

Evaluation of CRD and NUPI

USAID Uganda

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List of abbreviations and acronyms

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
APF	Acholi Peace Forum
AVSI	Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale
BMJ	British Medical Journal
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CBHC	Community Based Health Care Program
CBO	Community Based Organization
CHA	Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
CPMR	Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CVC	Community Volunteer Counselor/ Caregiver
DA	Development Assistance
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCA	Democratic Christian Army
DCOF	Displaced Children and Orphans Fund
DNH	Do No Harm
DRPT	District Reconciliation and Peace Team
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
FAP	Formerly Abducted Persons
FURA	Foundation for Urban and Rural Advancement
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GoU	Government of Uganda
HSMF	Holy Spirit Movement Front
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IEC	Information, Education, and Communication
IR	Intermediary Result
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
JFP	Kitgum Joint Forum for Peace
KOCISONET	Koboko Civil Society Network
KRRC	Kabarole Research and Resource Center
LC	Local Council
LDUs	Local Defense Units
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
LSA	Lord Salvation Army
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEMS	Monitoring and Evaluation Management Services
MoH	Ministry of Health
MSI	Management Services International
NAYODE	National Youth Organization for Development
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUPF	Northern Uganda Peace Forum
NUPI	Northern Uganda Peace Initiative

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OFDA	US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PADCO	Planning & Development Collaborative International
PEAP	Revised Poverty Eradication Action Plan
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief
PHC	Public Health Care
PLWHA	People Living With HIV/AIDS
PPF	Pader Peace Forum
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
REDSO	Regional Economic Development Services Office for Eastern and Southern Africa
RfA	Request for Application
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SCIU	Save the Children Uganda
SLA	Saving and Lending Association
SME	Small and Medium Enterprises
SO	Strategic Objective
SoW	Statement of Work
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UNLA	Uganda National Liberation Army
UPDA	Uganda People's Democratic Army
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Force (former NRA)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VoT	Victims of Torture
WHO	World Health Organization
WFP	World Food Program

Executive Summary

Introduction

The purpose of the evaluation is to focus on the two programs, CRD (Community Resilience and Dialogue Program) and NUPI (Northern Uganda Peace Initiative) to analyze the relevance of existing conflict components as related to the programs, map out areas in which USAID/Uganda had a comparative advantage and appraise the effectiveness of programming options made. Furthermore, recommendations for core program interventions under the Uganda Mission's Peace and Security Objective are given.

The evaluation used a combination of conflict mapping workshops, direct observation, interviews, and document review. The conflict mapping workshops were held in four locations: Kampala, Kasese in West-Uganda, Gulu in Northern Uganda and Arua in West-Nile. The field assessment was carried out from 12/03 to 30/03/2007 with a total of more than 230 interviewed informants, including local government officials, representatives from CBOs (Community Based Organizations), agency staff, beneficiaries and traditional authorities.

The workshops underlined the variety of regional conflict settings in Northern Uganda, whereas the root causes for violence and insurgency were mainly based on the same factors. These included the artificial borders and violent ruling structures set up by the former colonial powers, cultural and ethnical differences and a lack of regional interaction, the ongoing and unresolved situation of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in Northern Uganda, political mistrust and discontent that evoke rebel movements and the devastating situation of Human Rights in the country. Growing tensions between northern and southern Uganda, due to a perception of economic exclusion and political as well as social marginalization were identified as potential causes of future conflict.

Drivers for peace were connected to the ongoing Juba peace talks between Government of Uganda (GoU) and LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the democratization process (although dissatisfaction with the government was widely expressed) and with the increasing international presence in, and awareness, about the country.

USAID's Intervention

USAID has responded to conflicts in Uganda since the 1980s. USAID's program in Uganda contributes to the Revised Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is Uganda's comprehensive development framework. The USAID/Uganda Integrated Strategic Plan 2002-2007 supported Uganda's focus on poverty alleviation as articulated in the PEAP. Within the framework of the *Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for FY 2002-2007*, USAID Uganda commissioned a *Democracy, Governance and Conflict Strategic Assessment for Uganda* in 2000. Based on the findings, the Mission defined the Request for Applications for the Uganda Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) program in 2002. The program goal was to mitigate and reduce the impact of conflict in affected areas of Uganda.¹ In addition, based on another recommendation of the strategic assessment, USAID decided to support a complementary program targeting the national dimension of the conflict, especially the LRA – GoU conflict, and launched the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI). In 2004 NUPI started with the aim of preparing the GoU Presidential Peace Team for peace talks and confidence building measures with the LRA.

¹ Results Framework SO9 - More Effective and Participatory Governance - IR 9.2 Conflict Mitigated and Reduced.

Impact Assessment

CRD

CRD as a five year program, was proposed in April 2002, awarded in September 2002, and will finish on the 31/08/2007. Headed by the International Rescue Committee and implemented through a consortium of five international NGOs - Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), and Save the Children in Uganda (SCiU) - the CRD has worked with district authorities, local NGOs, and national NGOs. During the five years of implementation, it became necessary to modify the plan 16 times. The main reason for these modifications was the increase in the amount from \$ 12,431,116 to the final amount of \$15,552,889. The CA was modified to incremental fund it as yearly funds become available; expand its geographic reach; include new funding such as Trafficking in Persons (TIP); and continue the mandate with reception centers – when addition funds were obtained by the USAID Mission. The program was conceived as a post-conflict intervention in four ‘more or less’ stable geographical areas with three main objectives: HIV/AIDS, psychosocial support, peace building and economical support. Components of CRD are – Community Resilience and Psychosocial Support; Dialogue, Peace Building and Human Rights; HIV/AIDS; Program Quality (Capacity Building). A key strategy of the project was to multiply the efforts of other service providers to ensure their impact was increased; CRD awarded 118 sub-grants and collaborated with 62 local partners. The major findings for the assessment of CRD include:

- CRD strengthened the competitiveness of Service Providers (Sub-sub grantees). The trainings and capacity building activities with staff from local organizations have enabled these organizations to improve their management and accountability capacities and thereby improved their position for competitive budget acquisition in the development sector.

- USAID or CRD were not always recognized as the resource-provider; often the consortium member was seen as the deliverer of the resources. Beneficiaries were not always aware of the background of the activities or the objective of CRD, neither was there a general awareness about USAID's role as a donor to the program.

- Overall positive output for the beneficiaries through locally adapted structures and accepted local partners. The needs identified were real and the responses provided were consistent with the context. Furthermore the consortium made an effort to use local structures closer to the final beneficiaries and to support partners highly involved with the communities.

- Strengthening of a ‘non-governmental organization (NGO) middle-class’ was an unintended consequence of the program.

Uganda suffers chronically from this little noticed phenomenon as NGOs act as recipient of funds to transform them into activities. Due to the amount of external aid received, some NGOs are being outstandingly supported and have transformed in several cases into a type of business organization. CRD should have paid more attention to this challenge especially in a context in which NGOs are the sole service providers.

- Short-term activities had no significant impact on the ground.

Some *ad hoc* activities, e.g. conferences or radio programs, were not part of a wider strategy and did not achieve significant impact. A few other activities were financed for too short time to lead to a real change (see below).

- Merging of different objectives and strict financial constraints led to agglomeration of activities without a clear strategy. The Psychosocial support for example became an overarching

component financing many different activities, sometimes loosely related just because the component was receiving the highest financial contribution. The amount allocated was not based on needs assessment but on financial availability.

- The lack of income generating activities (IGAs) reduced the outcome of all components of the program. Some vulnerable groups need IGAs in order to fully participate in any reconciliation or development process. IGAs could have provided them with the resources needed to be positively engaged in their community and family life as was for example the case in the HIV/AIDS component of the program.

NUPI

NUPI was recognized as an inter-agency US Government initiative under the leadership of the American Ambassador to Uganda, with support from USAID and the State Department in Washington DC. An estimated overall duration of 24 months was originally planned. The program underwent many changes and resulted in several Option Periods with an overall implementing time up to April 2007. The End of Activity Report lists 135 deliverables. The major findings for the assessment of NUPI include:

- Strengthening of local and interregional dialogue and reconciliation structure had a positive - however limited - impact.

The program successfully built upon existing structures and supported them in the most appropriate way for an external actor such as NUPI: provision of logistical and facilitation support accompanied by research and media related activities.

- The structure in its present state does not yet link the grass root level to the national level. It is seen as a rather politicized structure and community members are not sufficiently represented. NUPI was seen as working too close to, or with the government.

- Objective of national reconciliation and efforts to campaign for it did not match. NUPI could not achieve the buy-in from civil society which is crucial for national reconciliation. NUPI did not allow the program to establish longer term and deeper relationships with CBOs, to build capacity and to work in a more sustainable way.

- The main weakness of the program lies in the lack of viability and ownership by local actors and institutions.

Furthermore NUPI depended on government structures which have a low capacity in the regions under discussion. This approach was in line with the original USAID assessment of the conflict situation, which justified high-risk interventions with less sustainable outcomes.

- Strengthening of interregional dialogue and exchange had positive impact, however, it was limited in depth and duration. A significant number of supporting events and measures were undertaken successfully (e. g. chief's tour, research and issue papers).

- The implementation of peace building activities at a local level included special activities with women and contributed to the creation of a 'return friendly' environment for LRA fighters. However, other, much stronger factors of influence must be mentioned in this regard and had a stronger impact on the conflict. NUPI activities were very broad and scattered, which reduced impact.

Conclusions

Looking at the main goals of both programs - CRD and NUPI - the assessment comes to the following conclusions:

- Some activities carried out by both programs have increased awareness of issues and this conversely has increased the demands of the local population. In the context of North Uganda, where the government is not ready to address all the demands, ongoing support is needed so that the achievements acquired are not reversed.
- USAID's continuing support for conflict reduction and mitigation with a revised strategy is necessary, based on the continuing instability and also recognition of successes achieved so far, paying special attention to the differences existing in each region/district of Uganda. Therefore a consistent national strategy with sensitive local approaches is called for.
- USAID has access to key players on national and regional level; giving a clear strategic advantage to the Mission in Uganda. The conflict in Uganda has a regional dimension. USAID is in a unique position as donor and the US Embassy as a diplomatic power to address the regional dimension and to involve the different stakeholders in further negotiations.
- The psycho-sociological dimension of main conflict actors (troublemaker or spoiler theory) is a necessary element which needs to be taken into account when looking at future interventions for peace building and reconciliation. This is the anchor point of future programming, alongside the capital represented by networks of local partnerships woven over time. Conflict actors may oppose peace simply because they fear losing their status and social role; peace for them becomes a threat instead of an opportunity.

Recommendations

Based on the findings and conclusions of the evaluation, the following recommendations are made for future interventions in the field of peace building and reconciliation.

- Future interventions should shift to developmental mode, rather than remain relief oriented, where development is a structural form of action. Although the humanitarian needs in the Great Northern Uganda are still extremely high and not easy to cover, regardless of the amount of money invested in the area, the ongoing support of relief intervention is likely to preserve the *status quo*. When designing future activities, special attention should be drawn to strategies for turning conflict actors into peace supporters, using developmental incentives.
- The design of a clear Human Rights strategy and the strengthening of Human Rights structures and institutions at community and national level are necessary to increase the coherence of peace building approaches. Therefore an empowerment and progress to self-sufficiency in the structures responsible for Human Rights protection and good governance are essential for a real change.
- USAID should engage deeply in discussion and coordination with other donors and the GoU itself about future interventions, particularly in the Justice Law and Order Sector. Improved coordination among donors could lead to better support of the development process in the Great Northern Uganda. USAID has a unique role to play in this effort due to its relative importance in Uganda.
- The integration of the Greater North (Acholi, Teso, Lango, Karamoja and West Nile sub-regions) into future programs and strategies of USAID should be considered as a significant and necessary conflict reduction element. It is important for the future USAID/Uganda strategy

on peace building and reconciliation to move beyond the focus on Acholiland to cover the whole Greater North and the conflict affected districts of Rwenzori Region in Western Uganda.

- Integration and mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity needs to be incorporated into the Mission's strategy and the structures of partner organizations. Conflict sensitivity has not been specifically targeted or integrated into the strategies and activities of NUPI and CRD. For future programs of USAID, budget allocation should be stipulated to cover these training needs for implementers and partners. The USAID Mission in Uganda should identify ways to furthermore adopt conflict sensitive practices into its program phases.

- The target population groups should be included to a much greater extent in the M&E (monitoring and evaluation) systems to support an efficient and reliable impact and outcome monitoring. Participatory Impact Monitoring has been used in many other different sectors of development assistance and it should be recognized as an essential tool in conflict and peace related activities. As a first step for future activities, USAID and/or the contracting partner should revise existing monitoring structures and formats of the service providers and develop respective strategies for participatory impact monitoring activities.

- To overcome the problem of a changing environment - frequently a common aspect in fragile conflict or post-conflict situations - and the known effects on M&E, the evaluation team recommends the establishment of a rolling baseline as monitoring principle.

1. Introduction

USAID manages a number of bilateral assistance programs in Uganda. The five-year Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) and the three-year Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) programs were delivered in partnership with government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The current political context in Uganda requires that these programs are planned, implemented and monitored in a manner that reduces the current violent conflict, mitigates against the increase in community and other social tensions or conflicts and/or is contributing to peace building at different levels.

The purpose of the evaluation, as defined in the statement of work is to focus on the two programs, CRD and NUPI to analyze the relevance of existing conflict components as related to the programs, map out areas in which USAID/Uganda had a comparative advantage and has been most effective in mitigating the causes and consequences of conflict and appraise the effectiveness of programming options made.

The overarching evaluation question to be addressed is:

“What is the extent of the measurable impact of the programs on the reduction and prevention of conflict, and what is the effectiveness of the results obtained?”

Another central objective was to work with the USAID Mission in Uganda to define the boundaries of what USAID/Uganda can realistically accomplish in the area of conflict mitigation and response in Northern Uganda. The current evaluation is looking at the Missions Strategic Objective 9 *“More Effective and Participatory Governance”*, and more specifically at one of its intermediary results IR 9.3 *“Conflicts reduced and new conflicts prevented”*.

Based on the findings of the assessment, recommendations are made to inform USAID in Uganda for future interventions in the field of peace building and reconciliation.

2. Methodology

2.1 Concepts and glossary

There are certain agreed terms and concepts of development aid which the evaluation team considers relevant to the present exercise:

- **Clients:** the direct beneficiaries or target groups of NUPI and CRD activities in the communities;
- **Coherence:** the absence of contradiction between objectives in different fields;
- **Coordination:** balanced and efficient interaction with outside agencies;
- **Effectiveness:** the ability to match objectives with results achieved (outputs or outcomes);
- **Efficiency:** the ability to achieve maximum results with given resources;
- **Impact:** the changes which result in the condition of the population from a series of outcomes;
- **Relevance:** the relation of objectives to the needs of the population;
- **Results:** changes achieved through activities, outputs, outcomes or impact;
- **Objectives:** the intended results, stated in program documents (i.e. for which there is material evidence), as evidenced by verifiable changed conditions in the population;

- **Outcomes:** the use by the beneficiaries of the outputs, as can be reasonably influenced by the agency (within its sphere of influence);
- **Outputs:** the deliverables (or products) provided by an agency, measurable in quantitative or qualitative terms;
- **Service Provider:** The Sub sub-grantees of CRD who directly work with the Clients (or beneficiaries of the activities) at the community level;
- **Sustainability:** the continuation of the outcomes after implementation has been completed.

2.2 Analytical Tools

The conflict mapping workshops were held in four locations: Kampala, Kasese in West-Uganda, Gulu in Northern Uganda and Arua in West-Nile. The mapping exercise is a workshop technique which involves using a wall where cards are placed to denote events/trends, creating a very visual end product. The approach is highly participatory. Through the elicitation of unprepared opinions and knowledge, it was up to the participants to identify key events and trends which have affected the levels of violence and hostility, and the interaction between these key trends/events in the specific regional conflict situation. The participants, as a first step, identify some conflict events and trends, which are then connected by a series of arrows. This leads to the identification of new events and trends, constituting a sort of flow chart.

The assessment of the impact of the program on conflict is defined through the linkages between the key events and trends identified in the workshops and the outcomes and impact of the programs. These linkages are assessed through the following questions:

1. **R: Relevance:** How precisely did the influence of the program relate to the key drivers of the conflict as defined by people with expertise on the situation? Were the significant impacts delivered in a timely manner?
2. **D: Duration:** Was the impact temporary and how long will it probably last? This is a time-based assessment which will be defined by looking at all the results, and estimating their longevity.
3. **E: Extent:** What was the depth and breadth of impact? This will most probably be defined in population terms, for example by detecting the numbers of direct beneficiaries (persons trained), the outcome beneficiaries (persons using the training), and the beneficiaries impacted (number of people affected by a dispute).

The assessment of the significance of impact is calculated with the following equation:

$$\text{Significance} = R \times E \times D$$

The respective value for each variable is identified through a professional judgment, based on the information and data gathered during the assessment. The ranking of the values varies between low (1), medium (2) and high (3).

This rating of significance provides the basis for an estimation of the effectiveness of the program. This is defined as the gap between intended significance and actual significance. By relating the impacts back to the programming process, it also allows an appraisal of the overall quality of the NUPI and CRD programs.

2.3 Information Collection

The evaluation included a comprehensive study of documents, monitoring reports and surveys provided by the USAID Mission, NUPI and CRD. During the field phase, relevant documents from the Service Providers at community level were handed out to the team. We faced an attitude of overall transparency and openness to share and distribute information, which gave us the possibility to make judgments on the quality of the activities implemented on local or community level. A questionnaire was elaborated and used for semi-structured interviews especially with beneficiaries and Sub-sub grantees.

2.4 Assessment Method

The geographical area to be covered in the assessment made it necessary to choose a sampling approach. Together with USAID and the management staff of NUPI and CRD, implementers and beneficiary groups were identified and visited for interviews and mapping exercises.

- Comprehensive desk research;
- Four mapping exercises in different regions of Northern Uganda;
- Individual and group interviews, with the agencies (service providers/implementing partners) present and without them;
- Working with an independent translator when possible;
- In Nakapiripirit the team attended a peace meeting between two groups being involved in a conflict about cattle raiding.

The field assessment was carried out from 12/03 to 30/03/2007 and covered a geographical area of 9 Districts: Kitgum and Gulu in the Acholi Region, Kasese and Kabarole in Western-Uganda, Adjumani, Koboko and Arua in the West-Nile Region, Nakapiripirit in the Karamoja region and the capital Kampala. In total, more than 230 informants were interviewed, including local government officials, representatives from CBOs, agency staff, beneficiaries and traditional authorities.

A questionnaire was developed to conduct semi-structured interviews, as they are a low-cost, quick method of gathering information from individuals or small groups. Depending on the particular situation and the interview process, some flexibility was applied. The questionnaire ensured that the interviews stayed focused on the conflict issue, but were informal enough to allow participants to introduce and discuss matters they saw as relevant. The list of persons met is included in the annex.

The evaluation team would like to thank the USAID Mission in Uganda, the liaison staff in the field, and the personnel of the implementing partners for their support and patience over the course of our field work. We hope our findings will be useful to the aims of the program.

3. Background

3.1 Current Context

Compared with other post colonial countries, Uganda had a seemingly peaceful transition to independence and at the time was viewed as having one of the most promising economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. However, despite the optimism and expectations at independence in 1962, Uganda's last twenty five years have been characterized by tragedy and upheaval followed by remarkable period of political stability, social progress and economic growth. However, these achievements are slowly being eroded, with the risk of serious backsliding. Although improvements in health, HIV/AIDS and education have had positive impacts on Uganda's population, other dimensions in the political sphere, including the country's inability to settle the conflict in the north, widespread corruption, and constitutional amendments leading to the removal of presidential term limits, have the ability to put the nation on a downward spiral.

