

Country Development Strategy Statement

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COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY STATEMENT

Niger

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A. Profile of Nigerien Population

The total population of Niger at the present time is uncertain. Although past estimates had placed the upper figure at approximately 4.8 million (1975) a recent pilot census survey indicated that the population could be greater than 6 million. A complete census is being undertaken in Niger with the assistance of UNFPA and the results should be available by mid-1978. Notwithstanding the unavailability of exact figures it is still possible to define a population profile of sufficient validity for purposes of strategy development.

Ninety-one percent of Niger's population is in the rural area and consists of sedentary farmers, semi-nomadic pastoralists and nomadic herders. The sedentary rural population is spread throughout approximately 9,000 villages averaging 500 inhabitants but with extremes ranging from 30 to 5,000, and is concentrated in the southern quarter of the country beneath the 15th parallel. There are an estimated 500,000 farms averaging six hectares in size and eight persons per farm. The average number of active workers is 2.8 per farm giving approximately 2.14 hectares for each productive agriculture worker. This latter figure is the highest in West Africa.

Semi-nomadic pastoralists and nomadic herders constitute approximately 15% of the rural population and are concentrated in the sparsely settled regions above the 15th parallel although the transhumant movements of the Bororo (Fulani) herdsmen bring them into the sudan regions of Niger and neighboring countries to the south.

Although per capita GNP is estimated at \$130 there have been no household surveys conducted at the rural village level which would give a valid estimate of cash income for the average farm family. Nevertheless, it would be expected that the median per capita cash income in the rural areas would be considerably less than the national GNP average. The GNP averages are based on market economy prices and the extent to which they accurately reflect the value of the non-monetized subsistence economy is open to question.

While no one in the rural areas could be classified as wealthy by western standards there are observable income differences between poor farmers and "successful" farmers - both within individual villages and between geographic areas.

Within villages, these differences can be accounted for by various factors ranging from social standing within the group, to size of family and accumulated land tenure, to individual industriousness, progressiveness and consequent attitudes. Between geographic areas the differences can be accounted for by the natural resource base such as soil fertility and rainfall patterns.

By all western standards, however, the rural population in its entirety is poor. Apart from the monetary income consideration, which is a relative factor, this poverty is reflected in the lack of sufficient and diversified foodstuffs and the lack of adequate health and medical care, both of which are compounded by a lack of the modern knowledge, techniques and infrastructure which could substantially alleviate these basic deficiencies.

Malnutrition is the most important health problem in the 0-4 year age group in Niger. Such malnutrition decreases the resistance of children to endemic disease and decreases their chance for survival once a disease has been contracted. For every ten births in Niger less than four survive to their fifth birthday. Those who do survive may be both physically and mentally disadvantaged due to nutritional deprivations during their critical first years of growth and development.

A lack of adequate, clean water supplies for the rural populations and a lack of basic knowledge of sanitation and hygiene interact to increase the incidence of disease transmission and compound the dangers facing a malnourished, disease-susceptible population.

While little is known about levels of adult malnutrition in Niger it is assumed that seasonal food deficits, which correspond with the agriculture work season, decrease work capacities and increase disease susceptibility.

The Republic of Niger has no official population policy, yet several key population issues which are discussed below are at the crux of acknowledged problems which pose major constraints to the nation's overall development. It should be noted that according to the United Nations Niger has the highest birthrate (crude) in the world.

1. Mortality: The crude death rate, per thousand persons, is estimated at between 25-30. The variance in this estimate reflects both incomplete data and the great variation in

living conditions experienced by different groups throughout the country. Infant mortality rates (0-1 year) as reported by the GON Ministry of Health indicated 314 per thousand and 327 per thousand for children 1-4 years of age. These figures are among the world's highest.

2. Life Expectancy: The United Nations Population Division estimates that life expectancy at birth in Niger for mid-year 1975 was 38.5 years for males and 41.6 years for females. The GON is cognizant of this fact and has articulated as the first objective of the Ministry of Health's Three-Year Plan, 1976-1978:

"To improve, at low cost, the life expectancy of all Nigeriens, taking into consideration the health situation."

3. Migration: The problem of the outflow of manpower from the rural areas, both to the towns and cities of Niger, and to neighboring countries on the coast has been an issue of concern since independence. This "rural exodus" has led to a population depletion which is so severe in some areas that researchers at the National Institute for Research in the Social Sciences (IRSH) question the ability of certain zones to sustain a rural development network. At the same time, public service facilities of the capital city, Niamey, are severely strained by the inflow of migrants whose expectation of urban employment cannot be met.

4. Dependency Ratio: Ministry of Health figures indicate that 43.8% of the population is under 15 years of age. This large segment of non-working young people creates a serious strain on the nation's educational system. High fertility and increases in survivorship might mean that most new classroom space will be taken up by expanding school populations without increasing the percentage of the population in school.

5. Land/Man Support System: Living in the Sahel means living in an arid land of short, uncertain rainfall and a highly fragile ecology. The drought of the past years has served to underline the vulnerabilities of this area. The past century has witnessed a severe loss of bush and wood cover resulting in widespread soil and grassland deterioration. In the past decade the country has not been able to produce the food it needs to feed its people. The drought resulted in the perishing of an estimated 35% of the country's cattle

which meant that the nomads, who are heavily dependent on their livestock, had to outmigrate or had to cope with severely reduced herd sizes.

With over 90% of its people located in the Sahelian zone, Niger has at least twice the Sahelian population of Mali, Chad, Mauritania and Senegal. The country's situation needs to be viewed from the perspective of the past 100 years. During these hundred years, the population has grown from 750,000 people to approximately 5-6 million. The increase in population and the corresponding need to put more land under cultivation has led to the settlement of new communities. The number of villages has grown from 1500 to over 9,000 today. The result has been a steady and progressive manmade deterioration of the soil and forest resources. Periodic droughts accentuate the process.

