

**Strengthening the Capacity of Civil
Society and Business to Promote
Sustainable Economic Growth along the
Congo River and its Tributaries**

Mid-Term Evaluation

September 2004

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GLOSSARY

ANR (*Agence Nationale de Renseignement*): Congo Intelligence Agency

ASSARCO (*Association des Armateurs du Congo*): Association of Boat Owners

CBO (Community Based Organization)

Chef du Territoire: Local Administrator; noted as one state service that was/is collecting illegal taxes at ports.

CLIFS (Congo Livelihood Improvement and Food Security Project): The IRM Livelihoods project that takes place in the same areas as this project

CLATS (*Commities de Lutte Anti-Tracasseries*): These CBOs were created at the suggestion of this project to fight against corruption at the community level.

CTO (Cognizant Technical Officer): This is the USAID person responsible for financial and programmatic oversight of a partners project.

DGI (*Direction Generale des Impots*): State service in charge of taxes, working illegally at ports

DGM (*Direction Generale d'Immigration*): Legal State Service for immigration that collects taxes at the ports, often illegally.

EDC (Education Development Center): USAID's partner for its Basic Education project that will start to be implemented in the same areas as IRM (Equateur and Bandundu)

FAC (*Forces Armees Congolaise*): The Kinshasa government's army during the 1998-2003 conflict, before the unification of the armies into the FARDC (Armed Force of DRC)

Hygiene: Legal state service at ports to check health status of travelers

IGAs (Income Generating Activities)

IRM (Innovative Resources Management): A US PVO and USAID's implementing partner for this project.

Manutention: Informal sector service at ports for casual labor and handling.

MLC (*Movement pour la Liberation du Congo*): Rebel force that operated in NorthWest DRC during the conflict and now a political party.

NGO (Non-Governmental Organization)

OCC (*Office Congolaise de Controle*): Legal State Service that collects taxes at the ports.

OFIDA (*Office de Duane et Assise*) Legal State Service that collects taxes at the ports.

RCD (*Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie*): Rebel movement that operated in the East of the DRC during the conflict and now a political party.

Relance Economique (Economic Recovery): The short title of this project

RVF (*Regis de Voies Fluviale*): State Service for control and maintenance of Congo's riverways

SO (Strategic Objective)

SOW (Scope of Work)

TOR (Terms of Reference)

Tracasseries: In the DRC the definition of *tracasserie* is very broad. A *traccaserie* is a form of corruption or abuse by one person who extols power over another person.

UCAB (*Union des Armateurs des Balaniers*): A union of traders on small boats.

USAID (United States Agency for International Development): US Government Donor

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Many thanks to everyone who provided input to the evaluation of IRM's *Relance Economique* (Economic Recovery) project.

To the community committees against *tracasseries* (CLATs) in Lusanga, Kikwit, Mbandaka, Ngombe, and Maita, thank you for taking the time to meet with us and share your insights, observations, and recommendations.

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To Desire Bolefa, thank you for being a core member of our team for the Kinshasa-Mbandaka leg, for your work on individual and group interviews, and for your translation skills.

To the IRM teams in Mbandaka, Kikwit, Lyse Pilon, the Country Manager for IRM/DRC, and all her staff for your work, your time, your hospitality, and logistical assistance. We would have never made it to so many places in such a short time.

And finally to all of those brave individuals who are dedicated to the *Lutte Anti-Tracasseries*, "ensemble on peut reussir!"

PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

1. Country: DRC
2. Project Title: Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society and Business to Promote Sustainable Economic Growth along the Congo River and its Tributaries
3. Implementing Partner: Innovative Resources Management (IRM – a US PVO)
4. Project Dates:
 1. First Project Agreement: August 2003 to March 2004
 2. 1st Cost extension April 2004 to September 2004
 3. 2nd Cost extension October 2004 to September 2005
5. Current Funding: \$999,999 (Phase 1 Funding/Evaluation Period)
\$1,380,000 (Phase 2 Funding, starting October 2004)
Total: \$2,379,999
6. Project Beneficiaries: Primary: Traders, Fishermen, Farmers, and the population in 49 communities along the Congo River and its tributaries in Equateur and Bandundu Provinces

Secondary: The citizens of the DRC
7. Implementation mode: Cooperative Agreement to IRM
8. Project Manager: Lyse Pilon, Country Director IRM
9. USAID CTO: Katherine Nichols, Activity Manager and CTO
10. Previous Evaluations None

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Starting in August 2003, USAID/DRC provided IRM with approximately \$1 million to combat corruption on the Congo River and its tributaries. To address the widespread and pervasive problem of corruption and illegal rent seeking, both of which inhibit economic growth and impact livelihoods of the lower level economic actors along the Congo River corridor and its tributaries, IRM designed the 'Relance Economique project,

In anticipation of USAID's approval for Phase II, beginning in October 2004, the USAID evaluation team conducted a mid-term evaluation of the project in September 2004. The second phase of the project will build on the activities and investments from the original project, as well as expand geographically the project to new areas along waterways of significance. USAID recently signed another cooperative agreement with IRM for \$1.38 million to cover an additional 12 months of project activities.

The purpose of the mid-term evaluation was threefold: to determine the impact of the project in building the capacity of local associations and platforms involved with the fight against *tracasseries*; to evaluate the level and effectiveness of service delivery to community members by these groups; and to evaluate the effectiveness of IRM's approach to capacity building.

In summary, the team believes that IRM has been successful in meeting its three project objectives under Phase I. A general decrease in *tracasseries* and an increase in the level of awareness have been achieved in a significant majority of the target areas.

The team also concluded that the model of local capacity development employed by IRM is appropriate, particularly in light of the sensitive issue of *tracasseries* throughout the DRC. Furthermore, IRM's multi-sectoral approach helped to increase individual project results and impacts.

In addition, the team offers several recommendations to both IRM and USAID to consider as Phase II commences. The main points highlighted for IRM include:

- ensure more frequent visits to targeted communities through the development of detailed implementation and M&E plans;
- ensure that IRM has sufficient staff in place, both in size and technical expertise; provide structured training to the CLATs and assist them in starting income-generating activities to improve organizational sustainability;
- improve the level and type of participation of women; and,
- collect consistent data and provide timely and detailed reporting to USAID.

The team recommended that USAID insist on regular reporting and conduct regular monitoring site visits to IRM's focus areas along the corridor; support complementary programs in the same areas where IRM is working; and actively participate in the development of IRM's implementation plan.

II. INTRODUCTION

A. CONTEXT

The DRC is emerging from 40 years of corruption and dictatorship and almost ten years of armed conflict. In May 1997, the 30 year Mobutu Sese Seko dictatorship was toppled by a rebellion led by Laurent Kabila. Kabila's regime was subsequently challenged by a Rwanda and Uganda backed rebellion in August 1998. In total seven African countries were involved in the conflict. A cease-fire was signed on 10 July 1999, but sporadic fighting continued. Laurent Kabila was assassinated in January 2001 and was succeeded by his son, Joseph Kabila. In October 2002, the majority of foreign forces withdrew from eastern Congo and two months later, an agreement was signed by all remaining warring parties in the country to end the fighting and set up a transitional government of national unity.

As a result of years of misrule and armed conflict, the country is in a shambles. DRC is one of the poorest countries in the world, with desperate indicators for infant and child mortality and the highest maternal and crude mortality rates in the world. GDP has shrunk from \$380 in 1960 to \$167 in 1992 to \$96 in 2002. Eighty percent of the population lives on less than \$0.50 per day.

B. IRM PROJECT SUMMARY

B.1 PROBLEM:

Addressed by IRM

Lack of central government authority, will, and capacity, has meant that government and parastatal workers remain on the state pay roll but are never or rarely paid by the state. This has resulted in a status quo of corruption and illegal rent-seeking behaviors at all levels: from national authorities to military, local authorities, teachers, the health care system, and the list goes on. The Congo's economic management is centered on this excessive illegal and legal taxation and corruption.

