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**EVALUATION
of the
PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM
USAID KOREA**

June 28, 1971 to July 18, 1971

DECLASSIFIED

Thomas M. Finn

James A. Cretecos

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GROUP 4

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Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
or 12 year

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PREFACE

Pursuant to an agreement reached between the Office of Public Safety (OPS), the East Asia Bureau (EA/SEA) and the USAID Mission in Korea, Mr. Thomas Finn and Mr. James Cretecos of the OPS/W staff visited Korea from 6/28/71 to 7/18/71, for the purpose of conducting an evaluation of the Public Safety project with the Korean National Police (KNP).

The evaluation was not prompted by any significant changes in the internal security situation or substantive changes in the KNP's organization, role or mission. All of these factors were substantially the same as identified in earlier studies ^{1/2/3/4/} conducted in the country. However, with the Public Safety project scheduled for termination on June 30, 1971, it was deemed advisable to conduct an evaluation in order to determine the effectiveness of past and present assistance efforts.

The terms of reference contained in STATE 036603 guiding the Team's activities are in part as follows:

Evaluate the effectiveness of past and present AID Public Safety project beginning 1966 as related to counter-infiltration threat; and its appropriateness

1/ Survey of the Korean National Police and Coastal Security, (S) Goin, Harrington, 1965.

2/ A Survey of Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea (S) Goin, Shannon and Thurston, 1966.

3/ Republic of Korea National Police Telecommunication Survey (LOU) Katz and Naurocki, 1968.

4/ Assessment of the Public Safety Program, USAID/Korea, Goin and Leister, 1969.

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as an instrument in strengthening the internal security and stability of Korea within the context of U.S. interest, objectives and economic programs in Korea.

Evaluate the effectiveness of project implementation, measuring degree to which project goals have been achieved. This will include evaluation of use of various project components, including technical advisory services, commodity support and participant training. Lessons learned here may be useful in AID Public Safety projects to other countries.

In view of the fact that the totality of project resources was focused on the improvement of KNP counter-infiltration capabilities, the scope of the Team's study and, therefore, of this report is limited. The report does not discuss the police organization in its entirety but only those elements directly concerned with counter-infiltration. Consequently, for a broader and deeper understanding of the Korean National Police organization, readers are directed to previous studies indicated by footnote on the previous page.

At the time of the Team's arrival, the project was in its final stage of termination. Of the four Public Safety advisors on board when the Team arrived, one (Masloh) left the following day (June 29, 1971), one (Goodwin) left the next day (June 30, 1971), and the Chief Public Safety Advisor (Bush) was scheduled to depart post about July 15, 1971, but was extended to assist the Team in its project evaluation. The Communications Advisor (Gormont) had been extended until December 1971 in order to assist in the installation of some pipeline communication commodities scheduled to arrive after the project termination date, June 30, 1971.

During the Team's stay in Korea, field trips were made to various police elements at Chon Ju in Cholla Pukto Province and

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Pusan in Kyongsang Namdo Province, in addition to the Police College at Bupyeong in Kyonggi Do. The purpose of these visits was to conduct on-site observations of police activities and operations which corresponded to project objectives and activities. For example, Cholla Pukto Province has major Combat Police Company activity; and in Pusan, which for two years was the location of the regional office for the Area Public Safety Generalist advisors (Hatem and Goodwin).

Meetings were held with many U.S. and Korean officials. The Team members are most appreciative of the time, effort, hospitalities and courtesies extended to them during their stay in Korea. (See Annex A, p.61 for list of officials.)

At the conclusion of the Team's visit, oral briefings regarding findings, conclusions, observations and recommendations were given to the Ambassador, Mission Director, and Program Officer.

In reviewing the observations section of this report, it may appear that the Team went beyond its objectives in addressing issues not specifically cited in the terms of reference. To do otherwise, however, would be to ignore significant aspects of the role of the police in a developing society and more specifically, the role of the KNP in the rapidly expanding economy that Korea is presently experiencing and will be facing in the immediate future.

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SUMMARY OF OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The following represents a summary of the Team's observations and recommendations:

Observations and Conclusions

Program objectives have generally been met, and with few exceptions the project at termination has been successful. Meaningful contributions have been made to increase the efficiency and capability of the Korean National Police in counter-infiltration operations.

Notable among program accomplishments has been the creation of tactical and administrative radio systems fortified with a training and maintenance capability; increased mobility through the provision of 886 vehicles which represent approximately 35% of the total fleet of 2,500 vehicles; a new armory with an ammunition reloading unit and weapons repair and maintenance capability together with three mobile weapons repair teams that are operational and providing required services to field units; a force of 4,107 trained and equipped Combat Police deployed in Coast Watch stations and effectively carrying out their counter-infiltration responsibilities; a 9,000 man reserve Task Force specially trained in unit tactics constitute a quick-reaction back-up force for deployment as required; a specially trained and equipped Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Task Force of approximately 500 men in an ever-ready state of preparedness who

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can be committed immediately within the Seoul metropolitan area in emergency situations.

Shortfalls in project objectives were noted as follows:

- 1) Training institutions have not been sufficiently upgraded and have not attained the qualitative or quantitative levels called for;
- 2) No comprehensive plan for protection of key strategic installations and facilities has been developed;
- 3) The Marine Police, a key element of KNP's counter-infiltration effort, was given only token support (participate training and 2 surplus barges) and the project goal of improving the patrol, search and liaison capabilities of this vital unit was largely ignored. Even the limited commodity support planned for in the 1970 ProAg (radar and searchlights) was cancelled by the USAID;
- 4) The public relation/civic action objectives received only minimal assistance.

Limited observations of the functional efficiency of the KNP reveal some serious deficiencies and indicate much needs to be done to improve the efficiency of the organization. Force level projections for the next five years, for example, call for an increase of 36,800 men. This raises a question relative to economy of force concepts of the KNP and the effective use of manpower resources. This, coupled with budget limitations, rapid urbanization of the population and increased security responsibilities will place a staggering burden on the KNP. In light of U.S. interests, both security and economic, technical advisory assistance should be continued, directed mainly toward strengthening the KNP in institutional areas to ensure its viability.

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Recommendations

(1) An in-depth survey be conducted of the KNP to identify its strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities to sustain itself as a viable institution in relation to its security and law and order responsibilities. Such a study should assess the relative importance of the KNP in the social and economic sectors as well as in the area of internal security, and relate this to the developmental activities of the ROKG.

(2) The Team strongly recommends continuation of U.S. participant training despite the absence of a Public Safety project in Korea. Ideally, KNP representatives should attend each of seven courses conducted in English at the IPA annually. Functional specialization for KNP officers attending the IPA should concentrate on Organization and Administration, Research and Planning, Instructor Methods, Patrol Functions, Police-Public Relations and Marine Police activities.

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NATURE OF THE THREAT

Agent Infiltration:

In January 1965, Premier Kim II Song of North Korea outlined a three-point program for reunifying and communizing Korea:

- 1) To overthrow the Park Government.
- 2) To convert the Republic of Korea into a neutral nation.
- 3) To force the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Korea.

Again, in October 1966, he stressed four tasks to be done in communizing Korea:

- 1) To build Korea into a revolutionary base..
- 2) To strengthen revolutionary forces in South Korea.
- 3) To eliminate U.S. imperialists in Korea and in Asia.
- 4) To eliminate U.S. "stooges" from Korea and from Asia.

With this in mind, the Communists launched anti-ROK operations; i.e., the dispatch of subversive agents, the organization and strengthening of underground cells, and the dissemination of inflammatory propaganda. On January 22, 1968, 31 armed North Korean infiltrators attacked South Korean policemen and civilians in Seoul in an attempt to raid the Presidential Mansion and kill President Park.

Two days later the North Koreans illegally seized the U.S.S. Pueblo when it was in international waters off the coast of North Korea. In November of 1968, in the largest military operation in Korea since the end of the Korean conflict, 120 North Korean commandos landed on the northeast coast of the Republic of Korea.

These North Korean actions were probably adopted with a view

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to the eventual accomplishment of the regime's long-term objective, i.e., the unification of Korea under Communist rule. In the short term, the actions may have been motivated by the desire to tie down ROK forces, infiltrate Communist agents into the ROK, and disrupt the economic and political progress which has taken place in the ROK in recent years.

North Korean aggressions continued at reduced rates in 1969, 1970, and in the first half of 1971 (see figure 1, p9). The reduction may have been due to measures taken by the ROK with U.S. assistance to improve its defense capabilities. It is also possible that the reduction was the result of North Korea's strategy to deny President Park a rallying point in his campaign for the Presidency. In any event, even though infiltration attempts have decreased, they continue to exist and may well increase in the immediate future. The possibility of infiltration by means of airdrops is also very real now that reported aircraft acquisitions (helicopters and light planes) by the North Korean "Reconnaissance Bureau" has been confirmed.

Interrogation of captured agents and defectors tends to support the intelligence reports that North Koreans, trained in special schools, capable of conducting subversion, espionage, agitation and military guerrilla action, intend to engage in these operations in South Korea until the objectives recited above are accomplished. (Refer to Assessment of the Public Safety Program, USAID/Korea, November 1969, Goin and Leister (pages 6,7 and 8) for report on North Korean infiltration capabilities. The information available to the team indicated that the North Korean capabilities as referred to in the Goin Report are still valid.)

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Figure 1) Summary of Incidents 1966-1971

	Number of Incidents		U.S.		ROK Military			N.K.	
	DMZ	Rear	K	W	K	W	MIA	K	C
1966	37	13	6	1	29	29	1	20	2
1967	452	277	16	65	129	279	0	200	33
1968	542	219	15	53	147	241	7	231	13
1969	98	36	5	6	10	37	0	47	7
1970	71	35	0	0	18	17	20	51	5
* 1971	22	6	0	0	10	27	0	6	2

LEGEND: DMZ = Demilitarized Zone
N.K. = North Koreans
K = Killed
W = Wounded
C = Captured

*

Figures complete through 30 July 1971

SOURCE: 8th Army G-2

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Crime:

While the record will show an overall decrease in the incidence of crimes reported to the police, this does not indicate a lessening of a serious problem for the police. Curfew violations and registration act infractions are reported as "crimes" and both of these offenses have shown a marked decrease over the last few years. Conversely, the Republic of Korea has experienced a growing increase in felonious crimes during the same time period. Murder, rape, arson, thefts, fraud and robbery are reported on the increase - particularly in the urban areas. Other offenses such as smuggling, embezzlement and bribery are reported on the increase in the more rural areas of the Republic.

