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EVALUATING GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCES:

An Analysis of USAID's Public-Private Partnerships for Development

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ACRONYMS

ABCD	Asset-based community development
ANE	Asia and the Near East
APS	Annual Program Statement
BSR	Business for Social Responsibility
CIMCAW	Continuous Improvement in the Central American Workplace
CO	Contracting Officer
CSPA	Certified Sustainable Products Alliance
CSR	Corporate social responsibility
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
EGAT	Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade
FSN	Foreign Service National
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GETF	Global Environment and Technology Foundation
GIS	Geographic information system
IAC	InterActiveCorp
ICT	Information and communication technology
IFC	International Finance Corporation
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LOP	Life of Project
M&E	Monitoring and evaluation
MOU	Memorandum of understanding
NGO	Nongovernmental organization
ODP/PSA	Office of Development Partners/Private Sector Alliances
PMP	Performance monitoring plan
R&D	Research and development
RFP	Request for proposal
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprises
TCCC	The Coca-Cola Company
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WADA	Water and Development Alliance

SYNOPSIS

OVERVIEW

The *Evaluating Global Development Alliances* report is a result of the growing importance of the private sector's contribution to the social and economic growth of emerging markets, and the need to understand the full value and impact of the U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) public-private partnership model for development – Global Development Alliances (GDA).

In order to provide this assessment, USAID's GDA office commissioned a team of evaluators¹ to review its public-private alliances created to date, provide a framework of analysis to evaluate the models effectiveness, and propose next steps for advancing the model. The following serves as a brief synopsis of the full report of findings. To inform this review, the Team conducted in-depth interviews with more than 100 representatives from businesses, USAID, and implementing partners from around the world;² conducted a web-based survey disseminated to more than 7,000 GDA points of contact to solicit anonymous

feedback; and reviewed case studies and other partnership documentation.

The most prominent finding is that interest and support for the GDA model of public-private partnership is widespread and increasing among all types of partners. Business partners value USAID's matching funds, local knowledge, development expertise, networks, and the credibility available through these alliances. USAID staff and other development practitioners appreciate the resources and long-term sustainability that businesses, foundations, non-government organizations (NGOs), universities, and other private sector partners lend to development programming.

However, as the partnership model continues to grow and evolve, many alliance participants are beginning to look for more and different things from the GDA office in the future. All partners want to improve learning and share lessons with others, including clear communication about what a GDA is, how to do them, and results to date. Looking to the future, it is important that

USAID's alliance builders develop clear priorities for resource allocation in terms of money, time, energy, technical expertise and program commitments.

METHODOLOGY

This report is a result of a three-pronged approach of evaluation. First, a sample of 18 alliances was selected to serve as case studies. Second, more than 100 people from 17 business partners, 12 USAID missions and bureaus, and 28 other organizations including donor agencies, NGOs, academic and practitioner institutions were interviewed. Third, a web-based survey was designed and disseminated to all GDA in the nearly 100 country and regional missions and USAID departmental bureaus points of contact and through the office's monthly newsletter to solicit anonymous feedback about the benefits, challenges, and comparative advantage of the GDA model of public-private partnership. Members of the Team attended meetings and alliance building training over a five-month period, engaged in file review on the cases

¹ Henceforth referenced as "Team".

² Implementing partners, with whom USAID has contracts and/or grants.

selected for the core sample, and considered 45 responses received from online surveys.

FINDINGS

Key findings for translating findings into policy and practice are organized into five sections in the full report, and this synopsis is organized accordingly: 1) GDA Model and Impact; 2) Evaluation, Metrics, and Monitoring; 3) Roles and Responsibilities in Implementation; 4) Learning and Knowledge Development; and 5) External Communications.

THE GDA MODEL AND IMPACT

Business partners, most mission staff, and traditional implementing partners strongly support the GDA model of public-private partnership. It is a widely held belief that the private sector must be directly involved in development, and should be encouraged to stay involved to improve impact and sustainability. The strongest supporters of these types of alliances are those who have direct experience with them, even when alliance outcomes are mixed. There is also recognition that alliances can create development impacts, above and beyond specific activities, by demonstrating working models of public-private partnerships in countries with limited multi-sector alliance experience.

From the business perspective, alliances with a strong business case are more likely to be high-impact and sustainable versus the more passive philanthropic contributions. They cite the most successful alliances as those with a single company, a compelling business case, and significant funding. However, there is a general overall lack of awareness among partners that the GDA model represents a distinct approach within government toward emerging market challenges.

Business partners expressed concern with USAID's funding approach and with the increasing decentralization of the agency. Funding and responsibility for GDA partnerships is decentralized, requiring individual negotiations at the mission-level in every country of potential interest. When questioned whether the funding model encouraged replication and scalability, they suggested that the GDA office consider providing additional funding so as to prove success in order to take projects to scale. In addition, as the Agency becomes more and more decentralized, alliances are increasingly vulnerable to shifts in budget, foreign policy, or mission priority. Business partners worry that USAID is reducing its focus the multi-year projects that are often required for

successful alliance formation and implementation.

Another concern of business is the amount of time that elapses from the initial conversation with a USAID office to the formal establishment of a headquarters-based global relationship. The slow pace impedes businesses' ability to make an effective case for funding to their executive teams. Within missions, the lack of dedicated partnership-building staff with the requisite skills and commitment to move alliances forward presents serious challenges.

Many USAID respondents recall the value of the incentive fund.³ Most funds at the country or regional-level are already earmarked or obligated, and it can be difficult to approach the private sector about an alliance without money that can be accessed quickly and used flexibly.

Mission buy-in to an existing agreement or model is identified as a key ingredient for successful alliances by all partners, providing an opportunity to use prior alliances as guidance and make changes along the way. Partners identify sustainability as the key comparative advantage of using the GDA model. Respondents did express common concerns including pressure to maintain a certain leverage ratio, which sometimes shifts focus away from

³ The GDA Incentive Fund was a dedicated pool of funding budgeted during the early years of the GDA office that missions could access. The funds went to support innovative alliances which would provide significant private sector resource leverage opportunities.

performance, and confusion about what is considered a “real” GDA.

EVALUATION/METRICS/ MONITORING

All partners agree on the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E) for both measuring impact and supporting accountability and results. Overall, respondents welcomed the idea of additional M&E resources from USAID, including guidance on suggested processes for M&E that would result in more systematic and consistent collection, analysis and distribution of information on alliance activities and impact. Several alliances demonstrated that goal-setting, indicator development, and a commitment to evaluation from the outset serve as a means of building trust, understanding partner interests, making useful adjustments to plans, and building alliance momentum.

Facing increasing internal and external pressure to demonstrate impact, business partners emphasized the importance of having robust alliance M&E systems from beginning to end. They note that determining clear business and development goals and objectives from the outset is critical to setting the alliance direction. Alliances should capitalize on diverse M&E resources. In addition to USAID M&E assets, business partners bring expertise in project management and data collection, and NGO partners bring strengths in designing development

indicators and participatory approaches to monitoring.

In general, evaluations conducted to date have successfully assessed: the “process” of alliance building, implementation and governance challenges; perceived value added; issues with limited timelines; and the problem of institutional buy-in. However, these evaluations have not convincingly established early signs of desired development impact and tend to be more descriptive than analytic. The unit of analysis in these evaluations typically focuses on the partnership and alliance itself rather than on the beneficiaries and their experience. Evaluation findings do not typically address the question of “comparative advantage” or, does a particular project or approach represent a better use of resources to achieve development goals more effectively than would have otherwise occurred? There does not appear to be a systemic effort to glean lessons or insights from completed evaluations.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION

Turnover among business partners and USAID staff presents challenges to building the sustained relationships that are critical for strong partnerships. There is a perception among business partners that USAID must do more to be involved and ensure that mission staff and resources are available to meet partnership

needs. All interviewees agree that the mission director’s buy-in to the GDA model is critical and factors strongly in to the success of alliances in different places at different times.

Respondents recognize that the public and private sectors move at different paces which may offer opportunities if carefully managed and supported by strong individual relationships on both sides. Business partners value having a dedicated point of contact at USAID-headquarters in Washington, DC serve as a development expert, thought partner, and champion. However, given the small size of USAID’s Washington-based alliance-building team, it cannot realistically be involved in all alliances. In reality, most alliances begin, proceed, evolve, and conclude with only minimal interaction with the Washington-based GDA team. A number of alliance participants hope that the team will serve as a central point of contact for the private sector, including conducting outreach and recruitment for future alliances.

Although the current emphasis of the GDA team is on start-up and the early stages of alliance-building, participants are increasingly looking for more support and resources for the middle and later stages of alliances. Respondents also want more training and hope that USAID will continue to cultivate “champions”. Implementers are seeking more

of a “clearinghouse” function from alliance builders that provides them with more and better information on businesses, their interests, and best ways to reach out to them.

LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

Respondents express that, overall, learning and knowledge development about GDAs is not well supported within alliances, between company partners, among alliances, or within the broader USAID system. Business partners indicate limited institutionalization of knowledge about completed alliances within their companies. This lack of institutional understanding indicates that businesses are not likely integrating lessons learned from past alliance experiences into current development practices or partnerships. The learning and knowledge development that does occur among business partners tends to be self-motivated rather than driven by USAID. Innovations introduced by partners from both private sector and traditional implementing organizations include “shadowing,” use of on-line collaboration tools, and disseminating monthly updates to all partners.

From the USAID perspective, there is growing interest in learning more about what does and does not work as part of the GDA model, but these activities are neither encouraged nor taken

advantage of in a systematic manner. Those who do take the initiative do not seem to get relevant support or reward for their efforts.

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Business partners support development of a stronger centralized system for public communications with USAID playing a greater role communicating with the public about alliances. Similarly, USAID and lead implementing partners indicated a desire for improved communications, particularly in support of their efforts to engage additional partners for current and future alliances, and to obtain institutional (such as ministry policy and practice changes) and donor commitments to support GDA initiatives.

RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS ABOUT THE GDA MODEL INCLUDE:

1. Define and differentiate the GDA model. Define and differentiate the GDA approach so that focus is on engaging private sector partners around their business model and interests rather than around corporate philanthropy.

2. Revisit funding systems. More centralized and reliable systems for funding and contracting help the private sector commit to multi-year partnerships. In addition,

by relaunching the Incentive Fund, some of the more innovative alliance structures such as the Global Frameworks may provide the traction they need to be successful.

3. Develop core indicators and invest in training to measure long-term impacts. To improve the effectiveness of alliance-building and inform future partnership efforts, it is important to set goals and put in place indicators, tools, and reporting mechanisms that are integral to the GDA model.

4. Define partner roles, responsibilities, and contributions at the outset of a partnership. Clearly defined and mutually derived written agreements help to make partnerships successful.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WASHINGTON AND FIELD-BASED ALLIANCE BUILDERS INCLUDE:

1. Clarify and focus the role of alliance builders both in the missions and in Washington to a well-defined set of activities to meet core strategic objectives in the medium and long-term. GDA itself should be more consistently involved in alliances.

2. Increase understanding and support for GDA at the mission level. Encourage missions to consider how GDA can be used as a platform to encourage multi-sector collaboration that might not otherwise occur, resulting in significant development impact.

3. Enhance learning and knowledge development. Improve learning and knowledge development about alliances by investing in tools, systems, and infrastructure for sharing partnership best practices and information, learning stories, research and documentation, and troubleshooting.

4. Establish additional communications channels for dissemination. Promote and convene peer exchange and create or link into existing networks. GDA is uniquely positioned to more effectively capitalize on its accumulating assets, social capital, and knowledge.

5. Establish a network of champions within USAID and in the private sector. Encourage private sector partner representatives and mission directors to become GDA champions in a “GDA Ambassador” program.

evidence about development impact and sharing lessons learned.

CONCLUSIONS

Much progress has been made in cultivating the supply of business partners and good development ideas for which alliances are an appropriate response, and stimulating demand and interest in GDAs within USAID and its network of implementing partners. As the process moves forward, USAID must find ways to provide even more support for evolving GDA policy and practice, while the at the same time develop solid methods for producing credible

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

OUR CHARGE

The Global Development Alliance (GDA) business model breaks with traditional development assistance approaches and sets forth a new way of doing business. Alliances are cultivated with the philosophy that social and economic conditions in poor and transitional countries are improved in more effective and sustainable ways when public and private sectors work together. Since its creation in 2001, the GDA team has repeatedly obtained anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness of its alliances; however, evaluation methods that were created to measure conventional approaches to development may not adequately measure the development outcomes of public-private partnerships. To promote better knowledge development and learning about alliances, some new tools and practices may be necessary.

USAID's Office of Development Partners/Private Sector Alliances (ODP/PSA) (hereafter referred to as the GDA office or the GDA team) has commissioned DAI to develop a framework for the future evaluation of the GDA model and alliances. The main purpose of this design work is to help the GDA team refine its strategy and workplans, develop new tools and training programs for alliance

implementations, and design new mechanisms to help missions build more alliances with improved scale and impact.

To inform this emerging framework, the evaluation team has examined a core sample of the more than 500 alliances undertaken to date. Our objectives in doing so are to better understand what has already been done to assess the impact and effectiveness of projects, to learn what seems to work best in decision-making and management of these various alliances, and to suggest specific steps that might set the stage for more effective learning, evaluation, and knowledge development in the future.

To most accurately understand the alliance building process and the eventual impact of these alliances, the evaluation team took into account the multiple viewpoints involved, including the private sector, foundations, international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and civil society actors. In the process, we learned something about how different partners view each other, and what they are looking for from USAID and the GDA team both in Washington and at the mission level.

TEAM COMPOSITION

Tom Dewar served as Team Leader, and was assisted by Christine Davachi and a team of researchers from Business for Social Responsibility—including Katie Swinerton, Chad Bolick, and Racheal Yeager—to assess the private sector perspectives. Samira Salem and Stephanie Schwartzkopf from DAI provided support to the team.

METHODS

The team used a three-pronged approach to inform its work, drawing its findings primarily through interviews from multiple sources.

First, the team selected a representative sample of 18 case study alliances to obtain an in-depth understanding of how alliances work and determine some common patterns and features (for a full list, see Annex 1). Selection criteria for these case studies were determined by conducting an analysis of the global features of over 500 alliances (see Annex 2 for a snapshot of the global features of alliances to date). Alliance reports and evaluations were requested and examined when available, interviews were held with the key business, USAID, and implementing partners, and a site visit was undertaken.

Second, the team interviewed a wide range of USAID staff, as well as representatives from other organizations, donors, and interested parties who came highly recommended. The team drafted interview protocols, which served to guide the interviews and ensure consistency of information being solicited (these protocols are included in Annex 3).

Third, the team designed a web-based survey and disseminated it to all GDA Points of Contact and through an announcement in the GDA newsletter. It solicited anonymous feedback on the benefits, challenges, and comparative advantage of using the GDA model (see Annex 4 for survey questions).

This report analyzes information collected from interviews with more than 100 people from 17 companies, 12 USAID missions and bureaus, and 28 other organizations (see Annex 5 for a full list of organizations consulted). Members of the evaluation team also attended various meetings and training sessions over a five month period, engaged in extensive file review on the cases selected for the core sample, and carefully considered 45 responses received from the online survey.

CHAPTER TWO

FINDINGS

The findings of our work are organized into five sections: the GDA model and its impact; evaluation, metrics, and monitoring; roles and responsibilities; learning and knowledge development; and external communications. In each of these sections, we will first present findings and then offer some recommendations for the GDA team to consider.

We present business views first because we see these as more likely to be new and useful for our primary audience, the GDA team, and less likely to be featured in other reports of this kind. Just as these alliances represent the coming together of the “different worlds” of government, nonprofits, and the private sector, our work here also attempts to bring together some of the important views from each perspective. Much of what is presented here, perhaps most, is *perception rather than fact*. We recognize this and so should the reader. But perceptions can have real consequences. Knowing about these perceptions—regardless of whether they are entirely accurate or factual—can help us to better understand the complex and changing nature and context of these alliances.

