



USAID/DRC

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## Integrated Strategic Plan FY 2004 -2008



*This strategic plan for the Democratic Republic of the Congo was assembled by USAID/DRC. This Strategic Plan is a 'pre-decisional' USAID document and does not reflect results of USG budgetary review. Additional information on the attached can be obtained from Nicholas Jenks, Program Officer, USAID/DRC. Release Date: March 2, 2004.*

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On June 30, 2003, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) began its multi-year transition to democracy. The Congo is now entering its third try at building a stable democracy. As it does so, it must shift and move dramatically away from the 40 years of corruption and dictatorship of the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila periods towards a new political order. Current United States foreign policy seeks to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization with the DRC to promote a stable, developing, and democratic nation.

Despite the optimism that the start of the transition brings to the DRC, poverty, de-development, and despair still characterize the lives of most Congolese. The Congo remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with desperate indicators for infant and child mortality and the highest maternal and crude mortality rates in the world. The estimated population of 55 million subsist at a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$107. GDP per capita has shrunk by 72% since independence in 1960. Life expectancy is only 46 years for men and 51 years for women. An estimated 3.4 million people are internally displaced by armed conflict that still continues in parts of eastern DRC.

Renewed hope amid desperation and poverty set the context for the USAID/DRC Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for fiscal years 2004-2008. The ISP is designed to produce robust results under three scenarios: successful transition, protracted transition, and stalled transition.

The DRC is currently in the first scenario. A government of national unity took office in mid-2003; national elections are scheduled to be held during 2005 or 2006. Uninvited foreign forces have left the Congo, the country is increasingly reunited politically, and the severity of humanitarian emergencies is beginning to decrease.

The middle scenario, "Protracted Transition," posits that even though a transitional government took office in June 2003, the transition would be much less stable than under the "Successful Transition" scenario. Elections would be held in 2005 or 2006, but would be difficult, and not seen as particularly credible, making the acceptance of results a problematic, protracted process. The new government that assumes power would retain some of the unsavory habits of the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila periods, including extremely high levels of corruption, thus braking growth and private sector activity. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) efforts under this scenario would only partly succeed, hobbling the political process, including political party development and elections. Donors would continue to re-engage, but more cautiously and with fewer resources. The country would remain relatively stable, and humanitarian emergencies would decline as in the "Successful Transition".

The final scenario, "Stalled Transition," is the most pessimistic, forecasting a Transitional Government (TG) marked by uncertainty, broken agreements, unkept promises, and continuing deep divisions within Congolese society. In this scenario, the transition would be marked by massive corruption, almost no re-engagement by the international private sector, and, if elections are held during this period, the international community and Congolese non-partisan observers would not consider them credible. Instability and insecurity would continue, particularly in eastern Congo, and perhaps uninvited foreign forces from Rwanda and/or Uganda (or other countries) would enter parts of the Congo close to their borders from time to time. Donors would remain engaged, although the World Bank would be forced to scale back its planned activities due to continued poor governance and instability. Humanitarian

emergencies would not abate and would continue to require substantial commitments of time, personnel, and funds from USAID's Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO), and other donors. This scenario includes the possible withdrawal of one or members of the TG, or, in the worst case, attacks on members of the TG.

Building on lessons learned from the current country strategic plan, the ISP consists of four Strategic Objectives (SOs) in health, democracy and governance, livelihoods, and education and one Special Objective (SpO) in DDR.

The Health SO - *Use of Key Health Services both in USAID-Supported Health Zones and at the National Level Increased (SO 2)*<sup>1</sup> - builds on thirty years of successful USAID health programs in the DRC. The USAID program will increase access and improve the quality and range of key health services. Key interventions planned include: insecticide treated bed nets, micronutrient supplements, effective management of childhood malaria, intermittent preventive treatment of malaria during pregnancy, family planning, support for routine vaccinations, strengthening of the directly observed treatment strategy for tuberculosis, behavior change initiatives, and support for people affected by HIV/AIDs. Certain activities will target a limited number of health zones while a core package of key interventions will be made available in every USAID assisted zone.

During the period of this ISP, USAID will increase its engagement with the government and take concrete steps to help the government of the DRC (GDRC) improve its support to the health sector at the local level in USAID assisted health zones and at the national level. On a macro and policy level, USAID will work with other partners and the GDRC to increase and regularize the remuneration of public sector staff and increase the proportion of the budget spent in the health sector. The Intermediate Results (IRs) are:

- IR 1. Increased availability of key health services and practices;
- IR 2. Increased financial access to key health services;
- IR 3. Enhanced quality of key health services;
- IR 4. Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors; and
- IR 5. Increased access to quality HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation services.

To reach these IRs during the period of the ISP, USAID will intensify its support to the 81 presently assisted health zones by improving the quality, management and coverage of key interventions and programs. In addition, over the life of the strategy, USAID will support up to 20 additional zones and will explore opportunities to include the 11 zones currently supported with OFDA resources into health programs funded with Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds. In total, if the high funding parameter is reached, USAID support to health zones will be assisting roughly 30% of the total population of 55 million people.

The Democracy and Governance (DG) SO - *A Successful Transition To Peace And Democratic Governance Promoted (SO 3)* - will build on established relations with partners and focus on targeted activities at the national, provincial, and community levels. Activities will support both the preparations for and holding of elections as well as building a solid base for democratic, participatory governance through support to targeted governmental institutions and constituencies for change within civil society. USAID is also prepared to help improve economic

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<sup>1</sup> The numbering of the SOs and SpO follow sequentially per the convention required by USAID/W.

governance and strengthen community conflict resolution and local governance initiatives. The IRs are:

- IR 1. Improved local security and stability through conflict resolution and community development;
- IR 2. Timely implementation of the legal framework required for the political transition, including elections;
- IR 3. Development and strengthening of democratic institutions and basic political processes, including elections; and
- IR 4. Increased participation of Congolese society in economic and political decision-making and government reform.

The Livelihoods SO - *Livelihoods Improved in Targeted Areas* (SO 4) - expands the Mission's previous focus on meeting critical food needs, addressing needs of vulnerable groups, promoting sustainable agricultural production, increasing access to economic opportunities, increasing productivity through human capacity development, and natural resource management. SO 4 also includes activities that will support enhancing the role of women in all aspects of agriculture production, marketing, and rural entrepreneurial activities. The aim of SO 4 is to help create a favorable enabling environment for small-scale private sector-led growth in urban, peri-urban, and rural targeted areas. USAID hopes to maximize the impact of this SO by targeting interventions in areas where other SOs are operating. The IRs are:

- IR 1. Agricultural productivity increased;
- IR 2. Access to markets along selected corridors improved;
- IR 3. Access to financial services improved; and
- IR 4. Critical needs of targeted vulnerable populations met.

The Education SO - *Basic Education, Especially for Girls, Improved in Targeted Areas* (SO 5) - builds on the strengths of the Congolese education system: a high demand for education, community self-reliance, and willingness to innovate. USAID will focus on teacher training and increasing access and retention, particularly for girls, by developing innovative model activities using technology and community-centered approaches to promote quality basic education. The IRs are:

- IR 1. Improved quality of basic education through innovative teacher training programs;
- IR 2. Improved community participation in basic education;
- IR 3. Increased access, retention, and achievement, particularly for girls.

The Mission has chosen to develop an SpO, *Ex-combatant Reintegration into Communities Fostered*, to expand its assistance to the reintegration of ex-combatants.<sup>2</sup> (With FY 2002 funding, USAID supported several discreet activities which laid the foundation for USAID to participate in the creation and implementation of structures and activities for the reintegration of ex-combatants into rural areas.) Illustrative activities under this SpO include providing education, training, counseling, and income generating opportunities in areas of reintegration. This SpO will take a community-based approach that will place special attention on women and children affected by the conflict. USAID/DRC will not contribute to the reorganization of the Congolese Armed Forces other than providing eligible assistance either during any quartering

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<sup>2</sup> Up to 235,000 armed forces need to be demilitarized and reintegrated into Congolese society or incorporated into the new, unified national army.

process leading to or after demobilization, and supporting reintegration of excess forces. The assistance to be provided under this SpO is economic and not military in nature. The IRs are:

- IR 1. A comprehensive, accepted, dynamic and operational national plan for DDR in place;
- IR 2. Social, economic, and political conditions exist in communities to enable the sustainable return of ex-combatants; and
- IR 3. Ex-combatants prepared to return to civilian life.

To maximize the impact of USAID-funded activities, the Mission has increased the integration of its activities and developed an approach high in synergies among the SOs and SpO. USAID's Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs (DCHA) activities are fully integrated with Development Assistance (DA)-funded activities to ensure a smooth transition from relief to development. The SOs and SPO are also linked together by six cross cutting themes: gender, HIV/AIDs, conflict management, governance, nutrition, and Global Development Alliances (GDA) and leveraging other resources.

To address the growing challenge of meeting its program development objectives, the Mission will continue to increase its human resources staff over the life of the ISP. With an expanding staff, the Mission anticipates its operating expense requirements will also increase during the ISP period. USAID/DRC will continue to seek contracting, legal, and some limited financial management support from USAID's regional office (REDSO/ESA) in Nairobi.

# CHAPTER 1 OVERALL ASSISTANCE ENVIRONMENT



Base: 802567 (P00758) 3-98

## 1.1. HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

### 1.1.1. Historical Environment

From the medieval period through most of the 19th Century, what we now call the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), or simply the Congo, contained some of the best-organized, most powerful kingdoms in Africa. Probably the best known of these is the Kingdom of the Kongo. This included territory now in contemporary Congo and Angola.

Some of the worst ravages of the slave trades – one running west to the Americas, the other east to the coast of East Africa, the Middle East, and Asia - occurred in the Congo. Under King Leopold II of Belgium, the territory existed as Leopold's personal domain, the "Congo Free State," from 1885-1907. The extreme brutality of Leopold's rule and the early colonial period under Belgian rule have been catalogued by Adam Hochschild in his book *King Leopold's Ghost*. Hochschild reports that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, perhaps as many as ten million Congolese – roughly half the population at that time – died unnecessarily: either murdered by state officials or killed by starvation, exhaustion, exposure, or disease.

From 1908-1960, the country was a Belgian colony known as the Belgian Congo. At independence, very few Congolese, perhaps fewer than a dozen, had been permitted to complete university-level studies. The colonial view was that primary school was sufficient for the Congolese, with any further training seen as largely superfluous.

Elections in early 1960 led to the installation of a democratic government upon independence on June 30, 1960. Joseph Kasavubu was the first President and Patrice Lumumba was the first Prime Minister. The heady optimism of independence only lasted days before multiple revolts, first in the military and then from secessionist provinces, tore the country apart. Lumumba was brutally assassinated in Katanga Province in January 1961. All subsequent efforts to put together a functioning democracy and reunite the country failed. In 1965, Colonel Joseph Mobutu took power in a military coup. This ended the Congo's first attempt to build a representative democracy.

Under Mobutu, who changed his name in the early 1970s to Mobutu Sese Seko at the same time that he changed the name of both the country and its majestic river to "Zaire," the Congo was united and stabilized, but at a tremendous cost. His 32-year dictatorship was characterized by vainglory, astonishing corruption,<sup>3</sup> human rights abuses, and increasing de-development. In 1990, as the Cold War ended, President Mobutu agreed to create political space for the open operation of political opposition. This second attempt at democratization occurred in the early 1990s, first through the mechanism of the Sovereign National Conference and later in the mid-1990s through a move towards national elections. At the same time, the frustration of unpaid soldiers and others spilled over into two rounds of severe pillaging that began in Kinshasa and moved into other major cities across the country in 1991 and 1993.

In 1996, Rwandan troops entered the Congo to destroy camps that had become havens for former members of the Rwandan Army and associated militias involved in the 1994 Rwandan

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<sup>3</sup> An entirely new term, "kleptocracy," was coined by academics to describe the depths of corruption of the Mobutu regime and was later used to describe the Laurent Kabila regime.

genocide.<sup>4</sup> To help legitimize their efforts, the Rwandans and Ugandans helped create a Congolese rebel movement, and selected Laurent-Desire Kabila to lead the rebellion. This rebel movement, with substantial support from these two countries, walked across the Congo from the Kivus to Kinshasa in seven months, recruiting fighters along the way including the infamous “Kadogos”<sup>5</sup> (child soldiers). In May 1997, Laurent-Desire Kabila arrived in Kinshasa and took power from Mobutu, who had fled a few days prior to Kabila’s arrival. The country was immediately renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

Laurent Kabila’s nearly four years of rule were chaotic and characterized by extreme corruption. After a very brief attempt at engagement by donors, including an initial donors’ meeting in Brussels in December 1997, donors and international investors were alienated by the increasingly inept and kleptocratic rule of President Kabila and his government.

Laurent Kabila regularly stated his commitment to hold democratic elections but any hope that this second attempt to move towards democracy could succeed ended when a second war, pitting President Kabila against his former key allies, Rwanda and Uganda, began in August 1998. Rwanda invaded the Congo with the express purpose of overthrowing Laurent Kabila. Rwanda failed to conquer the Congo, and its belligerent actions ultimately led to the involvement of major powers from throughout Africa, including, at various times, Uganda and Burundi (with Rwanda), and Angola, Chad, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe (with the Congolese Government). The military conflict became a stalemate by early 1999.

The Congo, as big as the United States east of the Mississippi River, dominates the map of Central Africa. With an area of 905,328 square miles, the Congo straddles the equator and covers most of the center of the African continent, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rift Valley lakes of East Africa. The DRC borders nine countries – Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, Central African Republic, Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, and Zambia – many of strategic interest to the United States.

A peace agreement was signed in Lusaka during the second half of 1999. A large United Nations force<sup>6</sup> known by its French acronym, MONUC, entered the Congo to monitor adherence to the agreement. Although the overall peace agreement held, instability, large-scale human rights abuses, and multiple humanitarian emergencies continued.

Laurent Kabila was assassinated as he sat in his office on January 16, 2001. His replacement by his son, Joseph, rapidly ushered in a more hopeful period of intensified movement towards peace, greater stability, increased cooperation and dialogue, and improved economic management. This phase ended in 2003 with peace agreements among all former belligerents and with the formation in mid-2003 of a new Transitional Government (TG) via processes of internal and external dialogue.

<sup>4</sup> The members of the Rwandan Army at the time of the genocide are often called “ex-FAR” (for ex-members of the “Force Armeé Rwandaise”). Militia members are often referred to as “Interahamwe” (the name these militias gave themselves in 1994; the term means “those who fight together” in Kinyarwanda).

<sup>5</sup> “Kadogo” means “small” in Swahili and was used to describe the child soldiers who were recruited during that period.

<sup>6</sup> MONUC is the United Nations Observer Mission to Congo or “Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Democratique du Congo.”

### 1.1.2. Present Political Environment

On June 30, 2003, the Congo began its multi-year transition to democracy. This is the DRC's third attempt to build a representative democracy since independence on June 30, 1960. As it does so, it must shift and move dramatically away from the 32 years of corruption and dictatorship of the Mobutu period towards a new political order. Current United States (U.S.) foreign policy toward the DRC focuses on promoting a successful democratic government as the outcome of the multi-decade transition process under way in the DRC. Despite the formation of a TG, this process is expected to be uneven and difficult.

The TG brings together the major groupings of Congolese society: the pre-transition government; two rebel groups, the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma* (RCD-G) and the *Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo* (MLC)<sup>7</sup> that until mid-2003 had been fighting the government; political parties; and civil society. To varying degrees and in myriad ways, they have all fought with various other groups over the last dozen years. Now, for the first time all are represented in the TG.

The present transition to democracy is embedded in two other simultaneously occurring transitions, a transition from war to peace and a transition to a sustainable democratic society. The first transition from war to peace began when the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was signed in 1999; this transition has largely been achieved. However, major elements of this transition, particularly as relates to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of Congolese armed groups and Disarmament, Demobilization, Resettlement, Repatriation, and Reintegration (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups, have not yet been attained. The transition to a sustainable democratic society will continue after elections are held in mid-2005 or 2006.

Congo contains enormous climatic variety – from tropical equatorial jungle to southern African savannah to snow-covered mountains. It overflows with valuable minerals, including cobalt, coltan (Columbite-Tantalite), copper, cadmium, petroleum, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron ore, and other resources like coal, hydropower, and timber. Its soil is fertile; it contains more than ten thousand miles of navigable rivers.

### 1.1.3. Present Economic Environment

The DRC economy grew by 3% to \$5.4 billion in 2002. Notwithstanding the 2002 growth, material output was a catastrophic 56% less than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) recorded in 1981. Most, if not all, of this growth happened in the capital of Kinshasa and in Bas Congo province. The remainder of the country probably experienced no or negative economic growth in 2002. In absolute terms, all sectors, including agriculture, have contracted sharply over the past 20 years. Inflation, as measured by the consumers' price index, stood at 511% in 2000, 135% in 2001, and 16% in 2002, and is forecast at 8% for 2003. Real GDP, which declined 7% in 2000 and 2% in 2001, increased 3% in 2002, and is forecast to rise 5% in 2003 and 6% in 2004. External reserves improved from a desperately short 1.4 weeks of imports in 2001 to 3.6 weeks of imports in 2002.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The TG also incorporates representatives of a variety of minor rebel groupings, but the RCD-G and MLC are included as one of five official groupings that agreed to share power under the present transitional arrangement.

<sup>8</sup> IMF August 2003.

The World Bank's Economic Recovery Credit of \$450 million approved in June 2002 assisted the government of the DRC (GDRC) in clearing its payment arrears and contained credits for forestry and mining sector reforms. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found during the second review of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) that "overall performance under the program (covering April 2002-July 2005) was broadly satisfactory for the first year with good progress on the structural side." The GDRC is receiving considerable assistance from the World Bank under a \$454 million Emergency Multi-sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (EMRRP), which began in August 2002. While the major portion of the loan (over \$350 million) is for rehabilitation of critical physical infrastructure, including National Road 1, the Matadi-Kinshasa-Lumbumbashi axis (see map on page 1), it also contains important support for policy and institutional reform, including for the agricultural sector. The latter includes elaboration of a policy framework to improve the investment climate for the sector.

The DRC economy is based on agriculture and extractive industries. Agriculture represents 56% of GDP, compared with 25% of GDP 20 years ago. The formal manufacturing, agro-processing, transportation, and service sectors nearly ceased to exist after the pillages of 1991 and 1993. Recent years of conflict and instability have wiped out all but subsistence or small-scale agriculture, which remains the primary economic activity for most Congolese. (After the economic collapse in all other sectors, agriculture, even in decline, became the single most important economic sector in the DRC.) The extractive industries include copper, zinc, coltan, petroleum, tropical hardwoods, and diamonds; these sectors account for most export revenues. Small-scale mining and timber extraction are now important sectors for entrepreneurs and employment.

Many formal sector employees have now become informal sector self-employed micro-entrepreneurs. Market-based agricultural production has shifted to subsistence agriculture. Formal sector mining jobs have nearly disappeared and small-scale informal mining has taken its place. Government and parastatal workers remain on the rolls in the same numbers but their wages have declined to the point of being symbolic rather than providing real purchasing power.

The prospects for economic recovery in the DRC are relatively good, providing the transition remains on course. An immediate peace dividend will be felt in the small-scale, commercial, and agricultural sectors with the reopening of transport corridors and the re-establishment of security in the countryside.

Although the DRC did not suffer from the classic statist economic management of its socialist neighbors, it suffered from its own brand of statism, which centered and continues to center around excessive illegal and legal taxation and corruption. This continues to inhibit economic growth across all sectors, pauperizing the GDRC (an estimated 15% of taxes actually enter the Treasury), and acts as a significant impediment to foreign direct investment. This economic management system needs to be overhauled for the economy to begin to realize more than a fraction of its potential.

The GDRC remains on track with the IMF and World Bank programs and conditionalities. However, both Bretton Woods institutions are gradually raising the bar on the GDRC, and will

require more stringent adherence to expenditure and revenue targets as the GDRC consolidates economic management.

The revised 2003 GDRC budget totals approximately \$800 million. This includes all International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), African Development Bank (ADB), European Union (E.U.), and IMF funds programmed through the budget as well as GDRC revenues. This amount is insufficient to operate the government without radical rightsizing. The risk of deficit spending as a last recourse to respond to urgent requirements linked to the transition is a real concern to the IMF and the World Bank. Although it is expected that official tax collection will gradually increase over the strategy period, balancing receipts and expenditures will be a long-term challenge.

The GDRC, parastatals, and the security sector need to shed hundreds of thousands of workers or soldiers from the various official rolls over the strategy period. The World Bank is engaged with significant resources in all these areas.

Finally, the GDRC must create the conditions that will entice foreign direct investment to return to the Congo. This will involve making deep structural reforms in the civil service, refining the taxation regime, enacting appropriate legislation, establishing a dispute resolution apparatus, reforming the banking sector, and improving transportation and communication.

**1.1.4. Present Social Environment**

Despite the optimism and hope that the start of the transition brings to the DRC, poverty, de-development, and despair still characterize the lives of most Congolese. The Congo remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with desperate indicators for infant and child mortality and the highest maternal and crude mortality rates in the world. The estimated 55 million<sup>9</sup> Congolese subsist at a per capita GDP of \$107. GDP per capita has shrunk by 72% since independence in 1960. Life expectancy is only 46 years for men and 51 years for women<sup>10</sup>.

The vast majority of the population is Christian, with perhaps half the population Roman Catholic. An estimated 10% of the population is Muslim. Congolese come from an estimated 200 ethnic groups; the four largest groups – Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and the Mangbetu-Azande – make up about 45% of the population.

Roughly two-thirds of the population live in rural areas; many people are cut off from their natural markets and debilitated by poverty. This poverty manifests itself in extremely low incomes and purchasing power, lack of access to and availability of fundamental health services, and an abysmal lack of basic education structures to give Congolese children the opportunity to become literate and numerate.

Economic opportunity reaches few people outside the capital city. The only paved road of any quality runs from Kinshasa to Matadi, the country's only ocean port. All other roads are rutted and potholed. Many are impassable for any vehicle larger than a motorcycle. Others, after decades with no maintenance, have utterly disappeared into the central African rain forest. Kinshasa, with an

<sup>9</sup> No census has been taken in the DRC since 1984. Thus, population estimates are just that, and range from 50 to over 60 million people. This document uses 55 million as the population figure for DRC. Roughly half the population is under the age of 15.

<sup>10</sup> Population Reference Bureau 2003.

estimated eight million people, already is dangerously overcrowded, with most people lacking access to basic services. Disproportionate over-attention to the capital by the government and major donors, although responding to real needs, risks creating the perverse effect of pulling ever-increasing numbers of people from impoverished rural areas and smaller cities to Kinshasa. As a result, Kinshasa has become an ungovernable mega-city with more and more of its people destitute and desperate.

Persistent discrimination against women, including a still valid law that requires women to obtain their husbands' permission for any legal act such as obtaining credit, severely undercuts development prospects. Corruption also reaches into every corner of the Congolese society.

Finally, the conflict that tore the Congo into pieces in the late 1990s, while officially over, still simmers in some areas. The possibility remains for the re-entry of uninvited foreign forces, particularly from Uganda and Rwanda. Human rights atrocities, including arbitrary killings of civilians, brutal rape, and the regular use of child soldiers, continue, particularly in the eastern portion of the country. Impunity remains the norm for anyone with a weapon. The justice system, like the education system, is dysfunctional – during those rare moments when it actually functions at all.

## **1.2. U.S. POLITICAL INTERESTS**

Given its size, population, and resources, the Congo is of long-term interest to the U.S. The U.S. has long considered the DRC a particularly important country in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a strategic alliance with President Mobutu, who generally supported U.S. interests throughout this period. Along with South Africa and Nigeria, the Congo is one of the few African countries that can have a significant impact beyond its borders. The DRC borders nine countries, including other states of strategic interest to the U.S., such as Angola, Sudan, and Uganda. It can serve as a force either for progress on the continent, or for instability. The U.S. seeks to strengthen the process of internal reconciliation and democratization within the DRC to promote a stable, developing, and democratic nation. With such a partner, the U.S. can work to address security interests on the continent and develop mutually beneficial economic relations.

USAID/DRC's Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) fully tracks with the Department of State-USAID Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2004-2009 as described in section 2.5. The ISP is also fully consistent with the strategic goals of the U.S., as articulated in the Mission Performance Plan of the U.S. Mission to the DRC. The ISP is consistent with the following U.S. strategic goals:

- Promoting Democratic Systems and Practices;
- Resolving Regional Conflicts;
- Protecting the Environment;
- Promoting Economic Growth in Developing and Transitional Economies; and
- Promoting Global Health.

### **1.3. STABILIZING AND DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION**

For the first time in many years, stabilizing factors are starting to outweigh those that contribute to instability. For years, deadly conflict and extreme brutality have been a fact of life for millions of Congolese. Now, an opportunity exists for lasting peace and stability. While violent conflict still exists in isolated areas of the DRC, the level and scope of these conflicts are diminishing further. This is due to several factors.

First, the eight countries involved in the Great Lakes Regional conflict from 1998 to 2002 have withdrawn their forces in keeping with United National Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1304 on the Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from the Territory of the DRC. This has eliminated much of the training and logistics support for domestic combatants, and greatly reduced the availability of conflict resources. Further, it has changed local socio-political dynamics, creating a political opening for the TG to extend its authority nationwide. In terms of regional dynamics, these countries now have committed, through international peace agreements and diplomatic commitments, to respect the territorial integrity of the DRC and to resolve regional issues through dialogue and policy mechanisms rather than by force.

Second, the deployment and recent expansion of MONUC to over 9,000 troops means there is an international force sufficient to disarm and demobilize renegade militias and facilitate the process of national military integration. Further, MONUC's mandate has been extended to include the disarmament and demobilization of domestic as well as foreign troops. In terms of logistics, MONUC has redeployed 95% of its troops to the east.

Third, the creation of the TG, assembling all of the DRC's former belligerents as well as political party and civil society leaders in Kinshasa, has created the necessary political space and level of security needed to demobilize and reintegrate ex-combatants. Further, the creation of the TG engages all political stakeholders in the process of replacing ineffective governance structures and building potentially durable peace throughout the DRC. Overall, the consolidation of TG institutions is perhaps a powerful stabilizing force, particularly as it provides a mechanism for conflict resolution, national reunification, and reconstruction.

These factors have created new opportunities for political, economic, and social development at the national, provincial, and local levels. Nevertheless, the potential for renewed conflict still exists.

### **1.4. GDRC STRATEGIES**

With the TG taking power as recently as in mid-2003, the GDRC's strategy remains highly inchoate and in flux. However, since Joseph Kabila assumed the Presidency in early 2001, the GDRC has hewed closely to a series of appropriate policies. The GDRC continues to work closely with the World Bank and the IMF, both of which have Resident Representatives in Kinshasa. The budget, which has long been opaque and unrealistic, shows clear signs of becoming more transparent and increasingly based on the realities of limited funding.

Senior officials of the TG initially have shown a surprisingly impressive capacity to work together. Although to date, this still exists more at the level of positive atmospherics rather than implemented, measurable, policy improvements. Ministries generally possess an extremely

low capacity, and are plagued by corruption, absenteeism, and widespread inefficiencies. The State rarely pays civil service salaries on time, and the public sector remains badly overstaffed.

The GDRC's work on the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) reflects some understanding of donor priorities, but a very weak sense of how to undertake broad consultations. Donors are working with the GDRC so that the multi-year process of preparing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) greatly improves upon that of the I-PRSP.<sup>11</sup> Prior to July 2003, the division of the country made organizing effective national consultations nearly impossible. This constraint is now lifted.

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<sup>11</sup> With the start of the transition, more and more donors are re-engaging. The Congo successfully reached a decision point under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in mid-2003. The World Bank and IMF are fully re-engaged; the first Consultative Group meeting on the DRC in over a decade was held in 2002. Other major donors, including the United States, Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Japan have important, often expanding assistance programs in place.

## CHAPTER 2

### STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR THE ISP

#### 2.1. CHOICE OF USAID GOAL AREAS AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

##### 2.1.1. USAID/DRC's Goal and Overall Framework

Optimism and renewed hope amid desperation and poverty set the context for the USAID/DRC Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for fiscal years 2004-2008. USAID/DRC is moving from a Country Strategic Plan (CSP), the hallmark of which was flexibility during an uncertain period, to a new, scenario-based, five-year ISP. The goal of USAID/DRC is **to assist the DRC in its transition to a sound democracy with a healthier, better educated population benefiting from improved livelihoods.**

The ISP's design is heavily based on lessons learned from the three prior periods of USAID engagement: heavy engagement during most of the Mobutu period (1965-1991); disengagement after pillaging in Kinshasa in the early 1990s (1991-1997); and cautious re-engagement prior to the installation of the Transitional Government (TG) (1997-2003). The previous strategic framework had one overarching strategic objective (SO). To develop this new ISP, the Mission subdivided, redrafted, and realigned this SO based on knowledge gained, lessons learned, and emerging needs. The new ISP has four SOs and one Special Objective (SpO) which address both development and chronic emergency needs in the DRC. The SOs and SpO were chosen to permit USAID to support efforts to meet USAID/DRC's goal throughout the Congo. In a country as huge as the DRC, a variety of strategies to reach this ambitious goal must be adopted. Strategies range from broad interventions across much of the country, including support for some national campaigns, to the development of successful models in targeted areas, and then working with the GDRC and other donors to replicate these achievements.

The ISP is marked by a high degree of integration among the SOs and SpO, with a strong focus on managing for results. This idea of integration, which was one of the parameters of the CSP, builds on a key recommendation of the SWIFT Action Team<sup>12</sup>. The SWIFT team found that Mission health activities were located throughout the country and provided a solid base for additional activities. However, these activities were seen as insufficient to reach the objective of the strategy, which was to contribute to the reduction of excess mortality and suffering while at the same time establishing a basis for development. The team concluded that health activities alone could not contribute to that objective because of the interconnected problems that cause malnutrition and poor health throughout the DRC. Instead, to maximize the impact of USAID-funded activities, the Mission would need to increase the integration of its activities. The team specifically proposed a combined health/food security/livelihoods approach. The Mission embraced that integrated approach and developed an ISP based on a coordinated set of interventions that include health, democracy and governance, livelihoods, education, emergency food aid and non-food aid, DDR, and communication promotion activities.

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<sup>12</sup> The SWIFT Action Team was a USAID/DRC-led 18 person inter-agency team that spent two weeks traveling through the DRC in January 2002 to assess areas for expanded engagement by USAID.

The ISP also reflects the high level of integration among USAID/DRC's development programs and activities supported by USAID's Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). To address emergency and transition needs in the DRC today, four offices within DCHA fund programs in-country: Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Office of Food for Peace (FFP), Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), and Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation (PVC.)

The SOs and SpO are:

SO 2 (Health): Use of key health services and practices both in USAID-supported health zones and at the national level increased.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): A successful transition to peace and democratic governance promoted.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): Livelihoods improved in targeted areas.

SO 5 (Education): Basic education, especially for girls, improved in targeted areas.

SpO (DDR): Ex-combatant reintegration into communities fostered.

The Mission goal and these objectives are shown in Figure 2.1. below. These SOs are linked by six cross cutting themes: gender, HIV/AIDs, conflict management, governance, nutrition, and Global Development Alliance (GDA) and leveraging other resources. All of these are discussed in section 2.3. Emergency food and non-food aid and transition assistance are also weaved throughout and described in more detail in the relevant SO chapters.




Figure 2.1. USAID/DRC's Goal and Overall Framework

\*In Figure 2.1, the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE) is depicted as a dotted line box to demonstrate that while it is not one of the Mission's SOs, it is managed by USAID/DRC and contributes to the Mission's overall goal.

The Results Frameworks for each SO are designed to remain valid and vibrant under all three scenarios outlined in section 2.2. This point is particularly important for activities under the health, livelihoods, and education SOs. SO 2 and the SpO will require greater adjustments depending on the scenario. For example, SO 2 activities following highly successful elections and the taking of office of an elected government will differ greatly from those designed during deeply flawed (or delayed, or even cancelled) elections, particularly if flawed elections are followed by a weak, fragmented, ineffectual government. The SpO will also suffer if the build-up to elections is fraught with infighting and mismanagement.

SO 2 (Health): The DRC's health indicators are among the worst in the world. Health zones are ill-equipped and strained. High cost-recovery fees restrict access to services, and the drug supply system is dysfunctional. Low levels of education, lack of power, and certain cultural dynamics constrain improvements in the health of women and children. Outreach and community-based services are weak and only benefit persons living in close proximity to health centers. The GDRC spends less than 5% of its total budget outlays on health care.

Despite these problems and constraints, USAID/DRC's experience in this sector gives it a comparative advantage in improving the use of key health services. *SO 2, Use of Key Health Services and Practices both in USAID-supported Health Zones and at the National Level Increased*, builds on thirty years of successful USAID/DRC health programs in the DRC. During the period of this ISP, USAID/DRC will increase its engagement with the government and take concrete steps to help the GDRC improve its support to the health sector at the local level in USAID-assisted health zones and at the national level. On a policy level, USAID will work with other partners and the GDRC to increase and regularize the remuneration of public sector staff and increase the proportion of the budget spent in the health sector.

For the following reasons, USAID/DRC believes it can contribute to substantial progress in the health sector.

- USAID/DRC has made measurable progress during the past two years. Largely attributable to the USAID/DRC primary health program (implemented through non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and U.S. private voluntary organizations (PVOs), vaccination coverage increased from 20% to 40% and overall health service utilization rose from less than 15% to an average of 26% in 63 health zones. Furthermore, with USAID/DRC assistance, the February 2002 distribution of vitamin A exceeded 50% national coverage. Excellent progress has been achieved towards interruption of wild poliovirus transmission, a longstanding USAID/DRC priority in the DRC.
- DRC has a proven health strategy: In the 1980s, prior to the recent civil strife, USAID/Zaire (now DRC) and other donors successfully used a health zone-based program to achieve relatively high and stable vaccination and antenatal care coverage, and high health service utilization rates (over 60%) despite serious health system problems.

- There is renewed donor confidence: Other donors, including the World Bank, UNICEF, and the EU are making new investments in the DRC and are adopting the same health zone-based approach. Over 54% of health zones receive some donor assistance.
- A base of knowledge and appropriate care-seeking behaviors exist: The 2001 MICS 2 survey indicates that over 68% of pregnant women received some antenatal care and trained personnel attended 61% of births.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): Since 1997, USAID/DRC has supported Congolese efforts to build peace, reunify the country, and renew the political transition process through dialogue, reconciliation, and a consensus on the mandate and structure of a TG. Building on its high level of credibility and success, USAID/DRC is now well-positioned to continue its support to constituencies for change in the DRC, including government authorities. However, its strategic goal has changed in keeping with new opportunities. During the first phase of the DRC's current transition, USAID/DRC's Democracy and Governance (DG) program sought to promote peace and unblock the stalled transition process. The new program proposed in the ISP builds on progress made during this first phase to: (1) improve security and stability through conflict resolution and community development; (2) assist in the development and application of the legal and constitutional framework for the transition process, including elections; (3) strengthen the capacity of key transitional institutions and political processes; and (4) increase participation of Congolese society in economic and political decision-making and government reform.

SO 3 is a *Successful Transition to Peace and Democratic Governance Promoted*. The SO will build on established relations with partners and focus on targeted activities at the national, provincial, and community levels. SO 3 activities will support both the preparations for and holding of elections as well as build a solid base for democratic, participatory governance through support to targeted governmental institutions and constituencies for change within civil society. USAID is also prepared to help improve economic governance and strengthen community conflict resolution and local governance initiatives. Overall, SO 3 has been designed to maximize synergies with the other Mission SOs and activities funded by USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs (DCHA).

SO 4 (Livelihoods): The DRC is first and foremost an agricultural country; yet an estimated one-third of all Congolese are food insecure. A gloomy macroeconomic environment characterized by high inflation, negative economic growth, and decreasing agricultural production has reduced average daily caloric intake to an estimated 79% of the recommended level of 2,300 kcal per day<sup>13</sup>. Malnutrition has become the norm, and has impacted negatively on labor productivity, health, and education. Children under five years and pregnant women are the most severely affected since, in most households, men have the first claim to food.

Concluding that a lack of income threatens the success of all other USAID-funded interventions in the DRC, the Mission developed SO 4, *Livelihoods Improved in Targeted Areas*, which will increase incomes. This SO expands the Mission's previous focus on meeting critical food needs, addressing needs of vulnerable groups, promoting sustainable agricultural production, increasing access to economic opportunities, increasing productivity through human capacity

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<sup>13</sup> FAO report, 2000.

development, and natural resource management. SO 4 also includes activities that will support enhancing the role of women in all aspects of agriculture production, marketing, and rural entrepreneurial activities, and which will improve rural financial services. The aim of SO 4 is to help create a favorable enabling environment for small-scale private sector-led growth in targeted areas.

SO 5 (Education): The alarming and steadily declining children's enrollment rate of 55% and, in particular, a rate of 49% for girls<sup>14</sup>, is catastrophic for the DRC. Under the current strategy, USAID/DRC received funding under the EDDI Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Program and was designated a Strengthening Basic Education in Africa Initiative country in 2002. Under SO 5, *Basic Education, Especially for Girls, Improved in Targeted Areas*, USAID will continue current activities and develop innovative model activities using technology and a community-centered approach to promote quality basic education. USAID will use the strengths of the education system – high demand for education, community self-reliance, and willingness to innovate – to achieve this objective.

SpO (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) or DDR: Up to 235,000 armed forces remain and need to be demilitarized and reintegrated into Congolese society or incorporated into the new, unified national army. USAID's discreet activities with FY 2002 funding laid the foundation for USAID to participate in the creation and implementation of structures and activities for the reintegration of ex-combatants into targeted rural areas. USAID developed the SpO, *Ex-combatant Reintegration into Communities Fostered*, to expand its assistance to the reintegration of ex-combatants. USAID/DRC will not contribute to the reorganization of the Congolese armed forces other than providing eligible assistance either during any quartering process leading to or after demobilization, and supporting reintegration of excess forces. The assistance to be provided under this SpO is economic and not military in nature.

The U.S. government (USG) has a comparative advantage in this sector. USAID's long experience with reintegration of ex-combatants is an institutional strength. The post's involvement in security sector reform (through the Department of Defense) provides a critical linkage for the reintegration process.

### **2.1.2. Sectors Not Addressed in this ISP**

There is no shortage of problems which USAID could address in the DRC. Even with increased donor support, the depth of need and constraints of the operating environment are overwhelming. Certain sectors need to be strengthened first to help lay the foundation to improve other sectors in the future. For example, without stronger basic services (health and education) and improved livelihoods, there is no hope for a successful, broadly-based trade and investment sector. Therefore, under this ISP, the Mission will fund activities that will lay this important foundation and achieve sustainable impacts within the five years of the ISP.

For this reason, USAID/DRC did not choose to develop the trade/investment and energy sectors into SOs in this ISP. Should the ISP prove successful in laying a foundation, USAID anticipates that the follow-on USAID strategy for the DRC could include SOs in trade/investment and

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<sup>14</sup> MICS2 Survey, UNICEF/Kinshasa, January 2002.

energy. It should be noted, however, that under this ISP, USAID/DRC will continue to pursue Global Development Alliances in the trade/investment sector.

CARPE operates under a new, stand-alone, regional strategic objective in the environment sector. To avoid duplication, USAID/DRC did not develop a separate SO on environment. CARPE is a nine-country, thirteen partner regional initiative. It supports work on identifying and establishing the conditions and practices required to reduce deforestation and loss of biological diversity in Central Africa. Through antecedent partners, CARPE has engaged a variety of African stakeholders in evaluating threats to forests in Central Africa and identifying opportunities for sustainable forest management.

## **2.2. SCENARIOS**

In light of the difficulties of Congo's 43 years of independence and the present movement towards elections and democratic governance, this strategy discusses three scenarios: Successful Transition, Protracted Transition, and Stalled Transition.

Overall the USAID/DRC five-year strategy is designed to produce robust results under all three scenarios. Hence, the results frameworks are designed to remain valid under each scenario. The central difference for interventions under each of the Mission's SOs is that, as the quality of governance improves (under a "Successful Transition" scenario), engagement with the government deepens. By contrast, under a "Protracted" or "Stalled Transition" scenario, almost all programmatic activity would occur with and through NGOs, with a limited role for the GDRC. The sole exception would be SO 3 (Democracy and Governance), which would concentrate its program and activities to overcome new barriers to the transition process.

**In developing the scenarios below, the Mission makes the following macro-level critical assumptions:**

- Peace will hold;
- As long as peace holds, the transition, including national military integration, will go forward;
- Territorial administration will be successfully extended to all major cities and towns;
- Foreign military powers will not intervene outside of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) framework, or such interventions will be so limited in scale and duration as to not pose threats to the overall viability of the transition; and
- Donors will remain engaged.

In addition, each SO chapter contains critical assumptions specific to the sector as well as details of specific programmatic adjustments that would be made under each scenario.

### Scenario: Successful Transition

The DRC is currently in this scenario. A government of national unity took office in mid-2003; national elections are scheduled to be held during 2005 or 2006. Uninvited foreign forces have left the Congo, the country is increasingly reunited politically, and the severity of humanitarian emergencies is beginning to decrease. Moreover, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries initiative (HIPC) decision point for debt reduction was reached in mid-2003.

The difficult steps in this scenario include the successful DDR of armed men and boys plus the reintegration of thousands of girls and women who have been raped and/or held in servitude by armed groups as well as others who have become their wives, have born children and now form families, and are female soldiers. These steps further include breaking the habits acquired during the long Mobutu period, building on substantial progress that is now being made in reducing corruption, improving governance, and promoting private sector-led economic growth. Following successful elections in 2005, the country will embark on a period of relative stability, with even larger aid programs envisioned from the World Bank, E.U., and other key donors. The formal private sector, which had nearly disappeared, is already beginning to come back. Growth levels are high, at the five to ten percent per year level during the period of this strategy.

USAID/DRC at present does not obligate its funds under Strategic Objective Agreements (SOAGs) with the GDRC. It proposes obligating funds via direct agreements with implementers, as it currently does, until successful national elections are held and a new government takes power. At that time, the Mission may negotiate agreements that would permit obligation via SOAGs.

### Scenario: Protracted Transition

The middle scenario, "Protracted Transition," posits that even though the TG took office in June 2003, the transition would be much less stable than under the "Successful Transition" scenario. Elections would be held in 2005 or 2006, but would be difficult, and not seen as particularly credible, making the acceptance of results a difficult, protracted process. The new government that assumes power would retain some of the unsavory habits of the Mobutu and Laurent Kabila periods, including extremely high levels of corruption, thus braking growth and private sector activity. DDR efforts would only partly succeed, hobbling the political process, including political party development and elections. Donors would continue to re-engage, but more cautiously and with fewer resources. The country would remain relatively stable, and humanitarian emergencies would decline as in the "Successful Transition."

### Scenario: Stalled Transition

The final scenario, "Stalled Transition," is the most pessimistic, with a TG marked by uncertainty, broken agreements, unkept promises, and continuing deep divisions within Congolese society. In this scenario, the transition would be marked by massive corruption, almost no re-engagement by the international private sector, and, if elections were to be held during this period, the international community and Congolese non-partisan observers would not consider them credible. Instability and insecurity would continue, particularly in eastern

Congo, and perhaps uninvited foreign forces from Rwanda and/or Uganda (or other countries) would re-enter parts of the Congo close to their borders from time to time. Donors would remain engaged, although the World Bank would be forced to scale back its planned activities due to continued poor governance and instability. Humanitarian emergencies would not abate and would continue to require substantial commitments of time, personnel, and funds from OFDA, ECHO, and other donors. This scenario includes the possible withdrawal of one or more members of the TG, or, in the worst case, attacks on members of the TG.

Both the first and second scenarios have an obvious indicator or benchmark, the holding of successful elections. The development and adoption of key legislation on decentralization, and the drafting of the Congo's permanent constitution to be put to referendum are also benchmarks indicating progress toward a successful transition, or at what point the transition becomes protracted. The third scenario is the most complicated, with potential downside triggers, such as the withdrawal of one or more members of the TG, which would lead to a re-evaluation of DG and DDR activities in particular.

The vast majority of USAID's envisioned health, livelihoods, and education programs can go forward regardless of scenario. Health and livelihoods interventions will change, depending on the scenario, in terms of geographic focus and funding mix. The broad geographic spread of interventions remains fairly constant, although specific sites for interventions would change depending on the scenario (largely based on local security assessments). Under less optimistic scenarios, the percentage of funding coming from DCHA sources increases. Under a "Stalled Transition" scenario, the balance between relief, developmental relief, transitional assistance, and development assistance would alter to meet increased emergency needs.

Education activities, primarily because of projected low levels of funding, will fund activities in relatively secure areas of the DRC that are not likely to be affected by an increase in fighting, and, therefore, will be highly likely to remain constant under any scenario.

SO 3 requires dramatic adjustments depending on the scenario. For example, the outlines of a DG program following highly successful elections and the seating of an elected government will differ greatly from the outlines of a DG program after deeply flawed (or delayed, or even cancelled) elections, particularly if followed by a weak, fragmented, ineffectual government. Under the most optimistic scenario, the DG portfolio would shift to a greater emphasis on promoting good governance, with more direct engagement with governmental actors. Under less optimistic scenarios, more emphasis would be placed on supporting constituencies for change and reform among political actors and members of the TG and within civil society, drawing from the strategies and approaches that worked under the previous DG strategy. As under the SO 2 and SO 4 programs, the geographic spread remains broadly constant under all scenarios.

DG interventions under each scenario will be tailored to respond to the different barriers and opportunities that emerge during the transition and post-transition period. Within the 36-month time frame of the longest constitutionally-permitted transition period, the "Successful Transition" program involves meeting key benchmarks contained in the Transitional Constitution<sup>15</sup> and in the Global and Inclusive Accords<sup>16</sup>. These include: effective functioning of the five Independent Democratic Commissions, particularly the Independent Electoral

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<sup>15</sup> The Transitional Constitution will act as the constitution to be used during the DRC's transition process.

<sup>16</sup> The Global and Inclusive Accords were signed in June 2003.

Commission (IEC); passage of electoral, decentralization, political parties, and citizenship laws; drafting of the Constitution for the Third Republic; meeting key dates in the electoral calendar; and progress on military reintegration.

Whether the DRC continues in the most optimistic scenario during the final years of this strategy will depend on the TG's success in installing the democratically-elected government and on its ability to govern effectively. Problems during the post-election period under scenarios one and two, particularly related to governance, could move the scenario from "Successful" to "Protracted." Under either of these, most DG funds will be concentrated on promoting improved governance. The "Stalled Transition" scenario involves the withdrawal from the TG of one or more of its major groups; lack of progress on, or cessation of, DDR activities; and, ultimately, weakening of agreement on the legal framework required for political competition and an electoral process.

DDR interventions will be as vigorous as possible under each scenario; the difference, ultimately, would come from the overall success of USAID and other donor interventions and GDRC commitment in promoting a stable transition. Should one or more members of the TG withdraw then the DDR process would suffer. The degree of success will in turn determine how quickly the SpO is achieved, and relevant activities folded fully into SO 3, IR 1.

In June and July 2003, USAID/DRC led a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) team<sup>17</sup> to analyze and make recommendations related to conflict, conflict vulnerabilities, and the potential for a successful post-conflict transition to democratic governance in the DRC. The CVA is a component of the Mission's strategic planning. Overall, this assessment identifies three main areas of vulnerability to conflict in the DRC at this stage in its transition.

These areas of vulnerability are:

#### (1) Fragility of the Transition Process

While the transition from war to peace is technically over, the political context remains fragile and the security situation is volatile. Lasting peace - and a durable solution to the chronic instability of Africa's Great Lakes Region - will depend on the success of Congo's nascent political transition. The danger that one or more parties to the former conflict will withdraw from the transition process and take up arms against the TG has faded as significant progress towards integrating the military and security forces has been made. At least 800 armed body guards loyal to different members of the TG are now present in the capital, working alongside an untrained national police force while their employers work to build national governance institutions from the ground up. In isolated parts of the interior, ill-disciplined army and former rebel forces continue to prey on rural populations and perpetrate acts of barbaric cruelty against unarmed civilians even as the process of national military integration progresses. The international community hopes to contain these destabilizing factors through the DDR processes now underway. However, DDR alone will not put an end to the culture of extortion and abuse that fuels local conflict and prevents economic growth.

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<sup>17</sup> The key findings and recommendations of the CVA team are provided in Annex X.

Moreover, as the DRC enters the post-conflict phase of its current transition, observers agree the real test of the transitional political process will not lie solely in elections, but in the willingness and ability of the government to reign in armed elements, reform the military, police, and judicial systems, and put an end to the impunity that has plagued the country for more than a decade.<sup>18</sup> This extends beyond rampant human rights abuses to widespread impunity for all crimes, including economic. The potential for international aid to impact Congo's economic recovery is hamstrung as long as a culture of extortion prevails. In both the western and eastern parts of the country, current or former civil servants, unpaid soldiers, ex-combatants, and other remnants of the predatory state continue to loot, rape, and collect "taxes" at unofficial "roadblocks" for survival. Roads and river ways are increasingly open to traffic. Yet anyone who travels them is forced to run a gauntlet of "road blocks" erected every 20 km. or so. As long as this cottage industry of criminal enterprise persists, the country's civilian population and economy will remain hostage to predation and abuse.<sup>19</sup> Congo's culture of impunity represents a serious obstacle to peace building, conflict prevention, and economic recovery programs.

## (2) Opportunity Space for Conflict Entrepreneurs

Competition for resources, including political influence and human resources, remains a powerful incentive for conflict in the DRC. Following the success of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD)<sup>20</sup> and a negotiated political settlement, most conflicts have evolved into local confrontations among or within various ethno-linguistic groups that have historically competed for land or other resources. This dynamic is further compounded by three main forces, including a legacy of endemic corruption, a series of foreign invasions that have spawned local war-economies, and, consequently, a pervasive lack of security and viable judicial institutions (discussed above).

## (3) Extreme Isolation and Exclusion of the Majority of the Population

The CVA team further found that Congolese communities in each of the six provinces visited shared a profound sense of physical isolation, insecurity, and abandonment. More precisely, the lack of mechanisms available for these communities to aggregate and articulate their grievances or resolve disputes has created a vicious cycle: in a situation of extreme isolation and poverty in which survival is the key objective for groups and individuals, the weakest become subject to abuse, exploitation, and manipulation by those with power, further limiting their ability to change this situation. This cycle disproportionately affects the most vulnerable populations including women, children, and minorities. In some cases, they become not only the victims but perpetrators of violence as well. In May/June 2003, the CVA team found that the situation remained largely unchanged a year and a half after an assessment team by DCHA's Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) concluded that, "the combination of economic and political degradation has contributed to the feeling of marginalization and isolation experienced

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<sup>18</sup> Amnesty International Press Release, AI index: AFR 62/047/2003, News Service No:244, October 24, 2003.

<sup>19</sup> In a recent meeting with one of the TG Vice Presidents, the NGO, Innovative Resources Management, provided proof of the more than 80 local "taxes" or "surcharges" river traders are required to pay on their way to Kinshasa. They receive a stamp for every "tax" paid. The Vice President confirmed that only four of the stamps were legal. It is unknown what percentage of legally collected fees finds their way to central government coffers. According to some estimates, it is less than 15%. The absence of government funds to pay civil servants and provide public services such as education, health, and a functioning judiciary, contributes to poverty, furthers impunity, and fuels the vicious cycle of conflict in the Congo.

<sup>20</sup> The ICD is the series of facilitated negotiations that produced the current two-year power-sharing arrangement as laid out in two documents signed in December 2002: the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution.

by Congolese civil society.” The vulnerability to manipulation and limits on public accountability that this produces is the third area of conflict vulnerability identified by the CVA.

These areas of vulnerabilities are further identified in a summary of the CVA in Annex X. The CVA also identifies the impact that USAID’s programs already have had or may have in the future on conflict prevention and mitigation in each of these areas. Each SO Chapter describes the potential for the DRC to move from a successful transition to a protracted or stalled transition scenario characterized by increasing levels of tension and violent conflict. Monitoring the evolving situation will be tied to the annual reporting cycle and portfolio implementation reviews, unless significant and/or triggering events and subsequent substantial program modifications become necessary, in which case these would be examined on an ongoing basis. Any change requiring substantial program modifications will be made in consultation with the Country Team and relevant USAID offices (e.g., USAID/AFR, OTI, FFP, and OFDA).

The following table illustrates the characteristics of each scenario and the political, military, economic, and social indicators that measure which scenario the DRC is experiencing. Certain indicators will trigger a change from one scenario to another.

Scenario	Characteristics	Indicators	
Successful	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Terms of Peace Accord and Transitional Constitution implemented.</li> <li>• Military reform and reintegration proceed.</li> <li>• DDR and DDRRR processes succeed.</li> <li>• Political reforms proceed.</li> <li>• Economic reforms initiated, including anti-corruption measures and transparent budget management.</li> <li>• Human rights protections, security and access to justice improve.</li> <li>• Credible, participatory general elections held in three years.</li> <li>• Increased public participation especially women in political and economic decision-making and oversight of public institutions.</li> </ul>	<u>Political/ Military</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Electoral, Decentralization, Political Parties Laws, and new Constitution drafted, debated, and adopted by Parliament and Senate.</li> <li>• Implementation of key laws and Constitutional referendum in keeping with the transition calendar.</li> <li>• Local, provincial, and national elections held within 36 months.</li> <li>• All irregular and regular forces report to duty and unify under a single civilian command.</li> <li>• Transfer of power to elected, representative government.</li> </ul>
		<u>Economic</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A balanced national budget is implemented.</li> <li>• Increased budget transparency at the national and provincial levels.</li> <li>• Increased GDP growth rates.</li> </ul>
		<u>Social</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Rapid rate of demobilization and successful reintegration.</li> <li>• Percentage increase in expenditures for public priorities including health, education, and national reconstruction.</li> </ul>
Protracted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Terms of Peace Accord and Transitional Constitution partially implemented.</li> <li>• Military reforms and integration slowed or halted.</li> <li>• Political reforms are hampered.</li> <li>• Economic reforms initiated but rampant corruption and non-transparent budget management continue.</li> <li>• Human rights protections, security and access to justice improve little.</li> <li>• Electoral process and calendar extended beyond three years.</li> </ul>	<u>Political/ Military</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Parliamentary process unwieldy and slows transition calendar.</li> <li>• Regular and irregular forces remain under pre-transition command structure.</li> <li>• Political boundary demarcation, political party registration and voter registration problems.</li> <li>• Violence and human right violations by competing political groups increase.</li> <li>• Increased bias, slander, and hate in national and local media.</li> <li>• Rate of demobilization and reintegration slows.</li> </ul>
		<u>Economic</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National budget remains unbalanced.</li> <li>• Budget remains opaque at the national and provincial levels.</li> <li>• GDP growth slows or stagnates.</li> </ul>
		<u>Social</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Percentage of population suffering from human rights violations in targeted communities increases.</li> <li>• Basic health indicators deteriorate.</li> </ul>
Stalled	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of the Peace Accord and Transitional Constitution is halted.</li> <li>• One or more members of the TG withdraws from the National Government.</li> <li>• Infighting among Congolese domestic forces.</li> <li>• Further economic and social deterioration.</li> <li>• Escalating tension with Rwanda or Uganda leads to increased border incursions.</li> </ul>	<u>Political/ Military</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elections are delayed beyond mid-2006.</li> <li>• Withdrawal of one or more members of the TG.</li> <li>• Increase in violence: raids on villages, pillaging, kidnapping and rape, fighting between armed groups.</li> <li>• Decrease or cessation of dialogue between rival factions.</li> <li>• Increased political infighting.</li> <li>• Demobilization and reintegration of all formal armed groups slows down or stops.</li> <li>• Decreased access in zones still controlled by non-unified armed groups.</li> <li>• Re-entry of foreign troops in border areas.</li> </ul>
		<u>Economic</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decreased economic freedom and ability to transport goods.</li> <li>• No change or decrease in national GDP rates.</li> </ul>
		<u>Social</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased internal displacement</li> <li>• Increased malnutrition</li> <li>• Increased morbidity and mortality</li> <li>• Increased destruction and deterioration of infrastructure</li> </ul>

Table 2.1. Scenario Characteristics and Indicators of Movement

## 2.3. SUMMARY OF CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

Four cross-cutting themes - gender, HIV/AIDS, conflict management, and governance - are all thematically and functionally mainstreamed in the ISP. Nutrition and GDA and leveraging other resources, the fifth and sixth cross-cutting themes, are likewise mainstreamed, albeit over a reduced number of SOs.

### 2.3.1. Gender<sup>21</sup>

The majority of citizens in the DRC (both men and women) have extremely limited opportunities to participate in the decision making that affects their lives at both local and national levels. Women and children are the most deprived members of Congolese society. Very few leadership roles in the DRC are held by women, even though Article 51 of the Transitional Constitution states that women must be significantly represented in local, national, and regional institutions. In the TG, only six of the 36 ministers and two of the 24 vice-ministers are women. In the national assembly, there are two women for every eight men. There are no women in the senate or among officers in the army. For every 120 professional and technical positions in the DRC, only 20 women are employed. For every 110 administrative and professional positions, only 10 are held by women.<sup>22</sup> This is both an injustice and a waste of tremendous resources.

The lack of equality between men and women is reflected and reinforced by laws that discriminate against women. Article 444 of the Family Code still states that the husband is the head of the family and that his wife must obey him. Moreover, Article 448 of the same code states that a woman must have her husband's authorization to perform any legal action and/or obtain any document. Those laws and practices discourage women from realizing their full potential by relegating them to the status of juridical minors thus caging their great potential in the development of the DRC.

To address gender inequality in the DRC, USAID/DRC is committed to mainstreaming gender in the ISP and subsequent activity design and implementation. The Mission has adopted three principles to accomplish these goals:

- Monitor partners' programs and activities to ensure that gender is mainstreamed, their programs are not implemented in a manner that reinforces bad practices, and best practices are shared across SOs.
- Promote women's representation at the grass root, district, provincial, and national levels to ensure women are given the opportunity to participate in all aspects of civil society and are able to assume leadership positions.
- Look for opportunities to finance activities which target the change of practices and the removal of barriers identified as relevant under each SO.

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<sup>21</sup> Gender refers to the cultural definitions of the roles of men and women in society. In discussing gender, we are concerned with the "economic, social, political, and cultural attributes associated with being male and female." The gender analysis conducted by USAID/DRC in 2003 reveals that not all men are empowered and not all women are disempowered; nonetheless, evidence shows that women are disproportionately constrained in exercising their rights and claims to social and economic resources compared to men.

<sup>22</sup> Naomi Left and Ann D. Levine, *Where Women Stand*, (New York: Random House, 1997.)

There are many challenges to implementing a people-centered development approach that considers the needs, interests, experiences, and knowledge of both men and women, especially those from disadvantaged groups. The three steps to implementing gender mainstreaming will help USAID/DRC face those challenges and increase its programmatic effectiveness. This, in turn, will assist the DRC in its transition to a sound, democracy with a healthier, better educated population benefiting from improved livelihoods.

Gender is integrated throughout each SO and the SpO:

SO 2 (Health): Maternal mortality in the DRC is the highest in the world, as almost 25% of children do not live to see their fifth birthday. SO 2 focuses mainly on prevention of morbidity and mortality among women and children through programs that address their particular knowledge and behavioral needs. In seeking to improve the availability, quality, and access of prenatal and family planning services, and the prevention and reduction of the severity of childhood infections, the SO will affect both women and children as well as help alleviate the significant economic, social, and emotional cost to the entire household. In this way, scarce household resources currently going to support preventable health care costs can be invested in more productive ways.

SO 3 (DG): SO 3 seeks to promote a successful democratic transition in the DRC by encouraging participation in elections and anti-corruption interventions and promoting the rights and awareness of all citizens. The lack of experience among both men and women with representation and public accountability as well as an electoral process are perhaps the greatest constraints to sustainable results. While the entire population was affected by the civil war, women have a much higher illiteracy rate than men and current Congolese legislation such as the family code show that women are systematically disadvantaged. Therefore, where USAID's DG approach encourages the empowerment of all citizens, it also aims to promote the increased inclusion of women in the electoral and political processes at the local and national level.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): Lack of income is the most fundamental problem impeding development in the DRC. Poverty in Congo is chronic and widespread. It is estimated that two-thirds of the population lives on less than a dollar a day. Malnutrition has become the norm, especially for women and children because tradition dictates that the head of the family (the man) receives the better cut of any share and that his dependents must rely on him to provide for them with what is left. The division of labor in agriculture is biased toward the exploitation of women, while males take little part in some operations but manage the bulk of family income. As a result, the Mission's support to agriculture production is designed to promote the redistribution of labor to relieve women of their overload by providing them with financial means (micro-credit) and a less labor intensive technology.

SO 5 (Education): The education system in the DRC has virtually collapsed. Although the government proclaims free education, there has been virtually no funding. While the education indicators are dire throughout DRC, the disparities between boys and girls education is also very noticeable: 55% enrollment ratio for boys and 49% for girls. Completion rates show that fewer than 15% of all girls in DRC complete primary education. SO 5 specifically targets increased access to education and school retention for girls through awareness raising at the community, school, and household level and through scholarships for girls.

SpO (DDR): To successfully reintegrate former combatants, the needs of female victims of the conflict must be addressed. USAID's Victims of Torture (VOT) and Trafficking in Persons (TIP)-funded programs for victims of sexual gender based violence in the east of the country help address these needs. There are also a number of female dependents, camp followers, combatants, and prisoners who remain associated with the Congolese armed groups. The Interim Strategy for Demobilization of Irregular Forces in the DRC, which USAID supports, envisages appropriate assistance for these groups to assist in their own reintegration into society. This assistance includes agricultural kits that contain farm implements and seeds appropriate for use by women.

### **2.3.2. HIV/AIDS**

Increased HIV/AIDS rates have a negative impact on agricultural and other economic productivity, the skilled workforce (including teachers, nurses, politicians), and the health care system. The epidemic also aggravates the competition for scarce resources among political and military elites, hampers the development of civil society, and destabilizes the extended family structure. While HIV/AIDS care and support activities in SO 2 will focus on preventive activities among high risk groups, a multi-sectoral effort using all means available (e.g., schools, churches, political events, community forums, and the private sector) will strengthen HIV/AIDS prevention to reach a much wider number of people within Congolese society. SO 2 has an IR dedicated to prevention, care, and support services for HIV/AIDS that will support the national AIDS control program and integrate HIV/AIDS activities into USAID-supported health zones. Through SO 3's strategy to promote better representation of all Congolese in the political process, public participation in combating HIV/AIDS will be enhanced. SO 4 will provide opportunities to People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) and offer prevention activities to promote a healthier and more productive workforce. SO 5 will incorporate HIV/AIDS education into the formal and non-formal learning environments in the areas targeted for education assistance, lessening the stigma surrounding HIV and teaching children prevention mechanisms at an early age. The SpO will work with SO 2 to encourage former combatants to receive Voluntary Testing and Counseling as they return to their communities.