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U. S. POLICY IN KOREA

The Department of State "Background Notes" dated October 1970 states in part:

The United States seeks under the principles of self-determination, a free, independent, and democratic Korea, peacefully unified through elections under U.N. supervision, with a National Assembly in which representation is proportionate to the indigenous population. Pending achievement of this objective, which has been obstructed by the Communists who reject the competence of the United Nations to deal with the problem, the United States seeks to strengthen and support the Republic of Korea so that it may achieve reasonable security against any renewal of Communist aggression and may attain economic viability.

The strategy section of the Public Safety Non-Capital Project Paper, dated 12/1/69 states:

In recognizing the critical nature of the threat posed by the North Korean infiltration, the U.S. strategy is to help strengthen the overall capacity and effectiveness of the ROKG in internal security activities. This project complements the U.S. Military Assistance Program in Korea, which directly aids the Korean military by providing needed assistance to the KNP, the civilian enforcement agency of the government. The U.S. plan is to concentrate on the counter-infiltration aspects of the public safety situation, largely leaving the other areas of police work needing assistance to Korea's own resources.

By helping Korea to counter the North Korean infiltration efforts, the U.S. is also enhancing its other development programs. The noteworthy economic progress that has already taken place in Korea can continue only if there is relative stability and safeguards against war and other disturbances. The U.S. has already made a heavy investment in Korea's security and economic growth, and this project can, in part, be viewed as a measure of insurance in protecting that investment. At the same time by helping the ROK to develop an independent civilian police force, the U.S. is striving to counter-balance the existing predominance of the military in Korean life. Finally the U.S. assistance is planned to bolster ROKG efforts in earning the confidence of the Korean people in the nation's police force.

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Since the Korean War, the United States has maintained substantial forces in the ROK. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, which envisages that other countries will assume a larger share of their defense burdens as the growth of economies permit them to do so, authorized U.S. strength in Korea was reduced from 63,000 to 43,000 troops during fiscal year 1971. This reduction, however, does not affect the basic commitment of the U.S. to the defense of the ROK as set forth in the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Coincident with this troop reduction, the U.S. Government is assisting the ROKG in a modernization plan for its armed forces. This plan is spread over a five year period with U.S. financial assistance amounting to approximately \$1.5 billion. (The Country Team Concept for ROK Internal Security and Counter-infiltration Operations included as Annex A in the Goin and Leister report cited earlier shows how the U.S. proposed to implement its policy in Korea).

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THE KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE

The Korean National Police is a centralized civil police force employing approximately 45,000 officers and men and functions as a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The authority of the police is derived from that inherent in the power of the state in the enforcement of edicts, but is not defined specifically by the Constitution, by law, or by decree.

The present organization of the National Police was established by the Organization Rule for the Minister of Home Affairs in Cabinet Decree No. 116, October 2, 1961, amended to Presidential Decree No. 1824 on May 27, 1964. (Figure 2 on page 14 reflects the present organizational structure of the KNP.)* The functional responsibilities of the police are:

- 1) Enforcement of law and ordinances;
- 2) Maintenance of public order;
- 3) Protection of life and property;
- 4) Prevention of smuggling (primary responsibility of the Minister of Finance, Customs Bureau);
- 5) Prevention of enemy agent infiltration and in-country activities (shared with the Korean Counter-Intelligence Corps, as well as the Korean Army and Navy, and the United States Central Intelligence Agency);

* The Team notes that the chart shows the Police College, Maritime Police, Police Hospital and Scientific Crime Laboratory elements reporting directly to the Vice Minister. This raises questions as to the validity of this chart in depicting KNP reporting channels. While the Maritime Police Commandant was somewhat unsure of his reporting channel, the Commander of the Police College repeatedly stated that he reported directly to the Director General of police. Time limitations precluded a resolution of this question by the Team.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL POLICE

AS OF AUGUST 24, 1970




FIGURE 2

Figure 2) KNP Organizational Chart

LEGEND: - CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION
POLICE ORGANIZATION

- 6) Protection of the fisheries fleet (shared with the Ministry of Agriculture); ~~SECRET~~
- 7) Protection of forests (primary responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture).

A Vice-Minister, within the Home Affairs Ministry, has the primary responsibility for the administration of funds allocated to the police force. Reporting to the Vice Minister is the National Police Commander, who is also the Director of the Police Bureau. The Bureau, with a personnel strength of 511, is organized into twelve main divisions: administration, planning, public safety, guard, fire protection, investigation, intelligence, communications, foreign affairs, equipment, traffic, and Homeland Defense Divisions.

The Director is also responsible for eleven police bureaus - nine provincial bureaus and the metropolitan police bureaus of Seoul and Pusan. In addition, the Police College, and Scientific Investigation Laboratory, the Police Hospital, and the Marine Police (coast guard) are also within the jurisdiction of the Director.

The police are distributed throughout each area in units and stations varying in size according to local requirements. In 1968 there were 165 police stations, 1,394 substations, and about 1,000 smaller units, including detachments. In addition, the National Police has 37 combat police companies that are trained in special military tactics for counterinsurgency activities, and nearly all policemen have had some training in guerilla warfare.

Note: The foregoing was obtained from the "Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea - prepared for the American University by Westwood Research, Incorporated - 1969" and was revised to reflect the current situation.

Readers will note this excerpt indicates the Police College, Scientific Investigation Laboratory, Police Hospital and Marine Police are "within the jurisdiction of the Director" while the KNP organization chart (Figure 2) reflects these elements reporting directly to the Vice Minister.

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Details of the KNP organization are contained in the "Survey of the Civil Internal Security Forces, Republic of Korea" (Goin, Shannon and Thurston, 1966) and updated the Goin, Leister "Public Safety Program Assessment Report" dated November 1969.

While there have been no substantive changes in the organization of the force since 1969, there has been an increase of 1,736 men in the force strength. In conversations with the Director-General of the National Police, he indicated the KNP was planning for 7,000 additional men in 1971-1972 to permit a country-wide expansion of the police box network. (Further planned increases in the force strength are shown in Figure 3, p. 17. Also, see Figure 4, p. 18 for Manpower Distribution Chart.)

The general provisions of the ProAgs governing the Public Safety project were quite broad. As an example, the following specific description is excerpted from the 1970 ProAg:

This is a continuing project under which the USAID has been assisting the Korean National Police in its efforts to develop an effective civil police organization capable of enforcing the law with a minimum use of force, protection of life and property and maintenance of internal stability. This effort is coincident with the priority given by the ROKG to the development of the National Police as the primary instrument for the maintenance of public order.

However, the language of the ProAgs goes on to confine the Public Safety program to the following specific KNP functional entities that deal directly with the KNP role in counter-infiltration operations:

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

PROJECTED KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE STRENGTH INCREASE

National Police 6 Year Recruitment Plan:

1971	7,000
1972	5,700
1973	5,700
1974	5,300
1975	6,400
1976	<u>6,700</u>
Total	36,800

This plan was submitted to the parliamentary inspection team by Minister of Home Affairs Park, Kyung Won.

Figure 3) KNP Force Strength Increases - Projected

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KNP MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION

(as of July 12, 1971)

<u>Police Agencies</u>	<u>Police Men</u>	<u>Fire Men</u>
HQs	981	11
Maritime Police	948	
Police College	154	2
Seoul	8,774	254
Pusan	3,665	165
Kyonggi Do	3,822	65
Kangwon Do	2,533	51
Chungchong Buk Do	1,703	41
Chungchong Nam Do	2,957	46
Cholla Buk Do	3,305	62
Cholla Nam Do	5,267	78
Kyongsang Nam Do	4,243	79
Kyongsang Buk Do	4,905	108
Cheju Do	675	14
Total	43,932	<u>976</u>
Grand Total		44,908

SOURCE: KNP PERSONNEL SECTION

Figure 4) KNP Manpower Distribution Chart

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1. Combat Police

The initial "Sweep Team" concept designed to develop forces that would engage in Rural Patrol in areas suspected as infiltration routes was revised in 1967 and the Combat Police Force^(*) came into being. Where the sweep teams were designed as a patrolling force who would provide a police presence and service to the people in the remote areas to which they were assigned, the Combat Police units are primarily designed as static elements whose patrol function is confined to lateral routes between their fixed posts. They are paramilitary-trained personnel who are deployed along the sea coast in relatively uninhabited areas where enemy agents are likely to attempt penetrations, consequently, they do not provide conventional police service to the people as the original sweep teams were designed to do.

Originally, 37 Combat Police companies consisting of 4,107 officers and men were authorized. Under a Legislative Act passed in 1970, the present 111-man companies will be increased to 175 for a total strength of 6,475. However, it is estimated that the training and implementation of these additional increments will take from two to four years.

With the exception of five companies that are assigned to special areas of responsibility (mountain watch stations in the interior, the

* Precedence for these paramilitary Combat Police elements was established just after the Korean War when some 40,000 Combat Police were created within the KNP to rid the Republic of mountain-entrenched Communist elements. Their mission accomplished, these forces were subsequently eliminated from the police structure.

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Combat Police are assigned to the three most southern provinces and Cheju Do Island. (See Figure 5, p. 21 for the Table of Organization and Equipment of the Combat Police Company.)

2. **Emergency Task Force**

The Emergency Task Force is a 9,000 man force specially trained to provide a police capability to counter sizeable North Korean infiltrations. It is made up of regular police personnel that perform their normal police functions until an emergency situation develops at which time, they serve as a back-up for the Combat Police, or city or provincial police elements.