We believe some sections of this report will be worth discussing in more detail than we go into in this report. This is true both for

our findings, such as those from interviews with business leaders, and our recommendations, such as those for the future evaluation of alliances. Here, we provide a description of the main findings from our work and try to draw out some important implications and possible “next steps” to consider in light of these findings.

A. THE GDA MODEL AND ITS IMPACT

FINDINGS

Business Views

Business partners are strongly supportive of the GDA model.

Business partners appreciate matching funds, USAID’s local expertise, and the credibility and contacts that are made available through partnerships. These factors help draw the interest of private sector partners, and cement their companies’ commitment to carry out alliances.

- Business partners feel that working with local USAID missions on alliances offered credibility and opened doors, especially in efforts to collaborate with government officials and agencies in host countries.
- Business partners appreciate the matching funds, and the opportunities associated with

them, which the GDA model has provided. Business partners are keen on the idea of pooling resources and maximizing impact by contributing to larger initiatives, and thus often enter into alliances because of its matching funds model. Many companies are using the GDA model to get extra funding for NGOs they are already working with. For instance, Procter & Gamble used the GDA model to support Technoserve’s implementation of the Central American Coffee Alliance. Others use the GDA model as a mechanism to make a matching philanthropic donation. For instance, Pfizer made a donation to the Certified Sustainable Product Alliance (CSPA) because it wanted to support the work of Rainforest Alliance: CSPA presented the opportunity to have their donation matched by USAID.

- Several interviewees note that the GDA business model enabled alliances that would otherwise have not come to fruition and that the local expertise and network that USAID brought to the alliance was central to its design and eventual success.

Business partners involved in one-company, large-scale projects

are more likely to view their alliances as having strong impact. From the perspectives gathered from business partners, the most effective alliances have been those with:

- **A single company;**
- **A compelling business case; and**
- **Significant funding.**

Examples of this kind of alliance include Chevron's Angola Partnership Initiative, The Coca Cola Company's Global Community Watershed Partnerships Program, and Cisco's Network Academy Program and e-Quality programs. This finding may be a result of the pool of accessible interviewees: the largest single-company alliances tend to have dedicated company staff members who are internal champions of the project. Larger coalition alliances tend to have weaker institutional memories of the alliances and the company staff we interviewed were often unaware of project results. Therefore, it is possible that these other types of alliances are also having significant outcomes and the company representatives are simply less aware of the effects.

From the business perspective, the alliances that hold a compelling business case are seen as having more impact and sustainability than those in which companies contribute through more passive philanthropy.

At the same time, alliances modeled on the GDA are only one set of approaches or tools in a growing array of partnership models: many people talked about how partnerships are not new to USAID practice.

Business partners do not consistently differentiate GDA from USAID. There is a surprisingly low awareness of the GDA model, as a distinct approach, among business partners. Many business partners interviewed are unfamiliar with the Global Development Alliance program or they express the opinion that "GDA is really just USAID." In contrast, in some instances, business partners are either only vaguely aware or totally unaware that USAID has been involved in their own partnership. In several interviews, business partners said that "they had never met or been in contact with USAID staff." While business partners who have been involved with large global alliances are typically well aware of the role of USAID, *in smaller projects, particularly those in which business partners provided funds to support an NGO with which they had a pre-existing relationship*, there tended to be a weak understanding of the GDA model and the role that USAID played in the alliance.

Business partners expressed concerns about the approach that USAID uses to fund GDAs. Concerns were raised about USAID's decentralized

structure, its ability to encourage replicability, and the likelihood of sustainability.

- Business partners expressed concern that funding and responsibility for GDA partnerships is now decentralized and might be in the process of becoming even more so, and about the need to engage in (often) unique negotiations at the mission-level in every country of potential interest. Company representatives understand that a decentralized model helps to ensure alignment with mission priorities and through them with local needs and objectives. Nevertheless, there is significant concern that such a decentralized funding system sometimes means that the process weighs USAID interests more heavily than partners' interests. Business interviewees suggest that the parties seek a compromise, one which establishes some degree of up-front centralized support. One business interviewee notes that "while we should need some sort of buy-in from the mission, projects shouldn't necessarily need funding from the mission if the model has proven successful. With limited funding, the goal of GDA should be to establish a beachhead for projects and then to get missions to pick them up."


- *Business partners are unsure about whether the GDA funding model encourages replication and scalability.* One business interviewee notes that: “It would be better if USAID funded the projects that show success. We should be able to go ‘back to the well’, show proven success, and then take projects to scale. This is now the focus of the better philanthropic programs and GDA should mirror this approach.” Headquarters-level business partners also express concerns about their ability to take successful alliances to scale given that GDA funding is becoming more decentralized and thus more liable to changes in budgets, in foreign policy or in missions’ interests.

- **Business partners are concerned that USAID might be reducing its focus on multi-year projects.** Companies find that it is easier (for them) to give staff time and resources to multi-year, well-funded projects, which ultimately leads to better functioning alliances and greater impact. Business partners also assert that since alliances not only take significant time and energy to get going, but also can require several years to get the “right” local actors directly involved and vested in the partnership, multi-year funding should be the GDA model’s standard approach. One business interviewee commented that longer-term project timelines

allows for greater private sector flexibility. In this case, a 5-year initial project term freed the company from yearly reapplication for funding, which allowed a slightly looser timeline to develop. This in turn, allowed more time for partner relationship and trust building, and delivered enormous benefits to the project activities of the alliance.

The time it takes to establish global alliances creates challenges for business partners. Corporate headquarters staff noted that too much time elapses from initial conversations to the formal establishment of a DC-based global relationship. Corporate staff with responsibility for global public-private partnerships

FIGURE 1: ALIGNMENT OF BUSINESS AND SOCIAL GOALS



expressed a general sentiment of frustration with the alliance establishment process: one interviewee commented “GDA needs to concentrate less on talking and more on moving forward and addressing the central issue of doing something for people.” Business partners suggested that the process for establishing GDA partnerships should be streamlined and clarified since the current slow pace impedes their ability to make an effective case for funding to their executive teams. (This point also has implications, and is expanded upon, in the *Roles and Responsibilities* section).

USAID and Other Views

Most USAID staff are also supportive of the GDA model, pointing out that it is “an idea whose time has come,” and largely accept it as a key way (among others) to achieve USAID’s stated development goals.

As an example, based on our interviews, it is widely felt that for “real development” to take off and root, and especially, for it to “build into something sustainable,” the private sector must be directly involved—and ideally, should be encouraged to stay involved.

The idea that business and development goals can be simultaneously pursued, and that furthermore, they often reinforce one another is a powerful and attractive argument. One business partner shared with us a useful

tool they had developed to make sure that the business and development goals of the alliance were aligned and clear to all partners:

It is important to report that many of the USAID staff we interviewed talked about how they have been very impressed with global alliances and their apparent impact—with some reporting that they “seem to work better... than expected.”

One seasoned mission director who has worked with alliances in several countries observed:

When I first started to be involved with these alliances I must confess I had my doubts. I didn’t want to be running ‘interference’ for business, or simply be helping them get ahead with their own business goals alone. After all, doing more than that is why I am in the international development and assistance field, and in this job... But I have to tell you that what I found in these alliances is that the two can really co-exist, and more importantly, it seems that in some instances we are both better off working together than apart....And yes, I still think there needs to be vigilance about not just throwing our (USAID’s) resources behind a business plan, but much more often than not the ideas that have been typically brought forward in proposed alliances can be developed into solid projects with genuine mutual gain, and sometimes, with

a multiplier or boost for each partner from doing it jointly.

Is the GDA model “mainstreamed” within USAID? Most of the agency people we talked with who are in a position to know the inner workings of USAID say “yes,” but some say “no,” or “not yet.”

Survey results show that out of 45 respondents, 43 were interested in engaging in alliances in the future, even though 22 respondents saw their past or current alliances only as “somewhat effective.”

The political and budgetary reality of USAID missions is such that GDA must still “compete” with other commitments and opportunities. The more that the GDA team and champions in the field can set the stage, expedite, promote and support mission directors as they consider their choices, the more likely that the GDA model will actually be chosen over other available commitments of people, time and resources.

As a mission director familiar with GDAs in practice put it, “strategically the GDA model is good, sometimes even excellent, but...applying it is situational, opportunistic, sometimes a one-off, and can be very time- and labor-intensive. So you can’t be naïve or lackadaisical about it. You have to think and negotiate, and adapt particular alliances to the actual (and often changing) circumstances that are present in the field.”

Furthermore, another mission director noted, “You have to make and keep the commitment. It can’t be just a short-term budget strategy. It has to go deeper than that.” The ideal pattern is for a mission to gradually build up its capacity to identify, build and implement alliances. Given the inevitability of periodic staff changes, a serious mission commitment should include enough people, relationships, experience and skills to be truly “resident” in a country. That way, the commitment to be involved in alliances can be turned into relevant working knowledge.

Key implementers and other resource partners are also impressed with GDA in terms of both its current and likely future impact. In general, implementers have great respect and appreciation for the contributions of the GDA model and team. They consider the opportunities now being created by GDA to be significant, and have worked hard to “live up” to the opportunity to join with others in making these alliances come to life.

At the same time, some donors and other development institutions we spoke with perceive GDA less as a “branded” or unique approach and more as a measure of USAID commitment to public private partnerships in general. For most of them, it is widely viewed as something to watch, and hopefully, to learn from. In some cases, they are actively looking for specific

ways to be helpful or even allies for GDAs in their own right.

The strongest support for GDAs comes from those people with the most direct experience with them. This

is true for all types of people contacted for this review. This seems to be true even in those cases where alliance outcomes were mixed, and where implementation might have been challenging.

The evaluation team believes this finding is very important. It seems to demonstrate that those who have actually worked on alliances consider them an excellent approach—even while pointing out that current practice may need improving, and even greater support.

It also serves as a useful reminder that the primary way for people to be “won over” or actively engaged around this model and its future prospects is through direct engagement. Thus, the pool of people directly involved needs to keep growing, and indeed, to deepen. (This is strongly confirmed by our online survey, site visit and contacts with a range of others.)

Being “business driven” is not the problem, it’s the point! For some long-time USAID hands and a few NGO activists, the process of seeing some alliances develop and make a positive difference has been important, and for some, surprising. To acknowledge that many of the most important

“development” impacts (especially in the long-run) derive from the ability to tap into business interests, goals, models, logic, assets, capacity and stamina is really at the heart of the change of practice now under way at USAID, among other places.

One current USAID Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO) argued that: “Businesses need to be deeply engaged in these alliances. It is not enough for them to be doing it as a sidelight, or as philanthropy. It is much better if they see their business “success” as being intertwined with the achievement of our development goals.”

Growing support for these alliances does not mean that caution and even skepticism have completely disappeared within the agency, and among other development partners. We heard some USAID people in the field express caution about those alliances where the “value added” was not entirely clear, or where it seemed that the businesses involved were engaged in some version of “business as usual.”

Although a number of interviewees noted the continuing importance of philanthropic support and corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a motivation for participation in alliances, a majority of people we interviewed expressed the view that it is more important, and potentially more lasting, to engage business partners around their core business interests.

The presence of an alliance in a developing country can create impacts independent of the specific activities of the alliance. Two business partners noted that alliances create on-the-ground impacts not only through their work, but also through their presence as models for public-private partnerships in countries that have less experience with multi-sector alliances. For countries that do not have a rich history of multi-sector collaboration, an alliance can serve as a model and catalyst, introducing a new way of collaborating to address development needs. For instance, by bringing businesses, NGOs, and industry associations together for the first time, one business partner felt that the GDA partnership had catalyzed a multi-stakeholder dialogue that did not previously exist, and that made a crucial contribution to the country's sustainable development.

The time for these kinds of alliances is now. For the overwhelming majority of people we talked to, it is no longer a question of “when” to start doing these kinds of partnerships, but of how to do them, where to focus, which people and partner organizations to enlist, and how to find the necessary and appropriate resources. Essentially this finding means that the period of making the basic case for doing these alliances as an approach to achieving development goals,

of increasing the “supply” of prospective partners, must now evolve into the next stage. Participants we spoke with report that the idea is now out there, and attracting initial interest. (We strongly suspect that the GDA team knows this already.) The question ahead may be to monitor and fine tune this interest so that there is better and more current information about how they work, what people should do with an initial idea or proposal, what has been learned already, etc. (We take up some of these ideas in the upcoming sections on Recommendations to Consider.)

Of course, not all alliances succeed. People interviewed are quite clear about this. Of those alliances that do seem to work, not all initially successful projects manage to be sustained.

Furthermore, “success” is defined in different ways for different alliances, and very often, different participants in the same alliance define it differently. Some definitions are clear-cut, and focused on short-term, concrete outcomes (health and employment outcomes, for example, are often rather clear-cut, and can be measured by changes that can be documented and agreed upon as either happening or not). Other definitions of success include improved relationships, shared knowledge or skills, and growing awareness of problems and the need for (sometimes shared) action to address them.

Several interviewees asked rather pointedly about where and how the GDA team (and its communications about the model) plans to discuss mistakes, limitations and even perceived “failure.” This, they suggest, would be a good sign that learning and deeper practice changes are underway.

Furthermore, several CTOs observed that even if individual alliances do work, and gain attention and solid support from effective partners, they eventually have to “find their legs,” and obtain the on-going means of support to continue and adapt. Otherwise, one noted, “it is just dependency producing or one-off projects, like too much of past work that we like to criticize when others do it.”

Some key ingredients for effective alliances are well-known. Among the key ingredients for effective, on-going GDA work, the importance of having a mission “buy” into an existing agreement / model was strongly emphasized by several experienced interviewees. This question of buy-in is often decisive for business partners, but it can be equally important for the mission staff and implementing partners. It isn't so much that you replicate, or worse, try to duplicate existing alliances and workplans. Rather, it is a question of using some of these alliances as guidance, “as a practice model, set of expectations and norms, sense of a way forward.” Changes

and adaptations always have to be made, but they are made within a coherent and shared framework or understanding.

Through the online survey, many USAID respondents claimed the lack of staff available with the requisite skills and commitment to move these alliances forward presented a serious challenge to successful alliance building, and called for increased support.

Responses to the online survey as well as some interviews also reflect the perception that businesses are inexperienced with development, thus creating a challenging task of combining business and development goals into a common set of objectives. One survey respondent noted however that when this is achieved successfully, it “enriches the initiative as the specific interests and concerns of the alliance members are taken into consideration and might thus result in models that are better than the usual donor-driven models, which might sometimes be outdated.”

A number of current resource partners express concern about how “leverage” is handled in the alliance building process. Many of our interviewees report a perceived increase in the importance given to leverage, one that emphasizes ratios of USAID dollars to other partners of greater than 1:1; and they point out that leverage is not

just matching cash gifts, and should be prioritized by USAID.

One partner feels that USAID prefers that companies give cash grants rather than provide other kinds of leveraged contributions. The interviewee notes that strategic leverage (in this case, a company’s commitment to pay a premium for certified products) and other forms of in-kind giving should be valued more by USAID. *The partner feels that by seeking high matching cash gifts from companies USAID is encouraging philanthropic participation rather than strategic business involvement in its alliances.* Ultimately, by emphasizing philanthropic cash gifts over strategic involvement from companies, USAID may unwittingly create a cohort of alliances with reduced potential for impact and sustainability.

What’s the perceived “value added” of completed GDAs? We asked everyone we interviewed this question. In response we heard about a wide range of “value,” including especially increased resources, relationships, commitments, skills, practical know-how and working knowledge, shared risk and responsibilities, and culturally appropriate ways of solving problems and working across traditional boundaries. Many of our interviewees became quite energized when asked to address this question of what the value being “added” by these alliances really is, as it afforded them the

opportunity to describe both their own personal involvement and to give an overall assessment of what happened.