Natural resources and environment

Uganda is a landlocked country, bound by Sudan in the North, Kenya in the East, Tanzania and Rwanda in the South the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the West. It comprises an area of approximately 236,000 kilometers. The country contains several large fresh water lakes. Lake Victoria and the River Nile flows through much of the country creating one of the best watered areas in Africa. The country is also located in an area where seven of Africa's distinct biogeographic regions converge and share one of the most important regions for global conversation – the Albertine Rift – which harbors more species of vertebrates than any other region on the African continent. This region shelters more than half of continental Africa's bird species and nearly 40% of its mammal species.

Population and ethnic groups

The population of Uganda is presently estimated to be 27 million which is overwhelmingly rural with only about 11% of the population living in town or urban areas. Current indicators demonstrate that the National proportion of the population living in poverty has risen from 34% in 2000 to 38% in 2003, but it has declined again to 31% in 2005/2006.² Inequality has also been rising with 38% of people living below the poverty line, and 26% mired in chronic poverty and therefore not benefiting from the current development. It is in the north of Uganda that economic underdevelopment is most pronounced and there is negative growth and rampant poverty. The 2000 Poverty Eradication Status Report³ indicated that while there was a general reduction in poverty in Uganda from 56% in 1992 to 44% in 1997 and 35% in 2000 (based on headcount index), that regional disparities still remain. The northern region also recorded the poorest indicators for health services, education, drinking water and sanitation with direct impact on the quality of life for the poor. Other indicators show further deterioration in the welfare of the Uganda's citizenry. Life expectancy is 47 years, and the country's ranking on the Human Development Index (HDI) is 144th out of 177 countries. Looking at the national context, Karamoja has the lowest indicators of all districts in Uganda.

The Ugandan Constitution recognizes 55 recognized tribes, which fall into four groupings; the Bantu in the south, west and part of the east; the Nilotics in the north, the Nilo Hamites in the

² Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey.

³ See: Poverty Reduction strategy paper – Uganda's Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) 2000.

East and the Sudanic people of the West Nile (Parliament of Uganda, 1997:5)⁴. Relations between ethnic groups have been conditioned by historic animosities and rivalries. It is argued by many theorists that this problem was created by the colonial policies of divide and rule that sought to establish a viable political state from a multiple aggregation of different groups who were at different levels of socio-economic development and political organization.

3.2 Uganda and Northern Uganda - Conflict and Actors

To understand the conflict dynamics in Uganda today it is important to analyze the major stages of conflict since the NRA government assumed power in 1986. The NRA was welcomed when it arrived in the north in February 1986. In Acholiland (Gulu and Kitgum districts), former government army turned in their weapons and the NRA recruitment of ex-UNLA soldiers began. However, unrest slowly grew. There were increasing reports of armed robbery and mistreatments by some NRA soldiers' station in Gulu and Kitgum. The former UNLA started organizing themselves to offer a relatively conventional military resistance to the NRM government. The Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) formed in Southern Sudan by ex-UNLA crossed the border to attack the NRA posts in both Kitgum and Gulu districts in August 1986 beginning the continuing prolonged conflict in the area. It has been acknowledged by the Ugandan government that the activities of the NRA soldiers⁵ against former Acholi soldiers and civilian population was partly responsible for the deterioration in the security situation during this period⁶. Another event which fueled Acholi fears was the order issued by the NRA high command over the radio for all Acholi ex-soldiers to report to the barracks within 10 days. This was reminiscent of Amin's directive for the Langi and Acholi soldiers to report to barracks, ostensibly for duty but in fact to be massacred. By the end of 1988 most of the UPDA troops had accepted amnesty and surrendered to the NRA.

Another key factor that contributed and maintained the armed conflict in the North and North East (Acholi, Lango and Teso sub-region) was organized cattle rustling by the Karamojong. In Teso, the NRA disarmed the local militias rendering it defenseless to the cattle raiding by the Karamojong⁷. The government had only limited success in disarming the Karamojong leaving the productive base of the countryside in the north depleted and a dislocated, bitter and alienated rural society. In Kumi in early 1990, the government forcibly moved more than 100,000 people perhaps a third of the civilian population into camps in order to clear the areas in which rebels were organizing and only allowed them to return nine months later. In Soroti, similar numbers moved into camps for several years to escape the conflict. In 1992, the Iteso insurgency in Soroti and Kumi ended in a peace agreement achieved through the efforts of the Teso Commission.⁸

Another rebel group, the Holy Spirit Movement, led by Alice Auma Lakwena, became active in Acholiland after UPDA, but it took on a charismatic spiritualistic flavor rather than that of a concerted political movement. Her army was finally defeated in November 1987 in an abortive attempt to take control of Eastern Uganda. She was arrested in Kenya, but later released and handed over for protection under the UNHCR. She died in January 2007. In late 1987, a cousin of Lakwena, Joseph Kony sprang up and started his armed fight. Kony's movement was known

⁴ The ethnic division is often simplified with the terms "Bantu South" and "Nilotic North". The dominant Bantu group (65%) are the Ganda (Baganda – the largest tribe), Soga, Nyoro, Nkole (Banyankole), Toro, Chiga (Kiga), Gisu, Gwere and Nyole (Banyuri) and live in the densely populated southern half of the country. The principal Nilotic groups (in the north) are the Acholi, Langi, Karamojong, Teso, Madi and Kakwa. (Economist Intelligence Unit. 1996:18)

⁵ Particularly the 35th Battalion made of ex-FEDEMU Bagandas.

⁶ See: Amnesty International, Uganda; The failure to safeguard Human Rights, 1992.

⁷ See: Brett, p. 2.

⁸ See: Gersony, p. 33.

first as the Lord Salvation Army (LSA), then Holy Spirit Movement Front (HSMF) and later as the United Democratic Christian Army (DCA) and finally in 1993 to Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

In an alleged attempt to overpower the LRA, the government forces launched an offensive in Gulu in October 1988 in which NRA soldiers were responsible for extrajudicial killings, the destruction of property and displacement of thousands of people⁹. NRA forcibly cleared people from their homes in the rural areas and pushed the whole population to Gulu town. Between March and July 1991, the NRA mounted another major military offensive, the so called "Operation North". Gulu, Kitgum, Lira and Apac were sealed from the rest of the country. NRA soldiers were alleged to have extra judicially executed hundreds of villagers. Hundreds others were detained without trial or charge. 18 Northern leaders¹⁰ including the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and two Members of Parliament who questioned government strategy or who protested at Human Rights violations by the NRA were arrested and charged with treason.

Part of the NRA operation involved the mobilization of villagers into self defense units using local weapons like spears, bows, arrows, etc. Kony in retaliation began an intensive campaign of punishment which included mass killings of the Arrow Brigade members¹¹, sometimes with their relatives and neighbors. Hundreds of others were mutilated by cutting off their limbs, lips, ears, noses and eyes. LRA crimes have been classified as crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court (ICC) which has issued arrest warrants for five top LRA leaders in 2005.¹²

The years 1992 and 1993 were militarily quiet and reconstruction work was able to begin. Besides reconstruction, there appeared to be an opportunity for durable peace. The government minister for the north, based in Gulu began a peace process that culminated in face to face talks with Kony in 1993. Several prominent political figure heads in exile returned to Uganda including former President Tito Okello Lutwa, who spoke out against continuing rebellion in Northern Uganda. In February 1994 however, President Museveni gave a seven day ultimatum to the LRA to come out of the bush. After the collapse of the peace process, the LRA withdrew to Southern Sudan and were equipped with weapons, ammunitions and landmines provided by the Government of Sudan thus escalating the conflict once again to crisis stage.¹³

From 1994, there was a steady escalation in the fighting as government forces sought to finish off the LRA militarily, while the LRA, with bases in Sudan and arms supplied by the Sudanese Government, built-up its fighting forces through large-scale child abduction. LRA also carried out well coordinated large scale attacks on the civilian population.¹⁴ Government forces have also been accused of Human Rights abuses in Northern Uganda.¹⁵ As far as the Acholi people are concerned, a far more serious violation has been the failure of the Uganda People's Defense Force (UPDF - former NRA) to provide adequate protection for the civilian population.¹⁶

⁹ See: Amnesty International, 1992: p. 5.

¹⁰ See: Mutibwa, p. 189.

¹¹ 'Arrow Brigades' tribal militia groups, governmental program to utilise citizens to end insurgency.

¹² See: related documents under <http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/UGD/c0105.html>

¹³ See: Gersony, 1997: p. 35.

¹⁴ See: Gersony, 1997: pp. 38-45 for a detailed insight into these Human Rights violations.

¹⁵ See: Amnesty International, 1996, p. 305; ACORD, 1997: p. 14; Gersony, 1997: p. 47.

¹⁶ See: Gersony, 1997: p. 47.

The overall effect of LRA activity has been social and economic disruption on a massive scale, schools, hospitals, health centers and trading centers have been drastically affected. Livelihoods have been disrupted through the burning and physical destruction of crops, houses and stores. As a result Northern Uganda has been facing acute humanitarian crisis. Thousands of people have been killed and currently more than 1.7 million people remain displaced. In August 2006, the government of Uganda and the LRA signed a landmark Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CHA) which has resulted in improved security conditions and humanitarian access.

The displacement took various forms. Some people fled in terror from LRA to trading centers and Gulu town, but in October 1996 the government forces began to move people into so-called 'protected villages'. On occasion the government indiscriminately used mortars and helicopter gunships as a means to force civilians into protected villages.¹⁷ In October 2002 the displacement crises was exacerbated due to an order issued by the Ugandan military stating that all those civilians in 'abandoned villages' had 48 hours to move to government camps. Despite the military presence, the camps remain targets for the rebel attacks. The involuntary displacement of the people has helped to strengthen the development of a negative attitude towards the government. Some people have said openly that the government has a hidden agenda for the people of northern Uganda particularly the Acholis.

3.3 Evaluation Mapping Results and Regional Context

In order to understand whether CRD and NUPI were relevant and oriented towards conflict mitigation, both in their content and in their manner of delivery, participatory conflict mapping exercises were conducted as part of the overall evaluation approach. The aim was to gain deeper understanding of the conflict issues in Uganda from the perspectives of a broad range of participants across the country. The key issues brought out by the process became key indicators to gauge whether the USAID program under evaluation were relevant to the context and the people in the program area by assessing if issues considered pertinent by the people were addressed by the program implementation.

In the four workshops, 10-15 participants were invited from different backgrounds: NGOs and CBOs, politicians, government, religious and local leaders. The exercise involved identifying key events and trends that had happened in the region or at national level which the participants could remember and agree on. Whereas the workshop in Kampala covered the conflict dynamics in the Greater North, the respective mapping exercises in the other regions mainly covered the local context. The key events were posted on a timeline from past to present. Trends related to the events were also identified and posted in appropriate places below each event. The next phase was to link the events and trends with arrows to indicate the magnitude of the identified issue based on the number of arrows drawn from and/or converging to an event / trend. The last part of the discussion was to indicate which of the identified issues could be influenced through external interventions by an Agency or Donor like USAID.

The summary of the outcome of the exercises in Kampala and Gulu are presented below. Descriptions of the regional conflicts in West Nile, South West Uganda and Karamoja follow together with workshop results. There was no workshop organized in Karamoja because of difficulties related to the security situation. Instead the team benefited from a recently undertaken comprehensive conflict analysis by CRD.¹⁸

¹⁷ Ahimbisibwe Ahimbisibwe 2002: pp. 2-3.

¹⁸ See: Wilskens Agencies Ltd. Kampala: Situation analysis of Karamoja, 16 February 2004.

Table 1: Summary of issues from the mapping exercises in Kampala and Gulu:

Location	Issues identified	Score	Influence through DA
Kampala	▪ Massive Human Rights violations and abductions	15	Yes
	▪ Operation Iron Fist	6	No / maybe diplomacy
	▪ Culture of silence	5	Yes
	▪ 2005 / 2006 Peace Talks	5	Yes
	▪ Militarization of Politics	5	No / maybe diplomacy
	▪ Tribalization of Government	5	Yes
	▪ 1996 Gulu, Decision for protected settlements	4	Yes
	▪ Increase in Regional Division N-S /N-N	4	Yes
Gulu	▪ Massive displacement	8	Yes
	▪ Increased insecurity by rebel movement	7	Yes
	▪ International awareness	6	Yes
	▪ Increased abduction	6	Yes
	▪ Increased international presence	6	No
	▪ Greater North Resistance/ Rebel movement	5	Yes
	▪ Human Rights Violations	5	Yes
	▪ Marginalization	5	Yes
	▪ LRA opening for dialogue		

West Nile regional situation

Between the years of 1980 and 1985 the UNLA army, dominated by Langi and Acholi soldiers carried out looting and killings in the West Nile (particularly Arua) in revenge for the Amin years. In 1986, when the NRA reached West Nile it was met with little resistance and soldiers were reportedly well disciplined. The ex-Amin soldiers of the Uganda National Rescue Front (UNRF) under Moses Ali and Former Uganda National Army (FUNA) under Isaac Lumango and Wilson Toko co-operated with the NRA.

At the time of the NRA arrival a large percentage of the population remained in Southern Sudan and many of the West Nilers were reluctant to return to Uganda. UNHCR began a repatriation program in 1986 which progressed slowly but in 1987 Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) units attacked and burnt refugee camps in southern Sudan forcing the majority of the refugees to self-repatriate. According to the Gersony report (1997:76), many West Nilers believe that the Uganda government feared an insurgency attack from ex-Amin supporters based in camps in Southern Sudan and therefore engaged the support of the SPLA to disturb these camps. However, the government's efforts to block the formation of an insurgency group failed. In 1989, three years after NRM/A taking power, the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF), under the leadership of Juma Oris was formed. It consisted of people formerly in the army during the Amin regime and is reportedly backed and financed by the Sudanese government (Gersony, 1997:78). The problem of insecurity was experienced more in the upper part of the district along the Uganda/Sudan border (Moyo and Arua) as well as areas bordering DRC (Kango and Zeu counties). The rebel group succeeded in disrupting life in these areas by blocking roads, targeting local government officials, and attacking Sudanese refugee camps displacing up to

70,000 people.¹⁹ However, with the capture of Mahagi town in Eastern DRC by the Banyamulenge and recapture of control of most of the Sudan/Uganda border by the SPLA,²⁰ the WNBF has been deprived of bases from which to launch attacks. Thus in 1997 WNBF activity has diminished considerably.

In comparison with Gulu and Kitgum, the incidence of rebel activity in the West Nile since the NRM took power has been sporadic and ineffectual. One reason for lack of support for the rebels may be explained by the vigilance and effectiveness of the Peace Task Forces, comprised of elders, youth and opinion leaders who actively campaign against the rebels.

Table 2: Summary of issues from the mapping exercise in Arua:

Location	Issues identified	Score	Influence through DA
Arua	▪ Lawlessness (Violence, insurgency)	6	Yes
	▪ Movement Government	5	Yes
	▪ Museveni in power	5	Yes / diplomacy
	▪ People run into exile for fear	5	Yes
	▪ Formation of opposition forces in / out	5	Yes / diplomacy
	▪ Rule by decree	4	Yes / diplomacy
	▪ Independence	4	not valued
	▪ British Protectorate	4	not valued

South West Uganda

The South West of Uganda played host to Rwandan refugees fleeing civil war in 1959. In October, Uganda was the base from which the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) carried out an invasion of Rwanda. In April 1994, when Rwanda exploded again, there was a new influx of Rwandans into Uganda. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 Hutu refugees fled into Kisoro and Ntugamo districts by the end of May 1994, but by October of the same year the number of Hutu had dwindled to 1,000.²¹ The close proximity of the crisis in Eastern DRC in 1996 also made its presence felt in Uganda, particularly with the arrival of over 8,000 mainly Congolese refugees into Kisoro area another 3,000 to Matanda. The movement of these groups in the region has been a source of insecurity and discord.

In 1996, a rebel group called Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) became active in the Ruwenzori mountains along the Congolese boarder. It was active in the districts of Kasese and Bundibugyo and the situation has been contained although recently, there have been reports of confrontation between the remnants and the UPDF in Bundibugyo district. It is alleged that ADF was originally made-up of the Salaf Tabliq Islamic militants who were supported by Sudan, but later it has simultaneously recruited from the exiled Hutu Rwandan Army, units of former Mobutu's and Kabila's army to form a rebel group who are united only in their antagonism towards the Ugandan leadership.²² Rebel activities in this area have been sporadic. The effects on the region have been damaging in terms of loss of revenue from tourism, disruption of agricultural activities and development of projects.

¹⁹ The Guardian, 01/04/1997.

²⁰ Both of these military offensives were reported by the Ugandan army (see: Gersony, 1997: p. 79).

²¹ See: UNHCR, 1995: p. 7.

²² Financial Times, 06/10/1997

Table 3: Summary of issues from the mapping exercise in Kasese:

Location	Issues identified	Score	Influence through DA
Kasese	▪ Human Rights Violations	6	Yes
	▪ Cultural Rights	6	Yes
	▪ Emergence of rebel movements	6	No, but target root
	▪ Escalation of violence	5	causes
	▪ Conflict over resources	4	Yes
	▪ Potential for violent conflict	4	Yes
	▪ Divide and rule	4	Yes

Karamoja Sub-Region

The Karamoja sub-region with the estimated population of 535,000 comprises the districts of Kotido, Moroto, Kabong and Nakapirit. The region is characterized by inadequate water supply, frequent drought resulting into chronic food shortages, insecurity, poor infrastructures and lack of employment and trading opportunities. The people are amongst the poorest in Uganda, with the majority of the population surviving on less than one dollar a day and feeling marginalized. Literacy rate is very low and poor sanitary conditions are widespread. The effects of the atrocities committed by the Karamojong warriors on the livelihoods of the vulnerable communities within Karamoja itself and the neighboring districts exacerbate the situation. In the recent past, the traditional Karamojong raids have become more violent including killings, rape and malicious destruction of household properties and crops causing massive displacements that have generated tensions and animosity among the Karamojong clans and other neighboring communities.

In view of increased violent acts committed by the Karamojong, the government has decided to disarm the warriors. After the failure of voluntary disarmament program, forceful methods were introduced with more disastrous effects for the ordinary people and warriors themselves. Of late there have been running battles between the warriors and the UPDF, with many warriors running to other areas like Labwor hills, Patongo, Adilang in Pader and across the border into Kenya. Some communities like the Pokot are being re-located by government enforcing the disarmament process. The government is currently employing a “cordon, search and disarm operation” whereby the army, using tanks and helicopter gunships, surrounds villages and searches for weapons. The operation has been characterized by Human Rights abuses and excessive use of force by UPDF including alleged arbitrary executions and torture²³. The unilateral disarmament program in Karamoja region faced challenges due to lack of comprehensive approach that includes the cattle corridor in the whole region.

The situation of widespread insecurity in Karamoja is an indirect result of the conflicts in the neighboring countries, the prolonged war in Southern Sudan and cattle raiding by groups from northern Kenya. The very harsh environment of Karamoja limits livelihood activities and productivity. Even the traditional pastoral livelihood systems are constantly challenged by insufficient water and pasture due to insecurity that restricts mobility. In response to the situation of insecurity and food scarcity, the Karamojongs have armed themselves with an estimated 40,000 guns. A market for guns and ammunitions from Southern Sudan has created a corridor for gun trafficking that stretches into Kenya and Ethiopia. The Karamojong warriors not only defend themselves but also have been raiding cattle from neighboring districts from

²³ See: UNOCHA, 2006.