The number of companies, platoons, or squads is not constant, being determined by the number of police stations and police boxes together with personnel strengths in the provinces and cities. The platoon is the principal combat unit in the task force, and in most instances will operate independently of other task force elements.

The basic purpose of the task force organization is to provide within the regularly assigned national police, a capability to cope with enemy agent infiltration.

The total manpower of the emergency task force is 9,184 men which when coupled with the 4,107 in-place Combat Police, creates a force of 13,291 specially trained men. (See Figure 6, p. 22 for the organizational composition and location of the Emergency Force.)

3. **Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Force**


The Seoul Metropolitan Police maintains a ready reserve force that was originally planned as a 407 man unit; however, the strength fluctuates to meet emergency situations. At this time, there are

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO/E OF COMBAT POLICE COMPANY

1. TABLE OF ORGANIZATION:

RANK	CAPT.	LT.	SGT.	SR. PTL.	PTL.	TOTAL
NUMBER OF PERSONNEL	1	3	11	10	86	111



2. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT:

(1) WEAPON

TYPE	M-2 CARBINE	M-1 CARBINE	M-79 LAUNCHER	BAR	LMGE	CAL. 45	M-1 RIFLE
QUANTITY	87	9	10	2	1	17	1

(2) COMMUNICATION

TYPE	FM-1	FM-5	SWITCHBOARD	TELEPHONE	GENERATOR	NICCO LIGHT
QUANTITY	13	13	1	15	1	32

(3) VEHICLE

TYPE	½ TON TRUCK	½ TON TRUCK
QUANTITY	1	4

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_ FIGURE 5

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KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE
EMERGENCY TASK FORCE

UNIT PROVINCE	BATTALION	COMPANY	PLATOON	SQUAD	M A N P O W E R				TOTAL
					CPT.	LT.	SGT.	PATROLMAN	
SEOUL	4	18	39	177	18	39	117	1,068	1,242
PUSAN	3	9	19	57	9	19	57	521	606
KYONGGI DO	5	13	30	90	13	30	90	819	952
KANGWON DO	4	10	25	75	10	25	75	680	790
CHUNGCHONG PUKTO	2	7	16	48	7	16	48	437	508
CHUNGCHONG NAMDO	5	11	27	81	11	27	81	735	854
CHOLLA PUKTO	4	9	22	66	9	22	66	599	696
CHOLLA NAMDO	5	12	33	99	12	33	99	894	1,038
KYONGSAND PUKTO	7	18	43	129	18	43	129	1,172	1,362
KYONGSAND NAMDO	5	13	32	96	13	32	96	871	1,012
CHEJU DO	1	1	4	12	1	4	12	107	124
TOTAL	45	121	290	870	121	290	370	7,903	9,184

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Figure 6) Emergency Task Force - Force Deployment

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581 assigned to this unit. Reportedly, the present overstrength can be attributed to anticipated student demonstrations, the Presidential inauguration and continuing threat of enemy agents.

This force has received special training and equipment to meet emergency situations. Of this unit, 180 are on standby duty 24 hours a day. They are housed near the National Police Headquarters and can be quickly transported to any trouble area within Seoul City as required. (See Figure 7, p.24 for the table of Organization and Equipment of the Seoul Mobile Force.)

4. **Homeland Defense Reserve Force**

The Homeland Defense Reserve Force (HDRF) was created shortly after the assault on the Blue House in 1968. It draws its strength, numbering some 2,402,338, from all walks of the Korean population a great many of whom are former members of the Armed Forces. Its primary mission is to stand ready for instant mobilization in the event of an emergency requiring large numbers of trained and equipped personnel to thwart an invasion or large scale infiltration attempt.

Personnel of the HDRF also help man the Coast Watch stations during the nighttime and assist the police in patrolling the urban centers during the 12 A.M. to 4 A.M. curfew that, with the exception of Cheju Do Island, is in effect throughout Korea. The personnel of the HDRF are not compensated for their services and each person provides his own uniform and food ration while on patrol. However, they are only required to serve on the average of one day each month and their day's absence from regular occupations is not deducted from their salaries in either the government or private sectors.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

T/O&E OF SEOUL MOBILE FORCE

Authorized Personnel	330
Present Strength	581

EQUIPMENT ON HAND

Busses	10
Dodge 2½ ton truck	1
Dodge 1½ ton trucks	2
¼ ton jeep	1
Armored Vehicles	<u>5</u>
Total Vehicles	19
Carbine rifles	530
Shotguns	<u>14</u>
Total	544
Gas Launchers	34
Gas masks	667

Figure 7) Seoul Mobile Force - Table of Org. and Equip.

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Their weapons are stored in armories that were constructed especially for this purpose in various parts of the Republic - most commonly at the regional police headquarters areas. Additional arms storage facilities were constructed contiguous to various selected police box stations (a facility having a complement of from 6 to 10 police personnel).

The ROK army has the training responsibility (as noted earlier, a great many of the HDRF have had previous military training). Formerly, the KNP provided instructor personnel to assist in this training effort but were relieved of this responsibility in June 1971.

In the three southern provinces, the HDRF comes under the cognizance of the KNP. The military exercises control over these forces in all other areas of the Republic. However, in a mobilization situation, all HDRF and police personnel come under the jurisdiction of the Senior Military Commander in their respective areas. (See Figure 8, p. 26 for HDRF Strength and Weaponry.)

5. Maritime Police Force

As an element of the Korean National Police, the Maritime Police Force is charged with the responsibility for maintenance of peace and order in the territorial waters of the Republic. In this regard, it is responsible for the preservation of lives and property, prevention of crime, the apprehension of criminals and their prosecution in courts of law.

Specifically, the force has responsibility for countering the illegal movement of people into the country by sea, for the suppression of illegal movement of goods into and out of the Republic, for maintaining order in the fisheries areas, and for search and rescue and salvage operations at sea.

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

HOMELAND RESERVE FORCES STRENGTH

PERSONNEL (Operational Base)

	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
Resident Area	1,237,066	1,848,221	2,055,747		
Office or Co. Location	92,672	302,242	317,914		
Volunteers not Req'd by Law	38,229		28,697		
Other					
TOTAL	2,077,967	2,051,463	2,402,388		

WEAPONS

M.I. Rifle	94,751	314,238	283,086		
Carbine M-1	606,152	881,113	772,304		
Other M-2		16,576	16,576		
SMG			18,220		
TOTAL	700,903	1,201,927	1,090,186		

NUMBER OF COMPANIES

Resident Area	4,222		4,254		
Employment Location	922		1,001		
Other					
TOTAL	5,144		5,255		

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Figure 8) HDRF - Strength and Weaponry --

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With a total complement of 948 officers and men and 51 boats of varying sizes and tonnage, the Maritime Police performs a vital role in the counter-infiltration efforts of the Korean National Police.

Their primary responsibility in this area is to interdict enemy agent craft attempting to infiltrate South Korea by sea. The ROK navy assists in this effort by patrolling the waters seaward off the east and west coasts of the peninsula southward from a lateral extension of the DMZ to the northern boundaries of Cholla Namdo and Kyongsang Namdo provinces in the south. Seaward patrols south from these points are the sole responsibility of the Maritime Police. Additionally, they have patrol responsibility for all coastal areas of the peninsula, assisted to a degree by limited provincial police boat patrols.

An effective coastal barrier could be created by Marine Police and ROK navy radar-equipped vessels which would form a "picket line" patrol and act as an "early warning" system for coastal defenses. However, the existing limited resources of the Maritime Police precludes the formation and implementation of this "ideal" system.

The counter-infiltration responsibilities of the Maritime Police include the monitoring of Korean fishing fleet vessels which have been marshalled into squadrons with radio-equipped boats to identify suspected infiltrator craft. They also have the responsibility, in cooperation with Japanese Maritime Enforcement elements, of maintaining order among the Korean/Japanese fishing boats in international waters. (See Figure 9, p. 28 for Manpower Deployment of the Maritime Police.)

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

MARINE POLICE

<u>1. Manpower Distribution</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Headquarters & Pusan Base (Combined)	244
Inchon Base	19
Kunsan Base	18
Mokpo Base	18
Yosu Base	18
Pohang Base	18
Mukho Base	18
Sokcho Base	19
Cheju Base	15
Aboard Ship	<u>550</u>
TOTAL	937

<u>2. Rank</u>	<u>Personnel</u>
Director	1
Senior Superintendent	6
Superintendent	10
Captain	26
Lieutenant	79
Sergeant	178
Senior Patrolman	70
Patrolman	<u>567</u>
TOTAL	937

Figure 9) Marine Police - Strength and Deployment

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THE PUBLIC SAFETY PROGRAM

U.S. assistance to the Korean National Police, (KNP), begun initially in 1956, has had a mercurial history. Following the initial program inputs from that date to 1962, the activity was, until 1966, confined to a one man advisory effort concerned mostly with providing the KNP with excess property and increasing its vehicle maintenance capability.

Up to the beginning of calendar year 1967, the nature and extent of the threat from North Korea, although recognized as being on the increase, was slowly matched by concrete steps on the part of the Republic of Korea Government (ROKG) to increase the KNP capability to counter the threat. However, during fiscal year 1966, the KNP with USAID support, developed and implemented a "Sweep Team" concept to meet the problem of enemy agent infiltrations. The basic strategy of this concept was to create units of 9 man specially-trained, well-equipped and highly mobile teams who would patrol along known or suspected infiltrator routes, make contact with rural farmers and villagers to stimulate sources of information on infiltrators and at the same time, provide conventional police services to the people. USAID allocated \$250,000 in support of this program for the acquisition of radios, M-79 grenade launchers and ammunition. The ROKG, under a special foreign exchange allocation, procured shotguns for the sweep teams. During fiscal year 1967, the USAID further support this project with an additional \$133,000. This amount provided additional telecommunications and

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testing equipment, together with some training aids.

Following the dramatic increase in North Korean infiltration in 1967, the ROKG developed a comprehensive counter-infiltration plan which involved the police and military establishments, together with their respective intelligence services. This resulted in a revision of the sweep team concept and evolved into the "Combat Police Force" plan. By the end of the calendar year, Presidential approval was received and initial implementation of this new concept was begun.