A study conducted from April to May 2003 by the USAID-supported IRM project *Relance Economique* (Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society and Business to Promote Sustainable Economic Growth along the Congo River and its Tributaries in the DRC) estimates that only 4% of legally collected fees find their way to the central government coffers. This diversion severely limits the funds available for government investment in such very basic services as a functioning justice system, education, health care, potable water, and the transportation network. The illegal collection of fees and fines by government employees (including the police and the military) by force and by private individuals creates a culture of oppression, legitimized thievery, undermines the rule of law, and creates an environment of fear. Weak government services, non-transparent commercial regulations, and the high cost of food and other essential goods continue to contribute to political instability and violence in the DRC. In addition, these

high levels of corruption are a central factor in the reluctance of foreign and domestic commercial investors to invest in the DRC.

The Congo's transportation network has fallen into complete disrepair due to lack of maintenance. As a result, the country's economy is dependant on what is often referred to as Congo's backbone, the Congo River. This river and its tributaries form a mass transportation grid throughout a large part of the country: in Orientale, Equateur, Bandundu, Kinshasa, and Bas-Congo Provinces. The Congo River serves as a "superhighway" for the evacuation of produce from the interior of the country and for the transport of commercial goods from major cities to the interior. Farmers, fishermen, hunters, and craftsmen in the Provinces of Orientale, Equateur, and Bandundu, sell their goods to barges and pirogues that frequent the Congo's river ways.

According to a study conducted by IRM¹, this environment of illegal taxation and *tracasseries*² is also the cause of many conflicts at the local level. IRM's survey showed that 35% of people interviewed believe that the number one cause of conflict in their area takes place when people refuse to pay illegal taxes. 41% of people stated that conflict in their communities is caused by lack of understanding, including knowledge of what is a legal versus illegal tax and what their individual rights are.

Additional Factors that Contribute to Problem

The war severely reduced river trade. The country was effectively divided into three main parts: RCD-Goma in the East, MLC in the Northwest, and Government forces loyal to Kabila (the FAC) in the West. The Province of Equateur was divided between the MLC and the FAC. The FAC kept the provincial capital of Mbandaka and the MLC created Gemena as their provincial capital. The Congo River was thus divided, and trade

¹ "Enquete sur l'Evaluation des Tracasseries et l'Inventaire des Conflits dans les zones d'Intervention de IRM; Philippe Ngwala Malemba, IRM M&E Officer, May 2004

² Note: The word *tracasserie* does not translate well into English. In lieu of finding an English word, we will use the french word *tracasserie* with the following definition. In the DRC the definition of *tracasserie* is very broad. A *tracasserie* is a form of corruption or abuse by one person who extols power over another person. *Tracasseries* can happen:

- at the family level between a husband and wife (spousal abuse);
- at the community level between a teacher and a student (teachers often hold pop quizzes and the students who are absent have to make up for the quiz after hours. This means that the student has to contribute money to the teachers overtime if they want to make up the quiz);
- at the community level between a patient and a hospital (hospitals will hold patients hostage if they do not pay their bill upon release);
- between local authorities and commercial vendors, traders, fishermen, and farmers (military and civil authorities demand illegal taxes and can fine or imprison someone for not paying) ; and
- at the national level by central government authorities (stealing from central coffers or not paying wages to state employees).

Tracasseries have become a way of life in the absence of human rights, good leadership, and local governance. The cycle of *tracasseur* over *tracassée* will continue to exist until the state pays their bloated public sector salaries, until people know their rights, and until the economy begins to recover. The first of those three things, salary payments, is outside of the hands of the IRM project but the second two are being addressed through information dissemination, training, and agricultural support and development.

between Kinshasa and Kisangani ceased. At the same time, the state system had become severely bloated by state employees who were not being paid. In order to earn their income, government services began setting up shop where the money was coming into and out of their “area of responsibility”: at the ports. Despite a law that was decreed in March 2002 that prohibits government services beyond the main four (OCC, DGM, Hygiene, and OFIDA³), an IRM survey in 2003 found that an average of 20 public services were functioning and demanding taxes at the ports along the Congo river and its tributaries. The traders who sold their produce at these ports were forced to pay a tax to each of the 20 services. Out of all these taxes, only 8% were legal, putting an enormous burden on the local trader so that production of goods was often more costly than what they were able to sell it for after taxes. In 2003, IRM estimated that the profit margin for the average local trader was 4%. If they were to eliminate all *tracasseries*, the profit margin would be 33%.

Following the peace agreement and the institution of a unified transitional government in June 2003, the ability to travel and trade across former front lines resumed. This enabled boat convoys from the interior of the country to travel from one former rebel-held area to another, thereby improving trade. However, the country’s transportation river and road infrastructure had deteriorated significantly over the past ten years, and the pre-war level of trade has not yet returned.

B.2 THEORY OF INTERVENTION

IRM’s proposal argues that by reducing petty corruption such as illegal taxes, inflated legal taxes, and illegal rent-seeking behaviors, the Congo’s provincial and in turn, national economies will be jump-started to generate employment and government revenues, thus removing some of the pressures of poverty. Furthermore, IRM states that alleviating these stress factors in turn will help in reducing civil strife and the vulnerability of sub-groups within the population to manipulation by political elites. Until corruption and impunity for economic crimes are effectively addressed, they argue, conflict will continue to be a way of life in the DRC.

B.3 DESIGN OF PROJECT

IRM designed the ‘*Relance Economique*’ project to address the problems of corruption and illegal rent-seeking, both of which inhibit economic growth and impact livelihoods of the lower level economic actors along the Congo River corridor and its tributaries. The original cooperative agreement was issued for a period of eighteen months (from October 2002 to March 2004). Phase II of the project was authorized through a follow-on cooperative agreement which has extended the project completion date to September 30, 2005. The second phase of the project will build on the activities and investments from the original project, as well as expand geographically the project to new areas along waterways of significance. Since the completion of the evaluation, IRM has received a follow-on grant of \$1.38 million for an additional 12 months.

³ OCC: Commercial Surveillance Service; DGM: Immigration Service; ; Hygiene is for Health services; and OFIDA: Customs Service

To achieve the goal of reducing illegal taxes, fines, and rent-seeking along the Congo River, IRM focused its activities around three objectives:

Objective 1: Increased public and stakeholder awareness of the social and economic costs of illegal rent-seeking behaviors, and the potential benefits of more transparent policies and practices for regulating traffic on Congo's waterways

Indicators:

- Baseline survey report completed
- Multi-stakeholder coalition meetings held to disseminate report findings and organize activities
- Press communiqué and media spots designed and facilitated multi-stakeholder process
- Research and analysis on social and economic effects of illegal rent-seeking disseminated to public audiences through multiple media outlets

Objective 2: Enhanced advocacy role for a broad range of stakeholder groups and coalitions with interest in the Congo's river transportation system with the aim of reducing illegal rent-seeking by the government.

Indicators:

- Stakeholder groups and coalitions gain capabilities for advocacy on behalf of reduction of illegal rent-seeking on Congo's waterways
- Stakeholder groups and coalitions actively advocating for reduced illegal rent-seeking
- Stakeholder groups and coalitions crafting and communicating policy recommendations to government officials
- Multi-stakeholders create opportunities for direct engagement with government officials
- Interested government officials participate in stakeholder capacity building workshops and TA sessions

Objective 3: Stakeholder groups with strengthened ability to provide services to constituents become more sustainable in the areas of operations and advocacy.

Indicators:

- Stakeholder group assessments conducted
- Participatory selection process for technical assistance priorities completed
- Specialized tech assistance provided in identified priority areas
- Stakeholder groups acquire identifiable strategies for long-term viability of organizational mission
- Effectiveness of organizations service provision to membership or client constituencies enhanced
- Membership or active constituent levels of stakeholder groups increased.