Kapchorwa, Teso, Acholi and Lango sub-regions. This only serves to further erode the general security and stability of Northern Uganda.

4. Description of the Intervention and Programs

4.1 Aims of USAID in Uganda

Uganda is of significant US interest and a stable Uganda is regarded as critical to addressing regional security. The US presence in the country is quite articulated and several departments and initiatives provide financial and technical support to Uganda. USAID is one of them and it does not operate separately from the remaining. Conversely, the US is considered a key actor in Uganda, both as donor and diplomatic presence.

USAID's program in Uganda contributes to the Revised Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), which is Uganda's comprehensive development framework. The PEAP, most recently revised in 2004, has guided the formulation of the GoU's policy since its inception in 1997. USAID's programs in economic growth; support to social sectors; promotion of democracy and governance; and assistance to people affected by conflict directly contribute to the five pillars of the PEAP: 1) Economic Management; 2) Production, Competitiveness and Incomes; 3) Security, Conflict-Resolution and Disaster Management; 4) Governance; and 5) Human Development.

Finally USAID/Uganda is currently looking into the possibility of supporting the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) for Northern Uganda. The PRDP is a comprehensive plan of 530 million US dollars developed by the GoU in consultation with donors and civil society. The aim of PRDP is to bring Northern Uganda at the same level of development with the rest of the country. The geographical areas covered by PRDP correspond to all the districts affected by conflicts excluding the region of West Uganda.

4.2 Strategy of Intervention

USAID has responded to conflicts in Uganda since the 1980s. Under the 1997-2001 strategy, the Mission has collaborated closely with the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), to address the impact of conflict through humanitarian and relief-to-development assistance. It also developed strong partnerships with other US donor such as the Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF) and the Victims of Torture (VoT) Fund to provide psychosocial assistance and reintegrate conflict victims with their families and communities. In addition, Uganda benefited from several interventions financed by USAID's Regional Economic Development Services Office for Eastern and Southern Africa (REDSO).

Subsequently, USAID/Uganda developed the Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for FY 2002-2007.²⁴ This planning period was selected to carry the programs past the 2006 national elections. In 2006 the NRM won the election again and President Museveni remained in power. The USAID/Uganda Integrated Strategic Plan 2002-2007 supported Uganda's focus on poverty alleviation as articulated in the PEAP. The program goal was to assist Uganda to reduce mass poverty and it was articulated into three strategic objectives (SO):

²⁴ Volume 1: Integrated Strategic Plan. Available at: http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABT976.pdf

- SO7: Expanded Sustainable Economic Opportunities for Rural Sector Growth;
- SO8: Improved Human Capacity;
- SO9: More Effective and Participatory Governance.

Under this ISP the strategic objective to address democracy, governance and conflict was SO9, *More Effective and Participatory Governance*. The Intermediate Result dealing with conflict was IR9.3: Conflict reduced and new conflict prevented. Furthermore it was stated that SO9 would collaborate closely with SO8, *Improved Human Capacity*, to improve delivery of comprehensive HIV/AIDS services in areas affected by conflict.

The achievement of the SO9 was to be measured by the following preliminary indicators: i) a 90 percent increase in resources released to local governments and properly expended; (ii) a four-fold increase in civil society organizations (CSOs) engaging with Parliament; (iii) the successful reintegration into communities of approximately 3,000 ex-combatants and abductees; and (iv) a reduction in HIV prevalence among adolescent men and women of 25% over five years, with a milestone indicator of reduced HIV prevalence among pregnant women at sentinel surveillance sites.

An appropriate change of approach has occurred within the USAID Mission during the period 2002-2007. Although the ISP stated that conflict objectives had been integrated within SO7 and SO8, to offer enhanced economic opportunity and improved social services in conflict zones, North Uganda was initially a strategic objective in itself. In practice few of the USAID funded programs were active in this geographical area. A gradual shift has taken place in the approach of the Mission since then and currently all the strategic objectives have or will develop activities in conflict-affected areas of Uganda, which contribute to mitigating the causes and consequences of conflict. The new strategic objective SO 11: Mitigate causes and consequences of conflict for the Financial Year (FY) 2006 - FY 2009 is structured as a cross-cutting SO. This SO will seek to improve coordination and cross-sectoral linkages, and to integrate program design and implementation across all technical areas in the Mission.²⁵

4.3 Priority Setting

In 2000 USAID/Uganda initiated a broad process of consultation, assessment and analysis leading to the ISP 2002-2007. Within this framework the Mission commissioned a 'Democracy, Governance and Conflict Strategic Assessment for Uganda'²⁶ in 2000 as preparation for the strategy design of the programs to be financed under the SO9: More Effective and Participatory Governance. The main findings of the assessment in relation to conflict can be summarized as follows:

- Existing conflicts in Uganda pose serious issues, but do not represent threats to the unity of the country or to the government;
- Uganda is suffering through several ongoing armed rebellions in the north and western regions of the country. These rebellions are in all likelihood supported by an extremely small minority of the population, but they pose serious problems for security and the rule of law in certain parts of the country;
- Northerners have consistently argued that the current government favors the southern half of the country. Although empirical evidence does not support this view, the persistence of

²⁵ Uganda Strategy Statement Final and USAID/Uganda Mitigating the Causes and Consequences of Conflict Strategic Objective Paper.

²⁶ van de Walle et al., 2001.

- conflict in parts of the north combines with increasing economic disparities between north and south to pose a significant long term threat to the country's unity;
- Domestic conflict within Uganda affects regional politics and conflicts and these same regional issues also affect conflict within Uganda's borders.

Furthermore the assessment looked at the root causes of the different regional conflicts and identified the key players in the conflict areas. The study finally advised the Mission to support activities within the Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Response (CPMR) spectrum directed towards the "Diminished Impact of Conflict on Ugandans Residing in Conflict Zones". This opened a wide area of options to the Mission for engagement in CPMR. The assessment identified key drivers and actors of the conflicts and it has been a good basis for the elaboration of conflict mitigation activities. Based on these findings, the Mission defined the Request for Applications (RFA) 617-02-005: Uganda Community Resilience and Dialogue (CRD) in 2002. The program goal was to mitigate and reduce the impact of conflict in affected areas of Uganda. The sectors to be covered by CRD were numerous although organized around three main components: psychosocial support, peace building, HIV/AIDS. The geographical coverage was of all the regions affected by conflict: Acholiland, West Nile, Karamoja, West Uganda (Bundibugyo and Kasese). Furthermore CRD had been since its inception a program targeting communities affected by the conflicts based on the assumption that the situation would have moved into a post conflict phase during the 5 years of implementation.- at the time of design CRD was a post conflict activity. Unfortunately the situation worsened dramatically in 2003 and 2004 and CRD required flexibility of implementation and change of some activities and geographical presence.

Another recommendation of the assessment was for USAID/Uganda to devote more of its resources to high risk, high return efforts in conflict issues and conflict zones. Based on this recommendation and previous experience of USAID in other conflict setting, USAID decided to support a complementary program targeting the national dimension of the conflict, especially the LRA – GOU conflict. USAID launched the Northern Uganda Peace Initiative (NUPI) during President Museveni's visit to Washington in June 2003. In 2004 NUPI started with the aim of preparing the GoU Presidential Peace Team for peace talks and confidence building measures with the LRA.

4.4 Objectives, structures, management of NUPI

NUPI came into force with the contract award to the US consulting firm PADCO. The contractor had been selected at the end of 2003 in a bidding process for a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee completion task order with a value of initially approximately 500,000 US\$ with Option Periods with approximately the same value for each period.²⁷

The purpose of the first contract was to provide expert services to assist the GoU in the peace process, in particular to develop a peace strategy and to strengthen the government's Peace Team to participate constructively in a negotiation process with the LRA. The services would include the preparation of a first meeting between the GoU and the LRA, a review of past peace initiatives, the drafting of ToR for the government's Peace Team, as well as training and coaching in conflict resolution and negotiation skills.

The contract foresaw a six-month Base Period with a further three Option Periods. The objectives of the subsequent extensions would depend on the Base Period. An estimated overall duration of 24 months was foreseen. According to this set up NUPI was understood as

²⁷ Contract Order 623-I-00-03-00048-00 dated 02.04.2004.

an inter-agency US Government initiative under the leadership of the American Ambassador to Uganda, with support from USAID and the State Department in Washington DC.

The focus of the US government strategy for peace talks then shifted in 2004. Instead of choosing humanitarian access as an entry point for building confidence between the GoU and the LRA, the US government was interested in finding a quick and permanent end to the conflict, which would include the removal of the LRA leadership.

Based on the revised focus and agreed changes in the program it had been planned that NUPI during Option Period I (from August 2004 to August 2005) would continue to assist the GoU in the peace process but would also concentrate on the improvement of the government's capacity to negotiate an end to hostilities with a newly introduced element of assisting and counseling the government in establishing a strategy for national reconciliation.²⁸ A key event of this Option Period was a conference in Gulu from 09/12 to 10/12/2004, titled 'Reconciliation: the Way Forward' with the participation of the Minister of Internal Affairs Dr. Rugunda and Mrs. Betty Bigombe, the chief mediator in a new peace initiative from March 2004 to 2005.

The assistance provided to work on a strategy for national reconciliation became in reality more the focus of the activities, which is reflected in the Revised Work Plan for the remainder of Option Period I (dated 14/02/2005). The Work Plan moreover envisaged first model concepts for grass-roots reconciliation activities and foresaw an engagement with CRD in order to harmonize activities. During the Option Period II (04/08/2005 to 03/02/2006) the support for the GoU's Peace Team was put on hold.

The program underwent further changes and resulted in three Option Periods²⁹ plus the Base Period and a Bridge Period from 04/02 to 15/04/2006. The overall time period was from 04/04/2004 to 15/04/2007.

According to the Performance Management Plan the goal of the program was to enhance the peace process³⁰: SO Peace Process Enhanced. Two Intermediary Results would contribute to the overall goal: "Outreach to and Dialogue with LRA Enhanced" and "Intra-Acholi, Regional and National Reconciliation process Strengthened". Five Sub-Intermediary Results have been formulated of which two contribute to IR 1 (IR 1.1 and 1.2), two contribute to IR 2 (2.1 and 2.2) and one contributes to both (1.3):

- 1.1 Capacity of GOU Peace Team enhanced;
- 1.2 Other GOU Agencies and CSO capacity to engage in outreach and dialogue with LRA Strengthened;
- 1.3 Information management and communication on outreach to LRA and reconciliation enhanced;
- 2.1 GOU and community participation in peace building and reconciliation dialogues enhanced;
- 2.2 Institutional framework for reconciliation further developed.

The activities undertaken were manifold. The End of Activity Report lists 135 deliverables. It is difficult to clearly attribute each of them to one of the IR.³¹ For clarity this report will group activities under three main headings:

²⁸ Implementation Plan dated 29 July 2004.

²⁹ End of Activity Report February 2007.

³⁰ Version from 28 August 2006.

³¹ The project office in Gulu worked with program officers in charge of four areas of activity: 1. Reconciliation activities, 2. Grassroots reconciliation activities, 3. Cultural Support Program, 4. Women in Peace building, including the youth.

Institutional framework for reconciliation

- Research, consultations and conferences regarding national reconciliation;
- Support to Peace and Reconciliation Teams and Peace Fora.

Community participation in peace building and reconciliation

- Chief's tour;
- Support to women groups;
- Grass root activities;
- Support to traditional ceremonies;
- Exchange visits.

Cross-cutting activities

- Communication and media;
- Research and publication;
- Training.

Geographically, the program covered greater Northern Uganda with significant input on Kampala level. Initially the program established an office in Kampala only. After the shift to support to the reconciliation process NUPI opened an office in Gulu and finally a representation in West Nile.

4.5 Objectives, structures, management of CRD

As a result of a tendered process, a Cooperative Agreement (CA) for the implementation of CRD was signed with International Rescue Committee (IRC), the leading agency of the consortium of INGOs that won the tender. Consortium members include IRC, Associazione Volontari per il Servizio Internazionale (AVSI), CARE International (CARE), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Save the Children Uganda (SCiU, initially the members were Save the Children Denmark and United Kingdom, but they merged in SCiU during the implementation of the program). The title of the program proposed by the consortium is "The Hope Project" - Health and Opportunity through Peace and Education.

The Program initially covered four Ugandan regions affected by conflicts: West Uganda, West Nile, Acholiland, and Karamoja. During the implementation of the program the geographical coverage expanded to Teso and Lango (Kasese and Bundibugiyi).

The goal of the program is "Human impact of conflict and HIV/AIDS mitigated and reduced in the targeted conflict districts of Western Uganda, Acholiland and Karamoja" and focus on achieving three major objectives:³²

- Improved access to HIV/AIDS services among CRD target population;
- Improved psychosocial functioning of target groups affected by conflict-related violence;
- Target communities are knowledgeable of and apply appropriate economic development, Human Rights and peace building within their communities and actively participate in positively impacting national and regional conflicts.

A fourth objective became a cross cutting one and regarded the quality improvement of CRD activities.

CRD is a five year program that was presented in April 2002, awarded in September 2002 and is finishing on the 31/08/2007. During the five years of implementation 16 modifications of

³² Community Resilience and Dialogue Performance Management Plan (PMP), revised May 25, 2006.

assistance were necessary. The main reasons for these modifications have been the increase of the amount from \$ 12,431,116 to the final amount of \$15,552,889. The CA was modified to incremental fund it as yearly funds become available; expand its geographic reach; include new funding such as Trafficking in Persons (TIP); and continue the mandate with reception centers – when additional funds were obtained by the USAID Mission. However the majority of modifications were due to the responses of the program to the evolution of the situation in Uganda. The program has been conceived as post conflict intervention in four “more or less” stable geographical areas. Unfortunately the humanitarian and security situation worsened in most of the areas covered by the intervention. Especially the LRA affected area suffered a dramatic increase of violence and displacement and new regions/districts became affected by the conflict. The disarmament in Karamoja of 2002 also largely failed, partly because of the transfer of UPDF soldiers to Acholiland, increasing dramatically the level of insecurity in the area. Therefore CRD changed part of its geographical focus and dropped some districts in West Nile and West Uganda and included districts in Lango and Teso where the LRA conflict spilled over in 2004.³³

The consortium saw the program “as an opportunity to promote and synergize the provision of key social services in target areas”. The proposal acknowledged that the four geographic regions suffered from historical exclusion by the central government. A key strategy of the project was to multiply the efforts of other service providers - government programs, local community-based organizations, and NGOs working in the regions - to ensure their impact is increased. Consortium members were already active in some of the geographical areas of interventions and had infrastructure in place that allowed immediate implementation of the activities. Furthermore the consortium members have a previous relationship with the local authorities and beneficiary communities. Local partners and authorities were involved in the development and/or review of the proposal. Several local NGOs and CBOs were already partners of some consortium members while other partnerships have been created during the five-year program with organizations that could provide added value for the implementation of selected activities. Indeed CRD awarded 118 sub-grants and collaborated with 62 local partners.

IRC supported the management of the program by recruiting CRD management staff: one Chief of Party, one champion for each component – psychosocial, peace building and HIV/AIDS, a monitoring and evaluation expert, and a financial advisor. Furthermore each consortium member identified key staff within their organization to link with the CRD management staff.

³³ See original work plan for CRD.

5. Assessment of Implementation

5.1 Choice of Approach and Partners

CRD

The Community Resilience and Dialogue program was supposed to deal with community reconciliation and resilience while NUPI was conceived as a program to forward national reconciliation. The consortium of NGOs implementing CRD made explicit since the beginning of the program their inability and unwillingness to deal with national reconciliation. National reconciliation was and still is a highly political issue. In 2002 there was no peace process and nowadays the talks are still going on, so organizations active in delivery of relief and/or development aid do not want to be seen associate to strongly with any one of the parties involved in the conflict. Therefore during the five years of the ISP two main programs were awarded: CRD in 2002 and NUPI in 2004.

CRD has been tendered through a RFA process. The RFA specified that one or more Cooperative Agreement (CA) could have been signed and it was quite specific in terms of sector and geographical coverage. Finally one CA was signed with IRC, the leading agency of the consortium that won the tender. The choice of signing only one CA with a consortium proved to be very effective and efficient. USAID defined the broad framework of intervention without sustaining the burden of micro-management. The geographical and sectoral coverage was so spread that it would have been a difficult task to coordinate the same amount of activities and to reach the same level of results dividing the overall amount into smaller components. Furthermore some of the activities carried out dealt with behavioral change, topic that requires a long term investment. Finally the choice was also correct from the sustainability point of view, as consortium members will remain active in the areas of intervention at the end of CRD funds if needs are identified.

It is important to state that CRD is composed of funds originating from different US sources and with different financial requirement. This rigid financial structure has hindered the development of a conceptual approach for the implementation of the program. The Mission had decided already at the Request for Operation (RfA) level the amount to allocate to each component and to each region creating a very rigid financial and operational structure. Initially the "Increased Community Resilience and Psychosocial Support" component was 68% of the overall program and was financed mainly by DCOF and VoT and it was agreed that for easing reporting activities DCOF funds were going to Acholi and the VoT funds to Western Uganda. The "Enhanced Participatory Dialogue" component comprised about 12% of resources.

According to the RfA, geographic/demographic priorities for dialogue activities will be based on both potential for success as well as comparative advantage of USAID versus other actors, and are expected to have the following relative emphasis: Acholi - 70%, Western Uganda - 10%, Karamoja - 15%, West Nile - 5%. However these explanations do not really clarify why Karamoja and West Nile do not need psychosocial support nor how the needs for dialogue activities have been identified. Due to the high amount available for the psychosocial support, this became a very comprehensive component that was supporting many more activities than the mere psychosocial support and reintegration of victims of trafficking/abduction. This aspect posed a challenge during the implementation of the program and for the evaluation itself. Finally the HIV/AIDS component was initially 20% of the program and no geographical priority was attached to it. However this component was further expanded during the five years of the

program as PEPFAR money became available. The consortium was asked to report the expenditures divided per component and regions so that USAID could have reported back to the different funds: DCOF, Vot, and PEPFAR. Nevertheless these financial reports have never been asked by USAID although have been prepared by the consortium management team.³⁴

NUPI

The assessment of NUPI's approach has to be done in the light of the changes the program underwent. The choice of using a contractor and to work with Option Periods with limited duration, is fitting for the original purpose of the program but can be questioned from today's point of view. The main aspects regarded here will be the choice of working with a contractor and the fact that the program was implemented in Option Periods (including a Bridge Period and phases of uncertainty whether the program would continue or not). Finally the fact that the program has originally be designed as a support program to the national government will be discussed.

The shift of the US government's strategy in the peace process in 2004 made a re-orientation necessary. From a very specific technical assistance program for the government in its efforts of reaching the LRA directly, NUPI changed to an initiative with national public appearance and support to grass root activities, similar to those of NGOs working with the affected population in Northern Uganda. This set up can be called unique of its kind in Uganda. Whereas the original task was best managed by a short and flexible contract with a contractor, the later activities required a more long term approach with thorough planning, reliability and continuity.

NUPI became a noteworthy actor within the national peace building process, not at least through the organization of the 2004 conference in Gulu. The initiative for this key event and the logistical support were valuable for the reconciliation process.

