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Volume III

Director's Advisory Council

and

Review of Projects

Volume III

Formulation of the Director's Advisory Council (DAC) and Review of On-Going Projects

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 - 1. DAC Staff Paper.
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 - 1. DAC Staff Paper.
 - 2. DAC Meeting Notes.
 - 3. DIR decision.

- O. Industrial Development Project.
 - (Meeting cancelled)
 - 1. DIR decision.

MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: Frederick H. Sligh, DD *msl*

SUBJECT: Director's Advisory Council

DATE: March 4, 1974

Addressees are aware that the Director has established a Director's Advisory Council (DAC) by Mission Order. The purposes of this memorandum are (a) to establish guidelines for the review of on-going projects and (b) to set an interim schedule for the review of on-going projects and plans for new projects. We will prepare guidelines for the review of new project plans shortly.

A. Guidelines for the Review of On-Going Projects

The responsible direct-hire Project Officer and the Evaluation Officer will write a joint staff paper to address the points enumerated in the outline below. They are encouraged to draw upon other Mission expertise in their work, if needed. While a consensus staff paper would accelerate the deliberations of the DAC, a consensus is not desired where honest disagreement exists. Copies of the staff paper should be provided at least one working day in advance of the review session to the members of the DAC. These two officers will attend the DAC review and provide such additional information and opinion as may be required.

Staff Paper Outline

1. A summary statement of the original justification (or "rationale") for the project and a succinct retrospective analysis of the pertinence of the justification in terms of the development situation today.
2. A summary of the original (or most recently amended) project design given in the authorized PROP using the logical framework format. The greatest concentration of effort should be on the goal, purpose, and output statements plus the targets (or "indicators") for these levels. Assumptions, "means of verification" and inputs may be omitted unless particularly pertinent to the DAC's deliberations.

3. A succinct analysis based on collected evidence, pro and con, of progress toward the achievement of the output and purpose targets in the logical framework. Under this heading, the subject of the extent to which Governments of Afghanistan have fulfilled their commitments should be addressed.

4. A succinct assessment of the project in terms of (a) the extent to which it meets the priority sectors and benefits criteria of the new legislation and (b) the extent to which it helps the GOA to fulfill its own explicit goals and priorities.

B. Interim Schedule

The following schedule presents the order in which the on-going projects and new proposals will be reviewed. Beyond April 10th, dates have not been set. Project Officers are, however, encouraged to begin preparatory work immediately in order that the review of the Mission's entire current and proposed program can be accomplished before the close of the fiscal year. Most review meetings will be chaired by the Deputy Director or the Assistant Director, Development Planning. You will be notified of the time and place of each meeting as well as any changes in dates.

| <u>Project Title</u> | <u>Project Officer</u> | <u>DAC Review Date</u> |
|--|------------------------|------------------------|
| Financial Administration Improvement (Revenue) | Mr. Barbour | March 9 |
| Curriculum & Textbooks | Dr. Lanza | March 11 |
| Statistical Information Systems Development | Mr. Barbour | March 19 |
| Higher Education | Dr. Lanza | March 27 |
| HAV Assessment | Mr. Mitchell & Team | March 30 |
| Proposal - Basic Health Centers and Staff Expansion | Miss Langley | April 3 |

| <u>Project Title</u> | <u>Project Officer</u> | <u>DAC Review Date</u> |
|---|------------------------|------------------------|
| Proposal - HAV Drainage | Mr. Mitchell & Team | April 6 |
| Proposal - HAV Production, Processing & Marketing | Mr. Mitchell & Team | April 8 |
| P/FP - Management | Miss Langley | |
| National Development Training | Mr. Landry | |
| Industrial Development | Dr. Zondag | |
| Food for Peace | Mr. Rusby | |
| P/FP - Aux. Nurse Midwives | Miss Langley | |
| Proposal - Non-formal Education | Dr. Lanza | |
| HAV Assessment (second session) | Mr. Mitchell & Team | |
| Proposal - Nutrition | Mr. Rusby | |
| P/FP - Demo/KAP | Miss Langley | |

Distribution:

Project Officers, as identified
Dr. Denton, AD/DP
Mr. Miller, A-AD/M
Mr. McMahon, CO
Mr. Standish, CDE
Mr. Brown, D
Mr. Johnson DP

TO: See Distribution

DATE: March 28, 1974

FROM: Frederick H. Sligh, DD *MSL*

SUBJECT: Director's Advisory Council

REF: Memo dated March 4, 1974

Referenced memo promised that guidelines would be forthcoming for the drafting of staff papers for new project proposals and to establish a complete schedule for the review of on-going and proposed new projects.

A. Staff Paper Outline for Proposed New Projects

- 1. Background to the proposal: the need for the project.
- 2. Project Purpose including quantified targets to be achieved by the end of the project.
- 3. Outputs to be generated, quantified and time limited to the extent practicable.
- 4. Inputs, both USAID and GOA; other donors, if applicable.

(Note: for the above four points the logical framework may be used; the logical framework will have to be developed at the end of the review in any event.)

- 5. Desirability of Project: from the GOA perspective; from the U. S. perspective; and in terms of the benefits which will accrue to the project purpose's target.
- 6. Feasibility in terms of the GOA's technical and administrative capacity. Also in terms of the USAID's in-house planning and administrative capacity.
- 7. A discussion of how the "fixed cost reimbursement concept" would be employed, if applicable.
- 8. A discussion about how to proceed with project development with the GOA.

B. Revised Project Review Schedule

| <u>Project Title</u> | <u>Project Officer</u> | <u>DAC Review</u> |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Higher Education - Kabul University | Dr. Lanza | March 30 |
| P/FP - Management | Ms. Langley | April 3 |

| <u>Project Title</u> | <u>Project Officer</u> | <u>DAC Review</u> |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|
| HAV Assessment | Mr. Mitchell | April 6 |
| Rural Development | Mr. Mitchell | April 8 |
| National Development Training Proposal - Basic Health Centers and Staff Expansion | Mr. Landry | April 10 |
| Industrial Development Proposal - Nutrition | Ms. Langley | April 24 |
| P/FP - Aux. Nurse Midwives | Dr. Zondag | April 27 |
| Proposal: Non-formal education | Mr. Rusby | April 29 |
| Food for Peace | Ms. Langley | May 1 |
| P/FP - Demo/KAP | Dr. Lanza | May 4 |
| HAV Marketing Study | Mr. Rusby | May 6 |
| HAV Assessment (second session) | Ms. Langley | May 8 |
| | Mr. Mitchell | May 11 |
| | Mr. Mitchell | May 13 |

Distribution:

Project Officers, as identified

Mr. Brown, D
Dr. Denton, AD/DP
Mr. Miller, AD/M
Mr. McMahon, CO
Mr. Standish, CDE
Mr. Johnson, DP

DATE: April 16, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: See Distribution

FROM: Frederick H. Sligh, DD *Sligh*

SUBJECT: Director's Advisory Council Review Schedule

The following is a revised schedule for the DAC's review of on-going and proposed new projects. Task Force proposals will also be reviewed by the DAC during the month of May and, therefore, changes and additions will be made to the schedule in the future, as appropriate.

| <u>Project Title</u> | <u>Project Officer</u> | <u>Date</u> |
|--|-----------------------------|-------------|
| P/FP - Management | Ms. Langley | April 23 |
| P/FP - Aux. Nurse Midwives | Ms. Langley | April 29 |
| Proposal - Nutrition | Mr. Rusby | May 1 |
| P/FP - Demo/KAP | Ms. Langley | May 6 |
| Food for Peace | Mr. Rusby | May 7 |
| C & T - Book Distribution | Dr. Lanza | May 11 |
| P/FP - Proposals for delivering FP Services | Ms. Langley | May 14 |
| Proposals- Education Sector | Dr. Lanza | May 19 |
| HAV Marketing | Messrs. Mitchell and Wilson | May 20 |

Distribution:

- Mr. Brown, D
- Project Officers, as identified
- Dr. Denton, AD/DP
- Mr. Miller, A-AD/M
- Mr. Towery, A-CO
- Mr. Standish, CDE
- Mr. Johnson, DP
- Mr. Martin, AGR (Task Force Chairman)
- Mr. Barbour, PA (Task Force Vice Chairman)

Project Title: Financial Administration Improvement (Revenue)

Project Number: 306-51-750-029.4

Total U.S. Funding: \$2,184,000

Life of Project: FY 71 to FY 75

1. a. PROJECT JUSTIFICATION

The project was justified in the 1970 PROP on the following basis:

For several years, the domestic revenues of the GOA have not kept pace with its budgetary needs. Approximately 25% of the total national budget and practically all of the development budget have been dependent on deficit financing and foreign commodity assistance. As a result, the money supply has been increasing at an unacceptable rate (20%) and Afghanistan faces serious inflationary pressures. A new government and a new Minister of Finance have recognized this problem and propose to deal with it by (a) curbing unnecessary expenditures; (b) increasing tax revenues by improved administrative methods; and (c) submitting legislation to Parliament to increase revenues. The new Minister of Finance has requested USAID assistance in training personnel and improving tax administration. The increased revenues resulting from improved methods of assessing, collecting and auditing taxes will permit the GOA to devote greater resources to development, thereby minimizing the need for large scale deficit financing and heavy reliance on foreign aid.

b. RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS

Review of the economic data cited in the PROP indicates the need for some correction. For example, in 1349, 1350 and 1351, internal borrowing and commodity assistance financed, on the average, 21% of the total GOA budget and 77% of the development budget. Percentages for the preliminary 1352 budget are 19% and 83% respectively and estimated 1353 percentages are 18% and 67%. These percentages are likely to fall over the next two years because (1) most commodities will be in tight world supply, and (2) this government has demonstrated a greater willingness to collect taxes. Nevertheless, reliance on deficit financing and foreign commodity assistance remain substantial.

Over the past seven years, the simple average increase in the money supply has been slightly less than 10% a year. Even though this is considerably less than the 20% figure cited in the PROP, it is still much higher than

Maxwell Fry's calculated maximum non-inflationary increase of 3.8% per year.

While Afghanistan admittedly faces inflationary pressures, Fry reports the average annual rate of inflation from 1950 to 1972 has been 5.6%, lower than for most LDCs.

In summary, it appears that although the PROP contained some inaccuracies, the basic economic conditions justifying the project continue to exist. All analysts agree that an improved capability to mobilize its domestic resources is a prerequisite to Afghanistan's development and that more efficient administration of tax laws is one element of achieving this mobilization.

2. a. SECTOR GOAL

"To mobilize domestic economic resources, especially (domestic) financial resources." (Fourth Five Year Plan, p. 23.)

b. SECTOR GOAL INDICATORS

The Fourth Five Year Plan indicates the following targets to be achieved by March 1976 and they may be considered GOA sector goal indicators:

1. Direct taxes total 5.5 billion Afs.
2. Indirect taxes total 17.1 billion Afs.
3. Income from sale of government properties and services totals 7.9 billion Afs.
4. Income from government enterprises totals 6.6 billion Afs.
5. Income from licenses, fines and fees totals 1.3 billion Afs.
6. Borrowing from Central Bank restricted to 1.72 billion Afs.

c. ALTERNATIVE SECTOR GOAL INDICATORS

1. The share of direct taxes to total domestic revenue sources rises to 13.6% or greater.
2. The share of indirect taxes to total domestic revenue sources declines to 42.3% or less.

3. Borrowing from Central Bank declines to 1.72 billion Afs.

d. PROJECT PURPOSE

To increase the amount of revenue collected from all forms of national taxation, excluding revenues collected by Customs houses.

e. PROJECT INDICATORS

1. Tax revenues increased at least 200 million Afs. by 1355 (1977) in the total of the following six categories: individual income tax; corporate income tax; land tax; priced documents; road tolls; and other provincial revenues.
2. Uniform revenue collection, enforcement and audit regulations and procedures adopted and in use by central and provincial revenue offices.
3. All provincial revenue personnel trained in the application of the new systems for tax administration.

3. PROGRESS ANALYSIS

(The underlined statements below are the specific project objectives taken from the 1970 PROP. Immediately following each is an analysis of the progress made in achieving it.)

a. Advice and assistance on general financial policy, fiscal controls, Ministry organization and establishment of a program budget.

