

**THE NIGERIA GOVERNANCE AND CORRUPTION SURVEY AND
CORRUPTION AWARENESS PROGRAMME – AN EVALUATION**

BY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study examines **TO** activities to determine the extent to which its objectives are realized. It does so by examining all the documentary evidence on the deliverables and by conducting some interviews with key actors and stake-holders.

IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

A major observation that is made in this study is that the delays in conducting the survey and writing the reports were occasioned by logistic challenges and inadequacy of facilities within the consortium used for the study. Thus, in future, these should be part of criteria used in selecting local contractors or the chosen contractor is assisted in building the needed facilities before the commencement of the project.

NATURE AND QUALITY OF DELIVERABLES

Overall, the study observes that the objectives of the **TO** were largely achieved as good-quality survey results and reports were produced and the workshops that were held as well as the media products that were broadcast were of highly qualitative and effective. Thus, Casals & Associates have done a good job.

LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Further, the lessons of the survey itself seem to suggest that any future anti-corruption activities must pay some attention to making the channels for reporting corruption clear, convenient and cheap. This may be achieved by empowering journalists to play greater roles in the investigation and reporting of corruption.

Finally, it is recommended that the programme be sustained to consolidate the gains.

1.0 BACKGROUND

It is now common knowledge that Nigeria is one of the 10 most corrupt countries in the world. This general perception about Nigeria both at home and abroad, though uncharitable may not be inaccurate. It is also generally agreed that corruption is an obstacle to good governance and hard-work in both private and public sectors of the economy and therefore a major hindrance to development.

With the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, promising in 1999 that fighting corruption would be a major focus of his administration, the USAID, with the support of World Bank (IBRD) and the blessing of the Government of Nigeria (GON), initiated some programmes of activities to assist the GON in realizing its objective of fighting corruption. These activities in the main consist of the conduct of the Governance and Corruption Survey, the analysis of the results and the launch of awareness campaigns. This set of activities is referred to as the Task Order (**TO**) by major parties to the implementation of the programme. The **TO** was coordinated by Casals and Associates (C&A) using a consortium of Nigerian researchers – made up of universities and research institutes – Nigerian media and media practitioners, relevant government organizations, and civil society organizations (CSOs).

The objective of the current effort is to evaluate the effectiveness of the **TO** programme with a view to making suggestions. Towards this end, the rest of this report consists of: Section 2: Methodology; Section 3: Task Order Objectives; Section 4: Implementation Issues; Section 5: Nature and Quality of Outputs

(Deliverables); Section 6: Achievement of Objectives and Policy Goals; Section 7: Lessons; and Section 8: Summary and Recommendations for Future Anti-Corruption Initiatives.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

This study examines the effectiveness of both the design and the execution of **TO** activities against the bench-marks set by the literature and best-practices as they concern this kind of activities. In particular, in evaluating the **TO** programme, the study examined the nature and quality of its major deliverables, drawing on the accumulated knowledge in statistics and best practices governing the conduct of surveys, analysis of survey results, writing of the associated reports, the conduct of workshops and media campaign. Furthermore, interviews were held with 50 randomly selected television viewers – consisting of 10 persons from each of the cities of Lagos, Ibadan, Port-Harcourt, Kaduna and Ilorin – to determine whether or not the media campaign was effective. Also, discussions were held with 6 key persons that were involved in implementing **TO** activities to determine whether or not the **TO** objectives/goals have been realized and identify challenges to its implementation (see Appendix I for a list of those contacted).

3.0 TASK ORDER OBJECTIVES

From the C&A's "Workshop/IEC Implementation Strategy" paper of January 7, 2002 and the Evaluation Scope of Work of February 4, 2004 provided for this evaluation, the objectives of the **TO** activities are stated to be:

- (i) To conduct a national survey covering households, public officials and business enterprises on governance and corruption in Nigeria;
- (ii) To disseminate widely the survey results and promote/provoke discussions of same with a view to promoting consensus on the appropriate policy framework for remedying the situation;
- (iii) To conduct anti-corruption awareness campaign using a multi-media approach; and
- (iv) To forge linkages among different anti-corruption constituencies.

