflect Mission approved changes to the PMP.

Only approval by the Mission Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO), or Alternate Cognizant Technical Officer (A/CTO), shall constitute Mission approval of the PMP and PMP updates.

The Contractor's regular program reports shall include the status of achievement of all indicators, reporting actual results against targets, and providing explanatory information on the CDP accomplishments, challenges and proposed corrective actions at the goal, objective, sub-objective, and activity levels in accordance with instructions provided by the CTO. .

2) External Evaluations

The Mission, at its discretion, may contract for an external evaluation of the CDP. The Mission will be responsible for developing the evaluation Statement of Work, and contracting for the evaluation. The Contractor shall make its staff and records available at reasonable times and places, and provide all necessary assistance to USAID and the evaluators facilitate timely execution of any evaluation of CDP contracted by USAID.

3) Performance Reviews

The Contractor shall participate in quarterly review meetings, conducted at a time and place of choosing by the Mission, on the performance of the CDP. Such reviews shall include, but not be limited to the following representative issues:

a. Progress toward achievement of the CDP goals and objectives, expectations for achievement of future results
b. Evidence that outputs of activities are adequately contributing to the achievement of approved objectives

c. Adequacy of inputs for producing activity outputs and efficiency of processes leading to outputs

d. Status and timeliness of input mobilization efforts

e. Status of critical assumptions and causal relationships defined in the Results Framework, along with the related implications for performance

f. Status of related Contractor and Afghan counterpart efforts that contribute to the achievement of results

g. Pipeline levels and future resource requirements

h. Vulnerability issues and related corrective actions, including but not limited to conformance of the Contractor to USAID policies and procedures, timeliness and appropriateness of USAID actions and decisions required for the Contractor to perform

An integral part of the Performance Review is to ensure that the CDP is progressing as planned, and that it is identifying issues and problems, and making decisions on corrective actions needed to achieve the overall goals and objectives of the CDP.

Table 1: Outcomes, Desired Results, Activities and Indicators

Outcome 1.1: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved via Full Foundation Package of Assistance			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• Up to seven, targeted partner ministries and/or agencies are demonstrating the application of measurably enhanced, core, public administration competencies in CDP-assisted skills areas provided in the Foundation Package (FP)	• Conduct two participatory, institutional assessments of each ministry or agency (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core public administrations skills deficits • Negotiate a CDIP targeting priority assessment results; for currently assisted ministries, carefully integrate relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework • Develop a MoU for USAID approval, and implement approved activities. Illustrative areas of potential focus include: targeted technical assistance to address areas of limited skills deficits; courses and relevant materials, developed in concert with ACSI and Training Centers, to address standardized, continuing skills deficits; follow-up mentoring and coaching to help assure the successful application of principles presented in courses; general participant training programs	• Two objective, participatory institutional assessments of each partner ministry, agency and their sub-national entities (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills • MoU with accompanying CDIP identifying priority areas for enhancing core, public administration competencies per partner • Specific, to-be-determined deliverables per the USAID-approved CDIP	• Performance of ministries in select core public administration functions • Quality of systems and procedures in place to support core functions • Number of executive branch personnel trained with USG assistance
Outcome 1.2: Capacity of Select Ministries Improved under Umbrella Clients (MoF, IARCSC)			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• GIRoA's three "umbrella" capacity building organizations – Ministry of Finance (MoF) and Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)(IDLG is treated separately below) – are demonstrating measurably increased capacity to enhance the capabilities of ministries, agencies and relevant sub-national entities and in compliance with relevant priorities, schedules, and standards	**MoF**: • Program Budgeting: Support MoF's provision of training, mentoring and coaching to support the continued roll-out of new Government guidance and protocols on program budgeting in select ministries and agencies • Procurement: Support MoF staff to provide training, mentoring and coaching to select ministries and agencies in support of the continued roll-out of new Government guidance and protocols on procurement planning and management training	• Course materials for participants and training-of-trainers in program budgeting; and internal audit. • Modern human resource management systems, policies, protocols and capabilities introduced and established within four ministries	• Performance of ministries in select core public administration functions • Quality of systems and procedures in place to support core functions • Degree of coordination/co operation between ministries and umbrella clients

Ministry of Finance: • MoF has completed its roll-out orientation and training packages to select ministries and agencies which are demonstrating enhanced competencies to implement Government's new program budgeting protocols under the requirements of the annual budget process • MoF has completed its roll-out orientation and training packages to select ministries and agencies are competent to implement Government's new Procurement Law • MoF's Internal Audit Department has a veritable internal auditing capability operating at internationally-recognized standards; and has orchestrated the development of similar capacities in select ministries and agencies **IARCSC**: • IARCSC's general management capacity is strengthened; and its roll-out of human resource management reforms under the Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) program are completed in four ministries • Government's new employee database system is rolled-out in select ministries.	• Internal Audit: Provide training, mentoring and coaching to the staff of the Internal Audit Department **IARCSC**: • Continue implementation of currently-approved program within USAID–IARCSC MoU, namely, Reform Implementation Units in four ministries; general management support to IARCSC, including its RIMU oversight committee (RASU), and development of a government-wide employee database		• Number of executive branch personnel trained with USG assistance
Outcome 1.3: Capacity of Non-Municipal Sub-National Governments Improved			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• IDLG Central Structure strengthened in order to better manage and deliver capacity building assistance to sub-national governments	• Assess IDLG Central Structure to identify capacity development needs and priorities • Provide technical assistance through workshops, training, mentoring and/or coaching to strengthen IDLG's human resource management capacity	• Assessment report	• # of Sub-national government offices provided capacity development through IDLG