What was to be an orderly step-by-step procedure to prepare a defense for the expected North Korean "spring increase" of agent infiltrations abruptly developed into a crisis as a result of the January 1968 near-successful agent attack on President Park's residence with the intent of assassinating him. Since that time, counter-infiltration has become a major concern and activity within the ROKG, cutting across and affecting almost every agency of the government.

The U.S. Government responded to this priority concern of the ROKG by adding \$100 million in military assistance and \$5 million to the Public Safety project in May 1968. The \$ 5 million add-on was for commodities to assist the KNP, and especially the Combat Police Companies, in strengthening and modernizing selected elements, with exclusive emphasis on counter-infiltration.

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Revision #6 of the FY 68 ProAg described the project as follows:

This is a cooperative project, under which USOM has been assisting the Korean National Police (KNP) in its efforts to strengthen and modernize its organization to assure its continued ability to maintain internal security; enforce law; and preserve order. The structure of the KNP has been studied and is being reorganized to bring about a higher standard of professional competence at all levels.

Specifically, the project is designed to improve the KNP's overall capability to counter the acceleration of subversive agent infiltration from North Korea and other increased threats to public safety. The KNP will be assisted in its efforts to:

- A) Improve the operation, command control, and efficiency of the KNP through the installation of tactical and administrative radio systems;
- B) Improve the mobility of the force;
- C) Develop an expanded capability for training police in the Police College and the eight Provincial Police Training Schools;
- D) Improve the present logistic and support system of the KNP, placing special emphasis on the support of counter-insurgency units;
- E) Improve and expand the present KNP efforts in public relations activities and to activate new civic action programs in the coastal and rural areas;
- F) To provide assistance to the Coast Watch Service under the jurisdiction of the KNP.

The ProAg revision went on to state:

The accomplishment of these objectives involves assistance to:

- 1) The 37 Combat Police Companies;
- 2) The organized Reserve Task Forces within the regular police;

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- 3) The Seoul Mobile Police Force;
- 4) The National Police College and eight Provincial Police Training Schools;
- 5) The Seoul Metropolitan and eight Provincial radio point-to-point radio networks;
- 6) The development of a system for the protection of key strategic installations and facilities; and
- 7) The reorganization and modernization of the KNP armory and field weapons maintenance capability.

These same objectives were repeated in subsequent ProAgs for Fiscal Years 1969, 1970 and 1971. Additionally, the 1970 and 1971 ProAgs included another objective: "Improve the patrol, search and liaison capabilities of the Korean National Police Maritime fleet."

Status of program objectives at the termination of the Public Safety project on June 30, 1971, will be found in the section entitled "Program Status on Termination" starting on p. 41

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Inputs

Inputs to the project by major components have been as follows:

Funding

The total funding input to the Public Safety program since FY 1966 through FY 1971 amounted to \$7,192,500. (See Figure 10, p.34). The specific program components were funded as follows: Technicians-\$744,900; Commodities-\$6,356,300; and Participants-\$91,300. The commodity component breakdown is as follows: Communications equipment-\$1,807,406; vehicles and automotive parts-\$3,160,000; weapons and ammunition-\$1,000,000. Miscellaneous items such as training aids, spare parts and excess property accounted for the remaining amount of \$388,894. (Refer to Annex B, p.64 for details on commodity inputs.)

Technicians

The Staffing Pattern for the Public Safety project since late FY 1966 provided for seven advisors as follows: one Chief Public Safety advisor, one Communications advisor, one Rural advisor, one Logistics advisor, and three Area advisors. Two advisors were in place during FY 1966, a Training officer and a Surplus Property officer. These advisors were carry-over from the earlier existing program. (See Figure 11, p.36). In reality, the present program encompassing any significant degree of technical assistance input began in June 1967 with the arrival of the Chief Public Safety advisor and the Rural advisor.

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FUNDING PROFILE
FY-1966 to FY-1971

	TECHNICIANS	PARTICIPANTS	COMMODITIES	TOTAL
FY - 1966	41.9 (2)	13.9 (6)	3.3	59.1
FY - 1967	53.0 (2)	18.6 (7)	167	238.6
FY - 1968	132.0 (6)	- 0 -		5,450.0
FY - 1969	175.0 (7)	17.0 (7)	504.0	696.0
FY - 1970	182.0 (7)	14.8 (7)	189.0	385.8
FY - 1971	161.0 (5)	27.0 (8)	175.0	363.0
TOTAL	744.9	91.3	6,356.3	7,192.5

- FIGURE 10 -

SOURCE: USAID/KOREA

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Figure 10) Funding Profile - 1966-1971

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By the end of FY 1968, the remaining five advisors had all arrived at post. (See Figure 11, p. 36). In 1970, under AID's policy of forced personnel reduction worldwide (OPRED), the authorized Public Safety staff of seven technicians in Korea was reduced to five, and the Team believes that this reduction, without a corresponding adjustment in the project objectives, accounted for the shortfalls cited in the "Program Status on Termination" section herein.

The technical advisory inputs were directed solely to the counter-infiltration activities of the KNP.

Chief Public Safety Advisor - The Chief Public Safety Advisor was responsible for the management of the project. He was the principal USAID link with the KNP in matters effecting project implementation, and, within the USAID organization, he reported to the Chief of the Public Services Division. Two persons occupied this position during the life of the project: Frank Jessup was assigned as Chief Public Safety Advisor from June 1967 to March 1970. He was followed by Robert Bush who arrived at post in May 1970 and because of the decision taken by the USAID to terminate the program at the end of FY 1971, departed post in late July 1971.

Logistics Supply Advisor - This position was established to provide technical advisory assistance to the KNP in the establishment of a comprehensive logistical and supply capability. Charles Mesloh was assigned to the position for a 23-month period, July 1968 to June 1971. Some degree of success was achieved toward developing an integrated logistic/supply system by the establishment of the Equipment

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PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISORS KOREA 1962-1971




FIGURE 11

	ARRIVED	DEPARTED	
HAROLD L. CAPLAN	FEBRUARY 1962	JULY 1, 1967	- SURPLUS PROPERTY OFFICER
GEORGE C. ANDERSON	AUGUST 1965	JULY 16, 1967	- TRAINING OFFICER
FRANK A. JESSUP	JUNE 1967	MARCH 7, 1970	- CHIEF PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISOR
JOHN W. MOSELEY	JUNE 1967	MAY 1970	- PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISOR (RURAL)
EARL N. GOODWIN	OCTOBER 1967	JUNE 30, 1971	- AREA ADVISOR
WILLIAM G. IKERD	OCTOBER 1967	NOVEMBER 1968	- AREA ADVISOR
ROY A. HATEM	FEBRUARY 1968	JUNE 12, 1970	- AREA ADVISOR
NEAL JACKSON	DEC. 28, 1967	NOV. 26, 1968	- COMMUNICATIONS ADVISOR
CHARLES F. MESLOH	JULY 8, 1968	JUNE 29, 1971	- LOGISTIC & SAFETY ADVISOR
LUCIEN V. GORMONT	MARCH 6, 1969		- COMMUNICATIONS ADVISOR
RAYMOND C. WILLIAMS	NOV. 10, 1968	MAY 10, 1971	- AREA ADVISOR
ROBERT N. BUSH	MAY 21, 1970	JULY 1971	- CHIEF PUBLIC SAFETY ADVISOR

R.N. BUSH
JULY 12, 1971

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Division of the KNP in November 1968. However, the advisor's End-of-Tour Report, dated June 30, 1971, indicates that much remains to be done before the KNP has a truly effective logistics/supply system. He reports the present system has no one division responsible for commodity planning, procurement and distribution. Further, there is no central warehouse receiving point. Due to these factors, he reports there is duplication of effort, lack of standardized procedures and waste of manpower and other resources.

Communications Advisor - This position was occupied by Neal Jackson from December 1967 to November 1968 when he was replaced by Lucien Gormont who arrived at post in March 1969. Mr. Gormont is expected to remain at post until at least December 1971 to complete the installation of equipment which is still in the pipeline. In the Team's view the communications' input in term of both equipment and advisory efforts has been outstandingly successful. The KNP embraced the communications effort and gave its 100% support to the project. No small part of the success of this activity is due to the high degree of competence and effectiveness of the Communications advisor, Lucien Gormont.

Rural Advisor - This position was occupied by John Mosely from June 1967 to May 1970. The position activities were directed toward training, deployment and effective utilization of the Combat Police Companies. Advisory efforts resulted in the development of a curriculum and a paramilitary tactics course at the Police College where all Combat Police are trained.

Area Advisor - Area advisors were required to perform extensive and frequent in-country travel in order to assist the KNP in its

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efforts to maintain internal security by assuring the operational concepts and techniques of the sweep teams and coast/mountain watch units were being carried out satisfactorily; helping to improve the intelligence collecting capability of the KNP and monitoring the Combined Command Centers to ensure the necessary coordination and liaison with other ROKG security agencies. A primary unwritten responsibility of the Area Advisor was to establish close rapport with counterpart officers and inculcate the concept of policing as a service to the public. He was to impress upon his counterparts that as representatives of their government, they should create the best possible image for that Government, win the loyalty of the citizenry and subsequently, derive the benefit of their support. Three positions were so classified and were encumbered as follows: William Ikerd, October 1967 to November 1968, was replaced by Raymond Williams who arrived at post November 1968 and departed in May 1970. Earl Goodwin and Roy Hatem occupied the other two positions and were at post from October 1967 to June 1971 and February 1968 to June 1970 respectively. The Area Advisors worked with the Provincial Police chiefs in their respective provinces on matters dealing exclusively with counter-infiltration activities. Ikerd and later Williams covered the Cholla Pukto and Cholla Namdo provinces; Hatem the Kyongsang Namdo and Kyongsang Pukto areas, and Goodwin the three northern provinces of Kangwon-Do, Kyonggi-Do and Chungchong-Pukto. Upon Hatem's departure from post in June 1970, Goodwin was assigned to Kyongsang Namdo and Pukto provinces.