Thus, the main objective of current effort is to determine whether or not the above-stated objectives/goals¹ of the **TO** were achieved.

4.0 IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

The first component of the **TO** strategies is the conduct of Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey, the analysis of the resulting data and the production of the associated reports. These were scheduled to be completed within six months. Between November and December, 2001, this survey was conducted. In March, 2002, the data files for the survey were produced and around June 2002, the preliminary survey report was out while a revised survey report was ready in December, 2002.

¹ In the strategic management literature, some authors use the terms objectives and goals interchangeably, while some others use objectives to mean broad and timeless statements of end results and goals to mean specific, quantitative, dated and tangible measures of objectives. Another group of authors use goals to mean broad and timeless statements of end results and objectives to mean specific, quantitative, dated and tangible measures of goals (Robson, 1997; Pp.20-24). In practice, it is often useful to distinguish between the two in line with leading practitioners like Smith and Smith (1986). However, because no clear distinction was made between goals and objectives in **TO** documents under review, in this report the two are used interchangeably to refer to broad and timeless statements of end results.

Even when generous allowance is made for some unforeseen events, like Muslim/Christian violence in September–October, 2001 (2 months), the implementation of this component was significantly delayed. Noting that the questionnaire was finalized and the first installment of payment effected in February, 2001, it took over 8 months of preparation (including pre-survey testing) for the survey to be started at all and another six months for the draft report to be ready. The revision and production of final report took another six months.

This delay was occasioned by the nature of artificial consortium used for this study as coordination problems arose especially within the Nigerian public-sector work setting, and with communication and facility inadequacy in the Nigerian university setting in particular (See C & A document entitled, **Narrative Activities**, p.3, for evidence on logistic problems and facility inadequacy). In particular, I am convinced that the non-availability of a portable computer, needed software and needed data management capability in the Institute of Development Research (IDR) for over seven months after the survey had been conducted is a major cause of the observed delay in data processing (see **Narrative Activities**, p.8). This leads one to question the criteria used in selecting the consortium in the first instance.

The second component which involves the dissemination of the survey results was executed mainly through workshops and publication of the survey results in both hard and electronic copies (see www.accountabilitynigeria.org). The publication of survey results was done as soon as the needed approval for

its release was obtained. Short of the delays that were occasioned by the back - slash associated with the release of Afrobarometer Survey results, the “political sensibilities” associated with Nigeria’s 2003 general elections in April, and of course the delay in the conclusion of the survey reports, this component did not suffer a delay comparable to that associated with the conduct of the survey.

It is worth noting that this component, executed by the Nigerian private sector, the media, civil society organizations and not constrained by needless bureaucracy and complex coordination requirement, suffers no significant delay in its implementation. The final survey reports were ready in the second quarter of 2003 and all planned workshops were conducted between November and December 2003. In all, 20 workshops were held across the country (Abuja, Calabar, Enugu, Ibadan, Ilorin, Jos, Kaduna, Lagos, Maiduguri, Port Harcourt, Sokoto, and Yola). Thus, this component was implemented as planned.

The third component – a multi-media campaign – which included production of vignettes and Public Service Announcements (PSAs) and their broadcast were implemented virtually as planned. The vignettes and PSAs were broadcast between April and June, 2003 at prime times on Channels TV (a private television network) and on the federal government-owned television network with national coverage, Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) (see the Transmission schedule). Impressed by the performance of the broadcast of the vignettes and the PSAs, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) sponsored their broadcast on the NTA for an additional quarter in 2003 (in the third quarter). There were also radio

programmes that translated the messages in the “Tight Rope” vignettes into Hausa. Again, the smoothness and timeliness of the execution of this component underscores my earlier observation that the Nigerian private-sector institutions may be more flexible and more result-oriented than public ones.

5.0 NATURE AND QUALITY OF DELIVERABLES

The deliverables that this evaluation study is interested in are IDR Deliverables 1–6 (see Appendix III), the Vignettes/PSAs and their records of broadcast and workshop records. I examined each of these and wish to make some comments.