### **2.3.3. Conflict Management**

USAID's DG and DDR programs will contribute to closing the opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs by improving security and stability through support for successful reintegration of ex-combatants into local communities that are prepared to accept them. This will be achieved by sustaining and expanding successful initiatives to manage conflict and engage civil society and public authorities together in local development initiatives using a tried and tested community development model. SO 4 will provide alternatives for ex-combatants through increasing opportunities for income-generation. For all SOs, activities that bring formerly divided community groups together will contribute to conflict management on a wide scale.

Conflict funds will focus on the following four areas to manage, mitigate, and prevent conflict:

- Address criminal impunity;
- Support the process of national reunification and reconciliation, focusing on strengthening the voice of vulnerable groups (e.g., victims of violence, internally displaced persons (IDPs), women, and persecuted minority groups);

- Create and sustain conflict mediation at the local level to address both short-term issues related to reintegration and longer-term issues related to making the government more accountable and transparent; and
- Mount wide-scale information dissemination and improved communication campaigns, especially for isolated communities.

#### **2.3.4. Governance**

DRC has suffered from years of mismanagement, government neglect, and poor governance at the national, provincial, and local levels. Corruption has direct negative impacts on activities implemented under all SOs because it increases the cost of doing business, prevents direct support to the GDRC, and slows down the pace of implementing programs (since inefficient and corrupt governance creates severe logistical problems). All SOs address governance as it affects the implementation of their programs and as a core development issue. The Mission's DG SO (SO 3) focuses on achieving a successful post-conflict transition. This means strengthening both governance capacity and citizen participation in governance at all levels so that citizens may directly influence how public resources are allocated and hold government officials responsible for managing these resources effectively. This will affect achievements in sectors such as improved health policies and practices, equitable access to quality education, sound management of environmental and economic resources, and livelihoods.

SO 3 focuses on political process development and strengthening governance institutions at the community and national level. The SO 3 and SO 4 teams in coordination with OTI are all working to address the problem of public exclusion from the economic and political decision-making process. This approach, it is hoped, will help to mitigate the acute social, political, and economic crises that the DRC has experienced since the 1960s. Good governance is a key attribute of a successful DDR process. Village leaders, both male and female, will participate in community structures to manage reintegration activities.

#### **2.3.5. Nutrition**

The overall national malnutrition rate for children under five with moderate to severe malnutrition is 38.2%, with a break down of 28.9% in urban areas and 42.6% for rural areas.<sup>23</sup> USAID/DRC has a comprehensive strategy to address malnutrition that cuts across three of the SOs and the SpO.

SO 2 (Health): SO 2 engages in growth monitoring and promotion activities based on proven "positive deviance" methods in USAID assisted health zones. In addition, USAID/DRC supports improved complementary feeding practices, exclusive breastfeeding, and continued feeding of children with diarrhea. Iron folate and vitamin A supplementation will be expanded. SO 2 will track national nutritional status through monitoring of weight-for-age in children, which will serve as a "goal" level indicator for the health strategy.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): SO 4 emphasizes a variety of food security and nutrition interventions within a selection of USAID assisted health zones, including home gardening and improved seed multiplication activities. In addition, especially vulnerable groups such as women who have

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<sup>23</sup> 2001 National Nutrition Survey

suffered sexual violence, AIDS widows and orphans, and especially vulnerable adolescents will receive food in designated reception and training centers through an integrated program with other partners.

SO 5 (Education): SO 5 will look to ensure that public health and hygiene practices that include good food storage and preparation, are incorporated into the formal and non-formal learning activities at the school and community levels.

SpO (DDR): The SpO will address nutrition during the reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependants into their communities by ensuring that that seeds and tools distributions and complementary food distributions are conducted when relevant and necessary.

### **2.3.6. GDA and Leveraging Other Resources**

The DRC has many needs in order to overcome the multitude of difficulties that face the transition to a sound democracy with a healthier, better educated population benefiting from improved livelihoods. Through the Global Development Alliance (GDA)<sup>24</sup> and the leveraging of other resources, USAID/DRC's programs will increase its impact in many sectors of this ISP. Global challenges addressed through the GDA combine the interests of the public sector, corporate America, and NGOs in support of international development assistance. It is clear that if the DRC is to succeed in its transition, the private sector must be coordinated with to facilitate this process.

SO 2 (Health): Several GDA initiatives such as the Global Fund and the World Bank's HIV/AIDS program will support activities related to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria.

SO 3 (DG): GDA leveraging may support the development of a communications network linking isolated communities throughout the DRC through radio, television, and print media as well as electronic communications and even boat convoys.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): The agricultural, marketing, and financial services sectors are particularly conducive for these kinds of alliances in a country on the verge of recovery with a strong agricultural base, enormous economic potential, and a large and diverse population. The transition from a divided and state-dominated economy to a re-unified and private one focused on rural and peri-urban development will require that SO 4 explore strategic public-private alliances.

SO 5 (Education): Public-private alliances offer considerable opportunities for SO 5, particularly given that the strategy focuses on the use of innovative technologies for high impact learning. The Global Learning Portal is one example where web access is in use and any educator has immediate access to materials, curricula, advice, collaborative opportunities, software, and much more.

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<sup>24</sup> In May 2001, the USG launched the Global Development Alliance, promoting public-private alliances as a new business model for USAID. The goal is to forge alliances among government, civil society and the private sector to multiply the impact of official US development assistance abroad.

## 2.4. SYNERGIES AMONG STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

Severe poverty levels, the effects of the conflict, and a long history of government mismanagement create common challenges across all SOs and the SpO. The DRC is so large and the needs so great that USAID/DRC's approach seeks to maximize impacts by focusing efforts in key, targeted areas. The geographic selection of project areas throughout the strategy period will seek to create these geographic synergies and to continue to expand upon them.




Figure 2.2. Overlap of USAID/DRC Programs

The following criteria will be used in the selection of target sites:

- Areas of return of vulnerable groups i.e., ex-combatants, separated and abandoned children, and former internally displaced persons;
- Potential to achieve results and impact;
- USAID comparative advantage;
- Other donor presence;
- Public-private partnerships;
- Environmental impact;
- Opportunities for scaling up and sustainability; and
- Synergies with other USAID/USG programs.

Thematic synergies are also an essential component of each SO. Common activities are shared across SOs, will produce overlapping results, and will complement each others' efforts.

**SO 2 (Health):** Use of key health care services in the DRC is limited in part due to ongoing instability and poor infrastructure which prevent physical access; inability of the government to

pay health care personnel salaries and to supply health structures; and peoples' inability to afford health care services, all of which have resulted in high rates of mortality from easily treatable illnesses. Improved livelihoods (through SO 4), increased security and stability (through SO 3 and the SpO), and strengthening government institutions (SO 3) all will contribute significantly to increasing the use of key health services.

SO 3 (DG): SO 3 will create an enabling environment for achieving results across all SOs. Changes to be promoted at the policy level will include strengthening of health policies and practices, equitable access to quality education, sound management of environmental and economic resources, and reduced corruption. The SO 3 and SO 4 teams are working in close collaboration to increase public participation in economic and political decision making. The SO 3 and SpO teams will jointly supervise reintegration activities for ex-combatants as they place a strong emphasis on community participation in conflict management, community development, and civic education and will work with the same implementing partners.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): Improved livelihoods in targeted areas will strengthen the success of each SO that will operate within the same geographic area. Projects will be selected in areas that complement the achievement of SO 2, SO 5, and SpO activities. Specific links will be made with areas of return to create opportunities for the most vulnerable populations affected by the conflict, i.e., ex-combatants, separated and abandoned children, women victims of Gender Based Violence (GBV), and formerly displaced populations.

SO 5 (Education): Improved economic prosperity and better health are normally correlated with increased levels of education. Mothers who finish primary education better understand basic concepts of good health and hygiene, and literate farmers are more capable of increasing their agricultural output and using innovative techniques. Education activities will therefore be linked geographically to areas where USAID/DRC is implementing these activities.

An estimated 10% of the armed forces are children who have had little access to education opportunities. Reinforcing access to education in areas of return will therefore play an integral role in the rehabilitation process. Civic education through the SO 3 will also link up with SO 5 to maximize use of innovation around community resource and information centers using internet and communication tools.

SpO (DDR): All four SOs link directly into improving the social, economic, and political conditions at the community level to enable the reintegration of ex-combatants. Successful transition from violent conflict to sound governance (SO 3) relies on the creation of a unified army and the DDR of combatants. If social, economic and political conditions exist at the community level to enable the reintegration of ex-combatants (SpO, IR 2) then Congolese citizens will enjoy improved security and stability (SO 3, IR 1).

CARPE: CARPE will reduce the rate of loss of biodiversity in the Congo River Basin countries. 55% of the Congo Basin forest lies within the borders of the DRC. The CARPE and Mission strategies converge when it comes to improved governance. Improved governance is central to translating the political transition underway in the DRC into a social and economic transition that improves the lives of the Congolese people. Improved governance is a condition sine qua non for the achievement of CARPE's objective. Both CARPE and SO 3 contain activities to improve governance. In the case of SO 3, this will primarily occur at the level of human and

economic resources, whereas CARPE will improve the management of environmental resources. These two efforts will clearly complement each other, as, with geographic targeting, activities undertaken by one will have direct impact on the achievement of the other. SO 4 will increase rural incomes and thus provide alternatives to unsustainable agricultural practices and the bush-meat trade.

## **2.5. CONVERGENCE WITH AGENCY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES**

This ISP is consistent with the goals and objectives described in the new joint USAID / U.S. State Department Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2004-2009. ISP priorities support the following strategic objectives within the joint Strategic Plan:

- 1) Achieve Peace and Security and
- 2) Advance Sustainable Development and Global Interests.

Specifically, USAID's SpO and the DG SO will contribute to the first strategic objective in the joint plan: achieve peace and security. USAID will support regional stability by helping avert and resolve local and regional conflicts to preserve peace and minimize harm to the national interests of the United States.

USAID's health, DG, livelihoods, education, transitional, and emergency assistance activities will contribute to the second strategic objective in the joint plan: advance sustainable development and global interests. Within this strategic objective, there are four strategic goals, all of which the Mission's other SOs fall under:

- 1) Democracy and human rights;
- 2) Economic prosperity and security;
- 3) Social and environmental issues; and
- 4) Humanitarian response.

SO 3 and transitional assistance provided by OTI will advance the growth of democracy and good governance, including civil society and respect for human rights. USAID will do this by mitigating conflict, strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights, encouraging credible and competitive political processes, promoting the development of politically active civil society, and encouraging more transparent and accountable government institutions.

The goal of Economic Prosperity and Security will be supported by SO 4, which is designed to encourage more rapid and enhanced agricultural development with the aim to increase food security and expand equitable access to economic opportunity for rural and peri-urban poor.

The goal of Social and Environmental Issues will be supported by SOs 2 and 5, which will improve health and education conditions for the Congolese by increasing use of key health services and expanding access to quality basic education for under-served populations.

The goal of Humanitarian Response will be supported by DCHA's assistance to the DRC through funding from OFDA, FFP, and PVC and will minimize the human costs of displacement, conflicts, and natural disasters.

USAID/DRC will continue to coordinate closely with its State Department counterparts when developing the Mission Performance Plan each year to ensure consistency in the level of resources requested in the respective plans, as well as in the allocation of resources to strategic goals and objectives.

## **2.6. THE DRC'S ELIGIBILITY FOR THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT**

The Mission has selected the following criteria as the most appropriate indicators for evaluating the DRC's eligibility for the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)<sup>25</sup>.

### **2.6.1. Good Governance**

The DRC and good governance remain separated by over 30 years of institutionalized corruption, systematic and widespread human rights abuses, and the most recent seven-year period of brutal conflict. The justice sector largely does not function. Unpaid and predatory government employees subtract rather than add value to people's lives and communities.

Despite these challenges, political liberties for the Congolese people are now increasing. In 1999 only one political party was legal; in 2003 there are over 400 established. Accountability and transparency are now being gradually institutionalized in the Ministries of Finance and Budget with the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF. The elections planned for 2005 will have the effect of creating space for the exercise of more civil and political liberties in the DRC. USAID's programs in democracy and governance do and will continue to support advances in these critical areas during the strategy period, but it is recognized that achieving a level of good governance congruent with MCA eligibility is a long-term prospect.

### **2.6.2. Investing in the Health and Education of People**

The GDRC faces some acute constraints in this area. Many, but by no means all, are related to the recent conflict. Others are the legacy of the Mobutu and colonial eras. In general terms, the GDRC currently invests extremely little in people.

The revised 2003 GDRC budget totals 331 billion Congolese Francs (CF), or approximately \$785 million. This includes all World Bank, IMF, African Development Bank (ADB), and E.U. funds programmed through the budget as well as GDRC revenues. Due to funding constraints (in the areas of tax collection and the pace of donor disbursements), it is thought that overall expenditures will amount to 50-60% of budgeted levels. The 2003 budget provides for 4.9% of total expenditures in the health sector, and 3.1% in primary and secondary education. This is thought to be an improvement over the 2002 budget, but methodology differences in budget formulation make demonstration of this difficult. Only 10 billion CF of the total 331 billion CF are determined by the World Bank and IMF to be HIPC poverty-reduction eligible expenditures. The DRC attained the HIPC Decision Point in August 2003. This augurs well for a future increase in the percentage of budget revenues devoted to the social sectors. However, with

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<sup>25</sup> On February 5, 2003, President George W. Bush submitted to Congress his plan for the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). It is a historic new vision for development based on the shared interests of developed and developing nations alike. The goal of the MCA is to provide people in developing nations the tools they need to seize the opportunities of the global economy. It recognizes that development must primarily come from within countries, not from outside. MCA funds would flow to countries where governments and citizens partner to set development priorities. The US and recipient countries would agree to business-like contracts that set benchmarks and responsibilities.

extremely low official tax receipts (9% of GDP), limited GDP growth, the cost of the extension of territorial administration, and increasingly strict restrictions on public expenditures as agreed with the Bretton Woods institutions, the assessment of USAID, the IBRD, and the IMF is that the rate of increase in social sector spending will be decidedly limited during the strategy period.

The DRC's health indicators are among the worst in the world. Infant and under-five mortality rates are 126 and 213 per 1,000 live births respectively. Malnutrition is both an important direct and underlying cause of under-five mortality. A catastrophic 13% of children suffer from acute malnutrition and 38% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition. 61% of children under three are vitamin A deficient, among the highest rates in Africa. The maternal mortality rate is 1,289 deaths per 100,000 live births. Female life expectancy is estimated at only 51 years. Childhood vaccination coverage is very low with DPT3 immunization coverage at 30% in 2002.

Access to formal education and health services is limited, with many families simply not able to access these services at all. The overall trend in education has been downwards for many years. The DRC had practically attained universal primary education in 1974, with a 94% gross enrollment rate. This went down to 60% in 1997-1998, and 55% in 2001-2002. 25% of primary school children (those in school) attained 5<sup>th</sup> grade in 2001-2002.

Although the GDRC scores extremely low in these key areas and is at this time far from approaching the minimum threshold for MCA, the trend, with the consolidation of the peace, is expected to be gradually positive in the social sectors.

USAID/DRC is heavily engaged in the health sector and will be increasingly engaged in the education sector. USAID's work on cost containment at health zones and improved efficiency of health zones will increase access to basic health care. USAID's engagement in education includes scholarships for primary school girls, teacher training, and curriculum development, likewise increasing access to higher quality education.

### **2.6.3. Promoting Economic Freedom**

There are few formal barriers to economic activity in the DRC. The currency is freely tradable, funds can be imported and exported without restrictions, imports and exports are not unduly regulated, and there are few barriers to investment. A new investment code was recently promulgated, which is an improvement over the previous code that was nonetheless relatively benign. A commercial court is now being established to provide additional protection to economic actors. The barriers to trade, investment, and economic activity that exist, however, are sufficiently troublesome to investors and business. New investment is primarily hot money, and existing businesses must engage in corrupt practices to survive.

The first and most important impediment to economic freedom is the number of legal and illegal taxes that can be and are levied against all forms of economic activity. The GDRC tolerates or even encourages resorting to this extortionate taxation in an attempt to meet IMF targets as a means of paying government employees who cannot be paid from central revenues. The second impediment is the corrupt, dysfunctional judicial system which provides no recourse to citizens looking for judicial redress of violations. The third impediment is the partially state run enterprises called parastatals in the mining and utility sectors. These

unprofitable businesses not only are net consumers of revenue and destroy shareholder value but also crowd out other more competitive actors that could operate in these areas. Finally, the continuing instability in the country and the lack of transportation infrastructure constitutes a significant barrier to economic activity. The GDRC needs to make significant progress in all of these areas to create the minimum conditions for economic activity that would lead to economic freedom.

The DRC has recently become partially eligible for benefits under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and USAID has supported (through the regional program) efforts to educate the DRC business community on how to access those benefits. However, until public revenue and expenditure targets converge, and until the public and parastatal reform programs are implemented, excessive and illegal taxation of all forms of economic activity will remain a significant barrier to economic freedom in the DRC. It is anticipated that reforms needed in this area will be implemented over a relatively lengthy period. Privatization of the parastatals will only be undertaken after the national elections in mid 2005 or 2006. Re-establishment of security and stability – clearly a task of the TG – will be an ongoing process up to and beyond the election period. USAID does not intend to become involved in these issues with the exception of anti-corruption activities during the strategy period.

In summary, in all areas, the GDRC falls short of meeting MCA requirements. However, engagement by USAID and the international community in these areas during this transition phase presents an unprecedented opportunity to bring the DRC significantly closer to MCA eligibility over the strategy period.

## **2.7. DCHA INTEGRATION**

### **2.7.1. The Need for DCHA in the Congo**

The DRC's seven years of armed conflict caused the displacement of over three million civilians and debilitated basic social services throughout the country. Approximately 20 million people in the DRC remain particularly vulnerable due to chronic insecurity and conflict. The conflict, now officially over although fighting continues in some parts of eastern DRC, has led to the debilitation of the already limited transportation and communications infrastructure and impoverished millions of people. Outbreaks of measles, cholera, and meningitis are frequent. Insecurity continues in many parts of the country due to the existence of renegade armed groups. Large segments of the population are marginalized and remain in dire need of continued emergency food and non-food assistance. Continued emergency assistance is therefore required as the local NGO sector struggles to respond to the massive needs of affected populations.

Further, years of insecurity have resulted in rampant extortion and petty theft that has sharply inhibited the movement of goods, people, and ideas and access to public services. As a result, the free flow of ideas and information has become virtually impossible, contributing to the stalled Congolese economy. The resulting community isolation is exacerbated by the lack of an effective or efficient national television or radio network. In this environment, scarce and inaccurate information facilitates the manipulation of the population by rumors and propaganda. Until recently, few opportunities existed for the exchange of views.

To address emergency and transition needs in the DRC today, four offices within DCHA fund programs in-country: OFDA, FFP, OTI, and PVC.

### **2.7.2. Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance**

OFDA has provided emergency assistance in the past to significantly alleviate the consequences of the war for vulnerable populations. Given that great humanitarian needs remain, OFDA will continue to provide emergency assistance mainly in the health and food security areas to war-affected, vulnerable, and internally displaced persons as well as logistical support to transport humanitarian workers. As access increases, OFDA's emphasis will shift more to development relief with food security activities such as seed and tool distribution and the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure that will connect producing and consuming areas. With two program officers based in country, and a project portfolio consistently among the five largest world-wide, the DRC remains one of OFDA's priority countries.

### **2.7.3. Office of Food for Peace**

Through the life of the ISP, FFP will continue to support the World Food Program's (WFP) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) and its Emergency Operations (EMOP) if needed. Ongoing emergency and non-emergency WFP programs provide P.L. 480 Title II food assistance to approximately 2 million beneficiaries. Under WFP's programs, direct food assistance will be provided to feed insecure internally displaced persons, refugees and other vulnerable populations. WFP will continue to support nutrition and supplementary feeding programs for women and school children. WFP's new PRRO running from January 2004 – December 2005 greatly expands WFP's geographical coverage, increasing its presence by 6 new offices for a total of 13 sub offices. The PRRO plans to have 49% of its resources go towards recovery programs in support of IDP resettlement, rural infrastructure rehabilitation, and training by 2005, marking a significant shift from the largely humanitarian relief focus to date. Overall, the WFP caseload is projected to diminish by 40% or 800,000 by the end of 2005 and to be reduced further in the years thereafter.

USAID/DRC may support a P.L. 480 Developmental Relief Transition Program or Development Assistance Program (DAP) in the DRC in the near future were there to be sufficient support from the PVOs and FFP. Subsequent to receiving approval for the ISP, USAID/DRC will re-assess how best to program and implement food aid in the DRC in the face of several convergent realities: the transition and peace process underway; DCHA and FFP's new strategies; the new focus on development relief; and the Mission's new ISP.

There are not any FFP staff presently based at USAID/DRC; REDSO/ESA manages the FFP program from Nairobi.

### **2.7.4. Office of Transition Initiatives**

OTI, which worked in the Congo from 1997 to 2000, re-established its presence in 2002. From the OTI perspective, the 1997-2000 period could be called "Transition 1." OTI arrived again in the Congo in 2002 during what could be called "Transition 2(a)," during the transition from war back to peace. On June 30, 2003 the Congo moved into "Transition 2(b)," the transition to

democracy. As stated in Chapter 1, transitions 2(a) and 2(b) are unfolding in the context of a longer-term transition, the transition to a sustainable democratic society.

To address the isolation experienced by Congolese communities, OTI's goal in the DRC is the informed participation of Congolese people in political and economic decision-making processes that contribute to a peaceful, unified, and democratic country. To advance this goal, OTI is supporting activities which fall under three objectives: 1) increased country-wide availability of and access to balanced information; 2) increased public participation and informed dialogue on issues of national importance; and 3) expanded and strengthened linkages between communities. OTI will also work to promote civil society's engagement with local and national government and reinforce activities that bring civic actors together around issues of shared interests (e.g., cost of health care and local security.) OTI is based in Kinshasa and has program offices run by its implementing partners in Kisangani, Bukavu, and Bunia. Its activities are integrally linked with SO 3 (Democracy and Governance).

The strategy described above, still the official OTI strategy, was developed to respond to "Transition 2(a)." The Mission has now developed a new strategy to respond to "Transition 2(b)" and beyond. SO 3 moves substantially beyond the approaches taken prior to the summer of 2003 and sets out new directions for USAID/DRC. OTI/DRC is in the process of re-evaluating its present strategy in coordination with the SO 3 team and OFDA; this process will not be completed prior to the submission of this document. USAID/DRC recommends that a full discussion of OTI's role under this new strategy occur in early 2004. USAID/DRC further recommends consideration of including the OTI activity under a specific Intermediate Result of the DG SO, as was done for the Sudan.

#### **2.7.5. Office of Private Voluntary Cooperation**

In FY 2003, PVC awarded \$3 million to World Relief Corporation to implement a five-year program to strengthen the capacity of NGOs working in the microfinance sectors in eastern DRC and Burundi. Specifically in the Congo, World Relief will work in North and South Kivu to:

- Establish a strong, replicable microfinance institution;
- Contribute to a forum of microfinance practitioners;
- Advocate for an improved legal and regulatory environment for microfinance;
- Identify and adapt tools and resources to be used by the microfinance members; and
- Distribute these tools and resources through the microfinance members and other means.

The activities to be implemented by World Relief are in direct alignment with the Mission's Livelihoods SO that includes a strong microfinance and capacity building component. This grant will be managed by USAID/DRC and does not require a PVC presence in-country.

#### **2.7.6. Integrating DCHA into USAID/DRC Activities**

During the development of this ISP, DCHA and the rest of the Mission held extensive consultations to ensure that all USAID/DRC activities led to a common set of results outlined in this document. DCHA activities are integrated with Development Assistance (DA)-funded activities to ensure a smooth transition from relief to development. In the health sector, for example, USAID/DRC's program aims to have a national-level impact, including in emergency

areas. Under the ISP, this will be accomplished by implementing most of the key national health programs described in IR 2, SO 2 (see section 3.6.2.) across all operational environments of DRC, including emergency; identifying key health zones for transition from emergency assistance to development funding; disseminating updated technical guidelines and protocols to OFDA grantees; and including OFDA staff in the planning and review of Mission health activities. A discussion of how DCHA is an implementing mechanism in support of each SO is provided in each SO chapter, as appropriate.

The Mission will continue to mainstream and integrate DCHA activities within its development portfolio by taking the following steps:

- Including DCHA staff in key brainstorming and design meetings, and annual portfolio reviews;
- Integrating DCHA results in the Mission's Annual Report;
- Tracking DCHA indicators and including them in the Mission Performance Monitoring Plan; and
- Coordinating strategies and jointly designing an exit strategy and smooth transition of OTI's program to the Mission's DG Office.

#### **2.7.7. DCHA Program Shifts Under Different Scenarios**

The level of DCHA assistance provided in FY 2004 and beyond will depend upon conditions in the country, as described by scenarios in section 2.2. Under the "Successful Transition" and "Protracted Transition", where the country is relatively stable and humanitarian emergencies are declining, USAID support to emergency activities will decline since rates of malnutrition and mortality due to displacement caused by violence would decrease, and since responding to the needs of populations directly affected by the war (an important criterion for much of OFDA and WFP's involvement in the DRC) would no longer apply. Under these scenarios, activities funded with DA and Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds and perhaps P.L. 480 development funds will replace activities funded by International Disaster Assistance funds (IDA) and P.L. 480 emergency funds.

Under these scenarios, OTI would continue its activities, working with the Mission and colleagues at DCHA to reduce conflict and ensure that USAID responds effectively to key events in a democratic transition in the DRC such as elections. Specifically, OTI would continue its connectivity initiatives ensuring that it takes targeted decisions in response to potential negative triggers. OTI is aligned with SO 3 (DG) and will concentrate on program areas such as elections, government/constituent relations, gender, and youth initiatives. OTI is continuously assessing its relevance in the DRC throughout the multi-layered transition and will continue its presence until deemed otherwise.

Under the most pessimistic scenario, "Stalled Transition," where instability and insecurity continue, particularly in eastern Congo, and humanitarian emergencies do not abate, USAID would plan to support the substantial resource requirement of time, personnel, and funds needed to address emergency situations. OFDA and FFP would continue to provide substantial emergency assistance. OTI would concentrate on program areas such as reintegration, transitional justice, elections, gender, and youth initiatives as well as encouraging regional initiatives. If elections are cancelled, OTI would consider withdrawing early. In this case, it would hand over its activities per its country strategy.

## 2.8. CUSTOMER AND STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATIONS

In February 2003, after the parameters cable (provided in Annex I) was received, the Mission organized a retreat with all of its implementing partners to discuss the new strategy, its development, and all of the cross-cutting themes. This set the stage for numerous SO-level stakeholder consultations with Congolese civil society, local, regional, and national government, men, women, minorities, IDPs, and youth later in the strategy development process. As the various sector chapters of the ISP were being defined, stakeholders and customers became increasingly involved. The Mission called on them to share their experiences, lessons learned, and suggestions as to the most appropriate approaches and implementation methodologies. The Mission conducted extensive interviews with all relevant stakeholders prior to drafting the relevant SO chapters, and revalidated these in various fora with stakeholders and customers. In June 2003, the Mission Director discussed the thrust of the proposed strategy with President Kabila.

In designing SO 2 (Health), USAID/DRC conducted field visits to talk with church communities and potential beneficiaries about their health needs, interests, concerns, and the degree of women's participation in health activities. In addition, community coordinating committees responsible for serving as the liaison between the beneficiaries and health facilities were among the recipients of a USAID questionnaire distributed during a field assessment. USAID/DRC's current and potential health implementing partners have received briefings on the ISP and shared their insights and reflections. Since February 2003, the strategy has been shared and discussed with key health development partners such as UNICEF, UNAIDS, World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), and United Nations Development Program (UNDP). USAID has also discussed the strategy with other partners such as the E.U. and other bilateral donors during regular donor coordination meetings. In June, USAID briefed the new Minister of Health on the ISP and sought feedback from him and his staff. USAID also introduced the ISP to the Ministry of Health and other partners via its participation in: the multi-partner disease control working groups in malaria, HIV/AIDS, and TB; the Interagency Coordinating Committee on polio eradication; and the group coordinating the DRC submission for the Global Fund. (Key elements of the strategy are reflected in the DRC Global Fund submission).

SO 3 (DG) was developed in consultation with current and new implementing partners, Congolese groups, and OTI. Current implementing partners include the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes/National Democratic Institute and International Foundation for Electoral Systems (CEPPS/NDI and IFES), the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), the International Human Rights Law Group (IHRLG), Innovative Resources Management (IRM), and Search for Common Ground (SFCG). Each of these partners has Congolese staff to co-manage their USAID-funded programs. Since January 2003, USAID has worked with its partners to evaluate their programs, refine performance measures, and identify new strategic objectives based on this analysis to advance the DRC's post conflict transition as the political environment evolved. USAID again consulted all partners in July following unforeseen budget cutbacks and earmarks to further refine ongoing activities and eliminate those outside USAID/DRC's strategic or manageable interest. USAID gave monthly briefings throughout this process on the proposed strategy where partners shared their insights and suggestions.

The CVA was based on feedback for the most part from Congolese groups plus representatives from OFDA, OTI, and partner organizations to vet and further develop the conclusions and recommendations of the team. The CVA was refined accordingly, as was the DG strategy. In August and September of 2003, USAID held extensive briefing and coordinating meetings with UNDP, MONUC, the E.U., the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID), and other members of the international donor community to obtain their feedback and share evaluations and program planning documents. Also during this period, USAID extensively consulted with partners to develop its conflict mitigation and management strategy. USAID/DRC's strategic choices regarding assistance to key transition processes and institutions reflect this input and series of consultations, as does the decision to reduce civil society capacity-building activities. This decision was based on budget cuts and an assessment of the impact of civil society capacity building activities by USAID in collaboration with DG partners.

Consultation for SO 4 (Livelihoods) began in January 2002 with the deployment of the SWIFT Team. The team consulted the World Bank, IMF, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), as well as MONUC, U.N. organizations, bilateral donors, and a range of U.S.-based and indigenous NGOs. Using the SWIFT findings, USAID/DRC developed provisional objectives and hypotheses to serve as the foundation for SO 4. In March 2003, USAID/DRC led a team to look critically at these objectives and hypotheses and suggest modifications and practical means of implementation. The team, composed of staff from USAID/DRC, REDSO, and SANRU, traveled extensively in four provinces of the country talking to local communities, international and local NGOs, and the donor community. In subsequently refining the findings of the SWIFT and March 2003 teams into SO 4, the Mission consulted many of the same organizations, particularly the World Bank, which is funding the rehabilitation of major national roads and is crucial for the success of re-opening the secondary road infrastructure in selected zones.

In designing SO 5 (Education), USAID met with the World Bank, UNICEF, and OXFAM to explain the ISP and get their input into its development. In September 2003, the team presented the strategy to the new TG Minister of Primary and Secondary Education. The Mission and its implementing partners discussed the proposed strategy in November 2002 and April 2003 with parents and students, who expressed their satisfaction with the proposed strategy. Consultations with teachers surfaced a great need and desire for the kinds of training to be provided under this SO.

The DDR team consulted frequently with the military authorities of RCD, GDRC, and MLC to discuss the parameters of a future DDR program in the DRC. USAID also participated actively in the definition of national programs for child soldiers and for the interim demobilization of irregular forces. In October 2003, in the context of the World Bank's Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) mission to the DRC, USAID discussed its proposed strategy in detail with the Ministries of Defense and Social Affairs designated to spearhead the process within the GDRC. USAID also conducted two field visits in two separate locations to discuss with receiving communities their concerns and abilities to reintegrate ex-combatants.

The three required analyses - Gender, CVA, and Biodiversity and Tropical Forests - were conducted in a participatory manner, drawing on and incorporating the observations of many interviewees in the DRC, and fully reflect consultation with stakeholders and customers.

## 2.9. RESULTS ACHIEVED UNDER DIFFERENT FUNDING PARAMETERS

### 2.9.1. High Funding Parameter

The impact of a high funding parameter will be felt by each SO:

SO 2 (Health): The high funding level will permit the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the health zone strategy maximizing achievement of results at the national level as well as in USAID supported zones. The flexibility to enlarge geographically will assure a critical mass of first hand experience required to: influence the development and implementation of national level policies and practices; demonstrate impact on a proportion of the population significant enough to influence national infant, child and maternal mortality and morbidity rates; and guarantee that synergies with the other SOs, DCHA, and CARPE are achieved to the maximum extent possible.

HIV/AIDS and sexually transmitted infection (STI) activities at the 'Basic Country' level will assure that the Mission continues to be strategically placed in key areas with limited funding support. The comprehensive and cross-cutting character of the HIV/AIDS portfolio will allow a rapid and strategic scaling up of activities in the event that additional resources become available.

SO 3 (DG): The program would achieve significant results in each of the Intermediate Result (IR) areas. Rapid response assistance to take advantage of new opportunities and overcome new obstacles during the transition would be possible. Support for the most critical processes and institutions in areas where USAID has a comparative advantage and a proven track-record would be provided. Ongoing support would be provided at the national level to the electoral process, including political party strengthening; the process of national reconciliation and providing access to justice for the most vulnerable Congolese; and the legislative process working with key legislative and executive committees. This national level support would be complemented by activities to combat corruption, enhance government accountability, and improve local resource management at the local and provincial levels.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): The high funding scenario would permit both a horizontal and vertical expansion of activities under SO 4. SO 4 activities would be extended to additional areas where USAID health sector interventions are already taking place, as well as into areas where security conditions permit the rebuilding of local economies. Vertical expansion would occur through links to FFP activities via food for work programs and targeted assistance to most vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, victims of HIV/AIDS, and returning IDPs and ex-combatants. Activities to improve agricultural production and marketing, and to improve the availability of micro-finance and business development services would expand horizontally, while those under IR 4 – *Critical Needs of Targeted Vulnerable Groups Met* – would expand vertically through programs to link SO 4 with FFP to meet critical needs of vulnerable groups.

SO 5 (Education): Under this parameter, the estimated number of schools that benefit from USAID activities (e.g., scholarships, community learning centers, and teacher training) would exceed 170. The estimated number of children enrolled in schools affected by USAID activities would exceed 110,000. In addition, more innovations will be produced and shared across communities that will lead to a higher level of quality education, increased teacher motivation,

and increased retention of students as programs become more relevant to their surrounding environments.

It is expected that the use of innovation and technologies will enable more people to be reached at lower cost due to the operational leverage provided by the technology.

SpO (DDR): The program would concentrate on: DDR planning and strategy development (IR 1); community revitalization and reintegration of irregular armed groups (IRs 2 & 3); and reintegration of surplus regular forces (IR 3). It would achieve results in all three key areas.

In summary, under a high funding parameter, the direct beneficiary-level impact in the social and DDR sectors would be significantly increased. The number of people benefiting from improved farming practices and able to improve their economic condition would be greater. The transition process would be bolstered by sufficient investment in key areas.

### **2.9.2. Low Funding Parameter**

SO 2: The program would have adequate resources to assure influence on national-level policy development and capacity building and to provide a critical package of key health interventions to a smaller number of health zones and regions of the DRC.

SO 3: The program would be forced to inflate IR 2 and IR 3. Either support for elections or political party development would be scaled back, depending on program performance. USAID/DRC would curtail assistance in the justice sector, reducing its program to a set of core activities focusing on political process strengthening and public participation. It would not be able to continue the high-impact media and civil society activities supported by OTI's Congo in Action for Peace program as OTI phases down, and would need to close some or all of the Democracy Resource Centers.

SO 4: SO 4 activities to increase agricultural productivity, improve marketing, and increase access to finance would be preserved under a low funding scenario for those areas which have already been identified for SO interventions. However, the Mission would be constrained in expanding the areas of intervention. This could seriously impact the success of other SOs since the intention of the Mission is to apply the Livelihoods model as an integral part of the process for improving access to health care and education opportunities, including for reintegrating ex-combatants. A low funding scenario would also constrain SO 4 in making linkages with FFP to meet the needs of vulnerable groups and rebuild essential local infrastructure through food-for-work programs. While the most important resources for these activities would come from FFP, DA resources via SO 4 will be required to identify needs, design and monitor programs, and, in some cases, complement those of FFP to purchase materials and services for use in conjunction with food for work programs.

SO 5: The target for the total number of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender) would be only 66,000. (This number estimates that a total of 100 schools at 660 students per school will be reinforced with increased teacher capacity, learning materials, and increased retention and achievement of students.) Fewer innovations would be produced which means that the quality of education would not increase

as significantly as under the high parameter and a much smaller targeted population would benefit.

SpO: The program would concentrate on DDR planning and strategy development (IR 1) and reintegration of irregular armed groups with limited community revitalization (IR 2 & 3). The program would have funding for only an extremely small number of pilot activities with irregular armed groups. The program would not be able to engage meaningfully in the critical DDR of regular troops.

In summary, under a low funding parameter, the direct beneficiary-level impact in the social and DDR sectors would be significantly reduced. The number of people benefiting from improved farming practices and able to improve their economic condition would be fewer.

## **2.10. OTHER DONOR ASSISTANCE**

### **2.10.1. Summary of Donor Activity by Sector**

Donor activity in the DRC is in a state of transition as many agencies review their programs in light of political developments. Given the DRC's vast territory, donors are making strategic choices regarding where to engage, based on interest, need, security, and logistical considerations. However, with the recent installation of the TG, it is likely that recovery and development activities will accelerate and that, security permitting, these will cover most of the country. That said, even under a "Successful Transition" scenario, humanitarian needs will persist throughout the period of this ISP.

Given the enormity of need in the DRC, USAID is investing in sectors where its activities will complement those of other donors: health, democracy and governance, agriculture/livelihoods, environment, and education. USAID is not investing in large infrastructure projects, which are normally funded by the World Bank and the E.U.). Details on development partners and other coordinating mechanisms within each SO are provided in specific SO chapters in this ISP.

Health is one of the largest sectors, with activities ranging from national campaigns (such as the campaign to eradicate polio) and basic support to health zones, to vaccinations, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and family planning programs. The largest actors beyond USAID are the E.U., Belgium, the World Bank, Canada, Italy, Germany, and UNICEF; other bilateral donors and U.N. agencies also have programs.

DG activities fall into two categories: government capacity building (E.U., World Bank, France, and Canada) and support to civil society (Belgium, Canada, Sweden, and the U.K.).

Programs directed at income generation are often linked to agriculture/food security. This is a field of engagement for many donors, including the FAO, Belgium, Canada, the E.U., France, and Germany.

A growing number of donors, including France, the E.U., Germany, the World Bank, and the FAO, are involved in work related to the environment, including development of government capacity and direct protection of natural resources. The Congo Basin Forest Partnership (CBFP) is the most important initiative bringing various donors together. The goal of the CBFP

is to promote economic development, alleviate poverty, combat illegal logging, enhance anti-poaching laws, improve local governance, and conserve natural resources. The USAID implementation arm of the CBFP, CARPE, is extremely active in the DRC.

The World Bank, UNICEF, and Belgium are supporting the education sector. The World Bank is embarking on a \$20 million school construction program designed for income generation as well as educational enhancement purposes. The Belgians are working with UNICEF and the GDRC to develop a basic textbook for primary grades 1-3, and UNICEF is developing a pilot life-skills program for selected primary schools (fewer than 200 throughout the country). There is a consensus among donors that the correct approach for the education sector is to develop focused model programs that build on lessons learned, have high impact, and scale up at the appropriate time. The Mission is already working closely with the World Bank and other donors for synergy and possible leveraging of other donor funds in the future.

DDR in the DRC is a multi-donor effort. The regional World Bank program, or MDRP, is the main mechanism through which DDR in central and southern Africa (including the DRC) will be implemented. MDRP partners are the U.K., France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy, the E.U., and Canada. The UNDP has been designated by the GDRC as the coordinating agency for the national DDR program.

Finally, donors are working to integrate gender considerations throughout their programming and specifically recognize the barriers to women's access to key services. Belgium specifies a focus on women in its income generation activities, such as technical training. Canada focuses its microcredit project on women, and also has a fund directed toward providing women with the tools for pursuing livelihoods. UNICEF's education programs specifically target girls.

### **2.10.2. USAID/DRC's Convergence with DAC Guidelines**

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC)<sup>26</sup> of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines for Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery indicate that donors should align their procedures with developing country systems and work to harmonize procedures among themselves while supporting efforts by partner countries to develop their own viable systems.

The level of coordination among donors varies depending on the sector.

- USAID and its health partners follow the DAC Guidelines, which allows for an easy understanding of who supports which zone and prevents overlap of efforts. Additionally almost all health partners follow standardized WHO guidelines, accepted by the GDRC, for technical implementation of primary health care. USAID is an active member of several working groups for different technical health areas (malaria, nutrition, and family planning).

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<sup>26</sup> The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established a Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Task Force on Donor Practices. The DAC Task Force consisting of representation from 22 countries, including the U.S., and the E.C. developed practical steps donors can take to improve the efficiency of the assistance they deliver. In Spring 2003, the DAC published a series of good practice papers, including the DAC Guidelines for Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery.

- To design its DG program, USAID collaborated closely with MONUC, UNDP, the World Bank, the E.U., DFID, and other donors including the Belgian and French Cooperations. USAID continues to work closely with other donors to ensure that critical opportunities are not missed and that its future program is complementary and not redundant with the emerging programs of other donors in this sector.
- The FAO coordinates an active donors' group on livelihoods issues. USAID interventions in agriculture and against corruption benefited from knowledge gained at these coordination meetings. Regular coordination with the World Bank, in particular, has strongly influenced other livelihoods interventions.
- Donors are in the initial stages of setting up an association aimed at rationalizing procedures and interventions in the education sector.
- In the DDR sector, procedure alignment and harmonization has largely been achieved through the trust fund mechanisms (grouping most major donors) and by USAID's commitment to participate with and work in conformity with jointly-developed policies and procedures. Also, donors have the opportunity to work with the soon-to-be-consolidated GDRC DDR coordinating structures to ensure that viable policies and procedures are jointly developed from the beginning.

### 2.10.3. Summary of the International Monetary Fund Program<sup>27</sup>

On June 12, 2002 the IMF's Executive Board approved a \$662 million<sup>28</sup> three-year arrangement for the DRC under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This arrangement was designed to support the Government Economic Program from April 1, 2002 to July 31, 2005. Three tranches totaling \$617.3 million were disbursed as of July 2003 and an additional fourth tranche of \$36 million will be available in January 2004 with the successful completion of a third review in November 2003. Similar six month cycles of reviews and disbursements will take place until the end date of the program. Prior to this program commencing in 2002, the IMF's last financial arrangements with the DRC were two programs that ended in mid-1990, totaling about \$429 million in approved funds and approximately \$287 million in funds actually drawn.

Overall macroeconomic performance under the program was broadly satisfactory during its first year, with progress achieved on the structural side. However, despite overall good efforts to meet conditions, the DRC requested waivers for the nonobservance of five performance criteria.

IMF activities under the PRGF include:

- Audits of five commercial banks—BCD (*Banque de Commerce et de Developement*), Citibank, BIAC (*Banque Internationale pour l'Afrique au Congo*), Banque Congolaise, and First Banking Corporation—as well as audits of the BCC (*Banque Centrale du Congo* or Central Bank) including net foreign assets, net domestic assets, and foreign exchange reserves management;

<sup>27</sup> IMF/Kinshasa staff and IMF report, "Democratic Republic of Congo—Second Review Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria", dated July 9, 2003.

<sup>28</sup> All monetary amounts were given to USAID/DRC in Special Drawing Reserve (SDR) figures. As of July 2003, the exchange rate was 27.6M SDR = \$36 million, or 1 SDR = \$1.3. Budget figures have been converted into this exchange rate for easy understanding in this ISP.

- Approval of a new procedures manual for the public expenditure chain and the reorganization of the four affected treasury directorates. In December 2002, treasury bills were created as was a new facility to back deposits at the commercial banks;
- The holding of a joint BCC-IMF seminar on corruption, money laundering, and transnational organized crime in April 2003. Also, a related national committee - the National Committee for the Fight Against Terrorism - was established in the BCC and legislation is planned to be presented to the Parliament by the end of 2003;
- Assistance in creating a reunification, reconstruction, and pro-poor 2004 budget by the end of 2003, reflecting the interests of all territories, including those recently unified;
- Mechanisms for increasing the effectiveness of tax collection agencies and the reduction of taxpayers' paperwork will be completed with IMF technical assistance; and
- A July 2003 reform of the customs authority implemented with a one-stop<sup>29</sup> customs collection point in Matadi, the country's only ocean port city.

#### **2.10.4. Summary of the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development Program<sup>30</sup>**

The Emergency Trust Fund funded the Emergency Stabilization and Recovery Project beginning in October 2000 to help the DRC assist communities in the health, education, food security, water, and infrastructure rehabilitation sectors. It also provided technical assistance, training, and seminars for economic reform and donor coordination assistance. Administering this fund for other donors, the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA) has \$13 million to date in the fund and the European Union recently pledged an additional 10 million Euros for the capacity building component.

In July 2001, the IDA approved \$50 million for the Emergency Early Recovery Project (EERP). Funds are fully committed and disbursements should be complete by the end of 2003. This project focuses on reunification of territories into one country, and only addresses former government controlled territories in the southern part of the country.

Below is a breakdown of the specific activities under the EERP:

- HIV/AIDS program (\$8 million);
- Matadi road reconstruction (\$15 million);
- Institutional Reform (\$21 million);
- Community/Social Projects (\$3 million); and
- Contingencies (\$3 million).

In August 2002, the Emergency Multi-sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project (EMRRP) was approved at a total budget of \$1.7 billion, of which the World Bank contributed \$454 million. This program is designed to have a direct and rapid impact on the urgent needs of the populace. The EMRRP<sup>31</sup> is a three year project which aims to reduce poverty through a multi-

<sup>29</sup> A one-stop customs collection point as opposed to multiple offices is designed to reduce chances of corruption and extortion.

<sup>30</sup> World Bank/Kinshasa staff and IMF report, "Democratic Republic of Congo—Second Review Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria", dated July 9, 2003.

<sup>31</sup> As of October 2003, this project had not yet started disbursements.

sectoral approach mobilizing the international community. Specifically, it will support the long term process of reconstruction and economic rehabilitation by financing:

- Infrastructure rehabilitation and reconstruction (water supply, transport, electricity, and urban infrastructure) - \$324 million.
- Agriculture (rural roads, agri-information system, policy framework for improving investment climate in the agriculture sector) and social sector development (basic service delivery for education, health, and social protection) - \$107 million.
- Capacity building, institutional reform, and sector strategy development - \$12 million
- Management, monitoring, and evaluation - \$11 million.

In July 2003, the Private Sector Development and Competitiveness Project was approved at \$120 million. This forthcoming program seeks to increase competition in economic activity, which will in turn encourage economic growth. It aims to:

- Improve the investment climate through support of commercial arbitration, reform the justice sector as it pertains to commercial matters, and support ANAPI, a government agency responsible for facilitating foreign investment.
- Support the reform of public enterprises in the mining, telecommunications, financial, transport, and energy sectors.
- Using a community driven approach, facilitate reintegration of retrenched workers in the local economy through the development of private enterprises and support for training, business development services, and finance.

Additional projects:

- A forthcoming multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS program (MAP) that will address the entire DRC has an estimated funding level of \$100 million.
- An Emergency Economic and Social Reunification Project (totaling \$214 million) which was approved in August 2003 will focus on eastern and northern DRC as a way of concretizing the unification.
- A Regional Power Project, managed by the Coordination Center of the Southern African Power Pool, promotes and manages electricity trade in the region; seeks to remove bottlenecks that inhibit trade; and aims to connect member countries that do not at present enjoy the full benefits of the Pool, which includes earning hard currency for the country and infrastructure. The DRC component is the largest and is estimated to cost \$186 million, with financing from IDA amounting to \$177 million.
- In May 2002, the Economic Recovery Credit was approved at \$450 million. The first tranche of \$410 million disbursed in July 2002 for debt servicing. The second tranche of \$15 million was given in April 2003 for forestry reforms. In July 2003, the third tranche of \$25 million went to mining reforms and financed the voluntary departure for about 9,000 workers from Gecamines, a state mining company.

### **2.10.5. The Congo Basin Forest Partnership**

The CBFP brings together bilateral donors, multilateral donors, NGOs, and private commercial interests for the purposes of slowing the rate of biodiversity loss in the Congo Basin. The World Bank, FAO, and E.U. are the main multilateral donors, whereas the U.S., U.K., France, and Germany are the main bilaterals. The CBFP formally includes the governments of the six basin

countries, and a number of international NGOs. The USG has pledged \$53 million to the partnership, and the major European donors have plans to follow suit with major contributions.

#### **2.10.6. Overall Donor Coordinating Mechanisms**

Donor coordinating mechanisms continue to strengthen in the DRC. A large group, including all heads of major bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, co-chaired by the UNDP and World Bank Resident Representatives, meets quarterly. Underneath this overall body are the following thematic groups:

- DDR, chaired, by UNDP, with active USAID participation;
- Forest and food security, chaired by FAO, with active USAID participation;
- HIV/AIDS;
- Capacity Building;
- Macroeconomic Issues;
- Human Rights and Justice Issues (chaired by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights); and
- Education (to be formed imminently; chaired by Belgium, UNICEF, and UNESCO).

In addition to these groups, a Humanitarian Action Group (infelicitously known as the "HAG") meets weekly, chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative and Humanitarian Coordinator, with active USAID participation. An elections coordination structure has been set up, with active involvement of the USG, including USAID. A working-level body, convened by MONUC, meets weekly and coordinates with a senior group of Ambassadors, convened by the Special Representative of the Secretary General. This senior group, known as the CIAT (French acronym for International Committee to Support the Transition), meets regularly to discuss key issues related to the transition. Progress towards elections is one of these issues, which is why the CIAT agreed to the special arrangement to be linked to an elections working group. A Donors' Coordination Committee was formed in October 2003 to coordinate donor interaction with the GDRC in the preparation of the PRSP. This group is likely to have the U.K. as its convener. Also, an informal working group on infrastructure issues is chaired by the E.U.

Yearly Consultative Group (CG) meetings are held on the Congo. It is expected that after the December 2003 CG meeting in Paris, subsequent gatherings will occur in the DRC.

#### **2.11. Implementation Time Frame**

USAID/DRC expects approval of the FY 2004-2008 ISP in December 2003. Subsequent to approval, the Mission will work with current partners and some new partners to implement activities in support of the approved strategy. During the period of this ISP, USAID/DRC will use various mechanisms (e.g., Request For Approval, Annual Program Statement) to seek new partners to implement activities while continuing to work with current partners. As soon as successful national elections are held and a new government takes power, the Mission may negotiate agreements with the GDRC that would permit obligations via SOAGs.

Each SO team in coordination with their stakeholders will further elaborate on its preliminary Performance Monitoring Plans (PMPs) in early calendar year (CY) 2004, field test them in mid

CY 2004, and finalize the PMPs by the end of CY 2004. The Mission will use the PMPs as a basis for measuring results on a regular basis. Initial quantifiable results under the ISP will be reported on in December 2004. Should the DRC fall again under 620q and Brooke sanctions, the Mission's engagement in democracy and reintegration would need to be recalibrated somewhat in re involvement with the GDRC in these areas.

## **2.12. Country Restrictions and Legal Issues**

Until very recently, the DRC was under sanction for nonpayment of debt under Section 620q of the Foreign Assistance Act and the Brooke Amendment, Section 512 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. As of June 5, 2003, however, the sanction has been lifted pursuant to entry into force of a rescheduling agreement between the DRC and the USG. As a consequence of the Brooke sanction, the Mission has had no direct assistance relationship with the GDRC. Now that the sanctions are lifted, activities under this strategy may include working directly with the GDRC. For example, USAID may obligate funds under SOAGs with the GDRC once successful national elections are held and a new government takes power. Direct assistance with the GDRC may also include the training of government cadres and other like ancillary benefits.

A current statutory provision requires regular congressional notification of each activity funded in the DRC irrespective of whether or not the activity had been included in the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ). Accordingly, the Mission will assure notification of each new activity and each incremental obligation as required by Section 520 of the FY 2003 Appropriations Act for as long as this or similar provisions continue in force.

A final overall consideration is the absence of a useful bilateral framework in the DRC. There is a 1948 agreement with the Government of Belgium that covered the then-Belgian Congo, but it does not provide for the immunities or the tax exemptions that modern bilaterals supply. A direct government-to-government assistance relationship in a post-Brooke environment is possible provided that the GDRC keeps its non-forgiven debt current. Accordingly, the Mission will consult with the U.S. Embassy in Kinshasa and USAID's Africa Bureau on the advisability of seeking authority to negotiate a new Bilateral Agreement, but does not intend for this operational issue to be an ISP approval issue.

Additional sector-specific legal considerations are addressed in the relevant SO chapters of this document, in particular the SpO chapter.


# CHAPTER 3

## USE OF KEY HEALTH SERVICES AND PRACTICES BOTH IN USAID-SUPPORTED HEALTH ZONES AND AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL INCREASED

### - STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 2 -

### 3.1. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

DRC's health indicators are among the worst in the world. The infant and under-five mortality rates are 126 and 213 per 1,000 live births respectively<sup>1</sup>. The maternal mortality rate, the highest in the world, is 1,289 deaths per 100,000 live births<sup>2</sup>. As a result, life expectancy is estimated at only 46 years for men and 51 years for women<sup>3</sup>. The total fertility rate of 7.1<sup>4</sup>, one of the highest in Africa, has shown little improvement over time.



Although the overall reported HIV prevalence for DRC is 5.1%<sup>5</sup>, data from a 1999 sentinel surveillance found rates of 6.7% among a limited sample of pregnant women in the capital of Kinshasa and 10% in the second largest city of Lubumbashi. Data from the 2002 UNAIDS report suggest that by the end of 2001, 1.3 million adults and children were infected with HIV. Higher rates may exist in areas recently occupied by foreign troops from countries with high national prevalence rates (such as Zimbabwe,

Uganda, and Rwanda) and that are characterized by internally displaced persons, conflict, violence, and increasing poverty. With the end of the Congo conflict, there will be an additional risk of elevated transmission from increased commercial traffic from Southern Africa (Zimbabwe 33.7%; Zambia 21.5%<sup>6</sup>) and East Africa (Kenya 15%; Tanzania 7.8%<sup>7</sup>), and the movement of displaced persons and army/militia "camp followers" to major cities and trade centers.

<sup>1</sup> UNICEF, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey - MICS2, 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Population Reference Bureau, 2003

<sup>4</sup> MICS2

<sup>5</sup> UNAIDS, 2002.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

According to the National Malaria Control Program (NMCP), malaria accounts for 25-30% of under-five deaths. Although surveillance data is incomplete, malaria accounts for 30% of national hospital admissions and an even greater percent of outpatient visits (e.g., 69% of outpatient visits in Katana Health Zone, South Kivu province in 2000). Due to low vaccination coverage rates (e.g., 30% DPT3 coverage<sup>8</sup>), measles and neonatal tetanus are still major causes of under-five mortality. According to a survey undertaken from 1999-2001 by the International Rescue Committee in eastern DRC, measles was responsible for between 3% and 18% of all under-five deaths. Although use of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) is high, only about 10% of children with diarrhea are provided extra fluids and continue to be fed normally. Deterioration of sanitation infrastructures and unhygienic behavior has significantly increased water borne diseases in children. Twenty-two percent of children were reported to have had diarrhea during the two weeks prior the MICS2 survey. The MICS2 also indicates a high burden of acute respiratory infections (10% of children were reported to have had this condition two weeks prior to the survey).

Malnutrition is both an important direct and underlying cause of under-five mortality. According to the MICS2, a catastrophic 13% of children suffer from acute malnutrition (an increase from 4% reported in 1995<sup>9</sup>), and 38% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition. The UNICEF 1998 National Vitamin A survey found 61% of children under 3 were vitamin A deficient (22% severe), among the highest rates in Africa. (Vitamin A deficiency increases child mortality by 23-26%, particularly when combined with extreme poverty and population displacement, as has occurred in the DRC.) Only 12% of children had received a dose of vitamin A during the 6 months preceding the MICS2 survey.

The high maternal mortality rate in the DRC is due to poor quality prenatal care, chronic anemia, high rates of infectious disease, a lack of access to emergency obstetric care, low access to contraceptives, early childbearing, and a high fertility rate. Modern contraceptive use is 4%<sup>10</sup>, among the lowest in the world.

Tuberculosis (TB) is one of the leading causes of death from infectious diseases in the DRC, particularly affecting individuals in their economically productive years. There are an estimated 150,000 new cases of TB every year and the DRC ranks twelfth in contributing to the world's TB burden<sup>11</sup>. The National Tuberculosis Program (NTP) reports that only 53% of estimated cases are detected and only 70% of detected cases are cured.

The DRC is prone to outbreaks of infectious diseases. In the last five years, there have been outbreaks of measles, pertussis, cholera, hemorrhagic fevers, and meningococcal meningitis.

Lower levels of education, lack of power, and certain cultural dynamics serve to hamper improvements in the health of women and children. Those with little education are less likely to understand public health and hygiene concepts, to use child spacing measures, to have a good understanding of how HIV is spread, and to have their children vaccinated and weighed. Additionally, girls who do not attend school or leave school early are more likely to marry young and bear children in their teen years.

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<sup>8</sup> MICS2.

<sup>9</sup> MICS1.

<sup>10</sup> MICS2.

<sup>11</sup> World Health Organization.

In addition to less education, women traditionally have less power in Congolese society. Men are not only more likely to occupy the decision-making positions in health facilities and communities (almost all health zone medical directors are men), but also in the home and in relationships. Men determine whether their partner uses family planning; the husband's signature is needed at the clinic-level to obtain any modern method. Moreover, men are usually in charge of the family budget, determining how much is spent on nutritious foods and health items such as well-baby visits or mosquito nets. Studies have shown that when women are in control of the finances these items are better funded.

Finally, cultural traditions hinder improvements in health. In the Congo, men generally do not participate in well-baby visits, prenatal visits, or the birth of their children. They may not in turn appreciate the importance (or dangers, in the case of childbirth) of these activities and subsequently may not provide women with enough financial and emotional support.

### **3.2. GDRC RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE**

The national health structure consists of the Central Ministry of Health (MOH), 11 Provincial Health Inspection Offices, 45 Regional Health Inspection Offices, and 430 health zones (to increase to 500 by late 2004 due to health zone reconfiguration). Each zone covers on average 150,000 people and consists of a central zonal office, a hospital, approximately 20 or more satellite health centers, and community action groups. Many zones are co-managed by religious or other non-governmental organizations. At the start of 2001 the MOH began a process of redefining and increasing the number of zones in an effort to improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the health care delivery system.

The GDRC spends less than 4.9%<sup>12</sup> of its total budget on health care. Its support is limited to irregular and very low salary payments of state health workers (e.g., \$5 to \$20 per month). High taxes charged on medications, other health and medical supplies, and low salaries as well as the diversion and misuse of health materials are problems common throughout the country. The population must bear the bulk of the costs of delivering health services, including much of the remuneration for health staff. Inefficiencies, including overstaffing as well as over-prescribed drugs and lab tests, exacerbate the burden on the consumer. This results in high cost recovery fees that restrict access to services, depress utilization of health facilities, and create a dysfunctional drug supply system. As a result, many health workers lack motivation and perform poorly.

Outreach and community-based services are weak, benefiting only those persons who live in close proximity to health centers. In addition, the infectious disease surveillance and routine health information systems are inadequate, resulting in an inability to systematically detect and address disease outbreaks, establish reliable baseline data, and effectively measure the impact of interventions. The GDRC is similarly unable to adequately monitor the geographic and demographic severity of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the country.

In 1998 the GDRC joined major development partners in the 'Roll Back Malaria' initiative. In 2000, the GDRC signed the Abuja accord with 50 other African countries agreeing to provide coverage with insecticide treated nets for 60% of pregnant women and 60% of children under

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<sup>12</sup> DRC Ministry of Finance 2003.

five years of age. It also agreed to provide intermittent preventive treatment of 68% of pregnant women by 2005. In addition, the Congo has received funding from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) to support routine immunization activities and from the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria (GFATM) for its TB, HIV, and Malaria control programs. Partner support has been solicited for the development of priority health interventions that will be included in a current World Bank grant, the PRSP, and HIPC Initiative debt reduction plan.

### **3.3. PRIOR USAID HEALTH EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC**

USAID past assistance in the health sector has produced results that continue to be visible in the form of community knowledge, behavior change, trained personnel, and programs operating with other donor support or local resources, such as the Kinshasa School of Public Health. Investments in infrastructure, increased community participation in the delivery of health services, and personnel training also have a proven record of effectiveness and durability in the DRC. Health centers are constructed only by communities and most of the 1,100 plus facilities currently supported by the SANRU<sup>13</sup> III project were constructed through direct support provided to these communities by the SANRU I and SANRU II projects<sup>14</sup>. They continue to function with community support although with diminished technical and financial capacity. A recent study of knowledge attitudes and practices in Equator Province by the Kinshasa School of Public Health documented that 40.6% of births were attended by traditional birth attendants trained by previous USAID programs.<sup>15</sup> In addition to the DRC's capacity to absorb assistance, there is a strong indigenous capacity and appreciation for establishing and operating programs and strategies, which provides the basis for effective partnerships and collaborations. If programs address a real need and implementation is done systematically within appropriate time frames, goals and objectives can be readily attained and long lasting impacts assured.

USAID/DRC believes that it can contribute to substantial progress in the health sector because of the following rationale:

USAID has a proven health strategy in the DRC. In the 1980s, prior to the recent civil strife, USAID/Zaire (now DRC) and other donors had very active health development programs. USAID and its development partners contributed substantial support to the GDRC in its establishment of a system of primary health care based on health zones. It also facilitated partnerships between the GDRC, churches, and local NGOs in the health sector.

