BREAKING POINT

Measuring Progress in Afghanistan

February 23, 2007



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CSIS

PCR PROJECT

Special thanks to

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Global Relief Technologies
Sayara Media and Communications
International Organization for Migration

ABOUT CSIS

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) seeks to advance global security and prosperity in an era of economic and political transformation by providing strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decision-makers. CSIS serves as a strategic planning partner for the government by conducting research and analysis and developing policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change.

Founded in 1962 by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C., with more than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated experts. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since April 2000.

About the Post Conflict Reconstruction Project

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project develops innovative strategies to speed, enhance, and strengthen international conflict response. Now in its seventh year, the PCR Project is seen as a leading global source for authoritative analysis, evaluation, and recommendations for fragile states and post-conflict reconstruction.

The project focuses on the full spectrum of conflict-related concerns, from early warning and conflict prevention to rebuilding shattered societies, and incorporates the four essential pillars of reconstruction: security and public safety, justice and reconciliation, governance and participation, and economic and social progress. PCR project staff collaborate closely with senior U.S. congressional, military, diplomatic, development, and humanitarian decision-makers and field staff—as well as local communities, national, bilateral, regional, and multilateral partners.

Key achievements of the PCR Project to date include numerous path-breaking studies on Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, creative reports on special challenges—such as youth in conflict, and regular conferences and roundtables that bring leading scholars and practitioners together with policy-makers. For information on these and other PCR studies, please contact Shannon Hayden at shayden@csis.org.

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project also manages an online forum (www.pcrproject.com) for the interactive exchange of views and opinions. It features opinion pieces, readings, new digests, reports, and more. The blog is updated daily and reaches more than 10,000 readers worldwide. To subscribe for free, please send an email to pcrbrief@csis.org.

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The project directors and author are entirely responsible for the content and judgments of this report.

MAP OF AFGHANISTAN

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The current study is a follow-up to the 2005 baseline report *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*. The report's conclusions are based on 1,000 structured conversations that took place in half of Afghanistan's provinces; 13 surveys, polls, and focus groups; 200 expert interviews; and the daily monitoring of 70 media sources and 182 organizations. Three of the report's main findings are:

- Afghans are losing trust in their government because of an escalation in violence;
- Public expectations are neither being met nor managed;
- Conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated in all key areas targeted for development, except for the economy and women's rights.

The general assessment of the five key pillars is as follows:

Security: Afghans are more insecure today than they were in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, and the inability of security forces to combat warlords and drug traffickers. State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight.

Governance and Participation. The central government's institutional and human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated. Sub-national government structures still lack capacity. In their place, militia commanders and local mafias have filled the void, undermining local governance, democratic rights, and service delivery.

Justice and Accountability. Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.

Economic Conditions. High economic growth and a more open business environment have improved the general health of the Afghan economy, yet these benefits have not translated into sufficient employment and income generating activities for the ordinary citizen.

Social Services and Infrastructure. Although reconstruction investments by the international community have enhanced social services and infrastructure, deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel and low quality has limited access and its benefits for many Afghans.

Overall Findings



Security



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

Justice and Accountability



Economic Conditions



Social Services and Infrastructure



The Afghan government and its international allies face a far more difficult and complex situation today than they did when the Taliban fell in 2001. Reforms are required in the military and civilian sectors, especially as the violence is expected to increase as spring approaches.

Countering these negative trends requires a more focused effort. A policy of "staying the course"—even if bolstered by new resources—will not reverse the trends. A fresh surge of supplemental funding is expected this year. It must be directed in a way that finds and engages the maximum number of Afghan citizens. .

1. **Restore public confidence in the plan for safety.** Focus on Kandahar and Helmand provinces; treat the threat as an insurgency; concentrate on ways to counter the Taliban's tribal and charismatic appeal and tactics of intimidation; and restore confidence in the U.S. and international commitment.
   - Move from "big army" sweeps to a rapid-response mode that would provide a "15-minute" rapid response protective umbrella in the endangered south and east of the country. Establish a consistent Afghan-led security presence in half of the 26 districts in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, with more flexible fighting forces and more helicopters.
   - Address Pakistan-Afghanistan challenges by focusing on the needs of disenfranchised Pashtun communities on both sides of the border. Invest in intelligence to clarify developments in the border region.
   - Shift the anti-drug effort from eradication to a combination of purchase, alternative crops, and interdiction, with a particular emphasis on the high-growth provinces of Kandahar and Helmand.

2. **Mobilize communities to contribute to the recovery.** Move away from over-reliance on Kabul and centralized systems; diminish the role of middle men and corruption; and enhance local participation.
   - Improve the use of international funds by shifting to a venture-capital model, delivering direct payments to the struggling Afghan middle class, and investing in non-traditional partners.
   - Leverage existing structures by expanding the National Solidarity Program (NSP) and working with the informal justice sector. Shift 50 percent of the development budget to the provincial level, and distribute direct assistance through the Hawala system.
   - Expand communications through a single message of effort and partnership, and use "no-tech" to "high-tech" methods such as text messaging or holding meetings in local town halls to link up with key gatekeepers of information (e.g., mullahs, truck drivers, local elders).

Restoring progress in Afghanistan requires dramatic changes. If a critical mass of Afghans experiences positive change, the negative trends are reversible. 2007 is the breaking point.

INTRODUCTION

The success of international involvement in Afghanistan should be judged by the ability to play a catalytic role in the country's journey to peace, democracy, and a functioning economy. Efforts should aim at helping Afghans reach the point where they manage their own affairs with minimal external involvement. Realizing this goal, however, in a country that has suffered immense devastation from warfare for the last thirty years will require a sustained, long-term commitment by the international community.

Critical to the success of the international mission in Afghanistan and other post-conflict settings is the ability to measure progress. In any reconstruction effort claims of success or failure are meaningless in the absence of a baseline, knowledge of where reconstruction efforts are at any given time, and a clear end goal. In order to tailor operations to the changing and often fluid post-conflict environment, progress should be measured throughout the life of a mission.

The Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) Project at CSIS has developed a unique methodology to measure progress in post-conflict environments. Using the CSIS-AUSA Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework[1] as a starting point for analysis, the PCR Project follows the status of five main sectors critical to Afghanistan's reconstruction:

(1) Security
(2) Governance and Participation
(3) Justice and Accountability
(4) Economic Conditions
(5) Social Services and Infrastructure

These five categories are evaluated on the basis of two criteria intended to capture the dual challenges of reconstruction: whether the short-term needs and interests of Afghans are being met, and whether legitimate long-term capacity of the Afghan state and society is being developed.

In July 2005 the PCR Project released its first report *In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan.*[2] This baseline report measured the impact of reconstruction efforts from January 2004 through June 2005. As a practical tool that Afghans and donors can use to devise timely and successful strategies, the CSIS model has been well received by high-ranking military and civilian officials in the U.S. government, Afghan government, the donor community, and more broadly among Afghan citizens. With the 2005 baseline in place, the current study, *Breaking Point: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan*, provides a second assessment of the status of reconstruction from July 2005 through October 2006 and tracks trends.

[1] Center for Strategic and International Studies and Association of the United States Army (CSIS-AUSA). Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework, 2001. http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/framework.pdf.
[2] Center for Strategic and International Studies, "In the Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan," July 2005.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PAST

Reconstruction is an enormous, complex and unpredictable task, made more difficult in Afghanistan by the country's segmented geography, years of war damage, low levels of investment, regionally charged politics, and continued insecurity. Past attempts by foreigners and Afghan elites to develop, reconstruct, and modernize Afghanistan were overly centralized and outsider-driven; they consequently failed.

When the international community committed itself in 2001 to the recovery of war-torn Afghanistan, the priorities were: to remove the Taliban from power; to capture key al Qaeda figures; to provide space for elections; to build roads, schools and clinics; to manage the return of millions of refugees; and to deliver humanitarian relief to vulnerable populations that had been ignored for decades. The CSIS study from 2005 found that considerable progress had been made in meeting these objectives during the first four years of reconstruction. The international community had undertaken the tasks it laid out for itself, and as a result, Afghans had seen significant positive changes in their lives: long-term capacity building was underway and people believed that the future held great potential.

By 2005, however, Afghans were faced with new and additional challenges. The situation on the ground had evolved from war, humanitarian emergency, and political negotiation to transition, development, and institution building. The international community and the government of Afghanistan together began to pursue a comprehensive development strategy. A centralized model was adopted, whereby the Afghan government was responsible for making progress in all sectors at the same time. Ordinary Afghans and local communities once again were relying on leadership from Kabul, informal power holder, and international organizations to deliver improvements.. Yet the country was not ready to move to a traditional development partnership with donors, and donors themselves were wary of Afghanistan's capacity to manage its own recovery. The needs were still too great, the state too weak, and the modalities of international aid too static and slow.

In its 2005 report CSIS recommended a number of steps to ensure that Afghans experience continual progress during the transition from emergency to development. Emphasis was placed on direct engagement with a struggling middle class, such as teachers and police; wiser use of water for irrigation, energy generation, and drinking and hygiene; border enforcement in four key geographical areas; and direct assistance to reliable governors and trusted local officials. All this would need to be undertaken in the context of a comprehensive long-term international commitment. To succeed, the international community would have to redirect its efforts and change the way it delivered assistance. Unfortunately, too little has changed since the publication of the last report.

Over the past year and a half, a number of pivotal events have occurred in Afghanistan. An election process ushered in the first popularly elected, functioning parliament; a state-building agenda was articulated in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) and internationally endorsed in the Afghanistan Compact; international military forces came under NATO command; riots erupted on the streets of Kabul; the Taliban reasserted its power in parts of the country's south and east; and opium production grew exponentially. Improvements have been made in certain sectors, such as education, communication,

government capacity, roads, and private investment. Yet the most critical challenges from the beginning of the intervention remain, including the unchecked power of warlords, economic dependence on poppy, pervasive corruption, a resurgent Taliban, and scarcity of electricity.

The 2006 *Measure of Progress* study has found that Afghan expectations are still not being met. Afghans are disillusioned with the slow pace of reconstruction. Moreover, there is a growing sense that the international commitment is not genuine or long-term, and that its approach is not well informed. Afghans nervously watch the security situation in their country's south deteriorate and increasingly feel isolated from government officials and international community representatives. They feel that their voice is not being heard and that their needs are not being identified and prioritized. They are insufficiently informed about the rapid changes happening around the country, and conspiracy theories are rampant.

International funding mechanisms and implementation models are not delivering change fast enough, nor are they flexible enough to meet the diverse and changing needs in each Afghan province. Deadlines on the reconstruction benchmarks articulated in the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS are lapsing without much progress. Afghans are beginning to wonder how long it will take for the government to develop the necessary capacity and generate sufficient political will to improve Afghan lives and tackle the toughest challenges.

Recently, NATO commander general David Richards suggested that the Afghan government and its international partners had six months to deliver on its promises of reconstruction and development or else risk losing the support of the Afghan people.[3] Around the same time, then U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld published an op-ed in the *Washington Post* with a list of promising indicators, concluding that "the trajectory is a hopeful and promising one."[4] Which view correctly captures the current situation? Given these divergent opinions, how can the public and policymakers assess the mission?

This report attempts to answer these questions through the use of an integrated methodology that captures the voices of Afghans and balances a variety of different sources. The findings and recommendations herein highlight strategic priorities and suggest practical actions that could begin to reverse negative trends.

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[3] . "NATO Gives Itself Six Months to Tame the Taliban: Report," *Agence France Presse*, September 2, 2006.
[4] Donald Rumsfeld, "Afghanistan: Five Years Later," *The WashingtonPost* , October 10, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/06/AR2006100601373_2.html.

MEASURE OF PROGRESS

Challenges in Evaluation

Measuring progress can increase the sophistication of the international community's understanding of post-conflict environments and improve its ability to tackle the complex issues of reconstruction. High-quality monitoring and evaluation that is integrated into programming facilitates strategic planning by ensuring appropriate resource allocation, promotes the development of appropriate tactics, and prioritizes poorly performing sectors. It allows policymakers to take stock of the challenges of stabilization operations at any given moment in the mission, determine whether current efforts are meeting the challenges, and make mid-course adjustments when necessary.

Post-conflict situations are notoriously difficult to evaluate due to numerous, often unanticipated, factors that arise in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict, including continued or sporadic fighting, political upheaval, information gaps, poor human intelligence capability, poor mobility of expatriate staff, and pervasive mistrust. Similarly, the voice of the local population is often overlooked or ignored, as the international community and the country's elite assume a leading role. Decisions are usually made at the headquarters level, often based on unreliable information.

State-building is complex, with many actors vying for space and resources, often with competing goals and concepts of success. What is required is a truly integrated mission, from the design phase through to monitoring and evaluation, which in turn would encourage the various actors to develop a common understanding of four essential considerations:

1) What does success look like, from the perspective of the international community and from that of ordinary Afghans?
2) What is the starting point, or baseline, from which to measure progress?
3) What is the reconstruction strategy and mission plan, and how realistic is it?
4) What is the process for measuring progress, for both monitoring and evaluation purposes?

Without consensus on these four issues, it is difficult to align the stabilization and reconstruction mission.

Numerous international experts have evaluated Afghanistan's reconstruction and undertaken assessments, highlighting areas of progress and warning of the perils ahead. Pressures exist for political officials to declare success in policy objectives without sufficient evidence from the ground, and their claims, when they do not coincide with the realities or address the overall efforts, tend to sound like political spin rather than objective evaluation. Mistrust is rampant in post-conflict environments, and often studies and methods used by one agency are not trusted by locals or replicated by other international partners and agencies.

Although various models to measure progress exist, many rely too heavily on quantitative data and fail to consider qualitative factors. These models tend to count what is most easily measurable rather than what is most valuable. Moreover, presenting large volumes of

quantitative statistics makes it difficult for decision-makers to assess the overall picture in a timely manner and even more challenging to determine whether the present course is the correct one.

Often metrics and benchmarks are established to measure progress. For example, benchmarks and timelines were established to help the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) monitor the progress of the Afghanistan Compact. Like most other metric-centric models, however, they track performance of activities or procedures rather than impact. Although helpful for monitoring, they cannot be a substitute for evaluation of change.

Most models also fail to incorporate local voices of progress into assessments of reconstruction. They attempt to address the needs of the Afghan state and society, but too few speak directly and fully with the people whose voices matter the most. Those methods that do speak to the people, such as surveys and opinion polls, are often designed to capture perceptions and impressions rather than real experiences. Such measures of progress present an incomplete picture.

CSIS Objectives

The assumption guiding the PCR Project methodology is that the quality of decision-making in post-conflict environments falls along a bell curve. A small percentage is quite good—attuned to the strategic choices facing local actors, knowledgeable of the particular history, culture, and politics of the place, and experienced with political transitions, rebuilding fragile states, and war-torn societies. A small percentage is also dangerously bad—routinely falling into well-known and avoidable traps. The majority of decision-making, however, falls somewhere in between these two poles—in the middle of the bell curve. The intent of the PCR methodology is to capture the ground reality "ahead of the curve," and to repackage this to inform everyone—from top decision-makers down to program-level officers. The product is a tool to help avoid poor decisions in this difficult environment, and to highlight good decisions in order to replicate success.

The PCR Project at CSIS attempts to meet the challenges of evaluation in post-conflict environments by combining four unique elements in its methodology: (1) a balanced perspective; (2) the incorporation of local voices; (3) a measure of those elements that matter most, not what is most easily quantifiable or collectable; and (4) the presentation of a large amount of data in a digestible format.

Balancing Perspectives

Without such trusted, integrated methods for measuring progress, reports of success and failure cannot be substantiated. International governments and their implementing partners are routinely accused of offering optimistic assessments of progress, while the media is often criticized for focusing solely on the negative. Polling is viewed as overly responsive to the events of the day, while interviews and focus groups are seen as too limited in scale. In addition to these challenges, the quality of intelligence and information available to policymakers is substandard. The PCR Project methodology addresses these problems through an integrated approach: it combines quantitative and qualitative data with local

perceptions, and balances source types in order to overcome inherent biases *and* provide better information to decision-makers at the highest levels.

Incorporating Local Voices

Because reconstruction ultimately depends on local ownership and "winning hearts and minds," local views of progress are essential for accurate assessments. Too often the sense of progress is based solely on international-expert opinion, which may misread local interpretation of events on the ground. The PCR methodology seeks to measure reconstruction in terms of the impact international efforts have on people's everyday lives. Thus, it incorporates local opinion through polls and qualitative interviews to place Afghan voices where they belong: at the center of the international debate over Afghanistan's future.

Measuring What Matters

Mission-assessment models tend to track implementation of projects rather than measure impact. Although monitoring of programs and activities is necessary to keep donors and implementing partners on track, they cannot serve as a substitute for substantive evaluation studies. The PCR methodology measures progress on the basis of outcomes—the on-the-ground conditions that impact Afghan daily lives and Afghanistan's future—rather than inputs or outputs. In other words, it measures improvements in health care or education levels, rather than just numbers of hospital beds or schools built.

Presenting Easy-To-Digest Data

In order to improve decision-making in the post conflict setting, busy decision-makers need to be provided with complex information in a digestible and easy-to-access format. Large amounts of data and statistics on too many metrics are difficult to assess. The big picture becomes obscured by the details. Efforts to measure progress tend to ignore qualitative information because it is difficult to incorporate into quantitative analysis. Yet ignoring this information bypasses essential components of progress. The CSIS study aggregates comprehensive data sets from numerous sources and presents the information in quick impact graphs to capture the essential, dual nature of the challenge of reconstruction: ensuring that the immediate needs of Afghans are met in the short run, while building legitimate local capacity and institutions to continue to meet Afghan needs in the future.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology used to prepare this report involved three major elements: (1) Collecting and Sorting Data; (2) Rating and Graphing Data; and (3) Analysis and Conclusions.

(1) Collecting and Sorting Data

The PCR Project's integrated model relies on a number of inputs, including expert opinion, public documents, media reporting, polling, and on-the-ground interviews conducted specifically for this report. More than 6,000 qualitative and quantitative data points from these sources were compiled by project staff, and then weighed equally to minimize the biases inherent in favoring any one source. At the end of the data collection phase, 1,031 data points were collected from the media, public documents and surveys; 230 from CSIS interviews; and 4,990 from Afghan interviews across all five pillars and all five source types.