On the financial side, the rural population is equally deprived of cash availability. However, reflecting the outlook of an underdeveloped, traditional people, it is less evident that they consider this a problem. While some development strategies may argue that agriculture producers are not receiving an adequate price compensation for their endeavors (implying that a higher price would bring forth more produce and a consequent increase in income), it is not clear that market and income consideration are predominant for the average farmer. For example: With the recent elimination of the head tax, those farmers who had a surplus grain product chose to retain their stock, rather than sell, for the simple reason that within their own perspective they no longer needed cash to pay the tax. The existence of full granaries, far exceeding consumption requirements, provided more of a gratification and sense of security than the cash income which that surplus could provide. In other words, demand, in the western sense, is very limited. Such a phenomenon is also found among the nomadic herders whose socio/economic needs are satisfied more by the accumulated wealth represented by the size of their herds than by the cash income they could receive through an orderly marketing of the meat.

While the above would be difficult to document without extensive sociological and economic surveys, simple observation would show that: (1) the producer market price for cereal grains has been stable for the past four years and farmers have no reason to believe that supply and demand forces will change that stability to their benefit; and

(2) due to the recent drought, the majority of farmers have been without a significant cash income from surplus produce since 1972; which would lead to the normal expectation that a great deal of latent consumer demand (if it exists) would have been built up. Clearly, insufficient understanding of the mental processes of the rural villagers is currently available.

Given the very low level of national income, the question of equity has little relevance for the Niger scene at this point. While there are a few pockets of amassed wealth within Niger, those that do exist are in commercial areas which are relatively unlinked to the rural population. That is: neither exploitation of the rural people nor accumulation of individual wealth at their expense are problems in Niger.

There are natural differences in rates of development between the urban and rural areas which, in the immediate future, will tend to increase the income gap in favor of the former. The urban areas have a development momentum of their own which is accounted for by the concentration of educated people and individual initiative, fewer cultural and traditional encumbrances, salaried wage-earners, a market economy, and the consequent consumer demand for goods and services which is thus generated and supplies its own fuel.

The rural areas, to the contrary, suffer the enormous constraints imposed by illiteracy, poor health, tradition and scant resource base which will take many years to overcome before the development rate will even begin to approximate the present rate of the urban areas. Even then, it must be recognized that the urban rate will continue to accelerate and, despite advancements in the rural sector, the gap will continue to widen. This is a worldwide socio-economic phenomenon which, even in the United States, has not been resolved. However, it should be noted that growth in the urban sector may well stimulate rural growth through such factors as increased demand for rural products, increased tax base, and greater opportunities for skills training.

Therefore, the development strategy for Niger rural development should appraise the realistic potential for the rural areas within the context of its constraints and establish rural development targets which, by taking cognizance of the capacity of the rural population and its limited resource base and by applying the major concentration in

that sector, will meet the basic needs of the people and the global needs of the country.

B. Key Factors Contributing to Rural Underdevelopment

The key factor which accounts for Niger's present state of development and low standard of living is the natural and human resource base. The soil resource base in this arid land is extremely marginal and subject to rapid deterioration by the incessant misuse and mismanagement resulting from population pressures. Using traditional technology and agriculture practices this obviously results in an inability to produce sufficient foodstuffs to meet the subsistence requirements of an expanding population. Human activities in the rural area have not only been largely responsible for this deterioration, but, the people living there have - until recently - hardly been cognizant of the contributing role of these activities.

The important role that the market economy played in the social change and technological development of the rural areas in the industrialized world was not duplicated in other parts of the world. Consequently, as is the case in Niger, the infusion of new ideas and thought patterns has been negligible and the rural society has remained relatively unchanged from its basic subsistence orientation, traditions and cultural practices which served it adequately 100 years ago. Thus, in the absence of improved environmental and technological practices, the population pressure on a deteriorating resource base compounds the growing natural imbalance. Relatively unchanged practices of rural society have interacted to force a steady downward cycle.

The above key factors were reinforced and abetted by the general conditions of rural life. Until recently there were only few schools in the rural area with a result that Niger has a literacy rate of only 6%. Combined with the lack of modern communication media, this illiteracy had effectively sealed off the rural population from the dissemination of new ideas.

As medical and health facilities were practically non-existent, as well as knowledge of basic sanitation and personal hygiene practices, the rural population became less and less resistant to the region's endemic diseases. This has resulted in another downward cycle whereby as the population becomes less able to provide its basic nutrition

requirements due to the deteriorating resource base, it becomes more susceptible to disease and sickness which in turn debilitates its capacity to provide the increased work effort required to produce basic subsistence on marginal resources.

Another basic reinforcing factor is the perspective of the rural population as regards themselves. It is not at all clear to what extent they are either aware of what has happened over the years or feel that they are living in poverty (except in times of a protracted disaster such as the recent Sahelian drought). Without such feelings there is little incentive for a society to demand or seek the necessary elements which would improve their condition. In other words, there will be little change unless there is a desire to change.

These, therefore, are major contributing factors to rural underdevelopment in Niger. Improved markets, road and communication networks, government and social infrastructure, access to improved inputs and appropriate technology are the vehicles by which a development program can alleviate and improve the rural condition.

C. Action Constraints

C.1. Niger Resource Availabilities:

The Government of Niger does not have the financial resources required to mount and sustain the full scope of activities required over the next twenty years for the long-term development of both the rural and urban sectors. Aside from the government revenues earned from traditional exports such as peanuts, livestock products, cowpeas and cotton, the major revenue earner is the exportation of concentrated uranium ore which presently accounts for 50% of all export revenues. The annual amounts received from this latter source are expected to grow each year as the active mines become more productive and possible new mines become exploitable. Fully 100% of the net uranium revenues are put into the National Investment Fund which is reserved for development activities. While the exact total reserves are as yet unknown, and the future annual income from this source unclear, it has been estimated that at present rates of extraction Niger's reserves will be depleted in less than 30 years. It is therefore clear that the next 20 years will be crucial in combining all possible domestic and foreign financial resources, in order to establish the human and

physical infrastructure required for the sustained support of a society which can be both self-sufficient within the means of its limited resources and generate sufficient domestic and export revenues for the maintenance of that level.

