



**Evaluation:  
The Sudan Peace Fund (2002-2005) and  
The South Sudan Transition Initiatives Program (2003-2005)**

Submitted by;  
**SOCIAL IMPACT, INC.**  
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....</b>	<b>I</b>
<b>ACRONYMS .....</b>	<b>II</b>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>IV</b>
<b>I INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>1</b>
A. OVERVIEW OF EVALUATION PROJECT.....	1
B. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE SPF AND SSTI PROGRAMS .....	2
C. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY.....	5
D. COUNTRY CONTEXT.....	7
E. REGIONAL DESCRIPTIONS .....	7
<b>II QUESTION 1: DID SPF AND SSTI CONTRIBUTE TO ESTABLISHING A FOUNDATION FOR DURABLE PEACE? .....</b>	<b>10</b>
A. SUMMARY.....	10
B. CHANGES IN SECURITY AND STABILITY.....	11
C. IMPROVEMENT IN LINKS AMONG COMMUNITIES, CIVIL SOCIETY MEMBERS, CUSTOMARY LEADERSHIP AND AUTHORITIES.....	17
D. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS.....	24
<b>III QUESTION 2: DID SPF AND SSTI-FUNDED PROGRAMS HAVE APPROPRIATE PARTICIPATION? .....</b>	<b>25</b>
A. SUMMARY.....	25
B. LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND STAKEHOLDERS .....	26
C. PARTICIPATION OF GRANTEES .....	30
D. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS.....	34
<b>IV. QUESTION 3. WERE SPF AND SSTI-FUNDED PROGRAMS RELEVANT TO THE CHANGING CONTEXT? .....</b>	<b>35</b>
A. SUMMARY.....	35
B. NORTH-SOUTH PEACE DISCUSSIONS .....	36
C. FLUCTUATION IN REGIONAL CONFLICT.....	39
D. GROWING LOCAL CAPACITIES.....	41
E. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS AND FINDINGS.....	45
<b>V. RECOMMENDATIONS.....</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>ANNEX 2: FINAL INTERVIEW LIST .....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b>ANNEX 3: TEAM MATRIX .....</b>	<b>64</b>

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## Acronyms

ABC	Abyei Boundaries Commission
ACAD	Abyei Community Action for Development
ACDC	Abyei County Development Committee
ACWA	Aweil Community Welfare Association
ACWO	Aweil Community Women's Organization
ANC	All-Nuba Conference
AU-IBAR	African Union Inter African Bureau for Animal Resources
BYDA	Bahr-el-Ghazal Youth Development Agency
CA	Cooperative Agreement
CBO	Community Based Organization
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
CMC	Consortium Management Committee
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CTO	Cognizant Technical Officer (USAID)
DABS	Development Association for Bor South
DCHA	Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs (USAID)
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DG	Democracy and Governance office (USAID)
DMR	Dinka-Misseriya-Rezigat
ESF	Economic Support Funds (U.S. State Department)
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan (USAID)
KRADA	Kush Relief and Development Agency
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMPACT	Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation
NRRDO	Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
NWGCE	National Working Group for Civic Education
OFAC	Office of Foreign Assets Control (U.S. Treasury)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID)
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID)
PARAD	Penykou Agency for Relief and Development
PACs	Policy Advisory Committees
REDSO ESA	Regional Economic Development Services Office for East and Southern Africa (USAID)
RFMC	Regional Financial Management Center (USAID)
RO	Regional Officer (PACT)
SFO	Sudan Field Office (USAID)
SPF	Sudan Peace Fund
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army

SRRC	Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
SSTI	South Sudan Transition Initiatives
STAR	Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (USAID)
SWIDAP	Sudan Women in Development and Peace
SYCP	Sudan Youth Consolidation Program
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USPSC	United States Personal Services Contractor
WRAPP	Water for Recovery and Peace Program (USAID)

## **Executive Summary**

The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) presented an historical opportunity to end 50 years of fighting between the North and the South. Peace, however, was contingent upon internal Southern stability, which had been undermined by 23 years of inter-ethnic fighting. For three years before the signing of the CPA, USAID had supported peacebuilding efforts in the South through the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF) and the South Sudan Transition Initiatives (SSTI) program under USAID's Strategic Objective # 4: expand support to the Sudan peace process (which now corresponds to USAID's Fragile State Strategy). The uniqueness, scope, and visibility of these programs provide a valuable opportunity to learn from their design and mechanisms in an effort to improve peacebuilding both in Sudan as well as in other fragile states.

### ***Evaluation Design and Methodology***

The objective of the evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of the SSTI and SPF programs in supporting peace in Southern Sudan with an underlying interest in determining how these programs have supported USAID's overall Fragile States Strategy. As indicated in the evaluation Scope of Work, its purpose is threefold: 1) document what impact the SPF and SSTI programs had and determine whether, and how, they contributed to establishing the foundation for a durable peace, with the broad participation of the Sudanese people, according to the Sudan Field Office's (SFO) Strategy; 2) evaluate the relevance of the SFO's principal peacebuilding programs in supporting USAID's four policy priorities in Sudan according to the Fragile States Strategy; and 3) provide USAID with conclusions and recommendations for the Agency to consider incorporating into future programmatic responses in Sudan in particular and fragile states in general. (See Annex 1 for Scope of Work.)

Given the similarities between the SPF and the SSTI programs and their common implementing partner, USAID's Democracy and Governance Office (DG) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) agreed to conduct an unprecedented joint evaluation managed through Social Impact. The two offices agreed to center the evaluation on the following questions: 1) Did SPF and SSTI contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace? 2) Did SPF and SSTI have appropriate participation? 3) Were SPF and SSTI relevant to the changing context?

The evaluation team comprised five individuals including Ms. Anne Carlin (team leader), Ms. Rose Marie Depp, Dr. Kimberly Maynard (team leader), Dr. Martina Nicolls, and Mr. James Bell. During the field visits, the team divided into two geographic teams, one for each side of the Nile River. One team also visited Juba to meet with government leaders. Each team member focused particularly on two of four geographic areas which included Bahr-el-Ghazal, Eastern Equatoria, Nuba Mountains, and Upper Nile (Jonglei State), while also keeping a broader, regional perspective.

The evaluation, which took place from November 7 to December 6, 2005, consisted of individual interviews in Washington, Nairobi and each of the four geographic areas; site visits to projects and communities; and review of documents, including databases, program material, and reports. The team spent one week in Washington and one month in the field. In Washington, the team

interviewed USAID staff (DG, Africa Bureau, OTI, Office of Private and Voluntary Cooperation), Sudan experts, PACT staff, and external evaluators. In Nairobi, the team met with PACT staff, USAID's SFO staff, and several implementing partners. In South Sudan, each team interviewed PACT field staff, implementing partners, community members, chiefs and local leaders, former and current SPLM/A members and commanders at all levels, peace committees, women's groups, business entrepreneurs, youth, state and county government officials, government ministers and Members of Parliament, opposition leaders, civil society leaders, members of the White Army and other armed opposition groups.

The evaluation covers the period from the beginning of each program (SPF – September 2002; SSTI – February 2003) through November 30, 2005. As in every external evaluation, the extent of time and coverage is never adequate to profess absolute knowledge, thus this evaluation is only a glimpse at three years of extensive work in an extremely complex context.

### ***Outline of Report***

The evaluation report covers each of the three questions the team was tasked to investigate. Section one is an introduction to the report that provides an overview of the evaluation project and a brief history of the genesis of the SPF and SSTI programs. It describes the evaluation objectives, methodology, composition of the team and details of where the team traveled and with whom they met. The last two elements of the introduction provide brief descriptions of the country context as well as information about the regions of Sudan implicated in the SPF and SST programs.

Section two deals with the first question of the evaluation, which is the following: Did SPF and SSTI contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace? As with the other two questions, each section begins with a summary and then the subsequent subsections are broken down by region followed by a set of observations and findings. This question looks at the impact the programs had on bringing forth peace in Sudan. Because this is a rather broad question, the evaluators broke it down into two indicators for which the impact analysis could determine whether the programs achieved the objective. They are changes in security and stability and improvement in links among communities, civil society members, customary leadership and authorities. In short, if the programs led to more security and stability in the region than they would also have contributed to building foundations for lasting peace. Likewise, if the programs resulted in strengthening linkages in the communities, especially across warring factions, then the objective was achieved.

The third section of the report explores whether SPF- and SSTI-funded programs had appropriate participation. The evaluators used this question to examine who participated in the programs and defined participation in the broadest sense, including all parts of Sudanese society, and to see whether stakeholders were involved in the various aspects of the programs as well as the breadth of the discussions that took place during the program process. Further, they used broad perspective on participation to look at how much of Sudanese society was engaged in the people-to-people process and whether some elements were excluded or not encouraged to participate. They divide this section into the following two groups: 1) local communities and stakeholders; and 2) the grantees.

The final question is covered in the fourth section and looks at whether the SPF and SSTI programs were relevant to the changing context. In other words, the evaluators were tasked with trying to determine if the SPF and SST programs were flexible and adaptable to changes in the political, social and economic environment in Sudan. To delve into this question, the evaluators broke it down into big picture events that were taking place at the time of program implementation including North-South peace discussions, fluctuation in regional conflicts, and growing local capacities.

The report concludes with the recommendations section. Rather than provide recommendations to each evaluation question, the team chose to develop recommendations based on the programs writ large.

### ***Summary of Observations and Findings***

Because the SPF and SSTI programs were implemented by one organization, the evaluation team was asked to look at the programs as if they were one program. Therefore, the findings and recommendations are not program specific but apply to both.

#### Question 1: Did SPF and SSTI contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace?

Overall, the programs were found by the evaluators to contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace. The programs achieved this by implementing activities that worked to make the geographic regions more secure and stable and by creating strengthened linkages among the communities so that peaceful solutions to conflicts became more profitable than violent ones. Some of the activities that contributed the most were the peace meetings. In every region where they were conducted, the evaluators remarked that they contributed to a reduction in violence between warring groups. Security and stability as well as strengthened linkages were results of these meetings. The evaluators saw the peace dividends, however, as not as strong of a contributor to the foundation of peace. They cite that the small numbers of water projects and the lack of organized construction or that follow-through on the construction created more frustrations than relief.

#### Question 2: Did SPF- and SSTI-funded programs have appropriate participation?

The evaluation team concludes that, by and large, the SPF and SSTI programs recruited a broad range of participation whereby much of Sudanese society was included in the programs. In other words, the implementing partner gathered the appropriate actors, in terms of stakeholders and grantees, to participate in or benefit from the various activities such as peace meetings and peace dividends. However, the biggest gap in participation according to the evaluation team was with youth and women. In Sudan, youth are seen as potential spoilers to the peace process because they are under tremendous societal pressure to acquire wealth so they can wed and contribute to society. Because of this pressure, the youth are often the ones that are implicated in cattle theft and other belligerent activities that could thwart the fragile peace established in various communities. For the evaluators, more activities should have been implemented that specifically targeted youth to reduce the perception and possibility that they would be the catalysts of conflict. The other group that the evaluators suggest were not included enough were women. In many cases, informants said that women are seen to play a key role in ensuring that peace is established and sustained. Compared to all of the programs implemented under the SPF and SSTI, few targeted women. Finally, the evaluation team noted that while the selection of grantees was pertinent to the program objectives, not enough capacity building training was

provided to ensure their ability to see the programs through successfully. While capacity building was not a direct objective of the programs, the evaluators believe that without ensuring the capacity of the grantees, the programs could not be fully successful.

Question 3: Were SPF- and SSTI-funded programs relevant to the changing context?

The evaluation team observed that the SPF and SSTI programs did respond to the changing conditions in Sudan and prospects for peace by trying to broaden peace initiatives and provide peace dividends. SSTI projects, such as support for the Dinka-Misseriya-Rezigat (DMR) dialogue, the training of parliamentarians and dissemination of the six peace protocols responded at the appropriate times to national political events, such as the North-South dialogue and other peace initiatives. The evaluators also noted that the programs responded quickly at the local level to address imminent outbreaks, but observed that it was unclear what the strategy was behind selecting which conflicts to help deter. Additionally, the programs did not address well the need for new organizations, the grant recipients, to develop their capacities to implement the programs. Because it was difficult for the implementing partner to travel to many of the geographic areas where grant activities were taking place, the new organizations were relied on to follow through with activities. An exception to this was peace committees, which became more active in peace activities and gained capacity to take on greater peacebuilding responsibilities. Over time, they also became more and more perceived as legitimate peace actors with broad community support.

***Summary of Recommendations***

The evaluation team concludes that the people-to-people peace processes are valued by South Sudanese and worthy of continued support since communities reported that dialogue, reflection and reconciliation reduced conflict and forced them to look within themselves to maintain communal peace. In addition, the evaluation team recommends that future peacebuilding programs also look to support local authorities as they assume new roles as administrators rather than warriors. Key to any prospects for long-lasting peace, therefore, will be the ability of local authorities to restore security, ensure justice and be accountable to the people.

The following general recommendations build on the progress already made by the SPF and SSTI program initiatives, but also can be extrapolated into similar programs in fragile states.

- Continue to support peace initiatives, but develop a more holistic approach including a strategic, longer-term package of assistance;
- Begin to transform part of SPF and SSTI activities into long-term peace initiatives;
- Engage the emerging Government of South Sudan in peacebuilding processes;
- Support customary laws as an immediate measure for supporting rule of law;
- Continue to strengthen local peace actors;
- Focus on capacity building for local organizations;
- Increase access to information and knowledge at the grassroots level;
- Undertake infrastructure construction only with qualified partners who are appropriate for the task and can ensure quality work; and
- Procure items for peace activities in South Sudan to stimulate the local economy and provide jobs.

## **I. Introduction**

### **A. Overview of Evaluation Project**

Sudan has suffered one of Africa's longest running civil wars. Conflict began in 1955, shortly before independence in 1956, and has ceased only for brief intervals since that time. In addition to war, famine and drought have claimed millions of Sudanese lives – an estimated two million since 1983 alone. The long-running wars and frequent famines have turned millions of Southern Sudanese into refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs).

In 2002, as the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) moved to sign another peace agreement, USAID offered to support peacebuilding in the South through the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF). The SPF was followed by the South Sudan Transition Initiatives (SSTI) program in 2003. Both programs seek to address USAID's Strategic Objective #4 for Sudan – expand support to the Sudan peace process – and fit into what is now USAID's Fragile State Strategy which seeks to “guide USAID's efforts in reversing decline in fragile states and advancing their recovery to a stage where transformational development progress is possible.”<sup>1</sup> The design and implementation of the SPF and SSTI programs provide a learning opportunity applicable to future peacebuilding in Sudan and other fragile states.

Articulated in USAID's Fragile States Strategy (FSS), which implicates such countries as Sudan, are four interconnected policy elements that seek to strengthen fragile states and include: 1) enhancing stability; 2) improving security; 3) encouraging reform; and 4) developing institutional capacity.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the FSS conveys the following four principles that are to govern program implementation in fragile states: 1) engage strategically; 2) focus on sources of fragility; 3) seek short-term impact linked to longer-term structural reform; and 4) establish appropriate measurement systems.<sup>3</sup> To determine whether the Sudan Field Office supported this policy and pursued the first three principles and adhered to the fourth, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and the Office of Democracy and Governance (DG) requested an evaluation of the SPF and SSTI programs implemented by PACT.

Social Impact (SI) was contracted by OTI using the Program Development Quickly mechanism to organize and field an evaluation. The program began in early November with a team building session on November 7, a desk review, and interviews of key informants in Washington, D.C. through November 10. The field work, conducted in Nairobi, Kenya and Southern Sudan, took place from November 13 to December 6, 2005.

The objective of this evaluation was to examine the effectiveness of the USAID-sponsored SPF and SSTI program in South Sudan as managed by the non-governmental organization PACT. The SPF cooperative agreement was signed in September 2002 and the SSTI contract was signed in May 2003. Both programs received no-cost extensions. The SPF was extended for three additional months to June 15, 2006, and SSTI was extended until December 31, 2006.

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<sup>1</sup> USAID, “Fragile States Strategy,” January 2005, 2.

<sup>2</sup> USAID, “Fragile States Strategy,” January 2005, 5

<sup>3</sup> USAID, “Fragile States Strategy,” January 2005, 5-6

Given the geographic vastness of Southern Sudan, the lack of transportation infrastructure and other logistical challenges, the five-member evaluation team divided in two in order to cover as much territory as possible. The team comprising Anne Carlin, the overall evaluation team leader, Rose Marie Depp and James Bell<sup>4</sup> traveled to the Nuba Mountains, Abyei, and Bahr-El-Ghazal. Dr. Kim Maynard, the field team co-leader, and Dr. Martina Nicolls traveled to Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile and Juba.

## ***B. Background and Overview of the SPF and SSTI Programs***

### **SPF**

Since 1989, USAID has contributed over \$1 billion in humanitarian assistance to Sudan. In 1998, USAID resumed development assistance through the Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) program. USAID deepened its involvement in 2002 with the launch of the SPF small grants program. The SPF was conceived as a follow-up to the grassroots reconciliation and community harmonization initiatives in South Sudan, notably the Wunlit peace conferences of 1999 and 2002 led by the New Sudan Council of Churches. SPF objectives were to:

- Facilitate grassroots people-to-people peace conferences among communities in conflict.
- Consolidate people-to-people reconciliation by coordinating implementation of peace agreements with key authorities and the Sudanese Diaspora.
- Deliver rehabilitation inputs or “peace dividends” to peace committees implementing community-based reconciliation agreements.<sup>5</sup>

The American non-governmental organization PACT, through its office based in Kenya, was selected to manage the SPF. PACT signed a Cooperative Agreement (CA) with USAID in September 2002. In November and December 2002, PACT studied the South Sudanese conflicts and created a conflict map upon which to base SPF activities. The map identified these conflict clusters and areas of focus:

- Bahr-el-Ghazal: Kiir, Pankar and Wunlit Clusters
- Equatoria: Kidepo Valley Cluster
- Upper Nile: Central and Pibor Clusters
- Transitional areas: Nuba Mountains and South Blue Nile.

The mapping exercise also identified trends affecting conflict in South Sudan:

- Conflict is generally ethnically based, and two-thirds has been politicized.
- The status of governance, noticeably the lack of civil administration and ineffective law enforcement and judicial systems, affects conflict.

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<sup>4</sup>Due to previous commitments and a week’s delay in fielding the evaluation team, James Bell was not able to remain in-country during the entire evaluation trip and returned home the weekend of November 26. Despite leaving early, he submitted a draft of the Nuba Mountain report.

<sup>5</sup> The Sudan Peace Fund Program Request for Applications Number RFA 623-02-026 issued June 25, 2002 provides additional details.

- The return of IDPs increases conflict.
- GoS-backed militias heighten conflict.
- Protracted war has led to a culture of violence and proliferation of arms.
- South Sudanese are traumatized, and cultural values and norms have broken down.<sup>6</sup>

In late 2002 and early 2003, PACT made three grants and one subcontract totaling \$4.7 million to SPF consortium partners, the African Union - Inter African Bureau for Animal Resources, Christian Aid, the New Sudan Council of Churches and Pact Kenya (subcontract recipient)<sup>7</sup>. Also in 2002 and 2003, seven grants totaling \$972,000 funded one rapid response project and the construction of water activities and boreholes. Another 79 grants totaling \$2.2 million were approved in 2004 and 2005 for a range of activities including drinking water provision, peace initiatives, rapid response, capacity building, and women. The program close date was anticipated for December 15, 2005 but was given a no-cost extension through June 2006.

### **SSTI**

OTI viewed the existing USAID relationship with PACT as one that fit well with the type of small grants programs OTI usually administers. Thus in May 2003, OTI signed a non-competitively awarded contract with PACT to administer the South Sudan Transition Initiatives program. SSTI's objectives as stated in the contract were to:

- Link ongoing South Sudanese peacebuilding efforts to initiatives that promote good governance and increase the participation of southern Sudanese in their governing structures.
- Transport conflict resolution experts to areas vulnerable to conflict in a timely manner and implement priority projects to secure peace agreements.
- Establish an independent southern Sudan media.<sup>8</sup>

Following the signing of the SSTI contract, approximately 19 grants nearing \$600,000 were approved in 2003 for a range of projects including media support; small development projects; civil society mapping; development planning; women's conferences; peace dialogues between Dinka communities and Arabs; and rapid response in Nuer areas. In 2004 and 2005 (through November 30, 2005, the cut-off point for SSTI activities for this evaluation), another 234 projects were approved. The total ceiling for grants at this time point was \$7.3 million. Moreover, according to PACT, as of January 24, 2006, \$6,032,725 was disbursed of the \$6,953,910 awarded.

### **SPF and SSTI Implementation**

There was little difference in the conception and implementation of the SPF and SSTI projects, which were both grant making programs. Although SSTI activities were more varied than SPF activities, PACT treated the mechanisms as one fund and implemented them in the same manner.

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<sup>6</sup> For additional details, please see, "Summary of Initial Findings from the Peace and Conflict Mapping Exercise undertaken in SPLM Controlled Areas of Southern Sudan as part of the Design Phase of the USAID-Funded Sudan Peace Fund Program," December 2002.

<sup>7</sup> The consortium partnership is discussed in more detail in section VII.

<sup>8</sup> For details, please see the 2003 contract: HDA-D-00-03-00136-00 between USAID and PACT, Inc.

The following are some advantages and disadvantages to implementing the two programs in this fashion.

*Advantages:*

- Given that PACT was the only implementing partner for SPF and SSTI, a larger pool of money was available for projects.
- Allocating resources to the projects was simplified as PACT could pull from the most available pot of money and deliver the funds more rapidly.
- PACT had the ability to choose which funds would be most appropriate for each submission, in terms of criteria, speed of disbursement, etc.
- Implementing the programs as one offered significant coherence between programs and unified the objectives of the entire effort.
- PACT was able to build on the synergies between the objectives of both programs (SPF building peace structures/SSTI quick impact/hot spots) as the two were intertwined and involved with the same institutions and actors.
- From the perspective of the beneficiaries, implementation was seamless – in that all funds were seen to be coming from the American government, rather than from separate offices from USAID.
- Having a single implementer meant that there was an element of coordination and compatibility between the two programs – PACT could integrate programs and enable one program to fund follow-on activities of the other fund.