Throughout the data collection process, PCR staff gathered data points that ranged in length from one to several sentences, as well as quotations from interviews. Researchers chose data points that were both outcomes and indicative of change, as opposed to inputs or outputs, in order to measure the impact of stabilization and reconstruction work.

A. Data Collection

Afghan Interviews

In collaboration with Sayara Media and Communications, the PCR Project trained six Afghans—three men and three women—to conduct 1,000[5] interviews with Afghans throughout the country from August 1, 2006, through September 15, 2006. The interview team held regular debriefs with the project leader to discuss lessons and improve techniques. Interviews were conducted in the city of Kabul and in a mix of urban and rural areas in the following 13 provinces:

- Capital: Kabul – 146 interviews
- Central: Kabul districts, Bamyan – 122 interviews
- East: Laghman, Nangarhar – 121 interviews
- West: Herat, Badghis – 140 interviews
- North: Baglan, Balkh, Kunduz – 208 interviews
- South: Helmand, Kandahar, Khost, Paktia – 261 interviews

These provinces were chosen to capture a representative ethnic and linguistic mix over a wide geographic scope. Moreover, some provinces were selected to capture areas that seem to receive less international attention. In the end, 41 percent of the interviews were conducted in urban locations, Kabul city, and provincial capitals while 59 percent were conducted in rural locations. Security was also a factor in determining interview sites.

[5] Note: Two interviews were omitted due to illegibility.

In the 2005 study a team of 12 interviewers conducted 1,000 interviews in 20 of the country's 34 provinces over a 12-day period from April 16 to April 28.[6] The 2006 study marked a slight decrease in the number of provinces surveyed. PCR decided to work with a smaller, more experienced Afghan interviewer team, and time constraints did not permit the team to travel as extensively.

Interviews were evenly split between males and females, and mirrored the diverse ethnic balance of Afghanistan: 46.6 percent Pashtun, 31.4 percent Tajik, 10.6 percent Hazara, 4.1 percent Uzbek, 1.8 percent Turkmen, 1.4 percent Kuchi, 1 percent Baloch, 0.2 percent Aimaq, 0.2 percent Nuristani, and 2.7 percent other.

Afghan researchers traveled to locations often considered too insecure or remote for international aid workers and journalists, enabling them to gather a perspective on reconstruction that extended beyond the reach of most foreign assistance programs and observation.

Rather than present interviewees with a fixed set of questions, researchers were trained to engage their fellow Afghans in semi-structured conversations to elicit comments not typically shared with foreigners. The in-depth interviews drew on a series of open-ended and closed questions from a thoroughly vetted interview guide and ranged from 30 minutes to one hour in length. The questions were designed to capture not only perceptions and impressions of the reconstruction efforts, but also real changes that the respondents had experienced and witnessed in their lives and communities.

Moreover, at the conclusion of each interview, the interviewee was asked to list his or her top three priorities, and project staff categorized these by pillar. The researchers also formulated their own conclusions, integrating another layer of local knowledge into the overall analytical structure.

This approach allowed Afghans to determine priorities and areas of importance, while ensuring that critical information was communicated. Each interview yielded specific quotations, as well as survey responses, giving the project a sense of issues pertinent to each individual, community, and region. From these answers and select quotations, background detail, core issues, experiences, and perceptions were captured.

CSIS Interviews

The PCR project staff also conducted interviews in Afghanistan and in the United States, meeting with more than 200 people from the Afghan government, donor countries, multilateral institutions, NGOs, and Afghan communities. Interviews were conducted one-on-one and in groups, for one to one-and-a-half hours each. By the end of the collection period, the observations had been compiled of 27 U.S., 12 international, 20 multinational, and 55 Afghan sources from 10 research institutions, 40 government agencies, 20 international organizations, 19 NGOs and civil-society organizations, 15 private businesses and contractors, and various cross-sections of Afghan society.

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[6] North: Baghlan, Balkh, and Kunduz. South: Helmand, Khost, and Paktia. East: Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, and Nuristan. West: Badghis, heart. Central: Kapisa, Logar, Panjshir, Parwan, Bamiyan, and Wardak.

Sampling of CSIS Interviews

- ***Academic/Research:*** Senlis Council; International Crisis Group (ICG); Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU); Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS); Center for Strategic Studies; Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- ***NGOs:*** Asia Foundation; Aga Khan Foundation; ACBAR; Afghans for Civil Society; Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau
- ***Private Industry:*** Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce (AICC); Afghan Telecom; Watan Group
- ***Afghan Government (Non-Military):*** Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC); Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA); ministry officials; members of parliament; provincial council members; police officials
- ***US Government:*** USAID; Afghanistan Reachback Group; Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT); Central Forces Command
- ***Contractors:*** Chemonics, Louis Berger; Maxwell PLC; Bearing Point
- ***Other International Governments:*** Italian Embassy; Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); PRTs
- ***International Organizations:*** UNAMA; NATO-ISAF; UNIFEM; UNHCR; UNODC
- ***Afghan Society:*** Shura members; journalists; mullahs; local women; poppy farmers; teachers; youth; doctors; judges

The network of experts and officials built during the 2005 study was leveraged to gain access to critical organizations and agencies. Sayara Media and Communications increased the breadth of information gathered by connecting the lead researcher to local officials and ordinary Afghans, and organizing interviews and focus groups.

The lead researcher was able to travel without significant security restrictions or guards, experiencing the Afghan street in a way that is increasingly unrealizable for internationals. From Kabul to Nangahar, Balkh, Herat, and Bamyan, and through numerous other provinces CSIS interviews were conducted in both urban and rural areas.

Surveys

A handful of surveys from other organizations included in this report were conducted during the data collection period from July 2005 through October 2006. This included thirteen surveys that best captured aspects of Afghan public opinion and experience. Some surveys that were published between July 2005 and October 2006 were omitted because the actual conduct of the surveys had taken place prior to July 2005. Others were omitted due to a lack of confidence in the methodology employed. For a full listing of the surveys included, see Table 7 in Annex A.

Media

Seventy media sources were monitored for a six-month period, beginning in May 2006 and ending in October. Sources from a range of different media outlets and locations were chosen to best capture variations in perspective across geographic location and media outlet types. Particular attention was given to capturing information from sources beyond the 23 U.S. media outlets, including 42 from Europe and other Western countries and 15 from the South and Central Asian region. Project staff also incorporated numerous Afghan articles from daily news round-ups compiled by Pajhwok Afghan News, Radio Free Europe's Daily Afghan Report, E-Ariana, Afghan News Network and Afghan Online Press. In addition,

data points were gathered from a variety of source types, including 77 newspapers, 14 periodicals, 8 newswires, and 13 web sites. For a full listing of the media sources monitored, see Table 8 in Annex A.

Public Documents
The PCR Project monitored a list of 182 organizations for data extraction. This list drew heavily from the source list used in 2005. Of the organizations, 33 are academic, 56 are governmental, 27 are international, 46 are NGOs or represent civil society, and 20 are private. They represent a diverse regional mix: 53 U.S., 36 international, 43 multinational, and 50 Afghan. Public documents were collected from July 2005 through October 2006. For a full listing of the organizations from which data was gathered, see Tables 9 and 10 in Annex A.

B. Data Sorting
The five pillars drawn from the *Post-Conflict Reconstruction Task Framework*—Security, Governance and Participation, Justice and Accountability, Economic Conditions, and Social Services and Infrastructure—capture the essential facets of reconstruction in Afghanistan. They are not independent categories of analysis, but part of an integrated whole in which progress or lack of progress in any one category impacts progress in the others.

Prior to beginning the data collection process, the *Measure of Progress* team had a brainstorming session to determine indicators for each of the five pillars. Once a sizeable list of indicators had been established for each pillar, the PCR team refined the five pillars into sub-pillars to address the key levers of transformation in Afghanistan today. An analysis of these indicators can be found in the findings of each individual pillar. In order to maintain consistency with the previous study, some of the data from 2005 was reclassified to reflect the revised sub-pillars.

Table 1: Pillars and Sub-Pillars

Pillar	**Sub-Pillar**
Security	Commanders
	Insurgency
	Civilian Safety and Law and Order
	State Security Institutions
Governance and Participation	National Governance
	Sub-National Governance
	Participation
	Political Security
Social Services and Infrastructure	Infrastructure and Communication
	Healthcare and Nutrition
	Education
	Basic Needs
Economic Conditions	Macroeconomic Climate
	Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture
	Jobs, Income, and Prices
Justice and Accountability	Justice System
	Rights Protection
	Impunity

In addition to classifying each data point according to one of the aforementioned sub-pillars and the source material, the PCR project team also categorized according to other factors meant to highlight biases and facilitate analysis, including location type—urban or rural—and region. Regions were delineated as illustrated in Figure 1. Afghans interviews were also compared by gender, age, ethnicity, occupation, and education level.

Figure 1: Regional Map



Understanding the voice of the speaker in the data point is critical to balancing biases. Commentary from journalists and academics reporting on the changes they see on the ground and the impact of reconstruction efforts represented the voice of an observer. Those responsible for carrying out reconstruction strategies, programs, and projects were classified as implementers. Most importantly, the voice of the ordinary Afghan citizen, the ultimate beneficiary, was also captured.

(2) Rating and Graphing Data Points

To evaluate qualitative information in a quantitative manner and to present policymakers with a quick impact presentation of findings, data is rated against two scales in relation to one another. Each data point is rated and graphed on an x-y grid, scaled from 0 to 10, in which the x axis of the graphs represents whether long-term Afghan capacity is being built, and the y axis represents whether short-term needs and interests are being met. These are both, to some extent, subjective measurements, but it allows for the current status of reconstruction to be graphically depicted.

The *Measure of Progress* study has developed a unique schemata to capture the neutral point (5,5), where there is no positive or negative change, or movement. The upper-right quadrant, the "Viable Zone," represents sustainable Afghan capacity as well as satisfaction of immediate needs and interests by Afghans and international partners. The lower-left quadrant is the "Danger Zone," representing a lack of sustainable capacity, with few needs and interests being met. The upper left and lower right quadrants are "Risk Zones," in which capacity and needs are not aligned. Risk Zone A represents the quadrant where short-term needs are being satisfied, but with a lack of long-term planning. For example, if an Afghan felt safe because of international forces, but had little confidence in the Afghan army or police, this would fall in Risk Zone A. On the other hand, Risk Zone B represents the quadrant in which long-term capacity is being built, while immediate needs and interests remain unmet. For example, if the Afghan army and police were being trained but the ordinary citizen did not feel secure, this would fall in Risk Zone B.

Figure 2



In a post-conflict country, it is critical to be realistic about the progress that can be achieved in the first 10 years. The situation should therefore be moving beyond the neutral (5,5) point—the boundary between positive trends and negative trends—toward the Viable Zone, ideally in a diagonally linear movement, continually improving Afghan lives today, with the ability of the government and society rising to meet the needs of the local population. Progress is not about being at a specific numerical rating. Rather, as the years pass, and as money is spent and projects implemented, Afghans must see that the momentum of change is positive, not backtracking or declining. Getting to the top-right corner (10, 10) is a long-

term goal—one that may take possibly twenty years or more—a goal that is likely to materialize only years after the international community has developed and empowered locals to take over ownership of numerous initiatives.

Afghan Interviews
After each interview, Afghan researchers plotted a single point for each of the five pillars. The 4,990 graphic data points provided offer a compelling story of whether, from an Afghan perspective, there has been an over- or under-emphasis on meeting immediate needs at the expense of building long-term capacity or vice versa, and whether Afghanistan's reconstruction is on a positive track.

CSIS Interviews
Interviews conducted by PCR project staff were broken down by topic according to the five pillars and then rated by the lead researcher. These ratings indicate CSIS' sense of what is necessary for a more peaceful, democratic, and prosperous future in both the short and long-term.

Media, Public Sources, Surveys
The PCR project staff assembled an informed and diverse team to rate the 1,031 textual data points gathered from the media, public sources, and surveys. The group of eight included a mix of men and women, internationals and Afghans, civilian practitioners and military personnel, as well as those with previous experience in evaluation. The initial assumption, based on the "wisdom of the crowd" theory articulated in *Progress or Peril?*[7], was that collective findings would be superior to the conclusions of any of the individuals in the group.

In order to eliminate potential biases, the raters were blind to the source of each data point, including type, location, and date. The collective ratings for each data point were then averaged, ensuring that no one person would skew the results. Thus, the findings led to a more accurate portrayal of ground truth than if the project team had relied on only one opinion—no matter how knowledgeable.

Each member of the rating team rated data points independently of one another and of the group at large in order to avoid "group think," in which project teams discourage independent thinking because of internal pressure to forge consensus. "Group think" of course can prove dangerous when agreed-on conclusions are wildly off the mark.

In the 2006 study, a smaller set of raters, with more diverse backgrounds and experience, was assembled. In order to maintain consistency with the 2005 rating process, data points from the previous study were used in trainings sessions.

[7] Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Progress or Peril: Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction," September 2004, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0409_progressperil.pdf.

(3) Analysis and Conclusions

In the final stage of the project, CSIS staff analyzed results, and drew conclusions and developed recommendations based in part on the graphical results of the data. PCR project staff examined two factors when interpreting the graphs—the average and the data spread—both of which were measured against the findings from the 2005 baseline study, *In the Balance*. In this approach:

- The *average* point permitted comparison between different pillars and indicators, and allowed an assessment of overall reconstruction progress. The average is an effective way to track positive and negative movement over time.

- The *data-spread* graphs highlighted the range of data, showing the diversity in any one pillar, indicator, or source type. The standard deviation of the average point was indeterminable, so the natural clustering of particular data were graphed and analyzed to determine the precision of the average point, identify consistent themes falling in specific sections of the graph, as well as determine the percentage of data in each quadrant. Often, disparate data within a pillar graph would point to differences between indicators.

After identifying the dominant characteristic of the graphs for each pillar, staff went back to study trends and themes, as well as successes and current and potential trouble spots.

The graphs drove the analysis of the most pressing issues in Afghanistan. Staff drew on the analysis to develop findings specific to each pillar and indicator. The findings are discussed in detail in the following chapters. It begins with a snapshot of the overall changes by pillar, and then assesses broad regional differences, the specific outcomes of the Afghan interviews and differences between source types. A detailed assessment of each pillar follows.

The recommendations in the final chapter are based on many components: the results of the methodology; field visits to the region; analysis of numerous studies of Afghanistan's present and future; and a synthesis of the advice and expertise of other reconstruction and Afghanistan experts. The recommendations attempt to take a strategic approach and focus on the most critical challenges to Afghanistan's recovery.

OVERALL ANALYSIS

In its 2005 study *In the Balance*, CSIS found that Afghanistan had not yet reached the Viable Zone, but that the potential to do so, as well as the threats that could undermine it, were both very tangible. Since then, conditions in Afghanistan have deteriorated into the Danger Zone. Afghan ability to meet needs and interests has not improved since 2005, despite more money spent, more projects implemented, and more time passed. Instead, the government and social institutions are perceived as being less legitimate and less prepared to meet Afghan needs today and in the future. All pillars, save Economic Conditions, have fallen into the Danger Zone. Security has shown the sharpest decline, with Justice still the worst-performing pillar.

Figure 3: Overall by Pillar



In 2005, Security was the most promising of the five pillars. Crime was a problem, and local commanders and their private militias continued to wield significant influence, but anti-government groups had not mounted large-scales attacks and violence, and international forces were perceived as effective. Security has sharply deteriorated in all regions. Afghans are more insecure today than they were in 2005. This is due largely to the violence surrounding the insurgency and counter-insurgency campaigns, and the inability of security forces to combat warlords and drug traffickers. State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and have trained more personnel, but they - particularly the Afghan National Police - have had problems with retention, staff effectiveness, corruption, and general oversight.

Figure 4: Overall Security



The results for Governance and Participation in 2005 indicated that a foundation for the future was being built, even if day-to-day needs were not being met. Although the central government remained weak in terms of capacity and legitimacy, Afghans supported President Hamid Karzai as a positive symbol of the new government. The central government's institutional and human capacity has improved, but its legitimacy has deteriorated. Sub-national government structures still lack capacity. In their place, militia commanders and local mafias have filled the void, undermining local governance, democratic rights, and service delivery.

Figure 5: Overall Governance and Participation



Justice and Accountability was the worst performing pillar of 2005, falling squarely in the Danger Zone. There has been little improvement of, or attention to, the Justice sector during the past year, and it has deteriorated even further. Traditional, informal judicial structures continue to fill the gap in justice for many Afghans, while the formal justice sector remains inaccessible and corrupt, and is unable to confront impunity, adjudicate land disputes, unravel criminal networks, or protect the rights of citizens.

Figure 6: Overall Justice and Accountability



The only pillar to show progress in 2006, Economic Conditions, has improved in all regions of Afghanistan. High economic growth and a more open business environment have improved the general health of the Afghan economy, yet these benefits have not translated into sufficient employment and income generating activities for the ordinary citizen. Illicit sources of revenue continue to undermine the development of a healthy market economy.

Figure 7: Overall Economic Conditions



The Social Services and Infrastructure pillar fell into the Danger Zone in 2006. Although reconstruction investments by the international community have enhanced social services and infrastructure, deteriorating security conditions, a scarcity of competent personnel and low quality has limited access and its benefits for many Afghans.

Figure 8: Overall Social Services and Infrastructure



REGIONAL

All regions have shifted into the Danger Zone. Provinces in the south and east—where the insurgency is based, the central government's presence is weak, and poppy production is rampant—continue to constitute the regions in worst repair, dropping squarely into the Danger Zone. The most significant decline has occurred in the northern and central regions and in the city of Kabul. Although the north and the west remain more secure than other areas of Afghanistan, instability in other parts of the country has begun to take a toll on Afghans living there too. The insurgency has also impacted the city of Kabul, where the security situation has most deteriorated since 2005, with more improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and suicide attacks killing Afghans. The west is performing better than the other regions, with slight increases there in Justice and Accountability, Economic Conditions, and Social Services and Infrastructure.

Figure 9: Overall Regional



SOURCE TYPE AND VOICE

Different sources have different perspectives and biases. The voices of ordinary Afghans, largely captured by Afghan interviews and survey data and to a lesser extent by CSIS interviews, are more optimistic than those of observers, including journalists and independent researchers, and implementers, such as members of the U.S. and Afghan armed forces, government officials, and aid workers.