	• Provide assistance to build IDLG capacity to develop program action plans • Design and assist in the establishment of an IDLG capacity to monitor capacity development initiatives • Strengthen through coaching/mentoring and/or training of IDLG's central staff its budgeting, management and service delivery capacities		
• Public Administration Reform (PAR) program effectuated in IDLG's central structure and X# targeted provincial and district Governors' offices	• Provide technical assistance to develop HR policy/guidelines • Provide technical assistance to formulate, develop, and administer personnel programs related to provincial and district appointments • Provide technical assistance to develop a comprehensive gender sensitive management framework	• HR Policies and Guidelines Report	• % staff PRR compliant in targeted provinces and districts
• X# provincial and district Governors' offices strengthened in administrative capabilities in order to better manage basic service delivery	• Provide Foundation Package assistance, including assessments to identify needs/priorities to X# targeted Provincial and district Governors' offices	• FP materials	• Performance of sub-national governments in service delivery functions
• X# Provincial and district Governors' offices communications capacities strengthened	• Provide assistance to set-up internet service for X# district centers • Provide technical assistance to develop e-governance applications in X# of targeted provinces/districts	• E-governance system	• Performance of sub- national governments communicating with counterpart governments and citizens
Outcome 1.4: Vocational Training Capacities Enhanced			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• Vocational training centers graduating skilled workers in construction and other trades required for development implementation	• Scholarships funded • Technical assistance provided in management and development • Technical assistance to complete business plans • Technical assistance provided to become accredited • Career counseling and job fairs assistance provided	• Accreditation application • Career counseling plan • Job Fairs	• # of vocational students graduating with critical trades skills

Outcome 2.1: Capacity of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute (ACSI) Developed			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• ACSI is on target in implementing priority, CDP-assisted components of its long-term strategic plan (subject to timely approval by IARCSC in 2008) • Increasingly, senior civil service managers in Grades 1 - 2, government-wide, have effective and efficient access to grade-based competency training that is relevant and of high-quality, delivered by qualified ACSI instructors, within a well-managed national training facility • ACSI's core curriculum at ACSI is being regularly assessed, upgraded and expanded to meet the higher level demands of Afghanistan's rapidly growing senior civil service • Consistent with ACSI's new strategy, relevant elements of CDP-assisted courses and training materials (including training-of-trainer materials) in targeted public administration skills for senior executives, are fully integrated into ACSI's growing curricula at the national and provincial levels • ACSI's training cadre has been oriented, trained, mentored and coached in the delivery of select CDP-assisted courses that are integrated into ACSI's curriculum for senior civil servants in Grades 1 – 2 civil servants	• Conduct two participatory, institutional assessments of ACSI (pre- and post-intervention), emphasizing core public administrations skills deficits • Negotiate a new Capacity Implementation Development Plan (CDIP) targeting priority assessment results, and carefully integrating relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework • Develop a MoU for USAID approval and implement approved activities. Illustrative areas of potential focus within the context of ACSI's new strategy include core competencies that support: general management, organizational development, training needs assessment, training-of-trainers nationally and in provinces, results-based curriculum development and assessment, staff evaluation, provincial level Training Center development, standardization, oversight and quality control, grade-based competency profiles	• Two objective, participatory, pre- and post-intervention, institutional assessments of ACSI, emphasizing core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills; the competencies of its cadre of instructors; and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for senior civil servants • A new CDIP and MoU (to be signed between USAID and ACSI) identifying priority areas for strengthening core, public administration competencies; training skills; and training materials, including training-of-trainer materials for courses targeted at senior civil servants • Specific, to-be-determined deliverables per the USAID-approved CDIP and MoU • Foundation Package core courses and materials in targeted public administration skills areas	• Change in the levels of key core competencies within ACSI based on post-intervention assessment • Percentage of ACSI's annual budget requests that is actually funded • Changes in the size, quality and relevance of ACSI's core curriculum for senior level civil servants • Number of executive branch personnel Trained with USG assistance

Outcome 2.2: Capacity of Selected National and Provincial Training Centers (TCs) Developed			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• ACSI is on target in implementing priority, CDP-assisted elements of its strategic plan that address Training Center development (subject to timely approval by IARCSC in 2008) • Increasingly, civil servants at Grades 3 - 8, in targeted ministries and in select provinces have effective and efficient access to basic training in ACSI's core curriculum skills areas that are relevant and of high quality, delivered by competent instructors in Training Centers that are well-integrated into ACSI's program of basic capacity development • ACSI's core curriculum for Training Centers in targeted ministry and select provinces is being regularly assessed, upgraded and expanded to meet the increasing demands of Afghanistan's rapidly growing civil service in Grades 3 - 8 • At least four, and not more than seven Training Centers in seven select provinces have been established or rehabilitated, and are fully functional • Consistent with ACSI's new strategy, relevant elements of CDP-assisted courses, and training materials (including training-of-trainer materials) targeted at Training Centers, are fully integrated into ACSI's growing curricula at the national and provincial levels	• Conduct participatory, institutional assessments of each Training Center targeted for upgrading, emphasizing management's core public administrations skills deficits; and competencies/adequacies of the instructor cadre and training materials • Negotiate a new or amended Capacity Implementation Development Plan (CDIP) with IARCSC (current owner/funder of Training Centers) targeting priority assessment results, and carefully integrating relevant, on-going activities into the revised program framework • Develop/amend a MoU for USAID approval; and implement approved activities. Illustrative areas of focus for Training Centers (within the context of ACSI's new strategy) include core competencies that support: Training Center management; training needs assessment; training-of-trainers nationally and in provinces, in ACSI's expanding curriculum; training assessment; staff selection; training and evaluation	• Two objective, participatory, pre- and post-intervention, institutional assessments of each Training Center in targeted ministries and select provinces, emphasizing the management's core competencies in targeted, pubic administration skills; the competencies of the cadres of instructors; and adequacy/relevancy of training materials to the current curriculum for civil servants in Grades 3 - 8 • An overarching CDIP and MoU (latter to be signed between USAID and IARCSC) identifying priority areas for strengthening/improving core, public administration competencies; training skills; and training materials, including training-of-trainer materials for relevant courses targeted at civil servants in Grades 3 – 8 (MoU for TCs may be an amendment to existing MoU) • Specific, to-be-determined deliverables per the USAID-approved CDIP and MoU with IARCSC	• Change in the levels of key core competencies within targeted Training Centers based on post-intervention assessments • Percentages of annual budget requests actually funded for assisted Training Centers • Changes in the size, quality and relevance of ACSI's core curricula for grade 3-8 civil servants in ministries and provinces • Number of Training Centers established/ rehabilitated and functional in seven select provinces