In general, the close personal relationship with the Minister that existed at the time the PROP was written did not continue after that Minister, Dr. Aman, went out of office. There were occasions during the period from December 1972 to July 1973 when the Minister discussed general financial policy questions, but in general, PAS advice and assistance was not sought on questions not directly related to their work program in improving tax administration.

b. Institutionalization of capability for preparation of tax legislation and regulations.

Continued work with the Tax Board has increased the capacity of the Board to prepare tax legislation and regulations. A report containing recommendations for improving the work of the Board was submitted.

One of its recommendations, that the size of the Board be reduced, has been implemented. Since the establishment of the new Board by the GOA, there has been no opportunity for this report to be discussed in detail.

c. Technical supervision by Revenue Dept. of the decentralized revenue system.

The improved system for recording and reporting revenues has improved supervision as one of its objectives. Obviously, accurate and timely information is required for effective supervision and control.

The functioning of the Tax Board in reviewing questions and issuing rulings and regulations is an essential part of technical supervision by the Revenue Department.

The preparation and adoption of standard written instructions for assessing and collecting taxes is also intended to provide a base for more effective supervision.

d. Introduction of an administrative review process in the central Revenue Department.

The whole question of an administrative review process remains open at this time. At present, tax appeals are made by taxpayers to the Mustofi or the Governor at the provincial level and usually to the Minister here in Kabul. The establishment of an orderly process of administrative review that requires the appellant to exhaust his remedy at each level before moving up to the next, and that informs each higher level of all of the prior proceedings would be highly desirable, but there is no evidence as yet that this desirability is appreciated by GOA officials. PAS opinion is that such a process would be so much counter to Afghan culture that it is not likely to be acceptable for some time to come.

e. Development of land tax legislation, regulations and procedures.

The whole issue of improved land tax administration is not so much dependent upon legislation, regulations and procedures as it is upon a firm policy decision to utilize the cadastral survey results for land tax purposes.

A recommendation to this effect was submitted to the Ministers of Finance, Planning and Interior and to the Deputy Prime Minister in 1972.

Following that, a Cabinet decree authorized the three Ministers to prepare a joint plan for implementation. A plan was prepared and submitted to the three Ministers who approved it in October of 1972. With the change of government in December 1972, implementation was suspended. Interest was being revived when the July '73 coup occurred. The Revenue President has recently been again pushing for implementation of the plan and it appears that interest at higher levels is being revived, no doubt encouraged by the pressing need for more revenues for the 1353 budget.

f. Improvement of statistical operations of revenue accounting.

The new system for recording and reporting revenues was designed to accomplish this objective. The resulting increased accuracy and speed of reporting testify to its success. The remaining provinces are expected to begin to use the new system at the beginning of 1353.

g. Design and installation of uniform enforcement and collection procedures for all taxes.

This objective is being fulfilled by the work now in process. Approval has been obtained for five different taxes and the standard instructions for seven more are ready for approval. Five others are in draft form while the instructions for three have not been started, largely because of uncertainty about pending tax policy decisions.

h. Development of capability to analyze and audit tax returns in Kabul and larger provinces.

The development and administration of a course of instruction in tax auditing for selected employees of the larger provinces is the major objective for the Tax Enforcement Advisor during the next 18 months.

i. Development and installation of assessment procedures for fixed taxes on small business establishments.

The fixed taxes on small businesses is a part of objective g. These instructions are now in draft form in English and Farsi and ready for review by a working committee of the Tax Board.

j. Training assistance in:

1. Establishing a cadre of training instructors.

The training office now consists of a director and five instructors. Three additional instructors have been promised as well as a promise that the organization of this office will be officially established in the 1953 budget. This is an important positive step because to date all of its personnel are on loan from other offices with all the resulting problems one might expect.

2. Developing course materials.

Lesson plans and other training materials were developed for the training program in the new system for recording and reporting revenues and are currently being prepared for the training in the standard instructions for assessing and collecting taxes. To the greatest extent possible, the actual preparation is being done by the training instructors with advice and assistance from the training advisor.

3. Conducting training of central and provincial personnel.

830 revenue collection employees in the 26 provinces were given 4-5 days of classroom instruction in the new system for recording and reporting revenues.

It is expected that the training in the standard instructions for assessing and collecting taxes will require 4-6 weeks of classroom instruction for about 600 provincial revenue personnel. Figures on the numbers for tax auditing training are not yet available.

4. Activation of a Revenue Training Center.

It is believed that the information provided in 1, 2 and 3 above are evidence that a Revenue Training Center has been activated.

5. Selection of candidates for overseas training.

For the past two years, PAS has assisted the Ministry in selecting candidates for participant training. As a result, there are now 10 participants in the U.S. studying for Masters Degrees in Public Administration. There are also four participants in Mexico in an on-the-job training program in tax auditing.

k. Project effects on tax revenues to date.

The latest available figures on tax revenues are for 1351 (March 1972 - March 1973). Since this year ended before this project could be expected to have any effect, comparisons with 1350 would be meaningless.

Although some benefits can be expected while the project is in operation, these will be limited. The basic thrust of the project is to standardize the assessment and collection of the different taxes based upon the training of the personnel involved. Therefore, the full effect cannot be anticipated until the training is completed which will approximately coincide with the end of the project.

It is believed, however, that PAS has had some effect upon increasing revenues in the course of the project to date largely through policy recommendations that have been implemented. These are commented upon below.

In October 1972, in a report on the problems of road toll collection, PAS recommended that the price of gasoline be increased. In March 1973, a 33-1/3% increase was imposed with the increase in revenues estimated at Afs. 300 million.

A recommendation was made by PAS that police officers be assigned under the control of the Mustofi in every province to assist in collecting delinquent taxes. The new Mustofi of Helmand obtained such an assignment of police. As a result, at the end of the sixth month of 1352, the collection of back taxes already exceeded the total for 1351. Also, PAS is informed that the Minister of Finance has received the agreement of the Minister of Interior to make such assignments of police in all provinces.

The PAS recommendation that the practice of allowing corporations to take amounts paid as fixed import tax as a credit against the business receipts tax was adopted. It is estimated that this will increase the business receipts tax revenues by Afs. 40 million.

The government also accepted a PAS recommendation that the imputed profit of individual licensed merchants be increased from 7% to 10%. This is estimated to produce an increase of Afs. 50 million.

The first set of standard instructions to be issued was for the Cinema Tax. Application of the new instructions has not really begun, but in the

instance of the Kandahar Cinema, it has been shown that the tax will be increased from Afs. 47,000 per year to approximately Afs. 350,000. An unofficial prediction for the cinemas in Kabul estimates the increase at Afs. 9 million.

A PAS recommendation that the airport tax be doubled has been implemented but no figures are available as yet as to the amount involved.

Another PAS recommendation that the government tax the proceeds of the Red Crescent lottery has been accepted and a 30% tax imposed. Again, there is no estimate of the amount realized.

PAS had made several recommendations that were approved by the previous government for increased land tax revenues, reimposition of the livestock tax, increased motor vehicle registration tax and increased taxes on consumer goods. None of these were put into effect before the coup, but it is believed that some of them are being considered in the preparation of the new budget.

Although most of the above recommendations lie in the field of policy rather than administration, it must be recognized that it is only because of PAS's presence and activity in the latter area that they have had the opportunity to make these recommendations.

l. Fulfillment of GOA commitments.

The GOA has fulfilled all its written commitments to this project.

While they could not be considered as commitments in a strict sense, the GOA has, for one reason or another, failed to take certain actions and this has affected the progress of the project to some extent. For example, the Ministry of Finance agreed to print new standard tax forms centrally for all provinces. It has not done so and some delay in training and implementation has resulted. The Deputy Minister of Finance promised more frequent meetings of the Tax Board to consider proposed regulations and procedures but to date this has not happened. The Ministry has not yet provided all the training instructors needed for the project.

m. Summary analysis.

The hypothesis underlying this project is that if more effective methods of

assessing, collecting and auditing taxes are developed and Afghan staff trained in their use, tax revenues will increase. A final judgment on the validity of this hypothesis is not possible until after the project is terminated. On the surface, however, the hypothesis seems reasonable and apparently was so accepted by the USAID and AID/W.

In retrospect, while the supporting hypothesis may be valid, certain questions about the project's concept and structure may legitimately be raised:

1. The project was primarily conceived as assistance to the GOA to improve the administration of existing taxes. Although it has some impact on laws and regulations, the project fails to address adequately the question of whether improving the administration of an inadequate tax structure can have more than limited value and is a legitimate objective for U. S. assistance.
2. The GOA's political will to collect taxes is recognized as a crucial element for the success of the project but it appears to have been narrowly equated with the tenure of a specific Minister of Finance. Experience indicates an average ministerial turnover rate of one per year. A broader commitment on the part of the GOA would have been more reassuring.
3. Project goals for increased revenues are not specific nor is there any conclusive way to measure the extent to which the contractor's efforts are responsible for any revenue increases, even though reasonable suppositions may be made after the termination of the project.

In spite of the reservations expressed above, the project has made substantial progress and, if estimated improvements are realized, will represent a satisfactory return on AID's investment.

4. PROJECT ASSESSMENT

a. FAA

This project is difficult to reconcile with the sector priorities and benefits criteria of the new legislation. It does address one of the objectives of the Human Resources sector of the FAA of 1973 in that it provides training in management skills. In a more general sense, to the extent this project

will ensure that the wealthier segment of the population pays its fair share of taxes, it will increase the equity of the tax burden, thereby benefitting the poorer majority.

b. GOA

An improved capability to mobilize its domestic financial resources is essential if the GOA is to carry out a development program. This project directly addresses this requirement in two ways: (1) by increasing domestic revenues; and (2) by training GOA personnel in improved methods of tax administration.

Supplementary Comments - C. Johnson, DP

Assessing Progress and the Validity of the Revenue Project's Hypothesis

A. Assessing Progress

The staff paper for each project review is supposed to include an assessment of the project at three levels: output, purpose and goal.

In the case of the Revenue project it is impossible to assess progress toward goal indicators because (1) meaningful indices or targets have not been developed to date and (2) because, by the Mission approved implementation plan, no revenue impact will register at either the purpose or goal level until 1983. At the purpose level we were able to reach a consensus with Mr. Orr, PAS Chief of Party, that a target of 200 million Af. in new revenue collections by 1985 and thereafter is reasonable. Furthermore, Mr. Orr asserts that it will be possible, at the end of the project, to attribute specific revenue increases to the work of the project.

At the output level, Mr. Barbour surmises (and I concur) that the administrative improvements and procedural changes which are envisaged are slightly behind schedule because, primarily, of the slow-down following the coup but it is possible that all output targets can be achieved by December 1976.

B. Assessing the Validity of the Project Hypothesis

The hypothesis for any project, in the language of AID, is: If a certain set of outputs are generated within a given time, then the project purpose will be achieved (i.e., a desired quantitative or qualitative change will occur). In the case of the Revenue project, the project hypothesis may be stated as follows: If a set of administrative reforms and practices are accomplished and installed (outputs), then there will be an incremental increase of certain direct tax revenues (purpose). Put more succinctly, this project aims to increase revenues by administrative reform.

In December 1970, the PROP Review Panel expressed some reservations about this hypothesis. They wrote:

"The PROP leaves unclear the socio-political aspects of an improved system for administering taxes. Afghanistan would be unique if improved taxation were merely a procedural problem. The somewhat varied and ineffective collection practices in the provinces may not be simply due to organizational failure, as the PROP suggests, and more than likely reflects traditional attitudes and socio-political factors which must be modified if the systems proposed are to succeed."

We may deduce, from the above statement, an alternative hypothesis, to wit: If the GOA possesses and chooses to exercise that amorphous quality which we may dub "political will", then tax revenues will be increased. (It is perhaps self-evident but warrants an explicit statement that AID probably doesn't know much about increasing the quantum of political will possessed by a host government.)

Thus, in the case at hand we have at least two hypotheses to examine in terms of their possible effect on the revenues which might be generated by the end of the Fourth Five Year Plan (1355, the first year that the current Revenue project will have full effect).

For the hypothesis grounded upon administrative reform, PAS supplied us with a set of figures which includes the base year 1351, hypothetical revenue increases without the current project by 1355, and hypothetical revenue increases with the current project by 1355. These increases, subdivided by six tax codes, total approximately 200 million Afs. On second thought PAS decided that it didn't wish to be held to discrete increases by tax code but that the total amount of revenue gain--200 million Afs.--would be directly attributable to the project by 1355. Having stated the PAS' disclaimer, the figures originally provided by PAS are presented in the following table broken out by tax code. The purpose of making this presentation is not to tie PAS to discrete increments by tax code (though they are now tied to the same approximate total of 200 million Afs.) but to illustrate a presumed difference between end results of two project hypotheses.