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<sup>13</sup> USAID's Sante Rural III or rural health project is designed to strengthen the capacity of approximately sixty NGO-managed health zones for priority primary health care (PHC) interventions and health zone support systems. Priority PHC interventions include a minimum package of services: HIV/AIDS and STIs, malaria, nutrition, re-emerging diseases such as tuberculosis, and water and sanitation. Support systems include planning and management; training and supervision; supply line and cost recovery; infrastructure rehabilitation and equipment; and information and surveillance systems. With USAID funding, Interchurch Medical Assistance has been managing SANRU III and providing priority primary health care interventions and health zone support systems under a five year cooperative agreement from mid-2001 through mid-2006.

<sup>14</sup> SANRU I and II (1981-1991) were bilateral projects managed on behalf of the Ministry of Health by the Church of Christ of Congo (ECC) to provide development assistance to 100 of Congo's 306 health zones. By 1987, with SANRU I and II assistance, more than 200 of a total of 306 health zones were considered functional. Although the political disruptions in Congo in 1991 forced USAID/DRC to terminate its assistance, the work of the ECC continued through a variety of projects and funding sources.

<sup>15</sup> SANRU/ESP KAP Survey 2002.

As a result of these activities and special initiatives for Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), family planning, and water and sanitation, the DRC was able to achieve relatively high and stable vaccination and antenatal care coverage and high health service utilization rates (over 60%) despite serious health system problems. The 2001 MICS2 survey indicates that 68% of pregnant women received some antenatal care and trained personnel attended 61% of births.

The Kinshasa School of Public Health receives students from several African nations and throughout the country through the support of USAID and other partners. Scholarships were also provided to Congolese students to study public health in the United States.

In FY 2002, USAID, including OFDA, obligated approximately \$27,825,000 in Child Survival and Health (CSH) and International Disaster Assistance (IDA) funds in the health sector to support activities in 91 health zones and selected national initiatives. CSH resources were used to support 81 of these zones, with the principal focus of USAID interventions on improving drug supply systems, management, supervision, and provider performance. OFDA with IDA resources supported 11 health zones. Insecurity and population displacement in these 11 zones had resulted in high levels of malnutrition and mortality requiring a focus on programs of therapeutic and supplemental feeding and/or basic primary health care. Emergency conditions will recede as the conflict ends; the transition of these “emergency” zones to “developmental” status will be a priority.

At the national level, support has been provided for routine immunization, polio eradication, and measles mortality reduction activities. To address the enormous malaria problem, USAID helped to develop and begin implementation of a revised national malaria policy, including improvements in case management, intermittent preventive treatment, and the introduction of insecticide treated bed nets (ITN) in several pilot health zones.

HIV/AIDS activities include prevention efforts emphasizing behavior change and condom social marketing targeted at high-risk groups, such as commercial sex workers, truckers, police, and the military. At the national and health zone levels, USAID also provides support for the NTP, family planning, nutrition policy development, and disease surveillance and response activities.



A volunteer vaccination supervisor in Kisangani during the 2003 National Vaccination Day. Photo by Lina Piripiri

To support the ISP, USAID will build on its past successes in the health sector. In the past two years, vaccination coverage increased from 20% to 40% and overall health service utilization rose from less than 15% to an average of 26% in 63 health zones supported by USAID<sup>16</sup>. Furthermore, with USAID assistance, national distribution of vitamin A (non-polio related) reached 74.8% in February 2003.<sup>17</sup> In addition, excellent progress has been achieved in interrupting wild poliovirus transmission, a longstanding USAID priority in the DRC. The last

<sup>16</sup> SANRU quarterly reports.

<sup>17</sup> PRONANUT, BASICS, MOST Campaign Report.

cases of wild poliovirus (28 cases) were reported in 2000. Since then, no more cases have been reported. The number of acute flaccid paralysis cases reported by the WHO surveillance system and classified as “compatible” by the National Committee of Polio Experts is decreasing: 324 cases in 2001, 59 cases in 2002, and 11 cases from January to August 2003.<sup>18</sup>

### 3.4. PROGRAM RATIONALE

The DRC ranks among the countries with the worst health indicators in the world. Routine immunization levels are extremely low and reproductive age females are chronically anemic and malnourished. Mosquito nets, effective malaria medications, micronutrients, and contraceptives representing new, revised, or standard prevention tools are in short supply and/or not effectively utilized when available. Although HIV/AIDS rates are estimated to be around 5%<sup>19</sup>, a high TB infection rate may suggest that the rate is underestimated. Rates are set to increase as combatants are demobilized and populations respond to increased economic and social opportunities.

These unfortunate realities notwithstanding, facilities, institutions, and community engagement continue to exist and form the basis upon which USAID, the GDRC, and partners can seek to stabilize and reverse unacceptably high morbidity and mortality rates. Although unaffordable health care costs represent a principal barrier to access, a significant proportion of the population chooses not to use public care facilities for other reasons. Primarily, there is a perception of poor quality and inefficient service delivery. In addition, some people choose to pay for health care through private sector providers including pharmacies, itinerant merchants, traditional healers, and private practitioners. Improving facilities and public awareness of quality services can create an informed demand and use of effective services and commodities in the public and private sectors.



USAID/DRC's target population: women of reproductive age and children under 5 (including these newborn twins from Pimu in Equateur shown in the bottom left).

The USAID program will increase access and improve the quality and range of key health services. Key interventions planned include: insecticide treated bed nets; micronutrient supplements; effective management of childhood malaria; Intermittent Preventive Treatment (IPT) of malaria during pregnancy; family planning; support for routine vaccinations; strengthening of the TB Directly Observed Treatment Strategy (DOTS); behavior change initiatives; and

support for people affected by HIV. Certain activities will target a limited number of health zones while a core package of key interventions including routine vaccinations, IPT, bed nets,

<sup>18</sup> WHO, 2003.

<sup>19</sup> UNAIDS 2000.

effective malaria case management, and vitamin A supplementation will be made available in every zone with threshold target levels of coverage established.

USAID's focus on its intermediate results (availability, financial access, enhanced quality, increased awareness and increased care, support, and prevention for HIV/AIDS/STIs) targets problems that can be addressed with a proven package of interventions. Experienced and skilled USAID partners are being accessed, and the GDRC is becoming increasingly effective in the recognition of and reaction to these problems. Improving policy, strategy and oversight capacity at the national level and enhancing the role of men in supporting appropriate health behaviors are key to increasing availability, financial access, and enhanced quality in a selected number of health zones.

Increasing the availability of key health services depends first on providing to all health zones a priority package of key commodities including effective malarial medications, ITNs, vitamin A and iron supplements, immunization program cold chain, HIV/AIDS tests for all blood transfusions, and key health messages to be employed at the household level. A limited number of zones will also benefit from the provision of family planning services and support for the control of TB, HIV/AIDS/STIs and safe water and hygiene practices. All of these inputs are compatible with existing practices and programs already supported by partners working in the selected health zones (e.g., UNICEF, the E.U., WHO, local NGOs, and religious organizations managing health facilities).

Improving financial access to key health services is a more complex endeavor. It involves cost containment at the facility level, as the package of services are increased, GDRC support in the form of increased financial inputs, rationalization of employment practices, and increased incomes at the community level. The TG has introduced HIV/AIDS program support in the budget for the national police and included for the first time immunization program support in the national budget. In addition to pushing for the removal of taxes on imported mosquito nets, the MOH has established a new office to address the issue of financial management at the facility level (*Programme National des Compte Nationaux de la Sante (PNCNS)*). Partners have also been invited to participate in the development of the PRSP and the HIPC initiative.

Enhancing the quality of key health services will require carefully structured training, monitoring and supervision activities, and the strategic integration of new practices and policies developed through support to the national level. USAID's planned package of services and commodities are cost effective. If successfully introduced, the package will increase the value of key health services without overburdening staff or increasing costs beyond the limited means of the target population. Prenatal and preschool clinics as well as curative care services can be dramatically enhanced by introducing IPT, support for the cold chain, iron and vitamin A supplementation, ITNs, and the use of standardized protocols for the treatment of severe and non-severe childhood malaria without significantly increasing costs. Effective treatment and adoption of preventive practices will over time reduce the instance of chronic and acute illnesses and increase the quality of care.

Increasing awareness and practice of healthy behaviors will reduce the health burden at the community and health facility level. The revitalization of facilities and services will build an important platform from which community outreach can be conducted, providing an opportunity to address the critical initial home based response to illness. Effective recognition and response

at the community and facility levels will help reduce the incidences of chronic disease that lead to acute high mortality outcomes. Outreach activities will promote effective preventive health practices at the community level with a particular focus on encouraging men to value and support appropriate health-seeking behaviors for women and children.

Improving service delivery through existing health facilities complemented by community outreach efforts is consistent with the approach of GDRC and other development partners. It is anticipated that the successful implementation of improving service delivery over time will contribute significantly to efforts to address the unacceptably high mortality and morbidity rates. National level support to key MOH departments and the School of Public Health will support cross-cutting activities such as the development and implementation of national policies and strategies, sound financial management practices, key health behavior messages and community outreach, and effective monitoring, surveillance, and evaluation tools, providing a basis upon which the GDRC, USAID, and other development partners can work in concert encouraging synergies, maximum program impact, and efficient use of limited resources.

Systematic efforts will be made by the SO team to identify and address gender-based issues that hinder or support the use of key health services and preventive health practices. Emphasis will be placed on increasing gender awareness among partners and health institutions so that strategies, policies, and practices not only recognize gender based inefficiencies but also exploit potential opportunities. Health care delivery and health care consumption represent two major areas of this approach where gender issues can either enhance or hinder successful outcomes and consistent awareness and reaction to gender issues will enhance outcomes.

The development hypothesis under which USAID/DRC will work is: If the existing health care delivery system and community outreach strategy (service delivery and promotion of preventive health behaviors) is strengthened by being made more sustainable, increasing the quality of and access to key services, then the use of those services and the adoption of best practices will increase which in turn will facilitate the reduction of unacceptably high levels of morbidity and mortality.

### **3.4.1. Critical Assumptions**

The most critical of the health SO assumptions are:

- Other donors, including the World Bank, UNICEF, and the E.U. continue to invest in the DRC and continue to adopt the GDRC health zone-based approach. Over 54% of health zones receive some donor assistance.<sup>20</sup>
- The TG demonstrates commitment and support to the health sector. The GDRC is making a visible effort to endorse activities and engagements that ameliorate the socio-sanitary and economic conditions of the population while also improving the environment in which donors, NGOs, and investors work.
- The HIV infection rate does not increase exponentially in a short period of time overwhelming an already over-burdened health system.

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<sup>20</sup> Department of Planning and Studies, MOH 2003.

### **3.5. RELATIONSHIP TO GDRC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS**

USAID's manageable interest lies in increasing the use of key health services. Although USAID will be working towards reducing mortality and fertility, these will be considered higher-level goals unless measurable progress is achieved in addressing the structural constraints in the sector during the life of the ISP. During the period of this strategy, USAID will increase its engagement with the government and take concrete steps that will help the GDRC improve its support of the health sector. On a macro and policy level, USAID will work with other partners and the GDRC to increase and regularize the remuneration of public sector staff and increase the proportion of the budget spent on the health sector. After three years, the Mission will review progress towards addressing these constraints and determine if the focus and level of the SO should be modified towards achieving reductions in mortality and fertility.

The I-PRSP for the DRC recognizes immunization coverage and combating HIV/AIDS/STIs, TB, malaria, and malnutrition as priority health issues consistent with the priorities targeted by this strategy. The I-PRSP also highlights the need for the GDRC to find ways that funds might be mobilized (e.g., effective tax and customs collection, better management of government resources, improvement of government enterprises generating income, the HIPC Initiative) to improve financial accessibility of the population to health services while improving the quality of those services. Through the Department of Planning and Evaluation within the MOH, USAID has been invited to participate in the drafting of the final PRSP.

USAID has extensive prior experience working closely with the GDRC and other partners on health sector planning. Most recently this has included the development and submission of proposals to the GFATM and GAVI, and assistance in planning and conducting campaigns for polio eradication and measles control. The PRSP and HIPC Initiative are not as structured as the other initiatives; experience gained by these previous collaborations will greatly enhance collaboration on their development.

### **3.6. RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

In drafting this strategy, the Mission adhered to the following general principles:

- Interventions selected are those that have a direct impact on the major causes of mortality, are feasible, and constitute the optimal use of USAID resources;
- USAID support of health zones will aim to establish and strengthen partnerships between the public and private sectors;
- Support for national level interventions will extend across all operating scenarios;
- Emergency health assistance will be targeted to populations directly affected by the conflict which started in August 1998 and are not adequately covered by any other international player;
- Institution building will support the development of viable health zones that will deliver integrated and cost effective health services; and
- Strategic support for key interventions nationwide will enhance the delivery of a limited number of cost-effective interventions expected to have the highest impact on health in DRC.

### 3.6.1. Results Framework and Targets

The Health SO (SO 2) is *use of key health services<sup>21</sup> and practices both in USAID-supported health zones and at the national level increased.*

Under this SO, there are five Intermediate Results (IRs):

- IR 1. Increased availability of key health services and practices;
- IR 2. Improved financial access to key health services;
- IR 3. Enhanced quality of key health services;
- IR 4. Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors; and
- IR 5. Increased access to quality HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation services.

To reach these IRs during the period of the ISP, USAID will intensify its support to the present 81 CSH-funded health zones by improving the quality, management, and coverage of key interventions and programs. In addition, over the life of the strategy, USAID will support up to 20 additional zones. Finally, USAID will explore opportunities to include in the CSH-funded program the 11 zones currently supported with OFDA resources. Thus, at the end of the strategy period, USAID will be supporting about 112 health zones with CSH resources.

By the end of the strategy, USAID's 112 health zones will be reaching a potential population of 16 million people (including a total of 6.5 million children under five and women of reproductive age) representing roughly 30% of a total population of 55 million people.

SO Level Indicators:

- Indicator: proportion of children under one year of age who have received their third dose of DTP (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)
- Nationwide baseline: 44% for 2002; target: 70%
- USAID-assisted health zones: baseline: 36% for 2002; target: 70%
  
- Indicator: proportion of children age 6-59 months receiving a vitamin A supplementation during the last round of semi-annual vitamin A supplementation (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)
- Nationwide baseline: 74% in February 2003; target: 80%
- USAID-assisted health zones baseline: NA; target: 80%
  
- Indicator: proportion of children under one year of age who have received measles vaccinations (nationwide and in USAID assisted zones)
- Nationwide baseline: 45% in 2002; target: 70%
- USAID-assisted health zones baseline: 42%; target: 70%
  
- Indicator: annual couple years of protection (CYP) for family planning (in USAID health zones and for social marketing)
- Baseline: 0 (due to several years of conflict very little and unmeasured or no modern contraception has been available in target areas)

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<sup>21</sup> including HIV/AIDS services

- Target: 60,720 CYPs
- Indicator: proportion of births attended by skilled personnel
- Nationwide baseline: 60% in 2001; target: 70%
- USAID-assisted health zones baseline: 78 %; target: 80%
- Indicator: proportion of households with at least one ITN (nationwide and in USAID assisted health zones)
- Nationwide baseline: under 1%; target: 35%
- USAID-assisted health zone baseline: 14% ; target: 60%
- Indicator: proportion of children under five years of age with diarrhea who received ORT
- USAID assisted health zones baseline: 33.2%; target: 90%
- Indicator: Case-fatality rate for epidemic prone diseases (proportion of people who die of an epidemic prone disease / # of cases of the disease in a given year: cholera and measles);
- Nationwide baseline: Cholera: 5%; Measles: 2.5%
- Target: Cholera: <5%; Measles : <2.5%
- Indicator: Increased utilization rate of USAID supported health zones
- Baseline: 25% nationwide; 31% in USAID assisted health zones
- Target: 30% nationwide; 40% in USAID assisted health zones

# USAID/DRC Results Framework for SO 2 (Health)

### Development Context:

- HIV prevalence rates
- Country Mortality Rates
- Maternal Mortality Rates
- < 5 mortality rate
- Total Fertility Rate
- # of cases of wild poliovirus notified countrywide
- Contraceptive prevalence rate


### Use of Key Health Services and Practices both in USAID-Supported Health Zones and at the National Level Increased

#### Overall Indicators:

- Ind. 1. % of children under one year of age who have received their third dose of DTP (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)
- Ind. 2. % of children age 6-59 months receiving a vitamin A supplement during the last round of semi-annual vitamin A Supplementation (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)
- Ind. 3. % of children under one year of age who have received Measles vaccinations (in USAID assisted zones)
- Ind. 4. Annual couple years of protection for family planning (in USAID health zones and for social marketing)
- Ind. 5. % of births attended by skilled health personnel (in USAID assisted health zones)
- Ind. 6. % of households with at least one ITN (nationwide and in USAID assisted areas)
- Ind. 7. % of children <5 with diarrhea who received ORT
- Ind. 8. Case-fatality rate for epidemic prone diseases (# of people who die of an epidemic prone disease / # of cases of the disease in a given year: cholera meningitis, measles, yellow fever)
- Ind. 9. Increased utilization rate of USAID-supported health zones.

### Critical Assumptions:

- Renewed donor confidence
- The new Government of DRC is demonstrating commitment and support.





### 3.6.2. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities

IR 1: Increased availability of key health services and practices.

USAID will increase availability of key health services and practices through two sub-intermediate results: 1) supporting the development of viable health zones, and 2) providing strategic support to high impact national level health initiatives.

Illustrative activities:

1. Achieve a threshold of public health coverage for a limited number of high impact interventions which address the outcomes and conditions likely to contribute most to achieving reductions in under-five and maternal mortality and are feasible to implement in all zones. This includes:

- IPT for malaria among pregnant women (60% coverage in USAID zones);
- ITN coverage for pregnant women and children under five (60% coverage in USAID zones);
- Routine childhood vaccinations (70% DPT3 and 70% measles coverage) and polio eradication;
- Twice yearly vitamin A supplementation of children (70% coverage); and
- HIV/AIDS control activities as discussed in IR 5.

2. Introduce family planning information and services within zonal health facilities and through community-based initiatives. Each health center will offer information and education as well as injectables, oral contraceptives, condoms and referral for other methods. Each zonal hospital will also offer IUD insertions. These efforts would not only address high fertility, but will also improve, through better child spacing and fewer at-risk births, maternal and child health. As men frequently act as a barrier to women's access to family planning in the DRC, men will be targeted in the community-based initiatives and will be included in the hiring of community mobilizers. HIV/AIDS prevention messages will be incorporated into family planning education and services, and where appropriate, family planning messages will be incorporated into HIV/AIDS activities, including prevention of mother to child transmission (PMCT) and voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) services.

3. Expand access to TB services. By the end of the period, all zones will be implementing the TB DOTS, which meets the quality standards of the NTB (all TB drugs will be provided through a grant from the Global Drug Facility).

4. Provide strategic support to high impact national health initiatives. On a national level, USAID will increase the availability of high-impact health services through support to national initiatives. While the level of USAID support will vary among the selected interventions, USAID will concentrate upon those elements deemed critical to success and within USAID's comparative advantage, including:

- Immunizations: Providing technical assistance and other support to the National Immunization Program for routine services and measles control; helping facilitate grants provided by the GAVI;

- Polio Eradication: Completing the process of interrupting wild poliovirus transmission by the end of 2004 and certification of polio free status by 2007 through support of high-quality supplementary immunization activities, enhanced surveillance, zonal-level planning, and communication and advocacy;
- Vitamin A and other micronutrients: Strengthening the MOH's capacity to implement its policy of semi-annual vitamin A supplementation and helping integrate other preventive services such as de-worming medication and iron folate supplementation into the program;
- Malaria: Assisting the NMCP in increasing the availability of effective anti-malarial drugs, including drug sensitivity testing; update diagnostic and treatment protocols and develop national guidelines and training materials for intermittent preventive treatment for pregnant women and severe and non-severe case management; and increasing access, availability and use of affordable insecticide-treated bed-nets;
- Family Planning/Reproductive Health: Helping the National Reproductive Health Program to improve donor coordination, advocate for policy changes that affect women's reproductive health, and standardize the implementation of the GDRC's maternal mortality reduction plan;
- Tuberculosis: Assisting the NTP to implement its expansion program and contribute to the achievement of improved case detection (70%) and treatment rates (85%) for new cases and improved linkages with HIV/AIDS control activities;
- Surveillance: Helping other donors and the MOH to develop an integrated disease surveillance system that will build upon the existing health zonal structure and allow rapid detection and effective response to disease outbreaks; and
- HIV/AIDS: as described in IR 5.

Illustrative indicators:

- Number of health zones that achieve threshold-level coverage of a limited package of key interventions;
- Number of new acceptors of family planning methods; and
- TB case detection rate (national).

IR 2: Improved financial access to key health services.
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Under IR 2, there are three sub-intermediate results: 1) health financing increased in all health zones; 2) livelihoods of local populations increased; and 3) GDRC contribution to health sector increased.

Illustrative activities:

1. Promote stringent cost containment in all health zones by reducing excess non-governmental hospital and health center personnel, further reducing the average number of drugs prescribed to patients (now over five<sup>22</sup>), and reducing or eliminating unnecessary laboratory tests and procedures. USAID will assist zones to restructure their present cost recovery systems to improve cross-subsidization, more equitably serve the poorest people, and reduce the roles of service providers in setting fees to eliminate existing conflicts of interest. USAID will

<sup>22</sup> USAID health team assessment in 2003.

experiment with performance contracts to encourage health zones to implement these and other measures (including mutual health insurance schemes) to improve the management and financing of health services. Only 10% of Congolese women have the right to manage their property on their own.<sup>23</sup> These financing schemes will encourage women's participation in key management positions. At the national level, USAID will advocate the reduction of taxes and tariffs on imported bed nets and medications.

2. Promote increased rural incomes and improved nutrition in target USAID-assisted health zones to further increase the populations' ability to pay for necessary health care. This will be done through a multi-sectoral effort described under SO 4.

3. Encourage the GDRC to allocate a higher percentage of its national budget to the health sector. (According to the Ministry of Finance, the current health budget for the DRC is 4.9% of the national budget). Improvements in this area will be in part dependent on economic growth.

Illustrative indicators:

- % of USAID-supported health zones reaching targets for cost containment related to non-governmental staffing;
- % of USAID-supported health facilities experiencing decapitalization of drugs; and
- Increase the national budget contribution for health from 4.9% to at least the WHO recommended average for Africa of 10%.

### IR 3: Enhanced quality of key health services.

There are four sub-IRs under IR 3: 1) improved supervision and training introduced and supported; 2) management systems enhanced; 3) policy development and implementation made effective; and 4) new global health alliances effectively used.

Illustrative activities:

1. Enhance supervision at the health zone level through revision of guidelines, retraining of supervisors, and helping to provide transport for supervision visits.

2. Improve training at the health zone level by updating modules, developing technical job aides, supporting on-site refresher training, and improving diagnostic and treatment guidelines.

3. Strengthen management of health zones by ensuring that each USAID-assisted health zone develops an annual plan reflecting both national level initiatives (e.g., immunization, Vitamin A supplementation) and key management and health interventions (including HIV/AIDS activities in high risk zones) detailed in this strategy. In addition, USAID will install improved financial management, drug logistic, and health management information systems in all USAID-assisted health zones to improve efficiency and lower costs. These systems will be made available for replication nationwide.

<sup>23</sup> UNICEF, Status of Customary Laws and Women's Rights in the DRC, April 1999.

4. Increase capacity of regional MOH Offices to be more efficient and to provide better support to health zones. USAID will provide technical assistance and training for regional supervisors and managers to improve planning and utilization of health information. In collaboration with other partners, USAID will provide transport, equipment, and logistical assistance to immunization depots supporting USAID-targeted health zones.

5. Provide technical assistance and other critical support to the central MOH, especially the primary health care and planning directorates, to:

- Enhance the quality of the national immunization program through improved planning, injection safety, training, and logistics;
- Improve TB drug management, recording, reporting, and supervision;
- Conduct operations research to develop new models for the delivery of high quality and appropriate anti-malarials and oral and injectable contraceptives through the private sector;
- Contribute to the design of service standards and protocols for family planning/reproductive health interventions; and
- Revise diagnosis and treatment guidelines to reflect current practices in malaria, acute respiratory infections, and STIs and update the essential drugs list.

6. Work with national program offices to develop improved national policies and implementation strategies.

- Work with the national malaria control program to revise national policies in response to increasing parasite and vector resistance and increased availability of insecticide treated nets and materials.
- Work with the national immunization program to restructure the national immunization policy to include new vaccines, measles control strategies, and improved injection security.
- Assist the NTP to develop improved strategies for the extension of the DOTS strategy and new policies to address increased drug resistance.
- In collaboration with WHO and the Kinshasa School of Public Health, assist the MOH in the development of improved surveillance systems and policies for response to outbreaks and continued support for surveillance and control of wild polio virus.
- Provide support to the national nutrition program to extend the current three-year policy and strategic plan for vitamin A coverage to include iron supplements for pregnant women.

Illustrative indicators:

- TB treatment success rate (nationwide);
- Rate of vaccination dropouts (BCG- DPT3);
- % of health facilities receiving scheduled supervision visits (for USAID-assisted health zones);
- % of health facilities reporting stockouts of sulfadoxine/pyrimethamine; and
- % of health facilities reporting stockouts of contraceptives.

#### IR 4: Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors.

USAID will increase awareness and practice of healthy behaviors among populations in targeted areas through two sub-IRs: 1) community-based services improved; and 2) behaviors changed at the household, community, and health provider levels.

Illustrative activities:

##### 1. Improve community-based services by:

- Better organizing the diverse cadres of community agents into one group and providing them registers, training, information, behavior change materials, and supervision;
- Engaging these agents in gender-sensitive social marketing of key commodities including condoms, oral contraceptives, ORS, and possibly anti-malarial drugs;
- Promoting hygiene and sanitation including key messages and information on hand-washing, exclusive breastfeeding, and cleanup of latrines and expanding the population coverage of low-cost spring capping;
- Researching and designing gender sensitive communication strategies appropriate for health zones including identifying key messages, target populations, and communication channels; and
- Promoting key community-level nutrition activities, namely community-based growth promotion and appropriate introduction of complementary foods.

##### 2. Improve key behaviors and practices at the household level, community level, and health provider level.

- Household level: Understanding by families of disease prevention (e.g., handwashing, exclusive breastfeeding, use of bednets); recognition of life-threatening illnesses; adequate knowledge of home care (e.g., ORT, anti-malarials); and appropriate care-seeking behavior. Men will be systematically targeted in these outreach activities and communication tools developed that specifically highlight a gender balance in health giving and health seeking practices (i.e. both depicted in communications tools as consumers and providers of health care and guardians of family health status).
- Community level: More effective community involvement in the management of health services (through community health committees, volunteer service, etc.). Gender balance will be specifically encouraged through the technical support provided for the establishment and operation of initiatives.
- Health Provider level: Identifying, promoting, and implementing client centered services. Health worker training will emphasize gender neutrality in the provision of health services and attempt to highlight and identify areas where gender bias may restrict the provision or consumption of services and how it might be avoided.

Illustrative indicators:

- % of target groups (children under 5 years and pregnant women) who slept under ITNs the previous night;
- % of women who desire to space or limit births (USAID-assisted health zones); and

- % of mothers who know the importance of increasing fluids and continuous feeding for childhood diarrhea.

IR 5: Increased access to quality HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation services.
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This IR summarizes the USAID/DRC HIV/AIDS Strategy that will be submitted for USAID/W approval in November 2003. IR 5 has three sub-IRs: 1) improved data available on HIV/AIDS; 2) preventive measures targeting high-risk groups and high-prevalence areas supported; and 3) care and support services for people living with HIV/AIDS strengthened.

Illustrative activities:

1. Support the National AIDS Control Program by:

- Strengthening epidemiological and behavioral surveillance in order to get a clearer picture of the country's epidemic. Improved data will help identify high-transmission areas and high-risk behaviors among specific groups, track prevalence, and inform the design and implementation of gender-sensitive HIV prevention and care activities.
- Supporting preventive measures targeting high risk groups and high prevalence areas. Activities will include behavior change and condom promotion through peer education, social marketing, and mass media campaigns. Key populations include the military and other uniformed personnel, demobilizing regular and irregular forces, sex workers and their clients, truck drivers, migrant workers, displaced persons, refugees, unborn children of infected pregnant women, street children and orphans.
- Strengthening key prevention and control services such as blood safety, safe injection practices, sexually transmitted infection management, development of voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) and prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) incorporating, when appropriate, family planning services into these activities.
- Supporting selected measures to strengthen care and support services to people living with HIV/AIDS.

2. Integrate HIV/AIDS activities into USAID-supported health zones. All USAID-assisted health zones will be supplied with communication materials on HIV/AIDS prevention that focus on primary behavior change approaches. In addition, blood screening will be available at all zonal hospitals and there will be effective recruitment of volunteer blood donors. Zones with high-risk populations will be able to promote and implement syndromic management and treatment of STIs. USAID will also strengthen HIV/AIDS education and referral services in health centers in major urban areas.

It is anticipated that early into the period of this strategy, the Mission will demonstrate its capacity to effectively utilize all available resources through the identification of critical needs and the strategic targeting of key interventions demonstrating qualitative and quantifiable results. This "intensive focus" approach will also establish a firm basis for rapidly scaling up Mission HIV/AIDS activities in the DRC. USAID/DRC's HIV/AIDS Country Strategy paper will provide evidence of both increased danger or risk of HIV prevalence in high-risk populations as well as a growing capacity to mount a nationwide response to the epidemic.

Illustrative indicators:

- Number of individuals seeking HIV testing and counseling at VCT centers;
- Number of HIV positive pregnant women counseled, tested, and receiving ARVs (anti-retroviral drugs) at the onset of labor and their newborns receiving ARVs within three days of birth at PMTCT sites;
- Number of condoms sold through social marketing programs targeted at high risk individuals; and
- Number of PMTCT and VCT delivery points offering family planning counseling and services.

USAID/DRC's HIV/AIDS strategy has a number of synergies with the Mission's health SO as well as the other SOs and SpO. For example, illustrative activities under sub IR 2 in the HIV/AIDS strategy have the following synergies:

SO 2 (Health): Incorporate HIV/AIDS messages into the new and expanding family planning programs in rural health zones.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): Address issues of stigma and rights of PLWHA; sensitize judicial systems and legal frameworks; and establish a platform for political dialogue and advocacy on HIV/AIDS.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): Sensitize workers in the field; provide outreach messages to the community agriculture sector; and generate commitment among policy makers and implementers in the agriculture/food security sector.

SO 5 (Education): Provide HIV/AIDS education and social and psychological support through the school system; develop HIV/AIDS primary school curricula; and train teachers and teacher trainees to effectively and consistently use HIV/AIDS curricula.

SpO (DDR): Behavior Change Communications (BCC) emphasize the ABC (Abstinence, being faithful to one partner, and use of condoms) approach to prevention for ex-combatants and their families; train peer educators (especially women); and improve access to VCT and STI treatment services.

### **3.6.3. Implementing Mechanisms**

USAID will continue to work closely with other donors to optimize the benefits from GFATM, GAVI, and the Global Drug Facility (for TB drugs). This will involve helping to submit quality applications for funding and working with implementing organizations to maximize the effectiveness of funds received. For example, the GDRG applications to the GFATM and GAVI include support for bed nets and cold chain equipment, respectively, that could be used in USAID and other donor supported health zones to complement existing disease control efforts.

While collaboration on polio eradication (with the Turner Foundation, Gates Foundation, and other donors) has decreased as the DRC moves closer to the goal of eradication, collaboration

with other partners such as the Elizabeth Glazer Pediatric AIDS Foundation is anticipated. Active participation in the development of the DRC's final PRSP and HIPC Initiative will provide additional opportunities to leverage resources in support of Mission programs.

USAID also gives grants to U.N. agencies, including UNICEF and WHO, to support international initiatives like "polio eradication" initiative and to U.S.-based organizations to support training in the School of Public Health and activities through local NGOs and the MOH.

OFDA will continue to provide IDA-funded assistance to the health sector in the DRC as long as conditions warrant. USAID's strategic approach to the delivery of OFDA funded health services in the DRC is outlined in the following principles:

- OFDA health activities will be funded for limited periods of time (one year periods) and provide concentrated, intensive assistance to immediately improve the health status of beneficiary populations (as measured by reduction in crude mortality and malnutrition rates to pre-emergency levels);
- OFDA health activities will be delivered in such a way as to promote the development of viable health zones in the DRC and longer term, priority health activities (e.g., routine immunization and a national health management information system);
- The highest impact health development activities such as vitamin A supplementation and the use of ITNs to control malaria will be implemented nationwide across all operating environments with a combination of OFDA and CSH funding;
- Ideally, all OFDA funded grants specializing in health should be transitioned to USAID/DRC health portfolio for ongoing support and further development; and
- OFDA grantees will use appropriate national technical guidelines in their programs.

Indicators for OFDA health assistance:

- Improvement in two humanitarian indicators (crude mortality rate and weight for age). Where this is not possible, OFDA grantees will track health facility utilization rates.
- Coverage of three key health interventions (semi-annual vitamin A supplementation; DPT3 vaccination coverage; ITN use coverage for children under five and pregnant women) to be implemented across all operational environments.
- % of OFDA-supported health zones (presently 11) that are transitioned for support under the USAID health development program.

DCHA's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) also plays a significant role in support of SO 2. According to the provisional calculations of an independent WFP evaluation mission in April 2003, food aid has enabled stabilization of the nutritional situation for the IDP population in the DRC. Through nutritional rehabilitation programs targeting hundreds of thousands of malnourished children, rates of recovery of 93% with less than 2% relapse have been recorded. Under WFP's new PRRO covering CYs 2004-2005, malnourished children, the elderly, and pregnant and lactating women will receive food rations. Beneficiaries under this vulnerable grouping will number 239,000 on average in 2004 and 183,000 in 2005. Throughout both years, an estimated 79,500 persons living with HIV/AIDS will also receive rations to ensure nutrition and encourage them to attend specialized institutions. In addition, a total of 363,000 IDP's and refugees' nutritional status will be stabilized through the provision of minimal energy

and nutritional requirements (kcal/day/person). FFP now commits its P.L.480 Title II resources exclusively through the WFP.

**3.6.4. Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan**

A preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan has been developed by the SO team and is contained in Annex II. The PMP will be finalized in cooperation with stakeholders and customers during CY 2004.

**3.6.5. Scenarios and Program Adjustments**

Implications for USAID/DRC support to programs under the scenarios described in section 2.2. of this ISP are described below.

Successful Transition: Under this scenario, the Mission will scale up a package of key health activities. It will add to the existing number of health zones, giving priority to the OFDA-supported health zones. OFDA's assistance to the health sector would decrease, since rates of malnutrition and mortality due to displacement caused by violence would decrease, and since responding to the needs of the "directly war-affected" population, an important criterion for much of OFDA's involvement in the DRC, would no longer apply. The Mission may change or add partners. Partners with a comparative advantage will be selected through open competition. A change in activities will occur if the situation warrants this (e.g., arrival of a new technology or new epidemiologic data).

Protracted Transition: In this scenario, the Mission will maintain a package of key health activities, but the geographic coverage may be reduced. USAID may change partners. Partners with a comparative advantage will be selected through open competition.

Stalled Transition: Priority development activities will be limited to certain accessible areas. Under this pessimistic scenario, OFDA would continue to address emergency health needs, with a continued requirement for substantial levels of funding. Moving a health zone from OFDA to CSH funding will require a detailed transition plan that addresses logistic, training, cold chain, and health financing concerns. In areas that become insecure, some partners may choose to withdraw.

**3.6.6. Budget Tables by Funding Parameters**

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**3.6.7. Priorities Under Different Funding Parameters**

- High Funding Parameter:
- Increased availability of key health services and practices (IR 1)
- Improved financial access to key health services (IR 2)
- Enhanced quality of key health services (IR 3)
- Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors (IR 4)
- Increased access to quality HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation services (IR 5)

The high funding level will permit the qualitative and quantitative expansion of the health zone strategy, maximizing achievement of results at the national level as well as in USAID supported zones. Expanding geographically will assure a critical mass of first hand experience required to influence the development and implementation of national level policies and practices; demonstrate impact on a proportion of the population significant enough to influence national infant, child and maternal mortality and morbidity rates; and guaranteeing that synergies with the other SOs, DCHA, and CARPE are achieved to the maximum extent possible.

It should be noted that the current reorganization of health zones may have unpredictable effects on final population totals and numbers of zones. One of the principles being followed by this delimitation exercise is the reduction of average population size per zone which in theory should reduce overall population coverage. Nevertheless the population coverage of the strategy remains the same and could mean that total number of zones will increase beyond the 112 target. To date, provinces that have already completed the delimitation process have experienced very little change in population coverage. This suggests that completion of the process will not substantially change the established targets given appropriate funding levels.

HIV/AIDS/STI activities at the 'Basic Country' level will assure that the Mission continues to be strategically placed in key areas with limited donor support. The comprehensive and cross-cutting character of the HIV/AIDS portfolio will allow a rapid and strategic scaling up of activities in the event that additional resources become available.

Low Funding Parameter:

Increased availability of key health services and practices (IR 1)

Improved financial access to key health services (IR 2)

Enhanced quality of key health services (IR 3)

Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors (IR 4)

Increased access to quality HIV/AIDS prevention and mitigation services (IR 5)

In a low funding scenario, the Mission would have adequate resources to assure influence on national level policy development and capacity building and to provide a critical package of key health interventions to a reduced number of health zones and regions of the DRC.

### **3.7. LINKS TO CROSS-CUTTING THEMES**

Gender: SO 2 focuses mainly on the prevention of morbidity and mortality among women and children. Pregnancy and childhood are high-risk endeavors in the DRC plagued by many acute and chronic health problems. Mission programs, in seeking to improve the availability, quality, and access of prenatal and family planning services, and the prevention and reduction of the severity of childhood infections, will affect primary consumers as well as alleviate the significant economic, social, and emotional costs of chronic illness to the entire household family. Scarce resources currently going to support preventable health care costs can be invested in more productive ways by the household. Gender will be mainstreamed into all health activities to ensure that both men and women value the key health practices promoted and encourage their use within their households both through emotional and financial support.

HIV/AIDS: HIV/AIDS is addressed in the health strategy as an IR but crosscuts all Mission activities and is affected by and will impact on results achievement. HIV/AIDS is a multi-sectoral issue: increased HIV rates will aggravate the competition for scarce resources among the political and military elite, hamper the development of civil society, destabilize the extended family structure, and increase economic misery. HIV and other infectious diseases directly reduce annual GDP growth and, at the family level, require households to spend resources for treatment that might otherwise be used for other forms of consumption more beneficial to the economy. As a result, this strategy promotes a multi-sectoral approach to addressing HIV/AIDS by identifying opportunities to integrate key HIV/AIDS activities and prevention measures across the other Mission SOs and SpO. The OTI-supported radio network provides an additional opportunity for the dissemination of HIV information.

Conflict management: During the five years of conflict, health activities, especially vaccination campaigns, Vitamin A supplementation, and disease surveillance systems served as the privileged entry point to reach isolated communities and bring together several partners in eastern DRC. During the implementation of this ISP, the SO 2 team will continue working closely with OFDA to respond to emergency needs of communities in conflict areas. In addition, the OTI communication network will serve as a channel to disseminate health messages countrywide, including conflict areas. Current conflict areas will have priority for long term assistance once they reach some stability.

Governance: Strengthening the institutions of the government through the DG program will help to create an enabling environment that will improve the development of policies and practices in the health sector. A more active and effective civil society will also have important implications for health care delivery at the community level particularly in rural areas where the zonal hospitals' satellite facilities (health centers) are managed collaboratively with the community leaders and financed entirely by community level inputs. Informed community involvement will help improve the quality, availability, and access to key health services.

Nutrition: USAID/DRC has a comprehensive strategy to address malnutrition. Growth monitoring and promotion activities based on proven "positive deviance" methods will be implemented progressively in USAID-assisted health zones. In addition, USAID will support improved complementary feeding practices, exclusive breastfeeding, and continued feeding of children with diarrhea. Iron folate and vitamin A supplementation will be expanded. The livelihoods SO will emphasize a variety of food security and nutrition interventions within a selection of USAID-assisted health zones, including home gardening and improved seed multiplication activities. The SO 2 team will track national nutritional status through monitoring of weight for age in children, which will serve as a goal level indicator for the health strategy.

GDA and Leveraging Other Resources: Several GDA initiatives such as the Global Fund, Malaria Action Coalition, and Tuberculosis Coalition for Technical Assistance will support activities related to HIV/AIDS, TB, and malaria.

### **3.8. SYNERGIES WITH OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

In January 2002, a USAID SWIFT Action team traveled throughout the DRC to assess areas for expanded USAID engagement in the country. The team determined health activities are located throughout the country and provide a solid base for additional activities. However, the

concluded these activities are insufficient to reduce excess mortality and suffering while at the same time establishing a base for development due to the interconnected problems that cause malnutrition and poor health throughout the DRC. Families lack income to purchase sufficient food or to pay minimal fees for health care. Farmers cannot readily reach markets to sell their goods. Traders cannot easily transport products. Urban dwellers lack income. As a result, the SWIFT team recommended an increased integration of USAID-funded activities, and specifically proposed a combined health-food security-livelihoods approach to maximize the effectiveness of USAID interventions in the DRC. Based on recommendations by the SWIFT team, USAID/DRC has ensured health programs are closely integrated with all other SOs and the SpO.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): Opportunities for synergies with SO 3 exist at the national and local levels. A government actively influenced and engaged by civil society will be better placed to play an active role in critical national health problems that will require input and collaboration from many sectors of the government and civil society. One national initiative that will have an important impact at the community level is the GDRC financial contribution to the health care sector. Another is the redress of gender-based impediments which would improve access, availability, and quality of care. National initiatives requiring government responsiveness to either identify resources or develop and implement policy include the urgent issues of malaria control, HIV/AIDS/STIs, polio eradication, and nutritional deficiencies that contribute to unacceptably high maternal, infant, and childhood mortality rates.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): USAID will actively promote the integration and synergy of its SOs by implementing key income generation, livelihood, and rehabilitation activities in a selected number of USAID assisted health zones. SO 2 and SO 4 are linked closely through an integrated health and livelihoods approach implemented by community relays/volunteers and farmer and/or community based organizations. Activities will include social marketing of health products; health behavior change activities; agricultural extension services to improve varieties and yields; home gardening; micro-finance programs; and rehabilitation of basic social and marketing infrastructure.

A special USAID/DRC Mission Integrated Working Group composed of lead members from each SO team will be formed to approve work plans and monitor impact. The Mission will be particularly interested in monitoring increases in utilization rates of rural health facilities as a goal level measure of increasing rural incomes in the targeted zones.

SO 5 (Education): SO 5, which specifically targets basic education for girls, will have long-term effects on the health of these pupils' future families. Women who are educated are better able to understand public health and hygiene concepts, use child spacing measures, understanding how HIV/AIDS is spread, and have their children vaccinated and weighed. Also, girls who attend school are less likely to marry young and bear children in their teen years.<sup>24</sup>

SpO (DDR): Demobilization will over time increase the stability of local communities, improving the potential earning power of households and the support of men in the health affairs of young children and pregnant women. This should help to improve access to services and preventive health messages that will encourage the adoption of preventive health behaviors. The formal and informal military represent an important potential source for sexually transmitted infections and HIV. A key element of the existing USAID/DRC HIV control program is a focus on high-risk

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<sup>24</sup> MICS2.

groups, which already includes the military and police. Demobilized forces will be of particular interest because of their former military status and the potential risks associated with their reintegration into their communities.

CARPE: Transmission of epidemic and chronic infectious diseases are closely associated with two key industries, mining and logging, that are of particular importance to CARPE conservation initiatives in the DRC. Formal and informal mining and logging activities in the DRC have been associated with outbreaks of hemorrhagic fevers and the spread of other infectious diseases such as monkey pox, HIV, STIs, and TB. Efforts by CARPE to encourage effective environmental policies and practices in these industries will focus on the provision by these companies or the local communities of key primary health care services. The development through health sector initiatives of a key package of health services will facilitate industry and community compliance through the provision of operational models with a key package of effective services, policies, and practices that target priority health areas, and disease monitoring and control strategies to limit outbreaks and increased transmission.

Apart from CARPE, but still in the domain of environmental protection, USAID/DRC will be supporting a new pilot project with the Jane Goodall Institute. Following an assessment of the Institute's community-centered conservation project in Tanzania, the Jane Goodall Institute will select an area of high biodiversity in the DRC to establish a similar integrated environmental project. After identifying local partners, activities will include sustainable resource management, economic development, education scholarships, and family planning. The Jane Goodall Institute will receive technical assistance from Advance Africa for their reproductive health related activities.

### **3.9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL**

USAID/DRC coordinates closely with CDC's GAP (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/Global AIDS Program) program. The GAP is comprehensive in that it targets a range of key HIV/AIDS control interventions but modest in terms of its financial investment (approximately \$3.4 million in 2003). USAID/DRC and CDC programs are complementary and synergistic, converging in several key areas. Both support VCT services and work together to improve TB program performance. Both USAID and CDC train public health personnel, including laboratory technicians, who are responsible for health care management and the diagnosis of priority diseases such as malaria, TB, HIV, and STIs. CDC's proposed Congo River Initiative, which includes accelerated laboratory capacity improvements and STI prevention and care, is one example of the targeted high risk geographic containment approach included in USAID/DRC's HIV/AIDS country strategy. Both USAID and CDC programs seek to not only provide direct services but, as important, to use those direct services as tools for the development of model systems, policies, and practices that can be used to improve all activities in these areas regardless of their funding source. These programs are also designed to leverage other resources by demonstrating DRC's capacity to address the range of vital HIV/AIDS management interventions.

### **3.10. OTHER DONORS AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS**

An Inter-agency Coordinating Committee (ICC) was established in 1996 to improve coordination among health partners. The sub-unit ICC for immunization began with polio eradication activities and has expanded to include all major components of immunization (routine EPI, campaigns, and surveillance). It is currently the prevailing model for operational relations between the MOH and its international and national partners. The model has been replicated for other national programs (e.g., HIV/AIDS, malaria, nutrition).

USAID and its partners follow the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines for Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery. This is visible in the adoption by all of the health zone system, which allows for an easy understanding of who supports which zone and prevents overlap of efforts. Additionally, almost all partners follow standardized WHO guidelines, accepted by the GDRC, for technical implementation of primary health care. Several working groups for different technical areas (malaria, nutrition, family planning) provide a forum for partners to discuss conformity to set standards and discuss best practices. USAID is an active member at these meetings.

The E.U., one of the largest donors (with USAID), provides support to several health zones to strengthen human and institutional capacities of these facilities. U.N. agencies including UNAIDS, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA, and UNDP are providing limited funding, particularly in technical assistance (workshop, conferences, expertise, logistics), either directly to national programs or through a selected number of NGOs.


A number of cooperation (Belgian, Canadian, Italian, German, Japanese, and Chinese) partners and international NGOs (e.g., MSF, Fometro, Care) have been involved in supporting primary health care activities. The GFATM is providing support to the NTP. The World Bank has committed to launch a large multi-sectoral HIV/AIDS program (MAP) in the entire DRC.

USAID also works closely with UNFPA, the other large donor involved in family planning activities in the DRC. When there was a reported overlap in the provision of contraceptives, USAID and UNFPA were able to quickly redistribute resources to other areas in need. Other project activities are also closely coordinated.

USAID is one of six members of the TB Coalition for Technical Assistance. This mechanism provides funds and technical assistance to expand the DOTS strategy through the International Union Against TB and Lung Diseases in the DRC.

During the strategy period, USAID will participate with the GDRC and other partners in planning and conducting a Demographic and Health Survey. The Mission has already provided support to the UNICEF MICS2 survey which provided a limited picture of health indicators in the DRC.

**CHAPTER 4**  
**A SUCCESSFUL TRANSITION TO PEACE AND DEMOCRATIC**  
**GOVERNANCE PROMOTED**  
**- STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 3 -**



Democracy and Governance Focus Areas

#### 4.1. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

The DRC has long been plagued by overly centralized political power, non-transparent government decision-making, and poor political representation. This has allowed corrupt regimes to benefit from the unequal distribution of Congo's wealth, while much of society is excluded from economic and political decision-making. The consequent weakening of state institutions has led to such extreme economic and political degradation that extortion and exploitation have become the standard way of conducting business, while a range of crimes are committed by government authorities with impunity. In this governance vacuum, competing political agendas and competition for resources have often sparked conflict, creating a vicious cycle of vulnerability and social deterioration. Yet, after years of negotiation, a national power-sharing agreement among all political actors now offers a means of replacing the DRC's ineffective governance institutions and building a durable peace. For this to happen, members of the Transitional Government (TG) need to stay engaged and work to build the new governance system created by the DRC's peace agreement.

Applying the terms of the peace agreement and legal framework that underlie the TG will require that several actions take place simultaneously. First, a series of political, economic, and military reforms must be implemented as agreed upon through the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD). Implementing these reforms will involve a period of intensive intra-governmental negotiation already begun by members of the TG, itself a product of these agreements. Furthermore, decision-making will be based on consensus, which will also be a challenge.

Second, as reforms are implemented, key steps in the transition calendar must be taken, including: creating a new political and electoral system, establishing parliamentary committees and rules of procedure, revitalizing justice sector institutions, and drafting the DRC's permanent constitution. At the same time, the TG will develop a budget and public finance system at the national, provincial, and local levels. Overall, the key challenge during this phase will be applying and developing the DRC's new legal and constitutional framework through consensus-building, mediation, and skilled facilitation by the international community. Another real challenge is to ensure that both men and women benefit equitably from such legal reforms.

USAID's Democracy and Governance (DG) strategy (SO 3) anticipates that this initial phase of reform will be followed by a period of intense political competition as the TG moves closer to elections. As in all transitions, tensions will likely mount as it becomes clearer who stand to lose their positions and who stand to gain. These winners and losers will begin to emerge as former rebel groups are transformed into political parties, long-standing political parties develop their internal capacities and build new constituencies, and new political leaders emerge. During this phase, the DRC's new, non-elected parliament will also be developing, amending, debating, and adopting key legislation that will shape political outcomes. This will include laws concerning the electoral system, political parties, decentralization, citizenship, and the post-transition constitution (to be decided by referendum during the transition period). The key challenge during this second phase will therefore be developing the capacity of these nascent institutions while maximizing public participation in new political processes, under the new political order, using the legal framework developed during the transition's first phase.

In the final phase of the transition, the third year of the DG strategy, the key challenge will then become implementing new and amended laws nation-wide, including the electoral law and the

law on government decentralization, through the developing institutions of the TG. At the outset of the post-transition period, the greatest challenge will be the replacement of the transition government and the power-sharing arrangement it represents with a legitimate, elected government accountable to the Congolese people. A key variable at this stage will be the extent of change in government. The new challenge in the years following general elections, the fourth and fifth years of the strategy, will then be either to institutionalize and strengthen the new government or, if the transition process is protracted or stalled, to facilitate its renewal.

Clearly, the task ahead is difficult. The DRC's fragile social, political and economic environment will make it more so. However, for each of the constraints faced by the TG and people of Congo at the outset of the transition period, there is a corresponding opportunity and strong constituency for reform. For example, during the first phase of the transition, there will be an opportunity to lay out the legal and constitutional framework for the DRC's future political and justice systems. If reformed, these systems could improve human rights protection, give equal voice to women and other marginalized groups in political and economic decision-making, and pave the way for a smooth political transition process. Already a strong consensus exists that reforms are needed, and that agreements produced during the ICD are the blueprint for moving forward. The challenge will be to maintain this consensus while building a functioning transition government.

Opportunities to support capacity-building efforts by the TG have also emerged. From the outset of the transition, the TG and members of the five independent institutions created to support the transition to democracy<sup>1</sup> have requested extensive training and technical support to fulfill their mandates. Each of these institutions and branches is inexperienced and faces serious material constraints, in addition to being influenced by a large class of corrupt entrepreneurs. The specific challenge during the second and third years of the strategy will therefore be to overcome these influences and overhaul existing, weak institutions. This will involve addressing rampant corruption, mismanagement of public resources, and criminal impunity, and controlling organized crime by gradually replacing current systems with transparent, equitable, and democratic processes and institutions. In USAID/DRC's analysis, shared by the rest of the international community, the political will and capacity exist to make initial headway on these reforms. Nevertheless, this effort will entail a constant process of evaluating the constraints and opportunities that emerge as the transition unfolds. (For example, early efforts to marginalize the Independent Election Commission were prevented through focused USAID engagement with the TG and other donors.)

Opportunities also exist to increase public participation in governance and to address any actual or potential gender-based inequities. Until now, the majority of Congolese society has been isolated and largely excluded from political and economic decision-making by those in power. Barriers to public participation in governance include a severe lack of communications infrastructure and a level of poverty so extreme that most Congolese, especially women, are focused on survival and securing livelihoods rather than holding public officials accountable for mismanaging or stealing public resources. The lack of trained police and military forces under civilian command is also a barrier, as those with guns tend to limit or control public behavior.

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<sup>1</sup> The five independent commissions of support to the transition are: the Independent Election Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights Commission, Media Commission, and Anti-Corruption and Ethics Commission.

Gender-based violence is a serious problem in the DRC. Most of these human rights violations are perpetrated by the police or the military with impunity.

Yet, as Congolese civil society leaders attest, none of this will change without public participation in the reform process. For example, an electoral process that allows citizens to choose among candidates based on performance or policy platforms rather than gender, ethnic identities, or monetary gain is essential to ensuring the credibility of future elections. Combating corruption and misuse of public resources cannot happen without strong activism and pressure from civil society. Community vulnerability to exploitation by competing political and economic entrepreneurs will lessen as men and women gain access to information and conflict mediation mechanisms that can change the nature of local dynamics between citizens and public authorities. Recognizing this, Congolese Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and activists have taken successful initiatives to overcome these barriers, with growing success.

The new challenges to be faced and opportunities that will emerge during the final period of the strategy will vary depending on the different scenarios that may occur (see section 2.2). If the transition succeeds (scenario one), the challenge will be the consolidation of new democratic practices and institutions following national elections and the acceptance of their results. If the transition is protracted (scenario two) by, for example, a highly flawed electoral process, the challenge will be addressing the issues that have caused this. If the transition is stalled (scenario three), the challenge will be to revitalize the transition process, as has been done before. Under each of these three scenarios, a second round of institutional analysis will be undertaken by the international community, and USAID/DRC's strategy and programs will be adjusted accordingly to meet new development challenges. The most important thing will be to conduct this analysis after the election so that there is no interruption in program support during this fragile period. After the appropriate assessments are completed, priority objectives will be set for the final two years of the DG strategy. These may include applying the Congo's new constitution, further strengthening the legislative process, and/or improving local governance.

Overall, the DRC is poised to enter a period of intense reform and revitalization. The Congolese public is eager for this period to begin, and their new TG feels this pressure. As we enter this period of transition and begin the new strategy, one thing is quite clear: a successful transition to durable peace and democratic governance in the DRC will depend largely on whether members of the TG and Congolese people build on the momentum of the ICD and creation of the TG to build a new political order and peaceful society.

#### **4.2. GDRC RESPONSE TO CHALLENGE**

The GDRC has taken several significant steps to ensure a successful transition to democratic governance. First, it has created the TG, in keeping with the Global and Inclusive Accord<sup>2</sup> and Transitional Constitution. This enabled freedom of movement and expression to be established nationwide. For the first time in nearly five years, Congolese citizens and political competitors may travel freely in all of the DRC's eleven provinces. The TG has also filled key military posts ranging from senior commanders to mid-level positions, and plans for military integration have

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<sup>2</sup> Specifically, the Global and Inclusive Accord establishes a Presidency including the President of the Republic and four Vice-Presidents representing each of the formerly warring parties to the conflict plus a representative of the political parties; the Government, comprising 36 Ministries; the National Assembly; the Senate; and the Courts and Tribunals.

been initiated together with the international community. The Parliament's rather unwieldy 500 appointed members have also been seated, together with 50 Senators. These seats are divided proportionally among the parties participating in government.<sup>3</sup> The Transitional Constitution has also been promulgated, establishing a transition timetable of 24 months and creating the executive, legislative and judicial institutions that comprise the TG. Simultaneously, the leadership and members of the five independent commissions were selected.<sup>4</sup>

Judging by these achievements, the level of collaboration and accommodation among the members of the TG has been remarkable. Good-faith efforts are being made both to work together and with the international community to make the government operational and initiate a sound legislative process. For example, the Independent Elections Commission (IEC) has already finalized the Organic Law establishing its mandate and structure, and submitted this to parliament. Further, the space for freedom of expression is opening and political party activity increasingly permitted nation-wide. Overall, these trends are extremely positive.

Nevertheless, there is also evidence that the most powerful members of the TG, specifically, the incumbent government of President Joseph Kabila, the *Movement de la Liberation du Congo* (MLC) represented by Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, and the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie-Goma* (RCD-Goma) represented by Vice President Azarias Ruberwa, will want to keep a tight grip on the transition process in order to safeguard their respective spheres of influence. Many of those interviewed by the Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) team were told that former belligerents are already positioning their allies and supporters in crucial administrative positions. This was anticipated in the Accord and Transitional Constitution, and is the underlying rationale for creating the International Committee for Support to the Transition (CIAT) and the five Independent Commissions of Support for Democracy. In the near and medium terms, these structures will hopefully help facilitate the transition process and help to manage any non-violent conflict, as requested by the members of the TG explicitly in the peace accord.

### 4.3. PRIOR USAID DEMOCRACY EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC

In response to the remarkable opportunity that exists in the DRC today, USAID/DRC believes that it can play a strong role in contributing to the success of the political transition based on the experience described below.

USAID has a proven DG Strategy in the DRC. In 1999, USAID/DRC conducted a DG Assessment that analyzed the barriers to economic and political liberalization and an effective transition to democratic governance in the DRC. The assessment concluded that the DRC's post-Mobutu transition from violent conflict to stable democratic governance had not failed but rather been blocked by the Great Lakes regional conflict as well as the ruling government's policies and practices. It recommended that development assistance should support engagement between state institutions and civil society organizations so that citizens' basic

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<sup>3</sup> An examination of this distribution shows that the former belligerents have 26 out of 36 ministerial positions and 18 out of 25 vice-ministerial positions, the rest of which are apportioned to civil society and the non-armed political opposition. At the apex of the system, the former belligerents claim the Presidency and three out of four vice-presidential seats. In the houses of parliament the former belligerent parties are entitled to 312 out of 500 delegates and 76 out of 120 senators.

<sup>4</sup> The five independent "Democracy Support Institutions" are the Independent Election Commission, the National Human Rights Observatory, the High Authority for the Media, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.

needs and interests could be effectively represented. It hypothesized that a combination of internal and external dialogue and advocacy efforts would lead to concrete political and economic reforms that would mitigate alarming trends in government policies that were undermining political and economic liberalization and contributing to growing instability.

USAID/DRC's experience during the past four years shows that the assessment's original conclusions were correct and the development hypothesis sound. The program designed accordingly has contributed significantly to the achievement of the most ambitious of the four scenarios envisioned at the time: a hard-won negotiated settlement among all of the parties to the conflict; an end to the war; and the continuation of the political transition process. Even hard-bitten Congo-watchers recognize this achievement, and the acceleration of stabilizing, progressive trends. Conflict vulnerabilities and pockets of crisis certainly persist, but the DRC has moved far forward on the continuum from war to peaceful, democratic governance with growing momentum that can be reinforced.

The capacity and political will to realize a successful transition also exist. This is largely due to initiatives taken by constituencies for change, many of which were originally identified in the 1999 USAID/DRC DG assessment. Somewhat surprisingly, the 1999 assessment found impressive constituencies within government, the private sector, and civil society. In updating this assessment in 2003, USAID/DRC has found that many of these same constituencies, such as the Congolese Federation of Entrepreneurs (FEC) (similar to a Chamber of Commerce), have survived and grown stronger with some USAID assistance during the past four years. Furthermore, USAID's focus on supporting these constituencies in promoting the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement and participating in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) contributed directly to the successful conclusion of the peace process, as demonstrated by the contributions of the Congolese civil society representatives, political opposition leaders, and technical experts who helped create the consensus and agreement ultimately reached in December 2002 on the structure and mandate of the TG. Without their participation, key elements such as the five independent commissions would not have been included, nor would the un-armed elements of society been represented.

#### **4.3.1. Program Experience to Date: Positive Trends**

##### **4.3.1.1. Peace-building and Conflict Resolution**

The Congo Support Program (CSP) implemented through Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), was started by OTI immediately after the fall of the Mobutu regime in 1997. OTI/DAI began by providing political transition grants targeting institutions and meeting public needs crucial to the resumption of civic life, democratic governance and community development. The grant portfolio consisted mainly of: (1) financial assistance in the form of communications and transportation for civic groups working in the areas of peace-building, reconciliation, human rights and rule of law; (2) provision of basic materials to repair physical and social infrastructure so that citizens could see the tangible results of the post-conflict transition; and (3) facilitation of community discussions to determine priority needs. It focused on strengthening collaborative efforts between different sectors of society, and promoting inclusive, democratic processes when designing local initiatives and implementing activities.

With the outbreak of war in August 1998, the CSP program began to target civil society initiatives to advance the Lusaka Peace Agreement. During this period, USAID/DRC became one of the principal donor agencies supporting activities surrounding the Lusaka Agreement and the ICD by funding dialogue forums for civil society groups from all areas of the country and from other Great Lakes countries, providing logistical support to the Office of the Facilitator of the Lusaka-mandated ICD, and supporting peace initiatives at the provincial and national levels. This created a participatory mechanism for belligerents, political parties, and civil society to negotiate and reach agreement on a transitional government process and power-sharing arrangement during a two year period culminating in national elections. When the ICD succeeded and the political climate improved in September 2003, USAID used this flexible mechanism to: (1) provide support to the DDR process in concert with the international community, focusing on the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependents, and (2) provide training, technical and material assistance to the nascent institutions of the TG, primarily the IEC.

#### **4.3.1.2. Human Rights Protection and Access to Justice**

Since January 2000 as part of the Great Lakes Justice Initiative implemented through the International Human Rights Law Group/IFES Consortium, USAID/DRC has worked to strengthen the capacity of the Congolese legal and human rights community to propel the peace process towards agreement on a new political order and democratic transition in the DRC. To this end, it built the institutional and organizational capacity for proactive organizations to participate in the ICD, focusing on the transition's legal framework with a view to improving access to justice and human rights protection. Key program areas of focus and achievements included: (1) building consensus in 2000 and 2001 on the irreversibility of the ICD as the only legitimate process for maintaining peace and building a new political order; (2) maintaining pressure after the change in DRC leadership in January 2001 for implementing the ICD in 2002; (3) harnessing Congolese expertise to develop policy positions on military reform, power-sharing arrangements, the issue of nationality, and a constitutional framework; (4) contributing to the 37 resolutions of the ICD through the work of commissions on Defense and Security, Peace and Reconciliation, and Political and Legal Affairs incorporated into the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution in December 2002; (5) creating frameworks and the capacity to confront and prevent human rights abuses exacerbated by the conflict, particularly sexual violence against women and other atrocities committed against minority ethnic groups; and, (6) working with over two dozen Congolese NGOs and hundreds of lawyers to improve their organizational and individual capacity. This led to the successful creation of a Human Rights Institute and a Strategic Lawyering Group that successfully advocated against the DRC's extrajudicial military tribunals.