Of the many highly-valued qualities of alliances, sustainability is at or near the top. According to the online survey, most respondents view sustainability as the key comparative advantage of using the GDA model. By engaging multiple partners and stakeholders in the alliance, and promoting ownership through the design of shared objectives and goals, these initiatives are well positioned to become sustainable. This has proven to be especially true in cases where linkages with the local private sector are strong and a sense of ownership has been firmly developed.

However, there are many instances where the activities initiated under an alliance were not sustainable and this led to frustration and disappointment when funding ended. In some cases, the amount of time needed to build the alliance at the front-end was more than anticipated and the issue of sustainability did not seem to participants to have adequate time to be properly addressed. In other cases, there was the idea that planning for next steps in funding would depend on strong outcomes, and that these expected outcomes would help “sell” the alliance as it moved forward. In practice, however, a sustainability plan was typically not built into these initiatives.

It becomes clear then that if alliances are to meet participant expectations, sustainability must be built into the design of the alliance early.

Unexpected results are also important, and occur often.

Beyond sustainability, others we interviewed report that while most GDAs have demonstrated that they can add real value, they also sometimes produce other unexpected benefits. For example, we heard that they have the potential to develop new and different kinds of relationships, change the way work gets done, introduce important innovations, develop relevant capacity for future partnerships and prospective development impact, create and demonstrate forums where people meet and discuss across traditional boundaries, value and enhance the role of local partners and their networks, and publicize the many positive possibilities around partnerships as an approach.

As one local business partner in Morocco noted: “This is a true partnership between the public and private sector because the idea underpinning the alliance is strong.” (That “idea” is to engage local business partners to help resolve youth employment problems). This partner was able to capitalize on the reporting and monitoring tools required by USAID to the benefit of their own organization, and to even expand the work of the alliance by forming

other partnerships with local and bilateral organizations.

We also heard that many alliances help make it clear how important it is to get “over” to the business side of private partners, and into an understanding of how to engage and retain business commitment around their core “operating” interests rather than their various philanthropic goals. This is especially important when it comes to the questions of scale and longer-term impact for these alliances.

For those USAID and NGO staff members who made this point, this understanding does not represent a form of “selling out” but of “buying in”—indeed, of coming to appreciate the long-term development impact potential of mutual interests and goals among diverse partners.

One NGO leader observed that “traditionally we have approached business first on the community relations or philanthropic side. That worked for us, in a way, but it was also very limited, and usually reinforced a grant-by-grant or project-by-project approach. It meant we spent a lot of time fund-raising, and waiting to see about the next grant rather than getting out into the field.... If the business leadership sees the direct connection to their business model and goals, then there is a greater likelihood of a longer-term, and a deeper commitment from them.”

The GDA office provides the following definition of an alliance:

- Common goal
 - Jointly defined solution
 - Non-traditional partners
 - Shared resources, risks and results
 - Innovative
 - 1:1 (or better) leveraged resources
-

Yet another group of respondents emphasized that beyond money and staff support, these alliances are really “leveraging competencies” and new ways of doing joint work. One NGO leader emphasized that for these alliances to really work over time, those directly involved “must come to understand how the others at the table think and choose to act. What drives them? What keeps them engaged, or worries them?” These (sometimes hard won) understandings are among the most critical elements being “leveraged” here.

Calls to “mainstream the GDA” must take this social reality into account. These understandings reside in individual people. They are very hard to “institutionalize.” Thus, when people turn over or move on, they don’t just leave tasks undone or carry away knowledge about contacts and workplans; they take hard won understandings and an “appreciation of the other’s point of view” with them. (This issue of staff turnover is also considered in the later section on *Roles and Responsibilities*.)

Is it a ‘real’ GDA or not? Just what is it that makes something a “real” GDA? Some of the people we spoke with take this question seriously, and some don’t. For those who do take it seriously, it is often because they assume that being a “real” GDA has a direct relationship to the possibility and amount of USAID funding and support.

Despite this definition there still is a lot of confusion over what constitutes a GDA. Some alliances meet the GDA criteria and some do not. Many people are not concerned with whether what they are doing constitutes a GDA or not, they are just trying to figure out how to work with the private sector and manage the relationship. For these, being a “true” versus a “false” GDA is a distinction without a difference. There is a tendency for some of the USAID staff members who have been around longer, some of what one interviewee called “older hands,” to take this view. They are usually more pragmatic, and want to know what difference it really makes in terms of resource flows, commitments, rewards, etc. They have heard various ideas and proposals receive some “priority” before and simply want to know what will be “rewarded” at the end of the day, and what will “stay around” and be turned into concrete practice.

For others, this distinction between being a “true” and “false” GDA is clearly important, and so

they want to better understand it. For people in this category, it is assumed to mean differential access to resources, and to other kinds of recognition and support down the line. Some missions have small budgets and therefore view partnering with the private sector as a key element of their strategy to leverage funds and engage in more projects. A narrow definition of GDA may imply that they do not qualify for seed funds, innovative and valuable partnership work is not being followed and lessons are not being extracted, learned and disseminated. Furthermore, an unclear understanding of GDA lends itself to an unclear definition of what counts as leveraging. Many alliances feel strong pressure to maintain a certain leverage ratio, and on several occasions this has shifted the focus away from performance, and sometimes led to doubtful counting.

One implementer noted that being a GDA is seen as a stamp of approval, and suggested that losing this designation might cause “anxiety.” Another implementer remarked: “An assessment carried out on our project determined that it was not a GDA, but a NGO matching grant program... we disputed this as we felt this was not in the spirit in which our project was working.”

In any case, whatever their view, the questions that need to be asked include the following—does it matter that GDAs are somehow

different than other alliances or public-private partnerships? If they are, then exactly how are they different? What implications does this have for current practice, since a fair number of GDAs now “listed” in the database turn out not to be “real” GDAs.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE GDA MODEL

I. The GDA model or approach should be more explicitly defined and differentiated

It is critical that the GDA team develop a clearer definition and strategy and communicate this. The GDA office should develop its own “brand”—a unique model which is differentiated from USAID—so that alliance partners and external stakeholders understand the unique focus and value-added of a GDA partnership. As GDA activities continue to grow, GDA should define itself as a model that focuses on private-sector development interests—for *it is the alliances that serve both business and development goals that tend to have the most commitment, resources and impact.* Private sector interviews revealed increased levels of engagement, a greater likelihood of local management (versus headquarters management), and higher instance of sustainability in alliances which targeted core areas of business interest.

It is recommended that the GDA model be more strictly defined

as aid projects that leverage strategic interests and resources at the intersection of the public and private sectors. In order to encourage alliances that serve both business and development goals and interests, and to move away from alliances driven by private sector philanthropic motives (e.g., contributing solely to make a matching donation), the GDA model will need to be more clearly defined and supportive systems will need to be put in place. In order to identify, establish and execute alliances which involve core business interests, the GDA team will need to reconsider the following: how the RFP process and APS could bring in more strategic alliances; how the GDA program and its leaders could build their private sector networks to bring in more innovative and executive-driven alliances; and how USAID can provide support for alliances that do not fall into the GDA category.

It may also be strategically important to explicitly state that support for non-GDAs is also important and appropriate, even while working to clarify what a GDA actually is.

If the GDA model is indeed redefined in this manner, other types of public-private partnerships could still be built and supported by USAID. By defining the GDA model more narrowly, the limited resources allocated to the GDA office could be used

for more targeted and tailored support.

A central premise to be reinforced here is the preferability of engaging private sector partners around their business model and operational interests rather than solely around their corporate philanthropy. While it is true that grants from corporate foundations can be helpful, and can sometimes do things that add value to the mix, they are not the central idea of GDAs.

Our point here is not to make a case against philanthropic support. Clearly it is also important, and often can play a strategic role by being available early in the alliance development process or by “covering” aspects of the alliance where it may be harder to find other sources of support. A number of the alliances selected as case studies appeared to be driven either by corporate grant-making (such as the International Youth Foundation’s Employment and Training Alliances and the Central American Coffee Initiative) or were “mixed” in that some corporate partners participated through their operations (or direct business) side, while others contributed through their foundations. For example the case of the CSPA was particularly interesting because this alliance was made up of companies that were philanthropically-driven (such as Pfizer), and others that were in it for core business reasons (such as Chiquita and IKEA).

Other alliances seemed to be primarily driven by, and focused on, business interests directly, such as Coca-Cola and its role in the Community Water Partnerships; CIMCAW (Gap, Timberland, Wal-Mart); Safe Drinking Water Alliance (Proctor & Gamble); and Building Business Linkages and Developing Business Skills: Mozambique (Chiquita and Cargill).

2. Revisit strategic priorities and resources for GDA

To further strengthen its already strong position, the GDA team should consider ways to clarify and focus its role. If possible, look for roles the team is well-positioned to do and deliver strongly on them (such as acting as a clearinghouse of information and communication about alliances, and linking prospective business partners to appropriate missions or bureaus). At the same time, it is important to identify areas that need to be passed on to others, and that perhaps the GDA office itself is less well-positioned to do. These role changes will obviously have to be negotiated carefully to insure that key work and support ends up being done, and done well.

The basic idea that our findings reinforce is that the GDA team and office should not try to do so many things. Communicate clearly what the GDA team will and won’t be doing, and where appropriate, make it clear how key activities will be carried out even when it requires interested parties to look elsewhere, especially at the

mission level, or within USAID more broadly.

In terms of resources committed to the GDA office by USAID, it is very important to re-introduce modest amounts of seed or incentive funding. Most funds at the mission or Regional level are already earmarked / obligated and it is difficult to approach private sector partners without any money on the table. These kinds of funds are valued not so much because of their dollar amount, but because they have been flexible and fast to arrive—thus demonstrating GDA and USAID’s commitment. Among other benefits, this has helped to counter stereotypes about the government’s slowness to act in decisive ways.

Given the generally low awareness by business partners of GDA as a distinctive program within the partnership options of USAID, there appears to be a need to better define and differentiate it.

As the work expands, and demand grows for support and resources, it seems inevitable that choices will have to be made. In some cases, things the GDA team lets go of can be picked up by others. In the process, be sure to let others know what the team is doing, what is and is not going to be done, and by whom.

It seems particularly important to focus on the mission level of USAID and to both broaden and deepen support for and

understanding of GDAs at that level. The GDA team should work even harder to get mission directors “on board,” and to publicize specific and concrete ways to support GDA work “out in the field,” at the country and regional level.

Explore how USAID could use the GDA model as a platform to encourage public-private partnerships in countries where enhanced multi-sector collaboration could result in significant development impacts. Given the finding that some GDA partnerships have had the spill-over effect of increasing local awareness of the benefits of public-private collaboration, USAID may want to consider formally using GDA partnerships as a means to promote cross-sector partnership. In practice, this may mean encouraging the organization of local stakeholder engagement events at which various alliance partners could present on their experiences, resources on building successful partnerships could be disseminated, and individuals could make themselves available as mentors, providing advice on partnerships.

Business interests strongly urge that the GDA office be given sufficient resources to make it effective, and to further build it as a distinctive and effective strategy. This seems especially appropriate once strategic priorities have been revisited and a strong plan for next

steps for GDA policy and practice is ready to be communicated more publicly.

3. Connect more effectively with emerging communities of practice around GDAs, and with partnerships more broadly

Don’t limit this process of connecting to people and places interested only in narrowly defined GDAs, nor only to US agencies and forums.

In reviewing internal GDA planning and strategy documents, this is sometimes referred to as “thought leadership.” We think it is important to learn as well as lead, so it is important to seek out and connect with people and experiences that are defined neither as “ahead” of, nor “behind”, the GDA model, but simply as peers and colleagues—people who share some common purposes, and who may have experience and reflections that they are willing to share.

Promote and convene peer exchange, and boundary-crossing, and connect with business schools; to the extent that some of these communities are self-organizing or already related to their own networks and associations, connect with them; all these seem to be good ways and issues around which to cross boundaries.

A set of diverse and knowledgeable constituencies for GDAs has been built, sometimes

painstakingly built. Their individual and collective experience and insights are deepening. Furthermore, they demonstrate a real appetite for more and better opportunities to interact with others, both in and outside of USAID / GDA circles.

At present this accumulating set of assets, social capital, and working knowledge is not being effectively considered or used. Use these more intentionally.

In addition, find, join, or invent some means for these constituencies to further learn together. Widen the net, look outside current networks and contacts, etc.

B. EVALUATION / METRICS / MONITORING

FINDINGS

Business Views

Nearly all interviewed company representatives emphasized that alliances should have robust monitoring and evaluation systems throughout their lifespan—from beginning to end. Business partners view monitoring and evaluation (M&E) as especially important because of increasing internal and external stakeholder pressure to demonstrate impact. Internal corporate culture is data driven and as corporate contributions are being used more frequently as strategic social investments, expectations for robust information about the impacts of

such contributions are growing. One company representative noted that “you always have to have hard numbers to support what you want to do, without them it is very, very difficult to convince executives to continue to fund projects.” Furthermore, external stakeholders are increasingly seeking transparent information about the impact of companies’ social investments. *Several interviewees noted that demonstrating impact using robust data is emerging as an expectation of corporate responsibility/sustainability departments and that GDA partnerships fall squarely into this expectation.*

Business partners noted that their expertise in project management and collecting data are strengths that they bring to alliance monitoring and evaluation systems; NGO partners are seen as bringing complementary and valuable strengths in the areas of designing development indicators and participatory approaches to monitoring. Company interviewees noted that determining clear business and development goals/objectives from the outset of an alliance is critical to setting the direction of an alliance. By agreeing on clear goals and indicators, partners are better able to manage the activities of alliances. One company identified participatory engagement in the design, monitoring and evaluation of projects as a key success factor for the alliance.

USAID and Other Views

Measurement is viewed as central to effective work. Many interviewees, from both business and non-business backgrounds, underscored the point that to be effective in carrying out these projects, “you have to be willing to measure what is happening.” Indeed, one said, “if you don’t measure it, you can’t really manage it.” Another noted, “If you don’t measure it, it may actually not be happening.”

In addition to being important in its own right, the commitment to measurement sends an important message about accountability and results. Furthermore, around both short-term and long-term goals, measurement is one of the ways that partners could be asked to stay involved or increase their commitment, find and engage additional support, revise the ways the work is actually carried out, and begin to identify key factors for closer analysis.

No consensus exists amongst business partners on whether or not the current overall process used, and guidance offered, for evaluation is adequate. Business partners had mixed responses on reporting requirements. Some partners felt that there was an onerous focus on required indicators that were not particularly relevant: “USAID focused too much on short term indicators of success”. Others felt that there was not enough guidance on indicators—“USAID

should develop common indicators that would cross different programs.” Overall, interviewees welcomed the idea of additional resources from USAID and GDA on monitoring and evaluation, with one interviewee stating “[w]e would all benefit if they could allocate significant resources to develop strong M&E frameworks.”

Several interviewees cautioned that any such guidance would need to be extremely practical and action-orientated rather than regulative. In general, business partners did not have clarity on how the reporting process is supposed to work in GDA partnerships: although interviewees were aware of the requirement of submitting quarterly and annual reports, they generally felt that the content of reports and the reporting process was often determined without strong guidance from USAID. Furthermore, several business partners noted that their final evaluation report was produced as a result of their own company’s impetus rather than being driven by USAID.

Evaluation is not taken seriously within USAID, as evidenced by current practice.

Most USAID staff with direct experience working on GDA evaluations, and several contract evaluators, told us that while a number of useful steps are currently mandated (such as having a Performance Monitoring Plan, or PMP, and identifying indicators

as part of the initial discussions around goals and agreements), there is usually no follow-up, and no likely consequence if they are done badly, or even not at all. When evaluation is taken seriously it is usually because the CTO cares about it, and stays on top of this issue.