• The training cadres of Training Centers in targeted ministries and select provinces have been oriented, trained, mentored and coached in the delivery of select CDP-assisted courses that have been integrated into ACSI's curriculum for civil servants in Grades 3 – 8			
Outcome 2.3: Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) Capacity to Do Capacity Building Developed			
Desired Results	**Illustrative Activities**	**Expected Deliverables**	**Indicators**
• CDP trained NGOs engaged in providing capacity building assistance to CDP, USAID, GIRoA, other NGOs and private sector businesses	• Core group of 20 NGOs provided all 7 modules of capacity development training, and training of trainers • Core group contracted to train 130 NGOs in the all 7 modules of assistance • Strategy developed to market newly trained NGOs to USAID and its implementing partners, GIRoA, civil society, private sector clients • NGO support fund established to provide newly trained NGOs with initial "practice" contracts	• Training materials • Marketing strategy • NGO Network of 150 organizations with enhanced institutional skills	• # of capacity development trainings and assessments performed by NGOs trained by CDP • Broadly disseminated NGO network web-based database

Annex B: Management Objectives

Management Objective	Required Steps to Achieve
A realistic, achievable design supporting core DG objectives	Mission approval of proposed restructured CDP; successful negotiation with BearingPoint
A more concerted focus on building within beneficiary agencies a sustainable capacity to develop capacity, building core, public administration skills rather than producing "sexy deliverables"	Mission approval to replace the current three contract objectives with this one, consistent theme or proposed objective
A well-articulated, mutually developed and agreed synergy between CDP activities and the programs of other USAID technical offices, at the national and sub-national levels	Contractor demonstrates key synergy elements in work plans and quarterly/annual reports. CTO approves work plans following review and concurrence by technical office directors, or Mission cross-cutting team, or both
Carefully researched and on-going coordination with other key donors supporting public sector capacity development initiatives; and an appropriate level of coordination and cooperation with evolving IROA initiatives to achieve enhanced donor coordination of public sector capacity development programs	Contractor highlights key donor coordination plans, achievements and issues in work plans and quarterly/annual reports
A clear understanding (with USAID and all beneficiary agencies) of and agreement on the deliverable aspects of skills building. For example, an over-emphasis on ministerial products/processes without adequate attention to the core public administration skills that drive those products/processes puts achievement of sustainable capacity at risk	Contractor work plans and activity implementation plans clearly identify anticipated "leave behinds," which emphasize sustainable capacity building capacity and relevant institutional support material (e.g., course modules, manuals, forms, institutional assessments, linkages with local capacity development providers, etc.
A performance monitoring and reporting system and plan anchored with well researched and appointed, high level impact indicators relevant to building core public administration skills across the major levels of government – nationally and sub-nationally, and supported by a succinct set of monitoring indicators that adequately describe progress	Contractor's revised LOP and annual work plans include negotiated and agreed set of deliverables as well as progress and impact indicators appropriately derived from the same analytical structure that guides the objective institutional assessments of beneficiary agencies
A streamlined project team, innovatively organized to achieve the following:	Contractor proposal or LOP work plan to propose a streamlined project team
Timely, objective and participative institutional assessments	Contractor to assess experiences and lessons learned to-date with the modified DOSA protocol; consider other relevant assessment protocols; and recommend/justify in Contractor proposal or revised LOP work plan a selected approach most relevant to the revised objective

Identification of critical skills deficits constraining improved performance of core functions, and prioritization of those deficits with key decision-makers	Contractor's institutional assessments to demonstrate a key focus on building sustainable capacity to build capacity, accentuating targeted public administration skills development
Well articulated, cooperatively implemented capacity development interventions	Contractor's institutional assessments to demonstrate a participative process and key focus on building sustainable capacity to build capacity
Verifiable sustainability of relevant elements of interventions	Contractor implementation plans to include a sustainability plan and strategy
Relatively smooth transitions from one US Mission to another	Mission and Contractor to develop and agree on a joint strategy for managing US mission transitions. Out-going CTO will refer in-coming CTO and relevant in-coming Mission staff to the agreed plan.
A tightly focused participant training program	Contractor to process only CDP participant training requests. Contractor to reassess staff requirements of the refocused design, and discuss in revised LOP work plan and FY09 work plan. Mission to advise formally all IPs of change in CDP participant training program focus
Streamlined activity reporting	Contractor and CTO to review current reporting stream and jointly agree on final set of reports. Options may include folding 4th quarter report into annual report; deleting portfolio review report; and substantially restructured use of the CDP Portal to serve as much more than a positron for old reports. For example, with the addition of an access database, the Portal may be used as a (quasi) real-time database of key project information; reports; and a platform for streaming field reports.
More efficient work planning development and approval process	Contractor and CTO to review past experiences with core reporting and approvals, and determine opportunities for saving time and level of effort. For example, reaching agreement upon an outline; and then upon an annotated outline before drafting a major report could save time, energy and the frustrations that naturally result from heavily iterating large reports. Contractor to propose other options. Use of the portal as indicated above may also facilitate more effective, timely reviews and approvals. CTO to promote Mission engagement in work plan approvals to help ensure synergy with other TOs.
A well researched, enhanced and resourced group of local private sector and NGO technical assistance and training and capacity development providers, marketed and available to all USAID IPs and targeted beneficiary agencies	The STU has a database of local training providers; and the NGO program is expanding the pool, which should be eventually included in the STU database. Contractor has noted the lack of a dedicated budget to STU for activities of this nature, but may not have proposed discrete activities for STU to implement in support of strengthening training providers. Contractor to assess experiences to-date with local providers and STU's approaches to supporting them; and formulate a proposal for the CTO based upon this assessment.
A well managed, timely transition out of non-core DG activities not approved for continuation	Contractor to negotiate the details of a transition plan with relevant USAID TOs and beneficiary agencies; and discuss the draft plan with the CTO. Contractor to finalize the transition plan as an attachment to the revised LOP work plan and FY09 final work plan.

