

USG Integrated Strategic Plan

For

Burundi

2003-2005

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**AFR/REDSO/ESA
DCHA/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
DCHA/Office of Food for Peace
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**This Strategic Plan is a 'pre-decisional' USAID document and does not reflect results of USG budgetary review.
Additional information on the attached can be obtained from Flynn Fuller, Director REDSO/ESA/NPC**

**BURUNDI -- INTERIM
INTEGRATED STRATEGIC PLAN
FY 2003-5**

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Executive Summary

Burundi is a country in the early stages of transition. A fledgling civilian government has replaced a military dictatorship that assumed power through a military coup d'état. The government struggles to involve all political factions in the transition, create security in the country, change old institutions, build new ones, reform the military, instill confidence, restart economic growth, and provide social services. In spite of an auspicious start-up, its success is uncertain, with social, political, and economic conditions compelling heightened concern and attention from USAID and the international donor community.

Along with other bilateral and multilateral donors, USAID has over recent years provided substantial emergency and humanitarian assistance, and limited development assistance aimed at supporting a transition from conflict to peace. After the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Accord (APRA) in August 2000, USAID focused all assistance on one Special Objective, "Foundation for a Transition to Peace Established," approved by Washington in November 2000.

As part of the Arusha agreement, a Transitional Government took office November 1, 2001. This event generated cautious optimism among Burundians, their neighbors, and the international community. It was characterized as a window of opportunity that deserved support and, as such, the USG pledged funding support of \$150 million over three years at the Geneva donor meeting in December 2001. At the same time, USAID began to rethink its program of assistance. The result is this proposed Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP). Its elaboration was governed by guidance from Washington provided in a parameters cable seen at Annex A. The Plan is designed to support Burundi's transition from conflict to peace and from relief to renewed development over an interim period of three years, 2003-2005.

Conception of the ISP drew on perspectives of U.S. Embassy personnel, the international donor community, international NGOs and agencies, Burundi government authorities, and local non-governmental and community organizations. The Plan supports USG and Agency goals, the U.S. Embassy's Mission Performance Plan, the transition outlined in the Arusha accord, and the objectives of the government's draft "Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper."

Cognizant of the uncertain conditions that prevail, the Integrated Strategic Plan sets forth a modest goal of "transition to peace and socioeconomic recovery underway" and presents three Strategic Objectives (SOs): 6) Peace Process and Good Governance Enhanced; 7) Food Security Enhanced; and 8) Access to Basic Social Services Improved. The Plan also builds on past USAID programs – the former mission closed in 1996 -- and current activities. It proposes to exploit USAID's comparative advantages specific to various funding sources – transition assistance, Economic Support Funds, development assistance, disaster assistance, food aid, Displaced Children/Orphans funds, War Victims' funds, and refugee funds.

For each of the Strategic Objectives, current and potential partners are identified. Prospective results, a menu of illustrative activities, and the means of measuring accomplishments are described. The Plan proposes a management structure that partners

two USAID bureaus and several offices OTI, OFDA, FFP, PVC), draws on the technical expertise of two other bureaus, continues a minimal presence in Bujumbura, and is led by the Regional Economic Development Services Office in Nairobi. Funding and personnel levels seen in the ISP were based on numbers provided in the parameters cable, on current activities, and on static, improving, or deteriorating security conditions. The strategy argues that senior USAID representation and oversight in Bujumbura is required. The ISP also reflects a spirit of coordination and collaboration among the various offices that must continue to prevail during the three-year implementation period.

Consideration of three possible scenarios influenced the selection of objectives and activities, and the proposed management, personnel, and funding levels.

- The current situation: little or no progress toward attaining a ceasefire, substantial amounts of humanitarian assistance are required, and development assistance is limited. In this situation, U.S. assistance will be largely emergency and humanitarian with smaller amounts of transition and development assistance.
- An improved situation: a ceasefire; a Hutu president assuming office on May 1, 2003; demobilization of combatants; reintegration of refugees, the internally displaced, and the demobilized; a call by the government for an increase in development aid; and a real transition from relief to development. In this situation, a short-term need for increased emergency assistance and food aid, mainly to support reintegration, is foreseen. An increase in development assistance and ESF will be warranted.
- A deteriorated situation: caused by a coup, political assassinations, increased ethnic strife, incursions by Congo-based militia, or a collapse of ceasefire negotiations. In this situation, the withdrawal of South African troops and a drawdown of Embassy staff would be likely. U.S. assistance will revert to a strictly humanitarian and relief mode with a potentially significant increase in levels.

Under all three scenarios, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and the Food for Peace Office are expected to play substantial roles. A deteriorating scenario will call exclusively for resources from these offices. The Office of Transition Initiatives and the Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation have initiated activities under the current scenario, which would likely increase under an improved scenario. A modest amount of Economic Support Funds and development assistance, managed by REDSO, will be provided under the current scenario and likely increase under an improved scenario.

The USG has a unique opportunity to contribute to peace, reconciliation, and renewed economic development in Burundi. However, the enormous security and management constraints mean that USAID's implementation of the program will require a skillful mix of talent from a limited presence in Bujumbura, from Nairobi, and from Washington.

I. ENVIRONMENT FOR ASSISTANCE

A. Political, Economic, and Social Context

The Political Setting: Since independence in 1962, Burundi has had a minority government, episodes of civil war and explosions of communal violence that approached genocide in nature. Hundreds of thousands of people have died or been displaced, and a legacy of bitter inter-ethnic relations and economic decline generate skepticism about the viability of democracy in Burundi. Civil conflict caused major refugee flows in 1972-73, 1988, 1993-94, and a constant stream from 1996 to the present. Currently, there are an estimated 820 thousand Burundian refugees in Tanzania, of which more than 350 thousand are in refugee camps. There are also nearly 400 thousand Burundians that have been internally displaced.

Burundi's latest round of civil war began in October 1993, triggered by the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye. In July 1994, a "convention" government negotiated under the auspices of the UN and OAU was formed. But the expected peace dividend did not materialize and increasing insecurity led to a coup by Tutsi military officers in 1996. In response, the U.S. suspended its development assistance program, regional leaders imposed economic sanctions on Burundi, and most donors respected the sanctions.

As conditions deteriorated, the donor community took a more proactive role in seeking a negotiated and peaceful resolution of the conflict. In August 2000, spurred by the peacemaking efforts of Nelson Mandela, nineteen political parties representing all but two factions signed the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement (APRA). However, two key rebel groups, the FDD and the FNL, did not sign the accord. They have declined to participate in the peace process or to join the Transitional Government (TG) mandated by the accord, and continue to engage the Burundian military on the battlefield. Nonetheless, with apparent progress on peace, the donor community pledged \$440 million at the Paris Conference in December 2000. Donors made additional pledges at the Geneva Round Table meeting in December 2001, bringing the total to \$823 million.

The Transitional Government took office on November 1, 2001 with Pierre Buyoya as president. Eighteen months later, on May 1, 2003, the Hutu vice-president is slated to succeed him. The TG initially generated much optimism and momentum for a political transition to peace and reconciliation. A multi-ethnic Senate and National Assembly were created. The international community pledged support, wishing to seize an opportunity to help end the conflict.

Attempts by the international community to bring the two rebel factions to the negotiating table have been constant but less than successful. Yet some optimism has been sparked by the October 2002 agreement of at least parts of the two rebel groups to engage in the peace process. But without the full inclusion of the rebel groups in the transitional government, the peace process will continue to sputter and the threat of military and rebel fighting will overshadow government and donor efforts to move Burundi from conflict to peace, from relief to development.

The conflict continues to render many parts of the country inaccessible and occasionally threatens the capital of Bujumbura. Civilians are sometimes caught in the crossfire or specifically targeted, and deaths of innocent people occur, including a September 2002 event that resulted in as many as 200 civilians killed by Burundi's military. Prodded by international condemnation, the military leadership admitted the killings and vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice.

The prognosis? Many are hopeful; few are optimistic that there will be substantial peace and reconciliation in the near future. But tentative, fragile and bumpy progress will likely continue. However, even if all rebel groups agree to the cease-fire and join the Transitional Government, a key problem will remain the composition of the armed forces, particularly its officer corps. The Arusha accord calls for a 50-50 Tutsi-Hutu split within the army. Identifying and quickly training Hutu officers will be a challenge, considering that Hutus have been largely excluded from the higher education system and many of those who are most educated have fled the country.

The Economic Setting: With 6.8 million people as of 1999, Burundi ranks second in population density (215 persons per square kilometer) among all countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Owing to a population growth rate of 2.9 percent annually, Burundi's population is projected to double in twenty-five years. High population density and extreme scarcity of land -- 421 persons per square kilometer of arable land -- highlights Burundi's prime environmental problem. Available land per household averages only about 0.5 hectares. With traditional subsistence practices, this is hardly sufficient to produce enough food for a household, much less generate income.