This paper will not attempt to present a recurrent cost analysis of this question. There remain too many unknowns at this time, both in terms of future government revenues and recurrent cost requirements, which will require in-depth research and analysis in order to fill the information gaps. CILSS has recently undertaken just such a study which will hopefully provide sufficient first-look analyses to enable some degree of assurance that project design and forward planning will not result in an undue encumbrance on national resources at the phase-out of donor support. However, it would seem prudent to assume the necessity for continued donor assistance in sectoral support until such time as Niger has achieved its development plan in the year 2000. In regarding the countries of the Sahel one could even posit the perhaps radical thought, but distinct possibility, that foreign donor assistance will never end and that specified amounts of sectoral budget support will be authorized annually by the world community for those countries which simply do not have the resource base to support themselves at an internationally determined minimum standard. As present foreign assistance development programs do not impose an undue burden on donors, the recurrent cost factor should not present an obstacle to the planning and design of those program activities which have been deemed essential for the future achievement and maintenance of the developing country's capability to meet basic human needs. In other words, if the recurrent cost issue presents a constraint which impinges upon donor/host country efforts to improve the welfare of the poor majority perhaps it would better serve the goals, ideals and interest of the foreign assistance program simply to remove the question. This strategy would not eliminate the requirement and responsibility to design projects which would meet program goals with a minimum of recurrent costs.

C.2. GON Policy Constraints:

The most obvious detriment to the successful achievement of development goals is the lack of either a population program or policy on the part of the GON and a reluctance heretofore even to admit that there is a population problem in Niger. The reluctance to squarely face this problem appears to be based simply on religious tradition and the

ethnic custom which embraces polygamy and encourages large families. There are indications, however, that the GON is becoming increasingly cognizant of and concerned by this problem. This is exemplified by the GON's request for information on family spacing and an increased interest in demographic studies by Ministry of Health officials. It is also widely assumed that the results of the national census presently being conducted will provide a shock to GON planners and policy-makers which may propel them to more deliberate action on the population problem. While this problem has not yet reached critical proportions it could easily approach that level within a generation.

Pricing and marketing policies have been established by the GON with the objective of providing the population with an assured supply of cereal grains at a low price. Experience has indicated, however, that the present mechanics of that policy are not working. The GON is presently committed to intervening in the market via para-statal, semi-monopoly control to prevent what it would fear to be the excesses and abuses of private traders and guarantee a stable economy in the cereals market. It is not likely that the GON will abandon such a policy approach and the donors would be well advised to recognize the fact that a free-wheeling, free-market economy, at least in the realm of basic subsistence commodities, is not likely to be in the cards for Niger's future policy. What therefore remains to be done is to assist the GON in refining its present mechanisms and defining that level of market prices which will most effectively complement the agriculture production development activities being designed and implemented while at the same time achieve the government's policy of stable prices within the reach of all citizens.

At this point there is insufficient data and information on farm economics and the market system in Niger to elaborate an adequate and responsive price/market structure. Such information will, however, be produced over the next few years through the experience gained in project implementation and through the complementary studies and research which will be carried out either through the projects or as separate activities.

C.3. Growth/Equity Trade-Offs:

Following the ascension to power of the present government in 1974 the GON has been squarely committed to the development of its rural sector - which encompasses 91% of the

total population. The following, unofficial translation from the introductory section of Niger's 1966-78 three-year plan provides the best evidence of the GON's policy:

"... the accent has been placed ... on the necessity to elaborate a plan essentially aimed at:

- liberating the economy from its dependence on natural forces;
- the building of a developmentally oriented society;
- the search for economic independence.

"In effect, the present situation of the country, as much from the economic point of view as the social point of view, requires us to bring the essential efforts of the nation to the following priorities:

- self-sufficiency in food production for the population, the rebuilding of the livestock herds and the conservation of our forest, animal and fish resource heritage;
- the disenclavement of our country, the improvement of its interior transport network, the provision of village and pastoral water supplies, and the search for a lesser dependence on imported energy supplies;
- the development of social activities in matters of health, education, animation and information in the search for a greater participation of the population in the national development effort;
- the development of industrial, mining and commercial activities to increase the contribution of these sectors to the GNP and become the master of our own economy."

In clarification of the GON's intentions, the introductory section further elaborates on its goal of building a "developmentally oriented society."

"The national development effort will be, above all, a Nigerien affair. It will revolve around a bold policy of redistribution of the national wealth and full employment and will seek the well-being of our population. In the sphere of social justice the accent will be placed particularly on activities in health, education, information and awareness."

While such statements could be interpreted as simple propaganda or political rhetoric with little meaning in practice or intent, it is the general opinion of the Niger representatives of the donor community and other close observers on the scene, that the leadership of the GON is committed to its policy pronouncements and is dedicated to the pursuit of those activities required for the achievement of its goals.

In drawing up its three-year plan the GON had projected the division of the development investment requirements from public sources - domestic and foreign - among four major sectors: (1) Rural Production (dryland agriculture, irrigated agriculture, cooperative formation, livestock and reforestation) - 33.6%; (2) Infrastructure, Public Works and Water Supply (primary and secondary roads, urban and rural water supply, urban electrification and housing, government services and administrative infrastructure) - 46.8%; (3) Human Resource Development (health, education, information and youth) - 15.3%; and (4) Industry, Mines and Commerce - 4.3%.

Of the total estimated three-year requirement of \$364 million, the GON had pledged to provide \$77 million (21%) from its National Investment Fund divided among the above four categories as follows: Rural Production - 10%; Infrastructure - 43.6%; Human Resources - 33.7%; and Industry, Mines and Commerce - 12.7%. The skewing of GON funds allocation away from rural production reflects the awareness of the GON that it is easier to solicit donor financing for rural development activities than it is for the construction of, say, infrastructure for government administrative services. These physical plant requirements, which have been identified in the three-year plan (\$13.2 million), are being 99% financed by the GON.

Although the term of the three-year plan is drawing to a close there has been no comprehensive analysis of the extent to which the plan has been achieved or how responsive the donors have been to the various projects contained therein.

Such an analysis, when performed, will undoubtedly show many projects being carried over to the forthcoming five-year plan (1979-83) and a difference in the amounts of financing actually garnered for individual projects. This in turn will skew the percentage dollar amounts originally planned per sector. Nevertheless, the planning effort still serves as an indication of the GON's development policy and goals.