In fact, data captured from the media and public documents are more negative than the other sources. Interview data was negative compared to survey data. The interview data captured by the study were designed to capture both the changes the respondent had experienced as a result of reconstruction work and their perceptions about changes in the country overall, whereas the survey data collected tended to capture perceptions alone. Further, open-ended interviews allowed respondents to focus on the issues that most concern them, and not surprisingly, those that remain challenges were cited the most often. Meanwhile, the predetermined questions in surveys forced respondents to focus on particular issues, regardless of their importance to them, and opened the space for more positive responses. While CSIS and Afghan interviews registered the largest drop in 2006, surveys found a noteworthy improvement in Afghan perceptions about reconstruction efforts.

Figure 17: Overall by Source Type



Figure 18: Overall by Voice



INTERVIEW DATA

Successful reconstruction depends on making progress in areas that Afghans feel are the most important. In so far as Afghan interviews reflect both their daily experiences and their expectations—reasonable or not—of what is happening in other parts of the country and what is likely to happen in the future, impressions will shift with news of failure and success. Although most Afghans voiced support for the changes happening in their country, deteriorating security conditions and the rise of rampant corruption have undermined people's confidence and their ability to take advantage of gains made in recent years. Afghanistan is a country of great regional and ethnic diversity, yet the data revealed more similarities than expected. The story for Afghan women was surprisingly positive, indicative of significantly improved circumstances.

PILLAR

The trends are more pronounced when talking to just Afghans. The results of the 1000 qualitative interviews with Afghans show that the deterioration of security, governance and justice is more dramatic than all of the data is considered together. Justice remains the worst performing sector, falling into the Danger Zone, while Governance and Participation, Security, Economic Conditions, and Social Services and Infrastructure all remained on the cusp. The Governance and Participation pillar showed the largest decline from 2005, while Security experienced the second-largest decline.

The success story of economic growth has not filtered down to the ordinary Afghan. Many still have trouble finding jobs, particularly one that offers steady income, and families remain indebted and vulnerable to economic shocks. Afghans do see considerable improvements in their social well-being, as access to healthcare and basic needs has improved, particularly in the North, West and Central regions.

Figure 10: Afghan Interviews by Pillar



When Afghans were asked in an open-ended question to identify their top three priorities that were then classified by pillar, 44 percent of respondents listed Social Services and Infrastructure as their first priority.. Although improvements in Social Services and Infrastructure were able to meet more Afghan needs in 2006, long-term local capabilities to meet those needs in the future have yet to be established. Meanwhile, 26 percent of respondents cite improvements in Economic Conditions as their top priority; these needs became more difficult to fulfill in 2006.

Figure 11: Priority 1 – All Afghans



REGIONAL

The most interesting regional trend has been the movement toward a more homogenous view of reconstruction efforts. The north and west of the country are still more positive overall than the south and east, but the regions have converged somewhat. Along the same vein, urban areas are better off than rural areas with regard to all pillars, yet people in urban and rural areas are also experiencing similar trends. Afghans are sharing more similar experiences and perceptions today than in 2005.

In the south and east, Afghans are finding it more difficult to fulfill their needs than in the north and west, but the sharpest declines from 2005 were in fact felt outside these areas. The north experienced the greatest regional decline for every pillar while the city of Kabul and the west showed significant declines in Economic Conditions, Governance and Participation, and Security. With regard to the Social Services and Infrastructure pillar, short-term improvements were made in the west and central regions but remained steady or fell in all other regions, while long-term capacity fell for all regions. Justice fell into the Danger Zone in all regions except for the west.

Figure 12: Afghan Interviews by Region



At least 40 percent of respondents listed issues related to Social Services and Infrastructure as their top priority in all regions except for the north, where 43 percent of respondents listed improvements in Economic Conditions as their top priority. Meanwhile, few respondents placed Governance and Participation issues as their top priority, irrespective of geographical location.

There remained some significant differences in priorities between regions. A higher percentage (32 percent) of southern Afghans claimed security issues as their first priority, compared to other regions. Where the environment was more secure, Afghans hoped to see improvements in other sectors. In the north and west, where security was mentioned least, Economic Conditions and Justice and Accountability issues were more important.

GENDER

Findings indicated that the lives of women have improved significantly, moving out of the Danger Zone. Women are more optimistic today that the state and society is building long-term capacity and will be able to meet their needs in the future, while men are less optimistic about the future capacity of the state and society.

Figure 15: Afghan Interviews by Gender



Women cited the economic and social sectors as the most positive pillars today, while men pointed to Security. Both genders put Justice and Accountability in the Danger Zone and indicated that it was the most negative pillar. Even here, however, women were more positive than men.

For women, priorities tended to be localized within the home around issues such as fulfilling basic needs, accessing healthcare and education, and the protection of rights. A majority of female respondents listed issues related to Social Services and Infrastructure as their first priority (56 percent), followed by Economic Conditions (22 percent) and Justice (12 percent). For men, priorities reflected their public role and their activities outside the home such as security, the economy, and infrastructure projects. As a result, their top priority was split between issues pertaining to Social Services and Infrastructure (31 percent), Economic Conditions (31 percent), and Security (27 percent).

Figure 13: Priority 1 – Men



Figure 14: Priority 1 – Women



In the city of Kabul and the north, women and men shared a more similar outlook on the success of reconstruction efforts in the country than in other regions. In the west, women were still struggling to meet their needs and interests but they were optimistic that Afghanistan was building its capabilities, while men were less optimistic despite the fact that most of their needs and interests were being met. In the east, all of the pillars were rated in the Danger Zone for men, while women remained in the balance. Finally, in the south, Security, Justice and Accountability, and Governance and Participation ranked low for both men and women.

ETHNICITY

Underlying ethnic tensions has been fueling the perception that reconstruction efforts are not equally benefiting all Afghans; the data, however, revealed that differences in experiences based on ethnic background were not as striking as one may think. Pashtuns were more negative on all five pillars than the other ethnic groups, while Uzbeks were the most positive—though the differential is not unbridgeable. Hazara rated Security higher than the other ethnic groups, while Pashtuns rated it the lowest. All ethnic groups were in agreement that the Justice sector was least viable. The Economic Conditions and Social Services and Infrastructure sectors were rated the highest by Turkmen and the lowest by Hazaras and Pashtuns.

Figure 16: Afghan Interviews by Ethnicity



SECURITY

Establishing security and public safety in a post-conflict society enables people to resume regular routines without fear of bodily harm or intimidation. Afghans are more insecure today because of the violence surrounding the growing insurgency and international military operations, and the inability of Afghan government and security forces to establish a necessary presence or combat crime and local power holders. Military operations by international forces and the Afghan National Army (ANA) have achieved some tactical gains against the insurgency, yet the Taliban continue to undermine stability and, consequently, Afghan perceptions of the government. The Afghan national security institutions are unlikely to be capable of maintaining security in the long-term without significant increases in international assistance and improved legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Figure 19 shows the state of Security by region, in terms of long-term development and the satisfaction of short-term needs. Figure 20 presents the Afghan interview data on Security.

Figure 19: Security by Region



Figure 20: Security by Region – Afghan Interviews



FINDINGS:

- Security was the only pillar to decline in both long-term capacity and short-term needs fulfillment, moving from the Viable Zone to the Danger Zone.
- In 2005, the northern, central, western regions, and the city of Kabul were in the Viable Zone but conditions have declined more rapidly there than in other places. The capital experienced the largest drop, falling to levels of the east and south. The south still remains the most dangerous region.
- Although improvements have been made to the state security institutions, the activities of commanders and insurgents continued to undermine civilian safety.
- Afghan interviews on security were more positive in the central, northern, and western regions, even though the deterioration there has been slightly more significant than in other parts of the country.

FINDINGS BY SUB-PILLAR:

The Security pillar has been further refined into the following sub-pillars: Commanders, Insurgency, Civilian Safety and Law and Order, and State Security Institutions.[8] Table 2 lists a sample of indicators that best capture the meaning of each sub-pillar and Figure 21 graphs the state of each Security sub-pillar.

Table 2: Security Sub-pillars and Indicators

Indicator	Examples of Details
Commanders	▪ Change in the impact of commanders and militias on civilian life (attacks, coercion, corruption) ▪ Change in government ability/willingness to threaten or empower commanders and militias ▪ Change in NGO and Government of Afghanistan access to areas in which commanders and militias are powerful
Insurgency	▪ Change in location or geographic scope of attacks ▪ Change in insurgent tactics ▪ Change in capability of Afghan National Army (ANA) and ISAF to combat insurgency ▪ Change in border traffic porousness (mobility of resources – personnel, money, guns)
Civilian Safety and Law and Order	▪ Change in crime levels and types ▪ Change in level of violence against civilians (by insurgents, commanders/militias, international forces) ▪ Change in number/type of people committing crimes ▪ Change in civilian ability to travel
State Security Institutions	▪ Change in security force ability to function: arrests and crowd control for the Afghan National Police (ANP); secure and hold territory for the ANA ▪ Change in Afghan security force independence – in resources and decision-making ▪ Change in number of attacks on ANA and ANP and recruits

Figure 21: Security by Sub-pillar



[8] This marks a change over the indicators from the *In the Balance* study, requiring some data reclassification.

INSURGENCY

The insurgency has gained momentum in the South and East, regaining and holding control in many districts in the southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul and moving from its traditional strongholds to Ghazni, Paktia, Paktika, Nangahar and Laghman.[9] Insurgents have managed to occupy critical roads and conduct ambushes from these strategic points. The insurgency is now able to recruit in larger numbers, wage battles with battalion-sized forces and is employing new tactics. In 2006, approximately 4,000 people were killed in insurgency-related violence, with a quarter of the victims representing civilians, and hundreds of Taliban, Afghan forces and 191 foreign troops killed.[10] It is not only insurgent attacks, but also the collateral damage from international military operations, that cause civilian casualties and undermine safety.[11] In the South, many new internally displaced persons (IDPs) have been created by the violence and intimidation.

Applying the term *Taliban* to all insurgents in Afghanistan is an inaccurate way of portraying several diverse groups. In reality, the insurgents are comprised of a diverse group of anti-government elements, including the northern and southern Taliban commands, disenfranchised powerholders, such as the Jalaluddin Haqqani Network in Paktya and Khost and a Hezb-e Islami wing led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Kunar and the Wana Shura, for Paktika.[12] The Taliban still poses the greatest strategic threat. It is often misunderstood as a fundamentalist Islamic movement, rather than what it is more likely to become—an incarnation of a long-standing tribal conflict. Most of the leadership is from the Ghilzai Pashtuns, including the charismatic leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, and its principle areas of operation coincides with the Ghilzai's largest population centres in Uruzgan, Zabul, Ghazni, Dai Kundi, and Paktika.[13] Unemployed, disaffected and often indoctrinated young men from camps within Pakistan generally form the mid-level leadership of the Taliban, and the foot soldiers of the insurgency are often tribally-affiliated, poor and dissatisfied local villagers. Feuding tribes, former warlords and drug traffickers, and foreign Jihadi fighters and al Qaeda operatives further demonstrates the diversity of the "anti-government" forces.

> "The foot soldiers of the insurgency are Afghans recruited within Afghanistan; they are driven by poverty, poor education and general disenchantment with their place in society. These internal fighters are not ideologically driven, but their ranks have expanded to support the growing upper echelons of the insurgency. They are thought to be ready to disengage from the insurgency if the appropriate incentives, particularly economic, are provided." — *UN Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Peace and Security," September 11, 2006.*

The insurgency has been very effective in its own "hearts and minds" campaign. Using the new media in Afghanistan, as well as relaxing the old religious rules and offering protection against the government's Central Eradication Forces and other abusive actors, the Taliban

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[9] Anthony Cordesman, "Winning Afghanistan: Facing the Rising Threat," CSIS, December 5, 2006.
[10] iCasualties.org, "Operation Enduring Freedom: Coalition Casualties." Accessed February 15, 2007. http://www.icasualties.org/oef/.
[11] Human Rights Watch, "NATO Should Do More to Protect Civilians," October 30, 2006. http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/30/afghan14475.htm.
[12] Kofi Annan, "Secretary General's Report to the United Nations Security Council on the Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Peace and Security," September 11, 2006, 2–3. http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep06.htm.
[13] Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, "Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan," *Orbis* (Winter 2006): 6, http://www.fpri.org/orbis/.

are proving to some Afghans that they are capable of moderation and protecting the people. They are gaining support by performing judicial and governance activities in the vacuum left by the central government. When this type of campaign does not work, they easily resort to intimidation and threats. In the Pashtun belt, most people do not support the insurgent's ideology, but the Taliban has successfully exposed and exploited the absence of government, on-going corruption, and inability to provide services to the population. The insurgents have been less successful in employing these tactics in the North, West and Central regions.

CIVILIAN SAFETY AND LAW AND ORDER

The ordinary Afghan has been caught between the abusive elements of the government—mainly the police and local commanders—and the Taliban, with both sides threatening their safety and affecting their ability to go about their daily lives.

IEDs, roadside bombs, crime and bribery, and international military operations against the insurgency have limited free movement. Most Afghans worry about traveling on the newly-built ring road, as well as on secondary highways and in urban centers for fear of being caught in the wrong place at the wrong time. Air strikes and military operations are causing higher rates of civilian casualties, and fueling resentment of the international presence and the central government. Internationals and those that work with the government, such as teachers, aid workers, police, government officials, and women working and attending school, are being threatened with night letters and targeted by insurgents. Some continue to travel and work at great personal risk, while other capable Afghans are refusing positions that put themselves and their families at risk.

While surveys and public sources indicate that levels of crime have decreased over the past year, PCR interviews of Afghans indicated that the level of theft increased in both rural and urban areas, particularly at night. There was also a rise in criminality, burglaries and kidnapping in the city of Kabul, targeting NGOs and wealthy businessmen and their families. Some of these activities were attributed to local commanders' militia forces and the police, and often went unreported.

> "Last year my shop in Kabul was robbed. After the robbery I found the identity card of one of the local police in my shop. When I brought it to the police station, the commander took it off me, and warned me not to tell anyone or else my life would be at risk." — Kabul businessman, *"Afghan Police Part of the Problem," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, June 1, 2006.*

Most women reported feeling safe at home. Women in the north, west, and central regions and in Kabul indicated that they did not experience significant security problems traveling outside their homes, whereas in the South, where the Taliban has been regaining strength, women and girls have been targeted for going to school, interacting with internationals and in some cases leaving the home.

STATE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

State security institutions have increased their operational capacity and more institutions have been built, yet retention, effectiveness and oversight continue to be low. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a fighting force in support of the Afghan National Army (ANA), leaving few officers to protect the people in the country. The Afghan government is

not likely to be able to fund its security forces in the near term,14 and with the new demands of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) force, resources will be further strained.

Official sources indicate that to date, 30,100 of Afghan National Army soldiers are operational and 49,700 Afghan National Police officers have been trained.15 Yet after taking into account desertion, ghost names and the incompetence of many, the total is more likely to be half the number, if that. The incentives to fight for the weakened Karzai government are inadequate to recruit and retain professional troops. Morale is low. Despite reform processes to increase the pay for the ANA and ANP, income for those in the lower ranks remains insufficient to meet more than the most basic needs. ANA soldiers now receive $100 month as a new recruit for a three-year commitment, up from $70 month,[16] and although the ANP will more than double the pay of all officers over the sergeant level, ordinary patrolmen will continue to receive $70 a month—if they receive pay at all.[17] In some reported cases, the Taliban are paying up to $12 a day, three times as much as the ANA field soldiers, and there is evidence of defection from the national security forces to the Taliban ranks.[18] In addition to this, the ANA and ANP are facing higher security risks and are increasingly targeted by anti-government elements. With the three-year contract period coming to an end it is likely that 20 percent of troops will not stay on for a second term.[19]

The ANA continues to serve as a symbol of national unity. Although forces sporadically disperse while on a mission, for the most part, they are operational and are undertaking critical security missions, counterterrorism and drug interdictions. For the first time in Afghan history, the new army conducted a battalion-sized combat operation that combined logistics, mortars, scouts and infantry from a number of companies.[20] One interesting development has been ANA willingness to take on missions at the request of its local commander or an Afghan government official without notifying the U.S. military. This may be a sign of progress towards breaking its dependence on international leadership, but may

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[14] Vance Serchuk, "Don't Undercut the Afghan Army," *Washington Post*, June 2, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/01/AR2006060101533_pf.html.
[15] Anthony Cordesman, "Winning Afghanistan: Facing the Rising Threat," CSIS, December 5, 2006.
[16] Phillip O'Connor, "Unsettled Afghanistan," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 28, 2006, http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/0/E18DBE084BCA009F8625721500664469?OpenDocument.
[17] Inspectors General, US Department of State and US Department of Defense. "Interagency Assessment of Afghanistan Police Training and Readiness," November 14, 2006, http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/IGInformationReleases/Interagency%20Assessment%20of%20Afghanistan%20Police%20Training%20&%20Readiness.pdf.
[18] Rachel Morarjee, "Taliban Goes for Cash over Ideology," *Financial Times*, July 26, 2006, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/786a53c0-1c42-11db-bd97-0000779e2340.html.
[19] Anthony Cordesman, "Victory in Afghanistan: The Need for a New Strategy," CSIS, January 30, 2007.
[20] David Zucchino, "It's Starting to Look a Lot Like an Army," *Los Angeles Times*, August 22, 2006, http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-army22aug22,1,4646539,print.story?coll=la-headlines-world.

also compound problems in the short-term if support is still needed, and in the long-term, if the Ministry of Defense does not retain oversight of these missions.[21] The institution lacks equipment and logistical support such as food, accommodation, and weaponry, and has trouble recruiting and retaining a steady level of troops. The Afghan National Army still cannot operate without significant logistical and operational support from international forces, which can be expected to continue in the long-term.

The ANP has insufficient presence in rural districts and those that are patrolling are perceived to be corrupt, abusive, and lacking discipline. The Central Eradication Forces, responsible for counter-narcotics, are especially susceptible to bribes.[22] Often, no leadership is in place to provide oversight on the ground. Many officers are local commanders and militia members in different clothes. Only the Hazara minority that dominates the central region seems to have a positive perception and experience with the police. In many districts the police are the only representatives that Afghans come across from Karzai's government, and their bad behavior is undermining the legitimacy of the central government.

