




# POST-EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO DISPLACED GROUPS & RECEPTOR COMMUNITIES



Seventh Quarter Report  
April - June 2002



IOM • OIM



United States Agency for  
International Development

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## I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Through the end of June 2002, the Program for Post-Emergency Assistance for Displaced Groups and Receptor Communities was working in 52 municipalities from the original six offices and 4 from the new office in Chocó to the direct benefit of more than 190 thousand displaced and receptor families. In the approval of 250 projects with an average IOM/USAID contribution of 30,000 USD, the Program has effectively concluded the first phase of project identification, pending new resources for further activities.

Under the Assistance Projects budgetary line, the Program has expended a total of 4,733,325 USD since the Program's start in October 2000 and holds the remaining 2,673,489 USD in unliquidated obligations to be disbursed according to the delivery and financial expenditures of the Program's implementing agents. Under all lines, the Program has expended 7,561,282 USD as of the end of the reporting period.

During the last quarter alone, new obligations in the amount of 1,193,909 were acquired through the approval of 55 new projects, predominantly in the departments of Nariño, Valle del Cauca and Norte de Santander and focusing on the components of Education and Housing, followed by Community Stabilization and Income Generation.

Another important development in the Program has been the start of activities in the department of Chocó; although IOM had not planned to establish the Program here until the formal approval of the extension, alongside the departments of Cauca and Huila, the horrific events in Chocó and Antioquia during the month of May and the ensuing exodus of persons to Quibdó prompted a decision by IOM and USAID to take immediate action. A permanent presence was established in mid-May and through the end of the reporting period, 7 projects had been approved in Chocó (three are ongoing and one has been completed already) representing an obligation in funds of 149,695 US Dollars.<sup>1</sup> An equal number of projects have been identified for development and approval in the first months of the next quarter.

### *Contents of the Report*

In the following section, recent developments and trends in the Colombian conflict and its most visible manifestation – internal displacement – are reviewed with special emphasis on the most recent tactics employed by the armed groups and changes in the geographical distribution of IDPs within each department.

In order to update the Program's understanding of the profile and priorities of its beneficiaries and in light of the production of valuable data by program counterparts, Section III includes a list of documents prepared by implementing agencies with information on the target group, followed by selected results on IDP backgrounds and present living conditions.

In section IV, a progress report is organized according to area of activity with emphasis on financial distribution between components and new projects approved during the last three months. Section V is also organized according to components and was prepared with reference to an exercise carried out by Bogotá and field-based staff to select best practices and lessons learned in several areas of activity, as a necessary input for the design of interventions in the next phase of project identification.

Section VI includes summary data on the context of each department, followed by summary information on the Program's intervention to date and new projects developed in the last quarter. A special report on Chocó is provided with contextual and programmatic information.

The supplemental report includes Project Cards and Status Summaries on all ongoing and new projects, as well as a Table on Completed Projects.

## II. NATIONAL CONTEXT

### *Context Notes on Conflict:*

In the last six months and particularly since the collapse in peace dialogues between FARC and the Government of Colombia last February, conflict has escalated with particular brutality in border areas where the guerrilla is making a concerted effort to regain control over strategic corridors lost to the paramilitaries in 2000 and 2001. Another zone of fierce combat is the Pacific Coast, affecting both Valle del Cauca and Nariño (Tumaco and Barbacoas) – the latter department brought full-scale into the conflict and drug wars after years of marginal participation.

As illustrated in several of the departmental contexts in the report, both paramilitaries and FARC have noticeably switched tactics over the last year. Although the number of deaths in 2001 attributed to FARC versus to AUC do not differ dramatically at 1,028 and 1,060 persons, respectively; the methods that characterize the groups vary. Particularly in the wake of the Alto Naya massacre in Cauca last year, the paramilitaries were bombarded in the press for their horrific and brutal massacres of civilians. Since then, the paramilitaries have generally opted for selective killings in public places over massacres (defined by the Ministry of Defense as the simultaneous murder of 4 persons or more) The Post notes that: “The small-scale killings mark a departure from the massacres that have been a hallmark of Colombia’s bloody civil war...” The end results, however, do not differ as much as one might expect: In 2000, the AUC was responsible for 105 massacres with a toll of 701 victims, while in 2001, the number of massacres was less than half at 42 and the number of massacre victims fell to 281; nonetheless, the total number of deaths attributed to paramilitaries in 2001 demonstrated a slight increase (16 additional victims) over the year 2000.<sup>2</sup>

The switch in FARC military tactics is more recent. Following the rupture in peace talks, the FARC was less prone to direct confrontation with the army or paramilitaries than pundits had predicted and instead dedicated efforts to acts of terrorism. In the last three months, however, the FARC has made a marked effort to recover territories lost to paramilitaries. The most clear-cut example of this policy is in the Middle Atrato region in the Urabá region of Antioquia and Chocó, though the FARC is increasing pressure on Caquetá and Putumayo in the South, as well.

Another FARC maneuver that has impacted all six departments of the Program’s original coverage has been the issuance of death threats to mayors and municipal council members. The tactic has led not a few to draw comparisons with the Sendero Luminoso and even the Khmer Rouge,<sup>3</sup> and intended to create a power vacuum at the local level, started with the departments of Arauca, Caquetá, Huila, followed by Santander and Norte Santander and eventually most of the departments in the country. Sustained pressure in municipalities like San Vicente del Caguán led to mass resignations at the end of June by the entire municipal staff – excepting the mayor, Nestor León Ramírez – in spite to the empty central government “refusal” to accept resignation papers. In Nariño and Valle del Cauca, the governors’ offices have redoubled security conditions for their mayors, but remain concerned particularly of municipalities lacking state security forces; in the case of Nariño, 19 municipalities are in this precarious situation. Although concern is focused on mayors, it is important to note that municipal councils have been impacted as well: in mid-June it is estimated that at least 100 councils were unable to meet due to security considerations.

Although few workable solutions have been devised, the Colombian government and international community have responded with outspoken condemnation and the US Ambassador to the country has offered assistance in protection. The OAS has warned the FARC that any murder of mayors will be perceived as a grave act of terrorism and deplored as such by OAS member states.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> Washington Post, 24 June 2002

<sup>3</sup> Semana Magazine July 2002 (A. Caballero)

<sup>4</sup> Caracol Website, June 27 2002


**Context Notes on Displacement:**

Since the start of program activities at the end of 2000 through to the end of the current reporting period, the number of RSS-registered IDPs in the six departments in the Program's original AOR has increased five-fold to 150,287 persons. Although this number likely underestimates the number of displaced persons, it is widely perceived that the RSS registry has improved and that the gap between civil society and governmental figures is closing gradually.

Throughout 2001, a geographical expansion in reception of IDPs was reported in terms of the increasing number of "most affected municipalities." A positive correlation existed between the growth in IDP numbers and the number of municipalities that together receive 85% or more of displaced persons in any given department, implying that the burden of absorption was taken on by an ever-increasing number of cities and towns. This trend has not been sustained in the first semester of this year, where the number of municipalities has remained constant despite the skyrocketing tendency in displacement figures. Possible explanations for this include over-saturation of mid-sized towns and the difficulties faced by the RSS in reaching isolated municipalities due to increased security concerns.

Another explanation, however, relates directly to the conflict and displacement patterns. One tendency noted in Putumayo during the last quarter in which the presence of armed groups in municipal capitals has altered the standard displacement route; rather than pass through (and register) in the nearest municipal capital and later travel on to the departmental capital and major cities, IDPs are migrating from rural areas directly to Mocoa and cities further north. This is likely true also in Caquetá, where the municipalities of Cartagena del Chairá and Valparaiso – once key receptors – are no longer considered safe by IDP families.

**Chart 1: Displaced Population (RSS) and Most Affected Municipalities**



### **III. BENEFICIARY PROFILE**

The Field Survey and Needs Assessment carried out in the first semester of implementation provided IOM with a photograph of the average beneficiary family, particularly in terms of the programmatic priorities laid out under the Program in its design. Aside from demographic data, the survey provided information on access to education and health services, living conditions, social and economic histories and income generation practices of the head of household and family as a whole. Moreover, the survey obtained data on overall priorities (health, housing and employment were consistently rated as the top three areas of concern) and more specific priorities within those areas of concern to be addressed under the Program.

However, this information requires fine-tuning for the implementation of specific interventions and needs to be updated to reflect changes in the beneficiary group on account of several situations. First, the origin and profile of IDPs in municipalities covered under the Program has changed in many departments:

- In Nariño, the Field Survey indicated that living conditions were slightly better for IDPs here than in other departments; this is a likely consequence of the fact that most IDPs at this time were arriving from Putumayo with some cash in their pockets. As the percentage of IDPs from Nariño itself increases – particularly from poor African Colombian towns along the Pacific Coast – these conclusions are unlikely to hold.
- In Caquetá during the time of the survey and through to the end of 2001, most IDPs had been resettled in Florencia for 2-3 years; new IDPs arriving in that time were those who had least to lose in migrating, i.e. families without legal title to land and generally without traditional “roots” in the municipality of expulsion. Particularly since the collapse in peace talks and the FARC efforts to re-dominate the department, more and more IDPs are long-term Caquetá residents with small plots of land, left behind at the moment of displacement.

A second reason that continuous updating of the Program’s understanding of the beneficiary profile is that the Field Survey concentrated on larger cities due to the geographical focus on the program at that time. In the last year, the Post-Emergency Program has been able to reach more isolated municipalities to address expulsion and reception simultaneously. With a smaller sample in non-departmental capitals (30% of the total survey sample) it is evident that conditions in these cities differ in important ways; from the family make-up (with a larger number of elders and a smaller number of children) to their housing conditions to the incidence of illegal or irregular conduct in neighborhoods, living conditions vary for IDPs between smaller and larger cities.

Although the Post-Emergency Program prioritizes action-oriented projects over academic exercises in beneficiary profiling and researching, many of the Program’s implementers either incorporated an initial phase of participatory surveying and needs assessment or systematized the results of their projects in a manner that allows IOM improved and updated understanding of the beneficiaries. The methodologies of these surveys are neither consistent nor statistically relevant, but taken together provide valuable insight into the conditions of IDPs in the Program’s area of responsibility.

The most important of these studies are in the following table and selected results are presented on the following page:

Table 1: Surveys and Results on Beneficiary Profile

<i>Survey Title</i>	<i>Department</i>	<i>Area of Study</i>	<i>Sample</i>
Survey Reports of Women Heads of Household	Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca	Needs, priorities and capabilities of AMUCIB members	18 women
Survey on IDP Organization Patterns	Bucaramanga, Santander	History and status of grassroots organizational structures employed by IDPs	N/A
<sup>3</sup> Legal and Psychosocial Survey of Heads of Household	Cali, Valle del Cauca	Needs and priorities of IDPs in depressed urban areas (Cali)	124 participants
Profile of IDPs in Cali	Cali, Valle del Cauca	General profile of persons seeking shelter at the center for IDPs	60 families
Health Outreach Program – Diagnostic Results	Exprovincia de Obando, Nariño	Health of displaced and vulnerable families	348 Families
Social and Economic Profile	Exprovincia de Obando, Nariño	Profile: Displaced families	211 Families
Youth Needs Assessment	Florencia, Caquetá	Youths' needs and priorities	104 Youths
Beneficiary Identification for Small Loans Project	Florencia, Caquetá	Profile: heads of household	182 Adults
Survey of Independent (Informal) Businesspersons	Florencia, Caquetá	Informal economy practices	200 Adults
Needs Assessment for Displaced Families in Leguízamo	Leguízamo, Putumayo	Profile and needs assessment	45 Families
Psychosocial Welfare Study	Mocoa, Putumayo	Psychosocial welfare of IDPs	237 persons
Health Outreach Program – Diagnostic Results	Pasto, Nariño	Health of displaced and vulnerable families	500 Families
Construyendo Caminos – Psychosocial Assistance Diagnostic Results	Pasto, Nariño	Psychosocial welfare of IDPs	250 Adults
Participatory Needs Assessment in Rio Viejo	Rio Viejo, Bolivar	Needs assessment and development plan for return	N/A
Community Organization Results (Pastoral Social)	Samaniego, Nariño	Profile: IDPs in rural areas	565 Persons
Health Outreach Program – Diagnostic Results	Taminango, Pasto	Health of displaced and vulnerable families	375 Families

### SELECTED RESULTS

#### **Youths**

In the IOM Field Survey, 31% of the population was aged between 7 – 17 years of age, significantly larger than the percentage occupied by this age group in national statistics for the average Colombian family (22%). This group requires special attention on account of their number; lack of educational and labor opportunities; their susceptibility to delinquent behavior, drug-use, adolescent pregnancy and recruitment by armed groups; and the impact of displacement and mal-adjustment on their psychological welfare.