However it has to be considered that national reconciliation is a sensible undertaking where confidence and trust are important factors. Actors involved are appraised regarding their origin and their affiliation to other actors. Whereas it has always been clear to interlocutors during this study that NUPI was a program financed by the US Government, it has been much less clear in how far NUPI was influenced by the Ugandan government and how exactly and why a contractor is implementing this program³⁵. Uncertainties regarding the set up and the character of NUPI reduced the buy-in of others and created some reservations towards NUPI's activities among some of the interlocutors met during this study. People are used to thinking in categories and group actors according to their agenda and set up, for example as development NGOs, Human Rights lobby organizations, etc. The model of a contractor implementing peace building activities in a public domain does not fit into any of those common categories and, therefore, influences the perception of NUPI as honest broker for peace.

Nevertheless, NUPI was a resource body, which was flexible, responsive and equipped with the means to give logistical support to meetings, research, traveling and publications. This flexibility was important in the fast changing environment and contributed to the fact that activities such as the Chief's tour, the Issues Paper, and the creation of the regional peace fora could be realized.

³⁴ Personal communication with Timothy Bishop (CRD Chief of Party), 31-03-2007.

³⁵ NUPI has changed its public appearance throughout the program. An illustrative example are the business cards of NUPI staff, which had at the beginning the government's logo together with NUPI's logo. This has later been changed to the USAID and the NUPI logo.

On the other hand the set-up of NUPI did not allow the program to establish longer-term and deeper relationships with CBOs, to build capacity and to work in a more sustainable way. NUPI had signed a number of Memorandum of Understanding with local organizations but could never commit itself for more than one year. NUPI could not transfer resources to local partners and could not contribute much to local capacity building.

This shortfall became especially apparent when looking at the grass root level activities, where lack of experience of NUPI staff, high staff turnover, missing follow-up, and delays in implementation had rather negative impact of activities. But also regarding the establishment of the reconciliation infrastructure NUPI could not achieve a deeper impact because of the short duration of the program and the ad hoc approach to activities (see in more detail below).

5.2 Monitoring and Evaluation

As part of the ISP 2002-2007, USAID commissioned Management Services International to implement the Monitoring and Evaluation Management Services (MEMS) project to provide technical assistance in the areas of performance monitoring, dissemination and utilization and M&E capacity development for USAID/Uganda programs. The objectives of MEMS embrace three main tasks:

- Program monitoring and the development of reporting and evaluation systems;
- Dissemination of the USAID Uganda Mission's programs and M&E findings;
- Conduct capacity building in monitoring and evaluation for implementing partners, USAID mission staff and young professionals.

MEMS was assigned to develop the M&E systems for the NUPI and CRD programs, which was strategically designed including a results framework, a performance management plan and defined indicators to assess progress on achieving targets and objectives. As a cross cutting issue for USAID, the indicators for the HIV/AIDS component of the CRD were predefined and had to be integrated into the M&E structure in cooperation with the Monitoring and Evaluation of Emergency Plan Progress project (MEEPP).

The initial process of elaborating the monitoring systems took three months for NUPI and six months for CRD. The PMP for NUPI was only finalized in August 2006, meaning about eight months before the end of the program. On the CRD model several diverse approaches to M&E had to be standardized to meet the requirements of the overall system. Indicators in both programs had to be adapted several times as result of the changing environment. Although a monitoring system has to be flexible under certain circumstances, the changes were seen as time and resource consuming. Despite the big effort to develop the PMP for NUPI, in the end it was still not consistent.³⁶

CRD managed the monitoring process with the help of a relational database that allowed the merging of data on different levels and enabled the consortium to control time and budget resources in an efficient manner. However, either the CRD as the NUPI monitoring is mainly focused on quantity, outputs and effectiveness, rather than quality, outcomes and changes, this fact hampered the strategic readjustment through lessons learned and programming options. Because of the decentralized structure of CRD, the readjustment happened on the local level, where the service providers had to adapt their activities to the respective situation. Although this can be seen as a positive indicator for the flexibility of the system, mismatches between the

³⁶ As an example might serve the indicator "Number of Peace Forum established." The indicator appears more than once in the PMP and is therefore a central indicator. In reality the establishment of the forums had progressed to very varied levels, which is in the end not reflected at all in the reporting regarding the PMP indicators.

reporting data of implementers, consortium members and MEMS occurred. Besides this, a serious challenge for MEMS was the observance of deadlines for reporting, as information came in late or was provided without all of the necessary data.

The focus on accountability corresponded to the needs of USAID, but the need for extensive data collection exceeded the capacities of smaller implementing partners, at least one organization dropped out from the CRD program as. Training and capacity building for partner organizations proved to be a sustainable approach for strengthening management capacities and accountability structures of the local implementers. This could not prevent a gap in monitoring the quality of services provided through the local partners, as the means of verification are mainly numerical indicators that do not allow any statement on the standards of the activities. Data collection was under the responsibility of each consortium member, as implementers provided information to the program management of the consortium members directly, the information had to be adapted to the overall monitoring standards.

6. Assessment of Results and Outcomes Achieved

NUPI

6.1 Institutional Framework for Reconciliation

Outcome

NUPI provided technical assistance to regional fora for reconciliation: the Gulu District Reconciliation and Peace Team (DRPT), the Pader Peace Forum (PPF), Kitgum Joint Forum for Peace (JFP) and the regional Acholi Peace Forum (APF). Support included the formation of Executive Steering Groups, support in developing Work Plans for the future, and the establishment of offices. Members of teams, comprising local government councilors and others, also received training in conflict management, and reconciliation methodologies and practices. NUPI initiated Reconciliation Steering Groups in neighboring sub-regions, including Teso, Lango, and West Nile.

Apart from the challenges and problems, the overall support for conflict reduction and reconciliation proved to be important and necessary. NUPI has contributed to a larger awareness and discussion about peace and reconciliation in Northern Uganda – maybe to a lesser degree in Uganda as a whole. USAID –and therefore NUPI- has access to key players on national and regional level, this is a clear strategic advantage of the Mission in Uganda. NUPI had resources which could be mobilized to produce visible results in a flexible manner (organization of events and visits, accompanied by research and media publications). The “Culture of Silence” has been identified as a driver in the conflict, at least in the workshop in Kampala. However the issue of reconciliation did not come up in any of the other workshops.

DRPT and APF were the most developed structures supported by NUPI up to date. KJPF’s and DRPT’s foundation date back to 2000, whereas PPF was founded in 2001. The APF was new in its kind and has been established in 2005. This new structure including NUPF and the revitalization of the existing structures attracted interest and could be named as inspiring within the national reconciliation movement. The need to continue activities has been expressed by the majority of the interviewed resource persons. However there are some issues which limit the positive impact of this component.

The structure in theory covers 24 districts within five sub regions of Acholi, Karamoja, Lango, Teso and West Nile. The establishment of the infrastructure outside Acholi started very late in the program and therefore did not advance very far. Especially the structures on district level are under-developed so that there are serious concerns regarding their sustainability.

The structure in its present state does not yet link the grass root level to the national level. In fact the structure is unbalanced in the sense that mainly on regional and intra-regional level institutions are in place. Maintaining and ensuring consistency of what has been planned is still a challenge. In West Nile and in Karamoja the structure is still very weak. The fact that NUPI was the only driver and the only source of resources in the foundation process today, proves to be a major weakness when it comes to viability and ownership of local actors and institutions. Peace forum members have been invited to foundation workshops and have been nominated on paper. What are missing are the follow-up and the resources from other sources than NUPI. The idea to include a budget position for the structure in the districts' budgets exists but still needs to be turned into a reality. The structure consequently depends in the end on the government.

Within the program period NUPI did not manage to advance the process far enough so that sustainable structures were created. Throughout the process NUPI was the main driver and so far no other actor to take over is in sight. In fact the initiative was quite isolated and did not coordinate with other peace building and reconciliation activities in the same region.

A number of factors contribute to a low impact of the component when it comes to sustainability. Especially the lacking exit and hand over strategy combined with a lack of communication regarding the end of the program are a missed opportunity for a more viable initiative with a stronger link to other actors and initiatives in the same field.

The fact that the structure covers only Northern Uganda raises questions regarding the national reconciliation agenda. The aim of "making government accountable for the security of the people" (ToR for Peace Forums³⁷), seems to be very ambitious, although is addressing one of the key issues of the conflict as shown in the results of the conflict mapping exercises. This aim remains unaddressed by the structure in its present, very preliminary state.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- (National) Reconciliation was and is relevant as shown by the results of the mapping workshops;
- The infrastructure and the activities were adapted to the situation and led to a positive starting dynamic of the initiative (especially the Gulu conference with the participation of the Minister for Internal Affairs can be named as a key event);
- Community Peace Committees caught the attention of key stakeholders;
- During 2005, NUPI helped develop this infrastructure by revitalizing regional and district peace teams which were already in existence, but had little *de facto* presence on the ground;

³⁷ See: NUPI, Foundation document - The Infrastructure for Peace Building and Reconciliation, Origin and Structure of the Peace Forums, p. 8.

- No other major donor brought the issue onto the agenda at this time or provided similar support, whereas towards the end of the program other initiatives 'competed' without being integrated or coordinated.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- NUPI could provide resources in a flexible manner and was responsive to upcoming needs;
- NUPI lacked identity and strategy throughout the process, which hampered buy-in of other actors;
- NUPI was perceived as too close to the Uganda government, whose agenda in national reconciliation and in the peace process in Northern Uganda has been observed critically by interlocutors;
- The priority focus on Acholi region hampered process on national level;
- The infrastructure did not spread out enough - not in terms of geographical coverage and not in terms of depths: inter-region and on lower levels;
- There was a lack of coordination and no use of synergies with other actors working in peace building (e.g. CRD);
- NUPI impacts almost exclusively through training, workshops and conferences. This has lower impact than building up viable structures or capacity building through work with local partners for instance;
- NUPI addressed government structures but at the same time depended on them which in the addressed regions means working with a low capacity.

Duration of impact: 1 (LOW)

- Poor management (lacking follow-up of activities, delays in implementation and spending of funds, high staff turnover, poor communication) reduced impact;
- Change of focus of the program: NUPI has not been an activity that was designed in a consistent manner. The program underwent many changes and had periods of uncertainty about its existence;
- Lack of exit strategy puts the whole initiative at risk;

Mission constrains:

- Fast changing environment/conflict situation.

Significance (RxExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	1	6

6.2 Community Participation in Peace Building and Reconciliation Dialogue

Outcome

NUPI has supported a variety of community participation initiatives, involving different groups of society, including traditional leaders, women and youth, and returnees. During interviews two activities in particular were positively mentioned, the Chief's tour and the inter-regional exchange visits.

The conflict mapping exercises showed that the lack of knowledge about other population groups and lacking reliable public information about conflict related events are factors

contributing to the conflict situation. The exchange visits and the facilitation of visiting tours address these issues. Although of importance, these issues were not the key drivers in the conflicts (same as under paragraph 6.1 above).

Supporting the Chiefs cannot be cited as very innovative or responding to a need. In fact, the Chiefs already have been receiving external assistance from international donors for a long time (including from CRS, one of the CRD implementing partners). The role of the Chiefs, their standing in the community today, and their importance in the peace process are not entirely clear. It could not be observed that the support for the new Paramount Chief structure did any harm so far. However the substantive resources provided by external actors raise concerns and might create divergence in the existing society structure (e.g. competition with other leading groups such as the elders). Some interlocutors mentioned a deficit in consultation of local leaders in the program design of NUPI.

One of the few real start-up activities of NUPI is the support to women groups. NUPI initiated group activities of 'Concerned Women' in IDP camps who miss their children and mostly have lost their children as a result of abduction by the LRA. The groups undertook outreach activities to send out signals of welcome and forgiveness to LRA fighters in the bush. How far the fear of vengeance held by returnees and conflicts between returnees and the local population were in fact decisive factors in determining whether for LRA fighters returned or not, could not be assessed in interviews or in the mapping exercises. The interviewed women and representatives from NUPI stated that LRA fighters came out of the bush because of their activities. In none of the workshops the activities of the women groups were mentioned as influencing activities, whereas the role of religious leaders and the importance of the amnesty act were mentioned as important factors.

The outreach activities of the women groups contributed to the creation of a 'return friendly' environment for LRA fighters. However, other, much stronger factors must be mentioned, such as radio programs, the Amnesty Act, and outreach activities of more influential groups, such as religious and traditional leaders.³⁸ Obviously the reach of mass media –and in particular of radio- is much wider. Interviewed women confirmed that they have doubts that their activities (singing and drama) have actually reached the fighters in the bush. Within the 'Women and Youth Peace Building Program' the radio as a means of communication was not used enough. There was for example only one radio message in the last Option Period.³⁹

Despite the low intensity of these activities, the NUPI reporting about them is very positive regarding direct outcomes of the activities. Reports refer to individual cases (even by giving their names) where LRA fighters came out of the bush because of NUPI activities.⁴⁰ These cases have not been verified by NUPI staff or M&E researchers and are therefore misleading and raise concerns regarding the credibility of the provided information in NUPI reports.

Of very poor quality were the grass root activities such as the joint income-generating activities (e.g. brick-making) between returnees and the host population in the internally displaced person's camps. NGOs are very present in IDP camps, especially in those close to Gulu. IGAs are one of their activities. By starting these activities as well, NUPI became one more actor in this field. Because of high poverty, the camp population willingly engages in the activities with the perspective of having access to external resources and potential income. The peace and reconciliation aspect becomes marginal

³⁸ See: also the M&E report May 2006: "...direct contribution to reconciliation was somewhat unclear...", p. 4.

³⁹ Women and Youth in Peace Building Program, Report October 2006.

⁴⁰ See M&E report May 2006: p. 18, p. 21 and appendix 2.

in this regard. This is even more the case when the activity is only of short duration and poorly managed. The evaluation team could observe a project which was poorly managed. It was manifested in frequent delays in implementation, in very sporadic follow-up, and in an obvious loose relationship between the NUPI project manager and the beneficiary group.

The program was meant to be a test for a reintegration methodology. What remains unclear is why a program such as NUPI has to implement such activities directly and without any prior experience in grass root implementation. Overall the activities were very broad and scattered including psycho-social counseling of ex-combatants and even counseling not directly related to conflict issues such as one reported case of counseling between husband and wife because of family problems.⁴¹

NUPI also became one of many international actors supporting traditional healing ceremonies. The meaning and significance of those ceremonies today is not entirely known. Nevertheless, in the life of the communities and the local reconciliation process, these traditional forms have had a positive impact on the reintegration of former combatants and should be considered as an important field for reconciliation. The aid community gets involved in this sensitive issue by providing material assistance. It could be worth to intensify research on the meaning and significance of these traditional ceremonies for the reconciliation process, thus to decide how to support these processes most effectively.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- Peace building and reconciliation were and are relevant;
- Community participation, also in form of cleansing ceremonies, is key to reconciliation.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- Traditional leaders were supported especially by organizing a Chief's tour. The traditional leaders received support also through different donor organizations. However their role and importance in the peace process remains unclear, as for example the social relation of the younger generation to the traditional authorities is not always without conflict;
- Exchange visits are relevant but were very limited in number and reach;
- The outreach activities were rather ad hoc, sporadic and even if they reached many people, the intensity is rather low (for example speeches in mass meetings, total number of students exchange visits is three);
- Women groups were formed and were active on both the community and higher level (participation in regional/national events). The impact of the activities of the women groups is hard to determine as their outreach is limited and attribution of results (coming out of LRA fighters) is difficult;
- The grass-root activities are addressing very few people with very low intensity; selection of direct beneficiaries seems to be random and not always logic (youth group with an average age of 27)
- Support to traditional healing ceremonies has been sporadic only. Importance of those ceremonies and the meaning of external support to the ceremonies are only recently being investigated;
- Lack of coordination and no use of synergies with other actors working in peace building (e.g. CRD).

⁴¹ NUPI Project Reports for Grassroots Reconciliation Projects in 10 IDP Camps, March 2006, p. 6.

Duration of impact: 1 (LOW)

- Most activities under this component started very late in the program only towards the end of 2006);
- Poor management (follow-up of activities, delays, poor communication) reduced impact;
- Lack of exit strategy puts activities at risk;
- Poor planning and implementation of activities caused frustration and missing credibility among participants;

Mission constraints:

- changing environment/conflict situation;
- high donor NGO density in the area with the known side effects (risk of dependency on external aid, increase of local prices and salaries)

Significance (RxExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	1	6

6.3 Media, Communication and Research

Outcome

A number of activities have been undertaken related to communication, research, and publication. Some of them within a framework (e.g. a radio partnership was established during 2005 between NUPI and the Gulu DRPT; NUPI collaborated with the Centre for Conflict Management and Peace Studies at Gulu University on two research projects during 2005), some were stand alone activities of which the following were referred to by interlocutors during interviews:

- NUPI has been requested by USAID to support the Government of Uganda to produce an Issues Paper as the first step towards the formulation of a National Policy and Institutional Framework for Conflict Resolution and Peace building;
- A documentary titled 'Trapped in Anguish: A Call for Acholi Reconciliation' was produced;
- In June 2005 NUPI invited more than government officials, civil society leaders, and representatives from media organizations across Uganda for a conference addressing the media's role in peace building;
- Journalists participated in a NUPI-organized training course in conflict-sensitive reporting in September 2005.

Those activities, as well as those not explicitly mentioned here, are related to the activities within the above mentioned two program components. They are therefore relevant for the conflict dynamic and in particular address the need for deeper knowledge about reconciliation in Uganda and contribute to objective information about events and conflicting parties. NUPI was also successful in getting media coverage of the key events of the program. However, as well as some of the activities mentioned above, the activities here were kind of scattered and in some cases were not followed-up so that there is only little impact.

Of crucial importance in Acholi is the radio, as it is available in many households, even across the border to Sudan. NUPI has collaborated with the biggest radio station, Radio FM. Again, NUPI was only one of many actors and did the same activities that were

being done by other NGOs at the same time (Radio FM was originally set up with DFID support and cooperates with many NGOs who buy air time for their programs and also for peace messages). The radio program with the biggest importance regarding the coming out of LRA fighters was named to be the program “Dwog Cen Paco”. On this program three times per week ex-fighters speak about their experience in returning to their home places. It is not a NUPI funded program.

Significance of impact

Relevance: 3 (HIGH)

- There is a need for scientific research into the causes of conflict and means for peace building and reconciliation;
- There is a need for more objective, balanced and more comprehensive information to the public;
- Media can play a central role in peace building and reconciliation (changes in social memory, help to overcome social distance);
- Radio is the central mass media in rural areas.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- The media component was a minor component of NUPI’s program;
- Publications reach only a very small group (those directly exposed in film presentations for example, those who have access to internet and modern communication).

Duration: 1 (LOW)

- The activities were one time activities mainly (workshops, conferences, training);
- Institutional relationships established are not sustainable and are likely to completely end after NUPI pulls out.

Significance (RxExD)

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	1	6

CRD

6.4 HIV / AIDS


Outcome

The link between conflict and HIV/AIDS is much more complex than originally expected by epidemiologists and aid practitioners. As the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)⁴² reiterate “the very conditions that define a complex emergency - conflict, social instability, poverty and powerlessness - are also the conditions that favor the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections.” Furthermore HIV and conflict influence and potentially reinforce each other, there are bi-directional causal associations, and therefore two focuses should be kept in mind:

⁴² Guidelines for HIV/AIDS interventions in emergency settings.