With regard to the alternate hypothesis grounded upon "political will", we have no way of projecting revenue increases to AFY 1355. We do have, however, a set of unpublished, preliminary figures based on seven months actual data for 1352 prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Da Afghanistan Bank for three tax codes. We also have estimates for 1353 for these same codes. These data are presented in adjacent columns of the table mentioned above. However, readers are advised that there is no consensus on the validity of the informal GOA data: Mr. Orr of PAS is skeptical of their validity based on his experience with past estimates and the source of these estimates; Dr. Hooker is reasonably confident that the numbers for 1352 will prove to be close to the actuals (Dr. Hooker makes no claim for 1353). In any event, we will soon have access to a revised preliminary estimate for 1352 based on nine months actuals and we will have the 1352 finals shortly after that.

Two Alternative Revenue Projections
(in billions)

| | P.A.S. Estimates | | | | Internal Mtn. Fin. Est. | | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|----------------|
| | 1951 Base (Actual)* | 1951 w/o Prof. (Est.) | 1955 w/Prof. (Est.) | Differ- ence (3-2) | 1951 Base (Actual)* | 1952 (Prelim. est.) | 1953 (est.) |
| 110 Personal Income | 208.2 | 208.4 | 201.5 | 62.1 | 208. | 207 | 207 |
| 120 Corporate Income | 148.1 | 172.2 | 200.3 | 27.1 | 168. | 260 | 275 |
| 130 Land Tax | 78.3 | 78.6 | 156.6 | 80. | 78. | 88 | 88 |
| 140 Sale Priced Documents | 31.4 | 32. | 61.7 | 9.7 | - | - | - |
| 150 Road Tolls | 62.5 | 71.9 | 78 | 3.1 | - | - | - |
| Other Prev. Revenues | 295. | 363.4 | 387.4 | 21. | - | - | - |
| | <u>641.2</u> | <u>679.1</u> | <u>1172.5</u> | <u>168.</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>-</u> |

* The differences in the base data are accounted by the fact that P.A.S. does not include taxes collected from foreign.

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With regard to the informal GOA figures, we can make two subjective statements. First, the increases given for codes 110 and 120 in 1352 over 1351, 55% and 57% respectively, appear to conform to our visceral knowledge that the GOA has been aggressive since the coup in collecting current and back taxes. It should be recalled that these increases, if they actually materialize, were accomplished without the reforms and improvements envisaged in the current project. Second, the 9% increase for code 130, land tax, appears to equate with our knowledge that the GOA has not been aggressive in this area.

Turning to the current hypothesis grounded on administrative reform we can ask whether an increase of 200 million Afs. in current prices by 1355 would be significant. The subjective answer turns on two judgments: the degree of confidence one has that the hypothesis is valid in the first place; and, second, the number of years the stream of benefits will accrue to the GOA in the absence of advisors. The reason for the subjectivity is that there will be no evidence, pro or con, on the validity of the hypothesis until after (more or less) the contractor is phased out and the project is terminated.

C. Concluding Remarks

1. The doubts expressed by the AID/W PROP Review Panel are my own: it is difficult to establish any causative linkage between the administrative reforms and practices which are to be established under the project (outfits) and any increase of revenue.
2. When the hypotheses grounded upon administrative reform and "political will" are juxtaposed it appears to be obvious that what really counts is the political will to collect taxes which will not an increase of revenue.
3. The project is so designed that it is impossible to measure progress, in terms of increased revenues, while the project is being implemented. Also, since PAS is reluctant to establish targets by tax code it will be impossible to determine at the end of the project whether the revenue increases obtained. Furthermore, even if there is an aggregate increase of 200 million Afs. by 1355 for the six tax codes it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to attribute these gains to the project. The above discussion and table illustrate the problem: it is possible that the GOA will swamp the project in terms of 1355 targets in 1352 with revenue gains obtained solely by the exercise of political will.
4. By virtue of its design and hypothesis, this project begs for a comparative and historical analysis to determine if anywhere in the underdeveloped world

revenue gains have been achieved which are solely attributable to the installation of new administrative practices.

5. Finally, the minimum condition for the continuation of any project ought to be that progress toward the project purpose is measureable both during the course of, and at the end of, implementation. Therefore, either real targets must be developed given the current design to permit this or the project must be redesigned in order that targets can be developed.

Observations on Chuck Johnson's Supplementary Comments

No one denies that "socio-political" factors are important influences on the collection of taxes. But to proceed from there to the contention that attempts to improve tax collection (or, by inference, any other government activities) are therefore without significant value seems to me to be stretching logic out of shape.

Chuck maintains that revenue increases due to "political will" are so much larger than those due to administrative reform that the latter are relatively insignificant. His this assertion is based on an analysis of dubious estimates of collections of three taxes for one year. Surely this is a shaky basis for such a sweeping generalization.

I think it is reasonable to assume--and I believe this would probably be proved by the "historical analysis" suggested by Chuck--that both "political will" and administrative reform will contribute to increased revenues. The amount of increase attributable to each factor can never be precisely determined or proved. There can only be a reasonable supposition established by analysis made after the full effects of the administrative improvements are felt on the revenue collections. For those who insist on precise quantitative indicators of progress, this kind of situation may be difficult or impossible to accept. But the fact is that most administrative progress, like most human progress, is not susceptible to precise measurement. One may note trends and general indications during the course of the action; but the results are not usually clear until all the returns are in and even then, differences of opinion may remain.

Ernest J. Barbour
Chief, Public Administration
Division

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

Total U.S. Funding \$2,184,000

Date Prepared: 3/7/74

Project Title and Number: Financial Administration Improvement (Revenue) 301-51-750-029.4

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTION |
|---|--|--|--|
| <p><u>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</u></p> <p>"To mobilize domestic economic resources, especially (domestic) financial resources." (Fourth-Five Year Plan, P. 23)</p> | <p><u>Measures of Goal Achievement:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> The share of direct taxes to total domestic revenue sources rises to 13.6% or greater. The share of indirect taxes to total domestic revenue sources declines to 42.3% or less. <p>(Targets to be achieved by March 1976, as reported in the Fourth-Five Year Plan.)</p> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> GOA budget | <p><u>Assumptions for achieving goal targets:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Continuing need for increased revenues by GOA. GOA commitment development. |
| <p><u>Project Purpose:</u></p> <p>To increase the amount of revenue collected from all forms of national taxation, excluding revenues collected by Customs Houses.</p> | <p><u>Conditions that will indicate Purpose has been achieved: End of project status:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Tax revenues increased a total of at least 200 million Afghani by 1355 (1977) in the following six categories: individual income tax; corporate income tax; land tax; priced documents; road tolls; and other provincial revenues. Uniform revenue collection, enforcement and audit regulations and procedures adopted and in use by central and provincial revenue offices. All provincial revenue personnel trained in the application of the new systems for tax administration. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> GOA budget Official regulations and procedures of Ministry of Finance Training records | <p><u>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Continued support for modernized tax administration by Minister of Finance and President of Finance. Trained personnel remain with the Revenue Department and utilize their training until new systems are institutionalized. New regulations and procedures enforced in all central and provincial Revenue Offices. |
| <p><u>Outputs:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> A trained Revenue staff. Establishment of a training institution in the Ministry of Finance. Implemented policies, regulations and procedures governing assessment, collection and audit of all direct GOA taxes. Installation of uniform accounting and reporting procedures in central and provincial Revenue Offices. | <p><u>Magnitude of Outputs:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Reports of contractor Acceptance and issuance of regulations by Ministry of Finance Training records | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Continued support of Ministry of Finance in: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Reviewing and accepting recommendations Providing training instructors Arranging for training of provincial revenue employee | <p><u>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</u></p> <p><u>U.S.</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of technical assistance in revenue administration, tax enforcement and revenue training. Training of participants in revenue and public administration. Commodities such as business machines. <p><u>GOA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Office space. Training facilities. Funds for local hire personnel, office equipment & supplies. Candidates for participant training. |
| <p><u>Inputs:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Tax manual providing detailed explanations with examples for application of income tax law 6/73 Written recommendations for improving the functioning of the Tax Board 8/73 830 Provincial revenue employees trained for 4-5 days in the implementation of new systems for recording and reporting revenues 1/74 A training office with director and 8 trainers established in Ministry of Finance budget 4/74 Written standard instructions for assessment and collection of all taxes (approximately 25) excluding Customs House revenues 5/74 400 Provincial revenue employees trained for 3-5 weeks in implementation of new standard instructions and use of tax manual 12/75 30-50 employees in larger provinces trained in tax auditing techniques 12/75 | <p><u>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</u></p> <p><u>U.S.</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Approximately 18 man-years of technical assistance advisor time provided by contractor. Approximately 24 GOA officials sent to USA for Masters Degree programs in public administration & 8-12 GOA officials sent to Tehran for OJT program in auditing. 2 vehicles and 56 manual adding machines. <p><u>GOA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Office space for team personnel in Ministry of Finance. Office space and classrooms for training personnel. Approximately 3,100,000 Af. allocated to project. Nominations of 8-10 persons each year for U.S. programs and 8 persons for Tehran program. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Contractor's reports Training office records GOA performance | <p><u>Assumptions for providing inputs:</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Continued funding of contract by AID Continued funding of local currency by Ministry of Finance |

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FINANCIAL HISTORY

PROJECT 029.4, FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION IMPROVEMENT (REVENUE)
Inception through March 31, 1974

| | FY FUNDED | MAN-MONTHS PARTICIPANTS | FUNDING PERIOD | | OBLIGATIONS (1) | DISBURSEMENTS (2) | UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS (3)=(1)-(2) | DISBURSEMENTS PLUS ACCRUED EXPENDITURES (4) | PIPELINE (5)=(1)-(4) |
|--|-----------------|-------------------------|----------------|--------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| | | | FROM | TO | | | | | |
| Technical Services Contracts: | | | | | | | | | |
| PAS for assistance to the Ministry of Finance in establishing procedures for improved and uniform revenue administration | FY-71 | - | 8/71 | 3/73 | \$ 318,000 | \$ 318,000 | \$ -0- | \$ 318,000 | \$ -0- |
| | FY-73 | - | 4/73 | 3/74 | 203,000 | 82,333 | 120,667 | 188,149 | 14,851 |
| | FY-74 | - | 4/74 | 8/75 | 242,000 | -0- | 242,000 | -0- | 242,000 |
| Dr. Edward S. Shaw | FY-73 | - | 7/73 | 8/6/73 | 24,000 | 7,408 | 16,592 | 24,000 | -0- |
| Total Technical Services Contracts | | | | | 787,000 | 407,741 | 379,259 | 530,149 | 256,851 |
| Participants: | FY-72-74 | 293 | | | 169,658 | 107,197 | 62,461 | 109,372 | 60,286 |
| Commodities: | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 Vehicles and Spare Parts. Hand operated calculators, Adding Machines, Visual Aid supplies and equipment under PAS contract | FY-73 | - | | | 14,000 | -0- | 14,000 | -0- | 14,000 |
| | FY-71 | - | | | 15,000 | 14,596 | 404 | 14,696 | 304 |
| Total Commodities | | | | | 29,000 | 14,596 | 14,404 | 14,696 | 14,304 |
| Other Costs: | | | | | | | | | |
| Invitational and Operational Travel and Miscellaneous | FY-73-74 | - | | | 6,147 | 6,107 | 40 | 6,147 | -0- |
| | | | | | 6,147 | 6,107 | 40 | 6,147 | -0- |
| Sub Project Total | | | | | \$ 991,805 | \$ 535,641 | \$ 456,164 | \$ 660,364 | \$ 331,441 |

**DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
(Meeting Notes)**

Date and Place: March 9, 1974, Director's Conference Room
2:30 - 4:30 p. m.