#### **4.3.1.3. Elections and Political Processes**

Since January 2000 the Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening (CEPPS) has promoted democratic elections and political party development. Initially, the program was implemented through an Elections Resource Center during a period when political party activity and public expression were prohibited by the regime of the late Laurent Desire Kabila. Operating in an extremely insecure environment, the Resource Center managed to stay open, providing civil society and political actors with access to information, training, and meeting space they would not have had otherwise. Using the neutral theme of elections, civic education

tools and activities were developed, and civil society networks and forums created that led ultimately to the ICD.

Later, the CEPPS program facilitated the participation of Congolese election experts and political party representatives in the ICD and peace-process it facilitated. These participants contributed directly to political negotiations leading ultimately to the inclusion of a framework for democratic electoral and political processes and corresponding legal texts and resolutions in the Final Act of the Dialogue: the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution. Capacity-building during this period focused on support for three main Congolese CSOs including Linelit, the *Ligue des Electeurs*, and the Association of Congolese Election Officials, (which temporarily emerged from a history of internal difficulties to participate constructively in the transition process.)

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) joined its consortium partner, the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), to work in DRC in 2001 following the assassination of President Laurent Kabila and the subsequent opening of political space. Until then, political parties and activity were effectively banned. Using the invasion of Congolese territory as a pretext, the late President Laurent Desire Kabila had increasingly reverted to desperate, extremist political strategies including a racist, anti-foreign propaganda campaign that dehumanized perceived enemies while alarming local populations. Political parties were increasingly marginalized during this period, in part because of this repressive political policy, and in part as a direct result of their own limited capacity and internal divisions. Nevertheless, impressive leaders persevered within the political establishment while new ones showed signs of emerging. USAID therefore decided to support a program of engagement with male and female political actors to support their development and constructive participation in the ICD. This led not only to their active participation in the peace process and, subsequently, inclusion in the TG, but also to jump-starting their internal democratic development.

To build on this progress, USAID initiated a nation-wide series of political forums in collaboration with OTI and implemented by CEPPS/NDI and CARE. The ongoing forums are designed to facilitate direct dialogue and greater accountability between political parties and future voters, as well as to catalyze internal party development of organizational and communication structures, policy platforms, and campaign strategies. The results of these forums, already held in Lubumbashi, Gemena, and Bukavu (one city formerly controlled by the then government, one by the MLC, and one by the RCD-G) has been remarkable. Political parties are presenting positions on mining policy, the environment, and rebuilding the economy in a public forum where participants are free to ask questions and debate responses. When the forums started, many thought they would not be possible due to security concerns or a lack of capacity on the part of the parties. They now serve to illustrate the widening political space in the DRC as well as results to be gained by broadening this space for competition and meaningful policy dialogue during the transitional, pre-electoral period.

#### **4.3.1.4. Rebuilding Communities, Resolving Conflict, and Fighting Corruption**

The Rehabilitation and Local Capacity Initiative implemented by the International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH) began in September 2001. The program consisted of 52 rehabilitation projects in both government controlled areas and in RCD-Goma areas: Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kalemie. This activity facilitated the formation and development of

community project management committees and conflict management committees for each project, the majority of which are now self-sustaining. The committee leadership is elected through a participatory, democratic process, which frequently results in the election of women as presidents and officers. These committees prioritized and co-financed selected social and physical infrastructure projects such as rehabilitating water sources, schools, health centers, and roads. Over the past two years, they have evolved into successful governance activities through which local authorities are engaged in the effective management of public resources and transitional community development. Many projects mitigate and manage conflict, as local authorities and sometimes even project participants have tried to steal or redirect project resources. In these instances, IFESH successfully facilitated the work of the Project Management Committees and Conflict Management Committees to resolve conflict non-violently. These projects further represent the first experience that community members have had with participatory decision-making, public resource management, and government accountability. They show the potential and necessity of gender-balanced local community development initiatives to bridge the gap between citizens and government authorities in order to move from crisis to stable, effective governance.



In August 2003, USAID's partner IRM lead a river convoy in Bandundu to investigate corruption in the region

In January 2003, USAID/DRC initiated an ambitious anti-corruption program implemented by Innovative Resources Management (IRM) and spearheaded by a Congolese NGO platform known as PROCODEM. The activity focuses on reducing barriers to transport, commerce, and economic development along the Congo River from Kinshasa to Kisangani. This project quickly seized the attention of both government officials and civil society following a national anti-corruption conference in Kinshasa and a boat convoy that traveled 800 kilometers into remote areas of Bandundu and Equateur provinces with government officials. The purpose of these events was to work with local organizations and government officials equally to expose and document corrupt and illegal practices, and implement reforms. For the first time in the DRC's recent history, civil society organizations are documenting and exposing corrupt and illegal

practices that stifle commerce and underlie the suffering of riparian populations. In response to the active engagement and vision of previously marginalized groups and individuals involved, the activity has rapidly evolved into a campaign for sound governance and social justice that seeks to end the misuse of public resources and criminal impunity in targeted provinces. Following the national workshop, the Presidency of the TG has taken up the anti-corruption campaign as a serious impediment to economic recovery, and has begun to address this problem through policy reform and new directives to military and security forces who engage in corrupt practices.

#### **4.3.1.5. Access to Balanced Information and Media**

Since 2001, Search for Common Ground (SFCG) has sought to support communications and access to information to advance the peace process, focusing on the ICD as the main mechanism for achieving a lasting cease-fire and building consensus on the structure and mandate of a transitional national government. As an implementing partner for both DG and OTI, SFCG has reinforced the capacity of local organizations through the use of radio and television media, dialogue, the arts, journalist training programs, and peace-building centers.

#### **4.3.2. Lessons Learned Concerning the Development Problem**

##### **4.3.2.1. Opening Political Space and Building New Political Institutions**

Democratic processes and institutions are now being created for Congolese political authorities and leaders to be held accountable by the Congolese people themselves, building on the lesson that public pressure and accountability work in the DRC, particularly at the local level, if linked to concrete objectives and facilitated through concrete mechanisms such as the ICD. Now that the ICD is concluded, the success of the CEPPS/NDI political forums and IRM/PROCODER's campaign for improved economic governance show that there are viable political party and civil society structures as well as emerging leadership at the national, provincial, and local levels that are successfully promoting reform, but need assistance to build their constituencies, develop their organizations, and expand the impact of their programs. These lessons could be applied to the appointed provincial and national parliaments to help them build a representative legislative process from scratch.

The struggle of the IEC to become genuinely independent and effective further shows that important institutional battles can be won during this fluid period at the outset of the transition. Specifically, a combination of expert training, technical, and material assistance can jump-start new institutions that are critical to the success of the transition. This can be applied to other institutions as well.

##### **4.3.2.2. Improving Government Accountability and Transparency**

Ultimately, the GDRC and those in rebellion against it were held accountable for their actions by the international community, which pushed hard for negotiations to attain an alternative to war, a mechanism for dialogue and negotiation (the ICD), and new incentives for peace. The accepted alternative to war is the power-sharing arrangement codified by the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution. The new incentives offered include positions within the government, opportunities for economic recovery and prosperity offered by the

World Bank, IMF, and other donors, and enhanced financial support and development assistance from the full donor community. That this approach can work is an important lesson in peace-building and supporting post-conflict transitions. Women's participation in the new government needs to be supported.

At the provincial and local levels, community development projects coupled with conflict-resolution mechanisms have proven able to improve public infrastructure, meet critical needs, and help citizens to organize and address governance problems with public officials at the commune level, the DRC's most basic political unit. This has been achieved through an approach integrating rehabilitation and construction projects with training in resource management, project management, and democratic decision-making (whereby community committees chose their leadership, prioritize projects, and decide how to deal with corrupt or repressive public officials or internal conflicts). If expanded, this approach could have a remarkable impact on enhancing community welfare, resolving conflicts, addressing gender-based disparities, opportunities, and constraints, and making government more accountable and transparent, a novel concept in the DRC. Similarly, the results of the *Anti-Corruption and Economic Recovery* project have shown that by documenting and exposing corruption and illegal practices at the local and provincial levels, the national government can be motivated to take note and respond. This was much more difficult before the transition began, and is only possible now due to the visible support of the international community for combating corruption and ending criminal impunity.

The justice sector reform poses a huge problem largely outside of USAID's manageable interest. While support for members of the legal and human rights community succeeded in advancing the peace process and ICD, these efforts now seem stalled as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) struggles to leave the starting gate. The TRC already excluded other members of the human rights community, and acted non-transparently to develop new legislation. Further, while the framework for a viable justice system in the DRC still exists, the system needs a complete overhaul: court infrastructure and the prison system must be built or rehabilitated nationwide; legal professionals including judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys need training; nearly all legal professionals lack the most basic resources, such as paper, and most have not been paid in years or decades; finally, most Congolese have little knowledge of their basic human and legal rights. Clearly, a comprehensive, well-coordinated analysis of the barriers faced and resources needed to rebuild the justice system is needed. Unfortunately, USAID has insufficient resources to do so beyond continuing to engage civil society actors in the process of justice sector reform to end criminal impunity and improve human rights protection, particularly for the most vulnerable Congolese including women, youth, and minorities. Overall, justice sector reforms must be implemented through a gender-sensitive, coherent, integrated strategy timed carefully to stabilize rather than destabilize the transition.



#### 4.3.2.3. Improving Public Participation and Representation

The successful conclusion of the DRC's peace-process and the ICD show that a combination of strong diplomatic pressures, expert international facilitation, and pressure by civil society, including the religious and business community, can produce an effective ceasefire and peace agreement, and initiate a post-conflict political transition process in the Great Lakes region. This was achieved in a complex political and regional environment through painstaking consensus-building and intense negotiation among all stakeholders, including regional actors as well as domestic belligerents, political actors, and civil society.

However, while the civil society organizations involved initially used their strengthened capacity and expertise to participate constructively in the peace process and ICD, many members and organizations based in Kinshasa have since abandoned the consensus and policy positions they helped to build to promote self-interested agendas. For example, USAID invested heavily from 1998 to 2003 in a nation-wide "harmonization" process to integrate feedback from civil society organizations throughout the DRC's eleven provinces into the final drafts of the Organic Laws on the IEC, the TRC, Media Commission, and Military Integration. Several of the same organizations deeply involved in this process are now producing new, alternative versions to these laws, developed independently. In one case, the only difference between this new legislation and that already developed is that in the new versions, particular individuals are given positions in the TG.

This situation is problematic. It is exacerbated by complaints of these organizations that international donors have abandoned them, despite continued significant investments to support civil society. Many Kinshasa-based organizations now complain that donor assistance is not being provided to Congolese institutions, despite the fact that the members of the TG, the five independent commissions selected by civil society, and the institutions they are building are entirely Congolese. These organizations have now launched a campaign against the very international organizations that helped them, and the independent commissions they created, accusing them of corruption and narrow self-interest.

Based on this experience, the sobering lesson concerning civil society is threefold: first, that self-interest and personal ambition for some of the most promising leaders surpasses the importance of a stable transition process; second, that despite years of capacity-building, civil society still cannot effectively organize and maintain a consensus on important objectives; and third, that many of the most promising leaders can be found outside Kinshasa, who distinguish themselves by starting concrete initiatives and working constructively with others with little or no outside assistance.

Moreover, capacity building for the sake of capacity building does not work well in the DRC, and often fuels rivalries and ruptures within civil society as individuals compete for assistance that is often their sole livelihood, forgetting to involve those citizens that they are in theory representing. Without concrete objectives and criteria for continued assistance, organizations and individuals quickly become overwhelmed and swallowed in the DRC's fractious and competitive political and social environment. Sometimes this dynamic is compounded by competing international interests and theories of development, when different donors and countries support competing civil society actors. Overall, these experiences underscore the importance of coordinating policies, problem analysis, strategy development, and future

programs within the international community together with Congolese constituencies, especially women and other vulnerable groups, for reform.

#### **4.4. PROGRAM RATIONALE**

There is now a unique opportunity to consolidate the DRC's post-conflict transition, thereby capitalizing on years of investments. But in order for the post-conflict transition to democratic governance to succeed, the government and people of Congo need to replace the centralized, predatory, exclusive governance system that has stifled economic and political development with one that is legitimate, representative, and accountable. In the interim, the TG must be able to reunify and reconstruct the nation, ensure public security, and effectively manage public resources.

While the withdrawal of foreign troops and the terms of the power-sharing arrangement that underlie the transitional government have been realized, this does not mean that a democratic government has been established. Rather, the DRC is between peace and war. On the one hand, the major armed actors now have an incentive to participate in the national reunification and pacification process, which they will lead and manage. Their main incentive is to position themselves to be able to retain political control following the elections, which are required to be held between 24 and 36 months from the beginning of the transition period. On the other hand, any group participating in the TG still may withdraw from the process. The main incentive to do so would be that what they stand to lose outweighs what they stand to gain politically or economically.

The transition will therefore be a fragile process based on a hard-won consensus that could lead to democratic changes and good governance in the long run, but is vulnerable to spoilers and derailment during its initial phases. The fundamental rationale for a robust DG program is therefore to sustain the momentum toward a successful transition process by strengthening key processes and institutions so that they are less vulnerable to spoilers or stalling, while sustaining and consolidating progress towards a successful transition and post-transition period. In keeping with the view that democratic governance itself is a mechanism to resolve conflict by non-violent means, the DRC's transition process can be viewed as a conflict resolution mechanism. SO 3 seeks to ensure that this mechanism works effectively while simultaneously laying the groundwork for the post-transition period.

Further, an evaluation of program impact to date shows that USAID/DRC is well positioned to provide a strategic programmatic response to the challenges that the DRC faces, building upon its high level of credibility and success. The previous program that sought to promote peace and de-block the stalled transition process has succeeded. The future program uses this as a departure point, building on the progress already made in the areas of: (1) improved security and conflict resolution; (2) applying and further developing the legal and constitutional framework for the transition process; (3) strengthening the capacity of key transitional institutions; and (4) increasing public participation in economic and political decision-making and government reform. Gender analysis will inform the choices made in these four areas to ensure that our goals of gender equity and women's empowerment are met.

By supporting key transitional political processes and institutions, USAID/DRC intends to help them succeed in managing conflict non-violently, facilitate social, economic, and physical

reconstruction of the DRC, and create a constitutional and legal framework for effective, democratic governance in the future. To focus its program and complement those of other donors, USAID/DRC selected key processes and institutions such as: (1) the IEC, political parties and electoral process strengthening; (2) parliament and legislation related to the political process, including the electoral law, political party law, and laws on nationality and decentralization; (3) the TRC and justice sector reforms focusing on the most vulnerable members of society, who need to be included in the political process; and (4) local governance reform in targeted provinces and communities that will directly affect the above areas by including citizens in political processes and promoting community security, conflict resolution, and development.

The program will also contribute to closing the opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs by improving security and stability through support for reintegration of ex-combatants into local communities via activities linked to those under the DDR SpO. This will be achieved by sustaining and expanding successful initiatives to manage conflict and engage civil society and public authorities together in local development initiatives using the IFESH community development model. In addition, the DG program will develop local capacity to monitor, document, and change policies of abuse and corrupt practices by local officials, including military and security forces. Gradually, these local civil society initiatives will be linked to national-level activities to reform political institutions and improve governance.

The impact of this approach is expected to be threefold. First, it will help to create a secure environment and facilitate DDR at the local level, thereby creating an environment in which the political transition can proceed. Second, it will facilitate ongoing local conflict management and prevention. This will be particularly needed as new policies and practices initiated at the national level begin to affect local communities. For example, as illegal taxation and human rights violations are exposed and condemned publicly, tensions between public officials and civil society activists will mount, requiring mediation and resolution. Third, it will improve government accountability by increasing citizen participation in local political and economic decision-making processes, paving the way for future political and economic reforms that benefit men and women equitably.

In addition, as the transition begins, it is becoming clear that many of the articles and provisions in the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution need clarification and amendment to be workable in reality. Specifically, several outstanding issues need to be resolved. For example, how will the TG address the issue of effective decentralization? The thorny issue of citizenship also needs to be addressed conclusively: as the election nears, what status will be given to people targeted for persecution under previous regimes, and what will be the prerequisites for citizenship and voter registration? How will issues concerning greater participation by women under the DRC's new political order be resolved constitutionally? How will the TG end criminal impunity, and improve access to justice for all citizens, particularly women and persecuted minorities, and help the DRC's struggling youth?

While the challenges posed by these issues are daunting, each represents an argument for, rather than against, the continuation and future expansion of the USAID/DRC DG program during the transition period. Because striking, measurable progress has been made in the last two years, there is strong evidence that these issues may be resolved through an approach that sustains and strengthens the existing governance consensus on transitional processes and

institutions. Because active and courageous religious leaders, civil society groups, and business associations have persisted in their struggle for peace and democracy, there is a strong basis for holding government accountable for its performance while responding to critical social needs. Because MONUC, UNDP, the E.U., and the World Bank are deploying human and financial resources to help pacify and reconstruct the country, there is a clear opportunity to expand and deepen community reconciliation and reconstruction efforts. Finally, the DG SO reinforces progress toward achieving USAID/DRC's objectives in health, education, and livelihoods by creating an enabling environment for all other strategic objectives to succeed. Overall, there is now an opportunity for USAID and other development partners in a range of sectors to work with the GDRC and Congolese communities in concert to reduce barriers to a successful transition and maximize its potential to succeed.

Based on this rationale, the development hypothesis under which USAID/DRC will work is:

If the transitional political process is supported and strengthened by enhanced citizen participation and institutional development, if legal and constitutional frameworks are sound, and if peace and stability are promoted, then the GDRC may succeed in building a sound governance process based on democratic principles of non-violent political competition, broad-based representation and accountability that will lead to durable peace, gender equity, and stable, effective government. This hypothesis is related to five others:

- To facilitate meaningful participation, it will be necessary to work simultaneously at the national, provincial, and community levels. In USAID's experience, community-based projects in DRC offer some of the best opportunities to engage citizens and public officials together to achieve a strategic goal. Many of the best opportunities and strongest constituencies for reform exist and function outside Kinshasa.
- Focusing on specific institutions and processes as well as particular provinces and communities will ensure that the assistance provided has the desired impact, despite the challenge of working at multiple levels of government simultaneously in a country the size of the DRC.
- For elections to succeed in the DRC, several elements are necessary: a voting population with sufficient knowledge of the electoral process and of the difference between parties and candidates to make an informed choice; functioning political parties with clear policy platforms articulated to voters; an IEC with the capacity to administer a fair, credible and transparent process; and a transparent polling process effectively monitored by partisan, non-partisan and international observers.
- USAID's strategic approach needs to be flexible enough to respond to the many potential pathways that might emerge from the shorter-term transition process and post-transition period.
- Because Congolese society has adapted to the absence of viable state institutions, an alternative social and physical infrastructure exists, largely created and maintained by religious institutions, that can contribute significantly to a successful transition.

#### 4.4.1. Critical Assumptions

In addition to the overarching critical assumptions outlined in section 2.2, the following critical assumptions are necessary for the success of this SO.

- The transition process can make progress while pockets of crisis and violent conflict persist in isolated areas such as Ituri in Oriental Province. However, if allowed to linger, these pockets may expand or draw in members of the TG, thereby destabilizing the transition.
- Slow but continual progress will be made towards the integration of national military and security forces, with ongoing support from the international community as well as the level of troop deployment needed to continue the DDR process and establish a minimum level of security.

#### 4.5. RELATIONSHIP TO GDRC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

SO 3 is consistent with the GDRC's policies and programs. Further, it is within USAID's manageable interest to support and strengthen the TG as a conflict resolution and management tool in itself, while simultaneously enhancing public participation in the political transition process. Because the policies and programs of the nascent GDRC reflect positive trends and progress, USAID believe that these should be expanded and deepened. As noted by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), William Swing, "two years before ... the wars were still raging, the foreign armies were still on the territory. Today, all those who were fighting are now in the same government. All the institutions foreseen under the constitutional transition have been stood up. There is a government that is functioning and meeting regularly."

Based on these trends and constructive policies, the DG program's relationship with the GDRC is to support the continued, active participation of those who comprise the new government in developing transitional processes and institutions. In keeping with the positive changes underway, training, technical, and material assistance will be offered to reinforce targeted institutions and processes in coordination with other donors. Specifically, USAID will support the IEC and TRC while strengthening the legislative, political party and electoral processes, and continuing to improve access to justice for the most vulnerable parts of society. These activities will be complemented by conflict management and community development activities at the local level, focusing on combating corruption, empowering women and men, and improving management of public resources. This will reinforce the GDRC's new policies of economic reform, transparency in government, and improved economic governance, which are now geared towards achieving a successful transition. OTI will also be involving government officials at the national, local, and regional levels of governance.



In Kiri, a priest discusses constraints to river commerce with a naval commander

## 4.6. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

SO 3 is *A Successful Transition to Peace and Democratic Governance Promoted*.

Illustrative SO level indicators:

- Ind. 1. Key benchmarks in the transition calendar for elections, political process development and a constitutional referendum achieved.
- Ind. 2. Male and female public perceptions of citizen participation, representation, and government accountability improved.
- Ind. 3. Resource management and public policies reflect public priorities in targeted communities.

SO 3 has four Intermediate Results:

- IR 1. Improved local security and stability through conflict resolution and community development;
- IR 2. Timely implementation of the legal framework required for the political transition, including elections;
- IR 3. Development and strengthening of democratic institutions and basic political processes, including elections; and
- IR 4. Increased participation of Congolese society in economic and political decision-making and government reform.

### 4.6.1. Results Framework and Targets

For IR 1, the program will target vulnerable communities in four eastern provinces (North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema) and possibly the Ituri District of Oriental Province. These are areas where ongoing or recent localized conflict has had a significant and differential impact on the population and might undermine a successful transition. The program will also look to provide assistance to isolated populations in the provinces of Bandundu and Equateur. These provinces and the communities they comprise were selected through careful evaluation in coordination with OTI, OFDA, and other SO teams based upon: (1) the level of conflict vulnerability within the Province; (2) the potential for conflict within the province to destabilize the transition; and (3) potential synergies with other SOs.

Eight activities are currently envisioned in the eastern provinces affecting between 2,000 and 10,000 beneficiaries in areas of reintegration of ex-combatants, their dependents, and IDPs, thereby reaching a maximum of 80,000 community members. In addition, each activity will include at least 200 ex-combatants, and is anticipated to have a “demonstration affect” on non-demobilized groups that could exponentially increase the number of beneficiaries as former combatants, their dependents, and local populations are drawn into the reintegration process. The DDR SpO also targets this population. However, the strategy anticipates that once DDR activities are completed, the conflict management and project management committees (with equitable male/female representation) created by this IR will continue to resolve conflicts and participate in local governance.

For IR 2, the anticipated impact will be national due to its focus on developing and implementing the legal framework for the IEC and TRC called for in the Global and Inclusive

Accord and Transitional Constitution. In addition, this IR will support development of the future electoral law, political parties law, decentralization law, and priority human rights legislation. Overall, this IR focuses on the processes that are most important for the transition to succeed in creating legitimate, representative, and accountable government institutions. In the short term, the clarification, application, and development of the legal framework for the transition will help to manage potential conflict and maintain the existing consensus among signatories to the accord. In the longer term, this IR will help to resolve issues that otherwise could lead to violent conflict through non-violent democratic processes.

If IR 3 is realized, the key institutions targeted will develop the capacity to apply the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution effectively. This means ensuring a credible and participatory electoral process takes place within the constitutionally mandated period whereby all members of Congolese society may select their individual and political party representatives based on an informed choice, knowledge of their rights, and an evaluation of government performance during the transition period. It further means that the existing culture of impunity is dramatically reduced or ended and access to justice expanded to reach many more citizens, including the most vulnerable. The institutions selected for USAID assistance include the IEC, TRC, political parties, and key committees of parliament and the presidency that will be involved in the development, amendment, debate, adoption, and implementation of relevant legislation during the transition period. To catalyze institutional development and enhance public participation, especially of women, and increase accountability, targeted legislation will be selected through a participatory process involving civil society, government authorities, and those institutional actors appointed to key institutions of the transition, as discussed above.

Finally, IR 4 will target populations living in those provinces where there is a convergence of



Community members of all ages are preparing for the transition

DDR, conflict management, community development, anti-corruption, political process, governance, livelihoods, and health activities. These are Equateur, Bandundu, North Kivu, South Kivu, Maniema, and Katanga provinces. These six provinces comprise two "axes", one along the Congo River itself in the West and the other along the Albertine rift on the DRC's eastern boundary. Targeted activities will also include Oriental Province, where Ituri territory is located and the DRC's residual conflict continues. If this result is achieved, both rural and urban populations of males and females in these areas will have access to balanced

information needed to: 1) develop an understanding of their legal and human rights during the transition period, including the right to choose elected representatives at the end of the transition period; 2) develop a knowledge of how to exercise their rights and actively participate in the prioritization of community needs and interests; 3) access economic and political decision-making processes to ensure that the public and social service needs of the community are met based on sound, legal resource and financial management practices; and 4) hold public officials and political leaders accountable for their policies and practices through effective advocacy and oversight.

#### 4.6.2. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities

IR 1: Improved Local Security and Stability through Conflict Management and Community Development Initiatives.

USAID will help to improve citizen security, resolve conflicts, and reconstruct vulnerable communities.

Illustrative activities:

1. USAID will build on the work of skilled conflict mediators and conflict management committees including civil society, religious leaders, and local authorities to resolve local conflicts and rebuild their communities. Toward this end, local project management committees will work jointly with conflict management committees to design and implement gender-sensitive community rehabilitation projects in areas to which ex-combatants and their dependents return.
2. In the future, conflict resolution at the local level will be supported by a network of Conflict Resolution Committees in targeted provinces. These committees will serve to mediate, prevent and manage conflicts that emerge at the local and provincial levels as the transition moves forward and tensions mount due to the implementation of new government policies and practices geared toward greater transparency and accountability that will challenge existing power structures. These committees will address issues ranging from the re-integration of ex-combatants to human rights abuses by local authorities to transparent management of public resources. They may ultimately evolve into mechanisms for civic education and election observation.
3. Support to the nascent TRC and process, as well as use of media as a conflict mitigation and prevention tool, will complement other activities under this IR.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. Decreased incidences of attacks by irregular forces, military or police on local populations in targeted communities.
- Ind. 1.2. # or % of internally displaced persons (disaggregated by sex) able to return home in targeted communities.
- Ind. 1.3. % of demobilized and resettled ex-combatants and their dependents (disaggregated by sex) in targeted territories reintegrated with sustainable livelihoods through effective community problem-solving and conflict management.

(The above would be based on surveys and focus group research with conflict management committees as well as MONUC statistics).

# USAID/DRC

## Results Framework for SO 3 (Democracy and Governance)

### Critical Assumptions:

- International support for the transition continues at sufficient levels to effectively implement national DDR as well as essential political and economic reforms.

### *A Successful Transition to Peace and Democratic Governance Promoted*

#### Overall Indicators:

- Ind. 1: Key benchmarks in the transition calendar for elections, political process development, and a constitutional referendum achieved.
- Ind. 2: Male and female perceptions of citizen participation, representation, and government accountability improved.
- Ind. 3: Resource management and public policies reflect public priorities in targeted communities.

- The foreign armies involved in the DRC's recent conflict, particularly those of Rwanda and Uganda, remain withdrawn and demonstrate a growing respect for the DRC's territorial sovereignty.
- Other major donors including the European Union and United Nations Development Program will coordinate constructively with the U.S. Embassy and USAID, sharing assessments and strategies, and when possible, developing these jointly.

Intermediate Results

#### Intermediate Result 1

Improved Local Security and Stability through Conflict Management and Community Development Initiatives

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. Decreased incidences of attacks by irregular forces, military or police on local populations in targeted communities
- Ind. 1.2. # or % of internally displaced persons disaggregated by sex able to return home in targeted communities
- Ind. 1.3. % of demobilized and resettled ex-combatants and their dependents in targeted territories reintegrated with sustainable livelihoods through effective community problem-solving and conflict management

#### Intermediate Result 2

Timely Implementation of the Legal Framework Required for the Political Transition, Including Elections

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. Organic Laws establishing the IEC and TRC are adopted and implemented
- Ind. 2.2. Adoption and implementation of legislation on the electoral process, political party functioning, decentralization, citizenship, and the Third Republic's Constitution
- Ind. 2.3. Mechanisms facilitating public participation in amending or developing targeted legislation at the national and provincial levels are operational and are gender sensitive
- Ind. 2.4. Priority legislation targeted by civil society advocacy groups is amended or drafted by parliament based on input by civil society partners
- Ind. 2.5. The legislative process is conducted in accordance with established Rules of Procedure that assure public participation and transparency in the legislative process

#### Intermediate Result 3

Development and Strengthening of Democratic Institutions and Basic Political Processes, Including Elections

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. Improved rating applying the Institutional Capacity tool developed by REDSO to the IEC and TRC
- Ind. 3.2. Targets met by political parties engaged by CEPPS/NDI using baseline study of political party capacity
- Ind. 3.3. Key benchmarks in electoral calendar accomplished
- Ind. 3.4. Public perception of electoral authority impartiality and neutrality disaggregated by sex
- Ind. 3.5. Male and female citizens discern differences between competing political parties and candidates sufficient to inform their choice of candidate.(Indicator to be shared with OTL.)

#### Intermediate Result 4

Increased Participation of Congolese Society in Economic and Political Decision-Making and Government Reform

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 4.1. Males and females experience decreased feelings of isolation due to increased access to diverse sources of information and communications networks
- Ind. 4.2. % increase in government revenues for priority social services in targeted provinces and territories

Illustrative Activity Types

- Facilitate spontaneous demobilization of armed groups that choose to integrate into society
- Develop local conflict management capacities necessary for the sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependents
- Facilitate productive reintegration of ex-combatants and their dependents through inclusive social and physical infrastructure rehabilitation projects managed by local project development committees working with trained conflict mediators

- Support the development and implementation of an Organic Law for the IEC and an Electoral Law
- Support the development and implementation of an Organic Law establishing the TRC and facilitate involvement of a wide-range of stakeholders
- Facilitate the identification, amendment, and implementation of priority human rights legislation concerning the DRC's most vulnerable groups
- Support the development and implementation of a Law on Political Parties, Citizenship, and Decentralization
- Facilitate the development of democratic parliamentary Rules of Procedure
- Provide access to communications, training, and technical resources

- Support the construction of an effective, credible electoral process
- Build a more representative and competitive multi-party system through political party capacity building
- Support the development of an effective, transparent and representative legislative process through support to key technical committees
- Strengthen the capacity of the TRC to end criminal impunity and enhance Congolese citizens' access to justice during the transition period
- Promote access to justice for the most vulnerable Congolese including ethnic minorities, women and children

- Support radio programming, local theater and other civic education tools
- Increase awareness by public stakeholders and authorities at the local and national levels of the social and economic costs of corruption, the potential benefits of more transparent polices and practices
- Hold public authorities accountable through workshops, reporting, advocacy and media events
- Engage a broad range of associations interested in ending government impunity for corruption and abuse of authority along the Congo River and its tributaries in a national network for government reform

IR 2: Timely Implementation of the Legal Framework Required for the Political Transition, Including Elections.

USAID will support the implementation and development of the legal and constitutional framework created by the Global and Inclusive Accord and Transitional Constitution by supporting the legislative drafting and vetting necessary for a viable electoral and political process to succeed. This process will examine gender-based constraints and opportunities. This will involve technical assistance and training for two of the five independent commissions, including the IEC and TRC, as well as for political parties and key legislative committees.

Illustrative activities:

1. Supporting the development, debate, promulgation, and implementation of an Organic Law establishing the IEC's roles and responsibilities and an electoral law creating the DRC's new electoral system through training, technical and material assistance to the IEC and key stakeholders in coordination with other donors.
2. Supporting the development, debate, promulgation, and implementation of a Political Parties Law, Law on Decentralization, and Parliamentary Rules of Procedure through training, technical and material assistance to at least 26 of the DRC's viable political parties and entities, appointed parliamentarians and senators, and key stakeholders in coordination with other donors.
3. Supporting the development, debate, promulgation, and implementation of an Organic Law establishing the TRC mandate through training and technical assistance to the TRC and facilitation of input by key stakeholders in coordination with other donors.
4. Promoting participation by key human rights organizations and Congolese legal experts in the development, amendment, debate, and implementation of priority human rights legislation.
5. Providing material assistance through access to communications, library and training materials available through the Democracy Resource Centers.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. Organic Laws establishing the IEC and TRC are adopted and implemented.
- Ind. 2.2. Adoption and implementation of legislation on the electoral process, political party functioning, decentralization, citizenship, and the Third Republic's Constitution.
- Ind. 2.3. Mechanisms facilitating public participation in amending or developing targeted legislation at the national and provincial levels are operational and gender-sensitive.
- Ind. 2.4. Priority legislation targeted by civil society advocacy groups is amended or drafted by parliament based on input by civil society partners.
- Ind. 2.5. The legislative process is conducted in accordance with established Rules of Procedure that assure public participation and transparency in the legislative process.

IR 3: Development and Strengthening of Democratic Institutions and Basic Political Processes, Including Elections.

USAID will help to advance the transition and support the consolidation of democratic processes by strengthening the organizational and individual capacity of key institutions of the TG

including the IEC, TRC, political parties, and key parliamentary and government committees involved in building transparent, accountable governance. The TRC will be supported as part of a targeted justice sector initiative to facilitate access to justice for the most vulnerable members of society during the transition period and promote reconciliation while national justice sector reforms are implemented.

Illustrative activities:

1. Support the construction of an effective, credible electoral process through support to the IEC.
2. Build a more representative and competitive multi-party system through political party capacity building.
3. Support the development of an effective, transparent and representative legislative process through support to key technical committees.
4. Strengthen the capacity of the TRC to end criminal impunity and enhance Congolese citizens' access to justice during the transition period.
5. Promote access to justice for the most vulnerable Congolese including ethnic minorities, women, and children.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. Improved rating applying the Institutional Capacity tool developed by REDSO to the IEC and TRC.
- Ind. 3.2. Targets met by political parties engaged by CEPPS/NDI using baseline study of political party capacity.
- Ind. 3.3. Key benchmarks in electoral calendar accomplished.
- Ind. 3.4. Public perception of electoral authority impartiality and neutrality, disaggregated by sex.
- Ind. 3.5. Male and female citizens discern differences between competing political parties and candidates sufficient to inform their choice of candidate. (Indicator to be shared with OTI.)

IR 4: Increased Participation of Congolese Society in Economic and Political Decision-Making and Government Reform.
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USAID will support programs to increase public access to information and participation in decision making processes through an array of activities.

Illustrative activities:

1. A variety of civic education tools and networks will be used to: 1) ensure that the Congolese public is informed about the transition process, including its new constitutional rights and responsibilities, and 2) engage the Congolese public with government authorities in a discussion and debate concerning the choices that lie ahead, including the design of the Congo's future electoral system and decentralized governance and any differential impact on men and women to be considered.
2. Public stakeholder awareness of the social and economic costs of corruption and the potential benefits of more transparent polices and practices will be increased and action

plans developed and implemented through workshops, reporting, advocacy and media events.

3. A broad range of stakeholder groups and coalitions with interests in the Congo's river transportation systems and the equitable distribution of resources in communities along these waterways will be provided training and technical assistance. These groups will be supported by local conflict management committees.
4. OTI will support a small grants field-based program that helps indigenous NGOs to play a more viable and vibrant role in advancing the political transition.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 4.1. Males and females experience decreased feelings of isolation due to increased access to diverse sources of information and communications networks.
- Ind. 4.2. % increase in government revenues for priority social services in targeted provinces and territories.

#### **4.6.3. Implementing Mechanisms**

The SO 3 team is working closely with OTI to achieve the shared SOs and IRs reflected in this strategy through collaborative strategy development, evaluation, and program implementation. Implementing mechanisms supported by both offices currently include an Associate Award through the CEPPS Cooperative Agreement with NDI and IFES, and a Cooperative Agreement with Search for Common Ground (SFCG). This will help to ensure the smooth transfer of ongoing activities when OTI implements its existing strategy. Conflict management, economic governance, and community development activities are currently implemented through Cooperative Agreements with IFESH and IRM. The SO 3 team will work closely with the SO 4 (Livelihoods) Team as well as OTI to address the problem of inequitable resource distribution through its community development and anti-corruption activities. Training and technical assistance for both transition institutions and community conflict resolution and reintegration is currently implemented through a contract with DAI.

OTI: The OTI and DG programs share the common objective of a successful political transition. The OTI program emphasizes peace-building through country-wide access to balanced information, public participation in informed dialogue on issues of national importance, and the provision of resources to a range of civil society groups through small grants. The DG program focuses on creating stability and building sound governance institutions during the transition period by working with specific actors and institutions at the national and community levels. This complements the OTI program. The OTI and DG programs each support three offices in different provinces that provide access to training and resources to promote democratic governance, forming a network of six centers.

FFP: Household food insecurity and family coping strategies are measured by WFP through surveys using participatory and community-based methods. These methods bring training in analytical techniques to communities and improve the identification and targeting of their most vulnerable members. WFP's CY 2004-2005 target is that women represent 70% of active members of management committees participating in decision-making, distribution of food commodities and monitoring and evaluation of programs. Thus, communities and women in particular are given the tools to improve their knowledge and ultimately their decision-making

abilities in regards to nutritional health, improved livelihoods, and dealing with conflict. Through its Food for Work programs, WFP and its partners - German Agency for Technical Cooperation, Save the Children, and Action Against Hunger – will also implement reconstruction activities for the rehabilitation of community infrastructure as a complement to IDP resettlement activities. These actions will favor marginalized communities and help re-establish their assets.

DCHA's conflict funds will specifically be used to achieve results in the following three areas.

- 1) Addressing impunity. This includes combating abuse of authority and predatory state practices as well as supporting transitional justice through the process of national reconciliation (to be facilitated by the TRC). These activities will focus on the most vulnerable members of Congolese society including women, youth, the handicapped, and persecuted minorities (supports IRs 1,3, and 4).
- 2) Expanding male and female conflict management and mediation capacity at the local level. This will help to address issues related to reintegration in the near-term, and conflicts that emerge as the transition moves forward in the longer term, making government more transparent and accountable (supports all IRs).
- 3) Providing wide-scale information dissemination and improved communication, especially within isolated communities to help mitigate and prevent conflict based on inflammatory or biased information and advance a peaceful transition (supports all IRs).

#### **4.6.4. Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan**

During the first quarter of calendar year 2004, the SO 3 team will work closely with its implementing partners and other donors to further develop its preliminary engendered PMP (provided in Annex II). This exercise will include the development of a public opinion survey and strategy for focus group research with OTI and other SO teams, particularly SO 4. It will further work with REDSO to apply the Organizational Capacity Development Tool that has been adapted to post-conflict environments in order to apply this to the transitional institutions strengthened through USAID activities. Finally, it will incorporate the findings and analysis of Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and other international organizations systematically evaluating progress towards democracy, gender equity and improved governance in the Great Lakes region. The PMP will be finalized by the end of CY 2004.

#### **4.6.5. Scenarios and Program Adjustments**

Successful Transition. Under this scenario, the DG program would continue activities under each of its four IRs. Conflict management, community reintegration and rehabilitation, and local governance activities that hold public officials responsible for managing public resources and responding to citizens' priorities would be implemented in the six provinces under IR 1. The application of the transitional legal framework and development of new legislation for democratic political processes, government decentralization and improved human rights protection as well as the DRC's future constitutions would be supported under IR 2. Legislative strengthening and governance programs including capacity-building for a successful electoral process and political party development would be implemented under IR 3. IR 4 will address the urgent need to develop the capacity of individual, appointed parliamentarians to participate constructively in key committees and represent citizen's interests in the process of developing, amending, debating and adopting priority legislation during the transition period. (With 500

members and no Rules of Procedure or internal organization as of the writing of the ISP, direct, coordinated assistance to make the parliament operational is a critical near-term need.) Informed citizen participation in political and economic decision-making and oversight of public institutions will be promoted through media and community-based civic advocacy activities linked to IR 1 under IR 4. Such assistance will build upon and expand the current IRs, heightening the likelihood of achieving SO 3.

USAID/DRC's 1999 DG Assessment noted that to build bridges between civil society organizations working in the justice sector and government it would be sufficient to strengthen the institutional capacity of legal professionals and human rights NGOs. However, it also noted that "this strategy by definition can have only limited impact. Justice sector institutions require significant assistance to recover from decades of neglect and abuse. Extensive training programs for the judiciary, lawyers and other sector professionals would be appropriate" in addition to which court administration and infrastructure rehabilitation are areas of substantial need. This limitation still applies, but cannot be addressed under this or any scenario without large budget increases. Even with these increases, other donors may meet this strategic need following completion of an E.U. Justice Sector Assessment in mid-2004. The USAID/DRC strategy will complement and enhance any assistance provided by other donors through its support to the TRC and continued human rights advocacy and action in the context of the legislative process.

**Protracted Transition.** Under this scenario, activities would be re-targeted under IR 2 and IR 3, depending on the nature of the barrier facing the TG and independent democratic institutions. For example, if the IEC's functions were transferred to the Ministry of Interior, program assistance in this area would cease, though it may be re-targeted to support civil society advocacy for a fair and transparent electoral process. By the same token, increased repression of political parties could curtail political party capacity-building work, which would then be re-targeted to promote policy change through the legislative process and public advocacy, if the parliament were functioning adequately. Areas that would remain robust under both scenarios would be IR 1 and IR 4. IR 2 and IR 3 may be conflated to focus on regaining momentum and overcoming new barriers, including gender barriers, to the political transition.

**Stalled Transition.** Under this scenario, the DG program would be reduced to the core program similar to that which existed prior to the beginning of the transition period. The program would focus on identifying and supporting a mechanism for negotiation and, depending on the cause of the problem, conflict mitigation and resolution. In keeping with the DG development hypothesis, a stalled transition would likely mean a high degree of vulnerability to conflict, as the transition process itself is the mechanism for managing and preventing conflict in the DRC. Key areas of program focus would therefore be strengthening dialogue mechanisms, peace initiatives, and advocacy in close collaboration with OTI. The current program would be examined to identify those activities that could best contribute to a new objective of jump-starting the transition process.

#### 4.6.6. Budget Tables by Funding Parameter

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#### 4.6.7. Priorities under Different Funding Parameters

The High Funding Parameter: Under the high funding scenario, using combined funding sources, USAID's DG Program in the DRC would have sufficient resources to achieve results in each of the IR areas. The program as designed would be able to provide rapid response assistance to take advantage of new opportunities and overcome new obstacles during the transition. Simultaneously, it would support the most critical processes and institutions in areas where USAID has a comparative advantage and proven track-record. Ongoing support would be provided at the national level to three of the most important transitional processes and institutions for SO 3: the electoral process, including political party strengthening; the process of national reconciliation and providing access to justice for the most vulnerable Congolese; and the legislative process working with key legislative and executive committees. This national level support would be complemented by activities to combat corruption, enhance government accountability, and improve local resource management at the local and provincial levels. Moreover, at this funding level, USAID could provide sufficient assistance to catalyze a successful transition and consolidate democratic reforms following the transition working with targeted institutions and communities. This strategy would build synergies between governance, livelihoods, election and political party strengthening, and conflict management activities and address cross-cutting issues such as gender.

USAID's network of Democracy Resource Centers is critical to achieving results under each IR. These centers provide training, technical assistance and material resources including access to internet and civic education materials linking citizens in remote rural areas and urban centers nationwide as part of a vital communications and civic action network. These activities will be complemented under the new strategy by a targeted media program providing access to balanced information through radio programming and electronic connectivity during and following the transition government's mandate. These centers will be linked to local governance activities to resolve conflicts, improve resource management and combat corruption through increased public participation in political and economic decision-making and oversight.

USAID engages in the justice sector to a limited degree by engaging civil society organizations in justice sector reforms in Kinshasa and targeted provinces, building on its work with national organizations and local activists in this sector. USAID will not support the revitalization of the justice sector together with other donors such as the E.U. and World Bank, for reasons discussed above. It will not support civil society capacity-building beyond providing access to the Democracy Resource Centers, the most effective means found of providing resources to civil society. It is worth noting in this context that the small-grants component of the democracy program was eliminated from the program in FY 2003 due to unforeseen budget reductions, the planned activities of other donors, and redundancy with activities supported by OTI through the Congo Peace Initiative. USAID will not support media activities beyond its communications strategy under IR4, which is a key area of interest for other donors.

The Low Funding Parameter: Under this scenario, USAID would be forced to collapse IR 2 and IR 3 and eliminate all justice sector and media activities. Either support for elections or political party development would be scaled back, depending on program performance. Due to unforeseen and non-strategic reductions in its budget level in FY 2003, USAID has already greatly reduced its support to SFCG, based on the logic that OTI has a robust program of support in the media sector, and the limited direct impact on advancing the DG SO. SFCG is currently engaged in efforts to re-focus its program with promising results. However, in a reduced funding scenario, support to SFCG would be eliminated altogether. USAID would also be forced to curtail assistance in the justice sector, reducing its program to a set of core-activities focusing on political process strengthening and public participation. It would not be able to continue the high-impact media and civil society activities supported by OTI's Congo in Action for Peace program as OTI phases down, and would need to close some or all of the Democracy Resource Centers.

#### **4.7. LINKS TO CROSS-CUTTING THEMES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

The Mission's DG strategy focuses on realizing a successful transition to democratic governance that will create the enabling environment necessary for achievements in other sectors such as improved health policies and practices, equitable access to quality education, and sound management of environmental and economic resources.

Governance: Part of SO 3's development hypothesis is that by strengthening public participation in economic and political decision-making, public resources will be more effectively and equitably distributed to improve social services. Further, increased government accountability and transparency will help to diminish corruption and mismanagement of public funds, thereby increasing public revenues and strengthening local communities. The program therefore has a strong cross-cutting link in the area of improved governance, insofar as it seeks to create a political process whereby all members of Congolese society will be able to participate in economic and political decision-making to improve their lives at the provincial and local levels as the process of national political reform moves forward.

Gender: IRs 1, 3, and 4 in particular will contribute to strengthening women's representation and voice in economic and political decision-making. This is an important link to the cross-cutting theme of addressing barriers related to gender. USAID's experience shows that women are systematically excluded from political power at the national level, as well as political, economic, and family decision-making at the community-level. For example, women hold very few high-level posts in the TG. Despite this, the CVA and updated DG Assessment found women to be playing an active role in peace-building initiatives and advocacy for reforms. Program support is needed to strengthen their organizational and individual capacity to do so, particularly in isolated areas. The Mission's political party capacity-building program includes women as both party representatives and constituents. Many women already play an active role within the 26 viable political parties engaged by CEPPS/NDI, often holding leadership positions and representing their parties in political forums, and the seven-member election commission includes an active female member. Based on its baseline assessment, CEPPS/NDI will tailor political party capacity-building programs to improve women's representation. CEPPS/IFES will also focus on ensuring women's particular needs and interests are taken into account as the electoral process is designed and implemented given women's comparatively low levels of education and restricted role in society, particularly in rural areas.

Enhancing citizen participation in governance will also improve representation for the most vulnerable members of society, including ethnic minorities, women, and children. Women already play an active, leadership role in the conflict management and project management committees created through the IFESH community development projects. They are also heavily engaged in the legal reform process facilitated by the IHRLG, which works closely with both national and provincial-level women's organizations to promote access to justice and human rights protection.

HIV/AIDS: SO 3 will further allow for greater public participation in combating HIV/AIDs, improving sustainable resource management, and increasing incomes in targeted areas.

Conflict: By facilitating conflict resolution and reintegration at the national, provincial and local levels, SO 3 contributes to the DDR process and improving security and stability nationwide, further reinforcing achievements in other SO areas where instability and conflict exacerbate or created obstacles to development.

GDA and Leveraging other resources: USAID/DRC may seek to participate in the GDA to develop a communications network linking isolated communities throughout the DRC through radio, television, and print media as well as electronic communications and even boat convoys.

#### **4.8. SYNERGIES WITH OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

SO 2 (Health): The focus of SO 3 is on strengthening political processes and citizen engagement in the DRC and will help to catalyze further reform in the health sector. Political parties will be guided in better responding to citizens' priority needs, which generally include health, education and livelihoods. Policy platforms will, accordingly, need to address how parties will address health issues and implement specific policies and reform practices in this sector. Strengthening the legislative process will facilitate the amendment or development of legislation addressing the most pressing health concerns, such as HIV/AIDs and family planning. If additional health funds were provided, the appropriate legislative committee could be engaged through the DG program.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): The SO 3, SO 4, and OTI teams are all working to address the problems of overly centralized, non-transparent government decision-making that leads to unfair resource distribution and public exclusion from the economic and political decision-making process. This approach, it is hoped, will mitigate the acute social, political, and economic crises that the DRC has experienced since the 1960s by helping to redistribute resources in keeping with public priorities. This in turn will strengthen vulnerable communities and improve livelihoods, thereby making them less vulnerable to manipulation and paving the way for greater public participation in the political transition. Further, SO 3 seeks to concentrate USAID/DRC's efforts by implementing activities in the same geographic areas as the SO 4 team, thereby harmonizing and maximizing the Mission's development resources. This will further strengthen the already remarkable synergies that exist within the program.

SO 5 (Education): Education and democratization are inextricably linked. Without adequate information and the intellectual tools needed to use it, citizens cannot make the fundamental choices and decisions that lie at the core of democratic processes. One of the greatest barriers

to Congo's development and continued political transition will therefore be the abysmal state of public education. However, as in other sectors opportunities do exist to build synergies using creative civic education approaches that can be implemented through schools in targeted communities.

In addition, as in the health sector, SO 3's focus on strengthening political processes and citizen engagement in the DRC will help to catalyze further reform in the education sector. As noted above, political parties will be guided in better responding to citizens' priority needs, which generally include health, education and livelihoods. Policy platforms will, accordingly, need to address how parties will address health issues and implement specific policies and reform practices in this sector. Next, strengthening the legislative process will facilitate the amendment or development of legislation addressing the most pressing education concerns. If additional funds were provided, the appropriate legislative committee could be engaged through SO 3.

SpO (DDR): SO 3 and the SpO are directly linked. Without successful DDR, communities will lack the security and stability needed to participate in the transition and electoral process. For example, voter registration cannot begin until combatants are effectively disarmed and demobilized. At the same time, the reintegration component of the DDR process will be limited unless the capacity for conflict management within targeted communities, as well as other social, economic and political conditions necessary for the acceptance of returning ex-combatants and their dependents. This will include addressing issues of criminal impunity, and improving livelihoods for all members of these vulnerable communities

CARPE: The CARPE program's focus on involving citizens in local resource management of environmental resources and greater participation in developing and implementing national environmental protection policies directly complements each of the four IRs under SO 3. For example, the topic of the second political forum held in the town of Bukavu in South Kivu province was the environment. Many of the government reforms advocated through activities to combat corruption and promote sound economic governance at the local and national levels will affect fragile ecosystems along the Congo River and its tributaries.

#### **4.9. OTHER DONORS AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS**

SO 3 has been designed in close collaboration with MONUC, UNDP, and the World Bank, the E.U., DFID and other bilateral donors including the Belgian Cooperation, the French Cooperation, and the South African Development Community. The peace process itself and successful conclusion of the ICD were realized in large part through close donor collaboration in concert diplomatic efforts. There is therefore already a strong basis for continued collaboration in the future.


Further, in response to the significant reduction of DG resources in FY 2003, USAID/DRC has worked closely with other donors to ensure that critical opportunities are not missed and that its future program is complementary and not redundant with the emerging programs of other donors in this sector.

Toward this end, the SO 3 team has identified those areas in which it has a comparative advantage and plays a catalytic role, while working to share analysis and design new strategies

with other development partners. Hence, it has worked with MONUC, the World Bank, and UNDP to coordinate its DDR strategy and fill the unmet need for rapid response in the absence of other donor mechanisms able to implement programs within even a one-month time-frame; it has worked with the E.U. to guide its significant planned future investment in civil society capacity building and civic education based on lessons learned and assessed needs; it has further worked closely with MONUC and UNDP as they begin to design electoral assistance programs focusing on logistics support, civic education and limited technical assistance; it is currently working with the South African Mission to coordinate proposed assistance for political party development, and coordinates closely with OCHA and MONUC in implementing community development activities, particularly in the East. Finally, USAID/DRC and the U.S. Embassy work together in seamless partnership in identifying program priorities and overcoming obstacles to successful program implementation.

Overall, the political transition and post-transition period will present new opportunities for the international community to speak with one voice on the most important issues facing the DRC, while finding constructive solutions. Moreover, the challenge of national reunification and reconstruction far exceeds the capacity of any single international financing or donor agency to address. USAID/DRC's DG strategy and those of other donors including the E.U., UNDP, and MONUC have therefore been designed in close coordination, with other donors relying heavily on USAID's unique analysis, flexibility, and responsiveness in this sector.

**CHAPTER 5**  
**LIVELIHOODS IMPROVED IN TARGETED AREAS**  
**- STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE 4 -**



USAID Targeted Areas for Livelihoods Activities

## 5.1. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

### 5.1.2. Overview

Congo, roughly the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River, has vast and diverse land resources that cover a range of agro-ecological conditions. It is widely considered to have one of the highest agricultural potentials among African countries. With its rich land resources, the DRC has been historically self-sufficient in food and an exporter of a wide range of agricultural products. However, decades of government mismanagement, followed by years of civil war and widespread lawlessness, have cut many links between productive farm areas and urban centers for marketing of both agricultural produce and inputs. Road networks and other transportation systems are in such a state of disrepair that most urban centers can be compared to mini-city states with minimal external contact that is not by air travel or telecommunications.

Sources of improved crop varieties and other technologies, and credit for inputs and investments have disappeared due to the decay of the institutional infrastructure for agriculture. The nation's public research and academic institutions, once a model for the developing world, are in an advanced state of decay. Where there is any activity at all, it is very small scale, antiquated, and of minimal impact. This has caused lower productivity and often vulnerability to disease for food crops, small livestock, and fish farming. In some areas relatively untouched by war, or where peace has returned, farmers and urban consumers have creatively adapted to these changing circumstances by increasing production for home consumption, and opening new areas for production close to major urban centers. Nevertheless, food insecurity and poverty have steadily worsened over the past decade.

The economy has become more and more reliant on agriculture during the last decade as other sectors, especially mining, have declined. However, the wars that have shaken the nation since 1996 have turned an adverse operating environment for agriculture into a catastrophic one by disrupting traditional lines of supply and displacement of population. The agricultural sector now accounts for 56% of GDP. Most of the 70% of the population inhabiting rural areas is forced to survive on traditional subsistence farming, fishing, and hunting. Even rural communities not displaced by conflict have been left completely to their own devices, forcing a return to subsistence agriculture, with essentially no cash for purchase of medicines or other essential products, or to pay for the cost of basic education.

Part of the problem of low productivity in the agricultural sector is related to the gendered division of labor in agriculture in most parts of the country, which is biased across the board to exploit women. Women provide 75% of the food production, of which 60% is traded. With the collapse of the formal economy, women have become more and more the major breadwinner in most households<sup>1</sup>. However, both legally and traditionally, women have little voice in deciding how income is spent. Women's food production responsibilities come on top of their daily tasks of preparing meals, fetching water and firewood, watching children, caring for the sick, attending markets, and other community duties. Women's excessive workload translates into poor health, which further negatively impacts their productivity.

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<sup>1</sup> USAID/DRC Gender Analysis, 2003.

Deterioration in the operating and institutional environment for agriculture combined with the effects of insecurity and population displacement, have resulted in a rate of agricultural growth that is inferior to that of population growth (2.2% vs. 3.1%). The decline in agricultural productivity has negatively impacted all other sectors, including agricultural processing industries, trade, and rural services.

### **5.1.3. Impact of Economic Collapse and Civil Conflict on Nutrition and Child Welfare**

Negative economic growth and decreasing agricultural production have reduced average daily caloric intake to an estimated 79% of the recommended level of 2,300 k/cal per day. Malnutrition has become the norm, and has impacted negatively on labor productivity, health, and education<sup>2</sup>. Children under-five and pregnant women are the most severely affected since, in most households, men have the first claim to food. The 2001 National Nutrition Survey showed that 28.9% of children less than five years of age in urban areas live with moderate to severe malnutrition, with a corresponding figure of 42.6% for rural areas. The overall national malnutrition rate was 38.2% for this cohort.

### **5.1.4. Vulnerable Groups**

Economic and social collapse and armed conflict have created groups of most vulnerable Congolese citizens who are destitute and require outside assistance for reintegration into society and lead productive lives. These include Separated Children (SC), who consist of orphaned children due to war or HIV/AIDS, abandoned children, and child soldiers, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), HIV/AIDS infected persons, and victims of Gender Based Violence (GBV). There are between 10,000 and 20,000 street children in Kinshasa alone.<sup>3</sup> The plight of street children is an increasing problem as family structures in the DRC collapse due to extreme poverty. While each group has particular needs, all of these most vulnerable groups require outside assistance in rebuilding their lives.

### **5.1.5. Land Tenure**

Most food production is conducted under traditional systems of land tenure, with annual allocation of arable land to families done by village leaders based on lineage and clan membership. In the absence of population pressure on the land, this system of land tenure is adequate for sustainable food production, albeit with relatively low yields. However, the traditional system breaks down with population pressure on the land. Such pressure can occur with either a natural increase in population, or concentration of existing population near major urban centers, such as has occurred in the DRC due to war and insecurity. An additional element of insecurity for land tenure under traditional systems is created by the 1966 DRC land law (Bakajika law), which does not recognize traditional land rights. In some parts of the country, there are conflicts over land rights between agricultural users of land and cattle herders. Such disputes, in combination with ethnic animosities, have resulted in civil conflict in the Ituri District of eastern Congo.

Land rights for agriculture and forestry are a sensitive issue in the DRC. As noted above, excess population pressure on land within traditional land management systems decreases soil

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<sup>2</sup> FAO, 2000.

<sup>3</sup> Displaced Children and Orphans Fund (DCOF), 2002.

fertility and thereby crop yields. Consequently, adaptation of traditional land management systems to models that encourage investment in soil fertility is a medium-to-long term necessity. Adoption of appropriate legislation that reflects the interests of all concerned should be a priority for the DRC's legislative process once transition to a democratic government is complete. At present, FAO, as chair of the Agriculture and Food Security Donor Working Group, is taking the lead, with assistance from the World Bank, to dialogue with the GDRC in adapting laws and regulations that will encourage the recovery of the DRC's once considerable timber and forestry products industries.

### 5.1.6. Poor Infrastructure



The state of the nation's transportation and communications network indisputably constitutes the principal bottleneck to the Congolese economy. The destructive combination of successive waves of war and looting, corruption, mismanagement, and obsolete equipment, has caused a deterioration of transportation infrastructure such that isolation and lack of access to markets are the norm in most rural areas. Costs for using roads are high because their poor

condition causes rapid depreciation of transportation equipment. Costs are further increased because, in most parts of the country, agricultural produce moving over roads pays heavy "informal taxes" via shakedowns. This high cost structure for agricultural marketing causes agricultural produce to be worth less at the farm gate, which depresses prices to farmers, damaging their incentive to produce for marketable surpluses, and, at the same time, increases prices for urban consumers, who spend two-thirds of their income on food. The problem of illegal taxation and shakedowns cannot be solved outside of a governance and civil society framework. Local governance and civil society institutions, such as associations of farmers and agricultural marketers, need to create pressures to reduce these corrupt practices.

Communications systems, with some exceptions, have broken down in the DRC along with road, railroad, and river transportations systems. However, due to difficulties in maintaining land-based communications over a vast territory that includes tropical forests and other difficult environments for land-based communications technology, the DRC has a long history of using wireless communications systems. In the past, these have included short wave radio and micro-wave technologies. Now, investment in cellular telephone systems has spread rapidly in the DRC's urban centers as land-based systems have failed due to lack of maintenance. In

addition, donor organizations are financing radio communications as part of their efforts in providing reliable information as part of the peace process.

### **5.1.7. Micro-Finance**

In the micro-finance sector, progress has been hampered by chronic inflation and other disastrous government policies over the last decade. The effect of high inflation itself was to decapitalize all financial institutions, including those for micro-finance, since real interest rates on lending turned strongly negative. Investment in the productive sectors of the economy, even at the smallest, most localized level, has suffered, and has contributed to declining food production and loss of economic opportunity. The foundation of any workable policy to promote savings and investment lies with the creation and support of local savings and credit operations to support small-scale rural or peri-urban producers. The DRC is at the very beginning of the process of rebuilding these institutions. Gender issues in micro-finance need to be addressed, since the Civil Code prohibits married women from applying for credit or opening a savings account. In contrast, single women may apply for credit and open savings accounts under the Civil Code.

Macro-economic conditions have now improved to a point where micro-credit institutions can be rebuilt. The GDRC, assisted by the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF), reduced consumer inflation from 511% in 2000 to 135% in 2001 to 16% in 2002. The forecast for 2003 is 8%, and 6% in 2004.<sup>4</sup> The Mission, along with other donors, is in a continuing dialogue with the GDRC over appropriate legislation and regulation to favor development of micro-finance institutions. The Central Bank of the GDRC held a workshop in June 2003 with donors and micro-finance institutions to discuss a banking regulation that would encourage development of micro-finance institutions, and in September 2003, it circulated a draft regulation for comment by donors and micro-finance institutions.

## **5.2. GDRC RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE**

In 1991, the GDRC developed a master plan for agricultural and rural development. Periodic updates were made and many suggestions in the plan over the years remain valid in the current context. The existing plan needs to be considered within the context of the present state of the national economy, and a country that is transitioning from war to peace. In all scenarios, DRC resources to support institutional infrastructure and make investments will remain highly constrained for the foreseeable future. GDRC strategic orientations for the agricultural sector are as follows:

- **Agricultural Research:** to rehabilitate and redesign the National Institute of Agricultural Studies and Research in terms of physical infrastructure, strategic direction, and management and human capacity.
- **Agricultural Extension:** to replace the "training and visit" approach previously used by the national extension system and adopt community-based approaches and Farmer Field Schools.