In Caquetá, a survey with 104 displaced and vulnerable youths in Caquetá confirmed their rural origins, minimal educational background and their tendency to start working and start sexual relations at a very young age. Adolescents who have been out of school for several years demonstrate little interest in returning to the classroom. Unlike their parents, displaced adolescents tend to define themselves as city-dwellers and renounce their rural origins earlier than their adult counterparts. Training interests for this group focus on computer training, motorcycle maintenance, woodworking and accounting.

### **Housing**

Subsequent surveys to the IOM Field Survey confirm low rates of home ownership ranging between 23 and 34 percent. In both Valle del Cauca and Nariño, surveys demonstrate that extreme crowding conditions are found in homes – particularly in those cases where IDPs are staying with family members and/or renting one bedroom. The percentage of families residing in extremely crowded conditions is cited in Nariño as ranging between 52% and 77%.

### **Family**

A little more than half of the families are “complete” in the sense that all members of the nuclear family unit are together. Approximately 30% of families are “incomplete,” due to the absence of a member of the nuclear unit; in one quarter of these families, a violent death has occurred and in another 8% of these, a family member has been “disappeared.” (Putumayo)

### **Land**

In Caquetá, 72% of families included in one survey claimed to have access or ownership to land on which agricultural production was carried out on a small scale with corn, plantain, yucca, pigs, poultry). In almost all cases, the land was abandoned. In Valle del Cauca, little under half of families in a survey had land prior to displacement – none of these families had the necessary documentation, either because they had never carried out the necessary paperwork, or had left it behind or had it taken away or destroyed by armed groups.

### **Reasons for Displacement**

Although this question was included in the IOM Field Survey, complete frankness was not requested, particularly regarding attributions to specific groups. Implementing agencies are able to inquire in greater depth regarding reasons for displacement once these have built confidence with the beneficiaries. Three interesting results

Both in Caquetá and Valle del Cauca, avoiding forced recruitment of a family member was cited as a key factor with greater frequency than indicated by official statistics – in Caquetá, 23% of respondents provided this explanation.

In Nariño, the primary receptor of families uprooted from Putumayo, 4% of families in Pasto and 22% in Valle del Obando cited fumigation as the primary cause for their migration.

The guerrilla was cited more often than paramilitaries by displaced persons from Putumayo as the agent of their displacement.

### **Informal Economy**

This data is provided as a result of the beneficiary selection process for micro-credit programs:

- ✓ Children take care of the family business on a regular basis in more than half of the businesses (Caquetá)
- ✓ Forty-one percent of businesses require a time dedication of 12 hours daily (Caquetá)
- ✓ The average income of a family business in food sales among the beneficiary group is 14,500 pesos daily (Caquetá)
- ✓ The average daily income of a “jornalero” or day laborer in rural Nariño is 4,000 pesos; approximately 37% of IDPs in these rural areas are day laborers. IDPs from Putumayo claim that day-contracts on coca plantations – paid according to results – could provide up to 50,000 pesos
- ✓ Unemployment rates faced by IDPs in Cali are estimated by one survey at 40%

## Health

Implementers of health projects are required to present diagnostic results to IOM and the Ministry of Health, under the guidelines of the strategic alliance signed by these two entities. Selected results include:

In Nariño, 28.7% of the displaced population shows some level of malnourishment. Paradoxically, changes in eating habits post-displacement also result in obesity, with particular frequency among adult women. In Putumayo, 85% of the families interviewed reported some ill in the last month.

Under psychosocial health and family violence, some statistics are available:

- ✓ 48% of adults verbally abuse their children (Nariño)
- ✓ 47% of adults assert that they themselves are “better people” due to their parents’ use of physical disciplinary tactics (Nariño)
- ✓ 40% of adults say that there is no discussion within the family about their displacement

Other quantitative data on psychosocial health comes from a study of IDPs, showing that 88% claim to feel “nervous,” 86% “sad,” 73% “easily frightened,” 51% claimed to cry frequently, 24% feel that they are more aggressive than before and 22% has considered suicide.


## Priorities

Surveys subsequent to the IOM Field Survey tend to confirm that housing, employment and health are the first three priorities of IDPs. It is worth noting, however, that food assistance and security are cited with greater frequency.

## IV. PROGRAM STATUS BY COMPONENT

As of the end of the reporting period, the Post-Emergency Program was in the process of implementation of 250 projects with an average Program contribution of 30,000 USD and represented in expenditures of 4,733,325 US Dollars and unliquidated obligations to projects in the amount of 2,673,489 US Dollars.

*Chart 2: Distribution of Financial Investments by Component*



Although the grant with USAID no longer requires that accounting be distributed between component lines, these continue to be a useful way to describe programmatic advance. Taking all departments together, the distribution of financial obligations and expenditures between components is demonstrated on the left:

It is worth noting also that the kind of implementation partners selected by the Program varies largely according to the component. More than half of the funds invested in education and health, for example, are disbursed to local authorities (namely, health and education offices) as these are two of the areas in which IOM has prioritized building permanent capacity at the local level by improving regular services. On the other hand, only 8% of funds to income generation projects are deposited with local authorities (generally Municipal Agriculture and Technical Units, or UMATAs) as these projects are more suitable to NGOs specializing in entrepreneurial development and credit.

Chart 3: Implementing counterpart by component





Chart 4: Implementing entity (type) by department




The kind of implementation partners varies also according to the department in which the Program is operating and the degree of civil society presence existing in each one. It is not surprising, therefore, that a department like Valle del Cauca, with a long tradition of qualified and creative NGOs, has obligated the majority of its funds to NGOs and little under one-fifth to local authorities, while a department like Putumayo – to which NGOs have never flocked and many scared off in the last six years – provides 40% of its funding to projects implemented by local authorities.


INCOME GENERATING ACTIVITIES:

Since its inception, the Program has approved some 65 separate projects dedicated primarily to increasing incomes of displaced and vulnerable beneficiaries. Approximately one-third of the projects provide **seed money or credit to small businesses** and the Program is sponsoring different approaches to entrepreneurial development. However, financially the most important of these is the Micro-Credit Program, implemented in all six departments. As this program has been described in depth in earlier reports, a brief status update is provided in charts as follows.


*Chart 5(a):  
Selected Beneficiaries (1669) vs. Bens Pending Selection*




*Chart 5(b):  
Individual vs. Group Projects*



*Chart 5(c):  
Rural vs. Urban Projects*



*Chart 5(d):  
Type of Business Approved*



Approximately one-half of the Income Generation projects are dedicated to **training**, either as part of IOM's Strategic Alliance with the National Training Institute (SENA) or through support to public and private training institutes at the local level. New projects in this line include combined training-equipment donation projects for sewing in Tulua and for bread and pastry-making in Cúcuta and an agreement signed with a local training institute in Pasto for flexible and rapid certification courses for IDP youths and adults in this city.

Another one-half of these projects are characterized as **agricultural projects**, carried out to stabilize displaced or threatened populations in high-risk zones, to facilitate rural resettlement or in the case of agricultural processing projects, as an income generating projects for IDPs. New projects under this line include a project for agricultural production in San Pablo (Bolívar) with returnees, a dairy processing plant in Santander and a four-component food security project for at-risk families in Bobali, Norte de Santander.

Finally, IOM has started some projects that aim to improve access to **private sector job market** for the Program's beneficiaries. The most important of these is the "*Empleo a Su Alcance*" Project, co-financed with the RSS, in implementation in five departments (AOR excluding Putumayo). Although no new projects were approved in this line during the quarter, an activity with the private sector in Nariño (as part of the Defensoría del Pueblo project) aimed to foster increased commitment on their behalf toward supporting IDPs in Pasto. (The "entrepreneurial forum" is covered in a newspaper articles in Annex II) Likewise, IOM is formulating a new project with the Council of Trade Guilds (Consejo Gremial) for implementation in the next phase of the Program.

#### HEALTH SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

The most common kind of activity in this component is the **support offered to local health offices and health providers** to expand coverage and improve quality of assistance provided to IDPs. There are ten projects (many incorporate more than one clinic, such as a project in Putumayo that builds capacity in 10 clinics throughout the department) in this area; in the last quarter, new projects were approved in Puerto Asís, Putumayo; Samaniego, Nariño and Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca. In each of these cases, the Program provides equipment in exchange for a clear commitment on behalf of the health provider to expand clinic hours, coverage and/or special programs for IDPs. In Buenaventura, difficulties in accessing neighborhoods and villages with high concentrations of IDPs were addressed by the project through the provision of a off-board motor boat.

A related project-type are the **outreach programs** which aim to visit neighborhoods and homes to promote healthy habits, carry out medical screening, provide on-the-spot assistance and refer persons to specialized treatment if necessary. (This model is explored in the next section.) A single new project was approved in this line – the "Healthy Families" project in Cali, Valle del Cauca.

A growing area of activity is **infrastructure for improved sanitation and access to safe water**; nine projects have been approved in this area, including five in the last quarter: expansion of sewage systems in Puerto Asís, Putumayo and Villa del Rosario, Norte de Santander; and three for potable water in Florencia, Caquetá, Taminango (studies) and Tumaco (cisterns) in Nariño.

#### EDUCATION

One of the lines of action for improving primary and high-school education for vulnerable and displaced beneficiaries which has been most favorably evaluated is the combined effort of **improving infrastructure, equipment and materials** for schools (IOM contribution) while the school commits to promoting new educational models to address the needs of IDP kids, provide adult literacy courses, equivalency classes, after-school tutoring, etc. (This model is explored in depth in the next section). The Program has approved a total of 15 projects of this kind, including six in the last quarter in five departments: Putumayo, Nariño, Caquetá, Santander (6 schools) and Norte de Santander (42 school cafeterias in Catatumbo).

Another growing area of educational support is in **adult and youth education**; in the last quarter, two new adult education programs were approved in Valle (for implementation in Cali, Jamundí and Tuluá), one in Pasto and another in Florencia. In Pasto, another new project aims to incorporate IDP youths into technical training and

academic classes at a local training institute. The institute prides itself on its capacity of placing youths in jobs upon graduation.

Finally, schools and local offices of education are beginning to show more innovation in their proposals to IOM in this area. **Innovative programs for children** include the new "traveling school" to be implemented in Samaniego, Nariño, and the use of musical teaching in Norte de Santander.

#### COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION, STABILIZATION AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION

Under community stabilization, the most important line of activity has been the **institutional strengthening component for governmental entities tasked with IDP assistance** – including the RSS, the local offices of the Public Ministry (Personerías) and local committees for IDP assistance. Close to 20 projects have been or are in implementation under the Post-Emergency Program in all departments within the AOR. Important new projects include a project for training municipal committees in Caquetá, Lower Putumayo and the Catatumbo region of Norte de Santander; this project is co-financed by the RSS and supervised by the Joint Technical Committee (UTC). Other projects approved in this quarter include training of Personerías in Putumayo, capacity-building with the RSS in Caquetá to better respond to the ongoing crisis in that department and the establishment of a Orientation and Assistance Unit (UAO) in Cali, Valle del Cauca.

Most social communication projects are dedicated to **research and dissemination regarding issues of concern to IDPs**; six projects have been developed in this area, the most important of which are the national framework agreements with Javeriana University, Defensoría del Pueblo and the Vice-Presidential Program "Haz Paz." However, smaller projects of this kind have been implemented at the local level, including: popular research by returnees from Ecuador to Nariño and research on trafficking of persons among IDPs in Cali. During this quarter, a sixth project was approved in this line in Cali for the development of public policies on holistic assistance to displaced persons.

#### HOUSING

Alongside the model for Design and Subsidies for IDP housing, the Program has implemented projects aiming to provide temporary shelter to IDPs or long-term shelter to special groups within the displaced community. Five such facilities have been built and/or equipped under the Program; no new projects of this kind were approved in this quarter.

In other kinds of intervention to provide new or improved housing to IDPs, however, several new projects were approved, including: **Improvement projects** in Trujillo and San Pedro (Valle del Cauca) and **progressive housing projects** in Samaniego, Nariño; along the Anchicaya River in Buenaventura, Valle del Cauca; and in San Pablo and Ciénega del Opón in Santander. Likewise, a project to provide legal electricity to the marginal and high-concentrated IDP neighborhood of Nueva Colombia was approved in Florencia, Caquetá at the request of the Neighborhood Action Boards (JAC, for its Spanish initials) and with significant co-financing from the municipality.

#### CROSS-COMPONENT PROJECTS

At least 19 projects, and arguably a much larger number, combine one or more components to promote recovery and reintegration of displaced populations and are not easily classified in the above categories of activities. For example, the projects implemented with ICBF tend to combine psychosocial assistance, education and income generation into package projects for IDPs. Another example is the current application of psychosocial components by IOM in which psychological assistance is provided as part of a larger project with more tangible benefits for participants – such as income generation, training, legal support and formal education. Final examples of this kind of project are those dedicated to providing specialized, intensive assistance to special groups, including the mentally and physically handicapped and the elderly (both projects implemented in both Putumayo and Santander).

## V. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED

As a starting point for the systematization of implementation experiences in the last seven quarters and a necessary input for the strategic design of IOM's intervention in the next two years, the Bogotá and regional teams worked together to select and outline successful projects to be multiplied and to record unsuccessful efforts and practices to be avoided.

The results of this exercise were discussed at a workshop in July with participation from all program staff at the Bogotá and field offices.

### INCOME-GENERATING ACTIVITIES

#### **Model for Revolving Funds**

The most advanced project of this kind is found in Florencia, Caquetá. The project is implemented by the Picachos Foundation, a local NGO whose IOM-sponsored project started with organizational and technical training and donation of equipment to 200 street vendors (80% IDPs). Upon completion of the first phase, the Picachos Foundation reported that despite increases in daily profit, beneficiaries faced an insurmountable obstacle to growing their businesses: lack of access to credit. The first step was to create a revolving fund from which 200 beneficiaries could access loans at 3% interest, gradually increasing in size according to each beneficiary's proven credit-worthiness. The second step has been to increase the number of beneficiaries (with a corresponding external injection of funds) and will soon incorporate the members into a legally recognized cooperative, providing additional services such as life insurance and discounted sales on foodstuff.

#### *Selling points:*

1. Permits members to escape vicious cycle of borrowing from "loan sharks" and increases profit margin on business
2. Limited funds reach a large number of persons on account of fast rotations and small loan amounts
3. Risk mitigated by providing small loan amounts to new users until credit-worthiness established
4. The project promotes community organization through joint responsibility to maintain fund, community "agents" and creation of networks between users with similar businesses.
5. Operating costs can be covered by interest making this project sustainable in the medium term (average case scenario) to the extent that technologies are transferred from the NGO to the users

#### *Best Practices:*

1. The project works with community promoters (remunerated according to results) tasked with supporting new users to complete necessary documentation and validates request for loans with Personal References listed by each applicant; obtaining and depositing payments into the Revolving Fund bank account. These promoters are better able to validate references than professionals due to the confidence built with neighborhood residents.
2. All users fully understand that non-payment by one borrower implies diminished funds for future borrowers; social pressure is exerted by members as well as by community promoters.
3. The legal form of a pre-cooperative allows the implementing NGO to act as a "sponsoring partner" while the cooperative members are trained to operate the fund themselves.
4. The NGO established and made public the administrative budget for the project so that all users understood the need to charge the established interest rate. At one point funds greater than those projected were made available to the NGO due to rapid rotation and timely rotation.

#### *Applicability:*

- As the loan programs implemented throughout the AOR come to a close, this kind of revolving fund may be created with funds generated from repayment of loans; in this way, sustainability of these funds is encouraged.
- For persons with already established businesses in the informal sector

- Most likely to be successful in cities with neighborhoods with concentrations of beneficiaries as territorial proximity is a key element to “social pressure” factors
- Rotating funds of this kind should consolidate “survival” businesses, but cannot be expected to catalyze formal or high-profit initiatives in most cases

### **Lessons Learned under Income Generating Activities:**

#### *Micro-credit for strengthening and start-up of businesses:*

1. On the whole, the notion of combining credit with seed money has been considered by the IOM team, governmental counterparts and implementing NGOs as a valid model for entrepreneurial development; however, more flexibility in determining percentages of donations vs. loans is recommended (and the timing – e.g. a donation could be provided to start the business with loans provided to consolidate it as necessary)
2. Well-established and national NGOs tend to replicate existing models for micro-credit that fail in many ways to respond to the unique challenges presented by the displaced population; smaller NGOs with presence in the region have been more flexible and generally a better choice of implementing partner
3. Micro-credit is not tailored for the poorest, most vulnerable beneficiaries, who are often unable to dedicate business capital to the business rather than to their basic needs: food, medicines, uniforms for school-aged children, etc.
4. Nor is micro-credit suited to start-up “survival businesses” in which the repayment of loans tend to bankrupt the business quickly
5. Despite its obvious benefits in terms of business size and potential market share, the model for “associative” or group businesses has been extremely problematic in its application. Factors that improve success rate of group projects include:
  - a) NGOs with prior contact with beneficiary group are better able to identify leadership and facilitate group formation
  - b) Partners who knew each other prior to the start of IOM’s intervention are more likely to stay together, particularly members of extended families
  - c) Reasonable expectations and early success of the business allow for group consolidation – even strong groups tend to collapse when the business encounters sustained difficulties in its first months of operation
6. In fact, businesses held by families in which one member of the family has access to at least occasional earnings from other means are more likely to sustain the family business in the long run as the working capital provided under the project is used exclusively to grow the business
7. The early success of a business appears to be positively correlated to the amount of time the beneficiary has been resettled in an urban environment; this is one argument for providing micro-credit to long-term IDPs (6-18 months in present location)
8. Facilitated access to subsidized public services, especially health, seems to impact positively on the projects, possibly on account of amelioration of the family’s economic situation, allowing the beneficiary to dedicate working capital exclusively to the business
9. Implementing NGOs have not been able to articulate projects to the regional market as of yet; this may be attributed to the lack of economic understanding on the part of NGOs and point to the need to strengthen the program through information-sharing with the private sector in each department

#### *Training and Private Sector Linkage:*

1. Like micro-credit implementers, the comparative advantages of working with local training institutes, particularly with regards to flexibility and innovation in designing IDP-appropriate courses, yet outweigh the disadvantages.
2. In order to strengthen opportunities for small IDP businesses, especially in the service and agricultural areas, it is essential that strong coordination be forged with local entrepreneurs.

## HEALTH

### **Model for Strategic Alliance with State Entities**

At the end of this quarter, IOM and the Ministry of Health began evaluation and systematization of activities carried out under the Cooperation Agreement signed between the two organizations. It is important to report that the Ministry of Health has informed IOM that this model of coordination is one of the most effective, practical and responsible models for Government of Colombia - IGO coordination used by the Ministry of Health to date. This makes it worthwhile to explore the characteristics of this strategic alliance, which have allowed it to function smoothly.

#### *Selling Points:*

1. Although long-term strategy and project approval are tasked to the Bogotá-based team, the processes of project identification, formulation of activities, supervision and reporting are decentralized in the local offices of health and the health providers.
2. During the process of project approval, technical errors in formulation have been identified and resolved. For example, the Ministry of Health noted that the technical characteristics of a Fetal Monitor requested by one hospital were outdated and no longer compliant with national health standards.
3. The involvement of the Ministry of Health has encouraged a more serious and committed approach by local offices of health to the IOM-sponsored initiatives.
4. Reporting by counterparts will be formatted in such a way so as to be coherent with national data on health conditions, thereby improving IOM's ability to measure impact against existing base-line data.
5. Joint monitoring of the FISALUD program (reimbursement system for costs incurred in treating IDP patients)
6. Joint financing of projects has increased impact of interventions and ensured non-duplication of funds
7. According to the Ministry of Health, its participation in the strategic alliance has provided the office with practical examples of IDP health efforts, which serve as inputs in its process of developing national strategies for IDP assistance

#### *Best Practices & Lessons Learned:*

- a) Constant follow-up on behalf of IOM staff, particularly in the first months of the agreement, was necessary to consolidate cooperation mechanisms; even now, IOM necessarily organizes committee meetings, sends "reminders," drafts minutes and lobbies for the continued commitment of Ministry of Health staff to the agreement. This represents substantial time dedication on behalf of IOM staff and should be considered a non-financial cost of this kind of coordination.
- b) The rigidity of central state entities can slow and otherwise impede IOM projects; for example, the Ministry of Health initially opposed IOM's contributions to Health Outreach projects on the basis that FISALUD "should" cover all related costs. Unfortunately, the FISALUD system is still too slow to encourage local health providers to engage in innovative, outreach programs for IDP groups. IOM's agreements with these health providers stipulate that eventual reimbursements by FISALUD must be re-invested in the outreach program to allow for its sustainability beyond the IOM intervention. Those areas of divergent opinion that have been identified in the last 18 months will be addressed specifically in the extension to the Strategic Alliance Agreement with the Ministry of Health.

#### *Applicability:*

This model of coordination has functioned best with governmental agencies possessing technical know-how and a legal mandate to regulate practices in any given area, such as the Ministry of Health, the National Training Institute and ICBF. For the future, it is readily applicable to the Ministry of Education.