Even absent the woes generated by poor governance, civil conflict and environmental degradation, Burundi's development challenges would be daunting. Sanctions imposed by the international community furthered Burundi's economic decline. Foreign aid fell from \$300 million in 1993 to \$48 million in 2001. With little trade and finance, the economy stagnated. There was a significant deterioration of macroeconomic balances, including a more than doubling of external debt arrears from 1996 to 1999. There was also a worsening of poverty. By 2001, 70 percent of the population was below the poverty level, compared with 40 percent in 1994. The incidence of poverty is highest for farmers and lower for public sector and private formal sector workers. In 2001, the gross national product per capita had fallen to \$100, well below the sub-continent's average of over \$400, and down from \$180 in 1993. Self-sufficient in food before the civil conflict, Burundi's food production in 2000 was markedly lower than its pre-conflict levels. Legumes production, for example, had declined by 34 percent, cereals by 15 percent, and cattle and small ruminants by 11 and 38 percent, respectively. The economy, dominated by agriculture, which employs 90% of the labor force, regressed by 18 percent during the same period. In January 1999, the sanctions were lifted to prevent further deterioration.

It cannot be overstated how much the conflict has contributed to food insecurity. It has not only displaced people, preventing them from taking adequate care of their fields and livestock. It has also discouraged them from making sustainable investments in their lands and reduces the perceived benefits of managing natural resources for the long term.

Subsistence agriculture accounts for more than 80 percent of the total agricultural output. Cash crop agriculture represents only 9 percent of total agricultural output, occupies 8 percent of total cultivated land, and accounts for 8 percent of primary sector GDP. Yet, cash crops dominate Burundi's exports and foreign exchange earnings. The economy relies mainly on coffee production for export, which in the past generated up to 80 percent of total export earnings, with tea and cotton contributing another 10 percent. Due to the decline in international market prices of coffee over recent years, export earnings have considerably decreased. But even in the good years, coffee revenues benefited mainly the ethnic minority, which is an equity problem that must be addressed by the transitional government.

In April 2002, after consultation with grassroots groups and with donors, the transitional government unveiled a draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which declared that "...Burundi's long-term development approach is based on the assumption that poverty plays a basic role in perpetuating conflict situations and problems of governance..." The PRSP was favorably received, though not free from skepticism about the government's ability to implement the many activities identified to combat poverty. The PRSP will undergo the usual review process by the IMF and World Bank. However, representatives of both institutions have urged donors to help implement the plan immediately and not to await its formal approval.

The Social Setting: Burundian society suffers from many divisions. Of course there is the ethnic, with the minority Tutsis dominating the government, economy and military, to the exclusion of the Hutus and Twa. But there are also urban-rural and regional divides; public investment and social sector spending have heavily favored Bujumbura and other areas, particularly in the south. There is also a gender divide. Women and girls, who have traditionally been disadvantaged (e.g. exclusion from decision-making, lower school enrolment and literacy rates), have suffered even more from the conflict. The incidence of violence against women has risen with the war, and the 44 percent of households in refugee camps headed by women are more vulnerable to poverty.

Besides an enormous proportion of the Burundian population being refugees or internally displaced, there are roughly 30 thousand refugees from other countries, primarily the Democratic Republic of the Congo, residing in Burundi.

The social consequences of conflict, poor governance and dismal economic performance have been grim. School attendance dropped from 52 percent in 1992 to 47 percent in 2000, with over 600 schools destroyed. Infant mortality increased from 100/1000 in 1993 to 106/1000 in 1999, and life expectancy dropped from 55 years in 1993 to 43 years in 2001. HIV/AIDS infection rates are about 19 percent in urban areas and 7 percent in rural areas. There are an estimated 25,000 war orphans, 14,000 child soldiers and 5,000 street children. Burundi's UN Human Development Index declined from 0.341 in 1992 to 0.288 in 1999, ranking it 170 of 174 countries.

Reversal of minority control of the government, economy and military is critical so that access to power and resources is more inclusive. The accession of Melchior Ndadaye via democratic election seemed to start the process, but his 1993 assassination by threatened elites ended the experiment. The Tutsi minority retained control, but in the ensuing conflict, almost everyone has suffered.

Surveys reveal that the vast majority of people are tired of the conflict and want the peace process to succeed. They want the transitional authorities to conduct elections and hand over to a new government at the end of three years. Fostered by peace radio and an expanding inclusive civil society, reconciliation is starting to take place at the grassroots levels. Tutsi and Hutu are working together to disseminate knowledge of human rights, to dispel rumors that can incite clashes, and to empower women. At the provincial and the commune level, international and local NGOs work with community-based groups to identify and implement activities that are characterized as peace dividends.

B. USG Foreign Policy Interests and Link to MPP and Agency Goals

USG priority foreign policy interests in Africa are preventing terrorism, combating the scourge of HIV/AIDS, promoting trade and investment, fostering democracy and the rule of law, supporting human capacity development, and encouraging policy reform needed to underpin social and economic development.

The FY 2001-2003 Burundi Mission Performance Plan's foremost priority is "to break the cycle of civil wars and massive killings by supporting the Burundian peace process and the democratization and protection of human rights." Four of the Plan's top five goals are directly reflected in and supported by USAID's current and proposed future assistance -- democratization, humanitarian assistance, health improvement and economic development. Regarding support for democratization, the U.S. Mission to Burundi, with support from USAID interventions, will continue its efforts to encourage all parties in the conflict to work toward a cease-fire. Humanitarian needs will continue to be substantial if the conflict continues. In a post-conflict setting they will burgeon over the short-term and a substantial increase in humanitarian assistance will be required as IDPs and refugees return. In the health sector, priority focus is on HIV/AIDS, secondarily on maternal-child health, malaria and polio. On the economic front, the Embassy promotes structural reform, liberalization of the economy, privatization of parastatal companies and market pricing for export crops to increase production efficiency.

The current and proposed USAID assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy interests, the goals set forth in the Burundi MPP and Agency goals and emphases. Proposed strategic objectives and potential activities are consonant with Agency goals of:

- # 1 - Broad-based economic growth and agricultural development encouraged
- # 2 - Democracy and good governance strengthened
- # 4 - World population stabilized and human health protected
- # 6 - Lives saved, suffering associated with natural or man-made disasters reduced, and conditions for political and/or economic development reestablished.

Further, in a Burundi that can successfully transition to peace and development, the strategy can also respond to Program Goal # 3 - Human capacity built through education and training. The ISP identifies education as a crosscutting theme that will support the achievement of all three strategic objectives and will be an important element of a comprehensive demobilization and reintegration program that will be required if a cease-fire is implemented.

C. Potential Risks and Implications for USAID Assistance Program

Besides the “trigger points” described in Part II, Proposed Assistance Program, there are several risks that may affect activity implementation. These are indicative and by no means exhaustive. Managers of the U.S. assistance program will have to be well informed to be able to anticipate and proactively react to changing conditions.

1. Too Little, Too Late: The signing of the Arusha accord in August 2000 and the constitution of the Transitional Government in November 2001 generated optimism and donor pledges of assistance, much of which has not materialized. In December 2001, the U.S. pledged \$150 million over three years. The Transitional Government has pleaded for increases in development assistance and debt relief to help rebuild the economy, restart growth and provide employment. Failure of the donor community to adequately support the transition may jeopardize its implementation.

2. Donor Fatigue: Delays, setbacks or sputtering implementation of the accord may stall donor disbursements and ultimately lead to fatigue or attention diverted elsewhere. This would bode ill for successful transition, reconciliation and economic renewal.

3. Lack of Commitment to Change: There have been indications that some members of the Transitional Government, including the Senate and the National Assembly, are more interested in personal aggrandizement than in bringing about equitable change. Unless this can be minimized, the credibility and success of the government will be threatened.

4. Effecting Reform of the Military: This may be the most difficult task confronting the Transitional Government. A key challenge is the identification of competent Hutu enlisted men or civilians who can be trained to form an officer’s corps. Making the army 50 percent Hutu, as called for by the accord, cannot be done overnight, but the government and current military leaders must make quick, tangible progress to demonstrate commitment to change. On the other hand, it must be done in a manner that gives the minority Tutsis confidence that their reduced control of the military won’t threaten their genocide.

5. Humanitarian Disaster Increased by Conflict or Weather: An expansion of the conflict caused by a breakdown in the peace accord, for whatever reasons, a severe and prolonged drought, or other natural disaster will negatively impact reconciliation, rehabilitation and increased development assistance. Such circumstances will see assistance programs revert to a relief mode.

6. Assistance Dependency: As is the case elsewhere in the region, refugees and internally displaced persons are often provided food aid and social services in settlements or camps that are superior to what they might receive in their home communities. This understandably can make people reluctant to return to their homes.

7. Grassroots Conflict: A cease-fire and armed forces reform will generate the demobilization of combatants and the reintegration of former fighters, returning refugees, and internally displaced persons into their home areas. Conflict over land and other resources can be anticipated. To help prevent grassroots conflict and assistance

dependency, reintegration assistance must be provided via a community approach that equally benefits people who remained in their communities as well as returnees.