IRM developed its activities around the core theory that civil society, business associations, and government authorities all have a stake, as well as play a critical role, in addressing the problems of illegal taxation along the Congo River corridor. The assumption was that all parties would benefit from increased economic activity along the river which results from ‘normalization’ of the system. IRM’s initial project used the approach of encouraging all stakeholders to become activists in the fight against corruption. Recognizing that the obstacles to overthrowing the entrenched system of status-quo corruption, which has become taboo for the population to discuss openly, IRM placed the emphasis on opening and supporting channels of communication between the various stakeholder groups, government officials, and others. This approach gave rise to the formation (or, in some cases, the strengthening of pre-existing, loosely-formed community groups) to the CLATs – Committee de Lutte Anti-Tracasseries (translation: the Committees Fighting Against *Tracasseries*).

IRM chose the geographical location for its activities based on discussions with the Government of DRC, the World Bank, and USAID/Kinshasa. At the time of the evaluation, IRM is working with approximately 15 CLATs in Equateur Province and 25-30 in Bandundu Province (10 on Kasai River axis; 10 on Kwilu River axis, and 5 on Mai-Ndombe axis).⁴ Finally, there is one CLAT in the formative stage located in Kisangani. IRM plans to increase its level of involvement in Orientale Province.

At the same time, IRM is conducting a complementary project in the same areas to improve agricultural production. This project has also helped to strengthen community participation in anti-corruption activities as they began to get organized to generate agricultural produce and increase income levels. This project is also USAID funded and is called CLIFS.

IRM’s staffing pattern for the Relance Economique project includes a Team Leader, Deputy/Logistics Manager, 2 facilitators in Kinshasa (1 River Expert, 1 Legal Advisor), and 3 facilitators per province (Equateur and Bandundu).

C. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY OF EVALUATION

The purpose of the mid-term evaluation was threefold: to determine the impact of the project in building the capacity of local associations and platforms involved with the fight against *tracasseries*; to evaluate the level and effectiveness of service delivery to community members by these groups; to evaluate the effectiveness of IRM’s approach to capacity building.

⁴ Note: CLATs are continuing to form throughout the project areas. These figures reflect the number of CLATs in existence at the time of the evaluation.

Methodology:

The team's plan was to conduct interviews and site visits with IRM field offices in Mbandaka (Equateur Province) and Kikwit (Bandundu); the local associations that have been forming along the river, also known as CLATs (Committee de Lutte Anti-Tracasserie) along the Congo and Kwilu rivers. In order to evaluate the project, the team decided to collect information using the following methods:

A three member team from USAID flew to Mbandaka in Equateur Province to take the IRM boat from Mbandaka to Bandundu, stopping at six IRM targeted communities along the route and discuss progress to date with the communities in each location. At the same time the team planned to conduct key informant interviews with IRM staff. The six communities were: Mbandaka, Ngombe, Maita, Mushie, Bandundu, Lusanga, and Kikwit. However, when the team arrived in Mbandaka, one of the boats two engines had broken the same day so the journey was rearranged to make up for the time that would be lost in travel on the boat. Thus, the team decided to take the boat from Mbandaka to Kinshasa, visiting Mbandaka, Ngombe, and Maita along the route. The team then flew from Kinshasa to Kikwit and drove to Lusanga to conduct the Bandundu part of the evaluation.

Sampling⁵:

Selected five communities targeted by IRM along the key river routes (Congo and Kwilu Rivers)

- Equateur Province: Mbandaka, Ngombe, Maita,,
- Bandundu Province: Lusanga, and Kikwit

Conducted group interviews with the associations (CLATs)

- Group interviews with CLATs in each location
 - 5 CLATs interviewed
 - Total of 33 CLAT members in Equateur Province
 - Total of 23 CLAT members in Bandundu

Conducted individual interviews with community members

- Individual interviews with traders, fisherman, and farmers, and market women in each location – 18 individual interviews in Equateur⁶

Conducted key informant interviews IRM staff.

- Key informant interviews with IRM Staff –
 - Management in Kinshasa – 1 person (Country Director)
 - IRM Field Office in Mbandaka – 1 Team leader and 2 facilitators
 - IRM Field Office in Kikwit – 1 Team Leader and 2 facilitators
- Key informant interview with CLAT member from Bilili (Bandundu Province)

Conducted Market Survey on Key Staple Goods

- Compare prices between locations along the river
- Compare prices and availability now and one year ago

⁵ Note: See Annex 5 for details and names of people interviewed.

⁶ Time constraints prevented the team from conducting individual interviews in Bandundu Province.

Observation

- Took place at ports, in markets and communities in general. Useful for drawing comparisons between sites but not useful, as originally hoped, in comparing present and past for linkages between price and existence of tracasseries.

D. LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS

The team encountered several constraints and limitations during the course of the evaluation. Though none proved significant enough to deter the work, it is important to note them so that they can be avoided in future evaluation missions in the DRC.

- Geographic scope of the project is very large and the evaluation period was only one week so the sample size for the evaluation was limited
- Boat motor problems led to last minute change in itinerary and the scope of the evaluation was reduced
- A lack of consistent, comparative data, especially for the market survey made it difficult to assess the impact of the project on price fluctuations
- While good information was available in some areas, poor quality quarterly reporting from implementing partner – increased time required to collect information

III. FINDINGS

General Findings

IRM's Phase 1 indicators are listed below. While the team did not intend to measure IRM's performance on each indicator, it is important to note that IRM's quarterly reports did not provide information on indicator progress. The team had to look at many different sources in order to find basic information on IRM's performance according to the project indicators. A general summary of the team's findings on IRM's performance against its indicators is listed below.

IRM Indicators (From initial proposal)	Status at time of Evaluation (09/04)
Objective 1	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Baseline survey report completed 	Completed baseline and follow-up surveys (2003 and 2004)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-stakeholder coalition meetings held to disseminate report findings and organize activities 	Achieved Initial workshops: Kinshasa, 2003; Mbandaka, 2003; Bandundu, 2003 Follow up workshops: Mbandaka and Bandundu, 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Press communiqué and media spots designed and facilitated multi-stakeholder process 	Achieved
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Research and analysis on social and economic effects of illegal rent-seeking disseminated to public audiences through multiple media outlets 	Achieved – 1 report
Objective 2	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder groups and coalitions gain capabilities for advocacy on behalf of reduction of illegal rent-seeking on Congo's waterways 	Achieved through workshops and information dissemination on illegal taxation issues
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder groups and coalitions actively advocating for reduced illegal rent-seeking 	In progress, currently more than 15 active CLATs in Equateur and 25-30 active CLATs in Bandundu
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder groups and coalitions crafting and communicating policy recommendations to government officials 	In progress. Examples to follow in report.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Multi-stakeholders create opportunities for direct 	In progress. Examples to follow in report.

engagement with government officials	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interested government officials participate in stakeholder capacity building workshops and TA sessions 	Yes, examples to be found in some, but not all, targeted communities.
Objective 3	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder group assessments conducted 	Not started
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participatory selection process for technical assistance priorities completed 	In progress as of June 2004
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specialized tech assistance provided in identified priority areas 	Not directly through this project at this time. Started through the IRM CLIFS project
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder groups acquire identifiable strategies for long-term viability of organizational mission 	Brainstorming has begun. No visible progress at time of evaluation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Effectiveness of organizations service provision to membership or client constituencies enhanced 	Service provision of CLATs still in early stages
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Membership or active constituent levels of stakeholder groups increased. 	CLATs did not exist prior to this project and now there are more than 30 CLATs with average of 15-20 members per CLAT

Evaluation Question 1: What approaches were used for creating the CLATs and strengthening the NGO Platforms?

IRM took a two-pronged approach to addressing corruption: first at the national level and then at the local level. IRM has engaged more than 15 ministries in the fight against corruption that have helped to support the subsequent formation and functioning of the CLATs described below.