## **Model for Operational Partnerships with Health Providers at the Local Level**

With technical guidance from the Ministry of Health, IOM is sponsoring some 18 projects in six departments under this model, including:

- ❖ Projects that provide equipment to a given health provider in exchange for its commitment to expand office hours to attend IDP groups; increase geographical coverage of outreach activities (provision of motorboats in Buenaventura) realize health brigades to respond to large-scale displacements, and promote regular health programs in IDP neighborhoods
- ❖ Special programs – designed by the health provider in coordination with IOM – which incorporate on-the-spot medical screening and assistance, awareness-raising on healthy habits and references to clinics and hospitals for further testing or specialized treatment
- ❖ Implementation of established programs in IDP neighborhoods, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) program for early detection of illnesses affecting infants (AIEPI) presently in implementation in Santander and Caquetá

### *Selling Points:*

1. Projects are tailored to meet the needs of IDP groups in each municipality
2. The systematization of diagnostic results from beneficiary families is providing IOM and the Ministry of Health with a clearer picture of the epidemiological profile of Colombian displaced persons
3. The provision of improved services to IDPs, and particularly the practice of visiting persons in their homes, should generate demand for higher quality services on behalf of the IDP population and reduce the distrust cited by some IDPs as a reason for not seeking professional medical assistance
4. In the long term and in a good case scenario, these projects should be sustained by the FISALUD reimbursement system

### *Best Practices and Lessons Learned:*

1. In general terms, the departmental and municipal offices of health have not been efficient partners for IOM health projects and lack the operational capacity to organize these projects; a more successful approach has been to work – under the umbrella agreement with the Ministry of Health – directly with health providers (clinics, hospitals).
2. Outreach programs based on household visits, the success of which depends heavily on the willingness of hospitals to receive references and treat patients accordingly, should be coordinated directly with the hospital. Otherwise, these projects can create the demand for professional health assistance (and create a need on behalf of the beneficiary to obtain laboratory results, for example) without guaranteeing the supply of these services.
3. Outreach programs should devise a system of follow-up and health promotion; in the AIEPI program community agents carry this out; in Nariño, an effort is being made to incorporate medical students into the follow-up phase of the project.
4. In projects where IOM provides equipment in exchange for services to the Post-Emergency Program's beneficiaries, it is necessary to stipulate precisely the activities to be carried out by the health provider (without further contributions by IOM) and ensure that the clinic or hospital has the staff and equipment to carry out these obligations, without curtailing medical attention provided to the receptor community

### *Applicability:*

- The AIEPI Program can be applied in all major cities with high concentrations of IDPs, provided that the local office of health and hospitals are interested in participating
- The provision of equipment to clinics is most likely to result positively when provided in rural areas or smaller towns, where residents are unable to access better-equipped hospitals and larger clinics

## Other Lessons Learned in Health Services

### *Psychosocial programs*

1. An estimated one-fifth of the IDP population requires psychological support. It is important to avoid too clinical approach to this group (by assuming therapy is necessary for the population as a whole) but also to avoid the assumption that recreational/cultural activities alone can provide psychosocial welfare for all IDPs.
2. Psychosocial responses to non-clinical cases (recreation, cultural integration, workshops, etc.) are a low-cost area of activity; in fact, many organizations have the funds necessary to carry out these activities (donors include ICBF, Ministry of Health, Red Cross France, UNHCR, UNICEF, among others). An appropriate role for IOM is in the coordination of efforts at the local level (Fundación Dos Mundos regional workshops) and in support to national entities to build and disseminate models and policies (RSS-IOM seminar on psychosocial assistance).
3. The Fundación Dos Mundos project was a catalyst for further inter-institutional coordination at the regional level, but requires more continuity (follow-up workshops or other actions) to consolidate mechanisms. Particularly effective was the implementation of a joint project by ICBF and the Office of Health (Putumayo) as a means of testing and fine-tuning the inter-institutional approach.
4. Psychosocial assistance is best received (and arguably most necessary) in combination with other efforts, including entrepreneurial development, assistance to youths, prevention of household violence and education
5. In the case of the latter, projects that provide training to school teachers to improve their management of psychosocial topics in the classroom have been well-received and evaluated by the teachers, as well as by parents of schoolchildren
6. Psychosocial efforts that focus on reintegration, cultural recovery, recreation, etc. are most successful when the target group selects and develops its own project; a certain kind of activity (sports competition, dance) is rarely exportable to other groups which are likely to resist the initiative.

### *Infrastructure for sanitation and safe water*

These projects are a potent catalyst for community integration to the extent that these are accompanied by social organization processes, including:

1. Ensure receptor groups understand that the project was selected on account of presence of IDPs in the neighborhoods and in full recognition that both the receptor and displaced groups have been impacted by the displacement phenomenon
2. Insist on participation of neighborhood action board (JAC) and / or a specific committee for water/sanitation, which should incorporate leaders from the receptor and displaced group
3. Engage grassroots organizations in a variety of activities related to the infrastructure projects, including: fundraising for additional resources, training on use and maintenance; campaign on healthy water and sanitation habits; and, implementation of complementary community-improvement projects.
4. The strategy of working with municipalities has more strengths than weaknesses, but the latter need to be addressed through close monitoring, training and technical assistance, to ensure transparent and high-quality delivery. Primary weaknesses in the model include:
  - a) risk posed by municipalities trying to use funds to garner electoral support
  - b) contracting and sub-contracting processes are slow, often ineffective and occasionally lacking in transparency
  - c) financial accounts to which project funds are deposited may be "frozen" in the event of auditing suspicions or complications by the central government
  - d) low technical capacity in municipalities to formulate and supervise infrastructure projects

The main strengths of this coordination, include:

- a) opportunities to build capacity in municipal offices
- b) increased commitment on behalf of local authorities to address IDP issues
- c) "bring back to life" municipal planning instruments, such as the Territorial Ordering Plan (POT) and catalyze dialogue on local development
- d) the relationship between state and citizens is validated and strengthened by direct interventions to the benefit of the latter

## EDUCATION

### **Model for Partnerships with Schools**

IOM is implementing approximately 20 projects (many of which work with several schools) in six departments to apply a model in which IOM covers the cost of improving infrastructure or equipment – like construction of a new classroom, equipment to a subsidized school cafeteria or provision of computers to a high school – while the school, municipality or other donors complement this activity with innovative solutions to educational problems faced by IDP children and adults.

#### *Selling points:*

1. Infrastructure projects promise tangible and durable results of IOM's intervention, while catalyzing a more holistic approach to resolving educational problems faced by IDP children and adults.
2. The local school is an ideal scenario or platform from which to promote integration between IDPs and receptor families: schools are neighborhood institutions, guaranteeing that the needs and priorities of IDPs and receptors will coincide with regard to their children's welfare.
3. As IOM explains that the school was selected for assistance due not only to its level of need, but also on account of its acceptance of a large number of students from displaced families, receptor families are made aware of the positive effects of displacement on the community.

#### *Best practices and lessons learned:*

1. In coordination with the school director, teachers and Parents' Board, IOM should continue to select an intervention which is justifiable in itself (e.g. IOM should build a new classroom only in those schools where crowding conditions affect the quality of education, for example, regardless of the projected "catalytic effect" of the project)
2. IOM should present schools with a kind of menu of ideas regarding projects that have worked in other schools, municipalities and departments (alternative use of school facilities for community activities, adult literacy courses, after-school tutoring, all day tutoring for new students, etc.) but allow the school to determine which components it will implement as a counterpart to IOM's investment.
3. It is essential that the local office of education be involved in the agreement (even when the school itself is the implementing agency) so as to ensure the validation of literacy and special programs, link schools to national programs and materials for equivalency (leveling) programs and ensure consistency between schools.
4. This kind of partnership with a local entity is very cost-effective in that a minimal budget is stretched (beneficiary contributions, minimal administrative costs) for the biggest bang. However, they are enormously time-consuming for IOM field staff, requiring intensive formulation meetings, technical support, assistance in drafting financial and narrative reports and monitoring for projects whose budgets do not often exceed 10,000 USD. As the model has been developed and fine-tuned in the last 20 months, it will be beneficial to identify NGOs specialized in education to serve as umbrella organizations to work directly with schools.
5. In both cases where IOM has agreed to support new constructions (ICBF daycare centers) delays in the legal procedures for obtaining title on the necessary plan have so far impeded any advance.

### **Other Lessons Learned under Education:**

#### *Academia and model building:*

1. Universities are interested in contributing to the policy and practical debates on internal displacement.
2. Local offices of education have proven more active and innovative partners in developing new models for IDP assistance than the Ministry of Education in Bogotá.

#### *Provision of school supplies and uniforms:*

1. The level of poverty is indeed so great among many IDP families that the cost of school supplies and uniforms becomes a genuine reason for non-attendance; although donations of this kind guaranty neither

the permanence of the IDP child within the school system nor the quality of education provided, they are a necessary “first step” to improving education conditions for IDPs.

2. The provision of school supplies to IDP children can lead to jealousy and tension among other children; it is important to benefit other vulnerable children lacking the appropriate supplies. The process of identifying these children is best executed by the school teacher or director – despite the increased risk of “playing favorites” – as they have proven reliable, fair and capable of avoiding conflict, on the whole.

#### *Adult and youth education – literacy and leveling efforts*

1. There is an urgent need to implement attractive programs for young people who have been out of school for some time, enabling them to obtain equivalency degrees or re-incorporate into the formal school system
2. Adult education programs require joint (beneficiary-implementer) decisions on scheduling, as heads of household are hard-pressed to set aside time from remunerated employment to engage in education. Ten-hour Saturdays have worked in one department; night classes in another.
3. The implementing entity should provide daycare for infants and children during classes for adults to increase opportunities for women.
4. The “Fundación Haceres y Sueños” project in Valle del Cauca demonstrates the potential of inter-generational teaching where the elderly learn to read and write to later teach young children.

#### *Innovative programs for IDP students*

A new project developed in Pasto, Nariño holds promise as a means of promoting immediate matriculation of IDP kids upon arrival in the receptor city. The “Peace Forgers” project provides children with a kind of halfway classroom to which they are free to arrive without supplies, uniforms or documentation. Here a certified teacher attends them with full-time assistance from a member of the displaced community (may also be a professional teacher) and are provided social and academic assistance, while a place within the formal system is located. This is an opportunity also to ascertain the child’s academic level and ensure placement in the appropriate class. Moreover, the child can engage in sports and recreational activities with other students at the school – allowing for a gradual acclimatization to the new social environment.

## SOCIAL COMMUNICATION AND PEACE PROMOTION

### **Model for Disseminating Messages to Improve Quality of Life for IDPs**

The IOM-sponsored project for improving capacity to prevent and respond to cases of household violence started with an alliance with the Vice-Presidential Program “Haz Paz.” Under this program, the GoC had developed and tested materials to be applied in training institutions to detect, process and assist in cases of child and spousal abuse. As it appears that the IDP population is particularly susceptible to household violence (likely as a result of abrupt migrations, changes in family roles and deterioration of the community fabric) IOM provides financial assistance for the immediate implementation of this program in six departments, with a focus on Valle del Cauca and Florencia, where the institutional component was coupled with training of community agents as “multipliers” at the local level.

#### *Best Practices and Lessons Learned:*

1. The project has fostered the commitment of a variety of institutional actors including the Vice Presidential Human Rights Program, ICBF, universities in each department, local authorities, hospitals and NGOs.
2. Haz Paz was able to disseminate its key messages in a more sustainable and cost-effective manner than observed in other social communication projects. A possible factor in this success is the pre-selection of messages (rather than local selection of messages), which allowed for the publication of training guides and popular-format “multiplier” handbooks.
3. A follow-up at the field level to ensure continuity is necessary, particularly to monitor and support the promotion work of community agents.

*Applicability:*

This model is applicable only in those cases where the messages to be communicated can be determined from the onset of the program. In cases where the subject matter must be identified at the local level due to cultural differences between departments (as may be the case for topics related to social integration and acceptance of IDPs, for example) the interventions will require a distinct design.

## HOUSING

As presented in earlier reports, IOM's principal strategy for housing has been participation in the design of housing proposals, presented to state-sponsored subsidy programs. The effectiveness of this strategy differs between rural and urban areas, as do the lessons learned; although IOM will continue with this model in the next phase of project identification, some modifications to the model will be incorporated as outlined in the following paragraphs.

### **Model for Leveraging Counterpart Funds for New Housing Construction**

In those areas where the IDP community and the mayor's office have identified land and started planning for a housing project, IOM provides technical support in the design of housing plans, completion of necessary documentation, submission to INURBE or the Agrarian Bank and, wherever necessary, financial assistance for construction.

