PD-ACD-701

EMERGENCY FOOD AID FOR HAITI:
AN EXPANDED PROGRAM FOR ADRA
1994-1995

202(e) Grant 521-0802-G-3002-00

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

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SUMMARY

In response to deteriorating nutritional conditions in Haiti in consequence of the political crisis and international embargo, an emergency expansion of the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) existing relief program targeting 112,000 recipients in addition to the 224,000 beneficiaries enrolled in the regular ADRA relief program was approved by USAID/W in July 1994.

Emergency food distribution through Maternal and Child Health (MCH), Food For Work (FFW) and General Relief (GR) programs started at the end of October 1994 and continued until September 30, 1995.

The emergency program provided incremental beneficiary-days of 35, 184 and 95 percent respectively for MCH, FFW and GR programs, in addition to the assistance supplied through the ADRA regular program. The emergency program provided ration supplementation equivalent to approximately 50 percent of the energy content and over 100 percent of the protein content of the average Haitian diet for a total of 24.1 million beneficiary-days.

Both ADRA and USAID underestimated the time necessary to put in place the additional resources and organizational capacity required to support a 50 percent increase in beneficiary level.

Choice of form of intervention, as well as the organizational capacity for rapid expansion, should be considered in planning future emergency food assistance activities.

The expansion of beneficiary levels was much greater in FFW and GR activities than with MCH and in future emergency programs an expansion of FFW activities may be the most effective means of reaching large numbers of beneficiaries.

In order to minimize response time and maximize coping capacity in future emergency situations consideration should be given to the establishment of an emergency standby capacity, which should consist of a stock of vehicles and equipment and a cadre of trained volunteer emergency staff.

224,000
112,000
336,000

1. Background and Purpose

Haiti has a long history of food insecurity; FAO figures indicate that since the early 1960's average caloric intake has hovered around 2000 kCal/person/day. (FAO,1991). The Haiti Household Expenditure and Consumption Survey (1989) estimated that nearly half of all Haitian households received less than 75 percent of the recommended daily energy need. The political instability following the military coup in 1991 and the international embargo imposed on Haiti in September 1993 subjected an already vulnerable population to still further privation.

By early 1994, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) had begun to observe a deteriorating nutritional situation in the country; data subsequently reported show that the incidence of malnutrition amongst children of pre-school age increased from 50 percent in January 1994 to 61 percent in August 1994 (USAID, 1995).

Following discussion with USAID, ADRA proposed to mitigate the hardship imposed on the most vulnerable groups in Haitian society by an expansion of its existing relief program to include a short term, emergency element, increasing the number of proposed beneficiaries by 50 percent.

2. Description of the Emergency Food Aid Activity

The proposal for an expanded program, submitted to USAID in mid-May 1994, targeted 112,000 recipients in addition to the 224,000 beneficiaries enrolled in the regular ADRA relief program. Of these additional beneficiaries it was envisaged that the majority (72,000) would be reached through expansion of ADRA's Maternal and Child Health (MCH) program. A further 30,000 would be reached through the Food For Work (FFW) program and the remaining 10,000 through the General Relief (GR) program, through which rations were provided to orphanages, to old-people's homes and to the Sisters of Charity.

ADRA assumed that allocation of additional food aid with emphasis laid on the most vulnerable groups, through the MCH and GR programs, would answer the humanitarian purpose of the emergency program. Reinforcement of the FFW program was seen not only as a means of providing humanitarian assistance to vulnerable groups not reached by the MCH and GR programs, but also as an opportunity to further longer-term developmental objectives.

- MCH program:

  The MCH program targets pregnant and lactating mothers, mothers of malnourished children and the malnourished children themselves. In addition to ration supplementation the program provides regular monitoring of child development, health education for mothers and medication for nutritionally-related illness (de-worming treatment, diarrhea treatment, vitamin A supplementation). The ration provided under the MCH program targets the child in the program, the mother and one sibling. Each month a total of 5.0kg of SFB, 3.84kg of WSB, 2.78kg of peas, and 1.4kg of oil is

given to each group of three beneficiaries. The ration is provided dry for preparation in the home and distribution is made at two-week intervals. This ration is estimated to provide an average 1782kCal per day and 77g of protein for the beneficiary group of mother and two children.