Purpose: Review of Financial Administration Improvement
(Revenue) Project 029.4

Participants: DAC Members:
Frederick H. Sligh, DD, Chairman
Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
John Standish, CDE (2:30 - 3:00)
Terrence J. McMahon, CO

Others:
Ernie Barbour, PA
Charles Johnson, DP

Papers considered by the participants and attached to these notes:

- Staff paper describing the project
- Supplementary comments - C. Johnson, DP
- Financial history
- Observations on C. Johnson's supplementary comments
- Mobility of Trained Revenue Officials - E. Barbour memorandum
- Max Fry's Views on Administrative Reform - E. Barbour memorandum

Introduction

Ernie Barbour introduced this project by commenting briefly on some of the major points raised in the staff paper. He noted that the project clearly does not fit the new legislation but expressed his opinion that the project is moving along as well as can be expected and should be permitted to continue as scheduled.

Funding

Chuck Johnson noted that the Mission has proposed in the FY 74 and FY 75 CP to extend the estimated completion date of this project to December 1975. To do so would require a PROP amendment to use

FY 75 funds. (The PAS contract was most recently funded to March 1975 from the FY 74 allotment.)

Barbour pointed out that the project was designed on the assumption that FY 75 funds would be available, that the original PROP indicates funding from FY 71 through FY 75 and that all PAS work plans and schedules have been developed on the basis of a December 1975 termination date.

GOA participation in project implementation

The group discussed the current work of the PAS team and GOA receptivity and support for advisor efforts and recommendations. Fred Sligh observed that the Progress Analysis section of the staff paper (pages 3-6) includes several statements which suggest a lack of GOA determined support or action to assist in implementation of the project. In answer to a question raised by John Standish, Ernie Barbour said that he believes MINFIN would argue for retention of this project because of the desire to increase revenues. Generally, the perception was one of limited progress.

Will this project produce any long or medium-term economic benefits?

Frank Denton questioned the feasibility of attempting to achieve administrative improvements (institutional development) of the type anticipated for this project in a government which frequently replaces the individuals who are responsible for accepting or rejecting these administrative processes and has a history of administrative incompetence despite extensive technical assistance. In short, is there any evidence that permanent administrative improvements can be instituted in Afghanistan for the purpose of producing sustained, increased revenues? In response to Denton's questioning the possibility of improving a government as inert as the GOA, Barbour asked if this was not exactly the kind of government that most needed such help. Sligh commented that Denton's logic could be interpreted to mean no help should be given to underdeveloped countries.

A discussion then followed on the legitimacy of treating increased revenues as a valid economic developmental objective in Afghanistan. (Dr. Maxwell Fry has suggested that economic development will not be enhanced through increased revenue collections in this country.)

Ernie Barbour subsequently submitted a memorandum quoting Fry on the importance in Afghanistan of (1) administrative reform in the Ministry of Finance and (2) agricultural taxation. (Attached)

Chuck Johnson expressed his opinion that improved administration is not the critical element in producing increased revenues, but rather, "political will" is the crucial variable. Johnson also noted Fry's analysis (pp. 332-337) that Afghanistan's "tax effort" as a proportion of its "tax capability" was 48th of 49 developing countries. Had Afghanistan's tax effort been closer to its capability than administrative reform might make a difference. Barbour maintained that political will was certainly important but that administrative reform could also produce increased revenues and there was no precise way to attribute increases to one or the other.

New legislation and the Revenue Project

The group expressed unanimous agreement that this project does not fit the new legislation. Frank Denton added that if the Fry thesis is accepted (i. e., that increased revenues are not desirable for economic development in Afghanistan), the project would not be acceptable under former project criteria. He added that in any event, Fry has raised enough doubts to suggest that these funds would be better spent in some other project.

Minister of Finance

There have been four Ministers of Finance since the PROP was written. Chuck Johnson pointed out that implementation of the project has slowed or stopped for a time after each change in Ministers (4 in 4 years).

Project future and identifiable results

Ernie Barbour commented that the PAS team has done a good job of performing contract assignments and that the Chief of Party believes that project tasks can be accomplished by December 1975. Chuck Johnson expressed his concern over the need to establish project purpose targets which would permit evaluation of progress during the course of implementation and at the end of the project. Johnson doubted that specific revenue gains, if any, will be directly attributable to the project.

Questions were raised concerning the continued project involvement of participants and others who have been trained for the purpose of improving revenue administration. Ernie Barbour will obtain the requested information. (Attached)

Recommendations

Fred Sligh asked the participants in this meeting to express their opinions concerning the continuation of the project. (Note that the Barbour position was expressed at the outset -- see "Introduction" above.) Recommendations were as follows:

Chuck Johnson: Terminate the PAS contract in March 1975. Permit current participants to complete their training programs.

Frank Denton: Suggest termination of this project, to occur in March 1975, during the April session with the GOA. If the Government wishes to continue and we agree, it will be necessary to radically restructure the project. As a part of such restructuring, we would insist on major GOA commitments to revenue generation and use. Such agreements are, however, not very likely.

Terry McMahon: Ask Julian Orr to prepare a proposal of tasks which could be performed by the PAS team to achieve fixed, identifiable objectives within present contract funding (through March 1975). After review, and modification if necessary, present this proposal to the GOA, and advise them that our legislation will not permit additional funding of this project beyond the current contract period.

Distribution Limited to Following Only:

V. W. Brown, D - with attachments *
E. Barbour, PA
F. Denton, AD/DR
C. Johnson, DP - without attachments
J. Standish, CDE
F. Sligh, DD
T. McMahon, CO

CO:TMcMahon:jr:gh:3-18-74

Clearances (in draft):

E. Barbour, PA C. Johnson, DP F. H. Sligh, DD
F. Denton, AD/DP J. Standish, CDE

*To be retained permanently by C. Johnson after Director's action.

Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

April 20, 1974

Vincent W. Brown /s/ **Vincent W. Brown**
Director, USAID/Afghanistan
Review of Financial Administration Improvement Project

Consistent with the Director's Advisory Council recommendations and Mr. Barbour's memorandum on a work plan, the Financial Administration Improvement Project will continue until September, 1976, assuming sufficient funds are available.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)

AD/DP:FHDenton:gh

REVIEW OF PROJECT 091
CURRICULUM AND TEXTBOOKS

March 7, 1974

- I. Project Objectives and Justification
- II. Logical Framework Summary
- III. Progress towards Achievement of Log Frame Purpose and Outputs
- IV. Project Assessment
 - 1. Assessment relative to priority sectors and benefit criteria of the FAA 1973
 - 2. Assessment of extent to which the project addresses explicit GOA Priorities
- V. Conclusions

REVIEW OF PROJECT 091
CURRICULUM AND TEXTBOOKS

I. PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND JUSTIFICATION

Project Objectives

The first ProAg Amendment introducing C&T as a sub-project of the Elementary and Secondary Education Project was dated March 31, 1967. The C&T Sub-Project objective was stated: "to establish by 1973 in the MOE a capability for the continuing creation and production of modern primary school textbooks, teachers' guides and supplementary teaching materials; and to prepare Afghanistan's first modern primary textbooks with teachers' guides based on the new curriculum."

The stated objectives have remained constant through the years as evidenced by the following statement from the FY 74 ProAg:

"Project Purpose

"To institutionalize within the Ministry of Education the capability of continuous curriculum research and development and the preparation of textbooks and teachers' guides."

Project Justification (Rationale)

In the PROP dated 11/2/70 (FOAID A-453) an extensive Project Justification is provided. That statement includes background information on:

1. A national literacy rate estimated at 8 to 10% and an estimated 17% of eligible children enrolled in elementary schools.

2. The expressed desire for increased educational opportunity and the steadily rising enrollments of 7 to 8% each year.

3. MOE recognition that a new curriculum, texts and teaching materials could provide the needed impetus and direction in improving its program of elementary education. The existing elementary school curriculum was found to be generally deficient in meeting the expanding needs of developing Afghanistan. Existing textbooks had obviously lost their relevance to the nation's modernization process.

4. The MOE was lacking in (a) curriculum structure (statements of values, behavioral objectives, education goals); (b) professional expertise (curriculum specialists); (c) technical personnel (writers, translators, editors, and artists) with the particular skills required in textbook preparation.

5. The capability for textbook publication and distribution was underdeveloped and seriously limited by lack of adequate planning and trained personnel.

The 1970 PROP further states:

"Education constitutes one of the largest single claimants to the limited resources of most developing nations (and Afghanistan is ~~an~~ exception). Thus, it is mandatory that the LDC's educational resources be used wisely and efficiently to enable optimal benefits from minimal inputs. Many factors are involved in cost-benefit educational planning. The most important consideration in the final analysis is the relevance of the educational system to, and its capability for, inducing needed social and economic

development. It was the above reasoning that led the Government of Afghanistan through its MOE to request U.S. assistance in developing a new and relevant curriculum for its primary schools with new textbooks and teaching materials based on the new curriculum."

Current Justification

There has been no basic change from the early Project Justification cited above. Elementary School enrollments have increased as predicted (currently approx. 600,000) and should reach 900,000 by 1976. As a result the literacy level has improved slightly. However, both enrollments and literacy remain at a level that is unsatisfactory to the ROA. The goal of universal elementary education (as urged by UNESCO) remains foremost with the ROA and its declared policy is as rapid an expansion of elementary schools as resources will permit accompanied by a holding action at secondary and higher education levels.

It may be said therefore that the original Project Justification has been strengthened by developments in the past four years and more specifically by policy statements of the new Republic of Afghanistan.

II. LOGICAL FRAMEWORK SUMMARY

Sector Goal

The most recent Log Frame for C&T was prepared during the Evaluation Seminar in October 1973. That document states the broad sector goal as being: "Quality primary education available to one-third of Afghan children by 1978." The indicators are as follows:

1. Enrollment
 - a. Increase to 33% by 1978
 - b. Decrease in attrition rate

- 2. Curriculum tailored to Afghan needs and development objectives
- 3. Quality Primary Education
 - a. Higher student achievement levels
 - b. Primary graduates better prepared to enter secondary and technical schools and for employment
 - c. Availability of modern textbooks (assumes completion of manuscripts and printing and distribution capability)
 - d. Increased demand for reading materials
 - e. Improved student/teacher ratio by 1978 (as proposed in 5-year plan)
 - f. Increase in number of primary classrooms (as proposed in 5-year plan)

Project Purpose

To institutionalize within the MOE the capability of continuing curriculum research and development, and preparation of textbooks and teachers' guides. A summary of the indicators follows:

- 1. Finite unit within the MOE organization
- 2. Trained, responsible staff working independently on textbook planning development and production
- 3. Educator/Parental/Official acceptance of new materials
- 4. Teacher comprehension and utilization of new materials
- 5. Long range impact of new materials on student achievement in comparison with similar programs in Nepal, Iran, India
- 6. Continuing MOE support for operation (assumes adequate funding for staff, printing and an effective distribution system)

Project Outputs and indicators are summarized as follows:

| <u>Outputs</u> | <u>Planned Quantitative Indicators</u> |
|--|--|
| 1. Staff members trained abroad | 47 |
| 2. Staff members trained on-the-job (only) | 13 |
| 3. Curriculum guidelines for each subject | 9 |
| 4. Completed manuscripts | 132 |
| 5. Orientation of teachers | 14,000 in-service teachers |
| 6. Research results | Research studies as required of language, living conditions, culture, teacher/student utilization of materials, etc. |

III. PROGRESS TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF LOG FRAME PURPOSE AND OUTPUTS

The institutionalization of the C&T activity within the MOE has been accomplished with its integration into the MOE Publications Department.

The MOE has provided space for the U.S. Team and approximately 50 Afghan staff. There has been consistent support for the C&T activity at each level of the MOE and a policy of close collaboration with the MOE Departments of Elementary Education, Teacher Education, Supervision and Administration. The quality of Afghan personnel provided for training continues to be superior.

Afghan section heads have been named for each subject area and they have begun to undertake full responsibility for staff and program planning and implementation. Participants have been selected and trained abroad, _____ trained and _____ being trained. Of the _____ trained two have been transferred by the MOE to positions of greater responsibility in areas not utilizing their participant training.

The U.S. role is now almost exclusively advisory where in the early years it was operational. Manuscripts are prepared in local languages after consultation with advisers on story line, content, objectives and educational approach.

The progress in manuscript preparation and production was as follows on Feb. 28, 1974:

| | | |
|-------------------------------|------------|--|
| Printed | 19 | (attachment A) |
| In Press | 21 | |
| Awaiting Press | 4 | |
| Approved MOE | 18 | |
| To be prepared 1353(74/75) | 48 | (various stages of being written and texted) |
| To be planned 1353(74/75) | <u>22</u> | (various stages of being organized & planned) |
| Total | <u>132</u> | (manuscripts to be completed by end of projects) |

The above figures represent some adjustment downward from certain 1970/71 projections but it is several years ahead of the original estimate that the Project would run until 1980. In fact, the last funding year is now set as FY 1976 as all manuscripts will be completed in calendar 1977. This acceleration has resulted in part from concentrated participant training programs and from a careful reduction of planned manuscripts to 132 from the original estimate of 176.