*Disadvantages:*

- The distinction between the two programs was not clear for most community-based organizations (CBOs) and PACT staff.
- Internal to USAID it was difficult to link impact to a particular USAID office or funding source.
- PACT essentially had two clients (the Democracy and Governance Office and OTI) for programs they were authorized to implement together, leading to confusion on the part of PACT given the differing – and sometimes competing – priorities of these offices.
- Neither client provided the oversight and strategic guidance necessary to ensure implementation met program objectives.
- Beneficiaries and grantees were confused by different requirements based on SPF or SSTI funding.
- The relationship between the two programs was vague. SSTI generally aimed to address tangible peace dividends emerging from peace-building meetings, but in reality both programs seemed to address all forms of projects.
- NGOs/CBOs and PACT staff in the field were often not clear of the distinction between the two programs – head office did not appear to inform field staff of the different program aims and criteria for funding.
- PACT field staff appeared to leave the decisions regarding which programs to use to senior management who allocated resources based on speed and ease rather than the realities on the ground.
- OTI aims, distinctiveness and uniqueness was subsumed into the wider USAID aims and hence OTI seemed to “lose” its capacity for quick impact aimed at transitional activities.

- It was difficult for the evaluators to distinguish which activities under SPF and SSTI were considered “transition” or “development” activities. This distinction is important as it would have helped identify where the activities fit in terms of how to evaluate them.

### **C. Evaluation Methodology**

#### **Evaluation Objective**

The objective of this evaluation is to examine the effectiveness of the SPF and SSTI program in South Sudan as managed by the non-governmental organization PACT. As indicated in the evaluation Statement of Work (Annex 1), the purpose of the evaluation is threefold:

- Document the impacts of the SPF and SSTI programs and determine whether they contributed to establishing a foundation for durable peace with the broad participation of the Sudanese people.
- Evaluate the relevance of the Sudan Field Office’s principal peacebuilding programs in supporting USAID’s policy priorities in Sudan.
- Provide USAID with recommendations applicable to future programs in Sudan in particular and in fragile states in general.

Since both programs were implemented by the one partner over a similar time period, the DG office and OTI agreed to a joint evaluation and to focus the evaluation on the following questions:

1. Did SPF and SSTI contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace?
2. Did SPF and SSTI have appropriate participation?
3. Were SPF and SSTI relevant to the changing context?

#### **Methodology**

The evaluation team, contracted through Social Impact, Inc., comprised the following consultants: Anne Carlin, overall team leader; Dr. Kimberly Maynard, field team co-leader; Rose Marie Depp; Dr. Martina Nicolls; and James Bell. The team began the evaluation with a desk review of key documents followed by field research.

On November 7, 2005, the evaluation team met in Washington, DC for a team planning meeting to have a preliminary discussion with PACT team members in Kenya via conference call; introduce the members of the team to each other; discuss the expectations of the client; review the scope of work; and develop a work plan that was to clarify roles and responsibilities of team members.<sup>9</sup> Prior to meeting in Washington, DC, the evaluation team was provided with key documents that provided background and details about the programs.

From November 8 until December 11, 2005, the team interviewed key informants in Washington DC, Nairobi, Kenya and South Sudan. (See Annex 2 for Interview Lists.) In Washington, DC,

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<sup>9</sup> Rose Marie Depp was not able to attend the Team Planning Meeting but was available by phone for the work plan discussion.

the team interviewed the following: USAID representatives from the Africa Bureau, Office of Democracy and Governance, and OTI; and current and former PACT staff. In Nairobi, the evaluation team met with the staff of the USAID Sudan Field Office, PACT staff, representatives from PACT's grantees, as well as other USAID implementing partners.

For interviews and research in South Sudan, the evaluation team split into two geographic teams to cover more geographic area. One team visited Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile (Jonglei State) and Juba. The other traveled to the Nuba Mountains, Abyei and Bahr-el-Ghazal. Due to time and security constraints, the teams were not able to visit Southern Blue Nile and Western Equatoria. (See Annex 3 for Itineraries.) The locations were chosen at the outset by PACT and USAID, and the evaluation team concurred with the selection. Almost all regions were traveled to except for Blue Nile. One team member specifically suggested that this region should have been included since it is a key transitional area but due to limited time, difficult logistics and high costs, it was not included.

While in the field, the team met with PACT field staff, implementing partners, community leaders, community members, peace committees, women's groups, former and current SPLM/A authorities, local and state authorities, Members of Parliament, opposition leaders, civil society leaders, and White Army members. The evaluation team departed Sudan having conducted approximately 440 interviews.<sup>10</sup> Of this total, approximately 59 were grantees, 90 were beneficiaries, 142 were relevant local authorities, 76 were program participants, and 30 were program implementers. Additionally, the team visited more than 55 grant/project sites. The remaining approximately 43 interviews were with representatives from other multilateral institutions. In large part the interviews were conducted in English, but an interpreter was always available as needed.

The questions outlined in the Scope of Work acted as the framework from which the evaluation team interviewed each informant. Each interview was open-ended and tailored to solicit answers to questions regarding whether SPF and SSTI contributed to establishing a foundation for durable peace; whether each program had appropriate participation; and if the programs were relevant to the changing context. Because the team was able to travel to only to specific regions given the logistical challenge of traveling in Sudan, the information included in the responses to the evaluation questions covers only those areas traveled to rather than all of the regions in which programs were implemented.

With the vastness of South Sudan, the two small grants programs were not expected to bring overnight and lasting peace to a region that has experienced conflict for decades. However, using the 1999 and 2002 Wunlit conferences as a model, the activities were expected to promote improved relations among those involved in the conflicts. Because of the complexities, evaluators relied upon statements from those involved in peace initiatives – community members, tribal leaders, civil society and CBOs, women, youth and local authorities – and their perceptions of the impacts of SPF and SSTI-funded activities on conflict in their areas. In addition, relations between community members, civil society organizations, local authorities and peace spoilers were also reviewed to understand if activities had promoted greater linkages and positive behavior change within communities.

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<sup>10</sup> This number is also the approximate number of persons interviewed though it does also include group interviews.

While the evaluation team was able to cover a substantial amount of Southern Sudan and meet with many and myriad informants, there were several challenges or shortcomings to the evaluation. One of the major challenges to the evaluation was the logistics in terms of the distances the teams had to cover to meet with key informants. Sometimes it would take the team 5 hours to get to one village for a set of meetings. Another major challenge for the team was the lack of a Terms of Reference and clear objectives, largely as a result of having to conduct the evaluation for two clients. This contributed to a lack of consensus among the evaluators as to what the content and themes of the evaluation should be. Another shortcoming of the evaluation was that the team composition contained no Sudan experts – though two members had limited experience in Sudan – and only one peacebuilding expert.

#### ***D. Country Context***

##### **Country Background – South Sudan**

In addition to the civil war with the Arab north, Southern Sudanese have been fighting among themselves almost continuously since independence. Primary conflicts have been over natural resources, especially grazing rights, water, land use, and more recently, oil. Violence has included murder, organized cattle raiding, abductions of women and children – sometimes for sale into slavery – and infrastructure destruction. The 1991 split in the SPLM/A exacerbated South-South tensions, forced the displacement of large portions of the population to northern Sudan and neighboring countries and further undermined the traditional tribal system. The ongoing North–South civil war contributed to instability since most battles were fought in the South and the GoS armed southerners to attack other southerners. The numerous and protracted conflicts have contributed to high poverty rates, frequent humanitarian emergencies, a lack of development, and an absence of governance structures and civil society organizations.

The quantity, variety, and complexity of conflicts, ethnic groups, and relationships in the region, combined with Sudan’s vast, difficult-to-access territory, create a challenging operating environment for donors and international organizations. The majority of international interventions have been limited to relief efforts, largely through Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), started in 1989.

#### ***E. Regional Descriptions***

##### **Nuba Mountains**

The Nuba Mountains are one of three transitional areas lying between North and South Sudan. They became the battle ground for the North-South war resulting in pockets of SPLA-aligned populations surrounded by Northern-controlled areas. Nuba is both “north and “south” in Sudanese political debates, though as part of the peace agreement with the North, the South surrendered its claim to this area. The Nuba Mountains are now annexed to the northern state of South Kordofan. This upsets many Nubans who feel betrayed by the SPLM/A leadership. Unlike residents of South Sudan, Nubans will not be able to vote for independence from the North in 2011.

Generally in the Nuba Mountains, SPF and SSTI funded capacity building projects followed by large peace meetings, many of which were co-funded with other donors. Other projects in the region were targeted at infrastructure and media. There were also three relatively small income generation projects for women totaling less than \$4,000. Overall, managing programs in the Nuba Mountains was challenging given the difficulties of traveling to or setting up a field presence in the region.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

Most of Bahr-el-Ghazal state, now divided into four, came under the administration of the new GoSS following the 2005 signing of the CPA. However, oil-rich Abyei County, including Abyei City, a former garrison town controlled by the north, is now administered by the GoS as part of an agreement between the North and South.

Over the years, conflict in Bahr-el-Ghazal has become politicized at the local, regional and national levels as a result of the civil war and the involvement of external actors. Conflict has been characterized primarily by regional Dinka-Dinka, Dinka-Nuer and Dinka-Arab disputes over resources. In 2002, the SPF conflict mapping exercise identified three overlapping clusters in Bahr-el-Ghazal on which to focus peace-building activities: the Kiir Cluster, the Wunlit Cluster and the Pankar Cluster.

It is important to note that these are very large geographic areas and cover vast swathes of territory and numbers of people. The Kiir Cluster in the north, affecting millions of people on both sides of the Nile, has Dinka and Arab populations, some of whom were armed by the North. It also includes the disputed area of Abyei whose boundaries were redrawn recently by the Abyei Boundaries Commission. The Wunlit Cluster includes the town of Wunlit, the site of the historic 1999 and 2002 peace conferences between the Dinka and Nuer who agreed to cease their bloody fighting and raiding. This cluster also covers counties on both sides of the Nile. The Pankar Cluster, incorporating more than six counties, includes mostly sections of the Dinka; however, a few other ethnic groups such as the Beli, Sudanic and Luo were included in activities in this cluster.

SPF and SSTI activities in this region have attempted to bring together northerners and southerners, Arabs and Dinka, together to discuss past grievances, bring development to the area, and share resources. While access to grazing land has been the source of most fighting – whether “inter” or “intra” ethnic – GoS support for some groups, the introduction of weapons, and the future division of oil revenues complicate the conflicts. Bahr-el-Ghazal was the recipient of \$3 million in SPF- and SSTI-funded projects, nearly fifty percent more than either Equatoria or Upper Nile, possibly due to the concentration of water activities in this area as well as the fact that USAID prioritized it as a returnee corridor. Under SPF and SSTI, peace activities, drinking water provision and information dissemination were the area’s main activities. There were 41 peace and rapid response activities – 18 SPF and 23 SSTI – and seven SPF and four SSTI water projects. Though water projects were fewer in number, water and peace/rapid response activities consumed nearly the same amount of money.

## **Eastern Equatoria**

Eastern Equatoria shares its borders with Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. The international borders support both legal and illicit trade and divide several ethnic groups, and complicating relations among Equatoria's Buya, Didinga, Harihilo, Jie, Ketebo, Mogoth, Logir, Lokoya, Loming, Lopit, Lotuho, Olu'bo, Pari, and Toposa communities. As in other parts of South Sudan, the GoS controlled garrison towns, such as Torit, and supported Equatorians in wars against other Equatorians. The area also faces increasing incursions from the Lord's Resistance Army, based in Uganda, causing greater instability, especially in the South.

The rich Kidepo Valley with its fertile grazing land comprises the most conflict-affected area of the region with eight conflicts among 12 ethnic groups, marking it a "conflict cluster" and warranting significant SPF and SSTI activities. Most of the conflict revolves around grazing rights, exacerbated by easy access to weapons. Two of the top three funding priorities, therefore, were peace meetings and rapid response activities. Small-scale development projects and capacity building were other regional priorities.

## **Upper Nile**

The Upper Nile has had a long, bloody history of violence and is constantly prone to volatility and instability. Like Equatoria, Upper Nile (now divided into two states) comprises numerous ethnic groups: Nuer (Lou, Jikany and Gawaar), Bor Dinka, Murle, Anyuak, Mabane, Toposa, Kachipo and Jie. Conflict in the area revolves primarily around resource issues and socio-cultural practices such as cattle raiding and child abduction. Inter-ethnic and inter-clan conflict has been heightened by GoS support for some ethnic groups and the White Army, an irregular force of armed youth.

The conflict mapping exercise identified two conflict clusters in Upper Nile. The Pibor Cluster, with its garrison towns of Pibor and Bor, is an area of significant intra-Nuer conflict. The 1991 Bor Massacre also took place in this area and led to the flight of 700,000 Bor Dinka to Equatoria. The Central Cluster includes the towns of Ayod and Akobo, and the White Army operates in this area. Peace and rapid response activities were two of the top four activities in the area. Water provision, targeting Murle participants in the Wunlit peace conferences and projects supporting women were also top priorities.

## **South Sudan-wide**

Approximately \$7 million in SPF and SSTI project funds was allocated to activities throughout South Sudan and logistics for Pact Kenya and the SPF consortium partners. The largest funding allocations went to Pact Kenya - \$2.7 million and \$1.3 million in SPF and SSTI grants to itself – and the SPF consortium partners - \$2 million. Of the national projects, \$628,000 supported the National Working Group for Civic Education (NWGCE) in summarizing and translating the six protocols signed between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A from 2002 to 2004. These agreements formed the basis for the 2005 CPA and the relative peace that exists in South Sudan. Though the summary of the protocols was considered controversial by some in the SPLM/A and unrepresentative of the actual protocols, the summaries and their translation were praised highly by Sudanese civil society organizations and community members who participated in

dissemination meetings. All who mentioned the protocol dissemination stated that this activity should be expanded even further – and possibly extended to the Arab north which was also eager to understand the basis of the CPA.

In addition to the protocol dissemination activities, support to the Sudan Mirror newspaper was significant. The English language paper has been distributed mainly throughout the aid community in South Sudan and in Nairobi where the paper is based. The paper has high journalistic standards and is one of the few local news sources in English dedicated to events in Sudan. NGO representatives in South Sudan and Nairobi stated that the paper was important because it provided a common source of information to a large body of people working in South Sudan – permitting all to speak about political and other events from a common information base. The paper also was involved in publishing summaries of the six protocols and fourteen percent of protocol dissemination funds supported special supplements in the Sudan Mirror. Like other media projects in South Sudan, the Sudan Mirror is not self-sustaining and still requires external assistance to operate.

### **Southern Blue Nile**<sup>11</sup>

Southern Blue Nile is a transitional area between northern and southern Sudan. Like the Nuba Mountains, this area was appropriated by the north as part of the CPA and will not have the opportunity to vote for or join an independent South Sudan in 2011 even though many people feel more connected to the South. This area received the smallest allocations of SPF and SSTI funding, and due to time and resource constraints, the evaluation team did not visit this area. Activities revolved mainly around North-South dialogue and discussions surrounding the return of IDPs and refugees.

## **II. Question 1: Did SPF and SSTI contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace?**

### **A. Summary**

As outlined in the Sudan Interim Strategic Plan, 2004-2006 (June 2003), the goal of the USAID Sudan Mission is to create a foundation “for a just and durable peace with broad participation of the Sudanese people.” With this overarching goal, the SPF and SSTI programs were designed to specifically address Special Objective 4 of the strategy to “expand support to Sudanese peacebuilding and maintenance capacities” by promoting peace initiatives in SPLM/A-controlled areas of South Sudan. Such initiatives addressed peace at a national level between the GoS and SPLM/A, and at the local level between and within ethnic groups. Examples of the types of activities implemented to directly target this objective included peace meetings and conferences; information dissemination; the provision of “peace dividends” such as boreholes for drinking water; and capacity building of potential peace actors – including peace committee and CBO members.

Based on the interviews conducted by the evaluation team, the conclusion about whether the two programs contributed to developing a lasting and enduring peace is mixed.<sup>12</sup> The project that

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<sup>11</sup> Although the evaluation team did not travel to the Southern Blue Nile, it is an area where SPF and SSTI programs were implemented and completes the geographic picture.

solicited the most positive feedback, implemented under both SSTI and SPF, was information dissemination. The information distributed to the information-starved South Sudan included the six protocols signed from 2002 to 2004 that framed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the GoS and SPLM/A and the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) Report detailing the demarcation of new boundaries. The success of these projects in contributing to the goal of establishing a foundation for peace is that they sparked discussions about peace and the future under the CPA and the new boundary agreement.

Communities and other peace actors were also generally positive about the people-to-people peace meetings and rapid response activities held over the course of the programs.<sup>13</sup> Though few knew these projects were funded by USAID, the participants asked for more of these initiatives, citing that these meetings were a welcomed distraction from the fatigue of war. These meetings also encouraged economic and social development, which were two additional reasons for continuing with the peace meetings. This indicates that these meetings contributed to a foundation for establishing a lasting peace.

The projects that were less successful in contributing to the foundations for a lasting peace were the trainings directed at women, local authorities, and some NGO members. While the participants valued the training, there was a lack of a systematic training program which would have provided more continuity and therefore more impact towards achieving the objective. Also, media projects, notably assistance for newspapers, were not well-supported. Coordination with OTI radio grantee, the Sudan Radio Service, could have boosted information dissemination of peace initiatives. Lastly, the water and infrastructure projects visited by members of the evaluation team were largely appreciated; however, more could have been done by PACT to build more or monitor the results better. Furthermore, they had extremely limited implications for improved peace and security beyond their localized areas.

### ***B. Changes in Security and Stability***

To determine whether SPF and SSTI programs contributed to establishing the foundations for peace, the evaluation team determined that changes in security and stability are useful indicators. Based on these indicators, overall the SPF and SSTI programs did contribute to positive changes in security and stability within the regions traveled to by the evaluation team. However, some of the projects, particularly in Bahr-El-Ghazal, seemed to have the potential of producing negative results because of the lack of support for women and the ineffective use of the borehole project.

### **Nuba Mountains**

Peace work in the Nuba Mountains involved the sponsorship of four large conferences, including two “All-Nuba” conferences, a Nuba-Baggara Conference (also called the All-Tribes Conference) and an Interfaith Dialogue. Other programs in this region included skills development and training for civil society, parliamentarians and local administrators; information dissemination; procurement projects and women’s activities. Of these projects, the

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<sup>12</sup> However, one evaluator contends that actually both programs had a huge and positive impact on the foundation for peace as demonstrated by program activities in all regions.

<sup>13</sup> The SSTI program continues into 2006, though those activities were not part of this review.

peace conferences and the training for parliamentarians contributed the most to increasing stability and security in this region and establishing a foundation for peace.

The peace conferences helped establish a new way forward in terms of security and stability based on dialogue rather than violence because they were large and inclusive. One parliamentarian said this work had “contributed to peace, but so much more needs to be done.” A Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT)<sup>14</sup> advisor working in the region said that the “All Tribes processes with Nuba and Baggara needed to be deepened.” She said these conferences were successful “because people were looking for change. But now they need to see development on the ground.” A member of parliament noted that “PACT helped build peace, but we want follow-up on the resolutions.” Hence, it is apparent that these conferences established a foundation on which subsequent programs and program implementers can build.

There were nine capacity building grants funded by both SPF and SSTI in the Nuba Mountains, and of the projects, the closest link to overall peace and security are the training of the parliamentarians and land mapping. The training of parliamentarians to assume their legislative roles and responsibilities was important because the 24 people selected to represent the Nuba Mountains in the parliament of Southern Kordofan have not held such positions before. In a week-long training they covered a range of topics including the role of the legislature, legislative committees, legislation drafting, and national budget review. Participants reported that the training was of a high standard.

There were four SSTI-funded skills development activities that were good ideas in principle, but fell short because of a lack of follow-through. These projects supported the writing of an area development strategy; construction of a peace and cultural center; support for a youth training center; and the purchase of four block press machines and training for their operators. For example, the Peace and Cultural Center (SSTI-1100) was extended until March 2006 as a result of unanticipated supplemental costs. While the center’s leader envisioned developing the center as a repository for safeguarding and promoting Nuba culture and languages, no resources were available to establish a training center or museum. Nevertheless, the center was used to sponsor a four-day sports carnival for both Nuba and Arab-Baggara in 2005. Those interviewed said the event was successful and participants were able to know one another better, though due to the distances involved, only about half of the groups from the region were able to attend.<sup>15</sup>

SPF and SSTI information dissemination activities in the Nuba Mountains included dissemination of the peace protocols, assistance to two newspapers and two meetings. As in the rest of South Sudan, the protocol summaries were in high demand, though the Nuba Mountains area had just three dissemination activities. One of the largest was a discussion of the CPA with conflict-affected people (SSTI-1226) – important since there are approximately 20,000 widows, orphans and disabled in the Nuba Mountains. This activity brought together approximately 150

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<sup>14</sup> Nuba Mountains Programme Advancing Conflict Transformation (NMPACT) is a multi-agency, multi-donor program established during the ceasefire in 2002; its goal is “to enhance the Nuba people’s capacity for self-reliance within a sustained process of conflict transformation guided by the aspirations, priorities and analyses of the Nuba people themselves.” The role of NMPACT is to serve as an umbrella for the spectrum of agencies working within the state. NMPACT was reported to be a ‘neutral player’ that facilitates policy development and strategic planning.

<sup>15</sup> Mary Kettman, “DRAFT - Impact Assessment Report Draft: Challenges and Lessons Learned,” June 20, 2005.

individuals to discuss the CPA and select representatives to form an organization to be registered with the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC).

The two newspaper projects, Blowing Horn newspaper (SSTI-1093) and Nafir newspaper/New Horizons magazine (SSTI-1133) were attempts to establish independent media sources in the Nuba Mountains and to achieve the following objectives: provide access to information in a war-affected area; enable communities to participate in development; establish checks and balances to enhance efficiency in public and private sectors; and develop a new culture of dialogue. Unfortunately neither project was able to mobilize enough to achieve the objectives even though the Blowing Horn has had more than one print run. The small grants did not provide sufficient support during the startup. While there is high demand for information, these two grants did little to ensure the availability of information that would provide people with knowledge of national and local peace initiatives.

