

REVIEW OF THE AFGHAN REFUGEE FEEDING PROGRAM

October 29 - November 19, 1982

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Introduction and Overview

Afghans in Pakistan constitute the largest refugee population in the world today. Government of Pakistan figures show a total of 2.7 million people registered and eligible for assistance in refugee villages, including 2.1 million in the Northwest Frontier Province and 629,000 in Baluchistan as of mid-October, 1982.

U.S. assistance is provided as a part of a massive international relief effort coordinated by the UNHCR or, in the case of the specific food commodities supplied by the U.S., by the World Food Program (WFP) acting as the UNHCR's operating arm. To date, the U.S. has provided close to \$140 million in the form of wheat, edible oil and dried skim milk (DSM) for food aid including ocean transportation, approximately half of the total of all such aid to the Afghan refugees. In FY 1982 alone, the U.S. contributed over 233,000 metric tons of these commodities, valued at \$65.9 million including ocean freight, through the WFP. Food commodities, while only one component of the total Afghan relief effort, comprise a major element of fundamental importance to the success of that effort, with a cost exceeding that of the entire UNHCR budget for the program.

Since the beginning of the Afghan relief effort, the food component of the program has been periodically reviewed during inspection and monitoring visits by WFP/Rome staff, State/RP representatives and a State/IG team. However, this was the first team from AID/Washington with the specific purpose of assessing the status, operational aspects and needs of the program. Team members were Robert Pooley, Deputy Chief of the Title II Program of the FVA Bureau's Office of Food for Peace; Louis Stamberg, Deputy Chief of the FVA Bureau's Office of Program, Policy and Evaluation, and Vicky Kunkle, Assistant Pakistan Desk Officer in the Asia Bureau.

In preparation for its work, the team reviewed Afghan refugee files and reports of prior State and WFP monitoring visits, as well as meeting with officers in State/RP and State/NEA with oversight or reporting responsibilities involving Afghan refugees. Prior to its arrival in Pakistan, the team consulted in Rome with the Director and staff of the Project Management Division of the World Food Program, which bears overall responsibility for coordination and support of refugee food assistance. The team spent approximately two and one half weeks in Pakistan, meeting with Pakistani, AID, Embassy, WFP, UNHCR, Volag and other donor officials with refugee related responsibilities at both the national and provincial level. Extensive field travel included visits to refugee villages at varying stages of development in the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan and review of refugee-related operations at the Port of Karachi, where commodities are received and dispatched in-country. After debriefings in Islamabad with the Embassy, AID Mission, WFP, UNHCR and GOP, the team returned to Rome for final discussions with WFP of its findings and observations.

The team was accompanied throughout its visit to Pakistan by Tariq Durrani, USAID Liaison officer in Peshawar, who has principal responsibility within AID for operational level monitoring of the U.S. food contribution and by William McKinney of the USAID Program Office. Their support was outstanding in all respects. The team also received invaluable cooperation from officers of the World Food Program in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta. The team's full itinerary is contained in Appendix A.

The report that follows is organized to include discussion of all major aspects of the Afghan refugee relief effort that bear on the U.S.-supported food component. To facilitate understanding of the context in which the program operates, we have sought to describe the mechanisms and systems through which the program is carried out and monitored, as well as presenting the team's observations, suggestions and recommendations.

As a preface to this report, the team wishes to emphasize its basic conclusion that the Afghan refugee program has been an indisputable success in achieving its fundamental goals. Food supplies are reaching the refugee population. Observational data and sample surveys indicate that the nutritional status of the refugees is generally satisfactory, comparable in any event to that of the rural Afghan and Pakistani population. There has been no known starvation and the incidence of severe malnutrition appears to be low. Moreover, the availability of food has been a major element enabling the GOP to keep within reasonable limits the tensions and conflicts inherent in a potentially highly volatile situation. This is a remarkable accomplishment when one contemplates the sheer magnitude of the refugee influx, the severe pressures this has created on Pakistan's land and water resources, and the assertiveness with which the Afghan refugees pursue their entitlements and express their needs.

The team also was impressed with the World Food Program's role as coordinator, monitor and advisor in matters relating to the food aid program - a role that is fundamental to maintaining the international character of the Afghan relief effort. The importance of continued U.S. support of the WFP in this regard, both directly and in coordination with other members of the donor community, cannot be overstated.

As would be expected in an undertaking of this magnitude, the feeding program is not without issues. As discussed below, they include most importantly the need for longer-range planning and strengthened donor coordination of food inputs to avoid supply disruptions and the human and financial burdens this creates; the need to assure that planning levels for commodity inputs are reasonably related to refugee numbers and needs; the need to assure that systems are adequate for the identification, assessment and interpretation of inevitable problems involving malpractice and loss; and the need to assure the continued commitment of the refugee administration to deal effectively with these matters when they come to light.

The seriousness with which these issues should be viewed and the extent to which they are amenable to resolution are largely matters of degree and informed judgement. The complex social and political environment in which this program is being carried out does not lend itself to absolutes. Progress is incremental, requiring steady, concerted and consistent attention on the part of the WFP, UNHCR and the donor countries, working closely with the GOP.

Underlying any analysis of the refugee program is the fundamental imperative of maintaining program credibility to ensure the continuation of strong international support. The continued, if diminished, flow of refugees; the GOP's strongly held position that the refugees must be viewed as temporary residents pending their return to Afghanistan; and the possibility that such a return may be long-distant - all of these factors support the likelihood that assistance will be required in substantial magnitude for the foreseeable future. Moreover, the linkage between an effective, credible refugee assistance program and the maintenance of an environment conducive to economic development cannot be overlooked in assessing the priority of the Afghan relief effort.

GOP Administrative Structure and Role

The Pakistan Government bears full operational responsibility for carrying out the Afghan refugee relief program. With respect specifically to U.S.-contributed food, the GOP assumes responsibility with the offloading of the commodities in the Port of Karachi. Within the Federal Government of Pakistan, the States and Frontier Regions Division (SAFRON) has overall responsibility for assistance to Afghan refugees, determining general policy and acting as counterpart to the UNHCR, WFP, other UN agencies and private voluntary organizations. With the increasing influx of refugees, the GOP in 1979 established a separate structure in SAFRON for management and administration of the refugee program, the Office of the Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees. This Department has a vertical organizational structure extending from the Chief Commissioner's Office in Islamabad to Provincial Commissioners in Peshawar and Quetta, through District or Tribal Agency Administrators to Area (multi-village) Administrators and, finally, to the Administrator of each refugee village (officially called "Refugee Tentage Villages").

In mid-October, the GOP reported a total of 342 refugee villages, including 60 in Baluchistan (with a reported registered population of 629,000) and 282 in Northwest Frontier Province (with a reported registered population of 2.1 million). At the time of the team's visit, the GOP had closed Northwest Frontier Province to further registration, with limited exceptions, and indicated its intention to begin to settle refugees in the Punjab, reflecting the assessment that the absorptive capacity of the NWFP has been reached. This is a decision of substantial import since it is the first time that camps for the primarily Pathan (Pashtun) refugees will be established outside Baluchistan and the predominantly Pathan Northwest Frontier Province, in which ethnic and linguistic ties have been

a major factor in explaining the hospitality and tolerance with which the refugees have been accepted by the local populace.

Refugee villages are administrative units theoretically comprising approximately 5,000 inhabitants but not uncommonly having a population of 10,000 or more. In some areas, multiple village units are grouped closely together. The population of one such grouping visited by the team in Mardan District of NWFP was said to exceed 150,000.

The full Pakistani staff complement of a refugee village totals up to 20, including administrative personnel, health and teaching staff. Separate registers are maintained to record population and commodity distribution for each village. Registration cards are issued to each family head including his photograph, a list of family members, commodities issued monthly and other assistance provided. Appendix H contains organizational charts and staffing patterns for refugee administration.

A Handbook prepared for the Commissioner's office outlines prescribed procedures for the refugee program. While organizational patterns and administrative procedures are fully articulated, the consistency, accuracy and effectiveness with which they are applied differs substantially, depending in large part on factors such as whether the village is newly or well-established; the efficiency, honesty, and stability of the staff, which is often young, inexperienced, underpaid, and works under exceedingly difficult conditions; and the tribal and political composition of the villages and their leadership. In physical and organizational terms, village patterns range from those approximating the administrative model closely in concentration of population, staff and facilities; to those with widely dispersed population; to "ghost camps" which serve essentially as a place for collection of rations. Moreover, in some of the better locations, a majority of residents move to cooler areas during the summer, returning or sending representatives back to the village only for their rations.

The refugee administration staff is said to total over 9,000, the costs of which -- an estimated \$7.5 million per year--are reimbursed by the UNHCR. While the quality of the staff varies at the local level, the team was impressed with the evident competence and commitment of the refugee administration leadership in both NWFP and Baluchistan. In each case, the incumbent Commissioner appears to be exercising a major role in improving the effectiveness and honesty with which the relief program is conducted -- a role requiring dedication, skill and, not infrequently, professional and personal courage.

The GOP estimates that it will contribute the equivalent of \$238 million to direct support of Afghan relief during its current fiscal year, over 40 percent of the total program costs. Whatever the precise cost, the burden on Pakistani resources is substantial. The GOP considers its responsibility for payment of all internal transportation costs (which GOP officials estimate at \$70-\$80

million per year) to be especially onerous. The financial strain of these costs and the belief that donors should help share them were recurrent GOP themes throughout the team's visit. The UNHCR, which has been the principal focus of the GOP's requests for assistance has chosen not to respond for reasons of both of magnitude and accountability. It is clear, however, that in some instances (the team is aware of cases in Baluchistan in particular) a GOP failure to provide funds has necessitated payment by the refugees themselves of the cost of transporting commodities from district terminals or warehouses to the camps. The recent provision of trucks by several donors (including 250 vehicles provided through a direct \$8 million grant by State/RP) to the Army's National Logistic Cell, which has assumed major transport responsibility, should alleviate the situation but the overall problem undoubtedly will remain. While the team is not in a position to make a recommendation on internal transport costs, a first step - were this matter to be pursued - would be the development of more reliable data than any of the parties now have in hand.

In addition to internal transportation, the GOP also bears heavy direct and indirect costs related to staff time, use of transport infrastructure, depletion of water resources, deforestation (a particularly severe problem) and provision of education and health care. The GOP also nominally provides a monthly cash allowance of 50 rupees (approximately \$4) per registered refugee up to a current family maximum of \$350. In reality, this cash distribution is highly erratic, perhaps 2 or 3 times a year. In newly-established camps, supplemental income would be expected to be of substantial importance; to the varied and limited extent that other sources of income are available to refugee villagers, the need would be lessened. To date, the irregularity of the allowance does not appear to have had a seriously detrimental effect on the relief program.

International Organization Roles

Most U.S. assistance for the Afghan refugees is provided through international organizations, principally the UNHCR and in the case of food aid, the WFP. This is consistent with the strong U.S. policy emphasis on the shared responsibility of the international community for refugee relief. The UNHCR is the lead agency, providing for the full range of non-food support including tents, metal roofing, quilts, clothing, storage facilities and kerosene for fuel, as well as financing the sugar and tea portion of the refugee ration "package." UNHCR staff, based in Islamabad, Peshawar and Quetta, totals 95 employees including 29 expatriates. For FY 1982, the UNHCR budget exceeded \$80 million including food commodities, with a slightly lower total projected for FY 1983. By agreement with the UNHCR, the WFP plays the principal international agency role with respect to food assistance. These organizations serve as suppliers, coordinators and monitors of refugee assistance as opposed to operational agencies, the role assumed by the GOP itself, although a fine line of distinction often exists between the two.

While U.S.-provided food commodities, and hence the operations of the WFP, provided the principal focal point for the visit, the team noted -- with regard to UNHCR-supported assistance--what appeared to be a serious shortage of tents in some camps, even though baked-mud dwellings are now prevalent in most of the established refugee villages, particularly those located on government-owned land. For those camps affected, this shortage was a matter of substantial concern with the approach of winter. The team hopes that the UNHCR will take all possible steps to minimize whatever logistical or quality problems contribute to this shortage. The team also noted some irregularity in the distribution of UNHCR-financed tea and sugar similar to that for the edible oil and DSM provided through the WFP. Presumably, these problems would similarly benefit from strengthened planning and coordination.

The WFP staff in Pakistan totals 20 professionals--both expatriate and Pakistani--12 of whom are involved in refugee affairs. WFP's chief officer in Pakistan, a Frenchman with long WFP experience, is based in Islamabad and bears responsibility at the central level for Afghan food relief, assisted principally by two other expatriates. In Peshawar, an energetic and highly effective Philippine national heads the provincial sub-office. His staff includes a UN volunteer and four Pakistani field officers plus support personnel. An additional expatriate staff member, a nutritionist, is expected shortly. The size of the Peshawar staff has increased relatively steadily since 1980. In Quetta, the current head of the provincial sub-office, a Frenchman, arrived earlier in 1982. A demographer and mathematician who served previously with the UN in Afghanistan, he impressed the team as well-suited to the rigors and challenges of the refugee environment of Baluchistan. His staff includes a UN volunteer and two Pakistani field officers as well as support personnel. The WFP also maintains a small office in Karachi.

The team was favorably impressed with both the staff and the operations of the WFP, particularly bearing in mind the difficult and sensitive context in which they carry out their responsibilities. The energy and esprit with which the provincial field staffs carry out their work was especially noteworthy.

From a logistic standpoint, the major need noted by the team was for two replacement vehicles for the Peshawar sub-office, which has only four dependable vehicles at present, seriously hampering its operations. The team encourages WFP/Rome to respond to this basic requirement without delay. With respect to the number of personnel, the Chief of WFP's head office in Islamabad expressed the conviction that existing staff is adequate. The team noted, however, that some consideration was being given to the possible need for an additional professional in Quetta to strengthen WFP's capacity to verify GOP-supplied data. Given the monitoring challenges in Baluchistan, the team hopes the WFP will give careful thought to the potential benefits of such a position.

While tensions have existed between the two principal UN agencies in the past, the relationship at the time of the team's visit appeared to be collaborative and, to most appearances, mutually supportive at federal and provincial levels. In both Peshawar and Quetta the UNHCR and WFP sub-offices share the same building or compound facilitating their coordination and interaction. The cost to the WFP of maintaining this close proximity is a severe lack of office space in each case, although plans are now on the drawing board for expansion of facilities in Quetta. The team hopes that WFP/Rome will stress to the UNHCR the need for rapid provision of adequate additional office space in both locations.

Donor Coordination

The "lead entity" designation in the United Nations system, which in the case of the Afghan refugees names UNHCR as the lead agency, has resulted in some confusion as to which agency -- UNHCR or WFP -- has the primary responsibility for issuing international appeals for food aid in emergency situations. International appeals on behalf of the Afghan refugees for food assistance were issued by the UN Secretary-General and the FAO Director-General only in the early days of this relief operation and no general appeals have been issued in recent years. However, as the World Food Program is enjoined in its General Regulations to "seek to ensure coordination of emergency food assistance", WFP does have the responsibility to ensure that emergency food, both multilateral and bilateral, is effectively coordinated at the international level and that food aid is properly integrated with other components of the international relief system.

In most emergency operations, WFP views its role at the international level as a clearing house and provides certain operational services. It makes information available to actual or potential donors on met and unmet needs, on shipping plans, port conditions, and on the progress of the operation. It also maintains informal contact at both field and headquarter levels with various emergency units of governmental and nongovernmental donors. While WFP is carrying out most of these functions, the team did conclude that there is a need to improve the organizational framework for coordination as well as the flow of information to donors. One indicator of this need has been the erratic delivery in the past of edible oil and DSM supplies. While the team's visit coincided with a full pipeline for both commodities, this has, for the most part, been the exception rather than the rule. Camp records uniformly showed gaps sometimes as long as 4-6 months in receipt of these commodities.

Because wheat is provided to the camps from GOP provincial stocks on a replenishment basis, supply disruptions of this basic commodity have been far less frequent. However, an important related consequence of disruptions in donor deliveries, which WFP and the donors need to bear in mind, is the additional expense incurred by the provincial governments when delivery of wheat by the international community is delayed. When donor replenishment falls short of

refugee needs, the provincial government must utilize local bank credits to finance procurement of supplies from Food Department reserves. The availability of such credit for provincial government use is limited and requires repayment at the prevailing rates. Consequently, the GOP must eventually absorb these additional costs. The team, therefore, strongly recommends that WFP make every effort to ensure that donor pledges of wheat keep pace with agreed requirements and that the arrival of internationally-supplied wheat be at a rate greater than the distribution offtake.

The team was informed that in the early stages of this relief operation, the UNDP Resident Representative in Islamabad chaired meetings with donor representatives to solicit aid and to coordinate efforts. After the initial phase was completed and relief supplies began to flow more routinely, the meetings were discontinued. The team does not believe that these meetings need to be reconvened on a formal regularized basis. However, there is still a need which the team believes the WFP Representative should fulfill by meeting with donor representatives at an operational level on an ad hoc basis to review operations, exchange information and discuss requirements.

The USG, through USAID/Islamabad and FODAG/Rome, has had access to the monthly situation reports prepared by WFP. It was not clear to the team if other donors were receiving this report. If not, the team suggests that WFP provide it to other major or potential donors. The report provides basic data on refugee numbers, pledges, distributions, stock positions and food shortfalls. However, it can be improved in several areas. Food requirements and estimated deficits are calculated on a six-month basis. On the other hand, donors face complicated and time-consuming procedures in making commodities available and need greater lead time for long term planning purposes. Therefore, the team suggests that WFP revise the situation report so that the estimate of food requirements/shortfalls covers needs for the succeeding 12-month period. In order to avoid port congestion and transport bottlenecks, additional information also should be included in the situation report indicating when the needed commodities should arrive in country. This will provide an improved basis for forward supply management and stock pre-positioning.

Within WFP in Rome, the planning and supervisory responsibility for emergency relief operations rests with the Emergency Unit, which is a part of the Project Management Division (WPM). However, another office, the Resource Management Division (WPR), through its donor contacts, is responsible for seeking donor contributions and arranging or coordinating food shipments. The team noted there appeared to be a lack of clarity as to the division of responsibilities between the Emergency Unit and the Resource Management Division vis-a-vis liaison with the donor community. It was not clear which of these two offices was responsible for following up on the situation reports, contacting donors for additional contributions and coordinating shipment schedules. During its exit conference, the team discussed this situation in detail with the Director of

WPM, who was already aware of the problem and was exploring the possibility of setting up a WPM/WPR working group to review Afghan refugee relief operations and define functional responsibilities. The team believes strongly that the establishment of such an internal working group is essential to the efficiency of the relief operation and will be an important factor in improving coordination with the donor community.

The team noted the large number of referrals prepared by WFP to the Director-General of FAO, seeking his approval each time a new pledge to the Afghan relief project has been announced. This has necessitated approval of 21 separate expansions to date. These referrals consume a large amount of staff time, generate a large quantity of paper work and can occasionally delay the issuance of commodity call-forwards. While this procedure is appropriate in more traditional "short-term" emergency situations, it would seem more practical, in long-term operations such as the Afghan refugee relief program, for WFP to seek a blanket authorization from the Director-General covering requirements for a more extended period.

Since most of the major donor countries are represented in Rome, the team recommends that informal meetings be held periodically by WFP with these representatives to keep them advised on relevant aspects of the relief operations and to seek their governments' support for meeting the long-term food needs.

Since effective donor coordination is a central element in the success of this relief operation, the team makes the following specific recommendations:

- WFP and UNHCR, either through periodic international appeals or other means, need to insure that the international community is kept fully aware of the continuing need for assistance to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.
- The WFP field representative should meet more often on an ad hoc basis with representatives from the donor countries to keep them advised of developments involving the Afghan refugee relief program and of projected food needs.
- The WFP Situation Report should be distributed to all major or potential donors. The report should be revised to include information on food requirements projected for the succeeding 12 months as well as proposed shipping arrival times.
- WFP should seek approval of a blanket authorization from the FAO Director-General covering at least a six-month food requirement.
- A WPM/WPR working group should be established within WFP to review the relief operation, define functional responsibilities, and improve the coordination with the donor countries.