Some reporting, however, does show that the donors have responded fairly well to the planned sectoral distribution. The most recent comprehensive report on external assistance is that prepared by UNDP/Niger for the year 1976. This report shows a contribution of donor assistance for that year totaling \$128.6 million (exclusive of emergency assistance) distributed among sectors as follows: Rural Production - 36.6%; Infrastructure - 39.5%; Human Resources - 16.4%; and Industry, Mines and Commerce - 7.5%. It should be cautioned that the relatively small proportion of financial requirements dedicated to the Human Resource Sector in the three-year plan does not represent a reduced level of priority or commitment to that sector but rather reflects the disproportionate level of costs required by the physical construction inputs of the other sectors.

It is also noted that approximately \$200 million in investment funds from private and para-statal sources was planned for the same period. 59.2% for Public Works, Energy and Telecommunications, and 40.8% for Industry, Commerce and Mines (chiefly uranium exploration and development, with minor amounts for small industry).

A breakdown of the \$142 million national budget for 1977 (exclusive of the FNI) also shows the GON's commitment to a balanced sector program:

<u>Ministry/Office</u>	<u>% of Total Budget</u>
Finance	48.3
Education	12.2
Public Works	8.1
Interior	5.8
Health	5.5
Defense	5.1
Rural Development	3.4
Foreign Affairs	3.2
Plan	3.0
President's Office	1.6
Other Ministries and Offices	10.4

The extremely large portion allocated to the Ministry of Finance reflects the fact that the salaries of all civil servants (which represent nearly half of the national budget) are paid centrally from that Ministry. The relatively small portion allocated to the Ministry of Rural Development reflects, as stated above, the eagerness of external donors to finance projects in that sector thus freeing GON financial resources for other priority areas. Perhaps most noteworthy is the fact that the defense allocation, as a ratio to GNP, is among the world's ten lowest. Despite the fact of a military government, the defense budget percentage has dropped from 8.16% at the time of the coup d'etat in 1974 to 5.1% in 1977 - less than half of the average for the African continent and rather remarkable considering the transition was from a civilian to a military government. Approximately 17% of the 1976 defense budget was in fact devoted to national development projects: urban electrification, road and bridge construction, upgrading civil aviation facilities, and telecommunication extensions. The Nigerien army's engineering section, in fact, provided the majority of equipment and skilled labor for the CIDA-financed "Unity Route" which recently completed Niger's eastwest link from Niamey to Diffa.

Thus despite the unavailability of reliable statistical data to gauge the relevant progress of its development program it is clear that Niger is committed to a balanced, national program which places a priority emphasis on the rural sector. As the rural sector is poor - and represents 91% of the total population - this translates into a priority emphasis on the poor majority.

C.4. Institutional Capacity:

Manpower limitations, which are the determinant of institutional capacity, represents one of the key constraints to the quick success of development activities in Niger. Despite the GON's orientation toward "auto-encadrement," i.e., the training of farmer-demonstrators and a reliance upon the cooperative structure, there is still a great need for mid and low-level government personnel to effectuate the necessary training and guidance to set the system in motion.

The number of high-level personnel with both requisite education and experience is extremely small and the limited mid-level support staff beneath them (coupled with the general reluctance in the LDC's to delegate authority) compounds their workloads and thus further limits their productivity and effectiveness. The mid-level personnel, in turn, having insufficient technical education or experience,

and crippled by the lack of delegation of authority from above, are equally ineffective.

Since the coup d'etat in 1974 there has been an increasing insistence upon the Nigerienization of the government ministries and services with the consequence that the expatriates who previously assisted in the performance of government services have been increasingly relegated to minor functions with less input into operational activities. While this policy will have long-term benefits in providing both the requisite experience and self-esteem to the Nigerien officials, it will also result in inefficiencies over the short and mid-term until such time as a sufficient availability of trained, experienced manpower is developed.

D. AID Assistance Strategy

D. 1. Club/CILSS/AID Considerations for Sahel Programming

Although the National CILSS Committee has been organized in Niger, its functions and role vis-a-vis the resident donor community have not been clarified; nor is it known whether the GON intends it to play such a role. The original letter from former CILSS Coordinator, Boulama Manga, to the member states requested each country to establish such a committee to facilitate coordination and planning efforts vis-a-vis the CILSS Secretariat. The feed-back mechanisms between CILSS program planning and the donor community thus remains to be structured at the country level. Such a mechanism or procedure is probably of more importance to the AID program due to the greater degree of responsibility in programming and design which is placed on USAID field missions than is true of other donors. To date, the USAID field missions are dependent upon AID/W and Paris for this feed-back which, while very helpful, results in the feeling that less than complete information on CILSS planning activities is available, and that the field missions are not completely involved in the Club/CILSS programming process. The nascent move to transfer the AID Sahel Development Planning Team to the field under the Sahel missions' direction may overcome this problem. The GON, while supportive of CILSS, has not yet begun a local dialogue with resident donors within that framework. A country-level donors' "Club" committee, perhaps under the chairmanship of the UNDP Resident Representative, might be considered in this regard.

In addition to the obvious benefits which can be derived from close donor coordination and cooperation on Sahel development activities, one of the most important potentialities of the combined Club voice is in the pressures it can bring to bear on such critical issues as population growth, family planning, and pricing. Whereas a single donor pressing on these issues could be easily rebuffed or accused of unwarranted interference in internal policy and political matters, thus jeopardizing the effectiveness of its influence with the government, subtle pressures and consistent dialogue applied through a concerted effort of donors represented by the entity of the Club would be more likely to produce reconsideration of policy matters by the recipient governments.

D. 2. The Relationship of AID Assistance to Club Strategies:
AID Contribution to Club Goals

(a) Rainfed Agriculture Sector

USAID/Niger sector goals in rainfed agriculture are consistent with the overall goals of the CILSS/Club and GON.

The common goals include self-sufficiency in food production, reducing the susceptibility of the production system to drought, maximum use of the rural labor force, emphasis on training to expand the human resource infrastructure, and improving the living standards of the rural population. Perhaps the major difference is that, based on Congressional fiscal limitations, AID goal achievement is often compressed into an unrealistically short-time frame and is therefore perhaps short-sighted in comparison with CILSS/Club goals and strategies which are longer-range (10-20 years).