Commodities

Since FY 1966, \$6,356,300 was funded for commodity support of the Public Safety project. Commodity components included

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\$1,807,406 for communications equipment; \$3,160,000 for vehicles and automotive parts; \$1,000,000 for weapons and ammunition and \$388,894 for miscellaneous items such as training aids, spare parts and excess property. (Refer to Annex B, p.64 for details on commodity inputs.)

Participants

Thirty-six police officers have been trained in the United States since 1966. (See Figure 12, p. 40 .) Of this number, 34 are still with the KNP. All participants trained at the International Police Academy are required to serve a minimum of two years at the Korean National Police College upon their return.

Proficiency in the English language is a factor that precludes a wider selection base for training in the United States. Police officers with whom the Team met, lamented the fact that English language training was so difficult to obtain and therefore they were unable to compete for the available training opportunities at the International Police Academy (IPA). This problem was recognized by the Goin, Leister team who conducted an assessment of the program in 1969, and recommended steps that could be taken to deal with the problem. (Refer Goin, Leister report of November 1969, p. 3, recommendation 3.) The Team feels that the investment made by the U.S. in the participant training area is one of the most constructive low cost investments that has been and could continue to be made. It was indeed gratifying to note the "esprit de corps" and dedication that exist among the IPA graduates with whom the Team came in contact. The recommendation section of this report urges the U.S. participant training program to continue despite the absence of a Public Safety project including advisors in Korea.

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KOREAN POLICE TRAINED IN U.S.

OPS sponsored participants for U.S. training from July 1, 1965 through June 30, 1971:

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Senior Course</u>	<u>General Course</u>	<u>Police Executive</u>	<u>Technical Specialist</u>	<u>Totals</u>
FY 1966		4		1 (FBI)	5
FY 1967		2			2
FY 1968	1	5		1 (FBI)	7
FY 1969	1	3	3		7
FY 1970	1	7	2	1 (FBI)	11
FY 1971	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	-	-	<u>4</u>
TOTALS	5	23	5	3	36

SOURCE: IPA

Figure 12) Korean Police Trained in U. S.

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Status of Objectives at Program Termination

Status of Objectives at Termination of Public Safety Project on

June 30, 1971:

The Team believes that the project goals as recited in the preceding section have, for the most part, been met and the project has been largely successful. Inputs in terms of advisory services and commodities have been most significant in relation to outputs, primarily in the areas of mobility and communications as they relate to the counter-infiltration activities of the KNP. The broad sector goal purpose of the project as set out in PAR 71-7 dated 4/19/71 is as follows: "To assist in the maintenance of a free and viable society where the daily vocations can be carved out without fear of duress, retaliation or reprisal against Korean workers or his family by strengthening the ROKG ability to provide internal civil security, to be accomplished by upgrading the KNP capability in counter-infiltration." In measuring the project accomplishments then, the Team had to relate the inputs strictly to the counter-infiltration activities of the KNP since the entire thrust of the project was in this one area.

A) Tactical and administrative radio systems:

The objectives of this activity were designed to improve the operations, command control and overall efficiency of the KNP through the development of tactical programs and the institution of radio systems. Included were eight Provincial point-to-point networks, the Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Force (407 man) radio system; a

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tactical radio system for the country-wide 9,000 man Emergency Task Force; an FM tactical radio system for the Combat Police Force and a Provincial Police station-to-police box net. Additionally, a radio technicians training school capable of training 100 junior and 10 senior technicians each year was to be activated. Announced objectives in this area have been largely met, and while pipeline delivery of radio equipment requires extension of technical advisory assistance for six months beyond project termination date to December 1971, this element of the project objectives has for all intents and purposes, achieved its goal. KNP communications facilities have been improved, radio repair and maintenance schools have been established and commodities provided have expanded and upgraded the police telecommunications system to the point where it is one of the best networks in the country, linking all provinces to KNP headquarters and providing sub-nets for quick-reaction tactical units and police box-to-station ties. The accomplishments realized in this effort can be attributed to the U.S. contribution of technical advisory services together with commodity assistance coupled with adequate ROKG funding and personnel support. (Refer to Annex B, p. 64 for further details.)

B) Improve the mobility of the force:

Since 1966, \$3,160,000 was obligated for procurement of 607 new vehicles and spare parts while 279 vehicles of various makes were obtained from U.S. excess property sources. The total input through U.S. procurement and excess property acquisitions amounted to 886 vehicles which constitutes over 35% of the KNP fleet of 2,500 vehicles. As a result of this input,

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the mobility of the Combat Police Force, Emergency Task Force, Seoul Metropolitan Mobile Force and other functional units of the KNP was considerably improved. It should be noted that 279 vehicles provided from excess property were for the most part old, rehabilitated units.

While the limited scope of the program and therefore of the evaluation, did not permit the Team's assessment of overall KNP transportation needs, it is reasonable to assume that the 279 rehabilitated vehicles are now in need of replacement.

C) Develop an expanded capability for training police:

While project activity pursued this objective to the degree possible, the inputs were too minimal to realize the specific goals reflected in the various ProAgs. The 1970 ProAg stated that the National Police College and eight Provincial Training Schools were to be improved and expanded to the point where they would have the capability to train 15,000 students annually. The 1971 ProAg stated they should be developed to the point where they would be capable of meeting Korea's total training requirement for the KNP.

Neither of these specific goals have been met and from briefings received and observations made at the Police College and Provincial Training School in Cholla Pukto, it is apparent that

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the KNP training institutions even with considerable expansion of existing facilities will be hard-pressed to meet basic recruit training requirements alone over the next five years.

The KNP with an annual attrition factor of 5% representing 2,250 men, has projected a 36,800 man increase over the next five years at the rate of 7,360 men per year. This represents an annual basic recruit training commitment of 9,610 men per year. If the Police College and eight Provincial Schools were to suspend all in-service refresher and specialized training and operate at full capacity year round, they would still not be able to produce the number of recruits required to meet the desired goal of 9,610 men annually. As a matter of fact, they could only produce a little over half this number.

With a dormitory capacity of 560 at the Police College and 150 at each of the eight Provincial Police Schools, three 16-week recruit classes during the course of a year would produce only 5,280 recruits - a far cry from the desired total and produced at the sacrifice of the all important in-service training requirements of the KNP.

The whole training structure in the KNP appears to be without any central direction, control or command. The various training units and facilities (including Seoul Metropolitan, Pusan City and Headquarters Training Division, in addition to

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those mentioned above) seem to exist as separate entities with attendant duplication of effort, no standardization of administration, and varying levels of student discipline and academic standards. The need within the KNP for a cohesive organizational structure such as a Police Education Bureau to which all training elements are subordinated is obvious.

D) Improve the present logistic and support system:

This objective met some degree of success. With a Public Safety logistics/supply technician assigned to the Equipment Division, some improvements in the KNP supply system were realized. Receiving and distribution procedures were improved, record keeping became more accurate and the flow of spare parts to the field was expedited. Additionally, a procedure for the acquisition of U.S. excess property was developed for continued use of the KNP.

While these improvements resulted in increased efficiency, the tenure of this advisor's assignment at post (1968-1971) did not permit the accomplishment of the desired institutionalizing of the system. Under the KNP logistics/supply system, there is no one division responsible for commodity planning, procurement and distribution. The Equipment Division is responsible for all AID-provided commodities, all weapons, ammunition, uniforms, vehicles, vehicle spare parts and the acquisition of excess commodities. All other items authorized are procured, received and distributed by the concerned division or bureau. Due to this arrangement, the KNP does not have a central warehouse receiving point and consequently, there is duplication, lack of procedural standards and waste of manpower.

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E) Expand and improve public relations and civic action:

Public Safety staff assisted in obtaining public relations films from USIS for use by the KNP in each of the nine provinces and these films have been used extensively by the police. Beyond this very minimal effort, there have been no other inputs in pursuit of the announced objective.

F) Provide assistance to the Coast Watch Service:

This objective was met through the advisory technical assistance, training, and commodity inputs which assisted the Combat Police Companies and the 9,000 man reserve Task Force of the KNP.

The ProAgs announce that the above objective would be pursued by assisting the following KNP elements:

(1) The 37 Combat Police Companies:

This force developed as a result of refinements in the original "Sweep Team" concept. From all indications, it appears that U.S. assistance and ROKG contributions have resulted in a well-organized, well-trained, well-equipped, and strategically deployed KNP element carrying out its duties and responsibilities in an effective manner.

(2) The Organized Reserve Task Force:

This 9,000 man force is composed of specially trained regular police personnel who perform normal law and order functions until an emergency situation develops at which time they assume combat unit configurations. While U.S. assistance has provided some training, increased mobility and communications capability for the

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force, the Team had no opportunity to observe elements in unit stature. Consequently, no assessment of their effectiveness as a quick back-up force could be made. However, police officials report this force has proven to be responsive and efficient when called upon.

(3) The Seoul Mobile Police Force:

This specially trained and equipped force of approximately 500 men is maintained in an ever-ready state of preparedness and can be committed immediately within the Seoul Metropolitan area in emergency situations. U.S. assistance provided some training, increased mobility and communications capability to this unit. While the Team had no opportunity to view their effectiveness as a quick reaction back-up unit, official Embassy reports indicate this unit performed exceedingly well in the past during periods of student disorders.

(4) The National Police College and Eight Provincial Training Schools:

This subject has been treated in "C" above.

(5) The Seoul Metro and Eight Provincial Point-to-Point Radio Systems:

These radio systems emerge as an outstanding contribution to the overall improved efficiency of the KNP.

(6) Develop a System for Protection of Key Strategic Facilities and Installations:

This is more in the nature of an "objective" rather than a KNP unit to be assisted. In any event, the Team was unable to find any evidence of assistance to the KNP in this area and the need for such a comprehensive plan continues to exist.