One of the procurement projects, a grant of \$36,849 to the Policy Advisory Committee (SSTI-1199), also faced obstacles. This program was to support travel for staff and computer equipment for a United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)-funded land mapping activity in the Nuba Mountains.<sup>16</sup> The computers had not been delivered due to non-compliance with licensing requirements. PACT headquarters in Washington, D.C. has been working to get the computers released.<sup>17</sup>

Although they were not a priority in the region, it is important to note that women's activities in the Nuba Mountains received minimal support - \$4,000 for three income generation projects supporting accounting, weaving and bread making – despite the request from Sudanese to bring women further into the fore of establishing peace. As a result of limited resources allocated to women's programs, it is unlikely that these projects will impact peace and security.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, security and stability seem to have been impacted by SPF and SSTI-funded projects, though impacts differed according to the type of project implemented. Peace meetings, rapid response initiatives and information dissemination seem to have had a positive impact and supported processes to involve a range of stakeholders in the peace process. However, mobile courts and the manner in which women's projects were conducted may have had a negative impact. The mobile court experiment led to disappointment regarding the possibility for full conflict resolution and the women's projects showed a lack of commitment to the importance of women's involvement in building the "New Sudan," especially since women have been allocated 25 percent of seats in the new government. Large investments in a handful of water activities, while appreciated as development projects, had minimal impacts upon peace and security since their number was few and their impacts were localized. There were also a number of small and one-off projects such as capacity building for local administration and CSOs as well as CSO mapping exercises that had little to no impact upon community stability.

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<sup>16</sup> Financed by USAID's Africa Bureau, Sustainable Development (AFR/SD), for \$850,000 over an uncertain time period; the team did not obtain further details on this activity.

<sup>17</sup> The team received at least three reports that computer equipment was not delivered due to non-compliance with licensing requirements.

Peace meetings, rapid response activities and information dissemination were said to have been important activities in support of peace, security and stability. To varying degrees, these meetings addressed relationships and encouraged dialogue among the Dinka, Misseriya and Rezigat (DMR) communities. They took place in localized meetings in 2003 (Agok<sup>18</sup> and Aweil) and regionally and internationally in 2004 (Gogrial, Addis Ababa and Nairobi). Initial meetings united Dinka communities and supported discussion of their grievances against Arab (Misseriya and Rezigat) communities and the Government of Sudan (GoS) as well as measures to be taken to address these grievances. These aspirations fed into higher-level DMR meetings in Addis Ababa and Nairobi, agreed neutral venues, where parties to the conflict from North and South Sudan felt free to participate. As these discussions were being held, the GoS and SPLM/A were signing peace protocols in Naivasha, Kenya. This parallel high-level dialogue, supported by the international community, led to decreased tensions and violence in the Abyei area, with a significant drop in raiding by GoS-backed Arab militias. Importantly, in the summer of 2005, the area opened up to free movement across the Kiir River, the GoS-SPLM/A civil war dividing line in Abyei County. Despite the progress, however, local DMR talks broke down in 2004 and have not restarted, though the tenuous peace remains.

In the Pankar Cluster in 2004, a series of rapid response meetings responding to reports of imminent conflict commenced. The meetings continued into 2005 and included the creation of a mobile court. The meetings were organized to address the area's mostly inter-Dinka conflict that revolves around the use of common grazing land. As a result of the meetings, the Pankar Peace Council was established and was charged with identifying possible outbreaks of conflict and requesting restraint on the part of potential warring parties. Communities and tribal leaders praised the peace council's efforts as well as the local peace committees that supported the higher council. The meetings and activism of the peace council members resulted in decreased conflict in the Pankar Cluster in 2005, though tensions continued to bubble just beneath the surface because the meetings and mobile courts were unable to resolve capital cases. After the meetings, communities exchanged looted cattle and property, but they await justice for murders and property damage. Communities fear that if justice is slow in coming, conflict will break out again.

SSTI funds were also used to support the development and use of mobile courts, and the concept – “bringing justice to the people” – was generally supported by local communities. However, the courts project was unsuccessful as a result of poor judge selection and a lack of oversight by PACT. The principal factor in the failed initiative was that police investigations were not completed prior to the sitting of the courts. Other issues included inadequate resources, unclear jurisdiction between customary and civil courts, mistrust of the judges' impartiality and competence, and allegations of corruption. As a result, communities were upset that full justice for past crimes could not be achieved, and they worried that conflict would again flare during the 2006 dry season migration, when some individuals might seek their own justice and others would try to get away with crimes that experience showed would go unpunished.

Information dissemination activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal were also said to have had important impacts on stability. Widely-hailed SSTI-funded information dissemination projects included

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<sup>18</sup> Funding for the 2003 Ngok Dinka meeting came out of a grant to BYDA to train water management committees since the local NGO selected to organize the event did not have the proper license to receive USAID funds. It is unclear why a separate grant was not made.

activities around two documents: the summary of the six CPA protocols discussed earlier and the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC) Report detailing the re-demarcated boundaries in this oil-rich area. The protocol dissemination, which reached thousands of people, was much wider than the ABC report dissemination, targeting 2,500 people. However South Sudanese continuously praised these activities as useful and important because they helped bring an understanding of complex political issues to the people.

During their stay in Bahr-el-Ghazal, the evaluation team had the opportunity to meet with a group of women to discuss the SSTI-supported income generation projects for women and a 2003 Bahr-el-Ghazal women's conference. The women expressed disappointment surrounding NGO project implementation and understanding of women's new roles in society, despite the visible interest the Sudanese have in including women at the fore of the peace process. While the 2003 women's conference was said to have been an important event, there was no follow-up to support the county-level women's associations that were formed to further women's involvement in peace discussions and build women's leadership capacity. Women were also disappointed that six months after completing income generation training courses, the promised support materials – sewing machines, grinding mills and restaurant equipment – had not been delivered. While these activities do not have an immediate impact upon security and stability in South Sudan, they feed into the overall process of leadership training. Moreover, since projects involve women who are said to be influential in communities, there were missed opportunities to build women's capacities and support their political and economic aspirations to ensure they have a voice in forthcoming development and peace activities. The women's center in Rumbek is a venue where such activities could take place, but this resource has been underutilized by PACT.

SPF, and to a limited extent SSTI, funded drinking water projects in Bahr-el-Ghazal. The water projects were said to be belated peace dividends to community requests that arose out of the Wunlit people-to-people peace conferences. The 52 SPF-funded boreholes drilled were praised widely by communities living near them, but it cannot be said that this limited number of drinking water points contributed to security in a significant way, since there is an estimated shortage of 9,000 boreholes in South Sudan.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the most significant conflict revolves around grazing areas and water points for animals, an issue not addressed by SPF and SSTI water activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

The evidence strongly suggests that overall, SSTI and SPF people-to-people interventions contributed to a reduction in violence between previously warring groups, especially in the Kidepo Valley. Interviewees repeatedly cited the people-to-people processes as the reasons for increased security. The most visible and significant indication statewide was the shift in cattle rustling from organized group raids supported by the community and elders to mostly small thefts carried out by younger "criminals." Reports pointed to a reduction in the size and number of cattle raids and people killed. "Raids have subsided because of PACT's work. It's an achievement," said a Member of Parliament from Eastern Equatoria. In Hyala where the population is principally Catholic and speaks one language, fighting and cattle raiding between

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<sup>19</sup> Adam Ashforth, Institute for Advanced Studies, e-mail to Stephanie Funk, USAID, January 14, 2006.

the Lotuho and Lopit clans have nevertheless undermined unity for years. The Hyala Payam Rapid Response Peace and Reconciliation Initiative (SSTI-1216) helped reduce tensions and, according to the Hyala Payam Administrator and Judge, “there has never been any fighting again.” While this may be an exaggeration, there is widespread agreement that the intervention increased security in the area.

The reduction in cattle rustling enhanced security overall, which, in turn, has led to increased travel within areas previously deemed unsafe, such as the main roads crossing east to west across the Middle Kidepo Valley. The former Commissioner for Kapoeta County attributed this to the Kidepo Valley Strategic Planning Workshop (SSTI-1008) which he said initiated local peace dialogue and increased interaction among the Kidepo Valley’s diverse population. PACT’s decision to build a compound in Kapoeta early in its operations also sent the message to residents and displaced people contemplating return that stability and development were coming to the area. The improved security conditions have led to increased trade, freedom of movement and inter-community communication (discussed further below). Perhaps the most prominent indicator of improved stability is the United Nations’ reclassification of Eastern Equatoria from a level 4 “no-go zone” to a more secure level 2/3 in 2004, permitting more international organizations to operate in the area.

The sustainability of the improved security conditions in Eastern Equatoria is somewhat difficult to assess since conflict resolutions in the past have been repeatedly violated, especially during the volatile dry season. Of the fifteen peacebuilding and rapid response projects visited, eight were conducted before the 2004 - 2005 dry season. The majority maintained a reduced or negligible level of violence over that period. Given that SPF and SSTI programs are relatively new to the region’s ongoing instability, their ability to continue to influence relationships positively in subsequent dry seasons is unknown.

### **Upper Nile**

The programs in the Upper Nile supported and strengthened both the CPA and South-South peace agreements through community-based activities responsive to the existing and emerging needs of various ethnic groups within the region. Programs commenced in December 2003, a year after the signing of the SPF Cooperative Agreement in September 2002 and six months after the signing of the OTI/SSTI contract in May 2003. The delay in launching activities was largely due to regional factors including its remoteness; its history of intense and violent conflict; fractured ethnic groups, political entities and armed militia; and the high cost of operating in the region.

The establishment of peace committees in Upper Nile was a major factor in contributing to a durable peace. Some, such as the Murle Peace Monitoring Team, were critical in early prevention, monitoring, information dissemination and rapid response to violations. The monitoring team involved government, church and community leaders in a participatory and collaborative approach. While capabilities varied between peace committees, they seemed to be prolific in the region and were in high demand where they did not exist. The extent of training for peace committee members varied, but appeared to be in progress due to repeated requests for peacebuilding skills. For example, while the evaluation team was in Pagak, six representatives living in Ethiopia were attending a peace committee training session in Sudan.

Another major undertaking in the region was the return of the Bor Dinka and their cattle from the Mundri area of Western Equatoria back to southern Upper Nile. The Bor-Mundri conflict was the focus of ten SSTI grants totaling nearly \$350,000. Several earlier initiatives had failed due to the lack of preparation, appropriate involvement and political undermining. Lessons learned resulted in a carefully orchestrated effort involving detailed discussions and meticulous negotiations at the highest levels of government and with receiving communities. The latest intervention included transportation support for vulnerable groups and the permission to drive the cattle directly through Juba,<sup>20</sup> which the evaluators witnessed in December 2005.

Of the 16 conflict situations observed – involving Anyuak, Gajaak, Gawaar, Murle and sections of the Bor Dinka and Nuer – one remained active, five had diminished violence and ten were stable. In summary, Upper Nile peace dialogues and conferences led to community-based and owned resolutions and addressed the root causes of tribal and politicized conflict. The activity that appeared to have had the most visible impact was “Promoting Peace and Culture Among Youth” (SSTI-1139; \$3,432) in Ayod where youth from neighboring communities and various ethnic groups came together for sports and training in peace dissemination methodologies. Five hundred youth joined the youth consolidation program in January 2005, and by November there were 2,220 members (a 344 percent increase in ten months), with 322 boys and young men playing volleyball and football. Where the communities once perceived the youth as potential peace spoilers, they now view them as critical peace agents.

### ***C. Improvement in Links among Communities, Civil Society Members, Customary Leadership and Authorities***

Another indicator for developing the foundations of lasting peace can be found in the links among communities, civil society members and the customary leadership and authorities. The evaluation team found that the activities undertaken did improve and strengthen the links among these social groups thereby contributing to the establishment of the foundations for peace. The links between the various actors that did not improve (but also did not worsen per se) was with youth, who are perceived as potential peace spoilers. The mobile courts were created to link the justice system closer to the citizens, but the reality of implementing this project did not bring this result.

### **Nuba Mountains**

Peace meetings in the Nuba Mountains not only contributed to positive change in security and stability but they also linked disparate communities, i.e. southerners and northerners, to enhance the establishment of enduring peace. Although the conference venues in former SPLM/A-controlled areas meant some Arabs were unable or uncomfortable participating, large numbers of participants attended. Also, the participants comprised various groups of people who would not normally have gotten together to discuss the region’s future. For example, participants at the All-Tribes Conference committed to the process of Nuba unification, as demonstrated by the

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<sup>20</sup> Remarkably, driving 1.5 million head of cattle (in stages lasting more than a week) through the city took place precisely during the signing of the constitution and the entry of 2,000 SPLA into Juba. Despite the tensions, no violence occurred.

dissolution of four Nuba political parties and the formation of a single United Sudan National Party.

SSTI-funded peace meetings in the Nuba Mountains resulted in some behavior change in community members and officials. The SPLM/A were involved in North-South peace negotiations that included the status of the Nuba Mountains. It was reported that after this conference, fewer Nuba accepted GoS-supplied arms to attack other Nuba people. The conference also set in motion a bottom-up process of conflict resolution and a mechanism for defining the aspirations of the Nuba, building on their culture of participatory governance. This was an important step in bringing together a society that has been fragmented by war and unable to debate their future openly. Participants also discussed conflict with the “Baggara,” agreeing that they were not the cause of the inter-ethnic conflict, rather the Baggara-Arabs were being used by the GoS. There were a number of resolutions and agreements on principles including the following: recognition that oppressive practices (such as female circumcision) should be eliminated; English rather than Arabic is the preferred language of instruction; and a democratic, unified and secular state, and a commitment to equal rights for women represent the aspirations of the Nuba people. The results were notable and provided a foundation for peace and future development work. As one participant reportedly said, “I turned 81 years old today, and if I were to die today, after what I have just witnessed, I won’t regret it.”

At the All-Tribes Conference, the GoS admitted its role in regional “divide and conquer” and accepted that the Nuba people have rights. The Baggara-Arabs admitted their role in attacking the area, and there was an acknowledgement of the need for tolerance and reconciliation. The conferees agreed to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and endorsed principles including the separation of state and religious institutions, the right to religious freedom and the need for conflict resolution mechanisms. The conference also produced governance plans, including revenue-raising for development. This conference produced extraordinary results given the bloody history between the two groups.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

In addition to creating increased stability and peace, SPF- and SSTI-funded projects in Bahr-el-Ghazal supported existing<sup>21</sup> linkages among stakeholders, such as community leaders and peace committee members, and provided fledgling organizations with funds to implement projects that by their nature brought them in contact with other stakeholders. For example, some peace committees had been dynamic actors in the peacebuilding process in Southern Sudan prior to the commencement of SPF and SSTI programs. For the past decade, members of the Abyei Peace Committee, formed in 1996 by the Dinka and Misseriya peoples, have been walking between forces at war and among GoS-backed militias attacking Ngok Dinka tribes. The SPF and SSTI-supported peace conferences broadened the participation and therefore the linkages because the international venues allowed GoS and SPLM/A officials to participate. Since community peace initiatives started prior to the commencement of the SPF and SSTI programs, it is difficult to

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<sup>21</sup> It is difficult for the evaluators to state whether the linkages were not only supported, but also improved. Some groups, like the peace committees, were established before the SPF and SSTI programs existed so the links were already there. However, it is unclear whether those links ameliorated over time or deteriorated; but the programs did support them.

attribute specific improvements in relations to specific SPF and SSTI projects, however, these USAID programs kept DMR talks going into 2004.

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, peace committee and community members came into contact with civil society organization members through training activities and peace conferences. In such cases, larger organizations such as BYDA and ACWA deepened relations with communities and peace committees, with many praising the work of BYDA in particular.<sup>22</sup> Some organizations were able to improve local relationships, while others were not, especially those that were new and still in the process of establishing their own identity. An interesting development in late 2005 was the appointment of many now former NGO and CSO officials to positions in the new Government of South Sudan (GoSS). While this reduces significantly the capacities of NGOs and CSOs, the GoSS has gained a cadre of educated individuals who understand how to work with local capacity and deal with the funding mechanisms offered by the international community.

While peace committee members reported dealing with local authorities and informing them of imminent conflict, they stated that resource-poor local administrations have been unable to follow through on the implementation of peace conference resolutions that were to provide justice to aggrieved citizens. Specifically, SSTI-supported mobile courts were to address weaknesses in judicial follow-through, though the court's inability to coordinate activities with the police and resolve cases led to disappointment in communities that are now uncertain where to turn for justice and the "peace" that they expected following the CPA signing.

The evaluation team heard the following statement several times in Bahr-el-Ghazal: "We have learned to look inside ourselves for the causes of conflict and not simply blame other parties." Peace conferences and peace committee member training led to this new understanding of conflict. Peace committee members trying to stem inter-Dinka violence spoke of using this insight to convince fellow community members not to retaliate against aggressors and to go first to local authorities and engage them in dispute resolution. This was apparently working in the Pankar Cluster, with local leaders and peace committee members reporting a measure of success in preventing retaliation; however, they cited that this was only a temporary measure. For more sustainable peace and security, communities reiterated that they need to change the thinking of youth and be able to rely upon justice meted out by local authorities.

While SPF and SSTI activities were not meant to support disarmament of young men, a need frequently cited that would have contributed to stability, activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal should have at least better targeted young men and encouraged them to participate in peace activities. Often cited was the fact that people bought their guns with cattle and they would not surrender these weapons for "nothing." Only one conference in Bahr-el-Ghazal targeted youth, a resolution and peacebuilding conference in Cueibet in July 2004 (SSTI-1037). The activity was important because six major battles had been fought just prior to the conference and local communities and authorities as well as peace council members wanted to change the behavior of the youth conducting raids and leading violent attacks. This one initiative, however, was not enough to change the violent youth culture, and communities complained in late 2005 that diverting youth from these activities was key to peace and security.

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<sup>22</sup> The evaluation team spent more time in areas where BYDA was operational.

SPF and SSTI funds were used to a limited extent to support the development of linkages between existing communities and IDPs/returnees, which a growing group in Bahr-el-Ghazal expected to impact regional security and stability. Since Ngok Dinka communities around Abyei report that some 85 percent of the population fled due to fighting, their return that has increased significantly following the 2005 signing of the CPA would pressure the area's limited resources. This was cited as a concern by communities, local authorities and CSOs. Three SPF projects, some eight percent of all resources spent in the Kiir Cluster under the two programs, addressed IDP return by conducting awareness-raising among recipient communities and local authorities and training for women in Aweil North to promote peaceful reintegration.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

The people-to-people peace conferences increased interaction among elements of society isolated by war at the same time that they were able to increase stability and security in the region. Horizontal linkages between Eastern Equatorian community members, different ethnic groups, authorities and local organizations improved during intensive negotiations and preparation for peace meetings. In many cases, the interaction developed into cross-group cultural activities, trade, education opportunities, political alliances, and traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, although the evaluators were unable to verify the length of time these efforts endured. Initiatives that opened up previously restricted access seemed to be particularly useful in re-establishing societal links.

For example, the 42-kilometer Napak-Riwoto road-clearing project, resulting from the Buya and Toposa Integrated Peace and Recovery Program (SSTI-1071), restored interaction between residents of Budi and Kapoeta counties. Two cross-border initiatives with Uganda, the SPF-funded Quick Response Cattle Rustling Prevention Project (SPF-1012) and the SSTI-funded Cross Border Peace Conference with Uganda (SSTI-1214) similarly re-established cross-border linkages. The former returned stolen cattle while the latter addressed common threats to peace and stability resulting from Lord's Resistance Army operations on both sides of the border. The outcome was improved security and road access which increased cross-border trade and created new relationships between market sellers. The same SPF Quick Response Cattle Rustling Initiative, however, was reportedly only partially successful in returning cattle and restoring relationships across the Ethiopian border.

Evidence suggests that horizontal linkages also grew through SPF and SSTI initiatives aimed at improving institutions and structures. The Eastern Equatoria Women Leadership Orientation Training (SSTI-1075) and the Kidepo Valley Women's Peace Campaigns (SSTI-1208), for instance, engaged isolated women's groups in institution building and networking. The Strengthening Customary Law (SSTI-1143) project was a unique effort to document customary laws among five sub-tribes of the Toposa, identify useful laws in each jurisdiction to incorporate into the formal legal system, and substantiate the roles of traditional chiefs and elders. This created bonds between members of different sub-tribes and resulted in the publication *The Toposa Customary Laws*. Additional projects that increased linkages included the following: the SSTI-funded Mapping and Survey of Kapoeta Town (SSTI-1074) and the Annual Stakeholder Planning (SSTI-1155) meetings that increased interaction between community leaders and civil authorities for joint reconstruction and development planning. Improved roads to Torit, the

capital of Eastern Equatoria, and Juba, the capital of South Sudan, increased opportunities for citizen communication with state and national representatives.

To a lesser extent, vertical linkages between local entities and state government also appear to have been strengthened. Government, civil society and community members interviewed reported an increase in communication. This interplay was strongest when the governor, commissioners and other high-level authorities participated in peacebuilding meetings and planning workshops. The Commissioner for Torit County (now Governor of Eastern Equatoria), for example, took part in the conflict mapping exercise and the Annual Stakeholder Planning for the Kidepo Valley (SSTI-1155). He ensured implementation of resolutions of county peacebuilding meetings by enforcing past ordinances banning weapons and engaging chiefs in legal processes. When civil authorities had a seat on peace committees, this vertical interaction also grew. Communication then grew to include county commissioners and other counties. A former Commissioner for Kapoeta County pointed to the growing yet informal government-citizen interaction stemming from the Annual Stakeholder Planning meeting. Many local governments are already discussing development plans across villages, he said. "Kapoeta people are part of this discussion for the first time and are demanding good governance."

A significant obstacle to further horizontal and vertical relationship building was the lack of communication mechanisms, such as radios, the Internet, roads and vehicle transportation. This clearly inhibited interaction between civil society members, ethnic groups and counties, which in turn reduced networking, infrastructure issues, and the ability to address violations. A grant (SSTI-1173) to install seven Internet centers in the diocese aimed to address this issue and support relief agency learning and coordination. The project did not appear to have a broad impact, however, due to a lack of access to the centers and a small number of local people with Internet skills. One CBO member complained about the cost of access. Installing CODAN radios in communities such as Ikotos and Hyala and along ethnic borders aims to increase inter-group communication. However, as was the case in Hyala, installing radios and their protective structures, a follow-up to the Inter-Lotuho Dialogue (SSTI-1072), was often slow and problematic. Thus, the inability to share information across groups and geographic locations remained acute and seemed to have a particularly negative impact on women, who were disproportionately limited by time and resources.