Verifiable application of modern human resource management protocols, including merit recruitment and development of qualified team members	The qualifications of a streamlined management and implementation team will be critical to achieving success of a refocused CDP. The need for high-level expatriate skills must be carefully balanced with the desire for Afghanization of the staff. Staff Afghanization must be driven by the demonstrable application of the same kinds of modern HRM protocols that CDP *itself* is proffering to its clients. Anything less than this will trigger unnecessary and detrimental "back firing" among the program staff, across the beneficiary community, and possibly beyond the program.
An appropriate level of synergy with USAID's host country certification process, addressing program management, financial management, auditing, and procurement capabilities of targeted host country agencies	Contractor to review USAID Handbook guidance and background material on the Agency's host country certification processes for host country agreements. Contractor and CTO to discuss with Mission Controller, Legal Advisor, Contracting Officer and ____ (add whoever assesses the project management capacity), to explain the nature and extent of its current activities in program budgeting, internal auditing, procurement planning/management. Mission staff to reciprocate in explaining the HCC process, and its current HCC activities. Determine plausible linkages and synergies. Summarize in writing. If positive, Contractor to integrate into activity work plans and quarterly reports. Determine any special reporting requirements.
Key lessons learned are regularly collected, analyzed, reported and incorporated in follow-on planning, as appropriate	Contractor highlights key, relevant lessons learned in quarterly/annual reports and illustratively demonstrates how they are being applied in work plans (and activity implementation plans?)
Important elements of "transitioning activities" are monitored for impact performance and reporting	As part of transition planning, USAID and CDP should discuss and agree upon which elements of the transition program may require continued monitoring and PMP reporting.
Key oversight structures (e.g., advisory and steering groups) are determined and, if positive, established with clear terms of reference, leadership responsibilities, and reporting relationships	USAID to determine the viability of a steering committee or other internal structure. Optionally, a cross-cutting team might include capacity development on its standing agenda

Annex C: List of Persons with whom the Assessment Team Met

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

Dr. Ahmad Moshahed, Chair, Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission
Ms. Rahela Hashim Sidiqi, Senior Advisor to the Chairman, Chairman of the Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service Commission
Prof. Sheraqa Jorat, Rector of Afghanistan Civil Service Institute
Mr. Noorullah Zaheer, Head of Design and Delivery, Afghanistan Civil Service Institute
Dr. Abdul Jalil Shams, Minister of Economy
Mr. Mohammad Omer Zakhilwal, Senior Economic Advisor to H.E. the President
Mr. Waheedullah Shahrani, Deputy Finance, Ministry of Finance.
Mr. Barna Karimi, Deputy Director General, Independent Directorate for Local Governance
Mr. Muhammad Suleman Kakar, Deputy Minister of Education
Ms. Farahnaz, Director of Provincial Affairs, Ministry of Education
Prof. M. Osman Babury, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Higher Education
Prof. Mohammad Sharif Sharifi, Auditor General (AG), Control and Audit Office
Mr. Ershad Ahmadi, Deputy Director General, High Office of Oversight
Dr. Ahmad Jan Naeem, General Director of Policy and Planning of Ministry of Public Health

USAID

Mr. Michael Yates, Mission Director
Mr. Charles "Chuck" Drilling, Deputy Mission Director
Mr. Peter Argo, Deputy Mission Director
Ms. Jatinder Cheema, Ph.D, Senior Program Officer
Ms. Elizabeth Chambers, Controller, Office of Financial Management
Mr. Jose Garzon, Director, Democracy and Governance
Ms. Tanya Urquieta, CTO/CDP, Office of Democracy and Governance
Ms. Jami Spykerman, Sub-National Governance Specialist, Office of Democracy & Governance
Ms. Theodora Dell, ANDS Advisor
Ms. Kimberly Rosen, Office Director, Economic Growth Office
Ms. Erin Nicholson Pacific, Deputy Director, Economic Growth Office
Ms. Elinor B. Bachrach, Senior Private Sector Advisor, Economic Growth Office
Ms. Aleksandra Braginski, Director, Office of Social Sector Development
Ms. Heather Smith, Deputy Director, Office of Social Sector Development
Ms. Kimberly Lucas, Ph.D., Deputy Director, Alternative Development and Agriculture
Mr. Craig Anderson, Deputy Director, Office of Infrastructure, Engineering and Energy
Ms. Mary Fontaine, Cross-Cutting Issues Advisor
Mr. Herbie Smith, Program Director, Provincial Reconstruction Team
Mr. Mark Parkison, Deputy Director, PRT Program
Ms. Sarah-Ann Lynch, Director, Office of Program and Development
Ms. Dorothy Mazaka, Development Advisor, Regional Command South
Mr. Erik Pacific, PRT Coordinator
Mr. Lane Smith, Afghanistan Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Mr. Jerry Kryschtal, Contracts Officer, Bangkok