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(7) The Reorganization and Modernization of the KNP Armory:

A combination of U.S. and ROKG contributions realized a major success in the accomplishment of this objective. The KNP acquired land, budgeted construction funds and purchased reloading equipment and supplies. A new armory in Seoul was completed in December 1970. Weapons repair tools and spare parts were procured through Public Safety commodity programs. Three shop van trucks were procured from U.S. excess, reconditioned and outfitted by the KNP to provide mobile weapons repair and maintenance service to field units in rural areas of the Republic. They became operational in February 1971.

(8) Improve the Patrol, Search and Liaison Capabilities of the Korean National Police Maritime Fleet:

In addition to this general objective announced in both the 1970 and 1971 ProAg, the Implementation Schedule in Annex B of the 1970 ProAg contains the following:

"Increase the counter-infiltration capability of 10 Korean police maritime patrol craft by equipping the boats with radar and searchlights. This equipment, mounted on KNP-built vessels, would provide the means for electronic detection of enemy vessels on sea and island search operations. Both are essential in the defense of the areas designated as the responsibility of the police."

Despite the announced objective, the only assistance

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provided to the Maritime Police outside of participant training consisted of two sea-worthy barges acquired from U.S. excess property in 1970.

Shortfalls in reaching project goals in police training, key strategic facilities and installations, and Maritime Police may be attributed to the USAID's failing to accept funding and staffing level recommendations made in the Goin-Leister report of November 1969 (cited earlier) together with a reduction in the level of Public Safety advisory assistance from a planned level of seven through FY 1971 to an actual level of five during FY 1971. Concomitant adjustments in project scope were not effected and the advisory effort was spread too thin to accomplish all objectives of the project.

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OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In assessing the effectiveness of the project and evaluating its attainment of stated objectives, it became obvious to the Team that the USAID has not, in fact, ever had a substantive Public Safety project involved in institutionalizing the Korean National Police (KNP).

The project from 1966 was a discrete project. Although its objective was broadly stated, its focus was narrow and tied specifically to the counter-infiltration activities of the KNP, and the technical assistance inputs were restricted solely toward meeting that end. While the counter-infiltration activity of the KNP function is most important, constituting about 65% of its total effort, it does not of itself contribute fully toward making the force a viable entity within the social and economic fabric of the society. Other equally important considerations bear on the role of the police as a vital element of government in a developing society. The announced ProAg goal of improving the police image should have been, in the Team's opinion, provided with more support and pursued with vigor.

The task of improving the image of the police must start with the development of efficient and capable institutions within the police structure. From its limited observations, the Team concludes the KNP needs development in several areas of police operations such as administration, organization, effective use of resources, police planning, patrol operations, traffic, logistics, records, crime prevention, training and manpower utilization. Of these, possibly

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manpower utilization is of prime importance. In less than two years, the force strength increased from 43,172 in October 1969 to 44,908 in July 1971; and additional planned increases of the KNP for the years 1971 through 1976 total 36,800. (See Figure 3, p. 17 .)

Given the projected population growth of 1.5% over the next few years, Korea will have a population of approximately 35,254,823 by 1976 and a police force strength of approximately 81,800 with a police/population ratio of approximately 2.3/1000 as opposed to the present 1.3/1000 ratio.

The Team is not convinced that adequate attention has been given by the KNP to the budgetary implications of such a manpower increase since the police budget has averaged only 4.4% of the National budget since 1967 (See Figure 13, p. 52), and personal services has historically accounted for from 73 to 76% of the total KNP budget. ^{1/} (See Figure 14, p. 53 .) Thus, the Team comes back to the question of the effectiveness of the management of the KNP Force resources. With only 24 or 27% of the KNP budget allocated to administration and capital investment for, say, mobility and communications equipment alone, it would follow that the KNP will be hard-pressed to meet the demands for increased police services without either a significant increase in its total budget or indirect inputs from outside the Government. The rapid growth rate of the Korean GNP during the past five years (See Figure 15, p. 54) has placed stresses on the Government for increased public service and consequently, there is strong competition among

^{1/} Research on the Administration of the Korean National Police conducted by Korean Research Institute of Public Administration and USOM-1968 (p. 165).

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ROKG NATIONAL BUDGET ALLOCATION TO KNP

Figures in won; 100 won = \$0.36.

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>National Budget</u>	<u>KNP Budget</u>	<u>Percentages</u>
1971	524,247,841,000	23,474,503,000	4.47%
1970	446,273,000,000	19,147,563,500	4.20%
1969	370,532,000,000	15,493,200,000	4.18%
1968	262,064,000,000	12,866,500,000	4.90%
1967	180,932,000,000	7,754,684,200	4.29%

Prepared by USAID/KOREA, 7/12/71

Figure 13) ROKG/KNP Budget - 1967-1971

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January 14, 1971

KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE BUDGET
FOR FY 1971

<u>Item</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>APPROVED</u> <u>FY 1970</u>	<u>PROPOSED</u> <u>FY 1971</u>	<u>APPROVED</u> <u>FY 1971</u>
1.	Police Unit Operation	13,020,320,000	15,433,102,000	15,524,502,000
2.	Equipment and Communications Management	816,716,000	1,009,838,000	1,009,838,000
	A. Equipment Management	195,143,000	180,169,000	180,169,000
	B. Inshore Boat Operation	152,962,200	162,540,000	162,540,000
	C. Aircraft Operation	32,516,100	34,961,000	34,961,000
	D. Communications Management	436,094,700	632,168,000	632,168,000
3.	Crime Investigation Activities	727,118,300	834,216,000	834,216,000
	A. Investigation Activities	590,891,000	687,032,000	687,032,000
	B. Identification Activities	84,709,000	92,055,000	92,055,000
	C. National Scientific Crime Laboratory	51,518,300	55,129,000	55,129,000
4.	Fire Fighting Administration	30,178,400	180,963,000	180,963,000
	Fire Fighting	20,625,100	175,360,000	175,360,000
	Civilian Anti-Air Raid	9,553,300	5,603,000	5,603,000
5.	Police School	120,806,900	145,182,000	145,182,000
	A. Police College	91,541,000	114,319,000	114,319,000
	B. Provincial Police School	29,265,000	30,863,000	30,863,000
6.	Police Hospital	68,988,000	84,344,000	84,344,000
7.	Combat Police Forces	1,556,911,400	2,165,526,000	2,165,526,000
8.	Maritime Police	1,124,420,000	1,299,012,000	1,358,951,000
9.	Homeland Reserve Force	315,647,400	714,234,000	664,234,000
10.	Private Police	520,729,500	395,000,000	395,000,000
11.	Counter Communist Intelligence Activities	668,978,300	846,178,000	846,178,000
12.	Foreign Affairs Police Activities	<u>176,749,300</u>	<u>265,569,000</u>	<u>265,569,000</u>
	Grand Total:	19,147,563,500	23,373,164,000	23,474,503,000

Figure 14) KNP Budget Breakdown - 1970-1971

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ROKG DEFENSE BUDGET

Unit: Billion Won

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>National Budget</u>	<u>Defense Budget</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
1971	524.2	127.8 a/	24.38
1970	446.2	100.5 b/	22.52
1969	370.5	84.4	22.79
1968	262.0	64.7	24.69
1967	180.9	49.6	27.41

Note: a/ - Original Budget

b/ - Final Budget

ROK GNP TRENDS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>GNP - Current Price</u>	<u>GNP at Constant 1965 Price</u>
1970	2,561.95 a/	1,433.47 a/
1969	2,047.11	1,306.19
1968	1,575.65	1,127.32
1967	1,242.35	995.16
1966	1,032.04	913.82

Note: a/ - Preliminary

Figure 15) GNP Growth Rate

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all elements of the Government for available resources.

With a current annual population growth rate of approximately 2% (See Figure 16, p. 56) coupled with the influx of the population to the urban areas (See Figure 17, p. 57), the police burden of maintaining law and order will become staggering, unless some strong effort is made now to plan for strengthening the police as an institution.

An overriding factor which further complicates the process of an orderly development of the KNP as a viable institution is the vital role it plays in the maintenance of internal security.

Police officials have indicated that about 65% of their effort, particularly in the three southern provinces, is devoted to counter-infiltration activities. This activity of the police has become its greatest single effort, and rightly so. But because of this very fact, the normal law and order function of the police, in relation to its responsibilities to the public, has had to take a lower priority. A sustained continuance of this posture without increased inputs to the police public service activities must have the consequence of eventual diminution of police public relationships with its attendant adverse impact on the effectiveness of the police in its critical role in the maintenance of internal security.

While the Team was not in a position to examine, in any depth, the police institution as a whole, it submits that it is unreasonable to assume that the KNP has reached the point of self-sufficiency and no longer has a need for continued U.S. assistance. In considering the magnitude of planned U.S. assistance to

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* RATE OF POPULATION EXPANSION

1960	3.0% per year
1961	2.9
1962	2.8
1963	2.7
1964	2.6
1965	2.5
1966	2.4
1967	2.3
1968	2.2
1969	2.1
1970	2.0

ESTIMATED POPULATION INCREASE

** Between 1944 and 1966, there was a net increase of over 13 million people, or almost 84 percent. In 1966, when the last complete census was taken, the population stood at 29,207,856 and was increasing at the rate of about 2.8% per year. Since then, however, the rate of natural increase has been declining steadily and rapidly to about 2.4 percent.

Future population growth projections are based on a further diminishing scale, stabilizing at 1.5% as the effects of AID's family planning program bear on the problem.