A number of alliances we examined closely reported rather dramatic shifts in their focus and the degree of emphasis given to evaluation with changes in the assigned CTO. Evaluation is only one of many important factors that can change, sometimes dramatically so, with changes in the CTO (see Roles and Responsibilities for further discussion).

On the other hand, several alliances demonstrated ways in which goal-setting, indicator development, and a commitment to doing some useful “evaluation” right from the outset can be also become ways to build trust, learn about varied partner interests, make useful adjustments to plans based on real-time feedback, and build momentum (e.g., CIMCAW, E-Quality). As one interviewee told us, “listening to each other on what ought to be measured, on what kinds of progress ought to be looked for, can be extremely valuable.”

More guidance is sought on how reporting and monitoring should be handled. One business partner commented: “Our contribution was pretty

clear, we knew what we wanted to accomplish with what we gave. But communication has been weak throughout—it’s unclear what is being accomplished by the project as a whole. We almost need a person dedicated to making sure that all the things that are being learned and done are captured and communicated well between all the alliance partners.”

For instance, this guidance could provide suggestions on how to integrate participatory approaches into M&E activities or how to leverage the knowledge, skills and experience of mission M&E officers. Guidance on suggested processes for M&E would result in more systematic and consistent collection, analysis and distribution of information on alliances’ activities and impacts. Effective guidance would enable improved management of alliances. Ultimately, effective systems would provide a means to attract and re-attract private sector partners—if GDA partnerships had a reputation for robust monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems, companies would likely be more willing to participate in alliances since they would have reasonable assurance that they would be able to quantify and demonstrate their impact.

A number of alliances have been evaluated, and a few report having benefitted greatly from doing so early enough to make adjustments. About one-third of the case study alliances we have looked at for this study have been evaluated.

Most of these specific evaluations have been commissioned at the mission level, while a few have been requested by the GDA office or USAID / DC in response to concern about progress and impact.

Some (but not most) of these alliance-specific evaluations have been done early enough to allow for appropriate adjustments and improvements to be made in the work itself.

Furthermore, in some cases, these evaluations have helped local partners make the case for support from additional sources.

Implementing partners have often played a key role in doing the best evaluations.

Some implementers have developed significant internal capacity around evaluation, learning and knowledge development (there are a number of examples out there, including TechnoServe, World Resources International, Rainforest Alliance, and International Youth Foundation, which come to mind here).

In general, the findings presented in these various evaluations have been particularly good on some issues, such as the “process” of alliance building itself; the challenges that arise in implementation and governance; naming the various kinds of value added that are perceived

by participants; the struggle to achieve key development impact within the timeline of actual project activity; and the search for institutional “buy-in” among government ministries, local and regional business leaders, and other key players.

On the process of alliance building itself, for example, as well as on the governance of alliances, there is often a very good discussion in these evaluations of what it takes to make alliances work as alliances.

Findings have been much less good at establishing early signs of the “development impacts” being sought by a given alliance. This can be linked to the short-term duration of many alliances, which some survey respondents argue merit a longer-term outlook in order to achieve, and measure, development outcomes.

Similarly, findings in these evaluations say very little about how the approach used by a particular alliance compares to other (perhaps previously used) ways of accomplishing some of the same goals. In other words, these evaluations are largely silent on the important questions of ‘comparative advantage’—that is, does a particular project or approach represent a better use of resources (time, technical know-how, money, etc.) than what would otherwise have happened.

The unit of analysis used in these various evaluations has typically focused mainly on the partnership and alliance itself, rather than on the beneficiaries and their experience.

In addition, these evaluations are typically more descriptive than analytic. That is, they report the extent to which intended activities were carried out and whether the corresponding outputs expected in fact occurred. They are less good at describing whether desired (and often longer term) outcomes are being achieved and how these outcomes and impacts can be correlated back to the partnership.

There does not appear to be any known use of these evaluations once they are done, beyond the obvious value they may provide to the alliance (and participants) in question, and the possible learning that those directly involved may take away from them.

Evaluators we spoke with express some frustration at how little these evaluations, once completed, seem to matter.

There does not seem to be any systematic effort to glean lessons or insights from these evaluations, however well or poorly done, once they are completed. These evaluations do not get the level of coordinated, integrated attention that will be necessary for it to go more deeply into what is working and what is not.

⁶ See “The 2008 Reader on Private Sector Development; Measuring and Reporting Results” ILO Turin (Italy) Training Center, 2008. This article was prepared for the Annual 2007 ILO Seminar.

The findings above means that the GDA initiative is not well positioned to address the question of whether stated development goals are being achieved more effectively here than through other means. Unfortunately, the lack of in-depth and systematic, longer-term evaluation of these various alliances and their impact, and the inherent weaknesses of the GDA reporting systems and core “database,” means that it is difficult (if not impossible) at present to address the critically important “comparative advantage” question of whether these partnership approaches achieve the stated development goals more effectively than what was done in the past on those same goals, or than what else might have been done elsewhere at present.

Broader Context of the Search for Ways to Improve Evaluation Practice.

Through interviews with people at other development agencies and research institutions interested in the question of how to improve the quality of current practice around impact evaluation, we learned about the broader context within which any impact evaluation of the Global Development Alliance Initiative can (and perhaps should) be understood.

Private sector development, in particular, and the impact of development aid, is an area without a great deal of solid evidence and analysis about results.

Pressure is strong and growing to change this situation. This seems true for a number of reasons worth noting. First, like much of the work in this area, “the goals of GDAs are very ambitious, and the impacts can be costly to quantify relative to the resources available.”

Recent work by Jim Tanburn⁶ is very clear and constructive on what needs to happen. He points out that:

In the absence of any commonly accepted methodology for measuring and reporting results, every agency—and indeed every project—makes its own measurements and does its own reporting. This is often (presented) under the heading of ‘success stories,’... reinforcing the perception that the contents are not impartial or objective. (p. 4)

In practice... little progress has been made on an interagency basis in developing a common methodology. Most agencies apparently struggle, even to conform to their own good-practice guidelines—although this could be interpreted as suggesting that the current guidelines do not address core concerns of either the agency or its core staff. (p. 8)

Very many of the people involved in these initiatives, coming from the private sector, pride themselves on performing against agreed (upon) metrics; they bring

with them the assumption that this will be both possible and desirable in the field of Private Sector Development. While not all their expectations will necessarily be realized, they are nonetheless much more oriented towards achieving measurable results than some practitioners are used to. The pressure to report results is, therefore, likely to increase in the future. (p. 10)

Second, the commitment to provide the kind of evidence necessary to make definitive (or even strong) claims about the impact achieved by a particular project, alliance or initiative is rare.

Increasingly, key research and policy institutions in the field, as well as some leading donors, are attempting to change this situation for the better. They seek incremental improvements that would improve current evaluation practice in this area, demonstrate the value and realistic possibilities of getting better evidence about impact and effectiveness in development work, and (given overall resource constraints) inform actual agency and donor decisions about which strategies to pursue. They know it won't be easy, but insist that the status quo will not be enough to defend current levels of funding and interest.

For some, the current situation is considered a ‘crisis.’ This crisis relates to how (not whether) to evaluate development work, and

it is producing a new willingness to join together to find solutions. In effect, pressure seems to be growing on the “development field.”

The basic goal and stated commitments to do better are in place, and often quite public, having been developed over the last three to five years in a variety of settings, as illustrated by the ‘Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness,’ the Multilateral Development Bank’s Evaluation Working Group, The Copenhagen Consensus, and the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation—or “triple IE.”

A newly formed international body, the “triple IE” is particularly interesting and promising as it will aim to finance high-quality, influential impact evaluations of development programs. The “triple IE” is a consortium or membership organization that will use impact evaluations to answer enduring development questions, and aims to scale up from conducting 12-15 studies in the first year to 30-50 studies per year in the subsequent 2 years. The consortium currently includes the Governments of Mexico, Uganda, UK, Netherlands and Canada, plus the African Development Bank and the Hewlett and Gates Foundations (among others).

Common practice in the field at present is widely described as including the following elements. In the absence of some agreed upon or “commonly accepted” methodology for measuring and

reporting results, each agency or donor develops its own format, questions and expectations. Then, projects are urged to “comply with the procedures necessary” to fully use these various formats. In general, these efforts are not successful—in part, because they require time, expense and skills that may be hard to find or pay for; and in part, because they are seen as something that is not actually part of the essential work. That is, they are seen as potentially useful but not essential. At the end of the day, people who do not “comply” with these formats, reporting guidelines, and evaluation protocols do not get in much trouble.

Often, as Tanburn and others point out, this agency-by-agency approach develops into a series of partially documented “success stories,” situations where real impact is seen and a good faith effort to “analyze” how that came about is attempted. While understandable, this pattern (under present circumstances) reinforces the outside or skeptics perception that there is no real commitment to do what it would be required to provide credible, independent and systematic analysis of evidence.

The lack of agreement around what to measure, and how to measure it, means that the observer has no way at present to tell whether any particular intervention, agency or approach was more or less effective than

any other one...So there is no reasoned debate about which approach works best in which circumstances; instead, there is a rush from one paradigm to the next, often within the space of 3-4 years. (Tanburn, p. 54)

Against this backdrop, any serious effort by USAID to strengthen its work on evaluation of current projects and alliances would be welcomed by many, and would likely be able to attract relevant support and cooperation from others trying to improve their own practices. A focus on better understanding GDAs would be of particular interest to colleagues at the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank (IFC), Department for International Development in the UK (DFID) and the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA). All of these are particularly active and interested in the challenges of evaluating development impact, and the metrics that might help.

Distinguishing between Monitoring and Evaluation.

To oversimplify, monitoring refers to the outgoing measurement of activity and baseline performance. Are the tasks and activities set out in the plans actually being carried out? What patterns appear in actual events (as opposed to plans?) That is, if the project carries out job-training, how many people are enrolled in the training? How many completed it? Are participants the ones who

were sought or expected? Once they finished the training, were they able to find jobs? What kinds of jobs? At its best, monitoring of this kind can be very helpful. It describes what is happening and looks for patterns, and can lead to ways to improve implementation of a project or alliance. It keeps track of who is involved and what is happening, and checks whether these correspond to agreed-upon plans and goals.

Evaluation refers to the effort to establish the longer term impact or outcomes of the work.

At present much more monitoring goes on now than evaluation, which is always the case. Even the monitoring is a bit uneven and incomplete, however. When asked for final reports and/or some of the quarterly reports, some CTOs said they would have to track them down, ask for them again, or simply did not have them.

True, M&E officers are usually designated and working in each of the various USAID missions. In some cases, these people are very effective and busy translating that role into a range of useful activities. In other cases, they seem to be less active. (We did not “study” this question, but can report this impression. In our site visit to Morocco, we ran into an active M & E officer who demonstrated how valuable the role can be.)

At present there does not appear to be very much common practice

across the various missions about monitoring and evaluation of GDAs.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON EVALUATION

1. Create a portfolio of 10-15 high quality alliance-specific evaluations to feature as part of a stronger commitment to learning and knowledge. The idea here is to share these with peer or partner agencies, practitioners, etc.

These should be well-done, credible, “deep” evaluations that aspire to go more deeply and look beyond the short-term outcomes (end of alliance) now being used.

Prepare a strategy for sharing these evaluations with the wider “international development” world. (The agency might consider joining “triple IE”.)

Tap into existing outlets for this information—such as the Aspen Institute’s Program on Business and Society, and their growing collection of in-depth case studies on business- driven partnerships that achieve sustainable development goals (see www.caseplace.com).

2. Develop some core indicators, and get them used.

It is recommended that GDA convene an expert committee, with representatives from public, private and NGO sectors that have been involved in GDA alliances, to identify core indicators and draft reporting guidelines which consider criteria such as:

- Practicality (“how high is the data collection burden for such information?”)
- Technical feasibility (“is it even possible to collect such information?”)
- Legal feasibility (“would such information reveal confidential information or contravene a legal requirement?”)
- Materiality (“is the most important information prioritized?”)
- Completeness (“is the information sufficient to assess the alliance’s performance?”)
- Comparability (“is the alliance working better this year than last year? in this geography versus another?”)

With input from the expert committee described above, USAID should develop sets of core indicators for various typologies of alliances. Since alliances vary greatly in their activities, it would be difficult to design indicators that could be used consistently across alliances to measure short term outcomes. However, indicators that measure long term impacts have greater potential for salience. Business partners are particularly interested in indicators that can be used to demonstrate the impact alliance activities have had on their business—for instance, indicators that measure factory productivity. A list of indicators that business partners have found to be useful

is included in Annex 6; this is not meant to be an exhaustive list but a starting point that could inspire the core indicator vetting process.

A review of existing indicators that are in use suggests that those that speak to the questions of “return on investment,” as understood by specific partners in particular alliances; and to the achievement of development goals, at least as evidenced by some short- and intermediate-term outcomes (as appropriate), are particularly valued by participants.

Among the possibilities for indicators would be systematic, longer-term evidence about increased income in households and communities, increased revenues for affected business or local governments, and various ways to calculate and measure the kinds of “return on investment” that fits with the actual goals and outcomes of these various alliances.

The GDA team and its network of champions and support should work hard to identify and integrate these core indicators into broader USAID practice and policy, especially at the mission level, and into GDA practice. It is imperative that these indicators start early and continue long enough to highlight demonstrated progress toward key long-term outcomes; and that will actually be used by alliance participants, including business.

3. Integrate evaluation into the planning and implementation of

all programs and use indicators that measure the specific development impact of alliances from the beginning, and re-orient potentially key participants from viewing reporting as a duty to being a means to an end. (See the “Common Framework” in Annex 7).

As long as it is seen as an after-thought or “extra effort” rather than as part of standard “best practice,” evaluation’s quality and role will be limited. Start early and be sure to follow-up in those cases where a good prospect exists to gather high quality evidence about both business and development goals, and their interactions.

To the extent that some good evaluation is being done now, it is usually being done on a project-by-project basis or at the country level by consultants brought in to look at particular alliances. As a result, some potential benefits of good evaluation work out there are now being lost.

These lost benefits include the chance to learn across alliances, sectors and regions about ways to gather credible evidence about progress against goals; ways for participants (and interested others) to digest new and often lively information about what it takes (culturally, politically and organizationally, as well as financially) to make these alliances work well; and forums where GDA experience to date can serve as the basis for practical discussion and guidance about how to build,

implement and govern them. Obviously, it would also be useful to discuss the evidence being gathered and analyzed across alliances about which factors seem to contribute most to either development or business “impact.”

A number of specific steps could be taken to start this process:

- GDA should provide practical guidance and best practices on the goal setting process (e.g. Figure 1 which aligned business and social goals from the outset of the project). Companies noted that there is always a desire to set goals and targets but that it does not always happen. This guidance should not be overly prescriptive—it should focus on best practices in the process of designing goals, targets and monitoring systems.
- Any guidelines should be created with significant input from corporate partners so that the guidelines take into consideration company needs and interests and leverage their expertise and experience with data collection and reporting. At the same time, several NGOs were mentioned as having strong expertise in this area (Technoserve, GETF, CARE), so their knowledge should be leveraged as well.

Nearly all interviewees noted that if reporting guidelines are created, there is a risk of creating an onerous process

that is unproductive and gathers irrelevant data. Care should be taken to create guidelines that are genuinely helpful and practical rather than overly prescriptive. Foremost, the reporting guidelines should clarify the suggested content and structure for quarterly and annual reports. In order to design appropriate guidelines, the purpose of reports must be clarified and prioritized. It is recommended that the core purposes of quarterly and annual reports be defined as:

- to inform improved management of existing alliances based on data and stakeholder feedback collected through the reporting process;
- to foster communications between alliance partners;
- to communicate project impacts to stakeholders;
- to evaluate project impacts so as to provide lessons learned for future alliances;
- to provide a method to enhance transparency and accountability with alliance stakeholders including alliance partners, USAID, beneficiaries, tax payers, shareholders and other stakeholders.