Government involvement in the fight against corruption
 In the course of a meeting with IRM, the Minister of Interior and Security made the following statement: " I commend IRM for your approach. You are not accusing the Government of corruption or unwillingness to address it, but instead you are trying to bring all key players together to raise their awareness of corruption and engage them collectively in the effort to eliminate it."

Prior to the project, the communities had some ad hoc associations, but no organized platforms or local committees. In general, civil society structures within the communities were weak and unorganized if not absent altogether. In Lusanga (a village situated on the Kwilu River about 25 kms from Kikwit), community members called the project a "wake up call" to snap them out of their malaise and get the community members working together in order to be more effective. The creation of the CLATS and the Platforms was

at the request, and due to recommendations resulting from, attendees of participative workshops in Kinshasa, Mbandaka, and Bandundu. That said, community willingness, enthusiasm, and mobilization were also critical factors in the genesis of the CLATs. The services provided by these Platforms and CLATs are both new to, and very much at the infancy stage in most of the communities that they serve.

From the beginning of the project, IRM has taken a hands off capacity building approach that does not include formal training. IRM did not seek to dictate the development of NGO platforms or CLATs but rather sought to encourage and accompany their development. This approach has encouraged many different groups within communities to participate around the common theme of corruption, *tracasseries*, and *relance economique*: themes that affect everyone at all levels. The approach was part “laissez faire” and part educative to ensure community design and ownership of the project.

Informal training/capacity building of the NGO Platforms and the CLAT has taken place during workshops and follow up site visits in the 50 targeted communities. This informal training addressed **advocacy, networking/partnerships, community participation, and conflict resolution.**

Chart 1 below is a flow chart illustrating IRM’s approach to creating and strengthening community-based organizations to fight *tracasseries*. (For further details of IRM Activities, refer to Annex 5)

IRM CAPACITY BUILDING FLOW CHART




Chart 1

Evaluation Question 2: Were the approaches to development of the CLATs effective?

In Bandundu, CLATs were spontaneously created following IRM's Kinshasa workshop in June 2003. In Equateur, the communities were slower to get organized; CLATs started to form following the June 2004 workshop in Mbandaka

CLAT structure varies from area to area and is very ad hoc. IRM did not provide a standard model but made general suggestions instead. As a result, some CLATs are more democratic than others; some are more gender balanced; and some have more participation of local authorities.

The institutional capacity of the CLATs in terms of management, financial management, and potential for sustainability is weak. Because of the ad hoc nature of their creation they have received no training and hold no legal status. On the other hand, it is fair to say the majority of the CLATs are "owned" by their communities and they have asked very little from IRM to get them up and running.

Women's participation in the CLATs was limited and during interviews with the CLATs, their participation was not always encouraged. However the activities of the CLATs are essential to women's activities as women are the main bread winners and vendors in market places.

Effectiveness of the CLATs depended on participation of local authorities. In areas where authorities were not involved, the existence of the CLATs was a source of conflict, and the CLATs were less effective at getting illegal taxes reduced.

Their weak management structures and their lack of legal status pose several difficulties for the CLATs. They want to be seen as "mediators" between the population and the authorities, they want to be able to dedicate much of their time to CLAT activities, but neither are completely possible because they hold no official or formal status. This problem was pointed out by each of the 5 CLATs that were interviewed during the evaluation. At the same time- unless they become economically viable in their own right, the CLATs risk becoming just another unpaid, unmotivated public service.

IRM field staff were limited for the geographic scope of the project: 3 field staff in Bandundu and 3 in Equateur, with support from the Country Director (part time in Kikwit and part time in Kinshasa). This did not allow for regular IRM follow up, monitoring, and site visits in all of the 50 targeted communities.

The CLATs sited several steps that need to be taken at this stage to ensure the continued effectiveness of the CLAT structure and to further reduce ongoing *tracasseries* and reinforce community initiatives. The CLATs themselves, together with IRM and all of the participants in the June workshops, developed a list of recommendations for their continuation. Their main recommendations that were reinforced during the interviews with the 5 CLATs include:


- 1) Need to reinforce the capacity of the CLATs: elaborate a TOR for the CLATs and create a harmonized procedure for their activities
- 2) Need to make the CLATs more dynamic through trainings on: conflict management, Gender-Based Violence, leadership, and management
- 3) Need to create a communication network so that communities can share information and so that local or provincial authorities can be kept informed if there are state agents who are harassing the population.
- 4) Need to have a permanent office for each CLAT that includes a public library with documentation on: all the rules and regulations on river transport, the rights and obligations of Congolese citizens, codes of conduct for state agents, the laws of the Congo, the civil code, the penal code, the family code, lesson modules on management of micro-projects, conflict management, and *code de procedure familiale*.
- 5) Need to assist the CLATs to further generate and disseminate information

Evaluation Question 3: What role has the project played, if any, in reducing illegal taxes and rent seeking behaviors and how?

Most of the places visited by the team reported a reduction in illegal taxation. A notable exception is in Ngombe and Mbandaka, where those interviewed, the CLATs and community members, cannot provide concrete examples of a reduction of illegal taxes. They can however, explain that the taboo of *tracasseries* has significantly reduced as people are much more open to speak out and document *tracasseries*. Results did vary depending on the community, their level of engagement, and the length of time after an IRM workshop or visit. Other outside factors also played a strong role in reducing *tracasseries*, especially in Equateur which was previously highly militarized during the war (More details on external factors are listed under question 5 below).

IRM's pre and post surveys report that the cost of illegal taxes was reduced by 49% between April 2003 and April 2004. The profit margin of traders on the River has increased from 4% to 16% over this same time period. According to 42.5% of people interviewed in Bandundu Province, the decrease in *tracasseries* in the interior of the country is due to the interventions of the CLATs. However no one in Equateur attributed the decrease to the CLATs (this could also be because the CLATs were not fully formed and functioning when the survey was conducted, while they were formed in Bandundu). Every targeted community now has a CLAT that is more or less active within their community.

Graph 1 shows the change in illegal taxes by state service between April 2003 and April 2004 according to the survey conducted by IRM in May 2004. The graph shows that while in 2003 there were 24 state services demanding taxes at the ports, in 2004 there were only 17 state services still demanding taxes and at a greatly reduced level. In areas where there has been an increase, IRM notes that these increases are for legal rather than illegal taxes.



Source: IRM survey, May 2004

The Role of the CLATs in Reducing Tracasseries

As noted above, the CLATs formed in Bandundu Province at a faster pace than in Equateur, but in general their activities are the same.

CLAT activities include:

1. Motivating communities members to work together, including local government officials, members of the military, farmers, traders, fishermen, market women, and other associations and local CBOs to fight against *tracasseries* and reduce illegal taxes. The core lesson they share is that communities can be stronger if they work together

2. Conducting their own awareness raising in their communities using the information and materials that was given to them by IRM during the Provincial Workshops and during site visits

Example of Functioning CLAT

The President of CLAT in Bilili village (Bandundu Province) reported that his committee's intervention with local authorities resulted in the reimbursement of 3000 FC per shop of taxes that were illegally collected by an employee of the environment office.

He also reported that his committee denounced, by letter addressed to the boat owner, the boat manager who was demanding a 10 percent commission for allocating space on the boat to traders. The boat owner immediately terminated the employment of the corrupt manager and replaced him with another one.

3. Informing merchants, traders, economic actors in the community about what taxes are legal and illegal. In some areas, CLATs are responsible for posting signs at the ports with this type of information

4. Relating outcomes of the Bandundu and Equateur workshops during meetings within their own communities in order to explain how the fight against corruption is working at the provincial and national levels and explain what has been achieved at those levels

5. Collecting reports from community members of *tracasseries* that occur in their communities, document the cases, and take them to the relevant authorities to negotiate on behalf of the community member who reports the case
6. Summarizing the documented cases of *tracasseries* and report them to the Provincial authorities, sometimes with the help of IRM
7. Writing reports to IRM on their activities and constraints
8. Starting to identify Income Generating Activities (IGAs) that will help support the sustainability of their activities. CLATs have begun to ask IRM to help them get started on these IGAs

Some Examples of the CLAT Activities and Results

During the Bandundu workshop ASSARCO (association of boat owners) and UCAB (*Association des Armateurs des Ballaniers*) denounced various types of *tracasseries*, giving examples of illegal taxation by local authorities and community members. As a result, various letters were written by the local authorities and by some of the CLATs, documenting cases of *tracasseries* and denouncing these *tracasseries*. IRM then distributed these letters around Bandundu Province when they conducted their field visits, which has enabled the CLATs to show success stories to their own communities.