The USAID/Niger program is consistent with SDP strategy in that the two major projects in the rainfed sector (Niger Cereals Production and Niamey Department Development) both take a cautious approach and include a substantial experimental element. Study, experimentation and analysis of technology packages, resource management, local institutional structures, rural population reactions and responses, and an assessment of GON managerial capabilities are an important part of the initial phases of USAID/Niger projects.

USAID/Niger projects in other supporting areas include: The INRAN project for supporting economic studies, including research at the farm level; participation in the multilateral IPDR Kolo activity as well as other institutions involved in human resource development (Human Resources Sector); and the proposed land-use planning project (Ecology Sector).

Whereas USAID/Niger had previously anticipated extending the Niger Cereals Project as presently structured into a Phase II project for an additional six years, the recent evaluations of the NCP have led project management to the conclusion that a division of activities into distinct projects would be both more efficient and practical. USAID/Niger and the GON are thus presently considering splitting off the seed research and seed production component into a distinct project and mounting a general Ag Sector project which would allow project management to focus more closely on the separate functions required for the process of improving agriculture productivity.

(b) Livestock Sector

The Club Livestock Sector strategy includes five major elements: evaluating potential of natural resources and range management, associating livestock and agricultural production, protecting animal health, providing training and

communication for government managers and technicians at all levels and for herders, and meeting domestic and international market demand for meat.

The AID Livestock Sector program includes a major project, Niger Range and Livestock which is consistent with the long-term objectives and major elements of strategy of the Club/CILSS working group. The objective of this project is to develop a system of range management in the pastoral zone of Niger and to contribute to increased income and well-being of the traditional herders. The project intends to produce a series of studies on (1) ways of protecting and improving the natural resources of the project area; (2) the benefits and costs of comprehensive small-herder productivity programs with a package of inputs and improved practices (vaccination, parasite treatment, mineral and food supplements; and (3) socially feasible methods for herder implementation of a range management program. In addition, training in range management, animal husbandry, and livestock extension will be provided for livestock service personnel and herders (to be trained as extension aides).

This AID-financed livestock activity responds directly to three of the Club/CILSS livestock strategy elements, i.e., range improvement, animal health, and training, all in relation to production in the pastoral zone. The results of the set of studies to be carried out through this project will permit a more informed evaluation and perhaps redefinition of the Club/CILSS livestock strategy based on research results and actual field experience.

As the project area lies outside the farming zone, this project does not address directly the association of livestock and crop production. Livestock marketing, another Club strategy element, will be addressed in a limited way.

(c) Health Sector

As stated in the health sector strategy section of the Human Resources Team report, adopted by CILSS at the Ouagadougou meeting April 1977, the strategy to advance better health, water supply and nutrition can be concisely stated as follows: The people themselves must progressively assume responsibility for their own health care through participation in the activities developed by their national health services. The specific actions to be undertaken in pursuit of this synthesis statement are carefully expressed as general guidelines which national governments might consider in their

policy and program formulations. These include: the selection and training of volunteer village health workers and their organization into functioning teams; developing a health program which emphasizes a system of preventive medicine, midwifery and simple curative medicine; promoting health and sanitation education and the provision of potable water supply and waste disposal systems; improving and expanding the capability of the national health services physical and personnel infrastructure to provide material and supervisory support to the basic health teams.

The Club/CILSS strategy is, in fact, a reflection of the rural health program strategy which the government of Niger has developed and pursued since 1964 and which has been incorporated into the recently approved GON/AID rural health project. This project represents a joint effort between the GON and USAID/Niger towards the promotion of health, prevention of disease and the treatment of Niger's rural population through a wide range of resources. The project intends to increase the capacity of the Ministry of Health to a projected coverage of 3,500 villages by 1982. This target, if achieved, would mean that 50% of the country will be provided with basic health care. Recognizing the limited amount of manpower and finances available to the GON for allocation to its health sector, the health project retains great emphasis on the volunteer aspects of the existing program. Sixty-five percent of the project's budget will go to human resource development with the major share being directed to the improvement and enlargement of the volunteer force of village health workers. Finally, it can be noted that there is total agreement of strategies between Club/CILSS and USAID/Niger with regard to logistics and infrastructure support. The remaining portion of the budget (35%) addresses critical issues such as supervision, transportation and supplies.

(d) Transport Sector

The Club/CILSS strategy for the transport sector has been initially fleshed out as first generation emphasis on: (1) assistance to national service capabilities for road maintenance; (2) rehabilitation of existing road networks; and (3) construction of secondary and feeder roads in support of production sector projects. In its May 1977 synthesis report, the Transport and Infrastructure Working Group recommended a first generation (1977-82) program for Niger consisting of rehabilitation of 1,311 kilometers of secondary roads and an increase in the GON's road maintenance capability from the 21% total road network coverage which it

presently provides to 44%. Preliminary estimates have budgeted this program at \$98.7 million over the 5-year, first generation period.

USAID/Niger feels that the Club strategy of viewing the transport sector within a supporting context to the integrated Sahel Development Program is sound. Although primary road network requirements are readily evident, the planning for secondary and feeder roads must be geographically consistent, supportive and integrated with the major investments being planned and implemented in the production sector. The more immediate requirement for improved road maintenance capability on the part of the Sahelian countries is likewise placed in its proper perspective if the large future investments are to be adequately protected and future requirements for rehabilitation costs reduced.

To date, with the exception of a small, 24 km. feeder road project financed under the Sahel Emergency R&R program, AID has not been involved in bilateral road construction projects in Niger. Although the mission has recently proposed that the major portion of AID's contribution to future road transport activities in Niger be conducted through regional, multi-donor programs under IBRD coordination and implementation, the possibility of bilateral activities which can be integrated within the context of AID's project zones should not be ruled out. As an example, the first phase of the Niamey Department Development project will result in the preparation of a comprehensive development plan including a road network requirement for the integration of the departmental supply, marketing and administrative communications. Many of the specific Niamey Department secondary road network requirements, which from simple observation can be identified as obvious necessities, are already listed in the Club/CILSS report on Niger and in the GON's Three-Year Plan. USAID/Niger has also proposed participating in the construction of the tertiary road network within Say Arrondissement as a necessary infrastructure input for the "New Lands" settlement program.