By defining the purposes of reporting in this way, GDA could reorient reporting from a rote activity to a practical means to an end. To insure usability and relevance, reporting content will need to be guided as outlined

above, and knowledge accessibility will need to be improved.

4. Identify and consult current evaluation assets, including especially USAID staff and resources; business partner skills and experiences; and high-capacity implementing partners. Based on our work, we believe there are many places to look for these kinds of assets.

Look at missions where evaluation has been done well, and even integrated into core practice. Look at implementing partners, and their growing capacity. Look at business partners, and their data / metrics. Look at other kinds of resource partners, and their priorities. Above all, look for ways to build on what is already being done.

Just as alliance building has started to be usefully decentralized and regionally based, so too might evaluation design and implementation. This support for evaluation might be a critical part of a renewed empowerment of regional bureaus (ANE, LAC, etc.) that some tell is now underway, as well as an integral part of the pillar bureaus (EGAT, etc.).

It might be useful to do this in a way that benefits from the local “asset mapping” techniques of the Asset Based Community Development (ABCD) network, as well as others. The work of the ABCD (which is based at Northwestern University) challenges the traditional approach to solving community and social

problems, which typically focuses professional service providers and funding agencies on the needs and deficiencies of neighborhoods. ABCD faculty (which includes T. Dewar) and their action projects have demonstrated that community assets are key building blocks in sustainable urban and rural community revitalization efforts. These community assets include:

- the skills of local residents;
- the power of local associations;
- the resources of public, private and non-profit institutions;
- the physical and economic resources of local places.

Among the new tools being developed by the ABCD network are some interactive and real-time mapping tools that allow local residents (and those working with them in support of their local development goals) to see and engage various local assets. Initial sites in Seattle, Washington and Connecticut have demonstrated real value. (For more information, see <http://www.sesp.northwestern.edu/abcd>)

5. Invest in M&E officers. Just as the GDA model has identified “champions” with respect to alliance building, there are also some champions around monitoring and evaluation. You will need more of these people as the work goes forward. Develop a plan to strengthen this role, use it as a two-way channel for information

and support. Grow the pool of champions, perhaps by featuring the skills, experience, and ideas of these people.

- GDA should provide clarity about roles and responsibilities in the M&E and reporting processes. Guidelines on standardized reporting procedures should be created, taking into account that different typologies of alliances will require different reporting structures. This guidance should lay out simply who is responsible for reporting, the role of different partners in M&E, the resources that GDA/USAID has available, expectations on format, etc. “We would all benefit if GDA/USAID could allocate significant resources to develop strong M&E frameworks.”
- Enhanced M&E could enable stronger transparency and accountability—this point is also addressed in the *External Communications* section of this document.
- GDA should provide resources on how to integrate participatory approaches into M&E.

6. Integrate evaluation into core training, and develop a strong evaluation option for those who seek it from follow-up training. The GDA team has shown itself strong at designing and implementing training that is well received. Can this existing training better

incorporate evaluation issues and skills into what now goes on, and/or can training be extended to some other roles? We think so. It will be important to do this in a way that insures evaluation is considered right from the beginning, and that identifies ways for people to get appropriate support as well as increase their own (and their organization’s) capacity.

The GDA team might want to explore both a “train the trainers” approach, and try to more effectively tap and learn from existing evaluation “champions” that are already out there in the field.

Include in this new emphasis much greater clarification about differences between monitoring and evaluation, and about the potential value (and rewards?) of the latter.

Make goal-setting, indicator development and reporting against goals more central—and more highly valued.

7. Look for “investment” opportunities and funders interested in new tools and methods, perhaps using the GDA business model itself. Google, Microsoft, Oracle and other IT firms are now working on these kinds of opportunities; as are a number of policy and applied research institutions. Internally, explore ways to make better use of the GIS project at DAI, and other opportunity and asset

“mapping tools” currently in active use or development.

Sometimes, the main contribution of those in the field is not dollars, but the agreement to be closely and appropriately documented through these new tools. In this way, the private sector partners get highly valued and relevant R&D opportunities that greatly improve their products and services, as well as inform key audiences interested in learning about how well these alliances and their myriad projects seem to work.

C. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION

FINDINGS

Business Views

Turnover amongst business partners, GDA and USAID mission staff presents challenges to the relationship building that is crucial to strong partnerships. Such transitions are common within USAID and in the private sector, and sometimes unpreventable. Under these circumstances, it is challenging to build trust and a meaningful dialogue structure. Partnerships intrinsically depend on interpersonal relationships, and personnel changes can be disruptive to both the implementation and the knowledge sharing of GDAs. Companies found that careful management of any staff transitions is necessary in order to maintain alliance success.

The small size of the GDA team places a natural limit on how much it can do in support of individual alliances. Thus, it cannot realistically be involved in all alliances.

The perception by business representatives, in particular, that “someone must step up” and be involved on behalf of USAID means that more will need to be done to insure that people and resources at the mission level are willing and able to meet that need.

Companies value having a dedicated point of contact at the DC level who could serve as a development expert, thought partner and GDA champion for the company. Where such a relationship existed, alliances benefited from input and support throughout each stage of their project—one interviewee explained how her company worked together with a representative from the GDA office to develop the original proposal, and as a result, went into the project sharing similar goals. It is key to establish trust, clear objectives, clear processes, and commitment on both sides to make the alliance work, the interviewee pointed out. Significant personnel investment up front is crucial. According to one interviewee, “it was critical to have a USAID champion who brought in the added value and expertise.” The GDA point person in DC provided a single point of contact who brought enthusiasm and commitment to the project.

She helped outline USAID’s mission and objectives, listened to the company’s areas of interest, and devised a partnership that addressed the interests on both sides. The GDA point person brought technical expertise in an area that the company lacked, and the same was true vice versa. This cooperative relationship continues to be maintained to the benefit of the alliance.

In most cases to date, however, alliances begin, proceed, evolve and conclude, with only a minimal interaction with the GDA team and associated DC-based USAID staff. The perception that this would be useful, among business partners as well as other resource partners, is something that future practice should consider.

The current lack of contact is sometimes misinterpreted as lack of interest or support—and thus can cause concern. It appears that GDA needs stronger and more consistent leadership to manage the relationship between USAID and the private sector. If this is not to come from the GDA team, then where will it reliably come from, and how will this current misperception be corrected?

A number of current and prospective alliance participants expressed the hope that the GDA team could serve as the central point of contact for the private sector, and indeed, should conduct outreach and recruitment for future alliances. To better support company outreach, and

to fulfill their “facilitator” role, the GDA team and office should maintain an updated portfolio of current and possible projects to present to companies as best practice examples and to stimulate and guide business and NGO involvement as well as the steady expansion of opportunities.

USAID and Other Views

Lead implementers and resource partners report similar views about what the key elements of successful alliances are. They believe that USAID funds were key, and in cases where there was discretionary or “quick” money, it was often critically important.

Local knowledge and expertise is crucial. Local implementers often become the face of the project, even when USAID plays a key role they may stay in the background. Increasingly, the hand-off is smooth. Furthermore, a CTO that really engages, problem-solves, and “walks along with participants” as the work unfolds is seen as significant and invaluable.

In sum, based on what we have heard, good staff work from USAID means setting the stage but not getting in the way, serving as a good-faith representative, interpreting rules and minimizing red tape / unnecessary hassles (fear of the bureaucratic problems is real).

The GDA team’s current emphasis on the start-up and early stages of alliance building is appreciated

and highly valued, but does not seem adequate for what's ahead. People are looking for more support and resources for the “middle” and “later” stages of these alliances. Interviewees raised questions and concerns about how to manage the evolving roles of partners, what happens once the activity is completed, how to learn from other alliances and their experiences and how to institutionalize and capitalize on knowledge and relationships built up over the course of the alliance.

One experienced NGO leader observes that:

We all understand that so far the emphasis has been on getting these alliances up and running... but now that we are starting to have some experience to reflect on, and are building some capacity, how can we share what is being learned? How can we get some guidance out here about how to manage these alliances as they mature, and as they (sometimes) move into a next phase?

USAID lends credibility to public-private partnerships and can enable more company collaboration and interface with local government agencies and ministries. One interviewee pointed out the advantage of developing relationships with a wider scope of government ministries than their industry typically interacted with. *In one case, a company directly attributed its improved government relations (as a result of a successful GDA) with*

its win of the government's needed support for further business in the country.

Public and private sectors move at different paces. This contrast sometimes creates conflict during project development and implementation. Companies tend to set timelines firmly and work backwards from them—shaping project activity and pace to meet those set timelines. Often this requires a much faster pace than government agencies or NGOs, creating challenges for business partners that have allocated certain budgets and time frames for alliance implementation. These different approaches offer opportunities, but must be managed carefully and supported by strong individual relationships on both sides. One interviewee commented that misunderstanding in this area led each side to doubt one another's commitment—the private sector wanted to get the project underway; the public sector wanted to be thorough in their formative research. A clear definition of roles and responsibilities of each side, and an equal and shared commitment to project timelines and objectives, would help alleviate tension in this area.

In addition, business partners also noted that in the course of implementing alliances, they have learned that in order to successfully engage stakeholders and build a local dialogue around the work of an alliance (and thus

contribute to the sustainability of the project), multi-year funding and commitment is necessary.

Training offered thus far has been well-received, and often leaves a desire for more and better follow-up. Some USAID staff and implementers have sought the GDA training in order to apply its principles to their non-GDA projects. One such implementer explained that subsequent to the training, they conducted a complete assessment of the GDA toolkit and reference materials to draw out practical applications for their project and shared these directly with the mission director.

Many interviewees noted a desire for more training, and respondents to the web-based survey suggested the need for CTO/CO-specific training. For example, one CTO explained that an alliance fell through because of an unclear understanding of the parameters of the GDA model, and weakness in the contracting office's ability to negotiate an appropriate leverage ratio and agreement with the business partner. The CTO remarked that “it was very frustrating, as I felt I was stuck between trying to comply with the mission and the private sector partner.”

Similarly, the cultivation of “champions” as an explicit strategy seems to be warranted based on what people tell us really matters out in the field. Along with support for both elements (training and champions) also

came the hope that they will be even more effectively used in the future—especially in terms of follow-up and follow-along, as well as around constructing the means of support for “peer learning” and practitioner networks.

Again and again, we heard about the value of having a “champion,” especially when placed at the higher level of whatever institutions are most relevant to actual alliances. A number of people felt that GDA champions can and do a lot on their own and can teach others from their experience.

As important as Champions are, don’t put all your eggs in one basket. It takes more than champions, however, to build momentum and grow the field. It is also important to keep trying to “win over” others, including especially current and future mission directors.

A number of mission-based USAID staff noted the difference between alliances that are fundamentally driven by business model and interests, and those that are driven by more traditional “philanthropic” interests. They noted that they have been impressed by the extent to which these complement rather than compete with each other, especially once the question becomes how to implement the work and attempt to achieve lasting impact.

In talking with a range of actual participants in current (or recent)

alliances, we have heard about a range of factors they consider “key” in successful alliance building (see box).

Best practices in successful alliance building:

- Flexibility
 - Building trust between partners
 - Communication and coordination between all partners, including the host government
 - Engaging local business partners
 - Field visits and participation in project events
 - Transfer of knowledge: strengthening local NGOs
 - Identifying and using existing knowledge
-

It’s not as if projects that eventually bring the good results are smooth, easy, or problem-free; it is rather that they are managed rather than allowed to simply ‘unfold.’

Different mission directors view GDA very differently.

All those interviewed agree that mission buy-in for particular alliances, as well as for the general approach is central. The decisive authority in the USAID structure is the mission director. Since mission directors regularly change over time, it becomes important to pay attention to differences between mission priorities and decision-making in terms of support for GDAs.

Several interviewees noted that some of the “growing capacity and support for GDAs” that has recently and carefully been

built up over the last five years has actually been cut back or weakened by subsequent, incoming mission directors. This produces frustration and uncertainty.

The range and variety of political and budgetary situations for USAID missions is highly variable. A very few find themselves in growth situations. But most are facing some sort of budget reduction or constraints.

Thus, doing alliances in different places and at different times depends a great deal on the degree of support demonstrated by mission directors. The USAID and implementing partners that we talked with, as well as business partners, overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of having a mission director who is genuinely supportive.

This support “at the top” is taken as an important initial indicator of likely “success,” just as business or NGO involvement and commitment is greatly shaped by the kind of initial and continuing support it gets from top leadership.

Flexible funds are seen as desirable and one of the keys to get things started on a solid footing in alliance building.

Many respondents to our web-based survey noted the value to GDA work of the incentive fund. Most funds at the country or regional level are already earmarked / obligated and many interviewees noted the difficulty

in approaching private sector partners without any money on the table. Along with the early and clear commitment of actual funds, mission financial support was seen as being key, along with USAID DC support, in bringing in other partners—especially business partners. In some cases, these other prospective partners have very specific (and often informed) worries about getting involved with the USG, or USAID. Getting personal commitments as well as agency endorsements are both seen as important to getting people past these worries.

One related observation here is that this reported interest in flexible funding seems to suggest that some mission-level staff are not aware of how flexible current funds are. To value flexibility is one thing, and makes sense; but to suggest that other kinds of funding are not currently also flexible is another. It suggests that a better job might need to be done with and through mission directors on just what is possible, and already available.

Key implementers do have some concerns. They emphasize the value of the “early stages” in building alliances, and of not being rushed. You go through predictable stages. It is hard to predict where delays might occur, but the fact that some alliances start out slow is not a sign that they won’t yield “good” results later.

Implementers, in particular, point out that when they did not have a “champion” inside USAID, at the mission, bureau or GDA level as needed, their work was much more difficult.

Some are not sure this can be an “assigned” role, as it might become if GDA Points of Contact were assumed to be the best or right people for this role.

The tensions between DC and the field are very real, and well-known. Combined with the challenge of key people changing or moving on to a new “assignment,” this can mean that level of support changes rather dramatically—especially when mission directors and CTOs turn over.

At the same time, the people we interviewed generally urge the GDA team, in the process of getting more clarity about roles and requirements, not to become too prescriptive. Clear and consistent messages are good, but so, too, is flexibility.

Aspects of GDA work that implementers often feel get under-estimated:

- **Engaging local partners:** importance of finding the right people and working with them in the right way
 - **Transitions from start-up/pilot projects** to next stage, larger scale, or broader implementation
 - **Quality endings:** keeping an eye on ways to sustain/adapt all or parts of the work
-

Most implementers we interviewed, especially at the country and alliance level, seek more and better information on businesses, their interests, and how to contact them. They seek a kind of “clearinghouse.” As much as possible, this information should be current and correct. A few complained about out-of-date or inaccurate “leads” being provided to them.

To the extent that “global agreements” or existing alliances elsewhere might have some application in an additional country, or location, these lead implementers can be helpful as agents that search for and bring in appropriate alliances. They bring connections, local knowledge, and in some cases, specific consultants to suggest or work with.

In some cases, mission staff are the alliance finders, in others, this comes from the lead implementers. Some alliances are their own best agents, and show strength as “opportunists” and entrepreneurs in support of broadening as well as disseminating GDAs—but they have to be kept in the loop... whose responsibility is this, several ask?