Due to work with the CLAT, the general of the first military region changed the system for taking people to court for not paying taxes, or for any other offense. Before civilians had to go to the military court, where there is no defense counsel. Following instructions by the general, local authorities now send civilians to the public courts, where in theory, they should be represented by a lawyer.

At the national level, following the Kinshasa workshop, the Minister of Transport wrote a letter that forbids the DGM to check transportation documents because it is not appropriate for them to do so within Congo's borders. This has also assisted in the reduction of *tracasseries* by the DGM. The Minister of Transport also wrote a letter forbidding the Navy (which patrols the Congo River and its tributaries) to check documents for materials shipped on the river.

Also at the national level, the Minister of the Interior wrote a letter to ban the utilization of the *laissez passer* for military to travel free on the river. Now the military have to pay their own way.

Radio: In Mbandaka, where a reduction of taxes was not documented but where the taboo had significantly decreased, IRM attributed this to the workshops, the CLATs activities, and to local radio transmissions about legal and illegal taxes and *tracasseries*.

Film: IRM took footage of *tracasseries* at the beginning of the project and then created a documentary. IRM showed this film on large projection screens while conducting field visits to

the targeted communities. The film had a big impact on reducing the taboo surrounding *tracasseries*.

Table 2 shows the change in *tracasseries* in each location visited during the evaluation.

Location	Situation reported before the project	Situation Reported after the project
Mbandaka	People were scared to discuss <i>tracasseries</i>	The taboo has been reduced and more discussion is taking place. Taxes remain the same however.
Maita	Taxes were between 100-2000 FC per merchant/week and 100 FC per sack of fish.	Now tax set at 100 FC per merchant per week plus 100 FC per sack of fish.
Ngombe	At the market, 50 FC per day per merchant and 1000 FC per market stall.	Generally the situation is the same; some reduction noticed immediately following workshops – but temporary
Kikwit	Between 1,700 FC and 12,500 FC per person to the DGM to permit travel on the river.	Now 500 FC for the police fee for travel, nothing is collected by the DGM.
	Tax to the commune for a market stall/day used to be 500 FC.	Now it is 50 FC per day per stall.
	There were a lot of services at the port, each of whom demanded various taxes	Now only 4 services function and ask for taxes at the port.
	There was no information on how to find out about legal taxation versus illegal taxation	All services at the port have begun to respect the laws, and documentation on legal taxes is available.
	There was no cooperation between civil society and the military authorities	IRM put up a sign at the port that explains illegal taxation and the sign is still there and has not been damaged after one year
		The CLAT spread messages over the radio
		The population is beginning to understand that there are some legal taxes that they do need to pay, and that the government is not paying salaries, which is the major reason for <i>tracasseries</i> .
	A sack of manioc was taxed at 50% of its value	Now a sack of manioc is taxed 20 FC
	12 services at the port	Now 4 services at the port

Lusanga	People were scared to report <i>tracasseries</i>	People are no longer scared to report and resist <i>tracasseries</i> because they now have information on what the laws are.
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Source: Data collected by USAID Evaluation Team

Evaluation Question 4: Are beneficiaries' lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided?

The farmers, fishermen, traders, and merchants now have more money now because they don't pay illegal taxes. Data above shows that traders have a profit margin that is 10% higher this year than the previous year, so their purchasing power has therefore increased.

The CLAT in Kikwit explained that it is difficult for the general population to notice a big change in their lives because the town is so large and it has always maintained a certain amount of trade. However, they say, in the villages the changes are much more noticeable. Markets are fuller, and the populations are much more encouraged to work, produce, and trade.

With the additional income that was a result of decreased taxation, almost everyone cited that they would use it to send their children to school and pay for medicines. In Lusanga, this was illustrated by school enrollment: 500 children began the 2003-2004 school year and only 300 remained in school at the end of the year due to inability to pay for school fees. This year, the community expects more children to be able to complete the school year.

Impact on community members

A market woman interviewed in Lusanga village (Bandundu Province) acknowledged that there has been an increase in her income level as a result of reduced *tracasseries*. The extra income has improved her family access to education and health care. She is now able to send all her five children to school, whereas before she could pay school fees for only two of them.

There used to be a lot of different control posts along the roads and the rivers but now the CLATs, the communities, and the local authorities are beginning to limit them. This will reduce harassment along these routes (including sexual violence, and illegal taxes) by authorities on the population that they are controlling.

Evaluation Question 5: What other factors contributed to the increase or decrease of *tracasseries*?

External factors have played a large role in reduction of *tracasseries*. Specific factors noted by the evaluation team included the following:

- End of the war and re-unification of the country
- Opening up of river and other commercial traffic
- Reduction in military presence in areas decreased the demand on the population to provide troops with rations (including food and money)

- Reinforced authority of central government
- Other projects in the area, including IRMs Livelihood Improvement Project. Communities had a difficult time distinguishing between the work of the CLATs and that of IRM's CLIFS livelihood project. Although CLIFS was planned to complement the anti-corruption activities by increasing agricultural production, the change in prices found at the markets, cannot be directly linked to a reduction in taxes.
- Seasonal production also contributes to price fluctuation so it is difficult to link increased profit margin due to reduced *tracasseries* with price fluctuation on the market.

An IRM survey in May 2004 listed the perceptions of community members in targeted communities on causes for changes (increases or decreases) of *tracasseries*. The results of this survey are listed below. They demonstrate that 57% of people interviewed believe that there has been a reduction of *tracasseries*. Of those, 18.25% attribute the change to the activities of the CLATs and 20.35% attribute it to the end of the war.

Reduction in tracasseries: yes, no, why?	Total %	Bandundu	Equateur
YES there has been a reduction of <i>tracasseries</i>	57.19%	63.1%	52.89%
1. CLAT Activities	18.25	42.5	0
2. End of the War	20.35	1.87	34
3. Increased awareness of the population	6.32	7.46	5.45
4. Departure of military troops	5.26	0.75	8.65
5. No answer	2.63	3.73	1.92
6. Official cancellation of certain legal taxes	2.63	2.61	2.87
7. Involvement of authorities	1.23	2.99	0
8. Commission of Peace and Justice	0.35	0.75	0
9. Witchcraft	0.17	0.37	0
Number of people interviewed (N)	326	154	172
NO there has not been a reduction in <i>tracasseries</i>	42.80	36.97	47.11
1. <i>Tracasseurs</i> have moved to smaller villages from the big towns	11.93	2.61	19.22
2. No answer	8.95	10.1	8.02
3. Increase in taxes	5.26	4.85	5.44
4. No respect for Human Rights	5.26	1.12	8.34
5. Ignorance	3.33	1.12	4.80
6. Lack of will	2.46	5.6	0
7. Impunity	1.75	3.36	0.65
8. Corruption	1.23	2.24	0.64
9. Lack of follow up	2.63	5.97	0
Number of people interviewed (N)	326	154	172

Source: IRM Survey, May 2004

The diagrams below illustrate the difference in attribution by communities in Bandundu and Equateur. As shown, the 42.5% of the people interviewed in Bandundu report a direct link between CLAT activities and the reduction of *tracasseries* in May 2004. The survey also shows that the communities in Equateur did not make a correlation between reduction of *tracasseries* and CLAT activities, which is partially due to the fact that CLATs were not functioning there until after the second workshop that took place in Mbandaka in June 2004.

COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF CAUSE FOR TRACASSERIES REDUCTION
BANDUNDU



COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF CAUSE FOR TRACASSERIES REDUCTION
EQUATEUR



IV. CONCLUSIONS

IRM has generally met its three objectives under the first phase of the *Relance Economique* project as demonstrated in the indicator table on page 9 and by the findings that illustrate a general decrease in *tracasseries* and an increase in awareness about illegal taxes. However, the team found that communities and CLATs require encouragement, training, and structure; and that without follow up *tracasseries* tend to return.

Because the project was slow in starting up, for several reasons, IRM's progress towards achieving objective 3 (Stakeholder groups with strengthened ability to provide services) was limited. However, now that the CLATs have formed more cohesively in more than 30 communities, IRM's involvement with them will be able to increase substantially, including the capacity building/training component of the project. In addition, more site visits should be possible now that IRM has fully outfitted its barge and can travel more efficiently up and down the river corridors.

In light of the sensitivity and high level of taboos surrounding *tracasseries*, IRM's approach to capacity building that emphasizes community participation and ownership, was appropriate. However, this model takes a long time to see results and requires consistent follow up if the results are to be maintained and multiplied.

Overall, the level of *tracasseries* has decreased and the profit margin of traders has increased because they are paying fewer taxes. People in these areas now have more money to spend on basic needs such as school fees and supplies and health care. Community members also have more incentive to produce and sell goods because of this reduction in taxes.

Participation of military, local authorities, women, etc. in the CLAT varied from community to community. Those CLATS that were more successful, had more diverse and complete participation.

Most community members say however that *tracasseries* will not go away entirely until the economy improves significantly and state agents are paid. Therefore, the project's success is dependent on many external factors outside of IRM's control.

IRM's multi-sectoral approach helped to increase individual project results and impacts. For example, the CLIFS project gave the community visible material support without which it is difficult to assess how participative/motivated the communities would have been in forming the CLATs.

Bandundu Province is much further along than Equateur due to an earlier start, more IRM follow up, and external factors. The results seen in Bandundu clearly illustrate this head-start and highlight the importance of frequent site visits.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

FOR IRM:

- 1) Ensure more structured and frequent follow-up visits to targeted communities, particularly in Equateur.
- 2) Develop a detailed implementation plan and establish a monitoring/field visit schedule for its teams to follow.
- 3) Review current staffing pattern to ensure that there are adequate numbers of personnel in the field to implement and monitor the activities.
- 4) Develop a network for reporting and communicating information about *tracasseries*. Perhaps create a simple database to log and track this type of information.
- 5) Provide structured training to CLATs on organizational management (including financial management and M&E).
- 6) Assist CLATs to get started with income-generating activities. Perhaps build upon the relatively informal linkages with IRM's CLIFS projects that have already been established.
- 7) Provide conflict management and resolution training to CLATs.
- 8) Provide small incentive items to CLATs to boost morale and promote their recognition as functioning, legitimate CBOs.
- 9) Ensure the participation of the local authorities in the CLATs and facilitate their inclusion where there has been friction.
- 10) Ensure adequate participation of women in the CLATs.
- 11) Timely and detailed quarterly reporting is required. IRM should focus reports on results, by indicator as per the cooperative agreement and modification to make reports more robust and result/impact-oriented.
- 12) Collect consistent data over the life of the project. More systematic studies should take place to document and analyze price fluctuation and income levels of farmers, fishermen, merchants, and traders.
- 13) Work with USAID's basic education partner – Education Development Center (EDC) - on their new education project, which will take place in the same areas as this project to increase impact through multi-sectoral programming.

FOR USAID:

- 1) USAID should insist on regular reporting and conduct regular monitoring site visits to IRM's focus areas along the corridor
- 2) USAID should continue to support complementary programs in the same areas where IRM is working
- 3) Now that Phase two has begun (October 1, 2004), USAID should be actively involved in the design of the detailed implementation plan.

ANNEX 1

Scope of Work

<p>USAID Project to be Evaluated: Strengthening the capacity of civil society and business to promote sustainable economic growth along the Congo River and its tributaries in the DRC</p>	<p>Initial and Final Funding Years: August 21 2002-September 2005</p>
<p>Type Evaluation: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Mid-Term <input type="checkbox"/> Final <input type="checkbox"/> <i>Post-Facto/Impact</i></p>	<p>Source and Amount of USAID funding: ESF and DA, \$999,999 + \$1,380,000 =\$2,379,999</p>
<p>Purpose and Intended Uses of the Evaluation:</p> <p>This evaluation is being undertaken to inform the second phase of project implementation. This is the first evaluation of the project and is a final evaluation of phase one. USAID is interested to know the possibility of replicating the project approach in other parts of the Congo.</p> <p>The audiences of the report will be the USAID Mission, specifically the DG SO team, IRM, PROCADEM, RDA, UAD, CATE, and the CLATs to share with beneficiary communities, the govt. local authorities, and civil society.</p> <p>NGOs: to replicate certain approaches that have been effective USAID: share with other partners; use as basis to make funding decisions in the future, i.e. replication; IRM and NGO platforms: To implement recommendations, improve project approaches Government: Use it to inform anti-corruption practices throughout the country, to show successes/what works and what doesn't work.</p>	
<p>Brief Description of Project and it's Intended Results:</p> <p>A study conducted by the USAID-supported IRM project <i>Relance Economique</i> (Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society and Business to Promote Sustainable Economic Growth along the Congo River and its Tributaries in the DRC) estimates that only 4% of legally collected fees find their way to the central government coffers. This diversion severely limits the funds available for government investment in such very basic services as a functioning justice system, education, health care, potable water, and the transportation network. The absence of needed social services contributes to political instability and violence. Further, this level of corruption is a central factor in the reluctance of foreign and domestic interests to invest in the DRC and so to jump-start the national economy, provide jobs, government revenues, and remove some of the pressures of poverty that contribute to the continuing civil strife and vulnerability to manipulation</p>	

by political elites. In addition, the illegal collection of fees and fines by government employees (including the police and the military) by force and by private individuals creates a culture of oppression, legitimized thievery, undermines the rule of law, and creates an environment of fear. Until corruption and impunity for economic crimes is effectively addressed, conflict will continue to be a way of life in the DRC.

Project Goal: Reduced illegal taxes, fines and rent-seeking along the Congo river and its major tributaries

Objective 1: Increased public and stakeholder awareness of the social and economic costs of illegal rent-seeking behaviors, and the potential benefits of more transparent policies and practices for regulating traffic on Congo's waterways

Indicators:

- Baseline survey report completed
- Multi-stakeholder coalition meetings held to disseminate report findings and organize activities
- Press communiqué and media spots designed and facilitated multi-stakeholder process
- Research and analysis on social and economic effects of illegal rent-seeking disseminated to public audiences through multiple media outlets

Objective 2: Enhanced advocacy role for a broad range of stakeholder groups and coalitions with interest in the Congo's river transportation system with the aim of reducing illegal rent-seeking by the government.

Indicators:

- Stakeholder groups and coalitions gain capabilities for advocacy on behalf of reduction of illegal rent-seeking on Congo's waterways
- Stakeholder groups and coalitions actively advocating for reduced illegal rent-seeking
- Stakeholder groups and coalitions crafting and communicating policy recommendations to government officials
- Multi-stakeholders create opportunities for direct engagement with government officials
- Interested government officials participate in stakeholder capacity building workshops and TA sessions

Objective 3: Stakeholder groups with strengthened ability to provide services to constituents become more sustainable in the areas of operations and advocacy.

Indicators:

- Stakeholder group assessments conducted
- Participatory selection process for technical assistance priorities completed
- Specialized tech assistance provided in identified priority areas

- Stakeholder groups acquire identifiable strategies for long-term viability of organizational mission
- Effectiveness of organizations service provision to membership or client constituencies enhanced
- Membership or active constituent levels of stakeholder groups increased.

