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**TO - AID/WASHINGTON TOAID A-193**

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August 6, 1970

**FROM - PANAMA CITY**

**SUBJECT - Noncapital Project Paper (PROP)**

**NONCAPITAL PROJECT PAPER (PROP)**

**Country: Panama**

**Project No. 525-11-710-044**

**Submission Date: August 6, 1970**

**Original: X**

**Project Title: Public Safety**

**U. S. Obligation Span: FY 1959 through FY 1973**

**Physical Implementation Span: FY 1959 through FY 1973**

**Gross life-of-project financial requirements:**

**AID Contributions U. S. Dollars**

Grant	\$4,049,000
Loan	0

**Other U. S. Contributions U. S. Dollars**

Excess Property (Est. Value)	2,062,889
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Government of Panama cash contributions (Cash value excluding <u>existing</u> physical facilities and <u>existing</u> equipment)	859,010
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<u><b>Total Contributions</b></u>	<u><b>\$6,970,899</b></u>
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Group 4  
Downgraded at 3-year intervals.  
Declassified 12 years after date  
of origin.

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APPROVED BY  
ABSaenz/fsm PSD

DATE  
7/30/70

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## I. SUMMARY DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT

It is United States policy to assist the police forces of selected free world countries to improve their capabilities to maintain law and order and internal security. One of the basic instruments for carrying out this policy is the AID Public Safety Program. The assistance provided by the USAID Public Safety program is based on the premise that law and order and internal security are elements essential to the achievement of economic, social and political development in any nation. In the present stage of world evolution, assistance to the police forces of a developing nation is also considered essential to counter communist and/or other extremist groups in their efforts to promote insurgency, violence and subversion to suit their own ends.

In Panama, the AID Public Safety program, which is strongly influenced by the dynamics of the local political situation, gives important emphasis to the improvement of the Panamanian security forces to help assure the internal stability necessary to fulfill Panamanian development goals and to help "contain" disorders and violence directed against U. S. installations in Panama. Added emphasis is given to the development of effective police agencies capable of functioning as a positive force in national development. This will entail achieving an awareness on the part of the highly militarized National Guard Force of their proper role as policemen in their society.

The cooperation of the Panamanian security forces in the recognition and enforcement of existing treaty obligations re the Canal Zone is also an objective.

The Panama National Guard and the National Department of Investigations (DENI) are primarily responsible for law and order and internal security in the Republic of Panama. The Public Safety program assists the police components of the National Guard and the National Department of Investigations (a civil police organization with responsibilities for criminal investigations and a limited amount of domestic intelligence). Very small scale assistance is also provided to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and to the Fire Fighters of Panama for the purpose of improving these services.

Military aid also is provided to the Panama National Guard through the U. S. Military Assistance program. The assistance provided by the Public Safety program and the United States Military Assistance Group to the National Guard of Panama is intended to serve mutually supporting objectives. The objectives for both programs are outlined in the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for 1972.

The U. S. Government, through the AID Public Safety program, will provide technical assistance in civil police matters, participant training and limited commodity support to develop the capacity of the National Guard and DENI to meet their responsibilities as law enforcement entities. Of first priority is the development of the new police academy into an institution capable of providing basic, in-service and specialized training at all levels to meet the civil

police training needs throughout the Republic. A Command Control and Communications System to control and coordinate the operations of the enforcement agencies in Panama is being implemented as a result of a recent study.

The overall objective of the Public Safety program is to encourage the National Guard and DENI to accept the role and function as an effective civilian police force. This objective includes the improvement of police operations, investigations, administrative and management practices, communications and mobility, emergency planning and operations, community relations and the inculcation of police public service concepts.

## NONCAPITAL PROJECT FUNDING (Obligations in \$000)

Table 1

Page 1 of 2

COUNTRY: Panama

Project Title: Public Safety

PROP Date: August 1970

Original X

Rev. No.