U.S. Role

From the standpoint of U.S. interests, the Embassy in Islamabad has overall responsibility for monitoring the Afghan refugee program including UNHCR, WFP and PVO roles. In early 1982, a report by a team from the State Department Inspector General's Office drew attention to a lack of clarity in delineating refugee-related roles and responsibilities within the U.S. Mission. In response, a position of Counselor for Refugee Affairs was created within the Embassy to provide a focal point within the U.S. Mission for all refugee-related matters. The incumbent of this new position, a State Department officer who arrived at post not long before the Food for Peace team's visit, possesses substantial area experience but does not have specific background in refugee or Food for Peace activities.

Within the AID Mission, the Deputy Director and the Program Officer have been the principal officers involved at the Islamabad level in matters of concern to AID with respect to Afghan refugees. The Chief of USAID's Liaison Office in Peshawar has principal field responsibility within AID for monitoring USAID interests in Afghan refugee relief operations in both Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan. An exceedingly competent and knowledgeable Pakistani professional, he works closely with the WFP staff and has been the AID officer most heavily and directly engaged in refugee-related matters. His reporting has constituted the major element enabling the Mission to maintain its currency on refugee developments, problems and needs, particularly with respect to the food program.

During its visit, the team received the impression that the Counselor for Refugee Affairs will be more involved in political aspects of the refugee situation than those aspects bearing on program implementation, particularly with regard to the food aid program. AID's statutory responsibilities for U.S. food aid were more than once drawn to the team's attention. At the same time, the heavy burden of planning and carrying out the rapidly expanding U.S. economic assistance program has created competing demands of high priority on the thinly stretched USAID staff. As a result, the Mission welcomed the establishment of the Refugee Counselor position and has expressed the desire that the Embassy, through the Office of the Refugee Counselor, shoulder as much of the refugee-related workload as possible. The rapidly increasing workload of the economic assistance program also has had a marked impact in reducing the time available to the Chief of the Peshawar Liaison Office for matters related to food aid. The team was told that while the Liaison Officer had earlier devoted approximately 50 to 60 percent of his time to the refugee program, this had been reduced to perhaps 15 percent over the course of the past year. During October alone, the team noted that the small Liaison Office staff was called upon to backstop 13 separate teams or visitors, most of them on project-planning and design-related TDYs.

Given the magnitude and complexity of the food aid program, the importance of maintaining its credibility through careful monitoring and follow-up, and the probable link between its continued

success and an environment amenable to implementation of the U.S. economic assistance program, the team believes that more active U.S. attention is essential in support of, and close cooperation with, the WFP, UNHCR and other donors. With specific regard to food aid, the team concluded that there were staffing implications at both the national and provincial level. In Islamabad, the team believes the existing need can be met either through augmentation of the Refugee Counselor's staff or through strengthening the oversight capacity of the USAID. The role to be played has two separate but closely related aspects: (1) assuring at the executive leadership level an awareness of and attention to food-related problems and policy issues involving the GOP, UN and donor community; and (2) assuring the capacity and expertise to analyze and interpret issues of operational concern involving coordination and administration of the food program, through close continuing contact with WFP, GOP and other donors.

As one possible approach to meeting this need, the team suggests exploration of the feasibility of assigning an AID-experienced officer, preferably with some background in food aid programs, by secondment to the Office of the Counselor for Refugee Affairs. Funding for such a position could be sought from State/RP. If this course of action were to be pursued, care would have to be taken to assure that close channels of communication were maintained with the AID officers in both Islamabad and Peshawar who exercise operational functions involving food-related aspects of the refugee program. The second option would involve a decision on the part of the AID Mission to devote increased staff time to matters relating to the food aid program. This would entail either an adjustment of responsibilities among existing staff to heighten refugee program priority or, as a likely more feasible alternative, creation of a new AID position to meet this need. With a spirit of cooperation by all concerned, the team is convinced that either option would be effective in serving U.S. interests.

At the provincial level, two steps have recently been taken which should significantly help in making available more adequate staff time for refugee-related matters. A Pakistani professional has been hired to serve as deputy to the Chief of the Peshawar Liaison Office. Given the Liaison Officer's unrivaled knowledge of the refugee program, the team believes it essential that responsibilities between him and his assistant be allocated so as to preserve at least 50 percent of his time for refugee affairs. While the team was in Pakistan, the Mission received GOP clearance permitting the Pakistani professional in the USAID Liaison Office in Quetta to play a more active role in monitoring the food program in Baluchistan in cooperation with WFP. Working under the supervision of the Peshawar Liaison Officer, he will spend at least half of his time on refugee matters. This should be satisfactory but, given the challenge of the Baluchistan environment, the Mission will need to continue to monitor its adequacy.

With respect to responsibilities in Washington, the team notes the importance of sustained oversight and hopes that State/RP will

continue to give priority to assuring full-time responsibility for the Afghan program by an RP professional. Lastly, the team recommends an annual visit by one or two persons from the FVA Bureau, perhaps in conjunction with RP, as a follow-up to this first Food for Peace review.

Reporting and Monitoring Systems

The team devoted considerable attention to reporting and monitoring systems at all levels, from Karachi through intermediate provincial and district points leading ultimately to the refugee village. Its conclusion is that required information is generally available and reporting systems in place, on both the GOP and WFP sides, to enable effective program monitoring.

The GOP hierarchy produces a large volume of data on the status of most major aspects of the refugee program, including monthly reports on registration and food distribution on a village by village basis. The WFP, utilizing this data along with the observations and reports of its own staff, translates this information into reports every four to six weeks which assess program status and identify future requirements. These reports, prepared by WFP/Islamabad and circulated by WFP/Rome, draw in turn on reports prepared by WFP Peshawar and Quetta based on field monitoring and GOP-provided data at the provincial level and below.

WFP staff monitors commodity distribution in several ways including comparison of GOP records and invoices for point of dispatch and point of receipt at various stages of the logistic system and testing the accuracy of recorded data against actual physical inventory at provincial, district and refugee village levels. Standardized reporting forms and formats are utilized by officers in both provinces in their field work and by the provincial sub-offices in reporting to WFP/Islamabad. Both provincial sub-offices have shown concern that formats be designed realistically for use under prevailing conditions. At the time of our visit, WFP/Peshawar had recently revised its format and was preparing to share its experience with WFP/Quetta. WFP's provincial staff spends the major part of its time in the field carrying out these various monitoring functions. Examples of the broad range of available GOP data and of GOP and WFP monitoring forms are attached at Appendices I, J and K.

The team concluded that the principal current priority, as related to reporting and monitoring systems, is for screening, analysis and interpretation of the information and data already available through existing systems and reports, in order to identify trends, issues, problems and requirements that warrant concern and follow-up. I.e., the major need is to assure that available information is assessed and utilized. As earlier noted, this is basic to the maintenance of program credibility and donor support. Given the magnitude of the U.S. contribution and our stake in the program's continued success, the team believes this function warrants more active U.S. attention in collaboration with and support of the

WFP. In large part, this need would be met through the staffing adjustments suggested in the preceding section.

A related need is for more clearly identified channels of communication with Washington concerning the refugee assistance program. The team observed that messages of concern often fail to reach all offices with program-related interests and responsibilities. As one procedural step, the team suggests that all communications concerning the program be directed explicitly to the attention of State/RP, the Office of Food for Peace in AID/FVA, and the AID and State Pakistan Desks.

Logistic System for Delivery of Commodities

Since the commencement of relief operations in January 1980, over 940,000 tons of food have been pledged of which over 800,000 tons have arrived in country. The quantum as well as origin of the commodities require a well coordinated external and internal delivery system. The main food donors as of November 15, 1982 are as follows:

<u>Country</u>	<u>Cumulative Pledges¹</u>	
	<u>(MT)</u>	<u>Quantity Percentage of total contributions</u>
United States	455,068	48.4
EEC	119,600	12.7
Australia	87,600	9.3
Canada	75,042	8.0
Germany	74,405	7.9
France	47,000	5.0
Japan	41,938	4.5
OPEC	16,000	1.7
United Kingdom	14,650	1.5
Turkey	3,828	0.4
Belguim	2,000	0.2
Switzerland	1,456	0.2
Norway	1,100	0.1
Kuwait	1,084	0.1
TOTAL	940,757	100.0

1. These figures are based on the three principal commodities (wheat, vegetable oil and milkpowder) for which WFP is responsible and do not include UNHCR purchase of sugar and tea.

The World Food Program is responsible for the arrangements and delivery of its own multilateral IEFER contributions as well as the monitoring of bilateral donations. Therefore, the WFP oversees both bilateral and multilateral shipments from the country of origin to the port of Karachi. As already discussed, this is particularly important as regards the orderly phasing of large food shipments to alleviate logistical problems at the port and to avoid straining the internal transport network.

The WFP field office in Karachi is responsible for confirming the adequacy of discharge and clearance facilities for all food shipments and intercedes with the appropriate authorities to ensure prompt discharge of commodities. The procedures followed by the WFP-appointed superintendent and forwarding agents for emergency relief supplies are similar to those followed with respect to regular WFP shipments. The GOP has been consistent in applying priority berthing rights to relief shipments; for only one relatively brief period of time did essential fertilizer supplies have priority over relief shipments.

The Government of Pakistan takes control of the commodities at Karachi and is responsible for inland transport, storage and distribution. After necessary formalities including custom clearance and verification, most of the supplies are transported to the Provincial Headquarters by rail and from there by arduous road journey to the over 300 distribution points.

The Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees has overall responsibility for the transportation of relief supplies. Some commodities like milkpowder and edible oil are physically transported from the port directly to the distribution centers. Wheat consignments, on the other hand, are funnelled through the GOP's Food Department pipeline, with part of the wheat remaining in Sind Province as replacement for government wheat made available to the refugees from Provincial stocks in NWFP and Baluchistan. The system of donor replenishment of wheat provided from GOP stocks has been effective in maintaining a generally steady flow of supplies to the refugees, in contrast to the disruptions experienced in delivery of edible oil and DSM, even though, as discussed above, it has resulted in a financial burden on the GOP when donor shipments have lagged behind GOP distribution needs. Moreover, for a number of reasons, including lack of storage facilities in Karachi and deficits of wheat in Baluchistan and NWFP, it is often necessary to move the wheat supplied from overseas directly up-country by train or trucks to the refugee camps.

While a few donors have provided direct contributions of sugar and tea, the bulk of the requirement for these two commodities is met through procurement by the UNHCR. Most of the sugar is purchased in Pakistan; the bulk of the tea is bought in Bangladesh. As these two commodities enter the logistic system, they are handled by WFP and GOP in the same manner as other commodities. As with oil and DSM, the team noted that there have been gaps in the distribution

of tea and sugar; more timely procurement by UNHCR would improve the distribution.

All commodities shipped by rail are at "owners risk" which means that no claims can be submitted against the railroads for losses. The alternative to this would be transporting the commodities at "railway risk" but GOP official indicated that the packaging specifications required under "railway risk", e.g., double bagging of wheat, double stitching, etc., would result in costs exceeding the value of losses encountered under "owner risk" transportation.

While, as previously mentioned, the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees and the GOP Food Department are responsible for transportation and storage of relief supplies, efforts are under way to phase-in the services of the GOP's National Logistic Cell (NLC) which has particular competence in the transport sector. Eventually, the NLC will provide most services from bulk delivery from the port to the camp level.

On an average 60 to 100 rail wagons are required to transport relief supplies from the port to the provinces but they are in perpetually short supply. At peak periods when large shipments arrive, up to 300 railway cars may be required creating a serious strain on the system. Occasionally, some of these cars have been side-railed and delayed, increasing the risk of infestation and commodity losses. The team wishes to emphasize the importance of the role of the WFP/Karachi office in intervening with the GOP concerning rail wagon allocation, as well as the need to constantly improve its tracking of wagons as they depart the port area.

Storage is tight all along the logistic network, but the GOP, UNHCR and WFP are trying to remedy the situation as possible and storage facilities are increasing. At the Karachi Port, only 10,000 MT of covered storage capacity is available to the Food Department and the bulk of the wheat, which on average is about 50,000 tons, is placed under tarpaulins in open storage areas. Storage facilities at Peshawar appear to be improving with the construction of new warehouses and the additional availability of binishells. Because storage is limited in Quetta, the province officials have sought to establish unloading facilities and temporary storage at points on the rail system as close to the camps as possible. However, some serious storage problems still remain at camp level and in some Districts where new settlements are under way. The GOP and WFP appear well aware of these problems and, with-in their limited means, are doing what they can to resolve them.

Health and Nutritional Status of Refugees

Insofar as the main objective of the Afghan relief program is to supply basic food needs of the refugees to prevent starvation, this objective has been fully met. The malnutrition rate is considered to be "normal" for such a group and may well be lower than that for Pakistan. Some health care, however rudimentary, is available to most of the refugees; in some cases health services are

undoubtedly better than those available to the local population. Epidemics have been avoided and the worst illnesses generally are given some treatment. Public sanitation reflects local standards. Nonetheless, child mortality and undernourishment are still high, and tuberculosis and gastro-intestinal diseases affect a large part of the refugee population.

A Health and Nutrition Survey, sponsored by UNHCR and carried out cooperatively with the GOP and the International Rescue Committee, had just been completed when the team finished its field work. This study was designed to provide an up-to-date source of information on key health and nutrition problems and related socio-economic factors affecting Afghan refugees. The survey covered 3% of families living in 15 camps in the Kohat District of the Northwest Frontier Province. 437 families (comprising 3,121 individuals, including 753 adult males, 737 adult females and 1,631 children) were interviewed on matters relating to health, dietary practices, water resources, sanitation education and income. Since the study was based on a small and geographically limited sample population, residing in a district where the level of services is probably atypically high (a district in which IRC assumes full health services responsibility), its findings may not be fully representative in important aspects. Nevertheless, it offers useful insights into the nutritional, health and income status of at least a portion of the refugee population and of the general living conditions that prevail. A comprehensive discussion of refugee conditions, drawing in significant part on this study, is contained in Appendix S.

Health care for the refugees has been developed by the GOP with the assistance of UNHCR and a number of voluntary agencies (volags). Over 310 static and mobile health units currently are operating in the refugee camps of NWFP and Baluchistan. Local hospitals are being assisted by UNHCR and volags to extend medical services to refugees requiring prolonged treatment and/or special consultation. Each health unit is intended theoretically to serve some 15,000 refugees; in practice, many serve double or triple that number. A basic medical team nominally consists of a doctor, a lady health visitor (LHV) and a compounder (dispenser of medicines) as well as para medical helpers such as a midwife and a malaria and sanitary inspector. In most cases, the medical teams are not fully staffed and, at times, only the dispenser is available. The practice of purdah prohibits women from being seen or treated by a male physician and female doctors and trained LHV's are in extremely short supply.

Among major health problems, tuberculosis is considered the most serious. One volag representative indicated that up to half of the women visiting his mobile health unit had TB. Respiratory and gastro-intestinal problems are frequent. Diarrhea is particularly serious in its effects on the children, reflecting unhygienic conditions and improper feeding habits. There appears to be a higher rate of malaria in the refugee camps than among the local population.

The UNHCR survey examined 313 children under 5 years of age and found that 24% suffered from some degree of malnutrition as measured on the weight for height classification, a figure considerably lower than the Pakistan national average for the same group. Second or third degree malnutrition was found among 13% of the refugee children in this group, as against a Pakistan average of 17%.

Refugee Numbers and the Relief Planning Base

While an estimated 400,000 Afghan refugees had entered Pakistan prior to the Russian intervention in late December 1979, the major influx began at that time with monthly increases of 50,000 to 100,000 not uncommon during 1980 and 1981 (see Appendix E). As of mid-October 1982, GOP-provided data showed a total of 2.737 million refugees registered in approximately 342 refugee villages, including 2.1 million in the Northwest Frontier Province and 629,000 in Baluchistan. These totals do not include those refugees who for a variety of reasons -- some by choice and others not -- have not been registered and hence are not eligible for relief supplies. Estimates of the current rate of inflow of new -- as opposed to newly-registered -- refugees vary, but the general consensus at the time of the team's visit was that the flow appears to have stabilized to a few thousand per month. More sizeable future inflows, should they occur, are likely to be sporadic and related to specific events in Afghanistan. Considering that perhaps 20 percent of Afghanistan's former population is now in refugee status, a relatively stable future trend seems likely.

Determination of the actual size of the refugee population in "refugee villages" (i.e., the number of people eligible for registration and hence for relief supplies) has been one of the most troublesome and perplexing aspects of the relief effort. The complexities are manifold. The normal difficulty of carrying out a census among the permanent resident population in developing countries is compounded by the social custom of purdah (seclusion of women). Moreover, the mobility of the refugees is unrestricted. Many leave their villages for cooler locations during the hottest months; others leave periodically to pursue economic or other interests.

Given the doubtful feasibility of a precise count and the general sensitivity of this issue, the donor community has sought not to address it directly. Yet, on the basis of the team's discussions, observations and review of past reports, there is little question that the registration figures are inflated, principally with respect to family size and through double or multiple registration. The issue is one of degree. Its significance is a function of the relationship which exists between the GOP figures and the planning base used by the WFP and UNHCR in calculating relief commodity requirements.

The basic approach utilized by the WFP in dealing with this issue consists of determining the amount of food necessary to keep the pipeline full based on monthly monitoring of GOP-supplied data on actual draw-downs. The planning base is a derived figure,

calculated by dividing the amount of wheat distributed, as reported by the GOP, by the prescribed adult ration. At the time of the team's visit, the WFP was utilizing a planning base of 2.2 million, approximately 20 percent below the number of registered refugees in GOP's reports. This planning level had remained unchanged since July, although the current calculation yielded a level of 2.3 million (the figure utilized by the UNHCR for its current planning purposes).

Informal estimates provided to the team by knowledgeable observers appear to support the conclusion that registration numbers are inflated by at least 25 percent in the Northwest Frontier Province, i.e., that the actual population probably does not exceed 1.6 million. Two specific examples cited to the team, in which re-enumeration exercises permitted reasonably reliable before and after comparison, yielded inflation rates of 29 percent and 40 percent. However, the team was not in a position to assess the representativeness of these samples: there appears to be substantial variation between individual villages and districts.

The team's impression is that the extent of inflation of refugee numbers is greater at present in Baluchistan than in the Northwest Frontier Province. This is not surprising, given its remoteness, its weak physical and administrative infrastructure and its complex social and ethnic makeup. The UNHCR, acknowledging that it may be conservative, has retained a 450,000 planning base in Baluchistan, 28.5 percent below the registered population reported at the end of October. While in Baluchistan, as in WFP, there appears to be considerable variation between individual camps, the team found a high degree of consensus among those familiar with program implementation that the degree of inflation was significant. One extreme example derived from a cooperative GOP/WFP enumeration exercise led to the conclusion that a camp's reported population of 23,000 was inflated by as much as 300 percent. The team noted that the GOP data for October 31 had not yet been corrected in this particular instance.

The problem of relating refugee registration numbers to actual food relief requirements is further complicated by two important factors. The first, which compounds the potential for oversupply and diversion, is that food requirements are calculated on the basis of an adult ration of each commodity, whereas children comprise over half of the refugee population. The second, which to date has served to ameliorate the effect of possible oversupply, is that logistic and distribution problems have reduced the actual provision of relief commodities well below programmed levels.

As noted elsewhere, delivery of edible oil and DSM has been irregular in the past, with extensive supply disruptions during most of 1982. WFP records indicate that commodities actually distributed generally have been only a portion of the full ("theoretical") entitlement. For the period January - September 1982, less than 30% of the oil and DSM entitlement was provided. Over the coming months, however, the supply situation will be much improved. The recent

arrival of large quantities of both commodities has created current stockpiles which should enable full supply beginning in late 1982 and sufficing for a major part of 1983. In the case of wheat, supply has been more consistent, although there have been periods of disruption particularly in Baluchistan. In NWFP, 99% of the wheat entitlement was provided during January - September 1982 as against 73% in Baluchistan (Appendix G provides "theoretical" and "actual" distribution data, by province, for each commodity during 1982). To the extent logistic problems have protected the donors against problems of oversupply, of course, they have by the same token deprived needy refugees of agreed rations. Moreover, to the extent external and internal logistic systems and coordination continue to improve, the effect of this "compensating" factor will decline.