The decision to create a new 11,000 strong Auxiliary Police from existing tribal militias and youth to augment formal state security institutions in 19 provinces across Afghanistan has received mixed reviews. To date, 2,000 ANAP police have been deployed in the troubled southern and eastern regions after a standard two-week training course. They receive the same pay as the ANP and are organized to report to the provincial police chief.[23] Some Afghans have already reported cases of excessive violence and bribery.[24] The new force is also creating rifts between the commanders in the North who participated in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs, and what they perceive as the rearmament of southern Pasthun commanders and militias. The concept of community policing is a traditional one in Afghanistan, yet it remains to be seen whether the current adaptation will be deployed to protect the people or fight the insurgency and whether they will enjoy similar levels of trust and success.

COMMANDERS

Local commanders and warlords continue to control private militia forces and wield significant influence in all parts of the country. More commanders have been brought into the ranks of the government over the past year as ministry officials or advisors, provincial governors, and police chiefs and into the newly elected parliament and provincial councils. Most Afghans reject the legitimization of commanders and view their growing sources of power as a movement back to the days of the civil war.

> "The Program for the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) is all but moribund, as the South refuses to disarm in the face of insurgent security threats, and the north refuses to disarm if the South does not." — *International Crisis Group, "Countering Afghanistan's Insurgency: No Quick Fixes," November, 2006.*

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[21] Phillip O'Connor, "Unsettled Afghanistan," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, October 28, 2006, http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/stories.nsf/0/E18DBE084BCA009F8625721500664469?OpenDocument.

[22] U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). "Afghanistan Drug Control," November 2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0778.pdf.

[23] *Pajhwok Afghan News*. "Afghan President 'Approves' Formation of Tribal Militias," May 27, 2006.

[24] Matt Prodger, "New Afghan Police Force Deployed," *BBC News*, November 17, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/6157920.stm.

In some provincial districts, particularly in the north and west, former warlords retain de-facto control and local legitimacy despite the presence of central government officials. Factional fighting over control of critical resources, such as water, poppy, land, and major routes of transport undermines security.

Warlords and their troops continue to engage in criminal activity with impunity in most parts of the country. [25] The threat of the insurgency spilling out of the south and the rearmament of Pashtuns in the Afghan National Auxiliary Police is influencing northern commanders to re-engage. Also, the process to disband the illegally armed militias has stalled, and even many ex-combatants that participated in the DDR process, faced with unemployment, have begun to rearm.

[25] Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2006," January 2006. http://hrw.org/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf.

GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION

Providing people with an open and trusted government that is capable of delivering the most basic services is critical to long term recovery, yet this remains an enormous challenge in Afghanistan. While some national institutional coherence and capacity is being developed, the government is losing legitimacy. Both national and sub-national structures and actors are still unable to deliver services in large parts of the country in line with Afghan expectations, and significant attempts to weed out corruption and criminal actors have not been made. The perception that the government is weak and ineffective is fueled by the Taliban's resurgence and propaganda. Although good governance is a long-term objective, given the international attention to ministerial development and technical advisors, steady progress should be further along than it is. Figure 22 shows the state of Governance and Participation by region, in terms of long-term development and the satisfaction of short-term needs. Figure 23 presents the Afghan interview data on Governance and Participation.

Figure 22: Governance by Region



Figure 23: Governance by Region – Afghan Interviews



FINDINGS:

- There has been a substantial drop in long-term capacity in the government, mostly stemming from large decreases in government legitimacy and effectiveness.
- Discontent with governance has been prevalent in both urban and rural areas. Both the North and Kabul city, where positive opinions of the central government were widespread over the past few years, also dropped significantly in long-term capacity.
- Political security has fallen dramatically and is now squarely in the Danger Zone. Government officials and those affiliated with the central government have been targeted by insurgents. The long-term capacity of sub-national governance has also decreased, pushing this sub-pillar into the Danger Zone. Meanwhile, there has been slight progress in the participation of Afghan civilians in government decision-making and the national government's ability to respond to them.
- Observers in the media have been slightly more negative than Afghan beneficiaries and program implementers. During the past few months, the media has reflected growing international disfavor with and negative rhetoric about Karzai's government and its ability to implement positive change.

FINDINGS BY SUB-PILLAR

The Governance and Participation pillar has been further refined into the following sub-pillars: National Governance, Sub-National Governance, Participation and Political Security.[26] Table 3 lists a sample of indicators that best capture the meaning of each sub-pillar and Figure 24 graphs the state of each Governance and Participation sub-pillar.

Table 3: Governance and Participation Indicators

Indicator	Examples of Details
National Governance	▪ Change in President Karzai's legitimacy ▪ Change in government ability to raise revenues through taxation and customs ▪ Change in government ability to pass laws and create legal framework ▪ Change in qualification for government leadership ▪ Change in amount, type, and quality of services delivered (water, power, health, infrastructure, education, etc) ▪ Change in government ethnic and gender balance
Subnational Governance	▪ Change in accountability and responsiveness of subnational government to the national government as well as constituents ▪ Change in subnational government access to resources for implementation and the capacity to use these resources ▪ Change in citizen use of informal structures on the local level
Participation	▪ Change in citizen ability to vote (by gender, ethnicity, religion, age, urban/rural, etc) ▪ Change in public awareness and understanding of voting procedures ▪ Change in levels of non-violent dissent, protest behavior, or community mobilization ▪ Change in number of media sources
Political Security	▪ Change in level of political intimidation ▪ Change in level of violence against public officials, teachers and aid workers ▪ Change in politician freedom of movement

Figure 24: Governance by Sub-Pillar



[26] This marks a change over the indicators from the *In the Balance* study, requiring some data reclassification.

NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Governance remains largely a product of a few people at the top as opposed to processes, political parties, institutions and capable administrative and management teams. High levels of corruption and nepotism are undermining the legitimacy of national and sub-national governance, and of President Karzai in the eyes of most Afghans. President Karzai is commonly perceived as a weak and ineffective manager and overly conciliatory to corrupt and criminal actors. His decisions to re-appoint government officials removed from previous official posts and known to be connected to criminal networks, private militias, the drug trade and human rights abuses have eroded the popular support that he enjoyed last year. In addition, the election process, which was expected to undermine warlords by subjecting them to popular will, managed to bring a number of warlords into official positions resulting in widespread disappointment.

Afghans indicate that they expect the government to deliver social and economic benefits, particularly electricity and jobs. Unfortunately, these are the two sectors that many Afghans have not seen improve in the past year. There is a growing perception and resentment of unequal distribution by province and ethnic group of these benefits by the government, fueling internal tensions.

At a Conference held in London on January 31, 2006, 60 donor nations, international institutions and the Government of Afghanistan endorsed the Afghanistan Compact, signaling a renewed focus on the state-building agenda. In the first few months, it reinvigorated the international community's commitment to the country. The Compact and Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) failed to draw in a broader group of Afghans to cultivate national buy-in. The strategy lays out the objectives of the central government, but it provides little direction of how to get there. There is little sequencing and prioritizing of initiatives, and little clarification of responsibilities and roles for the various national and international actors. The Policy Action Group (PAG), launched by President Karzai in June 2006 has helped to focus the efforts of the international community on the most pressing challenges as articulated by the central government.

Despite the new strategy to improve governance, in most ministries and provincial offices there are still no clear roles, no terms of references and patchy legal frameworks defining and restricting the activities of the institutions. The lack of clarity on rules and procedures creates an environment conducive to turf battles between government bodies and encourages the creation of multiple parallel institutions all conducting similar activities. A lack of skilled capacity and institutionalized processes, especially in public administration, undermines the Afghan government's ability to implement its programs, particularly in sub-national structures. During the past year, some ministries, such as Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) and Ministry of Communication and the Ministry of Public Health, have improved their ability to deliver results in social services and infrastructure to Afghans. However, ministries crucial to protecting the rule of law, such as the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, continue to be plagued with criminality and mismanagement.

> "There is no PROCESS. No process for decision-making and no process for basic administration in most of the government institutions" – *World Bank Advisor, CSIS Interview*

In its first year of operations, the bicameral legislature has emphasized procedural decision-making and has signaled a willingness to be a countervailing force to the executive by reviewing presidential appointments. As an institution, the capacity of the Parliament is steadily improving although its interaction with the executive and the international community remains limited and the larger reform agenda has yet to be tackled. Like the executive branch, the legislature also contains warlords, commanders and drug traffickers, emphasizing the need to strengthen the judiciary.

SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE

Over-centralized structures, budgeting processes, and managerial control undermine the effectiveness of sub-national governance. Provincial offices cannot make spending decisions or hire their own administrative teams. Capacity building and training remains especially limited in the provincial governments as compared to national institutions in Kabul. Many offices are under-equipped, understaffed, and lack skills to implement development budgets and deliver services in a timely manner. At the same time, the newly-elected provincial councils remain under-capacitated and struggle to find a meaningful role within the system.

> "The government is also divided. Everyone has its own government and keeps in touch with it, like Taliban, village elders, police and armed militia. Every one of them has its own area." - *Abdul Rashid – Helmand #48*

The number of elected community development councils (CDCs) of the National Solidarity Program (NSP) has increased to 16,072, representing millions of Afghans in 276 districts.[27] The program allows villages to elect local leaders, and choose and implement projects that meet their specific priorities. To date, $300 million has been disbursed for 20,000 projects in a variety of sectors, directly benefiting Afghans. In addition to delivering development, CDCs also solve local disputes. The CDCs and tribal shuras are seen as more responsive to Afghan needs than provincial governments and provincial councils, and in many cases are the only sign of improvement villages have seen in the past five years.

Most Afghans report that local authority figures are corrupt and do not consult with their constituents. Particularly in the south, a lack of central government presence and insecurity has opened provincial districts to abuse by the Taliban and local commanders. Where government presence is limited or where officials are perceived as unrepresentative, corrupt, and weak, people have turned to elders, tribal chiefs, and imams.

PARTICIPATION

There is a desire among many Afghans to participate in formal or informal governance structures, but they have not been effectively engaged by those in power. Roughly, 52 percent of men and 26 percent of women feel that they do not have a voice in reconstruction efforts.[28] In interviews, most Afghans corroborate that the central government is not listening or responding to their needs or demands. Civil society, business associations, and traditional elders are slowly becoming more organized and effective at

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[27] Gordon Adam, "Afghanistan's New Leaders Emerge from the Rubble," *Sydney Herald*, September 17, 2006, http://e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/D043F54F55620F4B872571ED003C11EE?OpenDocument.
[28] Altai Consulting, "ANDP Afghan National Development Poll: Survey 3," July 6, 2006.

lobbying the government.[29] Continued protest activity indicates frustration with government actions, but protests remain largely peaceful and therefore may be a sign of positive engagement.

Although proliferation of media sources and access to information has allowed Afghans to participate in national debate, some people and issues, particularly criminality and impunity of government officials and the actions of the Taliban, are still off-limits. With the rise of the insurgency's media-targeted threats, journalists face increasing uncertainty.[30]

> "Provincial governors and other influential figures tell journalists what to print and what not to print." — *Ibrahimi, Sayed Yaqub. "The Limits of Press Freedom," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, May 4, 2006.*

Participation in the parliamentary and provincial council elections declined to 6.4 million voters, from the 8.1 million that voted in the presidential elections.[31] Many refused to participate because the rosters reflected local criminal actors, or because of confusion over the complicated electoral mechanisms. Although some Afghans express satisfaction with the election process, a much greater number convey a mix of frustration and disappointment.

The formation of healthy political parties was hindered by the application of the single non-transferable vote, where citizens chose one candidate from a list of contenders rather than a political party roster, thereby fragmenting the vote to the point where candidates can be elected virtually by chance. The structure favored divisive, regionally concentrated, ethnically based blocs at the expense of nascent national or policy-oriented groups and coalitions.[32] The absence of overt party politics has limited opportunities for Afghans to express their needs and interests outside of Election Day, has stymied debate and effective decision-making in the new parliament, and has allowed the worst criminal organizations to flourish[33].

> "Government exists, but law and order is not enforced. The provincial council has the authority here, but those who go to their office in fear and come back the same, so if they have that much fear, how they would be able to help ordinary people?" - *Abdul Rashid – Helmand #38*

POLITICAL SECURITY

Afghans and internationals working for the government or NGOs have become targets of the insurgency. Several aid workers were killed this year[34] and high-level officials, such as the governor of Paktia province and the head of Kandahar's Department of Women's Affairs, were assassinated. The security threat has limited the movement of officials and aid workers to the provincial capitals, rendering them unable to deliver services into the rural and insecure areas. Further, political insecurity is undermining the long-term capacity of the government as qualified and effective people are being killed, intimidated out of office, or rejecting government positions.

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[29] CSIS Interview, Anje DeBeer, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), September 5, 2006.
[30] Ibrahimi, Sayed Yaqub. "The Limits of Press Freedom," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, May 4, 2006, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=261527&apc_state=heniarr200605.
[31] United Nations Development Program, "2004–2005 Voter Registration and Elections Project," http://www.undp.org.af/about_us/overview_undp_afg/dcse/prj_elections.htm.
[32] National Democratic Institute, "The September 2005 Parliamentary and Provincial Council Elections in Afghanistan," February 20, 2006, http://www.accessdemocracy.org/library/2004_af_report_041006.pdf.
[33] Ann Marlowe, "Life of the Parties ," *Wall Street Journal*, January 30, 2007.
[34] *The Economist*, "A Geographical Expression in Search of a State—Afghanistan," July 6, 2006.

Other reasons for rising political insecurity include fighting between mid-level commanders across Afghanistan and competition between commanders Abdul Rashid Dostum, Mohammad Atta, Abdul Hakim Munib, and others in the north, which has resulted in assassination attempts on those loyal to the leaders. Intimidation and targeted killings were reported during the election process, albeit at lower rates than expected.

JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The challenge of establishing justice and accountability is to create the conditions in which people are free to exercise their basic rights, live without intimidation, and have recourse to a fair system for resolving differences and protecting their livelihoods. Afghanistan has a long way to go in each of these areas. Of the five pillars, the justice sector has been the most criticized. The formal justice system remains illegitimate due to pervasive corruption and enduring impunity, and inaccessibility due to long case delays and lack of affordability. Afghans continue to rely on trusted and capable informal structures of justice. Figure 25 shows the state of Justice and Accountability by region, in terms of long-term development and the satisfaction of short-term needs. Figure 26 presents the Afghan interview data on Justice and Accountability.

Figure 25: Justice by Region



Figure 26: Justice by Region – Afghan Interviews



FINDINGS:

- The justice sector has decreased slightly in capacity.
- In both urban and rural areas across the country, Afghans report being dissatisfied.
- The protection of rights has improved but there has been negligible improvement in the justice system and little action taken to improve impunity.
- Afghan interviewees were more pessimistic about Justice and Accountability, pushing this pillar into the Danger Zone in all regions except the west.

FINDINGS BY SUB-PILLAR:

The Justice and Accountability pillar has been further refined into the following sub-pillars: Justice System, Rights Protection, and Impunity. Table 4 lists a sample of indicators that best capture the meaning of each sub-pillar and Figure 27 graphs the state of each Justice and Accountability sub-pillar.

Table 4: Justice and Accountability Sub-Pillars and Indicators

Subpillar	Examples of Details
Justice System	▪ Change in number of judges and lawyers ▪ Change in cost to use formal or informal justice system and amount of time it takes for a case to go to trial ▪ Change in individual willingness to use either the formal or informal justice system ▪ Change in ability to prosecute criminal and corrupt actors and officials ▪ Change in universality of laws
Rights Protection	▪ Change in number, type and intensity of human rights abuses ▪ Change in the legal recognition of basic freedoms ▪ Change in citizen awareness of basic human rights ▪ Change in ability of Afghan government and international community to monitor human rights abuses
Transitional Justice	▪ Change in the willingness of the Afghan government or international community to prosecute past abuses and to set up systems to prosecute abusers ▪ Change in knowledge about past abuses and putting past abuses on the historical record ▪ Change in citizen education about reconciliation programs

Figure 27: Justice by Subpillar



JUSTICE SYSTEM

Although there is hope that judicial training and rehabilitated court buildings will improve service delivery, the level of corruption continues to undermine the legitimacy of the institution for most Afghans. There is little proof that the system of institutions, courts, judges, the provincial attorney general's office, the police, and the legal statutes themselves are functioning holistically. Minimal attention has been given to reforming the justice sector since 2005. Instead, the informal structures, such as shuras, elders, and tribal and religious leadership remain the most legitimate, accessible, and affordable adjudicators and mediators in the community.

Most Afghans are reluctant to refer their cases to the formal court system because they are unable to afford the high levels of bribery required. In addition, the formal courts are seen to be staffed by unprofessional and uneducated judges, and both secular law, encapsulated in the constitution, and Islamic law, which has significant legitimacy, are not uniformly applied. In urban areas there is a greater willingness to engage with the formal system, often because informal structures are unavailable. For women, knowledge of and access to justice, both formal and informal, is still extremely limited because they are unable to travel to or access judicial mechanisms. Willingness to report crimes and violations, however, has increased.

> "No dispute is decided without bribery" – *Abdul Rashid, Kabul #12*

The legitimacy of the Supreme Court has improved with the parliamentary rejection of conservative Chief Justice Shinwari and the appointment of Abdul Salam Azimi. Still the government and judicial officials are still seen as apathetic and complicit, unwilling to punish those involved in bribery, drugs, crime, and injustice. A few Afghans, particularly in the south, are recalling the rule of the Taliban with nostalgia for a time when harsh justice was delivered against criminal actions and the security situation was stable. In fact, Taliban shuras have adjudicated a number of outstanding disputes during the summer in rural areas of the south.

> "So people would say, 'At least under the Taliban there was some kind of justice.' They're not contrasting that with justice that respects human rights and so on—that they would like—but we haven't offered them that. What we've offered them is nonfunctional courts, plus some training programs." — *Council on Foreign Relations, "Interview with Barnett Rubin: Afghanistan at Dangerous 'Tipping Point'," October, 2006.*

RIGHTS PROTECTION

Although Afghans are granted more social, political and economic rights than ever before, and institutions, such as the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and the media, have improved rights monitoring, violations by powerful and protected people continue to occur without penalty.

Most women interviewed do not experience violence within the household. They maintain that their rights as Muslim Afghan women are respected, despite the fact that they do not have permission to work or attend school. Most women expect and receive the right to receive protection and sustenance from their male family members and have their ideas be heard in the home. The media and public sources demonstrate that 38 percent of females continue to be forced into marriages, often due to intimidation by powerful people, gunmen

or in repayment for debts.[35] Honor killings, suicide and domestic violence are still common, although most cases go unreported and perpetrators rarely face justice. Police and judicial authorities often turn a blind eye to the practice.[36]

The resurgence of the Taliban in the south has meant that women's rights, freedom of movement, and freedom of speech are coming under increasing threat. Cases of intimidation and violence against journalists speaking negatively against the Taliban have been logged during the past year.[37] Targeted killings have limited freedom of movement for those associated with the government and internationals. Other actors, such as local government authorities and commanders, police and Taliban grab land and commit human rights abuses, arbitrary arrest, illegal detention and torture, all with impunity.