- FFW program:

Food For Work activities are designed to respond to felt needs for infrastructural or agricultural improvement in a community. Food is provided through the program for approved activities, in exchange for a committment by participants to work for a minimum of 20 hours per week for four weeks. Food distribution in the FFW program is intended for a beneficiary group of one worker and four dependents. A total of 40kg of SFB and 2.8kg of oil is distributed each month for each group of five beneficiaries; the average monthly ration per beneficiary is therefore 8kg SFB and 0.56kg oil. The commodities are provided for food preparation in the home, i.e. a dry ration distribution. This ration is estimated to provide an average 1098kCal per day and 46g of protein for each beneficiary

- GR program:

The GR program is essentially humanitarian assistance intended to provide ration supplementation to some of the most vulnerable groups in Haitian society. Under the GR program rations are intended to supplement basic food provided daily by an institution. The commodities provided under the emergency program were used for supplementary feeding in orphanages, old-people's homes and for use by the Sisters of Charity in their institutions. For each beneficiary in the GR program a monthly ration comprising 5.0kg SFB, 1.5kg WSB. 1.39kg peas and 0.7kg oil is provided. This ration is estimated to provide an average 1131kCal per day and 50g of protein for each beneficiary

2.1. Geographical Distribution of the Program

ADRA-sponsored activities represented only part of the overall emergency program and most effort was applied within the regions where the ADRA regular program was in operation. Numbers of sites and beneficiaries in February and August, 1995 show that GR activities were primarily carried out in the West and over 90 percent of MCH sites were concentrated in the North, West and Center regions. FFW activities were more widespread than either MCH or GR, with activities in all regions but the South, though by August 1995 76 percent of centers were in North, West, Center and Artibonite regions. Figure 1. shows the number of sites and beneficiaries by region. Generally increase in beneficiary numbers was made by increase in the number of activity sites, rather than through an increase in beneficiaries at a limited number of sites. Sites were identified by communities and adopted into the emergency program after appraisal by ADRA confirmed the reality of need for intervention and, in the case of FFW, the feasibility of projects proposed.

Figure 1. Regional distribution of beneficiaries 1995; ADRA Regular and Emergency Programs













3. Implementation of the Emergency Program

USAID/W approval for the expanded (emergency) program was provided on July 5, 1994, through Amendment no. 3 to 202(e) Grant 521-0802-G-3002-00. The amendment increased the budget by $1,071,520 and extended the project completion date to September 30, 1995. The budget was increased by $64,350 to a total of $1,347,958 by amendment no. 4 of July 29, 1994 and by a further $199,485 to a total of $1,547,443 in amendment no. 5 of Feb 10, 1995. Amendment No. 6, November 13, 1995 extended the activity completion date to November 30, 1995 and realigned the budget. Additional USAID funds totalling $923,350 were authorized for internal transport, shipping and handling (ITSH).

The first consignment of emergency food commodities was delivered to Haiti at the end of September 1994 and emergency food distribution through MCH, FFW and GR programs started at the end of October 1994. Food distribution continued until September 30, 1995.

The last two months of FY 1994 and the first quarter of FY 1995 were characterized by continuing social and political upheaval in Haiti, immediately prior to and following the reinstallation of the Aristide administration. All relief activities were hindered by a combination of security and logistic problems, with the result that actual numbers of beneficiaries in the different programs were quite different from those proposed. Activities in the MCH program in particular were curtailed as a consequence of the security problems; a number of centers requested that ADRA cease delivery of food commodities because of fears that stored food could not be adequately protected from theft.

3.1. Beneficiary levels - August 1994 to September 1995.

The evolution of beneficiary numbers in the different programs is summarized in Figure 2.

The highest number of beneficiaries reached in the MCH program was 39,607, significantly fewer than the proposed level of 72,000. Total beneficiary-days achieved under the emergency program represented 35 percent of the target amount. 39,607

The target number of beneficiaries on FFW was reached in April 1995, and from this period the number of beneficiaries of the FFW activities was sustained above the target level until the end of the program. The highest number of beneficiaries in any one week was 133,900 in mid-May. Expressed in beneficiary-days, the FFW program achieved 113 percent of its target. 133,900

The target number of beneficiaries for the GR program was passed in early December 1994. Numbers increased to a maximum of 15,753 at the end of December 1994. Expressed in beneficiary-days, the actual number of beneficiaries reached 80 percent of the proposed level. 15,753 / 19,260

3.2. Commodity Use

The total quantity of commodities shipped to Haiti for the emergency program is summarized in Table 1.