The GOP, in cooperation with the UN agencies, has sought to arrive at more accurate numbers by undertaking "re-enumeration" in both the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan. In the Northwest Frontier, this effort led to a reduction of approximately 300,000 by April/May 1982 although new registrations kept the provincial total stable. Registration figures have remained relatively stable in recent months and will presumably continue to be so given the GOP decision to close further registration in most of the Province. In Baluchistan, the team was told that a re-enumeration was carried out with seriousness of purpose in the fall of 1981. In the months following, however, the figures rose again rapidly. Data at two of the camps the team visited showed curiously large increases in refugee recipients in the early months of 1982, in one case, consisting almost entirely of male children. The total reported level of registered refugees in Baluchistan increased from 431,000 in January 1982 to 558,000 in April and 646,000 in September, dropping in October to 629,000. In this connection, it is striking that Baluchistan alone accounted for the entire increase in reported refugee registrations in Pakistan during this period, according to GOP figures. (See Appendix F.)

While inflation of refugee numbers clearly exists, the current refugee administration leadership in both provinces appears genuinely committed to rectifying abuses that may result, at times to their own personal and professional risk. The Refugee Commissioner in Baluchistan has begun to implement a multi-faceted plan to address this issue. On occasion, food has been withheld from camps for their failure to "negotiate" more realistic numbers. This was the current situation in one camp at the time of the team's visit.

Given the context in which the Afghan refugee program is carried out, it is clear that problems related to refugee overcount do not lend themselves to rapid or final solution. Careful monitoring accompanied by discreet, persistent pressure is necessary to effect incremental improvement and assure, at minimum, that the dimensions of the problem do not exceed the point at which program credibility and support are at risk. For food donors such as the U.S., the

specific need is to assure a reasonable relationship between planning levels and actual population.

In addressing this matter, the team suggests:

- The feasibility of reducing the current family food ration should be explored, taking into account that children constitute the refugee majority.
- While a totally accurate count cannot be expected, the importance of active, continued re-enumeration efforts should be emphasized to the GOP by the donor community in concert with WFP and UNHCR.
- WFP should persist in its efforts, with strong donor support, to assure that the planning base for determining commodity requirements remains closely related to bona fide refugee needs.

Commodity Loss and Malpractice

Matters involving loss, damage, diversion and corruption must be viewed in the context of the magnitude and complexity of the Afghan relief effort, as well as the social context in which it operates. The question is one of defining acceptable limits. From the narrow perspective of concerns involving the specific PL 480 commodities the U.S. provides, U.S. interests differ somewhat as between wheat, on the one hand, and edible oil and DSM on the other. Since wheat for the refugees is released from GOP provincial reserves with donor replenishment of GOP stocks based on reported distribution, the U.S. and other donors do not bear the cost of losses or diversion between the Port of Karachi and the provinces. The issues involve local distribution. This is not the case with edible oil and DSM, where the commodities shipped by the donors are directly distributed to the refugee population. Regardless of this consideration, the team believes that to the extent problems exist, they are to be found principally at the local level, beyond the provincial capitals.

The decision earlier this year to ship edible oil in 55 gallon metal drums rather than the 3.5 kg. tin containers previously utilized has had a highly beneficial effect in reducing loss through damage, as well as decreasing the likelihood of tampering and resale. While the drums are bulky to handle and take a heavy beating throughout the logistic system, they seem to hold up well. Supporting the conclusion that losses are within reasonable range, the team was told that of a 5200 drum shipment between Karachi and Peshawar, 44 were punctured and empty; the WFP sub-office in Baluchistan indicated a loss rate of less than 1 percent for shipment of oil between Karachi and Quetta; and one of the NWFP district warehouses visited by the team reported that of 3057 drums recently received from Peshawar, 37 were leaking and 9 empty. Recently, however, the team noted that due to the shortage of railway wagons it has become necessary to load the drums in double

tiers and it appears that leakage may again be on the increase. The team recommends that WFP and USAID investigate the impact of double-tier loading with regard to potential future commodity loss.

The team's observation of supplies at warehouses in both Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan evidenced a less satisfactory situation concerning DSM. The same NWFP district warehouse cited above reported that 400 of a shipment of 7000 40-kilo bags of DSM had arrived damaged. Considering that this level of damage occurred during only one leg of a distribution system with multiple transfer points, the total loss between Port offloading and refugee village can be sizeable.

Bearing in mind that the U.S. has supplied over 65% of the milk-powder, the team recommends that:

- USAID/Pakistan should further assess the extent of loss being experienced in DSM shipments; and
- AID/Washington should analyze the comparative costs of shipping DSM in 40-kilo bags as at present, as against the provision of smaller packages in cartons.

Although commodity loss and damage during rail transport between Karachi and the provincial or district capitals seems to be within reasonable limits, official reports far understate the extent of such losses. Losses of DSM, sugar and tea have been reported at an unbelievable level of less than 300 tons during the past two years, an amount that would be exceeded by spillage from damaged milkpowder bags alone. As discussed previously, the principal reason for these unrealistically low figures, as explained to the team, is the reluctance of any of the involved parties to accept responsibility for identified losses and the difficulty of establishing responsibility under current law when loss occurs. Bearing in mind the GOP's operational responsibility for the refugee program, a satisfactory resolution of this issue does not seem close at hand even though GOP as well as WFP officials expressed frustration on the subject.

Given the difficult logistics of delivery from railhead or warehouse to refugee village, the dependence on local trucking contractors has been a frequent source of problems, with high costs endemic and fixed prices not unusual. More recently, with the receipt of trucks donated by the U.S. and other donors, the Army's National Logistics Cell is assuming major responsibility for distribution of relief commodities beyond the provincial capitals, as well as from Karachi. Hopefully, this will reduce problems of the type experienced to date.

The team concluded that the most significant problems of diversion and malpractice are those that relate to the inflation of refugee village population, i.e., "bogus registration", resulting in the drawdown of commodities at levels exceeding bona fide requirements. To a certain extent any such oversupply has undoubtedly

served to compensate for the limited and irregular availability of the GOP cash allowance to which each refugee is theoretically entitled; to this degree it can be viewed as meeting legitimate refugee needs. The most troublesome questions relate to that portion of any commodity oversupply that is used for purposes not directly or otherwise beneficial to the refugee population. Cases of this can be found among both refugee administration staff and tribal leadership.

Distribution of food through maliks (tribal leaders) has been identified as one major source of such problems. In an attempt to address this, the GOP has enunciated a policy of distribution to family heads and appears committed to carrying it out to the extent feasible. Estimates at the time of the team's visit were that perhaps 50 percent of the commodities are now being provided through family heads, although patterns vary between camps and the extent of implementation appears considerably lower in Baluchistan than NWFP. Not surprisingly, obstacles to effective implementation of this policy are formidable. Moreover, while the role of the maliks in their communities lends itself to some abuse, the issue is by no means one-sided as indigenous leadership can serve useful and constructive purposes in administering and maintaining order in the refugee villages.

The team was impressed with the systems and personnel through which the WFP performs its monitoring role in both Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan, identifying problems and abuses and drawing these to the attention of the GOP refugee administration for follow-up. The process is both formal and informal, carried out by detailed official correspondence and documentation as well as through the constructive working relationships that currently prevail between the WFP Representatives and the Refugee Commissioners. As noted earlier, the Commissioners in both Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan have demonstrated a commitment to addressing problems and rectifying malpractices drawn to their attention. Correspondence between the WFP and GOP bears out such an assessment (Appendix M summarizes WFP correspondence and related GOP follow-up during a recent time period). Suspension, removal and prosecution of local refugee administration officials has taken place in both provinces. The GOP also has taken other actions designed to reduce the likelihood of malpractice or loss, e.g., passage of a law which makes the sale of any relief item a specifically punishable offense; reducing the number of transfer points for refugee commodities; and reorganization of provincial refugee administrations to strengthen monitoring and investigative functions.

Given the context in which it operates, it is clear that the refugee relief program will continue to offer opportunity for abuse. For this reason, the importance accorded by the donor community to aggressive identification of and action in response to such problems will continue to be a mainstay of program credibility. The WFP and UNHCR will need sustained attention and support from the U.S.,

as major donor, and other members of the donor community if they are to be fully effective in this regard.

Commodity Suitability

The food requirements for the refugees are based on a daily per capita ration established by WFP and consist of:

Wheat	500 grams
Edible Oil	30 grams
Milk Powder	30 grams
Sugar	20 grams
Tea	3 grams

This ration, which is supplied free and regardless of age, provides about 2250 calories per person per day. All of the above commodities, with the exception of milk powder, are the same or similar to traditional foodstuffs consumed in Afghanistan. Although the refugees would prefer ghee or butteroil, the various types of vegetable oils provided by WFP are acceptable to the refugee and far less expensive than butteroil.

The type of wheat grown in Afghanistan and Pakistan is generally a white variety, but a few international donors have proved a red variety that is not well accepted by the refugees. In a few instances the GOP had to incur additional expenses in exchanging this wheat for a local white variety and then transporting the red wheat to southern Baluchistan where it is generally more acceptable.

Most UN and GOP officials assured the team that the refugees were familiar with and valued the milk powder. This commodity is used in tea or converted in yogurt. However, the team did receive a few reports implying that the improper preparation of milk may be causing some diarrhea among the children. While these reports were too few in number to justify eliminating this commodity, there is no doubt that WFP and GOP need to make greater efforts in instructing the refugees in the proper and hygienic uses of milk powder.

As discussed earlier, one aspect of the ration that contributes to concerns of an oversupply of food to the refugees, as well as lending itself to diversion, is that the foods constitute an "adult" ration, i.e., 500 grams of wheat per person per day. Yet over half of the refugee population is composed of children, the younger of whom would not need or consume this amount of wheat or its equivalent in bread. The team believes WFP and the GOP need to give serious consideration to an adjustment in the supply, perhaps by establishing a second or "child" ration which would lower the overall food requirements, reduce costs to the donors and GOP and decrease the availability of food for market sales or misuse.

It should be noted that in addition to the food rations, the refugees have access to a large number of livestock, estimated at 3 million head, which they brought with them. Some of the refugees also are able to supplement the food supplies through income earned

as day laborers on local farms or on construction activities. Moreover, the refugees have additional purchasing power when the Government distributes the cash allowance, even though this has been highly periodic.

Taking these considerations into account, the team believes:

- When calling forward commodities, WFP should provide greater detail to donors regarding commodity specifications and packaging requirements and specifically indicate that in the case of wheat, the white variety is preferred.
- WFP and GOP should continue to review the need for milkpowder and make greater efforts to ensure that the refugees are instructed in the proper utilization and preparation of this commodity.
- In order to make maximum use of food resources, WFP and the GOP should consider formulating and applying a smaller ration for young children.

FY 1983 Food Requirements

At the team's request, WFP/Islamabad prepared an estimate of requirements for the period up to December 31, 1983 for the three basic commodities provided by WFP, namely wheat, edible oil and milk powder. While there has been some limited donation of sugar and tea through bilateral donors, the bulk of the requirement for these two commodities is being met by UNHCR through purchases using its cash contributions.

It should be noted that in making these calculations, WFP, at the team's suggestion, based its figures for 1983 on 2.5 million refugees. The team, after completing its review, believes that this planning base of 2.5 million beneficiaries in 1983 is on the high side and that a lower figure not greater than 2.3 million should be used. Line (G) of the following table reflects this change. In any event, these requirements should be reviewed and updated as more reliable data becomes available in respect of refugee numbers and donor contributions. For planning and budgetary purposes, the USG will probably have to provide about 50 percent of the overall food requirements.

FOOD AVAILABILITY AND REQUIREMENTS
(Quantities in Metric Tons)

	<u>Wheat</u>	<u>Edible Oil</u>	<u>Milkpowder</u>
A. Cumulative pledges as of October 5, 1982	859,235	46,051	33,242
B. Total distribution up to September 30, 1982	667,027	17,459	15,183
C. Reported Post - CIF losses up to September 30, 1982	222	195	178
D. Total available as of September 30, 1982 A-(B+C)	198,986	28,397	17,881
E. Total Requirements up to December 31, 1982 (on the basis of 2.2 million bene- ficiaries in 1982 and 2.5 million in 1983)	557,450	33,447	33,447
F. Total deficit up to Decem- ber 31, 1983	-365,464	- 5,050	- 15,566
G. Total deficit up to Decem- ber 31, 1983 adjusted for an average of 2.3 million refugees in 1983	-336,227	- 4,646	- 14,312

This report has already noted the need to keep the food pipeline full at all times in order to insure steady supply of food to the refugees and to help the GOP Provincial Governments avoid using their limited and costly bank credit for local procurement of wheat to compensate for temporary supply deficiencies.

Taking these projections into consideration, the team suggests interagency approval be sought by AID/FFP during January 1983 for a partial FY 83 Title II contribution consisting of 80,000 MT wheat. This will provide adequate lead-time to insure a full, uninterrupted pipeline. As already noted, present supplies of edible oil and DSM are adequate to meet needs through a major part of 1983. After a re-assessment of the food situation in April 1983, approval of a second tranche of Title II commodities should be considered. This will allow time to determine the level of other donor contributions as well as to review with the GOP and WFP the beneficiary numbers and ration sizes that should be applied in estimating total requirements for the balance of the year.

APPENDICES

- A. Itinerary of Food for Peace Team.
- B. USG Total Contributions for Afghan Refugee Relief, 1980-82.
- C. USG Contributions to World Food Program for Afghan Refugee Relief, 1980-82, by commodity, tonnage and value.
- D. Summary of Total Food Assistance for Afghan Refugee Relief, by Donor, as of November 15, 1982.
- E. Registered Refugee Population, November 1979 - October 1982.
- F. Registered Refugee Population by Province, January 1982 - October 1982.
- G. Theoretical and Actual Distribution of Food Commodities in NWFP and Baluchistan, January 1982 - September 1982.
- H. Organization Charts and Staffing Patterns for GOP Refugee Management.
- I. GOP Report on Number of Refugees in NWFP, by camp, as of September 30, 1982.
- J. GOP Report on Number of Refugees in Baluchistan, by camp, as of October 31, 1982.
- K. Examples of WFP Reporting and Monitoring Formats.
- L. Letter of Understanding between WFP and GOP on Project 1199, Emergency Food Relief for Afghan Refugees.
- M. Selected WFP/GOP Exchanges on NWFP Refugee-Related Problems, March 1981 - September 1982.
- N. GOP Estimate of Average Monthly Expenditures Per Refugee.
- O. UNHCR Budget and Programs in Pakistan, 1981-1983 est.
- P. Voluntary Agencies in Afghan Relief.
- Q. Map of Pakistan Showing Settled Districts and Tribal Agencies with Refugee Concentrations.
- R. Map Showing Distribution of Registered Refugees in NWFP.
- S. Health, Nutrition Status, Living Conditions and Income of Refugee Population.

ITINERARY

AID/W Food for Peace Team

October 29 (Friday)

Meeting with World Food Program, Rome (R. Cashin,
M. Zejjari, V. Dhital)

October 31 (Sunday)

4:55 a.m. Team arrival in Islamabad from Rome
Received by McKinney (Program Office) and Durrani (Liaison
Officer, Peshawar) - PK 786

Afternoon USAID

3:30 p.m. Meeting with Ambassador Spiers

November 1 (Monday)

8:30 a.m. Briefing: Program Officer L. Dean, W. McKinney, T. Durrani

9:30 a.m. Meeting with T. Greene, Counselor for Refugee Affairs

10:30 a.m. Briefing with Director D. Lion, Deputy Director B. George,
L. Dean, W. McKinney, and T. Durrani

11:30 a.m. Meeting with Masud Siddiqui, E&E

1:45 p.m. Meeting with Col. Babar, SAFRON

November 2 (Tuesday)

9:00 a.m. Meeting with Col. Razzak, Actg. Chief Commissioner for
Afghan Refugees

10:30 a.m. Meeting with Gerald Walzer, Chief, UNHCR

12:00 noon Mr. Wnendt, Acting Economic Counsellor, German Embassy

1:30 p.m. Meeting with Y. Claret, C. Vohl, and A. Abate, WFP

7:00 p.m. Dinner with CRS Representative Pat Hopkins

November 3 (Wednesday)

- 9:00 a.m. Meeting with Pravit Sarabanchong, Coordinator and Deputy Rep., UNICEF
- 10:00 a.m. Tariq Durrani
- 3:30 p.m. E and E (Hewett, McNamara, Deely)

November 4 (Thursday)

- 9:00 a.m. Brig. Sher Ali Baz, Joint Secretary, Cabinet Division, Rawalpindi

November 5 (Friday)

- 9:00 a.m. Depart Islamabad by AID vehicle
- 3:00 p.m. Arrival Peshawar

November 6 (Saturday)

- 8:30 a.m. Meeting with Ronald Lorton, American Consul and Patty Culpepper, Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate, Peshawar
- 9:30 a.m. Meeting with Dr. Hamidullah Durrani, Food Secretary, WFP
- 10:30 a.m. Meeting with Habibullah Khan, District Food Controller (Rural), Peshawar
- 11:30 a.m. Meeting with Provincial WFP Staff (M. Arela and staff)
- 1:00 p.m. Lunch at Lortons
- 3:30 p.m. Meetings with voluntary agencies assisting in Afghan relief activities (IRC, Mark Ice; Interaid, John Brogan)
- 6:30 p.m. Dinner at Tariq Durrani's home

November 7 (Sunday)

- 8:00 a.m. Meeting with Provincial UNHCR Staff (H. Keito and staff)
- 9:00 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Abdullah, Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, NWFP
- 10:00 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Jamshed Burki, Home Secretary, NWFP
- 10:45 a.m. Visit City Railway Station and Warehouse
- 11:30 a.m. Visit Azakhel Warehouses/Bini Shells

- 12:30 p.m. Visit Azakhel Camp
- 6:00 p.m. Dinner - Mel Arela Residence

November 8 (Monday)

- 7:00 a.m. Depart for Bajaur (Kerala) and Dir (Mayar) Camps
- 2:00 p.m. Lunch, Fishing Hut at Chakdarra - Area Administrator Afghan Refugees, Dir
- 5:00 p.m. Arrive Swat (Saidu Sharif). Stay at Swat Hotel
- 7:30 p.m. Dinner with Former Commissioner of Afghan Refugees, NWFP, Mr. Shemsher Ali Khan

November 9 (Tuesday)

- 7:00 a.m. Depart to Swat, Buner (Koga) and Mardan (Barakai) Camps
- 1:00 p.m. Lunch at Irrigation Rest House Gohati, Mardan with Area Administrator, Afghan Refugees, Mardan
- 4:00 p.m. Overnight stay at Rest House, Tarbela

November 10 (Wednesday)

- 7:00 a.m. Depart for Ghazi and Haripur (Pania) Camps and District Warehouse
- 4:00 p.m. Arrive Islamabad
- 7:00 p.m. Depart for Karachi via PK 309
- 8:50 p.m. Arrive Karachi

November 11 (Thursday)

- 8:30 a.m. Meeting with Mr. Alex Rattray, Consul General, AmConGen, Karachi
- 9:20 a.m. Meeting with WFP Provincial officials
- 10:15 a.m. Meeting with M/s. International Forwarding Agency (Clearing Agents)
- 11:15 a.m. Visit Karachi Port operations
- 12:30 p.m. Lunch
- 1:30 p.m. Meeting with Mr. Jilani, Cabinet Division Offices, Chief Refugee Commissioner's representative

November 12 (Friday)

- 9:00 a.m. Depart for Quetta via PK 338
- 10:15 a.m. Arrive Quetta
- 2:00 p.m. Discussions with WFP Rep. A. deBenoist

November 13 (Saturday)

- 9:00 a.m. Meeting with Mr. A. deBenoist, WFP Representative in Quetta and staff
- 9:30 a.m. Meeting with Mr. S. N. A. Wijayatilake (Mr. Nanda), Chief, UNHCR Sub-Office, Quetta
- 10:30 a.m. Meeting with Col. Abdul Rauf Khan, Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Baluchistan
- 11:15 a.m. Depart to Pir Alizai and Surkhab Camps
- 4:00 p.m. Return to Quetta
- 7:00 p.m. Dinner with A. deBenoist and staff

November 14 (Sunday)

- 9:00 a.m. Final meeting WFP staff
- 9:30 a.m. Visit Railway Station and Warehouse
- 10:30 a.m. Depart for airport