There are presently two other options available to USAID/Niger for future participation in the Transport Section in Niger. The first is represented by the recent CILSS study carried out by Louis Berger for road rehabilitation and maintenance. The second is represented by the IBRD (BECOM) study on Sahel feeder roads. While the first study has been received, it has not been thoroughly studied by either the GON or USAID/Niger. The second study has not yet been received in final form. In consideration of the many options available to USAID/Niger and the thorough study which must precede any option selection, coupled with

the present uncertainty of future availability of funds additional to that required by the ongoing program, USAID/Niger is deferring consideration of entry into the transport sector until FY 1980. This policy will be reconsidered if sufficient funds should become available at an earlier date.

(e) Ecology Sector

The strategy for the ecology sector, as well as USAID/Niger can determine, has correctly assessed the central role that prudent ecology-oriented programming can play in the successful achievement of the production sector goals as well as in making direct, substantial improvements in the quality of life for the rural population. A program of agricultural/pastoral expansion or intensification which does not include a sustainable ecological equilibrium is counter-productive in every sense. The Club strategy is based on recognition that the activities of man can in fact improve rather than degrade the environment. However, the strategy appears less a "strategy" than a simple listing of specific types of activities which could be immediately implemented. One notable exception is recognition of the priority for a research and action program in solar energy as an alternative to the resource-depleting use of firewood. However, the basic and priority element that appears to have been ignored is the necessity for extensive resource surveys and integrated planning which would allow the rational and imperative integration of this sector's activities with the production sector projects.

In the past, AID has joined forces with the GON and other donors in aggravating the "shotgun" approach. Under the Sahel Drought Emergency Program, approximately 3,000 hectares of "Gao" tree plantations were seeded throughout the country. Recognizing the enormity of the problem and the necessity to initiate ecology/environment-oriented measures, USAID/Niger has incorporated a major reforestation/soil conservation component within the Niamey Department Development project (NDD). With the full appreciation that an ecology program can only succeed with active and motivated participation of the villagers, the NDD proposed a program for extensive training of forestry service extension agents, awareness programs for villagers, and the preparation, with villager assistance, of an individual land use plan for each village touched by Phase I of the NDD. This plan consisted of village wood lots, reforestation activities and soil conservation programs. However, due to limitations in personnel resources, the Forest and Waters service of the

GON has elected to postpone the initiation of this component until the later stages of Phase I of the project. Similar activities have been included within the Niger Range and Livestock project, although following a different framework in recognition of the ecological and nomadic tradition differences between the agricultural and pastoral zones.

USAID/Niger and the Niger Forestry Service are preparing for consideration a Forestry and Land-Use Planning Project which will permit the Forestry Service to improve its planning capacity so as to better integrate projects within an ecological framework designed to rehabilitate and conserve the natural resource base as part of a long-term solution to the environmental problems which have threatened animal, land and human productivity in the Sahel. The project will assist the GON's Forestry Service in the establishment of a central planning unit, the pursuit of a national resource survey, the training of personnel, the launching of an ecology awareness program, and appropriate logistical, material and technical assistance. USAID/Niger stands ready to support alternative energy proposals for implementation in Niger.

(f) Human Resource Sector

In simplified form, the CILSS/Club strategy for human resource development in the Sahel consists of two broad goals integrated with the major thrust of the production sectors. The first, which requires immediate attention, emphasizes the improvement and expansion of training in planning, management and implementation of projects in the rural development production sectors. The second goal, more long-term in scope, emphasizes improving the effectiveness of formal and non-formal education through its expansion and reform. This obvious, but essential strategy receives across-the-board support from USAID/Niger, the GON and other donors.

In response to a request from the GON, the UNDP/FAO conducted a major study of the GON's rural development manpower needs at the high and mid-levels. This study resulted in the proposed project for the expansion and reform of Niger's Practical Institute for Rural Development (IPDR). USAID/Niger has proposed being a major participant in this multi-donor activity within the context of a project encompassing a broad scope of human resource requirements geared to the rural sector development program needs and constraints. In addition to the major IPDR/Kolo, multi-donor activity, other proposed components include:

1. Creation of Project Management Training Center for personnel of different technical backgrounds and positions.
2. Creation of a training center for mid and low-level credit and cooperative personnel.
3. Creation of a systematic manpower planning system for Niger's rural development program.
4. Major support for the expansion of the GON's adult literacy training program in the rural areas.
5. Establishment of a participant training fund for high-level personnel in the rural development services.

In addition to the above project proposal, all USAID/Niger projects have a heavy training component built into the project action plan.

(g) Irrigated Agriculture Production

The Club envisions the timely attainment of Niger's food crop production goals through the rapid extension of irrigated agricultural systems along the Niger River and other major water courses in the country's interior. The GON program for irrigation development conforms closely with the Club/CILSS priorities and guidelines and has been judged by the Agriculture Working Group as an ambitious (2,000 additional hectares/year) but soundly based program both in terms of short-term priorities and long-term objectives. The Club predicates irrigation development in Niger upon the existence of (a) a national policy for the construction and use of irrigated perimeters, (b) a national agency responsible for the execution of such a program, and (c) a core of trained personnel for the planning, implementation and management requirements.

Over the short-term (1977-82), the Club strategy places great emphasis on the need to increase the capability of Sahelian governments to plan, construct, manage and evaluate the development projects in the irrigated agriculture sector.

The Club's short and medium-term program strategy also places great emphasis on rehabilitation of existing irrigation systems throughout the Sahel (approximately 150,000 hectares). Rehabilitation is used in a general sense to mean intensification, expansion and upgrading of existing facilities as well as supporting extension, operation and maintenance services for farmer-based irrigation management organizations. The Club and the GON have identified approximately 1,000 hectares in need of such rehabilitation and have emphasized the concurrent need to increase the GON's operational capability through establishment of a series of equipment and maintenance facilities.