Figure 2. Emergency Program Beneficiary Levels Aug 1994 - Sept 1995







The quantities of commodities delivered were lower than requirements estimated in May 1994. This was primarily because actual distribution was lower than anticipated therefore quantities of commodities called-forward were revised downwards to reflect actual use. Total shipment of WSB was lower than both the estimated requirement and the quantity distributed through the emergency program. Over-stock from the ADRA regular program was the source of the additional WSB distributed in the emergency program.

Table 1: Quantity of food commodities (MT) shipped to Haiti for ADRA expanded program.

Commodity	FY94 (MT)	FY95 (MT)	Total (MT)	Estimated Requirement
SFB	1370	3200	4570	4920
WSB	0	595	595	1290
Peas	30	675	705	970
Oil	190	439	629	690

The total quantity (MT) of food commodity distributed between October 1, 1994 and September 30, 1995 and its allocation by feeding program is shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Total quantity (MT) of commodity distributed and allocation by program

	Commodity			
Program	SFB	WSB	Peas	Oil
FFW	3264	0	0	228
MCH	499	575	278	140
GR	482	145	134	67
TOTAL	4245	720	412	435
Total Delivery	4570	595	705	629
Distrib/ Delivery	92%	121%	58%	69%

Under/Over-delivery:	SFB	325 (under)
	WSB	125 (over)
	Peas	293 (under)
	Oil	194 (under)

Undistributed emergency food will be redirected to the ADRA regular program.

3.3. Commodity distribution by Program

Allocation of commodities to programs differed significantly from that anticipated, principally because of the shortfall in beneficiary levels achieved in the MCH program, compared with levels planned. A comparison of the proposed and actual allocation of commodities to the different programs is presented graphically in Figure 3.

3.4. Differences in achieved and planned results

Expressed in terms of beneficiary-days (i.e. number of beneficiaries x number of days receiving assistance), the extent of completion of the emergency program compared with the anticipated outcome is summarized in Table 3. The shortfall in MCH beneficiary levels arose because of the difficulty of expanding the program (nearly doubling beneficiary numbers) within the limited timescale of the emergency program. The increase in FFW participation was intended to compensate for the shortfall in MCH beneficiary level, to maximize the impact of the emergency program within the constraints imposed by the range of problems of implementation of the expanded program described more fully in section 4.

Table 3: Emergency Program Completion: Actual and Proposed Beneficiary-Days

	FFW	MCH	GR	Total
Actual Beneficiary-Days	12,238,800	8,985,431	2,890,727	24,114,958
Proposed Beneficiary-Days	10,800,000	25,920,000	3,600,000	40,320,000
Actual/Proposed (%)	**113.3**	**34.7**	**80.3**	**59.8**

3.5. Marginal Benefit of the Emergency Program

For the MCH, FFW and GR programs respectively, the emergency program provided incremental beneficiary-days of 35, 184 and 95 percent additional to the assistance supplied through the ADRA regular program (Table 4.). The distribution throughout the emergency period of emergency and regular program beneficiary levels is compared in Figure 4.

Figure 3. Proposed and Actual allocation of Commodities to Programs

Proposed allocation









Actual allocation









Figure 4. Evolution of beneficiary levels on Regular and Emergency Programs Aug '94 - Sept '95







Table 4: Incremental benefit of Emergency compared with Regular Program: Actual Beneficiary-Days				
	FFW	MCH	GR	Total
Emergency Program	12,238,800	8,985,431	2,890,727	24,114,958
Regular Program	6,650,525	25,916,541	3,043,250	35,610,316
Emergency/Regular (%)	**184.0**	**34.7**	**95.0**	**67.7**

4. Problems of implementation

Overall the expanded program achieved 60 percent of its planned target beneficiary levels. Differences in achieved and planned results arose both from problems introduced by the increase in scale of activities in the expanded program and from problems of implementation during a period of political and social upheaval.

The expanded program represented a sufficiently large increase in activities that incremental resources were necessary; ADRA did not have spare capacity in its regular program to absorb the required 50 percent expansion in activities. Indeed, ADRA clearly indicated in its concept paper for expanded program, that execution of its regular program required all of it's available resources. The organizational problems of a 50 percent increase in scale of activity were not sufficiently appreciated either by ADRA or by USAID, and significantly slowed response time for implementation of the expanded program.