Project No. 525-11-710-044

Fiscal Years	Ap	L/G	Total	Cont <sup>1/</sup>	Personnel Services <sup>2/</sup>			Participants		Commodities		Other Costs	
					AID	PASA	CONT	Dir & U.S. Ag	CONT	Dir & U.S. Ag	CONT	Dir & U.S. Ag	CONT
Prior through Act. FY 1970	CF * AG	G G G	2046 702 894	12	31 467			4 19 203		801 397 186		1241 243 38	12
Oper. FY 1971	AG	G	144		73			36		38		5	
Budg. FY 1972	AG	G	163		81			62		15		5	
Budg. FY 1973	AG	G	100		65			20		10		5	
Total Life			4,049		717			344		1,439		1,537	12

1/ Memorandum (nonadd) Column

2/ Includes Local and TCM

\* SA &amp; DG

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Project No. 525-11-710-Q/1

Table 1  
Page 2 of 2 Exchange rate \$1=0/1.00

Fiscal Year	AID-controlled Local Currency owned	Country- owned	Other Cash Contribution Cooperating Country	Other Donor Funds (\$ Equiv.)	Food for Freedom Commodities
Prior Through Act. <u>FY 1970</u>	N.A.		239	N.A.	N.A.
Oper. <u>FY 1971</u>	N.A.		233	U.A.	N.A.
Budg. <u>FY 1972</u>	N.A.		151	N.A.	N.A.
Budg. <u>FY 1973</u>	N.A.		136	N.A.	N.A.
Total LITE			859		

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TABLE A-100

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## II. SETTING

### A. Conditions and Trends

The Republic of Panama is a long, narrow land mass bounded on the north by the Atlantic Ocean, on the east by Colombia, on the south by the Pacific Ocean and on the west by Costa Rica. Its territory consists of approximately 29,200 square miles, excluding the Canal Zone, and is populated by approximately 1,417,000 people (1970 Census).

Panama's strategic geographic position and the presence of an inter-oceanic canal and military installations in the Canal Zone are important to the hemispheric security interest of the United States.

Panama is tropical in climate and has extensive jungle with many large inaccessible areas in the interior. There are two major highways, the Transisthmian, between Colon and Panama City, and the Inter-American, which extends from Chepo (approximately 40 miles east of Panama City) to the Costa Rican border. These two roads are highly important for commerce and for the interchange of traffic between the above areas.

Travel in many areas in the interior is difficult and can only be done by foot, horseback, or by using boats on the rivers and streams. Very few roads exist in many small towns and villages. Police services and law enforcement in some remote areas in the interior are limited because of their inaccessibility. The Civic Action program of the National Guard has apparently been effective in the past and is receiving increased emphasis under the Provisional Junta Government (PJG). National Guard personnel participate in community development projects, working closely with people in the rural areas.

Panama has experienced some problems with guerrillas in the rural areas in the past. The guerrillas have not been able to obtain support from the "campesino" and, as of this writing, appear to have been effectively controlled by the National Guard.

Panama suffers from social and economic ills which are not uncommon to her Latin American neighbors. The population growth rate of some three percent annually places heavy burdens on already inadequate public services. The concentration of the country's population in the relatively small and already crowded metropolitan areas of Panama City and Colon adds to the problem of law enforcement. A lack of adequate housing, existence of slum areas, inadequate public services, unemployment, general poverty, and other socio-economic difficulties that accompany a high population growth rate would be expected to bring about an increase in crime and law and order problems for Panama. It has been estimated by the USAID Community Development Division that as much as 60 percent of the people now living in urban slum areas have migrated from the interior. These persons are generally ill prepared for urban living and have to adapt to a new life and new social controls, all of which create tensions and frustrations. Law enforcement officers require extensive preparation and training to deal with law and order problems which can develop in these crowded urban areas.

In terms of political development, Panama has not always enjoyed a peaceful transition of power in government. The elected President of Panama was overthrown on October 11, 1968, approximately 10 days after his inauguration, by the National Guard. Panama has been ruled by the process of a de facto Provisional Junta Government (PJG) since that time. After the first takeover of power by the National Guard, General Omar Torrijos emerged as leader of the revolutionary movement. In a shift of power within the National Guard, General Torrijos in December 1969 was temporarily ousted as Commander of the National Guard by other National Guard officers. He returned to regain control of the National Guard approximately 24 hours after his overthrow had been announced. The effect of this was to strengthen his hold on the National Guard. Although General Torrijos appears to enjoy personal popularity, there is a general feeling among Panamanians that the National Guard may intend to prolong its hold over the government to suit narrow National Guard interests with all the attendant abuses of unchecked power. General Torrijos has publicly stated that there will be free elections but the date when the elections will be held remains uncertain.