8. Congo Chaos: Presidents Kagame and Kabila recently announced an agreement where some 23,000 Rwandan troops were pulled out of eastern Congo. In turn, Mr. Kabila is required to impose control by Congolese authorities over Hutu rebels and other militia in eastern Congo to prevent attacks or incursions into Rwanda. It is not clear that Kabila has the means to honor the agreement. A power vacuum has already been noted, militia fighting and looting prevail, and several thousand Congolese have fled to Burundi.

9. Forced and voluntary refugee returns: In the past Tanzania has threatened refugee *refoulement* - the forced repatriation of refugees. With over 800,000 Burundian refugees in Tanzania their forced repatriation would create a tremendous hardship on Burundi, due to their limitations in re-integrating the refugees at both and local and national levels. At the same time, optimism and positive development in the APRA might instigate returns that while voluntary would also have tremendous consequences on the country.

D. Overview of Other Donor Expected Contributions

In 2000 and 2001, donors met in Paris and Geneva to pledge \$823 million in assistance for a peaceful transition in Burundi. According to the Burundi Ministry of Planning, donors disbursed just 18 percent of those pledges as of June 2002. The primary sectors for assistance were identified as HIV/AIDS prevention, refugee resettlement, poverty reduction, humanitarian assistance, water and sanitation infrastructure rehabilitation, debt relief, food security and support for the peace process.

Leading multilateral donors are the European Union (\$242.2 million), World Bank (\$156 million) and African Development Bank (\$78.5 million). However, pledges from multilaterals may be jeopardized by the government's inability to service its debt (86 percent owed to the multilaterals). While most debt is concessional, the debt service in 2001 was 40 percent of the ordinary budget and exports. Consequently, the government and the World Bank are advocating balance of payments support and debt relief.

Significant bilateral donor pledges (inclusive of humanitarian assistance) are from the United States (\$150 million), Germany (\$35.7 million), Belgium (\$25.4 million), Great Britain (\$8 million) and France (\$6.9 million). However, these figures must be considered approximate as donors were pledging over different time lines. Since the funds were initially pledged, some donors' priorities have shifted and some of these pledges may no longer be forthcoming.

Most bilateral donors linked their pledges to progress on a negotiated cease-fire. In lieu of a cessation of hostilities, many donors have withheld significant portions of the funds pledged. The cease-fire would be the first step towards large-scale refugee repatriation and a gradual demobilization of the fighting forces, and many pledges were targeted for these activities. Other reasons for low disbursement rates include insecurity in many areas of the country and low absorptive capacity of Burundian institutions.

Multilateral and bilateral donors are providing funding to UN agencies and, in some cases, direct support for government activities. The French, for example, directly support

the justice sector with training, materials and rehabilitation assistance. Donor pledges and activities are presented in Annex B.

E. Prior USAID Experience and Impact

The 1996 coup d'état led to the immediate suspension, as required by legislation, of U.S. development assistance. Until then, USAID was a major donor implementing a comprehensive assistance program, managed by a fully staffed mission of nine U.S. Direct Hire officers. The Burundi Enterprise Support and Training project (BEST) was a private sector-targeted program that is well remembered by government officials. A \$55 million integrated health project focused on HIV/AIDS, maternal-child health, and family planning and capacity enhancement. A farming systems activity worked with the Ministry of Agriculture and the Burundi Agricultural Research Institute (ISABU) to increase farmer production and income. The remnants and results of this program are visible throughout Burundi, though no formal review or impact study has been done.

From 1996 until the present, USAID has provided food aid and disaster assistance to address the humanitarian needs of vulnerable people displaced or affected by the conflict. The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance has stationed one U.S. Personal Services Contractor in Bujumbura for the past five years. Food aid has been managed from Nairobi, and from Dar es Salaam for Burundi refugees encamped in Western Tanzania.

In 1997, the Clinton Administration approved the Great Lakes Justice Initiative. In FY 1998, the Department of State authorized \$10 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for democracy activities consisting of justice system improvements, civil society organization capacity building, ethnic reconciliation, public education (particularly about human rights), women's centers and a Great Lakes Policy Forum. Four U.S. NGOs -- Search for Common Ground, the International Human Rights Law Group, the International Foundation for Election Systems and Africare -- launched these programs in 1999. USAID/Washington provided oversight until April 2000, when responsibility was transferred to REDSO.

When it became apparent that Nelson Mandela's leadership would produce a peace accord in Arusha, USAID/W asked REDSO in August 2000 to elaborate an Action Plan to support implementation of the accord. REDSO was also asked to produce a "deliverables" list of activities and funding estimates for President Clinton to potentially announce during his visit to Arusha in August to mark the signing of the accord. These illustrative activities and funding estimates were subsumed under a Special Objective, "*Foundation for a Transition to Peace Established,*" included in the Burundi Transitional Action Plan formally approved by USAID/W in November 2000. Under the Special Objective, which includes a new program inaugurated by the Office of Transition Initiatives in May 2002, USAID provides development assistance, disaster assistance and developmental relief and food aid, and manages ESF allocated by the Department of State.

The current USAID program consists of peace-building and reconciliation activities, civil society enhancement, justice system improvement, women's empowerment activities, condom social marketing and HIV/AIDS prevention training, polio vaccinations and several scholarships to a U.S. university. In FY 2002, USAID incorporated food security, maternal mortality issues and psychosocial support for victims of torture into the

assistance portfolio. The OTI program supports the transition to peace and democracy through assistance to Burundi's Senate and National Assembly and a small- grants, quick-impact program implemented by three U.S. NGOs.

OFDA continues to provide some \$12 million annually to alleviate suffering. OFDA's emergency and developmental relief program have become more complex since inception in 1993. In FY 2002, OFDA provided grants to eight international NGOs and five UN agencies to support an integrated response to humanitarian needs, addressing nutrition, food security and emergency health needs in priority provinces. It maintains contingency stocks to meet emergency needs, and it helps support security for humanitarian personnel. OFDA is also helping strengthen early warning and rapid response capacities to mitigate the effects of new crises. The Office of Food for Peace has provided an average of \$20 million in food aid annually over recent years through the World Food Program, CARE and World Vision.

In the past two years, USAID has made a concerted effort to target disadvantaged provinces to help redress the imbalance that favored Bujumbura and certain areas. Where security enables USAID partners to work effectively in rural areas, offices have been opened and activities directed to rural areas in which conditions are most severe.

F. Partners, Customers, Stakeholders

The Burundi government must be a partner for the U.S. assistance program. Support provided by the Office of Transition Initiatives directly benefits government agencies and their officials. Child survival and HIV/AIDS assistance can also be provided to and through the government. However, U.S. legislative restrictions preclude the direct provision of development or ESF assistance to (for the benefit of) the government, unless a specific legal exception exists [see annex K for a list of exceptions]. Nonetheless, the government remains a key planning, coordination, and implementation partner for USAID's program. Activities implemented by NGO and U.N. organizations are intended to conform to government development plans to the extent possible, and implementation partners coordinate closely with government officials in Bujumbura, at the provincial level and in the communes. Activities described in this ISP under each SO may be appropriate for some, but not necessarily all, funding sources, since multiple funding sources support each SO.

In March 2002, the government promulgated its "Interim Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategic Paper - Interim PRSP" with the following long-term goals:

A country at peace -- A situation in the region that is peaceful and favorable to economic integration -- Progress toward poverty eradication -- Universal access to essential services (education, health and hygiene) -- A high standard of education for young people -- A diversified and modernized agricultural sector -- An industrialized, competitive economy, fully integrated within regional and international trade dynamics -- Demographic growth under control -- Institutions based on transparent, decentralized management of powers and resources.

The Interim PRSP emphasizes: "In order to achieve a significant degree of poverty reduction in its long-term strategy, Burundi restates its conviction that economic growth must be strong, sustainable, diversified and fair.

The government reiterated its commitment to tackling poverty by producing a Poverty Reduction Strategy (April 2002). This document reexamines the implications of the

Interim PRSP and identifies six major groups of obstacles to economic growth and poverty reduction that are consistent with USAID's analyses and strategic plan:

- 1) Problems of governance, including domestic and sub-regional political crisis
- 2) Inadequate access by the population to production factors
- 3) Poor quality of and insufficient access to basic social services
- 4) Increase in the number of vulnerable persons due to the crisis
- 5) Widespread incidence of HIV/AIDS
- 6) Continuing obstacles to gender equality

Besides the government, USAID's implementation partners include UN agencies and several U.S. nongovernmental organizations. These NGOs partner with local organizations to strengthen their capacity, influence, and service delivery.

Other donors are also USAID partners. For example, French cooperation has enabled USAID to concentrate resources on HIV/AIDS prevention while France builds laboratory capacity for detection and treatment. Scandinavian donors provide parallel financing for farmer support programs, and the EU (ECHO) and USAID (OFDA) share funding for UN World Food Programme aircraft for humanitarian workers.