> "As election day drew closer, intimidation also rose. Although the elections were to be conducted nationwide, neither the government nor the international community were able to guarantee security to candidates in certain 'no go' areas. This situation benefited candidates protected by powerful local and provincial figures. As a result, candidates' campaign activities in some provinces were limited and voters were faced with threats of violence and coercion leading up to election day." -—*Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2006," January 2006*.

While the elections passed without significant cases of violence, high levels of corruption and intimidation during the process have left many Afghans feeling that they were denied their right to vote.[38]

IMPUNITY

The impunity of a few highly visible government officials and local commanders is undermining Afghan faith in the formal justice system and the government. They operate outside the rule of law, with the formal system unable to prosecute them and no transitional justice mechanisms available. Various plans to bring commanders and government officials responsible for past or current human rights abuses to justice have been given lip service, however, the political will to implement them has been minimal. There are a few government officials, notably Attorney General Abdul Jabbar Sabit[39] and Kabul airport's security chief General Aminullah Amrkhel,[40] who are working to extract criminalized actors from positions of power with mixed success.

Approximately 2,000 Taliban have joined the National Commission for Peace in Afghanistan run by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi[41] and many former militia commanders have joined the DDR process, yet there is little oversight and many have rearmed and re-engaged in violence and illicit activities.

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[35] Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, "Evaluation Report on General Situation of Women in Afghanistan," March 2006, http://www.aihrc.org.af/rep_eng_wom_situation_8_march.htm.
[36] Golnaz Esfandiari, "Rights Watchdog Alarmed at Continuing 'Honour Killings,'" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, September 20, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/9/7D9925B9-96EE-4698-B292-DC4EAFB0E18E.html.
[37] *Associated Press*. "Top Taliban Military Commander Dismisses NATO Casualty Reports, Warns Journalists," September 4, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/04/asia/AS_GEN_Afghan_Taliban.php.
[38] Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2006," January 2006, http://hrw.org/wr2k6/wr2006.pdf.
[39] Pamela Constable, "Top Prosecutor Targets Afghanistan's Once-Untouchable Bosses," *Washington Post*, November 23, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/22/AR2006112201889.html.
[40] Makia Monir, "Security Chief Sees Conspiracy Behind Dismissal," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, October 12, 2006, http://www.pajhwak.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=25918.
[41] CSIS Interview, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, National Commission for Peace in Afghanistan. September 1, 2006.

ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Broad based economic development requires advancing agriculture yields and marketability, encouraging trade, investing in medium-sized industrial enterprises and empowering the individual Afghan to participate in the new economy. While the Afghan economy and private sector continues to grow, many ordinary Afghans are frustrated with their economic situation. They suffer from unsteady employment and economic insecurity, and are turning to illicit and illegal activity, such as corruption and poppy production, to meet immediate needs. The Taliban has become an alternative source of employment, recruiting the jobless as foot soldiers in the insurgency. Figure 28 shows the state of Economic Conditions, in terms of long term development and the satisfaction of short-term needs, by region. Figure 29 presents the Afghan interview data on Economic Conditions.

Figure 28: Economic Conditions by Region



Figure 29: Economic Conditions by Region – Afghan Interviews



FINDINGS:

- Economic Conditions is the only pillar that has improved since last year.
- The significant positive shift in the economic conditions has impacted all regions in Afghanistan. It is the only pillar to fall into the Viable Zone in 2006, albeit only in the Northern and Western regions.
- Macroeconomic Climate and Commerce, Industry and Agriculture have moved into the Viable Zone. Meanwhile the trend in Jobs, Income and Prices reflects only a slight upwards shift in terms of meeting Afghan needs, and has remained stable in long-term capacity.
- Afghan voices, as reflected by surveys and interviews, are less positive about economic progress than observers and implementers. This is largely due to stagnation in access to jobs, income and purchasing power, despite institutional reforms and improvements. Afghan interviews revealed a significant drop in both short-term needs and long-term capacity in the recovering provinces of the Nnorth, west, east, and the city of Kabul.

FINDINGS BY SUBPILLAR:

The Economic Conditions pillar has been further refined into the following three sub-pillars: Macroeconomic Climate; Commerce, Industry and Agriculture;and Jobs, Income and Prices.[42] Table 5 lists a sample of indicators that best capture the meaning of each sub-pillar and Figure 30 graphs the state of each Economic Conditions sub-pillar.

Table 5: Economic Conditions Sub-Pillars and Indicators

Indicator	Examples of Details
Macroeconomic Climate	▪ Change in GDP, trade, employment levels ▪ Change in tax rates and revenues ▪ Change in inflation
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture	▪ Change in access to markets ▪ Change in number and success of local businesses ▪ Change in diversity of agricultural production ▪ Change in access to credit and loans
Jobs, Income and Prices	▪ Change in access to jobs (gender, region, urban/rural, ethnicity) ▪ Change in income stability ▪ Change in cost of living ▪ Change in levels of debt or savings

Figure 30: Economic Conditions by Sub-Pillar



[42] This marks a change over the indicators from the *In the Balance* study, requiring some data reclassification.

MACROECONOMIC CLIMATE

The economy and the government's fiscal capacity grew significantly over the past year. GDP increased from $5.2 billion in 2005 to $6.7 billion in 2006[43], and the IMF projects 12 percent growth for Afghanistan's GDP for fiscal year 2007/2008.[44] The growth can be attributed to an increase in foreign direct investment and dramatically increased trade levels. Trade with neighboring countries has shown a double-digit increase. Customs tariffs have been rationalized, existing trade agreements have been renewed and new agreements have entered into force,[45] however, Afghan goods are still comparatively expensive in the region. Monetary policy has improved. Inflation has remained at reasonable levels and capital is more readily available in the country. During the past 18 months the central bank, Da Afghanistan Bank, has increased its foreign currency reserves to almost $2 billion from virtually zero.[46] Growth can be tied to illicit sources as well. Opium GDP is estimated in the $2.6–2.7 billion range during the last two years, equivalent to 27 percent of total drug-inclusive GDP and 36 percent of licit GDP in 2005–2006.[47]

> "The Government estimates that sustained growth of 9% annually of licit GDP is required to provide citizens with a tangible sense of improvement in living conditions, and compensate for the contraction caused by the elimination of the narcotics sector. Projected growth in FY2006 at 11.7% and FY2007 at 10.6% should exceed this minimum." – U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State. *"Doing Business in Afghanistan: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies," February 6, 2006.*

Despite the high levels of recorded GDP, when asked what has been the most important accomplishment of the central government in the past two years, only 3 percent of Afghans said economic growth. When asked what has been the most important failure of the central government in the past two years, Afghans' number one answer (32 percent of respondents) was not enough jobs or slow economic growth.[48] Essentially, the benefits of high growth have yet to trickle down to the ordinary Afghan and may be fueling further inequities.

An estimated 80–90 percent of market activity remains in the informal sector, impeding reliable data gathering, government revenue collection and regulatory oversight.[49] Although this is likely to pose a challenge for some time to come, the government has been successful in raising its revenues over the past year by 36 percent through better tax and customs collection.[50] In fact Afghanistan's total customs revenues increased by more than 100

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[43] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006," September 12, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf.
[44] International Monetary Fund, "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—Statement of the IMF Staff at the Conclusion of the Mission for the First Review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy," November 26, 2006, http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2006/112606.htm.
[45] U.S. Foreign and Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State, "Doing Business in Afghanistan: A Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies," February 6, 2006, http://www.export.gov/afghanistan/pdf/afghanistan_ccg_2006.pdf.
[46] Eric Ellis, "Afghanistan Gets Back to Business," *Euromoney*, September 2006, http://www.euromoney.com/article.asp?PositionID=1815&ArticleID=1079158&IssueID=50152.
[47] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and The World Bank, "Afghanistan's Drug Industry," November 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Afgh_drugindustry_Nov06.pdf.
[48] Altai Consulting, "ANDP Afghan National Development Poll: Survey 3," July 6, 2006.
[49] U.K. Department for International Development, "DFID Interim Strategy for Afghanistan 2005/06," August 9, 2006, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/afghanistan-interim-strategy.pdf.
[50] Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "1385 National Budget," 2006, http://www.af/resources/mof/nationalbudget/1385_National_Budget/1385BUDGETDECREE_ENG.pdf.

percent from 2003 to 2005[51] through computerization and the employment of more honest and professional customs officials.[52]

Collection of revenues does not necessarily imply improved delivery of services to Afghans if it is not spent. Only 43 percent of the core development budget was spent in 2005–2006[53] and just greater than 14 percent of the annual operating budget and less than 1 percent of the annual development budget were executed during the first quarter of the 2006–2007 reporting year.[54] This is primarily because the central ministries and provincial governments have yet to build sufficient capacity to develop project proposals, find implementing partners and eliminate bureaucratic bottlenecks.

COMMERCE, INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

The Afghan government's economic reforms, including legislation to improve financial, commercial and trading markets, have established the foundations for a market-led economy. New institutions such as the Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce and Afghanistan Investment Support Agency have been instrumental in encouraging foreign and Diaspora investment and pushing the government to implement pro-market policies, such as a better regulatory environment, more tax incentives, and new customs codes to reduce duty rates in a number of sectors.[55] During the past year, a number of small medium enterprises, particularly in the construction and agribusiness industry, have emerged. The success of a few large, albeit foreign-owned, firms, including the one billion dollar Roshan, AWCC and Areeba communications firms and ABI, a U.A.E. water bottling plant that was awarded a contract to supply the coalition forces under the "Afghanistan First" economic initiative,[56] indicates improvement in private sector development and investment.

However, the recent deterioration in security, high levels of corruption, high taxes, and unclear land titles and rights undermines international and Diaspora business confidence, increasing the cost of operations and persuading some investors to withdraw completely. Currently, businesses

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[51] BearingPoint, "Economic Governance Program Completion Report," October 16, 2006, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDACH901.pdf.
[52] Paul Wiseman, "Afghanistan Goal: Supporting Itself," *USA Today*, May 25, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2006-05-25-afghanistan-usat_x.htm?csp=34&POE=click-refer.
[53] Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, "1385 National Budget," 2006, http://www.af/resources/mof/nationalbudget/1385_National_Budget/1385BUDGETDECREE_ENG.pdf.
[54] International Monetary Fund, "Concluding Statement for the Staff Visit to Discuss Developments under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility-Supported Program," August 16, 2006, http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2006/081606.htm.
[55] Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), "Business Environment," Undated, http://www.aisa.org.af/Investment-Guide/Business-Environment.htm.
[56] *Afghanistan Coalition Press*. "Afghan Bottling Plant Wins Contract to Supply Water to Coalition Troops," October 10, 2006, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/913DE13582F24BFD87257203003DCD7F?OpenDocument.

allocate roughly 15 percent of their revenues to security infrastructure[57] and 20 percent to corporate taxes[58].

Afghan businesses are more likely to be less risk-averse to the security and regulatory constraints, but they face challenges such as access to capital and critical infrastructure. The banking industry has rapidly grown to 13 banks with branches in provincial capitals outside Kabul.[59] They service many ordinary Afghans and are starting to provide mid-size entrepreneurs with the capital they need for start-up activity, but liquidity is not yet widely available and when it is, it often comes at the high price of 15–20 percent interest rates on a short-term 1–2 year basis.[60] Access to credit is also a critical mechanism to provide a safety net against poverty and allows rural farmers to survive during the winter months.

In most areas, operating costs are still high due to lack of available and affordable infrastructure, such as a predictable power sources and roads to bring raw materials and supplies and carry products to national markets. However industrial parks in Herat, Bagram, Mazar-I-Sharif, and Kandahar[61] are providing a solution, by offering clear land titles, power and water access, roads, buildings and maintenance, and security for factories in designated zones. [62]

Agriculture remains the predominant sector of the Afghan economy, representing 36 percent of GDP, excluding opium, and providing nearly two-thirds of employment.[63] Limited access to markets, irrigation infrastructure and credits continues to prevent the growth of licit, value-added agriculture production. Investment in the agribusiness industry, such as cold storage and flourmills, is showing dividends, employing workers and supporting a new class of Afghan entrepreneurs.

JOBS, INCOME, AND PRICES

Both rural and urban Afghans are vulnerable to extreme poverty and have few safety nets to fall back on in times of need. Shortfalls in income are being supplemented by illicit sources of income such as poppy production, bribery and corruption. Afghans also are selling fixed assets and receiving support from extended family members to survive. Poverty is fueling anger towards the central government and motivating young men to rearm and fight in the insurgency or with local illegal armed groups to earn cash. Very few Afghans have hope that the central government will improve their economic conditions.

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[57] International Monetary Fund, "Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," March 2006, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06114.pdf.
[58] World Bank, "Doing Business in Afghanistan," http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/PayingTaxes/Details.aspx?economyid=2.
[59] Mustafa Basharat, "Private Bank Opens Office in Kabul," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, June 13, 2006, http://www.a-acc.org/c/news/news_private_bank.html.
[60] CSIS Interview, Azarakhsh Hafizi, chairman, Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce, September 2006.
[61] Afghanistan Industrial Parks Development Authority, http://www.aisa.org.af/ipda/.
[62] Industrial Parks Development Facility, http://www.aisa.org.af/ipda/mazai.html.
[63] Asian Development Bank. "Asian Development Bank Outlook 2006: Afghanistan," Undated, http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/ADO/2006/documents/afg.pdf.

Unemployment is still pervasive at 33 percent of the working-age population according to government estimates,[64] and of those with employment only 13.5 percent receive a steady and secure stream of income.[65] Many Afghans working for the government, from public officials and judges, teachers and doctors to police and army officers, sometimes do not receive salaries, and even when they do, they still have trouble making ends meet with their current salary levels. Afghan teachers are paid only $50/month, civil servants $150, police $70 and army soldiers $100/month, all to work in an increasingly insecure environment. Although many express a desire to have a job, women are often under-educated or not allowed to work outside the home.

Most adult wage earners get by on short-term employment, seasonal migration and informal or illicit support systems. Since they are unable to earn sufficient income to keep their households afloat, they tend to be highly sensitive to shocks and crises and depend on aggregating debt just to survive.[66] Savings are almost non-existent, with 63.5 percent of Afghans stating that their household is in debt. With average debt of $1,150 per family, compared to the average annual per capita income of $270,[67] this is a major source of discontent.[68] Lack of ownership of land and property also compounds the sense of economic insecurity for Afghans.

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[64] Hafizullah Gardesh, "Jobless Face Grim Future," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, July 13, 2006, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=322263&apc_state=henh.
[65] Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), "Economic and Social Rights Report," May 2006, http://www.aihrc.org.af/rep_economic_socail_may_2006.htm.
[66] Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), "Searching for Security: Urban Livelihoods in Kabul," April 2006,http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=&task=doc_download&gid=326.
[67] World Bank, "Doing Business in Afghanistan," http://www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreEconomies/?economyid=2.
[68] Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), "Economic and Social Rights Report," May 2006, http://www.aihrc.org.af/rep_economic_socail_may_2006.htm.

SOCIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

By improving access to vital infrastructure and basic social services, ordinary citizens can minimize their vulnerability to economic and social shocks and work toward more productive livelihoods. Although the amount of physical infrastructure has increased, low-quality construction and services and insecurity have made it difficult for the majority of Afghans to access the new services available and use them to improve their social well-being. Insecurity and natural disasters have created new groups of high-risk populations and IDPs seeking basic needs. Figure 31 shows the state of Social Services and Infrastructure, in terms of long-term development and the satisfaction of short-term needs, by region. Figure 32 presents the Afghan interview data on Social Services and Infrastructure.

Figure 31: Social Services by Region



Figure 32: Social Services by Region – Afghan Interviews



FINDINGS:

- The Social Services and Infrastructure pillar has fallen into the Danger Zone largely due to a drop in confidence in the government's ability to deliver services in the future.

- Short-term improvements were made in the west and central regions, but remained steady or fell in all other regions, while long-term capacity fell for all regions.

- Access to, and quality of, drinking water, food, and shelter has not changed significantly, while healthcare has become slightly more accessible and affordable. Despite the construction of new infrastructure, many Afghans are frustrated by the slow pace of progress.

- Afghans tend to be more positive than observers in the media and academic circles and implementers of programs in the governments, NGOs, and the private sector.

FINDINGS BY SUB-PILLAR:

The Social Services and Infrastructure pillar has been further refined into the following sub-pillars: Infrastructure and Communication**,** Basic Needs, Healthcare and Nutrition, Education, and Basic Needs.[69] Table 6 lists a sample of indicators that best capture the meaning of each sub-pillar, and Figure 33 graphs the state of each Social Services and Infrastructure indicator.

Table 6: Social Services and Infrastructure Sub-Ppillars and Indicators

Indicator	Examples of Details
Infrastructure and Communication	▪ Change in quality and access to infrastructure (roads, electricity, irrigation) ▪ Change in user numbers or types of infrastructure ▪ Change in who provides infrastructure ▪ Change in effect of regional agreements on infrastructure
Healthcare and Nutrition	▪ Change in access to and availability and diversity of healthcare services (regional, urban/rural, gender, ethnicity, cost, etc.) ▪ Change in civilian knowledge/awareness of health issues and services ▪ Change in quality of health personnel ▪ Change in infant and maternal mortality rates
Education	▪ Change in number of trained teachers ▪ Change in ability and willingness of parents to send their children to school ▪ Change in employment rates and quality for graduates ▪ Change in level of security for teachers and students ▪ Change in curriculum
Basic Needs	▪ Change in access to and quality of basic needs (food, water, shelter) ▪ Change in government and local and international community ability to deliver basic needs ▪ Change in quality of refugee camps ▪ Change in number of internally displaced persons (IDPs)

Figure 33: Social Services by Sub-Pillar



[69] This marks a change over the indicators from the *In the Balance* study, requiring some data reclassification.