One problem that may affect public safety is that, should elections be held, they might well be accompanied by a high level of agitation and public disturbance which could result in violence. The social and economic problems described above could offer an opportunity for contending political forces to incite violence. Anti-U. S. forces can be expected to attempt to exploit civil unrest to provoke incidents and attacks against Panamanian business and government establishments and Canal Zone installations.

The presence of the United States in the Canal Zone has created tensions and difficulties in the past and is certain to do so in the future. Violence that erupted in 1959 and 1964 stemmed from nationalistic reactions to the U. S. presence in the Canal Zone. If Canal Zone Treaty discussions are undertaken, Panamanian sensitivities may again be aroused. If the pace or the results of the negotiations appear unsatisfactory to the Panamanians, this would undoubtedly create a climate propitious to riots and violence, especially against the Canal Zone and U. S. establishments within the Republic of Panama.

The Panamanian Communist Party and other left wing groups are small in number; however, they are relatively well organized and will seek to exploit nationalistic issues in pursuit of their own objectives. Agitation prompted by communists would probably be directed at U. S. interests and installations in Panama.

At present, there appears to be no active threat of insurgency or resistance against the present National Guard-led government. However, the National Guard may undergo an erosion of power because of its own internal problems. In this respect, the continued instability within the National Guard may hamper the effectiveness of the security forces to cope with threats to public safety.

In view of the increasing trend toward urban guerrilla activity in Latin America, mention must be made of the potential threat of urban terrorism and kidnapping in Panama. Panama City, because of its compactness and crowded urban

areas, would present ideal terrain in which terrorists could operate. Lack of experience and negative attitudes between slum dwellers and the National Guard and DENI create conditions which could serve the interests of terrorists operating in Panama. The security forces are not considered adequately prepared to cope with organized urban terrorists or to control kidnapping threats.

### 1. National Guard

and a separate army

Panama does not have a separate police force/as such. The Panama National Guard is basically a police force with national jurisdiction and extensive military functions. It has an approximate strength of 7,500 men with 65 percent of the manpower concentrated in the major urban areas (Panama City, Colon and David). The five public order units of the Guard are considered to be well-trained in military operations and are estimated to have very good military capabilities. In general, National Guard personnel are strongly military oriented and thus require intensive and continued training and psychological preparation to function as a civil police force. The National Guard concentrates the majority of its efforts on improving its military capabilities at the expense of its civil police function. Insufficient emphasis is placed on crime prevention and control, police planning, crime reporting and records, investigations and the collection of evidence needed for the legal prosecution of people arrested. Training is required at all levels -- in police operations, law enforcement, police patrol operations, investigations, police supervision and management, internal defense operations and human and community relations.

National Guard personnel lack training in the democratic concepts of law enforcement. Possibly because of a lack of understanding of the civilian police concepts of law enforcement and the overemphasis on military concepts, police functions are considered to be of less importance. Personnel assigned to police duties often view such assignments as a demotion. The training of National Guard officers places strong emphasis on military combat operations and develops a strong military orientation in the men. Career advancement within the National Guard heavily favors those officers with military training and experience. The concept of public service in the civil police sense and the practice of working within a framework of proper community relationships are generally overlooked. AID participant training in FYs 1971 and 1972 will emphasize long-term training and group training of junior and intermediate National Guard officers to develop police competency and esprit de corps.

Another problem affecting the National Guard (as well as the National Department of Investigations discussed below) is the number of veteran National Guard officers that have been put in jail or exiled since the coup in 1968 and the counter-coup in 1969, leaving the leadership at the top level in the hands of young and inexperienced officers. This is true also of the NCO corps. The present top leadership in the National Guard is, at best, weak. This factor, added to the problem of instability within the National Guard ranks, may hinder

the capabilities of the security forces to maintain law and order. The security forces as a whole require extensive assistance in the police field to effectively carry out their police responsibilities in the Republic. Personnel must be made aware of the importance of the police role in the community and in national development. In many remote areas of Panama, the police force (National Guard) is the only continuing contact that people have with their government and the policeman (National Guard) is frequently the only representative of the government present.