*Selling Points:*

1. In urban areas, IOM formulated projects for 666 families of which 421 or 63% successfully obtained a subsidy from INURBE.
2. For rural projects, the Agrarian Bank approved a total (nationally) of 16 projects for displaced groups; 9 or more than half of these projects were those supported by IOM
3. Alongside the construction of houses, valuable community organization processes can and should be encouraged; in Buenaventura, for example, "vederías comunitarias" or grassroots auditors, have been successful in guaranteeing transparency, minimizing costs and improving quality

*Best Practices & Lessons Learned:*

- a) The provision of financial assistance by IOM improves the "rating" of the project by state entities, thereby increasing the chance of approval for subsidies (even in those cases where the municipality is also able to contribute financially to the project). In future, IOM may provide up to 25% of the value of the projects.
- b) Although the municipality is tasked with technical supervision over the project, it is almost always necessary to contract someone to work with the mayor's office to ensure high-quality and timely project delivery
- c) As expectations of beneficiaries are raised in the process of design and submission for approval for these projects, it is beneficial to elaborate a "Plan B." In the absence of INURBE subsidies in Cúcuta, for example, a housing project has been developed with inter-institutional support: Minuto de Dios provided the land, RSS the funds for construction, WFP and IOM provided assistance, furniture and equipment packages.
- d) To facilitate the design phase of these projects and avoid some of the problems encountered in this phase, the following steps should be taken:
  - Create a database of architecture and engineering professionals in each department
  - Insist that the mayors' offices present full documentation and certification showing real property of the proposed land for construction<sup>6</sup>
  - For rural housing, it is necessary to ensure that the lots proposed for construction are connected to a potable water system, are not located in high-risk zones and are classified as "rural zones" with the Territorial Planning Instrument or POT of the municipality

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<sup>6</sup> For rural housing, a certificate of legal possession for five years is sufficient; in the case of urban land, the mayors' offices should present a Certificate of "tradición y libertad del terreno," and if the land is owned by the municipality, a resolution stipulating the hand-over of the land to the beneficiaries is also necessary.

## **Other Lessons Learned under Housing**

### *Transitional housing – shelters*

1. Prior to constructing or improving shelters, their location should be coordinated and approved by the surrounding neighborhood
2. To generate acceptance of shelters by receptor groups, the proposed construction should benefit them also; in Mocoa, for example, the Casa Campesina provides office space to the local administrative office of neighborhood action boards (JAL)
3. To ensure that the construction and improvements are used to benefit displaced families once the IOM-sponsored intervention is complete, it is necessary to include explicit instructions on its long-term use in the contract or cooperation agreement signed between IOM and the owners of the building. It is useful to include a third party entity, like the RSS, in the agreement to encourage institutional pressure to continue using the space as agreed

### *Improvements to existing housing*

1. Housing improvement projects are low-cost and high-impact. These are generally proposed by NGOs lacking professional experience in architectural and engineering projects. Although these NGOs have been successful in beneficiary selection, administration, inter-institutional coordination and social organization aspects of the project, they require technical assistance to ensure appropriate designs and lower costs of materials. It is recommended that IOM contract this technical supervisor whose time and expertise can be provided to the project on a full-time basis as an in-kind contribution to the project.

### *Special interventions*

The provision of a block-making machine to a Nariño-based community engaged in self-construction of homes (rural resettlement) proved a very low-cost and high-impact intervention that should be replicated in similar projects. The machine allowed the community to expand the size of their homes and still save sufficient funds to begin implementation on a safe water system (purchase of tubing and cisterns) and a connection to the sewage. The new community has successfully negotiated with the nearby school to expand services to include their school-aged children in exchange for cement blocks – provided free of charge by the new community – to build a new classroom. In the next six months, the block-maker will be used to start-up a small income-generating endeavor.


## VI. DEPARTMENTAL SUMMARIES

### NORTE DE SANTANDER

●—●	Displaced Persons
●—●	Most affected municipalities

Registered IDPs 12/00:	3,148
Registered IDPs 12/01:	10,937
Registered IDPs 03/02:	14,839
Registered IDPs 06/02:	18,525
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00: 1	
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01: 1	
Municipalities with >85% reception 06/02: 2	

*The displaced population registered by the RSS in Norte de Santander has increased more in the last six months than in the whole of 2001, six-fold since the end of 2000. The department is one of the few in which the number of municipalities has increased to absorb a part of the newly arriving IDP group; Convención is the second-highest receptor in Norte de Santander due to the large numbers of displaced persons from the Catatumbo.*



#### *Context Notes on Conflict*

Although the conflict in Norte Santander impacts 39 of the 40 municipalities of the department, it has concentrated traditionally in the 12 municipalities of the Catatumbo region, where a journalist recently wrote: "To get to Catatumbo you need a passport issued by the guerrilla and another by the AUC. Otherwise there are not guarantees."<sup>7</sup>

In the last quarter an escalation in conflict was noted – as foretold at the beginning of the year by the AUC - in the municipalities closest to the Venezuelan border, including Villa del Rosario, Puerto Santander, Herrán, Ragonvalia and Toledo. Fighting between the guerrilla (FARC and ELN) and the Colombian armed forces – including a special Catatumbo Task Force – in Tibú has produced large-scale displacement from rural areas to the municipal capitals. Residents claim that there are some 700 FARC troops along the border with easy access on both sides.

#### *Context Notes on Displacement*

Although the gap between government statistics regarding displacement in Norte Santander and those managed by other actors – including ICRC, the Catholic Church and regional NGOs – has been diminished as the RSS becomes more effective in registry and data management, figures still run a wide gamut from 19,440 persons (RSS) to 60,000 (civil society, various). During the last quarter, the RSS registered the reception of 4,869 IDPs in the department, still heavily concentrated in the capital city of Cúcuta (81%) with smaller groups resettling in Convención, Villa del Rosario, Tibú, Ocaña, La Tarra, Los Patios, El Carmen and El Zulia. The department continues to be a net receptor of population, through expulsion rates are rising – during this reporting period, 4,601 persons were expelled from their homes in the department.


<sup>7</sup> El Tiempo. May 2002.

For 2002, Norte de Santander has been one of the departments most affected by displacement; according to CODHES, this department is the third-highest receptor of displaced population (after Magdalena and Bogotá) while Convención, El Tarra, Ocaña are number 4, 5, and 6 respectively in terms of municipalities with the highest rates of reception in January to March of this year.

***Program Status and Quarterly Advance:<sup>8</sup>***

Through the end of the reporting period, 36 projects had been approved in Norte de Santander representing total financial obligations of 824,480 US Dollars. Fifty-nine percent of these funds are dedicated to income generating activities, followed by Education (20%) Health (10%) and Social Communication, Housing and Community Organization with 4% each.

As illustrated in the chart on the right, this office has strengthened its operations in municipalities outside of Cúcuta with projects not only in Villa del Rosario (on the city outskirts) and Ocaña, but also in Convención, Tibú, El Tarra and Bobali in the Catatumbo region.



In the last quarter, 7 new projects were approved of which fewer than half are located in Cúcuta. In Catatumbo, the Program is now sponsoring a food security project in three projects in the Catatumbo region. The most financially significant of these is a food security project implemented by the NGO “MINGA” to work with 220 families in four agricultural activities: household vegetable gardens, livestock (poultry and pigs) a panela or brown sugar factory and a rice processor. Another two projects approved for implementation in El Tarra and Tibú involve the provision of kitchen equipment and eating utensils to 41 subsidized school cafeterias to expand coverage of this nutritional service provided by ICBF.

In Villa del Rosario, the Program is constructing a sewage system for 124 families residing in the neighborhood of Montevideo, which is characterized by high incidence of displacement.

<sup>8</sup> Kindly note that the figures for total obligations in each department include expenditures and unliquidated obligations, representing the gross projected investment in each department. Also, these figures do not include inter-regional projects developed from Bogotá which represent a further investment of 908,870 US Dollars.

## SANTANDER AND MAGDALENA MEDIO

Registered IDPs 12/00:	4,950
Registered IDPs 12/01:	17,831
Registered IDPs 03/02:	20,116
Registered IDPs 06/02:	38,203
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00: 4	
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01: 4	
Municipalities with >85%reception 06/02: 5	


Santander is one of two departments in which the number of municipalities sharing the "burden" of newly arrived IDPs increased this year, to absorb the more than 20,000 new IDPs registered in the last six months. Regardless of this fact, however, the concentration of IDPs in Bucaramanga and Barrancabermeja is notable at more than 12,000 IDPs in each municipality. Both Girón and Floridablanca (satellite cities that have gradually merged) receive between 3,000 – 4,000 IDPs. Piedecuesta is the fifth most affected municipality.

### Context Notes on Conflict

In the second quarter of 2002, the paramilitaries have succeeded in consolidating political control in municipal capitals throughout the region. Through local "bosses" the AUC exert control through local authorities and public corporations; Neighborhood Action Boards whose members are selected by them and carrot-and-stick approaches to controlling local leaders and grassroots organizations. The AUC moreover has tailored new grassroots groups and NGOs to advance political aims in the area. In fact, community needs and requests are often channeled to local government through parallel leadership structures managed by the AUC. Said parallel structure has all the trappings of a quasi-government including a written code of conduct, strict punishment<sup>9</sup> and taxes collected through "voluntary contributions."

As noted throughout the country, the paramilitaries have taken a clear step away from massacres and opt instead for selective killings, carried out in daylight in the homes or neighborhoods. Communities have reacted against these selective killings in some areas; in June, when three AUC members entered the Municipality of Cantagallo in June, threatening to take a president of a neighborhood action board, neighbors balked the mission, killing one of the paramilitaries and seriously wounding another. The paramilitaries threatened to burn down the town in retaliation and 350 persons sought refuge in the municipal capital.<sup>10</sup> The Colombian Armed Forces have reacted more noticeably against the AUC in recent months as well.

The guerrilla forces in the region, particularly the FARC, also demonstrate a change in tactics. They have avoided confrontation with the military and have attempted to take control in areas heavily dominated by the paramilitaries. The FARC and ELN are working together in selected areas toward this goal, including the zone of Santa Rosa del Sur. The FARC has made similar advances into Puerto Wilches, San Pablo, Yondo and Barrancabermeja: their strategy of wearing down AUC defenses through repeated attacks appears similar to that employed by the



<sup>9</sup> There are several documented cases of persons losing their lives as punishment for disobeying the Code of Conduct. On June 6, a schoolgirl by the name of Yulaine Garzón Galeano was taken from her home and killed – allegedly for her failure to correct her behaviour and manner of dressing. Source: *La Noticia*, June 15, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> Idem.

paramilitaries in wresting traditional FARC-controlled areas from the guerrilla, and foreshadows further territorial dispute in Magdalena Medio.<sup>11</sup>

The AUC hold a de Facto monopoly over cocaine processing in the region, concentrated in the South.<sup>12</sup> Nuclei of illicit production of coca have been located in Bajo Simácota, as well as along the banks of the Carare and Opón rivers – taken together, cultivated area may amount to some 1,200 hectares.

The AUC consolidated presence in 18 marginal neighborhoods of Bucaramanga and outlying municipalities; it is estimated that large numbers of IDPs reside in these neighborhoods, representing up to 40% of the current population. Leaders of IDP organizations and human rights groups have received threats repeatedly.<sup>13</sup>

As in other parts of the country, governance is made nearly impossible in some 33 municipalities of Santander where the FARC have issued death treats to mayors, council members and justice workers. In the last week of June the mayors of Matanza, Suratá, Charta and Tona resigned.