As this USAID strategy will be a major element of USG support for Burundian efforts to implement the Arusha accord, the range of stakeholders is wide indeed. They include not only the rural poor, but also urban youth, women and girls, and politicians of different ethnic groups. They also include economic elites, such as those traders who will be threatened by government and World Bank efforts to liberalize the coffee sector. USAID programs to improve agricultural incomes for the rural poor, to improve health services, and to promote peace may be viewed as threatening by those relatively few who benefit from the current situation. One group of particular concern is the Tutsi military, particularly the officer corps. Assuaging these groups is no easy task. Reducing the risk of their derailing implementation of the Arusha accord and of the development thrust of this ISP will require that our programs bridge the "divides," build broad support for the transition process, and quickly demonstrate that peace is beneficial to the vast majority of Burundians from all ethnic groups and regions and from both sexes. It will also require that the staff implementing this ISP be well attuned to developments on the ground and to perceptions across Burundian society.

II. PROPOSED ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

A. Development/Humanitarian Assistance Challenge: Elaborating the Strategy

Burundi's rehabilitation and development requirements are overshadowed by the urgency of attaining a just and lasting peace. As emphasized by senior Bush Administration officials, we must remain focused on the implementation of the Arusha accord. We need to lessen the possibility of mass killings as has been experienced in Rwanda and Burundi.

With transition and reconciliation imperatives foremost in mind, USAID will maintain and, as appropriate, expand current initiatives through various sources of funding – development assistance, disaster assistance, food aid, transition assistance – in an integrated manner that will help improve the setting for increased development activities and reduce the need for humanitarian interventions. In implementing the ISP, USAID must remain prepared to respond to a fluid socio-political environment in concert with the entire USG country team. For example, should a cease-fire be adopted and refugees and internally displaced persons begin to return to their homes in large numbers, we should work with the State Department’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration to facilitate reintegration via a comprehensive and inclusive community focus.

Towards this end, this ISP will enable USAID to flexibly respond to specific and evolving needs of Burundi and its people. USAID will continue its ongoing program of humanitarian and development assistance and, at the same time, refine or initiate activities in the three proposed priority areas of concentration: food security; health, including HIV/AIDS; and conflict management, democracy, and governance.

The education sector is not proposed for major USAID support but will benefit from targeted crosscutting support. Interventions may include, for example, continuation of food for education (underway in Karuzi Province), vocational training in health and agriculture, adult literacy and numeracy for women and adolescent girls, and civic education at the village level. Building on USAID’s experience in radio programming and broadcasting in Burundi, the essential means of improving education will be distance education. If the reconciliation progresses and an improving development environment materializes, USAID will undertake an education sector assessment to determine whether education activities should be expanded.

Likewise, the Family Planning Reproductive Health sector is not proposed for major emphasis. However, the Transitional Government (TG) is committed to contributing to sustainable per capita growth by slowing population growth. Accordingly, in the PRSP the TG's long-term development goals include bringing demographic growth under control. With a total fertility rate of 6.8 children contributing to high levels of maternal morbidity and mortality, family planning is considered a key component of the TG's population program. However, it should be noted that given the years of conflict and related mortality, there is an increasing pronatalist trend among the population. This trend should be addressed early and comprehensively. Thus, while UNFPA has in place a program which supports improvements in family planning and reproductive health, Burundi would greatly benefit from additional support through USAID, particularly given USAID's comparative advantage in family planning/reproductive health programming. The SO 8 description and design incorporates budget planning earmarks in CSMH and HIV/AIDS. Thus, SO 8 incorporates interventions in birth spacing into its maternal and child health activities. In the absence of funds for family planning/reproductive health, USAID cannot use CSMH or HIV/AIDS funds for focused population and family planning activities. However, the allocation of family planning/reproductive health funds to the Burundi program would enable direct support for non-governmental family planning programs and policy level interventions for demographic purposes to be fully incorporated into the ISP's health strategy.

The strategy team formally initiated the ISP elaboration process via a cable, "Thoughts From the Field on the Future of USG Assistance to Burundi," sent to Washington in April

2002 (Bujumbura 00818). The team drew on several documents, including the “Burundi Transitional Action Plan” with its Special Objective of "Foundation for a peaceful transition in Burundi established," which was approved by USAID/W in November 2000. This action plan, which covered the eighteen months immediately following the APRA signing, guided USAID interventions through April 2002. The team also reviewed the “shelf” strategy put together in December 2000 and the “Draft USG Integrated Strategic Plan for Burundi, 2002-2004.”

USAID/W reviewed the “Thoughts” cable in May and provided parameters for ISP development (see Annex A). Among them were:

- Three-year integrated interim strategy for FY 2003-05
- Strategic focus on conflict management, humanitarian assistance, health and agriculture, including food security
- Trigger points and scenario planning incorporated in the strategy.

An interim plan in accordance with Section 201.3.4.3 of the USAID Automated Directive Systems was deemed appropriate given the uncertain conditions of Burundi’s transitional environment, which makes planning beyond a three-year time frame unrealistic.

Following data gathering in-country and analysis, the strategy team held an ISP Workshop in Bujumbura on September 17-18, 2002. Representatives participated from Burundian and international NGOs, UN agencies, REDSO, OTI (Bujumbura and Washington), OFDA (Bujumbura and Washington), FFP (Nairobi and Washington), Africa Bureau, U.S. Embassy Bujumbura, and DAA/DCHA. The workshop elaborated the strategic objectives that form the core of this ISP. While in Burundi, the team discussed the proposed strategy with leaders of the Burundian Senate and Assembly, the Vice President of the Republic, and many of the major donors. They all endorsed the proposed priorities and welcomed an expansion of USAID development assistance.

Following the workshop, the strategy team: 1) further developed the country scenarios and trigger points, 2) refined the development goal, strategic objectives, and potential interventions; 3) linked proposed programs with regional activities; and 4) examined alternative management options. The team identified strategic objectives and intermediate results with the following in mind:

- Focus on a limited number of priorities
- Maximize the utilization of partnerships
- Limit management units and requirements, especially given security concerns
- Exploit USAID’s comparative advantages
- Program funds from various sources (DA, IDA, food aid, ESF) synergistically
- Design flexible activities responsive to changing circumstances
- Identify quick "peace dividends" to build confidence in the peace process.


B. USAID Vision and Goal

USAID's **vision** is a peaceful, reconciled, and equitable Burundi that supports individual prosperity and national development. To achieve this will take the long-term commitment of Burundian leaders and the support of the international community, including humanitarian and development aid, as well as moral and political support.

Within the three-year scope of this ISP, the **goal** is transition to peace and socio-economic recovery underway. This goal establishes the appropriate operational framework for continued support to the peace process and humanitarian and development assistance within whichever socio-political scenario USAID may be operating under. To achieve those ends, USAID created three Strategic Objectives (SOs) and associated specific Intermediate Results (IRs).

C. Proposed Strategic Objectives: Rationale And Expected Results

Burundi Interim Strategic Plan Results Framework 2003-2005



Strategic Objective 6: Effective Governance Enhanced

This objective builds on efforts underway by REDSO and OTI and focuses on: 1) strengthening transitional institutions and the peace process as it plays out in the cease-fire and implementation of the APRA; and 2) promoting effective governance through partnerships between strengthened transitional institutions and an active and expanding civil society.

In spite of the ongoing civil war, Burundi has embarked on a process of transition that could result in a more peaceful, inclusive, and better-governed country. Many of the most important political leaders are now together in the capital, Bujumbura, and have to establish mechanisms of debate and compromise as they struggle to implement the APRA protocols. Whether or not APRA is the final formula for peace, reconciliation, and democracy in Burundi, it has at least brought the beginnings of a true transition.

Potential results indicators for this objective are: 1) The capacity of Burundians to implement APRA protocols; and 2) The percentage of Burundians expressing satisfaction with the APRA process.

IR 6.1: Transitional Institutions and Peace Process Strengthened. The APRA is itself a framework for addressing many of the root causes of conflict in Burundi. By offering some prescriptive solutions and many additional requirements for continued debate and decision-making, the Agreement lays out a road map for achieving and implementing consensus. But it is quite clear that many of the fundamental requirements for executing the APRA, such as competence within government institutions, sufficient financial resources, and political will, are lacking. It is also clear that the lack of a cease-fire has slowed implementation. Poor implementation of the APRA would have potentially dangerous consequences. For example, if attempts at military reform or dealing with culpability for past war crimes are not handled in balanced and creative ways, they are likely to convince potential spoilers that their interests are better served by violence.

USAID will contribute to the success of Burundi's transition by focusing assistance on points of weakness within the Transitional Government institutions that could degrade the quality of the implementation of the APRA protocols and management of other contentious issues.

USAID will also enhance the peace process and conflict management by promoting aspects of inclusion and by publicizing successes in order to multiply impact beyond the beneficiaries of individual programs. Widely-shared information about the successes of USAID quick impact economic programs, multi-ethnic dialogues, reconciliation initiatives, and peace zones will help to build confidence in and momentum for peace in other areas.

Illustrative Activities under the Current Situation:

REDSO and OTI will provide technical advisors and other forms of assistance to facilitate coordinated planning for renewed APRA implementation. If requested, short-term technical advisors on conflict resolution and reconciliation will facilitate and

mediate initial dialogue on critical peace process issues and constitutional and legislative reforms.