Evaluation Questions

Question 1: What approaches were used for creating the CLATs and strengthening the NGO Platforms?

Question 2: Were the approaches to development of the CLATs effective?

Question 3: What role has the project played, if any, in reducing illegal taxes and rent seeking behaviors and how?

Question 4: Are beneficiaries' lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided?

Question 5: What other factors contributed to the increase or decrease of *tracasseries*?

Team Composition:

Mary Louise Eagleton
 Pamela Fessenden
 Victor Mangindula

Victor: Budgeting, Languages, Organizing Teams, Program Design, good knowledge of Congo, knowledge of the USAID program, good public speaker

Mary Louise: Monitoring and Evaluation experience, data analysis, program design, knowledge of Congo, good writing skills, knowledge of methodology, knowledge of the IRM project, previous site visits

Pam: Program Design, Evaluating evaluations, Good writing skills, Knowledge of agriculture programs, knowledge of Congo, skeptical

Deliverables:

- Evaluation Plan (methodology for data collection and analysis and GANTT chart showing detailed schedule for all steps in the evaluation) – August 18 (Project questions and field work week) and August 20, 2004 – oral presentations and handouts on approach for answering evaluation questions and GANTT chart.
- Draft Evaluation Report – October 6, 2004 by e-mail to mhageboeck@msi-inc.com; gausik@whoafrica.org; jkerley@usaid.gov. Maximum of 20 pages,

single spaced, 12 pt, plus annexes.

- Oral Evaluation Reports (PowerPoint or flip charts and handouts– October 18, 2004
- Final Evaluation Report – November 11, 2004 or earlier.

Evaluation Schedule and Logistics:

From 13 – 17 September, 2004. Need to schedule IRM boat. TA for Victor and Mary Louise, Mission Orders. Need country clearance for Pam. Hotel Reservation for Pam for 11-13 and 17-19th September.

Evaluation Budget:

Pam: \$800 for ticket

Per diem: \$1550

ML: 550 per diem

Victor: 550 per diem

Total budget:

\$3450

Flights in Country: tbd

ANNEX 2
CLAT Interview Form

1. Has the institutional capacity of the CLAT changed?

- What were they advised or assisted to do? Analyze how similar their understanding was of what they were advised to do?
- What support/assistance have they received from IRM?
- What has your CLAT done?
- Analysis: Breakdown the different activities of what they were advised to do and make a scale to measure the level of adoption.
- Before the program with IRM what were you doing and what were your constraints? How have they changed?
- To measure whether the changed occurred due to the IC building: ask using timeline:

i. what they did in each period

Before Kinshasa Meeting	After Kinshasa Meeting	After Regional Meeting

ii. what help they received in those periods

Before Kinshasa Meeting	After Kinshasa Meeting	After Regional Meeting

iii. how did that help change what they were doing?

Before Kinshasa Meeting	After Kinshasa Meeting	After Regional Meeting

iv. How did they use it?

Before Kinshasa Meeting	After Kinshasa Meeting	After Regional Meeting

2. Have the services provided by the NGO changed for the better? Increased/reached more people (access)/improved in quality terms

- What services were provided?
- To whom?
- How have they changed?

3. Was the change in NGO services a demonstrable result of a change in that NGO's institutional capacity, i.e., can a link be proven?

- Review timeline of capacity building as compared to change in services (same as under question 1).

- What else has happened in those communities over the same timeframe.
4. **What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms? Which ones were most effective?**
 - What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms?
 - Which ones were most effective?
 5. **Are beneficiaries lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided, i.e. do beneficiaries view the services as being appropriate to/important for meeting their needs?**
 - Are goods being traded on the river more or less expensive?
 - Are there goods newly available or have returned to the market recently?
 - Does the community know about the anti-corruption project?
 - What has the project done?
 - Have you witnessed a reduction in tracasseries by local authorities against you?
 6. **What role has the project played, if any, in reducing illegal taxes and rent-seeking behaviors?**
 7. **What are the future plans for the CLAT? Working with IRM?**

ANNEX 3
Individual/Community Interview Form
(3-6 interviews to be conducted per site)

Are beneficiaries lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided, i.e. do beneficiaries view the services as being appropriate to/important for meeting their needs?

- Are goods being traded on the river more or less expensive than a year ago?
- Are there goods that newly available or have returned? If yes, what?
- Have you experienced problems with tracasseries?
- Do you know about the anti-corruption project?
- What has the project done?
- Have you witnessed a reduction in tracasseries by local authorities against you since a year ago?

ANNEX 4 Evaluation Plan

Has the institutional capacity of the NGO changed?

Conduct key informant interviews with IRM (List points of what they taught them)
Conduct group interviews with 3 NGO Platforms in three different locations. Ask what were they advised or assisted to do? Analyze how similar was their understanding of what they were advised to do? Break down the different activities of what they were advised to do and make a scale to measure the level of adoption. To measure whether the changed occurred due to the IC building: ask using timeline in three periods (x-mas-June30), ask what they did in each period, what help they received in those periods, how did that help change what they were doing? How did they use it?
Ask: before the program with IRM what were you doing and what were your constraints?
Collect project reports and training documents
Observe the NGO platform at work in the field

Have the services provided by the NGO changed for the better? Increased/reached more people (access)/improved in quality terms

Conduct key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews;
observation of the NGO platform field work
Questions for each: What services were provided? To whom? How have they changed?

Was the change in NGO services a demonstrable result of a change in that NGO's institutional capacity, i.e., can a link be proven?

Review timeline of capacity building as compared to change in services (as under question 1). Ask what else has happened in those communities over the same timeline.
Observe what else is going on in the communities.

What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms? Which ones were most effective?

Conduct Key informant and group interviews with IRM and NGO Platforms and ask: What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms? Which ones were most effective?

Are beneficiaries lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided, i.e. do beneficiaries view the services as being appropriate to/important for meeting their needs?)

Review of existing economic data; rapid market surveys at each stop; Key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews; observation in villages
Ask: Are goods being traded on the river more or less expensive? Are there goods that newly available or have returned? Do you know about the anti-corruption project? What has the project done? Have you witnessed a reduction in tracasseries by local authorities against you?

What role has the project played, if any, in reducing illegal taxes and rent-seeking behaviors?

Ask IRM: Is there any data that shows that illegal taxing has increased or decreased?

Select what items (3-4 items) being sold to track. Interview purchasers: 3 buyers per item per stop (what do you buy from boats? Price/kilo? Has the price gone up or down from one year ago?);

Interview sellers/traders in Mbandaka and Kinshasa- look at the data we have? Why do you think the prices vary or change? Were you taxed? At which stops and for how much?

ANNEX 5 Summary of IRM Activities

➤ **Kinshasa Workshop: 16-18 July 2003**

IRM held a 3 day workshop in Kinshasa from the 16-18 July 2003 to initiate the project and identify ways of working at the national and local level to address corruption and *Relance Economique*. The workshop brought together 123 people from Bandundu and some parts of Equateur, and 15 representatives from various Ministries who are implicated in *tracasseries* along Congo's river ways. During the workshop, IRM encouraged existing organizations and motivated community members to get together around the common goal of reducing *tracasseries* and building Congo's economy. IRM encouraged civil society, economic operators, and local authorities to form platforms and pressure groups to fight against *tracasseries* and to get rid of the taboo surrounding *tracasseries*. Prior to the creation of these committees, there was almost no communication between community members and local authorities or between those who were being *tracassed* and those carrying out the *tracasseries*.

➤ **One Day Restitution Workshop in Kikwit - August 2003**

Following the Kinshasa workshop IRM then held a one-day restitution workshop in Kikwit with the local authorities, economic operators, traders, etc. A 2nd restitution workshop was held specifically for the authorities (political, administrative, military, police), at which IRM showed the film from the Kinshasa workshop. During the restitution, IRM distributed documentation about legal and illegal *tracasseries* to the attendees for further distribution in their communities. (list of docs).