The C&T activity has been carried on in close cooperation with a UNESCO Teacher Education Project. New materials have been tested with the assistance of UNESCO advisers who are placed in each of the 8 teacher training institutes in Afghanistan. In addition to pre-service

teacher orientation, there has been a series of in-service workshops for teachers, supervisors and school administrators in which the UNESCO/MOE sponsors have provided time for C&T staff to introduce the new curriculum and textbooks.

The Research Section of the MOE Publications Department has been engaged in a full program of testing trial materials and providing feedback to textbook writers. The result of the research has proved conclusively that the combination of new materials and new teaching methods has resulted in improved student achievement. These results are especially evident in reading **comprehension** and enlarged vocabulary, in higher correct responses in math, and in problem solving in science and other subjects. The research results, too numerous and involved to report here are available for review in the USAID Education Division and at the MOE office of the TCCU Team.

There are two additional areas of MOE responsibility that require mention. The MOE has not performed its (1) printing and (2) distribution functions with the same speed and dedication it has its other project-related commitments.

1. **Printing:** From project inception, it has been understood and agreed that the MOE Education Press (and other GOA presses as necessary) would print the project-produced manuscripts. Unfortunately in 1972/73 the Franklin Book Program management of the Education Press was terminating its ten-year contract. The MOE decided it would not renew the contract but would undertake Press management itself. This change resulted in a temporary shut-down of the Press while inventories were transferred and records and accounts checked. The MOE gave evidence of its

intention to manage the Press at its previous efficient level when it made special provisions for higher salaries to keep experienced workers and foreman at the Press. Nevertheless, there has been considerable delay and some backlog of manuscripts developed. To complicate the situation, there is a worldwide paper shortage and a tripling of paper prices so the MOE is having difficulty keeping the Press supplied with paper. We cannot be too critical of the MOE for there is ample evidence that the Minister himself has taken extraordinary steps to purchase printing paper. He received special permission from the Prime Minister to place an order in Iran for 500 tons of paper at a cost of \$350,000. Unfortunately, as of this date, Iran has declined to grant an export permit to the paper mill (in spite of a personal call by the Minister of Education on the Iranian Ambassador). The MOE is now seeking to purchase paper from other sources, particularly India, but the availability is uncertain. At the same time requests have gone through UNDP to SIDA and to UNICEF for assistance. UNICEF has prepared a project for submission to Headquarters and USAID has strongly endorsed the request for 860 tons of paper and some additional equipment for the Education Press.

At current consumption rates there is sufficient paper at the press for the next several months. By then we expect one or more of the other sources will have materialized.

2. Distribution: The MOE has never requested assistance in textbook distribution though from several studies made by U.S. consultants in 1970 (MacMakin, Rutter, Beardsley), it is clear that the MOE distribution system is unsatisfactory. The problem has been mentioned in each ProAg from the first, with MOE responsibility for distribution clearly

identified. Only toward the end of 1973, however, did the MOE take any steps to revise its distribution procedures. An MOE Study Committee chaired by the Second Deputy Minister was established. Members were the Presidents of Publications, Elementary Education and Administration. They did some field research and prepared a report for the MOE Council that was accepted early in 1974. Subsequently authority was given for establishing a Distribution Section within the MOE Administration Department. This was an excellent move as there has never been any certainty as to whom within the MOE was responsible for book distribution. Sadly, to date, the Distribution Section exists in name only for no Director or staff has been appointed.

The reasons why there has been comparatively little MOE interest in book distribution cannot be logically explained. We have been baffled by the MOE refusals of assistance with the problem. It is inconceivable that the MOE would continue to invest so heavily in staff and materials unless at some point it fully intended to place the new textbooks in the classrooms.

A genuinely hopeful note is that in the months ahead it will not be only the Americans calling for an effective distribution procedure. With the now total involvement and commitment of Afghans at every level of the C&T activity, we can expect there will be an internal pressure to get the books in the hands of children. The President of Publications is especially concerned that the work of 50 to 60 of his staff should benefit the Republic.

In spite of the above USAID has continued to execute its current commitment to complete assistance with Textbooks grades 1 through 6.

On the other hand, we have made it quite clear that USAID is not interested in responding to MOE requests for future assistance with textbooks for grades 7-9 until there is ample evidence that the books are in the classrooms and being utilized.

IV. PROJECT ASSESSMENT

1. Assessment Relative to Priority Sectors and Benefit Criterion of the FAA 1973.

Priority Sector Criteria

Section 105: Education and Human Resources Development. The purpose of this section is "...to reduce illiteracy, to extend basic education and to increase manpower training in skills related to development."

The C&T Project responds to the Education and Human Resources priority criteria in that it is designed to support the extension of basic education and to reduce illiteracy. The curriculum development undertaken as part of the project has resulted in courses of study in Practical Works that are directly related to the child's early adjustment to his environment and orientation to the world of work. A future sixth grade graduate should be a better candidate for formal or non-formal skills/occupational training.

This project has, further, helped develop curriculum and textbooks that relate learning experiences to other of the priority sectors of FAA 1973 including food and nutrition, population and health information.

Benefit Criteria

The C&T Project is aimed at all the children of Afghanistan

so that each year greater numbers of the "poorest majority" (as well as those economically better-off) will be benefitted by expansion and improved quality of elementary education. However as the project is designed it has as an assumption that the GOA will assume responsibility for the distribution of the textbooks. This basic assumption which if not assumed and implemented means that the project will not achieve its goal of benefitting the Afghan school children with quality primary education. Since the project has been designed so that the distribution component of the project is a GOA responsibility the project purpose has been confined to institutionalizing the capability of continuous curriculum research and development and the preparation of textbooks and teachers' guides. Therefore the project purpose can be achieved but it may be a mute accomplishment in regards to benefitting the maximum number of Afghan children (poorest majority) if an effective distribution system is not established.

2. Assessment of Extent to which Project Addresses Explicit GOA Priorities:

Considerable information about GOA priorities in Education may be gathered from the Fourth Five-Year Plan, Policy Statements by the Prime Minister, Minister of Education and other top officials, by reviewing current and projected Education Budgets and finally by studying education project planning and implementation.

a. The Fourth Five-Year Plan forecasts that a "quantitative expansion of primary education will be given more importance. At the same time due attention will be paid, within the limit of financial means to quality improvement in the primary education. Schools will

be distributed in proportion to the population and attention will also be paid, to the extent possible, to the quality of education." The Plan anticipates an increase in primary schools from 3,200 in 1350 (1971/72) to 4,500 in 1355 (1976/77), an increase of 39%. Also, the total number of students should go up from 575,000 to 914,000 in that period, an increase of 59%. This will represent a percentage increase from 23% to 35.8% of 7 to 12 year olds in school.

"In the Fourth Plan the main objectives are increasing literacy, improving the quality of education and achieving a balance between the different levels. In addition the necessary steps will be taken to provide more school buildings and to supply sufficient educational materials, all within the limits of the financial resources."

"Considering the increasing number of students, there will be need for 25 to 30 million books for elementary school levels and 15 to 20 million for the middle and high school level. Efforts will be made during the Fourth Plan to meet these requirements through a 10 per cent increase in the ordinary recurrent budget. At the same time, efforts will be made to construct the projected school buildings more economically" .."During the Fourth Plan development expenditure of the the MOE will amount to Afs. 697.7 million. Ordinary expenditures are projected as Afs. 4.7 billion during the Fourth Plan or 166% of the Third Plan's Afs. 2.8 billion.

b. Policy statements by high officials of the Republic have followed the guidelines set by the Fourth Five Year Plan as cited above. The Republic's declared intention is to improve the situation of "all" the people. Basic to that promise is the provision of schools and

books for all eligible children.

c. Recent actions by the MOE have confirmed its intentions to expand primary education and improve quality of that education as rapidly as resources will allow. A new MOE President of Elementary Education has been appointed. He is intelligent, energetic and daring. His earliest efforts to reduce dropout from grades 1, 2, and 3 resulted in a dramatic innovation - automatic promotion. This new policy will immediately result in a better retention rate and less educational wastage. In addition to the considerable investment in C&T, the MOE has provided funds for grade school kits of teaching materials to accompany the new curriculum and textbooks and approximately Afs. 39 million to support the printing of C&T textbooks. This will have a positive effect on the quality of education. There has, further, been a dramatic upgrading in teacher education so that 12th grade graduates must have at least two years of teacher training before being appointed by the MOE. This contrasts to having rural school taught by 8th and 10th graders in the past.

Ideally the GOA should develop a National Education Plan. It has not done so, as yet, but it has made the first steps by setting priorities and directions at each level of education. In addition to the examples cited above (and throughout this paper) there is additional evidence that thus far the GOA is carrying out its elementary education priorities. The C&T Project constitutes a significant and vital part of that GOA program.

V. CONCLUSIONS

Summary

It is evident from this project review that the C&T project, with strong GOA support and cooperation in meeting its obligations in terms of leadership, staff space, and funding, is achieving its defined stated purpose of institutionalizing within the MOE the capability of continuing curriculum research and development, and preparation of texts and teachers' guides. However, the GOA's problems in printing and distribution are causing us serious concern. Where difficulties are evident in meeting printing requirements, our assessment is that the MOE is doing its best. On the question of Book Distribution, the MOE has made its first tentative step by authorizing the establishment of a Distribution Section within the MOE Administration Department, but must take more substantive action in the near future or the project will fail to achieve its goal of benefiting Afghan children with quality primary education.

Distribution

The Fourth Five Year Plan projects a need for 25 to 30 million books for elementary school levels. There are currently 1,279,500 texts and teacher guides ready for distribution towards meeting this need. (Attachment A) Thus far, 222,500 texts have been reported to have been distributed to provincial warehouses. This represents less than 1% of the projected need by AY 1355. Information concerning actual numbers of books being used by students is not available.

Because of the complexities of an effective textbook distribution system, where the right titles and numbers of books must be in place to insure their proper utilization, the MOE must begin to implement a system that will be geared to handle the new books that are beginning to come off the press in substantial quantities. Otherwise, the MOE will be faced with such a large quantity of textbooks to begin distributing that it is not likely that an effective textbook distribution system will be established. The GOA's past performance with complex distribution systems does not give credence to the argument that the GOA when seized with the urgency of the need for a distribution system will establish a system and get the books distributed.

Because the textbooks have a student usages life of seven years, it is imperative that the textbooks be put into use as soon as possible after printing to insure that the investment by USAID and the GOA is amortized over the longest possible period of time.

USAID investment through March 1976 will be \$5 million (Attachment B) which includes approximately 1000 actual man months of technical assistance. The GOA support of the technicians through the trust fund will amount to an estimated \$267,000. If the institutional building aspects of the C&T project are not considered and cost is equated to the planned 132 textbooks and teacher guides, the unit cost of USAID's input is \$37,800 (excluding trust funds).

Project Design

The project sector goal of assisting Afghan children with quality education should normally be achieved if the project purpose is achieved. Unfortunately, this logic will not follow in the C&T project because an important factor, a distribution system, has been omitted from the project purpose and considered to be a factor that would be available through the MOE's own distribution system. In retrospect, it is clear that this ingredient necessary to achieve the project sector goal should have been one of the project purposes because we now have a project that will achieve its purpose but without an effective distribution system will end up being a white elephant for both governments.

Recommended Actions

The C&T project is at its most critical stage of implementation. It is considered a successful project with almost a 9-year history of implementation. Now is the time for that all important quantum leap (distribution) to insure a culmination of USAID and GOA efforts into a successfully completed project and to insure a project that will benefit the Afghan children.

Since it is conceivable that the project may reach its natural termination without an adequate number of textbooks and teachers' guides being in use, nor an operating distribution system that would insure their latter distribution the following actions are recommended for consideration.

1. Positive approaches should be made to the MOE in the form of an offer of technical assistance for implementing a distribution system and/or

an offer to reimburse the MOE a portion of the distribution cost for textbooks distributed within a specific time frame.