4.1. Organizational Problems arising from the expanded program

1. Increase in ADRA staff for supervision and management was necessary. The time necessary for recruitment and training of such additional personnel contributed to increased reaction time for new activity start-up. A total of 20 additional staff members, representing an increase in personnel of nearly 30 percent, were recruited by ADRA to cope with the expanded program.

2. Since the emergency activity was seen as an expansion of the established regular program ADRA considered that it was necessary to maintain standards and procedures established for the regular FFW and MCH programs. Procedures established for beneficiary selection, project identification, and for community involvement in MCH and FFW activities were therefore applied to the expanded program. These oversight and approval procedures necessarily require time for completion, and therefore caused additional delay in initiation of food distribution.

3. In spite of the lifting of the international embargo at the end of September 1994, procurement of materials and equipment for the expanded program was subject to delays which had significant repercussions for timely implementation of the emergency

program. In particular, vehicles necessary for food delivery and supervision of the expanded program in the field were not delivered until February 1995, and were not available for use until April 1995 because of problems encountered with registration for use in Haiti.

4.2. Security and Logistical Problems

1. Concern over security both of personnel and commodities led to curtailment of activities at the end of FY94 and during the first quarter of FY95.

Security of personnel was of particular concern during the political transition, when attacks on warehouses and food convoys occurred regularly. Distribution in some areas had to be halted because of physical risk to staff.

Security of commodities was a concern both to ADRA and to recipients during the transition period. Losses from convoys were experienced during distribution, and while such losses were limited by security assistance lent by U.S. military, coordination with military escorts proved to be time consuming and significantly slowed the in-country delivery.

Security of stored commodities was a problem at distribution sites and in a number of cases deliveries were stopped, at the request of the beneficiaries, or center managers, because they feared personal injury or loss arising from raids on the commodities stored under their supervision.

While significant losses of commodities occurred during the political transition at the end of FY94 and during the first quarter of FY95 it is not possible to determine what proportion of such losses were emergency supplies. However, total losses of commodities (from regular and emergency program stocks) in FY95 amount to about 150 metric tons. The proportion of emergency supplies lost during FY95 therefore represents at most 2.3 percent of the amount delivered, and more probably less than 1 percent of all food aid commodities imported for distribution by ADRA during FY95.

2. Transportation problems.

Delay in delivery and registration of additional trucks presented a major constraint to timely distribution of commodities. To some extent this problem was overcome by use of hired private transport, but this too was limited in its availability and reliability. The cost of the private trucking services was also an unexpected additional operating expense. During FY95 a total of $77,978 was spent on contracts with private hauliers for in-country food delivery.

Road conditions also played an important role in limiting distribution of commodities. Deterioration of the road network and lack of necessary maintenance during the embargo limited access to some sites and generally reduced ease of movement around the country. The poor condition of the

roads increased wear and tear on delivery and supervision vehicles, further restricting availability through increased need for maintenance and lost time in the workshop.

3. Problems of political influence

Support for several FFW programs was terminated when it was determined that access to participation was being exploited for political advantage. Approximately 32 percent of agricultural and 38 percent of all roads projects were not fully completed for this reason.

4.3. Impact of the expanded program on the regular program

Although the expanded program was intended to be incrementally supported, there were some instances in which it proved to be dependent on regular program resources, notably in use of supplies of medicines provided through the MCH program, and in dependence on other projects, or on beneficiaries, for provision of tools for FFW.

ADRA considered the emergency program to be an extension of its regular program and therefore expected that procedures for the expanded program would follow those established for the regular program. In order to do this, and to avoid distinguishing "emergency" and "regular" beneficiaries MCH centers continued their practice of providing medicines in case of need to all beneficiaries. However, since purchase of medicines was not authorized under the emergency funding medicines procured for the regular program were used to cover the needs of both regular and emergency beneficiaries, with the result that centers ran out of supplies before the operating-year end. The emergency program was clearly detrimental to the functioning of the regular program in this respect.

Procurement of tools for FFW participants was also excluded from the emergency budget. In the event many FFW projects were implemented, on the understanding that tools would be supplied by other projects or by the beneficiaries themselves. If access to tools for work is a prerequisite for participation in FFW activities there is a significant risk that some of the most vulnerable members of society, those lacking tools, will be excluded from the possibility of participation in the program.