Although the size and duration of impact of SPF and SSTI interventions on reducing violent behavior is not consistent across interventions, none of the projects visited in Eastern Equatoria appeared to have *increased* violent behavior between communities. At a minimum, people-to-people initiatives offered opportunities to air grievances and renew interaction among estranged groups. In a number of cases, such as the SPF-funded Come Let Us Reconcile (SPF-1043), interventions helped change destructive patterns such as cattle raiding. Among the 15 people-to-people interventions reviewed in Eastern Equatoria, six had a significant positive impact on community interaction but did not entirely resolve the issues. Four interventions appeared to have permanently (to date) changed behavior between the parties, and no violations had yet occurred. In one, the Buya - Toposa Integrated Peace and Recovery Program (SSTI-1071), community interaction remained essentially unchanged. In the latter, the initial positive resolutions resulting from the meeting quickly disintegrated as spoilers resumed aggressive tactics, halting the road-clearing project after just six kilometers.

Several key SPLM/A officials in the region seemed particularly inspired by the potential of people-to-people processes and got personally involved. The now Secretary General for the President, for example, was the rapporteur for a Bor - Mundri cattle return conference in which the Deputy Governor of Equatoria was instrumental. Several government officials were motivated to take responsibility for ensuring violations of peacebuilding resolutions were addressed with legal action. The Governor of Eastern Equatoria, for instance, told Kidepo Valley participants at the Annual Stakeholder Planning meeting (SSTI-1155), “You do the software, I’ll do the hardware” by tracking culprits and bringing them to court for violations. Expectations across the region were high that authorities would increasingly apply the rule of law to support peace.

Another impact on social conduct was the re-introduction of the role of customary leaders (and laws) in resolving local conflict in much of Eastern Equatoria. Undermined during the war, their revival helped rebuild the missing elements of law and order, social norms and respect. In the Buya community, elders not only condemn cattle raids, but youth found stealing cattle are required to pay fines in the form of cows or risk being cursed, said the local CBO staff member.

Changing the behavior of youth, the perpetrators of most violence, was a desired result of many initiatives, though activities lacked direct focus to achieve this objective. Interviewees often cited the importance of redirecting youth away from violence and toward income generation. Few programs other than the SPF-funded Sports for Life (SPF-1083) project created alternatives to cattle rustling, however. Moreover, youth behavior varied. Youth in Lauro were partial to their role as community “security keepers” and therefore reluctant to change their attitudes, according to a local CBO administrator. In Hyala, however, youth were inspired by the people-to-people process and formed a Torit youth group that attempts to reach out to other youth. The Hyala peace committee is comprised entirely of youth.

On a broader scale, more subtle efforts on the part of community members to de-emphasize conflict seemed to be growing. The evaluators witnessed leaders from once warring tribes socializing at conferences and rival youth dancing and playing sports together. A CBO director said, “Everything is changing now. People are talking about water and service delivery, not about fighting.” That said, in Eastern Equatoria, spoilers who can undermine more positive behavior patterns still exist.

### **Upper Nile**

As a result of the peacebuilding activities in Upper Nile, people from a wide range of groups were brought together thus enhancing the foundations of peace in Sudan. Addressing internal Murle conflict issues (SPF-1013 in December 2003, SSTI-1067 in July 2004, and SPF-1072/SSTI-1207 in May 2005) was a priority in Upper Nile. It took 18 months to identify a suitable, credible interlocutor that all Murle communities would accept. Eventually a Sudanese candidate from Australia was found. The venue was also a point of contention that took considerable time to resolve. A rapid response activity in December 2004 (SSTI-1122) addressed ongoing conflicts between the Murle (from Pibor) and the Bor Dinka (from Bor Town). Tensions escalated in July 2005 due to increased cattle raiding and abductions. The underlying social tension is that the Dinka accuse the Murle of being less fertile than other ethnic groups and claim that this is the root cause of their need to abduct and sell children. The Murle are offended by the

accusation and attack the Dinka in retaliation. There were also rumors that GoS-backed militia in Murle areas and SPLA forces in Bor Dinka areas were involved in causing a breakdown in community confidence and trust. Another rapid response activity was required in October 2005 (SPF-1084/SSTI-1229). To date, peace is holding.

Mitigation of the Murle-Bor Dinka conflict was critical for the integration of the two former GoS-held garrison towns, Pibor and Bor Town. The roads through Gumuruk from the south and Anyidi from the east are major transit routes into Bor Town. An example of follow-on activities from the Murle peace dialogues was the formation of a Peace Monitoring Team (peace committee) comprising youth, elders, church leaders, women and chiefs. Peace is currently holding between the Murle and Bor Dinka, with marriages occurring again between the two. In Anyidi there is a Peace Center (built in April 2004) where people work together and the local NGOs, Development Association for Bor South (DABS) and Penykou Agency for Relief and Development (PARAD) are located. PARAD receives USAID Water for Recovery and Peace Program (WRAPP) funds to conduct water projects in the region. Through the provision of radios, communication that previously took six hours (walking time from Anyidi to Bor Town) is now instant and provides an early warning mechanism to mitigate conflict. The Peace Monitoring Team also communicates regularly with the commissioner and government officials. Women, initially excluded from the Peace Monitoring Team, now have 25 percent representation on advice from project staff.

A sense of stability due to the 2004 construction of permanent, concrete buildings in the Ayod regional office drew people home to their razed communities to rebuild and resettle. Communities perceived the decision to locate offices in the volatile area as an important stabilizing element. The Chief of Nyirol County said of the Ayod offices, "it shows commitment to this area." A White Army youth remarked, "The rehabilitation of this town (Ayod) is due to the projects (SPF and SSTI). I am a practical man and want to see change and progress. I see that things are getting better." No one had erected permanent structures since a hospital and school were built in 1952 and 1959 respectively, "so to see a donor making concrete buildings was a very significant sign of peace," said the Chief and Chairman of the Pagak Peace Committee. Many interviewees confirmed the significance of permanent structures and the need for the government to erect similar buildings. The advisor of Political Affairs was SPLM/A's advance officer ("the first cock to crow") in Bor Town in June 2005 to establish a government presence. His comment was, "As the government accepts more responsibility, people want to see visible and tangible peace dividends. We are the link to the people so we must also show that we are here to stay and that the government is one; peace is an accumulation of efforts."

WRAPP also provided visibility and a sense of progress and legitimacy. The establishment of Water Management Teams, and their training, ensured collaborative decisions on the location and use of water points in consultation with communities and government authorities. However, water management issues, particularly the comprehensive and extensive oversight of water management at the state level and between states, required greater attention.

Positive change that arose from peacebuilding in Upper Nile was highlighted through the comments of many people. Communities stated that chiefs, customary leaders, and peace committee members are legitimate agents of conflict resolution and people felt they owned the peace process. People also said they were moving more freely throughout the region and they

had begun interacting with communities they had avoided for years. Moreover, increased movement has augmented trade, especially since September 2005. The perception of some youth was changing as some had laid down their arms to play soccer and volleyball against their former enemies. A woman in Pibor said she felt as if she “had been in a borehole and was lifted out to see the light.”

Further evidence of peace can be found in the reduction in ethnic tensions and organized cattle raiding. The senior trader in Bor Town, an Arab, has a contract with the SPLM/A and is paid by the Government of South Sudan. The Anyak, Toposa, and Nuer have returned to Pibor. Murle and Bor Dinka children share a school while Toposa children study in a nearby Arabic school. Most importantly, all community members, youth, women, government officials and chiefs, are involved in the peace process.

#### ***D. General Observations and Findings***

Overall, the SPF and SSTI funded programs did contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace in Sudan as indicated by the changes in security and stability in the region as well as increases in the peaceful linkages between the disparate groups who have been in conflict for more than 20 years.

- Peace meetings are an important part of peace processes, though they need to be followed by long term efforts at establishing lasting stability, security and peace. SPF and SSTI people-to-people interventions contributed to a reduction in violence between warring groups, evinced by a reported reduction in the numbers of cattle raids and people killed. However, the entire south still lacks functioning police departments and judicial systems which communities see as vital to sustain peace.
- The encouragement and involvement of women in the peace activities is crucial, but was lacking in the SPF and SSTI programs despite women’s demands for greater roles.
- Because youth are seen as some of the main instigators of violence, more activities targeting behavior change in youth should have been implemented. A youth sports program in Upper Nile was successful in providing an alternative to anti-social behavior. However, a broader, more targeted strategy was lacking to prepare the groundwork for when more youth programs could be implemented.
- PACT’s limited field presence combined with a difficult environment, a lack of transport and attempts to work in multiple sectors led to an inability to adequately oversee the implementation of all 90 SPF and 250 SSTI projects and ensure follow-up. Thus high visibility peace meetings and rapid response activities received the most attention and were the most successfully implemented.
- The lack of communications infrastructure inhibited interaction between local authorities, communities and peace committees seeking to reduce conflict. PACT purchased radios and bicycles for peace committees, though these items were not delivered in a timely manner, thus hindering independent peace committee initiatives.

- There is a strong demand for information, especially regarding peace activities. SSTI newspaper projects responded only partially to that need. Information and protocol dissemination were more successful in bringing information to South Sudanese. The protocol dissemination especially was credited for garnering support for the CPA and broadening its acceptance South Sudan-wide. More information should be made available in Arabic, however, to reach women and northerners in the Nuba Mountains.

### **III. Question 2: Did SPF and SSTI-funded programs have appropriate participation?**

#### **A. Summary**

Participation in SPF and SSTI-funded programs that contributed to program impact included the participation of local communities and other stakeholders and the grantees. By defining participation in the broadest sense, the evaluation team was able to see how much of Sudanese society was actually engaged in the people-to-people process. As a result of this approach, the team has deduced that the programs included such a breadth of participation that much of Sudanese society was included or implicated in the programs.

The local communities, related stakeholders and grantees played different roles in the implementation of SPF and SSTI-funded programs. While PACT's relationship with its grantees and consortium partners was less than harmonious at times, PACT's ability to ensure the involvement of a range of stakeholders in peace activities, especially people-to-people peace meetings and dissemination of the CPA protocol summaries was its greatest strength. Communities stated that tribal chiefs, local – and sometimes national – officials, peace committees, religious leaders, women, youth, displaced people, local civil society organizations and communities were involved in peace-related meetings, conferences and training activities.

Although there is some evidence that there was weaker participation among some groups, notably youth, women and the disabled, no one ever stated that they were excluded from peace conferences. In fact, communities requested more of these activities, saying that meetings brought people together to discuss peace and reconciliation for past transgressions. More importantly, participants were led through a “soul-searching” process where people began to understand that conflict sometimes came from within - realizing they have the power to change their behavior.

Participation in peace activities was generally broad and inclusive, while participation in “peace dividend” projects and projects targeting specific groups – women, youth training and report dissemination – was narrower, as intended. For example, with infrastructure-related projects, communities in the immediate vicinity of a project were involved and impacted. Communities and implementing partners reported their involvement in the selection of borehole and construction sites and benefiting from the results. However, weaknesses in monitoring and follow-up by PACT and its partners were noted with several projects. Projects targeting women and youth also addressed a narrow range of participants, and while some activities were well implemented, problems with follow-up were reported.

## **B. Local Communities and Stakeholders**

### **Nuba Mountains**

There was a high-level of participation of the local communities and stakeholders, which was the intended outcome of the activities implemented in this region, including the conferences and the mapping project.

The conferences in the Nuba Mountains were well-attended. For example the 2005 Nuba-Baggara conference had 700 participants, and included traditional leaders from SPLM/A and GoS-controlled areas, civil authorities, representatives from the IDP and Diaspora communities, civil society groups, religious leaders, women and youth.<sup>23</sup> People from all educational levels and ages participated in conferences, however some shortcomings were noted. Only half of the Arab-Baggara tribes attended the 2005 conference, and while women's participation had climbed to 22 percent of participants at the 2005 All-Nuba Conference, women were not in chair or organizing positions.

However, language became a barrier to participation in the Nuba Mountains. While about 90 percent of residents are Arabic speakers, conference resolutions endorsed English as the preferred language. People also noted that this places women at a disadvantage since most educated women speak and read only Arabic. To join the GoSS, however, women needed to learn English quickly. This finding was further verified by an OTI consultant who reported, that "all women interviewed requested English training."

While language was a barrier to participation, the involvement of local authorities in SPF and SSTI funded projects in the Nuba Mountains encouraged participation. A county health coordinator reported that he had attended a strategic planning workshop that he believed had been sponsored by PACT. At the workshop, he had learned how to write a strategic plan and develop a supporting budget. He suggested that he and his colleagues need follow-up training that improves their administration, planning and economic and social development skills.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, there was broad participation in peace and emergency response meetings organized in the Kiir and Pankar Clusters. Information dissemination activities also had wide outreach, with summaries of the six protocols reaching many remote areas, though the controversial Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) Report has had limited distribution to-date. Other activities, including the writing of a development roadmap and borehole drilling, involved a limited range of stakeholders. The international community also co-funded peace meetings, thus raising the participation in and stakes of these events.<sup>24</sup>

PACT assembled the "right" actors in Bahr-el-Ghazal for peace meetings, and there was evidence of productive partnerships between peace committees and local authorities. However,

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<sup>23</sup> The First All-Nuba Conference Report provides a breakdown of the participants.

<sup>24</sup> The United Nations, the New Sudan Council of Churches and donors such as the Canadian International Development Agency, the UK Department for International Development and USAID contributed.

the role of religious leaders in Bahr-el-Ghazal was sometimes unclear since their participation was mentioned in project documentation, though communities seldom spontaneously mentioned the activities of religious leaders, unlike their discussions of the participation of peace committee members and women.

Like the Pankar Cluster, peace meetings in the Kiir Cluster involved tribal chiefs, peace committees and Sudanese organizations. However, the peace dialogue between Dinka and Arab (Misseriya and Rezigat) communities meant that where possible the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLM/A were important participants. In addition, Dinka women participated in conferences, though the participation of Arab women was minimal because PACT did not actively reach out to them.

In terms of peace actors, peace committee members often were cited as the most influential and active peace actors inside and outside peace meetings. They conducted behind-the-scenes discussions, went to “the other side” of a conflict and invited communities to participate in meetings. Local authorities and senior political leaders also were involved in peace meetings, though securing the participation of the latter often required considerable effort and skill on the part of organizers. In at least one instance, when conflict raged out of control, Chairman John Garang<sup>25</sup> and then Vice-Chairman Salva Kiir Mayardit participated in a May 2004 emergency meeting (SPF-1020) in Rumbek with other high-ranking SPLM/A officials. The chiefs reported that the Vice-Chairman convened the meeting, challenged communities to stop killing each other and reminded them that peace dividends in the form of development activities would be impossible if the area were insecure. While the involvement of these officials raised the importance of the meetings to a higher level, the officials were often several days late due to busy schedules and transportation difficulties.

Under SPF and SSTI, women participated in conferences and trainings targeting women; however, there were complaints regarding follow-up to these activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Following the 2003 Bahr-el-Ghazal women’s conference (SSTI-1010), lauded for bringing together a wide range of women, women requested additional training but did not receive any concrete offers for follow-up.

As mentioned in a previous section, youth, cited as the instigators of conflict, were not involved as significantly as they should have been in peace conferences in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Tribal chiefs reported that they spoke with youth *following* peace conferences, but few mentioned that they spoke to youth *during* peace conferences. While youth were the target of a July 2004 peace conference (SSTI-1037) to review progress in resolving several conflicts and facilitate their understanding of peace initiatives, there were no other activities in Bahr-el-Ghazal directed specifically at youth and attractive enough to get them to lay down their guns.

With respect to information dissemination, more could have been done to increase the scope of recipients of the information. Members of civil society organizations, women’s and youth

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<sup>25</sup> PACT reported to the evaluation team that both John Garang and Salva Kiir attended this meeting, although The Pankar Peace Council’s Peace Initiative In the Lakes and Mvolo Sub-Region: Rapid Response May-July 2004 Consolidated Report, mentions only the participation of the Vice Chairman.

groups and local Abyei “officials”<sup>26</sup> did find SSTI-funded dissemination of the Abyei Boundaries Commission Report valuable. However, they also found that the activity should have had a wider outreach than the 2,500 people targeted to have a significant impact. A further concern raised with dissemination activities in general revolved around language since the two main written languages in South Sudan are English and Arabic. The report was made available in both languages; however, most reports are available only in English.

Writing the Abyei Area Development Roadmap was a lengthy and complex process that succeeded because of the broad participation of and input from intellectuals, primarily Sudanese, local and international NGOs, the SPLM/A, the Government of Sudan and UNDP. The resulting roadmap advocates in support of programs for Abyei-area returnees, good governance and development and makes note of the fact that Abyei County is to receive two percent of revenues from oil pumped from the area. It is unclear if local communities were consulted in the preparation of this document; however, the needs identified are similar to those mentioned when the evaluation team met with local communities.

Provision of drinking water involved a range of actors. Once PACT had determined the areas where 52 SPF-funded boreholes would be placed, NGOs mobilized communities and worked with them to determine sites that would be convenient for water users. Community members formed water management committees that received training in borehole maintenance and conflict reduction. Since communities complained about the lack of drinking water, but not the locations of boreholes, it seemed that the committees had made decisions acceptable to most people. The fact that women were on these committees may have contributed to this factor since women were said to be equitable when allocating scarce food and water resources.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

In Eastern Equatoria, the social breadth of participation, particularly in the people-to-people conferences, was clearly extensive. In nearly every peacebuilding meeting reviewed, multiple stakeholders were invited and given ample opportunity to speak. These included youth, traditional authorities, women, intellectuals, public officials, SPLM/A authorities, religious leaders, elders, ethnic and sub-ethnic groups and those directly involved in the conflict such as cattle rustlers, farmers and child abductors. No one individual or group interviewed claimed to have been left out of SPF or SSTI-funded people-to-people meetings or know others who were. However, those who may have been underrepresented were the disabled, political party representatives, and representatives of the GoS.

PACT and its implementing partners consulted with a wide spectrum of stakeholders in setting peace meeting agendas and selecting meeting facilitators. An example was the preparation leading up to the Inter-Lotuho Dialogue (SSTI-1072) held among members of the Lotuho tribe who had been estranged for over five years. PACT and its implementing partner, the Father Saturino Ohure Foundation, engaged critical actors in a highly participatory design process that resulted in a successful and enduring reduction in violence.

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<sup>26</sup> The term “official” is used loosely since Abyei’s local administration has not been formalized and the area is administered directly by the Presidency of Sudan. The “officials” who met with the evaluation team were unsure of their position in the soon-to-be-appointed, they hoped, administration.

In Eastern Equatoria, the sustainability of peace agreements reached at regional peacebuilding meetings depended upon the participation of key individuals as identified by communities. The visible support of leaders with substantial moral authority was strategic to giving agreements legitimacy and ensuring success. Meetings that did not include these stakeholders did not have the same credibility or moral backing and were at a greater risk of failure. The larger the visibility, level of discussion, size and geographic focus of the conference, the higher the level of stakeholders involved. By extension, mapping and planning sessions also gained greater legitimacy when attended by leaders.

Women's participation in peacebuilding meetings seemed to serve as a catalyst for broader women's involvement in peace activities. The 25 percent of seats allocated for women in the new government further encouraged participation in local initiatives. Nevertheless, women's leadership was noticeably lacking in interventions not specifically focused on women.

Rapid response interventions seemed to involve a somewhat narrower spectrum of participants, typically engaging local authorities, peace committees, CBOs, and at times the SPLM/A. Other types of projects appeared to have a smattering of participation but the outreach to women and other traditionally isolated members of society was generally less than in the people-to-people meetings.

### **Upper Nile**

The people-to-people peace process that builds upon traditional meeting forums and processes for accountability enabled inclusiveness at all levels of society: civil authorities, peace committees, chiefs, customary leaders, faith-based groups, local NGOs/CBOs, women's groups, youth, SPLM/A and the White Army. It was a mutually agreed mechanism for reconciliation, unity, and cooperation, ending decades of mistrust, broken relationships and lack of confidence between conflicting communities. It led to increasingly extensive cross-line and cross-border participation of multiple ethnic and sub-ethnic groups. Moreover, it also re-united families, some whom had not seen each other since 1983.

As in the rest of South Sudan, the legitimacy of the people-to-people process depended upon the interlocutors and key individuals who participated in meetings. Evidence of the capacity in Upper Nile to attract suitable, neutral and respected facilitators was a networking capability to secure the participation of Sudanese living in Kenya and Australia. The choice of venue and a mutually agreed agenda also required a long process of engagement and review among a large group of stakeholders. Due to the credibility of the process, communities now hold themselves and the government accountable for the implementation of resolutions and the violators accountable for their transgressions. However, roles and responsibilities for the implementation of resolutions were often confused. The evaluation team recognizes that while it was beyond the scope of PACT's work to monitor the implementation of the resolutions, some people felt "slighted." Because of this, it was the communities that appointed local judges to affect law and order, in accordance with customary laws, that were more effective in mitigating violations to the resolutions.

The focus of activities in Upper Nile was in SPLM-controlled areas and garrison towns with a GoS and SPLM presence. Participation, therefore, included multiple political perspectives (both

north and south). In addition, there was a notable village/city division, particularly among the youth. "Village youth have guns, town youth have pens," said one city youth in Ayod who became involved in the sports program because he "didn't want the government to use him as a tool for war." SPF/SSTI activities were not yet directly addressing the village/city divide, although the youth themselves had been progressively addressing it through sports activities and information dissemination (spearheaded by the more educated youth in Ayod).

Communities generally used collaborative approaches when community members reported violations to peace committees, local authorities, chiefs and, less frequently, the SPLA. Peace committee members assembled key personnel, including the government *payam* (district) administrator, the commissioner or governor to travel to the conflict site and address the situation. The lack of communication and transport hampered quick responses and often diverted peace agents to a prioritized conflict if more than one outbreak had occurred. Neighboring cross-community peace committees, particularly in Pibor County, interacted regularly to mitigate violations and exchange information.

An extensive effort was made to include the White Army in all peace dialogues, sports activities, cultural events, information dissemination and training. While the evaluation team was in the region, leaders of the White Army were attending an SSTI-funded 7-day peacebuilding workshop in Puktap. The remaining members of the White Army were disappointed they could not attend the meeting and were awaiting the training's outcome and messages. Training had been provided to CBOs in Upper Nile, and assistance with the formulation of their constitution and registration, but they were not yet networking among themselves.