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<sup>4</sup> IMF, Second Review Under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, August 2003.

- Seed policy: to be elaborated with major agricultural enterprises taking into account regional practices, and put in place with appropriate legislation.
- Crop and animal production: to privatize state production and support units with access to research results provided to the private sector. The policy on cash and export crops is yet to be defined, as data on this sector is insufficient.
- Ministry restructuring: to completely restructure the Ministry of Agriculture in line with most of the nation's public administration. Ministry employees are paid well below poverty line wages, and to survive must pursue secondary occupations. Due to lack of resources for both operations and investments, the Ministry is not now in a position to effectively fulfill its mandate.
- Government resources: to progressively increase budgetary allocation to the agricultural sector in coordination with the international community.
- Statistics: to create a system of information on food security and collection and monitoring of agricultural and food statistics.

The GDRC's Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (I-PRSP) proposes a strategic framework for future poverty reduction policies and measures.

The I-PRSP strategy is based on three pillars: 1) the restoration of peace; 2) macroeconomic stabilization and the stimulation of the economy by pro-growth policies; and, 3) harnessing community dynamics. Within these pillars and specifically in regard to promoting the economy's productive sectors and exports, the GDRC has opted to play a regulatory role supporting private initiatives in the growth sectors of agriculture, livestock, fishing, mining, forestry, services, and commerce. As a result, the I-PRSP concedes that to go beyond creating "good working arrangements" with the private sector in the short term, preliminary evaluations on specific government-led actions are required before any further action can be taken. Significantly, the I-PRSP recognizes that community dynamics have played a major role in the development of survival skills by the population, and that these acquired grass-roots dynamics can contribute significantly to the move beyond subsistence and basic food security to equitable growth and sustainable development. As such, community dynamics are considered a pillar of the I-PRSP's pro-growth strategies and the keystone to rural development initiatives. Action will be needed to further develop sectoral strategies, especially for agriculture, and to ensure consistency between the composition of fiscal expenditure and the PRSP. A full PRSP is due to be completed in 2005.

The extent of economic collapse in the DRC is such that central government activities will be constrained to perform core functions within the foreseeable future. GDRC revenues currently total about 9% of GDP<sup>5</sup>, which is itself, as noted above, at an abysmally low level. In comparison, government revenues in most Less Developed Countries (LDCs) are at the 20-25% level. Among the highest of priorities in the World Bank-funded Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Program (EMRRP) is the "rightsizing" of GDRC institutions, which were created with the support of a much broader economic base. This involves both reduction of personnel and adjustment of institutional mandates. If economic stabilization is to

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<sup>5</sup> IMF, 2003.

continue, central Government activities must be limited to essential and critical roles in security and infrastructure. Hence, community dynamics in the recovery process are indispensable. Without the harnessing of community resources and energy, recovery simply will not occur in rural and peri-urban areas, and that itself could imperil the entire transition process.

### **5.3. PRIOR USAID LIVELIHOODS EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC**

The USAID/DRC Country Strategic Plan (CSP), approved in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Mobutu regime in 1998 and ending in FY 2003, had one overarching SO: *Congolese people are assisted to solve national, provincial, and community problems through participatory processes that involve the public, private and civil sectors.* Within this SO, and directly related to livelihoods, the Mission supports a cassava multiplication and distribution project bringing disease-resistant varieties to farmers in two provinces severely hit by the cassava mosaic blight. This project has developed a successful model for sourcing improved plant varieties and working along the production and distribution chain to improve market access for small farmers.

In the area of sustainable agro-forestry, the Mission supported an initiative to bring improved dwarf palm oil trees to small-holder farmers in Bandundu province, working in conjunction with larger-scale plantation owners to provide logistical and technical support. Another effort linked small-scale producers in the western DRC with palm oil product manufacturers cut off from their traditional sources of supply in the rebel-occupied eastern provinces by providing material support in the form of equipment and loans.

Regarding micro-finance, the Mission has provided technical and financial assistance to networks of national cooperatives and NGOs with micro and in-kind credit, such as bicycles for rural transporters. Thanks to USAID support, these networks have greatly increased their capacity to mobilize and finance farmers and rural service providers, generating income and improving rural livelihoods.

Along the Congo River and several of its tributaries, the Mission has worked with riverine communities to address food security, poverty alleviation, and bio-diversity conservation. In conjunction with this river-based activity, the Mission has addressed the means of combating low-level corruption, which presents an equally deleterious barrier to trade. Through these integrated activities along the river, the Mission has been able to develop alternative sustainable axes of development, and ones that can complement or, in some cases, replace the country's devastated road network.

In areas directly affected by war and conflict, OFDA provided assistance to displaced populations in the form of seeds and tools. Although these interventions are by nature short term, some of the institutions receiving grants have evolved into viable organizations providing a range of sustainable services to rural and peri-urban communities via seed multiplication farms, agricultural extension services and farmer association organizations. OFDA has also recently supported strategic road and rail rehabilitation work, connecting food surplus areas to rail or road corridors in newly secure areas of Maniema and Katanga provinces.

USAID's Office of Food for Peace (FFP) has funded the World Food Program (WFP) in supporting targeted recovery operations in road rehabilitation, irrigation, and water supply, often using food for work schemes in partnership with other international NGOs.

Overall, the Mission has achieved results in livelihoods by flexibly responding to opportunities as the larger political scenarios evolved. Impact on a wider scale has been limited by major constraints, both institutional and operational. These include lack of effective access by surface to many parts of the country, inadequate resources, and the lack of a basis for making strategic decisions within an uncertain political environment. Nonetheless, the Mission has now developed a solid empirical basis for the validity of the hypotheses behind the new Livelihoods SO (SO 4), has expanded its partner networks, and, in the process, has greatly improved its managerial capacity to successfully implement SO 4.

#### **5.4. PROGRAM RATIONALE**

SO 4 supports the long-term Mission goal of assisting the DRC in its transition to a sound democracy with a healthier, better educated population benefiting from improved livelihoods. The rationale supporting this SO is that increased productivity for rural and peri-urban populations, will cause their incomes to increase; the increase in incomes will permit sustainable access to health care services and education, as well as improvements in the quantity and quality of food consumed by the population. Nutritional improvement will occur in two ways: (1) through higher and more varied on-farm production of food; and (2) with improved marketing and higher cash receipts, enabling food producers to purchase food products they need to supplement their diets.

This rationale was reinforced by the SWIFT Action team in January 2002. The team recommended "increased integration of USAID-funded activities," and, specifically proposed a combined health-food-security-livelihoods approach to maximize the effectiveness of USAID interventions in the DRC. Specifically, the team concluded:

"In addition to the strong health interventions already under way, the team recommends that a livelihoods approach, including food aid, agriculture programs, communications, micro-financing and other economic growth activities, be incorporated into Mission activities."

Mission experience in implementing its health sector interventions is that USAID-funded activities need to be complemented by activities that will both improve the nutritional status and also the ability of the population to pay for essential services for health programs. The Mission incorporated the SWIFT Action Team conclusions in designing SO 4, and has also reconfigured its staffing and organization to manage the SO.

The multiplier effects of raising productivity and incomes of agricultural producers will be to generate income growth in non-farm sectors. This in turn will provide greater access to health, education, and other basic services for segments of the population whose livelihoods depend on agricultural marketing, processing, and trade and on provision of goods and services in rural areas. The SO will also link relief to development in target areas by working with OFDA and FFP to ensure critical needs are met for acutely vulnerable groups, such as displaced persons, disinherited and street children, and other groups still affected by conflict and without assets to resume productive lives.

The development hypothesis is that if there is increased production and processing of major staple foods along with the re-establishment of market outlets, and the meeting of critical needs for especially vulnerable groups, such as Separated Children (SCs), IDPs, and victims of GBV, then both increased incomes and the solidification of communities will occur.

Rural and peri-urban households will benefit, first, through direct consumption of more, and qualitatively more nutritious food. Second, they will benefit through improved incomes which will enable them to pay for critical services in health care and education. Additional benefits will accrue down the marketing and food processing chain and to providers of rural trade and services, who will see the volume of business increase due to improved rural incomes. Finally, urban consumers will also benefit since an increased supply of staple foods will lower the real cost of food (the price of food relative to the cost of other goods, and especially with reference to the price of labor) which accounts for two-thirds of their household budgets. There is essentially no export of staple foods from the DRC, nor is any foreseeable: consequently, increases in food production will contribute directly to higher food intake by the population, whether in cities, peri-urban, or rural areas. Additionally, the SO will improve access to financial services, opening the way for the target population to save and invest, and expand rural based activities, including non-farm services, trade, and other micro-enterprises.

Because of the central role of women in production, processing, and marketing of food, and especially their role as major breadwinner for the household, special account must be taken of gender issues. Women's capacities and capabilities must not only be enhanced in traditional domains, but also through re-balancing the distribution of household labor, and reduction in barriers for access to finance, extension advice, and agricultural inputs.

#### **5.4.1. Critical Assumptions**

The most critical and overarching assumptions deal with the political environment in which the USAID mission can expect to successfully implement sustainable development programming. Critical assumptions at the macro level are provided in section 2.2. At a working level, the SO makes the following assumptions:

- Continued donor support to, and implementation of, the national infrastructure rehabilitation program, and, as a result, private and non-governmental partners will also emerge to make key investments.
- Support - or at least non-interference - from the GDRC in implementation of recovery and growth strategies affecting the rural and peri-urban sectors.
- Unimpeded access to project areas by USAID and implementing partner staff.

#### **5.5. RELATIONSHIP TO GDRC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS**

In most parts of the country only very limited support and services are available from provincial and local governments. The situation in the war-torn eastern DRC is even worse: state actors have been actively involved in acts of deliberate destruction of public assets and plundering of public goods, including minerals and other natural resources. The national system of health zones has been administered by church groups and supported by donors, of which USAID's support has been the most important. On the agricultural front, the nation's public research and academic institutions are in an advanced state of decay. Where there is any activity at all,

it is very small scale, antiquated, and of minimal impact. Road networks and other transportation systems are in such a state of disrepair that most urban centers can be compared to mini-city states with minimal external contact that is not by air or costly telecommunications equipment. Rural communities have been isolated and left completely to their own devices when they have not been displaced by conflict, meaning a return to subsistence agriculture, malnutrition, and vulnerability to disease with attendant high mortality, especially for children under five.

State-provided water and electric services already limited when economic decay set in (the access to potable water rate is 26%), have been reduced even further with population growth, poor maintenance, and lack of required investments in infrastructure. No effective government, in the sense of one carrying out essential service and public order functions, has existed for the last thirteen years. This situation however is in the process of being corrected with the installation of the new Transitional Government (TG). Under the most optimistic scenarios it will be a number of years before the GDRC will have the means to restore essential public services and public infrastructure.

Seeking to exploit gains made through humanitarian assistance programs, donors are now actively supporting a transition from relief to recovery and development for the rural and peri-urban sectors. Presently, the role of the GDRC is to create and maintain conditions conducive to the development of the private and non-governmental sectors that ultimately ensure production, processing, and marketing of agricultural production and the supply of inputs. As the transition proceeds, the state needs to make rural and peri-urban development a priority and allocate adequate resources for the infrastructural needs and administrative services required to sustain development in these areas.

## **5.6. RESULTS FRAMEWORK**

SO 4 will, over the lifespan of the ISP, increase food availability and increase incomes of targeted populations. Increased food availability will directly improve nutritional status and improved incomes will permit targeted populations to gain access to basic social services. The root cause of poverty and malnutrition in rural and peri-urban areas is neglect of agriculture, including its requirements for technology and inputs, and for the processing and marketing of its products. To correct this situation, immediate attention needs to be brought to bear on achieving the following Intermediate Results (IR) in targeted areas:

- IR 1. Agricultural productivity increased;
- IR 2. Access to markets improved along selected corridors;
- IR 3. Access to financial services improved; and
- IR 4. Critical needs of targeted vulnerable populations met.

### **5.6.1. Results Framework and Targets**

Conclusions drawn from various assessments and lessons learned from past and ongoing programs have led the Mission to conclude that with increased resources and management focus these results are achievable in targeted areas. Given the immeasurable needs and the yet uncertain outcome of the political processes towards national unity and a national development agenda, the Mission will continue to strive to forge partnerships and foster

synergies in a flexible and opportunistic way to create a critical mass of successes in the focus areas. Partnerships and synergies with civil society and community-based associations that have been the bulwark of survival during the DRC's years of civil disorder will be critical for the success of SO 4. Simultaneously, private sector partnerships will be pursued to serve as a complementary catalyst for achieving sustainable growth and employment generation. The SO will concentrate on the recovery of targeted rural and peri-urban areas where USAID has ongoing investments, and will link with other programs that seek to re-establish a national development agenda.

Because of the size of the country and the level of need, the Mission must identify entry points where improved access to markets will stimulate producers to increase productivity and income, generating multiplier effects essential for economic growth at the community, zonal, provincial, and national levels. Hence the Mission has decided to target both rural and peri-urban zones where linkages can be assured with USAID's own ongoing and future programs and those of other bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as the GDRC. For example, USAID is supporting 81 health zones with institutional building and strategic interventions aimed at improving the quality of their services. SO 4 will coordinate with health sector interventions and build on their community networks, expanding their sphere of activities, and thus parlay an investment in improving health into one where more generalized rural recovery can be achieved. Not only will the communities enjoy better health facilities but also they will have the means to pay for them, contributing to the sustainability of the Health SO. SO 4 will also target especially vulnerable groups such as IDPs (through OFDA and FFP), SCs, and victims of GBV.

The recent lifting of Brooke Amendment restrictions makes possible some assistance to government initiatives. Therefore, while the Mission's underlying rationale for the SO will remain unchanged, namely that improved livelihoods will alleviate poverty and mortality, it will remain flexible and opportunistic in program implementation to possibly include initiatives involving the government within the overall strategic framework outlined here.

In the short term, significant improvements in the performance of the agricultural sector at the national level are unachievable due to structural and specific constraints such as the deterioration of infrastructure, limited research, and insufficient investment. However, results can be achieved in food production and its marketing in very targeted corridors where other assistance is already in place, where there is peace and stability, and where traditional networks previously existed.

Baseline and targets are not available at this time because most activities under this SO are new under the ISP and occur in targeted areas where specific baseline data is needed.

SO level indicator:

- 20% increase in household income in the areas targeted by this SO.

Targets will remain illustrative until specific targets and data collection methods, along with procedures for establishing baseline data, are further refined during post-award conferences and subsequent PMP workshops scheduled to be held with grantees during early 2004.

# USAID/DRC

## Results Framework for SO 4 (Livelihoods)

### *Livelihoods improved in targeted areas*


**Overall Indicator:**  
Ind. 1. % increase in household incomes in the areas targeted by this SO.

#### Development Context:

- Health Services increased
- # of people living in poverty

#### Critical Assumptions:

- Continued donor support to and implementation of the national infrastructure rehabilitation program, and as a result, private and non-governmental partners will also emerge to make key investments.
- Support – or at least non-interference – from the GDRC in implementation of recovery and growth strategies affecting the rural and peri-urban sectors.
- Unimpeded access to project areas by USAID and implementing partner staff.



#### Illustrative Activity Types

- Introduce community-based seed multiplication and distribution of improved varieties of key food and cash crops
- Support for the improvement of livestock productivity
- Support for gender sensitive activities
- Demonstrate and promote agricultural and agro-forestry technologies
- Provide radio and TV programming and extension

- Conduct market analysis at target areas
- Support for rehabilitation of transport infrastructure
- Support improvements in use and cost of transport corridors
- Alliances in marketing, technology transfer and transportation, especially benefiting women
- Support for market-oriented producers to increase trade in high-value crops and target crops to markets

- Create or improve micro-credit and saving programs directed to women
- Capacity building of one or more micro-finance institutions in target areas
- Projects developed with other partners to finance key investments under this SO so that donor-driven support for reform continues
- Provide micro-credit to support entrepreneurial initiatives and agribusiness

- Grants, primarily in the form of food aid, to NGOs and CBOs for reintegration of IDPs in communities and for meeting the needs of other vulnerable groups
- Temporary support for shelters of abandoned and separated children
- Family Tracing and Reunification
- Psychosocial counseling
- Micro-credit lending for particularly vulnerable groups
- Food distributions to especially vulnerable groups

### 5.6.2. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities

Results achievement and activity implementation of IRs and illustrative activities will follow the Mission's principles of gender mainstreaming, including making special provision for female extension agents, labor saving technologies, mixed associations, and women's groups.

IR 1: Agricultural Productivity Increased.
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This IR focuses on increasing agricultural output. Generally, increase of agricultural production in the DRC to date has occurred from the expansion of the area of cultivated land, which is often done in environmentally unfriendly ways, and rarely through improvements in the quality and productivity of inputs. The consequence is an annual rate of growth in crop production of 2.2%, substantially lower than the rate of demographic growth of 3.1% per year. Increasing productivity will require the integration of critical agricultural and environmental interventions that address soil depletion and environment degradation as well as the introduction of improved and appropriate varieties, techniques, and technologies.

Illustrative activities:

1. Introduce community-based seed and cuttings multiplication and distribution of improved and disease-resistant varieties of key food and cash crops to both male and female farmers as an alternative seed supply.
2. Support for home gardens (wing beans, vegetables) and fish farms as sources of protein to fill nutritional deficits in the diet. Strengthen fishing associations and their institutional and technical capacity. Enhance marketing and transport of fish within sustainable systems. Disseminate improved village fish preservation techniques. Since fishing activities are generally a male domain, these will be linked and complemented with those of home gardening, which are generally a female domain.
3. Support for the improvement of livestock productivity:
  - Improve management and husbandry;
  - Improve animal breeds;
  - Strengthen animal health services; and
  - Improve marketing of animals and animal products.
4. Demonstrate and promote gender sensitive agricultural and agro-forestry technologies through partnerships with regional institutions, U.S. universities, and agricultural enterprises:
  - Provide community-based farmer-led extension and support (including women farmers as extension agents);
  - Create fruit tree nurseries; and
  - Establish village level palm oil, coffee, and cocoa nurseries.
5. Provide radio and TV extension programs specifically targeted for both male and female audiences.

6. Support the “Farmer Field School” approach to support communities and individuals, particularly women farmers, in learning and adopting improved crop and animal production techniques.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. % increase in output of selected commodities;
- Ind. 1.2. % increase in yields per hectare for selected crops;
- Ind. 1.3. # of producer organizations organized through the program;
- Ind. 1.4. % of organizations that became operational; and
- Ind. 1.1.1. # of new agricultural technologies adopted;

IR 2: Access to markets improved along selected corridors.
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Poor market infrastructure and inadequate market information are key constraints to increased agricultural productivity. Agricultural outputs will need to be transported through corridors where roads and bridges are presently in an extremely poor state of repair. Market outlets are key, since farmers have no incentive to produce agricultural products for income if they cannot market them.

The overall food deficit for DRC is presently 47%, with the country producing only about half its food needs. As far back as 1999, it was reported that 50% of households in urban areas were only having one meal a day against 25% in rural areas. Marketing strategies based on revitalizing traditional transportation networks (rivers, roads, railways) between production and consumption points are the key element to ensure that the production of agricultural and forest goods gets to where it can be sold, and is sustainable and profitable.

Given the rupture of traditional supply lines and the ensuing isolation, the state of abandonment of most agribusinesses, and the insecurity and high costs of shakedowns characteristic of the nation’s byways, national market information and brokerage systems have become dysfunctional. Imported mackerel, oils, and wheat have become staples in a country bisected with rivers and lakes which is agriculturally rich in potential. To support the market for agricultural commodities, critical transport bottlenecks must be overcome, competitive market dynamics re-established, and lawlessness and excessive corruption eliminated on road systems. This IR will therefore consist of three sub-IRs, as follows:

- Sub IR 1. Key bottlenecks in transportation corridors overcome;
- Sub IR 2. Market information and brokerage systems improved; and
- Sub IR 3. Corrupt practices and excessive taxation reduced.



A family uses the river for transporting goods, but this often comes at a price

Illustrative activities under IR 2 include:

1. Conduct gender sensitive market analysis in target areas.
2. Support improved market access (road, bridge, port, and ferry), rehabilitation of transport infrastructure and other infrastructure such as collection points, storage centers, docks, and community centers.
3. Provide improved transport, storage, packaging equipment, and /or technologies.
4. Support improvements in use and cost of transport corridors.
5. Develop alliances for marketing, technology transfer, and transportation, especially benefiting women.
6. Support market-oriented producers to increase trade in high-value and other target crops to markets, with particular attention paid to ensuring women are able to access opportunities created.
7. Support improvements for users and reduce effective cost for river, road, and rail networks along established axes and between stable zones, transition zones, and formerly rebel-held zones.
8. Develop alliances with agro-industries, other private sector partners, donors, and financial institutions for investing in marketing, technology transfer, and transportation in rural and peri-urban areas.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. % increase in sale of selected commodities; and
- Ind. 2.2. Index for corrupt practices and illegal taxation reduced.

### IR 3: Access to Financial Services Improved.

Improved access to financial and business development services is fundamental to economic recovery and enterprise development in both rural and peri-urban areas. Without improvement in these services, recovery of both agricultural production and marketing will be impeded since agricultural input delivery, processing, and marketing depends on businesses. In the absence of financial services, opportunities to increase agricultural production are lost and linkages to markets cannot occur optimally. At the end of the ISP, significant changes will have occurred in targeted areas. Local institutions will have been created or strengthened to introduce or improve sound and relevant savings and credit programs to clients including women's solidarity groups, farmer associations, village banking structures, and individual entrepreneurs.

Rural and peri-urban growth is also linked to availability of capital for investments. Under this IR, partnerships will be fostered with and between donors, banks, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and foundations to finance key capital investments leading to increased enterprise growth, employment generation, and expanded markets. This IR will be achieved through the accomplishment of the following sub-IRs:

- Local institutions receive support to provide financial and business development services linked to finance; and
- Partnerships fostered to finance key investments in SO operational areas.

Illustrative activities:

1. Create or improve micro-credit programs directed to women and mixed solidarity groups supporting small enterprises in production, marketing, and value-added post-harvest processing.
2. Increase access to credit and capital for micro-enterprise development.
3. Promote savings programs that mobilize funds for onwards lending to cover household needs such as health and education among vulnerable groups.
4. Train and build capacity of nascent and existing gender-balanced micro-enterprises and micro-finance institutions in target areas.
5. Provide micro-credit to support entrepreneurial initiatives, agribusiness, and other growth-oriented support for smallholder agriculture in rural and peri-urban enterprises.
6. Promote projects developed with private, donor, and/or non-governmental organizations to finance key investments under this SO framework, be it in agriculture production, marketing infrastructure, or financial services (e.g., management of kit-based business for redundant Gecamines employees).
7. Support for policy analysis, dialogue, and advocacy on issues affecting the financial sector, especially those which create barriers to women's full and equitable participation.
8. Support for growth of intermediate producers and processors.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. % increase in the use of credit in SO operational areas;
- Ind. 3.2. # of partnerships fostered to finance key capital investments in agriculture;
- Ind. 3.3. # of loans to men/women;
- Ind. 3.4. Value of loans to men/women.

#### IR 4: Critical Needs of Targeted Vulnerable Groups Met

As noted above, the nutritional status of the Congolese people has declined to an abysmal level. At the same time, it is clear from present USAID interventions that sustainable improvement in health care will only come about with improved incomes. Increased production and improved incomes in target areas under SO 4 will directly improve the nutritional status of rural Congolese by increasing the amount of food available to them, and permitting them to purchase food products they need for nutritional adequacy. Increased incomes will also support the sustainability of health sector interventions by making income available to purchase minimum required medical products and services. At the same time, increased marketing of food products from peri-urban and rural areas will lower the cost of food in real terms, which will improve the nutritional status of the urban population. SO 2 and SO 4 interventions will produce an overall synergistic effect; a healthier rural population is inherently more productive in food production activities, while at the same time, improved nutrition will contribute to health status.

Actions will also be undertaken through Community Based Organizations (CBOs) to directly meet critical needs in selected zones through rehabilitation of essential rural infrastructure for transportation, health services, education, water supply, and food storage and marketing. Assistance will likely be in the form of food aid through food-for-work programs complemented by cash grants to communities for rehabilitation of infrastructure. In those communities where specific groups having nutritional deficiencies are identified, nutritional rehabilitation programs may be undertaken with food aid resources. Such community groups could include, for example, school children and pregnant women.

Economic collapse in the DRC has produced numerous vulnerable groups which can be differentiated only by degree of desperation. An estimated 20 million persons remain potentially vulnerable due to insecurity and conflict. 30.2% of all children in DRC suffer from moderate to severe malnutrition. Conflict has created hundreds of thousands of IDPs who must be re-integrated into their communities, along with ex-combatants. Other vulnerable groups consist of people with HIV/AIDS and victims of gender based violence. Finally, the population of rural communities that has been isolated from the outside world and unable to market products to produce cash incomes for purchase of necessities, including health care and education, can also be considered vulnerable. More narrowly defined vulnerable groups in DRC are generally not living in discrete communities of their own. Groups such as victims of gender-based violence, ex-combatants, and IDPs will be re-integrating within communities that are themselves in a state of economic desperation. Consequently, the most effective way of reaching the most vulnerable groups is through a community-based approach under which community needs are addressed as well as the specific needs of more narrowly defined groups.

There are three sub-IRs under this IR:

- Assistance to IDPs. Most IDPs are utterly destitute and need to be supported for a transition period during which they reestablish their households and activities.
- Assistance to SCs. SCs are diverse as a group and include child soldiers, abandoned children, and orphans of war and HIV/AIDS. As such, assistance also needs to be flexible in order to meet the needs of specific sub groups.

- Assistance to victims of GBV. Civil conflict in DRC has left a high but undetermined number of victims of GBV.

Illustrative activities:

1. Grants to communities for food-for-work activities to rehabilitate essential infrastructure for health services, education, transportation, food storage and marketing, and water supply;
2. Grants, primarily in the form of food aid, to NGOs and CBOs for reintegration of IDPs in communities and for meeting the needs of other vulnerable groups.
3. Food aid grants to CBOs sheltering SCs;
4. Assistance to CBOs for encouraging placement of SCs in families;
5. Food aid grants to families accepting SCs;
6. Assistance to CBOs in advancing family reconciliation;
7. Support to CBOs in offering psycho-social counseling for victims of GBV;
8. Sensitization of CBO staff to needs of victims of GBV, including reinsertion in families and communities;
9. Micro-credit lending for victims of GBV; and
10. Business development and life skills training for victims of GBV.
11. Temporary support for shelters of abandoned and separated children;
12. Distribution of food for therapeutic nutrition for vulnerable groups;
13. Distribution of food as a seed protection strategy;
14. Improved access to safe water and sanitation systems;
15. Life skills training;
16. Psycho-social counseling;
17. Family identification and reunification; and
18. Identification of vocational training opportunities outside of major urban centers.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 4.1. % decrease in moderate-to-severe malnutrition for children 5 years in SO operational areas.
- Ind. 4.2. # of communities assisted in SO operational areas for basic services and members of most vulnerable groups, including victims of GBV, SCs, and IDPs (through FFP and OFDA) receive assistance for reintegration.
- Ind. 4.1.1. # of beneficiaries of food aid.
- Ind. 4.2.1. # of separated and abandoned children reunified or integrated into communities.
- Ind. 4.3.1. # of victims of GBV who received psychosocial care; medical care; life skills training; business development and micro-credit; and reinsertion assistance through CBOs.

SO 4 will emphasize a flexible approach in meeting needs of vulnerable groups. In addition to those groups cited above, there are others, for example, the elderly. In cases where communities identify specific groups as especially vulnerable to nutritional inadequacy, food aid may be used in meeting critical needs with a view towards making communities as a whole less vulnerable to food and nutritional insecurity.

### **5.6.3. Implementing Mechanisms**

SO 4 will be implemented by U.S.-based NGOs with a strong track record in implementing livelihoods-related programs in partnerships with both local NGOs and community-based organizations. Given the DRC's unusual overall operating environment, the Mission will place a premium on flexible, innovative approaches for addressing the livelihoods problem. NGOs also offer the opportunity for leveraging USAID support with contributions from the U.S. NGO community, the public, and corporate sectors. As transition in the DRC proceeds, food aid and rehabilitation activities will be progressively integrated with the livelihoods approach both over time and geographically. Also, approaches for combining food aid, for example in the form of Food for Work, will be explored as a complement to other activities to rehabilitate rural and peri-urban infrastructure necessary for the livelihoods approach to succeed. This could include rehabilitation of roads and bridges and of essential community facilities such as schools, health dispensaries, and public potable water supplies.

At the present time only approximately 30% of USAID's contribution to WFP's PRRO is used for recovery type activities such as road rehabilitation and water supply. The remainder goes for emergency general distribution to the war-affected and other vulnerable populations. Where feasible, WFP should be called upon to contribute Food-for-Work for rural infrastructure rehabilitation and Food-for-Agriculture to support farmers returning to production. In the medium term, a consortium of PVOs should be encouraged to submit a P.L. 480 funded Development Activity Proposal (DAP).

### **5.6.4. Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan**

A preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) has been developed by the SO 4 team and is contained in Annex II. The PMP will be finalized in cooperation with stakeholders and customers during CY 2004.

### **5.6.5. Scenarios and Program Adjustments**

**Successful Transition.** It is expected that all intermediate results will be achieved in an expanded geographic area if a Successful Transition scenario emerges.

**Stalled Transition.** Under this scenario, intermediate results will diminish in space and number. They could however be achieved within more limited areas assuming resources are committed (and mortgages on programs that are initiated can be funded.) Two major limitations would apply under a Stalled Transition. First, insecurity would limit the number of geographic areas within which operations under the SO could be conducted. Second, corruption, particularly in the form of informal "road taxes," would likely be much more severe, limiting the number of areas within which actions under the SO could be profitably undertaken. However, DRC is a very large country. Even under a "Stalled Transition" scenario, many areas would likely remain both more secure and less corrupt than others, permitting an overall level of effort at perhaps two-thirds of the "Successful Transition" scenario.

**Protracted Transition.** This scenario would lower the overall productivity of SO interventions by slowing the extension of activities, impeding the development of CBOs, which are essential to the overall success of the SO, and by resulting in delayed and less vigorous action of the GDRC

in containing corruption. Also, a Protracted Transition scenario would likely cause effective access to most vulnerable groups of the population to be delayed, with these groups receiving relatively more attention for their reinsertion in society during the out-years of the SO.

#### **5.6.6. Budget Tables by Funding Parameter**

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#### **5.6.7. Priorities Under Different Funding Parameters**

The high funding scenario would permit both a horizontal and vertical expansion of activities under SO 4. SO 4 activities would be extended to additional areas where USAID health sector interventions area already taking place, as well as into areas where security conditions permit rebuilding of local economies. Vertical expansion would occur through links to FFP activities via food for work programs and targeted assistance to most vulnerable groups such as pregnant and lactating mothers, victims of HIV/AIDS, and returning IDPs and ex-combatants. Activities to improve agricultural production and marketing and to improve the availability of micro-finance and business development services would expand horizontally, while those under IR 4 – *Critical Needs of Targeted Vulnerable Groups Met* – would expand vertically through programs to link SO 4 with FFP to meet critical needs of vulnerable groups.

SO 4 activities to increase agricultural productivity, improve marketing, and increase access to finance would be preserved under a low funding scenario for those areas which have already been identified for SO interventions. However, the Mission would be constrained in expanding the areas of intervention. This could seriously impact the success of other SOs since the intention of the Mission is to apply the Livelihoods model as an integral part of the process for improving access to health care and education opportunities, including for reintegrating ex-combatants. A low funding scenario would also constrain SO 4 in making linkages with FFP to meet the needs of vulnerable groups and rebuild essential local infrastructure through food-for-work programs. While the most important resources for these activities would come from FFP, DA resources via SO 4 will be required to identify needs, design and monitor programs, and, in some cases, complement those of FFP to purchase materials and services for use in conjunction with food for work programs.

### **5.7. LINKS TO CROSSCUTTING THEMES AND OPPORTUNITIES**

Gender: The majority of agriculture workers are women and they produce 75% of food in the DRC. Women are also active in food commodity trade and in small enterprises. Therefore, for there to be any real impact on agricultural production and marketing, the focus needs to be on women and on supporting activities that will train and empower them. Improving women's access to income is also key to increasing access to basic services such as health and education. Thus, women will be the prime targeted beneficiaries of SO 4. Inputs and appropriate strategies to enhance their capacities and capabilities will be implemented through gender mainstreaming and direct partnerships with women's associations. Such strategies include increasing women's participation in non-traditional activities and roles such as agricultural and credit extension agents; introducing labor saving technologies to correct the imbalance in workloads; and promoting female leadership in organizational settings. SO 4 will

also work to enhance and improve the role of women in conjunction with other SO activities pursuant to the recommendations contained in the February 2003 gender study.

HIV/AIDS: SO 4 is specifically designed to be integrated with the existing USAID health portfolio. It may offer opportunities for widespread messaging on HIV/AIDS prevention through additional community based organizations such as farmers and business associations, through nongovernmental agricultural extension services, and through micro-finance institutions. SO 4 will also improve the ability of targeted populations to pay for schooling and education, thus offering additional opportunities for message diffusion. Health facilities rehabilitated under the SO will provide additional opportunities for messaging and prevention.

Conflict Management: Several recommendations under the Development and Socio-Economic Initiatives rubric of the Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) are incorporated into SO 4. Chief among them is support to local initiatives to address rural isolation, kick start local economies, revitalize agricultural production, and rehabilitate market infrastructure. SO 4 also supports the policy of decentralization, which according to the CVA is one of the key elements in facilitating the transition process and marginalizing conflict entrepreneurs on the national stage.

Governance: The success of SO 4 will be closely linked to success in governance as related to reduction of corruption. As noted above, a severe problem for marketing of agricultural produce is the high rate of extraction of illegal payments (or “informal taxes”) for commercial traffic on DRC’s roadways. Such payments increase risk for agricultural marketers, directly increase their costs, reduce demand (and prices) for farm products, and increase food costs for urban consumers. Under SO 4, emphasis will be placed on working with and augmenting the capacities of NGOs and civil society organizations to produce tangible benefits for their members. In some cases these benefits will consist of agricultural technologies, micro-finance, or rehabilitation of public infrastructure. In other cases targeted benefits will be for improved marketing through reduction of extraction and illegal payments on roadways. These corrupt practices have been in place for a long time and are endemic. Generally, actions by single individuals are ineffective in dealing with them. However, organized groups of NGOs and CBOs can combat corrupt practices on roadways. An additional synergy between SOs 3 (Democracy and Governance) and 4 will come through the strengthening of civil society, generally, which will increase pressures for better governance.

Nutrition: As the situation in DRC continues to stabilize, increased efforts will be made to link SO 4 to food assistance and nutrition. Many of the same areas in which the SO will be operating will be faced by the need to reintegrate displaced persons and combatants, including child combatants, and to provide for orphans due to conflict and HIV/AIDS. In most cases, these are absolutely destitute people for whom reintegration will succeed only with provision of minimal needs for a period of time during which they can reestablish themselves in productive employment. CBOs will be the prime providers of this type of support. Additionally, much rural infrastructure in the DRC needs rehabilitation. As implementation proceeds, opportunities for using food-for-work under a community grants type of approach will be identified. In some cases, such assistance will be complemented with a limited amount of cash, either through monetization, as small cash grants, where purchase of supplies is necessary to do the work. Presently high rates of malnutrition are indicative of both an inadequate total supply of food as measured in kcal, which mainly reflects inadequate production, and nutritionally unbalanced

diets, which mainly reflect lack of education and ability to purchase needed supplements for local production. By improving marketing and technology, and thereby increasing incomes, and access to education, SO 4 will address the basic causes of under and malnutrition in the DRC. Food assistance will be used with an overall objective of making communities less vulnerable to insecurity of food supply both by addressing the needs of especially vulnerable groups and the needs of the entire communities for access to basic services.

Global Development Alliance and Leveraging other Resources: Successful public-private alliances will be key to the achievement of SO 4. The agricultural, marketing, and financial services sectors are particularly conducive for these kinds of alliances in a country on the verge of recovery with a strong agricultural base, enormous economic potential, and a large and diverse population. Cash and in kind capital will be required in massive doses to increase production, revitalize markets, and finance enterprises. As the government restructures its role in the economy, there may also be opportunities for USAID to play a role in easing the transition of employees of restructured ministries or government-owned companies into new livelihoods. This will also call for public-private alliances. The transition from a divided and state-dominated economy to a re-unified and private one focused on rural and peri-urban development will require that SO 4 make strategic public-private alliances.

## **5.8. SYNERGIES WITH OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

The basic premise of SO 4 is that the scope and nature of development needs in the DRC are so great that they require complementarities with other USAID interventions, other donors, and the private sector. Such linkages can serve as 'entry points' to minimize start up costs, avoid the risk of dissipating efforts and maximize impact where investments are made. The recommendation of the SWIFT team still stands: increased integration of USAID-funded activities will maximize the effectiveness of the overall program.

SO 2 (Health): USAID and other donors are supporting development and emergency health activities in 81 health zones throughout the country. As part of the support provided, community-based networks have been developed in order to diffuse health-related information and services, including nutrition and HIV/AIDS. These same community-based networks will also be used to provide agricultural extension services, to form savings and credit groups, and to establish road rehabilitation and maintenance brigades. Ultimately, the sustainability of investments in better health networks will depend on the users' means to pay for them. Thus these groups, whose needs often go beyond the preventive, palliative, or curative, will receive a broader range of interventions aimed at increasing their incomes and self-reliance. In the end, by incorporating activities under SO 4, better health, nutrition, and HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention will be achieved.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): SO 3 activities may impact on the livelihood of the people by reducing the rate of malnourishment through the promotion of a more equitable allocation of public resources to the components of the population where the malnourished are concentrated. Corruption, petty officialdom harassment, and illegal tax collection constitute major constraints to the free flow of trade and to remunerative investments in the agricultural economy: it is most often the small farmer, trader or business owner who is victimized and suffers economic loss. Therefore, SO 4 will work in conjunction with the SO 3 Anti-corruption

Program in addressing the issue. Recent conclusions point to local NGOs involved in economic activity as key partners in the fight against harassment and illegal taxation.

SO 5 (Education): Education is regarded as a basic need under SO 4, and one that is also necessary for its ultimate success, since diffusion of new agricultural technologies as well as other measures undertaken to improve livelihoods, such as health messaging, depends upon it. As noted above, specific actions will be undertaken for rehabilitation of schools in areas where the SO will operate. CBOs will also be encouraged to support schools and parents who send their children to schools. For many families, sending children to school is a luxury they cannot afford because of children's contribution to household income-generation. SO 4 actions will result in increased income in rural and peri-urban areas and help relieve this constraint on school attendance.

SpO (DDR): An important SpO activity is community level reintegration programs that provide for income generating activities and employment for demobilized soldiers. SO 4 fully expects that some of the communities it targets for assistance will also host demobilized soldiers. Failing that, it will consider positioning itself in areas where they are present and incorporate them in activities in agriculture, infrastructure rehabilitation, and micro-finance once they have graduated from other donor or government-led programs.

CARPE: SO 4 will seek linkages with CARPE. The CARPE mandate is to apply sustainable natural resource management practices to five landscapes and one protected area in the DRC. The landscapes approach taken by CARPE gives SO 4 an opportunity to combine its efforts with this program by supporting sustainable livelihoods activities in the landscapes or adjacent to them. Support to sustainable agriculture and forest use practices will benefit local communities by providing them with income and will also reduce the pressure on natural resources. The goals of both programs can be met by linking up along these geographic zones.

## **5.9. OTHER DONORS AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS**

Within the DRC and at the central level, donor coordination is done through thematic groups which consist of principal donors operating within specific areas. Several thematic donor groups apply to SO 4: forestry and food security; macro-economic stability; and infrastructure.

Activities under SO 4, which is using an international NGO consortium approach in implementation, are especially well positioned to benefit from donor coordination at the field level since the implementing partners are experienced international NGOs and their partners include NGOs based in a number of donor countries.

The World Bank has taken the leadership among the international donors to help the GDRC better define its policies. Indeed, the World Bank's Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) for the new government was approved in July 2001, initially for a two-year period. It had three primary objectives: 1) to stabilize the socio-economic situation following the February 2001 regime change and the implementation of the peace accords; 2) to initiate the re-engagement of the GDRC with the international community; and 3) to lay the groundwork for future growth by supporting economic reforms, capacity building, and improved governance. Essentially, the strategy sought to seize the momentum created by favorable political events to provide tangible economic and social benefits, to build a track record for the Government and the emerging

leadership, and to begin to restore confidence and forward thinking among the population, donors, and private investors.

The end of the TSS coincided with the installation of the TG in July 2003. The IBRD is opting for a two-year extension phase of its existing strategy to extend rehabilitation and reconstruction nationwide and continue its main programs, which include nearly \$1 billion in commitments. The World Bank's position is that it is preferable to advance a clear step-by-step national strategy during the upcoming two-year transition rather than embark on a long-term development program at this stage. Following a September 2003 assessment, the World Bank recommended that the EMRRP be extended to formerly rebel-held territory in the eastern DRC.

The TSS pays little explicit attention to the revitalization of agriculture. The emphasis is on infrastructure rehabilitation with a focus on roads and river routes. The logic is that the scope for increased agricultural production will be limited without the infrastructure to reach urban and regional markets, and that what is essentially needed is to unlock the production potential rather than focus on developing or intensifying it. That said, the World Bank recognizes that the potential for short-term growth in the GDRC economy lies with the agricultural sector as opposed to the traditional extractive industries.

Donor coordination in two areas will be extremely important for the success of SO 4. One of these is rehabilitation of infrastructure, the other is food assistance. Rehabilitation of feeder roads under SO 4 will need to be coordinated with that of major roads, which is being financed by the World Bank. In addition, rehabilitation of feeder roads will sometimes require major infrastructural investments. For example, the construction of bridges would be outside the scope of SO 4, but could be funded by the World Bank through its operational arm for the Emergency Multi-Sectoral Rehabilitation Construction Program, the *Bureau Centrale de Coordination* (BCECO). Ex-combatants and IDPs will be returning to SO 4 operational areas and will require coordinated assistance for reinsertion in their communities.

In keeping with DAC objectives to promote harmonization among donors, USAID is coordinating with a number of donors who are presently engaged in livelihoods programs linked to agriculture and food security. The FAO is a leader in the agricultural sector, chairing coordination meetings for Forestry and Food Security in which all major donors in the sector are represented. The FAO is also directly engaged in the sector. Soon, the FAO will engage in a review of the agricultural sector with the GDRC, donors, and the private sector to determine an overall sector strategy for medium-term development.

The German-funded Hans Seidel Foundation is active on the Plateau de Bateke east of Kinshasa with community-based interventions. Germany also supports an umbrella organization of local NGOs (RIFIDEC) involved in microfinance. Two other national platforms, COPEMECO and FOLECO, are also supported by Germany. The former is the small business equivalent to the large business federation, the FEC; the latter regroups NGOs with an economic agenda that includes self-sufficiency and cost recovery for their services.

Among bilateral donors, Belgium and France both have social funds aimed at providing small to medium sized grants for modest projects in infrastructure and income generation, including micro-credit. Belgium is funding a program for rehabilitation of a network of 2,400 kms of rural access roads and which is looking at alternatives for local maintenance.

The World Bank and the European Union (E.U.) are heavily engaged in infrastructure projects. The World Bank is directing its efforts towards the trunk road network between Matadi and Lubumbashi with E.U. support along parts of it, and on feeder roads to ensure that critical roads in adjoining rural areas are passable. The E.U. also supports food security by reinforcing agricultural production activities and the capacity of merchants' associations.

Many donors are making an effort to integrate gender considerations throughout their programming. Microfinance programs receive the primary attention of these efforts as do education programs, although these are still quite limited.

Currently only six of thirteen active bilateral donors have programs exceeding \$10 million per year, while among the multilaterals only three have development programs exceeding a few million dollars. However, other development partners are on the verge of embarking on much larger scale development programs that will encompass the eastern provinces, hitherto the domain of humanitarian assistance. The funding and implementation of these programs will hinge on the success of the transition currently underway. MONUC has a larger role to play in assuring the transition from conflict to recovery and development. If that succeeds, and the transition process that is unanimously supported by the international donors moves forward, the enabling environment for SO 4 will be in place, and the anticipated results achieved.



## 6.1. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

The DRC's education indicators are among the worst in Africa. The collapse of the education system and the alarming and steadily declining children's enrollment rate (estimated at 55%, 49% for girls)<sup>1</sup> is catastrophic. Dropout rates are extreme; in primary school, less than 25% of students entering school in September remain through the school year<sup>2</sup>. Classrooms are severely overcrowded, with often 80 or more children per primary school classroom. Schools lack the most basic materials – not just textbooks and benches for students, but often a roof that fully covers the classroom, so the school day is regularly truncated or canceled during the rainy season. At 3.1% of the budget, GDRC investment in education is one of the lowest in the world.

The DRC had practically attained universal primary education nearly thirty years ago in 1974, with a 94% gross enrollment rate. This dropped to 60% in 1997-1998, and 55% in 2001-2002. Retention rates are too low for literacy to be achieved, especially for girls. While 25% of primary school children attained fifth grade in 2001-2002, girls' retention rates at the fifth grade level in rural areas were already as low as 15%<sup>3</sup> in 1995. This attrition rate indicates 85% of the female student body will never advance in the educational process. No country, and certainly not the DRC, can achieve and sustain economic growth and democratic governance when generation after generation of its children do not learn to read, write, or add. Whether a school is public or church-run, the decline in the number of children enrolled and retained in school becomes more acute every year. In effect, the system is broken and steadily getting worse.

There are three major constraints to improving basic education in the DRC. The first is a severe lack of financial resources. In 1991, after the GDRC failed to pay teachers, schools subsequently closed. Most schools reopened in 1992, under "convention" agreements, which placed 80% of the schools under the control of the three major religious denominations – Catholic, Protestant, and Kimbanguist. However the real burden of support for education lies with the community i.e., parents. In fact, Congolese communities are responsible for 80-95% of the costs of operating schools, compared to an average of 30-50% elsewhere in Africa.<sup>4</sup> While the GDRC still is responsible, in theory, for paying teachers' salaries, it pays schoolteachers between \$2 and \$5 per month. Usually these payments are many months in arrears. As a result, parents, who are already overwhelmed by more fundamental needs, are required to make financial and in-kind contributions to keep the schools running. In a country where the vast majority live below the poverty line, parents simply cannot afford these costs. This complete economic collapse is at the core of problems in the DRC's social sectors.

The second constraint is a limited and unqualified cadre of teachers. The Congo's primary school teachers can be roughly divided into two types: 1) older men and women who received formal training in normal schools or "colleges" more than twenty years ago – and have never received in-service training; and 2) very young men and women with little or no formal training.

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<sup>1</sup> MICS2 Survey, UNICEF/Kinshasa, January 2002

<sup>2</sup> Ibid

<sup>3</sup> UNDP 2000

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

Poorly paid and working under miserable conditions, teachers in the DRC have very low levels of motivation. The quality of instruction is extremely low.

The third constraint is the glaring absence of learning materials. There are almost no materials in the classrooms. Except in the few elite schools in major and secondary cities, there are no teaching aids, few textbooks, and often no notebooks for students. In most rural schools there may be one textbook per class, which the teacher uses. Students often work from over-used small slate boards rather than notebooks.



Many children in villages across DRC do not know what "school" means  
Photo: Darfour Ndakakanu

Girls face particular barriers to seeking education. When household resources are limited, there is a tendency to spend money on boys' education rather than girls'. In addition there is a tendency within all cultures in Congo to worry about girls outside the home, to believe they are not as smart as boys, and perhaps most importantly to consider that there are competing demands on a girl's time. Girls are needed at home to cultivate fields, collect water and firewood, cook, and tend to younger siblings. These responsibilities are transferred over to them when they get married, which is often by age 15 (the legal age of marriage for girls). Even if

a girl has the opportunity to go to school, the cultural and social constraints listed above mean that she is under great pressure not only to under perform but also to drop out.

Not only does the Congolese school system function poorly, but what children learn in school is largely of no practical use to them. Education must be made relevant for it to become attractive to students and for parents to be convinced that sending their children to school is a worthwhile investment. More could also be done to make the curriculum and pedagogy more gender sensitive.

While the current state of the Congolese education system is grim, there are three inherent strengths in Congolese society that can and should be built upon and invested in. First is the demand for education. Despite their poverty, Congolese parents and children value education. Students, especially boys, are enrolled in tremendous numbers at the beginning of every school year, only to drop out or be expelled when their parents lose the struggle to come up with school fees. Overwhelmingly, vulnerable children such as child soldiers, street children, and child prostitutes cite getting into school as their greatest goal and best chance for a decent life. A second, related, strength is the self-sufficiency and resiliency of the Congolese people. Parents make great economic sacrifices to maintain their children in school. Communities, particularly in rural areas and secondary and tertiary cities, take an active interest in their schools. Parent Teacher Organizations exist for many Congolese schools; a surprisingly large number of them are active. There are strong links between the churches, religious communities, and the schools. Third, because the system is so badly broken, GDRRC, and the

private sector alike are willing to try innovative approaches to improve it. One example of this is that education has been decentralized by default. This offers the opportunity to build the capacity of existing local groups that will assure more sustainable and relevant education practices. USAID believes these factors constitute a foundation that can lead to substantial progress in targeted areas for relatively small investments of material and technical assistance.

**6.2. GRDC RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE**

Historically, the GDRC has recognized the high value of education. It maintains a staffed Ministry of Education and has produced a comprehensive national curriculum for primary education that focuses on the development of foundation knowledge that is intended to allow the child to become a useful member of society and pursue continuing educational goals. The core education components are reading, writing, and mathematics. Additionally, the national curriculum has objectives in the following areas:

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local languages</li> <li>• French</li> <li>• Civic and Moral Education</li> <li>• Health and Environment</li> <li>• History</li> <li>• Geography</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Natural Sciences</li> <li>• Design</li> <li>• Calligraphy</li> <li>• Singing and Music</li> <li>• Physical Education</li> <li>• Manual Labor</li> </ul>
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There are indicators that the GDRC is increasingly recognizing the extensive need in this sector. In the mid-2003 GDRC budget revision, the primary and secondary education budget line increased by 4% while the overall budget decreased by 8%. However, the near total absence of funds has severely restricted the GDRC’s ability to implement programs. It is unable to live up to its commitment to pay teacher salaries. It authorizes teacher housing, where possible, but there is very little flow of cash through the GDRC’s education system. The GDRC Ministry of Education is, for the most part, confined to policy statements, curriculum planning, and maintenance of its central offices and inspectorates.

**6.3. PRIOR USAID EDUCATION EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC**

USAID has, to some degree, been involved in education in this country since the early 1960s. Post independence capacity needs centered on a broad spectrum of technical skills deficits; a number of higher education activities were initiated to address these needs. In 1962, 102 Congolese officials and students were sent to programs in Europe and the U.S. to increase skills in government administration, transportation, and communication. In the same year, 70 Congolese were trained in education, administration, agriculture, and forestry. From 1960 to 1999, several thousand Congolese received advanced education and training in a multitude of disciplines including teacher training. During the same period, USAID/DRC also provided substantial support to the higher education system through grants to the government as well as to partner organizations that created and strengthened institutions involved in law, English language, agriculture, manpower development, non-formal education, and public health.

More recently, the Education for Democracy and Development Initiative (EDDI), which provides scholarships and incentives for girls to stay in school, was launched in the DRC on July 24, 2001, to enable recipients to begin the 2001-2002 school year on time.



Girls in Kikwit benefiting from the EDDI Program stand proud  
*Photo: Alissa Karg*

Through EDDI, the Ambassador's Girl's Scholarship Program has provided scholarships to over 1,350 primary school girls in the Kinshasa area. The scholarship rate per girl is approximately \$50 per school year. In addition to tuition, recipients receive uniforms, school bags, and supplies. Prizes are also given for scholastic achievement. In recognition of the outreach and impact of this program, the Mission received an

additional \$300,000 in April 2003. With these additional funds, the program was enlarged to provide 8,000 scholarships in Lubumbashi, Kikwit, and Matadi; expand the program to Vanga and Luozi; and provide education support for female HIV/AIDS orphans in Matadi and Lubumbashi.

During the past three years, EDDI has also provided scholarships to 45 high school girls to receive English language training at the U.S. Embassy's Congo American Language Institute. It has also supported basic education and training in sign language to deaf Congolese children and the provision of computers to targeted schools.

In Luozi, Bas Congo Province, USAID launched a radio-based training program for teachers in 2003. The project is designed to improve pedagogical practices and the quality of didactic material. The goal of the program is to increase the capacity of a select cadre of teachers and community members so that they can foster a type of learning that supports effective interaction with local development challenges.

In Vanga, Bandundu Province, USAID opened an internet based Community Learning and Resource Center in July 2003. This educational resource, which has 17 computers, will provide access for the community as well as the teachers and students of Vanga.

### **6.3.1. Lessons Learned**

The active pedagogy project in Bas Congo and the Community Resource Center in Bandundu have been useful tools for the educational development of both communities. At the beginning of the project, however, many community members, particularly villagers from more remote areas, were reluctant to accept the relevancy of computers and expressed their preference for USAID to invest in activities such as constructing an electrical power dam, renovating schools, and providing desks and means of transportation for the local education and political authorities.

The teacher training project in Bas Congo is just beginning and already the twenty teacher trainers show an increasing interest in the creation of culturally appropriate instructional

materials for youth and adults based on innovative pedagogy, using appropriate local technologies.

After the launch of the project in Bandundu, the center has become central to community life, with a daily attendance of between 50-70 teachers, students, nurses, and other community members. The center has significantly increased access to educational information such as the national curriculum. Teachers in the community say that it has tremendously improved their basic educational methodologies (many of them had never seen the national curriculum).

The Ambassadors' Girl Scholarships Program encountered initial problems. The boys and their families called the project discriminatory and asked to be included in the program. Meetings with the families were held to explain both the importance of girls' education and the fact that scholarships for girls alleviate part of the economic burden on the family and will free up money for the boys in the family to attend school.

#### **6.4. PROGRAM RATIONALE**

The work of educating the entire population is well beyond the resources at hand. It would take too much money and, perhaps more importantly, too much time to develop a classic school system with large numbers of highly trained teachers and well built, well equipped schools. Education is needed now and investing massive inputs over a long period is not a sufficient approach.

USAID has a comparative advantage in that it can, with far less money, focus on a small number of interrelated interventions that can have a crucial impact on the circumstances as a whole. Effective learning environments make use of persons, communities, technologies, and materials to launch innovative activities that demonstrate high impact results, acknowledging the importance of informal learning at the same time. These innovations could, while strengthening the community's capacity to support education, quickly satisfy educational needs relevant at the local level.

Such programs in local settings would involve the community in developing workable learning systems that satisfy fundamental knowledge needs and also serve the immediate survival needs of the learner in terms of livelihoods, health, and civic skills. Programs that prove themselves in the community setting demonstrate their viability and sustainability and as such are logical candidates for expansion.

Some assets are already known: the general willingness to innovate; the high value placed on education; the decentralized nature of the system; the links between churches, communities and schools; and the active participation of parents and the community in the education system. However, it is also known that there are a significant gender issue with respect to valuing and supporting education for girls as well as developing a gender balanced curriculum and implementing gender sensitive pedagogic methods.

Considering the serious constraints in the DRC, and the inherent strengths within a severely battered society, USAID's manageable interest lies in supporting innovative, high impact programs to improve educational quality and relevance, primarily for girls, at relatively low cost, and to ensure continuous synergy with other USAID sector programs.

Considering the severity of the statistics, special emphasis needs to be placed on education for girls. Girls' education is crucial to the development of the Congo, as women play a key role in the development of Congolese society, economy, health, and well-being. The UNICEF MICS2 2001 survey clearly demonstrates that women who receive primary education are better able to understand public health and hygiene concepts, use child spacing measures, have a good understanding of how HIV is spread, and have their children vaccinated and weighed. Also, girls who attend school are less likely to marry young and bear children in their teen years. The poor state of girls' education directly contributes to impoverished health and sanitary conditions, and reduced prospects for local economic development. Key impediments to formal and non-formal education for girls must be addressed.

The development hypothesis is that if the quality of targeted educational programs is improved through innovative programs, and community participation in these programs is increased with an emphasis on targeting increasing the access, retention, and achievement of girls, then basic education will be improved and the overarching goals of other SOs (increased use of key health services and practices, increased incomes, and increased participation in securing the political transition) can be furthered.

#### **6.4.1. Critical Assumptions**

There are potential threats that could limit the ultimate success of USAID/DRC's education program. The following critical assumptions present the conditions upon which the full success of the SO will depend. These assumptions build on the macro-level ones in section 2.2.

- Key parties, from the family level to the international donor community and the government, remain committed to continuous improvement in education in the DRC.
- The private sector continues to support the installation and maintenance of communication networks that provide a means for technological innovation in the education sector.

#### **6.5. RELATIONSHIP TO GDRC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS**

Through the Ministries of Primary, Secondary, and Professional Education, the GDRC's commitment is more than just rhetorical. As mentioned earlier, it has produced a comprehensive primary education curriculum through its Directorate of Scholastic Programs and Didactic Materials.

The GDRC remains in support of the goal of education of its people and welcomes the efforts of USAID as well as the rest of the donor and religious communities. USAID will maintain a close and collegial dialogue with the GDRC on all levels with the expectation that as innovations are developed, tested, and found viable they will be introduced elsewhere.

## 6.6. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### 6.6.1 Results Framework and Targets

SO 5 *Improving Basic Education, Especially for Girls, in Targeted Areas* will increase access to and the quality of basic education in targeted areas over the five-year period of the ISP. It will concentrate on improving community participation in education, improving teacher skills, and increasing the supply of appropriate texts and other learning materials. USAID/DRC expects to promote sustainable improvements in these educational areas by introducing innovative programs that generate enhanced educational impact and increased community participation. The primary impact is to increase the quality of learning for the Congolese child, especially for girls. To achieve this objective the following intermediate results will be attained:

- IR 1. Improved quality of basic education through innovative teacher training programs;
- IR 2. Improved community participation in basic education; and
- IR 3. Increased access, retention, and achievement, particularly for girls.

USAID/DRC will take into account the following strategic considerations that serve as the basis for using innovation to impact educational development in the DRC.

- Teachers, and by extension anyone else who gets involved in facilitating the learning of others, such as community leaders, youth activists, literacy workers, and parents, should receive attention. Such attention should focus on capacity building for supporting and leveraging the integrated development process with a particular view toward exploring and using the local environment, locally available knowledge, and local technologies in support of the core educational curriculum.
- The community is the natural environment in which schools and other learning initiatives function. The fact that schools are still functioning at all in the DRC (albeit with extremely limited resources and poor quality of services) is credited to the motivation and initiative of groups and individuals within their communities. Concrete community involvement in the development and implementation of all learning activities is essential.
- Tools must be provided that allow children, teachers, families, community leaders and other interested members of the community to make the best use of newly created capacities. Tools should support the creation and adaptation of local technologies and resources to make learning activities current and relevant to the immediate environment of children.
- Mechanisms that facilitate the above processes using modern technologies effectively, avoiding the costly infrastructure of the past, will be gradually introduced. Cost-effective, technology-based infrastructure will be built, including community learning resource centers, participatory community radio-broadcast systems, internet exchange, computer access to CD-ROM-based sources, and basic community library facilities. These resources and systems provide the means to support and sustain the steady involvement of people in their own development.

The underlying premise is that locally created quality and self-sufficiency in education can lead to more effective, relevant, and sustainable education practices throughout the country. A corollary to this premise is that, given the current condition of education and the resources at hand, a prudent course of action is to develop innovative, locally supported basic education

improvement programs that will serve the learning needs of the student and pave the way for expanded improvements in the education system.

The intention of SO 5 is to create a dramatic, cost effective impact through educational innovations as well as innovative applications of technology that provide a sustainable human interface between the most advanced educational achievements and the Congolese boys and girls in the remote classrooms of the DRC. The program will begin to lay the foundation for system-wide improvements.

It is anticipated that the program will improve pedagogical processes in the classroom and quality of didactic materials through capacity building and the application of instructional strategies that support existing curriculum and that:

- Are relevant to local development problems;
- Use local knowledge and technologies;
- Are integrated with areas of development such as health, nutrition, HIV/AIDS, agriculture, or micro-enterprise;
- Promote gender equity;
- Are rooted in practice and concrete experience;
- Reduce rote learning;
- Increase learner-centered instructional processes; and
- Make appropriate use of new techniques and technological resources.

USAID/DRC's program is aimed at stimulating community participation which will enhance sustainability and promote the replication of successful innovations elsewhere in the education system.

SO level indicators and targets:

- % increase of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender) TARGET: 15% for girls, 10% for boys.
- % increase of children completing primary education in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender) TARGET: 20% for girls and boys.
- OPIN: The target for the total number of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender) would be between 66,000 (low funding parameter) – 110,000+ (high funding parameter). (This number estimates that a total of 100 schools at 660 students per school will be reinforced with increased teacher capacity, learning materials, and increased retention and achievement of students.)

An integrated approach in targeted geographical areas is essential to maximize limited resources. Learning activities will be established in communities where other SOs are and will be operating, particularly emphasizing geographical overlap with rural health projects, livelihoods projects, and in areas of reintegration of ex-combatants.

USAID does not seek to replace, displace, or replicate existing assets. The intent is to improve existing education efforts through the use of innovative educational techniques and practices. While a school in a targeted area may be in a very poor state, the intention is to

# USAID/DRC

## Results Framework for SO 5 (Education)

### Development Context:

- National Primary School enrolment rates (by gender)
- National Primary School completion rates (by gender)

### *Basic Education, Especially for Girls, Improved in Targeted Areas*

#### Overall Indicators:

- Ind 1: % increase of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)
- Ind 2: % increase of children completing primary education in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)
- Ind 3: # of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)

### Critical Assumptions:

- All parties, from the family level to the international donor community, remain committed to continuous improvement in education in the DRC.
- The private sector continues to support the installation and maintenance of communication networks that provide a means for innovation in the education sector.