- The impact of HIV/AIDS on conflict: disease that threatens the stability of communities in some of the poorest countries in the world.
- The impact of conflict on HIV/AIDS: conditions that increase the vulnerability of individuals and communities to the disease.

The relationship between the two can be exemplified as:



Having diminished during the 1990s, Uganda's epidemic has stabilized overall. National adult HIV prevalence was 5.7% to 7.6% in 2005 but it was significantly higher among women (nearly 8%) than among men (5%). Approximately 850.000 to 1.2 million people were living with HIV in Uganda in 2005⁴³. Furthermore a study conducted in 2005 in IDP camps in Acholi identified AIDS as the second top self-reported death cause, malaria the first and violence was the third most frequent one⁴⁴. Therefore HIV/AIDS remains a major concern in the country and especially in the North where the conflict has severely affected the health service provision and the possibility of proper data collection and therefore of clearly understand the pattern of the infection and planning adequate interventions.

The main risk factors usually associated with HIV transmission in a conflict setting include massive population displacement, disruption of family and social structures and mores, disruption of sexual networks, sexual interaction of conflict-affected people with military or rebel personnel, the economic, social, legal vulnerability of women and children, the frequency of sexual violence and coercive sex, the interruption of health services, and the high prevalence of sexually transmitted infections⁴⁵. Most of the above mentioned factors are present in the Great Northern Uganda. However all these risk factors need to be contextualized in order to understand the direction and magnitude of their impact on HIV transmission. For example mass displacement increases the risk of transmission, however the reduced mobility and accessibility of local population in a displacement setting have acted as preventive factors in other conflict areas.⁴⁶ In the conflict mapping workshops massive displacement leads to Human Rights violation and to increased number of abductions, and therefore to increased vulnerability towards HIV/AIDS especially for children and women in a context of lack of protection. Consequently it was relevant to include an HIV/AIDS component in the program especially with a focus on vulnerable groups and their empowerment and protection.

A study recently conducted with the support of AVSI among pregnant women in the Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts found a prevalence of 8.2%, data consistent with the trend of declined prevalence observed at the national level. The prevalence in the region for the group under study, pregnant women attending ANC in urban settings, is consistent with the average for the country. Furthermore the study had a surprising result. People who are internally displaced in protected camps showed a reduced risk of being HIV-1 infected compared with

⁴³ UNAIDS (2006), Report on the global AIDS epidemic. Geneva.

⁴⁴ MoH Uganda, WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, WFP, IRC. (2005) Health and mortality survey among internally displaced persons in Gulu, Kitgum and Pader districts, northern Uganda.

⁴⁵ Khaw AJ, Salama P. et al (2000), HIV Risk and Prevention in Emergency-affected Populations: A Review. *Disasters*, 24(3): pp. 181-197.

⁴⁶ Spiegel, PB (2004), HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displaced populations: dispelling myths and taking action. *Disasters*, 28: pp. 322-339.

those who are not internally displaced⁴⁷. This might be due to the reduced mobility and increased access to health and prevention services of women in some of the camps. Although the attribution of results to any intervention is always difficult, it is plausible to suppose that CRD activities have contributed to contain the transmission of HIV in the IDP camps.

The initial approach developed by CRD was a comprehensive and appropriate response to HIV/AIDS in a complex emergency. Especially during the first years of the program the consortium offered unique services in the targeted area, going from data collection to improved care for PLWHA. Subsequently more HIV/AIDS programs, including some US funded, became active in the same geographical areas and were addressing specific topics within the HIV/AIDS component. At this point it could have proved of added value for CRD to reconsider its “consortium approach” and focus more attention towards the impact of HIV/AIDS on conflict. Although each consortium member is working on HIV/AIDS regardless CRD funds and all of them have very sensitive approaches towards HIV/AIDS in complex emergency as well as gender based violence (GBV), there has not been a systematic endeavor of the consortium for combining the efforts in a specific direction targeting the conflict drivers.

Most HIV and STIs prevention programs target the individual for behavioral change. In reality the individual as well as the social and community level factors can influence the rate of HIV transmission by affecting the individual ability to avoid hazard and therefore affecting the success or failure of prevention programs⁴⁸ and the level of conflict in a community. NACKWOLA program in Jumbe and Arua is an example of a comprehensive and successful intervention dealing with HIV/AIDS. The program is designed by PLWHA to provide Information, Education and Communication (IEC) on HIV in the communities as a way to increase demand for VCT. Furthermore the intervention is supporting and empowering PLWHA so that they become active and resourceful people in their communities, therefore challenging the stigma and discrimination through empowerment of the community members.

The positive involvement of men and the communities at large and a stronger emphasis on reducing vulnerabilities of the targeted population are as important as availability of services and it will lead to behavioral change. CRD has trained staff working in governmental health centers and hospitals in Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) and in Prevention Mother To Child Transmission (PMTCT). The consortium rightly supported and used the national policies for both activities, which do not conceive compulsory testing. However the staff in some health centers, under extreme workload pressure, did not follow these guidelines and tested without counseling pregnant women attending Antenatal Care visits (ANC). In one case in Karamoja the midwife responsible for ANC and PMTCT insisted that the Uganda policy is to routinely testing pregnant women without asking consent, this is a clear case of Human Rights violation.

Testing without consent and counseling undermines the capacity of the individual to deal with the consequences of the test and the pressure from the community, therefore reinforcing conflict drivers. In two cases, in Gulu district, women were tested without consent and counseling and were found HIV positive. Once they have been informed, they disclosed their status to the partners. Both husbands reacted by expelling the wives from the home. Women are already more at risk of contracting HIV because of physiological and social vulnerabilities and their partners are mostly in denial of their role in the infection, especially if the woman is tested first. Although PMTCT is crucial for reducing the transmission of HIV from mother to

⁴⁷ Fabiani M., Nattabi B., et al (2007), HIV-1 prevalence and factors associated with infection in the conflict-affected region of North Uganda. *Conflict and Health*, 1: p. 3.

⁴⁸ Campbell C, Mzaidume Y., How can HIV be prevented in South Africa? A social perspective. *BMJ* 2002/324: pp. 229-232 and Sumartojo E., Structural factors in HIV prevention: concepts, examples, and implications for research. *Aids* 2000/14, Suppl 1: pp. 3-10.

child (15% of HIV transmission in Uganda) and it helps to monitor pregnancy and baby status, the burden of the test is put exclusively on women. A strict focus on prevention of transmission leaves the concerns of women living with HIV/AIDS largely invisible, reinforces women's marginalization, and it will ultimately prove ineffective. Insecure livelihoods and Human Rights violation are two key factors which affect vulnerable people's susceptibility to exploitation and sexual abuse; this is even truer in a displacement context.

Furthermore more attention to "HIV/AIDS & conflict" should have been included / mainstreamed in the other components in order to mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on conflict. Good development and relief activities can paradoxically increase the likelihood of HIV transmission and "strategies to combat the HIV/AIDS epidemic are hampered in an environment where Human Rights are not respected"⁴⁹. Some work can be done directly on HIV/AIDS while other typologies can reduce the risk of transmission or respond to the impact of it without working directly on HIV/AIDS. Even within the development community, the problem of HIV is not linked to the problem of conflict, but rather these two issues are seen and treated as unrelated concerns⁵⁰ or not adequately integrated. It is not merely a question of coordination but it is an approach towards HIV/AIDS as a development problem. For example GUSCO recognizes PLWHA as vulnerable category but it does not have a policy or a procedure for dealing with HIV/AIDS and there has been limited collaboration with other CRD sub grantees active in the sector. They refer possible HIV positive people to the hospital but are not able to follow up. Two different examples from Karamoja: pupils attending the peace clubs are also involved in the HIV groups as for them these are all issues linked with life skills and peaceful environment. On the other hand an active member of an association of PLWHA was not welcomed in a peace committee, as the other members did not see the link between the two topics.

Regardless the level of sensitization already done in Uganda, many myths on HIV/AIDS still remain very rooted at the community level. In Koboko the local council affirmed that HIV/AIDS is a problem in the area because of scarce public health resources and ignorance. People in the district do not believe that someone dies of AIDS but they think that the death is due to the spell cast by the neighbors and this attitude fuel conflicts. IEC on HIV/AIDS should be included in any program dealing with Human Rights and peace building as they can mutually reinforce each other.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- HIV/AIDS is clearly a concern in Uganda, and especially in some of the regions affected by conflicts (Acholiland and Karamoja);
- The conflict could potentially increase the vulnerability of the targeted population towards HIV;
- At the time of the proposal development, other USAID programs were not active in the areas covered by CRD making the inclusion of this component important;
- Gender and reproductive health rights have been partially addressed through HIV/AIDS sensitization programs.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- CRD supports the Ugandan national policies on HIV/AIDS (VCT; PMTCT) therefore provides capacity building to governmental structures and synergies with other actors;

⁴⁹ UNHCHR Introduction to HIV/AIDS and Human Rights. <http://www.ohchr.org/english/issues/hiv/introhiv.htm>

⁵⁰ Mock NB, Duale S. (2004), Conflict and HIV: A framework for risk assessment to prevent HIV in conflict-affected settings in Africa. *Emerging Themes in Epidemiology*, 1: p. 6.

- The partners chosen have functioned as multipliers of the activities;
- The program has tried to be holistic and therefore inclusive, e.g. VCT is not successful if treatment is not available. However the needs in the four sub regions are enormous and cannot be covered by CRD. It could have been more effective to concentrate on a reduced number of activities;
- Human resources available in health centers are already overloaded with tasks, adding new tasks (PMTCT) to them reduce the quality of service delivery;
- If guidelines are not followed or properly implemented the result can be increase of conflict at family level;
- HIV/AIDS is a disease for life and PLWHA could receive support for IGAs or can be facilitated in the contacts with other organizations.

Duration of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- The general approach of CRD within this component has been directed towards capacity building of local actors to deliver services;
- Furthermore CRD has strengthen the capacity of districts in HIV/AIDS planning and data capture which will enable them to sustain their activities,
- However the local structures are still extremely underfunded, lack resources and they are not able to cope with the demands without external support;
- Some partners working on IEC and behavioral change needed support for longer time, especially CBOs and NGOs.

Significance (RxExD):

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
2	2	3	12

6.5 Psychosocial Support

Outcome

Psychosocial support has a crucial relation to key trends of the conflict as defined in the mapping workshops such as massive displacement, increased abduction, Human Rights violation, lawlessness, and fear. The practice of civilian targeting, by rebel groups as well as raiders and soldiers, has resulted in forcible displacement, on a scale previously unknown. Furthermore the strategy implemented by the LRA has been of creating terror within the local populations by high level of abductions, mutilations, indiscriminate killings and use of violence. Northern Uganda has experienced a protracted situation of lawlessness where people run for their own lives (as mentioned during the Arua workshop) and this “leaves individuals psychologically scarred and the intricate network of social interaction deeply torn.”⁵¹

The experience of trauma does not end, or disappear with the ceasefire or return from abduction, and life in an IDP camps can constitute a ‘secondary wound’. In many settlements the threat of violence is elevated and the rates of morbidity and mortality are high, due to overcrowding, poor sanitation and disease. These characteristics coupled with the constraints

⁵¹ Maynard KA. (1997), “Rebuilding Community: Psychosocial Healing, Reintegration and Reconciliation at the Grassroots Level”, in Kumar, Krishna (ed.), Rebuilding Societies After Civil War. London.

and dependency of living in a camp usually contribute to the advance of a sense of hopelessness and despair. This, too, constitutes a traumatic experience.

Furthermore agreement exists that such widespread suffering not only is damaging the individual but impede any type of rehabilitation, reconciliation, reintegration and finally sustainable peace, unless properly and systematically addressed. Indeed also conflict and psychosocial condition have bi-directional causal associations. Therefore any psychosocial components could be evaluated in two ways:

1. Response to the needs created by the conflict;
2. Impact of this component on the conflict dynamic.

The elaboration and implementation of an appropriate psychosocial support program in North Uganda began in the nineties, by some of the consortium members in Acholi region, and was partially supported by USAID. Lessons learned from the previous experiences and activities have guided the planning within CRD. Two important studies⁵² were recently conducted in Acholi and looked at some of the psychosocial interventions. CRD has managed to adequately address the problems and to use these resources effectively. An important reason was the extensive experience of its members in this field combined with the support of DCOF⁵³ and USAID experts in defining appropriate interventions and indicators. However most of the recommendations of these studies remain valid nowadays.

Regarding the impact of this component on the conflict dynamic the overall result is positive. The main strategy has been to focus on the community level rather than the individual, the initial title of the component was 'Community Resilience and Psychosocial Support' – this remained the title of this component – please see the quarterly reports. The individual approach concentrates on treating pathology among traumatized individuals, while the community-recovery model aims to address an individual's needs at the time of intervention⁵⁴ and make the 'solution' reside in an empowered community. Through training and involvement of local leaders, community volunteer counselors (CVC), teachers and parents, health workers, and others the community at large has been enabled to deal with psychosocial issues, to resist violence and provocations to violence. However it is crucial to sustain this attitude by enabling the communities to move forwards. Life in the camps and dependency could easily reverse positive gains.

An important part of this component was the reintegration of FAP into the communities. The importance of providing an alternative to the bush for LRA rebels and reintegrating them into the communities of origin in relation to the conflict is unmistakable. Within the national reconciliation process they should be treated as any other Ugandan. Several activities were conceived and they were geared towards capacity building for handling grievances that fuel the conflict. However, it is necessary to mention that such reintegration is already difficult in a post conflict setting and it is extremely challenging in situation of continuous displacement and Human Rights violation. In such a situation the focus on communities partially diminishes the pitfalls associated with reintegration such as the division between FAP and IDP.

⁵² Williamson J. (2005), Review of Psychosocial Components of the Community Resilience and Dialogue Project in Northern Uganda. DCOF and Allen T., Schomerus M. (2006), A hard homecoming. Lessons learned from the reception center process on effective interventions for former "abductees" in Northern Uganda, USAID and UNICEF.

⁵³ DCOF is a fund provided to USAID for displaced children and orphans

⁵⁴ MacDonald L. (2002), The International Operational Response to The Psychological Wounds of War: Understanding and Improving Psycho-social Interventions. Feinstein International Famine Center.

This labeling is more programmatic than real as both categories are affected by the conflict, however the consequences of this type of prioritization on the conflict can be tremendous. Many people interviewed in Acholi region resent the special attention given to FAP, such as amnesty packages, because the IDPs have suffered at least as much as the abducted people or repented rebels. In Gulu districts people complained that disable IDPs receive no support, especially compared to disable FAPs. The same is true for pupils enrolling in secondary school, many organizations support only children with amnesty certificates therefore reinforcing a form of marginalization. Therefore, future programming should also focus on the needs of IDP and include this target group into activities and supporting measures to reduce the tensions and causes of marginalization. The community recipients of CRD interventions are extremely poor and distraught; this discrimination could impede a successful reintegration and fuel tension at community level. Indeed according to the findings of the workshops competition over resources is an important conflict driver. CRD consortium members clearly advocate for the use of terms as 'war affected children' and are targeting different vulnerable groups as a way to reduce artificial boundaries.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- Psychosocial needs in the regions affected by the conflict are very high;
- Psychosocial support can lead to decreased tension within the community as individuals are better able to deal with sensitive topics and enable society to look forward;
- The component was very comprehensive and inclusive.

Extent of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- Targeting communities as well as individual had a strong multiplier effect;
- CRD and its members have played a crucial role in advocacy at national level for the right of children/people - through the National Psychosocial Core Team hosted by UNICEF and chaired by the Ministry of Gender, Labor and Social Development affected by conflict increasing the understanding of the problem and engaging other actors in active support.

Duration of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- Activities were already on going before CRD and they will go on after the end of CRD as most consortium members and their partners are extremely committed to the topic. This component requires long term support and it cannot be sustained without external funds until displacement ends;
- The enabling of communities to deal with problems related with conflict and violence will last after the ending of the program;
- People still live in IDP camps subjected to indiscriminate violence and fear. Unless their protection and security are improved, all the gains made could disappear.

Significance (RxExD):

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	3	2	18

6.6 Peace Building and Human Rights

Outcome

Peace building in the context of the CRD program has been defined as a sector-crossing issue, including economic development and Human Rights with the overall goal of impacting a regional and national reconciliation process. The scope of activities ranged from sensitization for peace and Human Rights to workshops for capacity building including structural measures like the formation of paralegals. Peace building in the CRD-context focuses on sensitization and dialogue as a crucial approach to deal constructively with conflict, mostly targeting track 3 (grassroots-level). Instead of directly entering in negotiations about issues and causes of conflict, this allowed involved actors to settle a pre-negotiation phase, characterized by confidence building and empathy to gain mutual understanding of the conflict situation. Efforts for conflict transformation need to provide the target groups with necessary information and techniques for dialogue and analysis, thus to prepare the beneficiaries and conflicting parties for peace and negotiation and support communities directly affected by conflict on an immediate and mid-term phase.

The different perceptions of peace in relation to the regional situation have been recognized throughout the CRD program phase, the necessity to identify and conduct adapted activities to the respective context have also been underlined by the conflict mappings conducted by the evaluation team.

Analyzing and effectively targeting the root causes of conflict should be done by the concerned parties themselves with the support of a third party, in the given context represented by the local implementing organizations. The core problem while looking at peace building activities during the evaluation was identified as the lack of experience and technical knowledge of the implementers. Activities often referred to a definition of peace as 'the need to live in harmony'. Although this is an easy concept to agree about, it does not allow the target groups to identify and analyze systematically the causes and consequences of violence, it even limits the capacities for conflict transformation to a superficial level. The delivery of resources and the change of social status in the communities can lead to a change in power relations; therefore development is likely to lead to conflict, adding a new layer to yet existing conflicts. The challenge for the communities is to transform these potentials for violence into a catalyst for positive change, which is not possible without deeper understanding and knowledge of specific techniques and methods to do so. Sustainability, therefore, can only be guaranteed if the capacity building itself is handled with a certain degree of professionalism. But only few of the assessed implementers have an explicit mandate to work *on* conflict. Because of the design of CRD, they had integrated issues of conflict transformation, peace building or Human Rights into their organizational portfolio. There is a continual need for capacity building and advisory services for NGO staff on how to build structural capacities for peace and Human Rights. Some partner organizations are better equipped to take an active role in peace building than others and have been successfully mediating between the local stakeholders. In this context, activities conducted in Karamoja to support dialogue between different conflict parties was a positive example for local conflict mitigation.

The collaboration with religious leaders and elders helped to improve interregional collaboration between existing peace building structures, e.g. the CRD-funded Acholi Religious Leader's Peace Initiative. The formation of peace groups and committees in schools and the integration of peace related teaching units have lead to an increased awareness for non-violent behavior. School children reported on discussions within their families about peace and violence; however the evaluation team was not able to verify the genuine positive impact on reduction of

domestic violence. CRD's efforts to integrate personnel of the security forces in trainings and sensitization for peace building and Human Rights corresponded to the request for more dialogue with police and armed forces, expressed by regional and local peace initiatives.

The lack of a clear and consistent human right strategy with mid-term to long-term goals throughout the program reduced the impact of the activities of this objective. Although the most effective measure has been identified in the strengthening of community based legal counselors or paralegals, they work on a voluntary basis, which makes it extremely difficult for them to proceed with their work after the end of CRD. Repeatedly, in the conflict mapping exercises on different regional levels Human Rights violations have been mentioned and identified as one of the most urgent tasks to work on. The communities positively valued the services of the paralegals, who are directly involved in the prevention and documentation of Human Rights violations. Some of these positive impacts were only possible through individual intervention of commanders from the armed forces, who in some cases directly supported the Human Rights activities and the prosecution in individual cases.⁵⁵ Human rights activities implemented with a structural approach have achieved the targeting of the three main elements of Human Rights work: prevention, protection and prosecution.