Meetings and projects that garnered the greatest participation surrounded issues of cattle raiding, land management, water management and the use of migration/transit routes. For example, the return of the displaced Bor Dinka and their cattle involved multi-faceted participation and dialogue over a long period of time and between the SPLM leadership, ethnic group leaders (Moro, Dinka and Mundari), military authorities and the international community. It also includes the establishment of a Joint Integration Return and Rehabilitation Support Team (JIRRST).

### ***C. Participation of Grantees***

PACT's role in SPF and SSTI-funded programs was to choose among project proposals from grantees and oversee project implementation according to program objectives and USAID priorities. Many of the grantees, however, were recently-created, post-2002 non-governmental organizations based in Kenya and Uganda. Most leaders were young men who had grown up in the Sudanese Diaspora. With the exception of organizations targeting women, few women were employed by or in leadership positions in these organizations. Primarily PACT partners were peace committees and councils and a handful of community groups.

According to the SPF consortium partnership MoU, PACT determined and coordinated activities with consortium members. However, this coordinating mechanism was weak, and PACT was accused of "dictating" roles to consortium and Sudanese partners for program activities. In part, this was due to the high number of grantees and small project budgets PACT had to oversee, though this was a situation of its own creation.

PACT was also responsible for ensuring that local authorities, notably the SPLM/A were onboard with SPF and SSTI peace initiatives. There were reportedly some weaknesses in this relationship which resulted in criticism, fair and unfair, of PACT's work by senior SPLM/A authorities. This critique about the lack of information dissemination about SPF and SSTI activities had merit, though other comments seemed to reflect jealousy that USAID "peace funds" in general had not been handed directly to SPLM/A officials. This disconnect between PACT and the SPLM/A caused delays in project implementation because of SPLM/A objections.

Another important task for PACT was sharing program information in Nairobi with other aid organizations working in South Sudan, USAID-supported media organizations for South Sudan and the international community via a Web site. In Nairobi, interviewees stated that information was not readily shared, even when requested. The media in particular wanted to highlight the eminently newsworthy peace conferences that generated a lot of interest among Sudanese and the international community. The evaluators tried to understand why PACT had not shared information that would have reflected positively upon its activities. PACT management admitted that early on, it had not sufficiently valued the importance of information sharing. PACT claims that it is now trying to be more active in coordination groups and information sharing. The PACT Sudan Web site has also been updated recently, though in early 2006 some of the information was nearly a year out-of-date.

### **Nuba Mountains**

The Nuba Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Organization (NRRDO) received 66 percent of funding, mostly from SSTI, designated for activities in the Nuba Mountains. The most significant NRRDO activities included the organization of the Nuba-Baggara and the Second All-Nuba conferences, CPA protocol dissemination and parliamentarian training. The Peace and Culture Center and New Horizons Magazine, discussed under question one, were less successful initiatives. Several other NGOs were reported to be involved in peace work<sup>27</sup> in the area; however, PACT has not forged alliances with these groups.

Communities in the Nuba Mountains reported that PACT's approach in the area was participatory and "bottom-up" with regard to the communities. This was well summarized by a County Health Officer who said, "They are not just giving their plan, but are getting the needs from the community." This approach is particularly relevant in the Nuba Mountains as it was reported that the area's cultural traditions were more participatory than those of other Sudanese ethnic groups. In addition, the exclusion and persecution of the Nuba people has created the desire for citizens of the area to express their views and become part of a new culture of democracy.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

PACT relied upon Sudanese and international CSOs and NGOs and peace councils to implement SPF and SSTI-funded programs in Bahr-el-Ghazal. While not specifically indicated in the scopes

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<sup>27</sup> For example, the International Rescue Committee is working with youth on peace initiatives and World Vision is promoting human rights training.

of work for the SPF and SSTI programs, project implementation and outcomes depended upon the implementing organization's capacity, PACT's level of expertise in an activity, and the project's distance from PACT's Rumbek field office.

For peace meetings, PACT provided logistical support, including transport and in-kind grants of commodities, to Sudanese organizations. Organizations initially accepted their lack of control under this type of arrangement, assuming they would gain responsibility over time. Small organizations in Bahr-el-Ghazal said this did not happen and they were not allowed to build their capacity (discussed in more detail under question three). PACT also seemed unwilling to hand over control of some activities, saying that Sudanese organizations were not able to handle the complexities of procurement.<sup>28</sup>

While the smaller NGOs struggled, two larger NGOs, BYDA and ACWA, received SPF and SSTI funds to build their capacity, host general assembly meetings and discuss their organizational missions. While these were two of PACT's most significant implementing partners in Bahr-el-Ghazal and their work was praised, it was unclear why no broader training program for all local implementing partners was conducted. Funding of some \$8,500 was provided to the Pankar Peace Council to develop a first quarter plan; however, other capacity building funds went *through* NGOs, such as ACWO and ACAD, to train women and local administrators, but not *to* these NGOs to build their capacity.

The Wunlit and Pankar Peace Councils were implementing partners comprising community members, although their project roles varied. Projects listing the Wunlit Peace Council as the implementer really involved just the distribution of sewing machines, grinding mills and restaurant equipment to women who participated in income generation training. By contrast, the Pankar Peace Council received equipment for rapid response activities and a chiefs' follow-up meeting.

Organizations working with SPF-funded water activities – ACWA, BYDA, Catholic Relief Services, International Aid Sweden and World Vision – were capable of conducting community mobilization and training; however, the drilling equipment and expertise of the international NGOs was questioned. PACT seemed unable to adequately supervise borehole drilling and maintenance, and some 25 percent of water points visited were out of order. PACT blamed the NGOs for the non-working boreholes, though there seemed to be a lack of supervision from PACT for these activities and no follow-up from anyone within the communities as to why these boreholes had stopped functioning.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

PACT's primary interlocutors in Eastern Equatoria were peace committees and CBOs/NGOs. Primary partners included the Association for Community Participation and Development, Community Relief and Development Foundation, Community Rehabilitation and Development Association, the Diocese of Torit, Fr. Saturnino Ohure Foundation, Galchalo, the Losolia Rehabilitation and Development Association, Manna Sudan and the Toposa Development

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<sup>28</sup> Until recently, the availability of goods in South Sudan has been extremely limited. Items have been purchased in Kenya and transported to Sudan at a high cost. Goods are now becoming available in the local market, however.

Association. Similar to other regions in South Sudan, women played minor roles, if any in organizations not specifically focused on women's issues.<sup>29</sup>

While the substantial SPF/SSTI support for capacity building is addressed under question three below, its relevance here is that as CBO/NGO capacity grew, so did several implementing partners' roles in the design and implementation of projects. Manna Sudan and the Toposa Development Association, for example, increasingly proposed innovative projects and implemented initiatives with greater independence, including some local procurement.

PACT's mentoring of its CBO partners, especially early on, sometimes blurred the line between the grantee and PACT on project ownership and accountability as PACT occasionally took over the implementing role from its partner. Often PACT felt partners did not have the skills to implement sensitive projects and/or the prerogative to avoid exploitation by stakeholders in project design and implementation. At other times, PACT seemed reluctant to relinquish authority and therefore micromanaged its partners. The Eastern Equatoria Women Leadership Orientation Training (SSTI-1075) in which the local partner was relegated to logistics provides one example. One senior PACT staff member admitted there was sometimes a lack of trust in a CBO's capacity to carry out people-to-people processes in the delicate, conflict-ridden environment. PACT was gun shy after it had handed over too much authority to its implementing partner in the first SPF-funded grant, the Kidepo Valley Strategic Plan Workshop (SPF-1008). The partner's lack of experience in the new program resulted in delays and confusion due to inadequate preparation and the pressure to implement rapidly. From this early experience, PACT recognized the need for partner development. Developing the right relationship and devolving responsibility as the CBO's capacity grew remained a challenge.

Peace committees were the other major participant in peace interventions. They arose throughout the state as an outcome of peace conferences and were in high demand where they did not exist. Where they were most effective and had received the most training, they helped to maintain peace and link conflicting communities. In Lauro and other places where both capacity and effectiveness were high, they received and acted on early warnings by enjoining traditional leaders, SPLM/A officials, CBOs and PACT staff and their counterpart peace committee to address the warring parties collectively. Other peace committees, particularly those that had received limited training and attention, were less effective, skilled and/or willing to engage proactively.

Repeatedly, interviewees blamed PACT for not following up on conference resolutions. Because PACT was seen as funding the conferences, many perceived it as responsible for carrying out conference resolutions. PACT may have perpetuated that belief itself. A minority of others, however, took a broader view and advocated for greater local ownership over problem solving. At the recent SPF-funded Kamulac Peace and Reconciliation among Ketebo and Didinga meeting (SPF-1082), for example, participants spoke of engaging the government, the SPLA, traditional leaders, peace committees, CBOs *and* international organizations in pursuing the next steps. Nevertheless, the expectations levied on PACT and its two interlocutors — CBOs and

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<sup>29</sup> Presumably to address this under-representation, SSTI supported the only women's NGO in Eastern Equatoria, Concerned Women Action for Peace, to mainstream women's participation in peacebuilding through the Kidepo Valley Women's Peace Campaigns (SSTI-1208).

peace committees – were tremendous and rarely met. This caused disappointment at the least and possibly undermined the impact of some peacebuilding meetings.

### **Upper Nile**

In Upper Nile there have been an emerging number of local, but predominantly Nairobi-based, NGOs/CBOs, established since 2002. The CBOs with the most capacity were in Ayod within the Central Cluster. Ayod, a hotly contested settlement with the political control changing regularly, is the interconnection to many neighboring towns and feeder roads. The PACT regional office in Ayod, established in September 2004, was fully functional in May 2005. The CBOs conducting the majority of activities in the Central Cluster include the following:

- Sudan Women in Development and Peace (SWIDAP): assisted in a rapid response with the Gawaar Peace Committee (SPF-1042); provided legal aid training (SSTI-1123); conducted peace education training (SPF-1039); rehabilitated boreholes (WRP-1015); conducted a women’s conference (SSTI-1099); disseminated peace protocols (SSTI-1110); and constructed feeder roads around Ayod (SPF-1036);
- Sudan Youth Consolidation Program (SYCP): conducted sports and peace education for youth (SSTI-1139) and disseminated peace protocols (SSTI-1115);
- Kush Relief and Development Agency (KRADA): constructed a Community Peace Centre (SSTI-1230) to be completed in January 2006 and received a future grant to strengthen local trading partners.

In the Pibor Cluster, the predominant CBO was the Development Association of Bor South (DABS) that operated from Bor Town. DABS conducted peace dialogues (SPF-1035 and SSTI-1122) and rapid responses (SPF-1084 and SSTI-1229) for the mitigation of Murle and Bor Dinka conflicts.

### ***D. General Observations and Findings***

In general, the SPF and SSTI programs benefited from the participation of appropriate actors and stakeholders. While the grantees with which PACT worked could have profited from more capacity building activities to enhance their performance capabilities, PACT was able to bring together disparate groups of people to progress towards the establishment of lasting peace in Sudan, which is supported by the following observations and findings.

- PACT assembled the “right” actors for SPF and SSTI-funded peace meetings and participation was generally broad, inclusive and appropriate, with traditional leaders, peace committees, local authorities, NGOs, and community members in attendance. Communities stated that the participation of Arabs, women and youth – peace spoilers - should have been enhanced, however, to gain fuller buy-in to the process.
- PACT’s failure to recognize the contributions of its SPF consortium partners to peace activities prior to and over the course of the SPF program contributed to strained relations with these important partners.

- PACT had too many recently-formed implementing partners to track and manage efficiently while one-time grant recipients built little capacity over the course of their programming engagement. PACT was reluctant to handover responsibility to partners, claiming they did not have sufficient capacity, though this was in part due to PACT's lack of strategic vision to limit the number of partnerships and to train its partners to assume greater responsibilities. This also meant that better-trained Kenyans were hired for some positions, particularly training, thus cutting Sudanese out of the process.
- PACT's significant involvement in peace meetings led some communities to feel that PACT was responsible for follow-up to conference resolutions. PACT's role was not well-understood by some communities, with Upper Nile perhaps an exception. This confusion remains, with some communities not taking ownership of conference resolutions.
- High-level SPLM/A participation in peace meetings was significant when it occurred. However, the participation of high-level leadership did not result in higher levels of enforcement of conference resolutions. These were still left to local authorities and communities to implement, though weak judicial systems meant criminal cases went unresolved.
- Under SPF- and SSTI-supported peace meetings and through training, peace committee members became known and respected peace actors in their communities who willingly took risks to minimize conflict.
- Though women were on peace and water management committees, a broad strategy to support women to become decision makers and increase their participation in activities with CSOs/NGOs was lacking. This was highlighted several times since it has been difficult to find educated women to fill the 25 percent of government seats allocated to them in the new GoSS.
- PACT's strength in SPF and SSTI activities was its ability to manage program resources and oversee on-the-ground implementation. PACT's management successes and failures often boiled down to its physical distance from an activity. PACT's three field offices were important but insufficient for PACT to carry out a thorough monitoring and oversight role. In remote areas such as the Nuba Mountains and northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, for example, PACT had to rely almost exclusively on local Sudanese partners for logistical support.
- "Participation" in SPF and SSTI projects could have been broadened to include Sudanese interested in hearing about peace activities throughout the South, but PACT failed to respond to media requests for information, particularly from the Sudan Radio Service and the Sudan Mirror.

#### **IV. Question 3. Were SPF and SSTI-funded programs relevant to the changing context?**

##### **A. Summary**

Generally, the SPF and SSTI programs responded to the changing conditions in Sudan and prospects for peace by trying to broaden peace initiatives and provide peace dividends. This was

accomplished in terms of implementing targeted, on-the-ground projects addressing specific national political developments, outbreaks/potential outbreaks of local conflict and the growing capacity of local organizations to implement programs.

The SPF was conceived in mid-2002 as the result of a change in context – a measure of peace in South Sudan – following the Wunlit peace meetings of 1999 and 2002 between Dinka and Nuer communities and a January 2002 peace agreement brokered in the Nuba Mountains between the SPLM/A and the Government of Sudan. Following these steps toward peace, USAID proposed to support people-to-people reconciliation processes and deliver peace dividends quickly in South Sudan through the SPF,<sup>30</sup> awarded to PACT. Shortly thereafter, in early 2003, OTI awarded PACT the SSTI small grant program to support peace activities and peace dividends.

As South Sudanese began making peace with each other and the GoS ceased support for Arab militias in the Nuba Mountains, the GoS and SPLM/A started down the road toward a formal peace agreement. Starting in Machakos, Kenya in July 2002, the two parties signed the Machakos Protocol which outlined the steps necessary for a peace agreement. Five more protocols addressing power and wealth sharing and peace were signed throughout 2003 and 2004, leading to the main Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of January 2005.

With respect to changing conditions in South Sudan and USAID's interest in supporting a peaceful transition on the ground, SSTI projects were more directly related to political milestones than SPF projects. The most significant SSTI-projects in this category supported broad dissemination of the six protocols, dissemination of the Abyei Boundaries Commission Report, rapid response mechanisms throughout the south, and Dinka-Misseriya-Rezigat (DMR) talks held in South Sudan and neighboring countries. SPF projects supported the construction of 52 boreholes, rapid response activities and DMR-related conferences in the Kiir Cluster. Both programs were weak in supporting the growing capacity building needs of local organizations.

## ***B. North-South Peace Discussions***

### **Nuba Mountains**

Major activities in the Nuba Mountains reflected overall North-South peace discussions between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A. The First All Nuba Conference was held in December 2002, in the same year as the North-South truce and at the beginning of the SPF program. The conference brought together the Nuba people who had been divided by the war, some of whom had allied themselves with the Arab north against other Nubans, and laid out a common platform for all. A second conference did not take place until 2005, possibly in part because PACT did not appoint a regional officer for the area until April 2004. The second conference followed the January 2005 signing of the CPA. As a result, participants could discuss the implications of the CPA signing: the expected return of Nuban IDPs from northern Sudan, Nuban participation in the parliament of Southern Kordofan state, the drafting of the state constitution and the necessity of holding Nuba-Baggara discussions.

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<sup>30</sup> The SPF followed on USAID's Sudan Transitional Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) Program that supported democracy and governance programs in opposition-held areas of South Sudan.

While the CPA did not satisfy the Nuba expectation that “peace means return of their land,”<sup>31</sup> the accords did establish a Land Commission to arbitrate land disputes and USAID support for this activity was important. The establishment of boundaries provides a basis for appeals to the Land Commission and helps communities negotiate conditions with potential investors. SSTI funding to the Policy Advisory Committee contributed to this \$850,000 USDA initiative.

Conferences also facilitated the discussion of IDP return, an issue that has increased in importance since 2002 as a high number of IDPs has returned to the area. Nubans also claim, however, that for political reasons, the GoS is hindering the return of some IDPs to the Nuba Mountains since Nubans provide cheap labor in the north and their return would complicate delicate land issues. Informants stated that improved social services would facilitate the return of their kinsmen from the north; however, few such projects were undertaken in the Nuba Mountains.

On the political front, NRRDO, PACT’s main implementing partner in the Nuba Mountains, received grants to train Nuba Parliamentarians from GoS and GoSS-controlled areas and conduct a Nuba-Baggara conference in 2005. These projects seemed directly relevant to ongoing, senior-level peace talks and brought local people into the discussions.

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

SPF and SSTI activities in the Kiir Cluster also mirrored national North-South peace initiatives between the GoS and SPLM/A. Starting in 2003 (SSTI) and then in 2004 (SPF), funds were used to organize a series of peace conferences in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Addis Ababa and Nairobi to address Dinka-Misseriya-Rezigat conflict. At the same time, GoS-SPLM/A talks were on-going in Naivasha as the two sides tried to negotiate an end to the country’s long civil war. The ability to bring parties to the table using SPF and SSTI funding to discuss DMR conflict was in part made possible by the high-level political meetings. Commitment to and interest in supporting DMR peace meetings by USAID and PACT staff also contributed to making these events happen.

When DMR meetings stalled in April 2004 due to the inability of the High Committee to reach agreement on a venue for a grassroots DMR conference in south Sudan, no additional funding was granted to restart these talks. The signing of the May 2004 Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict could have served as a jumping off point for additional DMR peace initiatives in support of the national CPA. While the SPF and SSTI are not responsible for the inability of the High Committee to reach agreement on steps to further DMR dialogue, the intensive SPF and SSTI-funded peace dialogue seems to have lost momentum.

Dissemination of the ABC Boundaries Commission Report was a timely activity that brought controversial information to impacted people. The report details the demarcation of Abyei’s boundaries following the 2004 signing of the Abyei protocol. Some Dinka and Misseriya community leaders participated in providing sworn testimony and background information for the report; however, understanding the ABC Commission’s final document, the boundaries determined and the possible impacts upon communities was and remains extremely important. In September 2005, therefore, following the mid-2005 completion of the report, SSTI funding was

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<sup>31</sup> USDA Land Advisor, Caroline Gullick, interview November 22, 2005.

tapped to begin dissemination activities targeting Sudanese civil society actors, members of the South Sudan assembly and a limited number of community groups. Dissemination to date, however, has targeted just 2,500 people, a handful of all those impacted by re-demarcation of Abyei's boundaries.

The signing of the Abyei protocol led to an initiative from Abyei intellectuals to develop an "Abyei Area Development Roadmap." The roadmap outlines the area's development needs that can be supported with newly-available donor funds as well as the expected two percent of oil revenues that is supposed to accrue to Abyei. Supporting the writing of this document was reported to be an important strategic choice beneficial to the Abyei area as it attempts to rebuild in light of its position in the North-South debate.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

A significant number of South Sudanese went to Naivasha to witness or participate in the North-South peace talks. This meant that throughout much of 2004 virtually all high-level officials as well as many SPLM supporters and minor dignitaries were absent from Eastern Equatoria. This made it difficult at times to obtain relevant participation in peacebuilding meetings and official approval for some activities. The absence of these authorities affected PACT and its implementing partners.

Despite the prospects for peace and development in South Sudan, a number of key Equatorian officials in the new government cautioned awareness of the potential for factionalization along personality lines and underlying ethnic divisions. The continued existence of spoilers - such as the Lord's Resistance Army based in Uganda and the Equatoria Defense Force in Eastern Equatoria - and the enormous tasks ahead in forming an accountable government require continued vigilance and strong peacebuilding capacity to ensure the transition is not undermined by violence. "There is peace in the air," said one Eastern Equatoria Minister of Parliament, "but it is not yet grounded."

The demand for legal structures to support peacebuilding resolutions and address violations was pervasive throughout Eastern Equatoria. Conference resolutions increasingly included roles for police and judicial structures to ensure violations were pursued. This capacity at the time of the evaluation was almost non-existent, but expectations were high. In fact, there appeared to be dangerous assumptions that police and judicial structures supported by state and county budgets would appear upon the signing of the new national constitution. Thus the euphoria accompanying the Naivasha talks and the long-awaited return to rule of law and judicious self-governance must be tempered to avoid creating unrealistic expectations that can undermine gains made thus far. The Strengthening Customary Law Project (SSTI-1143) aimed to revive traditional practices to provide an immediate rule of law foundation while the formal legal structure evolved. Many, including government interviewees, strongly supported this effort.

### **Upper Nile**

As in other parts of South Sudan, interviewees perceived the dissemination of the peace protocols in November and December 2004 in Upper Nile as timely, pertinent and highly successful due to the commitment of communities to spread the news of peace at a time of high

demand. The signing of the six protocols between the GoSS and the SPLM in Naivasha and Nairobi in May 2004 distanced itself from the grassroots level thereby increasing the demand for information. Tensions occurred when the SPLM wanted control over the dissemination process, delaying its implementation. The intervention of high-level SPLM officials led to the easing of the dissent, enabling local NGOs to commence information dissemination which communities perceived as democracy in progress. Interviewees confirmed knowledge of the protocols but demanded wider coverage into remote areas of Upper Nile and more detailed information. Cassette tapes of the protocols were easy to understand and in their own language, and a preferred media to the written text. Though it was much slower, the preferred method of dissemination was face-to-face, which occurred most often.

Initial peacebuilding activities in Upper Nile focused on grassroots-level peace dialogues due to the uncertain and changing government structures. Inauguration of the southern Sudan Parliament and legislative assembly in Juba occurred in September 2005 with the Constitution signed in December. Consequently, peacebuilding occurred during a period of political instability and transition. Some program staff have been appointed subsequently to government positions: a positive step towards integrating peacebuilding into government policy and planning decisions.