My overall comment on the questionnaires used, is that they are of high quality. However, there are some areas of these questionnaires that need to be re-examined in any future use. Because these observations do not invalidate the **main** results of the survey, my comments in these areas are relegated to Appendix IV.

It is noteworthy that the survey’s sampling design, guidelines for field work and data collection procedures must of necessity produce disproportionately more urban respondents than rural and more educated respondents. However, since the purpose of the survey is to provide a bird’s eye-view of attitudes and experiences of those who have significant business contacts with public institutions especially as they concern their effectiveness and integrity, it does not really matter whether or not the urban or the educated persons are over-represented. In any event, the results would still be valid for establishing baseline

against which improvements are going to be gauged in future, provided the same sampling design/procedure is used

I now turn to the analysis of the results. Going through the frequency results, it is found that data entry/cleaning went into a minor error. This is because all “missing cases” (blank responses) in all the questionnaires – households, enterprises and public officials - were treated as zeroes. This is not right. Missing cases are different from zero responses and virtually all spread sheets that I have come across - e.g. Excel and SPSS – treat them differently. Treating blank responses as zeroes is especially problematic when the computation of averages (or/and other statistical analyses like regression) are involved and in such cases the output will be incorrect – a simple numerical example can easily be drawn up to demonstrate this. For instance, the average of 2, 0 and 4 is 2 while the average of 2, --- and 4 is 3.

Another associated problem is that the summation of the frequency distributions (in percentages) of responses to various options would not add up to 100 percent even for simple Yes or No questions – this is rather absurd.

However, because the bulk of the analysis of the results was limited to analyzing frequency distributions, this observed error does not invalidate the major conclusions. But all results relating to averages and regression analysis would be incorrect and should therefore be interpreted with caution. Happily, such results are mainly alluded to or are foot-notes to major issues.

I can now turn to the workshops. The Focus Group Discussions and the 20 workshops held across the country have produced excellent discussions,

policy recommendations and suggestions. Though I was unable to lay my hands on the guidelines for the facilitation of the 20 workshops, the oral brief of Mr. Adelodun convinces me that a train-the-trainer workshop, where the guidelines for the facilitation of the workshops were agreed upon, was held. The guidelines for the Focus Group Discussions were available to me and were of good quality.

However, a major area for concern with respect to the 20 dissemination workshops is that there was no arrangement put in place to determine immediately after each workshop whether or not its objectives/goals were achieved. This could have facilitated continuous improvements in the conduct of workshops. For instance, it is possible to administer end-of-workshop questionnaires to participants and these are analyzed to determine the effectiveness of the workshops.

In a similar vein, there are indications that facilitators did not lead participants to reconcile contradictory and inconsistent policy recommendations. For instance, it is not uncommon to find participants recommending that government should establish new firms and provide more employment in this era of private sector development paradigm.

Despite these observations, my discussions with 20 randomly selected participants at the workshops indicate that they were very effective in realizing their objectives as they are generally described as “Helpful” with majority of the participants rating them as either “Effective/Helpful” or “Very Effective/ Very Helpful and Wonderful”. While one participant (5%) said the workshop only confirmed what he already knew about the scope and costs of corruption in

Nigeria, overall, no participant assessed the workshops as “Not Helpful/ In Effective” and only 3 (15%) said the workshops were “Somewhat Helpful” in understanding better what set of policies are appropriate in reducing corruption in Nigeria – 85% assessed the workshops as either “Helpful“ or “Very Helpful and Wonderful” in understanding better what set of policies are appropriate in reducing corruption in Nigeria (see Table1). Furthermore, while all the participants suggested that more of these workshops should be organized, over half of them (12) are of the view that the duration of each workshop was too short.