The strategic challenge of Human Rights activities in war affected societies or post-war situations lies within the 'peace versus justice' dilemma. Dealing with the atrocities of the past includes the question of legal responsibility for Human Rights violations or war crimes, even on community level while dealing with returnees or ex-combatants. Reactions against Human Rights activities range from resistance up to the point of intimidation and death threats against paralegals either by ex-combatants and individuals of the armed forces.

Although there was no specifically expressed policy for conflict sensitivity, the CRD consortium developed key principles for project implementation and relations with client communities, including a code of conduct for all CRD and implementer's staff and a clear commitment to a participatory and demand-driven approach.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- Human rights and peace building create the primary condition for reconciliation and development, especially in the fragile (post-)conflict context in Northern Uganda;
- Conflict transformation enables individuals and communities to create a stable environment through trust-building and dialogue and reduces the level of vulnerability.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- Merging the concepts of Human Rights and peace building and the lack of a clear strategy for the objectives reduced the impact on communities;
- Budget allocation and project implementation was done with a regional emphasis on Acholiland and Karamoja;
- Lack of coordination with other USAID programs, especially with NUPI, reduced the impact on regional and national reconciliation.

Duration of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- Lack of resources endangers the continuation of activities after termination of the CRD support;

⁵⁵ Discussion with paralegals in Gulu, Coo-Pe IDP camp, 19-03-2007.

- Resources were delivered to implementers, beneficiaries mostly received activities and had to finance necessary infrastructure on their own;
- Peace building and Human Rights activities will be an ongoing task for the donor community, chances for follow-up measures on community level are high.

Significance (RxExD):

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	2	12

6.7 Economic Development

Outcome

As part of the reconstruction process, economic development plays an important role in the process of reconstruction in post-war societies. It focuses on poverty reduction and empowerment of the poorest and marginalized people, whereby the strengthening of social interaction through economic activities helps to reduce potentials for violent conflict. CRD conducted economic activities as an independent objective until the end of the third quarter 2005 under the responsibility of CARE as consortium member. After the withdrawal of CARE from the consortium, CRD continued to implement economic activities mainly under the psychosocial and HIV/AIDS components of the program, but no longer as an objective on its own. Skill development and vocational training represent a necessary tool to regain self-confidence for the affected individuals and increase household income. Recent approaches on the dynamics of trauma in the reconstruction of war-torn societies have support the importance of economic activities for peace consolidation after violent conflict.⁵⁶ The difficult economic situation, low incomes and missing business opportunities lead to less access to health and public services for the affected population, an increased vulnerability of the communities and higher levels of violence. Children often leave school after finishing the primary level because their families cannot afford higher education. So far, economic development has a direct impact on all objectives of the CRD-program.

The undertaken economic activities have enhanced social interaction amongst community members, especially women.⁵⁷ This capacity should be taken into account while thinking about supporting the communities in future. But economic development does not automatically lead to conflict reduction. Formation of exclusive clusters within the community, like saving and loan groups, has the potential to initially increase dissimilarities and therefore intensify conflict potentials. In the cases visited by the evaluation team, participatory approaches have been widely used to decrease negative effects of competition, although it was not an intended conflict-sensitive strategy. SLA (Saving and Lending Association) systems were adapted under the premise that it would include community leaders and local administration authorities in the initial phase. Capital accumulation through saving and loaning enabled participants to start small businesses, some with remarkable effects. These success stories have attracted the attention of formerly critical community members; however, the capacity of the existing groups

⁵⁶ Becker, David, Dealing with the Consequences of Organized Violence in Trauma Work, Bergof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, April 2001.

⁵⁷ The particular role of women in small and medium economic development is underlined by World Bank's Gender Action Plan "Gender Equality as Smart Economics", Washington, September 2006.
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENDER/Resources/GAPNov2.pdf>

to deliver knowledge and technical assistance to support community based dynamics was not sufficient. Lack of resources (e.g. costs for traveling, stationary goods) limited a possible wider impact for economic development on the community.

The promotion of economic activities for women is orientated along 'typical' female activities like tailoring and herbal medicine, lacking a deeper analysis alternative market needs and innovative entrepreneurship.⁵⁸ Promoting alternative ways of income generating activities while respecting the cultural limits could have opened space for identifying economical niches especially in the challenging economic situation in the rural areas and IDP camps. It has been mentioned by the majority of interviewed beneficiaries that there was not enough emphasis on income generating activities. The problem of IDPs, looking for economical survival, has a negative effect on the weak local economy. There is a huge need for skill development and income generating activities, but channeling future support to this target group needs a creative approach to identify niches in the economy and prevent an unhealthy competition between the local business community and IDPs.

A major problem of the situation is the serious uncertainty about the development of the conflict. Will it continue on a low or mid-level with regional limits, will there be a positive result of the ongoing Juba peace-talks or will there be a new escalation of violence? Investment in economy needs first of all a stable political and security environment, even for small and medium enterprises. Small businesses are particularly vulnerable to regional crisis, the link to national reconciliation and local/regional conflict transformation can be identified at this level, underlining the importance of the cross-cutting and multi-sector approach of CRD. One of the most important drivers in economies with a large informal sector are private SMEs, empowerment of individuals and communities to create income reduces vulnerability and dependency from external resources. Whereas in the existing CRD-approach the donor-to-beneficiary delivery chain has been used, future assistance should try to identify ways of increasing business-to-business collaboration at grass-root level to improve local and regional economic collaboration.

Significance of impact

Relevance of impact: 3 (HIGH)

- There is an overall need for economic reintegration, opportunities and increased household income for returnees, IDPs and ex-combatants;
- Economic development has a crucial impact on the reduction of conflict potentials and the settlement of peace in post-war societies;
- Improvement of livelihood conditions and measures for psychosocial support need to integrate economic development as an integral part of the approaches;
- Economic disparities between North and South and growing resentments create the need for further economic development of Northern Uganda;
- The economic breakdown has several times been linked to the uprising insurgency in the workshops, thus highlighting the reciprocal relation between conflict and economy in Uganda.

Extent of impact: 2 (MEDIUM)

- Activities during the first phase (until 3rd quarter 2005) were mainly focused on CRD agencies and implementing partners, less on beneficiaries;
- The implementation of SLA systems was done with little regard to management and accountability skill building for the target groups;

⁵⁸ CRD, Report on a Market Skills assessment, Kampala, November 2004.

- In the second phase, the objective was subsumed under two other components (psychosocial support and HIV/AIDS), the regional priority was set to Acholiland and Karamoja mainly;
- Success stories had a positive impact on non-involved actors who asked for similar support.

Duration of impact: 1 (LOW)

- Economic development was handled as an objective on its own only until mid-2005;
- Activities were continued, but included short-term measures with limited impact.

Significance (RxExD):

Relevance	Extent	Duration	Significance
3	2	1	6

7. Findings and Conclusions

7.1 Generic Findings

NUPI

Project Outcomes

- Strengthening of local and interregional dialogue and reconciliation structure had a positive, however limited, impact.

The program successfully built upon existing structures and supported them in the most appropriate way for an external actor such as NUPI: provision of logistical and facilitation support accompanied by research and media related activities. The infrastructure and the activities chosen advanced the objective of the program. Structures have been established mainly in Acholi, to a lesser degree in other regions where NUPI could not build upon existing structures.

- The structure in its present state does not yet link the grass root level to the national level. It is seen as a rather politicized structure and community members are not sufficiently represented. NUPI was seen as working too close to, or with the government.

- The Objective of national reconciliation and efforts to campaign for it did not match one another.

NUPI could not achieve buy-in from civil society which is crucial for national reconciliation. NUPI did not allow the program to establish longer-term and deeper relationships with CBOs, to build capacity and to work in a more sustainable way.

- The main weakness of the program lies in its lacking viability and ownership of local actors and institutions.

Furthermore NUPI depended on government structures which have a low capacity in the target regions. This approach is in line with the original USAID assessment of the conflict situation, which justified high risk interventions with less sustainable outcomes (see above 4.3).

- Strengthening of interregional dialogue and exchange had a positive impact however were limited in depth and duration.

A significant number of supporting events and measures were undertaken successfully (chief's tour, research and issue papers).

- The implementation of peace building activities at the local level included special activities with women and contributed to the creation of a 'return friendly' environment for LRA fighters. However, other, much stronger factors of influence must be mentioned in this regard and had stronger impact on the conflict. NUPI activities were very broad and scattered, which reduced impact. Most activities for community participation started in 2006 and therefore very late in the program.

CRD

Project Outcomes

- Strengthened competitiveness of Service Providers (Sub-sub grantees).

The training and capacity building activities with staff from local organizations, carrying out activities with the target groups, have enabled these organizations to improve their management and accountability capacity, and thereby strengthened their position for a competitive budget acquisition in the development sector.

- USAID or CRD was not always recognized as the resource-provider, often the consortium member was seen as the sole deliverer of the resources.

Beneficiaries were not always aware of the background for the activities or the objective of CRD, neither was there a general awareness about USAID's role as donor to the program. Labeling was not always undertaken, in so far USAID could obtain only little improvement of its role as an assistance providing agency. This however did not affect the quality of the program, nor its overall coherence.

- Overall positive output for the beneficiaries through locally adapted structures and accepted local partners.

The needs identified were real and the responses provided were consistent with the context. Furthermore the consortium made an effort to use local structures closest to the final beneficiaries and to support partners highly involved with the communities. As participatory approaches were widely considered in the projects, sustainability will be achieved where dynamics do not rely on funding (e. g. peace groups in schools, SLA groups with delivery capacities).

- Most of the areas covered by CRD had endured conflict and insecurity for long time and the whole community is war affected. To enable the community to deal with their own situation is the only sustainable way forward. Although vulnerable categories always need to be targeted adequately, they still need a positive environment for communities to thrive. The project has successfully combined the targeting and, in Acholi, it has partially avoided the discrimination against IDPs as separated group from FAP.

- The Program was adequate to the needs and adapted itself through the local structures to changes in the environment.

CRD showed high flexibility in response to the dramatic change of situation in the field. This is partially due to the agreement between the consortium and USAID, which entitled the possibility of changing geographical coverage and moving resources. To some extent it has also been possible because of the bulky and geographically extent presence of the consortium members in Uganda.

- Strengthening of an NGO middle-class was an unintended consequence of the program.

Uganda suffers chronically from this little noticed phenomenon as a result of the amount of external aid received with NGOs being more accountable to donors than beneficiaries. Due to the amount of external aid received, some NGOs are being outstandingly supported and have transformed in several cases into a type of business organization. CRD should have paid more attention to this challenge especially in a context in which NGOs are the sole service providers because governmental institutions are not functioning. This in some cases leads to the creation of dependencies among beneficiaries from the Service Providers.

- Short-term activities had no significant impact on the ground.

Some ad hoc activities, e.g. conferences or radio programs, were not part of a wider strategy and did not achieve results. Few other activities were financed for too short time to lead to a real change

- Merging of different objectives and strict financial constraints led to accumulation of activities without a clear strategy.

The Psychosocial support became an overarching component financing many different activities, sometimes loosely related just because the component was receiving the highest financial contribution. The amount allocated was not based on needs assessment but on financial availability.

- Lack of income generating activities reduced the outcome in all components of the program.

Some vulnerable groups need IGAs in order to fully participate in any reconciliation or development process. For example, PLWHA are often marginalized and discriminated in their own communities and families. IGAs could provide them the resources needed to be positively engaged in their community and family life. One respondent said that the two goats she has received through CRD project have been the first possessions of her life. She was very proud of them and this has changed her perception of herself and boosted her confidence. She is now fostering two abandoned HIV positive children and taking care of her own children.

7.2 Management and Strategic Level Findings

NUPI

- NUPI is a unique initiative in Uganda. Whereas the original task (support of the government's peace team) was best managed by a short and flexible contract with a contractor, the later activities required a more long term approach with thorough planning, reliability and continuity. The model of a contractor implementing peace building activities in a public domain does not fit into any common category and therefore influences the perception of NUPI as an honest broker for peace. However NUPI lacked identity and a consistent strategy throughout the process, which hampered buy-in on the part of other actors. This flexibility through Option Periods was important in the fast changing environment and contributed to the fact that activities such as the Chief's tour, the Issues Paper, and the creation of the regional Peace Fora, could be realized.

- A number of management deficits reduced the potential impact of the program.

The program lacked continuity, lacked proper follow-up and often had delays in implementing activities. Constant rotation of staff and uncertainty of budget affected the dynamics and the management structures. NUPI was not strong in coordination and did not take advantage of its synergies with other actors working in peace building (for example CRD). At the field level NUPI is perceived as an NGO, just like many others. However implementation standards of NUPI's grass root activities was not as high as those of other NGOs operating in the same area.

- The monitoring structure (especially the quarterly reports) merge quantitative and qualitative sections without detailed description of changes achieved.

There has not been a clear and comprehensive list of activities with number of participants/beneficiaries according to location, exact date of implementation, nor good quality monitoring of progress. The PMP has changed constantly and became an exercise in itself instead of serving as a management tool.

CRD

- Building on existing structures and experiences prevented the creation of project-oriented NGOs.

Donor funding for civil society organizations and structures often leads to the phenomena of the creation of new NGOs that try to acquire financial resources. As CRD worked together with known and program-oriented partners, it avoided creating this unintended side-effect.

- Less control on project design for community activities and selection of service providers for USAID's Mission in Uganda.

The relegation of responsibilities and management decisions to a consortium reduced the control of USAID over activities and projects on the service-delivery level. As a decentralized model, the consortium approach gained its own momentum independently from USAID's influence. On the other hand the lower level of control provided the consortium members with more flexibility while interacting with their partners. That the model worked out in the end can be seen as a positive indicator of the mutual trust between USAID and CRD.

- The consortium model led to increased synergy amongst the members.

Some consortium members have already worked together in the past on some of the same components of CRD. These previous experiences and the framework offered by CRD have created synergies and a better understanding on approaches to implement, especially in sectors such as psychosocial support where the approaches and opinions are many. In some instances it has also offered better opportunities for advocacy on crucial matters.

- Fast service provision to beneficiaries and affected communities.

The consortium of NGOs implementing the project was already present in the country and it will remain active after the end of the funding. This allowed them to work with sub-sub grantees previously known and trusted, and to establish long lasting relationship. The consortium was quickly operational after the awarding of the grant. Furthermore, most of the components of CRD require long term commitment for achieving change and the choice of awarding CRD to established organizations in Uganda has supported this commitment.

- Involvement of governmental structures in service delivery

This approach had a double advantage. On one side local structures have received much needed capacity building and financial support. On the other it has concerned governmental institutions and employees in service delivery in areas perceived by their inhabitants as marginalized from the GoU.

- Synergy did not trickle down to the community level.

Most sub sub-grantees were coordinating their activities with the INGOs which were part of the consortium and financing them, or with the other organizations working on the same topic. Little exchange took place between partners of different INGOs, even working on different sectors.

- Many intermediary levels in the contractual chain consumed resources and hindered transfer to beneficiaries.

The management of CRD was quite demanding: five consortium members, 62 local partners and 118 sub-grants. This long chain has hindered transfer of resources to the local communities. However direct management of the same activities by USAID would have not been more productive or effective.

7.3 Conclusions

- Some activities carried out by both programs have increased awareness of issues and this conversely has increased the demands of the local population. Furthermore behavioral change is a social process that entails a long time to become the social norm. The time required is usually much longer than the life span of a project. Furthermore in the context of North Uganda, where the government is not ready to address all the demands, support is needed to not reverse the achievements acquired.

- USAID's continuing support for conflict reduction and mitigation with a revised strategy and objective is necessary. This derives from the strategic anchor point of country governance and networks of partnership developed locally.

The conflict is not over and most of the root causes of conflicts and insecurity in Uganda have not been removed yet. There is a clear need to increase support on conflict reduction and mitigation interventions paying special attention to the differences existing in each region/district of Uganda. The recent situation in Northern Uganda can be seen as a "stable instability"⁵⁹ with several actors (conflict economy, military, rebel groups, government) gaining from the existing situation (war or conflict economy) that guarantees the political status quo and consolidates the position of these conflict stakeholders. Any development intervention must be analyzed in how far it contributes to peace or a consolidation of the status quo. Therefore a consistent national strategy with sensitive local approaches is considered necessary.

- USAID has access to key players on national and even regional level; this is a clear strategic advantage of the Mission in Uganda.

The conflict in Uganda has a regional dimension. The involvement of Uganda in the neighboring countries and the involvement of these in Uganda is a crucial aspect of the conflict. USAID is in a unique position as donor and diplomatic power to address the regional dimension and to involve the different stakeholders in further negotiations. USAID should take the strategic position as an opportunity to remain a leading player for further activities in the field of peace building and reconciliation in Uganda.

- The psycho-sociological dimension of main conflict actors (troublemaker or spoiler theory) is a necessary element to take into account when looking at future interventions for peace building and reconciliation.

Conflict actors often confront peace simply because they fear to lose their status and social role; peace for them becomes a threat instead of an opportunity. When designing future activities, special attention should be drawn to strategies for turning conflict actors into peace supporters. Civil society organizations can play a crucial role in this process as pressure-groups for peace, focusing either on the government as on rebel groups. Reconciliation is not possible without trust building between conflict parties or the population and the government as a preceding objective.

⁵⁹ The term was used to describe the situation of IDPs in Georgia, see: Vivero Pol, Jose Luis, 1999: Stable instability of displaced people in Western Georgia.

8. Recommendations for future Programming of USAID in the field of Peace Building and Reconciliation

8.1 Scope of intervention

Future interventions should be more developmental rather than relief oriented, which may require less funding but should have a more structural impact. Although the humanitarian needs in the Great Northern Uganda are still extremely high and not easy to cover, regardless the amount of money invested in the area, the ongoing support of relief intervention is likely to support the status quo. The conflict in Uganda is a political crisis with humanitarian consequences but we cannot define the situation exclusively as “humanitarian crisis”. This point is reinforced by the need to influence key actors in the conflict through developmental incentives. These actors often act as spoilers, and working “on” the conflict should include a deliberate strategy of engaging with them.

Conflict and armed violence have occurred in Uganda since independence in 1962. Violence and military force have been used to assume and often retain power. These conflicts and uprisings have been rooted in deep ethnic divisions and regional inequalities, which have continued in the current period of relative stability. Marginalization has been mentioned as a key trend in all the workshops therefore a process targeting the National identity and supporting nation building is needed in order to reduce North-South and interregional tensions.

Furthermore regional divisions and disparities in development between the North and the rest of the country are real and not only perceptions⁶⁰. The provision of services carried out by international communities in the North corresponds to identified humanitarian needs and it is saving lives but it is disengaging the GoU even more. Proliferation of small arms linked with very poor livelihood options and schooling level, worsened by no alternative of income generation are leading the Karamojong in a negative and vicious trend of insecurity and underdevelopment. Disarmament without economic and development support is deemed to failure. It is necessary to address the long term needs of the Uganda population that has been so far affected by conflicts and enabling them to reach the same status of the other Ugandans.

The design of a clear Human Rights strategy and the strengthening of Human Rights structures and institutions at community and national level could lead to a better protection of Ugandan citizens and could offer a framework of unity. However it is important to stress that Uganda is suffering from a chronic weakness in transforming “good” legislation into real policies and services. Therefore empowerment and self-sufficiency of the structures responsible for Human Rights protection and good governance are essential for a real change.