The following represents estimated increases from 1966 to 1976 based on this diminishing scale:

1966-Population at last complete census	29,207,856
1966-1967 with 2.4% growth:	Increase to 29,908,844
1967-1968 with 2.3% growth:	Increase to 30,596,747
1968-1969 with 2.2% growth:	Increase to 31,270,031
1969-1970 with 2.1% growth:	Increase to 31,926,702
1970-1971 with 2.0% growth:	Increase to 32,565,236
1971-1972 with 2.0% growth:	Increase to 33,216,540
1972-1973 with 1.5% growth:	Increase to 33,714,788
1973-1974 with 1.5% growth:	Increase to 34,220,509
1974-1975 with 1.5% growth:	Increase to 34,733,816
1975-1976 with 1.5% growth:	Increase to 35,254,823

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* ROKG Bureau of Census

** Area Handbook for Republic of Korea - 1969

Figure 16) Population Expansion - 1960-1976

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REPUBLIC OF KOREA

URBAN POPULATION INCREASES

From 1966 to 1970, major cities in South Korea showed an average annual population increase of approximately 8%. The following table illustrates population increases in these cities during the four year period:

<u>CITY</u>	* POPULATION IN 1966	** POPULATION IN 1970	<u>ANNUAL INCREASE</u>	<u>FOUR YEAR INCREASE</u>
Seoul	3,805,261	5,555,581	11.5%	46%
Pusan	1,429,726	1,887,238	8.0%	32%
Inchon	528,949	645,317	5.5%	22%
Suwon	128,352	170,708	8.3%	33%
Taegu	847,949	1,085,373	7.0%	28%
Kwangju	404,459	501,529	6.0%	24%

* Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea - 1969

** Estimate based on percentage of population expansion as reflected in Figure 16, p. .

Figure 17) Urban Trends of Population

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the ROKG military establishment during the coming years, it is difficult to understand the rationale leading to the conclusion that the KNP has no need for further U.S. assistance. The KNP plays a critical role in, and interfaces with, almost every aspect of the social, economic and security development of the country. It must be a competent, reliable and responsive institutionalized element of the government if the country is to continue to make strong economic gains and then hold these gains.

In assessing the posture of the KNP at the conclusion of the Public Safety program, particularly in relationship to its ability to carry on those activities previously support by AID, the Team was struck by the fact that the word of the project's termination evidently had only recently filtered down to the action officers. Without exception, the police officials contacted by the Team, including the Director General, expressed profound amazement and almost disbelief concerning the termination of U.S. assistance to the KNP. While it is known that KNP officials were orally informed of the project's planned termination date, the Team has been unable to find any official written notification to KNP officials that the project was, in fact, to be terminated on June 30, 1971. It may be argued that the FY 1971 ProAg clearly set forth the termination date, and this in effect constitutes written notification. The ProAgs, however, are executed between the USAID and the Korean Economic Planning Board, and most official correspondence concerning project activities follows that channel. Not one single KNP official was a signatory to the ProAg.

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Therefore, it is the Team's opinion that the KNP had only recently become fully cognizant of the fact that the project was definitely terminating as of June 30, 1971. The absence of a KNP developed plan for absorbing formerly AID-supported activities further supports this view.

"Why is the U.S. Government abandoning its assistance to the police?" was a question repeatedly asked of Team members. The Team's response was that the U.S. was not abandoning its assistance to the KNP but that the goals agreed upon by both the U.S. and Korean Governments had been successfully met, and within the time frame specified by the U.S. and ROKG agreement. In discussing the project's termination with the Director General and his staff, it was their consensus that many deficiencies existed within the police organization and that they had planned for continued assistance to help them in meeting these deficiencies.

The Director General indicated that he intended to follow the matter up by requesting the U.S. Government to send a team of experts to Korea to study the KNP in order to develop a comprehensive long range plan to be used by the KNP as a guide for its future development. He considered such a plan to be vital.

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Recommendations

The Team is not sure of the present degree of viability of the KNP, but this is suspect because of the obvious lack of institutionalization that is essential to force viability in any organization as large and as complex as the KNP. Consequently, the Team suggests that consideration be given to an in-depth study of the KNP as an institution.

Such a study would provide both the U.S. and ROKG Governments with a factual and substantive document from which informed decisions could be made as to the present capabilities and future needs of the KNP.

Recommendations:

1. That a survey of the KNP be undertaken as soon as possible to determine its strengths, weaknesses, and capabilities to sustain itself as a viable institution in relation to both its security and law and order responsibilities. Such a study should assess the relative importance of the KNP in the social and economic sectors as well as in the area of internal security, and relate this to the developmental activities of the ROKG.
2. Participant training at the International Police Academy should be continued into the foreseeable future. Also, specialized training in areas such as maritime police, logistics, traffic management and communications should be encouraged. Currently, six English general courses and one senior officer course are offered each year at the IPA; ideally, a minimum of two officers should attend each class.

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Annex A - American and Korean Officials Met by Team

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American Officials met by Mr. Finn & Mr. Cretecos

Mr. William J. Porter	-	Ambassador
Mr. Michael H. B. Adler	-	Mission Director
Mr. Athos G. Revelle	-	AD/P
Mr. Richard L. Goodrich	-	D/C, PSD
Mr. William McClure	-	IIS
Mr. John Richardson	-	Special Assistant to Ambassador
Mr. Robert Bodraghy	-	Mr. Richardson's Deputy

Public Safety

Mr. Robert N. Bush	-	Chief Public Safety Advisor
Mr. Charles F. Mesloh	-	Logistics Advisor
Mr. Earl N. Goodwin	-	Area Advisor
Mr. Lucien V. Gormont	-	Telecommunications Advisor

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Korean National Police Officials met by Mr. Finn & Mr. Cretecos

General Headquarters:

Chang, Dong Shik, Director General, KNP

Kim, Bong Kyun, Supt. General, Chief Foreign Affairs

Myung, Jung Seok, Supt, 3rd Foreign Affairs Section

Equipment Division:

Kyon, Oh Kyung, Supt General, Chief Equipment Division

Lee, Ki Il, Sr. Supt, Weapons and Vehicle Section

Kim, Min Hee, Sr. Supt, Equipment Section

Oh, Chin Yung, Capt, Headquarters Garage

National Police College:

Choi, Suk Won, Sr. Supt General, Commandant Police College

Kim, Won Bae, Supt General, Deputy Commandant Police College

Park, Yong Kyu, Sr. Supt, Chief Instructor's Department

Kim Eul Chon, Sr. Supt, Training Officer

Chon, Kae Hwan, Administration Officer

Communications:

Yoo, Tae Sung, Supt General, Chief Communications

Kim, Jung Han, Capt, Radio Planning Officer

109 Combat Police Co & Staff Co Co - Capt. Lee, Jeon Ki

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Cholla Pukto Province:

Suh, Jae Keun, Supt General, Director

Moon, Il Su, Sr. Supt, Chief Security

Kim, Chul Hi, Sr. Supt, Chief, Intelligence

Chung, Sun Shik, Supt, Deputy Commandant, Province Training School

Maritime Police:

Lee, Chong Hak, Commandant

Har, Sam Shik, Deputy Commandant

Chon, Jang Keun, Chief, Administration Division

Lee, Hui Cheon, Chief, Intelligence and Investigation Division

Suh, In, Chief, Maintenance Division

Song, Jin Seok, Chief, Communication Division

Pusan City Police:

Kim, Chin Seok, Chief, Administration Division

Lee, Joon Bong, Chief, Public Safety Division

Kim Hyung Jin, Chief, Security Division

Chung, Sang Kok, Commander 213th Combat Police Company

Chung, Tae Jung, Chief Foreign Affairs Division

Park, Man Chong, Director Pusan City

Kyungsang Nam Do Provincial Police:

Lee, Byung Joo, Chief, Administration Division

Lim, Ju Yong, Chief, Security Division

Park, Jang Won, Chief, Intelligence Division

Lee, Jeong Su, Chief, Public Safety Division

Park, Yoo Su, Chief, Investigation Division

Cho, Sun Ki, Chief, Communication Division

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Annex B - Major Commodity Inputs

Telecommunications

Since FY-1966 the objectives of the Public Safety Telecommunications Program have been consistent, i.e., to assist the Korean National Police (KNP) in its efforts to strengthen and modernize its organization to assure its continued ability to maintain internal security, enforce the law and preserve order.

Specifically, the Communication Program was designed to improve the KNP's capability to counter the infiltration of North Korean agents and other threats to public safety by providing communication equipment and technical advisory assistance as follows:

1. FY 1966 - Provide \$225,444 to finance the costs, excluding transportation, of portable two-way communications equipment for ROK (Republic of Korea) anti-infiltration "sweep teams" and fixed two-way communications equipment for installation of intelligence gathering centers.
2. FY 1967 - Provide \$94,608 for procurement of communications and communications testing equipment and some training aids. Provision was also made for the services of a communications advisor.
3. FY 1968 - To improve the operation, command control, and efficiency of the KNP through installation of tactical and administrative radio systems.

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Revision #6 of ProAg number 644-8001 provided funds in the amount of \$1,177,261 for communications out of a \$5 million supporting assistance add-on. The equipment was to provide communications for:

- a) Combat Police Companies (formerly known as 'sweep teams') - To be equipped with FM tactical radios for operational command and control.
 - b) Reserve Task Forces - Reserve Task Forces are to be equipped with communications equipment.
 - c) Seoul Mobile Police Force - To be provided communications equipment.
 - d) Provincial Communications Systems - Provide equipment to police stations to improve their command and control radio nets.
4. FY 1969 - A total of \$54,066 was provided for communications equipment to consolidate the communications ability of the Combat Police Force, in the light of the experience developed through one year of operation; strengthen the maintenance capability of the provincial repair shops; equip maintenance training facilities.
 5. FY 1970 - Replace obsolete equipment and expand the radio facilities of nine provincial networks and establish five additional radio repair shops. To accomplish this objective, \$144,109 was funded.
 6. FY 1971 - Assist the KNP in the radio technicians training

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school so that it will be capable of training 100 junior technicians and 15 senior technicians per year. The amount of \$111,918 was funded for SSB transceivers, electronic maintenance equipment.

Since FY 1966, then, \$1,807,406 along with technical advisory assistance has been funded for the communications component of the project. This provided funds for: 1837 OPS/FM-1; 1489 OPS/FM-5; 106 Hallicrafters SSB transceivers model SBT-20B; 40 Hallicrafters VHF/AM (air-to-ground) transceiver model HT-2B; 750 Hentron Co. SSB transceiver model C-Tran-15. All equipment, with the exception of 285 SSB transceivers, 1/2 lot of related spare parts, and 1/2 lot of installation materials, had arrived prior to July 15, 1971; approximately 20 installations (out of 720) have been completed.