USA EMBASSY/AFGHANISTAN

Mr. Greg Chapman, US Political Advisor, NATO Regional Command South

CDP IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

Mr. Kami Rahbani, Chief of Party
Mr. Steven H. Stull, Deputy Chief of Party/Administrator
Mr. J. Wright, Chief Technical Advisor
Ms. Leah April, Director, Public Sector Program
Ms. Carla Rosa O. Rosa Borges, Director, Private and NGO Sector
Mr. John Shumaker, Education Program Director
Mr. Borni Borni, Internal Audit Advisor
Ms. Arti Duggal, Acting Team Lead, Scholarship & Training Unit
Mr. Bill Millsop, Monitoring & Evaluation Coordinator
Mr. Ridwan Rahman, Sub-National Governance Advisor
Ms. Mina Sherzoy, Deputy Director, Workforce Development Center
Mr. Gordon Yurich, Financial Management Team Leader
Mr. Allen Decker, Team Leader ACSI/Public Sector Training
Mr. Qaudir Ameryar, Advisor to the Ministry of Higher Education
Mr. David Craig, HR Team Leader
Rayhana Kamal, Executive Assistant, NGO Sector USAID/CDP

OTHER STAKEHOLDERS/OBSERVERS

Ambassador Sardar Roshan, Executive Director, Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute
Mr. Alan Whaites, Governance Advisor, Department for International Development (DFID)
Mr. Zlatko Hurtic, Aid Effectiveness Advisor, DFID/Adam Smith International
Mr. Roger Calhoun, Team Leader, DFID/Adam Smith International
Mr. Paul Lundberg, Manager, Afghanistan Sub-National Governance Program, UNDP
Mr. Kumlachew Aberra, Project Manager, Civil Service Leadership Development, UNDP
Mr. Nigel Coulson, Senior Public Sector Specialist, South Asia Region, World Bank
Mr. Paul Sisk, Financial Management Specialist, South Asia Region, World Bank
Mr. Manish Kumar, Advisor to the Auditor General, World Bank
Mr. Erwan Marteil, Head of Sector – Governance, Rule of Law, European Commission
Mr. Anton Stemberger, Attaché – Public Administration Reform, European Commission
Mr. Patrick O'Mahony, Chief of Party, Local Governance and Community Development

NGO REPRESENTATIVES:

Dr. Noor Khanum Ahmadzai, TDH Mother & Child Project Manager
Munawar Shah, Admin/Finance Manager, Social Volunteers Foundation
Hossai Andar Member of Board Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI)
Ghezal Rahimi, Senior Human Resource Officer, Bakhtar Development Network (BDN)
Friba Ludin, Education Manager, Afghanistan Institute of Learning (AIL)
Dr. Massoud, Care of Afghan Families (CAF)
Dr. Asif Gheyasi, Care of Afghan Families (CAF)
Torpikay Noori, Deputy Director of Afghan Women Union
Dr. Yasamin Yousufzai, Program Development Manger, Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan (AADA)

Annex D: List of References

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Annex E: Questionnaires Used in the Interviews

Public Sector

1. How are capacity building needs, initiatives, and impacts within your ministry being identified, planned, coordinated and assessed – both at the national and sub-national levels?

2. In order of priority (e.g., funding, duration, technical focus areas, etc.), which other international donors are currently supporting capacity development within your ministry? What unique attributes of assistance from XX (donors) makes their assistance your top priority capacity development provider?

3. What have been the most valuable (3 – 5) contributions of CDP to capacity development, including direct and indirect assistance, and what, in particular, makes these contributions stand out?

4. How does CDP assistance compare to other capacity development activities in terms of, responsiveness to your needs, approach to management, and contribution to improved performance in your ministry?

5. What are the most prominent, general measures of improved performance within your ministry that demonstrate sustainable benefits from capacity development initiatives?

6. What are the priority (3 – 5) but unmet capacity development needs in your ministry and what are your plans for addressing these needs?

7. How will addressing these priority needs impact the performance of your ministry?

8. A recent management review of USAID's Capacity Development Project concluded that it needed a tighter focus, both in terms of (a) the number of client categories it supports (i.e., ministries, NGOs, private sector and higher education); and (b) an overarching theme to guide the selection of activities. In light of this, what would you envision as the most relevant theme for achieving a tighter focus for CDP's work within the public sector, and what is the strongest rationale for inclusion of your ministry in a potentially smaller group of ministerial clients?

NGOs

1. How are capacity building needs, initiatives, and impacts within your particular NGO and your NGO sub-sector community being identified, planned, coordinated and assessed?

2. In order of priority (e.g., funding, duration, technical focus areas, etc.), which other international donors are currently supporting capacity development within your particular NGO and your NGO sub-sector community? What unique attributes of assistance from XX (donors) makes their assistance your top priority capacity development provider?

3. What have been the most valuable (3 – 5) contributions of CDP to capacity development in your particular NGO and your NGO sub-sector community, including direct and indirect assistance, and what, in particular, makes these contributions stand out?

4. How does CDP assistance to your NGO sub-sector community compare to other capacity development activities in terms of, responsiveness to your needs, approach to management, and contribution to improved performance in your areas?

5. What are the most prominent, general measures of improved performance within your particular NGO and other NGOs in your sub-sector community that demonstrate sustainable benefits from capacity development initiatives?

6. What are the priority (3 – 5) but unmet capacity development needs in your particular NGO and your NGO sub-sector community and what are the plans for addressing these needs?

7. How will addressing these priority needs impact performance of NGOs within your sub-sector community?

8. A recent management review of USAID's Capacity Development Project concluded that it needed a tighter focus, both in terms of (a) the number of client categories it supports (i.e., ministries, NGOs, private sector and higher education); and (b) an overarching theme to guide the selection of activities. In light of this, what would you envision as the most relevant theme for achieving a tighter focus for CDP's work within these client categories and within the NGO sector?