## 2. National Department of Investigations (DENI)

This organization, which in our view should function solely as a police investigation bureau, has an approximate strength of 301 men and has investigative jurisdiction throughout the Republic of Panama for major crimes and subversive activities. The personnel strength of DENI is considered inadequate in terms of the overall responsibilities assigned to this organization by law and the extent of territory that has to be covered. Since the October 1968 coup d'etat, the DENI has been placed under the control of the National Guard G-2 (Chief of Intelligence). Both the National Guard and DENI are under the Ministry of Government and Justice according to law. This is true in theory only and is not actually practiced. There are many factors which hamper the effectiveness of DENI and which preclude the institutional development of this organization to any satisfactory degree. Although DENI personnel are considered to be generally better selected than National Guard personnel, the opportunity for career development and advancement is very limited. The advancement rate of personnel in DENI is far below that of the National Guard in spite of the fact that there are many capable officers in this organization. DENI receives very little support in terms of government funds and resources which are required to develop it into a professional police organization. Poor pay, weaknesses in training and inadequate organization and management add to the problems of institutional development for DENI. DENI does not have its own organic law or what might be a civil service system under which personnel can maintain tenure and career development. (The Director of DENI at the present time is a National Guard officer who holds the rank of Major.) It is an AID objective to divorce the detective and investigative functions of DENI completely from state security and to see the latter transferred in toto to G-2 of the National Guard.

## 8. U. S. AID Public Safety Project Accomplishments and Obstacles to Progress

In 1958 the GOP recognized that the law enforcement agencies of Panama needed reforms and that an upgrading of the police services was necessary. The GOP requested assistance from the United States, and a study of the law enforcement agencies was conducted by the AID (then ICA) Office of Public Safety. In 1961, a Project Agreement between the GOP and the U. S. AID was signed for technical assistance and material support for the law enforcement agencies. Emphasis has been placed on improving the police capabilities of the National Guard and

investigative capabilities of DENI. With the assistance of the USAID Public Safety program, the National Guard and DENI have undergone organizational changes to improve their overall ability to provide police services in the Republic. The National Guard's First Military Zone in Panama has developed an improved system for urban police patrols. In order to meet extensive training requirements, the National Guard recently established a civil police training academy. This police academy will provide police training at all levels and specialties and will serve to train National Guard and DENI personnel who will be assigned throughout the Republic. Prior to the establishment of the police academy, over 1,000 men from the National Guard and DENI were trained in civil police operations with the assistance of the USAID Public Safety program. One hundred National Guard and DENI officers of senior and intermediate grade level have received training at the International Police Academy in Washington, D. C. These officers have received training in police operations, investigations, police administration, internal defense, instructor training, border control and traffic enforcement. In order to effectively patrol urban areas, the National Guard has received 54 pickup trucks equipped with radios from USAID. The communications capability of the National Guard and DENI has been improved through the provision of over 250 radios consisting of mobile and portable units and base stations. A 75-man highway patrol force was formed to patrol the main highways leading from Panama City to the interior of the country. The improvement of border and coastal patrols was accomplished through training of personnel and the establishment of a coastal patrol unit. The coastal patrol force was developed jointly by the USAID and the USMILGP. Six patrol vessels were provided by the USMILGP and training and limited commodity support were provided by the USAID. With respect to the control of urban violence, the National Guard has received training in riot control in which the use of non-lethal methods was emphasized. During the disturbances that accompanied the attempt by the Assembly to impeach President Robles in early 1968 and the subsequent stormy election campaign, the National Guard forces performed effectively and refrained from using excessive force in maintaining public order. This resulted in few injuries despite several violent encounters between the National Guard and unruly mobs.

A reorganization of DENI resulted in the establishment of a complaint office and an improvement in the identification and records system and the police laboratory. The number of sections and divisions in DENI was reduced and personnel that were not being effectively utilized were placed in operational and investigative positions. Six radio equipped vehicles were provided to improve the mobility of DENI. A 16-week training course was established for DENI investigators and key officers have received training in the United States in criminal and/or security investigations. It is anticipated that future investigations training will be conducted at the newly established police academy. The training officer for DENI is presently assigned as a deputy director of the police academy.

Assistance has also been provided to the fire fighters of Panama in the form of commodity grants of U. S. excess property and training of Panamanian firemen by the Canal Zone Fire Department.