### *Context Notes on Displacement*

In the Magdalena Medio, the incidence of large-scale displacements decreased during this quarter, though individual “trickle-rate” displacement proves constant. The situation faced by IDPs in Sur de Bolivar remains critical on account of the lack of visibility and the minimal capacity demonstrated by local authorities. The Defensoría del Pueblo’s early warning system in the department had some success in averting large-scale displacements during the quarter in the cases of Mirolindo and India in the municipality of Landazuri.

In Santander and on account of territorial dispute throughout the departments, 63 of the 87 municipalities are now points of expulsion of IDP population. Displacement to Barrancabermeja has dropped off; on the contrary, its rate of expulsion is increasing, particularly with families seeking resettlement in Bucaramanga. In fact, Bucaramanga – along with satellite neighborhoods in adjacent municipalities - has become the primary receptor of IDPs in the northeastern sector of the country.

The department is demonstrating a change in the standard displacement pattern from rural areas to municipal capitals and on to departmental capitals. Due to the consolidated presence of paramilitaries in municipal capitals, rural IDPs are moving directly to major cities and are more likely to move to another department in their first migration.

### *Program Status and Quarterly Advance:*



As evident in the chart on the right, the office in Santander has concentrated resources in Barrancabermeja and Bucaramanga, and to a lesser extent in Piedecuesta, while investing approximately 4% of the total budget to four other affected municipalities of Santander and Magdalena Medio.

As of the end of the reporting period, the Santander office had approved 39 projects, including 8 new projects in the last quarter, representing financial obligations for 913,559 US Dollars. Activities have focused on income generation (46%) followed by health, housing and social communication (13% each).


New projects include an agricultural project for 19 returnee families in San Pablo (Sur de Bolivar), which is being co-financed by UNHCR, RSS and the municipality. Two new projects are good examples of cross-component initiatives aimed to support populations with special needs – in this case of war-handicapped persons and elderly displaced persons. Also, two projects in housing for 89 IDP families in Puerto Wilches and Ciénega del Opón (Municipality of Barrancabermeja) were approved in this quarter.

<sup>11</sup> Varios, including *Vanguardia Liberal*, May 28 and June 14, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> *Vanguardia Liberal*, June 12, 2002

<sup>13</sup> *Vanguardia Liberal*, June 21, 2002

## VALLE DEL CAUCA



Registered IDPs 12/00:	12,558
Registered IDPs 12/01:	30,585
Registered IDPs 01/02:	35,707 <sup>1</sup>
Registered IDPs 06/02:	48,836

Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00:	7
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01:	5
Municipalities with >85% reception 06/02:	5

*The number of IDPs in Valle del Cauca is the highest in the six departments; Cali and Buenaventura receive by far the largest percentages of IDPs.*

### Context Notes on Conflict

National events – including the rupture in dialogues with the FARC and later with the ELN, and the elections – are felt acutely in the City of Cali and the Department of Valle del Cauca. Conflict has escalated in Cali where residents have witnessed bomb detonations, a FARC attack on the Departmental Assembly in Cali followed by the kidnapping of 12 representatives. With few exceptions, the municipal capitals throughout the department have received threats of violent takeovers. On all sides of the conflict, armed groups have beefed up their regional presence and the FARC, ELN and Bateman Cayón's increased presence has been matched by an expansion in the Bloque Farallones, Pacific and Calima fronts of paramilitaries. The Colombian armed forces have increased activity in the southwestern zone of the departments, where they suppose the kidnapped representatives to be held.

Armed combat between groups has occurred during the quarter with surprising frequency: in Tuluá, Buga, Cerrito, Palmira, Pradera and Florida between FARC and the Colombian military; in Tdagua, Jamundí, Florida, Pradera and Cerrito between guerrilla and paramilitary groups; and, between paramilitaries and the Colombian armed forces in Bugalagrande and municipalities in the North.

Following Caicedonia and Sevilla, the Mayor of Cali was threatened with death by the FARC if his resignation was not granted immediately. Moreover, the entire City Council, as well as Congress members from the department and Senate representatives (not in captivity) were all issued similar threats. The departmental Peace Commissioner, who had been engaged in dialogues with the FARC, informed that this guerrilla group has ordered an immediate halt to all talks with local governments – this decision will impact negatively on IDP families whose return was being negotiated.

### *Context Notes on Displacement*


As in Santander, the trickle-rate of displacement continues to increase, most notably with families arriving in the Aguablanca District of the City of Cali.

Four large-scale displacements occurred this quarter, including 30 families from Jamundí in April and a further 110 families from rural areas of this municipality in May; 150 families from Buenaventura and 300 indigenous persons from the indigenous reserves in Florida. In all of these cases, return was made possible through negotiations held between the Departmental Peace Commission and the armed groups; as noted above, these negotiations will no longer be held.

There is renewed concern in the department regarding the shortfalls in assistance to IDPs; during this quarter, the RSS was unable to meet its law-mandated task of providing even emergency food to IDP families during the first three months post-displacements, as available rations were given to families involved in large-scale displacements.

More so that in previous quarters, Valle del Cauca has received IDPs from nearby departments of Nariño, Putumayo and Chocó.

### *Program Status and Quarterly Advance:*




The distribution of IOM investment in Valle del Cauca closely follows the distribution of IDP population, where Cali accounts for 43% of departmental reception, followed by Buenaventura with 26% and Tuluá with 11%.

Likewise, the fact that this department is the largest receptor of IDPs among the six departments in IOM's original area of responsibility is reflected in this department's current budget for approved projects – at 1,418,488 US Dollars it is the highest in the Program. Forty-two percent of these funds have been expended or are earmarked for income generating activities, including a large number of agricultural projects; other priority areas are education (19% of the budget) and health (16%).

During the reporting period, 11 new projects were approved for implementation in Cali, Buenaventura, Tuluá, Trujillo, Bugalagrande and Jamundí. These projects include two efforts to strengthen the RSS in the department – an office which has been under enormous pressure from IDPs due to the overwhelming demand (and shortage in supply of assistance opportunities). The Program is providing support to improve the pace and accuracy of the RSS registry and has helped to set-up an Assistance and Orientation Unit (UAO) in Cali. Also in coordination with the RSS, the Program has approved two housing improvement projects to benefit 75 families in two municipalities. In the area of adult education, the Program is working with an NGO to provide literacy and high-school equivalency courses to 100 adults with a creative curriculum that incorporates teaching on human rights, community participation and preventive health. In the latter area, the Program has approved a new project in Cali also to promote better health in depressed urban areas of this city through improved practices and nutrition.

## NARIÑO



Registered IDPs 12/00:	761
Registered IDPs 12/01:	11,337
Registered IDPs 03/02:	13,147
Registered IDPs 06/02:	16,969

Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00:	3
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01:	5
Municipalities with >85% reception 06/02:	5

*As the chart and statistics demonstrate, the number of IDPs in Nariño has skyrocketed in the last 18 months; in the first year the number of municipalities most affected by displacement also increased to absorb these groups; however in the last six months, Pasto, Taminango, Samaniego, Tumaco and Cordoba continue to receive new population, putting to test the absorptive capacities of these small and mid-sized cities.*

### Context Notes on Conflict


The conflict in Nariño began in earnest in March 2001 with the incursion of the paramilitaries into the coastal areas of the department, particularly the coca-growing Llorente area of Tumaco, and later with guerrilla offensives against paramilitaries and Colombian armed forces in Barbacoas and Ricaurte, as well as in Pie del Monte. A predominantly African Colombian and to a lesser extent indigenous (Awa and Embera) region, it is believed that most persons uprooted from the coast settle temporarily in Pasto on their journey to Guapi and Buenaventura in the departments to the north. Of the registered IDP households resettled in Nariño, 968 were displaced from Nariño itself, in large part from the Municipality of Tumaco.

Among the FARC aggressions during the last quarter are included two takeovers of small municipalities of La Cruz and Genova in April, theft of eight oxygen tanks from the hospital in La Unión. Fighting in Barbacoas with the armed forces and an unannounced blockade on road transportation closed-in the community causing economic and food crises.

### Context Notes on Displacement

The percentage of new IDPs in Nariño arriving from Putumayo is diminishing as territorial disputes between the AUC and the FARC intensify along the Pacific Coast and in other areas of Nariño, producing a non-stop exodus into Pasto and municipal capitals of Taminango, Samaniego, Tumaco and Córdoba, in that order. According to RSS statistics, the cumulative number of IDPs registered in this quarter increased by 29% over the figure for March 2002 and the rate of reception during this time period jumped also by 13 percentage points. According to figures the Municipal Offices of the Public Ministry – which serve to predict, albeit roughly, RSS registration numbers for the next period as IDPs present their declarations first to the Personerías – the cumulative number of IDPs in the department is now 21,894 persons.

### Program Status & Quarterly Advance




The Program in Nariño has also followed the pattern of displacement in the department over the last eighteen months, focusing first on Pasto and the former Province of Obando (Pupiales, Potosí, Ipiales and Córdoba) and later working intensely in Taminango and Samaniego. In 2002, the numbers of IDPs in the extremely poor and high-conflict in the Municipality of Tumaco have increased such that this Tumaco is now the fourth-highest receptor in Nariño.

Difficulties in access to this municipality have impeded as timely an expansion as the Program has sought; however, in the last quarter, three new projects were identified in the area of education (school improvement, special programs) and sanitary infrastructure (communal sanitary units, water cisterns) were approved with a joint budget of more approximately 55,000 USD. The Program will continue to prioritize new projects in Tumaco over the next months.

Through the end of the reporting period, cumulative obligations (including expenditures) to 47 approved projects reached 1,025,348 US Dollars. Financially important projects approved in this quarter involve highly innovative approaches to education, developed in coordination with the IDP associations, teachers and the local offices for education. For example, in Taminango, the Program is supporting an agricultural school to improve the quality of its courses (particularly practical applications in agriculture and animal raising) and starting an in-kind revolving fund for IDP and vulnerable families in nearby rural villages. In Samaniego, the Program has approved a "traveling school" requested by a school whose potential IDP students are located in isolated towns and villages and are unlikely to attend school on a regular basis on account of responsibilities on the home farm. Most innovation has come from the departmental capital of Pasto, where the Program is now working with "Don Bosco," for adult education; with a local technical training institute to provide night and weekend courses to out-of-school displaced youths; and a project called "Peace Forgers" to facilitate immediate entry of young children into the formal school system.

## CAQUETÁ



Registered IDPs 12/00:	5,379
Registered IDPs 12/01:	11,963
Registered IDPs 03/02:	14,106
Registered IDPs 06/02:	15,957

Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00:	4
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01:	4
Municipalities with >85% reception 06/02:	2

RSS figures show a tripling in numbers of IDPs received in Caquetá (almost exclusively from other municipalities Caquetá with small numbers from Putumayo) coinciding in the last semester with a decrease in the number of main receptor cities from 4 to 2. A likely explanation is that Valparaíso and Cartagena del Chairá are considered too unsafe by uprooted populations to seek resettlement there – both municipalities are points of expulsion within the department.

### Context Notes on Conflict

Like Putumayo, Caquetá has been hit-hard by the FARC's indignation at the election results and their declared wish for the Government of Colombia to cede control of the two departments permanently as a pre-condition for peace talks with the new administration. Also like Putumayo, local authorities are the most noticeable target of the FARC – their nation-wide threat to kill mayors who fail to resign their posts immediately holds particular sway with Caquetá authorities after the murder of the Mayor of Solita during this quarter brought the tally up to six assassinated mayors in the last twelve months. The FARC have included health workers in their lengthening list of declared military targets.