Table 1: Participants’ Assessment of the Workshops

Questions	Helpful/ Effective as % of Total	Very Helpful/ Very Effective/ Wonderful as % of Total	Helpful/ Very Helpful/ V. Effective/ Wonderful as % of Total
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better the nature and scope of corruption in Nigeria?	70	25	95
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better the magnitudes of the costs of corruption in Nigeria?	70	25	95
Was the workshop helpful to you in understanding better what set of policies are appropriate in reducing corruption in Nigeria?	80	5	85
Was the workshop helpful to you in identifying other persons /institutions that are involved in anti-corruption activities in case you need to work in partnership with them?	75	25	100
Overall, how do rate the effectiveness of the workshop(s)?	75	25	100

On the reports themselves, I can say they are of high quality. However, it might be desirable that in future, such reports that would be widely circulated be copy-edited by English language specialists. For instance, if this had been done, expressions like “comprised of” (p. 2) etc. I in the “Nigerian and Corruption Survey Study – Analysis of Survey Results..., Final Report” could have been

minimized². Similarly, a few statements that remain unclear to the general English readers could have been made clearer.

Keys to some charts are either incorrect or unclear. For instance, the keys to figure 4.5 on page 29 of the above cited final report are incorrect. Some other minor editorial problems are visible. Also, the publisher of this report, for citation purposes, is not indicated.

Furthermore, throughout the report, corruption – the animal that is running away from justice – is nowhere defined. Is corruption the same as any crime? Is it a sin? What distinguishes it from other crimes that are expressly provided for in the penal codes? It is often useful to provide some operational definition of the subject under investigation. This would forge a common understanding between interviewer and the respondent and even among the anti-corruption crusaders.

On the vignettes, PSAs and their TV and Radio broadcast, my interviews with 50 randomly selected television viewers indicate that they are of good quality and have created great awareness among Nigerians with 44 (88%) rating the media campaigns as either “Helpful/ Appropriate” or “Very Helpful/Very Appropriate” (see Table2). However, a number of viewers also indicated that power outage by National Electric Power Authority (NEPA) might have limited the effectiveness of these broadcasts. This is of course beyond the control of those implementing the **TO**.

² . It also seems some English specialists prefer “security of lives and property” to “security of lives and properties” (p. 58).

Table 2: Television Viewers' Assessment of the Media Campaigns

Questions	Helpful/ Appropriate as % of Total	Very Helpful/ Very Appropriate as % of Total	Helpful/ Very Helpful/ Very Appropriate as % of Total
Were the media messages helpful to you in understanding better the nature and scope of corruption in Nigeria?	50	40	90
Were the media messages helpful to you in understanding better the magnitudes of the costs of corruption in Nigeria?	52	36	86
How appropriate is the frequency of the media messages?	60	16	76
How appropriate is the timing of the media messages?	70	24	94
Overall, how do rate the media messages?	52	36	88

6.0 ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES AND POLICY GOALS

The objectives of the **TO** were largely achieved judging by the quality of survey results, the reports and the workshops that were held as well as the quality of the media products and their broadcast.

Specifically, I am confident to report that Casals & Associates have conducted an acceptable survey and have produced an acceptable report that presents a picture that is indicative of the attitudes and personal experience of the selected groups. Also, because majority of participants at the workshops and television viewers confirm that the **TO** Information, Education and Communication Programmes have been helpful and have improved public awareness of the nature and scope of corruption in Nigeria and its evil effects, it is expected that their determination to fight corruption would be improved.

7.0 LESSONS

This evaluation study has taught us a number of lessons. First, the creation of an artificial consortium like the one that conducted the Governance

and Corruption Survey may create coordination and logistic problems especially among Nigerian institutions that are public sector culture-driven. It is my belief that faster result could have been achieved if only one of the institutions had been awarded the contract to undertake the study with strict deadlines for the deliverables. That way, the contractor would be free to forge strategic alliances with other institutions or even recruit individuals in the far-away areas to get the study concluded on time.

Second, survey instruments must be continually reviewed to benefit from recent development in the relevant literature and to accommodate local conditions including cultural influences.

Beyond issues of methodology, the study also throws in some interesting lessons. It shows that the channels and costs of reporting corrupt activities are either unclear or prohibitive. For instance, the ICPC reporting centres outside Abuja are generally unknown. With retaliation being a real danger, fears keep would-be whistle-blowers from going ahead with their plans.