At the same time, REDSO or OTI will collaborate with the TG and other donors and assess how best to incorporate peace building and reconciliation strategies within community development interventions.

OTI will also implement a community-based, non-formal education program that will assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants, both ex-rebels and ex-military, following demobilization.

Current OTI efforts to mobilize constituents for peace through the dissemination of information about APRA and the Peace Rally Program will be continued and expanded. Existing OTI efforts to demonstrate tangible APRA dividends through high profile, quick impact economic initiatives will be expanded and accelerated.

Equally important to continue and expand are REDSO's programs designed to reduce the vulnerability of youth to political manipulation and to disseminate and educate the population by supporting independent radio. Programs to quickly train and employ youth to implement quick-impact assistance projects (funded by REDSO or OTI) in other sectors will support this IR.

Both REDSO and OTI will expand current efforts to promote tolerance in civil society through civic education, reduction of violence against women, conflict mitigation and resolution, human rights training, and support for grassroots-level truth and reconciliation efforts, particularly by targeting women's and youth groups and, where appropriate, religious organizations.

The impact of these programs and the results achieved under SO 7 and 8 – which can be characterized as “peace dividends” – can be replicated by an on-going joint REDSO and OTI publicity campaign. Increasing the reach, programming, and capacity to receive broadcasts (the latter through large-scale distributions of radios and supporting radio transmission capacity) will amplify the impact of these peace dividends and other uses of radio.

Illustrative Activities under the Improved Situation:

REDSO could, in coordination with the government, APRA Implementing Monitoring Commission, UN, and major donors, provide technical and program support to assist the implementation of the APRA protocols. Assistance could focus on critical peace process issues such as constitutional and legislative reforms, settlement of land disputes, elections, institutionalizing government-civil society partnerships, and reintegration of refugees, IDPs, and demobilized soldiers. OTI could support some activities such as those related to reintegration and provide limited material support to some ministries.

Illustrative indicators for IR 6.1 are: 1) the number of USAID-supported quick impact “peace dividend” initiatives implemented and the number of Burundians benefiting from them; 2) the number of APRA technical commissions established; 3) the number of APRA pieces of legislation passed; 4) the number of soldiers or fighters, IDPs and

refugees successfully re-integrated and gainfully employed; and 5) the percentage of land claims brought by refugees and IDPs successfully adjudicated.

IR 6.2: Civil Society Participation Increased. The vast majority of Burundi's population has been excluded from providing any meaningful input into the structure of governing bodies or receiving the benefits that their economies have produced. Accepted international norms on human rights are not well known at the grassroots level, where war weariness and a desire for peace are the overwhelming public sentiments. Organized political challenges from civil society are rare. On the other hand, significant community initiatives to organize against violence and to support peace are taking place.

USAID assistance to civil society, whether in the form of capacity building for civil society organizations, structured participation in the national dialogue on critical peace process issues, and improving understanding of democracy and the process of reducing violence against women, will result in larger and more effective community initiatives and advocacy. These are essential for a successful peace process, local and regional-level conflict management, and the development of effective governance.

REDSO and OTI will continue to strengthen independent radio and other media while expanding programming to provide an environment for formal and informal exchanges between government officials and civic groups, and continue to strengthen independent radio and other media. All USAID elements will involve civil society and government officials as much as possible in activity design.

Illustrative indicators for IR 6.3 include: 1) the number of quick impact "peace dividend" economic initiatives designed and implemented with civil society participation; 2) the number of independent radio debates on peace process issues that include civil society participants; 3) instances of USAID-supported civic advocacy successfully influencing the implementation of an APRA protocol; 4) the number of USAID-supported civic groups achieving a minimum level of technical and administrative competence; and 5) the number of grassroots truth and reconciliation meetings undertaken.

Strategic Objective 7: Food Security Enhanced

USAID will promote the three elements of food security -- availability, access and utilization -- through efforts to: 1) address the basic nutritional requirements of Burundians; 2) establish a basis for productive livelihoods through economic activities, primarily in agriculture; and 3) invest in the longer-term viability of the country's productive base by addressing environmental land degradation, which affects the ability of the land to produce in the long and short run.

Unless the current situation deteriorates, at the end of the three-year ISP period, at least five provinces having received USAID assistance will no longer need OFDA and FFP assistance and will have reduced signs of malnutrition among the most vulnerable populations. Likewise, the adoption of improved technologies and planting materials will lead to a distinct increase in the area planted, improved crops, and increases in diversity and quantity of crops sold on the market. Traffic on rehabilitated roads will have increased, and exports to national and regional markets from the assisted provinces will have increased. Finally, improvements will be evident in the landscape surface area as a result of integrated land improvement measures such as agro-forestry.

As with the other strategic objectives, work in this SO will (with the exception of some OFDA and FFP activities) be largely focused in stable areas where, for example, conditions for investment by private sector entrepreneurs are more enabling, enhanced by the establishment of civil administration, relative security, and nascent civil society. However, work in other locations is not ruled out if conditions improve.

Activities under the SO will integrate relief, emergency food assistance, food aid for development, and development assistance and include linkages with regional and international organizations. The SO will capitalize on investments in humanitarian infrastructure established with OFDA support in the region. It will also take advantage of REDSO's investments in regional partners and programs, such as the Association for the Strengthening Agricultural Research in East and Central Africa (ASARECA), the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the East and Central African Global Competitiveness (Trade) Hub.

Illustrative SO level results indicators are: 1) level of malnutrition in targeted provinces; 2) number of hectares in improved crops attributable to USAID interventions; 3) increased road traffic on rehabilitated roads; 4) diversity of products exported from stable areas; and 5) land area subject to integrated land improvement measures.

IR 7.1: Vulnerable Groups Receive Effectively Targeted Assistance. Household food security in Burundi is dependent on three main factors: domestic agricultural production, household income, and external food assistance. USAID assistance under this IR will integrate PL 480 Title II emergency food aid (FFP), OFDA, and OTI resources to address short- and medium-term food security needs, while also helping set the stage for longer-term productivity and income gains in the rural sector. This IR will focus on the immediate needs of vulnerable populations and will result in reduced malnutrition in target provinces, less need for food assistance, and improved productivity in the targeted areas. The introduction of improved technologies and practices into communities will emphasize the areas expected to receive the greatest number of IDPs and returning refugees.

The IR will go beyond supplementary and therapeutic feeding by providing high-potential seeds and tools for agricultural recovery and basic support to livelihoods skills building and income-generating activities. IDP-oriented programs will be coordinated with other key actors such as FAO and UNDP to ensure that vulnerable populations are protected. Early warning systems for malnutrition and food insecurity will promote proper targeting. By funding smaller community-level activities, OTI will build hope by putting people to work around quick-impact projects of common good.

In addition, USAID will support local and international NGO rehabilitation activities in the provinces. Programs will prepare communities for IDP and refugee returns by supporting food security, health, water and sanitation, income-generation, and small infrastructure repair and rehabilitation. They will emphasize a community-based approach that helps the returning populations in the context of their communities.

In areas of relative stability, developmental relief activities supporting the rehabilitation of the agriculture sector will continue and expand from current levels. Several types of public works activities could utilize food as payment for labor. In addition, there is a

possibility that food could be used to offset farmers' risk in the initial period of adopting new technology, such as improved or diversified seed varieties.

In the mid-to-longer term and under an improved scenario that includes a cease-fire and significant progress in the APRA process, it is expected that this program would transition away from relief activities to those which are more sustainable and development-oriented. In examining the root causes of food insecurity in Burundi, there are several areas in which development food aid programs could be integrated with other programs under this food security strategic objective (blending IR 7.1 with IR 7.2).

Possible activities under this IR include: 1) food for work, highly targeted free distributions, and supplementary food; 2) strengthening early warning and targeting information systems; 3) improving accountability in food distribution systems; and 4) food for education to encourage hungry families to educate their children.

Illustrative IR 7.1 indicators are: 1) incidence of malnutrition in targeted areas; 2) level of food deficits in targeted households; and 3) diversity of income-generating activities.

IR 7.2: Increased Opportunities Provided for Productive Livelihoods. Programs will focus on rural Burundians who have inadequate access to enterprise skills, inputs, credit, and technologies. The IR will build on the investments made in IR 7.1, initially in the same provinces and areas. Productive livelihoods can be advanced through targeted assistance to entrepreneurial individuals and organizations for launching activities that will expand the economy. In the three-year period, it is expected that: 1) improved planting materials, inputs and tools will be readily available in the market place and in use; 2) many more farmers will be producing for the market, exemplified in the range of goods available; and 3) farmer and community-based associations will be actively promoting commodity-linked investments.

Through the collaborative use of all funding sources, USAID support will include targeted interventions that can demonstrate the benefits of peace in the stable areas and reduce vulnerabilities in the conflict and transitional areas while accommodating returnees of all types in the context of their communities. By the end of the ISP period, a diversity of improved inputs and technologies will be widely adopted in targeted areas, with improved agricultural practices leading to increased production. Income levels from value-added activities (drying, preserving, and marketing) will have substantially risen. Also, planning and management skills imparted to community-based organizations will enhance the ability of local communities to organize and operate commodity associations.