<u>Private Sector</u>

1. How are capacity building needs, initiatives, and impacts within your sector areas being identified, planned, coordinated and assessed?

2. In order of priority (e.g., funding, duration, technical focus areas, etc.), which other international donors are currently supporting capacity development within your sector areas? What unique attributes of assistance from XX (donors) makes their assistance your top priority capacity development provider?

3. What have been the most valuable (3 – 5) contributions of CDP to capacity development in your private sector community, including direct and indirect assistance, and what, in particular, makes these contributions stand out?

4. How does CDP assistance across your community compare to other capacity development activities in terms of, responsiveness to your needs, approach to management, and contribution to improved performance in your areas?

5. What are the most prominent, general measures of improved performance within your community in your sub-sector that demonstrate sustainable benefits from capacity development initiatives?

6. What are the priority (3 – 5) but unmet capacity development needs in your private sector areas and what are the plans for addressing these needs?

7. How will addressing these priority needs impact performance of your community?

8. A recent management review of USAID's Capacity Development Project concluded that it needed a tighter focus, both in terms of (a) the number of client categories it supports (i.e., ministries, NGOs, private sector and higher education); and (b) an overarching theme to guide the selection of activities. In light of this, what would you envision as the most relevant theme for achieving a tighter focus for CDP's work across these client categories and within the private sector?

Higher Education

1. How are capacity building needs, initiatives, and impacts within your institutions being identified, planned, coordinated and assessed?

2. In order of priority (e.g., funding, duration, technical focus areas, etc.), which other international donors are currently supporting capacity development within your sector areas? What unique attributes of assistance from XX (donors) makes their assistance your top priority capacity development provider?

3. What have been the most valuable (3 – 5) contributions of CDP to capacity development in your private sector community, including direct and indirect assistance, and what, in particular, makes these contributions stand out?

4. How does CDP assistance to capacity development among higher education institutions compare to other capacity development activities in terms of, responsiveness to your needs, approach to management, and contribution to improved institutional performance?

5. What are the most prominent, general measures of improved performance within the higher education community that demonstrate sustainable benefits from capacity development initiatives?

6. What are the priority (3 – 5) but unmet capacity development needs in your institutions and across the higher education community, and what are the plans for addressing these needs?

7. How will addressing these priority needs impact performance of higher education institutions?

8. A recent management review of USAID's Capacity Development Project concluded that it needed a tighter focus, both in terms of (a) the number of client categories it supports (i.e., ministries, NGOs, private sector and higher education); and (b) an overarching theme to guide the selection of activities. In light of this, what would you envision as the most relevant theme for achieving a tighter focus for CDP's work across these client categories and within the higher education

community? What is the strongest rationale for inclusion of clients within your community in a potentially smaller group of clients?

Participant Training

1. To date, what is the percentage allocation of participants processed through your unit (a) across the public, private, NGO, and higher education sectors; and (b) across USAID SO areas and partners?

2. What have been the rates of participants' return (from overseas training/education) and retention (within the sponsoring institution), e.g., 6 - 12 months following completion of training?

3. What is the nature, extent and duration of your follow-up initiatives; and what are the overall conclusions to date?

4. What have been the most problematic issues in managing USAID's participant training program?

5. What is the percentage allocation of funding for participant training between CDP funds and non-CDP funds?

6. What might be the impact on the Participant Training Unit if it was only required to process participants being funded solely with CDP funds, i.e., only from USAID's Democracy and Governance team and no funds from other SO teams? (Assume a continuation of the same levels of CDP funding noted in #5 above)

Annex F: CDP Review - Statement of Work

STATEMENT OF WORK

ANALYSIS OF USAID'S CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (CDP) WITH A VIEW TOWARDS PROVIDING PROGRAMMATIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO REFOCUS CDP ON THE MOST CRITICAL NEEDS IN CONSULTATION WITH THE USAID MISSION AND THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

I. OBJECTIVE:

The objective of the analysis is to assess USAID's Capacity Development Program in coordination with the Government of Afghanistan with a view towards refocusing CDP. For each area identified, specific findings and targeted recommendations should be made.

II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT:

Since 2002, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan ("GIRoA") and the international community have focused on supporting the establishment of national government structures, education and health systems, civil society and private-sector economy in Afghanistan. However, the GIoRA and USAID appreciate the need to shift program focus away from emergency reconstruction towards developing Afghan capacity to plan and manage the economic and social development process over the long-term.

Most Afghan institutions – be they public, private or non-profit, have made tangible progress, however, much remains to be done. Priority capacity building institutions (e.g. universities, government training institutes, training non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") and professional associations) need to strengthen their own capacity in order to become sustainable providers of capacity building services throughout the economy.

The objective of the Afghan Capacity Development Program, as originally designed, was to obtain services and specified deliverables to support and contribute to the achievement of the Mission's strategic objectives to: promote democratic government with broad citizen participation, create a thriving economy led by the private sector, promote a better educated and healthier population, and enhance Mission development results by:

a) Building near-term capacity directly within target institutions, e.g. select line ministries, businesses, and universities;

b) Strengthening Afghan capacity building institutions in the public-private, NGO and educational sectors that will allow Afghans to provide sustained capacity building over the long term; and

c) Developing a critical mass of Afghans trained in management and other skills through training, technical assistance and participant training.

The CDP program was originally designed to address specific capacity building needs not met through USAID sector projects or those of other donors. The CDP program seeks to complement or supplement other efforts- planned or underway. Its original intent was to fill gaps that remain unaddressed.