2. The current status of the C&T project's distribution problem and its implications should be explained at the highest level within the GOA. Our concern and willingness to help should also be highlighted with an understanding that we will be forced to terminate our assistance to the project unless the distribution problem is solved in the near future.

| <u>Titles Printed</u> | <u>No. Volumes Printed</u> | <u>Dates Printed</u> |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Health IV - Pashto Guide | 3,500 | Fall 1971 |
| 2. " " " Text | 128,000 | " " |
| 3. " " Dari Guide | 5,000 | " " |
| 4. " " " Text | 170,000 | " " |
| | <u>306,500</u> | |
| 5. Health V - Pashto Guide | 3,500 | Fall 1972 |
| 6. " " " Text | 60,000 | " " |
| 7. " " Dari Guide | 5,000 | " " |
| 8. " " " Text | 70,000 | " " |
| | <u>138,500</u> | |
| 9. Lang. Arts - Pashto Guide | 3,500 | Fall/Winter 1973-74 |
| 10. " I " Text | 150,000 | " " " |
| 11. Religion I-II - Dari Guide | 3,500 | " " " |
| 12. " IV " Text | 211,000 | " " " |
| 13. " V " " | 170,000 | " " " |
| 14. " VI " " | 128,000 | " " " |
| 15. Prac. Works IV - Boys Dari Guide | 5,000 | " " " |
| 16. " " " " Pashto " | 3,500 | " " " |
| 17. " " " Girls Dari " | 5,000 | " " " |
| 18. Math I - Pashto Text | 150,000 | " " " |
| 19. Social Studies IV - Dari Guide | 5,000 | " " " |
| | <u>834,500</u> | |
| Total Guides & Texts | <u>1,279,500</u> | |

SUMMARY OF PROJECT COST
(Thousands of Dollars)

| | <u>Total</u> | <u>Ps</u> | | <u>Parts</u> | | <u>Commodities</u> | | <u>O/C</u> |
|-----------|---------------|-------------|----------------|---------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------|
| | | <u>DH</u> | <u>Cont</u> | <u>Direct</u> | <u>Cont</u> | <u>Direct</u> | <u>Cont</u> | <u>Direct</u> |
| FY 74 | \$ 823 | \$- | \$672 | \$14 | \$119 | \$ - | \$15 | \$3 |
| 73 | 770 | - | 655 | 8 | 83 | - | 22 | 2 |
| 72 | 758 | (1) | 670 | 7 | 68 | (1) | 15 | - |
| 71 | 675 | - | 601 | 14 | 51 | 3 | - | 1 |
| Thru 70 | <u>1129</u> | <u>32</u> | <u>920</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>137</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>19</u> | <u>-</u> |
| | <u>\$4155</u> | <u>\$31</u> | <u>\$,518</u> | <u>\$48</u> | <u>\$458</u> | <u>\$23</u> | <u>\$71</u> | <u>\$6</u> |
| Projected | | | | | | | | |
| FY 75 | 950 | | 791 | 6 | 137 | | 14 | 2 |
| | <u>\$5105</u> | | <u>\$4,309</u> | <u>\$54</u> | <u>\$595</u> | | <u>\$85</u> | <u>\$8</u> |

FINANCIAL HISTORY

PROJECT 091.1 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION (CURRICULUM AND TEXTBOOK)
INCEPTION THROUGH MARCH 31, 1974

| | FY FUNDED | FUNDING PERIOD | | OBLIGATIONS (1) | DISBURSEMENTS (2) | UNLIQUIDATED | DISBURSEMENTS | PIPELINE (5)=(1)-(4) |
|---|-----------|----------------|------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| | | FROM | TO | | | OBLIGATIONS (3)=(1)-(2) | PLUS ACCRUED EXPENDITURES (4) | |
| U.S. Direct Hire Personnel Salaries and Support Costs | FY-70 | | | \$ 30,542 | \$ 30,542 | \$ -0- | \$ 30,542 | \$ -0- |
| Technical Services Contracts: | | | | | | | | |
| TCCU Contract for Curriculum & Textbook Project for Assistance to the Ministry of Education in establishing a modern primary school curriculum structure | FY-66-68 | 7/65 | 3/68 | 288,000 | 288,000 | - | 288,000 | - |
| | FY-69 | 4/68 | 3/69 | 437,000 | 437,000 | - | 437,000 | - |
| | FY-70 | 4/69 | 3/71 | 195,000 | 195,000 | - | 195,000 | - |
| | FY-71 | 4/71 | 3/72 | 601,600 | 601,600 | - | 601,600 | - |
| | FY-72 | 4/72 | 3/73 | 669,900 | 669,900 | - | 669,900 | - |
| | FY-73 | 4/73 | 3/74 | 654,559 * | 254,259 | 400,300 | 654,559 | - |
| Total Technical Services Contracts | | | | 2,846,059 | 2,445,759 | 400,300 | 2,846,059 | - |
| ----- | | | | | | | | |
| Participants: (Direct) | FY-68-74 | | | 37,169 | 35,257 | 1,912 | 35,431 | 1,738 |
| To be funded under C&T Contract | FY-68-73 | | | 338,691 * | 269,952 | 68,739 | 314,785 | 23,906 |
| Total Participants | | | | 375,860 | 305,209 | 70,651 | 350,216 | 25,644 |
| ----- | | | | | | | | |
| Commodities: | | | | | | | | |
| To be funded under C&T Contract (Reference Books, Office and Electronic Equipment, Science Equipment, Test Materials, Paper and writing Supplies | FY-68-73 | | | 56,500 * | 32,164 | 24,336 | 38,193 | 18,307 |
| Supplies and Materials (Direct) | FY-68-71 | | | 22,679 | 22,679 | - | 27,619 | - |
| Total Commodities | | | | 79,179 | 54,843 | 24,336 | 60,812 | 18,307 |
| ----- | | | | | | | | |
| Other Costs: | | | | | | | | |
| Invitational and operational Travel and Miscellaneous | FY-71-73 | | | 4,346 | 3,686 | 660 | 3,908 | 438 |
| SUB PROJECT TOTAL | | | | \$ 3,335,986 | \$ 2,840,839 | \$ 495,947 | \$ 3,291,579 | \$ 44,389 |

* FY-73 TCCU Funding \$760,000
 FY-73 addition to TCCU Contract 736,536
 Uncommitted Balance \$ 23,464

Note: Figures include only Curriculum and Textbook Sub-Project. Totals do not represent total of either project 091 or TCCU Contracts.

DAC Agenda

Curriculum & Textbook

Project No. 091

1. Brief introduction to the project -- hitting the highlights of the staff paper. (The Project Officer)
2. Discussion and Questions
 - A. Is the original justification for the project the justification used today? Does the current justification, or rationale, make sense?
 - B. Are the desired results (i.e., the achievement of the project purpose) meaningful and significant? Will the results be observable? What are they?
 - C. Does the project design make sense, i.e., is there a causative relationship between the generation of planned outputs and the achievement of the stated project purpose?
 - D. What measurable progress has been made at the output and purpose levels?
 - E. What is the GOA committed to doing within the project? Is it significant? Are they fulfilling their commitment?
 - F. Are there "friction points" in the project, i.e., are American advisors impinging upon sensitive GOA policy or operational areas? If so, is friction recognized by both parties as a necessary condition for the project?
 - G. How well or how poorly does the project fit the new legislation and the priorities of the GOA?
3. Conclusions: DAC option recommendations for the Director
 - A. The project is satisfactory in terms of the justification, significance of intended results, design, progress and fits the new legislation and GOA priorities?
 - B. The project is unsatisfactory in specific respects and DAC recommendations to correct deficiencies.

DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
(Meeting Notes)

Date and Place: March 11, 1974 (2:30-4:00 p. m.)
March 12, 1974 (2:30-3:30 p. m.)
Director's Conference Room

Purpose: Review of Curriculum and Textbook Project 091.1

Participants: DAC Members:

Fred Sligh, DD, Chairman
Frank Denton, AD/DP
Fred Miller, A-AD/M
John Standish, CDE
Terry McMahon, CO

Others:

Tony Lanza, ED
Chuck Johnson, DP
Gary Towery, CO

Papers attached to these notes:

Staff paper describing the project
Financial history
Supplementary Statements by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Towery

After the presentation of background information by Tony Lanza, there was a general discussion of current project activities. The consensus was that, within the confines of the present ProAg, the project has been and is moving along very successfully. The remainder of the discussion dealt with specific problems, by far the most important of which is textbook distribution (and use.)

Printing and Printing Schedule

It has only been during the current year that the Ministry of Education has shown real concern over the problem of printing books. (Pages 7 and 8 of the staff paper.) Tony Lanza reported that the Ministry has made the decision to use the Government press and private presses if necessary, and expressed his opinion that printing will take place. The Government has included 35 million Afghans for publication of new books in the 1353 budget.

Book Distribution

There is no information available on the number of new books in use, but there has been a national distribution of 222,500 volumes consisting of two titles or eight books (Pashto and Dari teacher guides and texts for each title). A distribution system has been planned but has not been initiated. No estimate has been made of the distribution costs for all planned titles.

Book Distribution (Continued - second session)

In answer to a question raised by Fred Sligh, Tony Lanza said that the book distribution problem had been discussed with the Ministry without participation of the TCCU advisors to avoid any possible friction between the Ministry and the contract team.

The group then turned to that portion of recommendation number 1 (staff paper, page 16) which suggests that we offer to reimburse the MOE for a portion of the distribution costs of textbooks distributed within a specific time frame. Fred Sligh asked if cost is the deterrent to distribution. Tony Lanza said that, in his opinion, an offer of funds to defray costs would expedite implementation of the distribution system.

Frank Denton suggested that no action should be taken on the distribution financing recommendation until we obtain more information on the actual student receipt of the 222,500 volumes included in the national distribution referred to above. Tony Lanza agreed that the past distribution pattern has been inefficient and suggested that spot checks could be made to determine the extent to which "distributed" books have reached classrooms.

Information produced by this survey will be made available to the DAC by mid-April, when the distribution question will again be considered.

Contract Activities

During the introductory portion of the meeting, Tony Lanza reported that the C&T project had become an integral part of the Ministry, and that the objective of institutionalization had therefore been achieved. The TCCU team will now provide advisory assistance for preparation of the 70 remaining titles. The first advisors to be phased out are in health, social studies, and science. A gradual reduction of advisors will continue as manuscript writing progresses through the last operational year, #7 1978. The present 12 advisors will be reduced to eight during the next

seven or eight months. This is a faster rate of reduction than previously envisaged. Frank Denton then asked when we might terminate the project if the distribution system is not established (see item 2 on page 17 of the staff paper.) Tony Lanza said that if the decision is made to terminate, we would not continue the project beyond March 1975, the date shown in the ProAg now awaiting signature. The project plan indicates that 48 of the remaining 70 manuscripts should be written by March 1975.

New Legislation and the C&T Project

Chuck Johnson suggested that book distribution to the end user (students) must be established as an integral part of the project purpose if the project is to meet our new benefit criterion; C&T is one of only a few of our current projects that has this potential.

Frank Denton dissented from the fairly general opinion that the project is acceptable under the new legislation. He expressed his opinion that project benefits will not reach the poorest majority if only 25% of the total eligible children are enrolled in school. Tony Lanza replied that the majority of children who attend village schools are from poor families. Frank said that he could not be convinced of the legislative conformity of the project in the absence of better enrollment information. It appears, however, that the Ministry uses a base of 20 million people. It is possible that with current enrollments they are reaching more than 25%.

No major objections were raised to a concluding view as follows:

We have invested about 3.5 million dollars in a project which is well along in implementation. It should be continued for the purpose of producing realizable benefits. The crucial issue is: what action should be taken to bring about textbook distribution? This issue will be reconsidered by the DAC in mid-April, **after** the current distribution exercise is completed and we have more information on distribution effectiveness. At that time, the DAC will examine possible project re-design to include the distribution element, if this appears appropriate.

Supplementary Statement by Charles Johnson

The memo does not reflect, in my opinion, the gravity of the problem of not distributing the books. End use is the key question. We must remember that we were unable to declare Kandahar Airport a success even though the contractor (I don't know this) built the facility precisely to specifications and on time. The failure to put it to use, by definition, makes it a failure and "white elephant." We have precisely this prospect staring us in the face with C and T: if students don't get books, the project is a failure and no amount of glib reporting will obscure that fact.