November 15 (Monday)

Formulation of Conclusions/Recommendations

November 16 (Tuesday)

- 9:00 a.m. Debriefing, Col. Babar, SAFRON
- Formulation of Conclusions/Recommendations

November 17 (Wednesday)

- 8:30 a.m. Final Session with WFP Representatives (Y. Claret, Vohl, Hudson, Abate)
- 10:00 a.m. AID Debriefing (Lion, George, Dean)
- 11:00 a.m. Embassy Debriefing (Amb. Spiers, DCM King)

- 1:00 p.m. Counselor for Refugee Affairs Debriefing (Greene)
- 2:00 p.m. UNHCR Rep. Walzer Debriefing
- 3:00 p.m. Final Session with Program Office (L. Dean)
- 7:00 p.m. Depart for Karachi via PK 309
- 8:50 p.m. Arrive Karachi

November 18 (Thursday)

Arrive in Rome

November 19 (Friday)

- 9:00 a.m. WFP Debriefing (Cashin, Zejjari, Dhital)

U.S. Government Contributions
to Afghan Relief Program
(Dollars in Thousands)

<u>Organization</u>	<u>FY 1980 Obligations</u>	<u>FY 1981 Obligations</u>	<u>FY 1982 Obligations</u>	<u>Total</u>
UNHCR	\$ 5,000 ^{1/} 3,800 ^{1/}	\$ 30,000 ^{1/} 2,600 ^{1/}	\$ 24,150 3,000 ^{1/}	\$ 68,550
WFP ^{2/}	31,880	39,271	65,889	137,040
ICRC and volags	300 1,000 ^{1/}	1,893 2,200 ^{1/}	1,725 1,250 ^{1/}	8,368
Government of Pakistan	-0-	8,000	-0-	8,000
TOTALS	\$ 41,980	\$ 83,964	\$ 96,014	\$221,958

^{1/} Non-appropriated excess-foreign currency (Pakistan rupee) contribution

^{2/} Includes value of commodities and shipping

U.S. Contributions to WFP for Afghan Refugee Relief

FY 1980 - FY 1982

	<u>Wheat</u>		<u>NFDM</u>		<u>Vegoil</u>		<u>Ocean</u> <u>Freight</u>	<u>Total</u>	
	<u>MT</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>	<u>MT</u>	<u>(\$000)</u>
FY 1980	82,048	14,198	3,156	1,116	6,619	6,566	10,000	91,828	31,880
FY 1981	117,448	19,426	2,897	1,212	6,850	5,300	13,333	127,195	39,271
FY 1982	196,317	28,911	15,460	2,154	21,648	14,184	20,460	233,425	65,889
TOTAL	395,813	62,535	21,513	4,482	35,117	26,050	43,973	452,443	137,040

Emergency Food Assistance for Relief of
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan

Pledge Situation as of November 15, 1982
(Bilateral, IEF, and WFP Regular pledges)

<u>Donor</u>	<u>Cereals</u> (MT)	<u>Oils</u> (MT)	<u>DSM</u> (MT)	<u>Total</u> (MT)
USA	398,049	35,107	21,912	455,068
EEC	106,696	4,790	8,100	119,586
Australia	87,500	-	100	87,600
W. Germany	74,295	45	65	74,405
Canada	67,808	7,234		75,042
France	47,000			47,000
Japan	39,380		2,558	41,938
OPEC	16,000			16,000
U.K.	14,650			14,650
Turkey	3,828			3,828
Belgium	2,000			2,000
Kuwait	1,084			1,084
Switzerland	950		506	1,456
Norway	-	1,100		1,100
TOTAL	859,240	48,276	33,241	940,757
U.S. Share as % of total pledges	46.3	72.7	65.9	48.4

Of the 940,757 MT of commodities pledged as of November 1982, about 86 percent or 806,539 MT has been delivered. The entire U.S. pledge of 455,068 MT has been shipped and this contribution accounts for 56.4 percent of the delivered commodities.

Registered Refugee Population

Nov. 1979 - Oct. 1982

Nov. 1979	314,578
Dec. 1979	402,100
Jan. 1980	487,789
Feb. 1980	577,955
Mar. 1980	693,317
Apr. 1980	778,624
May 1980	867,711
Jun. 1980	953,875
Jul. 1980	1,021,678
Aug. 1980	1,087,650
Sep. 1980	1,177,133
Oct. 1980	1,256,237
Nov. 1980	1,331,186
Dec. 1980	1,417,897
Jan. 1981	1,541,183
Feb. 1981	1,647,664
Mar. 1981	1,827,036
Apr. 1981	1,956,316
May 1981	2,083,688
Jun. 1981	2,265,859
Jul. 1981	2,290,722
Aug. 1981	2,323,467
Sep. 1981	2,351,488
Oct. 1981	2,370,654
Nov. 1981	2,377,240
Dec. 1981	2,375,325
Jan. 1982	2,555,181
Feb. 1982	2,669,162
Mar. 1982	2,670,886
Apr. 1982	2,695,106
May 1982	2,735,857
Jun. 1982	2,753,497
Jul. 1982	2,698,778
Aug. 1982	2,739,899
Sep. 1982	2,749,007
Oct. 1982	2,742,963

Source: GOP Refugee Estimates

Registered Refugee Population, NWFP and Baluchistan

January - October 1982

<u>Month</u>	<u>NWFP</u>	<u>Baluchistan</u>	<u>Total</u>
January	2,124,094	431,087	2,555,181
February	2,164,019	505,143	2,669,162
March	2,140,421	530,465	2,670,886
April	2,137,577	557,529	2,695,106
May	2,175,038	560,819	2,735,857
June	2,147,728	605,769	2,753,497
July	2,088,495	610,283	2,698,778
August	2,101,643	638,256	2,739,899
September	2,102,863	646,144	2,749,007
October	2,113,466	629,497	2,742,963

EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR RELIEF OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN - 1982

Statement of Actual and Theoretical Beneficiaries Distribution of Food Commodities in NWFP and Baluchistan

(All figures in M. Tonnes)

A = Actual distribution

T = Theoretical distribution


NWFP = North West Frontier Province

B = Baluchistan


Month	No. of Registered Refugees NWFP / Baluch		No. of Beneficiaries NWFP / Baluch		GENERALS (500 grms)				OIL (30 grms)				DSM (30 grms)				SUGAR (20 grms)				TEA (3 grms)			
					T		A		T		A		T		A		T		A		T		A	
					NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B	NWFP	B
JAN	2,124,094	431,087	1,769,216	377,493	26,528	5,662	26,637	3,907	1,592	340	174	84	1,592	340	169	109	1,041	226	382	7	100	34	48.3	8.7
FEB	2,164,019	505,143	1,660,876	501,520	24,913	7,522	23,019	3,686	1,494	451	138	183	1,494	451	643	112	996	301	955	45	100	45	142.3	14.7
MARCH	2,140,421	530,465	1,823,531	526,343	27,353	7,895	25,101	7,559	1,641	474	833	106	1,641	474	723	146	1,094	316	868	384	100	47	95.5	11.7
APRIL	2,137,577	557,529	1,815,183	410,722	27,228	7,211	26,022	6,224	1,637	433	779	219	1,637	433	239	238	1,089	288	1,006	61	100	43	79.3	9.7
MAY	2,175,038	560,819	1,575,803	536,267	23,637	8,044	19,828	6,865	1,418	483	784	81	1,418	483	136	71	945	322	921	120	100	49	37	3.4
JUNE	2,147,728	605,769	1,715,344	549,103	25,730	8,236	28,751	5,867	1,543	494	357	27	1,543	494	155	16	1,029	329	1,250	100	100	49	71.2	8
JULY	2,088,495	610,283	1,902,174	546,428	28,533	8,196	30,656	7,353	1,712	492	84	318	1,712	492	22	40	1,141	328	947	150	100	49	16.9	11
AUG.	2,101,643	638,256	1,876,920	534,111	28,154	8,012	31,438	4,196	1,689	431	54	43	1,689	431	502	21	1,126	320	1,044	80	100	49	26	20
SEPT.	2,102,863	646,144	1,717,950	574,377	25,769	8,616	25,599	5,306	1,546	517	286	78	1,546	517	1,328	409	1,031	345	964	210	100	52	110	15

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ORGANIZATION FOR REFUGEE MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN




**ORGANIZATION - CHIEF COMMISSIONERATE
FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES
(AT FEDERAL GOVT. LEVEL ISLAMABAD)**



SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHMENT

CCAR	-----	1
DIRECTORS	-----	5
DY. DIRECTORS	-----	7
OTHERS	-----	68
VEHICLES	-----	11

ORGANIZATION OF DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR



SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHMENT


PERSONNEL - 14 (EXCL. ATTACHED DEPTTS.)

VEHICLES - 1

DUTIES

- Control and coordination of refugee management at Distt./Agency level.
- Maintenance of Warehouses, and allocation & transportation of relief assistance to R.T.Vs. within the Distt./Agency.
- Close liaison with Distt. Civil Administration for law and order, acquisition of land for water and other schemes etc.
- Compilation of cash and store accounts within the Distt. and timely submission to CAR's office.
- Control and coordination of projects entrusted to specialized agencies like Medical, Education, Food, Animal Husbandary, Agriculture, Industries departments etc.
- Conducting of VIP, visitors, Journalists and coordination of UN Agencies.

ORGANIZATION - AREA ADMINISTRATOR
(CONTROLLING UPTO 5 RTVs)



SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHMENT


PERSONNEL - 18 (Excl. Attached Deptts.)
VEHICLES - 1

Note:- Figures in brackets denote number of personnel in each Section.

DUTIES

- Control / Co-ord. and monitoring of RTVs within the Area.
- Supervision of distribution of relief assistance to RTVs.
- Submission of reports and returns to Distt. Administrator.
- Supervision of work of attached Departments.

ORGANIZATION OF AN RTV (UPTO 10,000 REFUGEES)



SUMMARY OF ESTABLISHMENT

PERSONNEL - 16 (Excl. Attached Deptts.)
VEHICLES - 1

Note: Figures in brackets denote number of personnel in each Section.

DUTIES

Discipline and maintenance of law and order.
Distribution of relief assistance/cash allowance.
Maintenance of records and submission of reports & returns.
Registration/re-enumeration of refugees.

File No. 2/10.11

OFFICE OF THE
COMMISSIONER AFGHAN REFUGEES,
NWFP., PESHAWAR.

NO. P.O (SIT) / 12334-44

DATED PESHAWAR THE 30-9-1982.

For Information

To,

The Secretary,
Govt. of Pakistan,
States & Frontier Regions,
Division Islamabad.

SUBJECT:- STATEMENT SHOWING THE LATEST NUMBER OF
AFGHAN REFUGEES, IN N. W. F. P. /

Memo:-

Reference your Memo No. 4948/F. 179 dated 10-5-1979 the latest camp wise figures of Afghan Refugees for the fortnight ending 30th September 1982 are as follows:-

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTRICT/ AGENCY.	NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED	NEW ARRIVAL	AFGHAN PROVINCE WHERE MIGRATED	TOTAL FAMILIES	BIRTHS	DEATHS	MOVEMENT	TOTAL POPULATION
1.	Ghazi Camp No. 1	10812	1404	Ningahr	1395	-	-	2086	10130
2.	Padhana	9749	-	-do-	1205	-	-	618	9131
3.	" " "	14260	-	-do-	1848	-	-	50	14210
4.	" " "	10708	-	Faktia	1361	-	-	106	10602
5.	" " "	8234	236	-do-	813	-	-	2198	6272
6.	Ghazni	5269	-	-do-	753	-	-	433	4836
7.	" " "	5713	-	-do-	518	-	-	2118	3595
8.	" " "	4774	-	-do-	262	-	-	2638	2136
9.	Pania	11402	-	Loger	1585	-	-	-	11402
10.	" " "	2460	7	Ghazni	353	-	-	-	2467
11.	" " "	6156	7	Paktia	937	-	-	-	6163
12.	" " "	9936	16	Kabul	1537	-	-	-	9952
13.	" " "	7755	259	-do-	1146	-	-	-	8014
14.	" " "	7580	14	-do-	1109	-	-	-	7594
15.	" " "	13055	-	Kunner	1864	-	-	-	13055
16.	" " "	17463	6	-do-	2597	-	-	-	17469
17.	" " "	8758	7	-do-	1334	-	-	-	8765
18.	" " "	12430	-	Loger	1757	-	-	-	12430
19.	" " "	11427	92	-do-	1602	-	-	-	11519
20.	" " "	10507	19	-do-	1518	-	-	-	10526
TOTAL:-		188448	2067	-	25504	-	-	10247	180268

BAJAOUR.

1.	Damadola.	1	9445	-	Kunner	1296	-	-	2	9443
2.	" " "	2	8468	-	-do-	1156	-	-	-	8468
3.	" " "	3	8034	-	-do-	1181	-	-	-	8034
4.	" " "	4	6476	-	-do-	1030	-	-	-	6476
5.	" " "	5	9570	22	-do-	1503	-	-	-	9592
6.	" " "	6	5880	-	-do-	796	-	-	33	5845
7.	" " "	7	3977	11	-do-	547	-	-	-	3988
8.	Yousaf Abad	1	5481	-	-do-	825	-	-	260	5221
9.	" " "	2	3068	17	-do-	491	-	-	-	3085
10.	" " "	3	3647	24	-do-	500	-	-	-	3671
11.	Shahjahan.A	1	6457	-	-do-	239	-	-	76	6381
12.	" " "	2	6280	-	-do-	905	-	-	37	6243
13.	" " "	3	6831	9	-do-	920	-	-	-	6840
14.	Raghagan		8150	-	-do-	1041	-	-	120	8030
15.	Bai-China		4506	-	-do-	582	-	-	1	4505
16.	Kirala		9392	260	-do-	1252	-	-	-	9652
17.	Nawab Abad		5211	-	-do-	825	-	-	12	5199
18.	Jahangir Abad		8930	59	-do-	1261	-	-	-	8987
19.	Khazana		7833	1	-do-	1192	-	-	-	7834
20.	Nawagai		7497	250	-do-	951	-	-	-	7747
21.	Bajaour	1	7075	-	-do-	875	-	-	2	7073
22.	" " "	2	6073	-	-do-	788	-	-	8	6065
23.	" " "	3	17001	-	-do-	2335	-	-	144	16859
24.	" " "	4	4981	488	-do-	727	-	-	-	5409
25.	" " "	5	11969	-	-do-	1548	-	-	120	11849

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTT/ AGENCY.	NO.OF REFUGEE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.	NEW ARRIVAL	AFGHAN PROVINCE FROM WHICH MIGRATED.	TOTAL FAMILIES.	BIRTH.	DEATH.	MOVEMENT.	TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEEES.
26.	Bajaour	6	7665	- do -	1026	-	-	32	7633
27.	" " "	7	7479	- do -	976	-	-	93	7386
TOTAL:-			197376	1069	-	27368	-	942	197513
BANNU.									
1.	Bannu Camp	1	13620	- Paktia	1594	-	-	3	13617
2.	Kurrum Garhi		6906	23 -do-	826	-	-	-	6929
3.	Maman Khel		6004	- do -	731	-	-	-	6004
4.	Bakha Khel		6258	- do -	754	-	-	-	6258
5.	Ghandi Khan Khel		4631	- do -	663	-	-	-	4631
6.	Gambila		6366	- do -	829	-	-	-	6366
7.	Lakiri II		3145	- do -	365	-	-	-	3145
8.	Naurang		3694	- do -	489	-	-	-	3694
TOTAL:-			50624	23	-	6249	-	3	50644
CHITRAL.									
1.	Kala Kattak		3172	- Kohistan	466	-	-	-	3172
2.	Kesu		356	- Kunner	54	-	-	-	356
3.	Shidi		3002	- Pathans	547	-	-	-	3002
4.	Nagar/Bodogal camp		1090	- Nuristan	128	-	-	-	1090
5.	Outer Area		16500	- do -	2611	-	-	-	16500
TOTAL:-			24180	-	3806	-	-	-	24180
DIK.									
1.	Barawal No.	1	6878	- Lagh/Jan:	1151	-	-	15	6873
2.	" " "	2	506	- do -	39	-	-	-	506
3.	Sundarwal	1	3839	- do -	688	-	-	4	3835
4.	" " "	2	751	- do -	86	-	-	-	751
5.	Doaba		4703	- do -	720	-	2	8	4693
6.	Pimar		9821	4 - do -	1576	-	-	5	9820
7.	Chakdara	1	5090	- do -	980	-	-	-	5090
8.	" " "	2	5471	- do -	949	-	-	4	5467
9.	Toor	1	8265	- do -	1234	-	-	-	8265
10.	" " "	2	8145	- do -	1217	-	-	102	8043
11.	" " "	3	8170	- do -	1168	-	-	-	8170
12.	" " "	4	8175	- do -	1229	-	1	-	8174
13.	Mayar	1	8630	102 - do -	1248	-	-	-	8732
14.	" " "	2	8609	- do -	1222	-	4	138	8470
15.	Barari	1	7880	- do -	1276	-	2	10	7868
16.	" " "	2	798	- do -	141	-	-	-	798
TOTAL:-			95731	106	-	14924	-	6	286
D. I. KHAN.									
1.	Tank.	1	10036	- do -	1186	-	-	-	10036
2.	" " "	2	10368	- do -	1185	-	-	-	10368
3.	Dabarrah		9460	- do -	1079	-	-	-	9460
4.	Kurai		9368	- do -	1157	-	1	-	9367
5.	Zafar Abad		8559	- do -	1101	-	-	-	8559
6.	Ratta Kulachi		9164	- do -	1099	-	-	-	9164
7.	Shor Kot		7224	65 - do -	921	-	-	-	7289
8.	Push Pul		13577	- do -	1820	-	-	-	13577
9.	Girsal		13605	- do -	1657	-	-	16	13589
10.	Rakh Zandai		4538	- do -	620	-	-	-	4538
11.	Naivellah		5422	- do -	659	-	-	-	5422
12.	Dababan Kalam		8896	- do -	1126	-	-	-	8896
TOTAL:-			110217	65	-	13678	-	1	16
KOHAT.									
1.	Gankol	1	6089	23 Paktia	830	-	-	-	6112
2.	" " "	2	11284	23 Ningahar	1583	-	-	59	11248
3.	" " "	3	13797	66 - do -	1836	-	-	16	13847
4.	Oblen	1	7911	- do -	1030	-	-	49	7862
5.	" " "	2	7155	29 - do -	1013	-	-	-	7184
6.	Shah Pur		6661	46 - do -	866	-	-	-	6707
7.	Zara Mela		8238	- do -	1025	-	-	-	8238
8.	Gadda Khel		5392	- do -	642	-	-	375	5017