### Intermediate Results

#### Intermediate Result 1

Improved quality of basic education through innovative teacher training programs

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. % increase in test scores
- Ind. 1.2. # of teachers trained (or improved teacher capacity)
- Ind. 1.3. # of textbooks and learning materials produced and disseminated (including through technology channels)
- Ind. 1.4. # of students who have textbooks (OPIN indicator) or access to online materials
- Ind. 1.5. Money obligated for teacher training (OPIN indicator)
- Ind. 1.6. Money obligated for innovative educational approaches (OPIN indicator)
- Ind. 1.7. Money obligated for textbooks and learning materials (OPIN indicator)

#### Intermediate Result 2

Improved Community Participation in Basic Education

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. % increase of community support to schools (in terms of time, money, and materials)
- Ind. 2.2. % increase of community involvement in school management
- Ind. 2.3. % increase in administrative and managerial knowledge of school faculty and community volunteers
- Ind. 2.4. % increase in relevancy of coursework to expressed local needs (measured using before and after analysis)

#### Intermediate Result 3

Increased Access, Retention, and Achievement, Particularly for Girls

##### Indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. % increase in test scores
- Ind. 3.2. % of students who stay in school
- Ind. 3.3. # of scholarships given (OPIN indicator)
- Ind. 3.4. # of years of education received under scholarship (OPIN indicator)
- Ind. 3.5. Money obligated for scholarships (OPIN indicator)

### Illustrative Activity Types

- Train teachers in the production and use of local materials that support the national curriculum and are based on active pedagogy, namely, one that encourages student-centered learning
- Develop technology-based community learning centers to improve teacher skills and materials development
- Distribute the national curriculum and teachers' kits
- Link scholastic and community based learning activities
- Information, Education and Communication (IEC) campaigns on the value of education for girls
- Promote community fund raising programs and capacity development of school boards, parent teacher organizations, student associations and other support groups
- Administration skill programs for PTO members, teachers and school administrators
- Support learning and other development learning opportunities through community radio
- Support mentoring of female students
- Train teachers not to reflect gender bias in the classroom
- Ensure adequate sanitation facilities for girls (if and where appropriate)
- Disbursal of scholarships to girls
- Teacher training to motivate and engage students
- Income generating activities for parents (with the livelihoods SO)

develop it as an asset and add value to the school, schooling for girls, and the community in which the school is situated.

### 6.6.2. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities

IR 1: Improved quality of basic education through innovative teacher training programs.
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USAID will improve the quality of basic education in targeted areas by establishing and maintaining a direct link between innovations in education and their adapted application in the classroom. Innovations may be as concrete and straightforward as converting from rote learning to learner-centered pedagogy or linking community service to learning in the school curricula, or asking girls as well as boys to answer questions in the classroom. Innovative activities will also make use of technologies that provide cost-effective programs like web-based educator collaboration and radio instruction for students as well as teacher trainers.

The use of Information Communication Technologies (ICT), telecenters, and radio will not only increase access to training and learning that would otherwise not be available in rural DRC, but will also increase interactive learning for the development of teaching professionals. These technology channels have potential impacts on the development of educational systems where very few presently function and also on the development of the free and democratic flow of information and ideas. Through the use of radio listening groups or online moderated discussions, debate and discussion will be modeled to teacher training that can then replicate similar active discussions in the classroom. Through the use of the internet, materials such as the national curriculum can reach a much wider audience of teachers and schools.

In addition to classic distribution of textbooks and materials, training of teachers will focus strongly on guiding teachers how to take advantage of their local technologies and resources, and on how to use them as learning tools and opportunities. This strategy is necessary to overcome the perpetual situation where teachers expect textbooks to come from the outside only to find that the content is not relevant to their students' immediate environment. In the DRC, these local technologies and resources offer an opportunity to break through a difficult and isolating situation. Distribution of teachers kits should include tools and materials to support the creation and adaptation of local technologies and resources (e.g. water filters, palm oil presses) to make learning activities relevant to the students' immediate environment.

Particular attention will be paid to gender sensitivity in the classroom and teacher training will focus on improving teachers' capacity to identify good practices, and to motivate, counsel, mentor, and support girl and boy students in order to increase retention, particularly for girls. This discussion is elaborated under IR 3.

Illustrative activities:

1. Train teachers in the production and use of local materials that support the national curriculum and are based on active pedagogy, namely, one that encourages student-centered learning;
2. Develop technology-based community learning centers to improve teacher skills and materials development; and
3. Distribute the national curriculum and teachers' kits.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. Improved test scores;
- Ind. 1.2. # of teachers trained (or improved teacher capacity) (OPIN indicator)<sup>5</sup>;
- Ind. 1.3. # of textbooks and learning materials produced and disseminated (including through technology channels) (OPIN indicator);
- Ind. 1.4. # of students who have textbooks (OPIN indicator) or access to online materials;
- Ind. 1.5. Money obligated for teacher training (OPIN indicator);
- Ind. 1.6. Money obligated for innovative educational approaches (OPIN indicator); and
- Ind. 1.7. Money obligated for textbooks and learning materials (OPIN indicator).

IR 2: Improved community participation in basic education.
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The intent of USAID's education program is to fortify the link between the school and the family and to encourage discussion on the value of education for girls. SO 5 activities will help communities form and strengthen the capacity of groups that have a vested interest in the quality of education.

Establishing and/or strengthening community support groups for learning provides a means for teachers to support each other in the development and implementation of new strategies and materials. These support groups for Congolese teachers and others invested in educational development in the DRC open the doors to local networks of individuals who can share ideas, discover new ways to make learning relevant in the DRC, and find appropriate methods to integrate teaching and learning into the practices of daily life.

Increasing the relevance of learning will enhance the meaning of the national curriculum and address ways to interact constructively with local problems. This can be achieved by linking learning activities to local community development challenges in the areas of health, nutrition, agriculture, micro-enterprise, gender, and HIV/AIDS through life-skills training. When education and development are integrated into community life, these linkages respond to community demand, are natural, and make sense. These activities can also promote the importance of education for girls by making learning more relevant to the family and local environment.

Community involvement and support for long term sustainability of local education initiatives can be achieved through establishing or strengthening local steering, management, and conflict resolution committees in close collaboration with the SO 3 (DG) team to enhance civic education and conflict mitigation efforts. Training in participatory leadership, management, teambuilding, and conflict resolution will build community capacity and structures. In addition to ensuring sustainability of education and conflict management initiatives, community involvement will also serve to ensure continued relevance of learning in the classroom to local development problems.

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<sup>5</sup> The Online Presidential Initiative Network (OPIN) requires specific indicators for activities that receive Presidential Initiative funding.

Illustrative activities include:

1. Link scholastic and community based learning activities;
2. Conduct Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) campaigns on the value of education for girls;
3. Promote community fund raising programs and capacity development of school boards, parent teacher organizations, student associations and other support groups;
4. Administer skill programs for Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) members, teachers and school administrators; and
5. Support learning and other development learning opportunities through community radio.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. % increase of community support to schools (in terms of time, money, and materials);
- Ind. 2.2. % increase of community involvement in school management;
- Ind. 2.3. % increase in administrative and managerial knowledge of school faculty and community volunteers; and,
- Ind. 2.4. % increase in relevancy of coursework to expressed local needs (measured using before and after analysis).

IR 3: Increased access, retention, and achievement particularly for girls.
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In targeted areas, USAID will not only increase the quality of basic education for girls (IR 1) but will also improve their ability to enroll and stay in school. Congolese girls face problems due to their environment. To improve their abysmal access and retention rates, programs will be tailored to their needs.

Teacher trainings to improve a teacher's capacity to identify good practices, and to motivate, counsel, mentor, and support girl and boy students will lead to increased retention rates. Increasing the relevancy of education through community support groups in IR 2 can also be enhanced by teacher training in life-skills such as health, nutrition, agriculture, micro-enterprise, gender, and HIV/AIDS. Teachers should also be trained to take into account the special needs of girls in the school environment, and to ensure that girls actively participate in and outside the classroom in all learning activities. Programs to make schools more girl-friendly (e.g., separate latrines for girls, hiring of more female teachers, families allow their female children the time and place to study) can also be stimulated through Parent-Teacher Associations (PTAs) and IEC campaigns.

Scholarships through the Ambassadors Girls Scholarship Program will continue to be given, especially to vulnerable girls, to create opportunities for girls who otherwise would not be able to access primary education. Scholarships will be given to girls who attend schools in the same communities where other education activities take place in order to ensure a holistic and targeted approach. Scholarship opportunities can also link with the SO 4 (Livelihoods) sub IR 4.2 (care and reintegration of Separated Children (SCs) including ex-child soldiers, street children, and orphans) to facilitate the reintegration of SCs into communities.

Coordination will also take place with SO 4 to create income-generating programs and opportunities for parents (especially mothers) to enable them to enroll and to keep their children enrolled in school in targeted areas.

Illustrative activities:

1. Support mentoring of female students;
2. Train teachers not to reflect gender bias in the classroom;
3. Ensure adequate sanitation facilities for girls (if and where appropriate);
4. Disburse scholarships to girls;
5. Train teachers to motivate and engage students; and
6. Develop income generating activities for parents (with SO 4).

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. % increase in test scores;
- Ind. 3.2. % of students who stay in school (OPIN indicator);
- Ind. 3.3. # of scholarships given (OPIN indicator);
- Ind. 3.4. # of years of education received under scholarship (OPIN indicator); and
- Ind. 3.5. Amount of money obligated for scholarships (OPIN indicator).

### **6.6.3. Implementing Mechanisms**

Through EDDI, the Ambassador's Girl's Scholarship Program provides scholarships to over 1,350 primary school girls in the Kinshasa area, 1,454 primary school girls in Lubumbashi, 1,454 in Kikwit, 3,842 in Matadi and Boma, 600 in Luozi, 700 in Vanga, 45 secondary school girls learning English, and 500 AIDS orphan girls in Matadi and Lubumbashi. Winrock International implements the Program in cooperation with FODESA (a local NGO), UMCOR (a Methodist Church organization), Catholic Fathers in Kikwit and Luozi, CONAFED with the secondary school girls, Catholic Schools Coordination in Matadi, and AMOCONGO with the AIDS orphan girls in Matadi and Lubumbashi.

EDDI has also partnered with the Dikembe Mutombo Foundation to provide 20 computers and internet access for one year to the College of John Mabuidi in Kinshasa. The College of John Mabuidi has a sister school, Ottwell Middle School, in Forsyth, Georgia, with which it is planning exchange programs.

The Congo is one of the countries under the President's Africa Education Initiative (AEI). The initiative has three main components: scholarships, teacher training and texts, and other learning materials. It also has two crosscutting themes: HIV/AIDS and community involvement. All the elements of the initiative are included in this SO. It is expected that AEI will continue to support the Mission for the full term of the initiative.

OTI supports community level awareness raising and training on conflict mitigation and prevention. Schools are sometimes used to disseminate the culture of peace within civil society. OTI supports a rural radio in a number of provinces, written press, and Internet access to teach the population on peace and democracy.

Following a successful pilot program in 2001-2002, WFP's new PRRO covering calendar years 2004-2005 will extend its emergency school feeding program targeting certain primary schools in areas where school attendance is below the national average (North and South Kivu), and in the outlying areas of three main cities that have received many IDPs (Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Kisangani). WFP will provide a daily meal to approximately 100,000 students at selected schools and work in collaboration with UNICEF to provide additional services to support this activity. The objective is to improve the attendance and success rates of these children, with a particular emphasis on girls' education.

**6.6.4. Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan**

The preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) is provided in Annex II. The PMP will be finalized in CY 2004 in collaboration with stakeholders and customers to ensure that OPIN and Annual Report indicators are consistent with the data collection approaches of our implementing partners.

**6.6.5. Scenarios and Program Adjustments**

The three scenarios as outlined in this ISP - successful transition (one), protracted transition (two), and stalled transition (three) - are not expected to have a significant impact on the results to be achieved under this SO. Geographic areas that are targeted under this SO have remained peaceful, even when heavy fighting was occurring in other parts of the country. Any potential political or military instability that could occur should the situation deteriorate to a stalled transition, are not expected to reach these areas. As long as the overarching critical assumption that peace will hold over the life of the ISP is maintained, albeit with areas of instability and fighting in fragile zones, then access to the project areas and implementation of all proposed activities should achieve the expected results. That said, should scenario one and, to a certain extent, scenario two be the trend from 2004-2008, then the successes of this SO will be far greater as a successful transition process enhances more efficient, democratic political processes and institutions, which will strengthen government support to education. SO 5 will not suffer under scenario three (Stalled Transition) because none of the implementation sites are located in fragile areas where pockets of fighting may occur.

**6.6.6. Budget Tables by Funding Parameter**

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**6.6.7. Priorities under Different Funding Parameters**

Under both high and low funding parameters, innovative education programs will be introduced and expanded; community participation in basic education will be improved; and access, retention, and achievement, particularly for girls, will be increased. The effectiveness and expanse of activities, however, will vary dramatically.

The key difference between these two parameters is the number of children who will benefit from improved quality education, and the number of schools and communities that will have enhanced abilities to provide quality education. The program does not seek to cover all education needs in DRC as there is no USAID/DRC budget that could possibly support that.

However, it does aim to reach as many children as possible in the most cost-effective way. The number of children enrolled in schools that are benefiting from USAID/DRC programs will vary under each parameter and are estimated as follows.

High Funding Parameter:

- Estimated number of schools that benefit from USAID/DRC activities: 170+
- Estimated number of children enrolled in schools affected by USAID/DRC activities: 110,000+

In addition, under this parameter more innovations will be produced and shared across communities. This will result in a higher level of quality education, increased teacher motivation, and increased retention of students as programs become more relevant for their surrounding environment.

It is expected that the use of innovation and technologies will enable more people to be reached at less cost. Therefore the more money invested in the program will mean that the number of customers of the program will increase by more than a fixed cost per beneficiary.

Low Funding Parameter:

- Estimated number of schools that benefit from USAID/DRC activities: 100
- Estimated number of children enrolled in schools affected by USAID/DRC activities: 65,000

Under the low funding parameter, fewer innovations will be produced which means that the quality of education will not increase as significantly as under the high parameter and a much smaller targeted population will be covered.

## **6.7. LINKS TO CROSS-CUTTING THEMES**

Gender: Studies have shown that the family of an educated mother is healthier and more economically viable. An educated woman is more able to make a social and economic contribution to society. By increasing the number of girls that complete primary education, SO 5 will make significant improvement in gender issues as well as the social strength of the DRC. This ISP is guided by a Mission wide gender analysis and principles for gender mainstreaming. The role of education presents a number of critical opportunities, including mentoring opportunities for girls, safety at school, equity in the classroom, and male peer education that will be addressed as part of SO 5. Educating men on the importance of educating their daughters is extremely important. This is one of the benefits of USAID/DRC's community based approach to SO 5.

HIV/AIDS: SO 5 focuses on providing quality education most relevant to the needs of children within their community environment. HIV/AIDS education will be incorporated into the formal curriculum in areas assisted by USAID/DRC, as well as community-based learning in learning centers and other outreach programs.

Conflict Management: Intense community involvement in primary education will bring groups of individuals together to discuss common problems and find common solutions. This will help

to bridge gaps between and within communities and will open up a network of communities who will share ideas through radio, television, and the internet. In addition, non-formal education at schools and at community learning centers, as well as teacher training, will incorporate conflict management, mitigation and prevention training and activities.

Nutrition: Life skills training will also incorporate good health and hygiene values such as food preparation and storage. This will provide children (especially girls who prepare food for the household) with improved capacity to increase healthy eating and improve nutrition.

GDA and Leveraging other Resources: The GDA approach may offer considerable opportunity for this SO. One example is the Global Learning Portal, a \$10,000,000 GDA between USAID, the Academy for Educational Development, Sun Micro Systems, Scholastic Incorporated, and other sub partners. It is a comprehensive web based education support portal with nearly unlimited scope. Where web access is in use, any educator has immediate access to materials, curricula, advice, collaborative opportunities, software and much more. With its focus on technology and innovations, SO 5 is poised to make use of, or even initiate, such alliances.

## **6.8. SYNERGIES WITH OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Other USAID/DRC SOs and donor activities are complementary to SO 5 activities. Increasing the quality and effectiveness of learning systems at the local level plays a supportive role in all development work. The involvement with the President's AEI which supports scholarships, teacher training, and learning materials will strengthen the activities of this SO considerably. An additional asset – technology applications in education – permits a number of alternatives to be embraced. USAID/DRC DG activities have already installed over 100 internet access centers in eight cities in the DRC. Technology in the DRC is developed well enough to be considered a valuable resource in education programming.

SO 2 (Health): When primary education may be the only education ever received, critical relevancy issues arise. Enabling knowledge building blocks like reading, writing and math skills are necessary but not sufficient preparation for life. This indicates that health and livelihood components, at the least, are included in educational designs. Teaching prevention, especially HIV/AIDS prevention, at the primary school level is an outstanding opportunity. It is expected that community-level decisions will inform program design on specific applications but these two topic areas are viewed as key learning requirements.

SO 3 (Democracy and Governance): A fundamental goal of education is to empower people to make informed decisions affecting the quality of their own lives and the health of their community. To this end, civic education is implied in some form in all education activities. The opportunity for collaboration with democracy efforts is present through normal civic and moral education components of the GDRC curriculum as well as in teacher development – modeling democratic practices in the classroom – and, perhaps most valuable, the broad area of community involvement in education. The strengthening of PTAs and other local groups to develop social responsibility and initiate effective community action around education issues, a function that has general appeal, has high potential.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): Lack of income is the fundamental constraint to education in the DRC. The primary link between SO 4 and SO 5 is the positive effect that increased earnings will have on

support for education. The choice of Luozi for the radio-based teacher trainer instruction program was made because of the significant impact of USAID's current agriculture program in Luozi. The increases in income generated by SO 4 activities provide key support to increases in the community's educational quality. SO 5 can support SO 4 activities through strengthening economic, commercial, and entrepreneurial knowledge development as well as some vocational skill building. Likewise, SO 4 activities will support SO 5 in targeted areas by providing income-generating opportunities for parents (especially mothers) in order to increase disposable income to send children to school.

SpO (DDR): SO 5 has a very important contribution to make to reintegration activities. During the early years of the ISP, the Mission anticipates the demobilization and reintegration of between 11,000-17,000 child soldiers, including many of primary school age or who need basic education. Returning members of the community often have distinctly different learning styles and may not fit well with classroom education. Community level programs that engage this population in the most appropriate way would be an excellent tool for involving the community both in education but reintegration as well. USAID expects to collaborate with UNICEF to respond to the learning needs of this most important population.

## **6.9. OTHER DONORS AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS**

The education challenge to the development community in the DRC, including donors, NGOs, and the GDRC, is immense and actors' work should be complementary. To assure the kinds of systemic impact the SO envisions, USAID/DRC will develop relationships with appropriate partners through coordinating mechanisms.

The DRC does not have a national framework plan, which could allow various technical and financial partners in the education sector to start negotiations with the Government on programs to undertake. To harmonize interventions and avoid resource diversion, a donors' committee is setting up an association of various donors aimed at rationalizing procedures and programs in the education sector. The association will include the following donors: Japanese Embassy, German Cooperation (GTZ), Embassy of Italy, UNESCO, Belgian Technical Cooperation, the E.U., USAID, UNICEF, UNDP, the Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Centre Wallonie Bruxelles, Embassy of France, and OXFAM/GB.

The World Bank is currently conducting an analysis of the entire DRC educational system. The results of this analysis will allow the donor community to define a rehabilitation program for the education sector and determine short-term as well as long-term actions to be undertaken.

A thematic group, piloted by UNESCO and UNICEF, is in place to prepare a strategy on actions to be taken for the development of the education sector. In all donor coordination activities, USAID will strive to implement DAC harmonization best practices.

## CHAPTER 7

### EX-COMBATANT REINTEGRATION INTO COMMUNITIES FOSTERED - SPECIAL OBJECTIVE -

#### 7.1. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE

##### 7.1.1. The Problem

The peace process in the DRC progressed significantly in 2003. The Global and Inclusive Accord was signed. The Transitional Government (TG) incorporating the political leadership of all major Congolese belligerent factions was formed. Foreign armed forces (Ugandans, Zimbabweans, Namibians, Chadians, Angolans, and Rwandans) involved in the DRC conflict have departed. However, a kaleidoscopic array of Congolese armed forces remains, both regular and irregular, allied in various ways with each other.

The total number of armed persons in these forces is estimated to range between 150,000 and 235,000<sup>1</sup>. It is of political, military, social, and humanitarian necessity that a large proportion of the various Congolese armed forces be demobilized and reintegrated into society. Forces that will not be reintegrated into communities will need to be demilitarized and reintegrated into Congolese civilian society or incorporated into the new, unified national army.



The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) of combatants poses four serious challenges to the transition to peace, the reunification of the country, and the ability of people and communities to rebuild their lives. First, any former rebel factions which are now part of the TG and continue to maintain their armed forces separate from the unified army represent an unresolved internal military threat to the newly unified GDRC. Unification must be respected by all former belligerent armed groups who are now part of the TG. Second, the GDRC needs to create a unified army that will implement the will of the reunified republic and not only factions thereof. Third, excess regular soldiers represent a threat to local, regional, or national stability, unless they are afforded the opportunity to make their livings in other ways. Fourth, irregular armed forces need to be incorporated or disbanded and offered other economic and social opportunities.

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<sup>1</sup> The TG estimates up to 300,000 total irregular and regular men under arms, while the international donor community is using more cautious figures of between 150,000 to 235,000. Exact figures will not be known until all armed groups present themselves for demobilization and/or integration. For strategic planning purposes, USAID/DRC will use the figures used by the donor community.

Failure to address these challenges will most likely lead to a continued state of extreme instability in many parts of the country, an ongoing humanitarian crisis as armed groups pillage the country at will, an untenable internal military threat to the TG and the reunified Congolese state, and the breakdown of the transition. Moreover, failure to tackle these challenges potentially would lead to countless additional deaths, a great number of lives blighted by war-related violence, massive population movements with the attendant social costs, and the eventual overflow of instability into neighboring states in the region.

A nexus of integrated interventions is required to enable and facilitate the reintegration of these people into civilian life, to re-establish security in all parts of the DRC, and to remove the threat that is a daily part of millions of people's lives. Gender relations is an important aspect of the development challenge. It is an area of significant concern at all levels of the reintegration process. Ex-combatants will return to villages where they may have attacked. The impact on the community, particularly female community members, must be carefully managed.

### **7.1.2. The Profile**

Former combatants will fall within two categories. The first category consists of members of organized armed forces of the formerly opposed rebel factions (primarily the RCD-Goma and MLC) and the government who will not be a permanent part of the unified armed forces of the TG. It is estimated there are as many as 135,000 individuals in this category.

The second category consists of irregular militias belonging to factions, which are not signatories to the Sun City agreement. This includes belligerent forces in Ituri, semi-organized militias created to resist the occupying forces or the RCD, more organized militias supported in the past by the GDRC, and rogue war-lord headed forces. This group also includes community defense forces which are mostly semi-organized at the village or community level. These are known collectively as irregular Congolese armed groups. Estimates are that there are perhaps 30,000 individuals in this category.

There is another group of people who are not former combatants but associated with armed groups and have separate needs. These people are dependents of ex-combatants, camp followers, and prisoners and slaves of the armed groups. They have been denied the normal education and income-generating opportunities afforded by a stable life, and require training and other forms of rehabilitation to lead productive lives. Finding appropriate life solutions for these people is part of the development challenge. Community reintegration activities must take this into account.<sup>2</sup>

There are high and low estimates of the number of people to be demobilized and reintegrated. The figures below represent estimates from a Kinshasa-based DDR working group that includes all major donors and implementing partners.

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<sup>2</sup> Note: It is important to note that the DDR process and the transitional process are evolving on a daily basis. Some of the facts stated in this chapter may change over the period of the SpO without affecting the content of the desired results.

### High Scenario

RCD regular forces	45,000
MLC regular forces	25,000
Government regular forces	135,000
Irregular forces	30,000
Total regular and irregular	235,000
Incorporated into the army	(70,000)
DDR of regular forces	(135,000)
DDR of irregular forces	(30,000)
Total regular and irregular to be demobilized and reintegrated	165,000

### Low Scenario

RCD regular forces	20,000
MLC regular forces	10,000
Government regular forces	90,000
Irregular forces	30,000
Total regular and irregular	150,000
Incorporated into the army	(70,000)
DDR of regular forces	(50,000)
DDR of irregular forces	(30,000)
Total regular and irregular to be demobilized and reintegrated	80,000

Table 7.1. DDR estimates for regular and irregular forces

## 7.2. GDRC RESPONSE TO THE CHALLENGE

With the leadership of the major Congolese belligerent factions incorporated into the GDRC, progress on key transitional issues is possible. The TG is sufficiently established to be able to define the policies for and modalities of a national DDR program. It is now possible for the TG to make decisions on the size and composition of the new army, its position *vis a vis* the DDR of irregular forces, the desired attributes of a national DDR program, and the preferred organizational structure to coordinate and implement this program. Such decisions clearly could not be taken prior to the formation of the TG.

The TG will be supported by donors and the U.N. system in the definition and implementation of the national Security Sector Reform (SSR)/DDR program. The Belgians, U.S. (DOD, with funds other than economic assistance funds), U.K., and French will take the lead on restructuring the national army. MONUC and the TG defense ministry take the lead on disarmament of irregular forces. UNDP, the World Bank, and other donors will lead the technical aspects of the reintegration program. UNICEF will take the lead on child DDR. The P-5 (Security Council) Ambassadors and the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General (SRSG) will ensure program coherence and congruence with the principles of the transition.

The GDRC has virtually no financial resources to devote to the DDR program. The national budget for FY 2003 is \$785 million. While a significant percentage of the budget will go for defense, the country is not in a position to finance any meaningful part of the \$120 million plus DDR process. It is anticipated that the IBRD will invest between \$120 million and \$170 million in this operation in the DRC under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration (MDRP) program and will require a GDRC contribution of 1%. Donor investment will be required to develop the national DDR plan, support the TG institutions designated to coordinate implementation of the plan, and finance virtually all activities.

The TG response to this situation is hampered by serious human capacity constraints in line and staff Ministries and other government structures in certain sectors. Congolese technicians have little or no experience with disarmament and demobilization; however, there is considerable experience and skill that can be utilized in the area of reintegration. Donors will need to supplement TG planning and coordinating staff with skilled technicians.

The TG, as a newly-formed government, needs to design a national DDR program that meets all needs of the transition. In recognition of this, the TG has decided to establish a DDR coordinating structure within its executive branch. The Ministries of Defense and Social Services, with the assistance of the Ministries of Human Rights, Humanitarian Affairs, and Foreign Affairs will coordinate the development of the program. (A technical level "*Comite Technique de Planification et Coordination*" has been established to take the lead in developing the national DDR program, in conjunction with the donors). It has not yet been determined if the first two Ministries will report to a vice-president or to the *Conseil National de la Defense*, but it is clear that these ministries need to receive backing and policy direction from the Presidency.

### **7.3. PRIOR USAID DDR EXPERIENCE IN THE DRC**

In CY 2003, USAID/DRC became actively engaged in several DDR activities. (They are all in support of three IRs in this SpO.) FY 03 Economic Support Fund (ESF) funding was provided to DAI under a contract to support the development of the national plan for, and finance, community based reintegration programs for ex-combatants spontaneously demobilized. Subsequently, ESF funding was provided to IFESH to develop community conflict management capacity for reintegration activities that will revitalize communities and help to reduce tension as former combatants return. OTI funding was made available for the services of a radio producer to develop DDR messages for ex-FAR/Interhamwe combatants. Later the Mission provided ESF funding to develop messages for Congolese armed groups. USAID staff actively participated in the effort to develop a national plan for reintegration in the DRC.

Activities were redesigned in CY 2003 to reinforce one another and to reintegrate groups that are spontaneously demobilizing while the national program is being developed. To date, USAID has engaged in the following activities and has developed the SpO to incorporate lessons learned.

Sixty Mayi Mayi plus their dependents voluntarily disarmed to the Catholic Diocese in Kindu, Maniema Province. They were provided with basic reintegration kits (clothing, kitchen utensils, bedding, and school supplies) by DAI. Several lessons were learned from this process. MONUC was slow to arrange the transport of the reintegration kits, which delayed the reintegration process. In addition, MONUC did not at that time play an effective guarantor role *vis-a-vis* RCD efforts to recruit the self-demobilized Mayi Mayi into the RCD army. As a result, the RCD military succeeded in integrating approximately 25% of the group into its armed forces. The RCD also seized the weapons from the Bishopric, where they had been stored for safekeeping. The Bishop of Kindu witnessed and verified this seizure.

In April 2003, 160 Mudundu-40 combatants (M-40 – a locally organized Mayi Mayi group) active around Walungu, South Kivu Province, self-demobilized to MONUC after a military defeat at the hands of the RCD. MONUC in Bukavu provided these former combatants with a document indicating their non-military status and took possession of the 12 weapons surrendered. The RCD agreed to honor this demilitarization document but in reality continued reprisals against former M-40 combatants. Ultimately, security conditions and the RCD belligerent attitude heightened the risks of providing assistance to the ex-M-40 and any implementing partners to the point that donors, including USAID, declined to intervene in this issue.

Local Mayi Mayi commanders in Butembo, North Kivu Province, presented 500 child soldiers ready for demobilization to religious authorities in July 2003. USAID and Save the Children-UK organized an assessment mission to develop recommendations for their reintegration into society. In mid-July 2003, the RCD army advanced very close to Butembo. This resulted in a Mayi Mayi decision not to demobilize these child soldiers and the cancellation of the assessment mission.

With USAID funding, DAI also engaged the services of a child-demobilization and reintegration expert to work with UNICEF to develop the child reintegration strategy. This consultant produced excellent work contributing to the finalization of this strategy.

With USAID funding, IFESH is identifying IDPs affected by fighting in Katanga Province and engaging them in the DDR process. IFESH conducted an evaluation of reintegration needs in six territories and is now implementing a participatory community planning and prioritization activity in Kalemie to facilitate IDP reintegration. This consists of conflict resolution training for both villagers and IDPs. The community decided that infrastructure rehabilitation would be an appropriate means to bring people together and provide short-term employment for the IDPs. The next group to be engaged in the process will be ex-Mayi Mayi combatants, once they are fully demobilized. IFESH's methodology for preparing the community to reintegrate ex-combatants builds on the methodology of the IFESH Rehabilitation and Local Capacity Building project in Kinshasa, Lumbumbashi, and Kalemie that ended in 2003.

In Kalemie, Katanga Province, IFESH learned and documented that community rehabilitation projects provide a solid entry point into community revitalization, build credibility with all concerned, and create local capacity for project management and conflict mediation. Three schools, two road/bridge complexes, and one storm drain were rehabilitated. The IFESH assessment also revealed that initially the local government was very hostile to working with the Mayi Mayi. After IFESH engaged with the communities and the IDPs by strengthening local capacity for conflict resolution, and began to support initiatives by the Peace and Justice Commission of the Catholic Diocese, the communities became more comfortable with the prospect of engaging the Mayi Mayi. The Governor of the province recently created a mixed commission for Mayi Mayi reintegration; this will be a key mechanism for program implementation.

Results achieved to date include valuable information on security conditions required to implement effective reintegration activities, political and military agreements needed to be in place to implement reintegration activities, and appropriate community engagement techniques. USAID intends to finance additional social analysis of communities' conflict management capabilities and community attitudes towards reintegration of ex-combatants.

#### **7.4. PROGRAM RATIONALE**

Failure to address the DDR issue will lead to a continued state of extreme instability in the DRC, an ongoing humanitarian crisis, and the breakdown of the transition. Millions of lives will potentially be destroyed by war-related violence, economic recovery will remain a dream, and it is likely that instability will spill over into neighboring states in the region. If a comprehensive, effective DDR program is not implemented in the DRC prior to the elections, the transition will be undermined by lawlessness, the state will be unable to extend territorial administration and

govern the country, the election apparatus will be unable to conduct a free and fair election, and personal and economic freedom will continue to elude Congolese citizens.

If a comprehensive, accepted, dynamic, and operational national plan for DDR is in place, if the social, economic, and political conditions exist in communities to enable the sustainable return of ex-combatants, and if ex-combatants are prepared to return to civilian life, then an important transition problem facing the DRC will be solved, thereby providing a fundamental condition for sustainable development in the country.

This SpO is an integral and essential DDR component of a comprehensive SSR and pacification program. A variety of actors will be involved in the overall SSR/DDR/pacification program. Bilateral military assistance will be provided for SSR, including by the US Department of Defense (DOD). MONUC and the TG defense apparatus will be responsible for disarmament, demobilization, and pacification. The World Bank and bilateral donors will be responsible for funding reintegration efforts. USAID will provide complementary funding for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

USAID's assistance under the SpO will be carefully structured so as to constitute assistance for an economic, rather than a military, purpose. While specific activities will receive case-by-case legal review based on the existing facts at that time, the following basic principles are relevant:

- Reintegration assistance, for ex-combatants who are fully demobilized (discharged from the fighting forces) constitutes economic assistance, even if targeted at or provided exclusively to, ex-combatants.
- The point at which ex-combatants are fully demobilized, such that economic assistance can be provided absent a determination that assistance for the process of demobilizing can be provided, needs to be reviewed in each case. USAID's standards have often varied from those used by other donors, and issuance of a demobilization card at an early point during an ex-combatant's stay in a demobilization camp has been insufficient in the past to conclude that he is fully demobilized.
- Assistance for the process of demobilizing is economic, and can be supported, in carefully defined circumstances. This requires a high degree of confidence that the ex-combatants will in fact be demobilized. This usually involves an agreement signed by the warring parties, which provides for demobilization, with a timetable and benchmarks sufficient to determine adherence, and international monitoring; and the agreement is actually being implemented.
- Child soldiers are considered to be soldiers, and are not exempt from the economic vs. military distinctions by virtue of their status as children.
- Camp followers, families, slaves, etc. in many cases can be considered to be civilian, rather than military, for purposes of economic-military restrictions, although they are within the scope of this SpO.

- Assistance for irregular combatants is subject to the same considerations as for members of the DRC military. In many cases a careful legal review of the facts will be required to determine when they are in fact fully demobilized from the fighting forces.
- Economic assistance funds can be used to plan for activities that can be substantively funded. Thus, they may be used to plan for the process of demobilizing when it can be concluded that the substantive process can be funded.

#### 7.4.1 Critical Assumptions



Demobilized Child Soldiers in Kibomango  
Photo: UNDP

The DDR program depends for its success on a number of intrinsic and extrinsic factors. DDR can be a contributing factor to a successful transition, but it cannot replace the political will needed to ensure a successful transition. As such, a successful DDR program in the DRC depends on the overarching ISP critical assumptions outlined in section 2.2 as well as on the following critical assumptions specific to DDR:

- The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) Partners and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) will remain engaged in the process with significant levels of resources;
- Slow but continual progress will be made towards the integration of national military and security forces, with ongoing support from the international community; and
- The level of troop deployment needed to continue the DDR process and establish a minimum level of security will be in place.

#### 7.5. RELATIONSHIP TO GDRC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

The GDRC has not yet developed or formulated applicable DDR policies or programs. During the last quarter of CY 2003, the TG, with the assistance of the donor community, plans to define the parameters of the national DDR program and develop and adopt that program as national policy. Negotiation of the parameters among the donors and the GDRC is expected to be difficult.

## 7.6. RESULTS FRAMEWORK

### 7.6.1. Results Framework and Targets

The SpO is *Ex-Combatant Reintegration into Communities Fostered*. For the purposes of this SpO, "ex-combatants" are defined as: disarmed and demobilized regular and irregular adult male and female and child (girls and boys) soldiers; male and female dependents of those soldiers; and male and female camp followers, prisoners, or slaves under the control of armed groups. (As noted above, some of these groups may not be considered to be ex-combatants for purposes of economic vs. military assistance distinctions.) All of these are present in the DRC, as elements or associated with armed groups and all require appropriate and often different interventions in the DDR processes. An alarming percentage of these are child soldiers, who may make up an average of 10% of the total armed groups<sup>3</sup>. Of this total, an estimated 2-3% are female. All factions make extensive use of child soldiers, even if many deny this. The irregular forces generally have a high number of dependents, prisoners, and slaves. The target group specifically excludes foreign armed groups of any kind irrespective of their presence in the DRC.

In general, former combatants are poorly trained, if trained at all. For the most part, they have a low level of educational attainment. Many joined the armed groups under coercion or due to the lack of any other opportunities. It is significant that these Congolese irregular and regular armed forces rarely fought each other. Instead armed groups terrorized lightly-armed or unarmed villagers. This fact presents some reintegration challenges.

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<sup>3</sup> A national average of 10% of armed group members are children, however these figures vary significantly between armed groups and estimates for many of the irregular forces are up to 50%.

# USAID/DRC Results Framework for SpO (DDR)

## *Ex-Combatant Reintegration into Communities Fostered*

**Overall Indicators:**


Ind 1: Number of ex-combatants and their dependants reintegrated into their communities of origin or choice (disaggregated by gender and type)

**Development Context:**

- Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
- Government of transition selection of interlocutors
- Military and Police Force


**Critical Assumptions:**

- MDRP Partners and the IBRD will remain engaged in the process with significant levels of resources
- Slow but continual progress will be made towards the integration of national military and security forces, with ongoing support from the international community as well as the level of troop deployment needed to continue the DDR process and establish a minimum level of security.



- Illustrative Activity Types**
- Participation in the development of the terms of reference for the development of the national plan
  - Providing Technical Assistance (TA) to the GDRC structures to assist in the development of the plan
  - Active USAID and partner participation in the technical and procedural aspects of the plan's development
  - Providing expert environmental impact and gender TA to inform the process
  - Arranging for high-level world-recognized DDR experts to inform key decisions
  - Ensuring the provision of P5 ambassador and SRSG guidance to the process
- Psycho-social analyses of selected communities and ex-combatants to determine the reconciliation issues and inform decisions on how to overcome these
  - Creation of management groups and conflict management groups within communities to manage the reintegration of ex-combatants and other community strengthening
  - Training in conflict management
  - Implementation of community recovery activities that create the conditions for reconciliation
  - Targeted programs of assistance to women victimized by the conflict
- Provision of a reintegration kit
  - Transportation to reintegration location
  - Provision of education, training, counseling or income generating opportunities in the reintegration location.

The groups of ex-combatants that will be targeted by this SpO are located in all parts of the country. The irregular forces<sup>4</sup> are concentrated in the east of the country, in an arc running from central Katanga, through Maniema, South Kivu, North Kivu and eastern Orientale provinces (see map below). The Ituri belligerent forces are a special category of this group.



Regular Government forces (*la Force Armee Congolaise* or FAC and the *Police d'Intervention Rapide* or PIR) are located in the east and south. MLC forces are in Equateur and Orientale Provinces. RCD regular forces are in Katanga, Maniema, the Kivus, and parts of Orientale. For the purposes of clarity, this SpO and the national DDR program will not target any foreign armed groups e.g., Rwandans, Burundians, UNITA forces, or Ugandans. DDRRR<sup>5</sup> of these forces is the responsibility of MONUC.

Donors operate under legal structures that permit assistance to be provided to ex-combatants if and only if they are disarmed and formally demobilized or in the process thereof. The point at which USAID considers ex-combatants to be fully demobilized, or an acceptable process of

<sup>4</sup> The Ituri belligerent forces are a special category of this group. The conflict in Ituri, while certainly enabled and exacerbated by the foreign armed groups is ethnic and tribal in nature unlike the conflict in other parts of the DRC. Ituri is recognized as a special case both in terms of the peace process and in terms of DDR planning. The special nature of the Ituri conflict dictates that different conflict mitigation tools need to be used in this specific case.

<sup>5</sup> The term DDRRR is used when referring to foreign forces to be Disarmed, Demobilized, Resettled, Repatriated, and Reintegrated

demobilizing to be underway, such that economic assistance may be provided, are fact-specific and may differ from the points used by other donors in some cases.

The Intermediate Results are:

- IR 1. A comprehensive, accepted, dynamic, and operational national plan for reintegration in place;
- IR 2. Social, economic, and political conditions exist in communities to enable the sustainable return of ex-combatants; and
- IR 3. Ex-combatants prepared to return to civilian life.

The beneficiaries of the activities under this SpO located in all parts of the country will be:

- Disarmed and demobilized regular and irregular adult male and female and child (girls and boys) soldiers;
- Male and female dependents of those soldiers;
- Male and female camp followers, prisoners, or slaves under the control of armed groups; and
- Communities reintegrating ex-combatants.

The SO level indicator and target for reintegration of ex-combatants is:

- Indicator: # of ex-combatants and their dependants reintegrated into their communities of origin or choice
- Baseline: 0
- High Target: 165,000
- Low Target: 110,000

This indicator will be achieved in collaboration with other donors and the GDRC.

### **7.6.2. Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities**

IR 1: A Comprehensive Accepted, Dynamic, and Operational National Reintegration Plan in Place.
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With the formation and increasing consolidation of the TG, planning for national DDR can begin. The TG must decide on:

- the size and composition of the national armed forces;
- the number of troops from each former faction that will be incorporated into those forces;
- any eligibility criteria that will be applied;
- the timing of demobilization (i.e., before or after incorporation into the unified army);
- the demobilization package (i.e., the assistance that a demobilized combatant will receive immediately subsequent to demobilization);
- the reintegration package; and
- the implementation modalities.

All of these policy decisions have significant political, military, economic, social, and environmental implications that need to be carefully analyzed.

UNDP, other U.N. agencies, and certain donors (including USAID) have made some progress in certain areas. However, progress has been specialized and technical in nature and the TG has for the most part not been involved in the process in a meaningful way. Work to date has resulted in the production of a final draft of an Interim Strategy for the DDR of Irregular Armed Forces, and a Strategy for the DDR of Child Soldiers. On October 4, 2003 the GDRC formally took on responsibility for the production of the national DDR plan. The GDRC will require significant levels of outside technical assistance to produce the plan. There are at present two sources of funding that will be rapidly mobilized to provide this technical assistance: the UNDP Rapid Response Fund and USAID's facility with DAI (reintegration). Thus, providing the needed technical assistance (TA) to the TG's Ministries of Social Affairs (USAID and UNDP) and Defense (UNDP) will be undertaken by UNDP and perhaps USAID. UNDP will work to build a limited amount of institutional support deemed necessary to these bodies to enable them to accomplish this task.

Illustrative activities:

1. Participating in the development of the terms of reference for the development of the national reintegration plan;
2. Providing TA to the civilian GDRC structures to assist in the development of the plan;
3. USAID and partners actively participating in the technical and procedural aspects of the reintegration plan's development;
4. Providing expert environmental impact and gender TA to inform the reintegration process; and
5. Arranging for high-level, world-recognized DDR experts to inform key decisions.

Any USAID support for the national DDR plan will be provided only for the reintegration aspects except where the criteria for assisting the process of demobilizing are met.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 1.1. Existence of a workable national reintegration plan agreed upon by all relevant parties;
- Ind. 1.2. Existence of a reintegration plan specifically for ex-child soldiers developed and in use; and
- Ind. 1.3. Existence of an operational and functioning interim reintegration plan.

IR 2: The social, economic, and political conditions exist in communities to enable the sustainable return of ex-combatants.

Reintegration of ex-combatants cannot take place if the communities into which these people will be reintegrated are not ready, able, and willing to receive them. A number of obstacles in this regard will need to be overcome. The first is that by virtue of the conduct of the conflict, many target communities were brutalized and otherwise victimized by the same people who will be reintegrated. It is clear that a process of reconciliation will be required in many cases; at the personal and family level in some cases and at the community level in others. The second

challenge is the ability of target communities to receive ex-combatants. Reconstruction and rehabilitation activities will not take place overnight; in most cases it is envisaged that the physical reintegration of ex-combatants will pre-date the reconstruction of the community (as the former combatants will be involved in the latter). Thus, it will be necessary to apply judgment and involve the target communities' leadership when making decisions on and preparing for reintegration. Experience has shown that community/ex-combatant reconciliation is both needed and possible, provided that time and appropriate human resources are invested. Outside observers have noted that many Congolese people are in general willing to forgive and move forward with their lives, even subsequent to extreme provocation.

Illustrative activities:

1. Psycho-social analyses of selected communities and ex-combatants to determine reconciliation issues and inform decisions on how to overcome these;
2. Creation of project management groups and conflict management groups within communities to manage the reintegration of ex-combatants and other community strengthening activities;
3. Training in conflict management;
4. Implementation of community recovery activities that create the conditions for reconciliation; and
5. Targeted programs of assistance to women victimized by the conflict.

In target communities, male and female leaders will be enlisted in the development and selection of activities. Conflict management groups will deliberately involve both men and women in decision-making. Particular attention will be paid to the differing psycho-social needs of very young women, and those who have no memory of life other than as a soldier.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 2.1. % of target communities of return with operational conflict management groups;
- Ind. 2.2. # of community recovery projects implemented; and
- Ind. 2.3. # of communities supported in and by reintegration activities.

IR 3: Congolese ex-combatants prepared to return to civilian life.
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The legal framework for the DDR of Congolese Armed Groups can be found in three separate but linked documents. First, the All-inclusive and Global Agreement of Sun City and the Lusaka agreement provide the legal basis for the DDR of the forces signatory to the agreement, i.e., the Government, the RCD/G, RCD/KML, MLC, and certain Mayi Mayi forces. Second, the Dar Es Salaam Agreement provides the basis for the DDR of the forces party to the conflict in Ituri (Orientale Province). Third, the Congolese criminal code criminalizes the carrying of arms by unauthorized civilians (this covers most of the irregular forces).

On July 28, 2003, the UNSC approved a Chapter VII mandate for MONUC under UNSCR 1493. This enables MONUC to take a much more proactive stance in the DRC. UNSCR 1493 also mandates MONUC to take responsibility for disarming and demobilizing irregular troops in the DRC. With the installation of the TG, MONUC has decided to deploy 90-95% of its assets to the

east of the country, specifically to the triangle bounded by Uvira, Kindu, and Bunia. This planned re-deployment corresponds to the area where the majority of the irregular armed forces are located and where virtually all of the 9,000-12,000 Force de La liberation Rwandese (FDLR)<sup>6</sup> troops are located. MONUC has also agreed to shoulder the logistics burden involved with the DDR of irregular armed groups.

The former SRSNG burns arms symbolically in Kinshasa with assistance from a MONUC Soldier



Kinshasa : le SRSNG Ngongi assisté par un casque bleu allume le feu symbolique au nom de l'ONU

Photo Serge A Kasanga/Monuc

The DDR of irregular forces will be at first voluntary, and then, when effective territorial administration is extended, accomplished by coercion if needed. It will be either top down – when whole units present themselves for DDR – or bottom up - when isolated defectors present themselves as individuals or in small groups. The DDR of regular forces will be planned and executed from the top down, in order to maintain military command and control over those troops up to the moment of demobilization.

The procedures for the DDR of regular Congolese armed forces have yet to be determined. However, it is likely that the DDR package for formal armed

groups will be some variation on the following:

- Determination on a troop-level or unit-level basis that a particular soldier or unit will or will not join the unified army. If not, he or it are selected for DDR;
- Disarmament by the force commander (followed by appropriate disposition of the weapon);
- Formal demobilization and the issuance of a demobilization certificate or card;
- Explanation of DDR rights and responsibilities and what it entails;
- Provision of a reintegration kit;
- Transportation to reintegration location; and
- Provision of education, training, counseling, or income-generating opportunities in the reintegration location with links to community development and conflict management activities.

If the criteria for assisting the process of demobilizing have not been met, USAID will provide assistance once the ex-combatants have been fully demobilized (generally as they depart from the demobilization camps.) If these criteria have been met, USAID assistance may commence at an earlier point, subsequent to disarmament.

<sup>6</sup> The FDLR are Rwandan Hutus responsible for staging attacks in eastern DRC.

The DDR of irregular armed groups is better defined, although some modifications may be made subsequent to TG review. As planned, the DDR of irregular groups will entail some combination of the following:

- Verification (MONUC);
- Disarmament (MONUC);
- Provision of a Certification of Surrender of Weaponry by the TG;
- A briefing on DDR;
- Provision of an initial humanitarian kit if required; and
- Referral to new or existing community-based public works opportunities in the area of reintegration that will employ both ex-combatants and community members.

If the criteria for assistance for the process of demobilizing are not met, USAID will provide assistance after the ex-combatants are fully demobilized (generally as they depart from the demobilization camps.) If these criteria have been met, USAID assistance may commence at an earlier point, subsequent to disarmament.

The DDR plan for these irregular groups will not include:

- Quartering;
- Official demobilization certificates;
- Any automatic entitlements including those detailed above;
- Any training programs not offered to the community at large; and
- Any automatic eligibility to join the unified army.

The decision about the locations and types of reintegration activities depends on a number of imperatives, in particular the desires and needs of the ex-combatants to be reintegrated. In this context, however, it is important to note that much of the conflict has taken place in or adjacent to locations in the Albertine Rift which contain some of the world's most important areas for biodiversity conservation. Siting will be an important factor to be considered when funding reintegration activities, as will the record of the NGO implementing partner in environmental protection.

MONUC will take responsibility for much of the DD (disarmament and demobilization) of irregular groups and the logistics of DDR for all groups. UNICEF will take the lead on designing and coordinating children's activities. UNDP will manage the Rapid Response Mechanism to quickly fund projects. The World Bank and the Trust Fund partners will fund a variety of interventions, including special projects and the national DDR program. International and national NGOs will be the primary implementing partners. USAID will fund reintegration activities.

Illustrative Activities:

For the ex-regular combatants (subject to a determination on the demobilization criteria):

1. Explanation of what DDR entails, rights and responsibilities, civic education and VCT/HIV/AIDS briefing;
2. Provision of a gender-differentiated reintegration kit;
3. Transportation to reintegration location; and

4. Provision of education, training, counseling or income generating opportunities in the reintegration location with linkages to community development and conflict mitigation activities.

Reintegration support will be provided by a variety of donors; support provided will be consistent with the national DDR program. USAID does not at this time plan to provide cash payments to ex-combatants, and will likely not invest significant resources in transportation. USAID intends to concentrate its assistance in this program area on the provision of training and alternative activities in reintegration areas.

For the ex-irregular combatants (subject to a determination on the demobilization criteria):

1. A public awareness campaign to create the conditions for self-demobilization and reintegration;
2. DDR and civic education briefing including VCT/HIV/AIDS briefing;
3. Provision of an initial gender-differentiated humanitarian kit if required; and
4. Gender-differentiated community-based public works or agricultural production opportunities in the area of reintegration that will benefit both ex-combatants and community members through community development activities.

Illustrative indicators:

- Ind. 3.1. % of ex-combatants reintegrated with sustainable livelihoods;
- Ind. 3.2. # of job trainings conducted;
- Ind. 3.3. # of kits distributed; and
- Ind. 3.4. # of job opportunities created.

### **7.6.3. Implementing Mechanisms**

OTI's program in the DRC for peace and reconciliation directly targets ex-combatants through media campaigns using and expanding radio networks and internet connectivity. Target groups are the ex-FAR and Interhamwe from Rwanda, the FDD from Burundi and the Congolese irregular armed groups. Production and dissemination of DDR sensitization messages are funded by both OTI and the Mission.

USAID is currently funding a cooperative agreement for rehabilitation and local capacity building and a contract for reintegration support. The Mission will consider awarding a grant to an NGO consortium or establishing an umbrella grant mechanism with one lead NGO to channel funds to implementing NGOs via a flexible mechanism for reintegration activities.

Through its PRRO for CYs 2004-2005, the WFP plans to assist 129,400 families to resettle by providing food aid for a limited period (three months) until they can become self-sufficient. WFP's contribution will be part of a broader resettlement assistance effort whereby non-food items and other services will be provided by other partners. An estimated 126,000 individuals will also be assisted through Food for Training activities: women who have suffered sexual violence, AIDS widows and orphans, and troubled adolescents will receive food in designated reception and training centers in an integrated program with other partners. During each of the next two years WFP will also provide a complete ration to approximately 15,000 child soldiers

participating in the new government's demobilization and reinsertion program (subject to a legal determination for use of USAID food resources.) This assistance will be conducted in partnership with UNICEF, UNDP, MONUC, the World Bank, and the International Labor Organization. This program could be scaled up substantially in the event the number of demobilized child soldiers increases. FFP commits its P.L. 480 Title II resources for the DRC exclusively through the WFP.

The Interim Strategy for Reintegration of Irregular Forces does not provide for quartering, and thus food assistance will not be provided to ex-combatants in such a setting. Likewise, the reintegration kit for these groups does not contain food assistance. In the context of the formal demobilization program, food assistance may be provided in a quartering setting (it is highly recommended that this be the original barracks and not a new facility) and possibly as part of the reintegration package when the ex-soldiers leave the cantonment facility for the communities they intend to reintegrate into. In this instance, the Mission would look to WFP to provide this assistance. The Mission recognizes that if any USG food assistance were to be provided to such an operation, a legal determination would be needed.

The Reintegration SO deals with a variety of military/political and social issues focused on formerly armed groups. Overall, it is not an area that is conducive to GDA-type collaboration, as few business interests would find such activities congruent with their strategic, business development, or marketing plans.

#### **7.6.4. Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan**

The preliminary PMP for this SpO is found in Annex II. It will be finalized by the SpO team in collaboration with other donors and implementing partners during the first quarter of CY 2004, and field tested during the second quarter. The final PMP will be produced in the third quarter of CY 2004.

#### **7.6.5. Scenarios and Program Adjustments**

The proposed DDR program is feasible and will produce results under all three scenarios described in section 2.2. Depending on the scenario, the geographic location and the nature of the target groups will change.

**Successful Transition.** In the successful transition scenario, political will brings the country increasingly together, the GDRC recognizes that DDR is a major transition issue, and the GDRC organizes itself to enable the process to move forward effectively. In this instance, planning would be accelerated, and implementation put on a fast track. USAID would provide relatively fewer resources for planning and pilot activities, and devote more resources to community preparation work, accelerated reintegration of irregular forces, and activities targeted at formally demobilized ex-combatants.

**Protracted Transition.** Under this scenario, steps forward on the political/military integration front are followed by steps backwards, but the overall trend is gradually positive. Different areas of the country are stabilized at different rates, with some areas of the country outside government control for significant periods of time. USAID's investment in reintegration planning would continue, but investment in community preparation and reintegration of

irregular forces would decline. Investment in the reintegration of regular forces would be reduced.

Stalled Transition. In the stalled transition scenario, the peace process falters and extension of territorial administration is patchy at best. Instability reigns in many parts of the country. One or more organized rebellions are active. Demobilization and reintegration of regular armed groups would either not take place or be extremely limited in scale. Investment of resources in planning reintegration programs would be reduced, as the enabling environment would not be conducive. Eligible child soldier reintegration would receive relatively increased investment. A limited investment in target of opportunity reintegration of informal armed groups would be maintained with a view to creating humanitarian and development space in areas where possible.

**7.6.6. Budget Tables by Funding Parameters**

-----Reserved-----

**7.6.7. Priorities under Different Funding Parameters**

Under the high funding parameter, USAID will be in a position to invest resources in all three IR areas sufficient to produce the intended results. The Mission will continue to actively engage in the development and installation of the reintegration aspects of the national DDR program and community based reintegration projects that will take place in approximately 70 communities of return for irregular armed groups and surplus regular forces. This component of the wider multi-donor DDR process is essential for increased stability in fragile areas of DRC as the National Program that will be funded by the MDRP may exclude irregular groups who are often the most destabilizing forces.

- Priorities under a high funding parameter:
- Reintegration planning and strategy development (IR 1)
- Community revitalization and reintegration of irregular armed groups (IRs 2 & 3)
- Reintegration of surplus regular forces (IR 3)

- Priorities under a low funding parameter:
- Reintegration planning and strategy development (IR 1)
- Reintegration of irregular armed groups with limited community revitalization (IR 2 & 3)

Under a low funding scenario, the Mission would have an engagement in the sector sufficient for little more than the development of an appropriate GDRC national reintegration program and a limited number of activities with irregular armed groups. USAID would not be able to engage in the reintegration of regular troops.

**7.7. LINKS TO CROSS-CUTTING THEMES**

A number of the Mission-identified cross-cutting themes are relevant to the achievement of this SpO.

Gender: Gender, a mainstreamed cross-cutting theme for the Mission, is a critical element in the design and implementation of the DDR program. Prior to World War II (WW II), the ratio of military to civilian casualties worldwide was 9:1. In the period following WW II, the ratio has reversed to 1:9. A disproportionate number are women and children. The civilian population suffered the majority of the casualties in the DRC, with women particularly victimized. To achieve reintegration of former combatants, the needs of the female victims of the conflict need to be addressed. Although formally lodged in SO 3, the VOT and TIP-funded programs for rape victims in the east of the country are required to address this need. In addition, there are a number of female dependents, camp followers, and prisoners who remain associated with the Congolese armed groups. The Interim Strategy for Demobilization of Irregular Forces in the DRC envisages appropriate assistance for these groups to assist in their reintegration into society. Agricultural kits distributed will contain farm implements and seeds appropriate for use by women. In addition, women play a key role in conflict management and community revitalization activities as active and productive members of the community.

HIV/AIDS: The DDR process presents some unique challenges and opportunities in the fight against HIV/AIDS infection. Regular and irregular armed forces, by virtue of their lifestyle and mobility are a high-risk group, and risk, during the reintegration process, spreading the infection to heretofore less-infected communities. In the context of the Interim Strategy for Irregular Forces, UNFPA has agreed to supply both male and female condoms for distribution where appropriate. Additional measures to sensitize the male and female elements of the various forces and their dependents will be required and will be pursued. The mechanics of demobilization of regular and irregular armed groups are different, and each presents different opportunities. Quartering often will be a feature of the DDR of regular groups, but irregulars will not be quartered. Quartering centers represent an ideal opportunity for HIV/AIDS prevention messaging. Implementing partners – which already are focused on high-risk groups in the DRC – will be deployed to these quartering areas for this purpose. HIV/AIDS prevention messages may be funded even where the criteria for supporting the process of demobilizing are not met.

Conflict Management: DDR in the DRC is by nature a critical conflict reduction program; the primary rationale for such programs worldwide is to significantly reduce the potential for conflict. The Mission's CVA identifies a successful DDR program as a critical component of the effort to decrease the risk that the peace process will fail. Thus, the DDR program is a key conflict reduction or mitigation mechanism at both the local and national levels and is essential to the creation of a secure environment to allow for community participation in governance.

Nutrition: Conflict, instability, and a militarized society create unplanned population movements, breaking the vital survival links of people and communities with their main means of production, the soil. The expected decrease in the number and duration of population displacements as a result of a DDR program will tend to improve nutritional status as populations as they regain the use of their primary production factor.

Governance: Demilitarization of the countryside and the gradual extension of territorial administration to occupy the space thereby created are sine qua non conditions for improved governance.

GDA and Leveraging Other Resources: USAID's resources programmed for this SpO represent only a small fraction of the total resources theoretically available. For this reason, USAID determined that its comparative advantage in the area is to design and implement pilot activities for future replication, and to lead in early action as groups are demobilized. On the policy side, USAID is a major player in design of the national reintegration program, a highly leveraged investment.

## **7.8. SYNERGIES WITH OTHER STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES**

Geographical synergies as well as thematic synergies will create direct causal links with all SOs to a successful DDR program. This SpO has significant links to each of the SOs in this strategy as sustainable return of ex-combatants to their communities rests on their ability to access education and health care, and to create incomes. Community participation in reintegration efforts and community conflict management is a shared IR with SO 3.

SO 2 (Health): Access to health care will be increased through SO 2 and will by definition revitalize areas of return where geographic areas coincide. In some cases, community revitalization activities will also include rehabilitation of health posts in areas that have no health activities.

SO 3 (DG): Successful transition from violent conflict to sound governance relies on the creation of a unified army and the DDR of combatants. Indeed, if social, economic, and political conditions exist at the community level to enable the reintegration of ex-combatants (SpO, IR 2) then Congolese citizens will enjoy improved security and stability (SO 3, IR 1). Both SOs place a strong emphasis on community participation in conflict management, community development, and the transitional process. Moreover, projects that focus on these activities will be supervised by a joint SO 3 and SpO team, and in some cases will be carried out by the same partners.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): A key community conflict mitigation and protection issue will involve the reintegration of former belligerents into communities that were brutalized and pillaged. Of particular concern will be the reintegration into communities of men who raped large numbers of women and girls. The conflict mediation aspect of this program will link up with community protection committees that are being formed by partner NGOs who are conducting protection and care activities for women and girl victims of rape and violence under SO 3 and SO 4.

The reintegration of child soldiers poses particular difficulties. Depression often sinks in for child soldiers if they cannot find alternatives to the only lives they know. It is essential therefore, that the SpO collaborate closely with other SO 3 and SO 4 programs that address preventing and mitigating separation and abandonment of children through community awareness raising, and projects to protect the rights of the child. These projects also have a number of tools that will contribute to tracing and reunification activities for the safe return of child soldiers to their families as well as finding alternatives to reunification in cases where the family members are deceased or cannot be traced.

SO 4 will, to the extent possible without stigmatizing ex-combatants by creating an unfair advantage within community reconstruction and revitalization activities, incorporate ex-combatants into their agricultural and microfinance activities. SO 4 team will also advocate for

the inclusion of ex-combatants into reconstruction projects along major routes (roads and railroads) where OFDA, the World Bank, the E.U., and others will be opening up access. OFDA is already employing ex-combatants for road reconstruction along crucial axes in Ituri and Maniema. FFP food-for-work for road rehabilitation employing ex-combatants will also be used through MONUC Quick Impact Projects.

SO 5 (Education): Community level education programs that engage some of the estimated 15,000-24,000 child soldiers expected to be demobilized and reintegrated during the early years of the program are good tools for involving the community both in education and reintegration activities. USAID/DRC expects to collaborate with UNICEF to respond to the learning needs of this group.

## **7.9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The U.S. DOD intends to begin a military to military cooperation program in the DRC beginning in FY 2004. This program will provide non-lethal equipment (e.g., uniforms and tents), increased funding for HIV prevention activities, civilian medical assistance, and military training. The DOD envisages training programs in defense resources management, civilian/military relations, the role of the military in a democratic society, and disaster management. The DOD plans to implement this assistance program for five years in the DRC.

## **7.10. OTHER DONORS AND COORDINATING MECHANISMS**

DDR in the DRC is a multi-donor effort. The regional World Bank program, MDRP, is the central mechanism through which DDR in central and southern Africa (including the DRC) will be implemented. The World Bank has attracted pledges to the Trust Fund totaling \$200 million, which, added to the \$150 million IDA credit approved, brings total resources available to \$350 million of the total authorized ceiling of \$450 million. Although country allocations are not part of the MDRP, it is envisaged that the DRC will be one of, if not, the main recipient of MDRP funding. MDRP partners are the U.K., France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Italy, the E.U., and Canada. The USG determined several years ago that the U.S. would not become a donor to the MDRP trust fund but rather would support the processes (including the DRC process) outside of the trust fund but in strict coordination with the MDRP.