A recent audit, in April 2008, specified the following findings and recommendations to the Mission, specifically that USAID/Afghanistan analyze the current needs of the institutional sectors of Afghanistan society and make a determination as to the focus of this capacity development program. The USAID Mission needs to efficiently focus the CDP Program on the most critical needs.

Many of the program's problems originated with the contract, which is broad, ambitious, cumbersome, and often confusing. Specifically, the scope of the program lacked a systematic theme and, as a result, there were five separate themes with five separate objectives. The mission and BearingPoint spent a considerable amount of time in the first fiscal year trying to bring structure to the program and make sense of the contract.

While achievements were made, we believe a complete rewrite of section C ("statement of work") of the contract is probably necessary and, at a minimum, a major reorganization is necessary so that the contract and work plan structures become aligned, synergies are created among the components, and duplication of efforts are minimized both within the program itself, as well as, with other USAID programs.

The audit also pointed out the huge dependence on expatriate staff to implement this program. While this may be necessary at the beginning of the program, the mission and BearingPoint should be looking for ways to decrease the number in succeeding years. A clear phase-out plan for moving to Afghan consultants is needed.

Furthermore, the mission's decision to bring the mission's capacity building efforts under one umbrella contract resulted in an overwhelming task for one CTO to manage. The mission needs to apply more resources to this critical and complex program or reduce the scope of the contract and redirect some activities to more appropriate technical offices.

A key concept underlying USAID's managing for results is for a mission to assess the impact of activity it designs. To do this, a mission should have previously defined what the activity is intended to accomplish, how the various inputs should work together to achieve the desired results, and how these results will be measured. This key concept of designing how the inputs should work together in achieving the desired results is most critical under the Capacity Development Program because of the mission's broad statement of objectives coupled with the type of contract it chose to implement this activity. Also, during the activity planning stage, the mission did not give close consideration to how this program would work most efficiently to complement the activities in place across each of the mission's program areas.

The Capacity Development Program was designed to be a cross-cutting technical assistance program that addressed specific capacity building needs not met by other USAID programs and that supported capacity building activities in every sector of the mission.

For that reason, the program was structured around five components: (1) public sector, (2) private sector, (3) NGOs, (4) Higher Education, and (5) participant training. These five components have essentially become five separate programs with different objectives and themes as laid out in the contract.

While each component was uniquely designed to target a specific audience, it soon became apparent that they were, in fact, very duplicative, not only with the other components but also with other mission programs. Duplication also existed between the CDP program and other USAID programs

The mission and BearingPoint both realized this and made a number of changes such as paring down components and consolidating others. Yet, because of the scope of the contract, it still remains largely unfocused and too loosely-connected, which decreases its overall impact in developing capacity. As a result, activities in the scope of work and work plan are no longer in agreement.

Both the mission and BearingPoint believe that the program needs to be better defined and focused as capacity building is critical to the Afghanistan government. In a June 2008 news show on Afghan television, numerous Afghan officials commented on the lack of capacity in the government and how this was hindering the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Therefore, the mission needs to make critical decisions as soon as possible in order to give proper direction to this program and achieve the desired results.

III. CURRENT CDP WORK PLAN STRUCTURE

USAID is currently supporting the CDP program through a $218 million five-year contract. The contract (No. 306-C-00-07-00508-00) was awarded to BearingPoint in February 2007 and is set to expire February 2011.

BearingPoint's assistance under the contract has transformed itself through the work plan development with two objectives: 1) Strengthening Government/Strengthening the Public Sector; and 2) Strengthening the Workforce through Strengthening Targeted Sectors. The first component consists of a strengthening the capacity of government institutions to provide better services to the citizens of Afghanistan. A major portion of CDP's institutional capacity building efforts focus on increasing the capacities of public sector institutions. Currently, CDP is doing approximately 20 different types of activities in 17 different ministries including annual payment of 400 salaries. The second component of the contract entails promoting the private sector workforce development and training 150 top of the line NGOS so that they benefit from the current period of donor-led growth.

IV. TASKS:

The review and analysis need to focus on areas where assistance is needed and makes the most political and strategic sense.

The review and analysis should answer the following:

1. How should USAID/Afghanistan refocus components 1 (public sector) and 2 (private sector and NGOS)?
2. What are the priorities of the GIoRA within the context of the Afghan National Development Strategy ("ANDS"), the Capacity Development Strategy, and institutional reforms (Civil Service Reform etc.) with reference to component 1 of the contract?
3. Should CDP focus on all Ministries or focus on key priority Ministries? For example the Ministry of Finance, Civil Service Commission, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Education (responsible for capacity building?) If the latter, what criteria should be used to prioritize? For ex. those Ministries with the biggest procurement budget in hopes to position them for eventual bidding on international solicitations? Does the USAID mission have sector priorities? (Example: Construction, public works, education etc.)
4. How will future programming *build* lasting capacity instead of *buy* temporary capacity?
5. How would future programming play off the strengths and respond to the weaknesses of current programming?
6. How will CDP Afghanize (transfer capacity to national advisors to take over capacity-building efforts?)
7. What areas/Ministries are being covered by other donors? What are priority gaps for CDP?
8. What specific management and organizational systems need to be modified, and how might this be done to improve performance? Recommendations should be identified within a 24 month timeframe with priority areas identified and followed by secondary areas.
9. What specific capacity building skills and management systems have been introduced to government institutions and to what extent have these been effective?
10. Can skill levels be evaluated to determine where the gaps and types of training needed?
11. What other important issues emerged during the review and analysis exercise that may be outside the scope of this exercise, but that ought to be addressed nonetheless elsewhere in other analyses, evaluations, or programming?
12. What should the explicit objective(s)/results be of future assistance within the scope (as defined by the GIoRA) and what is the roadmap for USAID/CDP to get there?
13. What should the explicit activities be of future assistance within the scope a view towards being responsive to the recent audit in the areas of public sector, NGOs and private sector? (Should private sector be picked up by new procurements of economics office? Should 150 NGOs graduate after their training is completed? (Can one not carve off the top of the line x number of NGOs and accelerate them

through all modules this year so they can train the other NGOs or administer sub-grants (Afghanization))?