To date the flexibility and responsiveness of the GDA team and approach have been critically important, and highly valued. It is hoped that as demand for their time and attention increases, these qualities will be at least as likely, if not more so.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

I. The GDA team should clarify roles and responsibilities in alliances.

Several companies were unsure of the GDA office or USAID's official role in alliances and interviewees reported highly disparate levels of USAID involvement. One interviewee said: "There is a lack of understanding of the role that USAID plays (is it the facilitator? instigator? implementer?) and the types of specific resources that are available." GDA should more clearly define its role so that it may better serve partnership members and help guide alliances. A more robust, clear and standardized definition of roles and responsibilities should be developed, and with it, some greater clarity about the range of services and resources that are available.

In addition to some standardized roles and responsibilities for the GDA team, individual alliances should have a carefully negotiated Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which typically summarizes core activities for each alliance, key objectives, and the roles, responsibilities and contributions of each partner.

Each individual alliance will require unique contributions from each partner; however, above all, GDA must establish standards for consistent involvement. To support their roles and responsibilities

thus defined, the GDA office will need to develop staff capacity in Washington, DC and in local USAID missions to support a consistent level of involvement in all alliance projects. Local missions should also be made aware of these roles and responsibilities so that their alliance involvement is equally consistent.

As part of the clarification process specify the supports that will be available going forward—consider revising through serious consultation with experienced GDA champions and business participants—sticking to those it is well-suited for, and can deliver on.

The current emphasis of the GDA team on "front end" work, and alliance building, seems entirely appropriate to the stage you have been in.

As the work continues to evolve, however, and practice challenges deepen, there is likely to be more and more demand for follow-along and follow-up; perhaps, these are things the GDA team will also want to consider spending more time on. What is the GDA team (or its chosen consultants) best-suited and less well-suited for? The GDA team should clearly define its level of commitment and participation in an alliance, as people in various leadership roles in the field are looking for this clarification. If participant expectations are more informed and consistent, it will lead to more satisfaction and ultimately, confidence in the process.

To boost understanding of the GDA model, the role of USAID in the alliance, and the resources available to alliances, there also needs to be more readily available expertise (such as GDA alliance officers or points of contact) to assist the partnerships during their initial phases. Given the finding that many business partners were unaware that USAID was involved in their alliance, investing GDA staff time during the planning phase of all alliances—at the very least—would be a simple way to establish a greater GDA presence and sphere of influence.

This engagement would likely strengthen partners' perceptions of USAID/GDA's contribution and ultimately may increase the likelihood of future engagement and funding. More importantly, this upfront involvement would provide a simple way for the alliance to be able to access existing knowledge on similar GDA partnerships—for instance, the GDA representative could counsel the partners on what has worked with this type of GDA before, how similar partners addressed challenges that came up, which contacts at similar projects could provide practical advice, what best practices in the particular type of alliance are, etc.. By providing internal GDA champions as thought partners to nascent alliances, USAID would effectively be leveraging existing knowledge, skills, abilities and experience to motivate and advance the alliances.

In order to grow business participation in GDA partnerships, the current funding systems should be revisited to allow for more consistent multi-year funding. The funding system of GDA could better support private sector partners if multi-year funding was established as the norm. Additionally, GDA should examine how its funding mechanisms and cycle could be altered to permit more global partnerships that are established as a kind of “model” and then implemented in areas of shared interest (this model has been used successfully by The Coca Cola Company and Cisco). This may require a dedicated fund of centralized capital.

The initiative for corporate involvement in alliances often needs to come from executives at a company’s headquarters. These people are looking for evidence that transaction and negotiating costs can be mitigated or minimized. Thus, it can help if there is some central funding to allow companies to establish global programs through the GDA office in Washington DC. While there is certainly much value in locally designed and driven GDAs, many companies do not have (or want) field staff with the authority or direct contacts with missions to establish alliances. Having a global model can thus provide the necessary relationship capital that can engender the spontaneous formation of local alliances—for instance, in the case of Coca Cola’s Community Watershed

Partnership Program/Global Water and Development Alliance, the global relationship served as a conversation-starter between The Coca-Cola Company, USAID/ Egypt, and a USAID bilateral contractor, and a local alliance was initiated without oversight or prompting from the central alliance. (Note: to some extent the new Global Frameworks may help address this problem.)

We found that business partners feel challenged by the emphasis on mission/bureau funding and called for USAID to determine systems for funding and contracting that are more centralized. Business partners recognize the benefits of requiring mission/bureau funding for GDA partnerships, but would appreciate a better understanding from USAID of the constraints this poses on the private sector.

Some interviewees suggested that USAID should also be more flexible in determining the geographic areas where alliances are implemented. Several business partners felt that their strategic business interests in a particular country or region were not as valued as they should be. These individuals felt that if a company is willing to significantly invest in a particular region or country, unless there is a compelling reason not to invest, then USAID should make every effort to support an alliance in that particular geography.

2. Strengthen training and “champion building,” and plan for the next five years.

Currently this is an exemplary part of the GDA team practice. But where is it all heading? Can those now doing the training realistically expect to keep up with growing demand, and with challenges to do follow-up as well as introductory training?

Looking ahead, the GDA team can consider the following questions: How can this training work be further decentralized without losing its clarity and focus? Are there some dimensions of what belongs in future and follow-along training that must be allowed to percolate up from the field rather than only “down and out” from DC?

One action is to identify partner trainers and candidate trainers, as well as ways to better use existing champions and their networks, and those who have already undergone training.

CTO/CO-specific training can help strengthen individual alliances, help USAID act as a ‘true’ partner, and build capacity to negotiate and communicate better with the private sector.

Exchange programs have also proven to be very useful and can continue to be broadened in the following areas:

- The Global/Institutional level: USAID/GDA-Private Company exchanges have helped both

institutions understand each other's culture and opportunities, and have proven to be valuable for building and cementing long-term relationships.

- The mission level: the Foreign Service National (FSN) Program is very good for building local capacity in the missions. It might be that USAID and the US government should look at doing similar rotations for newly-appointed Foreign Service Officers.
- The Alliance Partnership level: at the onset of an alliance, some rotations/shadowing between partners may help tremendously to build trust and achieve common understanding.

3. mission GDA Points of Contact should be strengthened in all countries/regions with current or potential future GDA projects. The GDA team should utilize existing USAID mission staff to enhance the reach and impact of private sector engagement. GDA Points of Contact are already identified. In the future, these people should be endowed with the knowledge, skills and resources to serve the GDA strategy. They should have responsibility for knowing which companies are operating in country, what development issues they face and what projects might prove relevant to them. These individuals could regularly attend

American Chamber of Commerce meetings and/or US Commercial Service meetings in order to make connections with the private sector and to stay informed of development issues of interest to the business community.

It is clear that personal relationships contribute significantly to the success of alliances, and having a clear point person in each USAID mission to manage in-country private sector relations would create significant opportunities for expanding the role of public-private partnerships. The GDA Points of Contact would communicate regularly with the GDA team in order to report on their alliance building efforts. In addition, USAID bureau staff could provide an additional support network for GDA Points of Contact, including technical assistance to help establish and run alliances.

In addition to GDA Points of Contact, there are also Regional Alliance Builders. At present there are three of them. This recommended approach would significantly increase alliance building capacity, as well as USAID mission capacity to manage relationships with the private sector once alliances have been established.

4. The GDA team should look for ways to become more consistently involved in alliances—at least at the outset - to provide

information about resources and connections to the GDA network. Clear roles should be defined for the GDA team, and these could take multiple forms:

- The GDA team and office should improve its capacity to act as an effective liaison between companies and alliance opportunities; GDA should become more proactive in its relations with the private sector. A USAID/GDA staff person should serve as a liaison to connect companies to appropriate opportunities and contacts—thus serving as a kind of “account relationship manager” that could be the person a company calls first. Developing a stronger relationship between relevant GDA staff and private sector counterparts will prove especially salient if the GDA model becomes better defined as being focused on private sector development interests. For instance, if a company wanted to make a philanthropic donation, this relationship manager could pass them on to the appropriate USAID contact at the mission or bureau level. Dedicated GDA related staff, with issue or regional expertise would also likely improve companies' ongoing engagement with USAID/GDA, which would likely lead to more alliance opportunities.

⁷ TCCC-USAID Water & Development Alliance (WADA), Quarterly Report July—September 2007, The Global Environment and Technology Foundation, 16 October 2007.

- *There should be more dedicated GDA staff, with regional and topical alliance expertise.* Such internal GDA capacity building would improve the office’s ability to better support alliance development and project design and implementation. Moreover, issue and regional experts could contribute to the reporting and knowledge sharing process, so that best practices and common challenges are more consistently identified, understood and communicated to GDA participants.

5. USAID mission staff should have an explicit responsibility for managing relationships with local government ministries to support public-private partnerships. Many interviewees noted that getting local government ministries or agencies involved (which may first require capacity building) was essential to the project’s sustainability, and also contributed to the internal business case for partnering with USAID. Interacting with local government is a natural role for USAID staff to play as it aligns with its strengths and expertise: this role should be encouraged and formalized.

The general question here seems to be how to broaden the number and variety of people working on GDA while recognizing current budget and personnel constraints. Presumably, this means that a number of current staff not

formally identified with GDA would have a new and explicit role to play, while a number of already GDA-associated staff would have their role clarified and supported—both kinds of people would not be GDA staff, per se; but could be expected to play an active and informed role at the mission, bureau and regional levels.

It seems clear that USAID and its direct involvement in the field offers an important and sought after “value added” that business partners look for, that is, access to and relationships with local/host country governments. Understanding the local context in which that strength plays out is an exercise each mission can undertake (for example in one alliance in Central America, the mission found that it offered a transparent and ‘safe’ mechanism through which, for the first time, the local private sector could work with the host government ministries).

D. LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

FINDINGS

Business Views

Learning and knowledge development about GDAs is not well supported within alliances, between company partners, between alliances, or within the GDA system. Business partner interviews revealed that most knowledge about

completed alliances has not been institutionalized. It was extremely challenging to identify the company partners who were involved in particular alliances and to locate quarterly and annual reports. In many instances, company partners were not able to locate a person who could speak to the alliance nor provide any alliance reports. This experience is telling—a large contingent of business partners do not have strong institutional understanding of their GDA partnerships and thus are likely not integrating learning from their experiences into current development projects or partnerships. To a certain extent, staff turnover amongst alliance partners is the root cause of this problem. In this context, appropriate systems to support ongoing learning and knowledge development must be put into place.

Similarly from the USAID perspective, it is telling that when asked in the online survey for “examples of using documentation or evidence that were good at describing impact of a particular GDA,” very few respondents were able to offer any referrals at all.

Learning and knowledge development that does occur for business partners tends to be driven by their own systems and not by GDA or USAID. Business partner interviews revealed several innovative practices in the sphere of learning and knowledge development that were proactively initiated by company

staff to improve their alliance. For example:

- In order to learn about each other's operations, in one alliance, company and USAID staff shadowed each other at their respective offices for one week. The company felt that this practice created a turning point in the relationship that enabled greater levels of trust and mutual understanding, and ultimately, a better functioning and strong alliance team
- Another interviewee, from an ICT business partner, noted that the effective use of online collaboration tools (such as wiki tools, voting tools, debate tools, and blogging tools), when coupled with in-person engagement, would be an excellent method for enhancing the collaboration and communications of alliances.
- In a third upstart practice, GETF, the implementing partner of the Coca-Cola Company (TCCC)—USAID alliance, started to create and disseminate monthly updates to alliance partners. "These 2 page updates are intended to keep GETF, USAID, and TCCC current and coordinated on the progress of ongoing projects as well as the cross-cutting elements of [the] Alliance (e.g., monitoring, evaluation, communications, preparation for new projects). The updates' objective is to make sure that the Alliance partners

have common and consistent information regarding the oversight of the projects and to highlight any specific actions required of USAID, TCCC, or GETF." This practice was also noted in the Technoserve and Procter & Gamble alliance.

USAID and Other Views

There is a great deal of interest in learning and knowledge development. For the most part, this interest is not encouraged nor taken advantage of in a systematic way. People engage in many activities that are designed to promote learning, sharing of lessons and the development of knowledge about alliances and the factors that contribute most effectively to real and lasting impact. But in general, they don't seem to get relevant support for doing this nor are they rewarded in any meaningful way when they try.

This growing support for the ideas and techniques underlying the GDA model is also associated with an appetite to learn more about 'what works' and 'what doesn't.' Many interviewees expressed their interest in gaining more shared knowledge about how certain kinds of development goals (such as economic growth, agricultural development, governmental capacity building, etc.) are most effectively pursued.

People want to get smarter about this alliance work. They also want to build on what they

are learning, and many expressed a willingness to share their own experience, contacts and insights. They assume others are busy learning like themselves, through the bumps and bruises, as well as the satisfaction and surprises that come along with this work. They want to have a better and more current sense of what these others are doing and learning.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

1. Designate someone on the GDA team to be the leader for learning and knowledge development.
2. The GDA office should enhance learning and knowledge development within and between alliances, between company partners in different alliances, and within the GDA system through investments in tools, systems and infrastructure.

The following would improve learning and knowledge development:

- *An informal mentorship system* in which a new business partner entering into a GDA partnership has the option to be matched with an individual from a business partner who has had experience with similar GDA projects. The mentor could serve as coach, providing insights on best practices and advice on challenges as they arise.

- *An improved online database or “community of practice” for sharing best practices*—this could be a build-out of the current database but would need functionality to search for best practices by topical area (e.g. monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, capacity building etc.). It would be critical to tie in contact information to this “community of practice network;” a user should be able to research a topic and then contact those who have worked on alliances and have direct expertise in a particular topic. This system would enable sharing of best practices between missions, business partners, NGO partners, and so on. The current GDA database could certainly be built out as part of the creation of this larger online community—this database could serve as a regularly updated information and contact management system. Alliances should be required to post all quarterly and annual reports and updated contact information to this database; this will require assigning responsibility to a particular individual within an alliance, such as the manager of the implementing partner. Access to the database and to the online “community of practice” should be granted to all GDA partners.
- *A standard package of online tools* such as wiki tools, voting

tools, document storage tools, debate tools, and blogging tools, etc. that alliance partners could use to share knowledge within an alliance. The GDA office could lead on establishing an alliance in which an ICT partner provided such tools as an in-kind contribution and the GDA team worked to disseminate the package as a resource to existing and new alliances. For instance, through the online “community of practice” discussed above, there could be a subpage for each alliance (only alliance partners would be able to access these subpages), with ready-to-use online communication tools. One ICT interviewee indicated that this may be an area they would be interested in making a contribution; the report writers would be willing to ask this individual if he would be willing to have preliminary conversations with the GDA team on this. GDA should engage corporate partners such as Google, Microsoft, Oracle, Yahoo and IAC to determine if a partnership focused on developing such a package of online tools (or innovative communication tools) would be possible.

- *An annual conference that would include sessions/convenings on specific GDA structures*—for instance, ICT partners may benefit from a session in which they could learn about other

education-focused projects while extractives companies would benefit from a convening on SME development projects. By bringing together stakeholders to discuss what works within a given area (and potentially developing materials given the outcomes), GDA would encourage replicability of best practices. Furthermore, an annual gathering would be an opportunity to develop a stronger GDA network—alliance partners would have the chance to meet and develop relationships which in turn would enable enhanced communications and knowledge sharing between partners involved in different alliances. This event would also be an opportunity to publicly highlight particular alliances; this point is elaborated upon in the External Communications section.

- A well-written document or training component that would outline the benefits of the innovative “shadowing” practice mentioned in the findings above. This document could outline how best to organize a shadowing program in which alliance staff shadow each other at one another’s respective offices in order to build mutual understanding and trust. Business partners expressed interest in “more in-depth studies or research on the most effective processes and approaches to developing

multi-sectoral partnerships”; the shadowing approach would be a natural candidate for such a case study.

3. Establish more forums and communication channels

that unpack findings and explore implications for learning and knowledge development—and provide greater emphasis on evidence that shows longer-term development impact, and that goes more deeply into the questions around the claimed comparative advantage of the GDA model. Some of these forums may already exist, and can be “joined” as they are; others may need to be created or adapted.