A survey of the Immigration and Naturalization Service was conducted in 1965 by the USAID Office of Public Safety and recommendations were made to improve the records section and alien control system. Follow through support has been provided through the TDY services of the Office of Public Safety Regional Immigration Advisor and the provision of U. S. excess property, such as filing cabinets and desks.

Although some improvements in the law enforcement agencies have taken place with USAID assistance, there are many weaknesses and deficiencies which must be overcome if the security forces are to effectively deal with potential threats of urban violence and crime and if they are to function as a positive force in national development. There are traditional ills which must be confronted and which represent constraints within which this program has and continues to operate. The low calibre of personnel and the resources from which the security forces must draw are factors which hamper the development of an effective police force. With the escalation of urban guerrilla activities in Latin America by leftist movements and with the increase in political kidnappings, the security forces must prepare to cope with new types of threats. There are other obstacles impeding progress in the USAID Public safety program:

- (1) Direct exercise of power by the National Guard in control of the Government;
- (2) Overemphasis on improving the military capabilities of the National Guard at the expense of professional police training;
- (3) Lack of understanding of the importance of a strong investigative arm for crime prevention and control and inadequate financial support needed for the institutional development of DENI;
- (4) General lack of adequate police practices and personnel management, and ineffective administration of the Panamanian law enforcement agencies, and
- (5) Numerous personnel changes at the command level of the National Guard resulting from the recent political events which has weakened the leadership of the National Guard. The internal instability within the National Guard may be protracted to the detriment of the people and the country.

### III. STRATEGY

The scope and type of assistance provided to the security forces of Panama by the USAID Public Safety program will depend largely on the political developments and in keeping with U. S. objectives in Panama. The overall strategy for

this program is set forth in the Country Analysis and Strategy Paper (CASP) for 1972. The main thrust of this program will be to continue the assistance (as appropriate) to strengthen the capabilities of the Security Forces to maintain law and order and to control police problems that can disrupt the stability of Panama and threaten the security of the Canal Zone. Increased efforts will be made to make the National Guard more aware of its legitimate role in the national development process and to encourage the application of improved human and community relations techniques in civil police operations.

The potential threat of internal instability and violence will likely persist into the 1970's. USAID assistance will focus on this problem so that the task of maintaining law and order is possible for the Panamanians and that direct U. S. involvement in response to a security threat to U. S. interests or installations will not be necessary. The cooperation of the Panamanian security forces in dealing with the Canal Zone Police and other U. S. forces during emergencies and for other public safety matters will continue to be encouraged.

The improvement of the Panamanian police services to cope with law and order problems such as urban terrorism, major crimes, and political kidnapping is also important in terms of strategy.

Plans for the establishment of a Command Control and Communications System (Operations Center) which will permit the control and coordination of all the Panamanian security forces involved in an emergency are presently being implemented. It is contemplated that Canal Zone police/security forces will be in contact with the Panamanian Operations Center during any problem which requires close coordination.

The National Guard Commander has requested and is actively supporting the training of the National Guard personnel in civil police concepts and techniques. To this end, he supported the establishment of the new police training academy. In order to elevate the "image" of the policeman in the eyes of the public and within the ranks of the National Guard, the training of all National Guard personnel in civil police concepts will be strongly encouraged at the new police academy. This will include training in human and community relations as a part of a major effort to improve effectiveness in crime prevention and control.

The preparation of the National Guard forces and DENI to handle law and order problems will be done through the provision of technical assistance, participant and in-country training and limited commodity support. The control of civil disorders and riots through non-lethal means and minimum usage of force will be emphasized. The use of a 26-inch wood baton to replace the rifle and bayonet in some riot situations will be recommended. Supervision of riot control contingents in the field will be encouraged. The overall control and coordination of security forces in any emergency is to be accomplished through the use of the Command Control and Communications Center mentioned previously.

Excess Property

Excess property to CII, DENI and Bomberos (Firemen).  
Total estimated value (at acquisition cost)  
of \$352,089.

FY 1970 - Government of Panama (GOP) Inputs

1. International travel costs and continuation of salaries of the 13 participants selected for training in the United States.
2. Resources needed to remodel a building for use as a civil police training academy for National Guard and DENI personnel and funding required for the Director and his staff.
3. Spare parts for transportation and communications equipment provided by program, including the materials and funds needed for the rehabilitation of U. S. excess property.
4. Instructors, materials and funds required for in-country training activities.
5. Transportation and funds required for the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment used in civic action/community development projects.
6. Local costs for the research and planning needed to establish a Command Control and Communications Center.