### *C. Fluctuation in Regional Conflict*

#### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

In Bahr-el-Ghazal, SPF and SSTI programs were initially implemented according to existing conditions on the ground that were a mix of on-going conflict and on-going peace initiatives. In the Wunlit Cluster, for example, the first SPF projects approved targeted “peace dividends” in response to community requests that arose from the Wunlit I and Wunlit II peace conferences. While community definitions of “peace dividends” included development projects, disarmament programs, increased security and investigations into human rights abuses, the latter three initiatives were beyond the scope of a small grants program. Under SPF, therefore, it was determined that boreholes to provide drinking water were an appropriate “peace dividend” intervention. Initial SSTI projects in the region were a mix of small projects such as civil society organization mapping and an assessment of peace committees as well as large conferences such as the Bahr-el-Ghazal Regional Women’s Conference and Dinka-Misseriya-Rezigat (DMR) cross-border dialogue. Some of the smaller projects, such as one to support DMR peace meeting planning, contributed to future work, though others, such as the civil society organization mapping, were good ideas in principle, but never referred to as part of strategic planning in the region.

While projects such as borehole digging were funded in a timely manner, there were numerous complaints regarding implementation delays. While the exact date a borehole is completed is not the most important issue for it to function, people perceived the delays as a lack of commitment to peace in Southern Sudan by the international community. Little seems to have been done by PACT to allay these concerns. In terms of the regional women’s peace conference in 2003, the initiative responded to a request from women who wanted to organize and take advantage of the relative peace on the ground that allowed them to travel and meet. While the conference was timely and significant for the women who attended, the lack of follow-up training for the county

women's associations formed at the conference, despite repeated requests from the women, demonstrated a lack of commitment to and understanding of women's changing roles and their position in South Sudan's future. It has been suggested that activities such as these were not followed up because PACT focused too much on rapid response projects designed to address what appeared to be imminent conflict. Whether PACT made the right decision in such cases is difficult to say, though PACT's management team seems to have focused more of their attention on rapid response activities than on other important areas such as ensuring women were fully represented in activities.

The best example of responsiveness to changing conditions in the Pankar Cluster occurred in 2004 when all six peace protocols had been signed, but local conflict in the Lakes region was escalating. Thus, precisely when the SPLM needed to demonstrate its ability to govern on the ground, thousands of cattle were being raided and hundreds of people were being killed. The situation became so serious that civil authorities asked for help in organizing an emergency meeting of the newly-established Pankar Peace Council. This meeting occurred in May 2004 and was followed by a series of eleven community meetings from May to July at which each Dinka section described the conflict and its causes and then proposed solutions. The outgrowth of these meetings was the formation of multiple local peace committees that then began contacting leaders from other sections to enlist their cooperation in stopping the violence and cattle looting. Given the number of conflicts among the various Dinka sections, however, it is difficult to determine how PACT made strategic choices in determining which meetings were most critical and would contribute the most to reducing overall conflict in the Lakes region.

While the Pankar Cluster activities focused on the intra-Dinka conflicts, assistance in the form of meetings was also provided to the Wulu Peace Committee that represents the sedentary agricultural Beli people. The committee said they had accepted peace, but the "Dinka had not honored" agreements since they continued to destroy Beli crops and beehives and burn their grasslands. They added that more should be done through meetings held prior to the dry season migration to the *toich* (grazing land) to remind parties of Dinka-Beli agreements concerning the timing of the Dinka cattle's seasonal migration and ensure the protection of Beli crops. Peace committee members suggested that community meetings be held prior to the annual trek and in the presence of government officials. At this time, communities could review resolutions and renew commitments to peace, thereby increasing the possibility for conflict reduction. Follow-up meetings were not held, however.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

SPF and SSTI programs in Eastern Equatoria were tied to changing levels of conflict and continuous evaluation of the potential for an outbreak in conflict and opportunities for reconciliation. The Eastern Equatoria PACT team kept abreast of changes in conflict factors and made decisions to engage as conditions permitted. While this was essential to their effectiveness, it also presented dilemmas. PACT in Eastern Equatoria continually re-examined and responded to local demands through the SPF and SSTI short-term grant mechanisms which demanded flexibility and quick reaction. Meeting these two conditions earned PACT the reputation of being responsive, but also transitory. One CBO partner in Eastern Equatoria said, although 'PACT has

been a main actor for peace within Kapoeta County” in its ability to address local issues rapidly, it undermined its position by its impermanence and inability to “stay with the people.”<sup>32</sup>

The conflict map of South Sudan drawn up in late 2002 outlined conflicts geographically within the Kidepo Cluster and presented a foundation upon which PACT could build. The map served as a strategic tool to understand and predict outbreaks of violence, though it was not updated in the years following. This may have been because PACT’s field staff had gained significant in-depth knowledge of local conflicts, the key actors and the contexts.

Rapid response activities were a prominent mechanism allowing SPF and SSTI programs to react to fluctuations in conflict, despite their mere six percent of both programs’ regional funding. For example, in 2005, the SPF-funded Rapid Response Logir, Katebo, Buya, and Didinga Communities (SPF-1041) and the SSTI-funded Jie-Magoth Conflict Rapid Response (SSTI-1132) responded to incidents involving violence and multiple casualties that could have escalated into larger inter-tribal conflict. The former tempered the situation, leading to a peace conference to address the underlying issues. The latter resulted in road clearing and school construction and contributed to continued peace between the Jie and the Magoth.

Rapid response activities, however, did not address all urgent conflict issues in Eastern Equatoria; the demand far outweighed the ability and resources to respond. Determining which projects would receive funding – rapid response activities or follow-up for existing initiatives - created tensions and criticism over lack of follow-up. The demand for additional peacebuilding activities was an indicator of SPF and SSTI program successes, and simply required a great deal more resources to meet the need.

### **Upper Nile**

In Upper Nile the changing context was volatile and fragmented. In response, those guiding project implementation were sensitive to the political context. For example, staff delayed the Murle-led grassroots peace initiative (SPF1013) when the political situation did not support dialogue. It resumed when stakeholders held consensus to participate.

### ***D. Growing Local Capacities***

#### **Nuba Mountains**

The SSTI Capacity Building for Civil Society grant was initiated at the urging of the U.S. Administration that had pledged assistance in the wake of the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement to the three Transitional Areas (Nuba, Abyei and Blue Nile). Policy Advisory Committees (PACs) in each area were set up to define how some \$100,000 could be used in each area. The Nuba Committee asked that government storekeepers be trained in bookkeeping and storage management and that sixteen buildings, including warehouses and conference halls for

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<sup>32</sup> One evaluation team members disagrees with the statement based on the experience in the Upper Nile region. In the Upper Nile, there was a permanent PACT office constructed, which was viewed by the community as a commitment for long-term support for the people of the region. Further, because no other organization would work in the volatile region, PACT was seen as being there for the people. In sum, confidence, trust and respect for PACT was extremely high in Upper Nile.

the region and county, be constructed. A grant was awarded to NRRDO for these activities in mid-2004. While the team did not see any of these facilities and the final report is not available, a progress report of early 2005 noted delays due to rains and unforeseen costs. Thus, it is too early to assess whether this activity contributed to building capacity of civil administration.<sup>33</sup>

### **Bahr-el-Ghazal**

Local capacity to implement projects in Bahr-el-Ghazal reportedly increased over time, though some implementing partners and PACT staff said they were not given the opportunity to prove their capabilities with additional responsibilities. Also, staff members of PACT and partner organizations joined the new South Sudan government, thus leading to a decrease in NGO peacebuilding capacity. Some organizations will handle the losses and transition period better than others. For example, the Bahr-el-Ghazal Youth Development Organization (BYDA), an implementing partner that received some \$620,000 in SPF and SSTI funds, has offices and significant experience in Bahr-el-Ghazal. Also, BYDA has been the recipient of two capacity building grants totaling \$26,000 and it has a large membership network upon which it can draw. While BYDA is losing some of its key staff to the new GoSS, it has experience in building an organization to a regional level and can be expected to remain an important organization working in Bahr-el-Ghazal.

Smaller organizations, however, complained that over the course of their engagement with PACT as implementers of SPF and SSTI projects, they were not given increasing responsibilities. Most had begun as implementing partners that received goods “in-kind” to support peace initiatives, income generation projects and other activities. Organizations asked if they could receive funds directly to do local procurement and increase their level of responsibility and accountability and inject needed cash into the South Sudanese economy; however, under OTI’s direction, PACT did not provide the funds. Several also asked for small amounts of administrative overhead to sustain themselves while carrying out SPF and SSTI activities. At the same time, PACT was unable to deliver items such as sewing machines and grinding mills in a timely manner despite a large office in Southern Sudan.

Peace committees had similar complaints. Members were recipients of BYDA training, an activity that was stated to have increased their capacity to analyze and respond to local conflict. However, they added that tools to increase their abilities, additional training and delays in the delivery of bicycles, permitting them freedom of movement to investigate conflict issues, and CODAN radios, to spread news regarding threats to peace, were not provided quickly, thus hampering their work.

Many of the local authorities interviewed in Bahr-el-Ghazal had experience collaborating with NGOs as they implemented projects and some had been NGO officials previously. For example, the new Deputy Governor in Lakes State and the new Yirol East Commissioner were both former employees of BYDA. Over the course of SPF and SSTI project implementation, local officials involved in projects, especially peace conferences with broad community involvement, gained experience in dealing with donor-funded initiatives. Newly appointed government officials often came with that experience. The formation of the Government of South Sudan

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<sup>33</sup> Of interest, is the apparent promise of USAID to “refund” the costs of the three projects; however, to date, no funds have been provided to PACT to offset the costs.

increased the capacity of the local administration nearly overnight, though these officials have no funds with which to operate and are working without pay. The GoSS is supposed to receive a funding allocation from Khartoum in the near future, but as of November 2005, nothing had been transferred. If the funding is received and the authorities remain in their new positions, the government will have significant capacity with which to operate. If funds are not received, however, it is likely the capacity will transfer back to NGOs. Regardless, it would be prudent to rebuild the capacity of NGOs and civil society organizations working in South Sudan and expand that role to build democratic institutions.

### **Eastern Equatoria**

The capacities and responsibilities of PACT's regional staff increased as the SPF and SSTI programs progressed. Staff members were better able to respond to changes in the political context as PACT's understanding of on-the-ground issues grew and its institutional capacity evolved. Over time, Sudanese staff took on a larger share of responsibility. Nevertheless, there appeared to be a glass ceiling separating PACT Sudanese staff from senior management that limited their organizational role.

PACT's implementing partners, NGOs and CBOs, grew in number as North-South peace discussions and other peace initiatives made working in South Sudan possible and safer. This created opportunities and challenges for PACT's Eastern Equatoria team in implementing SPF and SSTI programs through local partnerships. The CBOs' initial lack of capacity was limiting, while expectations of them were high. Nine SSTI- and SPF-funded capacity building programs in Eastern Equatoria helped local CBOs and NGOs evolve and one-quarter of all funding from both programs (\$334,278) in Eastern Equatoria went to these activities. Local organizations also benefited from two SPF-funded projects, Strengthening the Capacity of Sudanese CSOs (SPF-1025) and Building Capacities of Civil Societies in Eastern Equatoria (SPF-1017). Not all implementing partners were invited to participate, although those who did reportedly increased their peacebuilding and development skills. As a result of these capacity building efforts, the network of CBOs and NGOs has grown and an initiative to form an Eastern Equatoria Community Association started. Less successful was the SSTI-funded Eastern Equatoria Women Leadership Orientation Training (SSTI-1075), which was a study tour intended to expose women to development projects, but suffered from disorganization.

CBOs benefited from other aspects of participation in SPF and SSTI programs. Projects provided legitimacy to nascent CBOs such as Galcholo by engaging them in visible activities in their local communities. The regional PACT team also offered considerable handholding to weak implementing partners during the preparation and implementation of projects. Nevertheless, there was a clear distinction in capacities between organizations involved in capacity building programs and those not invited to participate.

Notably, the short-term nature of SPF and SSTI grants limited partner contact with PACT. PACT's relationship with CBOs – whether capacity building, mentoring, or implementing – was viewed as ephemeral. Several CBO leaders stated that the lack of consistent interaction and funding over an extended period was detrimental to their effectiveness. Since the nature of short-term grants is risky and extremely challenging, they require close oversight and a tremendous amount of energy. PACT performed better on the latter than on the former.

SSTI and SPF programs also helped form and develop peace committees in Eastern Equatoria. Creating, training, mentoring, and equipping peace committees were crucial aspects of SPF and SSTI grants. The SSTI-funded Inter-Lotuhio Dialogue (SSTI-1072), for example, trained 60 people in basic peacebuilding as community mobilizers. The Peace Committee Stakeholders Meeting (SPF-1032) held in February 2005 promoted common approaches and increased coordination among peace committees throughout Eastern Equatoria. As a result of training, committees became a locus for peace activities as they gained legitimacy in the eyes of communities and began addressing local needs and building a base for reconciliation. This increase in stature created a demand for committee office space and equipment. Two SSTI grants, 1094 and 1136, provided funds for peace/community centers in Lafon and Lauro, respectively. Participants at the Kamulac Peace Meeting (SPF 1082) also talked enthusiastically about a proposed peace center at a central location between the Kitebo and Didinga ethnic groups. However, peace committee infrastructure projects were fraught with delays and red tape, including logistical foul-ups and a lack of follow-through, leading to frustrated local officials, CBOs and peace committees.

Interviewees from the SPLM, government, CBOs, peace committees, and the local population repeatedly raised the role of the new legislative assembly and the constitution in continuing peace processes established under the two programs. While many state and county officials had just been appointed and others were awaiting appointment during the time of this evaluation, informants from all corners of society expressed expectations that local authorities would take on peacebuilding roles. At the national level, the felt responsibility was particularly strong among newly appointed Members of Parliament and high level government officials.

Beyond capacity issues, another facet of local entities assuming the convening role is the provision of resources such as transportation and items for people-to-people conferences. A significant portion of SSTI and SPF funds for peacebuilding meetings went toward the purchase of new chairs, pots, mattresses, transportation and food for peacebuilding meetings in Eastern Equatoria. According to some interviewees, the fact that gatherings were a festive occasion facilitated by external resources attracted more people to the meetings, which, in turn, generated greater participation and ownership over the outcomes. There were opinions on both sides of the question as to whether the re-use and transportation of existing items to new meetings would be more costly than the purchase of new ones. Regardless, the enormous expense of providing these items cannot be transferred easily to local entities assuming the role of peacebuilding in the region.

In short, the embryonic state of most CBOs, local NGOs, peace committees and the national legislature leave a dearth of capacity to continue substantive peacebuilding activities independently. Interviewees throughout Eastern Equatoria validated the need for an external organization to continue implementation and capacity building for several more years. If indeed the appropriate locus for the people-to-people process rests with these local entities,<sup>34</sup> developing their capacity requires continued financial and administrative assistance. According to a national civil society leader, such an effort requires the commitment to work closely with communities and the ability to manage expectations—both the community's and the government's.

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<sup>34</sup> An internal PACT report suggests that the jury is still out on whether the locus should be with CBOs, peace committees, specialist intermediary organizations, international agencies, or the government.

## **Upper Nile**

The emergence of peace committees rapidly became a focal point for community-based conflict resolution because of peace conference recommendations. Peace committee members interviewed were pro-active, leading the way in their regions for peace dissemination and conflict resolution. The emergence of local CBOs/NGOs increased responses to community needs as community expectations rose. Some were gradually entrusted with procurement of local goods lending further legitimacy to grassroots level involvement and participation.

Interviewees at all levels in Upper Nile appreciated the significant progress of peacebuilding activities over the past two years and now expect donors to implement the development phase as they are impatient for visible, concrete structures and economic growth. The newly appointed governors expect assistance from international NGOs and those that recognize that the government must eventually provide services to their constituencies admit to needing “hand-holding,” capacity building and institutional strengthening. In December 2005, the GoSS handed down a nine-month emergency budget that was distributed among the states. While the transition to peace is seen as a time to work for the people of southern Sudan to establish a legitimate government, many governors are not yet in tune with the needs of their constituencies. However, many have indicated that they will focus on improved communication, networking and transport for greater interaction with communities to support infrastructure, peace conference resolutions, and law and order. The key to long-term support for the peace process is the establishment of a legal framework and support for customary laws in the interim as a means to conflict resolution of the local level.

### ***E. General Observations and Findings***

The SPF and SST programs generally responded well to the changing contexts in the country and the program activities, by and large, were linked to broader peace initiatives. However, there is a mixed review of the efficacy of the small grants programs in terms of how their short term nature conflicts with longer terms benefits. Basically, the programs did a very good job of responding to immediate needs, but they did not address how the activities might impact long-term development goals in the Sudan.

- SSTI projects such as support for DMR dialogue, the training of parliamentarians in the Nuba Mountains and dissemination of the six protocols and the ABC Report responded in a timely manner to national political events and mirrored North-South dialogue and peace initiatives, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
- SPF projects with the most direct link to broader peace initiatives were drinking water projects since they were seen as post-Wunlit “peace dividends.”
- At the local level, SPF and SSTI rapid response projects addressed imminent outbreaks of conflict throughout South Sudan. However, it was unclear why certain conflicts were chosen for intervention and not others. This lack of a clear strategy created tensions as communities perceived that they were being ignored while other communities were being favored.

- The foundation of the SPF and later the SSTI program was the 2002 conflict map that divided South Sudan into conflict clusters. This tool was never updated, making it difficult to measure progress in conflict resolution over the course of the programs.
- When PACT decided to commit funds to a rapid response activity, it responded in a relatively timely manner. However, PACT was continuously criticized for its lack of follow-up and seemed unable over time to address this shortcoming so that communities did not feel abandoned. PACT also failed to address inadequacies in infrastructure construction, such as non-functioning boreholes and incomplete buildings, though these assets were supposedly “new.”
- No standard, replicable training programs for capacity building were developed and it is uncertain why some partners were chosen over others for training programs. As a result, the capacity development of CBOs/NGOs and peace committees was uneven, though it could have been more balanced.
- Over time, PACT added more implementing partners to its portfolio rather than concentrating on a few partners that had proven themselves after responsibly managing activities under a grant. Furthermore, the short-term grants mechanism minimized interaction between PACT and its implementing partners. These factors hindered capacity building and the undertaking of peace activities by Sudanese organizations.
- As peace committees became active in peace activities and gained capacity, they took on greater peacebuilding responsibilities and PACT and local communities seemed to rely more upon them as legitimate peace actors with broad community support.
- In mid-2005, many local CBOs and NGOs lost their most qualified staff to the new GoSS. This raised the capacity of the government and decreased the capacity of organizations. This shift in capacity was not addressed by SPF and SSTI programs, though this may have been because it came near the expected closeout of the programs.

## **V. Recommendations**

The people-to-people peace process is valued by South Sudanese and worthy of support since communities reported that dialogue, reflection and reconciliation reduced conflict and forced them to look within themselves for aspects of communal peace. Following the 2005 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreements between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, a measure of hope for a peaceful future descended upon the country. With the shift from active war with the North to prospects for peace and development, it would be logical to continue peace activities such as those begun under the SPF and SSTI programs since communities need support to transition from conflict that they know well to peace with which they may have little experience.

Local authorities also need support as they assume new roles as administrators rather than warriors. Fortunately, at least in the short term, many of the new administrators in leadership positions are former NGO staff with experience in peacebuilding and working with the international community upon which much of South Sudan relies. Key to any prospects for long-

lasting peace, therefore, will be the ability of local authorities to restore security, ensure justice and assume governmental authority and accountability to the people. Additionally, ensuring that national revenues, especially oil revenues which could be a flashpoint for conflict, are shared fairly with the south, will contribute significantly to overall peace.

Assuming that activities such as those begun under SPF and SSTI continue to be supported by USAID, the following recommendations, applicable to South Sudan and more broadly to fragile states in general, arise as a result of this evaluation:

- Continue to support peace initiatives, while developing a more holistic approach including a strategic, longer-term package of assistance comprising:
  - Mentoring community leaders and peace committee members to assume greater responsibility for conducting events including cost sharing.
  - Targeting peace spoilers, especially youth and cattle camp members, for behavior change.
  - Advocacy with local and national authorities and training where necessary to enable authorities to assume responsibility for security and justice.
  - Coordinating development assistance with the international community as “peace dividends” for communities that take strides to maintain peace, not simply participate in meetings.
- Begin to transform past SPF and SSTI activities, especially rapid response, to longer-term peace initiatives:
  - Concentrate resources and invest in communities that “accepted peace” under SPF and SSTI-sponsored meetings.
  - Work with communities and local authorities to reach more sustainable levels of peace by supporting peace actors in their outreach work and local authorities in developing systems of justice and accountability.
  - Share community peace initiatives and past successes and failures with other communities in South Sudan through meetings and radio programs.
  - Seek long-term solutions to pastoralists’ issues, including peace monitors in cattle camps and border guards that monitor seasonal cattle treks.
- Engage the emerging Government of South Sudan in peacebuilding processes:
  - Ensure government strategies include conference resolutions.
  - Encourage former NGO staff in the new GoSS to spread support for peacebuilding.
  - Support increased dialogue with the GoS.
- Support customary law as an immediate measure for supporting rule of law:
  - Use customary law to resolve local issues.
  - Consolidate and enhance customary law practices within regions.
- Strengthen local peace actors by:
  - Linking peace committees and local security authorities to each other throughout South Sudan.

- Outfit peace committees and local authorities with basic equipment – radios and bicycles – to ensure quicker responses to potential outbreaks of conflict and show that peace work is valued.
- Strengthen the capacity of local organizations:
  - Develop a standard curriculum that can be replicated in South Sudan by Sudanese organizations.
  - Conduct trainings with Sudanese trainers not Kenyans, as much as possible.
  - Limit the number of implementing partners, invest in building their capacity, and assign multiple projects per partner to enable organizations to learn from their strengths and weaknesses and build capacity over time.
- Increase access to information and knowledge at the grassroots level:
  - Broaden media and information dissemination activities, especially for non-literate populations.
  - Expand radio programming with news and information, particularly through the OTI-funded Sudan Radio Service that already broadcasts in ten languages.
  - Begin providing more information in Arabic to target border communities and Northern Sudanese who have little knowledge of the South.
  - Consolidate support for print media and ensuring the production of one or two quality products rather than several fledgling papers.
- Update the 2002 conflict map to understand the shifts in types and locations of conflict and identify areas of success and failure.
- Undertake infrastructure construction only with qualified partners who are appropriate for the task and can ensure quality work.
- Procure items for peace activities in South Sudan to stimulate the local economy and provide jobs.