Each of the communications program activities as defined above has been accomplished with the exception of the police box-to-station SSB link that is to be completed by December 1971. Specifically, the following accomplishments have been achieved:

The 23 "Sweep Teams" planned for in 1966 were activated in 1967 after having been renamed "Combat Police Force" companies. Each company was equipped with 26 OPS/FM radios (13 FM-1 and 13 FM-5), as well as with sufficient ancillary equipment to:

--Provide a self sufficient, independent company communications function, allowing each of its components (Company Commander, 10 squads and 10 platoons), to remain in contact with each other and with the Company HQ during an operation, and within a radius of at least 50 miles.

This tactical, very flexible, network offered immediate results: A number of monthly reports written in 1967 and early

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1968 point out several instances whereby enemy agents were captured or killed through the new tactics afforded by the improved police communications ability.

The test equipment procured in 1967 modernized repair facilities located in each of the Provincial capitals. Such facilities existed prior to the introduction of this phase of the program but were very primitive and poorly equipped. Only three, Seoul, Taegu and Chonju, were capable of a little more than just elementary repair work, and of these only Seoul had enough test equipment to cope efficiently with 70% of the required repairs.

Test equipment input allowed:

--The Seoul Repair Shop to cope with 99% of all types of repairs related to OPS/FM equipment.

--Taegu and Chonju to cope efficiently with 70% of all repairs needed in their respective provinces.

--The remaining five provincial repair shops to cope with 50% of all repairs needed in their respective provinces.

Training was given in 1967 and 1968 to 40 technicians, detailing the use of this test equipment and its application to OPS/FM radio transceivers.

A communications advisor, Neal Jackson was assigned to the Public Safety project in Korea and arrived on December 13, 1967.

During FY 1968, an additional 1,468 OPS/FM-1 and 957 OPS/FM-5 were procured with the funds made available that fiscal year. Also obtained were 100 Single Side Band (SSB Hallicrafters Model SBT-208) Transceivers. With this equipment, the following was accomplished:

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--Additional communications equipment was provided to the 14 newly created Combat Police Companies. (Total 37 Combat Police Companies.)

--Approximately 160 Police Task Force Teams were equipped with sufficient radios to allow each task force to operate effectively while fielded for a counter-infiltration operation, and to maintain contact with the Police Station to which it is attached.

--A total of 221 OPS/FM transceivers and associated equipment was provided to the Seoul Mobile Police Force, enabling this branch of the Metropolitan Police to coordinate special operations (traffic, riot control, VIP displacement and control, etc.) with other units and HQ.

--A total of eight point-to-point networks was established between all rural police stations and their respective Provincial capitals. Whenever practical, these networks were established with VHF equipment; when the topography of the terrain prohibited this approach, HF/SSB equipment was used. In either case, for the first time in the history of the KNP, reliable 24 hour emergency communications were available to all police stations.

In FY 1969, the communications complement of each Combat Police Force was increased with a ground-to-air radio transceiver to coordinate support from the ROK Air Force in counter-infiltration operations.

--Field telephones were provided to each Combat Police Force Company to improve communications between Company HQ and certain fixed outlining positions.

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--Training equipment was obtained for two specific purposes: At the Police College, for the training of CPF operators; to date, 623 operators have been trained with this equipment. At the Seoul repair shop, for the training of maintenance technicians; 147 maintenance technicians have been trained to date.

--Additional test equipment to bring the repair potential of all Provincial radio repair shops to 95% capability.

In FY 1970, a total of 468 SSB transceivers and associated equipment was procured to extend the Provincial network established in FY 1968 to the Police Box. None of this equipment was received before January 1, 1971.

The test equipment needed to cope with this additional installation and maintenance load was also procured.

--The training equipment procured in FY 1969 was received and the training facilities then planned were established. Maintenance school rooms were installed, programs and curriculum prepared to cope with an estimated 100 students (three levels of knowledge) per year.

During FY 1971, an additional 282 SSB transceivers were procured to complete the Police Box Network planned in FY 1970. The first 468 transceivers were received and installations were begun; the planned completion date for this project is December 1971. Preliminary observations of the initial installations indicate that this network will perform in accordance with the anticipated results.

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To summarize, from 1966 to 1971 the development of the communications sub-activity provided all of the counter-infiltration units of the KNP with an effective radio communicating capability.

Furthermore, the communications management, engineering and maintenance concepts developed while implementing this program prompted, within the KNP, an awareness of unfulfilled needs and potential which the KNP attempted to fill with great enthusiasm. Several large scale new projects were promoted and completed by the KNP, out of its own funds, with varying degrees of success.

In order to give a direction of growth to these proliferating communication networks, the communications advisor, at the request of the KNP communications division chief, prepared and submitted a development plan tentatively scaled over a five year period and priced at 3.5 million dollars or \$700,000 per year.

Such a plan, if developed as recommended, would bring all communications functions, current and future, into one single network; would provide a multi-circuit facility to all major police centers; and a single circuit facility to all police boxes.

The equipment involved is not unduly sophisticated; however, the engineering, maintenance and management concepts required to successfully complete this task are beyond the present level of knowledge of the KNP Communications Division. The trial and error learning period would be lengthy and costly should a competent advisor not be present to assist the KNP in developing the proposed program.

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Transportation

From FY 1966 to FY 1968 transportation items were obtained from U.S. excess property sources and during this period a total of 165 vehicles and parts were turned over to the KNP.

In an effort to significantly increase the mobility of the KNP, and especially the Combat Police, the Emergency Task Force and the Seoul Mobile Force, \$2,464,025 was funded for vehicles and parts from the five million SA add on to the FY 1968 project. A total of 571 1½-ton vehicles was provided to these quick reaction forces and during FY 1969 an additional 35 jeep type vehicles and one bus were procured in further support of these units. The continued availability of excess property provided an additional 114 vehicles and spare parts, bringing the total U.S. input of vehicles since 1966 to 607 direct U.S. procurement and 279 from excess property sources. Thus 886 vehicles have been provided to the KNP since 1966 which represent over 35% of the total fleet of 2500 vehicles. This contribution has provided essential mobility to the Combat Police Companies and Emergency Task Force and the Seoul Mobile Task Force. The Combat Police vehicles are used mostly in rough terrain and the deadline rate, while not presently high will soon become a significant factor unless plans are soon taken to increase the flow of spare parts to the quick reaction force elements. One Combat Police Company commander told the Team he had spent 230,000 won (\$690) of his own money during the past year for jeep repairs because he could not get spare parts from KNP headquarters.

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Weapons and Ammunition

The weapons and ammunition commodity inputs totaling approximately \$1,000,000 primarily assisted the Combat Police Companies, the KNP armory and training activities.

The principal beneficiary of this input was the Combat Police Force that received approximately \$891,700 of the total. This provided the 4,100 men of the CPCs with 5,611,290 rounds of .30 caliber carbine ammunition for basic loads and a reserve element; it also provided 1,964,780 rounds of .30 caliber carbine tracer ammunition; 211 M-79 grenade launchers together with over 21,000 rounds of HE 40mm ammunition; 7,506 fragmentation grenades; 170 12-gauge shotguns together with 60,000 rounds of shotgun shells; 50 .38 caliber revolvers; 6,000 illuminating flares; 120,000 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition and 3,916 smoke grenades.

This input provides the force with an adequate capability to perform their coast watch assignments in a state of preparedness. Projected personnel additions, however, will render the CPCs in need of additional weapons and ammunition.

The KNP armory received \$47,200 worth of weapons repair parts and tools, together with one lot of ammunition reloading equipment. The repair parts and tools have been put to excellent use both in the new armory and in the three mobile shop vans that bring a weapons repair and maintenance capability to distant field units. The ammunition reloading equipment has helped to increase reloading production to a small degree, but this capability is still

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far from adequate to meet ammunition needs of the KNP for training activities alone.

Training activities received the remainder of these commodity components for firearms training courses.

Training Aids

The training aids commodity input totaled approximately \$67,767 over the life of the project. (Refer to Figure 18, p. , for commodity details.)

With thirteen separate training facilities, including nine Provincial Police Training Schools, National Police College, College Annex in Seoul, Pusan and Seoul City Police schools, the commodity support of this activity was rather minimal.

The KNP has a continuing need for police training at all levels at the present time and force level increases projected over the next few years will worsen an already poor institutional capability for training. The existing system could not satisfy the qualitative or quantitative levels announced in ProAg goals over the past five years, and prospects for improved capability over the next few years without external assistance is dismal.

With the Provincial Police Training Schools continuing to suffer from chronic neglect, project termination finds them, for the most part, understaffed, poorly equipped, and lacking in adequate ROKG financial support.

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GROUP 4
Downgraded at 3 year
intervals; declassified
after 12 years

~~SECRET~~February 19, 1971
C. F. Mesloh, PSD-SUSAID PROCURED TRAINING AIDS FOR THE KNP
FY 1966 - 1971

Description	1966-67	1968	1969	1970-71	Total
Training Films		269 ea	60 ea		329 ea
Training Books		31	14		45
Projector, 16 & 8 mm		7	5		12
Overhead Projector	12 ea				12
Projection Screen		7	2		9
Paper Cutter		1	2		3
Wire Stitcher		1	1		2
Duplicating Machine		4			4
Public Address System			8		8
FM-1 Transceiver		16	4		20
FM-5 Transceiver		8	2		10
Cal. 38 Revolver			50		50
M-79 Grenade Launcher		3	11		14
Air Rifle		250			250
BB Shot		20 bg			20 bg
Plastic Bullet, Cal. 30 & 38		20,000	25,000		45,000
Cartridge Case, Cal. 30 & 38		450	100		550
Primer, Magnum Large Pistol		300,000	35,000		335,000
Decapping and Repriming Tool		9	6		15
Magnetic Compass			103		103
Blasting Machine			2		2
Blasting Galvanometer			2		2
Blasting Crimper			4		4
Binocular		9			9
Spotting Scope			12		12

~~SECRET~~*Figure 18) Training Aids Provided - 1966-1971*