FY 1971 U. S. INPUTS

During FY 1971, Public Safety Advisors will continue to provide technical assistance to the National Guard and the Department of National Investigations (DENI) to complete ongoing projects and to improve civil police operations and training. Emphasis will be placed on developing a positive and constructive community relations program for the National Guard. If the circumstances warrant it, the USAID and the Country Team will consider the addition of a Public Safety Training Advisor to the Public Safety Staff.

A study of the traffic situation in Panama City will be made to find ways to alleviate the increasing problems of traffic control and enforcement. Assistance to the National Guard to establish a Command Control and Communications System (Operations Center) in Panama City will continue.

If the situation demands it, attention will be directed toward increasing U. S. assistance to the law enforcement agencies to strengthen their capabilities to control urban terrorism and kidnapping threats.

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An evaluation of the USAID Public Safety program is planned for some time in FY 1971. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the overall effectiveness of the program, to evaluate the adequacy of the program, and to provide recommendations to the USAID on the Public Safety program in Panama. Specific terms of reference for this evaluation are now being prepared.

FY 1971 AID Financing\$144,000\*

- |  |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| 1. <u>U. S. Personnel (AID Direct Hire)</u>  | <u>\$67,000</u> |
| Two (2) Public Safety Advisors   |                 |
| 2. <u>Local and TCN Personnel</u>  | <u>6,000</u>    |
| One (1) local secretary  |                 |
| 3. <u>Participants</u>   | <u>36,000</u>   |
| Twelve (12) officers of intermediate level and two (2) officers of senior level for training in the U. S. at the International Police Academy in police organization, administration and operations, investigations, internal defense, communications, traffic control, instructor methods, and other specialized training, such as investigation of terrorist activities, as may be required. |                 |
| 4. <u>Commodities</u>  | <u>30,000</u>   |
| Communications equipment required to establish the Command Control and Communications System (Operations Center) in Panama City, training and demonstration equipment for the civil police training academy, investigation equipment to improve the capabilities of DENI, and traffic control equipment.   |                 |
| 5. <u>Other Costs</u>  | <u>5,000</u>    |
| TDY assistance by OPS Regional Advisors in communications, traffic control, and immigration, local travel and supplies, in-country training costs such as reproduction of training materials, and limited commodity  |                 |

\* Estimated project cost with three (3) Public Safety Advisors - \$174,000.

assistance in support of the civic action/  
community development programs of the  
National Guard in the rural areas of Panama.

Excess Property

Excess property for GN, DENI and Bomberos.

FY 1971 - Government of Panama (GOP) Inputs

1. International transportation costs and salaries of participants selected for training in the United States.
2. Local transportation, office space and secretarial help for U. S. technicians.
3. Resources required for the construction and operation of the civil police training academy facility, including funds for the maintenance of an adequate staff. (GOP funding of the temporary building and maintenance of the staff of the civil police training academy will continue until the permanent facility is constructed.)
4. Resources required for the establishment of the Command Control and Communications Center. (Radio equipment and material which can be procured locally will be financed by the GOP.)
5. Spare parts and funds for maintenance of equipment provided by AID, including materials and funds for rehabilitation of U. S. excess property.
6. Instructors, materials and funds required for local police training programs.
7. Non-lethal riot control equipment required for the Riot Control Forces.

FY 1972 - AID INPUTS

Further AID inputs for FYs 1972, 1973 and 1974 will be based on the recommendations provided by the Public Safety evaluation which is being planned for FY 1971.

It is expected that the overall U. S. objectives and goals for this sector will not change in the above time frame; however, as mentioned previously, USAID assistance will continue to be influenced by local political setting.

Technical assistance on a day-to-day basis by two (possibly three) U. S. direct hire technicians will continue. Emphasis will continue to be placed on police training and on improving the capabilities of the National Guard and DENI to cope with urban law and order problems and internal unrest, using a minimum of force.