We know a little bit about the Afghan ability to distribute things. It wasn't revealed in the DAC discussion, but Tony told us that there ^{are} a million or more books in Ministry warehouse that have been declared "obsolete" and, ergo, have not been distributed. That is a frightening thought because there are many reasons why a book might be declared obsolete which have nothing to do with its utility in the classroom. During Operation Help the Mission, in the form of Abe and Gary, virtually organized the whole operation. Afghans then carried it out. But books are more difficult. They will have to worry about getting the right text, for the right grade, in the right number, in the right language, to the school that needs them. Since books have a shelf life of 7 years and a use life of 2 or 3 years, this will be a mammoth continuing problem. It cannot be done ad hoc each year.

We know that they have about 1.2 million project books in Kabul warehouses. As a minimum condition for the continuation of the project (and more importantly to protect their investment and save our skins) we ought to say that those 1.2 million must be distributed by, say, December 31st. If this proves to be impossible, for whatever reasons, then I think we must pull out by March 1975. Otherwise it is just a larger disaster if we wait longer. I suggest that this minimum condition (minimum it is, because they will be printing millions more this year) ought to be made known to the Ministry, Plan and the PM, if necessary ASAP. At the same time we shouldn't be negative. We should offer, I suggest, both financial assistance and technical assistance to get the job done. The money side (say 1 or 2 afs per book) can be accommodated within approved PROP and FY 75 CP funding levels if we proceed, as Tony suggests, to phase down the contract at a faster rate. We could help with such financing on a fixed cost reimbursement basis and build in a system to monitor the delivery of the product to the end user.

Supplementary Statement by Gary Towery

I agree and support Chuck's comments. Distribution is an issue that we discussed at great length in our review of this project. We must attack the distribution angle or we may have to face future criticism for our failure to do so.

E-4

DP

Mr. A. E. Lanza
Chief Education Advisor, USAID/Afghanistan

April 4, 1974


Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan

Project 091.1 - Curriculum and Textbook

I have reviewed the results of the Director's Advisory Council evaluation of subject project.

I conclude that the project should be continued, but agree that means must be found to assure timely and effective distribution of textbooks. I look forward to receiving recommendations on this after the mid-April LAC review.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)



DD: F. H. Sligh

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April 15, 1974

Review of Statistics Project

Project Title: Statistical Information System Development
 Project Number: 205-U-780-124
 Total U. S. Funding: \$5,065,000
 Life of Project: FY 72 through FY 76

1. Summary of Project JustificationA. Original Justification

Most of the statistical information required to plan and carry out public and private development in Afghanistan is either lacking or unreliable. The activities of existing GOA statistical units are uncoordinated, their staffs are poorly trained and much of their output is essentially guesswork and presented in unusable form. The dearth of basic statistical data has been remarked by practically every foreign group working in Afghanistan.

In the spring of 1970, the GOA gave evidence of recognizing its statistical shortcomings and wanting to correct them. The Minister of Planning requested USAID assistance in reviewing the statistical system and suggesting guidelines for its improvement. Bruce Schire, then Chief Statistical Advisor in Pakistan, prepared and submitted a comprehensive analysis of the situation. After reviewing the "Schire Report", the GOA formed a National Statistical Advisory Committee which drew up specific proposals for Cabinet consideration, one of which was the establishment of a Central Statistics Office. Two Cabinet resolutions and approval of the King resulted, in May 1971, in a formal request to AID for long-range technical and training assistance.

On the basis of its fundamental importance, the obvious need for it and convincing evidence of GOA commitment to it, the project was approved and initiated in 1972.

B. Retrospective Analysis

The original justification for the project is, in retrospect, still pertinent. A shortage of reliable and timely statistical data continues to be one of

the principal constraints facing the GOA. The capability to produce and publish such data in a usable form is a prerequisite for the rational planning and implementation of economic development in both public and private sectors.

2. Summary of Project Design

A. Sector Goal

To encourage and assist the mobilization, wise investment and efficient management of public and private resources directed toward achieving a sharply increased rate of economic growth.

B. Project Purpose

To assist the GOA to create an integrated statistical information system capable of reliable and timely response to the needs of Afghanistan.

C. Project Outputs

1. An efficiently functioning program of coordinated statistical activities.
2. An established Central Statistics Office organized along functional lines.
3. An established data processing center.
4. The production and regular publication of accurate statistical information on agriculture, industrial production, prices, household incomes and expenditures, labor force, demography and national economic accounts.
5. A minimum cadre of 75 Afghans trained to continue and expand the statistical program in Afghanistan.

3. Progress Toward Achievement of Objectives

A. An Efficiently Functioning Program of Coordinated Statistical Activities

In 1972, the GOA approved regulations making the CSO responsible for a centralized, coordinated statistical system with the recognized principles of compulsory reporting by respondents and confidentiality of response protection for respondents.

It was recognized by all that the major effort of the statistical system for the first year was to be the completion of the Demographic Survey being conducted by the ADS/Ministry of Planning. At an appropriate point, the staffs of ADS and the Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Planning were to be incorporated into the CSO to provide the nucleus of a single, coordinated statistical system covering the whole country. Subsequently, other statistical functions would be integrated into the CSO as appeared desirable.

In June 1973, vigorous steps were being taken to effect this transfer and Cabinet approval was expected in the week the coup occurred. Following a long period of inactivity, the Cabinet and President approved, on April 9, 1974, the transfer of the personnel, equipment and budgets of all Ministry statistical offices, except Interior, to the CSO. Responsibility for the Afghan Demographic Survey was also transferred to the CSO by the same decree.

B. An Established Central Statistics Office Organized Along Functional Lines

After approval of GOA regulations establishing a Central Statistics Office, the CSO was created by the transfer of some 40 members of the Department of Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture. Office space and furniture was obtained. A budget of 6 million Afghanis was approved for 1351 (1972-73); this was increased to 8.5 million in 1352 (1973-74) and by mid-1973, staff totalled 148 employees. The CSO was organized along functional lines consisting of a Design and Analysis Department, an Implementation Department, a Data Processing Department and an Administrative Service Department. Field staff was to be provided by means of the consolidation of the ADS/Ministry of Planning statistical staffs with the CSO.

Sixteen vehicles were ordered under the project agreement. In addition, eleven vehicles have been made available to the CSO by the USAID and the GOA up to the present time.

CSO began to assume control and coordination of all training in the field of statistics and received assurances from the USAID and UNDP that they would keep it informed of all training offers and seek CSO approval for all statistical training activity. CSO also sought to control data processing activities within government agencies as empowered by Article 10 of the regulations establishing the CSO.

A service center for the maintenance of CSO equipment was created and a TCN engineer hired to train CSO staff in the operation and maintenance

of data processing, reproduction and other office machines and equipment.

In late 1952, the Ministry of Planning approved a 1353 (1974-75) CSO budget of 11 million Afghanis which would fund a staff of 214 civil service employees and 123 contract employees, including 36 in seven regional offices. The Cabinet subsequently reduced this to 9 million Afghanis, which will fund 200 civil service and 85 contract employees and 24 employees in six regional offices. The transfer of Ministry statistics offices to the CSO will increase the total personnel and budget of the CSO considerably.

C. An Established Data Processing Center

A Data Processing Department was established in the CSO when it was created in 1972 and a BuCensus Data Processing Advisor assigned to it. Data processing equipment was ordered, six surplus keypunch machines were installed and operators trained. This equipment, plus additional equipment on order, has provided CSO with input capability for use with the Afghan Business Machines Computer Center. Reproduction equipment was also ordered and installed.

Since the coup, the work of the Data Processing Department has expanded with the tabulation of the foreign trade statistics being done at CSO (rather than in Iran, as formerly), other jobs not based on field survey reporting and work done for other government agencies.

D. The Production and Regular Publication of Accurate Statistical Information

By the time of the coup, the CSO developed and published a weekly four-commodity price index; improved and published promptly the National Consumer Price Index formerly made available by the Ministry of Planning (with considerable time lag); published a separate Consumer Price Index for the city of Kabul; issued an Index of Precipitation for the crop year ending May 31, 1972 (for purposes of forecasting wheat production) and currently for each month thereafter; began field work on the development of a fully revised Consumer Price Index for Kabul; began field work on the collection of large-scale industry statistics, including a monthly report of employment, wages, production and value of sales, and a design for an annual Census of Industry; designed a household/establishment listing survey procedure to provide a basis for sample selection of households, and sample selection of small to medium-scale retail, service and industrial establishments; and conducted a census of government employees. Steps were initiated for improving foreign trade, including the design of import and export declaration forms which would provide the Customs administra-

tion with means for controlling and checking the staff activities and introducing a statistical system to produce improved foreign trade data.

In Agricultural Statistics, CSO conducted and published the first annual survey of sugar cane production and bee hives and honey production. Other agricultural survey procedures were designed and land use survey procedures were presented. For this and for population census purposes, use of satellite imagery was explored; the CSO developed and approved a proposal to NASA for use of ERTS imagery and a project agreement for a Remote Sensing Census Project was developed and approved.

After the coup, all proposed field work outside of Khartoum was cancelled. Even a new survey within Khartoum (to provide estimates of changes in rents for the new Khartoum Consumer Price Index) was stopped. Other work in Khartoum which had already been started (surveys of prices and industrial establishments) was allowed to continue. Plans for the establishment of seven regional Data Collection Centers were shelved. The weekly coordination meetings previously held between top CSO staff and the SACOM members were discontinued.

On the positive side, work of the Data Processing Department expanded with the initiation of the foreign trade statistics being done at CSO and other jobs not based on field survey reporting, as well as jobs for other agencies of government.

Another positive note is the fact that CSO was recently asked to assist the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation in improving its program of estimation agent evaluation through modern data processing practices and questionnaire design. In addition, CSO's work on developing a village list from 1,000,000 scale maps was restarted in mid-November 1973 after being completely halted following the coup. CSO has also been assisting the Civil Registration Department of the Ministry of Interior to design proposed new forms on the date for an improved population registration system could be tabulated by computer.

Although the full impact of the Cabinet decision to centralize statistical functions in the CSO has not yet been felt, it seems likely that the CSO will be able to resume all its activities, both in Khartoum and in the provinces, in the near future.

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E. A Minimum Cadre of 75 Afghans Trained to Continue and Expand the Statistical Program in Afghanistan

Five participants were sent for training to the U. S. under USAID sponsorship; two were sent for third country training under sponsorship of ECAFE; and one to the Asian Statistical Institute in Tokyo. One additional person was later sent for training to the U. S. Although a 10 week course in Basic Statistical Concepts, to be taught in Kabul by staff from the Asian Statistical Institute, was planned and scheduled for the summer of 1978, at the last moment this course was cancelled by the GOA. Lack of English language capability proved a severe constraint on the availability of staff for training abroad and an English language training program was begun in CSO using the services of a PCV.

Classes in computer programming language were conducted. A service center for the maintenance of CSO equipment was created and a TCN engineer was hired by USAID to train CSO staff in the care and maintenance of data processing, reproduction and other office machines and equipment.

4. Project Assessment

A. FAA of 1973

This project does not directly meet the higher priorities and benefits criteria of AID's new legislation. Nevertheless, it addresses such a fundamental need of Afghanistan's development that it deserves special consideration. Without a minimal statistical reporting capability in Afghanistan, it will be extremely difficult for the GOA, and for bilateral or multilateral donors, to make sound choices on how to assist in the development of Afghanistan, or how best to meet the needs of the poor majority. Without a minimal statistical reporting system it will likewise be extremely difficult to assess the effectiveness of the GOA's development effort, or for donors to evaluate the success of their activities, or the impact of their activities on the poor majority.

B. GOA

This project will fulfill a fundamental need of the GOA: the production and publication of accurate and timely data required for the economic development of Afghanistan.