Four U.S.-based international PVOs will be USAID's primary implementing partners, working through the UNDP Community Assistance Umbrella Program (CAUP). Decisions to support programs will be directly linked to those geographic areas where OFDA and FFP have been addressing livelihood and food security, but where a transition to longer-term development investments is now called for. This will build on OFDA-funded livelihood-support programs, such as women's cooperatives and micro-enterprise loans. These activities will be expanded to increase the impact, including helping to restore trade and market activities and supporting income-generating activities.

Illustrative activities for achieving this IR include: multiplication and distribution of improved seeds; training of farmers; restocking with appropriate livestock; strengthening

private animal health service-delivery; formation of group farming and cooperative projects among women's rural associations; expanding existing farmer and community associations to include women; providing micro-credit and micro-enterprise services to communities receiving returning/resettled refugees; linking small-scale Burundi businesses within the region; and promoting increased non-farm economic participation among women.

Under the improved scenario, crop diversification can be more actively promoted with reference to regional market integration, drawing on the regional resources of REDSO regional programs.

Illustrative IR 7.2 results indicators are: 1) availability and use of improved agricultural inputs; 2) number of subsistence producers emerging to cash crop economy; and 3) number of agricultural production community-based organizations functioning.

IR 7.3: Sustainable Natural Resources Management Practices Adopted

Unsustainable land use practices, deforestation, and soil loss are important concerns for Burundi. This IR will help reverse environmental degradation caused by over population and unsustainable land use practices through specific integrated community-based agro-forestry and soil and water conservation investments. Efforts to improve crop yields through sustainable intensification will be a key strategy to reduce the pressure to move to uncultivated land and to stem the degradation of soil resources and vegetative cover.

USAID's partners for this IR will be those funded within the UNDP's FY 2003-05 CAUP activity. In all cases, the PVOs and their implementing partners, communities, and associations will be developing multi-sectoral programs integrating rural enterprise, agriculture, and natural resource management (NRM) investments with community participation oriented around rehabilitation of infrastructure (e.g., health posts, erosion control works on hillsides and associated with roads, bridges) and common resources such as water supply. Returnees will benefit in the context of the communities they return to.

Under the current situation, it is important to address the "flashpoints" of potential collisions of interests around land and repatriation/return. Development and application of an environmental and GIS decision-support system may be promoted to aid better visualization and understanding of resource allocation factors, appropriate land use patterns and NRM practices, and make transparent the land allocation process in order to support dispute avoidance.

Illustrative activities for achievement of this IR fall into two types of interventions:

(a) Increase agricultural productivity and farm income while protecting natural resources, such as: 1) sustainable intensification of basic food production integrated with soil fertility-enhancing measures; 2) integrated plant health and pest management; 3) improved hillside farmland and waterlogged areas management; 4) community tree planting for fuel and construction; 5) promoting natural resource-based enterprises with economic potential (bee keeping, plant-based natural products, fiber crafts, etc.); and 6) use of a voucher system to promote adoption of improved seeds, tools, tree seedlings, small ruminants, etc.

(b) Infrastructure investments that protect natural resources and avoid unnecessary environmental impacts, such as: 1) rehabilitate and construct soil and water conservation and management structures; 2) introduce appropriate vegetative cover for erosion control and soil fertility; 3) rehabilitate farm-to-market roads with community involvement; 4) construct spring catchments systems for drinking water for communities and livestock; and 5) introduce community-based and participatory resource management practices via enterprise-based, social self-help and other types of associations.

Food for work may be used to support several of these activities. Environmental guidelines will be incorporated into program design, such as water and sanitation; road construction/rehabilitation; improved drainage; soil and water conservation; and integrated pest management.

Illustrative IR 7.3 results indicators are: 1) land area subject to integrated land improvement measures; and 2) production per unit area.

Strategic Objective 8: Access to Basic Social Services Improved

Basic social services incorporate health, water and sanitation, and education programming. SO 8 will focus on expanding and enhancing services and systems in health, water, and sanitation. Activities will build on efforts underway by REDSO and OFDA (and planned PVO/NGO strengthening efforts by PVC) to increase the delivery of services in rural areas, the strengthening of public-private sector partnerships in service delivery, and the development of mechanisms to increase community knowledge, ownership, and management of service programs. A strategic approach will target specific provinces to phase in expansion of activities and will also ensure gender-sensitive approaches to programming.

Given the current environment and level of resources available, this SO will be implemented in phases. During the first phase, we will focus our efforts on identifying critical health problems that need immediate attention such as cholera, measles, and malaria and work with our partners to develop and implement targeted interventions to address these life threatening health problems. We will begin to build partnerships and learn about the implementation capacity of our partners. Based on the lessons learned and results achieved, in phase 2 we will begin to expand our targeted interventions and capacity-development and systems strengthening activities.

The scale, range, and sustainability of results will, to a large degree, depend on our efforts working directly with the Government of Burundi's Ministry of Health (MOH). To ensure equity in improving access to services, SO 8 needs to undertake both NGO and public sector service strengthening. Working only with NGOs in the health sector, entirely separate from the public sector program, would severely limit USAID's ability to substantially increase access to services at the provincial level. Currently, NGOs operate only about 25 percent of facilities in Burundi, with the MOH operating the majority nationwide. Moreover, NGO clinics charge fees that can be a barrier to care for individuals unable to pay. While MOH clinics are in principle positioned to take on expanded roles in service delivery, they lack the capacity and infrastructure to provide quality services. Given the large quality gap between NGO and public sector services and the broader availability of public sector facilities at the rural level, it is vital to strengthen both NGO and public sector service delivery through provider training,

systems strengthening, and where needed, through refurbishment of health facilities at the provincial level. As well, central-level MOH engagement in the development, dissemination, and facility-level adoption of standardized service guidelines and protocols is vital if USAID is to help achieve expansion of client-focused, quality-driven approaches to service delivery.

Proven interventions, technologies, and approaches play a significant role in reducing excessive levels of maternal, infant, under-five, and child mortality and morbidity and HIV/AIDS rates. With over 90 percent of the Burundian population in rural areas, it is important not only to enhance access to care in rural areas but to empower individuals to prevent illness and reduce the risk of mortality by increasing their knowledge about preventive and care-giving health behaviors. Accordingly, SO 8 will expand the availability, range, and quality of essential services in rural areas; involve female and male members of communities in managing these services to ensure that they are responsive to community needs; and improve community health awareness and health-seeking behaviors. Improving access will lead to increased demand and utilization. Increased use will lead to improvements in health status and enable Burundians to lead more socially and economically productive lives. Ultimately, improving the quality of services and providers and health awareness at the community level will benefit entire families.

By the end of the three-year period, essential maternal and child health and HIV/AIDS services will be available at the provincial level both through public and NGO sector health care facilities and through community-based practitioners. More communities will have in place systems to ensure safe water and sanitation to reduce vulnerability to disease. Certainly, security and political conditions will have an important impact on the range and reach of activities. If conditions remain the same, a broad package of basic MCH and HIV/AIDS services that can be accessed on a regular basis will be developed and established in a limited number of provinces. Improved conditions would allow the establishment of service packages in more provinces and communities. But if conditions deteriorate, SO 8 may need to transition to direct support to NGOs to provide a limited set of services in fewer areas that are safe in which to operate.

Illustrative SO-level indicators are: 1) number of individuals with access to quality maternal and child health services; 2) number of individuals reached through HIV/AIDS prevention, care, and support programs; 3) number of individuals with access to safe water and sanitation facilities.

In addition, REDSO should provide support from Leahy War Victims Fund and Victims of Torture Fund to address the issue of violence against women. If funds become available, REDSO would work closely with these programs to integrate a package of appropriate interventions.

IR 8.1: Increased Availability of Client-Oriented Health Services. A scarcity of skilled providers, chronic shortages of essential drugs and supplies, lack of service delivery guidelines, quality assurance systems and referral linkages, and an absence of health information systems contribute to a generally poor quality of care in the public sector. During the ISP period, health sector infrastructure and systems will be strengthened to support the provision of maternal and child health interventions to reduce

maternal deaths associated with pregnancy and delivery and to address primary causes of child mortality related to diarrheal disease, malnutrition, and infectious diseases.

By the end of the strategy period, more trained providers in provincial and community-level health service facilities will offer maternal and child health services and stock a supply of essential drugs and commodities. Uniform service delivery guidelines and standards will improve approaches to care. Quality assurance systems, to include supervision and appropriate service referrals, will be in place to improve the quality of care. Better health information systems will strengthen program monitoring and management. Finally, increased knowledge of proper maternal and child health practices will enhance health behaviors.