5. Assessment of the impact of emergency feeding

Beyond measure of the number of beneficiaries assessment of impact of the emergency program is not extensively quantified, as detailed impact assessment was not called for under the program. However, it is clear that beneficiaries on each of the programs should have derived significant nutritional benefit from the rations distributed. Individual allocations contributed up to 55 percent of the daily energy content and 125 percent of the protein intake of an average Haitian diet; the average value of the rations provided is summarized below (Table 5).

In addition to the nutritional impact of ration supplementation, less tangible benefits of the emergency program may be seen in the form of improved child care and domestic hygiene, promoted through the health education component of the program, as well as economic and environmental gains created through the activities of the FFW program.

Table 5: Average nutritional value of rations*

Program	Energy kCal/day	Protein (g/day)
MCH (Mother + 2 Children)	1782	77
FFW (Each beneficiary)	1098	46
GR (Each Beneficiary)	1131	50

* Based on energy and protein contents per kg of commodity: SFB, 3500kCal, 173g; WSB, 3680kCal, 200g; Peas, 3400kCal, 241g; Oil, 8840kCal, 0g.
Source: Commodities Reference Guide, Office of Food for Peace, USAID, June 1988.

5.1. FFW Projects undertaken

Food For Work projects were targeted principally at soil conservation or road repair; of the 82 projects attributable to the Emergency Program completed during the emergency period, 38 were soil conservation and 38 were road repair. The remaining projects involved tree-planting, land drainage, installation of drinking water systems and school construction. The value of commodities provided to workers on the FFW projects was $15.35, or the equivalent of $0.51 per worker per 4-hour day. While the return for the worker appears much lower on the ADRA FFW program than the cash payment received by participants in the USAID-funded JOBS project ($1.82 per worker per 8-hour day), it is consistent with the ADRA philosophy of use of FFW for encouragement of local endeavor and community committment to projects, rather than as a market-rate reimbursement for work which may or may not be perceived as beneficial to the community at large.

Soil conservation activities carried out under the emergency program resulted in construction of an estimated 110km of water run-off control canals, 43km of stone wall soil erosion barriers and 52km of hedgerows planted for soil erosion control.

A total of 117km of road repair and construction was completed by FFW activities during the emergency period.

Since soil conservation and road construction activities have environmental and productive value, the emergency program may reasonably be supposed to have had impact extending well beyond the period of food distribution. Soil conservation activities help to sustain agricultural productivity on hillsides and prevent downstream damage to land and water

resources by limiting soil loss and reducing water run-off and risk of flooding. Anti-erosion barriers (hedgerows, stone-walls) have been shown to significantly reduce soil loss and to increase soil depth by 10-15cm within three years of installation, while land on which soil conservation works have been constructed has shown average cereal (corn and sorghum) yield increases of between 60 and 430kg/ha (Lea, 1995).

Road construction impacts are less easily measured than those derived from soil conservation, but the economic benefits of increased ease of movement of goods and people are none the less real; Brown et al (1995) for example, estimated that travel time on repaired roads was reduced by approximately one third compared with the time required to cover a similar distance on an unrepaired road.

6. Lessons learned

Some of the delay in reaching target beneficiary levels was influenced by security concerns during the first four to five months of FY 95. Not only did these security concerns constrain ADRA food distribution activities, but they caused potential beneficiaries of the food assistance programs to decline participation in the program. Clearly security issues may become an overriding constraint for the targeted beneficiary.

Delays in reaching target beneficiary levels were also created by lack of available institutional capacity for management of an expanded program and by application of ADRA regular program procedures for identification of additional beneficiaries and sites. Both ADRA and USAID underestimated the time necessary to put in place the additional resources and organizational capacity required to support a 50 percent increase in operation, though ADRA signalled its lack of spare capacity to USAID before the start of the emergency program.

Some reduction in response-time for future emergency food distribution may be possible (1) by realistic assessment of available institutional capacity, (2) by selective expansion of the regular program, or (3) by establishment of an emergency standby capacity.

1. If spare capacity for management of an expanded program is not available, USAID should either identify alternative institutions or provide adequate resources to allow management capacity to be increased in a timely manner and without causing negative impact on the implementation of the regular program.

2. If future emergency food distribution is made through expansion of the ADRA regular program, the differences in response of the MCH program and the FFW and GR programs to rapid expansion should be noted. While all three forms of intervention were slow to start up, the possibility of rapid expansion of beneficiary levels was evidently much greater in FFW and GR activities than with MCH. Given that FFW targets a worker and four dependents, with 1100kCal and 46g of protein per person per day and the MCH targets only a mother and two children, with an average of 593kCal per individual per day, food distribution through the FFW program may be more effective than the MCH network in reaching vulnerable groups on a large scale.