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTRICT/AGENCY.	NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED	NEW ARRIVAL V.L.	AFGHAN PROVINCE FROM WHERE MIGRATED	TOTAL FAMILIES.	BIRTH.	DEATH.	MOVEMENT.	TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEES
9.	Chichana	5976	-	-do-	755	-	-	-	5976
10.	Ghulam Banda	7380	1023	-do-	987	-	-	402	8001
11.	Kata Kanri (Hangu)	10399	-	-do-	1283	-	-	8	10391
12.	Lakhti Banda	1	6522	-do-	782	-	-	-	6523
13.	" " "	2	10394	6	-do-	1378	-	-	10400
14.	Kotki	7170	114	-do-	890	-	-	-	7284
15.	Mohd Khoja	11483	-	-do-	1354	-	-	-	11483
16.	Doaba	8205	752	-do-	1011	-	-	-	8957
17.	Dasamand	1	7635	-do-	859	-	-	-	7635
18.	" " "	2	11336	78	-do-	1287	-	-	11414
19.	Thall	1	11091	-do-	1366	-	-	-	11091
20.	" " "	2	10576	-do-	1342	-	-	-	10576
TOTAL:-		174694	2160	-	22225	-	-	909	175945
<u>KURRAM</u>									
1.	Ahmadi Sahma	1	5328	- Pak/Kost/Nong	740	-	-	-	5328
2.	" " "	2	5183	-do-	712	-	-	-	5183
3.	Jraghurga	1	6973	-do-	846	-	-	-	6973
4.	" " "	2	4599	10	-do-	560	-	-	4609
5.	Old Bagzai	10666	-	-do-	1458	-	-	-	10666
6.	Maidani	7797	-	-do-	945	-	-	-	7797
7.	Gerzandani	9324	-	-do-	1051	-	-	-	9324
8.	Muzafar Kot	6691	-	-do-	792	-	-	-	6691
9.	Tindo	1	9138	-do-	1257	-	-	-	9138
10.	" " "	2	3744	-do-	548	-	-	-	3744
11.	" " "	3	4037	-do-	507	-	-	-	4037
12.	Durani	5252	-	-do-	705	-	-	-	5252
13.	Shabak	6050	-	-do-	769	-	-	-	6050
14.	Ahardand	4210	-	-do-	452	-	-	-	4210
15.	Gawakai	9623	-	-do-	1278	-	-	-	9623
16.	Shashu	14194	-	-do-	1810	-	-	-	14194
17.	Arawalai	6297	-	-do-	779	-	-	-	6297
18.	Satin	1	8194	-do-	1133	-	-	-	8194
19.	" " "	2	6387	-do-	831	-	-	-	6387
20.	Matasangar	10343	26	-do-	1163	-	-	-	10369
21.	Ghuzagarhi	5657	20	-do-	700	-	-	-	5677
22.	Bushora(Baggan)	11049	-	-do-	1335	-	-	46	11049
23.	Parachinar	1	12557	-do-	1675	-	-	-	12557
24.	" " " "	2	12124	-do-	1610	-	-	14	12110
25.	Basu	11975	-	-do-	2171	-	-	-	11975
26.	Chappri	6281	-	-do-	743	-	-	-	6281
27.	Asghro	1-A	9651	-do-	1201	-	-	-	9651
28.	" " "	1-B	6833	-do-	753	-	-	-	6833
29.	" " "	2	9089	13	-do-	1240	-	-	9102
30.	" " "	3	10233	-do-	1293	-	-	-	10233
31.	New Bagzai	1	15615	-do-	2232	-	-	-	15615
32.	" " "	2	14523	-do-	2220	-	-	-	14523
33.	" " "	3	8109	-do-	1144	-	-	-	8109
TOTAL:-		277772	69	-	36657	-	-	60	277781
<u>KHYBER.</u>									
1.	shah kus	5228	-	Nangahar	656	-	-	-	5228
2.	Khyber Agency	20504	-	-do-	2522	-	-	-	20504
TOTAL:-		25732	-	-	3178	-	-	-	25732
<u>MANSHERA.</u>									
1.	Sheikh Abad	1	4558	-	Paktia	675	-	-	4558
2.	Barwari	2	12401	16	-do-	1744	-	-	12117
3.	Haji Abad	3	15313	-	-do-	2513	-	100	15213
4.	Kutlia	4	14877	156	-do-	2482	-	-	15033
5.	Khaki	5	11995	760	-do-	1514	-	-	12755
6.	Harimaira	6	14617	315	-do-	2006	-	669	14263
7.	Naclor	7	13261	669	-do-	1904	-	315	13615
8.	Chiryali	8	12244	-	-do-	1553	-	-	12244
9.	Rata Deport	9	12439	-	-do-	1612	-	-	12439
TOTAL:-		111705	1916	-	16003	-	-	1084	112537

SL. NO. NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTT/ AGENCY. NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. NEW ARRIVAL RECORDED. AFGHAN PROVINCE WHERE MIGRATED. TOTAL FAMILIES. BIRTH. DEATH. MOVEMENT. TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEES.

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTT/ AGENCY.	NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.	NEW ARRIVAL RECORDED.	AFGHAN PROVINCE WHERE MIGRATED.	TOTAL FAMILIES.	BIRTH.	DEATH.	MOVEMENT.	TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEES.
<u>MOHMAND.</u>									
1.	Yakka Ghund	1	17825	- do -	2799	-	-	-	17825
2.	" " "	2	22629	- do -	3219	-	-	-	22629
TOTAL:-			40454	- -	6018	-	-	-	40454

<u>MARDAN.</u>									
1.	Mardan	1	9398	- Paktia	1243	-	-	-	9398
2.	" " "	2	8750	- Ningahar	1105	-	-	-	8750
3.	Baghica	1	7417	- Kabul	909	-	-	-	7417
4.	" " "	2	11082	- Farvan	1494	-	-	-	11082
5.	Barakai	1	8960	- Laghman	1087	-	-	-	8960
6.	" " "	2	8654	- Kanner	1077	-	-	-	8654
7.	" " "	3	8397	- Luger	953	-	-	-	8397
8.	" " "	4	7660	- Kindas	851	-	-	-	7660
9.	" " "	5	6463	- Halman	775	-	-	21	6442
10.	" " "	6	14088	- Giazni	1804	-	-	-	14088
11.	" " "	7	10560	- Bagllan	1256	-	-	-	10560
12.	" " "	8	10772	- Badakshan	1289	-	-	-	10772
13.	" " "	9	9374	- do -	1245	-	-	12	9374
14.	" " "	10	9949	49 - do -	1251	-	-	-	9949
15.	" " "	11	11039	- do -	1362	-	-	-	11039
16.	" " "	12	10750	170 - do -	1444	-	-	-	10920
17.	" " "	13	10530	349 - do -	1495	-	-	-	10879
18.	Fazal Camp		14149	- do -	1733	-	-	-	14149
19.	Gandaf	1	9366	- do -	1486	-	-	-	9366
20.	" " "	2	7051	- do -	1101	-	-	-	7051
21.	" " "	3	8562	- do -	1243	-	-	-	8562
22.	Jalala	1	12282	- do -	1558	-	-	55	12227
23.	" " "	2	10891	37 - do -	1432	-	-	-	10928
24.	" " "	3	10479	105 - do -	1327	-	-	-	10584
TOTAL:-			236623	710 -	30330	-	-	88	237245

<u>MALAKAND.</u>									
1.	Malakand.		12691	- do -	1587	-	-	-	12691
2.	Pali Camp		-	- do -	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL:-			12691	- -	1587	-	-	-	12691

<u>N. WAZIRISTAN.</u>									
1.	Sher Khel		6328	- Paktia	907	-	-	-	6328
2.	Stanye		5196	- do -	969	-	-	-	5196
3.	Bangidar		6337	- do -	888	-	-	-	6337
4.	Dado Reghzai		6258	- do -	749	-	-	-	6258
5.	Narai Dug		6561	- do -	819	-	-	-	6561
6.	Hemzoni	1	8971	- do -	939	-	-	-	8971
7.	" " "	2	7343	- do -	770	-	-	-	7343
8.	Darpa Khel	1	4791	- do -	512	-	-	-	4791
9.	" " "	2	5128	- do -	532	-	-	-	5128
10.	Dargamandi	1	3951	- do -	471	-	-	-	3951
11.	" " "	2	6579	- do -	818	-	-	-	6579
12.	Serai Miranshah		3663	- do -	443	-	-	-	3663
13.	Vill:Miranshah	1	3776	- do -	429	-	-	-	3776
14.	" " "	2	3778	- do -	435	-	-	-	3778
15.	Match Factory		7501	- do -	809	-	-	-	7501
16.	Batti	1	9226	- do -	1040	-	-	-	9226
17.	" " "	2	7972	- do -	885	-	-	-	7972
18.	Gnashma	1	8862	- do -	1028	-	-	-	8862
19.	" " "	2	4888	- do -	535	-	-	-	4888
20.	Qatab Khel		7242	- do -	796	-	-	-	7242
21.	Mir Ali		4828	- do -	540	-	-	-	4828
22.	Jossai		1501	- do -	164	-	-	-	1501
23.	Sinwam		5691	- do -	859	-	-	-	5691
24.	Shiga		6543	- do -	882	-	-	-	6543
25.	Sirai		6546	- do -	937	-	-	-	6546
26.	Dwaghundi		6094	- do -	803	-	-	-	6094

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTT/AGENCY.	NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.	NEW ARRIVAL.	HIGHWAY FROM WHICH MIGRATED.	TOTAL FAMILIES.	BIRTH.	DEATH.	MOVEMENT.	TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEES.
27.	Bado Zirat	7680	-	-do-	993	-	-	-	7680
28.	Godiwala	8882	-	-do-	1183	-	-	-	8882
29.	" " "	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
30.	Mohd Khel	9418	-	-do-	1179	-	-	-	9418
31.	" " "	7700	-	-do-	974	-	-	-	7700
TOTAL:-		189234	-	-	22868	-	-	-	189234
ORKZAI.									
1.	Mullah Patai	8521	8	-do-	1230	-	-	-	8529
2.	Ghilgo	6080	-	-do-	994	-	-	-	6080
TOTAL :-		14601	8	-	2224	-	-	-	14609
PESHAWAR.									
1.	Nasir Bagh	6826	7	-do-	951	-	-	-	6833
2.	" " "	7156	-	-do-	1112	-	-	-	7156
3.	Kacha Gari	7722	96	-do-	1030	-	-	-	7818
4.	" " "	5193	-	-do-	755	-	-	-	5193
5.	" " "	5450	-	-do-	743	-	-	108	5342
6.	" " "	4662	-	-do-	683	-	-	-	4662
7.	" " "	4792	28	-do-	674	-	-	-	4813
8.	" " "	5940	-	-do-	1735	-	-	-	5940
9.	Warsak/Machani	15327	63	-do-	9232	-	-	41	15379
10.	Khazana/Naguman	4231	82	-do-	1137	-	-	-	4313
11.	Badaber	3862	-	-do-	572	-	-	-	3862
12.	" " "	4148	11	-do-	584	-	-	9	4150
13.	" " "	4323	-	-do-	688	-	-	-	4323
14.	" " "	5073	-	-do-	776	-	-	-	5073
15.	" " "	10199	-	-do-	5177	-	-	-	10199
16.	Mera Kachori	5812	-	-do-	992	-	-	20	5792
17.	" " "	6324	11	-do-	927	-	-	-	6331
18.	" " "	4356	27	-do-	627	-	-	-	4383
19.	Dag Baisud	8080	-	-do-	1033	-	-	81	7999
20.	" " "	6398	25	-do-	833	-	-	-	6423
21.	Kababian	3524	-	-do-	842	-	-	-	3524
22.	" " "	4674	-	-do-	655	-	-	-	4674
23.	" " "	3518	-	-do-	496	-	-	-	3518
24.	" " "	4349	6	-do-	634	-	-	-	4355
25.	" " "	4496	-	-do-	632	-	-	-	4496
26.	Peshawar No.	4339	-	-do-	528	-	-	-	4339
27.	" " "	4637	-	-do-	607	-	-	-	4637
28.	" " "	4515	-	-do-	679	-	-	-	4515
29.	" " "	4315	-	-do-	641	-	-	6	4309
30.	" " "	4377	-	-do-	592	-	-	-	4377
31.	" " "	4578	-	-do-	634	-	-	-	4578
32.	" " "	DISBANDED
33.	" " "	4234	-	-do-	565	-	-	128	4106
34.	" " "	2387	-	-do-	326	-	-	-	2387
35.	" " "	4039	-	-do-	536	-	-	167	3872
36.	" " "	4620	-	-do-	596	-	-	-	4620
37.	" " "	4814	-	-do-	570	-	-	-	4814
38.	" " "	5592	-	-do-	764	-	-	-	5592
39.	" " "	5575	-	-do-	827	-	-	7	5568
40.	" " "	6135	-	-do-	891	-	-	13	6122
41.	" " "	5064	-	-do-	692	-	-	19	5045
42.	" " "	4185	-	-do-	535	-	-	-	4185
43.	Jalozai	8149	-	-do-	989	-	-	-	8149
44.	" " "	5425	-	-do-	696	-	-	-	5425
45.	" " "	5467	-	-do-	661	-	-	27	5440
46.	" " "	5576	-	-do-	1568	-	-	-	5576
47.	" " "	4914	-	-do-	587	-	-	-	4914
48.	Aza Khel	3391	-	-do-	507	-	-	-	3391
49.	" " "	4559	-	-do-	558	-	-	-	4559
50.	Nosehra	3955	10	-do-	537	-	-	-	3965
51.	Khair.A/Kund/Akora.	5206	-	-do-	940	-	-	-	5206

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE CAMP LOCATION & DISTT/AGENCY.	NO. OF REFUGEES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.	NEW ARRIVALS.	AFGHAN PROVINCIALS FROM WHERE MIGRATED	TOTAL FAMILIES.	BIR-TH.	DEA-TH.	MOV-MENT.	TOTAL POPULATION REFUGEES.	
52.	Charsadda	1	3222	11	-do-	426	-	-	3233	
53.	" " "	2	3860	-	-do-	550	-	-	3860	
54.	" " "	3	4313	-	-do-	580	-	-	4313	
55.	Utmanzai		3517	-	-do-	535	-	-	3517	
56.	Hajizai		5285	53	-do-	766	-	-	5338	
57.	Munda		6489	-	-do-	1053	-	-	6489	
58.	Defence/Police		5641	-	-do-	840	-	-	5641	
59.	Nasir Bagh(Special)		2738	-	-do-	380	-	-	2738	
TOTAL:-			301548	419		55676	-	-	596	301371

SWAT.

1.	Bunner	2340	4189	-do-	996	-	-	-	6529
TOTAL:-		2340	4189	-	996	-	-	-	6529

S U M M A R Y

SL. NO.	NAME OF THE DISTT/AGENCY.	MEN	WOMEN	CHILDREN	TOTAL
1.	BAJOUR.	49546	57133	90834	197513
2.	BANNU.	9913	11067	29664	50644
3.	CHITRAL.	7648	6422	10110	24180
4.	DIR.	21202	28174	46169	95545
5.	D.I.KHAN.	23626	31068	55571	110267
6.	KOHAT.	48782	53087	74706	175945
7.	KURRAM	81877	76398	119506	277781
8.	KEYBER.	3951	4794	16980	25732
9.	MANSEHRA.	16970	26355	69212	112537
10.	MOHMAND.	10223	11517	18714	40454
11.	MARDAN.	45037	54391	127817	237245
12.	MALIKAND.	1300	4272	7119	12691
13.	N.WAZIRISTAN.	49734	46406	93094	189234
14.	S.WAZIRISTAN.	9915	13176	27237	50328
15.	ORAKZAI.	2973	4556	7072	14601
16.	PESHAWAR.	97715	95922	107734	301371
17.	SWAT.	1035	1950	3544	6529
TOTAL:-		481454	536688	904453	1922595
18.	ABBOTTABAD.	-	-	-	180268
G.TOTAL:-				2102863

210,2865

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1. The Secretary to Governor, NWFP.,
2. The Secretary to Govt: of NWFP., Home & Tribal Affairs Department.
3. The Inter Service Intelligence Field Department.
4. The Office of the UNHCR Peshawar.
5. The Director (Relief Operation) Chief Commissioner, Afghan Refugees, SAFRON Islamabad.
6. The Director Food NWFP., Peshawar
7. The WFP Adviser (Emergency) H.No.2, Street 87-F/6/3 P.O.Box 1051, Islamabad Pakistan.
8. The Additional Commissioner(S) Afghan Refugees, Peshawar.
9. Mr. Shaik Abdul Khaliq O.S.D Afghan Refugees Pesh:.
10. Additional Commissioner, (E) Afghan Refugees, Pesh:.

Arbab

(DOST MOHAMMAD ARBAB)
Administrator, Afghan Refugees,
N.W.F.P., Peshawar.

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From : The Commissioner, Afghan Refugees Organisation,
Baluchistan, Quetta.

To : The Secretary, Government of Pakistan States & F.R.
Division Islamabad.

Memorandum No. 5-RC(S)/82.
Dated Quetta, the 01 November, 1962.

Subject: STRENGTH OF AFGHAN REFUGEES IN BALUCHISTAN PROVINCE.

The latest camp-wise figures of Afghan Refugees in
Baluchistan Province for the fortnight ending 31-10-62 are as under:-

S.No.	Camps.	Previously reported.	New arrivals.	Migrated from.	No. of families.	Deaths.	Births.	Movements.	Total Strength.
<u>DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR, QUETTA.</u>									
1.	MUhammad Khel I&II.	24896	-	-	4211	-	-	-	24096
2.	Muhammad Khel III.	20609	-	-	3200	-	-	-	20609
3.	Muhammad Khel IV.	10667	-	-	2200	-	-	-	10667
<u>CHAMAN SUB DIVISION.</u>									
4.	Maku Kach.	13334	-	-	1939	-	-	-	13334
5.	Larra.	12886	-	-	1793	-	-	-	12886
6.	Roghani.	11898	-	-	1635	-	-	-	11898
7.	Tor Tangi.	8876	-	-	1186	-	-	-	8876
8.	Abshar.	7192	-	-	962	-	-	-	7192
Total :		<u>109558</u>	-	-	<u>17126</u>	-	-	-	<u>109558</u>

<u>DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR, PESHAWAR.</u>									
1.	Surkhab I & II.	19566	-	-	1525	-	-	-	19566
2.	New camp Surkhab.	10185	-	-	-	-	-	-	10185
3.	Karez I & II.	17061	-	-	2848	-	-	-	17061
4.	Hadira I & II.	25976	-	-	4166	-	-	-	25976
5.	Kach I & II.	17058	-	-	2390	-	-	-	17058
6.	Chowki I & II.	15888	-	-	2539	-	-	-	15888
7.	Ziarat I & II.	20836	-	-	2806	-	-	-	20836
8.	Killa Abdullah I & II.	17788	-	-	2591	-	-	-	17788
9.	Jungle Piralezai I-II.	27068	-	-	4693	-	-	-	27068
10.	Jungle Piralezai I-V.	61359	-	-	10532	-	-	-	61359
11.	New Camp Jungle Piralezai.	13319	-	-	1834	-	-	-	13319
12.	Sarman.	22246	-	-	3178	-	-	-	22246
13.	Gulistan.	20839	-	-	3275	-	-	-	20839
Total:-		<u>289189</u>	-	-	<u>45298</u>	-	-	-	<u>289189</u>

<u>DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR ZHOB/ LORALAI AT LORALAI.</u>									
<u>ZHOB DISTRICT.</u>									
1.	Malgagai I	10753	-	-	1893	-	-	-	10753
2.	Malgagai II.	10865	-	-	1922	-	-	-	10865
3.	Malgagai III.	9993	-	-	1562	-	-	-	9993
4.	Malgagai IV.	11502	-	-	1768	-	-	*1052	10450
Total:		<u>43113</u>	-	-	<u>7145</u>	-	-	<u>1052</u>	<u>42061</u>

Note: *1052 Afghan Refugees have been shifted from RTV Malgagai IV to RTV Spaidar of Loralai District.

S.No.	Camps.	Previous reported	New arrival.	Migrated from.	No. of families.	Dea- the- ties.	Bar- the- ties.	Mo- the- ties.	Total
LORLAI DISTRICT.									
5.	Zar Karez I.	7530	3102	Shifted from RTV Mekhter wal.	1800	-	-	-	10632
6.	Zar Karez II.	7106	-	-	1010	-	-	-	7106
7.	Ghazghai Manara.	9492	-	-	1682	-	-	-	9492
8.	Ghazghai Wal.	3167	-	-	514	-	-	-	3167
9.	Ghazghai Tak.	6790	-	-	1109	-	-	-	6790
10.	Spider.	5187	1052	Shifted from RTV Malgugai IV.	947	-	-	-	6239
11.	Makhter Wal.	3102	-	-	380	-	-	*3102	-
12.	Katwai.	5823	-	-	915	-	-	-	5823
	Total:	48197	4154		8357			3102	49249

Note: RTV Makhter Wal has been closed and Afghan Refugees have been shifted to RTV Zar Karez I.

DISTRICT ADMINISTRATORS CHAGAI AT NUSAKI.