To accomplish these results, IR 8.1 will expand the availability and delivery of an essential package of maternal and child health services which might include: a) nutrition education; b) birth preparedness programs; c) safe delivery programs with assisted delivery, postpartum and newborn care and birth spacing services; d) programs to improve the management of obstetric complications, including referral to emergency obstetric care if required; e) cross-border polio eradication activities; f) routine immunization services strengthening and growth monitoring; g) malaria prevention and management; and h) interventions to prevent dehydration from diarrhea, to treat respiratory illness, and to reduce morbidity related to poor hygiene, water or sanitation.

IR 8.1 will use a systems strengthening approach to establish and ensure the continued quality of essential services. This might include the development and dissemination of service standards and guidelines; training of facility and community-based health care providers; strengthening of logistics management systems; and development of referral, quality assurance, and health information reporting systems. IR 8.1 will also strengthen services in primary care health facilities that serve as the first line of referral, and the development of systems to ensure appropriate referrals to other primary care services and, if needed, to higher-level care. IR 8.1 will also focus on strengthening the skills of community health workers and traditional birth attendants to provide non-clinical services and on developing linkages between these providers and primary care health facilities. Finally, IR 8.1 will focus on increasing awareness and adoption of preventive and care-giving behaviors to improve the ability of families and communities to protect maternal and child health and nutrition. IR 8.1 will closely collaborate with SO 6 on this activity so that radio broadcast communications incorporate key health messages.

In building community health awareness, IR 8.1 will develop mechanisms to increase community participation in the management of health care, linking closely with community development activities undertaken through SO 6 and SO 7. This IR will give special attention to vulnerable groups to ensure their access to health services. As such, USAID will explore the feasibility of community-level health financing mechanisms, such as community-based health insurance or cost sharing schemes to test approaches to ensuring equity in access to health care.

Illustrative indicators are: 1) number of facilities providing quality MCH services; 2) number of community providers trained to provide quality MCH services; 3) community knowledge of positive maternal and child health behaviors; 4) number of communities with operational gender-balanced health services management committees.

Security and political conditions will govern the number of provincial sites and communities in which IR 8.1 activities can be conducted. Should the current situation remain, SO 8 will be able to achieve results in a limited number of sites in accessible provinces. Should conditions deteriorate, depending on the stage of the program, it might be necessary to greatly reduce program training and systems development inputs and instead, provide support to NGO clinics in relatively secure areas. Improved conditions will permit IR 8.1 to expand its geographic reach and will necessitate increased efforts to ensure that refugees and internally displaced persons reintegrating into their communities enjoy equitable access to health care.

IR 8.2: HIV/AIDS and Infectious Disease Prevention, Care, and Support Programs Expanded. Given rapidly rising rates of HIV/AIDS, particularly among adolescents in rural areas, there is an urgent need to expand and link prevention, care, and support activities for HIV/AIDS. Moreover, the increasing regularity of epidemics of malaria, measles, and other diseases of epidemic potential mandates the establishment of effective rapid response systems.

By the end of the ISP period, HIV/AIDS behavior-change communications and condom distribution programs will be reaching groups at high risk of infection, including male and female adolescents, and increasing awareness and influencing behavior change in these groups. Expanded prevention services will include interventions to strengthen and standardize voluntary counseling and testing services and referrals for care. Community-based care and support programs will be established to enable communities and families to care for HIV/AIDS-infected individuals and mitigate the impact of HIV/AIDS on orphans and families. A rapid response team will be in place and trained to respond to infectious disease epidemics.

To achieve these results, HIV/AIDS activities will promote the application of standard procedures and quality-assurance systems for voluntary counseling and testing programs. This will include strengthening referral networks and post-test care for HIV-positive persons to prevent and treat opportunistic infections, particularly tuberculosis. Care and support activities will strengthen and link with maternal health services to help prevent HIV in women of reproductive age. Prevention activities might also include: dissemination of behavior change messages via radio supported under SO 6; expansion of behavior change programs to integrate sexually transmitted infection (STI) messages into HIV/AIDS social marketing programs; integration of STI services into health care facilities; development of community-based approaches to education regarding STI and HIV/AIDS prevention; and expanded condom promotion approaches. IR 8.2 will devote special attention to the development of support services for orphans and vulnerable families and provision of home and community-based care and support services for individuals infected with HIV/AIDS. In this, IR 8.2 will support faith and other community-based organizations to develop and disseminate appropriate palliative care and support systems. IR 8.2 will also link, where feasible, HIV-infected, affected and at-risk communities to micro-credit lending programs created under SO 7. Finally, with OFDA assistance, IR 8.2 will help establish and train a central-level epidemic response team.

Illustrative indicators are: 1) total condoms sold; 2) community awareness of HIV prevention approaches; and 3) number of communities with care and treatment programs.

Security and political conditions will affect the number of provincial sites and communities in which activities will be conducted. Should conditions deteriorate, IR 8.2 will reduce program development inputs and, instead, provide direct support to NGO clinics for basic HIV/AIDS services to community members. If conditions improve, IR 8.1 may expand its geographic coverage and target returned refugees, reintegrating IDPs, and demobilized combatants for HIV/AIDS prevention and support services.

IR 8.3: Safe Water and Sanitation Facilities More Widely Available. The expansion of community-level access to safe water and sanitation is an important part of a comprehensive approach to improving health status. OFDA's existing program of support to improve access to safe water and sanitation will form part of SO 8 and will complement the expansion of access to key health services by reducing vulnerability to diseases linked to environmental causes. OFDA anticipates that water and sanitation activities may expand under its planned PVO grants program.

By the end of the three-year period, communities will have an increased number of safe water and sanitation facilities in place with effective community management. To accomplish this, water and sanitation activities might include the rehabilitation of existing facilities; the construction of new facilities, particularly in areas of displaced or recently-moved vulnerable populations; the differentiation of water sources for humans and animals; and community-level education on water and sanitation. Activities may also include the creation and training of community structures to identify needs and priorities and ensure sustainable operation of water and sanitation facilities.

Illustrative indicators are: 1) households with access to water for domestic use; and 2) households with access to adequate sanitation facilities.

As with IR 8.1 and 8.2, security and political conditions will affect the number of provincial sites and communities in which IR 8.3 activities will be conducted.

D. Country Scenarios and Trigger Events That Will Affect the Program

In accordance with the "parameters" cable and pursuant to ADS 201.3.4.3, the following country scenarios were established for purposes of discussion during the ISP Design Workshop (except the "Deteriorated Situation" scenario) and the subsequent deliberations on the structure and composition of this new strategy. These scenarios served as the basis for the formulation of the specific SOs, IRs, and illustrative activities under each of the situations. By definition, however, some of the IRs and potential activities would be applicable under all scenarios, e.g., support for HIV/AIDS prevention and priority conflict-mitigation interventions, when and where possible.

As evidenced by the characteristics of the three scenarios provided below, expected programmatic results necessarily will fluctuate, based on geographic access due to security concerns. Also, the type of assistance provided, and therefore the activities implemented and corresponding results, will vary, depending again on security, but also on the resulting movement of displaced persons. At present, the activities and results listed under the SO narratives are illustrative and will be further refined during program design and development of a Performance Monitoring Plan.

Under the current situation, security and political conditions affect the number of sites and communities in which activities can be conducted for all three SOs. If there is an improved situation, USAID can expand the geographic coverage of our development program and target displaced persons returning as a result. Should conditions deteriorate, USAID will reduce program development inputs and focus on humanitarian activities, mostly through OFDA and FFP. In any case, each source of funds will be used for the purpose for which they are appropriated – i.e. DA funds will continue to be used for development, not humanitarian, purposes.

Illustrative examples of scenario-based results:

SO6, Peace Building Process and Good Governance Enhanced:

Current Situation: Mobilization (youth and/or women's groups) for peace expanded in stable areas;

Improved Situation: Peace networks expanded nationwide; and

Deteriorated Situation: Conflict mitigation efforts focus on recording worst-case violations, i.e., civilian massacres.

SO7, Food Security Enhanced:

Current Situation: Targeted food assistance provided to 100,000 households in transition provinces;

Improved Situation: Food assistance phased out of five provinces at end of third year; and

Deteriorated Situation: Emergency food assistance provided to the most vulnerable.

SO8, Access to Basic Social Services:

Current Situation: MCH service package in place in accessible provinces/communities;

Improved Situation: MCH service package in place in expanded number of provinces/communities; and

Deteriorated Situation: Support shifted to NGO facilities to provide services in limited number of sites

Scenario 1. Current Situation: Continued Slow or No Progress in Attaining Cease Fire.

The current situation may continue to be characterized by events that will slow or compromise APRA's implementation. It will likely prevent any meaningful, substantive increase in rehabilitation and development efforts, except in more stable geographic areas. The principal characteristics of the current situation are----

- Continued insecurity affecting activity implementation
- Substantive national dialogue affected by mistrust
- Constitutional and legal reforms achieved only slowly
- Presidential transition and elections uncertain
- Continued deterioration of living conditions, economy
- Slow security force reforms undermine APRA momentum
- Weak government institutions and services
- High levels of government weapons procurement
- Rebel taxation and resource exploitation internally and in surrounding countries
- Low levels or slow disbursement of international assistance

- Access to social services limited
- Refugee, IDP, demobilized combatant reintegration frozen
- Rising tensions, strikes, and demonstrations, weak coup attempts.