Some forums seem especially important to do first. GDA should develop guidance around private-sector best practices to be used as a resource for private-sector alliance partners. *Business partners would benefit enormously from a set of case studies that used quantitative data to demonstrate the return on investment of GDA partnerships.* While there has been significant work to date on communicating alliance success stories, there are no materials that effectively use robust data to show the impact of alliances on business and development goals.

In addition, collecting qualitative data on innovative and effective private-sector approaches to managing alliances could serve as valuable guidance for businesses embarking upon new partnerships. Information on local staffing

practices, project management tools, relationship building, staff transition teams, and company champions would provide private-sector partners with relevant guidance on executing a successful alliance.

GDA should also establish a system for consistent public reporting; a profile of information on all alliances should be publicly available and regularly updated. Currently, only a few case profiles are accessible through the GDA website. In addition to guidance on reporting internally within the GDA system, the GDA office should create guidelines as a resource to enable consistent public reporting. A simple template for standardized public reports and an associated website/database (accessed through the current GDA website) would enable stronger transparency and accountability for GDA. The work of alliances that are already communicating publicly about their work should be leveraged—for instance, the Coca Cola Company and USAID Water & Development Alliance (WADA) employ a standardized 2-page format to publicly provide overviews of their alliances.

E. EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

FINDINGS

Business Views

Business partners would like the GDA office to play

an enhanced role in publicly communicating about alliances. Several partners noted that part of their motivation for being involved in an alliance with USAID was to benefit from the resources, reputation and extensive network of the United States government. While many partners felt that they were reaping such benefits at the local level (for instance, being part of a USAID alliance was often seen as offering credibility in relations with local governments), they felt that the GDA office could provide a stronger centralized system for public communications.

One interviewee noted that the press release process was very difficult; he suggested that the process for getting information out to the public should be streamlined. Another interviewee noted an incident when the GDA office asked for a senior executive to be involved in a panel, but after significant effort to get the executive to attend, the panel was canceled at the last minute. The interviewee felt that this was symptomatic of a cleavage in understanding between business and GDA in terms of the prioritization of communications about alliances.

Externally, there are low levels of understanding of what a “GDA” is, even amongst business partners.

In the course of interviews with business partners, many were unfamiliar with the terminology of “GDA”. Many referenced and

understood their work as a “USAID partnership” rather than as a project under the Global Development Alliance.

USAID and Other Views

Lead implementers and USAID supporters would like to see more and better communication efforts, especially in support of their efforts to gain additional partners and prospects for future alliances, and obtain appropriate institutional (such as ministry policy and practice changes) and donor commitments to support work initiated under GDAs.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. The Annual Program Statement (APS) should be simplified and made more concise. Currently the main GDA external outreach document, it is critical that the APS clearly outline how to form alliances. The language of the document should either be tailored to be more “business-friendly,” or else, consideration should be given to developing a separate, companion document for business participants. It might also be worth considering whether a companion document designed for the private sector audience should be drafted.

2. A system for consistent public reporting should be established. Currently only a few case profiles are accessible through the GDA website; to

improve transparency as well as general public awareness, all alliances should be publicly promoted through consistent profiles available on the website. Note that this recommendation is further outlined in the *Learning and Knowledge Development* section.

3. USAID/GDA should create streamlined processes and dedicated events in order to raise the profile of alliances and the GDA model. The GDA office should develop a more streamlined press release process and should seek to hold more frequent public events to accommodate business partners’ desire to have USAID publicly discuss their alliances. It should offer resources to alliances on stakeholder mapping so as to improve their ability to ensure that appropriate stakeholders are attending meetings and events.

4. The GDA team should encourage specific individuals from business partners to become public champions of the GDA model. One possible approach for raising the profile of the GDA model externally would be to establish a “GDA Business Partner Ambassador” program (this could be done in coordination with the current “Alliance of the Year” program) that would award individuals from business partners as “GDA Ambassadors of the Year”. These individuals would be asked to provide expert advice and to lend their presence at GDA events and other public panels. Designating

such business partner champions would enable improved knowledge sharing, external communications of individual and company contributions, greater external awareness of the GDA business model, an enhanced and more active network, and reputation benefits for the champions’ companies.

CHAPTER THREE

LOOKING AHEAD

Interest and support for the GDA model is widespread and growing. The GDA model has now been around since 2001, long enough for many to see what it means in practice. A key finding here is that people with direct experience in GDAs (or direct exposure to them) overwhelmingly like and support them. Based on our interviews, this support extends across the various partners and players.

On the whole, business interviewees were very satisfied with the GDA partnership model. Business partners value matching funds, USAID's local and development expertise, and the credibility and contacts made available through partnerships. Business partners reported a widespread enthusiasm for continued involvement with GDA.

USAID staff and implementers similarly expressed their support for GDAs and the approach used thus far. They also value the training and initial support provided on leads, alliance building, and guidance about types of agreements to consider. An overwhelming majority of those directly involved in alliances to date express great interest in finding new and better ways to use them in the future. They

also express a real appetite for learning and sharing lessons and experiences with others.

At the same time, many are looking for slightly more and different things from the GDA team in the future. They also see the current GDA team as overstretched. Thus, they acknowledge that this additional work will have to be designed carefully.

THE GDA MODEL AND IMPACT

The GDA model is not well defined or explicitly differentiated from USAID. One way to better differentiate GDA would be to focus on more strategic business partnerships than philanthropic pursuits. Up to this point, alliances that held a compelling business case were seen as the most impactful and sustainable. In addition, business partners would find enormous value in a set of case studies that used quantitative data to demonstrate the return on investment of GDA partnerships. Such a study would also enhance future alliance outreach efforts.

Staff turnover amongst business partners, the GDA office and USAID mission staff presents challenges to the relationship building component of strong

partnerships. A more robust system of knowledge development and sharing, and careful management of staff transitions could alleviate related challenges.

EVALUATION/ METRICS/MONITORING

Companies emphasized the importance of robust impact measurement and reporting, and commented on the current lack of centralized GDA support for this process.

The GDA office should develop strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) frameworks to provide to business and NGO partners as resources. Roles and responsibilities in the M&E and reporting processes should be clarified. The frameworks should be practical and action-oriented rather than regulative, and should be developed with significant input from experienced corporate and NGO alliance partners. In developing these frameworks, the GDA team should revisit core indicators, and modify them to include business impacts.

In addition to guidelines for internal reporting in the GDA system, the GDA office should establish a system for consistent public reporting. A profile of information on all alliances should

be publicly available and regularly updated on the GDA website.

There are many evaluation-related assets to build upon, including both people and practices. These should be identified and more effectively tapped. Unfortunately, many of these assets are isolated and in general, evaluation is not well supported or integrated into current USAID programs as it now operates. GDA practices reflect this same pattern.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN IMPLEMENTATION

Strong interpersonal relationships and clearly defined roles and responsibilities are crucial to building strong partnerships. Roles, responsibilities and contributions of each partner should be clearly defined and agreed upon through initial written agreements for each partnership.

GDA staff should play a larger, more consistent role in initializing, facilitating and supervising GDA partnerships. GDA staff should become more proactive in their relations with the private sector and developing alliance opportunities. GDA staff should manage the initial proposal process, and should facilitate the relationship between missions and companies. In an effort at centralization and streamlining pace and the burden on business partners, GDA staff should play an active role in managing the logistics of financing GDA

partnerships. GDA staff should also be mindful of the conflicting pace of work in the public and private sectors, and should provide leadership and guidance for cooperation in this area. It seems clear that expanding GDA capacity will require additional financial and personnel resources.

While the GDA team has understandably been pre-occupied thus far with the start-up and initial organizing around alliance building, many in the field are now looking for more help with the middle and later phases, including especially help around issues of sustainability and with other kinds of institutional commitments that can sustain or deepen alliance impact.

Missions should identify strong GDA Points of Contact to manage in country business-USAID relations and GDA projects. Keeping in mind country contexts and unique needs, GDA mission Points of Contact should be the lead in project implementation phase(s). The GDA team and mission Points of Contact should maximize their impact on multi-sector collaboration and should have explicit responsibility for managing relationships with local government ministries to support public-private partnerships.

LEARNING AND KNOWLEDGE DEVELOPMENT

Many people interviewed report a lack of support for learning

and knowledge development about alliances within the existing GDA system. Business leaders, in particular, expressed concern about this. Where it does occur, learning and knowledge development is often driven by companies' own systems and is not necessarily shared with the GDA office. This is an enormous missed opportunity.

Learning and knowledge development systems should be developed within the GDA system through tools, systems and infrastructure. Potential methods include:

- An informal mentorship system to share experiences and best practices;
- An improved online database for sharing best practices;
- A standard package of online tools for internal alliance knowledge sharing;
- An annual conference to include sessions on specific GDA structures; and
- A document or training to outline benefits of innovative "partner-shadowing" practice.

In addition, there is considerable support for efforts to connect with other players, partners, forums, and networks around learning and knowledge development.

It would help to focus and plan this new dimension of GDA work if someone on the GDA team is

identified as the leader on learning and knowledge development.

EXTERNAL COMMUNICATION

Public knowledge of what “GDA” is remains quite limited—so improved external communications would enhance the GDA brand and potentially increase company participation in alliances.

Several business partners, as well as other key GDA players, noted that they would like USAID/ GDA to play an enhanced role in communicating publicly about alliances. Many noted that the GDA office could provide a stronger centralized system for communications. One interviewee commented on a perceived disparity of prioritization of communication about alliances—business partners value this highly, and would like to see increased GDA participation in this area.

Existing external communication methods should be improved: the Annual Program Statement should be simplified and made more concise, and the language more business-friendly. New systems should be developed to raise the profile of alliances and the GDA program:

- GDA should create a system for consistent public reporting;
- GDA/USAID should create a more streamlined press release process;

- GDA/USAID should hold more frequent public events to highlight alliance activities and accomplishments; and
- GDA should encourage specific individual private-sector champions to become public champions of the GDA system: GDA Ambassadors of the Year.

In closing, it is clear that much progress has been made in cultivating the supply of business partners and good development ideas for which alliances are an appropriate response, while also stimulating demand and interest in GDAs within USAID and its network of implementing partners. As the process moves forward, it will be important to find ways for USAID to provide even more support for evolving GDA policy and practice, while at the same time develop solid ways to produce credible evidence about development impact and share lessons learned.

ANNEX I

ALLIANCE CASE STUDIES

Selection Criteria was based on USAID implementer, sector, business and non-US business partners, geography and initial year.

Initial Year	Alliance Name	USAID Implementer	Sector	Partners Consulted
2002	Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance (SFPGA)	EGAT	Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/EGAT
2002	Huancavelica Economic Service Center	Peru	Economic Growth/Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Compañía de Minas Buenaventura SAA (Buenaventura Mining Company)
2002	Entra 21	EGAT	Education/Workforce training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/EGAT • International Youth Foundation
2002	Building Business Linkages and Developing Business Skills	Mozambique	Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Mozambique • Technoserve, Inc.
2003	Safe Drinking Water Alliance	Global Health	Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Procter & Gamble
2003	Angola Partnership Initiative	Angola	Agriculture and Economic Growth/Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Angola • Chevron Corporation
2004	Finca and Visa International	Central America Regional Program	Economic Growth/Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/EGAT
2004	Continuous Improvement in the Apparel Workplace (CIMCAW)	Central America Regional Program	Economic Growth/Trade	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Central America Regional Program • Development Alternatives, Inc. • Social Accountability International • Gap Inc. • Wal-Mart • Timberland Company
2004	Education and Employment	EGAT	Education/Workforce training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Morocco • International Youth Foundation • Government Partners - Morocco • Local Business & NGO Partners - Morocco • Lucent Technologies • GE Foundation • Oracle Education Foundation
2004	Central American Coffee Initiative	Central America Regional Program	Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technoserve, Inc. • Nestle • Procter & Gamble
2004	Achieving E-Equality in the IT Sector in Morocco	Morocco	Education/Workforce training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Morocco • UNIFEM • CISCO Systems • Regional Academy - Morocco
2004	Certified Sustainable Products Alliance (CSPA)	Central America Regional Program	Agriculture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • USAID/Central America Regional Program • Rainforest Alliance • Chiquita • Pfizer

Initial Year	Alliance Name	USAID Implementer	Sector	Partners Consulted
2004	EQuALLS: Education and Livelihood Skills Alliance (ELSA)	Philippines	Education/Workforce training	• USAID/Philippines
2004	Improvement of Local Governance and Quality of Life in Pilot Cities (SUAL)	Russia	Democracy and Governance	• USAID/Russia
2005	Community Watershed Partnership Program	EGAT	Environment	• The Coca Cola Company
2006	School LINK	Egypt	Education/Workforce training	• USAID/Egypt • Vodafone Egypt
2006	Bird's Head Development Initiative	Indonesia	Environment	• USAID/Indonesia
2006	Alianzas	El Salvador	Health	• USAID/EL Salvador • Research Triangle Institute

ANNEX 2

GLOBAL SNAPSHOT OF ALLIANCES (1999–2007)

(523 ALLIANCES REVIEWED)

The majority of GDAs to date are focused on one country and implemented at the mission level (73%). They tend to last no more than three years (70%) and have less than five partners (70%). They cover a wide range of sectors, mostly focused on Economic Growth (26%), Health (13%), Environment (13%),

DURATION OF ALLIANCES

Duration	Count	Percentage
1-3 years	365	70%
4-6 years	105	20%
7 + years	14	3%
Unknown	39	7%

IMPLEMENTATION

USAID Implementor	Count	Percentage
mission	382	73%
bureau	108	21%
Regional mission	33	6%

NUMBER OF PARTNERS IN ALLIANCE

Number of Partners	Count	Percentage
1	146	28%
2–5	222	42%
5–9	71	14%
10+	55	11%
Unknown	29	6%


SECTORS COVERED

Sector	Count	Percentage
Economic Growth and Trade	137	26%
Health	68	13%
Environment	67	13%
Agriculture	66	13%
Education and Workforce Training	53	10%
Democracy and Governance	43	8%
HIV/AIDS	23	4%
IT	23	4%
Conflict Relief/Humanitarian Assistance	20	4%
Energy	19	4%
Family Planning	4	1%

RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION BY REGION

Region	Total LOP	USAID LOP	PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)
AFR	\$1,922,756,519	USAID LOP	\$279,106,707
		PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)	\$1,643,649,812
ANE	\$853,922,213	USAID LOP	\$228,891,497
		PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)	\$625,030,716
ENE	\$356,049,437	USAID LOP	\$100,116,675
		PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)	\$255,932,762
LAC	\$973,574,549	USAID LOP	\$275,765,259
		PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)	\$697,809,290
WORLDWIDE	\$3,032,735,857	USAID LOP	\$585,748,033
		PARTNER LOP (cash + in-kind)	\$2,446,987,824

RESOURCE CONTRIBUTION BY REGION



ANNEX 3

INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: BUSINESS PERSPECTIVE ON THE ALLIANCE

Note: bold questions are required, non-bolded are suggested follow-up questions

1. Background information
 - 1.1. Name of Alliance:
 - 1.2. Date:
 - 1.3. Person interviewed:
 - 1.4. Position and Role:
 - 1.5. Period of Direct Involvement:
2. Alliance History: How did the alliance happen and who was involved?
 - 2.1. **What was the origin of the alliance? Where did the idea come from (e.g. local vs. USAID vs. company idea)?**
 - 2.2. Who were the partners and how much did they contribute? Did this change over time?
 - 2.3. **Who was responsible for bringing together the alliance and moving it forward? What was the role of local groups or individuals in moving it forward and planning for the alliance?**
 - 2.4. Why was the GDA model used for this particular project or purpose?
 - 2.5. **How was the business case made internally at the company of the corporate implementing partner(s)? Could the business case for this particular project have been made without the leverage aspect of the GDA model?**
 - 2.6. How would funds have been spent if this alliance had not come to fruition (if it all)?
 - 2.7. What allowed for your company's involvement and what maintained this involvement?
 - 2.8. What were the key issues or challenges in getting the Alliance off the ground and how were these specifically addressed? What were success factors in helping it to gain traction?
 - 2.9. Please describe the planning for the alliance that occurred, both at an individual partner and group level.