Finally USAID should deeply engage in discussion and coordination with other donors and the GoU itself about future interventions, for example in sector strategies, such as that in Justice, Order, Law and Security. The PRDP or PEAP or any other framework of development and poverty reduction could be of assistance. A common, flexible, and properly monitored framework for interventions can potentially engage the GoU deeper and could create synergies and sustainability among donor initiatives. The GoU, on one hand needs technical and financial support on how to implement conflict sensitive approaches to development, on the other it needs to be seen as the driving force for development in conflict affected area. Improved coordination among donors could lead to better support of the development process in the

⁶⁰ Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS): 2005/2006 Uganda National Household Survey.

Great Northern Uganda. USAID has a unique role to play in this effort due to its relative importance in Uganda.

8.2 Geographical Coverage

The integration of the Greater North (Acholi, Teso, Lango, Karamoja and West Nile sub-regions) into future programs and strategies of USAID should be considered as a conflict reduction priority. The mapping exercise and discussion with people in the conflict affected areas in the Northern and Western Uganda have indicated similar clear sources of latent and open conflict (security issues, economic inequalities, the militarization of power and ethnic divisions). Perceptions of marginalization and inequality seem to fuel discontent; this could be a signal of a growing dissatisfaction and frustration with the situation.

The Karamoja region needs broad regional measures for conflict transformation, not only regarding to cattle rustling, but also taking into account the problem of small weapons smuggling. West Nile is still hosting Congolese and Sudanese refugees and in some areas this population is posing a heavy burden on insufficient resources. The situation in Acholi is definitely linked with the development of South Sudan, regardless the possible success or failure of the Juba talks.

It is therefore important for the future USAID/Uganda strategy on peace building and reconciliation to move beyond the focus on Acholiland to cover the whole Greater North and the conflict affected districts of Rwenzori Region in Western Uganda.

8.3 Mainstreaming conflict sensitivity

Conflict sensitivity (defined as reducing the negative impact of aid on the conflict and increasing the positive impact) has not been specifically targeted or integrated into the strategies and activities of NUPI and CRD. Both programs had a high level of interaction with target groups in conflict affected regions and, as identified in the assessment, some of the management gaps and poor quality service by local implementers have led to unintended negative impacts. Thus, conflict sensitivity should be regarded as a cross-cutting issue for future programs, particularly in the field of peace building and reconciliation. Participants in the mapping workshops have pointed out several times experiences with international donor organizations that inadequately responded to the local needs or even impose measures that do not correspond to the context. The team has identified a similar case while visiting a beneficiary group nearby Kasese, where handicraft-production was suggested, although there was no potential for selling the products.⁶¹ There was a certain level of frustration in the target group, thus fueling their impression of being marginalized even by the donor community.

Through the international discussions, several approaches have been developed to handle the risk of intensifying conflict potentials through development assistance, as resource transfer and third party interventions can create new imbalances. Conflict sensitivity aims to identifying in a systematic way the negative impact of development interventions on conflict and post-conflict situations, thus opening space for readjustment of activities and strategic redesign. In 2001, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD published guidelines for conflict preventive co-operation, with the Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment methodology and the Do No Harm approach so that conflict sensitivity was recognized as a relevant topic for most of the

⁶¹ Visit at Kisongora Women's Group. The proposed handicraft production did not form part of a CRD activity.

international development agencies.⁶² Whereas these tools mostly target the strategic level of donors, it got obvious during the assessment that the implementing partners at the local level must be part of any measure for conflict sensitivity. Here, at the activities level, training for conflict sensitivity should be integrated into the capacity building for partner organizations to strengthen the planning and implementation process. As a first step, these trainings can sensitize local staff to their own role and impact on the ground, but further steps are needed to mainstream conflict sensitivity into the organizational structures and make it a cross cutting issue. The process is characterized through three steps (analytical phase, implementing phase and follow-up) and emphasizes on staff formation and organizational restructuring.⁶³

For future programs of USAID, budget allocation should stipulate that it covers these training needs of implementers and partners. USAID Mission in Uganda should identify ways to furthermore adopt conflict sensitive practices into its program phases, incorporate conflict sensitive principles into the Mission's strategic policies and make it an obligatory topic for any contractor or partner organization. Furthermore, service providers should be chosen by their ability to adopt specific conflict-related features, namely:

- Basic mediation skills;
- Conflict analysis tools and methods;
- Self-reflection on attitudes, values and ethical messages;
- Advocacy track record.

Some elementary key principles of conflict-sensitivity should be regarded as indispensable for USAID's activities:

- Maintaining staff consistency in projects as well as positive behavior and attitudes towards the community and the local stakeholders of a conflict;
- Linking the objectives of the project and the project design with the results of regional and local conflict analysis;
- Staff of service providers should be from the same region as the beneficiaries, be connected to the local situation and understand the dynamics within the communities;
- Cooperating closely with local partners in identifying and addressing conflict dynamics;
- Regularly reviews of the local security situation, changes and the perception of the stakeholders about NGO's and donors;
- Demonstrate through their working practices, organizational norms, and staff profile that they are addressing caste and gender-based discrimination themselves;
- Work with a minimum number of intermediaries between the donor funding and the beneficiaries.

8.4 Measuring the impact and outcome

As mentioned above, the existing monitoring systems for CRD and NUPI do not allow qualitative statements about achieved changes or outcomes. Looking at a regional or even the national context, it becomes exceedingly difficult to appraise sustainability and results. Another difficulty for impact monitoring is the fact that the information input comes from the same entities that receive funding, so their commitment is to prove success to the donor or commissioning organization. Failure constitutes a hazard and puts at risk the resource flow to the NGO or local implementer. Cross-checking of the information provided is difficult as long as there are no alternative sources for verification and the donors are not present at local level.

⁶² Kenneth Bush, 1998: A Measure of Peace; Mary B. Anderson, 1999: Do No Harm; OECD-DAC, 2001: The DAC Guidelines.

⁶³ See Annex, Chart "Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity".

With the implicit understanding that change primarily happens at an individual or community level, where delivered resources turn into activities and service is provided to the target groups (or clients) a future outcome-monitoring should orientate towards these changes.

To gain more reliable information about the outcome of activities, future programs should focus on the beneficiaries as additional information providers and take care to integrate them into the outcome-monitoring process. Although some CRD consortium members like AVSI have worked with community based data collection, it was not an approach used prevalently. Community participation can be arranged through jointly elaborated questionnaires, result workshops and small scale evaluations on the spot. The Participatory Impact Monitoring has been used in other different sectors of development assistance⁶⁴ and it should be recognized as an essential tool in conflict and peace related activities.

As a first step for future activities, USAID and/or the contracting partner should revise existing M&E structures and formats of the service providers and develop respective strategies for participatory monitoring activities for each project. While defining outcome-monitoring as a mutual process between donor, partner organization and target group, the different steps should be developed together in a workshop or several meetings, assuring the participation of representatives of the target groups in these events. Such a system would always be a secondary measure to a sophisticated monitoring as used by CRD and NUPI. Most of the local partner organizations do not have the capacity to proceed with these diversified measures nor can a sufficient control over resources and budget be guaranteed through outcome-monitoring. But a participatory monitoring design can encourage local ownership on peace and reconciliation and support sustainability.

To by-pass the problem of a changing environment - frequently a common aspect in fragile conflict or post-conflict situations - and the known effects on M&E, the set-up of the monitoring system on a rolling baseline is recommended. Experiences from USAID/OTI's Confidence Building Initiative in Macedonia indicate the positive effects on flexibility and readjustment of the program strategy that this approach can have.

⁶⁴ See for example UNOESP: Who are the question makers? A participatory evaluation handbook, 1997.

Annexes

Annex 1: Bibliography

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Annex 2

International Experiences with Peace Building and Reconciliation

I. Reconciliation phases:

1. Recognition and protection of human dignity;
2. Protection of fundamental Human Rights;
3. Support of the institutional infrastructure for transition;
4. Empowerment for the affected population, most vulnerable and marginalized groups;
5. Recovery of the historical truth;
6. Promotion of social justice and equitable access to resources;
7. "Healing the wounds" and trauma recovery.

II. Common instruments for peace building and reconciliation:

Instrument	Activity / Target / Content	Institution	Country examples
Transitional Justice, Truth-seeking and documentation			
Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Commissions are established during a political transition phase after a period of civil war or military rule. - To provide recommendations to facilitate reconciliation. - Addressing impunity and provide a forum for both victims and perpetrators of past abuses. 	UN Special UN-Missions (MINUGUA, UNAMA, ...) NGOs and CBOs	Guatemala, South Africa, Liberia, Brazil, Guatemala, Zimbabwe
Special International Courts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Breaking the culture of impunity. - Prevent of Human Rights abuses. - Increase awareness on Human Rights. 	UN ICC UN and national courts	Sierra Leone
Community Courts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Handling of less severe crimes to deal with the past. - Promotion of reconciliation and co-existence. 	Local communities	Rwanda (Gacaca Court)
Verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Verification and monitoring of peace agreements. 	UN-Missions OHCHR	Afghanistan Guatemala El Salvador
Human Rights monitoring and capacity building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To prevent Human Rights abuses through documentation and prevention. 	OHCHR GTZ USAID	Several countries Guatemala
Establishment of accountability mechanisms			
Legal System Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rebuilding trust and confidence in legal institutions. - Provide legal certainty and end impunity. 	GTZ EU	Colombia Guatemala
Institution and structure building			

Instrument	Activity / Target / Content	Institution	Country examples
Security Sector Reform	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Modernization of Police and Armed Forces. - Human capacity building. 	DFID EU	Afghanistan Nepal
Human Rights Commissions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improvement of the Human Rights situation. - Prevention, Protection and Prosecution. - Strengthening the Rule of Law. 	EU GTZ	Yemen Afghanistan Nepal
DDR	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To contribute to peace and security. - Reintegration, economical and psychosocial support. 	UNDP Special UN Missions	Afghanistan Colombia Sierra Leone Somalia Guatemala
Acknowledgement of the suffering			
Public recognition; Memorial sites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognizing the atrocities. - To facilitate nation building and co-existence 		Several countries
Reports on historical memory"	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Recognizing the atrocities. - To facilitate nation building and co-existence 		Peru Guatemala
Promotion of reconciliation, trauma healing and conflict prevention			
Awareness rising / Culture of Peace	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of reconciliation, strengthen national unity and enhancement of solidarity and trust. 	USAID	Uganda
Co-existence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pre-condition for reconciliation. 	UNHCR	Afghanistan
Peace education / Peace journalism etc.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of reconciliation and peace through public dialogue and discussion. 		Several countries
Conciliation / mediation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Promotion of non-violent conflict transformation through empowerment. 		Guatemala, Afghanistan
IDP and refugee programs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - IDP and refugee programs for economic support / IGAs. 	UNHCR	Guatemala, Afghanistan, Colombia
Address the individual and collective trauma	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Gender sensible approaches are necessary. 	GTZ	Several countries
Reparation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reparation as merged strategy with development projects. 	GTZ	Several countries
Grassroots initiatives and NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - To rebuild civil society structures. - Advocacy for peace - Promotion of empathy and coexistence. 	Several agencies	Several countries
Addressing the social and economical causes of conflict			

Instrument	Activity / Target / Content	Institution	Country examples
Land commissions or Court	- To resolve the problem of the lack of legal titles of property. - To mediate between former owners (IDPs and refugees) and new possessors.	GTZ (land register program)	Guatemala
Social and economical development	- Addressing the root causes of conflict.	USAID	Philippines

III. Examples for National Truth and Reconciliation Commissions:

Country	Name	History	Publication
Afghanistan	Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission	Established in 2004 with a constitutional status, the commission consulted in a nationwide research more than 6000 people in Afghanistan for their view about transitional justice in the country.	"A call for Justice: A National Consultation on Past Human Rights Abuses", published on January 30, 2005.
Argentina	National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons	Created on December 15, 1983 to investigate forced disappearances and Human Rights violations during the "National Reorganization Process" from 1976 to 1983	"Nunca Más", published in September 20, 1984.
Chile	National Truth and Reconciliation Commission	Created on April 25, 1990 with a nine month mandate to investigate Human Rights violations under the military rule of Augusto Pinochet	"The National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation Report", also called Rettig Report, published on March 4, 1991.
	National Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation	Established in 1992 and operating until 1996, the NRRC had the task to promote, coordinate and execute the recommendations of the Rettig Report.	
	National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture	Initiated in November 2003 to investigate details abuses (esp. prison and torture) of the Pinochet military regime in the period of September 11, 1973 to March 10, 1990.	First part was published on November 29, 2004, a second part on June 1, 2005. The testimonies will be kept secret for the next 50 years and can not be used in trials.
El Salvador	Commission on the Truth for El Salvador	Establishment was decided in a mutual agreement between the Government of El Salvador and the FMLN in the Mexico Agreement on April 27, 1991. The Commission was established in 1992 with an 8 months mandate.	"From Madness to Hope", published on March 15, 1993.
Ghana	National Reconciliation Commission	Established on January 14, 2003 to work until October 14, 2004 to seek and promote national	The final 5-volume report "The National Reconciliation

Country	Name	History	Publication
		reconciliation bay establishing an accurate historical record of the Human Rights abuses for the period between March 5 1957 and January 6, 1993.	Commission Report", was submitted to the President on October 14, 2004.
Guatemala	National Historical Clarification Commission (CEH)	Establishment was decided in the Accord of Oslo, signed on June 23, 1994 to investigate Human Rights violations for the period between January 1996 and June 23, 1994.	"Memory of Silence", published in February 1999
	Recovery of the Historic Memory (REMHI)	Alternative process established by the Catholic Church in Guatemala, naming the governmental and military authors of violence.	Report "Nunca Más" was published on April 24, 1998. Two days later, the Guatemalan Bishop Monseñor Juan Gerardi was assassinated.
Liberia	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	Officially launched on June 22, 2006 and based on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of June 2005.	Report still in progress, as the commission has not yet finished its mandate.
Morocco	Human Rights Advisory Council (CCDH)	Created by King Hassan II in 1998, the CCDH investigated and documented cases of political disappearances. In August 1999, the CCDH was tasked by King Mohammed IV to create an independent Commission for reparation.	A list of names was published by the President, but no official report has been released.
	Commission on Arbitration	Created by King Hassan II within the CCDH, operated from July to December 1999 as a special committee to provide financial reparations to victims of past abuses.	
	National Commission for Truth, Equity and Reconciliation	Created on January 7, 2004 by King Mohammed VI to investigate Human Rights violations during the "Years of Lead" between 1960 and 1999.	Final report was submitted to the King in December 2005, a public summary was distributed on December 17, 2005.
Peru	Truth and Reconciliation Commission	The TRC operated from June 4, 2001 until August 2003. The commission was established by a government mandate to analyze the root causes of conflict, aid the courts and elaborate proposals for reparation. First TRC in the Americas to hold public hearings.	A Report was submitted to the King in December 2005, a public summary was published on December 17, 2005.
Rwanda	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC)	Legally established on March 12, 1999, the commission's mandate is to sensitize the Rwandan people about reconciliation, unity and tolerance.	No final report, the commission works now as an established and permanent institution.
South Africa	ANC - Commission of	Initiated in 1991 and formally	"Report of the

Country	Name	History	Publication
	Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees ("Skweyiya Commission")	established in 1992 by Nelson Mandela, the commission investigated complaints from prisoners for the period between 1979 and 1991.	Commission of Enquiry into Complaints by Former African National Congress Prisoners and Detainees", published in October 1992.
	ANC - Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse Against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members ("Motsuenyane Commission")	Established by the ANC in January 1993, the Commission worked for 7 months to continue the work of the Skweyiya Commission	"Reports of the Commission of Enquiry into Certain Allegations of Cruelty and Human Rights Abuse Against ANC Prisoners and Detainees by ANC Members", published on August 20, 1993

Especially the case of Peru could be an interesting example for similar activities in Uganda, as in both cases no formal peace agreement has been signed until now and the government - with the support of the international community - was the leading actor to promote and support reconciliation. In Afghanistan, the establishment of the Independent Afghan Human Rights Commission was an important step for the documentation of Human Rights violations of the past and a consultation of the population, thereby initiating a reconciliation process even under extremely difficult conditions. It also shows the limits of reconciliation, if the government is not fully supporting the process.

IV. Possibilities of Reconciliation in the Ugandan context:

In the given context of Uganda, we consider three scenarios as possible:

- 1) A failure of the Juba Peace Talks and an ongoing conflict setting. This would set the strategic priorities for USAID to *conflict prevention* and peace promotion;
- 2) A successful Peace Process that opens space for *peace consolidation* and the possibility for USAID to emphasize on reconstruction, reintegration and reconciliation.
- 3) An escalation of the present conflict and further spill over from the Eastern regions. This would significantly reduce possibilities to continue with reconciliation.

These settings allow different margins for reconciliation activities. Some examples are listed in the following tables:

Scenario one: *conflict prevention* and reconciliation

Overall goal:			- End violence - Confidence building between conflict parties
Strategies:			- Reducing and limiting the use of violence for conflict actors - Strengthening a culture of peace - Prepare society for a nationwide reconciliation process
	Objectives	Activities	
Track 1	Empowerment of government (and rebels) to enter into negotiations	- Diplomacy	
	Support for dialogue and confidence building	- Diplomacy - Media activities: Information about peace efforts, reduction of hatred and fear	
	Development assistance as strategic element for peace	- Conditionality of financial and technical assistance to the government	

	Promotion of national identity and solidarity	- Media - Leaders and opinion makers
	Accountability structures	- Fight against corruption - Public debate about war crimes and amnesty
Track 2	Strengthening of civil society organizations as actors for peace	- Capacity building for advocacy for peace - Creation of networks between NGOs / churches and donor organizations
	De-escalation of violence	- Workshops and human capacity building with armed forces and military
	Advocacy for Peace	- Publications and public events for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice. - Conferences and seminars on reconciliation.
	Diminish ethnical tensions	- Exchange programs on inter-regional level. - North-South exchange
Track 3	Local reconciliation	- Documentation (historical memory) and oral history workshops. - Financial support for traditional cleansing ceremonies.
	Establishment of conflict transformation structures	- Empowerment of local NGOs and CBOs for conflict transformation and mediation.
	Trust building on local level	- Regain the confidence of the people into their local government structures.
	Women as actors for Peace	- Special focus of activities on women

Scenario two: *peace consolidation and reconciliation*


Overall goal: - Reconciliation as part of a peaceful restructuring of society, politics and economy		
Strategies: - Support of the institutional infrastructure for transition - Recovery of the historical truth - "Healing the wounds" and trauma recovery		
	Objectives	Activities
Track 1	- Establishment of a legal framework for reconciliation (Truth Commission, compensation)	- Legal support, training for Lawyers and Parliamentarians
	Transitional Justice process	- Special chambers that deal with war crimes - Fostering cooperation with the ICC
	Accountability structures to monitor reconciliation activities	- Special bodies of the international community in close collaboration with government bodies
	Institutional and political accountability	- Sector reforms and legal framework - Capacity building
	Verification measures for peace agreement	- National and international bodies for monitoring and documentation
	Public recognition of the atrocities of the past	- Establishment of an official commemoration day
Track 2	Scientific historical documentation	- National conferences and seminars - Support for universities and scientific bodies
	Exchange of international country experiences	- Conferences and seminars
	Human Rights Commission as part of reconciliation	- Documentation and investigation
Track 3	Peaceful coexistence and dialogue	- Schools, Media and public forums
	Promotion of a Culture of Peace (UNESCO toolkit)	- Community workshops - Human capacity building for peace

		- Memorial sites
	Women as actors for Peace and Reconciliation	- Special focus of activities on women
	Psychosocial support	- Collective and individual trauma work

As scenario three (escalation of violence) diminishes the possibilities for reconciliation or makes it even impossible, a strategic table for this scenario is not being drawn.