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Emphasis will be given to crime prevention and control, human and community relations, and to the preparation of the law enforcement agencies to cope with urban guerillas in Panama City, if required. Assistance will also be provided to the DENI in the area of investigations by the continuance of training and limited commodity support. The assistance of a records specialist may be required at this time. It is expected that a traffic survey will have been accomplished and recommendations will be implemented as appropriate. Assistance in the establishment and operation of the Command Control and Communications System for the security forces will continue.

FY 1972 AID Financing\$163,000\*

- |  |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| 1. <u>U. S. Personnel (AID Direct Hire)</u>  | <u>\$75,000</u> |
| Two (2) Public Safety Advisors   |                 |
| 2. <u>Local and TCN Personnel</u>  | <u>6,000</u>    |
| One (1) local secretary  |                 |
| 3. <u>Participants</u>   | <u>62,000</u>   |
| Training for 18 officers of intermediate level and 6 officers of senior level at the International Police Academy in the U. S. in civil police organization, administration and operations, internal defense, traffic control and enforcement, instructor methods, and other specialized courses as may be required. |                 |
| 4. <u>Commodities</u>  | <u>15,000</u>   |
| Communications equipment to expand Command Control and Communications Center system to some rural areas, training and demonstration equipment for civil police training academy, transportation equipment to improve urban and/or rural police patrol operations.  |                 |
| 5. <u>Other Costs</u>  | <u>5,000</u>    |
| TDY assistance by OPS Regional advisors in immigration, investigations and records, local travel and supplies, in-country  |                 |

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\* Estimated project cost with additional Public Safety Advisor - \$189,000.

training and limited capacity assistance (medicine, picks, shovels) in support of the civic action/community development program of the National Guard in the rural areas of Panama.

Excess Property

U. S. excess property for GN, DENI and Bomberos.

FY 1972 - Government of Panama (GOP) Inputs

1. International travel costs and continuation of salaries for participants selected for training in the United States.
2. Local transportation, office space, and secretarial help for U. S. technicians.
3. Continuation of funding required for the maintenance and operation of civil police training academy.
4. Funding required for maintenance and operation of the Command Control and Communications Center.
5. Funding required for maintenance and operation of equipment provided by AID including resources needed for rehabilitation of U. S. excess property.
6. Instructors, materials and funds required for local civil police training programs.

FY 1973 - AID Inputs

If U. S. objectives and goals in this sector remain unchanged, emphasis will continue to be placed on the training of National Guard and DENI personnel in civil police operations and on the improvement of the capabilities of the National Guard in crime prevention and control and the control of civil disturbances. Technical assistance will continue to be provided to control urban law and order problems by improved police patrols and training. Attention will be placed on the adequate enforcement of traffic laws and control of traffic in Panama City. Assistance will continue to be expanded into the interior to assist police contingents operating in these areas.

FY 1973 AID Financing

\$100,000

1. U. S. Personnel (AID Direct Hire)

59,000

Two (2) Public Safety Advisors (18 mm)

- |  |                 |
|--|-----------------|
| 2. <u>Local and TCN Personnel</u>  | \$ <u>6,000</u> |
| One (1) local secretary  |                 |
| 3. <u>Participants</u>   | <u>20,000</u>   |
| Six (6) intermediate-level officers and two (2) senior officers for training at the International Police Academy in the United States in civil police organization, administration and operations, internal defense, investigations, traffic control and enforcement and instructor methods. |                 |
| 4. <u>Commodities</u>  | <u>10,000</u>   |
| Transportation equipment for urban patrols, communications equipment to expand Command Control and Communications Center to include entire country, training and demonstration equipment for civil police training academy.  |                 |
| 5. <u>Other Costs</u>  | <u>5,000</u>    |
| TCN assistance by OPS Regional Advisors in communications and investigations, local travel and supplies, in-country training materials, and limited commodity assistance to support civic action/community development programs of the National Guard in the rural areas.                    |                 |

Excess Property

U. S. excess property to GN, DENI and Bomberos.

FY 1973 Government of Panama (GOP) Inputs

1. International travel costs and continuation of salaries of participants selected for training in the United States.
2. Local transportation, office space and secretarial help for U. S. technicians.
3. Continuation of funding required for maintenance and operation of civil police training facility and Command Control and Communications Center.

4. Funding required for maintenance and operation of equipment provided by AID including resources required for rehabilitation of U. S. excess property.

5. Instructors, materials and funds required for local civil police training program.

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