Programs to strengthen the planning and coordinating capability of the major river basin commissions in the Sahel constitutes the third major strategy component of the Club du Sahel strategy.

In the FY 79 ABS, USAID/Niger submitted a PID for support to the creation of a GON office of irrigation. This PID was approved subject to removal of production component. The project has since been picked up by the FAC. More recent analysis by USAID/Niger has led to the conclusion that without a significant increase in AID funding availabilities, no new initiatives in the irrigated agriculture sector should be proposed.

There are presently a number of donors actively involved in irrigation activities within Niger. In addition, AID is indirectly furnishing assistance through an Entente Fund grant for the rehabilitation of an irrigated perimeter at Firgoun and will be providing additional direct assistance through the recently proposed Sahel Regional Rehabilitation of Irrigation Systems project. The multi-donor Niger River Development Planning project with the River Niger Commission will also provide long-term assistance to Niger as well as the other member states.

D. 3. Donor Participation in CILSS First Generation Program

In consideration of the first-generation CILSS/Club program which was approved at the 1977 Ottawa conference, the following presents a breakdown of Niger sector activities and known donor response to date:

Dryland Agriculture

(1) Badeguichiri Productivity Project

FED

(2) Maradi Productivity Project

IBRD

(3) Zinder Productivity Project

FED

(4) Niamey Productivity Project

USAID

(5) Tahoua Productivity Project

(Being considered by FRG)

(6) Diffa Productivity Project

(Being considered by CIDA)

(7) Dosso Productivity Project

FAC (Phase II being considered by IBRD)

(8) Say Arrondissement Development

(Project being developed. Possibility for multi-donor participation - including USAID.)

(9) Niger Cereals Program

USAID

(10) Research

(USAID has proposed participation through the INRAN project)

Irrigated Agriculture

(1) Development of Irrigated Perimeters on the Niger River (1,850 ha)

Four separate dossiers have been submitted to the PRC. FAC is presently implementing two perimeters totaling 1,120 ha. although it is not clear if they are included in the GON dossiers for the first generation. Entente Fund (USAID) through the Firgoun rehabilitation project (350 ha.).

- (2) Irrigated Sugar Cane Production (2,500 ha.)

(ADB has indicated interest.)

- (3) Preparation of development plan for the Koumadougou-Yobe Valley and Lake Chad Terrasses.

(For possible consideration under the LCBC.)

- (4) Study of Development Potential in the Maggia Valley.

(No information)

- (5) Creation of National Irrigation Office and Professional Training.

FAC is preparing study and has pledged \$1 million for implementation.

- (6) Creation of a training center for irrigated agriculture "Monitors."

The Netherlands has pledged \$1.5 million.

- (7) Development of earthen dams in the Ader-Doutchi-Maggia (ADM) Valley.

FAC has raised one existing dam and is performing study on another. FRG has pledged \$4 million.

- (8) Irrigated perimeters on the Koumadougou River.

(No information)

Village and Pastoral Water Supply

- (1) Development of "hydro-agriculture" in the Daliol Bosso.

(No information)

- (2) Development of "hydroagriculture" in the Maggia Valley.

(No information)

- (3) Inventory of water points and reenforcement of the hydrogeological services.

(No information)

Livestock

- (1) Training scholarships.

(No information)

- (2) Creation of a central pastoral development support office and pastoral development activities in the Tahoua-Agadez area.

USAID-IBRD-other donor projects possible.

- (3) Continuation of technical training for veterinary service agents.

(No information. Assume FAC continued support.)

- (4) Study of the use of educational television for technical training.

(No information)

- (5) Animal Health.

Entente Fund (USAID) through VETHOPHAR project.
FRG through provision of vaccines. No information on other donors.

- (6) Herd Reconstitution.

FRG - Saudi Arabia.

- (7) Diversification of livestock production.

(No information)

Fishery Development

- (1) Research, training, preservation and marketing, and fish technology.

(No information)

Plant Protection

- (1) Reinforcement of the National Plant Protection Service.

CIDA (bilateral) - Integrated Pest Management
(regional - multi-donor)

Ecology and Environment

- (1) First generation program (as approved) consists of a listing of 15 separate activities in all areas of the country.

USAID through Forestry and Land-Use Planning Project. (Other than pilot activities, this project will not address the specific projects in the first generation program.) IBRD has indicated interest. Other donors unknown.

Transport and Infrastructure

- (1) Road rehabilitation and maintenance (1977-82).

Proposed program calls for financing of \$98 million. Project preparation will require intensive review of existing studies (Louis Berger, IBRD) and close consultation with donors.

Human Resource Development

- (1) Reform and expansion of the Practical Institute for Rural Development (IPDR/Kolo).

Multi-donor including UNDP/FAO, USAID, FAC, Belgium, FED and possibly the Netherlands and IBRD. Approximately one-half of the funding requirements have been pledged.

- (2) Creation of a cooperative training center.

(Proposed in USAID's Rural Sector Human Resource Development Project.)

- (3) Training of personnel for adult education in ethnic languages.

(No information)

- (4) Regional centers for adult education.

(No information)

- (5) Support to rural radio clubs and training of high-level personnel.

(No information - Support for radio clubs in Niamey Department being provided through USAID's Niamey Department Development Project.)

(6) Financing for local training and retraining.

(No information)

(7) Basic Health.

USAID - WHO - FAC - Belgium - FRG -
The Netherlands - FED - PVO's

(8) Retraining and supervision of service personnel.

(No information)

D.4. AID Cooperation With Other Donors:

AID is presently participating with other donors (or planning participation) in the following projects being implemented, monitored or planned by USAID/Niger:

<u>Project</u>	<u>AID</u>	(\$'000) <u>Other Donor</u>
a. Niger River Development Planning Phase I (Reg.)	1,350	3,386
b. Sahel Water Data Manage- ment (Regional)	4,580	9,470
c. Rural Sector Human Resources Development (IPDR/Kolo Component)	5,300	8,700
d. Transport Sector (Rural Roads)	2,000	10,000

The table below presents a breakdown of sector contributions by other major donors for 1976. Given the diversity in reporting procedures by the various donors, and the sometimes arbitrary ascribing of projects to different sectors, it is extremely difficult to detail with exact precision a sectoral breakdown of projects which would fit exactly with AID's sector definitions. The table represents a summary of a UNDP report which originally listed thirteen separate "sectors." It has been consolidated into six sectors which will perhaps render it more meaningful to AID reviewers. As only the major other donors, and major sectors, have been treated no attempt should be made to perform an analytical comparison between the table below and the percentage breakdown as reported in Section C.3 of this report.