## **ANNEX 1: Scope of Work**

# **STATEMENT OF WORK EVALUATION OF THE Sudan Field Office's (SFO) PEACE BUILDING PROGRAMS IMPLEMENTED THROUGH PACT**

## **I. Background**

USAID articulated its overall policy towards countries such as Sudan in its Fragile States Strategy (FSS). The FSS established “four interrelated priorities to strengthen fragile states: (1) Enhance stability; (2) Improve security; (3) Encourage reform; and (4) Develop the capacity of institutions.” The strategy goes on to explain the four basic principles USAID should use in programming in fragile states: (1) Engage strategically; (2) Focus on sources of fragility; (3) Seek short-term impact linked to longer-term structural reform; and (4) Establish appropriate measurement systems. In order to establish how the Sudan Field Office's (SFO) peace building program has supported this overall policy, pursued the first three principles and adhered to the fourth, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives and Democracy and Governance are collaborating on an evaluation of their programs implemented through PACT.

The Sudan Field Office (SFO) under Strategic Objective (SO) #4 has worked to “Expand support to the Sudan peace process,” in pursuit of its overall Strategic Framework Goal which is to see the “Foundation established for a just and durable peace with broad participation of the Sudanese people.” Under SO #4, USAID provided support to PACT from 2003-2005 to implement two programs: the Sudan Peace Fund (SPF), managed by USAID's Democracy & Governance Office; and the South Sudan Transition Initiative (SSTI) managed by USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives. Both programs began in FY03, before the SFO was established in November 2003. The SPF is scheduled to close at the end of this fiscal year; the SSTI runs through the end of this calendar year.

In late 2002 and early 2003, USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives initially designed the SSTI program in close collaboration with the DG office and members of the Sudan Task Force in Washington. This led to the decision to implement both SPF and SSTI through PACT, resulting in an unprecedented level of synergy between OTI and DG programming at the time. Since then, both SPF and SSTI have provided conflict resolution expertise in areas vulnerable to violence. Simply put, their combined effort aimed to create the conditions necessary for rehabilitation and broaden space for governance. The main difference between the two programs, beyond varying degrees of flexibility, has been the type of conflict addressed and the nature of the outcomes that result. Broadly speaking, SPF sought to promote people-to-people dialogue to mitigate strictly inter-communal conflicts, frequently resulting in bilateral agreements that addressed trigger points between tribes. While SSTI aimed to address primarily political conflict (as opposed to purely tribal conflict) as opportunities for local authorities and communities to come together. In

doing so, it sought to create links between grassroots initiatives, local authorities and opportunities to promote participation of the Sudanese people in both peace building and good governance practices. SSTI has also provided rapid response teams to intervene when peace agreements between communities have appeared to be at risk.

Given the synergy between the SPF and SSTI programs, it makes sense to evaluate them together. This evaluation will represent a collaborative effort between USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), Democracy and Governance (DG) and the SFO to examine these various peace building projects as well as the overall programmatic impact and response to political developments during the three year period that began with the signing of the Machakos Protocol in July 2002, culminated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, and ended with the swearing in of the Government of National Unity in July 2005. The unexpected, untimely death of SPLM Chairman, Dr. John Garang, three weeks after he was sworn in as Sudan's First Vice-President on July 9, 2005, renewed fear of the potential for further destabilization and grassroots conflict in a number of areas across South Sudan and the remote threat of renewed violence between the North and South. The need for USAID to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of its primary peace building experience over the past three years has consequently taken on renewed urgency, in the hope that this effort may help to inform future programmatic responses in Sudan.

## **II. Purpose**

The purpose of this evaluation is threefold. First, to document what impact the SPF and SSTI programs had and to determine whether, and how, they contributed to establishing the foundation for a durable peace, with the broad participation of the Sudanese people, according to the SFO's Strategy. Second, in light of the fact that programs in Sudan must adhere to the Fragile States Strategy, to evaluate the relevance of the SFO's principle peace building programs in supporting USAID's four policy priorities in Sudan, outlined above. Third, to provide USAID with conclusions and recommendations for the Agency to consider incorporating into future programmatic responses in Sudan in particular and fragile states in general.

## **III. Objectives**

The objective of this task order is to provide technical assistance to USAID for the following:

1. To recruit and field a five-person evaluation team to South Sudan;
2. To propose an appropriate methodology in consultation with USAID/DCHA/OTI, USAID/DCHA/DG, and the SFO;
3. To evaluate the performance and impact of the SPF and SSTI programs up to November, 2005;
4. To document, in a final evaluation report, findings, conclusions and lessons learned from the past three years, as well as recommendations for the future;
5. To provide an out-briefing in Nairobi and an official presentation in Washington on the above.

#### **IV. Methodology**

The evaluation team is responsible for developing an evaluation strategy and methodologies that include a mix of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analyses approaches. Specific methods, and the appropriate instruments, are developed in concert with OTI Washington.

After the initial week of interviews and document review, the evaluation team and USAID/OTI agreed that the evaluation will answer the following questions.

##### **1. Did SPF and SSTI-funded programs contribute to establishing a foundation for durable peace? How?**

- types of interventions and locations
- organizations involved, their roles and current status
- links established among and between communities and community groups, customary leadership and authority at several levels
- changes in community/local authority behavior

##### **2. Did SPF and SSTI-funded programs funded have appropriate participation?**

- links to national political processes
- local peace initiatives
- types of stakeholders
- issues around which engagement and peace activities occurred
- governance issues

##### **3. Were SPF and SSTI-funded programs relevant to the changing context?**

- evolution of programs alongside changing political scene
- response to conflicts
- institutional changes
- interplay between SPF and SSTI-funded projects
- relevance to future

OTI and the evaluation team additionally agreed that the expected field site visits would include: Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile, Transition Areas, Behr al-Ghazal, Juba

#### **V. Composition and Qualifications of the Evaluation Teams**

1. Two senior level evaluators with extensive experience designing and conducting evaluations, and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative data. The senior level evaluators will serve as the team leaders and be responsible for the draft and final evaluation reports and for de-briefs in Nairobi and Washington, DC. Qualifications must include:

- Academic preparation and at least ten years experience in social science evaluations particularly with programs involving community participation, media and civil society organizations, in countries undergoing transitions;
  - Academic preparation and experience in evaluation methods (survey design, sampling techniques and statistical computer applications);
  - Academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques (survey development, direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews and key informant interviews);
  - Excellent analysis and writing skills;
  - Knowledge of Sudan's unique political, social, economic, and cultural environment.
2. Three mid-level evaluators with experience conducting evaluations and analyzing both quantitative and qualitative evaluation methods. Qualifications must include:
- Academic preparation and at least five years experience in social science/international setting evaluations particularly with programs involving community participation, media and civil society organizations, in countries undergoing transitions;
  - Academic preparation and experience in evaluation methods such as survey design, sampling techniques and statistical computer applications;
  - Academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques including survey development, direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews and key informant interviews;
  - Excellent analysis and writing skills;
  - Knowledge of Sudan's unique political, social, economic, and cultural environment.
3. One logistician with three years experience facilitating travel/events in foreign countries, especially in difficult post-conflict environments. This person must be highly organized and able to work in collaboration with others to locate the operational support needed for this evaluation. The logistician will be responsible for making the arrangements for translators, transportation, housing, and other logistics. The logistician will also be responsible for making arrangements for the team's own work space, computers, and printers, as well as taking the necessary security precautions while in Nairobi, Kenya and South Sudan.

## VI. Evaluation Components and Deliverables

1. One week, (November 7-12, 2005) in Washington, DC for **two senior and three mid-level evaluators**. Tasks include:
- Conduct literature review and desk study including OTI/Sudan grants data base;
  - Interview key Washington, DC staff and stakeholders;
  - Identify draft questions to address;
  - Draft work plan in collaboration with OTI/Sudan and OTI/W, Africa Bureau and DG Washington staff;
  - Develop methodology and instruments;
  - Finalize work plan.

2. Four weeks, (November 14 – December 12, 2005) (one week in Nairobi and three weeks in Sudan) for **two senior and three mid-level evaluators** to conduct an evaluation of Strategic Objective # 4 “Expand support to the Sudan peace process”. Tasks include:
  - Collect evaluation data from Nairobi, the Sudan Field Office as well as from other stakeholders;
  - Conduct initial analysis and develop initial findings;
  - Confer with field staff and other evaluation team at mid-evaluation;
  - De-brief with USAID/Sudan staff and present a brief PowerPoint summary report of key findings.
  
3. Thirteen days, (December, 2005 – January, 2006) in US and Washington for **two senior evaluators**. Tasks include:
  - Produce complete draft report;
  - Debrief to OTI Washington and collect comments from Washington and the field;
  - Produce final Report, ensuring a concise Executive Summary, with findings and recommendations. Additionally, the senior evaluators are to work collaboratively to ensure that the report reads with one voice.
  
3. Seven days (December, 2005 – January, 2006) for **three mid-level evaluators** to
  - Contribute to draft report.
  
4. Two weeks, (November 8 – November 20, 2005) in Nairobi, Kenya and South Sudan for **one logistician**. Tasks include:
  - Arrange for evaluators’ housing, cars and drivers, drivers, translators, etc.;
  - Make interview appointments and arrange transportation;
  - Overlap with the team by a week in order to provide any additional support to evaluation team.

## VII. Proposed Time frame

FUNCTION	APPROXIMATE COMPLETION DATE
Desk review of program documents, phone interviews with key staff, and preparation of proposed methodology and details schedule of field visits	November 12, 2005
Field Work and Outbriefing	December 14, 2005
Preparation of draft report, Presentation of findings, recommendations and discussion of draft; and Preparation of final report	Draft report and debrief – mid January, 2006 Final report – Mid-March, 2006 (at the latest)

### **VIII. Level of Effort**

- Desk review of program documents, phone interviews with key (DC&SFO) Preparation of proposed methodology and details schedule of field visits: 6 days x 5 consultants
- Field work and out briefing (South Sudan, Nairobi) consultants: 25 days x 5
- Preparation of draft report, Presentation of findings, recommendations and discussion of draft (DC) (mid-level consultants): 7 days x 3
- Preparation of final report - Senior level consultants: 13 days x 2

### **IX. Scope of engagement**

The contractor will need to engage the following stakeholders in the preparation of the methodology, desk review, fieldwork, and presentation of findings and recommendations: staff in the USAID Sudan Field Office and OTI Field Offices in Nairobi and Sudan, USAID/Washington Office of Transition Initiatives and the Africa Bureau Sudan Office.

### **X. Final Report**

The outline for the final report shall include but not be limited to the following:

- Executive summary;
- Table of contents;
- Introduction and background;
- Summary description of evaluation objectives;
- Description of methodology and data sources, and limitations of the study;
- Analysis and statement of findings;
- Recommendations for future OTI programs.

Bound copies of the final evaluation report and supporting documents will be provided to OTI, along with an electronic version of the report and an electronic copy of all data files used to conduct analyses.

**ANNEX 2: Final Interview List**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>ORG</b>	<b>POSITION</b>	<b>DATE</b>
<b>WASHINGTON, DC</b>			
Jeanne Briggs	USAID OTI	Program Officer	11/07/2005
Sarah Cohen	USAID DCHA/PVC/PDM	Program Analyst	11/07/2005
Dina Esposito			11/07/2005
Sara Brewer	USAID OTI	Former OTI Sudan Team Leader	11/08/2005
Wendy Marshal	USAID/DCHA/DG	Democracy Specialist	11/08/2005
Curt Reintsma	USAID Africa Desk	Director Sudan Program	11/08/2005
Dana Ott	USAID Africa Desk	International Cooperation Specialist, Sudan Program	11/08/2005
Sharon Isralow	USAID Africa Desk	Sudan Program	11/08/2005
Bill Polidoro	USAID OTI	Former OTI Sudan Advisor	11/09/2005
Georgia Beans	PACT HQ	Director, Grants Management Unit	11/09/2005
Mary Ngugi	PACT HQ	Program Manager	11/09/2005
Vic Tanner			11/09/2005
Rob Jenkins	USAID OTI	Deputy Director	11/10/2005
Konrad Huber	USAID OTI	Team Leader, Africa	11/10/2005
Fritz Weden	USAID OTI	Senior Advisor	11/10/2005
<b>NAIROBI</b>			
Erica Krug	USAID OTI	Country Representative	11/14/2005
John Marks	USAID	Disaster Assistance Program Officer	11/14/2005
Brian D'Silva	USAID/PSC	Policy Advisor	11/14/2005
Allan Reed	SFO	Director	11/14/2005
Stephanie Funk	SFO	Democracy Officer	11/14/2005
Paul Murphy	Pact	Director Sudan Country Program	11/15/2006
Marv Koop	Pact	Senior Program Advisor	11/15/2006
Simon Richards	Pact	Acting Regional Director Pact Africa	11/15/2006
Paul Savage	Pact	Senior Technical Advisor	11/15/2006
Rachel Perks	Pact	Technical Support Officer	11/15/2006
Nikolai Hutchinson	Pact	Senior Technical Support Advisor	11/15/2006
Hannah Kamau	Pact	Program Advisor	11/15/2006
Marion Casey	Pact	Senior Program Officer	11/15/2006
Samuel Lony	Pact	Regional Manager Upper Nile	11/15/2006
Keer Bol Weet	Pact	Regional Manager Bahr El Ghazal	11/15/2006
Clement Alesio Pwong	Pact	Regional Manager Equatoria	11/15/2006
Dr. Ahmed Saeed	Pact	Regional Manager Transition Areas	11/15/2006

Keni Adwok	Pact	Program Assistant	11/15/2006
Elizabeth Majok	Pact	Admin Sudan Country Prog	11/15/2006
Wendy Fenton	Ex-Save the Children	Ex-Regional Director	11/16/2006
Jeremy Groce	Sudan Radio	Program Director	11/16/2006
Paul McDermott			11/16/2006
Lainie Thomas	Mercy Corps	Country Rep Sudan	11/17/2006
Peter Lofune	Pact	Technical Assistant	11/17/2006
Florence Akello Salama	Pact	Technical Assistant - Gender	11/17/2006
Mary Puru	Pact	Technical Assistant	11/17/2006
James Kok	SPRC	General Director	11/18/2006
Rev Peter Tibi	NSCC	Deputy Executive Secretary	12/09/2006
Michael Ouku	NSCC	Peace Desk	12/09/2006
Remy Okura	NSCC	Financial/Admin Coordinator	12/09/2006
Kuol Athian Hawien	Bahr El Ghazal Youth Association	Leadership	12/09/2006
Dan Eiffe	Sudan Mirror/Sudan Dev Trust	Director	12/09/2006
Tim Leyland	African Institutions/Tufts	Research Director	12/09/2006
Hubert D Charles	Christian Aid	Program Manager/South Sudan	12/09/2006
Ilana Aquino	Christian Aid		12/09/2006
Gerald Cofie-Djangmah	Christian Aid		12/09/2006
Jeremy Groce	Sudan Radio	Program Director	12/10/2006
Jim Walsh	USAID SFO	Technical Committee Member	12/11/2006
<b>EASTERN EQUATORIA</b>			
Davis Wafula	Taposa Development Association	Deputy Program Coordinator	11/18/2005
Cassiao Lopir	Taposa Development Association	Financial Administrator	11/18/2005
Dominique Lotubai	Taposa Development Association	Field Assistant for Conflict Man. Program	11/18/2005
Lokai Iko	Taposa Development Association	Program Coordinator	11/18/2005
Luis Lobong	Government of South Sudan	former Kapoeta Commissioner	11/19/2005
Paul Napwon	Losolia Rehabilitation and Dev. Ass.	Program Coordinator	11/19/2005
Joseph L	Losolia Rehabilitation and Dev. Ass.	Deputy Program Coordinator	11/19/2005
Taposa Community	Lauro town	participants in peace building meeting	11/19/2005
Aloysious Ojetuk	Government of South Sudan	Governor of Torit County	11/20/2005
Ron Roy	Kapoeta market	Private business owner	11/20/2005
Mathew Ebenwo	Gocholo CBO	Sitting representative	11/21/2005
Peter Lodita	Gocholo CBO	Camp Manager	11/21/2005
Madeleine Aldo	Kimatong Peace Committee	Member	11/21/2005
Rosa Nangulu	Kimatong Peace Committee	Member	11/21/2005
Rose Achee	Kimatong Peace	Member	11/21/2005

	Committee		
Maria Lamana	Kimatong Peace Committee	Member	11/21/2005
Kimatong community members			11/21/2005
Kimatong Water Management Committee			11/21/2005
Daniel Afatio	CHIWESE Child Welfare Soc East Eq	Program Coordinator	11/21/2005
Soloman Ochuba	Government of South Sudan	Payam Administrator and Judge for Hyala	11/21/2005
Romeo Liwaerum	Government of South Sudan	Chief Inspector of Police for Torit	11/21/2005
Felix Okingy	Government of South Sudan	Commissioner of Budi County	11/22/2005
Celesio Ohisa	Government of South Sudan	Commissioner of Ikotos County	11/22/2005
Participants of Kamulac Peace & Reconciliation Among Kitebo & Didinga Conference			11/22/2005
Charles Loker	Manna Sudan	Executive Director	11/22/2005
Hilay Nafal	Manna Sudan	Field Officer	11/22/2005
Ojara Richard	Manna Sudan	Field Officer	11/22/2005
Gabriel Oryem	Manna Sudan	Accountant	11/22/2005
William Loki Lokirimoi	SPLA	Commander & former Comm. of Chukudum	11/23/2005
<b>UPPER NILE</b>			
Philip Thon Lok	Government of South Sudan	Governor of Jonglei County	11/25/2005
Nya Choln	Government of South Sudan	Minister of Local Government	11/25/2005
Kuol Amor	Government of South Sudan	Minister for Peace Accord	11/25/2005
Stephen Ogut	Government of South Sudan	Advisor to Governor for Security Affairs	11/25/2005
Michael Majok Ayom	Government of South Sudan	Advisor to Governor for Political Affairs	11/25/2005
Philip Thon	Development Ass. for Bor South CBO	Peace Advisor for Bor South County	11/25/2005
Dyak Chuon	Government of South Sudan	Commissioner of Akobo County	11/25/2005
Panchel Jongkuc	Sudan Relief & Dev. Comm. SRRC	Deputy Director SRRC, Bor Town	11/25/2005
Sam Lony	PACT	Regional Manager, Upper Nile	11/26/2005
Dyak Chuon	Government of South Sudan	Commissioner of Akobo County	11/27/2005
Freya Rodd	Medicins Sans Frontiers	Field Coordinator Pibor	11/27/2005
Joseph Oleyo	Government of South Sudan	Commissioner of Pibor County	11/27/2005
Rev Joseph Morti	Presbyterian Church of Sudan	Member, Murle Peace Committee	11/27/2005
Mary Bal	Murle Peace Committee	Member	11/27/2005
Karku Aturuk	Murle Peace Committee	Member	11/27/2005
Youanes Nyellang	Murle Peace Committee	Member	11/27/2005
Khamis Ngatidich	Murle Peace Committee	Member	11/27/2005
Kolbich Mathouch		Peace Monitor & Peace Committee Trainer	11/28/2005

Alfred Legai	UNHCR	Field Project Officer, Pibor	11/28/2005
Rev William Nganloki	COOPI CBO	Logistician	11/28/2005
Michael Gatwech Phok	Save the Children US	Pagak Community Health Worker	11/28/2005
Andrew Madule	Norwegian Peoples Aid	Assistant Field Monitor, Pagak	11/28/2005
Laban Mutywa		Peace Committee Trainer	11/28/2005
Brigadier Charles Lam	SPLA	Army Commander, Upper Nile	11/29/2005
David Thok	Government of South Sudan	Acting Commissioner, Maiwot County	11/29/2005
Duop Jock Lam	Sudan Relief & Dev. Comm. SRRC	Secretary SRRC, Pagak	11/29/2005
Kuith Buoch		Judge, Pagak	11/29/2005
Nyaluok Thach Khan	Pagak Women's Group	Leader of Pagak Payam	11/29/2005
Nyadak Nhial	Maiwot County Women's Association	Leader of Maiwot County	11/29/2005
Wilson Omol	GARDOS Glob. Rel. & Dev. Org Sudan	Program Officer	11/29/2005
Clement Mormanyi	GARDOS Glob. Rel. & Dev. Org Sudan	Field Administrator	11/29/2005
Nyaduth Jock	Returnee family	Pagak	11/29/2005
Nya Chin Bol	Returnee family	Pagak	11/29/2005
Nyabiay Bol	Returnee family	Pagak	11/29/2005
Nyaruach Riek	Returnee family	Pagak	11/29/2005
Nyathiel Gatkuoth	Returnee family	Pagak	11/29/2005
James Gagluak Thoak Kuny	Lou Nuer, Central Upper Nile	Paramount Chief	11/29/2005
James Lguany	Pact	Camp Manager, Ayod	12/01/2005
James Both	Pact	Community Development Officer, Ayod	12/01/2005
Abraham Chan	Pact	Accountant and Assistant Administrator	12/01/2005
John Mayiel	Government of South Sudan	Executive County Director, Ayod	12/01/2005
Gang Thoat	Lou Community	Chief	12/01/2005
??	Magok Payam	Chairman of Peace Committee	12/01/2005
Chief Kual Choli	Pagek Payam	Chairman of Peace Committee	12/01/2005
??	Nyrol County	Chief of County	12/01/2005
??	Kuigang Payam	Chief	12/01/2005
Members	White Army		12/01/2005
Peter Paul Maet	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	SYCP Sports Chairman	12/02/2005
Simon Khot	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	Deputy Youth Chairman for Fagil Payam	12/02/2005
Tut Lal	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	County Youth Rep	12/02/2005
Marina Nyayod	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	Women's Rep	12/02/2005
Jacob Bol Ter	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	Sports Chairman for Magok Payam	12/02/2005
Stephen Kuach Bilieu	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	Deputy Sports Chairman Magok	12/02/2005
David Yien	SYCP Sudan Youth	Sports Chairman for Pagil	12/02/2005