FARC actions affected the health sector in other ways this quarter as well: in the April bombing of the police station in the municipality of Paujil, unintended damage was done on the nearby hospital – it is estimated that 60% of the facility was made unusable with an associated lost of 100 million pesos. Economic activity has been halved at times by blockades to transport, electricity and communications limitations and guerrilla-led extortion. Caquetá's economy is largely based on cattle-raising and dairy; nationwide, cattle raisers are talking of a 388 billion peso loss in the first semester to FARC aggressions (up 30% from last year) including kidnapping of 353 cattle raisers, murder of a further 21 and theft of some 77,000 heads of cattle.<sup>14</sup>

### San Vicente del Caguán

Located 150 kilometers from the departmental capital Florencia, this municipality was the unofficial capital of the former demilitarized zone. The economic boon that arrived here with the announcement of the demilitarized zone in 1998 resulted in a 60% increase on revenues on average for the service industry and transformed this once poor, agricultural zone. In the months after the collapse in peace talks, the situation was reverted to pre-DMZ conditions – with a vengeance. The jobs of two hundred twenty civil servants with posts closely linked to the peace process were the first to go; the cattle and dairy business has slowed to a crawl; commerce is hard hit, with one hotel owner reporting a 50% decrease in customers; transportation from San Vicente to Florencia was cut deeply by the unannounced armed blockade department-wide (supported by the occasional explosion of vital bridges). At the

<sup>14</sup> Caracol Website, 23 June 2002

time of writing this report, the municipality did not have electricity on account of a FARC terrorist act and the municipality had imposed a 9:00 p.m. curfew.


Even before the municipality was made a stage for the peace negotiations and handed over to FARC control, it was one of the most violent places in Caquetá. This pattern likely continued during its tenure as the capital of the DMZ. It is certainly true again now: since February 20 and according to official statistics, 35 persons have been killed violently. The violence is attributed predominantly to the FARC, who were responsible for the recent murder of the wife of the Acting Mayor. On June 24, all municipal officers excepting the Mayor Nestor León Ramírez had presented their resignation; a temporary alternative was provided by setting up a operations room in the Hilton in Bogotá.<sup>15</sup>

Press reports point to permanent engagement by military forces with some successful identification of facilities (a citadel-shelter for 1,500 insurgent troops) and drug activities (500,000 kilos of chemicals, 7 tons of cocaine, 2 large laboratories).<sup>16</sup>

### *Context Notes on Displacement*

Several information sources in Caquetá, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Local Office of the Public Ministry and the Social Solidarity Network concur that the socio-economic profile of newly arrived IDPs to Florencia varies from that observed in earlier migrations: while IDPs arriving at a “trickle rate” to Florencia in 2001 were in large part migrant groups, in small family units and without roots or land-ownership in the department, the families arriving now are large, Caquetá born families who leave behind legally-titled land. These families are arriving mostly from the southern municipalities of Solita, Curillo, Valparaiso and Milán, where paramilitaries had successfully wrested territorial control from the FARC – until recent reversals. To a lesser degree families are arriving from the former demilitarized zone and the adjoining municipality of Cartagena del Chairá.

### *Program Status and Quarterly Advance*



According to the RSS, 82% of the IDP population is concentrated in the departmental capital of Caquetá (Florencia) as has been the case since the end of 2000, where small groups of IDPs were also found in Puerto Rico, Valparaiso and Cartagena del Chairá. Due both to this concentration of the beneficiary group and to security conditions in the department since August 2001, the Program has invested the majority of its funds in Florencia. Not only has travel been made difficult by the precarious security situation, but municipal offices have been practically closed (with mayors in Florencia) since late last year.


Florencia is one of the cities where the impact of the resettlement of IDPs on the receptor population is most immediately visible as receptor and IDP families reside side-by-side in marginal and high-risk neighborhoods along the Florencia hills and compete for pirated electricity and rationed quantities of municipal water.

During this quarter, a project to provide potable water to 1,124 families and electricity to a further 1,100 families at a heavy subsidy, aim not only to improve living conditions of IDP and receptor families alike, but to catalyze community organization and integration processes between these groups. Likewise, the Program will start working in the joint primary-secondary school in the Nueva Colombia neighborhood to improve opportunities for IDP children, provide computers to equip an IT laboratory and complete construction on a school cafeteria to be subsidized by ICBF.

<sup>15</sup> Caracol Website, June 2002

<sup>16</sup> Caracol 28 April 2002

**PUTUMAYO**



Registered IDPs 12/00:	1,659
Registered IDPs 12/01:	6,164
Registered IDPs 03/02:	8,458
Registered IDPs 06/02:	11,797
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/00:	3
Municipalities with >85% reception 12/01:	6
Municipalities with >85% reception 06/02:	6

*According to the RSS displacement has increased seven-fold since the end of 2000 in Putumayo; while this increase was matched by a doubling in the number of affected municipalities in 2001; the latter number has not changed in 2002 despite a 91% rise in IDPs in this period.*

**Context Notes on Conflict**

The FARC strategy of destabilizing communities by attacking local governance has taken a toll in Putumayo. Alongside the death threats to mayors throughout the department (with resignations issued by the mayors of Puerto Guzmán and Puerto Caicedo) the FARC have caused the displacement of several teachers and 17 health workers, mostly posted to rural areas. The FARC are systematically debilitating social organization as well; for example, the FARC has demanded the immediate resignation of any Neighborhood Action Board president who has signed a voluntary eradication pact with implementing NGOs in Putumayo.

Quietness on the paramilitary front has given rise to speculation regarding a strategically timed strike against the highly active guerrilla groups.


**Context Notes on Displacement**

In a gradual manner through individual and small-group displacements, the displaced population has increased from 295 households at the beginning of last year to 2,223 households at the end of this quarter, making Putumayo the fifth largest receptor in the country. Moreover, Putumayo demonstrates the largest percentage of displaced population over total departmental population in the nation.

Following the trend of the last six months, the reception rate in Mocoa has remained stable while reception in the municipal capitals of Puerto Asís, Villa Garzón, Orito and Puerto Leguizamo has increased dramatically. It is probable that more IDPs from the rural areas of these municipalities are resettling in the municipal capitals closest to home – rather than travel to Mocoa – as fear of paramilitary retaliations against IDPs arriving in secondary cities wanes, while social and economic opportunities in Mocoa are evermore limited.

The high rate of reception in Puerto Asís is the clearest example of this tendency – the declaration of IDP status in Puerto Asís by a peasant uprooted from guerrilla-dominated rural areas was once considered near-suicidal behavior. Although the paramilitary stronghold on the city has not loosened, the city is now the second-largest receptor in the department and is the chosen place for resettlement of families uprooted from its rural areas, as well as San Miguel, Valle del Guamuez, Orito, Puerto Caicedo and Leguizamo. In terms of expulsion, escalated conflict in “middle Putumayo” has led to the uprooting of teachers and health workers Puerto Guzmán and Puerto Caicedo.

***Program Status and Quarterly Advance:***



With the exception of Villa Garzón, which became a key receptor only in the last six months, the Program has reached all municipalities heavily affected by displacement in the department. Through the end of the reporting period, the cumulative total of approved projects in this department reached 35 representing an obligation in funds of 1,248,236 US Dollars.

In the last quarter, the Program extended its agreement with CONFAMILIAR to implement the Micro-Credit Program – previously implemented in Mocoa, Sibundoy, Orito and Valle del Guamuez – in the municipalities of Leguizamo and Puerto Asís. Following the upsurge of IDPs in Puerto Asís, 4 of the 5 projects approved this quarter are implemented in this municipality, including infrastructure and education improvements to the Las Brisas School, expansion of a sewage system, provision of equipment to 2 clinics and a departmental workshop to follow-up on psychosocial assistance plans.

**CHOCO**



The department of Chocó has a population of 410,116 inhabitants of which 60% reside in rural areas, where they have been vulnerable historically to pressure from armed groups who value the area as a route for trafficking arms and drugs, for its large sectors without state presence and its propinquity to the unguarded area in Darien on the Panama side of the border. The corridor of Urabá has been in dispute between guerrilla and paramilitaries since 1997, switching hands between the two groups on several occasions since that time. At present, the FARC are the most important in terms of numbers and territorial control, followed by the AUC, the ELN, the EPL and the EGR (in Boche).

A constant obstacle to getting assistance to the at-risk areas within the Urabá region of Chocó and Antioquia is the presence of armed groups along the river and the regularity with which a traveler runs into their check points, only to be turned back or sent away without the goods brought for distribution to beneficiaries – these areas of difficult access are displaced in the triangles in the attached map.


Although Bojayá continues to be the zone of greatest concern, developments along the Baudó River and San Juan (southwest) are cause for alarm as well; in the month of June, the indigenous organization OREWA reported sightings of corpses in the river in the midst of combat between AUC, ELN and FARC.

ACABA reported also that a de facto armed blockade in the area is choking the economy and resulting in a food crisis.

*Local non-governmental actors in Chocó*

<i>Institution</i>	<i>Basic Facts</i>
Catholic Church	The church works with black communities along the Atrato River and indigenous groups throughout the department; seek visibility for the recurring incidence of violation against human rights. The Diocese of Quibdó works closely with ACIA in 120 communities in the Middle Atrato and indigenous groups. The Diocese of Itsmina works in the southern parts of the department from Quibdó to the Valle del Cauca border.
Consejo Comunitario Mayor de la Asociación Campesina del Atrato (ACIA)	This entity works with 120 black communities along the Atrato River, representing some 45,000 persons.
Organización Regional Indígena Embera Wounaan (OREWA)	Works with 44,000 members from indigenous communities in the entire department.
Asociación Campesina del Baudó (ACABA)	This association represents the peasant communities located on the banks of the Baudó River.
Asociación Campesina del San Juan (ASOCAMESAN)	Like ACABA the association represent riverside residents, in this case along the San Juan River.
<i>Institution</i>	<i>Basic Facts</i>
Catholic Church	The church works with black communities along the Atrato River and indigenous groups throughout the department; seek visibility for the recurring incidence of violation against human rights. The Diocese of Quibdó works closely with ACIA in 120 communities in the Middle Atrato and indigenous groups. The Diocese of Itsmina works in the southern parts of the department from Quibdó to the Valle del Cauca border.
Consejo Comunitario Mayor de la Asociación Campesina del Atrato (ACIA)	This entity works with 120 black communities along the Atrato River, representing some 45,000 persons.
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*A Crime of War in May 2002*



Direct combat between the two groups began in earnest in April of this year; on the 21<sup>st</sup> of that month, the paramilitaries took Vigía del Fuerte (Antioquia) and Bellavista (Chocó). Fighting along this section of the river started on May 1<sup>st</sup>, forcing residents to flee the area or weather the storm in spots that soon proved unsafe. On May 2<sup>nd</sup>, a gas cylinder exploded in a Catholic chapel where some 300 persons had sought shelter, killing 117 civilians including 48 children, and setting in motion a massive exodus of indigenous and African Colombian peasants to Quibdó and other Colombian cities.

Between this terrible event – immediately labeled a war crime – and the end of May, more than 100 persons showed up dead. The guerrilla has since announced that they have sent a further 1,500 troops to Urabá and will not back down; according to the Washington Post, the paramilitaries are “hit-hard” and struggling, despite calling their urban recruits out into the jungle.

As of the end of June, the Social Solidarity Network was reporting that close to 9,000 persons had been displaced in Chocó since the massacre; of whom some 5,771 persons had been able to make official declarations on their IDP status. These 5,771 persons comprise 1,744 households; 52% are women and 57% are children.

Although the Government of Colombia has neither organized returns nor provided protection and assistance projects, voluntary returns, especially to Vigía del Fuerte, Murri and Miguel (none, apparently, to Bellavista) are estimated to account for the exit from Quibdó of approximately 1,000 persons.