Sector/ Donor	Rural Development	Human Resources (Health/Education)	Water Supply	Industry/ Commerce	Science/ Technology	Transport/ Communication	Total
UNDP	1,131	670	666	224	-	122	2,813
IBRD	3,600	-	-	-	-	1,100	4,700
UN/Agencies	796	1,896	445	-	-	178	3,315
FED	9,911	181	601	6,445	-	5,370	22,508
ADB	232	4,800	-	-	-	4,440	9,472
CIDA	562	836	197	-	-	3,737	5,332
Algeria	1,000	270	-	-	-	4,000	5,270
FRG	2,094	833	11,385	1,000	927	90	16,329
Saudi Arabia	9,262	(Plus \$4,000,000 for urban housing)	-	-	-	-	13,262
Belgium	216	954	216	27	-	27	1,440
FAC	5,070	8,570	6,952	-	2,450	4,052	27,094
PVO's	2,280	2,529	238	-	-	50	5,097
Total	36,154	21,539	20,700	7,696	3,377	23,166	112,632
	(32%)	(19%)	(18%)	(17%)	(3%)	(20%)	

Source: UN

E. Optional Funding Levels

Based on present estimates of future fund availabilities USAID/Niger feels that it has reached an optimum program level with projects presently underway or proposed. The following listing of projects by year would show that USAID/Niger has already reached its FY 80 funding "mark". (This listing is subject to change in the ABS):

<u>Project</u>	<u>Funding (\$'000)</u> ^{1/}				
	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Niger Cereals - Phase I	2,500				
Niger Cereals - Research		1,000	1,000	1,000	1,000
Agriculture Sector Production Support		1,871	2,000	2,000	2,000
Niamey Department - Phase I	1,525	1,350			
Niamey Department - Phase II			2,000	2,000	2,000
Range and Livestock - Phase I	1,133	1,896			
Range & Livestock - Phase II			3,000	3,000	2,000
Agriculture Economics Research	373	943	943	851	873
Say Arrondissement Development			3,000	2,000	1,000
Forestry/Land Use Planning - Phase I	800	1,200	1,500	1,500	
Forestry/Land Use Planning - Phase II					3,000
Rural Health - Phase I	3,107	3,275	2,770	2,896	
Rural Health - Phase II					3,000
Human Resource Development	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	2,000
Shelter Sector Planning	326	245			
Evaluation Assist.to MinPlan		220	230	240	
Level I TOTAL	11,764	15,000	19,443	18,487	16,873

^{1/} The above does not include funding required for either OPG's or PD&S

Additional funding availabilities would allow USAID/Niger to propose new interventions in priority sectors such as transport and shelter as well as provide increased funding possibilities for ongoing projects as follows:

<u>Project</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Rural Feeder & Secondary Roads		2,000	5,000	5,000	7,000
Ongoing Projects		1,000			
Low Income Housing			2,000	2,000	1,000
(Plus funding from Level I)	<u>11,764</u>	<u>15,000</u>	<u>19,443</u>	<u>18,487</u>	<u>16,873</u>
Level II Total	11,764	18,000	26,443	25,487	24,873

The above projections have been made on the basis of existing and planned projects (Level I) plus other priority interventions consonant with the CILSS/Club strategy (Level II). However, both levels have ignored the forthcoming five-year plan (1977-83) of the GON which is presently under preparation. It can be assumed that this plan will delineate many projects of a high priority for the GON and that bilateral approaches for funding will be made to USAID/Niger. Only in the case of funding availabilities over and above level II could such approaches receive a positive response. While such future bilateral possibilities remain conjectural at this time, a contingency level of \$3-5 million per year beginning in FY 81 could easily be envisaged. Other shelf-projects such as Say Arrondissement (New Lands Development) could be initiated in FY 80 as well as additional funding interventions for the priority, multidonor road rehabilitation and maintenance project. Additional funding for the proposed Agricultural Sector Production Support Project could also be envisaged. This would raise funding requirements to level III as follows:

<u>Project</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Road Rehabilitation & Maintenance		2,000			
Say Arrondissement Development		2,000			
Contingency for 5-year plan			3,000	4,000	5,000
Ag Sector Production Support (construction)		3,000			
(Plus funding from Level II)	<u>11,764</u>	<u>18,000</u>	<u>26,443</u>	<u>25,487</u>	<u>24,873</u>
Level III Total	11,764	25,000	29,443	29,487	29,873

Finally, consideration must be given to the distinct probability of the construction of Niger's highest priority infrastructure project - the Kandadji Dam. Although feasibility studies are not yet complete, the purposes of long-range financial planning will be served by the assumption

of economic feasibility and the initiation of construction by FY 83. Notwithstanding the internal U.S. debate which will be taking place over the heavy infrastructure issue, this strategy paper assumes that valid infrastructure projects, particularly those directly supporting rural development, will be given favorable consideration by the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program in the near future. Based on the above assumptions a fourth funding level option can be projected in consideration of a possible AID contribution to the multi-donor Kandadji Dam project, perhaps on a loan basis:

<u>Project</u>	<u>FY 79</u>	<u>FY 80</u>	<u>FY 81</u>	<u>FY 82</u>	<u>FY 83</u>
Kandadji Dam Contribution					10,000
(Plus funding from Level III)	<u>11,764</u>	<u>25,000</u>	<u>29,487</u>	<u>29,487</u>	<u>29,873</u>
Level IV Total	11,764	25,000	29,487	29,487	39,873

As the critical factor is funding availability, USAID/Niger does not intend to specify a preferred level. It is felt that all levels are valid options (given the stated assumptions) and that sufficient manpower for operational implementation can be made available either through AID direct-hire employees, contract employees, or the assumption of implementation responsibility by other participating donors.