Thus, it seem to me that any future anti- corruption activities must pay some attention to offering some protection to whistle-blowers and making the channels for reporting corruption clear, convenient and cheap. In this regard, careful thought must be given to offering some immunity to whistle-blowers for their own past misdeeds and publicizing venues for reporting corruption. Also, journalists must be encouraged to serve as reporting centres and must be prepared to use their investigative skills to investigate reported cases. Since journalists have the ethics of protecting jealously their sources of information, this is likely to serve as

the cheapest vehicle of reporting corruption that would enjoy the confidence of the people. Thus, designers of future anti-corruption initiatives are advised to explore this window of opportunities by providing training for journalists in areas of investigative journalism.

8.0 SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE ANTI-CORRUPTION ACTIVITIES

This study observes that the objectives of the **TO** were largely achieved as good-quality survey results and reports were produced and the workshops held as well as the media products broadcast were of high quality and effective. Thus, Casals & Associates have done a good job.

However, the study suggests that in future, the possession of needed facilities must be an important part of the criteria used in selecting local contractors for this kind of programme. In the alternative, the chosen contractor should be assisted to build the needed facilities before the commencement of the project. In the same vein, preference should be given to consortium that has existed and functioned for a while. Also, a greater blend of private initiatives and public sector efforts may make a difference.

Further, the lessons of the survey itself seem to suggest that future anti-corruption activities must pay some attention to making the channels for reporting corruption clear, convenient and cheap. This may be achieved by empowering journalists to play greater roles in the investigation and reporting of corruption.

Finally, it is recommended that the programme be sustained to consolidate the gains.

APPENDIX I

STAKE-HOLDERS CONTACTED

1. 50 randomly selected television viewers in Lagos (10), Ibadan (10), Port-Harcourt (10), Kaduna (10) and Ilorin (10).
2. 20 workshop participants – Lagos (5), Ibadan (5), Ilorin (5) and Abuja (5).
3. Implementing Officials:
 - (i) Mr. Adelodun;
 - (ii) Mr. Sergio, Casals;
 - (iii) Dr. Ayodele, IDR
 - (iv) Dr. Eke Uka;
 - (v) Mr. Tunde Oloyede, Channels TV, Lagos; and
 - (vi) Mr. Durosin Etti, Lagos

APPENDIX II

MATERIALS EXAMINED.

1. “Narrative Activities” – Document prepared by Casals & Associates (C & A).
2. Nigeria Household Survey Questionnaire.
3. Nigeria Governance and Business Environment Questionnaire.
4. Nigeria Survey of Public Officials Questionnaire.
5. Frequencies of Survey Results – Households.
6. Frequencies of Survey Results – Business Enterprises.
7. Frequencies of Survey Results – Public Officials.
8. “Combating Corruption in Nigeria Report of Stakeholders ...” (for all the 20 workshops).
9. Policy Considerations: Forums on the Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Summary Report, March 2003.
10. Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Overall Summary Report, June 2003.
11. Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Household Survey Summary Report, June 2003.
12. Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Enterprise Survey Summary Report, June 2003.
13. Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Public Official Survey Summary Report, June 2003.
14. Nigeria Governance and Corruption Survey Study, Analysis of Survey Results, Households, Enterprises and Public Officials, Final Report, June 2003.
15. Copies of TV Vignettes – all.
16. Copies of Public Service Announcements (PSAs) –all.
17. Focus Group Discussions Report on the Dreaming Nigeria” Vignettes and PSAs, Anti-corruption Activities Television Series, held in Lagos on June12, 2003 – prepared by C & A.
18. Workshop/ IEC Implementation Strategy - prepared by C & A.
19. Transmission Schedule.
20. Web site: www.accountabilitynigeria.org.