BASIC NEEDS

Access to basic needs for many Afghans has not changed significantly since 2005. Shelter, water, and food are more readily available in urban areas. In smaller rural communities, social networks often fill the gaps where the state does not and neighbors, families, and tribes support those in critical need of food and shelter. Nevertheless, Afghanistan is currently ranked lowest on a number of critical human development indicators,[70] and it is likely to take decades to raise the country out of chronic poverty. The state continues to be unable to deliver basic needs on a large scale, particularly in emergency cases.

Natural disasters, such as droughts and floods, and conflict have put new populations at risk. In 2006, 30,000 people in the east, west, and north either required emergency assistance, or were displaced or evacuated, as a result of floods.[71] New levels of violence from both insurgency and counterinsurgency operations have created somewhere between 80,000 and 90,000 IDPs in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces.[72] This has renewed the need for humanitarian assistance to meet basic requirements for a growing number of affected people.

EDUCATION, HEALTHCARE, AND NUTRITION

Despite an increase in the number of rehabilitated and newly built schools and clinics, quality, long-term sustainability and accessibility, particularly in remote villages and for women, remains a problem. Traveling to clinics is becoming more dangerous. A rise in the number of attacks on teachers, students, and schools to more than 200 from January 2005 to June 21, 2006, has forced many reopened and rehabilitated schools in the south and east to shut down and has spread fear among Afghan parents. [73]

Illiteracy remains pervasive in Afghanistan, with 71 percent of the population over the age of fifteen, including 86 percent of women, unable to read and write.[74] Although access to basic healthcare and clinics has improved from 7 percent in 2001 to almost 80 percent today,[75] many facilities are without critical medicines and equipment, and professional and experienced doctors. Countless teachers have been trained, and 140,000 are salaried according of the Ministry

> "The closure of a school is bound to have a ripple effect so that many other schools close around [one affected school] for no particular reason except that the school was burned. When it reopens fewer girls than boys come back." — *Senior western education official, "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan," Human Rights Watch, July 2006.*

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[70] United Nations Human Development Index, 2006, http://hdr.undp.org/hdr2006/pdfs/report/HDR06-complete.pdf.
[71] Emergency Disasters Database, http://www.em-dat.net/.
[72] *IRIN*, "More Assistance Needed for 80,000 Displaced by Southern Conflict," October 4, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=55823&SelectRegion=Asia&SelectCountry=AFGHANISTAN.
[73] Human Rights Watch, "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan," July 2006, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf.
[74] Human Rights Watch, "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan," July 2006, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf.
[75] Frequently Asked Questions, Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington D.C., http://www.embassyofafghanistan.org/faqs/faqsociety.html.

of Education,[76] but many do not come to work. The pay is insufficient to induce them. Even in urban areas where teachers and doctors are more readily available, it has become a challenge to meet the demands of the rapidly growing population.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMUNICATION

Significant improvements have been made in communications and roads, although deteriorating security has made it difficult for many Afghans to travel. Lack of progress in providing a steady source of electricity continues to frustrate most Afghans. Moreover, those living outside the major urban centers have yet to benefit from larger public works projects.

The partnership of the private sector and the Ministry of Communication has made the communications sector one of the success stories. Telecom systems are rapidly stretching to more remote districts and villages. Satellite technology is improving voice and data connections between the central and provincial government offices. Three private cell phone companies, Roshan, Afghan Wireless Communication Company (AWCC), and Areeba, are operational and providing ordinary Afghans with affordable connectivity. For Afghans to capitalize on the new technology, however, it will still be necessary to train and educate people about the new services, and develop reliable sources of power.

The Ring Road is almost complete and construction on secondary roads has begun, though a number of promised roads to many provincial centers, including Bamyan, Nuristan, and Dai Kundi, have not been started. These provinces subsequently remain cut off from the center, regional markets, social services, and reconstruction programming. Also, insecurity in the south and east and unofficial "taxes" collected by local commanders, militias and police has made it dangerous for many Afghans to use the new roads. Afghans complain that the quality of the roads are low and rapid depreciation is undermining gains.

Access to a continual source of electricity, cited most often as a source of hardship and proof that progress has not been made, has not improved significantly. The Ministry of Power and Water is barely able to offer two hours of electricity per day to Kabul, while 90 percent of the rest of the country remains completely unconnected..[77] Some wealthy, mostly urban families and businesses are meeting their needs by purchasing and running generators, but they are expensive and many villages and small businesses cannot afford the high fuel costs of 50 Afghans per KW. By tapping into Afghanistan's numerous water sources, micro-hydro electricity has provided an alternative in some villages. With a capacity to serve about

[76] Human Rights Watch, "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan," July 2006, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf

[77] David Zucchino, "In Afghanistan, Yesterday's Warlords are Today's Diplomats," *Los Angeles Times*, November 29, 2006, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003452568_afghanwarlords29.html.

150 families at approximately 20 Afghans per KW, micro-hydro projects provide a cost-effective and sustainable to way deliver electricity to small businesses and families.[78]

More small-scale irrigation projects to deepen and restore canal waterways have been completed. However, Afghanistan is still far from implementing a holistic water management system for irrigation and hydropower. Instead programs have been focused on crisis management to stem the devastation of floods and droughts.

[78] Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), "ACTED Afghanistan Micro-Hydro Power: Small Projects Making a Big Impact," October 7, 2006, http://www.acted.org/article/articleview/1495/1/23/.

POPPY AND NARCOTICS

Poppy production has increased dramatically over the past year, but it remains localized in a few problem provinces, namely Helmand, Kandahar, and Badakhshan, which together accounted for nearly 60 percent of Afghanistan's crop in 2006.[79] Although poppy cultivation declined by 21 percent in 2005, this trend reversed completely in 2006, with land under cultivation increasing by 59 percent to approximately 165,000 hectares.[80]

Throughout the country as many as 2.9 million people, or 12.6 percent of the population, are involved in poppy cultivation, contributing an estimated 36 percent or $2.8 billion to Afghanistan's GDP.[81] The numbers of those that believe it is acceptable to grow poppy have increased from 26 percent in 2005 to 40 percent of all Afghans and 59 percent of Afghans in poppy growing provinces today who believe it is "acceptable" to grow poppy.[82]

Inasmuch as most farmers borrow against their future crop, opium cultivation places tens of thousands of Afghans into an inescapable debt cycle. Although alternative livelihood programs, such as seed projects and small-scale irrigation projects, are helping a few farmers, their scope is too narrow to significantly reduce the incentives for poppy production for the majority of growers. In addition to this, frustration is growing among Afghans in non-producing provinces that alternative livelihood rewards promised to them have not materialized and that the benefits are being handed out to the worst provinces. Many interviews, particularly in the eastern provinces, indicated that after two years of supporting the government initiative to stop growing poppy, farmers are facing acute poverty and will return to the crop this year.

In the problem provinces, especially Helmand and Kandahar, the insurgency has gained traction, drought conditions have been particularly dire, and the presence of and support for the Karzai government has been limited. Drug traffickers have learned to turn these challenges into opportunities; they provide access to credit against the season's harvest so that farmers can sustain their families in the winter, and then pick up the produce themselves, eliminating any risk to farmers in delivering to faraway markets.

Further exacerbating the poppy problem has been a failed eradication effort. Eradication increased by more than 200 percent between 2005 and 2006, but it only succeeded in eliminating 8 percent of the land under cultivation.[83] Moreover, eradication has disproportionately targeted the poorest farmers who were unable to bribe corrupt

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[79] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006," September 12, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf.
[80] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006," September 12, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf.
[81] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006," September 12, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf.
[82] ABC News and BBC World Service. "Afghanistan: Where Things Stand," December 7, 2006, http://www.angus-reid.com/admin/collateral/pdfs/polls/Afghan_Dec.2006.pdf.
[83] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). "Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006," September 12, 2006, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/execsummaryafg.pdf.

eradication forces.[84] This has fueled the belief that the Afghan government is both corrupt and involved in the drug trade, as well as given the Taliban an incentive to protect poppy farmers for the sake of winning hearts and minds.

Although recent interdiction efforts have shown some government willingness to tackle the drug trade, the formal justice system remains incapable of adjudicating the cases. Interviews reveal that ordinary Afghan largely do not feel that their personal security is threatened by those linked to the drug trade, but rather consider the latter to be a sign of corruption within the government and the unfettered power of local commanders and warlords. There is some evidence that the Taliban is also financing part of its operations with drug revenues, though the total value in relation to their other sources of income is unclear.

[84] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), "Afghanistan Drug Control: Despite Improved Efforts, Deteriorating Security Threatens Success of U.S. Goals," November 2006, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0778.pdf.

A WAY FORWARD

Public fear and frustration are on the rise in Afghanistan. As a result, Afghans are beginning to disengage from national governing processes and lose confidence in their leadership. Faced with increased insecurity and violence, and inadequate government response, Afghans are settling back into familiar patterns, where deal-making and self-protection predominate. The situation in Afghanistan now is both more perilous and more complex than at any time in the previous five years—and a spring Taliban offensive is expected.

Although it is unlikely that the Taliban will retake Kabul or that the government will disintegrate, the sense of common purpose that is necessary to rebuild the state is slipping away. "A point could be reached at which the government of Afghanistan becomes irrelevant to its people, and the goal of establishing a democratic, moderate, self-sustaining state could be lost forever," was Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry's description at a hearing before members of the U.S. House of Representatives in mid-February.

Afghans will attach themselves to whomever they consider to be the most effective at providing security, income, and improved living conditions. NATO commander general David Richards estimates only 10 percent of the south's population supports the Taliban, 20 percent does not, and the remaining 70 percent will not declare their loyalty until they "see which side will win. They can't wait forever. We've got to show them we will win."

Dramatic changes are required in the coming weeks, or 2007 will become the breaking point. In order to halt and reverse these dangerous negative trends, the Afghan government, along with the U.S. government and other allies, needs a tough, realistic assessment of the current situation, a clear sense of what is possible in the coming months, a long-term commitment, and an action strategy that focuses on near-term public safety and mobilizing communities. President George W. Bush's attention and additional resources are welcome, but success will require a fresh approach.

A REALISTIC FUTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN

Even with full international support and sound policies and programs, Afghanistan in 10 years will likely still be a poor and underdeveloped country. Sustained growth in the economy and trade will not provide enough jobs and steady income for Afghan families. The central government will struggle to retain legitimacy, to collect revenues for the sustenance of its military and bureaucracy, to eliminate corruption, to deliver social and judicial services, and to extend its presence to the whole country. Pockets of territory will remain or fall under the influence of local strongmen, and Afghans will rely on local and tribal institutions to fill the vacuums left by the state. Historical social divisions between tribes, ethnicities, and regions will persist, and populations will remain isolated from one another and from the center. Neighbors will meddle in Afghanistan's domestic economy and politics.

Yet progress is possible—if expectations are realistic: the primary goal should be a stable Afghanistan during the course of the next decade. The international community should not allow itself to be distracted by too many secondary activities.

The Afghan government laid out its long-term goals in the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), with which the international community promised to align its activities at the London Conference in January 2006. Too broad in its ambitions, the ANDS agenda fails to make tough, priority decisions or to recognize high-yield initiatives. Dispersed and competing efforts will be the result, impeding progress. The Policy Action Group (PAG) launched by President Hamid Karzai in June 2006 has brought some welcome focusing of efforts.

In Afghanistan in 2006, the United States spent $19 billion on military operations, $3 billion on supporting Afghan forces, and only $2 billion on reconstruction and development. Still the dominant international player, the United States accounts for approximately 50 percent of reconstruction funding, and has spent four times as much as the next-highest donor. Signs of progress are many, including basic health care coverage for much of Afghanistan's population, yet a new approach that engages more Afghans is overdue.

The best way to set priorities is by engaging ordinary Afghans, from planning through to implementation. The process is as important as the programs or government institutions. At various times, from shuras to elections to micro-hydro projects, Afghanistan has shown the value of local ownership. Loyalty and trust are built when partnerships are led by local people, with outsiders playing a supportive and catalytic role. Locals know what is possible and desirable, while internationals can help advance progress through assistance and incentives.

A proper balance between a capable central government and traditional, decentralized systems has not yet been struck in Afghanistan. A contextually specific type of participatory government that involves a majority of Afghans in providing security, rule of law, and economic opportunities is needed. Such a model will gain the government legitimacy and begin to reverse the country's troubling course.

AN ACTION STRATEGY

RECOMMENDATION 1: RESTORE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITY PLAN

Afghans want to contribute to their recovery, but growing instability and criminality has made them feel unsafe. Their perception is that the government is not committed to the rule of law, and that insurgents are increasing in strength and in attacks. The rule of law has deteriorated, while militia commanders, corrupt officials, and traffickers all are ascendant. Insecurity in the south and east has impeded the undertaking of new reconstruction projects and even threatened progress made during the past five years.

Time is short and there are many security threats to Afghanistan, but the most pressing one of 2007 remains the Taliban. Others offer a challenge, but do not have the tribal base or charismatic leadership to build as large a following. The Taliban leadership, stemming from Pashtun tribes not represented in the new government, is expected to wage its most severe battles this year in and around Helmand and Kandahar provinces. The Taliban and their partners are fighting guerilla warfare. NATO and the United States' "big army" military operations and emphasis on foot soldier "kills" are doing more damage than good. The

ensuing collateral damage in a culture that emphasizes revenge has created "ten enemies out of one" and has disillusioned most Afghans.

Security efforts must treat the Taliban threat as an insurgency. Although ultimate success will require sufficient international forces for the next decade, progress can be made now by protecting and restoring the confidence of Afghans in the most conflict-ridden areas of Helmand and Kandahar while targeting the Taliban's leadership.

1.1 Develop a 15-Minute Rapid-Response Protection Umbrella in Key Districts

Move from "big army" sweeps to a rapid-response model that provides a "15-minute" safety umbrella to deal with emergencies in the endangered south and east. Establish a consistent presence in 15–20 districts in Kandahar and Helmand Provinces where the Taliban are most likely to initiate their offensive. This is vital for individual Afghans, local authorities, and the police, and for ensuring the progress of reconstruction projects.

- **Build a rapid-response capacity.** Commit more forces with the skills, flexibility, and resources to fight where they are needed most. Increase special operations troops and renegotiate NATO country caveats. Double the helicopters, communications, intelligence, and resources available, and shift more personnel to Kandahar and Helmand.

- **Move from Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to District Stabilization Teams (DSTs).** Create district-level teams in 80 percent of Kandahar's and Helmand's districts, staffed largely with Afghan forces, and embed international soldiers and trainers with them to provide early warning for emergencies, be first responders, and cooperate and communicate with local leaders and populations.

- **Ensure adequate levels of professional Afghan forces.** Provide pay, incorporate joint patrols, vet mid-level police, and offer other forms of support to improve oversight and stem the widespread desertion and retirement of the Afghan military and police. Rationalize the role of the police, the auxiliary police, and special forces so that a high priority is placed on maintaining public safety.

- **Post-operation response.** Organize a system of responders to address civilian casualties and sustained damage in the aftermath of military operations. Responsibilities would include providing food, medical care, shelter, jobs, and village and individual compensation.

1.2 Develop a Rational Cross-Border Strategy

Respond to the Pakistani-Afghan challenges through balanced, integrated, tribally sensitive engagement with the Pashtun communities on both sides of the border. Key tribes have been left out of the government on both sides of the border, and a way must be found to include them. Regular cross-border travel will continue to be a fact of life. Reliable and improved flows of information are needed to clarify developments in the south and east.

- **Invest in intelligence.** More information is needed on corruption, criminality, interaction between Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and the Taliban, insurgent

leadership, and cross-border infiltration. Innovations in the cell phone and telecommunications industry should be harnessed to increase the options for information sharing – connecting truckers, mullahs, leaders, and ordinary Afghans on both sides of the border. Call centers with information, directory, and security hotlines should be opened, and hand-held, durable, and cost-efficient communication tools should be distributed to local organizations, officials, and security forces to improve response capacity. Pilot "tech-up-the-town" projects should be initiated in key districts.

- **Reorient assistance to conduct holistic cross-border programming.** Coordinate Afghan and Pakistani programs to pursue common objectives, pool funding, and possibly report to the same leadership. Direct assistance to tribal groups who lack clout in Kabul and Islamabad.

- **Build on positive interactions between Pashtuns.** Augment the existing political structures for cooperation, such as the Tripartite Commission, Regional Opportunity Zones, and tribal mechanisms to develop business opportunities, energy- and water-sharing schemes, security measures, and to counteract the drugs and arms trades.

1.3 Redirect and Rethink the War on Drugs

Dramatic changes are needed to reverse the expensive and ineffective direction of current anti-drug policy. A shift in emphasis from eradication to interdiction, bonus programs, and direct purchase would shake up the market and the traffickers in 2007. Targeting Helmand and Kandahar, where 50 percent of Afghanistan's poppy grows, will increase public safety. Transferring funds through local channels will offer more productive incentives to communities and farmers.

- **Redirect eradication money.** Move the bulk of the $500 million to be spent on eradication in 2007 to alternative solutions for Helmand and Kandahar, including purchasing poppy crops at farm gate value for a total of $375 million. Some of the remaining $125 million should go to credit schemes and to enhance substitute livelihood programs and interdiction.

- **Focus on interdiction**. Transfer funds from eradication to strengthening the efforts of the special interdiction forces, particularly in transit states, borders, and with regional partners. Improve judicial institutions.

- **Offer a bonus to non-producing communities.** Triple the $500,000 Good Performance bonus and deliver it directly to the local communities to provide positive incentives for farmers to abstain from growing poppy.

RECOMMENDATION 2: MOBILIZE COMMUNITIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO RECOVERY

In the reconstruction of Afghanistan, solutions have been too Kabul-centric, slow, and technocratic, focusing primarily on strengthening the central government and relying on international contractors and NGOs to make decisions and deliver. Much of this is driven by a class of Afghanistan leadership that is threatening the entire enterprise with exclusionary,

corrupt, and controlling practices. Traditional donor constraints are also to blame, as large-scale contracting, the need for certifiable partners, dependence on central governments, and the expenditure of funds become standard ways of doing business.

A fresh surge of supplemental funding is expected this year. It must be directed in a way that finds and engages the maximum number of Afghan citizens. This will not be easy in a high-pressure environment with multiple international donors and a new government with "capacity problems".

It is incumbent on donors to begin to shift from a portfolio that is unevenly divided into large projects (80 percent) and localized initiatives (20 percent) to a more balanced approach. This will require hundreds of new Afghan partners and agents, each entrusted with a much higher level of fiscal responsibility than present practices allow. Contracting officers, auditors, inspectors general, and congressional committees will need to revise their expectations to address this new way of doing business. By spreading support around the country in much smaller amounts, oversight becomes more difficult. On the other hand, the percentage of development money that reaches the average Afghan will increase, transaction costs for international handling could drop, and the likelihood of large, centralized corruption will be diminished.