Annex 3: Chart "Mainstreaming Conflict Sensitivity"⁶⁵

The following chart gives a brief overview of a typical procedure for mainstreaming conflict sensitivity (e.g. the Do No Harm approach) into organizational structures:



⁶⁵ The chart is based on a model that has been developed together with German Development Cooperation - namely the German Development Service DED - for mainstreaming conflict sensitivity into the donor's and partner organizations' structure in Afghanistan. German Development Service: Conflict Sensitive Development Cooperation in Afghanistan through the Deployment of Conflict Advisors, Berlin, July 2005.

Annex 4: List of informants and organizations consulted

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
14-03-2007	Timothy Bishop	Chief of Party CRD	IRC	CRD	Kampala
14-03-2007	Orotin Patrick	M & E Coordinator – CRD	IRC	CRD	Kampala
14-03-2007	Josephine Kalule	HIV/AIDS Advisor	IRC	CRD	Kampala
14-03-2007	Julien Schopp	Country Director	IRC	IRC	Kampala
14-03-2007	Frederick Luzze	National Advisor – Child protection	Save the Children	CRD	Kampala
14-03-2007	Timothy Ahimbisibwe	National Advisor – HIV/AIDS	Save the Children	CRD	Kampala
14-03-2007	Stig Marker Hansen	Chief of Party	NUPI	NUPI	Kampala
	Jared Leiderman	Fellow	NUPI		
14-03-2007	Kevin Fitzcharles	Country Director	CARE	CRD	Kampala
	Grace Kikombo	VSLA Program Manager SUSTAIN			
15-03-2007	Susan Cowley	Deputy Team Leader, Democracy and Governance Programs	USAID		Kampala
	Scott Dobberstein	Team Leader, Democracy, Governance and Conflict			
	Margot Ellis	Mission Director			
	George Frederick	Refuge Coordinator			
	Anne Gachukuzi	Refugee Assistant			
	Randolph Harris	Team Leader, Conflict Programs			
	Lyvia Kakonge	Conflict and Reintegration Advisor			
	Liz Regan Kiingi	Leader Program Office			
	Patrick Mugabo	Acquisition and Assistance Specialist			
	Richard Quinby	North Uganda Program Officer			
	Kennedy Tumutegereize	Conflict Specialist			
15-03-2007	Hillary O'Connor	Peace Building Program Manager	CRS	CRD	Kampala
	Benjamin E. Philipps	Country Representative		CRD	
15-03-2007	Filippo Ciantia	Representative	AVSI	CRD	Kampala
	Lucia Castelli			CRD	Kampala
15-03-2007	Niels Hjordtal	Head of Programmes	DANIDA		Kampala

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	David R. Okello	Program Officer, Conflict Acholi			Kampala
	Ejoyi M. C. Xavier	Program Coordinator			Kampala
16-03-2007	Augustine Wandera	M&E Specialist / SO8 Liaison	MEMS / MSI		Kampala
	Polly Mugisha	M&E Specialist / SO9 Liaison			
17-03-2007	Achan Susan	Program Officer	NUPI	NUPI	Gulu
17-03-2007	Dr. Fabius Okumu	Director, Center of Conflict Management and Peace Studies	Gulu University	NUPI	Gulu
18-03-2007	Alex Otim	LC 5 Councillor, DPRT Steering Committee Member	District Local Government	NUPI	Gulu
	Ojara Mapendusii	District Speaker LC 5, DPRT Member	District Local Government		
	Santa Oketta	Women Councillor LC 5 Layibi/Bardege, Secretary Community Development	Local Council 5		Gulu
18-03-2007	Okobo Celestino	Chief, Pader	Group of Chiefs / Beneficiaries	NUPI	Gulu
	Okello John Samuel	Personnal Assistant, Paramount Chief	Ker Kal-Kwaro		
	Peter Ojigi	Chief, Amuru			
	Rwot. Opoka	Chief, Gulu			
	Okot Vincent	Chief, Gulu			
	Aliwoko Sophie	Minister of Agriculture	Ker Kal-Kwaro		Gulu
	Oyet Nyekorach	Chief, Gulu			
	Okot Latiyet	Chief, Pader			
	Ojok Cissy Charity	Chief			
	George William Lugai	Chief			
	A. K. Banya	Project Officer	Ker Kal-Kwaro		Gulu
	Otto Alex	Cheif, Amuru			
18-03-2007	Santa Oketta	Secretary Community Development	District Local Government	NUPI	Gulu
18-03-2007	Katherine Liao	Regional Human Rights Officer	UNHCHR		Gulu
19-03-2007	Christine Cipolla	Head of Sub delegation	ICRC	-	Gulu
19-03-2007	Sr. Pauline Acayo	Peace Building Project Officer	CRS District Office	CRD	Gulu
	Paul Bishop	HIV/AIDS Project Officer			
	Kossi Kpogo	Northern Area Manager			
19-03-2007	Charles Mboya	Executive Director	Comboni Samaritans / CRS	CRD	Gulu

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	Macimo Opiyo				
	Godfrey Canwat				
19-03-2007	Alanyo Christine	Beneficiary group	Comboni Samaritans / CRS	CRD	Layibi / Gulu
	Achayo Jane				
	Achiro Helen				
	Paska Ajok				
	Apoko Mary				
	Adyero Nighty				
	Rose Oruni				
19-03-2007	Ochira Evaristo	Paralegal group	CRS	CRD	Coo-Pe IDP Camp / Gulu
	Okee Gaudensio				
	Adeleide Oryem				
	Eugenio Odong				
	Obuce Christopher				
19-03-2007	Kitara Mahmot	Vice Chairman LC 5	District Local Government	NUPI	Gulu
19-03-2007	Odwong W'Ayoo Robert	Journalist	Radio Mega FM	NUPI	Gulu
19-03-2007	Jesca Driciru	Program Officer Psychosocial Support	SCiU	CRD	Gulu
	Grace Pamela Lanyero	Program Officer HIV/AIDS	SCiU		
19-03-2007	Francis Akena Adynaja	Program Coordinator	Gulu Development Agency	CRD	Gulu
19-03-2007	James Opia	Clinical Officer	African Centre for Treatment of Torture Victims - ACTV	CRD	Gulu
	Gilbert Nwsinguzi	Project Officer			
20-03-2007	Esteban Sacco		UNOCHA	-	Gulu
20-03-2007	Luis Lennon Okello	Program Officer	GUSCO/SCiU	CRD	Gulu
20-03-2007	Nyeko Jimmy	Beneficiary Group	Can Miro Ribe Youth Group	CRD	Te-Tugu IDP camp - Gulu
	Opiyo Abili				
	Okema Christopher				
	Ojok Michael				
	Apiyo Beatrice				
	Dorine Ajok				
	Atimago Lily				

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	Aloyo Concy				
	Awarango Paska				
	Labong Christine				
	Ojok Michael				
	Opiyo George				
	Okello david				
	Oringa Walter				
20-03-2007	Aber Evaline	Beneficiary Group	Concerned Mothers	CRD	Gulu (Te-Tugu IDP camp)
	Domisia Odoch				
	Kevin Akwero				
	Rose Nyeko				
	Aryemo Hellen				
	Atim Lucy				
	Rose Ajok				
	Aber Filder				
	Achayo Jenifer				
	Anjullina Abwol				
	Angeyo Lina				
	Carolina Lanek				
	Akello Korina				
	Aweko Margaret				
	Aparo Christine				
	Lamunu Margaret				
	Auma Korla				
20-03-2007	Luis Lennon Okello	Program Officer	GUSCO	CRD	Gulu
20-03-2007	Beneficiary Group	25 perons (teacher and schoolchildren)	Primary School Project	CRD	Koto / Gulu
20-03-2007	Polly Phillip Okin		CARE Uganda	CRD	Gulu
21-03-2007	Stig Marker Hansen	Chief of Party	NUPI	NUPI	Kampala
21-03-2007	Stephanie Le Bihan	Protection Officer	UNHCR		Gulu
	Yann Rebois	GIS Technician	UNHCR		

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
21-03-2007	Mark Avola	Programme Manager	World Vision		Gulu
21-03-2007	Okello Lwanga	Sales Executive	Mega FM Radio		Gulu
	Oryema Justin	Programmes Manager			
21-03-2007	Iranya Araku Peter	Program Officer	NUPI	NUPI	Adjumani
21-03-2007	Anyama Saul	Chairman West Nile Peace Forum	District Peace Committee	NUPI	Adjumani
21-03-2007	Betty Ojom	Incharge Antenantal	St. Joseph's Hospital	CRD	Kitgum
	Robert Ocholla	HIV/AIDS Councillor			
	Oyella Alice	Acting Deputy Matron			
21-03-2007	Dennis Nurula	Director	Library- Centre for Night Commuters	CRD	Kitgum
22-03-2007	Richard Onen Opii	Program Officer	IRC	CRD	Kitgum
	Laura Jacoby	Child and Youth Protection Program			
22-03-2007	Godfrey Bongomin	District Coordinator	CPA (Concerned Parents Association)	CRD	Kitgum
22-03-2007	James Latigo	Head of Gulu Office	NUPI	NUPI	Kitgum
22-03-2007	George Jimmy Ayella	Chairperson Steering Committee	Kitgum Joint Forum for Peace (KJFP)	NUPI	Kitgum
	Florence Apiyo	Committee Member ,Supervisor of Children's peace programme			
	Ogal Gaudensio	Secretary			
22-03-2007	Anyeko Grace Obina	Beneficiary Group	Concerned Mothers	CRD	Akwanga IDP camp – Kitgum
	Pido Dorine				
	Mary Kitara				
	Acholla Carla				
	Eterino Acayo				
	Anek Regina				
22-03-2007	Sabo Kamilo	District Vice Chairman	District Local Government	NUPI	Arua
	Drakare Ereminio	Arua District Peace Team			
22-03-2007	Dona Asero	Member	NAKWOLA / StC	CRD	Arua
22-03-2007	Hon. Beatrice Agole	District Vice Chairperson	District Local Government	NUPI	Koboko
	Hon. Mokini Peter	Coordinator Peace Team			
	Hon. Amuke George	District Speaker			

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	Asendu Patrick	Assistant CAD			
22-03-2007	Akandru Grace	Coordinator	KOCISONET	-	Koboko
	H.-D. Sebi	Member KOCISONET			
	Chan Stephen	Member KOCISONET			
23-03-2007	AVSI Staff meeting	CRD team	AVSI	CRD	Kitgum
23-03-2007	Florence Nanteme		AVSI staff	CRD	Kitgum
23-03-2007	Canokema Massimino	Head Teacher	Namkora Secondary School	CRD	Namkora IDP Camp – Kitgum
23-03-2007	Abalo Jerina	Beneficiary group / AVSI clients	AVSI	CRD	Namkora IDP Camp – Kitgum
	Aculu Santa				
23-03-2007	Ketty Opoka	Coordinator	Meeting Point (HIV/AIDS Organisation)	CRD	Kitgum
23-03-2007	Okim Ponsiano Odora	Coordinator	Christian HIV/AIDS Prevention and Support (CHAPS)	CRD	Kitgum
24-03-2007	Gael Griette	Program Manager	EU Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Program	-	Kampala
26-03-2007	Graham Carrington	Conflict and Humanitarian Advisor	DFID	-	Kampala
26-03-2007	Lam Oryem Cosmas	Executive Secretary	Justice and Peace Council	NUPI	Kampala
	Tolit Atiya Charles	Training, Communication and Advocacy Officer	Justice and Peace Council	NUPI	Kampala
26-03-2007	Lemmy Solomon	Team Leader Western Uganda	CRS District Office	CRD	Fort Portal
	Manori Lawrence	Administrator / Finance			
26-03-2007	Proscovia Birra	Child Protection Officer	SCIU District Office	CRD	Kasese
27-03-2007	Mbauta K. Reuben	Chief Executive Officer	FURA	CRD	Kasese
	M. Barnabas	Project Officer			
27-03-2007	Regina Kima	Beneficiary Group / FURA	Lhwanza Women's Group	CRD	Rsembyo Village (Kasese)
	Teddy Biira Bitsotso				
	Sophie Birra				
	Mbambu Jemina				
27-03-2007	Tumwine Yasin	Coordinator	NAYODE / SCIU	CRD	Kasese
27-03-2007	Joseph Karuany	Beneficiary Group	Mohokya Peace Committee	CRD	Kasese
	Joseph Ruhwezy				
	John Gahuluguma				

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	Kajanabyo Elovise				
	Margaret Binugi				
	Kisembo Mary				
27-03-2007	N. N. (15 women)	Beneficiaries / FURA	Kisongora Women's Group	CRD	Kisongora / Kasese
27-03-2007	Muhimdo Justine	Women's Desk	Diocese of Kasese /CRS	CRD	Kasese
	Mugosa Marta				
	Kobusinge Annel				
27-03-2007	Lucy Apio	Karamoja Coordinator	IRC	CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	Godfrey Omukat	HIV/Aids Coordinator	St Mary Primary School	CRD	Nakapiripirit
	Simon Peter Okong	Peace Club Coordinator			
27-03-2007	James Achau	Member of Peace Comitee	Namalu Peace Committee	CRD	Nakapiripirit
	John Lorot				
	Pius Looyan				
	Lina Emuron				
	Christine Longeh				
	Charles Otyang				
27-03-2007	Sam Ketaya	Peace Club Coordinator/Teacher	Namalu Secondary School	CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	25 members	Peace Committee Kokomole		CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	Sam Angolese	HIV/AIDS Advisor	Church of Uganda	CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	Moses Aboka	VCT/PMCT Coordinator	Tokora Hospital	CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	John Orot	District Chairperson	Local Government Nakapiripirit	CRD	Nakapiripirit
27-03-2007	Robert Lochap Rogers	UNDP district representative	UNDP		Nakapiripirit
	Johann Lomongin				
28-03-2007	Caroline Peace Apuuno	Peace Committee Coordinator/Teacher	Nabilatuk Primary School	CRD	Nakapiripirit
28-03-2007	Aryemo Christine	ANC and PMTCT Coordinator	<i>Nabilatuk Health Center</i>	CRD	Nakapiripirit
	Peter Lokol	HIV/Aids campaign mobilizer			
28-03-2007	<i>30 Members</i>	<i>PLWHA association</i>	Nabilatuk	CRD	Nakapiripirit
28-03-2007	Susan Alupo	Program Officer	Karamoja Agricultural Development Programme-KDP	CRD	Nakapiripirit
28-03-2007	120 men	Participants in Peace Dialogue		CRD	Nakapiripirit


Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
28-03-2007	Sister Monica	Coordinator CBHC, CRD-Program	Kasanga Primary Health Care / CRS	CRD	Bwera / Kasese
	Edson Thembo	Focal Person for CRD-Program			
28-03-2007	Masika Agnes	Beneficiary Group CBHC-Program	Kasanga PHC / CRS	CRD	Bwera / Kasese
	William Wakabalya				
	Masinde John				
	Constance Kefeza				
	Ngyabake Neveless				
	Justin Tumwekwase				
	Muhindo Salvin				
	Medira Biira				
	Maseka Samson				
	Alozio Kufa				
	Mary Kaiga				
	Biira Saroliti				
28-03-2007	Bwambale Biira Loice	Chairperson	JYAK	NUPI	Kasese
29-03-2007	Alex Ruhundu	Director	KRRC / CRS	CRD	Fort Portal
	Businge Christopher				
	Jackie Mpaka				
	Peace Lydia Kateeba				
	Patrick Muzinduki				
29-03-2007	Kiganda Lawrence	Portfolio Manager	HOFOKAM / CRS	CRD	Fort Portal
30-03-2007	Stig Marker Hansen	Chief of Party	NUPI	NUPI	Kampala
30-03-2007	Randolph Harris	Team Leader Conflict Programs	USAID		Kampala
31-03-2007	Timothy Bishop	Chief of Party	IRC	CRD	Kampala
31-03-2007	Lyvia Kakonge	Conflict and Reintegration Advisor	USAID		Kampala
	Lynne Schaberg	Microfinance Evaluation	USAID / DECOF		Kampala
	Evelynn Stark	Microfinance Evaluation	USAID / DECOF		Kampala
02-04-2007	Adrienne Bory	Political TDY	USAID		Kampala
	Susan Cowley	Deputy Team Leader, Democracy and Governance Programs			

Date	Informant	Designation	Organization	Program	Location
	Scott Dobberstein	Team Leader Democracy, Governance and Conflict			
	Margot Ellis	Mission Director			
	Randolph Harris	Team Leader, Conflict Programs			
	Lyvia Kakonge	Conflict and Reintegration Advisor			
	Danielle Reiff	Deputy Team Leader, Program Office			
	Elzadia Washington	Deputy Mission Director			
	Walter Welz	Food for Peace Officer			

Annex 5: Results Framework CRD and NUPI


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
**The Community Resilience and Dialogue
Results Framework, 2002-2007**




NUPI:

NUPI Results Framework






NUPI SO2-IR2.1



NUPI SO2-IR2.2



Annex 6: List of workshop participants

1. Mapping Exercise 16.03.2007, AVSI-Conference Room, Kampala

Timothy Bishop	CRD / IRC
Frank Nyakaine	Daily Monitor
Stig Marker Hansen	NUPI
Kennedy Tumutugye	USAID
Alex Jurua	MS-Uganda
Valentina Frigerio	AVSI
Lucia Catelli	AVSI
Cecilia Roselli	ASB
Lyvia Kakonge	USAID
Chris Dolan	Refugee Law Protect

2. Mapping Exercise 20.03.2007, Diana Garden-Conference Room, Gulu Town

Susan Achan	NUPI
Simon Okello	QPSW Uganda
Ulrike Wesch	Gulu University
Lioba Lenhart	Gulu University
Jesca Driciru	SciU Gulu
Pamela Atim	SOS/CUAP
Grace Abalo	CPA
Evalyne Achan	ACORD
Francis Ogwal	UHRC
Aber Jacqueline Oridi	Gulu University
Sr. Pauline Silver	CRS Uganda
Santa Oketta	GDLG

3. Mapping Exercise 23.03.2007, Arua

Odama Oscar Lee	United Ex-Combattants Organization
Haruna Ndema	Director
Fr. Joseph Robert Nyakun	N. N.
John Peter Amdroa	Justice and Peace Commission
Drakare Erminio	Independant Womens's Association
Beety Inukuru	NACWOLA
Aseru Dona Abibiku	District Secretary, UMSC
Rahama Hassan	Bishop, West Nile
Rev. Joel Obelia	

4. Mapping Exercise 28.03.2007, Kasese

Tumwine Yasin	NAYODE
Wilson Bwambale	Amnesty Commission
Christopher Bwambale	KADDE-NET
Sikiryabos Emmanuel	REROK
Thembo M. Ambosi	SSD-Caritas
Kobusinwe Annet	Diocese of Kasese

Catherine Musine Gloria
Turyaheebwa Doreen
Bihanikire Samson
Baita Pascal
Biira Scovia

SCiU Kasese
KADYFA
SRD-YAPI
District Local Government
SCiU Kasese