➤ **Restitution of the Workshop in 30 local communities in Bandundu Province - August to October 2003**

After restitution in Kikwit, IRM began the restitution on the different axes from August to October. The Kwilu River axis includes the towns and villages of Kikwit, Lusanga, Mitchakila, Pindi, Bulungu, Vanga, Mbemi, Bilili, Juma, Timbane, and Bagata. The Kasai River axis includes the towns and villages of Dibaya, Mangai, Yuki-Ngolo, Yuki-Onatra, Piopio, Panu, Eolo, Mabenga, Semodane, Makaow, Dima. The Mai Ndombe axis includes Kiri, Inongo, Kutu, Nioki, Mushie, Kwenge, Imbongo, Iko. This is a total of 30 towns and villages along three river axes. The IRM facilitators spent 2-3 days in each village. A typical visit would have the following schedule:

Day 1: Arrive, inform people of the schedule,

Day 2: informal meetings to hear people's complaints and to encourage them to organize themselves in platforms, then in the evening hold a meeting with local authorities, all state services, civil society, religious people, economic operators, and community members etc, to show them the film from the Kinshasa workshop and then have questions/answers sessions.

Day 3: distribute documents with information about *tracasseries*, human rights, and legal and illegal taxation. During the visits IRM would give informal advice depending on how far the

community had organized itself. For example the facilitators often had to reinforce that they should include local authorities in the CLAT. All Kin participants had started getting something together. IRM then encouraged their development. Explained how working in a group can be more productive and have more weight if one person is *tracassé*, everyone becomes concerned. Gave them documentation and information. No other capacity building such as training.

➤ **Follow up field visits to each of the 30 communities - October 2003, January and April 2004**

IRM conducted follow up on the various axes: Kwilu and Kasai in October 2003, Mai Ndombe in January 2004, and all axes again in April 2004. Each site received one IRM follow-up visit. At the Kinshasa workshop in September 2003 each targeted community agreed to form follow up committees who would be responsible for following the evolution of *tracasseries* in their communities. During the IRM follow up visits to the 30 communities, IRM noted that almost every village had established an ad hoc structure that had been formed by the members of the follow-up committee. Most of these ad-hoc structures had an office, a president, and had begun writing reports. These ad hoc structures were the first versions of the CLATs (Committee de Lutte Anti-Tracasserie), and later began to call themselves CLATs.

➤ **3-day Workshop in Bandundu and Equateur - June 2004**

In June, IRM held a three-day workshop in Bandundu. They invited various members from each site: in total 30 from Kasai, 32 from Kwilu, 24 from Mai Ndombe, and 28 from Bandundu Town. The workshop gave an opportunity to the different communities to exchange views, share experiences, and learn about conflict resolution. Each CLAT gave their experiences and then the participants worked in teams by axis to make recommendations on how the project should proceed.

During this three day provincial-level meeting in Iyonda, IRM distributed materials, including a booklet on citizen rights; one on code of conduct for state agents; a small dictionary on infractions; the transitional constitution; various text that describes the tax structure/list of legal taxes; fight against corruption; and conflict management; list of recommendations following the Kinshasa workshop.

In addition, IRM distributed the audio cassette from Iyonda workshop to the CLAT in a follow up visit.

➤ **Two Day Follow up Workshop in Ngombe – August 2004**

➤ **Report of workshop dissemination - July 2004**

IRM then wrote up final report from the workshop and gave one copy to each participant. According to the IRM team the participants are now holding restitution meetings in their own communities.

Questions	Form of the Answer	Relevant Criteria	Sources of Information	Methods for Collecting Data	Data Analysis Procedures
Institutional Capacity Questions					
1. Has the institutional capacity of the NGO changed? Program and Service Delivery, Sectoral Expertise, Constituency Ownership, Impact assessment (see handout)	Yes/no, comparison	Disaggregate by type of service NGO received. Disaggregate by NGO platform/location Representative of other project areas	Existing project data; NGO platforms: PROCODEM, UAD, CATE; IRM	Group Interviews with NGO Platforms; Key informant interviews with IRM; Collect project reports and training docs; observation of the NGO platform field work	Tabulation of interview answers; content analysis of reports/training materials
2. Have the services provided by the NGO changed for the better? Increased/reached more people (access)/improved in quality terms	Yes/no, description of the services provided; comparison with what the NGO Platforms did before	Disaggregate by type of service NGO received capacity building in. Disaggregate by NGO platform/location Representative of other project areas	Existing project data; NGO platforms: PROCODEM, UAD, CATE; IRM; Local govt. officials; suppliers; traders; purchasers; community members	Key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews; observation of the NGO platform field work Questions: What services were provided? To whom? How have they changed?	
3. Was the change in NGO services a demonstrable result of a change in that NGO's institutional capacity, i.e., can a link be proven?	Yes/no, and to what extent? What other factors resulted in change of NGO services	Disaggregate by type of service NGO received capacity building in. Disaggregate by NGO platform/location	Existing project data; NGO platforms: PROCODEM, UAD, CATE; IRM;	Review timeline of capacity building as compared to change in services. Key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews; observation of the NGO platform field work; observation of what else is going on in the communities.	

Questions	Form of the Answer	Relevant Criteria	Sources of Information	Methods for Collecting Data	Data Analysis Procedures
4. What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms? Which ones were most effective?	Description of approaches, comparison of approaches	Disaggregated by approach, location, NGO Platform	IRM, NGO Platforms	Key informant interview, project reports, training materials, group interviews/focus group interviews	What approaches were used for strengthening the NGO Platforms? Which ones were most effective?
Services Questions					
5. Are beneficiaries lives any better because of the services the NGOs provided, i.e. do beneficiaries view the services as being appropriate to/important for meeting their needs?)	Yes/no. Comparison with before and with other locations not receiving services	Disaggregate by type of service NGO received capacity building in. Disaggregate by NGO platform/location	Existing economic data; rapid market surveys; suppliers; traders; purchasers; community members; local government officials	Review of existing economic data; rapid market surveys at each stop; Key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews; observation in villages	
Results Questions					
6. What role has the project played, if any, in reducing illegal taxes and rent-seeking behaviors?	Description, comparison, test cause and effect relationship	Disaggregated by type of illegal taxes/rent-seeking behaviors. Locations	Existing economic data; rapid market surveys; sellers, buyers, traders, community members; local govt. officials; NGO Platforms; IRM	Review of existing economic data; rapid market surveys at each stop with buyers; Key informant interview; group interviews; and community interviews; observation in villages	Mapping exercise with table on three items being sold from the boat. Tabulate results.

ANNEX 5
Interviews Conducted and Persons Met

Key Informant:

Lyse Pylon, Country Representative, IRM
Jose Cabrera, Deputy Team Leader, Relance Economique Project, IRM
Desire Bolefa, Facilitator, IRM Mbandaka Office
Riza Latelabwe, Coordinator, IRM Kikwit Office
Sacre Mapasi, Facilitator, IRM Kikwit Office
Fabrice Mbeshi, Facilitator, IRM Kikwit Office
Mr. Kandamba, CLAT President, Bilili (Bandundu Province)
General Mustapha, First Military Region, Bandundu Province
Kisungu Katiti, Territory Administrator, Lusana, Bandundu Province

Group and Individual Interviews

Mbandaka market women (6 individuals, random selection)
Maita community members (6 individuals interviewed within group)
Association de Protection de *Parroquet*, Maita, Equateur Province
Ngombe community (individuals – 3 women, 3 men – random selection)
Ngombe Women's Association
Lusanga Women's Association
Kikwit Theatre Troupe

Comites de Lutte Anti-Tracasseries (CLATS)

Mbandaka CLAT
Maita CLAT
Ngombe CLAT
Lusanga CLAT
Kikwit CLAT

ANNEX 6

References

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