The UNDP has been designated by the GDRC to be the coordinating agency for the national DDR program. This entails coordinating the development of the national DDR program, assisting the GDRC to develop that national program, managing a Rapid Response Mechanism, and providing a forum for donor coordination. The International Transition Support Committee (the UNSC, Belgian and South African Ambassadors accredited to the DRC and the SRSG) have primary responsibility for political level interface with the GDRC on the issue.

The DAC Guidelines for Harmonizing Donor Practices indicate that donors should align their procedures with developing country systems and work to harmonize procedures among themselves while supporting efforts by partner countries to develop their own viable systems. This DDR program offers donors and the GDRC an excellent opportunity for such harmonization and alignment. Procedure alignment and harmonization has largely been achieved through trust fund mechanisms (grouping most major donors) and by USAID's commitment to participate with and work in conformity with jointly-developed policies and procedures. USAID

and other development partners in this area will continue to align and harmonize procedures to the extent possible. Donors also have the opportunity to work with the soon to be established GDRC DDR coordinating structures to ensure that viable policies and procedures are jointly developed.

## **ANNEX I. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT**

### **Introduction**

DRC is entering a multi-layered transition period: from war to peace; to national democratic elections; and, to building the foundations of a democratic state. This marks a period of renewed hope for DRC and presents the need for USAID's new dynamic and robust ISP to apply a results-based focus to ensure comprehensive performance measurement throughout the life of the ISP.

The previous strategy "Staying Engaged" had one overarching Strategic Objective (SO): *The Congolese people are assisted to solve national, provincial, and community problems through participatory processes that involve the public, private, and civil sector.* This SO had three Intermediate Results (IRs) in health, Democracy and Governance (DG) and food security. The new ISP expands, strengthens, and moves beyond the previous strategy by clearly defining 4 SOs and one Special Objective (SpO) with measurable results that reinforce the overall program. Furthermore, focusing on synergies between the SOs and interweaving integral cross-cutting themes has greatly fortified the attainability of these results. All SOs contribute to the Missions overall goal: to assist the DRC in its transition to a sound democracy with a healthier, better educated population, benefiting from improved livelihoods.

Perhaps the most significant lesson learned from prior USAID engagement in the DRC is that, despite enormous impediments, successful programs that achieve important, measurable results can be designed and implemented. The likelihood of achieving results increases dramatically when programs use locally-grounded Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and are based on a thorough understanding of effective coping mechanisms which continue to function even as many other societal structures weaken, collapse, and fail.

Each SO team has developed their Results Frameworks (RFs) in close collaboration with stakeholders and other donors. Whenever possible and relevant, USAID Annual Report indicators and Online Presidential Initiative Network (OPIN) indicators have been included in the RFs. The preliminary Performance Monitoring Plans (PMPs) submitted in this annex have listed illustrative SO and IR level indicators and SO level baselines and targets to the extent possible. The preliminary PMPs will go through three stages of development over CY 2004. In the first quarter of CY 2004, they will be reviewed and finalized in collaboration with stakeholders and implementing partners. In the second and third quarters, the PMPs will be field tested, missing baselines will be collected, and targets established. By the end of CY 2004, all PMPs will be finalized and initial results from the trial period will be reported on in the FY 2005 Annual Report.

USAID/DRC is making a strong commitment to institutionalize performance management and will continue to find creative ways to streamline data collection and train SO teams and implementing partners throughout the life of the ISP.

### **The Data Challenge in DRC**

Up until June 2003, the DRC was divided, most transport across the country was limited to UN flights, and commercial river traffic between east and west was blocked. Poor infrastructure,

lack of access due to precarious security, and severe incapacities of government ministries has made data collection a difficult and expensive endeavor. Statistics in this environment are not always available and as a result, many indicators will only be measurable annually or every three years.<sup>1</sup> Taking this into account, process indicators will need to be developed and measured regularly by implementing partners and the PMPs will need to ensure strong causal links between output and IR level indicators. Some of the indicators required in the Annual Reports will not be available, but when possible, proxy indicators will be used.

## Personnel and Training

In July 2003, the Mission hired a full-time USPSC Monitoring, Evaluation, and Program Design Specialist who works in the Program Office and provides technical support services to all SO teams. Trainings on indicator definition, data collection, data quality assessments, and data requirements for Annual Reports will be conducted with SO Teams and implementing partners. In October 2003, the Mission held a one-week Activity Managers Workshop for all SO teams that focused on Managing for Results. PMP training will be conducted at the beginning of CY 2004 in preparation for finalizing each PMP with SO teams and their implementing partners. Ongoing Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) will be strengthened with support from REDSO and the Africa Bureau in collaboration with the Monitoring, Evaluation, and Program Design Specialist.

## Measuring SO Results

SO 2 (Health): The Health SO team use the UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) II as the primary source for national health data in DRC. MICS II was produced in 2001 and the next survey is expected at the end of 2004. All USAID implementing partners who operate at the health zone level also conduct Knowledge, Attitude, and Behavior (KAP) surveys once a year or once every two years. These surveys measure results at the health zone level. It is from these surveys that most indicators will be measured for USAID assisted zones and with the MICS that most national-level indicators will be measured.

SO 3 (DG): During the first quarter of calendar year 2004, the DG SO team will work closely with its implementing partners and other donors to further develop its preliminary PMP. This will include the development of a comprehensive public opinion survey and strategy for focus group research with OTI and other SO teams, particularly livelihoods. It will further work with REDSO to apply the Organizational Capacity Development Tool that has been adapted to post-conflict environments in order to apply this to the Transitional Institutions strengthened through USAID activities. Finally, it will incorporate the findings and analysis of Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and other international organizations systematically evaluating progress towards democracy and governance in the Great Lakes region.

SO 4 (Livelihoods): SO 4 focuses on improving livelihoods in targeted areas. Indicators will be measured through community-based surveys in targeted areas and project records of implementing partners for IRs one, two, and three. IR 4, *Critical Needs of Vulnerable Groups Met*, will focus largely on FFP, OFDA, DCOF programming for separated and abandoned children, and programs for victims of Gender-Based Violence (GBV), and will therefore work

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<sup>1</sup> The UNICEF MICS is one of the leading sources for national health and social data but is only conducted every three years.

closely with implementing partners for especially vulnerable groups. A PMP meeting will be held in the first quarter of CY 2004 with all implementing partners to finalize the preliminary PMP and to develop a timeline for baseline collection and establishing targets.

SO 5 (Education): SO 5 will be financed mainly with Presidential Initiative funds. All OPIN indicators have therefore been written into the Results Framework and the preliminary PMP. This SO is also geographically focused in order to achieve maximum results cost-effectively. OPIN indicators will remain in the document and the other illustrative indicators will be reviewed and finalized with implementing partners in CY 2004.

SO 6 (DDR): The DDR process in DRC is a multi-donor effort. Results achieved will be linked directly to the success of the program as a whole. Close, regular collaboration with other donors, their implementing partners, USAID's implementing partners, and the GDRC will be necessary to monitor and manage the results of this SpO. Because the timeframe of the SpO is only for three years the preliminary PMP will be finalized and field tested within the first half of CY2003 and the final PMP will be produced by the third quarter of CY 2004.

The following tables present draft indicators, their definitions, the unit of measurement, the data sources and the method of data collection. Illustrative baselines and targets have been included when possible at the SO level. IR level baselines and targets will be established during CY 2004 and the PMPs will be finalized before the end of CY 2004.

### Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan for SO2 (Health)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
				FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
<b>SO 2: Use of Key Health Services and Practices both in USAID-Supported Health Zones and at the National Level Increased</b>										
Ind. 1. % of children under one year of age who have received their third dose of DTP (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)	Proportion of children aged 12-23 months who received three doses of DPT before their first birthday	PEV, SANRU	Statistics from PEV, SANRU, and CRS	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	36%	70%
Ind. 2. % of children age 6-59 months receiving a vitamin A supplement during the last round of semi-annual vitamin A supplementation (in USAID assisted health zones and nationwide)		Pronanut Basics Most	Campaign reports	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2003	84%	90%
Ind. 3. % of children under one year of age who have received Measles vaccinations (in USAID assisted zones)		PEV SANRU CRS	Statistics from PEV, SANRU, and CRS	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	56,4%	70%
Ind. 4. Annual couple years of protection for family planning (in USAID health zones and for social marketing)	Estimate of the protection against pregnancy provided by FP svcs. over 1yr, based on volume of all contra-ceptives sold/ distributed over 1yr	Statistics collected at facilities and pharmacies	Estimate of the protection against pregnancy provided by FP svcs. over 1yr, based on volume of all contraceptives sold/ distributed over 1yr	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2002	0	60,720 CYPs
Ind. 5. % of births attended by skilled health personnel	Proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel	SANRU CRS	National Information system	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2001	78,6%	90%
Ind. 6. % of households with at least one ITN (nationwide and in USAID assisted areas)	Proportion of households with at least one ITN	PNLP* SANRU CRS	Survey samples at the community level	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2003	2%* 14%	50%* 60%
Ind. 7. % of children <5 with diarrhea who received ORT	Proportion of children with diarrhea 15 days before and who received ORT	SANRU CRS	Survey samples	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2003	33,2%	90%

ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
				FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHO M	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
Ind. 8. Case-fatality rate for epidemic prone diseases(# of people who die of an epidemic prone disease / # of cases of the disease in a given year: cholera, meningitis, measles, yellow fever)	Proportion of people who die of an epidemic prone disease.  Unit of measurement: Percentage	WHO/ <i>4eme Direction</i>	Statistics from the MOH/4e Direction through the IDS	Weekly	SO Team	Weekly	SO Team	2003	5% (cholera)  2,5% (measl)	<5%  2%
Ind. 9. Increased utilization rate of USAID-supported health zones. (%)	Proportion of the new cases who utilize the health care service/# patients expected	SANRU  CRS	Statistics from SANRU and CRS projects in the Health zones	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	31%	50%
<b>IR 1.1: Increased availability of key health services and practices</b>										
Ind. 1.1. # of health zones that achieve threshold level coverage of a limited package of key interventions: ➤ Coverage of intermittent preventive treatment for malaria ➤ ITN coverage ➤ DPT3 coverage ➤ Measles coverage ➤ Vitamin A coverage	Proportion of the Health zones with a package of key interventions (PMA)	SANRU  CRS	Statistics from SANRU and CRS projects	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002  Sanru  CRS	20%  NA	60%  40%
Ind. 1.2. # of acceptors new to modern contraception	# of persons who accept for the first time in their lives any program method of contraception	Statistics	# of persons who accept for the first time in their lives any program method of contraception	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.3. TB case detection rate (national)	Proportion of new patients with sputum smear-positive	NTP	Statistics at the NTP	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	53%	70%
<b>IR 2: Improved financial access to key health services</b>										
Ind. 2.1. % of USAID-supported health zones reaching targets for cost containment related to non-governmental staffing		Evaluation	Survey of health facilities	Every 2-3 years	SO Team	Every 2-3 years	SO Team			
Ind. 2.2. % of USAID-supported health facilities experiencing decapitalization of drugs		SANRU and CRS reports	Survey samples	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.3. Reported GDRC health budget		GDRC	Budget	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			

## ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
				FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
<b>IR 3: Enhanced quality of key health services</b>										
Ind. 3.1. TB treatment success rate	Proportion of new smear positive pulmonary TB cases that were successfully treated in the past year Percentage	NTP	Statistics at the NTP	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	70%	85%
Ind. 3.2. Rate of vaccination dropouts (BCG-DPT3)		PEV, SANRU, CRS			SO Team		SO Team			
Ind. 3.3. % of health facilities receiving scheduled supervision visits (USAID-assisted zones)					SO Team		SO Team			
Ind. 3.4. % of health centers reporting stockouts of SP	# of facilities reporting SP stockouts/ total number of health facilities	SANRU, CRS		Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002		
Ind. 3.5. % of health facilities reporting any stockouts of contraceptives over one year	# of facilities reporting contraceptive stockouts/total Percentage	SANRU and PSI supervision visits		Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
<b>IR 4: Increased awareness and practice of healthy behaviors</b>										
Ind. 4.1. % of target group(children under five and pregnant women)who slept under ITN the night before.		SANRU, CRS	Surveys samples	annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	NA		
Ind. 4.2. % of women who desire to space or limit births (USAID-assisted health zones)	Percentage of women currently married or in union who are fecund and who desire not to have additional children or who wish to delay the birth of their next child	PSI KAP	# of women married or in union who are fecund and who express desire to space or limit births/# of women surveyed	2 years	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 4.3. % of mothers who know the importance of increasing fluids and continuous feeding for childhood diarrhea		SANRU, CRS			SO Team		SO Team			
<b>IR 5: Increased use of key HIV/AIDS prevention, care and support services, and practices</b>										
Ind. 5.1. # of individuals seeking HIV testing and counseling at VCT centers	# of customers tested and counseled at VCT centers	FHI and CAID reports	Register	Monthly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	2021	6000

ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	INDICATOR DEFINITION	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
				FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHO M	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
Ind. 5.2. # of HIV positive pregnant women counseled, tested, and receiving ARVs at the onset of labor and their newborns receiving ARVs within three days of birth at PMTCT sites	# of HIV (+) pregnant women assisted for prevention of MTCT	SANRU quarterly reports	Register	Monthly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2003	359	1000
Ind. 5.3. # of condoms sold through social marketing programs targeted at high-risk individuals.	# of condoms sold or distributed to CSWs, CSWs clients, persons in uniform, truckers through PSI/ASF social marketing programs	PSI monthly report	Register	Monthly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	1,262,230	
Ind. 5.4. # of PMTCT and VCT delivery points offering family planning counseling and services	# of PMTCT and VCT services that have incorporated HIV and FP activities	FHI and SANRU reports	Register	Monthly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2002	0	

### Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan for SO 3 (Democracy and Governance)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VAL UE	VALUE
<b>SO 3. A Successful Transition from Conflict to Peaceful and Democratic Governance Promoted</b>									
Ind. 1. Key benchmarks in the transition calendar for elections, political process development and a constitutional referendum achieved.	Transitional Government  Assessment by USAID, Embassy, IPs, UNDP, MONUC and other Donors	Comparison of progress toward implementation of transition calendar with actual events including, but not limited to: (1) Debate and/or Promulgation of Selected Laws: Constitutional Referendum; Voter Registration General Elections	Monthly	SO Team	Monthly, Quarterly, Annually	SO Team, Mission	Aug 2003	TBD	2005/8  TBD
Ind. 2. Public perceptions of citizen participation, representation, and government accountability improved. (% change)	Public Opinion Research Org./Consultants	Public Opinion Polling Data and Focus Group Research	Bi-annually	SO Team	Bi-annually	SO Team	2003	TBD	2005/8  TBD
Ind. 3. Resource management and public policies reflect public priorities in targeted communities.	IPs; Embassy; MONUC; UNDP USAID	Provincial and Municipal Budgets and Community Councils Analysis of Data	Bi-annually	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team		TBD	2005/8  TBD
<b>IR 1: Improved Local Security and Stability through Conflict Management and Community Development Initiatives</b>									
Ind. 1.1. Decreased incidences of attacks by irregular forces, military or police on local populations in targeted communities.	MONUC, UNDP, IP Conflict Management Committees	Reports, meetings, analysis	Quarterly	SO Team, SpO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO 3, 4, and SpO Teams			
Ind. 1.2. # or % of internally displaced persons able to return home in targeted communities	MONUC, UNDP, IP Conflict Management Committees	Reports, meetings, analysis	Quarterly	SO Team,	Quarterly, Annually	SO 3 and 4 Teams, and OFDA			
Ind. 1.3. % of ex-combatants and their dependents in targeted territories reintegrated with sustainable livelihoods through effective community problem-solving and conflict management.	MONUC, UNDP, IP Conflict Management Committees	Reports, meetings, analysis	Quarterly	SO Team,	Quarterly, Annually	SO 3, 4, and SpO Teams			
<b>IR 2: Timely Implementation of the Legal Framework for a Democratic Transition to Representative Government</b>									
Ind. 2.1. Organic Laws establishing the IEC and TRC are adopted and implemented.	TG/Embassy, MONUC, UNDP, IPs	Reports, meetings, analysis	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.2. Adoption and implementation of legislation on the electoral process, political party functioning, decentralization, citizenship, and the Third Republic's Constitution.	TG/Embassy, MONUC; UNDP, and IPs	Reports, meetings, analysis	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.3. Mechanisms facilitating public	TG, IPs, and other	Reports, meetings, and	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly,	SO Team			

ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VAL UE	VALUE
participation in amending or developing targeted legislation at the national and provincial levels are operational	donors	analysis			Annually				
Ind. 2.4. Priority legislation targeted by civil society advocacy groups is amended or drafted by parliament based on input from civil society partners	TG, IPs, and other donors	Reports, meetings, and analysis	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.5. The legislative process is conducted in accordance with established Rules of Procedure which are sound and assure public participation and transparency in the legislative process.	TG/Embassy, MONUC; UNDP, and IPs	Qualitative Assessment Based on Parliamentary Process for Specific Legislation Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
<b>IR 3: Development and Strengthening of Basic Political Processes and Democratic Institutions</b>									
Ind. 3.1. Improved rating applying the Institutional Capacity tool developed by REDSO to the IEC and TRC.	SO Team and REDSO	Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.2. Targets met by political parties engaged by CEPPS/NDI using baseline study of political party capacity	SO Team, CEPPS partners, MONUC, UNDP	Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.3. Key benchmarks in electoral calendar accomplished.	SO Team, CEPPS partners, MONUC, UNDP	Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.4. Public perception of electoral authority, impartiality, and neutrality.	SO Team and IPs	Public survey, Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.5. Citizens discern differences between competing political parties and candidates sufficient to inform their choice of candidate (shared indicator with OTI).	SO Team, IPs, OTI	Public survey, Analysis of Data	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team		20 05 /8	TBD
<b>IR 4: Increased Public Participation in Economic and Political Decision-Making and Government Reform</b>									
Ind. 4.1. Decreased feelings of isolation due to increased access to diverse sources of information and communications networks (% change)	Consultants/ Contractors	Public Opinion Polling	Bi-Annually	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 4.2. % increase in government revenues for priority social services in targeted provinces and territories.	Consultants/ Contractors	Public Opinion Polling	Bi-Annually	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			

### Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan for SO 4 (Livelihoods)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHO M	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
<b>SO 4: Livelihoods Improved in Targeted Areas</b>									
Ind. 1. % increase in household incomes in targeted areas	Community based survey by Implementing Partners (IPs)	Surveys using Proxies	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2004		
<b>Ind. IR 1: Agricultural productivity increased</b>									
Ind. 1.1. % Increase in output of selected commodities	Quarterly report by IPs	Surveys using questionnaire	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly/Annually	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 1.2. % Increase in yield per hectare for selected crops	Quarterly report By IPs	Surveys by implementing partners	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly/Annually	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 1.3. # of producer organizations organized through the program	Quarterly report by IPs	Survey by implementing partners	Annually	SO Team	Quarterly/Annually	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 1.4. % of organizations that became operational	Quarterly report by IPs	Surveys by Implementing Partners	Annually	SO Team	Quarterly/Annually	SO Team	2004		
<b>Sub IR 1.1: Improved technologies and inputs improve productivity in targeted rural areas</b>									
Ind. 1.1.1. # of agricultural technologies adopted through the program	Quarterly report by IPs	Implementing partners records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2004		
<b>Sub IR 1.2: Improved technologies and inputs improve productivity in targeted urban and peri-urban areas</b>									
Ind. 1.1.1. # of agricultural technologies adopted through the program	Quarterly report by IPs	Implementing partners records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2004		
<b>IR 2: Improved access to markets along selected corridors</b>									
Ind. 2.1. % increase in sale of selected commodities	Annual survey by IPs	Market surveys by IPs	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 2.2. Index for corrupt practices and illegal taxation reduced.	Quarterly report by IPs	Surveys along corridors by IPs	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	TBD 2004		TBD 2004
<b>IR 3: Access to financial services improved</b>									
Ind. 3.1. % Increase in use of credit in SO operational areas	IPs quarterly report	Surveys by IPs	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly/Seasonally/Annually	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 3.2. # of partnerships fostered to finance capital investments in agriculture	IPs quarterly report	MFIs records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly/	SO Team	2004		

ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHO M	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
Ind. 3.3. # of loans to men/women	IPs quarterly report	MFIs records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 3.4. Ratio of Value of loans to men/women	IPs quarterly report	MFIs records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2004		
<b>IR 4: Critical needs of targeted vulnerable groups met</b>									
Ind. 4.1. % decrease in moderate-to-severe malnutrition for children 5 years in SO operational areas	Health Zone records NGOs and IPs	By gender using weight for height	Annually	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team	2004		
Ind. 4.2. # of communities assisted in SO operational areas for basic services and members of most vulnerable groups, including victims of GBV, UAMs, and IDPs (through FFP and OFDA) receive assistance for reintegration.	IP reports, OFDA, and FFP	Project records	Annually	SO Team	Quarterly	SO Team			
<b>Sub IR 4.1: Emergency food aid provided to vulnerable groups</b>									
Ind. 4.1.1. # of beneficiaries of food aid	WFP	WFP records	Annually	SO Team	Annually		2004		
<b>Sub IR 4.2: Key Services provided to separated and abandoned children</b>									
Ind. 4.2.1. # of separated and abandoned children reunified or integrated into communities	IPs quarterly report	IPs Projects records	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly	SOT	2004		
<b>Sub IR 4.3: Well-being of Victims of Gender-Based Violence in targeted areas restored</b>									
Ind. 4.3.1. # of victims of GBV who received care and counseling	IPs quarterly report	IPs Project Records	Quarterly	SO Team		SOT	2004		

### Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan for SO5 (Education)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
<b>SO 1: Basic Education, especially for girls, improved in targeted areas</b>									
Ind. 1. % increase of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)	IP reports	Project records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team	2004	0	15% for girls 5% for boys
Ind. 2. % increase of children completing primary school education in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)	IP reports	Project records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team		0	20%
Ind. 3. Total number of children enrolled in primary schools affected by USAID programs (disaggregated by gender)	IP reports	Project records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			66,000 low funding 110,000+ High funding
<b>IR 1: Improved quality of basic education through innovative teacher training programs</b>									
Ind. 1.1. % increase in improved test scores	IP reports	End of year exam results	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.2. # of teachers trained (OPIN)	IP reports	Training records, Resource center records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.3. # of textbooks and learning materials produced and disseminated (OPIN)	IP reports	Distribution records and Resource center records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.4. # of students who have textbooks (OPIN)	IP reports	Project records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.5. Money obligated for teacher training (OPIN)	USAID records	USAID financial records	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.6. Money obligated for innovative educational approaches (OPIN)	USAID records	USAID financial records	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 1.7. Money obligated for textbooks and learning materials (OPIN)	USAID records	USAID financial records	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
<b>IR 2: Improved community participation in basic education</b>									
Ind. 2.1. % increase of community support to schools (in terms of time, money, and materials)	IP reports	School records: meetings, stock, financial, and admin.	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.2. % increase of community involvement in school management	IP reports	School management records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.3. % increase in administrative and managerial knowledge of school faculty and community volunteers	IP reports	Training records and supervisory reports	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			

ANNEX I. Performance Management

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YEAR	VALUE	VALUE
Ind. 2.4. % increase in relevancy of coursework to expressed local needs	IP reports	Measured using before and after analysis	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
<b>IR 3. Increased access, retention, and achievement among girls</b>									
Ind. 3.1. % increase improvement in test scores	IP reports	End of year exam results	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.2. % of students who stay in school (OPIN)	IP reports	Project records	Quarterly	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.3. # of scholarships given (OPIN)	IP reports	Project records	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.4. # of years of education received under scholarship (OPIN)	IP reports	Project records	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.5. Money obligated for scholarships (OPIN)	USAID financial records	Grant and cooperative agreements	Annually	SO Team	Annually	SO Team			

### Preliminary Performance Monitoring Plan for SpO (DDR)

PERFORMANCE INDICATOR	DATA SOURCE	METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION OR CALCULATION	DATA ACQUISITION BY MISSION		ANALYSIS, USE AND REPORTING		BASELINE		TARGET (2008)
			FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	FREQ-UENCY	BY WHOM	YR.	VALUE	VALUE
<b>SO 6: Ex-Combatant Reintegration into Communities Fostered</b>									
Ind. 1. Number of ex-combatants and their dependants reintegrated into their communities of origin or choice (disaggregated by gender and type)	Implementing Partners, other NGOs, IOs and GDRC records	Quarterly reports (QRs), coordination meetings	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly & Annually	SO Team	2003	0	High: 165,000 Low: 110,000
<b>IR 1: Comprehensive, accepted, dynamic, and operational National Plan for DDR in place</b>									
Ind. 1.1. Existence of a workable national plan agreed upon by all relevant parties	DDR Working Group	Dissemination of national plan and follow up meetings	Weekly	SO Team	Once	SO Team			
<b>Sub IR 1.1. Plan specifically for ex-child soldiers developed</b>									
Ind. 1.1.1. Existence of a plan specifically for ex-child soldiers developed and in use	Children's DDR Working Group	Dissemination of national plan and follow up meetings	Weekly	SO Team	Once and Quarterly	SO Team			
<b>Sub IR 1.2. Interim DDR plan established and agreed upon by all relevant actors</b>									
Ind. 1.2.1. Existence of an operational and functioning interim DDR plan	DDR Working Group	Dissemination of interim plan and follow up meetings	Weekly	SO Team	Once and Quarterly	SO Team			
<b>IR 2. Social, economic, and political conditions exist at the community level to enable sustainable return of ex-combatants</b>									
Ind. 2.1. % of families in targeted communities willing to accept the return of ex-combatants	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	QRs, coordination meetings, site visits	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.2. % of communities of return with operational conflict management groups	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	QRs, coordination meetings, site visits	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.3. # of community recovery projects implemented	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	QRs, coordination meetings, site visits	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 2.4. # of communities supported in reintegration activities	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	QRs, coordination meetings, site visits	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
<b>IR 3. Ex-combatants prepared to return to civilian life</b>									
Ind. 3.1. % of ex-combatants reintegrated with sustainable livelihoods	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	QRs, coordination meetings	Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.2. # of job trainings conducted	Training records of IPs, IOs, NGOs	QRs and coordination meetings	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.3. # of kits distributed	Distribution lists from IPs, IOs, NGOs	QRs and coordination meetings	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			
Ind. 3.4. # of job opportunities created	IPs, IOs, other NGOs	Qrs and coordination meetings	Monthly, Quarterly	SO Team	Quarterly, Annually	SO Team			

## ANNEX II. STATISTICS

### GENERAL ECONOMIC STATISTICS

- The Congolese population subsists at a per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of \$107. GDP per capita has shrunk by 72% since independence in 1960 (World Bank). Two-thirds of the population subsists on less than a dollar a day.
- The DRC economy grew by 3% to 5.4 billion in 2002, however, material output was a catastrophic 56% less than the GDP recorded in 1981 (IMF August 2003).
- Inflation, as measured by the CPI, stood at 511% in 2000, 135% in 2001, and 16% in 2002, and is forecast at 8% for 2003. Real GDP, which declined 7% in 2000 and 2% in 2001, increased 3% in 2002, and is forecast to rise 5% in 2003 and 6% in 2004. External reserves improved from a desperately short 1.4 weeks of imports in 2001 to 3.6 weeks of imports in 2002 (IMF, August 2003).
- The revised 2003 GDR budget totals 331 billion Congolese Francs, or approximately \$785 million. Due to funding constraints it is thought that overall expenditures will amount to 50-60% of the budgeted levels, about \$390 and \$470 million in 2003. The 2003 Budget provides for 4.9% of total expenditures in the health sector, and 3.1% in primary and secondary education. Only 10 billion CF of the 331 billion total are determined by the IBRD/IMF to be HIPC poverty-reduction eligible expenditures. The GDR also has extremely low official tax receipts, only 9% of GDP.

### DEMOGRAPHICS

- No census has been taken in the DRC since 1984 at which time the population was 30,729,443 with an estimated annual growth rate of 3.1%.
- Population estimates a range from 50 to 60 million people. 55 million is used as the population figure for DRC in this ISP. Roughly half the population is under the age of 15 (CIA World Factbook, 2003).
- Approximately 20 million people in the DRC remain particularly vulnerable due to chronic insecurity and conflict (OFDA).
- In 1984, the last time a national census was conducted, the population was. With
- An estimated 10% of the population is Muslim. Congolese come from an estimated 200 ethnic groups; the four largest groups – Mongo, Luba, Kongo, and the Mangbetu-Azande – make up about 45% of the population (CIA World Factbook, 2003).

### GEOGRAPHY

- The Congo has an area of 905,328 square miles (CIA World FactBook, 2003).
- The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses over 50% of Africa's tropical forests and is second only to Brazil in terms of countries ranked by surface area covered by tropical forest. Dense forests and woodlands cover 494,096,212 sq.ft. of the DRC's total surface area of 905,092.8 sq.ft. Protected areas cover about 7% of the country.
- In terms of species diversity the DRC has the highest number of mammal and bird species in Africa (415 and 1,094 respectively), and plant diversity is also very high (>11,000 species).
- Central Africa has a relatively low deforestation rate of 0.5% per year (Tropical Forestry 119/119 Study," Wildlife Conservation Society, 2003).

## GENDER

- Women's representation in the Transitional National Government: six out of 36 ministers are women; two out of 24 vice-ministers are women; three out of 40 members of civil society commissions are women; there are no women in the Senate; and there are no women officers in the army(Transitional National Government).
- Women provide 75% of food production of which 60% is sold and/or traded. For every administrative and professional position in the DRC, 10 women are employed for every 100 men (Left and Levine, 1997).
- For every 120 professional and technical positions in the DRC, only 20 women are employed, while for every 110 administrative and professional positions, only 10 women are employed (Left and Levine, 1997).
- 10% of Congolese women have the right to manage their property on their own (UNICEF, 1999).

## MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH

- Female life expectancy is estimated 46 years for men and 51 for women (Population Census Bureau, 2003).
- Infant and under-five mortality rates are 126 and 213/1,000 live births respectively (UNICEF—MICS2, 2001).
- The maternal mortality rate is 1,289 deaths per 100,000 live births (MICS2).
- 68% of pregnant women received some antenatal care and trained personnel attended 61% of births (UNICEF-MICS2, 2001). 40.6% of birth attended by the traditional midwives in Equateur (SANRU/ESP KAP Survey 2002).
- Total fertility rate is 7.1% and modern contraceptive use is 4.0% (MICS2).
- Although the overall reported HIV prevalence for DRC is 5.1%.1999 data from a limited sentinel surveillance survey of pregnant women found rates of 6.7% in Kinshasa and 10% in Lubumbashi. By the end of 2001, 1.3 million adults and children were infected with HIV. Other prevalence rates include Zimbabwe 33.7%; Zambia 21.5%; Kenya 15%; Tanzania 7.8% (UNAIDS, 2002).
- In 2000, the GDRC signed onto the Abuja accord with 50 other African countries agreeing to provide coverage with insecticide treated nets for 60% of pregnant women and 60% of children less than five years of age, provide intermittent preventive treatment of 60% of pregnant women by 2005.

## MALNUTRITION

- 13% of children suffer from acute malnutrition (an increase from 4% reported in 1995), and 38% of children suffer from chronic malnutrition (MICS2).
- 28.9% of children under five years of age live with moderate to severe malnutrition in urban areas, and 42.6% in rural areas. The overall national rate was 38.2% for this combination (2001 National Nutrition Survey).
- Average daily caloric intake is an estimated 79% of the recommended level of 2,300 kcal per day (FAO, 2000).

- 61% of children under 3 were vitamin A deficient, 22% severe. Vitamin A deficiency increases child mortality by 23-26% (1998 National Vitamin A Survey, UNICEF). Only 12% of children received a dose of Vitamin A in the 6 months preceding the MICS 2 survey.
- With USAID assistance, the February 2002 distribution of vitamin A (non-polio-related) exceeded 50% national coverage and in February 2003 it reached 74.8% (PRONANOT, BASICS, MOST Campaign Report).
- Through nutritional rehabilitation programs targeting hundreds of thousands of malnourished children, rates of recovery of 93% with less than 2% relapse, have been recorded (OFDA). Under WFP's CYs 2004-2005 program, malnourished children, elderly, pregnant and lactating women, numbering 239, 000 on average in 2004 and 183,000 in 2005, will receive food rations. Throughout both years, an estimated 79,500 persons living with HIV/AIDS will also receive rations to ensure nutrition and encourage them to attend specialized institutions. In addition, a total of 363,000 IDPs' and refugees' nutritional status will be stabilized.

## EPIDEMIOLOGY

- The last cases of wild poliovirus (28 cases) were reported in 2000. The number of 'compatible' Acute Flaccid Paralysis (AFP) cases is decreasing: 324 cases in 2001, 59 cases in 2002, and 11 cases from January to August 2003 (OMS, Rapport sur les activités de surveillance des Paralysies Flasques Aigües (PFA) en RDC, Janvier – Août 2003; Bulletin Epidemiologique du Congo- BEC, No 23 Juillet 2003).
- 46% of estimated cases are detected and only 58% of detected cases are cured. There are an estimated 150,000 new cases of TB every year and DRC ranks 12th in contributing to the world's TB burden (The National Tuberculosis Program). On the other hand, 53% of estimated cases are detected and only 70% of detected cases are cured (WHO).
- Although use of oral rehydration therapy (ORT) is high, only about 10% of children with diarrhea are provided extra fluids and normal meals (IRC, 1999-2001).
- Measles was responsible for between 3% and 18% of all under-five deaths (1999-2001) (IRC, 1999-2001).
- Malaria accounts for 25-30% of under-five deaths, 30% of national hospital admissions, and an even greater percentage of outpatient visits (e.g., 69% of outpatients visits in Katana Health Zone, South Kivu Province, in 2000) (National Malaria Control Program).
- In the 1980s, health service utilization rate was over 60%, despite serious health system problems. In the past two years, vaccination coverage increased from 20% to 40% and overall health service utilization rose from less than 15% to an average of 26% in 63 health zones supported by USAID (SANRU Quarterly Reports).

## ADDITIONAL HEALTH

- Over 54% of health zones receive some donor assistance (GDRC MOH Department des Etudes et Planification).
- Access to potable water rate is 26%, and to electricity 6.0% (EMRRP, DRC, Ministry of Planning, 2002).

## FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

- The DRC is producing only about half of its food needs. As far back as 1999 it was established that 50% of households in urban areas were only having one meal a day against 25% in rural areas (National Nutrition Survey, Ministry of Health, On the Situation of Women and Children in the DRC, USAID/UNICEF, 2003).
- The agricultural sector accounts for 56% of GDP. The 70% of the population inhabiting rural areas is now forced to survive on traditional subsistence farming, fishing and hunting (Central Bank, Annual Report, 2001).
- The rate of agricultural growth, 2.2%, is inferior to the rate of population growth (National Program for the Promotion of the Agricultural Sector, UNPD/UNCPS, 1997).
- An estimated one-third of the population is food insecure.

## EDUCATION

- Second and Primary education increased in the national budget by 4% from last year while the overall budget decreased by 8%.
- There is a steadily declining children's enrollment rate, estimated at 55% for boys and 49% for girls (MICS2). Schools often have 80 or more children in a primary school classroom. For primary schools, fewer than 25% of students entering school in September remain through the school year (MICS2, UNICEF/Kinshasa, January, 2002).
- In 1974 the DRC had a 94% gross enrollment rate. This went down to 60% in 1997-1998, and 55% in 2001-2002. While 25% of primary school children attained 5th grade in 2001-2002, by 1995 in rural areas girls' retention rates at the 5th grade level were 15% (Human Development Report, UNPD, 2000).
- 20% of urban and 55% of rural women over 15 are illiterate versus 7.3% of urban and 24.4% of rural men are illiterate.
- Fewer than 15% of all girls complete five years of primary education. This assures that with attrition, 90% will never advance in the educational process (Situation Sociale Dramatique en République Démocratique du Congo, USAID/DRC, Décembre, 2001).
- In 1992, under "convention" agreements, schools reopened with 80% of them under the control of the three major religious denominations—Catholic, Protestant and Kimbanguist—which pays schoolteachers between \$2 and \$5 per month. Communities (i.e., parents) are responsible for 80-95% of the costs of operating schools, compared to an average of 30-50% elsewhere in Africa (PNUD, 2000).
- In 1962, 102 Congolese officials and students were sent to programs in Europe and the United States for skills training. In the same year 70 Congolese were trained in education, administration, agriculture and forestry. Over the period from 1960 to 1999 several thousand Congolese received advanced education and training in a multitude of disciplines including teacher training (USAID/Education activity in DR Congo, July 2003, Africa Bureau Information Center).
- The Ambassador's Girl's Scholarship Program has provided scholarships to over 1,350 primary school girls in the Kinshasa area. The scholarship rate per girl is approximately \$50 and USAID Mission received an additional \$300,000 in April 2003 to enlarge the program to provide 8,000 scholarships: 1,454 primary school girls in Lubumbashi, 1,454 in Kikwit, 3,842 in Matadi and Boma, 600 in Luozi, 700 in Vanga, 45 secondary school girls learning English and 500 AIDS orphan girls in Matadi and Lubumbashi (data provided by the target schools and project implementers).

## **DDR AND DONOR COORDINATION**

- It is anticipated that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development will invest between \$120 and \$170 million in the DRC under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration program and will require a GDRC contribution of 1% (World Bank).
- Prior to WWII, the ratio of military to civilian casualties worldwide was 9:1. In the period following WWII, the ratio has reversed to 1:9.
- Current estimates of the total number of armed persons in these forces range between 180,000 and 235,000 (DRC Transitional National Government).
- There are between 110, 000 and 165,000 of ex-combatant who will be targeted by the DDR program in the DRC over the next three years. Child soldiers may make up 10% of the total armed groups.
- An average of 10% of armed forces are child soldiers who have never had access to education.
- There are between 10,000 and 20,000 street children in Kinshasa alone (DCOF, 2002).

### ANNEX III. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES RELEVANT TO SO 2 (HEALTH)

The Mission employed a variety of analyses in the development of the Health Strategic Objective. These include:

- The second UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS2) conducted in the DRC during 2001;
- The Kinshasa School of Public Health's *"Evaluation de Couverture en Soins de Sante et du Niveau des Connaissances, Attitudes et Pratiques de la Population des Zones de Sante Rurales Face a la Maladie"*, May 2003;
- The Ministry of Health's *"Etat des Lieux du Secteur de la Sante Profil Sanitaire du Niveau Central, des Provinces, des Zones de Sante et des Menages"*, April-June 1998;
- The International Rescue Committee's (IRC) "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Results of a Nationwide Survey", September - November 2002, reported April 2003;
- A study carried out by the Ministry of Health's National Bureau for Micronutrient Deficiencies (BN-TDCI) with support from UNICEF and the collaboration of CEPLANUT (National Human Nutrition Planning Center) "Prevalence of Vitamin A Deficiency in the Democratic Republic of the Congo", published March 2000 and conducted July 1998 and March 1999;
- A study by PHR+ *"Analyse de Systeme de Fonctionnement des Zones de Sante"*, 2003;
- A study by the Kinshasa School of Public Health *"Analyse de System Comptable: Phase pilote d'Implantation du Systeme de Gestion Comptable et Financiere des Zones de Sante"*, final report 2003;
- A study by Save the Children UK surveying HIV rates among pregnant women in Kalemie, DRC; and
- Preliminary results from the 2003 results of HIV sentinel surveillance from nine of 15 planned sites (six sites remain uncompleted).

#### USAID/Health Conducted Analyses

Country assessments were conducted by USAID/Washington teams during October 2002 and June 2003. 2002 Findings included issues with technical aspects of program implementation including the correct definition of a vaccinated child, weak outreach immunization strategies, tracking and reporting key threshold indicators, extremely weak family planning activities, poor tracking of malaria outcomes in children, weak TB control activities, and a very impressive but stand alone spring capping activity. In response to these findings the team recommended increased use of technical assistance contractors and the integration of hygiene and sanitation messages into the spring capping program.

In addition, there were issues with management of and financial access to health services including coordination between SANRU and CRS on establishing health zones, drafting annual work plans that did not reflect key indicators, unethical cost recovery practices, overstuffed facilities, and the imprisonment of poor people unable to pay their bills. Recommendations proposed work with a technical contractor to establish ethical guidelines for cost recovery, experimentation with performance contracts, coordination on the establishment of health zones, revision of the annual planning format to include key indicators, semi-annual reporting on key threshold indicators, and action regarding imprisoned people.

The 2003 assessment found progress in immunization coverage, patient utilization rates, and management of malaria. Major problems were under-funding of health zones which were unable to

support full implementation of key interventions; lack of approaches to reach people beyond the reach of health facilities; under-utilization of services due to the inability to pay; and poor-quality supervision. Key recommendations were that SANRU address important management and supervision weaknesses and concentrate on and improve the quality of six key interventions: immunization coverage; vitamin A supplementation; IPT for pregnant women; bed-net coverage of pregnant women and children under five; correct treatment of all children hospitalized with severe malaria; and appropriate diagnosis and treatment of 20% of children hospitalized with pneumonia. Additionally, SANRU should improve its community based delivery of health messages through health center outreach, establishing a functioning cadre of community volunteers, and expanding communication and behavior change activities.

## ANNEX IV. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES RELEVANT TO SO 3 (DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE)

### Key Analyses and Documents

#### GDRC Documents

- *Constitution de la Transition. Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo*, April 2003; and
- *Accord Global et Inclusif sur la Transition en République Démocratique du Congo: Dialogue Intercongolais - Négociations Politiques sur le Processus de Paix et sur la Transition en RDC*, Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo, April, 2003.

#### UN Documents

- *Final Report of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*. United Nations Security Council, 15 October, 2002;
- *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493*, UNSC, July 28, 2003; and
- *Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies Résolution 1304 sur le Retrait des Troupes Etrangères du Territoire de la République Démocratique du Congo*. LINELIT, September 2000.

#### Other and Joint Donor Assessments

- *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 26, 20 December 2000;
- *Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri*. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 64, 13 June 2003;
- *Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach to Disarmament and Reintegration*. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 63, 23 May 2003;
- *The Kivu's: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict*. International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 56, 24 January 2003;
- *Cluttered with Predators, Godfathers and Facilitators: The Labyrinth to Peace in the DRC*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, June 2003;
- *Ituri Covered in Blood*, International Human Rights Watch, June 2003;
- *Enhancing the Capacity of Civil Society Organizations (ECCSO), Democratic Republic of Congo*. AFRICARE, March 2001;
- *Building Bridges: An Integrated Approach to Civil Society and Peace Building in the DRC*, draft. DFID, 2003;
- *Transitional Support for the Democratic Republic of Congo*. World Bank, official document, July 2001; and
- *Country Profile: Democratic Republic of Congo, 1999-2000*. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000.

#### USAID Analyses

- *Conflict Vulnerability Analysis*. USAID/DRC, 2003;
- Nichols, Katherine and John Flynn. *Democracy and Governance Assessment*. USAID, 1999.
- *USAID Assessment & Economic Growth Strategy: Congo*. J.E. Austin Associates, Inc., April 1998;
- *ARD Conflict Timber Report: DRC*. USAID, 2003;
- OTI/DRC Strategic Plan;

- Conflict Vulnerability Analysis. USAID/Burundi; and
- Conflict Vulnerability Analysis. USAID/Rwanda.

#### USAID/DRC/DG Conducted Analyses

In 1999 USAID/DRC conducted a DG Assessment that analyzed the barriers to economic and political liberalization and an effective transition to democratic governance in the DRC. The assessment concluded that the DRC's post-Mobutu transition from violent conflict to stable democratic governance had not failed but rather been blocked by the Great Lakes regional conflict as well as the ruling government's policies and practices. It recommended that development assistance should support engagement between state institutions and civil society organizations so that citizens' basic needs and interests could be effectively represented. It hypothesized that a combination of internal and external dialogue and advocacy efforts would lead to concrete political and economic reforms that would mitigate alarming trends in government policies that were undermining political and economic liberalization, and contributing to growing instability.

Despite the current and continuing transition process from war to peaceful, democratic governance, conflict vulnerabilities and pockets of crisis certainly persist. In June and July, 2003 a USAID/DRC team conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) that provides analysis and recommendations related to conflict, conflict vulnerabilities, and the potential for a successful post-conflict transition. The team conducted targeted interviews with members of the TG, private sector, civil society, and religious community, as well as other donors and international organizations. A country level CVA presentation was developed and extensively vetted with the USAID management and the U.S. Embassy political section, as well as with an extended team consisting of representatives from partner organisations operating in the DRC including OTI and OFDA.

In addition to the 1999 DG Assessment and the 2003 CVA, this basis of analysis for the DG SO also builds from DG partners' performance as monitored and evaluated throughout the year and officially recorded in quarterly reports. Past synergies with other USAID sections, specifically Livelihoods, the DDR SpO and OTI initiatives, have also assisted in forming our strategy.

## **ANNEX V. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES RELEVANT TO SO 4 (LIVELIHOODS)**

USAID/DRC undertook two specific analytical studies to inform the formulation of the Livelihoods SO. These were in addition to analytical information from a wide variety of sources including from USAID Health Sector interventions, the UNDP, the World Bank, the World Food Program as well as NGOs and PVOs. The two specific studies were (1) analyses done by the SWIFT Action Team in February 2002; and (2) the Livelihoods Assessment Team analysis done in March 2003, prior to issuance of the Mission's Annual Program Statement (APS).

### **SWIFT Action Team – February 2002**

The 18-person SWIFT Action Team traveled throughout the DRC to visit field sites and interview relief and development workers on how USAID could ensure developmental success. The SWIFT team was composed of representatives from AFR/EA, DCHA/OTI, DCHA/FFP, REDSO/ESA, and USAID/DRC. The team consulted the World Bank, the IMF, FAO, MONUC, other U.N. organizations such as the World Food Program and UNICEF, and bilateral donor organizations including France, U.K., and Belgium. Further, the SWIFT team consulted with a wide range of US-based and indigenous NGOs and USAID partner organizations.

The SWIFT summary recommendation was as follows:

"The SWIFT Action Team recommends increased integration of USAID-funded activities, and specifically, proposes a livelihoods approach to maximize the effectiveness of USAID interventions in the DRC. In addition to the strong health interventions already under way, the team recommends that a livelihoods approach, including food aid, agriculture programs, communications, micro-financing and potentially other economic growth activities be incorporated into Mission activities. The Team believes that these activities must be integrated to the maximum extent possible with ongoing health activities, and that new livelihood project selection should be guided in part by the location of USAID-funded health activities. Based on its finding that high rates of child malnutrition are directly linked to various problems relating to the child's mother, the Team further recommends a series of modifications to improve the IITA SECID cassava project. The team strongly supports the recommendation by USAID/DCHA/OTI to start a program to enhance and expand USAID initiatives in support of the peace process. The Team also endorses a focus on rural employment generation activities, including public works projects with a food-for-work component, as critical to the successful demobilization of Congolese ex-combatants, particularly in the eastern part of the country."

The SWIFT Team made a total of ten specific recommendations:

1. Improve Livelihoods: emphasizing that activities should meet the specificity of areas where interventions are undertaken, the teams stressed that a "basket" of livelihoods interventions was needed, and that the basket should "include food aid, agricultural projects, microfinance activities, local capacity building, communication-promotion strategies, and others."
2. Focus on Women: the team stressed the need to support women's associations in areas of interventions, and that ".....women's associations could be an especially effective complement to activities in areas where single-parent woman-headed households comprise the bulk of families with malnourished children."

3. Expand Food Aid Programs and Partners: food aid should “be used to support farmers returning to production and help them throughout the first season or two, and that food-for-work could be used to rehabilitate marketing/distribution networks, such as feeder roads and other public works programs for bridge or railway repair.”
4. Examine Employment Generation as a Key to Successful DRR: the team found that “employment generation activities, including those using food for work, will be critical to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and other disaffected young boys and men into more productive activity.”
5. Cassava Project Requires Various Improvements: the team recommended expanding the regional focus for the project, acceleration in level-of-effort, and more integration with other Mission activities.
6. Re-Deploy USAID/DCHA/OTI in the DRC: the Team recommended “...a focus on improving connections between key communities throughout the DRC to decrease isolation and increase local engagement and participation in the peace process.”
7. Integrate and Expand Communications Activities: The team found “improving access to credible information and improving communication flows is integral to the peace process for the unification for the country,” and made of number of recommendations to strengthen communications, especially through civil society.
8. Communications Interventions are Important to the Success of DRR: The team recommended that “.....OTI examine opportunities to strengthen communications to promote successful DDR, including enhancing the capabilities of civil society groups to promote discussion, debate, and to serve as sources of credible information on DRR options.”
9. Respond Opportunistically to New Conditions: The team recommended USAID/DRC examine the utility of programming in zones of disengagement, and that DCHA and DCHA/FFP “should consider targeting emergency agricultural and food inputs to households of mothers and children who are or who have been malnourished in these areas.”
10. Enhance Donor Coordination: The Team found that donor coordination was working “reasonably smoothly” in the health sector, and that “greater efforts are necessary to develop coordinated information systems within all sectors.”
11. In discussing funding scenarios at the end of their report, the SWIFT Team pointed to the need for integration of CHS and EGAT activities that “funding across the sectors be considered together, and that “large increases in EGAT funding, coupled with decreases in CSH, would run counter to the major findings and recommendations of the SWIFT Action Team.”

### **Livelihoods Assessment Team – March 2003**

The Livelihoods Assessment Team conducted its work in March 2003, consisted of representatives from USAID/DRC and USAID/REDSO, and traveled to four DRC regions, Bas Congo, Bandundu, Eastern Kasai and Orientale provinces. It met with principal donor and NGO organizations in Kinshasa. The

Livelihoods Assessment Team revalidated the findings of the SWIFT Action Team. Among its principal findings were:

1. Principal impediments to increased production and marketing in all areas were poor rural infrastructure, especially disrepair of roads and bridges, lack of credit, agricultural inputs, and extension services.
2. Isolation of communities was a major problem, particularly in those areas where local labor could not assure road repair because heavy equipment was required.
3. Road blocks to extract bribes were a major problem for the expansion of trade.
4. Because of lack of cash, trade was done a barter basis in many areas.
5. There were some improvements in malnutrition rates in the Kabinda region of East Kasai due to the cessation of hostilities.
6. Low quality of inputs and declining soil fertility was contributing to lower yields pointing to the need for both improved availability of inputs and extension services.
7. Much expanded diffusion of cassava mosaic resistant cuttings was necessary because of the extent of the problem posed by cassava mosaic disease.
8. Cassava remained the backbone of production systems in most areas, although in certain areas, maize was becoming more common.

The Assessment Team recommended a Livelihoods Activity that would be structured around a consortium of NGOs, with a lead grantee and that would work in close collaboration with health-related activities.

## ANNEX VI. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES RELEVANT TO SO 5 (EDUCATION)

### Key documents used

- The second UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS2) conducted in the DRC during 2001;
- *Gouvernance pour le développement humain en RDC*, UNDP, 2000;
- USAID Education Project Strategy Paper, Kinshasa, June 2002;
- USAID/Namibia Country Strategic Plan – FY 2004 – 2010;
- Dot-Edu/DRC Work Plan;
- Dot-Edu/DRC Quarterly Reports (October 2002-December 2002) (January 2003 – March 2003);
- USAID/Education activity in Congo, July 2003, Africa Bureau Information Center;
- *Situation sociale dramatique en République Démocratique du Congo*, USAID/DRC, December 2001; and
- *Fonds pour le Développement du Sankuru (FODESA)*, Final report For First Year of the Program, EDDI-AGSP Program, Kinshasa, DRC.

### USAID/DRC/Education Conducted Analyses

USAID/DRC organized an educational needs assessment in the provinces of Bandundu, Katanga, Kasai, Bas-Congo and Kinshasa in June 2002. The team was composed of eight members including education specialists from the Washington, D.C. Africa Bureau, USAID/Kinshasa Health and Education teams as well as staff from the Academy for Educational Development (AED). The assessment confirmed that the education sector in the DRC had undergone a dramatic and steady decline. Children's enrollment and retention rates in school, particularly for girls, had become catastrophic due to economic collapse and armed internal conflicts.

Major factors for this decline were cited as poverty, lack of school infrastructure or deteriorated school buildings, limited and unqualified teachers, and severe absence of learning materials. Despite this, the team found that Congolese parents, children, and the entire community value education. Nonetheless, girls face particular barriers and are disadvantaged by cultural and social pressures.

## ANNEX VII. SUMMARY OF ANALYSES RELEVANT TO THE SPO (DDR)

### Key Analyses and Documents

- *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, International Crisis Group, December 20, 2000;
- *Cluttered with Predators, Godfathers and Facilitators: The Labyrinth to Peace in the DRC*, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, June 2003;
- *Ituri Covered in Blood*, International Human Rights Watch, June 2003;
- *Evaluation of the Reintegration of Vulnerable ex-Combatants – ILO Program*, World Bank Post Conflict Unit, June 2003;
- *Rapport d'Analyse Preliminaire effectuee dans les territoires de Mitwaba et Pweto*, IFESH, August 2003;
- *Proposition d'Intervention Amelioration de la Security Alimentaire dans la Province Orientale*, Atlas Logistique, 2003;
- *Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program*, World Bank Project Approval Document, 2002;
- *Aide-Memoire – Mission d'Identification de la Banque Mondiale pour le Project d'Urgence de Demobilization et Reinsertion des ex-Combatants*, IBRD, September 2003 ;
- *Mechanism de Reponse Rapide en Appui au Processus de DDR des ex-Combattants en RDC*, GDRC/UNDP, July 2003;
- *Plan de Travail pour le Developpement du PNDDR des Forces Congolaises*, UNDP, May 31, 2003;
- *Journal Officiel de la RDC, Numero Special*, Cabinet du President, September 20, 2003
- *Thirteenth Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission to the DRC*, Security Council, February 21, 2003;
- *United Nations Security Council Resolution 1493*, UNSC, July 28, 2003;
- *Sierra Leone USAID Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program*, USAID/OTI, undated;
- *UNCLAS 02 STATE 245276*, STATE DEPARTMENT, December 3, 2002; and
- *Ed Spriggs-John Hicks Memorandum on Legal considerations for Demobilization Activities*, USAID, March 24, 1993.

### USAID/DRC Conducted Analyses

- *Mayi-Mayi Demobilization in Kindu – Obstacles to DDR*, USAID/DRC, February 2003
- *Action Plan for Demobilized Mudundu-40*, USAID/DRC and DAI, July 2003
- *Interim Operational Plan for the Reintegration of Informal Armed Groups*, UNDP, September 2003

The first two assessments conducted by USAID were among the first performed in the DRC on the demobilization and reintegration of irregular militia forces. The experience and lessons learned during these two assessments and follow-on activities were instrumental in designing the Interim Operational Plan, which has become the de-facto policy guideline for reintegration of irregular forces used by the entire the DDR donor community. USAID participated extensively in the development of the Interim Operational Plan.

In Kindu, Maniema Province, 60 Mayi Mayi plus their dependents voluntarily disarmed to the Catholic Diocese. USAID provided them with basic reintegration kits (clothing, kitchen utensils, bedding, and

school supplies). MONUC was slow to arrange the transport of the reintegration kits, which delayed the reintegration process. In addition, MONUC did not at that time play an effective guarantor role *vis a vis* RCD efforts to recruit the self-demobilized Mayi Mayi into the RCD army. As a result, the RCD military succeeded in integrating approximately 25% of the group into its armed forces. The RCD also seized the weapons from the Bishopric where they had been stored for safekeeping.

160 Mdundu-40 (M-40 – a local organized Mayi Mayi group) combatants active around Walungu, South Kivu Province, self-demobilized to MONUC after a military defeat at the hands of the RCD in April 2003. MONUC in Bukavu provided these former combatants with a document indicating their non-military status and took possession of the 12 weapons surrendered. The RCD agreed to honor this demilitarization document but in reality continued reprisals against the M-40 former combatants. Ultimately, the security conditions and the RCD belligerent attitude heightened the risks of providing assistance to the ex-M-40 and to any implementing partners to the point that donors declined to intervene in this issue. These events were documented by USAID and the reports were distributed to all donors active in DDR in the DRC.

## **ANNEX VIII. GENDER STUDY: SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS**

### **Gender Analysis**

The term gender refers to differences in behaviors and roles between men and women. The gender analysis in DRC, focused on the roots, machinations, and results of these differences, while considering the complexities of race, ethnicity, culture, class, age, and disability.

### **The USAID DRC Gender Study**

The following discussion provides a summary of the key challenges identified by a gender study commissioned by the USAID/DRC Mission in February 2003. The gender study was conducted to inform the Mission's Integrated Strategic Plan (ISP) for 2004-2008. The study, conducted by two local consultants, focused on USAID/DRC's four specific sectors of programming: Education, Health, Economy/Agriculture, and Democracy and Governance. It included field visits, interviews with USAID program managers, NGOs, the government, and communities. The consultants also analyzed government reports, local and international agencies, and held focus group sessions in Mbuji-Mayi and Matadi. The findings and recommendations were discussed in a briefing with members of the USAID/DRC gender task force and shared with USAID/W.

The study findings are broad in nature. While the mission begins activity planning within the new ISP, it will be necessary to carefully examine gender relations and dynamics in areas where USAID-funded projects will be undertaken.

### **Gender Relations in DRC**

The eight-year conflict and the suffocating economy have left the DRC with abysmal roads, scant infrastructure, high numbers of displaced persons, and widespread poverty. However, peace accords, the installation of a Transitional Government (TG), and the development of a transitional constitution have brought optimism for development of the country. USAID/DRC is concerned by how this key transition period from war to peace and to a democratic government will facilitate or hinder gender equity in social, political, and economic life.

In 1980, the government of the DRC (GDRC) established a Permanent Secretariat to address concerns of women. Over time, national and provincial women's committees were created to advise what is now called the Ministry of Family and Social Affairs on how to approach and address women's issues. Unfortunately, the existence of the Ministry has not resulted in much improvement in the socio-economic and political condition of women in the DRC. However, following the Beijing Conference for women in 1993, a gender approach was adopted by the Ministry in their National Action Plan (1999-2004). This plan provides an opportunity for USAID/DRC to collaborate with the GDRC and other organizations and institutions seeking to promote gender equity.

One of the major impediments to women's rights rests in the Congolese Family Code (1987) which legalizes women's unequal access to land and requires married women to seek their husband's permission to enter into any legal deeds (Article 448 Family Code) such as acquiring land and/or credit, establishing bank accounts, applying for a passport, traveling, and accessing contraceptives. The transition process, which includes the development of a new constitution and the reform of all legal codes, presents a unique opportunity to institutionalize and codify gender equity.

### Gender and Education

The DRC national law mandates free, equal access to education at the primary level for males and females. In reality, parents must spend scarce resources to educate their children and few can afford to send all of their children to school. According to a U.N Special Report in 1999, only fifteen families per 1,000 are able to provide their children with schooling. Access to school and retention of students in school varies across the country according to geography, gender, class, and ethnic differences.

With only 3.1% of the GDRC budget allocated to education, gravely insufficient school infrastructure, a dearth of qualified teachers, and the inability of families to cover school costs, it is unsurprising that only 52% of all children in the DRC are enrolled in primary school. Gender disparities are reflected in overall attendance rates (55% boys vs. 49% girls) as well as drop out rates (36% boys vs. 56% girls). School attendance in rural areas is much lower than in cities (76.85% urban vs. 51.5% rural). Poverty, social customs, and early pregnancies and marriages for girls, negatively impact on formal education opportunities and retention rates.

### Gender and Health

The burden of health care payment rests on the population of DRC. Even where there are stocked health centers with trained staff, the population is often unable to afford the services. Only 37% of families are able to afford the cost of treatment at medical facilities. Traditional healing and a lack of transport and clothing also prevent people from accessing health care at centers and hospitals. Only one physician must serve an average of 22,600 people.

Gender and health are integrally related. UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS II, 2001) reported the highest maternal mortality rate in the world. This indicates that giving birth is a dangerous and often fatal activity in the DRC. Indeed, 1996 data shows that a woman in the DRC has a 1 in 18 chance of dying from pregnancy related causes (Left & Levine, 1996). Furthermore, women are almost entirely responsible for their children's health care including travel to health clinics for vaccinations and responding to illnesses.

The MICS II also indicated that only 10% of women have necessary knowledge of HIV/AIDS. The gender study found that women often feel powerless in making decisions about their sexuality, including when and to marry. Taboos prevent open discussions on HIV/AIDS and the extent of extra-marital sex. Myths about how HIV/AIDS is transmitted abound.

Other issues that impact on women's health in the DRC include increasing levels of unhygienic and unsafe abortions, malnutrition, and conflict induced disabilities. Maladies plaguing the Congolese as a population include malaria, tuberculosis, diarrhea, respiratory infections, and sexually transmitted diseases.

### Gender and the Economy/Agriculture

The general economic picture in the DRC is dismal, as a result of fragmented economic reforms, political instability, decline in investments, bankruptcy of larger firms, lack of state provision of social and economic services, high unemployment, low wages (for those who are employed), and corruption. From a gender perspective, such economic conditions have resulted in the need for women in Kinshasa

to increase their productive roles and earning power. As a result, new marital or household dynamics have led to “tense” gender relations in some instances: women’s decision-making and economic power have increased while men exhibit frustrations, some of which result in desertion or divorce.

Women are involved in the formal and informal sectors of the economy to varying degrees. In 1997, the International Labor Organization reported the following distribution of men and women in specific sectors of the economy:

<b>Sector</b>	<b>% Men</b>	<b>% Women</b>
Agriculture	57.5	81
Extractive Industry	19.8	5.21
Manufacturing	11.31	4.37
Services	22.7	13.83

Source: USAID February 2003 DRC Gender Study

In the agriculture sector, the majority of small-scale farmers and traders are female. Women provide 75% of food production of which 60% is sold and/or traded. A clear gendered distribution of farming, household, and child-rearing tasks exists in both urban and rural settings.

In the formal sector, women receive less pay for similar work and hold few positions of authority. Left & Levine (1997) reported that for every professional and technical position in the DRC, 20 women were employed for every 100 men and for administrative and professional positions, they found only 10 women for every 100 men.

More research is needed to ascertain the full extent of gender disparities in terms of women and men’s access to credit, farm machinery, and other resources for agricultural production. The unsteady macro-economic situation and disruption of financial and banking systems intensify women’s inaccessibility to credit. Congolese economic associations such as *Association des Mamans Commerçante du Congo* (AMACO), *Union des Femmes de Congo* (UFECO), and *Association des Femmes Commerçantes* (AFEC) provide some support, but much more is needed.