There are many ways that business can be conducted reliably. Working with new and existing local structures to develop small-scale, dynamic projects can speed the delivery of benefits to a larger percentage of Afghans. If people are mobilized and given the responsibility to control, contribute, and improve their circumstances, they can be a powerful—and indeed may be a necessary—agent of change. Flexible and direct assistance will challenge international and national bureaucracies to change the way business is done and will minimize the opportunities for corruption and waste, allowing benefits to materialize more quickly. The micro-credit movement has demonstrated that this can work.

More honest accounting and planning is also needed in the undertaking of huge infrastructure initiatives. Desirable projects, such as the multi-year Kajaki Dam, should be explicit about the risk of attack and sabotage, resultant delays, and the costs of at least 10-year full-time regional security for transmission lines, facility protection, and worker safety.

2007 is the year to convert past inadequate practices into new directions.

2.1 Move to a More Flexible Spending Model

The international community must bring financial liquidity to the Afghan countryside in a higher-risk, higher-reward venture capital model. For this to succeed, the prospect of multiple failures must be accepted alongside the potential of dramatic gains. The window of opportunity will close while Western-style developments unfold, unless resources move from international contractors and government ministries to various non-traditional partners.

- **Set a target for moving to a 50 percent venture capital portfolio by 2009**. A process should be designed to disburse smaller fast-tracked grants through new partners for local reconstruction initiatives, rather than investing in large bundled

contracts for flagship projects. Hundreds of Afghan field agents, including individuals, women's centers, business unions, NGO consortiums, cell phone salesmen, and other organizations that were developed since 2001 can be cultivated. Projects should be promoted through these partners to ensure requirements for local contributions are met and simple, and that the reporting of expenditures is transparent. Standard grant and loan procedures will need to be streamlined to provide locals with access to funds, especially in the under $10,000 project range. Measurable goals should be established for the portfolio in the next three years.

- **Deliver directly to strengthen the prospective Afghan middle class.** Identify, train, and pay salaries for key agents of change, such as teachers, doctors, police, army, civil servants, and community leaders. Review the current funding of 86,000 civil servants through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and look for opportunities to reach well beyond Kabul. Support private-sector development by delivering more mid-size loans at reasonable rates to the growing class of Afghan entrepreneurs

2.2 Leverage Existing Structures and Processes

Existing structures should be connected to the government for faster and broader delivery. After decades of neglect, Afghans have become largely self-reliant—skilled in navigating and moving resources around the country, adept at dispute resolution and reconciliation and at providing security and governing locally. These skills manifest themselves in decentralized, traditional, and informal channels, through local networks that can be leveraged.

- **Expand the National Solidarity Program (NSP).** Commit to expanding and deepening the NSP program from 77 percent coverage to full coverage and move into urban neighborhoods. Expedite the National Area-Based Development (NABD) program to increase the opportunities for villages to undertake joint programming at the district level. Broaden the choices to include more local-level electricity solutions and counter-narcotics initiatives. Gradually increase the community's contribution by requiring a commitment of people, funds, and security to sustain the project.

- **Recognize the informal justice sector.** Clarify the informal mechanism's role vis-à-vis the formal system, and devise mechanisms to subject shuras and adjudicators to periodic administrative review. Minimize the caseload of the courts to the most egregious cases of government corruption and to criminal activity by drug traffickers, mafia, and warlords. Ensure that at least 20 provincial courts are staffed with the best judges and personnel and are operating effectively.

- **Redistribute 50 percent of the development budget to good governors.** Pilot a program to provide honest governors, who transparently report revenues and spending, with their share of half of the government's development budget to implement provincial reconstruction projects. Ensure that the provincial councils, as representative, elected bodies, have the power to approve budget proposals and are able to provide oversight. Work with local media so that the public can be involved in monitoring.

- **Engage the Hawala system.** Register Hawala dealers who successfully transfer licit funds and remittances to deliver salary payments, reconstruction assistance, capital for local businesses, and credit to rural Afghans. Provide dealers with beneficial treatment and services through the 13 operational banks of the growing banking industry.

2.3 Open the Lines of Communication

Steady, tangible progress must come with a full-scale strategic communications plan. Such an initiative will help to manage expectations through public discussions about the complexity of the challenges and realistic timeframes. Creative approaches should be applied to share information and spread success stories of reconstruction to insecure and remote parts of Afghanistan.

- **Connect the gatekeepers.** Improve the opportunities for Afghans to be heard and brought into decisions and future plans by connecting the traditional and newly created gatekeepers of information, such as tribal and local leaders, mullahs, media, local NGOS, and community-governance structures, to international, national, and provincial decision-makers. Pay a stipend for Afghan gatekeepers to act as local monitors, tackle and report on security and corruption, meet with governors and internationals, administer small projects, provide additional oversight for the auxiliary police, and influence what is preached in the mosques.

- **Develop a public engagement strategy.** Manage information on military operations casualties, and responses, money, projects, initiatives and plans to promote successful activities and explain failures. Enhance the PAG Strategic Communications pillar to develop a unified message. Get the message out with ribbon-cutting ceremonies, a team of "domestic diplomats," local media and radio programs, mullahs and tribal elders, popular personalities, videos, and music.

CONCLUSION

Afghanistan is a complex country with enormous challenges but also opportunities for partnership, efficiency, and progress. The task is urgent. A renewed conflict against a resurgent Taliban and other anti-government elements; a crisis of government legitimacy within a culture of corruption and impunity; and a failure to meet people's expectations of development, income-generation, and better lives in general all point to a breaking point.

Negative trends must be reversed in 2007. Public confidence can be restored with fresh new civilian and military approaches. If a critical mass of Afghans sees positive changes, the negative trends are reversible.

Staying the course with incremental improvements and new resources will not produce success. Now is the time for dramatic changes.

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ANNEX A

Table 7: Surveys

Surveys			
Organization	Survey Name	Survey Dates	Sample Size
ABC/Charney	Life in Afghanistan	October 2005	1,039
AIHRC	Report on Economic and Social Rights	April 2005–December 2005	7,929
AIHRC	An Overview on Situation of Child Labor in Afghanistan	July 2005—March 2006	18,944
Altai Consulting	ANDP Afghan National Development Poll, Survey 1	August 2005	3,600
Altai Consulting	ANDP Afghan National Development Poll, Survey 2	December 2005	3,600
Altai Consulting	ANDP Afghan National Development Poll, Survey 3	May 2006	3,600
Asia Foundation	Afghanistan in 2006: A Survey of the Afghan People	June 2006–August 2006	6,226
DACAAR	KAP Study on Hygiene in Faryab: Baseline Assessment Report	November 2005–December 2005	N/A
Management Sciences for Health	Rural Expansion of Afghanistan's Community-Based Healthcare Program: Measuring Program Outcomes through Household Surveys	Early 2006	3,725
Program on International Policy Attitudes/ WorldPublicOpinion.org	Poll of Afghanistan	November 2005–December 2005	2,089
UNAMA/ UNDP	Commanders' Incentive Program Satisfaction Survey	February 2006–March 2006	107
UNODC	Afghanistan Drug Use Survey 2005	April 2005–August 2005	2,873
UNODC	Afghanistan Opium Survey 2006	N/A	4,708

Table 8: Media Sources

Media Sources					
Newspapers			**Websites**	**Periodicals**	**Newswires**
Allentown Morning Call – U.S.	The Independent – U.K.	San Francisco Chronicle – U.S.	Al Jazeera – Qatar	Defense News – U.S.	Agence France Presse
Asia Times – China	International Herald Tribune	San Jose Mercury News – U.S.	BBC News – European	Der Spiegel – Germany	Associated Press
CanWest News Service – Canada	London Times – U.K.	The Statesman – India	Bloomberg – U.S.	The Economist – U.K.	IRNA – Iran
Christian Science Monitor – U.S.	Los Angeles Times – U.S.	St. Louis Post-Dispatch – U.S.	CBS News – U.S.	Euromoney – U.K.	Reuters
Chicago Tribune – U.S.	The Nation – Pakistan	Sydney Morning Herald – Australia	CNN	Fortune Magazine – U.S.	United Press International
Dawn – Pakistan	New York Times – U.S.	The Telegraph – U.K.	ComputerWeekly.com – European	Newsweek	
Financial Times – U.K.	The Observer – U.K.	Toronto Star – Canada	Institute for War and Peace Reporting	Time Magazine – U.S.	
Globe and Mail – Canada	Pajhwok Afghan News – Afghan	USA Today – U.S.	IRIN	U.S. News and World Report – U.S.	
The Guardian – U.K.	PakTribune – Pakistan	Washington Post – U.S.	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty		
Gulf News – UAE	Philadelphia Inquirer – U.S.	Washington Times – U.S.	Voice of America – U.S.		

Table 9: Official Public Sources

Public Sources – Official			
Government		**International Organization**	
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) – Afghan	Ministry of Communication, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	Afghanistan National Development Strategy	United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) – Afghan	Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	Asian Development Bank (ADB)	United Nations Development Program – Afghanistan New Beginnings Program
Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA) – Afghan	Ministry of Finance, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	European Commission	United Nations Economic and Social Council
Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals Report 2005	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	International Monetary Fund (IMF)	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Central Statistics Office, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	Ministry of Public Health, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	International Organization for Migration (IOM)	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) – U.S.	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	NATO-International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF)	United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
Department for International Development (DFID) – U.K.	U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) – U.S.	Office of the Special Representative of the European Union for Afghanistan	United Nations World Food Program (UNWFP)
Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – U.S.	United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)	World Bank Group
Ministry of Commerce, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan – Afghan	U.S. Department of State – U.S.	United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM)	World Health Organization (WHO)

Table 10: Non-Official Public Sources

Public Sources – Non-Official					
Private	**Academic**		**NGOs and Civil Society**		
Chemonics International, Inc. – U.S.	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) – Afghan	Congressional Research Service (CRS) – U.S.	Afghan Health and Development Services (AHDS) – Afghan	Human Rights Watch – Multinational	Mercy Corps – Multinational
Bearing Point, Ltd. – U.S.	American Enterprise Institute – U.S.	Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – U.S.	Amnesty International - Multinational	International Alert – International (Non-U.S.)	National Democratic Institute (NDI) – U.S.
DAI – U.S.	Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School – U.S.	Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics – U.K.	Asia Foundation – Multinational	International Campaign to Ban Land Mines – Multinational	Oxfam International – U.K.
Kroll Security International Limited – U.S.	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments – U.S.	Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) – Danish	British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG) – U.K.	International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) – Multinational	Reporters Without Borders – Multinational
Land O'Lakes, Inc. – U.S.	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – U.S.	Feinstein International Famine Center, Tufts University – U.S.	CARE International – Multinational	International Development Law Organization (IDLO) – Multinational	Society of Afghan Engineers – U.S.
Louis Berger Group – U.S.	Center for the Study of Democracy, Queen's University – Australian	FRIDE – Spanish	CorpWatch – U.S.	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies – Multinational	Urgence Rehabilitation Development – French
Management Systems for Health – U.S.	Center on International Cooperation, New York University – U.S.	International Crisis Group (ICG) – Multinational	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) – Danish	International Foundation for Election Systems – U.S.	WomanKind Worldwide – U.K.
Management Systems International – U.S.	Chr. Mendelson Institute (CMI) – Norwegian	The Senlis Council – Multinational	Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan – Afghan	Internews – Multinational	
Nathan Associates, Inc. – U.S.	Clingendael Institute – Dutch	U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) – U.S.			

ANNEX B

Interview Guide

Social Services and Infrastructure

- What basic needs such as food, clean water, clothing and housing do you have? Describe them. Do you have adequate access? Why or why not?
- What social services (such as education, training, doctors and medicine) and infrastructure (such as roads, electricity and communications) have you received that improve your quality of your life?
    - What kind of services?
    - Who provided those services (GOA/your community/national NGOs and business)?
    - Who paid for those services?
    - Describe your experience.
- Do you have any other needs for social services and infrastructure?
- Which do you consider most critical to improve the quality of your life?
- How long have you lived in this community? If not long – what made you come here (or come back here)? Describe your experience, how is the quality of life (access to basic needs, services and infrastructure) different from where you moved from.
- What social services such as education, training, doctors and medicine are available in your community? Describe them. Do you have adequate access? Why or why not?
- What infrastructure needs such as roads, electricity and communications do you have in your community? Describe them. Do you have adequate access? Why or why not?
- Who is trying to provide Afghans (your community) with services and infrastructure? (GOA/your community/national NGOs and business)? Are they the right ones (qualified/appropriate) to be providing those services today? How about in the long term? If no, who else should provide services?
- Do you think that these services will be provided to you/your family/ your community on a continuous basis (for a long time)? How, if at all, will they change? What will cause the change or why?
- Do you think that those who are working to provide these services will continue to do so in the future? Is this good or bad? Why?
- Do you think that the GOA/your community/national NGOs and business have the capacity – (capabilities/resources) to provide roads, electricity, water, schools, healthcare, farming assistance and housing for you in the future? What obstacles do they face? Are these obstacles getting larger or smaller and why?
- Have there been improvements or disruptions in any of these services/infrastructure (use examples) in the last year? If yes, please describe. If no, why didn't it happen?

Additional Questions for Women

- Do you get to go outside of the home? If so, why? (education, vocational training, clinics, shopping/work, visit family/special occasions)
- Do you know what social services are available to women in your community
    - If yes, what are they? Do you use these services? Why or Why not?
    - If no, what would your like to have access to?
- Are the schools and clinics of good quality?
- What social services would you like to receive in the future? What social services would you like to see women in your community/Afghanistan have in the long run?
- Do you think that this will be provided in the future? Do you think that your family/your community will allow you to receive these in the future?

Economic Conditions

- How would you describe your economic level/social status/lifestyle relative to your community (ex. rooms in house, income level, how often you eat meat, size of land).

- What else do you need to provide for yourself or your family (improve your lifestyle)? (ex. house, land, income, job, food, housing, loans)?
- Are you working? What do you do to earn income?
    - If yes…
        - What is your job or means of earning?
        - Who provides income/salary?
        - How much do you make?
        - How long have you been in this job?
        - How did you find this job?
        - Do you have enough money/income to support yourself/your family?
        - Do you think that this is the right job for you? (given education, training)?
        - Are you satisfied with your job? If yes, please explain why? If no, why not?
    - If no…
        - Do you want to work? Are you looking for a job?
        - If yes, how is the search going?
            - Are you finding positions that will pay sufficiently to meet your needs?
            - Are you finding positions that you qualified for (education, experience)?
    - Do you think that your financial needs can be met in the future? At the same level/quality?
- Do you owe money to anyone/have debt? Do you have sufficient income to pay your debt? If not, how do you expect to solve this issue?
- Are there sufficient opportunities to work/earn income in your village/province? If yes, how? If not, why not? What do people do in your community to earn money/cover their costs/supplement their income?
- What are the illicit sources (bribery, drug money, extortion, forced taxation) of income that people in your community access to supplement their income or increase their wealth? How often?
- Do you or have you received financial (cash, micro-credit) or non-financial (ex. Training, equipment, start-up resources) non-assistance to improve your economic situation?
    - What kind?
    - Who provided that assistance?
    - Describe your experience.
    - Do you trust that those providing will continue/want to provide for these needs going forward?
    - Are those enabling actors the legitimate one to provide for needs going forward?
- Poppy:
    - Are you farmer? If yes, do you grow poppy? If no, do people in the area grow poppy?
    - What is the advantages and disadvantage that growing poppy has for you/your community/Afghanistan?
    - How do view the ban on poppy? Is it being implemented properly? By the right people?
    - What is the best way to handle the poppy issue so as to create the least economic harm to the farmer?
    - Are their alternatives (being provided) to growing poppy? What are they? Do they provide sufficient income?
- Do you think that the GOA will have the capacity – capabilities/resources to build and sustain a strong economy in the future? What should GOA/ international actors/NGOs/private sector role be? NGOs?
- What will it take to improve your/community's/country's economic situation? Please be specific.
- Have there been any changes in your/your community's economic situation in the last year?

Additional Questions for Women

- Do you make any decisions about how money is spent in your house? If yes, what kinds?
- Are you working?
    - If yes:
        - What do you do?
        - Is this the right job for you? (given level of education, training, gender, income)?
        - Are you satisfied with your job? If yes, please explain why? If no, why not?
        - What happens to the income that you earn?

    - If no: Why?
        - If you had the opportunity to work, would you? What would you do?
        - What are the obstacles that keep you/women from working? (education, lack of adequate jobs, role of women outside of the public sphere)
- Is there vocational training for women available to you?
    - Do you have access to such training? Why or why not?
    - If you have attended, describe your experience. Are you able to use that training to earn income? Would you like to receive more?
    - Would you enroll in such a training/enroll your daughters? Why/Why not?
- Do you think that in the future you/ women in Afghanistan should work? Why? Why not?

Security

- What does it mean for you/your community to be safe/secure? How do define a safe/secure environment?
- Do you currently feel safe? (yes/no)
    - Do you feel safe to go about your daily activities within your community?
    - Do you feel safe to sleep safely at night (with or without a gun?)
    - Do you feel safe to travel outside of your community (alone)?
    - Do you feel safe to say what you want to say (act how you want to act) without fear of being harmed?
    - Is it safe for your children (girls) to go to school?
    - What kind of security problems are there in your community?
    - Do you fear that someone is watching you?
    - If you feel safe, why do you feel safe?
        - Who (what are the security mechanisms that) makes it secure? If there is an incident who do you turn to for security? What actions do they take?
        - Do you trust them? Are the police/ANA/international soldiers helpful? Impartial? Honest?
        - What kind of incidents occur?
        - Who keeps it from being secure?
    - If you do not safe, why do you not feel safe?
        - What kind of incidents occur?
        - Who keeps it from being secure?
        - Who makes it secure? If there is an incident who do you turn to for security? What actions do they take?
        - Do you trust them? Are the police/ANA/international soldiers helpful? Impartial? Honest?
- Has this changed over the last year?
- How do you expect your personal safety/ your community's /your country's safety to be in the future?
    - Do you think will change?
    - How?
    - Why?
- Who (who else) do you think will influence your personal safety in the future positively?
- Who (who else) do you think will influence your personal safety in the future negatively?
- Do you think that those who are working to provide safety today will stay committed/continue to provide security?
- Are they the legitimate ones to provide security?
- Do you think that the GOA (ANA/ANP) has the capacity – (capabilities/resources) to provide sufficient security for you to feel safe in the future? If yes, describe what kind of capabilities/resources you belive they have? What else do they need to provide security for you in the future?
- Have there been security incidences in your home/village/ city in the last year?
- Has there been any improvements or disruptions in security within the last year? What or Who do you attribute it to? Do you think that they were handled better this year than last year? Why?