14. What is the political will of the priority institutions/beneficiaries and how does that contribute to the strategic choices being recommended (ex. which ministries should we work in, continue to work in, remove from our assistance especially given likely changes in Key counterparts).

V. TEAM COMPOSITION

The team will need to be comprised of two US consultants and two Afghans specialized in areas such as public management/administration and workforce development/capacity building. One high level expatriate with eight to ten years of experience in international development, including relevant facilitator/consensus-building skills/stakeholder analysis, is required. The team will also include a qualified U.S. technical advisor to assist the team and draft the recommendations and draft the revised design. At least one of the expatriate team members must have prior experience working in Afghanistan.

USAID requests a total of one week of consulting in Washington and/or Afghanistan at the beginning and end of the analysis of Joseph Lombardo, Capacity Building Design Consultant, to brief the team on ongoing and planned capacity – building efforts at USAID/Afghanistan and to assist in crafting the final recommendations.

VI. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE / LOE

The review and analysis should take place over a period of 45 working days, all except for two days of consultations in Washington of which will be spent in Afghanistan. Each expatriate team (except for Mr. Lombardo) member and Afghan national will provide 45 days of LOE. The start date is o/a October 8, 2008.

For Mr. Lombardo, we request approximately 7 workdays, 2 at the outset in the U.S., and 5 towards the end of the process in Afghanistan.

The Mission authorizes a six day work week for this activity.

VII. METHODOLOGY:

The analysis and review of CDP program should include a review of the programmatic progress reports, project implementation methodology, data results collected and analyses conducted by the project.

In addition, the analysis should include a review of on-going USAID's capacity building programs. Using the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) as a guide and framework, the facilitators should engage in a consultative process with the key Ministries of the GIoRA (TBD by Mission) to prioritize in which ministries CDP should focus its capacity building efforts, establish desired results in capacity-building for the next 2- 5 years, and the road map to reach those results in the short- to mid-term (next 2-5 years). This will include focus groups, and meetings with GIoRA staff, and interviews

with key stakeholders (USAID staff, CDP project staff, donors institutions linked with the project, and key GIoRA counterparts).

The SUPPORT project and the CDP Cognizant Technical Officer will be provided relevant reports and studies, including the CDP contract, ANDS, etc. that will aid this review and analysis.

USAID/Afghanistan recommends that the team divides up whenever possible in conducting interviews, etc. to optimize on resources and overall LOE. In the light of the fact that two Afghan consultants will be part of the team, USAID deems this feasible.

VII. DELIVERABLES:

All work under this purchase order should be completed on or before November 23, 2008, in accordance with the delivery schedule that follows.

Initial Analysis, which will include methodology to guide input from keys stakeholders and participants in the organization and a schedule for data collection: four days after the team's arrival in Afghanistan.

1. Initial briefing with Front Office, Office of Democracy and Governance (ODG) and Program Office: within one day after arrival in country.
2. Initial briefings with Office Directors related to capacity building needs, ongoing activities, and future planned activities in different USAID sectors.
3. Initial briefings with ODG and CDP BearingPoint staff.
4. Briefing with T. Dell on ANDS within first 3 days.
5. Work plan of in country work presented for approval to CTO and ODG within 7 working days after arriving in country.
6. Briefings/focus groups/stakeholder's analysis with key GIoRA government counterparts within second week (TBD by USAID)
7. Briefing and feedback on the team's preliminary insights/findings presented to USAID on October 23, 2008.
8. Another follow up brief to USAID on November 4 or 5.
9. Due November 12: A draft final report clearly stipulating recommendations on how to refocus CDP as recommended by the audit regarding components #1 of CDP with a reference to political implications of push back by Ministries that may be scaled back; plus a recommendation on how the USAID/Afghanistan Mission should address capacity building in the different sectors beyond CDP, and a separate section with recommendations on what to do with Component #2 of CDP (the private sector work and NGO capacity work). This should have clearly stated results to be achieved in capacity building in the 2-5 year range, and define the roadmap for getting us there.
10. Due November 15: Draft rewrite of Components 1 and 2 of Section C of the CDP BearingPoint Contract in line with recommendations to refocus CDP, a separate monitoring and evaluation plan using results framework, and indicators.
11. USAID comments on draft report (item 9) due back to team by November 17, 2008.

12. Presentation of a final report to key USAID staff and other stakeholders and submission of all deliverables by November 23.

VIII. REPORTING FORMAT/STRUCTURE

Format of the Report

Table of Contents laying out the sections and pages on which respective sections begin.

1. Executive Summary stating the purpose of the review and analysis along with methodology, findings, conclusions and recommendations and future design.
2. Main body providing a more in-depth treatment of the executive summary sections (not to exceed 70 pages, including the Executive Summary).
3. Recommendations for refocusing CDP's components 1 and 2 – tailored to addressing the concerns and recommendations by the audit team.
4. Identify clear results desired for the CDP program (next 2-5 years) and the roadmap to get there.
5. General recommendations for addressing capacity building as a cross-cutting issue for the USAID/Afghanistan Mission.
6. Draft rewrite of Components 1 and 2 of Section C of the CDP contract, with a separate monitoring and evaluation plan within the framework, and an indicator set for measuring progress.
7. Draft Action Memo for Mission Management Decision on refocusing of CDP.
8. Annexes providing names of people interviewed, questions asked, including organizational affiliations, locations visited, and other information as appropriate.