### Gender, Human Rights, and Democracy and Governance

Gender equity issues addressed by the gender study included investigating the level of participation of men and women in leadership positions, including civil society associations, local and national governance structures, and political parties.

Research indicates that women are found in lower numbers in political institutions, as seen in the table below.

<b>Institution</b>	<b>No. of Women</b>	<b>Total Number</b>	<b>% Women</b>
Parliament	29	300	9.6
Government	4	37	10.8
Local Admin.	11 (vice-governors)	33	33

Source: USAID February 2003 DRC Gender Study

Civic participation of women is hampered by high illiteracy and low educational rates. Thus, while women are legally eligible to vote, few can read newspapers, listen to the news through the mass

media, or decipher political leaflets (or other printed material). The belief that politics is a male domain further undermines women's participation. As a result, women are scarcely found in public forums and civil society platforms such as political parties. This belief signals a departure from traditional structures, among some ethnic groups such as the Mbongi (Fu-Kiau, 1997), which incorporated women in communal decision-making alongside men. While gains for the inclusion of women have been few, some women do hold leadership positions in public administration and state-owned companies.

Human rights and gender based violence issues requiring serious attention include: domestic violence; rape of women and girls (especially in conflict areas); beating and torture of women accused of being "witches and cannibals"; the existence of laws in the Family Code which maintain women's unequal access to land; and the requirement for married women to seek their husband's permission to enter any legal deeds (Article 448 Family Code). Although the Family Code was revised in 1987 to permit widows to inherit their husband's property, control their own property, and receive a property settlement in a divorce, women are routinely denied these rights. (Left & Levine, 1997).

The existence of refugees and internally displaced men and women in war torn DRC requires both government and nongovernmental interventions. Both men and women have trouble attaining even modest levels of health care, basic sustenance of food, land to cultivate, clothing and shelter. These groups are susceptible to high levels of abuse, violence, and ethnic discrimination.

## **Conclusion**

In all areas of intervention, the USAID-DRC Mission is advised to collaborate with local and national public and private entities to promote gender integration in all areas of strategic program intervention. More geographical and context-based studies on gender dynamics and power relations are necessary to properly ensure that both men and women benefit and that disparities and/or inequalities in male-female relations are accurately assessed. Furthermore, the intersection of ethnicity, gender, class, age, religion and/or disabilities must be analyzed to determine the nature of socially constructed ideas of manhood and womanhood which continue to have negative impacts on socio-political, health, and economic conditions.

As the mission moves from strategy development to activity planning it should:

- Monitor partners' programs and activities to ensure that gender is mainstreamed, their programs are not implemented in a manner that reinforces bad practices, and best practices are shared across SOs.
- Promote women's representation at the grass roots, district, provincial, and national levels, to ensure women are given the opportunity to participate in all aspects of civil society and are able to assume leadership positions.
- Look for opportunities to finance activities which target change of practices and the removal of barriers identified as relevant under each SO.

## **ANNEX IX. Democratic Republic of Congo Conflict Vulnerability Assessment Overview**

### **Introduction & Methodology**

During May, June, and July 2003 USAID/DRC conducted a Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA) in order to provide analysis and recommendations related to conflict, conflict vulnerabilities, and the potential for a successful post-conflict transition to democratic governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The CVA is intended to inform the USAID Integrated Strategic Planning (ISP) process for FY 2004 to 2008, currently in progress, and to provide a basis for coordination with other members of the international community supporting the national transition in the DRC. The Assessment team was led by Katherine Nichols, Democracy and Governance Officer for USAID/DRC, and included Victor Mangindula, Program and Development Specialist, Raymond Lumbuenamo, Economist and Agriculture Development Specialist, Simon Mutala, Transition Program Specialist and Field Program Manager for the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI/DRC), Maguy Nzuzi, Community Development and Conflict Resolution specialist with the American NGO International Foundation for Education and Self-Help (IFESH), and Pyt Douma, an expert consultant with Management Systems International (MSI-Washington). Overall the six-member team comprised four Congolese and two international members.

This CVA was conducted in a context of historic change. Although violent conflict between renegade forces continues in isolated areas of the DRC, a cease-fire has been implemented, foreign forces have been withdrawn, and a consensus has been reached on how to share political power among former belligerents, political actors and civil society representatives during a period of transition. The first phase of this transition process began with the signing of the Lusaka Accord in October 1999 and lasted until 2001 when a cease-fire was finally implemented and a United Nations Peace-Keeping mission was deployed. A series of political negotiations followed known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD) lasting from 2001 to 2003. During this phase of the peace process and transition the architecture of the Transitional National Government (TG) was designed. This phase culminated in the adoption of the All Inclusive and Global Agreement, Transitional Constitution and accompanying resolutions which were signed in December, 2002 and now comprise the legal basis for the TG. The third and most recent phase of the transition process began when the new Transitional Government was officially seated in Kinshasa in July 2003. This phase will focus on the implementation of the Accord and Transitional Constitution during a three-year period. Already, the TG is moving forward with an ambitious transition timetable, culminating in national elections. Thus, the peace process has drawn to a conclusion, opening the door to a successful post-conflict transition.

Given the extensive analysis already conducted during each of these phases, at its outset the CVA team decided to build upon the extensive literature concerning the root-causes of Congo's complex five-year war, and the isolated confrontations that continue. Using this analysis as a departure point, the team focused primarily on the current transition's viability, new vulnerabilities and the potential confluence of conflict variables that exist simultaneously in the DRC at the national, provincial and local levels. Toward this end, the team first analyzed conflict risks at the national level during a two-week period in June, conducting targeted interviews with members of the TG, private sector, civil society, and the religious community, as well as other

donors and international organizations. Interviews in Kinshasa were also held with U.S. Embassy officials, Ministers and officials of President Joseph Kabila's government and representatives of civil society including religious, labour, and business organizations (see Annex 1-B- list of persons interviewed).

Given the broad variation between and within the DRC's eleven provinces, the team then spent two weeks analyzing conflict vulnerabilities in seven of the DRC's 11 constituent provinces where conflict continues or has high potential to erupt. These provinces are the Kivus (North and South), Oriental Province, Eastern Kasai, Katanga, Bas Congo and Equateur. This field work was divided between three teams, each of which visited two Provinces. Specifically, ten-day field missions were conducted in the Kivus and Oriental Province by Katherine Nichols and Simon Mutala; Victor Mangindula and Pyt Douma visited Kasai Oriental and Katanga, and Raymond Lumbuenamo and Maguy Nzuzi assessed conflict vulnerabilities in Bas Congo. The latter team also visited Equateur in July.

In order to ensure comparability of data from its national-level and provincial-level work and to guide its analysis, the team developed a questionnaire based on the Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation's Conflict Assessment Framework (see Annex 1-A). This was subsequently tested and applied in Kinshasa, altered slightly and used during the team's field visits to the various Provinces. The questions served as a basis for later qualitative comparison between the findings of the various teams based on their work in the Provinces. Upon returning to Kinshasa, the team analysed its findings and prepared conclusions and recommendations for each of the seven provinces visited, which were then discussed exhaustively and compared with national level findings. An overall CVA presentation (see Annex 1-C) was developed and extensively vetted with USAID management and the U.S. Embassy political section, as well as with an extended team consisting of representatives from partner organisations operating in the DRC including OTI and OFDA. A set of recommendations and conclusions were then formulated, as presented below.

## **Executive Summary**

The USAID Democracy and Governance Assessment conducted in May 1999 concluded that "The Democratic Republic of Congo's transition from dictatorship to stable democratic governance has not failed but has rather been blocked by the current regional conflict as well as the ruling government's policies and practices." Based on this conclusion, the strategy envisioned four scenarios ranging from "Accelerated Disintegration" characterized by increasing levels of conflict to "Hard-won Stabilizing Negotiations." Accordingly, the USAID "Staying Engaged" strategy was designed to achieve hard-won stabilizing negotiations, but also to be flexible and adaptable even in a scenario of accelerated disintegration.

Four years later, the hard-won stabilizing negotiations promoted by USAID, other donors, and most importantly Congolese constituencies for change have succeeded, creating a new opportunity for Congo's transition to proceed. In response, the DRC's political and military leadership is now proceeding with a national transition. This new phase will be characterized by peace and national reunification, emerging from five years of conflict and division that were preceded by several decades of political, economic and social deterioration. War and insecurity, compounded by a political culture of predatory government and public repression, have taken a heavy toll on the DRC and its citizens. Millions of people are reported to have died or have had

their lives uprooted by the war. In addition the country suffers from the near total collapse of its infrastructure and economy, social divisions persist, and political institutions are so weak, non-representative and corrupt that they need to be replaced entirely. The TG is working to address these issues. Yet in doing so, the team concluded, they will face three main areas of vulnerability to conflict:

### **1) The Fragility of the Transition Process**

The fragility of Congo's political transition is the first area of conflict vulnerability identified by the CVA. The consensus and legal framework now being implemented in the DRC - based on the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement, the Global and Inclusive Accord, the Transitional Constitution and accompanying resolutions from the Sun City dialogue - are paving the way for national pacification, reunification, and a successful transition to sound governance based on democratic principles. In keeping with the view that democracy itself is a conflict resolution mechanism, the TG is a power-sharing arrangement that has succeeded in achieving peace. It provides a new mechanism for members of the TG to resolve future conflicts and crises non-violently, through agreed-upon processes within an established institutional framework. Consequently, new opportunities for a successful post-conflict transition exist in the Congo today that did not exist before.

Nevertheless, the legal framework for the transition and underlying agreements reached between all stakeholders in the transition process are limited by significant omissions and ambiguities regarding the mandates, relationships, rules of procedure and internal processes of the various transitional institutions. This leaves the texts open to interpretation by key elite interest groups seeking to manipulate the process and pre-determine political outcomes. Moreover, while the transition from war to peace is technically over, the political context remains fragile; the security situation volatile. At least 800 armed body guards loyal to different members of the government are now present in the capital, working alongside an untrained national police force as their employers work to build national governance institutions from the ground up. In isolated parts of the interior, ill-disciplined army and former rebel forces continue to prey on rural populations and perpetrate acts of barbaric cruelty against unarmed civilians, even as the process of military integration proceeds at the national level. The international community hopes to contain the problem through the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) process now underway (implemented by MONUC in collaboration with the TG). However, DDRR alone will not put an end to the culture of extortion and abuse that fuels local conflicts and prevents economic growth.

Based on its analysis, the team further concluded that the real test of the national transition in DRC will not lie in elections, which will mark the final phase of the transition period, but in the willingness and ability of the government to reign in armed elements, reform the military, police, and judicial systems, and put an end to the impunity that has plagued the country for more than a decade.<sup>2</sup> This extends beyond rampant human rights abuses to widespread impunity for economic crimes. The potential for international aid to impact Congo's economic recovery is severely limited as long as a culture of extortion prevails. In both the Western and Eastern parts of the country, current or former civil servants, unpaid soldiers, ex-combatants, and other remnants of the predatory state continue to loot, rape, and collect "taxes" at

unofficial “roadblocks” for survival. Roads and river ways are increasingly open to traffic. Yet anyone who travels them is forced to run a gauntlet of “road blocks” erected every 20 km or so. As long as this cottage industry criminal enterprise persists, the country’s civilian population and economy recovery will remain hostage to predation and abuse, hampering a successful transition. This impunity also contributes to the area of vulnerability described below.

## **2) An Opportunity Space for Conflict Entrepreneurs**

Competition for resources, including political influence and human combat resources, remains a powerful incentive for conflict in the DRC that takes place at three levels: a) between various Congolese elites and external actors at the national level; b) between Congolese authorities and elites and sub-state actors such as local militias at the provincial and local levels, and; c) at the level of intra-provincial confrontations between ethno-linguistic groups that cross provincial and national boundaries, such as the conflict taking place between the Hema and Lendu. As a result of these power-struggles, the prevailing political culture focuses on the exclusion of weaker groups and precludes resource sharing, which in turn fuels further impoverishment and instability.

This conflict dynamic is compounded by three main forces including a legacy of endemic corruption, a series of foreign invasions that have spawned local war-economies and, consequently, a pervasive lack of security and absence of viable judicial institutions. In combination, these factors have each contributed to the creation of an opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs, both external and internal, who have ample incentives as well as resources to perpetuate violent conflict among groups at all three levels of the DRC’s ongoing competition for economic, environmental and human resources.

During the last eight years, this has led to the proliferation of local warlords, notably in the eastern and central parts of the country, who have yet to be drawn into the transition process. Such actors hardly ever confront each other on the battlefield, but rather prey on rural populations and perpetrate acts of barbaric cruelty against unarmed civilians. They are symptoms, as well as causes, of conflict at the provincial level that the international community hopes to contain through the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) now underway.

## **3) The Extreme Isolation and Marginalisation of the Majority of the Population**

The CVA found throughout the six provinces visited profound physical isolation, insecurity and a pervasive sense of abandonment. In this environment, the lack of mechanisms to aggregate and articulate public grievances or resolve disputes has created a vicious cycle: in a situation of extreme isolation and poverty in which survival is the key objective for groups and individuals, they become subject to abuse, exploitation and manipulation by those in power, further limiting their ability to change this situation. As a part of this cycle, the most vulnerable populations, including women and children, are not only victims but may become enablers or perpetrators of violence as well. As the USAID DCHA/OTI Strategic Plan notes, “The combination of economic and political degradation has contributed to the feeling of marginalization and isolation experienced by Congolese civil society.” The vulnerability to manipulation and limits on public accountability that this produces is the third area of conflict vulnerability identified by the CVA.

## **Principle Conclusions and Recommendations for Strategic Programming by USAID and Other Donors**

In the CVA team's analysis, for each of these areas there are currently positive trends and strong constituencies for change that should be sustained and expanded. Specifically, the DRC's new transitional institutions and processes should be strengthened. Efforts to close the narrowing opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs should be accelerated. Finally, the extreme isolation and consequent repression and exploitation of the Congolese people should be ended through civic education, increased access to balanced information, and increased participation in political and economic decision-making at the local, provincial and national levels. Toward this end, the CVA team recommends that USAID/DRC activities focus on the following program areas in collaboration with other donors:

- (1) Support for the development of key transitional political processes and institutions so that they may succeed in managing conflict non-violently, facilitate national reunification and reconciliation, and manage public resources for re-building social and physical infrastructure efficiently. Based on its research and interviews, the team concluded the most critical institutions and processes are the Truth and Reconciliation process and Commission, the Electoral process and Independent Electoral Commission, political parties and political competition, and the Parliament. The team further concluded that combating impunity and resolving local conflicts that threaten or are created by the transition could best be achieved by working with civil society organizations and associations as well as government authorities at the local level. This in turn will strengthen the national transition process and reduce its vulnerability to spoilers.
- (2) Close the opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs and improve security through: a) support for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; b) enhanced local capacity for conflict management; c) great transparency in political and economic decision-making, and; d) improved access to livelihoods.
- (3) Improve access to balanced information and strengthen government accountability in isolated areas where the population is most vulnerable to conflict entrepreneurs.

The team further recommends targeting specific provinces as Areas of Focus. Based on its analysis, those where the greatest opportunities or vulnerabilities are, and where the highest program impact with limited resources can be achieved are: Equateur, Bandundu, Katanga, the Kivus, Oriental Province and Bas Congo. In each of these provinces, an integrated program of assistance should be implemented that includes the following activities for each area of vulnerability.

*Recommendation One: Support the development of transitional political processes and institutions in order to strengthen their capacity to succeed in facilitating national reunification, reconstruction and improved governance.*

- Maintain international pressure and assistance in collaboration with local and provincial organizations for the Transitional Government to operationalize the DRC's new legal and constitutional Framework in keeping with the terms of the Global and Inclusive Accord.
- Provide technical assistance , training and material support to key transitional institutions, in particular the Citizens' Institutions of Support for Democracy including the Independent

Electoral Commission, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Human Rights Observatory, the Media Commission and the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission. This will enhance the Transitional National Government's institutional capacity for managing and preventing future conflict.

- End impunity and support improved governance through political process monitoring by civil society organizations of local authorities and government bodies at the local, provincial and national levels.
- Increase access to objective information about the transition process including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), military integration, public rights and responsibilities, and government authorities and mandates.
- At the provincial and local levels, support local community development and conflict resolution as a means to engage citizens with authorities to improve governance. This includes enhanced citizen participation in economic and political decision-making.
- At the national level, the Legislative Process should be used as a tool for enhanced public participation and government accountability.

*Recommendation Two: Close the opportunity space for conflict entrepreneurs.*

- Support for Regional Conflict Resolution and Prevention through mechanisms such as a Great Lakes Forum involving international, regional, religious, traditional, civil society and private stakeholders. At the Provincial level, support for mechanisms such as the Ituri Pacification Commission.
- Support for regional economic integration.
- Continue international pressure to end the sale and circulation of arms within the DRC, including support for the Kimberly Conflict Diamonds Certification Process.
- Work with other donors to build state institutional capacity for public finance and budgeting, poverty reduction, combating corruption and generating GNP.
- Work with MONUC, the UNDP, the Embassy and other donors to support successful military and police reform and integration.
- Support the process of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants in targeted communities, building on existing community development programs.
- Support for local conflict resolution and pacification committees and initiatives.

*Recommendation Three: Improve communications, access to information and public participation in political and economic decision-making to end the extreme marginalization and isolation of most members of Congolese society.*

- Improve communications and provide public access to information through radio, print media and local civic information and education initiatives.
- Facilitating civil society initiatives and actions by religious institutions, civil society organizations, the private sector, and traditional institutions.
- Support a transparent, credible and effective electoral process as a tool for increasing public participation for everyone, but with an emphasis on promoting women's participation, government accountability, and combating corruption.
- Support the decentralization of political and economic decision-making as a tool for increasing public participation for everyone, but with an emphasis on promoting women's participation, government accountability and combating corruption.

## ANNEX X. SUMMARY OF FAA SECTION 118(E) AND 119(D) ANALYSES

### Essential Procedures

Sections 118(e) and 119(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act state that:

**Biodiversity:** All country-level Operating Unit Strategic Plans must include a summary of analyses of the following issues: (1) the actions necessary to conserve biological diversity, and (2) the extent to which the actions proposed meet the needs thus identified.

**Tropical Forestry:** For country-level Strategic Plans that cover countries that have any part of their territory within the tropics, each Strategic Plan must also include (1) a summary of their analyses of the actions necessary to achieve conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests and (2) the extent to which the actions proposed meet the needs thus identified.

These requirements may not be waived, modified, or eliminated by the responsible Bureau for country-level Operating Unit Strategic Plans.

This summary analysis was derived from a comprehensive analysis performed by the Wildlife Conservation Society (under contract to USAID/DRC) that was completed in September 2003. This document is available for review by those interested.

### DRC Tropical Forest Overview

The Democratic Republic of Congo possesses over 50% of Africa's tropical forests and is second only to Brazil in terms of countries ranked by surface area covered by tropical forest. By virtue of its tremendous biomass, DRC's forest are important in helping to maintain global climatic and chemical cycles in that conversion of its forests to agricultural land will result in an extraordinary increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), dramatically impacting efforts to combat global warming. In addition, DRC's forests help drive both regional and local weather patterns. Indeed as over 50% of the rainfall received in the region results from local cycling of water through evapotranspiration, loss of forest cover will result in both less precipitation and an increase in the severity of droughts. Finally, millions of people make their home in DRC's forests, using it for the construction of shelter, harvesting food stuffs, and as a source of spirituality.

DRC's forests are diverse systems at both the ecosystem and floristic levels. While there are a variety of different ways of dividing DRC's forests, it is clear from table 1 that there are a number of major divisions. Even within vegetative formations, there are a variety of different forest types and floristic associations. Within a given forest type forests typically contain over 120 species > 10 cm diameter at breast height (dbh) per ha (see e.g., Hart, 2001). DRC's forests are far from homogenous as evidenced by the differential distribution of important timber species. For example, Wenge (*Milletia laurenti*) is found in relatively high densities on poorly drained and swamp soils in Bandundu, Limba (*Terminalia superba*) is found in high densities in the semi-deciduous forests of the Mayombe in Bas Congo, relatively high concentrations of Afromosia (*Pericosios elata*) are found in the forest northeast of Kisangani in Oriental Province, and Sapele (*Entandrophragma cylindricum*), while found throughout the forest in the central Congo basin south of the Congo river is found in relatively high densities in the

semideciduous forests of northeastern DRC, often in association with both Iroko (*Milicia excelsa*) and the true African mahogany (*Khaya* spp.).

### Area covered by principal vegetative formations in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

VEGETATIVE FORMATION	AREA (Km <sup>2</sup> )	% TOTAL FOREST AREA	% NATIONAL TERRITORY
<b>Closed equatorial forest</b> (evergreen and semi-deciduous)	872,251.16	68,14	37.20
Mountain forest			
-Closed mountain forest	38,612.39	3.01	1.65
-Bamboo forest	1,666.72	0.13	0.07
Open equatorial forest			
-Dry forest	51,946.17	4.06	2.22
-Open forest (Miombo)	102,225.61	7.99	4.36
Flooded forest	88,614.08	6.92	3.78
Gallery forest	2,500.05	0.19	0.11
Mangroove forest	555.07	0.04	0.02
Secondary forest	121,670.70	9.54	5.19
<b>TOTAL FOREST</b>	<b>1,280,042.46</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>54.59</b>
Forest-savanna mosaic	165,838.83		7.07
Plantations	555.57		0.02
Savannas, grass and wooded	768,358.82		32.77
Water	62,502.24		2.67
Un-interpretable (clouds)	67,502.24		2.88
<b>COUNTRY TOTAL</b>	<b>2,344,800.00</b>		<b>100.00</b>

Source: SPIAF, 1995; Synthetic forest map

## Threats to Tropical Forests in DRC

### Deforestation

Environmentalists, ecologists, and other concerned parties have been calling the attention of the world's population to the problems posed by tropical deforestation for over two decades. While the debate continues in some circles as to whether or not the decrease in return time and increase in severity of El Nino events and droughts as well as concurrent increases in global warming have actually occurred, the fact that there have been highly variable local, regional, and global weather patterns in recent years cannot be denied. Further, the vast tracts of tropical forest that have been lost in Central and South America, Asia, and West Africa have made a substantial contribution to atmospheric increases in CO<sub>2</sub>, a major greenhouse gas.

In 1992 FAO found deforestation rates in Central Africa to be on the order of 0.5 percent per year, representing a forest conversion of some 114,000 km<sup>2</sup> for the decade ending in 1990 (Buzzard, 2002). While the forests of DRC's central basin are relatively sparsely populated, at an estimated annual human population growth rate of over 3.3% for the past two decades, eastern DRC's population has exploded. The wave of deforestation caused by this extraordinary growth is discussed in relation to the

Albertine Rift and Rift Frontier eco-development zones. One cannot emphasize enough the fact that DRC's forest biodiversity is not distributed equally and that these two eco-development zones - Albertine Rift and the Rift Frontier - happen to be two of the most important regions for biodiversity conservation in Africa, if not the world. Thus the loss in terms of forest cover here and its contribution to global warming and climate change is by no means equivalent to the absolutely tragic loss of biodiversity that is presently underway.

It must be emphasized that it is the rate of change that is the most alarming in DRC. As the human population of DRC has gone from approximately 40 million in 1990 to somewhere on the order of 55 million people today, it is expected to roughly double in the next 20 years and become on the order of 120 million people.

Given the agrarian lifestyle of eastern DRC's population as well as its reliance on fuel wood and charcoal for cooking, one should expect analogous rates of forest loss here. The ability to manage population growth and agricultural expansion will be essential to minimizing loss of biodiversity and forest cover.

### Commercial Logging

More than anything else, geography has thus far spared most of DRC's forests from bearing the brunt of commercial logging. The approximately 200 km of waterfalls and rapids between Stanley Pool and the port of Matadi make it impossible to float logs down the river to the port and thus require increased transportation costs imposed by transferring timber to road and rail. Similarly, transportation costs to ship wood from eastern DRC's forests 1,000 km or more to the port of Mombasa, Kenya make it an expensive proposition to export timber. While table 2 depicts a dramatic reduction in timber production as the result of war and political instability, it is worth noting that even in 1992, DRC reported timber export volumes of only 330,300 m<sup>3</sup> of wood. This pales in comparison with export volumes on the order of 2 million m<sup>3</sup> of wood for each of the Republic of Congo and Gabon.

The fact that these neighbors that only possess a fraction of DRC's forest each exported well over \$100 million worth of timber (Gabon exported over \$300 million) as compared to DRC's \$11 million in 2000 is a dramatic indication of lack of development of this important economic sector.

### Change in number of timber companies and declared volumes for the period between 1992-2002.

YEAR	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Number of Companies	28	28	25	22	25	18	16	16	12	13	11
Declared Volume (m <sup>3</sup> x1000)	330	287	272	225	308	257	262	34	62	38	44

Direction de la Gestion Forestière (2003)

The GDRC is well aware of the potential economic potential of the forest sector and, in consultation with a number of donors, is undertaking efforts to increase timber production. In order to move towards sustainable development in this sector, the GDRC has reformed its forestry code and is developing plans for pilot zoning projects that would work with stakeholders to determine production

forest zones in areas of high timber production and/or high human population growth. Concurrent with development of the forestry sector are plans for buttressing the protected areas network.

## **Roads**

Buzzard (2002) discusses the threat of roads to tropical forest conservation in view of an analysis of the importance of logging roads in Cameroon produced by Minnemeyer et al. (2002). The thesis apparently is that many areas believed to be “low access” or roadless may in fact be accessible by logging roads. Indeed the threats posed by logging roads with respect to facilitating immigration, forest fragmentation, and commercialization of the bushmeat trade are much discussed in conservation circles.

Part of the legacy of the Mobutu era in DRC is a complete neglect of all but the most important roads. This is generally believed to have been a strategic decision by the former dictator to make it difficult for potential aggressors (be it rebellious populations or invading armies) to advance on his strongholds and take over the country. As there was a relatively well developed road network at independence (that continues to be represented on maps), studies undertaken to depict wilderness areas in Central Africa based on road networks have understated the importance of DRC. In contrast, river transportation has been the major mode of access to remote forests here. River boats have long been transporters of bushmeat from the forest to important urban areas.

## **Actions necessary to Achieve Conservation and Sustainable Management of Tropical Forests in DRC**

In a FAA 118/119 Analysis of the Central African Program for the Environment, Buzzard (2002) puts forth nine areas within which actions should be taken to work towards conservation and sustainable management of forests within the Congo Basin. Her analysis serves as a useful framework to discuss the same subject with respect to DRC.

*Strengthen policy and institutions:* The fact that political and institutional factors play a critical part in the management of forest resources has been recognized by both the GDRRC and donors.

The World Bank is developing a loan package aimed at reforming relevant forestry laws in the DRC (e.g., the forestry code) and to help create a coordination office within the Ministry of Environment (along with help from FAO), in order to work with other Ministries on issues related to forest policy as well as travel throughout the country to meet with stakeholders. Nonetheless, some actors are apparently working against such reforms such that donors must remain vigilant.

*Assist parties to honor legal/management commitments:* Buzzard (2002) points out that it has been noted that forest degradation would be significantly slowed around the world if governments and industry were to actually implement commitments they have made – locally, nationally and internationally -- to manage and protect their forests (Global Forest Watch 2002). While many countries have taken great strides in enacting laws to protect their forests, in many places regulations are simply not enforced. These points are pertinent to the DRC.

*Combat illegal logging:* Measures to combat illegal logging include improved monitoring, improving governance and accountability and involving communities. In DRC, even the government documents refer to timber production figures as “reported” data with the implication that significant production

goes unreported (Batunyi and Mbala, 2003). As the GDRC moves to increase timber production, the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) recommendations cited by Buzzard (2002) are worth consideration:

- Develop and implement effective monitoring systems that include the use of logtracking, remote sensing and field investigations;
- Provide capacity building and training to communities, non-government groups and law enforcement agencies in various monitoring approaches and tools;
- Develop regional data sharing programs to help identify problem areas that need to be targeted for enforcement; and
- Support and undertake research on the nature, extent, causes and impacts of illegal logging and on potential solutions.

*Promote community participation:* Community participation, and the involvement of civil society are key pieces to achieving conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests, which have often been overlooked. The new forestry code in the DRC makes specific reference to the need to work with local communities to determine areas suitable for timber production zoning as well as to assure both secure tax revenue for these communities and require timber companies to undertake locally agreed upon actions to improve the livelihood of local communities (e.g., build schools and health centers). Donors could facilitate this process through governance activities.

*Land Use Planning:* Land use plans, and/or appropriate land use policy development can provide for a more integrated land use for forests and adjacent lands. Communities should be involved in this process as stakeholders. The new forestry code requires zoning activities to be undertaken with local communities prior to issuing new timber concessions. The World Bank is currently working with government to choose areas for pilot studies and early indications suggest that CBFP landscapes could make ideal sites for such activities.

*Improved monitoring and data analysis:* Improved data and capacity are necessary to improve understanding of economic and ecological alternatives with regard to forest management and utilization. Steps must be taken to improve decision-making, based on sound data, and in the absence of corruption. A multi-donor program "SYGIAP" is currently underway to improve geographic information systems (GIS) capacity in the ICCN and partner organizations, including SPIAF (the forest inventory branch of the Ministry of the Environment). The fact that ICCN is part of the coordination office in the Ministry of the Environment should theoretically facilitate information exchange. However, it is important that efforts to improve data analysis and information exchange continue and that crucial Ministries (e.g., mines) be included in the process.

*Reform forest concession systems and management:* Buzzard (2002) points out the need to reform systems for awarding forest concessions. The new forestry code has gone a long way to addressing concerns with the granting of timber concessions. However, it is apparent and not surprising that some individuals are not happy with these reforms and may be working against them. It is imperative that legislative reforms be implemented (the rules and regulations implementing the forestry code need to be promulgated) and monitored.

*Halt forest corruption:* Steps must be taken to halt corruption in the forestry sector and help to curb its associated environmental effects.

*Adopt a transboundary watershed approach to planning and management:* Buzzard (2002) suggests that in order to protect and sustainably manage tropical forests in the Congo Basin, it is important to recognize the Congo River Basin as a unique watershed that requires integrated management cross-sectorally and at many levels. It is indeed important to have transboundary collaboration on a variety of issues but given the political realities a pragmatic approach will be required.

## **Biodiversity Overview**

The DRC is the single most biologically diverse country on the African continent. It has the highest number of species for almost all groups of organisms with the exception of plants in which it is second to South Africa. It has the highest diversity of mammals (415 species, of which 28 are endemic) and birds (1,094 species of which at least 23 are endemic). Reptiles (268 species, 33 endemic) and amphibians (80 species, 53 endemics) are poorly known and no doubt much remains to be discovered about the true extent of their diversity. Freshwater fish diversity is also high with at least 963 known species. Here again much probably remains to be discovered. Over 11,000 species of higher plant are known for the DRC, of which 3,200 are endemic. The DRC has 12 of Africa's 30 Centers of Plant Endemism as identified by IUCN/WWF lying partly or wholly within its borders. These are Mayombe, Itombwe, Ituri, Maiko National Park, Kahuzi-Biega N.P., Salonga N.P., Haut Shaba, Kundelingu N.P., Upemba N.P., Marungu Highlands, Garamba N.P. and Virunga N.P. It also has two of the Endemic Bird Areas identified by BirdLife International. These are the Albertine Rift Mountains and the East Congo lowlands.

A biodiversity tally shows that DRC possesses more species of birds and mammals than any other African country and is one of the most flora-rich countries on the continent. It ranks sixth highest among countries worldwide for total numbers of mammal species and 9th highest for numbers of birds. What was originally the old Belgian Congo, which included Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, contains about 9,500 species of seed plants and of those already described, approximately 15 percent were considered new to science when included in the *Flore du Congo Belge*. Even with very little botanical exploration over the last decade new species continue to be found including a large tree new to science in the forests of the Ituri only described during the recent war (*Pradosia spinosa*).

### Endemic species

Some of Africa's large mammals can only be found in DRC. The northern White Rhino is known nowhere except on the Congo's north eastern savannas in the Garamba National Park. Grauer's gorilla, or the eastern lowland gorilla, is found further south but only on the DRC's side of the Albertine Rift and in the immediately adjacent lower elevation forests. Further west and north the okapi, a giraffe of DR Congo's closed equatorial forest, which, although the size of a small horse, did not become known to science until the beginning of the 20th century. The bonobo chimpanzee is found further west still in the Congo River's central basin. Among the endemic birds the best known is the Congo Peacock whose nearest relatives are Asian.

Although less spectacular there are many endemic species among smaller mammals and other taxa. Overall at least 10% of plants, 6% of mammals and 32 % of birds are endemic to the country.

The Albertine Rift contains a greater concentration of endemic vertebrates than anywhere else on mainland Africa, and the rift lake, Lake Tanganyika, has the record for endemic fish. Of 325 fish species, 89% are found only in L. Tanganyika. The two rift protected areas in the DRC, Virunga NP and Kahuzi-Biega NP, contain the highest number of endemic vertebrates and plants of all protected areas in the Albertine rift, itself, and probably in all of mainland Africa.

#### Rare and endangered species

The IUCN Red List of threatened or vulnerable species (plants and animals) for the DRC lists a total of 325 species. However the list is almost certainly very incomplete since good quantitative data on status, distribution and trends have never been collected for most plant and animal species in DRC. Notable exceptions are the white rhino and the mountain gorilla.

For the vast majority of species in the DRC knowledge is limited to mere presence/absence information. The table below presents a list of animal species that appear in the IUCN Red List of vulnerable and threatened species for DRC.

<b>Primates:</b>		
<i>Cercopithecus dryas</i>	Dryas Guenon	DD
<i>Cercopithecus hamlyni</i>	Owl-Faced Guenon	LR
<i>Cercopithecus lhoesti</i>	L'hoest's Guenon	LR
<i>Euoticus elegantulus</i>	Elegant Galago	LR
<i>Galago matschiei</i>	Eastern Needle-Clawed Bushbaby	LR
<i>Gorilla beringei</i>	Eastern Gorilla	EN
<i>Gorilla gorilla</i>	Western Gorilla	EN
<i>Lophocebus aterrimus</i>	Black Crested Mangabey	L
<i>Pan paniscus</i>	Bonobo	EN
<i>Pan troglodytes</i>	Chimpanzee	EN
<b>Carnivores</b>		
<i>Acinonyx jubatus</i>	Cheetah	VU
<i>Crocuta crocuta</i>	Spotted Hyena	LR
<i>Lutra maculicollis</i>	Speckle-Throated Otter	VU
<i>Lycaon pictus</i>	African Wild Dog	EN
<i>Osbornictis piscivora</i>	Aquatic Genet	DD
<i>Panthera leo</i>	Lion	VU
<i>Potamogale velox</i>	Otter Shrew	EN
<i>Profelis aurata</i>	African Golden Cat	VU
<b>Hoofed animals</b>		
<i>Cephalophus callipygus</i>	Peter's Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus dorsalis</i>	Bay Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus leucogaster</i>	White-Bellied Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus nigrifrons</i>	Black-Fronted Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus rufilatus</i>	Red-Flanked Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus silvicultor</i>	Yellow-Backed Duiker	LR
<i>Cephalophus weynsi</i>	Weyn's Duiker	LR
<i>Ceratotherium simum</i>	Square-Lipped Rhinoceros	NT
<i>Giraffa camelopardalis</i>	Giraffe	LR

## ANNEX X. Biodiversity and Tropical Forestry Analyses

<i>Hippotragus equinus</i>	Roan Antelope	LR
<i>Hippotragus niger</i>	Sable Antelope	LR
<i>Hyemoschus aquaticus</i>	Water Chevrotain	DD
<i>Kobus ellipsiprymnus</i>	Waterbuck	LR
<i>Kobus kob</i>	Kob	LR
<i>Kobus leche</i>	Lechwe	LR
<i>Kobus vardonii</i>	Puku	LR
<i>Loxodonta africana</i>	African Elephant	EN
<i>Manis temminckii</i>	Cape Pangolin	LR
<i>Neotragus batesi</i>	Bates' Pygmy Antelope	LR
<i>Okapia johnstoni</i>	Okapi	LR
<i>Oreotragus oreotragus</i>	Klipspringer	LR
<i>Ourebia ourebi</i>	Oribi	LR
<i>Redunca redunca</i>	Bohor Reedbuck	LR
<i>Syncerus caffer</i>	African Buffalo	LR
<i>Taurotragus derbianus</i>	Giant Eland	LR
<i>Tragelaphus eurycerus</i>	Bongo	LR
<i>Tragelaphus oryx</i>	Common Eland	LR
<i>Tragelaphus spekii</i>	Sitatinuga	LR
<i>Tragelaphus strepsiceros</i>	Greater Kudu	LR
<b>Bats</b>		
<i>Casinycteris argynnis</i>	Short-Palate Fruit Bat	DD
<i>Micropteropus intermedius</i>	Hayman's Epauletted Fruit Bat	DD
<i>Miniopterus schreibersi</i>	Common Bentwing Bat	LR
<i>Plerotes anchietae</i>	D'anchieta's Fruit Bat	DD
<i>Rhinolophus blasii</i>	Blasius' Horseshoe Bat	LR
<i>Rhinolophus maclaudi</i>	McLaud's Horeshoe Bat	LR
<b>Rodents and shrews</b>		
<i>Crocidura attila</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura caliginea</i>		CR
<i>Crocidura congobelgica</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura kivuana</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura latona</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura monax</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura polia</i>		CR
<i>Crocidura stenocephala</i>		VU
<i>Crocidura zimmeri</i>		VU
<i>Hystrix cristata</i>	Crested Porcupine	LR
<i>Idiurus macrotis</i>	Long-Eared Flying Squirrel	LR
<i>Idiurus zenkeri</i>		LR
<i>Praomys jacksoni</i>		DD
<i>Praomys minor</i>		VU
<i>Praomys mutoni</i>		LR
<i>Ruwenzorisorex suncoides</i>	Ruwenzori Shrew	VU
<b>Marine mammals</b>		
<i>Megaptera novaeangliae</i>	Humpback Whale	VU

<i>Sousa teuszii</i>	Atlantic Hump-Backed Dolphin	DD
<i>Trichechus senegalensis</i>	African Manatee	CE
<b>Reptiles</b>		
<i>Crocodylus cataphractus</i>	African Sharp-Nosed Crocodile	DD
<i>Kinixys erosa</i>	Common Tortoise	DD
<i>Kinixys homeana</i>	Home's Hinge-Back Tortoise	DD
<i>Osteolaemus tetraspis</i>	African Dwarf Crocodile	VU
<i>Pelusios upembae</i>	Upemba Mud Turtle	DD

Categories of threat used in the IUCN Red List are:

- Critically endangered (CE)
- Endangered (EN)
- Vulnerable (VU)
- Near threatened (NT)
- Least concern (LR)
- Data Deficient (DD)

### Species Diversity

Although maps showing relative concentrations of African plant biodiversity are probably generally correct even for the DRC, the best diversity information exists for large mammals such as primates and ungulates. The data are of progressively poorer quality with respect to smaller mammals, amphibians, insects and non-flowering plants for which there is much less information. What is striking about central Africa is the hole left in the center of the DRC when biodiversity surveys are mapped. The few clusters of dots in the DRC represent the better known protected areas and old Belgian research stations (i.e., Yangambi downstream from Kisangani). The vast areas without any information include some of suspected fascinating diversity and of probable importance for protection. But, even when endemism and diversity is only considered for the large mammals and flowering plants, the DRC emerges as being of absolute and critical importance as a global center of biodiversity.

The Congo, in its three segments, has more fish species than any other African river. Lake Tanganyika (ca 32,893 km<sup>2</sup>), the largest lake of the Albertine Rift, contains a unique fauna of about 1,300 species of vertebrates and invertebrates, of which 325 are fish species. Lake Tanganyika is one of the oldest lakes on the continent. Although the lake's fish species have not been fully documented, it has an 89% rate of endemism and is therefore one of the most important areas in the world for freshwater fish conservation.

The primate diversity of DRC is second only to that of Brazil with 37 species from 18 genera. The Ituri forest alone contains 13 diurnal species, unrivalled by any other forest in Africa. Two globally important primate species, with very restricted distributions, occur in the mountains of the Albertine Rift. These are the famous mountain gorilla, *Gorilla gorilla beringei*, occurring in the Virunga volcanoes (astride DRC, Rwanda and Uganda), and the Bwindi Impenetrable Forest in Uganda, and the golden monkey *Cercopithecus mitis kandti* restricted to the Virungas and the Nyungwe Forest (Rwanda). The mountain gorilla population numbers little more than 600 individuals. However numbers are stable despite the recent war thanks largely to the sustained support that the Congolese authorities have received from the international conservation community. On the eastern side of the Albertine Rift fragmented populations of Grauer's gorilla (*G.g.graueri*) live in the high and mid altitude forests. The population was estimated to be approximately 17,000 in 1996 (Hall et al., 1998) but it is known that many

populations of this sub species, particularly in and around the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, have suffered severe poaching during the recent armed conflict. It is worth noting that the Mountain and Grauer's gorillas represent a very significant economic resource for the country. At the end of the 1980's the gorillas of Kahuzi-Biega NP and Virunga NP were receiving around 8,000 visitors per year, and generating nearly \$1 million annually from the sale of gorilla viewing permits.

Further east the endemic pygmy chimpanzee, or bonobo (*Pan paniscus*), is restricted to low altitude forests to the south of the Congo River. Its range is thought to be quite large (>800,000 km<sup>2</sup>) but its distribution within this range is poorly known and is suspected to be quite patchy. Considered to be genetically the closet relative to man it was not discovered until 1935. Other mammals endemic to the DRC rainforest, and only discovered in the course of the 20th century include a forest giraffe, the Okapi (*Okapia johnstoni*), the aquatic genet (*Osbornictus piscivora*) and the Salonga monkey (*Cercopithecus dryas*) of which the first adult specimen was found in 1985.

The DRC has a high antelope diversity with 30 species. These include the bongo (*Tragelaphus euryceros*), the swamp dwelling sitatunga (*Tragelaphus spekei*) and eight species of forest duiker (*Cephalophus* sp).

Finally the emblematic northern white rhino (*Ceratotherium simum cottoni*) is endemic to the savannas of the Garamba National Park in northern DRC. This last remaining population is very seriously threatened and numbers little more than 35 individuals.

The DRC has a coastal section of little more than 40 km comprised essentially of the Congo River delta. The Réserve de Mangroves covers 66,000 hectares and includes 226 km<sup>2</sup> of mangrove forest. The mangrove ecosystem provides a nursery and breeding ground for many of the species of fish exploited commercially. Although a full inventory of the fauna and flora of the reserve has never been undertaken, the principal plant species are *Rhizophora racemosa*, *Rhizophora mangle*, *Avicennia nitida*, *Avicennia tomentosa*, *Hibiscus tiliaceus*, and *Acrostihum aureum*, with restricted localized communities of *Conocarpus erectus* and *Laguncularia racemosa*.

Wildlife species of this zone include the critically endangered West African manatee (*Trichechus senegalensis*), the hippopotamus (*H. amphibius*) and the sitatunga (*Tragelaphus spekei*). Three species of marine turtle, *Dermochelys coriacea*, *Chelonia mydas*, and *Eretmochelys imbricate* are known to be present and a fourth, *Lepidochelys olivacea*, is suspected to be present. Freshwater fish species include *Lamprologus lethops*, *Haplochromis fasciatus*, *Oreochromis lepidurus* but there are no quantitative data on species diversity and rates of endemism.

## **Threats to Biodiversity in the DRC**

### **Agriculture in previously remote areas**

The tropical forests in the Democratic Republic of Congo are at risk with the greatest threats being in areas of high population density. It is likely that these threats will soon be compounded in some areas by intense development and international investment. The latter will bring improved roads and other communication and transportation networks opening up areas that were previously nearly inaccessible. The human population is increasing at greater than 3% per year with some of the greatest growth and density being in forest frontier areas. Overall 70% of DRC's population is rural and surviving on extensive, land demanding, agricultural techniques such as slash and burn agriculture.

The demand for agricultural land is therefore increasing. Poor transportation networks make delivery of agricultural produce difficult so that wherever populations move agriculture also moves, with the result that halos of new cultivation radiate out from remote illegal mining camps, camps of displaced persons, military camps and also from the camps of militias of numerous affiliations that are scattered through the forest of eastern DRC. Extensive conversion of the forest to non-forest land cover occurs, therefore, not only as a steady eating in from the edges but also as multiple interior disintegration.

Human movements and anarchistic distribution of farmland is partly a result of unclear land tenure. This problem must be tackled through zoning and the zoning should be grass roots in its approach. Different zoned units should have management plans such that protected areas, forest concessions, and community farming zones all have plans for land management.

Simultaneously, it is critical to explore livelihood alternatives for rural populations, and empower them to develop new enterprises and activities that incorporate sustainable natural resources management. The rate of increase of rural populations is lower than that of urban areas, but the actual numbers of people in rural areas is increasing. The geographic position of livelihood activities is crucial such that they serve to pull people away from areas zoned for protection rather than attract immigrant populations towards protected areas.

## **Mining**

The separation between the Mining Ministry and the Environment Ministry has allowed for a disturbing distribution of mining concessions. In eastern DRC these completely ignore the distribution of protected areas such as the Okapi Faunal Reserve that, on paper, has been entirely covered by "legal" concessions. DRC's mineral wealth is, itself, a threat if in the rush to develop it environmental concerns are not taken into account.

During the war years when the government could not control the exploitation of its mineral rich eastern provinces, many of the parks (Okapi, Kahuzi-Biega, and Maiko in particular) were over-run by small scale extractive operations. It would be a failure if the post-war mining development only increased the size of mining operations without any increase in their environmental accountability. Environmental considerations should include not only the methods of extraction but also the location, protected areas must indeed be protected.

## **Hunting and bushmeat trade**

Whereas the armed conflict and ensuing anarchy in eastern DRC reduced development dependent on infrastructure, bushmeat hunting increased. Whole villages forced to abandon gardens depended almost solely on bushmeat. This was the case during several gardening cycles in the Ituri forest and in areas of southern Kivu. Furthermore, large military camps in the Ituri forest fed themselves on bushmeat and sold bushmeat in nearby markets in order to gain petty cash. The increase in arms and munitions has filtered throughout the population with local hunters working for the military. Significant quantities of bushmeat were and are transported by bicycle regardless of the conditions of the roads. Even as peace is established, the increase in arms and the lack of alternate livelihoods is likely to maintain the importance of bushmeat. Around the forest town of Beni and to a distance of 50 kilometers there is no longer any game meat except that of the smallest animals (porcupines and squirrels, Mapilanga unpublished report). In the remote Okapi Faunal Reserve pygmies are having to

hunt at greater and greater distances from the road in order to assure a catch (Tshikaya, unpublished report). Despite the increase in bushmeat dependence in the east, associated with anarchy, the phenomenon is not limited to the war zones. Bushmeat is favored and continues to be brought into the metropolis of Kinshasa. In order to feed Kinshasa's markets, enterprising *comerçantes* purchase game from hunters using the Salonga National Park (Ilambu, personal communication), a park mainly in the Equateur Province. Any road system that penetrates into previously un hunted areas will open up new source areas for the bushmeat trade. At a commercial scale, bushmeat hunting has nowhere been shown to be sustainable (Bennett, personal communication)

### **Habitat loss**

Although mining and bushmeat hunting are likely to lead to empty forests; it is the first threat, agriculture, that will lead to forest conversion. Some of the DRC's better known animals depend on large areas of forest: elephant, okapi, Grauer's gorilla, bonobo. Beyond these highly visible large mammals, the IUCN Red List of threatened species lists over 300 species. This means that many species are likely to disappear from areas as the forest gets broken and divided into smaller remnants. This is already the case around populated forest borders. Any activity that facilitates the movement of people and establishment of agriculture will lead to habitat loss. Road building will certainly dictate the geographic direction of major habitat loss. The effects can be diminished if prior to road building, there are environmental impact statements and, where a choice of location is possible, that the choice least likely to pull people to unpopulated zones is chosen.

### **Analysis of Actions necessary to Conserve Biodiversity in the DRC**

The actions necessary to conserve biodiversity in DRC include:

- Inventory and protect key areas of biodiversity that are not now protected. Take steps to integrate protected areas with other surrounding land uses.
- Inventory protected areas affected by the war and take steps to increase their protection.
- Develop multiple use areas as buffer zones around protected areas and include the local populations in the management of these buffer zones.
- Produce management plans for all protected areas based on good biological and socio-economic information and implement them.
- Curb illegal bushmeat hunting – through both protection and incentives.
- Produce zoning and management plans throughout the Congolese landscape.
- Assure that development activities, including road building, are accompanied by environmental assessments.
- Assure the inclusion of environmental concerns in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper.
- Expand community conservation programs: Involve communities – and empower them to manage in a sustainable manner.

- Strengthen institutions and public-private-community linkages.
- Improve laws, policies and governance pertaining to the environment.

### **Analysis of the Extent to Which Activities Proposed for Support in the new ISP Meet the Needs Identified**

Actions necessary to achieve conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests.

#### **Action Required**

- Strengthen policy and institutions
- Assist to implement commitments
- Combat illegal logging
- Promote community participation
- Undertake land use planning
- Improved monitoring and data analysis
- Reform forest concession and management
- Halt forest corruption
- Adopt a trans-boundary watershed approach to planning and management

#### **Response Initiatives in the DRC**

CBFP, CARPE, IBRD  
 IBRD  
 CBFP, CARPE  
 Mission, Livelihoods, DG SOs  
 CARPE, IBRD  
 CARPE  
 IBRD  
 Mission, DG SO  
 CBFP, CARPE

The extent to which activities proposed under the ISP meet the needs for conservation and sustainable management of tropical forests.

The proposed USAID/DRC ISP and the activities thereunder will respond to only a subset of the needs identified. The Mission will undertake significant activities in the area of promoting community participation in identification of areas suitable for timber production, and areas that will not be utilized for timber production. These activities will involve working with communities in general and specific ways to empower them to make decisions affecting the community. The intervention approach chosen to work with communities in the Livelihoods SO relies heavily on community decision making. The DG program's activities will likewise work with communities to promote self-determination of development needs. OTI's program and the community-support aspect of the DDR program will involve significant community participation. The community structures created and supported through these activities are expected to make a significant long-term impact in areas adjacent to or bordering forested areas.

The Mission's DG SO will have an impact on reducing forest corruption, and the Livelihoods SO will increasingly target this issue as well. The Mission's transportation axis-based anticorruption activity has attracted a very high level of interest within the GDRC and operates through participatory needs identification and exposure of corrupt practices. These activities will be continued under the Livelihoods SO, and could be further strengthened under the DG SO were sufficient funds to be available. Empowerment of communities will tend to have the indirect effect reducing the space for corrupt activities by strengthening local capacity to resist or counter such practices.

As indicated above, USAID has put in place coordinating and operational structures that are designed specifically to address conservation and sustainable management of the DRC's tropical forests. The Congo Basin Forest Partnership and the CARPE program were created and established to serve this end across the entire Congo river basin. The CBFP/CARPE Presidential Initiative's activities will meet many

of the identified needs in this area during the strategy period. The World Bank's involvement is also significant, particularly in the area of the legislation required for sustainable forest management. The USAID/DRC program, recognizing that the CBFP/CARPE and IBRD programs are designed and funded to respond to the challenges of sustainable forest management, has decided not duplicate efforts in this area, but rather reinforce support of the CARPE efforts in the areas of community participation and anti-corruption through the ISP.

Actions necessary to achieve conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity.

### Action Required

- Inventory and protect key areas of biodiversity that are not currently protected
- Inventory protected areas affected by the war and increase their protection
- Develop multiple use areas as buffer zones around protected areas and include the local population in the management thereof
- Produce management plans for all protected areas
- Curb illegal bushmeat production and trade
- Produce zoning and management plans
- Ensure development activities including road building have environmental assessments
- Ensure the inclusion of environmental concerns in the PRSP
- Expand community conservation programs
- Strengthen institutions and community linkages
- Improve laws, policies and governance pertaining to the environment

### Response Initiatives in the DRC

CARPE, CBFP

UNESCO, GTZ

CARPE, French Cooperation, EU

CARPE, IUCN

CARPE, CBFP  
UNESCO, UNDP, EU  
IBRD

IBRD

CARPE, UNDP  
UNDP, Mission

OSAFAC, IBRD  
Mission

The extent to which activities proposed under the ISP meet the needs for conservation and sustainable management of biodiversity.

ISP activities planned will partially respond to the last and second to last needs identified above. As detailed in the tropical forests section, community management capacities will be strengthened under the Livelihoods SO, and local governance strengthened through the Livelihoods, DG and DDR SOs with OTI initiatives further strengthening community management. These efforts, in areas contiguous to areas of biodiversity importance, are expected to increase informed community management of natural resources, including the biodiversity resource in the DRC.

The international community has long been keenly interested in biodiversity conservation in the DRC. Indeed, rare fauna and flora identification and protection was the overriding interest of the international environmental community, to the virtual exclusion of all other environmental interests in the DRC, until recent times. That interest remains, and the funding made available from a plethora of international actors continues to flow. The table above is only a very partial listing of actors involved in this sector in the DRC. The CBFP/CARPE program is the USG's main investment in biodiversity

conservation in the DRC, and will work towards responding to the identified needs in virtually all areas identified. The Mission does not intend to invest in activities under this ISP in the need areas identified for biodiversity conservation as those needs will be met through the activities of other donors and the activities under the CBFP/CARPE, security conditions permitting.

CARPE is a stand-alone regional Strategic Objective managed by USAID/DRC. However, the CARPE SO (and the CARPE program, by extension) does not form part of this ISP.

### **SO-Level Recommendations for Responding to Opportunities and Threats with Regards to Conservation and Sustainable Use of Tropical Forests and Biodiversity**

#### Health Strategic Objective

Human population growth rates in eastern DRC in the areas bordering Uganda and Rwanda are among the highest in Africa. This area also happens to be one of the most important areas for biodiversity conservation in Africa. Be it birds, plants, fish, or mammals, the Albertine Rift region has phenomenal rates of endemism and extraordinarily high levels of diversity. The human population places tremendous pressure on the environment for land conversion to agriculture and harvesting of wood for fuel. The USAID HIV/AIDS prevention program could provide an opportunity to become involved in family planning activities. Such activities would not only be expected to have positive impacts on the environment but also improve the overall health and economic status of the families involved.

Placement of health facilities is also critical and a major factor in the distribution of population centers. This can be either positive or negative with respect to biodiversity conservation. A major health center within a protected area (or logging concession) would pull immigrants into the protected area (or concession). But it is also true that at a distance of 30 to 60 km a health center could encourage emigration from the protected area of potential poachers, miners, etc. and thus have an important positive impact. This might be considered in future collaborations between USAID funded health programs and CBFP. When such synergies are sought, it is important that local people be made aware that the presence of the protected area is one reason for the health center financing. It is important that people get a feeling for some of the positive benefits of protected areas as opposed to simply thinking of them in terms of restrictions.

#### Democracy Strategic Objective

Good governance, the rule of law, and the ability to participate in the selection of individuals called upon to make policy and decisions that both affect the quality of daily life and set the course for the future are extremely important for environmental management. Assuming the thoughtful implementation of governance activities these should enhance the long-term protection of biodiversity and maintenance of forest cover. Nevertheless, governments do have the right and obligation to set a national policy and promulgate and enforce laws that provide for the long term protection and sustainable use of biodiversity and forest resources. While communities must be afforded the opportunity to participate in decisions that affect them, there will none the less be rules, regulations and laws written with long-term sustainability in mind that are unpopular in selected communities.

The government has recently rewritten or is currently considering rewriting laws on mining, forestry, nature conservation, and land use (*affaires fonciers*) with careful consideration of balancing long term economic and sustainability interests while at the same time affording communities the opportunity to

participate in activities such as zoning. Governance activities should enhance community participation in efforts such as zoning while at the same time help communities understand the process by which decisions are made that are in the interest of the nation but not necessarily in the short-term interests of a particular group.

An example of how USAID funded governance activities could make a positive impact in this arena lies with the new forestry law. The Forestry Code was signed into law in August 2002 and the rules and regulations implementing the law are currently being written. The law provides for community participation in zoning areas for timber production and requires timber companies, through a *cahier de charge* (an official document listing the rights and responsibilities of the timber company managing the concession) to list social obligations such as the construction of schools and health centers. Governance programs located adjacent to timber lands could facilitate community participation in these activities. In addition, the law calls for the sharing of revenues generated from the surface area tax applied to timber concessions. These will amount to substantial revenues to be shared at both the provincial and local government levels. Governance activities could help assure the correct transfer of funds to the local level. At the same time, they should help communities understand that the laws/rules governing timber concessions are to be respected and that the arrival of a concession is not an invitation to use company infrastructures to facilitate the commercialization of the bush meat trade. Communities should also be helped to understand that once zoned as a forest concession, land is off limits for agricultural activities.

#### Livelihoods Strategic Objective

Work in the agriculture sector is critically important to improving the well being and economic status of those who need it the most. USAID livelihood projects have the opportunity to enhance the long term protection of biodiversity and tropical forests by promoting sustainable use. Activities can also help orient people away from critical protected areas as well as other areas highlighted as important for conservation. At the same time, livelihood projects that do not plan for possible negative environmental consequences run the risk of contributing to the degradation and/or loss of forest cover and biodiversity.

The livelihoods strategic plan states that the program intends to improve transportation networks in selected areas with the intention of improving access to markets for agricultural goods. While absolutely essential to improving the economic status and well being of isolated rural populations, such activities could have a negative effect on the environment, facilitating the overexploitation of natural resources by bringing down transportation costs for bush meat as well as facilitating human immigration into remote regions. This is particularly important as the USAID livelihoods program is working in a CBFP landscape in the Province of Equateur. Community-based natural resource management efforts are a critical component of the biodiversity conservation puzzle. However, improving transportation infrastructure here could have negative effects such as facilitating the commercial bush meat trade. This is important to keep in mind, as there has never been a case of sustainable harvest of bush meat when trade has been commercialized (L. Bennett, personal communication). To the extent that facilitating human movement between commercial centers and remote areas is a component of this or any livelihood project working in or adjacent to areas of high biodiversity importance, measures should be taken to mitigate such potential problems. It is critical that the ICCN and other state institutions be contacted and brought into the planning process when such activities are to be undertaken. This will not only help avoid unintended consequences but could play a positive role by acknowledging the importance of protected areas.

## DDR Special Objective

Much of the combat that has taken place over the course of the recent war has taken place in or adjacent to some of the most important areas for biodiversity conservation in Africa: Virunga National Park, Kahuzi-Biega National Park, Maiko National Park, Salonga National Park, the Okapi Wildlife Reserve, and the Itombwe Forest. All factions have been implicated with pillaging resources including ivory poaching, mining (coltan, cassiterite, diamonds, and gold), and bushmeat hunting both within and outside protected areas. In addition, the instability within the regions of eastern DRC has facilitated the occupation of protected areas for cattle farming and the exploitation of forests for charcoal production.

Given the geographic position of the various warring factions in relation to key protected areas at the end of hostilities and the fact that the majority of the combatants will be demobilized, the locations of demobilization activities and how they are undertaken will be critical to the future viability of critical areas for biodiversity conservation and the protection of tropical forests in Africa.

Activities need to be geographically oriented away from areas deemed important for biodiversity protection. If properly implemented these activities could help take pressure off these areas and actually improve the prognosis for successful long term conservation of these areas. This is due to the fact that many of the current pressures are directly related to military, armed irregulars, and rural militias. It will be critically important that NGOs financed to assist in demobilization activities be aware of the proximity of national parks, reserves and other areas of critical ecological value and contact protected area managers. It will be important for those undertaking public works activities or offering assistance through more traditional development activities to take the necessary precautions to reduce the negative impacts on biodiversity and tropical forests.

## ANNEX XI. ACRONYMS

ADB	African Development Bank
AEI	Africa Education Initiative
AGOA	Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
CARPE	Central African Program for the Environment
CBFP	Congo Basin Forest Partnership
CBJ	Congressional Budget Justification
CBOs	Community Based Organizations
CEPPS	Consortium for Elections and Political Processes Strengthening
CF	Congolese Franc
CG	Consultative Group
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CSH	Child Survival and Health
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSP	Country Strategic Plan
CVA	Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
CY	Calendar Year
DA	Development Assistance
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAI	Development Alternatives Incorporated
DAP	Development Assistance Program
DCHA	Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Affairs
DCOF	Displaced Children and Orphans fund
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement, and Reintegration
DFID	Department of International Development
DG	Democracy and Governance
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DOTS	Directly Observed Treatment Strategy
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EERP	Emergency Early Recovery Project
EMOP	Emergency Operations
EMRRP	Emergency Multi-Sector Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Project
EPI	Expanded Program on Immunization
ESF	Economic Support Fund
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FFP	Food for Peace
GAVI	Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GDA	Global Development Alliance
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDRC	Government of the DRC
GFATM	Global Fund for AIDs, Tuberculosis and Malaria
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ANNEX XII. Acronyms

ICD	Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICC	Inter-agency Coordinating Committee
ICT	Information Communication Technologies
IDA	International Disaster Assistance
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IFES	International Foundation for Election Systems
IFESH	International Foundation for Education and Self-Help
IHRLG	International Human Rights Law Group
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPT	Intermittent Preventive Treatment
I-PRSP	Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
IR	Intermediate Result
IRM	Innovative Resources Management
ISP	Integrated Strategic Plan
ITN	Insecticide Treated Bed Nets
MCA	Millennium Challenge Account
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
MONUC	United Nations Observer Mission to the Congo
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NMCP	National Malaria Control Program
NTP	National Tuberculosis Program
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ORT	Oral Rehydration Therapy
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PLWHA	People Living With HIV/AIDs
PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
PMTCT	Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PVC	Private Voluntary Corporation
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
RCD-G	Rassemblement Congolais Pour la Democratie -Goma
RF	Results Framework
SC	Separated Child
SFCG	Search for Common Ground
SO	Strategic Objective
SOAG	Strategic Objective Agreement
SpO	Special Objective
SRSG	United Nations Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STI	Sexual Transmitted Infection
TA	Technical Assistance
TB	Tuberculosis
TG	Transitional Government

ANNEX XII. Acronyms

TIP	Trafficking in Persons
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
TSS	Transitional Support Strategy
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNFPA	United Nations Fund for Populations Activities
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
US	United States
USDH	United States Direct Hire
USG	United States Government
USPSC	United States Personal Services Contractor
VCT	Voluntary Counseling and Testing
VOT	Victims of Torture
WVF	War Victims Fund
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organization