Scenario 2. Cease-Fire Established, All Factions Join the Government

This would accelerate APRA implementation, immediately improve the environment for reconciliation, increase international community recognition and assistance, and witness the expansion of rehabilitation and development activities on a much larger scale.

Characteristics of this situation would include—

- Increased national dialogue among all parties
- Acceleration of constitutional and legal reforms
- Accelerated establishment and work of technical commissions
- Successful presidential transition and elections
- Decreased intimidation of human rights groups
- Security force reforms (including integration of the officer corps; possible peace-keeping force established)
- Orderly departure of South African Protection Force
- Increased donor development assistance (including release of major pledges tied to cease-fire)
- Improved security and living conditions
- Mass return of displaced populations
- Increased food production
- Improving economic conditions
- Large-scale demobilization of combatants, reintegration of refugees and IDPs
- Potential increase in land disputes

Scenario 3. Deteriorated Situation: Successful Coup, Armed Conflict, And Ethnic Violence

This situation will create tremendous uncertainty and insecurity. The fragile stability of Bujumbura and certain provinces will disappear. National disarray caused by political, economic, and social tensions and a rogue military could engulf the nation.

Characteristics of this situation would include—

- A successful or hotly contested military coup attempt
- Fighting between army factions
- Fall of Transitional Government and *de facto* abrogation of APRA
- Serious breakdown of security, notably in Bujumbura
- Possible politically-motivated assassinations of both Tutsi and Hutu politicians
- Attacks on, possible departure of the South African Protection Force
- Flight, exile, incarceration, or killings of Hutu leaders
- Potential for thousands of ethnic killings
- Massive population displacement
- International condemnation, evacuation of foreigners, suspension of donor aid
- Potential intervention by neighboring states or international military force

Trigger Events and Crisis Modifier

A. Improved Situation: The signing of a cease-fire agreement and accelerated implementation of the APRA would be triggering events for the “Improved Situation.” Donors would be expected to immediately increase development assistance to provide a peace dividend. USAID would be expected by the government, the international community and the Department of State to expand its assistance program and formally reopen a USAID mission. In the short term, increases in emergency assistance from OFDA and food aid from Food for Peace would be required to deal with the likelihood of a mass return by refugees and IDPs to their communities. State PRM would also likely be called upon to play a major role in supporting refugee returns. There will be a strong demand by the government for donor assistance to implement the Poverty Reduction Strategy and for debt forgiveness. Lack of government financial resources and human and institutional capacity will be a major constraint to expanding assistance programs.

B. Deteriorated Situation: A successful coup d’etat or the assassination of a major political figure, Hutu or Tutsi, could lead to increased violence. For the U.S. Mission, this would likely require the immediate evacuation of non-essential personnel, including probably at least some USAID personnel. Security conditions allowing, a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) might be dispatched to address hugely increased humanitarian needs. In this situation, all development activities would cease and humanitarian interventions would multiply. Close coordination between OFDA and FFP would be especially critical, and planning for this contingency is needed.

Prolonged continuation of the status quo, including the current stalemate in the cease-fire talks, may undermine confidence in the APRA process. Nonetheless, in the absence of a deteriorating scenario, ongoing USAID-supported activities will be expected to continue at the current pace with a modest increase in development assistance and perhaps Economic Support Funds. However, if this period of stalled talks becomes significantly protracted, there may be a slow decline into the worst-case scenario as a consequence of political and social tensions or perhaps increasing food, fuel, or other basic commodity shortages. Any of these could be manifested in demonstrations and strikes that could be precursors to outbreaks of inter-communal violence.

C. Crosscutting Themes and Activity Synergy

Implementation of the strategy will see a heavy emphasis on effecting synergy between the three objectives and the several activities undertaken to achieve them. A number of cross-cutting themes will guide programming and implementation. For example, under the conflict management objective (SO 6), building civil society capacity to engage in public affairs will be a major activity. But because USAID will ask international agency and NGO cooperators and grantees to partner with local NGOs or community organizations in the implementation of virtually all activities under all three SOs, civil society capacity building will be an end unto itself as well as a means to accomplish specific interventions that can provide tangible grassroots peace dividends. This approach will also help reinforce the complementary theme that reconciliation is more rewarding than conflict. All funding sources will support this theme.

HIV/AIDS education for prevention messages will also pervade the implementation of all activities. All the local civil society organizations engaged by USAID's partners will be targeted for HIV/AIDS messages. If a cease fire is achieved and refugees, the displaced, and demobilized combatants return to their homes, USAID plans to work with recipient communities as the focal points for activities to ensure that people who never left their homes during the conflict benefit equally from assistance programs as returnees. Combating HIV/AIDS will be a major endeavor in these communities.

Devoting special attention to the needs of women and children will be another key crosscutting theme. Again, HIV/AIDS education will target women and improved grassroots-level health care will benefit women and children. An expanded menu of radio-broadcast programs will transmit messages aimed particularly at women – as peacemakers, caregivers, breadwinners, and the half of Burundian society most likely to promote reconciliation. This activity will build on the successful broadcasting of radio programs that are part of USAID's current portfolio of activities. USAID will add high-quality educational messages with significant agriculture, health, HIV/AIDS, and democracy and governance content. Using radio education programs to support the SOs has several advantages: it is a relatively low cost approach to reach a potentially large group of listeners and learners; it provides access to information and skills development that is less bound by security, geographic, institutional, or ethnic constraints; and it provides engaging and content-rich programs to people through a non-formal and non-threatening learning environment.

Environment education and management will also be part of USAID's community and broadcasting approach. Devastation to the land due to the conflict, drought, and poor waste management -- to cite just a few examples -- has serious implications for the revitalization of agricultural productivity, clean water availability, the reduction of malarial vectors, and the overall health status of rural dwellers.

If conditions improve in Burundi, USAID could enhance its education support activities. Support for education in Burundi has been identified as a critical need and priority for social and economic development. A first step towards enhanced support for education would be to undertake a comprehensive sector assessment and to identify potential targets of opportunity for USAID support.

Another key cross-cutting element in the strategy is the promotion of partnerships. Joining international agencies and NGOs with local organizations will place the development effort in the hands of Burundians. Partnering local organizations with local government will be a crucial theme. Promoting the collaboration between central government offices and provincial centers will help achieve implementation synergy between the power bases, the resource providers, and the target beneficiaries.

Finally, as will be seen in the program coordination section below, the solid relationship between the field-based and Washington officers of the Africa Bureau and the Democracy Conflict Humanitarian Assistance Bureau, strengthened by collaboration in the strategy design process, must be nurtured by constant communication. The various sources of funding and expertise must be focused on the joint pursuit and achievement of agreed USG objectives.

III. Program Management and Coordination

A. Management

Burundi is a “non-presence country,” with oversight provided by REDSO for ESF, DA, and food aid programs. REDSO’s Non-Presence Country Office (including one USPSC located in Bujumbura who focuses on conflict and democracy activities) supervises these programs, with assistance from the REDSO technical and support offices (food for peace, legal, financial, procurement, and program). The REDSO Director has mission director authorities for Burundi but has no responsibility for OFDA and OTI programs, which are managed by DCHA with two USPSCs in Bujumbura reporting to Washington. All three USPSCs in Bujumbura report equally and independently to the Ambassador.

B. USG Program Coordination

With funding provided from several sources (DA, IDA, transition funds, food aid, ESF, refugee funds), the assistance program must have clear direction, objectives, projected results and unified management. Collaboration, cooperation, integration, and complementarities must be assured and duplication avoided. There must be no confusion about who is responsible for what. The challenge for USAID, in conjunction with the Department of State, the Burundi Transitional Government, and various development partners, is to maximize the impact of available resources and achieve synergies wherever possible in Burundi’s difficult environment. The Department of State will provide policy guidance and carefully consider the continued allocation of Economic Support Funds to facilitate the transition. USAID’s Africa Bureau must provide leadership and coordination for the overall program and allocate adequate program and staff resources for strategy implementation in close consultation with the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs.

At the Washington level, USAID’s Director of East Africa Affairs should chair a committee to coordinate the assistance deliberations and consultations among USG agencies and partners. Participants will include the State and USAID Africa Bureau desk officers; lead OFDA, OTI, FFP, DG, and Conflict Management officials in USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs; the USAID Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs Africa liaison officer, and other USAID technical or program officers, as appropriate. From the State Department, besides the State desk officer, specialists from the Bureau for Population, Refugees, and Migration and the Bureau for Democracy, Human, Rights, and Labor should be included. The committee should meet on an ad hoc basis and the chair should request appropriate participation depending on the topics to be discussed.

At the field level, the Director of the Office of Non-Presence Country Programs in REDSO should assure coordination between the several bureaus and offices within USAID, among other USG agencies, the transitional government, other donors, and partner organizations. This should be accomplished via regularly scheduled meetings, most often in Bujumbura, but occasionally in Nairobi.