1.	Umer Chah	11339	-	-	2267	-	-	-	11339
2.	Girdi Jungle I-II.	15384	-	-	2817	-	-	-	15384
3.	Okar I-II.	18253	-	-	3267	-	-	-	18253
4.	Chagai.	9670	-	-	1750	-	-	-	9670
5.	Peshook I-II.	16840	-	-	5402	-	-	-	16840
6.	Gillachah.	10241	-	-	1785	-	-	-	10241
7.	Makantak	11762	-	-	2153	-	-	-	11762
8.	Posti I.	9960	-	-	1882	-	-	-	9960
9.	Posti II.	9447	-	-	1986	-	-	-	9447
10.	Amri.	10955	-	-	1832	-	-	-	10955
11.	Lajee Karez.	15589	-	-	3023	-	-	-	15589
	Total:	139440			26064				139440

GRAND TOTAL: 629497 4154 103990 412823

Name of District.	Male.	Female.	Children.	Total.
Quetta.	24685	33797	51076	109558
Pishin.	53290	58039	177860	289189
Zhob.	14000	16632	11429	42061
Loralai.	11602	13815	23832	49249
Chagai.	24657	30782	84001	139440
Total:	128234	153065	348198	629497

Phikarajee
for Commissioner, Afghan Refugees
Baluchistan, Quetta.

FAK - 1199 EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE TO AFGHAN REFUGEES

FIELD MONITORING REPORT - PAF/PESHAWAR

Distt./Agency _____ Report No. _____

Period Covered _____ 19__

PART A - DATA/INFORMATION - DISTRICT/AGENCY

1. GOP Officials Met :

DATE OF VISIT	NAME	POSITION/DESIGNATION

1.1 GOP Officials Absent :

DATE OF VISIT	NAME & POSITION	REASON FOR ABSENCE

2. Follow-up Pending Matters as of Last Visit on _____ 19__ :

DATE	NATURE/TYPE OF PENDING MATTERS FOLLOWED UP	NATURE/TYPE OF ACTION TAKEN OR FURTHER FOLLOW UP SUGGESTED (specify names/dates)

2.1 Others Comments/Observations : -

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PAGE 1

Distc/Agency _____

Report No. _____

Page - 3

5. Population :

SOURCE	DATE	N U M B E R				T o t a l	R E M A R K S
		Families	Men	Women	Children		
Sitrep							
Dist/Asy							

5.1 Comments/Observations on Discrepancies, if any, Between Sitrep and District/Agency Figures .-

6. Diversion/Sale of WFP Commodities Noted, if any, Specifying Items, Quantities and Source, if known .-

7. Note Down Cases of Malpractices, if any, by ARs/Staff, Specifying Names, Nature of Cases, and Action Taken by GCF Officials concerned .-

8. Action Taken/Solution Recommended by FOs on Deficiencies Noted/Problems Encountered During Field Visit .-

DATE OF VISIT	SUMMARY OF DEFICIENCIES NOTED/PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED	ACTIONS TAKEN/SOLUTIONS RECOMMENDED (dates, names & position of GCF officials concerned)

9. Other Comments/Observations on :

a) Refugee - related economic/social problems .-

PART A

Distt./Agency _____

Report No. _____

Page - 4

b) Progress of re-enumeration/verification .-

c) Adequacy of staffing, specifically those handling food, and rate of turn-over .-

d) Any significant events/developments .-

9. Matters for Follow-up Action by Sub-office :

SUMMARY OF MATTERS FOR FOLLOW-UP	RECOMMENDED ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN	TYPE/NATURE OF ACTIONS TAKEN AND DATES
----------------------------------	---------------------------------	--

cc : WFP/Islamabad

Note : Part B of this form
refers to individual
HTV data/information
Being filed separately

Submitted by: _____

Date : _____

PART B DATA/INFORMATION - RV

Distt./Agency _____ Report No. _____ Date : 1) Visit _____ 19__

Period Covered _____ 19__ 2) RV Estab-
lished _____ 19__

Name of : 1) RV _____
2) VA _____
3) Area Adm. _____
4) Dist/Agy Adm. _____

RV Food Staff		
Post Sanctioned	Date Filled	REMARKS
Food Assistant		
Storekeeper		
Junior Clerk		
Peon/Chowkidar		

1. Commodity Receipt/Lifting from Distt./Agency Stores/DFC Godowns Since Last Visit :

PERIOD COVERED		COMMODITY	QUANTITY (KGS)		REMARKS
Last Visit	Present Visit		Receipt	Losses	
		Wheat			
		Sugar			
		E. oil			
		DSM			
		Tea			

2. Commodity Distribution Since Last Visit :

PERIOD COVERED		NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES	COMMODITY	QUANTITY (KGS)			REMARKS
Last Visit	Present Visit			Distribution	Losses	Balance	
			Wheat				
			Sugar				
			E. oil				
			DSM				
			Tea				

2.1 Comments/Observations :

a) Discrepancies, if any, between book balances and stocks on hand :

b) Reasons/Causes for Losses, if any, and steps taken to prevent/minimise its recurrence : -

c) System/mode of distribution through Family Head (), Malik (), Representative () or any other arrangement (indicate briefly) : -

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PART B

Dist/AGY _____ HV _____

Report No. _____ Page 2

3. Population

SOURCE	DATE	Tents	Katcha Houses	Families	Men	Women	Children	Total	REMARKS
Sitrep									
Dist/AGY									
HV									
Others									

3.1 Comments/Observations :

4. Births and Deaths, Indicating Period Covered, Number, and Causes of Death .-

5. Health/Nutrition Problem Noted, if any .-

6. Livestock, Indicating Kind and Number, if Data are available .-

7. Adequacy and Timeliness of Documentation, Recording and Reporting .-

8. Operational Problem, i.e., Transport, Storage, Distribution, etc.-

9. Other Comments/Observations .-

Submitted by : _____

Date : _____

RAILWAY GODOWN REPORT

Date of Report 26th October, 1982.
Period reported 26th Sept: to 25th October, 1982.

A-1 EDIBLE OIL UNLOADED IN QUETTA RAILWAY GODOWN.

Item	Date of Arrival (Unloading)	Wagon Number	Booked	Received	Damaged	Empty	Shortage	Excess	Remarks.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Oil drums	14th Oct: 1982	61360	101	100	1	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	75547	101	100	1	-	-	-	" "
"	"	65946	101	101	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	65843	106	105	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	66752	101	100	1	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	61186	101	101	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	55278	106	106	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
	TOTAL	7	717	713	4	-	-	-	
Oil drums	10th Oct: 1982	60122	96	93	3	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	74318	100	99	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	62889	100	100	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	38287	100	100	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	46304	100	99	1	-	-	-	" "
"	"	76562	100	97	3	-	-	-	" "
"	"	38651	100	100	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	75584	100	99	1	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	8	796	787	9	-	-	-	

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Oil drums	27th Sept:1982	69554	57	56	1	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
	TOTAL	1	57	56	1	-	-	-	-	
Oil drums	8th Oct:1982	53204	110	410	-	-	-	-	-	UNKNOWN
"	"	71003	100	98	1	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	63320	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	63819	100	96	4	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	66322	100	98	2	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	61184	100	100	-	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	62338	100	99	-	-	1	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	71914	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	60328	100	99	-	-	1	-	-	" "
"	"	71996	110	110	-	-	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	72021	100	99	-	-	1	-	-	" "
"	"	39449	100	97	2	-	1	-	-	" "
"	"	11711	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	68271	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	68213	100	100	-	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	70921	100	100	-	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	62955	100	97	-	3	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	62378	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	62676	100	98	1	1	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	19	1920	1896	15	5	4	-	-	

(Contd: on P/3)

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	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11 drums	13th Oct:1982	71863	100	99	-	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	62977	110	110	-	-	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	53613	101	99	2	-	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	44641	128	125	2	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	70918	100	97	2	1	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	5	539	530	6	3	-	-	-	
11 drums	4th Oct:1982	C-65558	101	100	-	1	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	C-61344	101	101	-	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	C-70943	101	97	4	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	C-55215	100	98	1	1	-	-	-	" "
"	"	C-45662	101	97	4	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	C-54136	101	99	2	-	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	6	605	592	11	2	-	-	-	
11 drums	21st Oct:1982	73912	100	98	2	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	55716	106	106	-	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	64290	101	99	1	1	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	71695	100	100	-	-	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	55145	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	STONEWALL JACKSON
"	"	72166	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	75210	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	39172	100	99	1	-	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	8	807	799	7	1	-	-	-	

(CONTD:ON P/4)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Oil drums	20th Oct:1982	76158	100	99	1	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	72134	105	102	2	1	-	-	PRESIDENT HOORER
"	"	47966	105	105	-	-	-	-	" "
"	"	38393	100	97	-	3	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	63245	105	105	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	66525	100	100	-	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	74526	100	100	-	-	-	-	PRESIDENT GRANT
"	"	46658	100	99	1	-	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	65844	106	105	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	70354	100	101	-	1	-	2	" "
	TOTAL	10	1021	1013	5	5	-	2	
Oil drums	19th Oct:1982	70561	100	99	-	1	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
	TOTAL	1	100	99	-	1	-	-	
	24th Oct:1982	70348	100	95	3	2	-	-	BANGLAR KAKOLI
"	"	54933	106	105	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT TYLER
"	"	60811	105	105	-	-	-	4	ROBERT LEE
"	"	60339	105	103	2	-	-	-	" "
"	"	36159	105	100	5	-	-	1	" "
"	"	54115	105	102	2	-	1	-	" "
"	"	53482	105	104	1	-	-	-	PRESIDENT HOOVER
"	"	55600	105	104	1	-	-	-	" "
	TOTAL	8	836	818	15	2	1	2	
	TOTAL UNLOADED	73	7398	7303	73	19	5	2	

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1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
EDIBLE OIL	5th October, 1982	65895	886	867	11 Ctns 4tins	-	7Ctns 4tins	-	City of London
"	"	71602	886	830	6 Ctns	-	46 Ctns	-	-do-
	Total.	-	1772	1697	17	-	53	-	

Appendix L Agreement -
Amended each time
new commitment made

PAK 1199

Dear Mr. Shah,

LETTER OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME AND THE GOV. GOVT OF PAKISTAN IN CONNECTION WITH PROJECT 1199, 2 JULY 1968 AND AGREEMENT CONCERNING ASSISTANCE IN RELIEF OF HOMELAND REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN LIVING IN CAMP IN BALEKISTAN AND THE NORTH WEST FRONTIER PROVINCE.

As the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (hereinafter called "the Government") and the United Nations/FAO World Food Programme (hereinafter referred to as "WFP") have entered into a basic agreement concerning assistance from WFP on 25 July 1968 and as the Government has now submitted a request dated 13th September 1970 for emergency food assistance in connection with the relief of homeland refugees from Afghanistan, the Director General of WFP has, upon the recommendation of the Executive Director of WFP, approved a grant of emergency aid for 185,000 persons for a period of six months.

WFP will make available to the Government the following commodities at a total cost to WFP of US\$ 5,135,000 including US\$ 1,103,200 for freight and superintendence up to Karachi ports:

- (i) 15,984 metric tons of wheat
- (ii) 999 metric tons of edible oil
- (iii) 643 metric tons of Dry Skimmed Milk
- (iv) 1,332 metric tons of pulses which will be acquired by exchanging up to 2634 metric tons of the above 15,984 metric tons wheat.

With regard to this assistance it will be greatly appreciated if you can kindly confirm acceptance of the following points:

1. The above mentioned commodities will be distributed to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan in accordance with the following daily rations:

/.....

Commodity	Grammes per day	No. of beneficiariss	Duration of the feeding (days)	Total quantity (MT)
Wheat	400	185,000	130	13,320
Edible Oil	30	185,000	180	999
Pulses	40	185,000	130	1,332
D.S.Milk	30	120,000*	180	648

*Only for 70,000 aged and 50,000 children.

2. The Government will be responsible for prompt discharge from vessels at the port of Karachi, immediate clearance through customs, adequate storage, inland transportation, and distribution of commodities supplied by WFP for the aforesaid relief programme. From the point of delivery by WFP all expenses, including taxes and duties, will be borne by the Government. The responsibility of the Government will include the provision in the appropriate budget of the equivalent of Rs. 7.6 million to meet the cost of staff handling the emergency and the costs of unloading, clearance, transport, storage of commodities, maintenance of relief camps, either from its own sources or any other bilateral or multilateral sources.

3. The Government hereby designates the Cabinet Division as executing agency for the implementation of the emergency programme. This agency will also be responsible for the necessary reporting and will act as the channel of communication between the Government and WFP. At the provincial level, the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in NWFP and the Secretary, Home Department, Government of Baluchistan/ the Commissioner of Quetta Division will be responsible in their respect provinces.

4. Commodities will be distributed free of charge and without discrimination to the refugees at distribution points to be agreed in consultation between the Government of Pakistan and the UNHCR and WFP representatives.

5. The purpose and the duration of the assistance will not be modified without the prior concurrence of WFP.

/9000

6. The Government will maintain accounts of the total receipts and the allocations made to each relief camp, as well as full accounts of distribution at each location. The Government will submit final accounts to WFP Headquarters at the conclusion of the emergency relief programme, duly audited by a Government auditor or other authorized officer.

7. The Government will provide implementation reports every month and on the termination of project operations, including the quantity of commodities received, the amounts allocated to each relief camp, the total amount of each commodity distributed to the beneficiaries, indicating cumulative quantities from the beginning of the operation ^{1/} up to the end of the period under review, the manner and the machinery employed for distribution, rations issued per person per day, the number of beneficiaries receiving commodities, and stocks on hand at the end of the period under review. The report will show losses, if any, and their causes, and indicate the measures taken to prevent recurrence.

8. The quantities of commodities borrowed, if and when authorized by WFP, should be recorded by the Government with an indication of the source from which it was borrowed, and should be repaid immediately upon receipt of the WFP commodities delivered for the emergency.

9. The Government will provide a final report on the termination of the emergency operation. This report should indicate, inter alia, the total quantities of commodities received, the distribution at each location, the total number of beneficiaries, the balances left over, if any, the difficulties encountered and the benefits derived from the assistance provided by WFP.

10. WFP officials will be allowed to travel freely to Afghan refugee camp sites, as and when necessary, in consultation with the Commissioners, for the purposes of monitoring the project operation, inspection of the commodities in warehouses, and the distribution of the commodities to the beneficiaries. WFP may also appoint additional representatives, one in each province, to be based at Quetta and Peshawar.

1/ For the purpose of this letter of understanding, the beginning of the operation of an emergency relief operation is the date of the first distribution of WFP commodities.

11. Any part of the commodities provided by UNF that remains unused at the end of the emergency operation will be placed at the disposal of UNF by the Government for such use within the country or elsewhere as UNF may decide. For this purpose, such unused commodities shall be placed at the disposal of UNF at the point of entry into the country, at which the Government took delivery, or at some other port or border station mutually agreeable to the Government and UNF, it being understood that UNF may designate a different location within the country in respect of any commodities which are to be used for UNF-aided development projects or for non-emergency relief operations in the country. The Government shall be responsible for making all necessary arrangements for, and bearing the costs arising from, the transport and storage of such commodities.

12. To promote recognition of UNF and its activities, the Government will arrange for appropriate public information action to be taken at the time UNF commodities are received and being distributed.

I am sending you this letter of understanding in five copies and would ask you kindly to return three copies, duly countersigned on behalf of the Government, as confirmation that it is in agreement with the above provisions.

Yours sincerely,

J. Priestley
 J. J. Priestley
 Representative of UNF and
 Resident Representative of
 United Nations Development
 Programme in Pakistan.

Asad Ali Shah
 Counter signed

Asad Ali Shah

Additional Secretary

Cabinet Division

Government of Pakistan

Dated 18 November, 1977

Selected WFP/GOP Exchanges on NWFP
Refugee-Related Problems
(March 81 - Sept. 82)

<u>Type of Problem Noted</u>	<u>Action Taken by GOP</u>
Unauthorized sale of edible oil (tins) increasing.	Order to District/Agency Administrators to exercise vigilance, keep shopkeepers under surveillance.
Improper distribution/storage of commodities for "free-livers" (refugees not resident in camps).	Order to District/Agency Administrators to store in/distribute from Refugee Villages.
Food distribution through maliks.	
Mardan problems: (1) overreporting of food distribution, (2) loss of DSM between warehouse and camp; (3) preferential distribution to refugees in dispersed areas.	(1) Order to Dist./Ag. Admins. to give accurate count, holding them personally responsible; (2) Directive to Dist. Admin. to conduct inquiry.
Stockpiling in Chitral; inadequate long-term storage.	Request to Dep. Commissioner to take action; follow-up action noted.
Double registration; lax registration process causing inflation of figures.	WFP noted action taken through re-enumeration.
Peshawar, Mardan, Mohmand problems: registration inflation; sale of commodities (esp. oil); lack of WFP access to go-downs controlled by parties; distribution to parties from go-downs; sale/misappropriation of commodities by staff; distribution to unregistered refugees; overdistribution.	WFP noted all staff accused of misappropriation under investigation or arrested.
Re-enumeration/verification process (double/triple registration e.g., Bannu).	No direct action taken but WFP noted re-enumeration proceeding
Failure by some to implement policy of distribution through family heads.	
Error in figures in situation report.	
Information needed on sudden influx of refugees, Haripur.	Info. provided.
Commodity losses/improper disposal practices, Kamran.	

Type of Problem Noted

Action Taken by GOP

Prompt submission of accurate food distribution reports by districts/agencies.

Distribution of Saudi-contributed dates to parties.

Local Pakistanis registered as refugees.

Transportation delays to refugee villages and other such operational problems.

Short delivery of wheat; oil drums with water.

Distribution through maliks resulting in local sale (Abbotabad, Mansehra).

Designation of specific district/agency officials authorized to withdraw wheat and sugar from Food Dept. stocks.

WFP noted some administrators attempting resolve by shifting villages to other areas and re-counting.

WFP noted some correctives underway.

Order sent that practice stop.

Team noted this had been done.