Some effort should be applied to determining the relative nutritional impact of FFW and MCH food distribution on vulnerable sectors of the community, to assess which of these programs is the more appropriate vehicle for emergency food distribution.

If the emergency activity is an expansion of a regular program, the emergency activity should follow established implementation procedures, to avoid undermining regular program activities. Particular examples are seen in provision of medicines for MCH participants and tools for FFW participants.

The character and time-sensitive objectives of an emergency program may not appear consistent with the objectives, time-scale and modes of operation of a regular program with significant developmental content, and therefore pose a question of whether it makes sense to expand the regular program in event of emergency, or rather to adopt a different mode of operation specifically for the emergency.

ADRA believes, however, that there is good reason for directing response to an emergency situation through a regular program network. Use of an existing program network allows established contacts with vulnerable communities to be exploited, while long-term contact and on-going monitoring activities allow early-warning of problems and facilitate targeting of responses. In addition, increase in the developmental content of emergency assistance is emphasized by both USAID and ADRA, following extensive experience of emergency food aid programs.

Problems with expansion of a regular program evident from the FY '95 operation were response time and the linkage of operating capacity to level of emergency response. These issues may be addressed by change in readiness procedures, rather than by abandonment of the long-term, developmental, objectives of the regular program.

3. Future emergency-response time could be reduced and coping capacity expanded by establishment of an emergency standby capacity: supervision vehicles, delivery trucks and other equipment purchased for the emergency could be stored as a strategic reserve rather than transferred to the ADRA regular program as is currently planned; necessary replacement vehicles for the regular progam should be budgeted under the regular program funds. A cadre of volunteer standby emergency staff should be established, and encouraged to participate in periodic emergency-response training exercises. Relatively small investment could ensure rapid mobilization of increased capacity in response to a declared emergency.

Annex A. Weekly Beneficiary levels 1994-95; Regular and Emergency activities

Period	FFW (Emerg)	FFW (Reg)	MCH (Emerg)	MCH (Reg)	GR (Emerg)	GR (Reg)
29-Aug-94		4250		68034		6984
05-Sep-94		2850		76510		6994
12-Sep-94		2250		81258		6981
19-Sep-94		14350		87382		6981
26-Sep-94		13800		87022		6981
01-Oct-94	0	13100	0	87991	0	6981
08-Oct-94	0	14450	0	89713	0	7121
15-Oct-94	0	14450	0	85650	0	7121
22-Oct-94	0	13450	0	82324	0	7121
29-Oct-94	2550	10900	11675	70000	3042	7421
05-Nov-94	2550	10900	15000	75497	3715	7421
12-Nov-94	2550	10900	15000	75497	3715	7821
19-Nov-94	2550	10900	18400	80480	3715	7821
26-Nov-94	3550	10900	25172	74000	4415	7821
03-Dec-94	6875	11825	27666	74000	7925	7861
10-Dec-94	6875	11825	28349	74000	15525	7861
17-Dec-94	9825	11825	28349	73497	15525	7861
24-Dec-94	9825	11825	28349	73497	15525	7861
31-Dec-94	10375	11825	16383	73497	15753	7861
07-Jan-95	10375	11325	13538	71297	15753	7861
14-Jan-95	10375	11325	15418	73497	15753	7861
21-Jan-95	12725	11325	25018	73497	15753	7861
28-Jan-95	12725	11325	36786	73497	15753	7861
04-Feb-95	15325	17525	36786	73983	10000	13614
11-Feb-95	21125	17525	39607	73983	10000	13614
18-Feb-95	21625	17525	38953	73983	10000	13614
25-Feb-95	21625	17525	38953	71581	10000	13614
04-Mar-95	21625	17525	38953	71581	10000	13614
11-Mar-95	21125	17525	31631	60532	10000	13614
18-Mar-95	24625	18325	31631	62240	10000	13678
25-Mar-95	24625	18325	35675	71581	10000	11114
01-Apr-95	25175	18525	38627	70882	10000	10914
08-Apr-95	30000	21625	38692	73000	10000	11114
15-Apr-95	30000	21625	38692	73000	10000	10034
22-Apr-95	30000	21625	38692	73000	10000	10034
29-Apr-95	22000	22500	38501	73000	5974	5000
06-May-95	22000	22500	29658	74000	5974	5000
13-May-95	22000	22500	29658	74000	5294	5000
20-May-95	111400	22500	29658	74000	5294	5000
27-May-95	70800	22500	20528	59045	5294	5000
03-Jun-95	70800	22500	20528	59045	8018	5000
10-Jun-95	85575	22500	21115	60000	8032	5000
17-Jun-95	84625	22500	21359	60000	8032	5000
24-Jun-95	85475	22500	21271	60000	8032	5000
01-Jul-95	85475	22500	21271	60000	8032	5000
08-Jul-95	82475	22500	19090	60000	6742	5000
15-Jul-95	71525	22500	19090	60000	6742	5000
22-Jul-95	85850	22500	30018	60000	6742	5000
29-Jul-95	85850	22500	30018	62000	4232	5000
05-Aug-95	76925	22500	23509	62000	4832	5000
12-Aug-95	76925	22500	24509	65072	4832	10400
19-Aug-95	68475	22500	24509	65072	4832	10400
26-Aug-95	25825	22500	22051	64072	5757	10400
02-Sep-95	22000	15500	16528	64072	5757	10400
09-Sep-95	25975	22500	17010	64072	7707	8000
16-Sep-95	25975	22500	17023	64072	5151	8000
23-Sep-95	25975	22500	15978	64072	4896	8000
30-Sep-95	25975	22500	15978	64072	4896	8000
	1748400	950075	1283633	3702363	412981	434750