Additional Questions for Women

- Are there any family tensions?
- Do you feel safe from violence within the household? If yes, what makes you safe? If no, why not?
- Have there been any incidents of violence against you? Were you able to tell anyone? What, if anything, was the outcome?
- Do you feel safe to travel outside of the house? If yes, in which situations? Do you feel safe? How do people receive you?
- Is it safe to let your daughters go to school or work?
- Do you have access to anyone when a security incident or crime or family tension happens? Who did or would you go to? What do you think they will do to protect you/your community against violence?

Justice

- Have you ever interacted with the formal justice system or the informal system before?
    - Why?
    - Describe your experience.
- Why else (for what other reasons, types of legal problems) do you/your family/community need justice today (ex. dispute resolution, land disputes, recourse against crimes or violence, violations of the law or your rights, protect yourself against criminals)?
- Where would you go to resolve these problems today?
- Do you have reliable access? Why? Why not?
- Do you trust the people/the system/the law will be fair, impartial, honest, qualified? Why?
- Do you feel that the formal/informal justice system fairly protect your rights and interests? What are those rights?
- Are there people in your community that are suspected of/responsible for committing crimes? What kind of crimes? What, if anything, has been done about it?
- Where (to whom) would you go for justice or to settle your disputes in the future if given a choice (shuras, local courts, religious leaders, elders)? Why?
- Do you trust the people/the system/the law will be fair, impartial, honest, qualified in the future?
- Is the legal system effective (resolving disputes, prosecuting criminals, reconciling the community)?
- Do you think that the GOA/your community have the capacity – (capabilities/resources) to provide a legitimate and effective justice system in the future? Has there been any change in the way you use the justice system from last year? Has there been any change in the quality of the justice system in the last year?

Additional Questions for Women

- Has there been any violence towards you? What, if anything has been done? Do you feel that you received justice?
- Do you have access to the formal/informal justice system? Can you go to anyone when there has been a crime against you? Do you think that they will be fair, honest, able to help you?
- Describe what rights you currently have? What are you allowed to do?
- Do you feel that your rights and interests are protected within the household? Within the community? Do you think they will be in the long run?
- Do you feel that you/Afghan women/women in general have specific needs in the justice sector (women's rights, more equal laws, more protection, more freedom of movement, to study, work, choose your husband)? Are they being met today? Can they be n the future? Why or why not?

Governance and Participation

- Who is in charge, or the leaders, of your communities/make decisions for your community?
    - The national government and its leaders/ policies?
    - The provincial government and its leaders/ policies?
    - The new mechanisms (parliament and provincial councils) and its leaders/ policies?
    - Your community and its leaders/ policies?
    - The warlords/commanders within your community?
    - The Taliban within your community?

    - With international actors operating in Afghanistan?
- When was the last time (how often) do they come to your village? Where were they from? What did they do?
- Do you get your concerns/support/opposition/issues voiced/addressed? Do you communicate with and have access to local authorities?
    - If yes, how? Describe you experience.
    - If no, why not?
- Do you think this will change in the future? How? Why?
- How would you like to interact with, participate in or influence leaders and government officials? How would you like to participate in community decisions?
- Who are the influential leaders in your community? (Government officials, community leaders, commanders/warlords, Taliban, Internationals)? Why are they influential? Are they responsive to your needs? How have their roles changed in society? Is it a positive or negative change? Why?
- What role do they play in your life? What role should they play in your life?
- Who should be the leaders in your community in the future? What will it take for that to happen?
- Do you think the government represents the Afghan people fairly? Are the leaders qualified to represent the Afghan people's interests?
- How do you think you will interact with, participate in or influence the government in the future?
- In your opinion, are the political processes (presidential election, loya jirga election) conducted fairly?
- What do you expect from the national government for yourself/for your community/Afghanistan?
- What do you expect from the provincial government for yourself/for your community/Afghanistan?
- What do you expect from the local government for yourself/for your community/Afghanistan?
- What do you expect from the international community for yourself/for your community/Afghanistan?
- What do you expect from the NGOs for yourself/for your community/Afghanistan?
- What do you think that Afghans themselves should do to contribute to the (reconstruction, political) process?
- Are sufficient government services available/accessible to you? Have you gotten any services from government? If yes, did your experience meet your expectations? If, no, why not? How do you think this will change in the future? Why?

Additional Questions for Women

- Who are the decision makers in your family?
- Within the household, what are your main concerns? What kind of issues do you speak to the men in your family about?
- What kind of decisions do you make for the household, the family?
- Who are the decision makers in your community?
- Do they represent you? Are they responsive to your needs as a woman?
- Do you talk to them about your needs?
- Are there female decision makers? Is there a need for this in the future?
- Have you participated/interacted with the any officials or community decisions/programs/activities? In what way? Describe your experience.
- Do you know about the government and their role in the country? What are your opinions about them?

Overall Questions for Women

- Have women benefited from the reconstruction efforts? The new government? The international community program? If yes, how? If no, why not?
- Has your general situation as a woman/women's situation improved in comparison to the last year?
- Is there any gender awareness training going on in your community?
    - If yes, did you attend? Do other women in the community attend? Why? Why not?
    - If no, is there a need? Would you attend?

ANNEX C

Pillar	
SECURITY	**Afghan Interviews** **Male**: "Security is completely bad. There is fighting everyday, and people are forced to leave their homes and move to other places. Now we cannot identify friend or enemy. Everyone is an enemy to the public, because if the Taliban catches you, they would say you are government's person, and if the government gets you, they will say you are Taliban's people. To whom can we complain? Now we have lost confidence on everyone who has weapons." – *Helmand #59* **Female**: "We feel safe of the family violations and live together with love. No violation has occurred against me. It is safe for our girls to go to school." – *Laghman #3*
	Commanders "Afghans throughout the country said that disarmament and the sidelining of commanders from security posts had helped weaken some of them and lessened their capacity to threaten voters or candidates. But many expressed serious doubt that the local forces have been effectively disarmed." - Human Rights Watch. "Afghanistan on the Eve of Parliamentary and Provincial Elections," September 2005. http://hrw.org/backgrounder/asia/afghanistan0905/afghanistan0905.pdf
	Insurgency "American troops on Afghanistan's eastern border have seen a threefold increase in attacks following a recent truce between Pakistani troops and pro-Taliban tribesmen that was supposed to stop militants making cross-border raids, a U.S. military official said Wednesday. The peace agreement, which followed the June 25 cease-fire, has also contributed to the Taliban's overall resurgence as ethnic Pashtun rebels are no longer fighting Pakistani troops and are using the North Waziristan border area as a command-and-control hub for launching attacks in Afghanistan, the American official said." - Associated Press. "Taliban Attacks Triple in Eastern Afghanistan Since Pakistan Peace Deal, US Official," September 26, 2006. http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/09/27/asia/AS_GEN_Afghanistan.php
	Civilian Safety and Law and Order "Dozens of civilians have been killed during NATO air strikes in the insurgency-ravaged southern province of Kandahar. "Some 62 of our villagers have been killed and buried, including women and children, while another 12 were injured during the air strikes," resident Atta Mohammad said." - IRIN. "Scores of Civilians Killed in Airstrikes, Say Officials and Elders." October 26, 2006. http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/c132973e777d4db738c86422fc214728.htm
	State Security Institutions "But even [the Afghan National Army's] most ardent supporters, including U.S. Sergeant Deghand, admit that the national army itself faces an uncertain future. Even as the A.N.A. works to expand its numbers, it is having trouble holding on to those soldiers it already has. In several camps, more than half the troops have deserted, and thousands more are reportedly set to leave once they complete their three-year contracts later this year. Officials say the major issue is poor pay. A.N.A. soldiers earn about $90 a month, significantly less than they could make as civilians." - Sand, Benjamin. "As Violence Flares, Afghan Army Struggles to Come into Its Own," Voice of America, May 22, 2006. http://e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/033AD522D80DB461872571760052A60E?OpenDocument

Pillar	
GOVERNANCE AND PARTICIPATION	**Afghan Interviews** **Male**: "Anyone appointed by the government has power. However, some members of the former militias also have power. The Provincial Assembly has been very useless. The National Assembly is its own servant. No one consults people. We will not take part in elections anymore as anyone the government chooses becomes a member of the parliament and a minister. We have no trust in the current government. It has lost people's confidence."– *Baghlan #45* **Female**: "In our family my husband is the decision-maker. I participate with my husband and our family's problems and he respects my opinion. In the future when security improves, our women will be able to participate in decisions and programs related to our society."– *Kandahar #17*
	National Governance "Since its creation seven months ago, the parliament has passed no laws, but it has been quite an effective check on Mr Karzai. For example, it rejected his nomination for chief justice, an Islamic extremist and incompetent to boot." - The Economist. "A Geographical Expression in Search of a State—Afghanistan," July 6, 2006.
	Sub-National Governance "In most of the provinces visited during the review, the physical facilities at provincial departments are equipped with the basic set-up but lack means of communication and transport and rely heavily upon NGOs or UN agencies." - Urgence Rehabilitation Developpemente. "Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development in Afghanistan," April 2006.
	Participation "The proliferation of media outlets, and the undeniable progress that has been made, can obscure some unpleasant underlying realities: there are topics - and people - that cannot be touched. The print sphere, especially, is having a difficult time. Following an article in the March issue of his magazine entitled "Karzai's government lacks a national strategy", all the windows in his office were broken, he said. He later received a phone call warning him to be more careful about what he published in the future. "Media freedom ends the minute you touch a warlord or a government official," he said." - Ibrahimi, Sayed Yaqub. "The Limits of Press Freedom," Institute for War and Peace Reporting, May 4, 2006. http://www.iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=261527&apc_state=heniarr200605
	Political Security "First a Taliban suicide bomber killed a provincial governor. Then a gunman murdered a Women's Ministry director. A police chief, intelligence director and top administrator from the same eastern district were killed. Bombs targeted but missed two more governors elsewhere. And the latest target—a provincial councilman—was slain in Kandahar this week. Hewing closely to a strategy used by Iraqi insurgents, Taliban militants are increasingly targeting top government officials in Afghanistan, which has seen a spike in assassinations and attempted killings the last six weeks. The attacks are forcing officials to travel with more bodyguards and to set up more checkpoints. Some government employees have stopped going to work, fearing for their lives." - Associated Press. "Taliban Targeting Afghanistan Leaders," October 19, 2006. http://e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/2E33F47B23134F6A8725720C006CBE7A?OpenDocument

Pillar	
SOCIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE	**Afghan Interviews** **Male**: "The biggest problem we have is with getting clean drinking water. We travel up to two villages to get water from a well. Doctor and medicines are not available for our poor people, but schools are good, and we are hopeful for the future of our children."– *Kabul* **Female**: "Our family has food, clothes and a home. Social help, like a doctor, medicine and clinics are provided for us, but are not enough. Sometimes we have doctor, but we don't have medicine and sometimes we have medicine, but no doctor. My daughters don't go to school because they don't have the permission and there aren't professional studies for women either." – *Badghis #8*
	Infrastructure and Communication "Five years after the Taleban's overthrow, most Afghan roads remain in a state of dismal disrepair, yet the Kabul to Kandahar highway was once held up as a symbol of Afghanistan's reconstruction process, having been upgraded and resurfaced by an American company, Louis Berger, at a cost of nearly a million dollars a mile along its 242 miles (389km). This route linking the country's two biggest cities is of strategic importance, though since the summer it has become a virtual no-go zone for supply convoys unless very heavily protected." - Loyd, Anthony. "Drivers Who Run Gauntlet of Taleban on Highway Through Hell," *London Times*, October 17, 2006. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-2406778,00.html
	Healthcare and Nutrition "According to [UNICEF's Linda] Bartlett, health care has improved significantly in some provinces, with new clinics built and staffed in large towns. The problem, she said, is at two extremes: remote regions where medical help is dangerously scarce, and urban areas where hospitals can barely keep up with the population boom." - Constable, Pamela. "Many Afghans Lost to Hazards of Childbirth," *Washington Post*, June 6, 2006. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/05/AR2006060501177.html
	Education "Barriers to recruiting more women teachers include low salaries. At $37–$41 per month, experienced teachers are forced to seek other, or second jobs." - Human Rights Watch. "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan," July 2006. http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/afghanistan0706/afghanistan0706webfullwcover.pdf
	Basic Needs In order to ensure smooth supply of food stuff to 17 provinces of the country, the World Food Programme (WFP) opened its largest and most modern godown in Kabul on Wednesday. Food supplies would be made from the store to 17 provinces which usually face acute food shortages in winter. The spokesman said WFP used to keep the foodstuff destined for Afghanistan in godowns in the neighbouring countries which was a costly process. However, the construction of the new godown here would reduce the expenditure as well as facilitate smooth supply of food to the people in need. Mohammadi, Zainab. "WFP Opens Largest-Ever Store House in Kabul," *Pajhwok Afghan News*, October 11, 2006. http://pajhwok.com/viewstory.asp?lng=eng&id=25873

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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS	**Afghan Interviews** **Male**: "My economic situation is worse than others because I don't have a house, land or a fair income source. I am working daily and receive my salary daily too. I get my salary from the owner of the Construction Company, but I do not get a regular salary. I am looking for a better job to have more salary than this job." – *Herat #11* **Female**: "My husband decides about spending money. Our economic condition is relatively good, and we get the daily expenses from our shop. I do not have enough education; however I am interested in tailoring. Our men do not allow us to work outside and say that women are created to work inside the house not outside it."– *Nangarhar #12*
	Macroeconomic Climate "President Karzai has sidelined Khan and Dostum and the customs revenue that once went to their fiefdoms now goes into government coffers in Kabul. In fact, the government's domestic revenue has risen from $129 million in the fiscal year that ended in March 2003 (after the fall of the Taliban in late 2001) to more than $400 million in the fiscal year that ended this March. About half comes from customs revenue, taxes on imported goods. Customs collection is improving. Customs offices are getting computerized. And although corruption is still believed to be widespread, customs officials seem to be more honest and professional these days." - Wiseman, Paul. "Afghanistan Goal: Supporting Itself," *USA Today*, May 25, 2006. http://www.usatoday.com/money/world/2006-05-25-afghanistan-usat_x.htm?csp=34&POE=click-refer
	Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture "For the first time since deploying here five years ago, the US-led coalition is drinking Afghanistan's water. Starting this month the water bottles that are as ubiquitous as the soldiers' guns have been coming from a gleaming new factory in a scruffy industrial park on the outskirts of Kabul. The move was part of the force's 'Afghan First' initiative launched in March to award more contracts to local suppliers. Since then, the number of contracts awarded to Afghan-based firms has increased to 86% from 58$, covering a wide ranged of services from buying tents to cleaning." - Agence France Presse. "Coalition Forces Help Bolster Afghan Economy by Buying Local Water," October 27, 2006. http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/subcontinent/2006/October/subcontinent_October992.xml&section=subcontinent
	Jobs, Income, and Prices "[Ghulam Hazrat lives an hour from Jalalabad, in Kamah.] "This year we are all going to grow poppy: me, my cousin, my uncle, everyone," he said. Last year's promises of help and hard cash failed to materialise—all he got was a fruit tree that will not blossom for four years - and in the meantime his nine daughters and one son needed school and medical fees. To make ends meet last year, Hazrat said, he sold his car. This year he desperately wants to avoid pawning off a daughter." - Walsh, Declan. "Strange Victories in Poppy Province," *The Guardian*, October 5, 2006. http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,,329593644-105806,00.html

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JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY	**Afghan Interviews** **Male**: "I have been to court and judiciary for decision on a claim regarding my lands. I had a negative experience. Judges say their salaries are low and they take bribes. We solve most of the minor and small problems ourselves in the mosque. However, we want criminals to be punished."– *Baghlan #54* **Female**: "Violations have occurred against me, but there was no one to defend me and this is a big injustice. There is no authority to hear women's voices and help them when needed. Currently, I do not have any kind of rights, and have no permission to work."– *Kunduz #136*
	Justice System "The justice system continues to suffer from a lack of sufficiently qualified judges, prosecutors, and lawyers, and the necessary physical infrastructure to administer justice fairly and effectively." - UN Security Council. "Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for Peace and Security," March 7, 2006. http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_repots-SG/2006/2006-145.pdf
	Rights Protection "Court procedures did not meet internationally accepted standards for fair trails. Defendants have the right to an attorney under the law, but this right was inconsistently applied. Citizens' lack of awareness of their constitutional rights was a problem, and there was no functioning public defender system. Local elders and shuras sentenced persons to unsanctioned punishment including flogging or death by stoning, as well as ordering, in murder cases, the defendant to provide young girls in marriage to the victims' family." - U.S. Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005: Afghanistan," March 8, 2006. http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61704.htm
	Impunity "In Ghor Province, for example, considerable evidence existed to disqualify a candidate with well-known ongoing links to an illegal armed group. However, the name of the candidate was reportedly not submitted to the Electoral Complaints Commission as there were concerns that his disqualification would be 'destabilising.'" - Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). "A House Divided? Analysing the 2005 Afghan Elections," December 2005. http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/areu-afg-16dec.pdf

ABOUT THE PROJECT DIRECTORS

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Mr. Barton's work is informed by 15 years spent in more than 20 global hot spots, and his positions as United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees in Geneva (UNHCR, 1999–2001) and as the first director of the Office of Transition Initiatives at USAID (1994–1999).

For five years Mr. Barton taught at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School, where he was the Frederick H. Schultz Professor of Economic Policy and Lecturer of Public and International Affairs.

Mr. Barton's prior public service includes work for Cabinet secretaries Joseph Califano and Patricia Roberts Harris, and U.S. senator William D. Hathaway of Maine. Mr. Barton was the Democratic nominee for U.S. Congress from Maine's First District in 1976 and was the Democratic state party chairman for Maine in the late 1980s.

A graduate of Harvard College with an MBA from Boston University, Mr. Barton has an honorary doctorate from Wheaton College.

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