AVERAGE MONTHLY EXPENDITURE PER HEAD

(GAP Estimates)

Sr	ITEM	DETAILS / SCALE	COST(Rs)	SOURCE	%age
1.	CASH ALLCE	PER HEAD/PER MONTH	50	PAK GOVT	100%
2.	FOOD BASKET [2100 CALORIES] [70 Gms PROTEIN]	WHEAT-500 DSM - 30 Gms E/OIL- 30 PER HEAD SUGAR- 20 PER DAY TEA - 3	50	WFP UNHCR BILATERAL PVOs	70% 15% 10% 5%
3.	HOUSEHOLD RELIEF ITEMS	CLOTH -8 m/HEAD F/WEAR -1 PAIR/HEAD BLANKETS-1/HEAD QUILTS -1/HEAD TENTS -1/7 PERSONS UTENCILS-1 SET/FAMILY	30	UNHCR BILATERAL PVOs	70% 15% 15%
4.	INDIRECT ASSISTANCE	MEDICARE EDUCATION WATER SUPPLY SELF RELIANCE AGRICULTURE LOGISTIC SUPPORT INLAND TRANSPORTATION	20	PAK GOVT UNHCR BILATERAL PVOs	15% 60% 10% 15%
TOTAL COST PER HEAD PER MONTH			150	PAK GOVT UNHCR WFP BILATERAL PVOs	36% 28% 23% 7% 6%

UNHCR Budget & Programs in Pakistan

A/AC.96/606

page 447

DEPENSES DU HCR AU PAKISTAN*(en millions de dollars des Etats-Unis)*

Source des fonds et type d'assistance	1981 Montant engagé	1982		1983 Allocations demandées/ projections
		Crédits approuvés/ estimations initiales	Allocations révisées/ estimations	
<u>PROGRAMMES GENERAUX</u>				
<u>Assistance à fins multiples</u>	89,710.9	70,132.0	70,132.0	74,654.0
<u>Réinstallation</u>	18.9 ^a	-	-	-
<u>Rapatriement librement consenti</u>	1.5 ^a	-	-	-
<u>Assistance juridique</u>	0.6 ^a	-	-	-
<u>Aide d'appoint</u>	22.0 ^a	-	100.0 ^a	500.0
<u>Appui au programme et administration</u>	719.0	922.1	936.7	994.0
Total partiel (1)	90,472.9	71,054.1	71,168.7	76,148.0
<u>PROGRAMMES SPECIAUX</u>				
<u>Compte d'éducation</u>	38.3	66.0	205.0	394.0
<u>Autres fonds fiduciaires</u>				
<u>Santé</u>	13.9	-	54.1	-
<u>Vivres</u>	17,088.4	-	11,875.0	-
<u>Transports</u>	81.0	-	20.4	-
<u>Assistance à fins multiples</u>	1,756.3	-	-	-
<u>Reboisement</u>	-	-	-	1,916.4
<u>Appui au programme et administration</u>	31.7	36.4	37.2	39.9
Total partiel (2)	19,009.6	102.4	12,191.7	2,350.3
Total (1-2)	109,482.5	71,156.5	83,360.4	78,498.3
BUDGET ORDINAIRE (3)	-	-	85.9	109.1
TOTAL GENERAL (1-2)	109,482.5	71,156.5	83,446.3	78,607.4

^a/ Engagements imputés sur les allocations globales

ANALYSE DES ACTIVITES D'ASSISTANCE POUR 1983

PAKISTAN

<p><u>PROGRAMMES GENERAUX</u></p> <p>type d'activité</p>	<p>description</p>	<p>nouvelle</p>	<p>poursuivie</p>	<p>transfert des responsabilités/ clôture</p>	<p>montant prévu en dollars des Etats-Unis</p>
<p>Assistance à fins multiples</p>	<p>Assistance à un groupe estimé à 2,3 millions de réfugiés d'Afghanistan dans les secteurs suivants:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Aide alimentaire d'appoint - Entreposage - Hébergement - Santé - Vêtements et chaussures - Courtepointes - Combustible - Approvisionnement en eau - Services vétérinaires - Activités génératrices de revenus et formation - Education - Véhicules - Hébergement du personnel administratif - Appui logistique - Divers 		<p>x</p>		<p>10,800,000</p> <p>700,000</p> <p>13,400,000</p> <p>7,700,000</p> <p>9,000,000</p> <p>2,800,000</p> <p>8,400,000</p> <p>2,900,000</p> <p>900,000</p> <p>1,200,000</p> <p>3,100,000</p> <p>200,000</p> <p>300,000</p> <p>7,500,000</p> <p>5,754,000</p>

ANALYSE DES ACTIVITES D'ASSISTANCE POUR 1983

PAKISTAN

<u>PROGRAMMES GENERAUX</u> type d'activité	description	nouvelle	poursuivie	transfert des responsabilités/ clôture	montant prévu en dollars des Etats-Unis
Aide d'appoint	Assistance à des réfugiés afghans en attente de réinstallation, et à d'autres cas isolés, surtout iraniens. <u>1/</u>		x		500,000
<u>PROGRAMMES SPECIAUX</u> Compte d'éducation	Bourses pour quelque 250 étudiants afghans et 100 autres cas isolés dans des institutions techniques ou de troisième cycle.		x		394,000
Reboisement	Reboisement et projets de conservation des sols afin d'atténuer ou de réparer les dommages causés à l'environnement par le bétail appartenant aux réfugiés. <u>2/</u>		x		1,916,400

1/ L'assistance à de tels cas isolés était auparavant imputée à l'allocation globale
2/ Imputé auparavant aux programmes généraux

PAKISTAN

ANALYSE DE L'APPUI AUX PROGRAMMES ET DEPENSES D'ADMINISTRATION

I. ESTIMATIONS INITIALES POUR 1983 PAR SOURCE DES FONDS ET OBJET DE DEPENSE

(En milliers de dollars des Etats-Unis)

Objet de Source des fonds	Dépenses de personnel a/	Frais de voyage	Services Contrac- tuels	Dépenses générales fonction- nement	Autres dépenses b/	Total
Programmes généraux	766,1	86,1	-	115,6	26,2	994,0
Programmes spéciaux	39,9	-	-	-	-	39,9
Budget ordinaire	82,2	10,2	-	14,1	2,6	109,1
TOTAL	888,2	96,3	-	129,7	28,8	1.143,0

a/ Traitements et dépenses communes de personnel

b/ Fournitures et matériaux, meubles, matériels et contributions à des activités communes des Nations Unies

II. BESOINS EN PERSONNEL

(En nombre de postes)

Année	Source des fonds	Administrateurs et au-dessus						SG	AA	Total	
		D.2	D.1	P.5	P.4	P.3	P.2				Total
1982 Init.	Programmes généraux	-	1	1	3	5	-	10	26	-	36
	Programmes spéciaux	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
	Budget ordinaire	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	TOTAL	-	1	2	3	5	1	12	26	-	38
1982 Rev.	Programmes généraux	-	1	1	3	6	-	11	26	-	37
	Programmes spéciaux	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
	Budget ordinaire	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	TOTAL	-	1	2	3	6	1	13	26	-	39
1983 Init.	Programmes généraux	-	1	1	4	5	-	11	26	-	37
	Programmes spéciaux	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	1
	Budget ordinaire	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
	TOTAL	-	1	2	4	5	1	13	26	-	39



Refugee Bulletin



United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
House No 18, Street 18, Shalimar 7/3,
Islamabad Tel. 26001-5

1 August 1982

UNHCR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES IN PAKISTAN

Financial Overview

UNHCR has been assisting the Government of Pakistan in its efforts towards the care and maintenance of Afghan refugees since August 1979 soon after the first major influx was reported.

By the end of 1980 US \$74 million had been contributed in cash and kind.

During 1981 UNHCR approved a further US \$109.5 million for a wide range of assistance measures, again contributions were both in cash and in kind. Approximately two-thirds of the amount, the equivalent of US \$73.4 million, was earmarked for basic supplies and relief items. Basic supplies include sugar and tea given to supplement food rations provided by WFP, relief items such as shelter, (tents, tarpaulins and groundsheets), clothing, shoes and quilts as well as utensils and kerosene needed for cooking and heating purposes. In addition to the above US \$13.6 million was needed to meet the cost of health services, primary education in the refugee villages, for the provision of water and to cover veterinary services for livestock brought in by the refugees. US \$11.4 million was required for the construction and maintenance of storage and administrative buildings, for the purchase of vehicles and for the movement of refugees. US \$1.7 million was made available to start reforestation schemes and to encourage income generating projects. The remaining US \$9.4 million were mainly allocated for logistic support and administrative expenses of the Government and UNHCR. Certain sectors of the 1981 programme could not be fully implemented by the end of the year and as such a number of budget sectors had to be extended into 1982.

Only refugees living in officially recognized refugee villages are eligible for UNHCR assistance though supplementary food rations are also being provided to a limited number of refugees awaiting transfer to newly-established villages. UNHCR's assistance measures in 1982 have so far been budgetted on the planning average of 2.2 million beneficiaries and by the end of June obligations in cash and kind for 1982 had exceeded US \$51 million. This sum included US \$29 million for the continuation of the assistance programme directly implemented by the Government of Pakistan; a further US \$9.0 million for procurement by UNHCR of shelter material, as well as almost US \$12 million in form of a special donation of wheat to be distributed through WFP. Further allocations will shortly be required to cover the needs in the various sectors of the programme for the remainder of the year.

BRIEF REVIEW OF MAJOR ONGOING PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES

Shelter

- By the end of 1981, over 180,000 tents had been purchased by UNHCR and a further 40,000 by Voluntary Agencies. In 1982 UNHCR intends to provide an additional 30,000 tents, 22,000 tarpaulins and 80,000

groundsheets, partly needed for replacement and partly for distribution to newly arrived refugees. However emphasis is now shifting from providing tents to supplying tarpaulins and wooden beams needed as roofing materials for traditional "katcha" houses which the refugees are being encouraged to construct.

- Some refugees still need to be provided with quilts and 200,000 are now being ordered for distribution during the second half of 1982. Two pilot schemes are also being implemented in NWFP and Baluchistan to determine whether refugees can make their own quilts if they are provided with the necessary materials.

Supplementary Food Rations

- A recently concluded agreement with the Government provided funds for the local purchase of 2,500 MT of sugar. A further 2,100 MT purchased by UNHCR arrived in Karachi in early July 1982. To meet the needs until the end of the year, a further 7,000 MT of sugar are needed. Each refugee should receive 20 grams of sugar and 3 grams of tea per day to supplement the basic food rations supplied by WFP.

Health Care

- Static medical units are gradually replacing the tented dispensaries and the mobile health units. Each of these units will serve some 15,000 refugees and will be staffed by a doctor, a lady health visitor, a compounder and para-medical helpers. The staff will be accommodated in katcha type buildings which will form part of the village administrative blocks now under construction. Up to 180 medical units may eventually have to be maintained, a number of them with the support of the Voluntary Agencies active in the medical field.
- A UNHCR-supported Malaria Control Scheme will, inter alia, ensure spraying of refugee villages as from end July. Funds have been provided for staff, insecticides and 600 hand-operated sprayers. Protective clothing needed has been donated by a Voluntary Agency.
- Vaccination campaigns continue with the co-operation of UNICEF.
- A sanitation project which had been successfully carried out by a Voluntary Agency in refugee villages in Mardan and Peshawar districts is now being extended to other districts in NWFP for a further six months. UNHCR will fund the extension of the programme. Finding qualified sanitary inspectors has proved rather difficult but it is hoped that the formation of Public Health Units as part of primary health care will be completed before the end of the year.
- Thanks to a renewed contribution from a donor government, it will be possible to continue with the distribution of very beneficial high-protein biscuits to small children and pregnant women.
- The diagnosis and treatment of tuberculosis, as well as preventive health care will require increased attention in the months to come.

Efforts in the medical field will be strengthened by the recent appointment of a WHO/UNHCR Senior Health Co-ordinator for the Refugee Programme who is due to take up his assignment in early August 1982.

Education

- By the end of June 1982 nearly 60,000 refugee children had been enrolled in primary schools in refugee villages staffed by some

Water Supply

- Reports from NWFP indicate that water schemes for close to 50% of the refugee population in the province have either been completed or are under construction. A further 15% of the population rely on adequate natural sources; for the remaining, supply schemes still need to be designed.

Storage Facilities

- Out of a total of 81 warehouses with a storage capacity of 500MT each (61 in NWFP, 20 in Baluchistan), 55 are completed and in use. Another 16 are almost completed while work on the remaining 10 has fallen considerably behind schedule and these are only expected to be finished towards the end of the year. In addition to the above, small stores of the "katcha" type with CI-roofing are being built in many refugee villages for storage of limited stocks of relief items.

Kerosene Oil

- Lack of adequate infrastructure prevented a regular distribution of kerosene oil during the first half of 1982. Meanwhile storage tanks have been installed in almost all villages and refugees were issued stoves and plastic containers. A fleet of oil tankers, bought under the programme, has since started delivering kerosene oil from the provincial capitals to the villages. The regular distribution of kerosene should considerably reduce deforestation caused by refugees in search of firewood, though it is acknowledged that the impact of this measure is likely to vary depending on the area. It is hoped that much of the kerosene oil needed will become available through donations in kind, as funds for local purchase are very limited.

Reafforestation

- In 1980 four reafforestation projects were started in the Quetta Basin (Surkhab, Khaisar, Susnanama and Hazarjangi-Chiltan). Two further schemes were begun in 1982 in the districts of Zhob and Loralai. All schemes were initially designed for a 3-year period. In NWFP reafforestation projects were introduced in 1981 in four areas - Bannu, Kohat, Hazara and Swat. A new scheme was added in 1982 for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Income Generating and Skill Training Centres

- Since 1980 UNHCR has supported efforts to provide training facilities for refugees, thus far in the form of carpet weaving and mechanical training centres. Funds have been allocated for altogether 25 carpet weaving centres both in NWFP and Baluchistan, of which 19 centres are by now operational. Six mechanical workshops have been planned of which two are nearing completion in Baluchistan, the remaining being still under construction.

Resettlement

- Having been accepted by the Government of Turkey for resettlement, some 4,350 Afghan refugees will be leaving for Turkey during the month of August on 13 special flights organised with the financial assistance of UNHCR and in co-operation with the Intergovernmental Committee on Migration (ICM). A team of senior Turkish government officials has arrived in Pakistan to co-ordinate the final arrangements with the Pakistani authorities, UNHCR and ICM.

UPDATE ON REFUGEE POPULATION

At the end of May 1982, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan reported having registered a total of 2,762,000 refugees from Afghanistan of whom 2,175,000 were living in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), 561,000 in the Province of Baluchistan and an estimated 26,000 in other parts of the country. At the beginning of the year, Afghan refugees registered by the Government had numbered 2,375,000.

According to the Government's statistics, the refugees living in NWFP and Baluchistan comprise some 386,000 families and they are accommodated in almost 300 villages located in 22 districts and tribal agencies.

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Note: The Office of the UNHCR Chief of Mission in Pakistan intends to issue this Refugee Bulletin at intervals of 4-6 weeks.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Voluntary Agencies in Afghan Relief

VolAgs take on an important, although limited share of the relief burden, having provided some \$18 million in 1980 and \$20 million in 1981 to the relief effort. Most of their work is confined to the medical field. 15 VolAgs operate in the NWFP and three in Baluchistan. VolAgs are allotted districts by the GOP -- only one VolAg can operate in each district. GOP (under the Provincial Refugee and Health Commissioners) and UNHCR together coordinate the VolAgs. The following two tables describe the VolAgs currently operating in the NWFP and Baluchistan.

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN N.W.F.P.

Agency/Address	Incharge/Title	Brief description of activities	Area of operation
1. AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE 1-Tariq Lane, P.O. Box 489 GPO, Peshawar Cantt. Tel. 76084	Mr. Nasim Jawad Project Manager Mr. Ghulam Hassan Ms. Maryluce Sartori Project Administrator for sanitation. (3-Karakul Lane, University Town Peshawar) Tel. 41644	Two static dispensaries and one laboratory. Two female and two male teams providing curative treatment and preventive programmes Sanitation schemes through construction of pit latrines. Basic health instruction and distribution of some sanitary items.	<u>Mardan</u> Gandaf Baghicha <u>Peshawar</u> <u>Mardan</u> <u>Hazara</u>
2. CARITAS PAKISTAN C/o St. John's Church Circular Road Peshawar Cantt. Tel. 63119	Mr. John William	Shelter, Immunization, Artificial limbs.	No fix camp
3. DANISH REFUGEE COUNCIL C/o Austrian Relief Committee. Tel. 76084	Mrs. Inger W. Boesen	Investigation on feasibility of self-reliance and income-generating projects particularly for women.	<u>Mardan</u> Gandaf
4. GERMAN AGENCY FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION (GTZ) Hazara House Daraban Road D.I. Khan	Dr. Volker Dobra Mr. Michael Wolf	Three doctors and medical teams. Overall medical care in 6 camps. Vocational training. Assistance to local rural population.	<u>Dera Ismail Khan</u> Daraban Kurrai Pusha Pul Ratta Kulachi Naivala Girsal

Agency/Address	Incharge/Title	Brief description of activities	Area of operation
5. INTER-AID COMMITTEE 1-B, Chinar Road, University Town, Peshawar. Tel. 41918	Mr. Fred Innis Mr. Harrison Naszey	Five mobile health units. Educational programmes with supplies of books, stationary, etc. Tents, clothes and food supplies. Experimental stage in handicrafts for women.	<u>Peshawar</u> <u>Mansehra</u> <u>Abbottabad</u> <u>Mardan</u>
6. INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN AID Garhi House, off Abdara Road, University Town, Peshawar. Tel. 41332	Mr. Manuel Torres Mr. Pervez Sadiq	Assistance to refugee children in various schools (medical and financial). Tents, blankets, carpets and stationery. Gifts from sponsors (approximately 7,000 children enrolled).	<u>Peshawar</u> Kacha Garhi Nasir Bagh Badaber Khazana Kababian Aza Khel Adizai
7. INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, (IRC) 39-Sahibzada Abdul Qayyum Road, University Town, Peshawar. Tel. 41274	Mr. Mark Ice Administrator	Preventive and curative treatment with emphasis on T.B. Five mobile health units operating in 20 camps.	<u>Kohat</u>
8. PAKISTAN MEDICO INTERNATIONAL (SWA) 105-Gul Bahar Colony No. 2, Peshawar.	Dr. M.S. Boi Khan Director Mr. Jan Mohammad	Two medical mobile health units and two static dispensaries. Water supply for Dag Besud and Jalozei camps.	<u>Peshawar</u> Jalozei 1 & 2 Dag Besud Aza Khel
9. PAKISTAN RED CRESCENT Dabgari Gardens Peshawar. Tel. 74901	Lt. Col. (Retd) M.A. Shah, Secretary.	Medical services, health education, relief goods, transportation of wounded ARs.	<u>Peshawar</u>

Agency/Address	Incharge/Title	Brief description of activities	Area of operation -
10. SALVATION ARMY 9-B, Rafiqi Lane, Peshawar Cantt. Tel. 74545	Capt. David J. Burrows Divisional Officer	Preventive and curative medical cover.	<u>Abbottabad (Haripur)</u> Ghazi
11. SAUDI RED CRESCENT 9-Habibabad Tehkal Bala, Jamrud Road, Peshawar. Tel. 74264	Mr. M.R. Al Hartuni	Preventive and curative treatment (four dispensaries). General relief assistance, financial donations.	<u>Peshawar</u> Nasir Bagh Kacha Garhi <u>Abbottabad (Haripur)</u> Pania 1, 2 & 4
12. SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND 9-A, Shami Road Peshawar. Tel. 76657	Mr. C.J. K. Campbell Field Director	Three clinics (general practice, paediatrics, baby clinic).	<u>Peshawar</u> Badaber 1, 2 & 3.
13. SERVE 5-Mulberry Road, University Town P.O. Box 477 GPO Peshawar. Tel. 41706	Mr. Gordon Magney	Education 30 boys per year (literacy, carpet weaving). Health education booklets.	<u>Manshra</u> <u>Peshawar</u>
14. UNION AID House No. 4, Arbab Abdur Rauf Khan House, Canal Road, University Town, P.O. Box 428, Peshawar. Tel. 8072	Dr. Toryalay Nassery	Health Project with seven Health Units. Nutrition, liquid milk to refugee children. Artificial limbs section. First aid course. Handicrafts project. Food distribution section.	<u>Peshawar</u> Kababian, Utmanzai, Mechini, Mandapul, Khazana, Mora Baghbanu Naguman, Mir Kachori. <u>Mardan</u> Jalala Barakai

VOLUNTARY AGENCIES IN BALUCHISTAN.

1. AICF : (Action International Centre la Famine).

Person in Charge: (Vacant since 8/9/82).

Address : Al Galani Road
P.O. Box 319
Quetta.

Phone : 74478

Area of Operation: Health Sector.

AICF is mainly involved in programmes for women and children.
They train the Pakistani/Afghani Staff working with/for them.

Programmes:

I. At Pishin District Hospital.

a) Out-patient clinic.

b) Indoor treatment.

A 10-bedded ward at present used for women and children.

c) Lab. facilities. (lab. technician).

II. Mobile Team for the treatment of women and children at
Pir Alizai RV and Shurkhab RV.

AICF is planning to expand this programme. All plans ready
for the start of another Mobile Unit in the Loralai area.

2. Saudi Red Crescent.

Person in charge : Dr. Abdul Qadir Mansoor
(to be replaced soon. Manager is changed
every 2-3 months).

Address : Sariab Road,
Quetta.

Phone : 70671

Areas of Operation: Health Sector
Relief Commodities.

Health Sector:

Operating 3 medical units - staffed by Pakistani Staff.

Locations : 1 Chaman area
2 Malgagai RVs.

No preventive programmes like Malaria Control, EPI, Sanitation or T.B. control in their programmes.

Relief Commodities:

Distributing tents, shoes, cloth, blankets etc. to "needy refugees", selected by Representative of Saudi Red Crescent.

No coordination with CAR.

3. Inter Aid Committee.

Person in Charge: Mr. Fred. S. Innis.

Address : Braganza Villa)
Lytton Road, Quetta) temporarily.

Phone : 75557

Areas of Operation: Relief Commodities.
Health Sector.
Education.

Relief Commodities:

Tents, Blankets, Quilts handed over to CAR.

Health Sector.

- Supply of medicines - support to Christian Mission Hospital Quetta.
- Operation Iron - Milk-cow - temporarily out of operation due to lack of organisation and programming.
- Planning to assist more in Health Sector.

Education:

Supply of School tents, books and cloth through Education Department.

SKETCH MAP OF PAKISTAN

REFERENCES

- BOUNDARY INTERNATIONAL (PAKISTAN) - - - -
- PROVINCE - - - - -
- DIST OR TRIBAL - - - - -
- TRIBAL AREA [Symbol]


SCALE


1 CM = 63.36 KILOMETERS

KMS 50 0 50 100 150 200 KMS



SHOWING SETTLED DISTRICTS AND
TRIBAL AGENCIES WITH REFUGEE
CONCENTRATIONS.