Annex B: Final Disposition of USAID-funded equipment

All the items noted below will be transferred to the ADRA/ESF Project

Description	No. of Units	Total Cost	Date	Date	Comment
		US $	Purchased	Received	
Toyota LandCruiser	10	224800	Nov 94	Jan 95	One Land Cruiser Stolen
Toyota LandCruiser	1	41408	Nov 94	Jan 95	Good Condition
Toyota LandCruiser	1	37524	Nov 94	Jan 95	Good Condition
Jeep Cherokee 4x4	5	127450	Aug 95	Oct 95	Good Condition
Jeep Cherokee Sport	2	42100	Jan 95	May 95	Good Condition
Ford F-350	2	65900	Jan 95	May 95	Good Condition
International Truck 4800	7	324400	Sept 94	May 95	Good Condition
Motorcycle Honda XR200R	5	13495	Sept 94	Oct 95	Two new, remainder good cond
Motorcycle Honda XR200R	1	2575	Feb 95	Oct 95	Good Condition
Motorcycle Yamaha XT225	1	3200	Oct 95		
Vehicles		882852			
Toshiba T2400 CT	1	2661	Apr 95	May 95	Good Condition
Magitronic Computer	1	1795	Nov 94	Dec 94	Good Condition
LaserJet 4L	1	635	Jan 95	Feb 95	Good Condition
Magitronic 17"MPRII Digital	1	515	Jan 95	Jan 95	Good Condition
Magitronic 17"VESA Digital	1	575	Mar 95	Apr 95	Good Condition
Laser Printer HP 5L	1	510	Nov 95	Dec 95	Good Condition
Computers & Printers		6691			
Generator Kubota 6.5 kVA	1	4444	Sept 94	Sept 94	Good Condition
Generator Isuzu TI-12.5	1	5541	Sept 94	Sept 94	Good Condition
Generator Perkins 75 kVA	1	11836	Sept 94	Sept 94	Good Condition
Generator Honda 1000W	1	725	Nov 94	Dec 94	Good Condition
Transformer 100kW	1	2127	June 95	July 95	Good Condition
Power Conditioner	1	1615	July 95	Aug 95	Good Condition
Generators & Electrical		26288			
Portable Radio GM300	11	5698	June 95	Jul 95	Good Condition
Radios		5698			
Copy Machine Xerox 5050	1	14225	June 95	July 95	New
Copy Machine Xerox 5614 R/E	1	5160	Nov 95	Dec 95	New
Air Conditioner (18000 BTU)	2	1030	Feb 95	Mar 95	Good Condition
Air Conditioner AES15DA	1	875	June 95	July 95	Good Condition
Pneumatic Tire Changer	1	3089	Sept 94	Sept 94	Good Condition
Other Equipment		24379			

TOTAL 945906

Annex C. References

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