APPENDIX III

IDR Deliverables

Deliverable One	Proposed schedule of activities for the conduct of the survey, preliminary versions of the survey questionnaires as adapted to conditions in Nigeria, and a proposed survey implementation management structure.
Deliverable Two	Survey sampling design, data collection (including sequencing) and proposed survey data analysis plan, and survey questionnaire translation (selected portions into Hausa, Yoruba and Igbo).
Deliverable Three	Interview training protocol approach and guidelines for field work data collection procedures (including measures to be implemented to ensure data quality) for interviewers.
Deliverable Four	Written report describing survey data collection results, a data-entry code book, and clean data files for the three survey components in SPSS and/or Microsoft Excel Office 97. The data files to be transmitted to C&A via e-mail as well as on diskettes.
Deliverable Five	Preliminary survey report providing national, as well as regional, analysis of the data.
Final Deliverable	Final survey report

APPENDIX IV

OBSERVATIONS ON THE QUESTIONNAIRES

First, the Willingness To Pay (WTP) questions in both household and business enterprise questionnaires do not benefit sufficiently from the contingent valuation literature. The current conventional wisdom in this area is that for responses to WTP questions to be meaningful, each respondent must be provided with all relevant information to enable him/her give an informed response. Such information include: general statistical risk of being a victim, current cost of corruption to the respondent and how the reduction will be brought about. Also, for valid inferences to be made from WTP responses, the sample must be representative of the population (Morrison and Gyldmark, 1992; p. 233-238; Persson and Cedervall, 1991; Jones Lee et al, 1985; Berwick and Weinstein, 1985; Johannesson, et al, 1991; Thompson, 1986; Berger et al, 1987; and Johannesson and Jonsson, 1991).

In the case at hand, these conditions are virtually not met. For instance, question 1.1(b) is WTP question. Yet, the interviewer could not have taken the respondent through the process of informing him about the general statistical risk, the respondent current own risk and his/her own current cost, let alone stating how the elimination of corruption would be brought about.

Surprisingly, question 8.7a of the same household questionnaire is nothing but the same as question 1.1(b). If responses to the two questions are not the same, then, it would underscore the fact that question 1.1(b) came too early in the interview. If the responses are the same, then it is a needless repetition. In any event, issues can be raised as to the whether or not the sample taken was representative enough. If the sample is not representative, then, why waste valuable resources asking such questions and analyzing the resulting responses. Observations herein apply

with equal force to other WTP questions 8.7b and 8.7c in the household questionnaire as well as to WTP questions in the Business Enterprises Survey as well.

Second, it is often more effective to state clearly all the options from which you want the respondent to make a choice. Statements like “when we provide the meaning only to the end points, 1 and 5, please assume that 2, 3 and 4 have corresponding meanings as indicated above” are recipe for ineffective communication. This over taxes the interviewer’s ability to recall what constitutes the corresponding meaning or/and encourages him to pass the burden of recalling the corresponding meaning to the respondent. In either of these cases, a room is created for ineffective communication, inconsistent responses and weird results for the analyst. Though stating all these options clearly in all questions will increase the length of the questionnaire by a page or two, the benefits far outweigh the costs. Examples of questions affected by this observation are: in the household questionnaire, questions 2.1, 5.2(f), 7.5, 7.7 and 7.8(d). Similar questions in Business Enterprises questionnaire suffer the same fate.

Third, the household questionnaire appears not to have been fully adapted to Nigerian environment. For some nationalities in Nigeria, children are not to be counted. A typical respondent with such a cultural background would not answer truthfully (and in most cases would evade the interviewer’s prompt) question 4.1.

Enumerators/interviewers are often advised to get round this by gathering the needed information indirectly. For instance, among those standing around us, who is your first child? Where is your first child? What does he/she do for a living? Is she/he in a school? Which school? What class? Thereafter, similar questions are asked about the second child, third child, etc. in that order until the last child is reached. This observation applies to question 9.1 of the household questionnaire. But a skillful interviewer would get round these problems. In a similar vein, question 9.3(a) may not elicit faithful response as they may be construed to be intended for tax purposes. If that information is important, it is often recommended that the information be obtained from questions on household expenditures and savings. The business enterprise questionnaire may suffer less from this but the same observation applies.

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