HEALTH, NUTRITION STATUS, LIVING CONDITIONS
AND INCOME OF REFUGEE POPULATION

Introduction: Since very little information is available on the health, nutrition and socio-economic status of the Afghan refugees, this discussion draws extensively - in addition to personal observation and interviews - on the results of a health and nutrition survey sponsored by the UNHCR in cooperation with the GOP and IRC and carried out in the Kohat District of Northwest Frontier Province. The survey covered 3% of families living in 15 camps: a total of 431 families with 3,121 individuals including 753 adult males, 737 adult females and 1,631 children. In reading the sections that follow, it should be borne in mind that the sample survey group is very small and that the level of services to this group may be higher than to the refugee population in general. For this reason, caution should be exercised in drawing conclusions concerning the refugee population as a whole. Nevertheless, the findings help to fill an important information gap.

Health Services: Health care for the refugees has been developed by the GOP with the assistance of UNHCR and a number of voluntary agencies (volags). A total of 310 static and mobile health units are currently operating in the refugee camps in the NWFP and Baluchistan. Local hospitals are being assisted by UNHCR and volags to extend medical services to refugees who require prolonged medical treatment and/or consultation by specialists. Each health unit is intended to serve some 15,000 refugees; however, many serve double or triple that number. A basic medical team consists of a doctor, a lady health visitor (LHV) and a compounder (dispenser of medicines) as well as paramedical helpers such as a midwife and a malaria and sanitary inspector. However, in most cases, the medical team is incomplete; at times, only the dispenser is available. There is a great shortage of female doctors and trained LHVs as the practice of purdah (seclusion of women) prohibits women from being seen or treated by a male physician. In most of the refugee camps, women and children constitute 75-80 percent of the total population. There is an on-going effort to train and recruit more female doctors and LHVs, as well as Afghan doctors, into the program.

a. NWFP: The medical coverage in the NWFP provided by GOP/UNHCR consists of 95 static dispensaries and 85 mobile health units spread over 15 Districts/Agencies. In addition, 55 static dispensaries and 35 mobile health units are run by various volags in various camp locations. 115 male doctors and 10 female doctors are working in these health units. Tables I through III show the medical coverage by GOP/UNHCR and volags as well as the number of medical personnel involved in the NWFP health effort:

Table I
GOP/UNHCR Medical Coverage in NWFP

<u>Name of District/ Agency</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Static Health Units</u>	<u>No. of Medical Officers</u>
Peshawar	Peshawar	5	3
Mohmand	Yakka Ghund	3	1
Kurram	Parachinar	27	25
Bajaur	Khar	14	14
Chitral	Chitral/Droosh	5	2
Dir	Timergara Barand Munda Chakdara	7	7
North Waziristan	Miranshah Spinwan Data Khel	15	15
South Waziristan	Wana	4	3
D.I. Khan	D.I. Khan Tank	4	4
Abbottabad	Haripur	3	3
Mansehra	Shinkiar	1	1
Orakzai	Ghiljai	1	1
Bannu	Bannu	4	4
Malakand	Dargai	1	1
Swat	Coga	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
	Total	95	85

Table II

VolAgs Medical Coverage in NWFP

<u>Name of VolAgs</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Static Dispensaries</u>	<u>Mobile Health Units</u>
Pak. Red Crescent	Parachinar Dir	1	1
Union Aid	Peshawar Mardan	14	7
Saudi Red Crescent	Peshawar Haripur	8	8
Save the Child Fund	Peshawar	3	2
Pak. Medico International	Peshawar	4	2
Idara-i-Ahyaul Uloom	Peshawar	1	1
Inter Aid	Mansehra	5	5
Austria Relief Committee	Mardan	2	2
Salvation Army	Ghazi	2	2
I.R.C.	Kohat	<u>15</u>	<u>5</u>
	Total	55	35

Table III

Medical Personnel Serving in NWFP

	<u>Govt./UNHCR</u>	<u>Voluntary Agencies</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>
Doctors	85	40	125	
LHVs	60	30	90	Ambulances 74
Compounders	94	40	134	Other vehicles <u>3</u>
Midwives	31	Nil	31	Total 77
Watchmen	85	40	125	
Bodyguards	9	Nil	9	

b. Baluchistan: 15 static health units were established in 1980 and five new units became operational by March 1981. By the end of May 1982, most of the tented dispensaries had been replaced by mud-walled constructions. Some of the local hospitals are being assisted by UNHCR to enable them to extend their services to the refugees. Only three volags have been allowed to operate in Baluchistan to date.

Table IV

GOP/UNHCR Medical Coverage in Baluchistan

<u>Name of District</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>No. of Static Dispensaries</u>	<u>No. of Mobile Dispensaries</u>
Quetta	Mohammadkhel I-III	2	1
Pishin	Surkhab I-V	5	
	Pir Alizai I & II	1	1
	Injini	1	
	Toba Farrakhi	1	
	Saranan		1
	Skam Kan		1
	Norek		1
Zhob	Malgagai I-III	3	
Chagai	Girdi Jungle	1	
	Okar	1	
	Pishuk	1	
	Makantuk	1	
	Posti	1	
	Umerchah	1	
	Plantuk	1	
	Amri		1
	Gallacha		1
	Lijje		1
Loralai	Zar Karez		1
	Ghazagai		1
Total		20	10

Table V

Volag Medical Coverage in Baluchistan

<u>Name of Volag</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Static Dispensaries</u>	<u>Mobile Health Units</u>
Action International Contre la Faim (AICF)	Pishin Pir Alizai Shurkhab	1	1
Saudi Red Crescent	Chaman Malgagai		1 2
Inter-Aid	Quetta	<u>1</u>	<u> </u>
	Total	2	4

Major Health Problems: Tuberculosis (TB) is considered the single most serious health problem. One volag representative stated that up to 50% of the women visiting his mobile health unit have TB. 22% of the women examined in the UNHCR Survey were anemic (the national figure is 41%). The problem appears to be mal-absorption, as many suffer from parasitic infestation. Respiratory and gastro-intestinal problems are frequent. During the time of the interview for the UNHCR survey, 35% of the women and men claimed to have suffered from diarrhea and fever the preceeding week.

Diarrhea is considered to be a major cause of death among children, resulting from unhygienic conditions and improper feeding habits. More than half of the children examined (56%) in the UNHCR survey were reported as having been sick with diarrhea, vomiting, fever and cold during the week preceeding the examination.

Table VI lists the most common illnesses reported for males, females and children in NWFP camps during the period January through June 1982:

Table VI
Disease Statistics in NWFP for January - June 1982

Males

	<u>Cases Treated</u>
1. Upper respiratory tract infections	69,515
2. Diarrhea/dysentery	46,681
3. Other gastro-intestinal problems	34,445
4. Misl. aches and pains	33,075
5. Joints/bones rheumatic	27,296
6. Malnutrition	25,785
7. Eye infection	22,436
8. Fever (excluding malaria)	21,838
9. Suspected/confirmed T.B.	19,207
10. Ear infection	18,930
11. Nervous system diseases	16,555
12. Worms	14,794
13. Suspected/confirmed malaria	13,896
14. Suspected/confirmed measles	2,841
15. Others	73,391
Total	<u>440,685</u>

Females

1. Upper respiratory tract infections	40,595
2. Misl. aches and pains	33,916
3. Diarrhea/dysentery	31,982
4. Other gastro-intestinal problems	24,740
5. Eye infection	20,342
6. Joints/bones rheumatic	20,237
7. Suspected/confirmed T.B.	18,180
8. Malnutrition	16,129
9. Worms	15,821
10. Fever (excluding malaria)	15,609
11. Ear infection	11,111
12. Suspected/confirmed malaria	10,118
13. Nervous system diseases	9,723
14. Suspected/confirmed measles	3,347
15. Others	86,234
Total	<u>358,084</u>

Children

1. Upper respiratory tract infections	83,403
2. Diarrhea/dysentery	71,174
3. Worms	40,791
4. Misl. aches and pains	37,915
5. Ear infection	35,500
6. Fever (excluding malaria)	35,097
7. Suspected/confirmed malaria	25,193
8. Malnutrition	24,785
9. Eye infection	23,314
10. Nervous system diseases	17,330
11. Other gastro-intestinal problems	17,317
12. Suspected/confirmed T.B.	9,920
13. Joints/bones rheumatic	8,487
14. Suspected/confirmed measles	6,307
15. Others	65,573
Total	<u>491,079</u>

Malnutrition: The UNHCR survey examined 313 children under five years of age and found that 24 percent suffered from some degree of malnutrition as measured on the weight for height classification. (This compares favorably with the Pakistani national figure for the same age group.) 13 percent of the children were 60 to 70 percent of normal weight to height and therefore seriously undernourished, and 43 percent were below normal according to the mid-arm circumference measurement. The following tables show the rate of malnutrition in the sample survey, comparing the findings with the national figures for PEM (protein-energy-malnutrition):

Table VII

Weight in Relation to Height for Children under Five

Percent of standard (weight-height)			No.	%	Pakistan
Standard	100%	Normal	177	57	40%
	90%		59	19	
Malnutrition	80%	First degree	34	11	43%
	70%	Second "	29	9	10%
	60%	Third "	14	4	7%
Total			313	100%	100%

Mid-Arm Circumference for Children under Five

Description	No.	%
Above normal	144	46
Normal 13.5 cm	44	11
Below normal	133	43
Total	321	100%

Sanitation: Modern concepts of sanitation are conspicuous by their absence among the refugees. Health personnel in camps, often young and inexperienced, are not motivated to improve sanitary conditions and finding qualified sanitary inspectors has proven difficult. While sanitary facilities do exist in some of the newly established camps, for cultural reasons the refugees are unaccustomed to using latrines. The UNHCR survey reveals that 43 percent of the sample population use an open place close to home and another 41 percent use the fields. Only six percent have latrines within the compound while ten percent use latrines outside their court yards. The same survey also

shows that 77 percent of the sample households throw garbage outside their homes and the remaining families take it to the fields.

The high morbidity rate among the children, especially from diarrhea, is often the result of the unhygienic and unsanitary habits of the refugees. The high rate of parasitic infections and gastro-intestinal diseases also results from these conditions. The UNHCR has realized this problem and hopes to have a sanitary inspector attached to all its mobile medical teams beginning in 1983.

Some of the volags have on-going projects in sanitation/hygiene. A UNHCR-funded sanitation project which has been successfully carried out by the Austrian Relief Committee in refugee villages in Mardan and Peshawar Districts has now been extended to other districts in the NWFP. Inter-Aid is conducting a sanitation/latrine program as well as teaching families about water purification. The International Rescue Committee is currently awaiting GOP approval to do full time work on a basic health education program which includes a strong sanitation/hygiene component with emphasis on women and children. In Baluchistan, AICF hopes to begin a sanitation/hygiene education program also aimed at women and children.

Water: Water is a scarce and valuable resource for the refugees and provision of adequate supplies remains a high priority. UNHCR is currently establishing various water supply schemes with the goal of providing each refugee with a minimum of 10 litres of water per day. By August 1982, water schemes for close to 50 percent of the refugee population in the NWFP either were due to be completed or under construction.

Under an agreement with UNHCR in 1981, UNICEF took over a CARE project to construct and maintain wells in NWFP. Approximately 1,000 wells have been dug and improved over an eighteen month period; most of these wells were dug by the refugees themselves. UNICEF planned to terminate this activity by the end of 1982, with provision for the GOP to assume project responsibility. The only other UNICEF activity involving refugees has been the provision of 30 water tankers which truck an average of 500,000 litres of water a day to 15 refugee camps in the NWFP. UNICEF does not have any activities involving the refugees in Baluchistan. Water supplies in this poorest and least developed province of Pakistan remain extremely scarce.

Nutrition:

a. Nutritional Intake: The sample population surveyed in the UNHCR report enjoys a high nutritional intake, much higher than the recommended daily allowance (RDA) for the Pakistani

population. The iron content of the daily consumption is equally high. Table VIII shows the average and individual nutritional intake of the sample group and compares the results with the local population.

Table VIII

Average and Individual Intake Comparisons

Description	Protein		K Cal* RDA**		Iron RDA		Vit A	
	AR***	Pak	AR	Pak	AR	Pak	AR	Pak
Adult Male	100	54	2,902	2,550	54	20	2,388	750
Adult Female	85	45	2,646	2,160	49	30	2,427	750
Pregnant	81	55	2,421	2,510	44	40	2,484	750
Lactating	91	71	2,802	2,710	51	30	2,365	1,200
Under 5 Child	45	31	1,398	1,390	23	20	1,993	400
Family Average	90	34	2,696	2,044	48	15	2,414	460

Comparison Afghan Refugees - WHO Standard

Family Average	Afghan Refugee	WHO-RDI****	Pakistan RDI
Calories (K Cal)	2,696	2,500	2,044
Protein (grams)	90	29	34
Iron (Milograms)	48	15	15
Vit A (Micrograms)	2,414	595	460

*K Cal:kilo-calorie, a standard unit of measure for food energy intake/nutrition

**RDA: Recommended Daily Allowance

***AR: Afghan Refugees

****RDI: Recommended Daily Intake

b. Food Intake: The staple food for the refugees continues to be wholewheat bread or "naan" with green tea and vegetable curry. Some families also have vegetable or, less frequently, meat curry. The families who own livestock often use milk, curd or buttermilk with "naan" for a meal.

c. Infant Feeding: Data reveals that 89% of infants are breast-fed with 88% beginning on the first day of birth. The remaining 11% are partially breast-fed because the mother does not have enough milk. The study found that breast-feeding continued up to two years or until another pregnancy. The families that own livestock supplement breast feeding with cow/goat milk.

There is no evidence of systematic introduction of solid foods to supplement breast feeding.

d. Dry Skim Milk (DSM): Some refugee women have expressed a reluctance to use DSM for their children because they associate it with diarrhea. There may be several reasons for this: dilution with contaminated and/or unboiled water, improper dilution, or lactose (milk sugar) intolerance. Some medical people in the field say there are too many problems with DSM, that the refugees do not appreciate it and prefer to sell it. Others suggest that the refugees use DSM for tea, yogurt and rice pudding, considering its use as a milk substitute to be a luxury except for a sick child.

Some "mechanical cows," donated by the Federal Republic of Germany, have been introduced to the program. The "cows" reconstitute DSM into liquid milk. Unfortunately, their numbers are very limited, covering only a few refugee camps.

e. Nutritional Education Programs: Many volags try to emphasize preventive health care and nutrition education. For example, a nutritional education program for mothers is being conducted by ICRC. Inter-Aid is carrying out a nutritional feeding program for pregnant and lactating mothers. UNHCR is trying to introduce preventive health care, with emphasis on nutrition education, into the primary school program.

Vaccination Program: There are presently 12 EPI (Expanded Program for Immunization) units operating in the NWFP consisting of one supervisor and three vaccinators. Two volags (Saudi Red Crescent and CARITAS) are operating three vaccination units. UNHCR is trying to establish a regular vaccine delivery system in all refugee camps with the assistance of EPI in providing training and technical assistance. EPI will offer vaccines for tuberculosis, DPT (diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus), polio and measles. No regular immunization program has been established in Baluchistan as yet. Table IX shows the number of people immunized in the NWFP as of September 1982:

Table IX

	<u>No. of Persons Immunized</u>
B.C.G.	33,552
Polio	102,028
D.P.T.	32,383
D.T.	34,645
T.T.	54,429
Measles	<u>24,523</u>
Total	281,560

Malaria: There is a higher rate of malaria in the refugee camps than among the local population. Malaria epidemics usually occur during the summer months. Sporadic malathion spraying of camps is being undertaken by the GOP under their national malaria program. UNHCR plans to initiate a regular malathion spraying program covering all camps, as well as providing laboratory back-up for camp dispensaries and increasing case detection through mass screening.

Laboratory Equipment: At present, laboratory equipment necessary to diagnose TB, malaria and other illnesses is generally unavailable. Existing laboratory facilities in local hospitals are often located too far from the camps to be of use. UNHCR is trying to acquire mobile X-ray units and other diagnostic lab units to visit the camps, as well as obtaining additional equipment for laboratories already in use.

Skills Training and Income Generating Activities: Skills training was initiated by UNHCR in 1980 with a view to enable the refugees to: (1) improve their working possibilities in Pakistan and their employment opportunities if and when they return to Afghanistan; (2) further develop and maintain the skills which some of the refugees may have acquired in Afghanistan; and (3) provide an additional source of income. However, traditional handicraftsmen do not enjoy a high status in the Afghan society and the program has experienced difficulties in attracting interest among the refugees.

UNHCR is, nevertheless, still promoting self-sufficiency and income-generating schemes. Funds have been allocated for a total of 25 carpet weaving centers in both the NWFP and Baluchistan. 15 carpet weaving centers have been established in the NWFP providing training to 250 boys and 6 in Baluchistan training a total of 362 boys. In addition, several mechanical workshops have been planned of which two are nearing completion; one vocational training center has been completed and another is under construction and an embroidery scheme has been established. In order to increase the impact of such activities, which has been very limited to date, surveys were conducted throughout 1982 to identify more refugees with skills on which further income-generating activities could be based.

A World Bank Mission visited Pakistan in October 1982 to identify income generating projects which would benefit both the refugees and the local population with particular focus on reforestation, feeder roads and irrigation schemes. Equal participation of both Pakistanis and Afghan refugees will be emphasized in this proposed \$21 million project.

An ILO Mission that also visited Pakistan in October examined smaller-scale, less labor-intensive projects inside the refugee

camps, e.g., handicrafts and carpet weaving.

As one source of income, Afghan refugees are very active in the transportation business, especially in the NWFP. Refugees also often obtain work as day laborers, e.g., digging ditches or working on road construction projects. Some have set up their own shops inside the camps; others have vegetable gardens.

An important aspect of the UNHCR study was an attempt to estimate refugee family income from sources other than the relief provided by UNHCR, WFP and other donors. Using indirect questions to identify income from all sources, this small scale survey indicated that 87 percent of the families had one income earning member and some had more than one. 72 percent of the adult males between 15 and 45 years had some type of employment, usually casual labor. Of 528 men in this group, 379 were wage earners.

Habitat/Standards of Living: The refugees in the sample survey were asked to describe the types of dwelling they occupied in their home country and how it differed from their present structure. This was the first in a series of questions aimed at evaluating the socio-economic status of the population. The finding showed that 24 percent lived in a similar dwelling before migration, while only 15 percent lived in "pucca" (brick-cement) structures. In the camps visited, 60 percent were living in self-made mud ("katcha") huts while 40 percent were still living under canvas. The GOP, which for long resisted the establishment of the "katcha" huts, now has accepted these more permanent-looking structures which the refugees prefer because they are cooler in the summer and provide warmth in the winter. UNHCR now provides up to 800 rupees per family for roofing material for "katcha" construction.

Table X

Type of House Before Migration

<u>Description of Habitat</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Cement, Brick	52	15
Mud Brick	24	7
Mud Stone	186	54
Same as in Pakistan	82	24
Total	344	100%

Table XI
Present Habitation in Refugee Camps

<u>Description</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>
Tent	108	23
Tent surrounded by courtyard	82	17
Mud hut	206	43
Mud hut surrounded by courtyard	83	17
Total	479*	100%

* The total figure above is more than 437 because certain families are living in mud hut and tent surrounded by courtyard which has been counted as two in the analysis.

Education: The lack of educational tradition among the refugees, their preference for religious schools and reluctance to provide education for girls are major constraints in implementing an education program for the refugees. The GOP/UNHCR education project is designed to provide primary and religious education for at least 20 percent of the male refugee children of school age. In the primary schools, which usually go up to fourth grade, children are learning Pushtu (their mother tongue), Urdu (the official language of Pakistan), very basic arithmetic (using only numbers up to 100) and teachings from the Koran. In the NWFP 250 schools have been completed and equipped and three to four teachers appointed per school. UNHCR is trying to introduce preventive health care as an integrated part of primary education.

In Baluchistan, 39 schools have been in operation since early 1982; however, only approximately 5,480 children have been enrolled against a total of 94,000 male school age children. 15 small schools have been constructed by the refugees themselves and are receiving UNHCR assistance in order to encourage more refugee participation in the program.