	Consolidation Prog	Payam	
Jack Wilson	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog		12/02/2005
Martha James	SYCP Sudan Youth Consolidation Prog	Deputy County Youth Rep	12/02/2005
John Kuok	SWIDAP Sudan Wom In Dev. & Peace	Health Coordinator	12/02/2005
Tutyang Kong	SWIDAP Sudan Wom In Dev. & Peace	Team Leader Ayod County and Community Mobilizer for Duk, Atar, and Ayod Counties	12/02/2005
Simon Khot	SWIDAP Sudan Wom In Dev. & Peace	Community Mobilizer	12/02/2005
Martha James	SWIDAP Sudan Wom In Dev. & Peace	Community Mobilizer	12/02/2005
John Both	SWIDAP Sudan Wom In Dev. & Peace	Community Mobilizer	12/02/2005
Elizabeth Nyamut	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Nabrita Nyaran	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Sarah Ador	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Rebecca Atar	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Nyabar Gawrah	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Mary Nyalam	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Tabitha Nyangot	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Nyawat Kalo	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Rebecca Nyanar	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Mary Nyaew	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Tabitha Nyabuok	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Elizabeth Nyachop	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Martha Nyagon	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Nyaweka Mut	Ayod town	female resident	12/02/2005
Daniel Kuony	Kush Relief and Dev. Organization	Program Liaison Officer	12/02/2005
James Maker	Kush Relief and Dev. Organization	Field Coordinator	12/02/2005
Returnees	Kuadeng Boma	resident	12/03/2005
John Gatluo Ker	Bieh Boma	resident	12/04/2005
Peter Riek Biey	Bieh Boma	resident	12/04/2005
Nyakhor Ker	Bieh Boma	resident	12/04/2005
Peter Bhap	UNPDA Upper Nile Peace and Dev Ass.	Director	12/04/2005
Chris Lewis	MedAir	Program Officer	12/04/2005
JUBA			
David Mayo	Member of Parliament	Chukadum, EE constituency	12/06/2005
Alfred Sebit Lokugi		Consultant on DG, Man., Dev. & Policy	12/06/2005
Richard Mula	Member of Parliament	Mundri East, UN? constituency	12/06/2005
Simon Lado	GOSS (former Pact)	Ministry of Finance (former Pact)	12/06/2005
Gatkuoth Duop Kuich	Member of Parliament, Kush Relief Int.	Waat, UN constituency, KRI Director	12/07/2005
Mary Nyaluang	Member of Parliament, SWIDAP	Director of SWIDAP	12/07/2005
George Kinga	GOSS	EE, Advisor to Pres on Religious	12/07/2005

		Affairs	
Tulio Odangi	Member of Parliament	Torit constituency	12/07/2005
Martin Lorika	Member of Parliament	Kapoeta constituency	12/07/2005
George Echom	Member of Parliament	Kapoeta constituency	12/07/2005
Arthur Awein	GOSS	Minister of Finance Bar el Ghazal	12/07/2005
Abdul Agau	GOSS	Secretary General of President's Office	12/07/2005
Charles Lado	Sudan Council of Churches	Transformation Committee	12/07/2005
David Lotigo	Sudan Council of Churches	Transformation Committee	12/07/2005
Christine Anita	Sudan Council of Churches	Transformation Committee	12/07/2005
Alex Gabriel	Sudan Council of Churches	Transformation Committee	12/07/2005
David Deng	GOSS	Minister of Public Service	12/07/2005
Joseph Ngere Packo	GOSS	Western Equatoria Deputy Governor	12/08/2005
Acuil Malith Banggol	Sudan Production Aid	Outgoing Director	12/08/2005
Bellario Ahoy Ngong	GOSS	Comm. of Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation	12/08/2005
<b>NUBA MOUNTAINS</b>			
Ahmed A. Saeed	NRRDO	Reg Off for Technical Advisors	11/20/2005
Jacob Idris Rahal	NRDDO	Prog Manager NRDDO Nairobi	11/20/2006
Mojo Mohammed	Kauda Community Member	Head of Youth Group	11/20/2006
Sadic Monsor	Kauda Cultural Center	Head of Information and Cultural Center	11/20/2006
Ten MP's (8 men 2 wom)	Kauda Parliament	MP	11/20/2006
Community Groups	Tongoli, Southern Kordofan	15 Community Leaders	11/21/2006
Dan V. Anduvate	FIT	Facilitator	11/21/2006
Peter Nuer Timothy	Tongoli Community	Medical Doctor	11/21/2006
?	Rashid County	Junior Officer	11/22/2006
Tanis McKnight	NPACT Kauda		11/22/2006
Caroline Gullick	USAID Kauda	Land Advisor	11/22/2006
Mohanna	USAID Kauda	Assistant Land Advisor/Facilitator	11/22/2006
Zaki Kodi Agenlo	Blowing Horn Newsletter, Kauda	Administrator	11/22/2006
Enouch Danile Almani	New Sudan Youth Ass Info Center	Administrator/Computer Technician	11/22/2006
Dr. Ahmed	Pact Sudan	Senior Regional Advisor	11/23/2006
<b>ABYEI</b>			
Sher Hussaini	UNDP	Project Manager	11/23/2006
Mousa Malei	Abyei Community	SPLM Secretary	11/23/2006
Bol Dau	Abyei Community	SRRC/HAC Director	11/23/2006
Philip Deng	Abyei Community		11/23/2006
Philip Agok	Abyei Community	Abyei County Official	11/23/2006
Kuol Deng	Abyei/Agok Peace Committee	Community Leader	11/24/2006
20 youth	Abyei Youth Group		11/24/2006
Community Leaders	Agok/Abyei County	7 men/3 women; Peace Committee	11/25/2006
Local Authorities	Agok/Abyei County	Group of 30 include. Finance and Admin.	11/25/2006

<b>BAR EL GHAZAL</b>			
Mark Atak	WARAB State	Executive Director of Gorial West	11/26/2006
Ayok Deng Agor	Goriel West County	Politician	11/26/2006
John Mandok Kuot	Goriel West County	Commissioner for Civil Society	11/26/2006
Asunta Kasio Madul	Alek Women's Group	Member	11/27/2006
Regina Arui	Alek Women's Group	Member	11/27/2006
Regina Adut	Alek Women's Group	Member	11/27/2006
Nyanut Madut	Alek Women's Group	Member	11/27/2006
Alfred Amet Kuol Amet	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok North	11/27/2006
Wek Deng Ariec	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok South	11/27/2006
Joseph Madut Maya	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok South	11/27/2006
Mathuc Madut	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok North	11/27/2006
Madch Bol Kuol	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok North	11/27/2006
Makna Akot Makuac	Alek Community Executive Chiefs	Kuajok South	11/27/2006
Ann Deng	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Payam Court President	11/28/2006
Judge Malik	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Health Coordinator	11/28/2006
Mariol Kual Amet	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Ex Director of Gorial West	11/28/2006
?	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Payam Administrator	11/28/2006
?	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Chief of Police and Security	11/28/2006
?	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Information Officer	11/28/2006
Lt. Angelo Nok	Executive Chiefs of the Aguok	Soldier	11/28/2006
Executive Chiefs of the PanKuc/Deputy Chair of Wunlit Peace Council, Payam Judge-Tonj North County			11/28/2006
Executive Chiefs of the PanLual/Community Leaders- Tonj North County			11/28/2006
Executive Chiefs of the Aqurpiin (Maiwai)/Community Leaders- Tonj North County			11/28/2006
Bol Buop Bap	Wunlit Peace Council	Secretary	11/29/2006
?	Wunlit Peace Council	Chair	11/29/2006
?	Wunlit Peace Council	Spiritual Leader	11/29/2006
8 men	Wunlit Peace Council	Executive Chiefs	11/29/2006
Mario Malok Luol	Tonj West County, Warab State	Member of Parliament	11/30/2006
Daniel Mongar	Tonj North County, Warab State	Administrator Marial Lou	11/30/2006
6 men	Peace Council Members	Executive Chiefs	11/30/2006
3 men	Peace Council Members	Court President	11/30/2006
?	Peace Council Members	Executive Director of Tonj East County	11/30/2006
?	Peace Council Members	Payam Administrator- Tonj North	11/30/2006
Ngapagok Village Women's Group (35 women, three of whom were trained by Pact)			11/30/2006

Elizabeth Major	Pact	Administrator	11/30/2006
2 men 2 women	Yirol East Peace Committee	Members	12/01/2006
Rebecca Youm	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Rebecca Abuoc	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Mary N.	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Rebecca Nalet	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Rebecca Ayet	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Helena	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Tabisa N.	Women's Group Yirol West	Members	12/01/2006
Rin Tueny	SPLM Yirol	Party Chair	12/01/2006
Athiann Majak	SPLM Yirol East	Commissioner	12/01/2006
Joc Apuya	Yirol Town	Commissioner	12/02/2006
Marier Alec	Yirol Town	Wildlife Officer	12/02/2006
Jonathan Kulang	Yirol Town	County Dec Officer	12/02/2006
Juong Nyiel Aper	Yirol Town	Town Major	12/02/2006
Martin Mayor	Yirol Town	Payam Administrator	12/02/2006
Joseph Madiig Akec	Yirol Town	Police Officer	12/02/2006
Maj. Andrau Makor	Yirol Town	Prison	12/02/2006
Salvatore Chol Majok	Yirol Town	Public Secretary	12/02/2006
3 Chiefs	Aweirial County	Executive Chiefs Aweirial	12/02/2006
Ajuong Nwel Apeer	Yirol West Peace Committee	Town Mayor and Chair Peace Committee	12/02/2006
Mary Ayen Ndhui	Yirol West Peace Committee	Member	12/02/2006
Manyan Machar	Yirol West Peace Committee	Member	12/02/2006
5 Men	Yirol West	Executive Chiefs	12/02/2006
Rec Dit Niyith	Yirol East	Executive Chiefs	12/02/2006
Alok Byn Malback	Yirol East	Executive Chiefs	12/02/2006
Deng Buong Alueng	Yirol East	Executive Chiefs	12/02/2006
Aweer Lang Joc	Yirol East	Executive Chiefs	12/02/2006
Mary Ayol	Wulu Peace Committee	Treasurer	12/04/2006
Samuel Wui Wui	Wulu Peace Committee	Secretary	12/04/2006
Sunday Dhou	Wulu Peace Committee	President	12/04/2006
Youth Members	Wulu Peace Committee	Member	12/04/2006
Police Officers	Wulu Peace Committee	Member	12/04/2006
Joseph Maker	Yirol Water Limited	Water Driller Expert	12/04/2006
Tom Belknap	Medic Ltd	Water Driller Expert	12/04/2006
John Lat	Rumbek County	Governor of Lakes	12/05/2006
Mary Atak ai Delkoc	Rumbek North	Pankar Peace Council	12/05/2006
Rosa Adat	Rumbek North	Pankar Peace Council	12/05/2006

Madghand Majok	Rumbek North	Pankar Peace Council	12/05/2006
John Makir	Rumbek North	Pankar Peace Council	12/05/2006
Aurupai Mary Vincincia	NSSC	PA to Deputy Ex Sec & Programs Coord.	12/05/2006
Manut Chol Atem	GRDF	Pact Local Implementing Partner	12/05/2006
Bol Malik	SUVAID	Pact Local Implementing Partner	12/05/2006
Kenit Akau	INCODE	Pact Local Implementing Partner	12/05/2006
Iliak Reec	INCODE	Pact Local Implementing Partner	12/05/2006
Anei Mangong Anei		Secretary/HR/Facilitator	12/06/2006
David Noc		Deputy Governor Lakes State	12/06/2006
Daniel Kuol	Bar El Ghazal Women's Center	Director of Programming/Prog Officer	12/06/2006
?	Bar El Ghazal Women's Center	Founder Women's Center	12/06/2006

## ANNEX 3: TEAM MATRIX

**Teams Matrix**  
**BAHR EL GHAZAL AND TRANSITIONAL AREAS TEAM A**

Location	Date	Names	Accommodation	Flight	Local Transport	Pact Person	Logistic notes and Local Contact(s)
Nairobi- Loki	Fri 18 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005	Team Leader: Anne Carlin. Evaluators: Jim Bell* and Rose Marie Depp	748	East Africa			Flight booking: Lillian Local Transfers: Amimo/Lillian Pick up in Loki: Elisha
Loki- Kauda	Sat 19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		NRRDO	OLS	TBA	Ahmed Saeed	(OLS flight 19 <sup>th</sup> LK-KD) Benson/Elisha pick up from airport: Ahmed/Benson/Elisha ( need to find out in advance NGO on ground with car! Local Contact: Lazim Suleiman- NRRDO
Kauda- Kadugli – Kauda and areas	Sat – Tues 19 <sup>th</sup> , 20 <sup>th</sup> , 21 <sup>st</sup> 22 <sup>nd</sup> Nov 2005		NRRDO		TBA	Ahmed Saeed	OLS booking on 19 <sup>th</sup> LK-KD: Benson Local Transport: Dr Ahmed Accommodation: Concern, SCF or NRRDO Local Contact: Philip Neroun
Kauda-Agok	Wed 23 <sup>rd</sup> Nov 2005		ACAD or UNDP	<b>Flight - Password</b>			Book charter KD-Agok: Benson/Elisha Local Contact: Deng Aar- ACDC, other ACDC
Agok-Abyei	Thurs – Fri 24 <sup>rd</sup> , 25 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		ACAD or UNDP		Vehicle – goal, undp		Local transport: Goal (Elisha/Benson) accommodation: Elisha/Benson) Local Contacts: Caroline Gullick, Deng Mading
Abyei-Agok	Fri 25 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		ACAD or UNDP		Vehicle – goal, undp		Local transport: Goal: Elisha Accommodation: Elisha Local Contact: Arop Deng, Kuol Dem

Agok-Gokmachar	Sat, Sun 26 <sup>th</sup> , 27 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		ACWO - camping	<b>Flight Password</b>		Keer Bol	Book a charter: Benson/Elisha Accommodation : Peter/Elisha, <i>tents mattresses will be brought along. Need to ask partners on ground to prepare tukuls for use (ACWO)</i> Local transport: Pact car to be driven to Gok Machar: Peter/Radio room Local Contacts: ACWO, more TBD
Gokmachar-Mariel Lou	Mon 28 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		VSF-B	<b>Flight Password</b>		Keer Bol	Charter flight: Gok Machar Local Transport: Pact car ( subject to confirmation) Accommodation: VSF-Belgium ( Elisha/Benson) Local Contacts: Sabina Makana Akol- ex-Commissioner of Tonj. East, Mosses Madot- Executive Director.
Mariel Lou - Makuac-Wunlit	Tues 29 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		NSCC - camping		Pact vehicle	Keer Bol	Road transport: Pact car (Kuol D) Accommodation: NSCC: Benson/Elisha in Loki or Peter if in Nairobi Local Contacts: Pankar Peace Council Members, Nyandeng Malek
Wunlit-Thiet	Wed 30 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		TBD		Pact vehicle	Keer Bol and Paul Savage	Road transport: pact car (KuolD) Accommodation: Keni/Keer, who is TBD Local Contacts: Mary Nyibol Arou- Dioceses of Rumbek Marial Lou parish, Makuac Chiefs: Victor Bol- member of Wunlit Peace Council, Chief Madut Aguer, Chief Ajourng Mading, Madame Sada Mangok- Wunlit Peace Council, Chief Makom Majok Pankar- Peace Council, Chief Gum Mading and Chief Mabior Dau- Jalwau community (these people will be brought to Makuac or, if time permits, evaluators will go to Wunlit for interviews.)
Makuac -Yirol	Thurs Fri 1 <sup>st</sup> , 2 <sup>nd</sup> Dec 2005			Thurs Dec 1 * Jim to Loki and Nrb <b>Flight Password</b>		Keer Bol and Paul Savage	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha * Jim to Loki and Nrb Local Transport: Pact car ( Kuol D) Accommodation: Benson/Elisha Local Contacts: Yirol Peace Committees, BYDA team in Yirol and Rumbek women's groups, other Tonj/Yirol groups supported by PACT that can be found.

Yirol-Rumbek	Sat 3rd Dec 2005		Pact		Pact vehicle	Keer/Paul Savage	Road Transport: Pact car (Kuol D) Accommodation: Afex or Bros ( note our RK compound will be occupied by TOT meeting, but should depart on Dec 2 <sup>nd</sup> . Local Contacts: John Lat, Judge Aleu Akajak (Yirol mobile courts,) Ruben Madol, Rumbek County Authorities- Water and Peace, Peace Committee of Rumbek,- some chiefs should be found in town NSCC, CA representatives of the Wulu Peace Committees.
Rumbek	Sun – Tues 4 – 6 <sup>th</sup> Dec		Afex or Pact		Pact vehicle		Local transport: Pact car (Kuol D) Accommodation: Afex or Bros (Kuol D)
Rumbek-Juba	Wed 7th Dec 2005			<b>Flight OLS</b>			Book OLS tickets: Benson/Elisha Provisional charter: Benson/Elisha
Juba	Wed – Fri 7 <sup>th</sup> – 9 <sup>th</sup> Dec		Bros (TBC)		Hire vehicle	Marv Koop	Accommodation: Bros (Kuol D) Local transport: Marv K to hire local taxis Local Contacts: Abuor Gordon, Alfred Deng Alouk, Daniel Awet, Sabina Makana Akol, James Lual, Mary Nyibol.
Juba-Loki- Nairobi	Fri 9 <sup>th</sup> Dec 2005		Nairobi	TBD			Booking of team to Nairobi: Lillian K Local transfer: Lillian/ Amimo
<b><u>EQUATORIA AND UPPER NILE - TEAM B</u></b>							
<b>Location</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Names</b>	<b>Accommodation</b>	<b>Flight</b>	<b>Local Transport</b>	<b>Pact Person</b>	<b>Logistics notes and Local Contact(s)</b>
Nairobi- Loki	Thurs 17 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005	Team Leader: Kim Maynard. Evaluator: Martina Nicolls, Kate Buban	748	Pact			Booking on EASA: Lillian Local transfers: Lillian/Elisha Accommodation: 748/Trackmark
Loki- Kapoeta	Fri 18 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		Pact Kapoeta Camp		Pact vehicle	Alesio	Road Transport: Pact car ( Sam Felix) Accommodation: Pact compound (Sam Felix) Local Transport: Pact car (Sam Felix) Local Contact: Louis Lobong of TDA

Kapoeta-Lauro	Sat 19 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		DOT		Pact vehicle	Alesio	Local Transport: Pact car (Sam Felix) Accommodation: Pact Compound, <i>DOT as alternate if overnight is necessary!</i> (Sam Felix) Local contact: Paul Napwon of LRDA in Lauro
Lauro-Kamulach	Sun 20 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		DOT		Pact vehicle	Alesio	Local Transport: Pact car (Sam Felix) Accommodation: Pact Compound, <i>DOT as alternate if overnight is necessary!</i> (Sam Felix) Local Contact: Commissioner of Kapoeta County
Kamulach-Kimatong	Mon 21 <sup>st</sup> Nov 2005		DoT		Pact vehicle	Peter Lofane and Rachel Perks	Local Transport: Pact car (Sam Felix) Accommodation: Pact Compound, <i>DOT as alternate if overnight is necessary!</i> (Sam Felix) Local Contact: Paul Napwon of LRDA
Kimatong-Kapoeta	Tues 22 <sup>nd</sup> Nov 2005		Pact Kapoeta Camp		Pact vehicle	Alesio Clement	Local Transport: Pact car (Sam Felix) Accommodation: Pact Compound, <i>DOT as alternate if overnight is necessary!</i> (Sam Felix) Local Contact: Clement of Galcholo
Kapoeta- Torit-Kapoeta	Wed 23 <sup>rd</sup> Nov 2005		Pact Kapoeta Camp	<b>Flight Password</b>		Peter Lofane and Rachel Perks	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Local Transport: Benson/Elisha ( clement will be consulted over this) Accommodation: there will no overnight, plane will be on ground or come back later to pick team up when finished <b>Please note Kate Buban needs to travel back to Loki by road and connect to Nairobi: (Sam Felix/Elisha)</b> Local Contact: Pio Anja and the Governor (Alesio)
Kapoeta- Bor	Thurs 24 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		TBD – PARAD ?	<b>Flight Password</b>	TBD	James Both Gatdet	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Local transport: check on NGOs in the area (Benson/Elisha) Accommodation: check on local authorities for accommodation place. <i>There is need for proper camping gear in case</i> Local Contacts: Philip Thon Leek Governor of Jonglei, Mary Nyarieka Chol- MP, Gatkuoth Tiap MP, Thon of DAPS
Bor-Lekuangle	Sat 26 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		COOPI TBC	Flight Password		Kengen Jakor	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Accommodation: book and confirm it with COOPI ( Benson/Elisha) Local Transport: Use COOPI car (Benson/Elisha) Local Contact: David Aruok of PDA

Lekuangle-Pagak	Mon 28 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		GARDOS TBC	Flight <b>Password</b>		Koang Puk	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Local transport: GAARDOS car or other NGO on ground (Benson/Elisha) Accommodation: GAARDOS compound (Benson/Elisha), <i>camping gear (tents, mattresses, bed sheets etc) needed</i> Local Contact: Commissioner, Peace Committee Chairman
Pagak- Ayod *	Wed 30 <sup>th</sup> Nov 2005		Pact Ayod Camp	Flight <b>Password</b>	Pact vehicle	James Both Gatdet	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Accommodation: Pact compound (James Nguany) Local transport: Pact car (James Nguany)  Local Contacts: Mary Nyaulang- SWIDAP, Lony Ruot Koak- SYCP, Ayod Chamber of Commerce, Mary Chiek- Chairlady of Women's' Association, John Toang- CRADA, Nyoon Nin Nguen- White Army, Peter Bhab Both- CBO Network, Stephen Reat Chany- Nuer Peace Council, Majok Gatluak Thoak- BRADO, Peter Gai Lual- Nuer Peace Council, Rev. John Both Reath- Nuer Peace Council, Rachel Nyadak- UNNWA.
Ayod- Juba	Mon 5 <sup>th</sup> Dec 2005			Flight	Hire vehicle	Marv Koop	Charter flight: Benson/Elisha Accommodation: Bros Local transport: Marv to look for taxis Local Contact: Maker Deng Maluo- GOSS
Juba	Tue – Thurs 5 - 8 <sup>th</sup> Dec 2005		Bros (TBC)			Marv Koop, John Lakor, George Echom, Nartisio, Abour	Accommodation? Local Contacts Juba: see Marv Koop
Juba-Loki- Nairobi	Fri 9 <sup>th</sup> Dec			Flight			Lillian to make booking on Delta connection Local transfers: Amimo/Lillian

TBC – to be confirmed  
TRD – to be determined