3. Alliance Execution: How did it work?
 - 3.1. What resources did the company contribute? Money? Staff time? Other resources (e.g., networks and knowledge transfer)? How did this compare to the contributions of the other partners and USAID?
 - 3.2. What were the additional costs (transaction costs, management time, etc.) that were incurred over the course of alliance execution? How do these costs compare with non-GDA development projects that your company is involved with?
 - 3.3. **Who managed the alliance? How much company involvement was there in the day-to-day operations? How did the partners allocate roles?**
 - 3.4. Did the alliance have local support or leadership?
 - 3.5. Were goals determined from the outset? Did these goals influence the management of the project? Who determined the goals?
 - 3.6. Did the alliance maintain momentum? Was there follow through on what had been planned?
 - 3.7. Did the alliance produce products and services at the levels anticipated?

4. Alliance Impact: What were the outcomes of the alliance?
 - 4.1. **What were the goals of the partnership – both in terms of addressing a development problem and contributing to business goals?**
 - 4.2. **Were the goals in both areas met?**
 - 4.3. **What sort of evidence of impact (on business and development goals) was gathered? Can you describe the evidence, or direct us to it?**
 - 4.4. What worked about the evaluation approach? What practices or advice do you think would be good to share with other alliances?
 - 4.5. Are there any particular metrics that you tracked that you felt were very useful – either for the management of the alliance or for demonstrating impact?
 - 4.6. **In your view, are the development achievements of the alliance sustainable? What role did building local capacity play in this?**
 - 4.7. Has the alliance become an ongoing, enduring relationship among partners? Or, is it expected to?
 - 4.8. What unanticipated outcomes or impacts has the alliance created?
 - 4.9. **On balance, has the alliance created a development outcome or impact greater than if the GDA model had not been used?**
 - 4.10. Compared to other social investments that your company has made, how have both the process and impacts differed? Would you recommend this model for future projects sponsored by your company?
 - 4.11. How did the business case for involvement change over the life of the alliance, if at all?
 - 4.12. **What matters most in making these alliances work (or not work) from a business-partner point of view?**
 - 4.13. What makes the alliance worth the effort? Was it an effective use of resources?
 - 4.14. **Based on your experience with this alliance, what would you do differently next time?**
 - 4.15. What are the key challenges ahead? What is needed to effectively address these?

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: CTO PERSPECTIVE ON THE ALLIANCE

Note: bold questions are required, non-bolded are suggested follow up questions

1. Background information
 - 1.1. How long have you been serving as CTO for this alliance?
 - 1.2. Over what time frame was the alliance developed and implemented?

2. Alliance History: How did the alliance happen and who was involved?
 - 2.1. **What was the origin of the alliance? Where did the idea come from (e.g. local vs. USAID vs. company idea)?**
 - 2.2. Who were the partners and how much did they contribute?
 - 2.3. Did this change over time?
 - 2.4. **Who was responsible for bringing together the alliance and moving it forward? What was the role of local groups or individuals in moving it forward and planning for the alliance?**
 - 2.5. How different is this alliance from the way they normally work? (If different, how is it different?)
 - 2.6. Why was the GDA model used for this particular project or purpose?
 - 2.7. What were the key issues or challenges in getting the Alliance off the ground and how were these specifically addressed? What were success factors in helping it to gain traction?
 - 2.8. Please describe the planning for the alliance that occurred, both at an individual partner level and at the partnership/group level.

3. Alliance Execution: How did the alliance actually work?
 - 3.1. What resources did USAID contribute? Money? Staff time? Other resources (e.g., networks and knowledge transfer)? How did this compare to the contributions of the other partners?
 - 3.2. What were the most significant additional costs (transaction costs, management time, etc.) that were incurred over the course of alliance execution? How do these costs compare with non-GDA development projects that mission is involved with?
 - 3.3. Who managed the alliance?
 - 3.4. **Did the alliance have local support or leadership?**
 - 3.5. **Were goals determined from the outset? Did these goals influence the management of the project? Who determined the goals?**
 - 3.6. **Did the alliance maintain momentum? Was there follow through on what had been planned?**
 - 3.7. Did USAID or your mission have a direct relationship with any of the business partners?
 - 3.8. Were there important changes made in how the alliance was actually executed after it started?
 - 3.9. How were the shared goals determined? Were they adjusted over time?

4. Alliance Impact: What were the outcomes of the alliance?
 - 4.1 **What were the goals of the partnership – both in terms of addressing a development problem and contributing to business goals?**
 - 4.2 **Were the goals in both areas met?**
 - 4.3 **What sort of evidence about impact was gathered? Can you describe the evidence, or direct us to it?**
 - 4.4 What worked about the evaluation approach? What practices or advice do you think would be good to share with other alliances?
 - 4.5 Are there any particular metrics that you tracked that you felt were very useful – either for the management of the alliance or for demonstrating impact?
 - 4.6 In your view, are the development achievements of the alliance sustainable? What role did building local capacity play in this?
 - 4.7 What unanticipated outcomes or impacts have been created?
 - 4.8 **On balance, has the alliance created development impact greater than if the GDA model had not been used?**
 - 4.9 **In your view, what matters most in making these alliances work (or not work)?**
 - 4.10 Has the alliance become an ongoing, enduring relationship among partners? Or, is it expected to?
 - 4.11 What makes the alliance worth the effort? What has been (or will be) the value added?
 - 4.12 **Based on your experience with this alliance, what would you do differently next time?**
 - 4.13 What are the key challenges ahead? What is needed to effectively address these?

INTERVIEW PROTOCOL: LEAD IMPLEMENTER PERSPECTIVE ON THE ALLIANCE

Note: bold questions are required, non-bolded are suggested follow up questions

1. Alliance History: How did the alliance happen and who was involved?
 - 1.1. **What was the origin of the alliance? Where did the idea come from?**
 - 1.2. Who were the partners, how were they selected, and what did each contribute? How has this changed over time?
 - 1.3. **Who was responsible for bringing together the alliance and moving it forward? What was the role of local groups or individuals in moving it forward and planning for the alliance?**
 - 1.4. Is this alliance different than the way you normally operate? If so, how is it different?
 - 1.5. Do you know why the GDA model was used for this particular project and not another mechanism?
 - 1.6. What were the key issues or questions that had to be addressed to get this alliance off the ground, and how were these specifically addressed? What were the key factors in helping it to gain traction?
 - 1.7. Please describe the planning for the alliance that occurred, both at an individual partner level and at the partnership/group level.

2. Alliance Execution: How did it work?
 - 2.1. What resources did USAID contribute? Money? Staff time? Other resources (e.g., networks and knowledge transfer)? How did this compare to the contributions of the other partners?
 - 2.2. What were the most important additional costs (transaction costs, management time, etc.) that were incurred over the course of the alliance (or thus far)? How do these costs compare with non-GDA projects that your organization is involved with?
 - 2.3. How was management for the alliance handled? Who did (or does) what? Did these people change over time, and if so how did this affect the project?
 - 2.4. **Did the alliance have local support or leadership?**
 - 2.5. **Were goals determined from the outset? Did these goals influence the management of the project? Who determined the goals?**
 - 2.6. **Did the alliance maintain momentum? Was there follow through on what had been planned?**
 - 2.7. What sorts of tools were used to facilitate the work of the alliance and how were the activities monitored?
 - 2.8. What were main activities of the alliance?
 - 2.9. Where there important changes in how the alliance was executed once it got started?
 - 2.10. What external influences on the program do we have to be aware of in order to understand what happened?
 - 2.11. Were there any unexpected outcomes?

3. Alliance Impact: What were the outcomes of the alliance?
 - 3.1. **What were the goals of the partnership – both in terms of addressing a development problem and contributing to business goals?**
 - 3.2. **Were the goals in both areas met?**
 - 3.3. **What sort of evidence about impact was gathered? Can you describe the evidence, or direct us to it?**
 - 3.4. What worked about the evaluation approach? What practices or advice do you think would be good to share with other alliances?
 - 3.5. Are there any particular metrics that you tracked that you felt were very useful – either for the management of the alliance or for demonstrating impact?
 - 3.6. Was the Alliance able to establish a cooperative relationship with all the key stakeholders?
 - 3.7. **In your view, are the development achievements of the alliance sustainable? What role did building local capacity play in this?**
 - 3.8. What unanticipated outcomes or impacts has the alliance created?
 - 3.9. **On balance, in your personal view, has the alliance created a development outcome or impact greater than if the GDA model had not been used?**
 - 3.10. Would you recommend this model or approach for future projects? Have you done others since?
 - 3.11. **What matters most in making these alliances work (or not work)?**
 - 3.12. What are the key challenges ahead (for what? For this alliance, in particular? For others, in general?) What is needed to effectively address these?
 - 3.13. **Based on your experience with the alliance, what would you do differently next time?**
 - 3.14. What do you feel you have learned from the experience?

ANNEX 4

GDA SURVEY

Thank you for taking the time to complete this brief survey. This survey is part of an independent evaluation commissioned by the Global Development Alliance (GDA) to help develop a framework for future assessment of the GDA model and alliance outcomes. Your feedback and comments are greatly appreciated. All answers are confidential.

The GDA Evaluation Design Team

1. Where do you work?

- USAID
- USAID contractor
- Private sector
- Other (please specify) _____

2. What is your experience with GDA alliances? (Check all that apply)

- I have been directly involved in a GDA partnership
- I have undergone GDA training
- I have had some indirect involvement in a GDA partnership
- I have no experience with GDA partnerships at all

3. If you had a direct experience with GDAs, what role did you play?

- Chief Contracts Officer (or CTO)
- Chief of Party (or COP)
- Role with lead implementer/contractor/subcontractor (please specify)
- Role with business partner (please specify)
- Role with group representing the intended beneficiaries of a GDA (please specify)
- Other role within USAID (please specify)
- Other (please specify)

4. In general, how effective do you think GDA partnerships are at accomplishing their intended development goals?

5. What, if any, is the “comparative advantage” of using GDA partnerships to achieve development goals rather than some other model or approach?
6. What are the most important factors in making GDAs work? (Please specify up to three.)
7. What are the most important challenges or barriers that must be overcome to design and implement GDAs? (Please specify up to three)
8. Looking forward, what key changes or additions to GDA/ USAID policies and practices might best be made to improve the likely impact of GDA partnerships? (Please specify up to three, in order of importance)
9. What specific steps or actions might improve the quality of documentation and evidence about impact of GDAs? Can you name an especially good example of using documentation or evidence to describe the impact of a particular GDA?
10. Based on your experience, how would you describe your interest in, or willingness to be, directly involved with GDAs in the future?
 1. Very interested
 2. Somewhat Interested
 3. Somewhat uninterested
 4. Very Uninterested
11. Do you have any additional comments/concerns or suggestions to improve GDAs?

Thank you very much for time and thoughts.

ANNEX 5

ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH INTERVIEWEES

Note: Names have been withheld in order to preserve anonymity. Parentheses indicate number of people spoken to in each organization

USAID

Bureaus:

ANE (1)
EGAT (3)
ODP/PSA (GDA) (6)

Missions:

Angola (1)
Central America Regional mission (5)
Egypt (1)
Ghana (1)
Morocco (5)
Nicaragua (1)
Nigeria (3)
Philippines (1)
South Africa (1)

COMPANIES

Alcatel-Lucent (1)
Buenaventura Mining Company (1)
Chevron Corporation (2)
Chiquita (1)
Cisco (3)
Gap (2)

GE Foundation (1)
Microsoft (1)
Nestlé (1)
Oracle Education Foundation (2)
Pfizer (1)
Procter & Gamble (3)
Synergy Strategy Group (1)
The Coca Cola Company (1)
Timberland (1)
Vodafone Egypt (1)
Wal-Mart (1)

OTHER ALLIANCE PARTNERS

AFEM Morocco (1)
Al-Jisr Foundation Morocco (1)
Casablanca Regional Academy, Morocco (1)
Development Alternatives, Inc. (5)
Hassan II University, Morocco (1)
International Youth Foundation (5)
L'Heure Joyeuse Morocco (1)
Lycée Technique Salé, Morocco (3)
Moroccan-American Chamber of Commerce, Morocco (1)
Rainforest Alliance (1)
RTI International (2)
Technoserve (2)
UNIFEM (2)
USCL, El Salvador (2)

OTHER

Acumen Fund (2)
Aspen Institute (3)
Dalberg (1)
Danish International Development Assistance (Danida) (1)
Department for International Development, UK (DFID) (1)
European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) (1)
European Foundation Centre/ EU Centre on Development Research (1)
Institute for Development Studies (IDS), University of Sussex, UK (1)
International Development Research Centre, Canada (IDRC) (1)
Local Initiatives Support Corporation (1)
Rockefeller Philanthropic Advisors (1)
UNDP (1)
World Bank (1)
Ex-USAID Staff (7)
Independent Evaluators (4)
Large, new Family Foundation (with International Development Priority) (1)

ANNEX 6

INDICATORS THAT WORK

The following indicators are intended to provide examples of the types of indicators that businesses have found helpful – either for measuring or for communicating the impact of their development projects. These indicators are project specific and are not necessarily intended for broad use.

Examples of business indicators that are in use and work:

- HERproject, Business for Social Responsibility: Measuring impact of worker education programs (rights, health) in a factory setting:
 - Employee Absenteeism (# of Days, Numbers of Employees)
 - Staff Turnover (# of Days, Numbers of Employees)
 - Productivity (Projected, Per Employee Per Day)
 - Net Profit (Change based on Productivity)
 - Worker Satisfaction with Employer
- Technoserve: Measuring impact from projects that focus on building SMEs
 - Sales YTD (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
 - Net Profit (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
 - Number of Producers (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
 - Number of Employees (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
 - Wages YTD (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
 - Cost of Assistance (Projected, Actual, Variance %)
- Chevron API indicators
 - Total value of loans granted to SMEs
 - Number of supported SMEs that access bank loans
 - Number of supported SMEs that demonstrate an expansion of institutional capacity
 - Number of government officials trained

- Number of government representatives that have improved their organizational capacities due to the program
- Institutions that have their capacities and quality of services provided
- Number of commercially beneficial links and contracts between farmers, input suppliers, distributors and retailers
- Improvement of SME capacity to access the market
- Mining Company capacity building program:
 - Impact of the program on “informal” employment or “informal” use of skills: % of students that have contributed to the social fabric with their new technical skills (for example, making home improvements or starting a small neighborhood business). Even though the participants in the electricity course may not have gotten jobs as electricians, they might start their own neighborhood business or apply those skills to improving their homes. [This points to broader, less formal benefits that are worth trying to capture with indicators because they are more immediate and often more common than “formal” indicators of development.]
- Buenaventura Mining Company: Economic Services Center
 - Sales
 - Number of permanent jobs created
 - Amount of local investment

ANNEX 7

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT ALLIANCE EVALUATION FRAMEWORK

Sustain ability Issues and Opportuni- ties		
Long-Term Outcomes/ Indicators (5+ years)		
Inter- mediate Outcomes/ Indicators (2-3 years)		
Short-Term Outcomes/ Indicators (1 year)		
Grants/ Other Actions	What spe- cifically will be done to support the work?	
Imple- mentation Strategy	Who will do it? How will it be done?	
Primary Com- ponents	What will be done?	
Target Populations	Intended Beneficiaries	
Key Partners		
Core Alliance Goals		Development Goals Business Goals

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