### *IOM Activities*

In consideration of the likely extension of the Post-Emergency Program to three new departments, including Chocó, IOM joined several humanitarian organizations in responding to the Chocó crisis in May. Approved projects are outlined below:

**Project Title:** Interethnic Health Brigade  
**IOM Contribution:** 21,622 USD  
**Status:** Completed

In partnership with the Departmental Office of Health and OREWA, this project provided immediate medical assistance in 22 indigenous and 10 African Colombian communities along the Buchadó, Bojayá, Napipí and Opogado Rivers. Four thousand persons benefited from medical screening, vaccination, laboratory tests and dental work, while receiving guidelines to prevent further illness.




**Project Title:** Clearing of Waterways  
**IOM Contribution:** 17,814 USD  
**Status:** Ongoing

This project aims on the one hand to solve a local transportation problem and on the other provide temporary employment to 504 persons facing extreme poverty. The project will employ these persons for four months to clear trees and branches that obstruct the flow in 18 rivers of Quibdó, Medio Atrato, Vigía and Bojayá. The project is implemented by ACIA and co-sponsored by the WFP with the provision of 4,320 food rations to be given as Food-for-Work. At the end of the reporting period, direct beneficiaries had been selected and work plans prepared by ACIA; activities had started along the waterways of Napipí and Caño Sucio.

**Project Title:** Institutional strengthening of the Communal Councils of Black Populations in Middle Atrato  
**IOM Contribution:** 32,859 USD  
**Status:** Approved

Under this project, ACIA hopes to build capacity in these grassroots organizations in the areas of administration, territorial and resource management and peaceful co-existence. The project will be carried out in 120 communities, which will participate through their council representatives in the joint elaboration of a regional “Ethnic Development Plan.”

**Project Title:** Construction of a school in El Reposo 2  
**IOM Contribution:** 24,000 USD  
**Status:** Ongoing



In order to improve education conditions faced by some 498 school children in El Obrero, Reposo I and II neighborhoods, currently crammed into small spaces and rented space in nearby homes, a school will be constructed in El Reposo 2. The school will measure 10,000 m2 and include recreational spaces; UNICEF is co-sponsoring the project with a donation of equipment and materials and the implementation of an innovative educational program.



**Project Title:** Improvements to ICBF facilities in Santa Ana  
**IOM Contribution:** 40,000 USD  
**Status:** Ongoing

ICBF has one daycare center in Santa Ana, a neighborhood with high concentrations of IDPs, including new arrivals from the Atrato area, which attends 82 children – well above the usually permitted number. The center has been unable to respond to the increased demand since May. Nearby ICBF has an abandoned facility, which will provide daycare services to 69 infants once improved and equipped by the Post-Emergency Program.

**Project Title:** Support to ICBF “Mobile Unit” for Psychosocial Assistance  
**IOM Contribution:** 4,400 USD  
**Status:** Approved

ICBF has identified a need for psychological and psychosocial support for persons affected by the conflict in Chocó, with special emphasis on child and adolescent witnesses to the intense violence in May. The ICBF team will provide group therapy and recreational activities to 2,880 persons in Quibdó, for which task this state entity will receive financial support from the Post-Emergency Program to purchase materials and visual aids.

**Project Title:** Health Campaign and Services for IDPs and Receptor Families in Quibdó  
**IOM Contribution:** 9,000 USD  
**Status:** Approved

The Municipal and Departmental Offices of Health are co-financing and implementing this project, which aims to provide medical screening and treatment, psychological support and dental services, alongside a campaign to reduce incidence of illnesses through improved health practices.

### ***Chocó Pipeline***

- 1) Construction of communal sanitary units for 90 families in Villa España, Quibdó
- 2) Agricultural and livestock projects to re-activate local economy in 4 indigenous and African Colombian communities
- 3) Reconstruction of the electrical system in Vigía Fuerte, with complementary actions to identify alternative energy sources and strengthen community fabric
- 4) Research on the situation of IDPs in Chocó
- 5) Housing improvements for displaced and receptor families in Tagachí
- 6) Support civilian documentation
- 7) Improve and furnish with texts basic library in Fátima neighborhood

**BASIC PROGRAM INDICATORS**

**Organization:** International Organization for Migration  
Mission to Colombia

**Reporting Period:** 1 April – 30 June 2002

**Key Results:**

- 6,422 Adults engaged in technical or vocational training
- 36,647 Persons provided medical attention (preventive or treatment)
- 2,857 Household provided improved water and/or sanitation solutions
- 66,326 Children supported in academic and educational programs or direct beneficiaries of improved conditions in schools (provision of school supplies, uniforms, texts, increased access in schools, infrastructure improvements, equipment)
- 235 Municipal and Departmental Committees strengthened through contingency planning, project formulation, etc.

**Projects Approved this Period:** 55

**Budget Information on New Projects:** New Financial Obligations for 1,227,358 USD  
New Counterpart Funds for 1,258,834 USD

**Expenditure Information:** USD 1,608,063 expended April – June 2002  
USD 7,561,282 total expended through June 30 2002

**Projected Expenditures Third Quarter:** USD 1,800,000

**Projected Number Direct Beneficiaries:** 191,208 (New 52,933)

**Projected Number Indirect Beneficiaries:** 293,799 (New 50,844)

**BENEFICIARY DISTRIBUTION BY DEPARTMENT**

Department	Direct beneficiaries	Indirect Beneficiaries
Valle del Cauca	22,338	72,320
Santander	16,824	34,836
Norte de Santander	44,221	82,101
Nariño	27,197	13,784
Putumayo	47,170	42,791
Caquetá	22,763	11,247
Inter-Regional	10,695	36,720
<b>Total</b>	<b>191,208</b>	<b>293,799</b>

**PROJECT DISTRIBUTION BY COMPONENT**

Department	Income Generation	Health	Education	Housing	Community Stabilization and Communication	Total
Putumayo	9	5	8	7	6	35
Nariño	8	8	12	6	12	46
Caquetá	6	5	7	4	5	27
Valle del Cauca	13	5	10	7	14	49
Santander	12	9	4	7	7	39
Norte de Santander	13	6	10	1	6	36
Inter.-Regional	4	3	2	2	7	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>250</b>

El objetivo de este encuentro fue sensibilizar a la comunidad empresarial de Pasto acerca del fenómeno de desplazamiento forzado que aqueja a la comunidad.

Ayer, en el foro empresarial "un encuentro hacia la productividad" -convocado por la Defensoría del Pueblo y la OIM- se dejó ver un completo panorama acerca del problema de desplazamiento forzado que se vive actualmente en esta capital.

De tal manera, los representantes de distintas entidades de la ciudad dieron a conocer sus puntos de vista sobre este tema, así como también expusieron sus propuestas.

El Defensor Regional del Pueblo, Álvaro Montenegro, indicó que se hace necesario reflexionar sobre uno de los temas más humanos, más difíciles y agobiantes como es el desplazamiento. De tal forma, se deben propiciar escenarios para plantear propuestas de solución donde participen empresarios, autoridades y representantes de la comunidad desplazada y, en un trabajo conjunto, buscar insertar a esta población en nuestra sociedad.


"Con preocupación examinamos diariamente como la población desplazada se incrementa más en Colombia y especialmente en la capital de Nariño. Ya vamos bordeando el orden de las 6.500 personas de diferentes partes del Putumayo, Cauca, Antioquia y de aquí mismo que están en nuestro municipio, a raíz de los problemas presentados en el Corregimiento de Santa Bárbara. Pero tanto la población civil y las autoridades podemos trabajar para aminorar el sufrimiento de nuestros semejantes. Sabemos de los momentos difíciles que se atraviesan, pero no nos podemos quedar con los brazos cruzados ni tampoco silenciosos, sino ser sensibles para buscar soluciones".

#### Triste realidad

Vitelmo Cadena Riscanevo, presidente de la asociación municipal de desplazados - Manos Unidas, dejó ver sus sentimientos ante los asistentes: "Los desplazados no somos por voluntad, fuimos expulsados de nuestras tierras por la violencia. La mayoría somos campesinos que nos dedicábamos a labores agrícolas que incluían el cultivo de la coca, no por esta razón somos personas malas, pícaros, ladrones, coqueros o cosa pa-

En foro empresarial

## Gremios presentaron propuestas para ayudar a los desplazados



Cada vez es más preocupante el incremento en el número de personas que se ven obligadas a dejar sus tierras debido a la violencia.

queremos hacer parte de la sociedad en la cual vivimos. Somos personas buenas, trabajadoras, con ganas de salir adelante y de ayudar en la solución de nuestra problemática. Queremos recordar que lo que sufrimos y el dolor que hemos sentido por tener que ver morir a amigos, parientes, vecinos y familiares cercanos, además de tener que salir huyendo como si fuéramos malhechores y no las víctimas, le puede pasar a cualquiera. Por eso, todo lo que ustedes puedan hacer por nosotros no es en vano; es un aporte real por una sociedad mejor, por un país mejor, sin tanta injusticia y desigualdad, sin tanto dolor y miseria".

#### Propuestas y acción


Hernán Quintero, coordinador regional de la OIM, manifestó que en el departamento de Nariño se viene realizando un programa integral de asistencia pos-emergencia, dirigido a los grupos de desplazados y comunidades re-

ceptoras. "Por ello, se están implementando iniciativas a través de programas canalizados, a través de instituciones del Estado como la Red de Solidaridad Social, el Sena, el Icbf, la Universidad Nacional, entre otras entidades. La intervención de dicho programa se ejecuta en 7 municipios de Nariño, con un total de beneficiarios de 290, el 68% en zona rural y el 32% en zona urbana. Los proyectos productivos además de la capacitación, asesoría socioempresarial y atención sicosocial a los desplazados".

Franco Jimmy Torres, director ejecutivo de Acopi, dijo que esta Asociación como representante de la pequeña y mediana industria está encaminada a fortalecer iniciativas donde se evidencie creación de nuevos procesos productivos. Por lo tanto, se hizo la presentación de propuestas como la capacitación práctica ajustada a los desplazados con respecto a los requerimientos de proyectos productivos; la creación de un fondo capital

semilla, para proyectos que apalanquen las iniciativas previstas e identificadas que permitan desarrollar diversas iniciativas. Así mismo, se planteó, por parte de Acopi, desarrollar un trabajo sobre esquemas culturales hacia el espíritu empresarial de la comunidad desplazada, "buscando el vencer barreras y obstáculos propios de nuestra región por el fenómeno de desplazamiento".

Por su parte el alcalde de Pasto, Eduardo Alvarado Santander, manifestó que "la violencia tiene tal proporción que desplaza cantidad de personas de toda condición social que llegan a las ciudades en búsqueda no de la caridad pública sino de oportunidades. Por eso es importante pensar este fenómeno desde la perspectiva de la productividad. Sabemos que hay una situación de desempleo muy difícil; sin embargo, creemos que entre ellos hay gente de empuje y creatividad a quienes dando apoyo competirán en igualdad de condiciones por su sustento". Agregó que la Alcaldía tiene a través de la Secretaría de Desarrollo Comunitario una política de productividad: "se necesita capacitar a la gente, enseñarle a hacer para que genere sus ingresos, pero también se necesita organizarla empresarialmente, ya sea para que trabaje de manera individual o en forma asociada. Asimismo, el crédito es un elemento vital para adquirir materias primas, insumos, etc. Aún obteniendo el crédito necesita de un acompañamiento en el proceso de comercialización de productos. Así, se viene trabajando en esos cuatro puntos, los cuales son aplicables para la comunidad desplazada. Esto con el fin de buscar el mejor modo de brindar alternativas de solución a su problemática", concluyó Alvarado.



En el evento se contó con la participación de autoridades, representantes de los gremios y de las distintas instituciones encargadas de velar por la protección de la comunidad.

Foto: QUANO ESTRADA