FINANCIAL HISTORY

PROJECT 124 STATISTICAL INFORMATION SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT
Inception through March 31, 1974

| | FY FUNDED | MAN-MONTHS PARTICIPANTS | FUNDING PERIOD | | OBLIGATIONS (1) | DISBURSEMENTS (2) | UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS (3)=(1)-(2) | DISBURSEMENTS PLUS ACCRUED EXPENDITURES (4) | PIPELINE (5)=(1)-(4) |
|---|-----------|-------------------------|----------------|---------|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|---|----------------------|
| | | | FROM | TO | | | | | |
| Technical Services Contracts: | | | | | | | | | |
| PASA with Bureau of the Census to carry out a comprehensive program of data collection compilation and dissemination in the field of statistics | FY-'72 | | 5/1/72 | 6/30/72 | \$ 33,565 | \$ 33,565 | \$ -0- | \$ 33,565 | \$ -0- |
| | FY-73 | | 7/1/72 | 6/30/73 | 202,820 | 186,053 | 16,767 | 202,820 | -0- |
| | FY-'74 | - | 7/1/73 | 6/30/74 | 232,146 | 29,145 | 203,001 | 211,346 | 20,800 |
| Total Technical Services Contracts | | | | | 468,531 | 248,763 | 219,768 | 447,731 | 20,800 |
| Participants: | | | | | | | | | |
| | FY-73 | 24 | - | - | 20,520 | 15,471 | 5,049 | 15,471 | 5,049 |
| Commodities: | | | | | | | | | |
| 2 Vehicles and Spare Parts | | | | | | | | | |
| 6 Keypunche Machines and Miscellaneous commodities | FY-72-73 | - | - | - | 220,207 | 41,694 | 178,513 | 148,960 | 71,247 |
| Other Costs: | | | | | | | | | |
| Invitational and Operational Travel and Miscellaneous | FY-73 | - | - | - | 5,485 | 2,801 | 2,684 | 5,358 | 127 |
| Project Total | | | | | \$ 714,743 | \$ 308,729 | \$ 406,014 | \$ 617,520 | \$ 97,223 |

Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

April 23, 1974

Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan

for Vincent W. Brown

Statistical Information Systems Development Project

Informal review of the SISE project, has led me to the conclusion that this project should not be continued beyond FY 75. The CSO is not implementing all aspects of the project as originally designed, and in any case this type of activity is not high priority given the current mission strategy.

No further funds should be obligated for this project after FY 75. The Office of Development Planning and the Public Administration Division should work out a plan for phasing out the Bureau of Census Team by June, 1975 within a budget ceiling of about \$250,000 in FY 75 funds.

AD/DP:FHDenton:gh

PROPOSAL:

Drains for the Helmand Valley Salted Lands

I. Background:

During the past several years the amount of irrigated land in the Helmand Valley has been increasing but provision has not been made for adequate drainage -- a need recognized by the GOA and USAID. Improved drainage would benefit the poorest farmers and the new settlers who are poorer still. Between 25,000 and 40,000 acres do not reach their productive potential because of waterlogging and salinization.

II. Project Purpose: To increase the net income of, at minimum, 750 settler families or small farmers within 12 to 18 months after the drainage is completed. (Note: the incremental increase will be defined as better information becomes available.)

III. Outputs: To reclaim 7,000 acres of salted land by installing farm drains, installing laterals, and deepening main drains and wasteways in an 18-month project implementation period.

IV. Inputs: The approximate cost to reclaim 7,000 acres is \$700,000 of which the USAID would provide approximately 70% in cash on a fixed-cost reimbursement basis.

V. Desirability of Project:

From the GOA's perspective this project would address the recognized need of reducing the amount of waterlogged, saline land in areas where settlement has taken place in the past and where new settlement could take place in the future. Such a project would assuage local criticism that HAVA has not taken responsibility for drainage as it should have. On a national level, a successful drainage project, planned and executed by HAVA, would help to blunt criticisms that HAVA is an overblown, expensive and inept organization which barely functions after 22 years of American assistance.

For the USAID, this project would be the forerunner of projects in the three sectors in which the benefits directly accrue to the newly-legislated target, the "poorest majority." The project would also be a test of a new method of project planning and execution wherein the sole responsibility for success would rest with the GOA. This method is fixed-cost reimbursement. On a political level, this project would help to alleviate GOA fears that the U.S. is abandoning the Helmand Valley.

The economic benefits from this project are estimated to be quite substantial. By using a 40-year project life, an 8% discount factor and various assumptions about both the cost of equipment and labor and future prices for cotton and wheat (wheat at 45 afs per seer) the benefit/cost ratio varies between 2.5 and 10.3 to 1. By using a longer project life of 50 years, a higher discount factor and lower estimated prices for wheat, a benefit/cost ratio for all project areas would still be, at minimum, more than 2 to 1.

In summary, the project appears to be very desirable from both the GOA's and USAID's points of view. However, the desirability of initiating planning for the project while the assessment is underway is open to debate.

VI. Feasibility

We are advised by BuRec and HAVR Agriculture that the project is technically feasible. The deepening of the waste-ways and main drains and the installation of laterals and farm drains can be accomplished by using machines (draglines, scrapers, dozers, self-loading scrapers and motor graders) and/or manual labor. Rough calculations indicate that machine work is half as costly as manual labor. These calculations assume that unemployed labor will not work for less than \$1 U.S. per day and that fuel costs will remain static. We need more information on the cost of operating machinery before making a judgment about the cost effectiveness of machines versus labor. However, with the new legislation's emphasis on employment creation and the presence of unemployed labor in the project areas in mind, USAID should give serious consideration to recommending to HAVA a mix of machine and manual work for the drainage activity. A project implementation plan which is entirely dependent on machine work would be vulnerable to equipment breakdowns and to the use of the machines for other work. A project plan which is entirely dependent upon manual labor would presuppose that HAVA is capable of a large organizational effort over an extended period of time. On technical grounds the machines may be best used for the cleaning and deepening of the waste-ways and main drains (and in some cases the construction of laterals) and manual labor may be best used for the construction of sub-laterals and farm drains. This proposal does not assume that farmers would be paid for constructing drains on their own land.

With respect to the administrative feasibility the situation is less clear. First, we are uncertain whether the project would be implemented by HAVA's O&M section using its scanty inventory of equipment or whether HAVA would contract with HACU. If the latter, we are uncertain of HACU's machine availability over the next 18 to 24 months given canal construction activities in the Chankamsur, the ADB-financed road project for which HACU will be a major contractor, and activities related to the creation of a large state farm and collective. With respect to organizing manual labor -- perhaps as much as 1500 people per project area over a long period -- we are uncertain of HAVA's capabilities. We are reasonably certain that HAVA has

the design capability to accomplish the project, but we are less certain of its field engineering and supervision ability. Finally, we do not know what effect, if any, the project would have in diverting attention from the current assessment effort.

For USAID, the project is within the Mission's "in-house" administrative capability. It would require a substantial allocation of staff time to work out a list of agreed project areas, to establish the maximum size farms for which USAID would reimburse part of the cost of installing drains, to establish mutually agreeable standards of work, and to negotiate the fixed costs and the USAID share. Implementation and monitoring would require the services of the now resident BuRec maintenance engineer and the direct-hire agricultural water management specialist.

VII. The Reimbursement Concept

The essential steps to employ the concept are: (a) agreement on work to be accomplished (in this case project area, farm size, and work standards); (b) agreement on total costs and the USAID share of financing (expressed in an absolute amount, not a percentage of actual costs); (c) GOA execution of the project; (d) USAID and GOA inspection of the work to ascertain that the agreed elements in (a), above, have been achieved; and (e) USAID reimbursement to the GOA of a fixed amount per the agreement in (b), above. In addition to these steps, it might be possible and desirable to make a side agreement that the USAID dollar reimbursement would be used for a specific purpose like the procurement of spare parts and supplies.

To highlight the advantages of this concept the General Accounting Office has written:

"To distinguish this method (fixed cost reimbursement) from traditional cost reimbursement methods, it should be noted that actual costs are not reimbursed. Other methods usually involve the incurring of costs by the assisted government for some agreed purpose, the submission of vouchers by the assisted government to AID evidencing the costs and legitimacy thereof, the auditing of the vouchers by AID, and the reimbursement. This approach tends to emphasize costs rather than projects.

"The fixed cost reimbursement method used in the Philippines emphasized the project, not the costs. In fact, actual project

costs are not a factor in determining the amount of assistance since agreement on the amount to be reimbursed is reached at the inception of the project, notwithstanding its actual costs."

The same GAO report presents a list of advantages of the fixed cost reimbursement method.

- "1. The U.S. does not have to bear cost overruns.
2. The method transfers management responsibility to the recipient government while reducing U.S. direct participation.
3. (Since the host government must bear a portion of the costs), there is greater assurance that projects are ... high priority...
4. When a project is not as successful as originally planned ..., failures are less likely to be attributed to the (U.S.).
5. ... careful planning, programming and development of specific management systems at the outset of programs enhance the probability of success.
6. And, most importantly of all, the method protects the U.S. interest because it insures that funds are being effectively used in the manner and for the purposes desired since funds are paid out only after the project is completed in accordance with the agreed plans and specifications."

The GAO opines that there are no apparent disadvantages to the fixed cost reimbursement method. The GAO does, however, speak of "constraints". These are, briefly, the politically undesirable prospect of the USAID not making its reimbursement because the project was not completed per the prior agreement; the recipient government must have the necessary management and engineering expertise to execute the agreed project; and the USAID must have qualified people for continuous monitoring and inspection (to assure that a project doesn't go beyond a point of no return before mistakes are discovered). From the Afghan

point of view the element that might be the most worrisome would be their own self-assurance in their management and engineering capability to execute the project. If they are not self-confident on these counts, they may be reticent to undertake the financial risk.

The Senate Appropriations Committee has observed the results of the fixed cost reimbursement method in the Philippines and it was this Committee that asked the GAO to undertake its study. Based on these observations and the study, the Committee has recommended that the concept be employed elsewhere in the world where circumstances warrant. It is, in sum, a method which can be used wherever AID elects to design a project wherein activities are directed toward observable results. It is, thus, a method to be used whenever projects are intended to benefit people directly -- as in the case of drains in the Helmand Valley.

VIII. Strategy for Proceeding with Project Development

We are aware that the Government of Afghanistan is concerned that the U.S. remain in the Helmand Valley for the foreseeable future. This concern has been expressed to the Ambassador from sources who claim to be speaking for President Daoud. At the same time the USAID has a need to initiate projects which conform to our legislation's "new look" and to demonstrate to the new regime that we are not losing interest in their development. While it remains to be seen whether the interests of both sides coincide in the Helmand Valley, we propose the following steps in a scenario leading to a new project agreement.

A. Assuming we choose to reinforce Dr. Keshawarz' legitimacy both within HAVA and vis a vis the Minister of Agriculture, the idea that we would consider helping to finance a drainage construction project should be broached with him first. We would have to outline the parameters of our involvement in specific terms: complete consultation on the project areas to be improved, farm size, and results to be achieved in terms of the size and length of drains to be constructed or improved; prior agreement on the total cost of the effort; prior agreement on the USAID share of fixed costs; continuous joint monitoring by HAVA and USAID of work in progress; and USAID reimbursement of a fixed share after the work was completed. In terms of prior agreement, the USAID might push (gently) a certain share of the

work to be performed by manual labor to achieve a substantial employment effect in the project areas. As an added fillip, the USAID could hint that it would be willing to press the central government to earmark or block part of the USAID's reimbursement for HAVA's off-shore procurement needs. We should initiate this dialogue by mid-April.

B. Assuming a positive response from Dr. Keshawarz, USAID would have to be assured that HAVA and HACU's other work priorities would not conflict with the drainage activity. If this were the case, the USAID could work with HAVA in Lashkar Gah to develop a detailed plan of the areas to be improved and a mode of operation. Though this is a GOA responsibility, we would have to be prepared to offer an as yet undetermined amount of technical and planning assistance at this stage.

C. We would encourage Dr. Keshawarz to present the HAVA plan to the Minister of Agriculture for review. Here we should recognize that the Mission and the Embassy have a larger set of needs than just a new project in the Helmand. More specifically, the USAID through the Ambassador intends to present its views on a new set of projects and a new working relationship with the GOA to the central Government sometime in mid-to-late April. Thus, if the dialogue with Keshawarz isn't initiated expeditiously or if he doesn't respond with alacrity, the USAID may have to proceed with its negotiations with the GOA before he has played out his role with the Minister of Agriculture.

D. Upon the GOA's agreement in principle, we would undertake detailed negotiations to determine work standards and the USAID's share of the total fixed cost. Agreement would also have to be reached for regular inspection and monitoring by HAVA and USAID and an agreed procedure for periodic reimbursement as work is completed. In addition, procedures might have to be worked out for the actual cash payment, i. e., whether of dollars or afghanis, to a blocked or unblocked account.

E. As an internal matter, the USAID would also have to seek the Embassy's concurrence to undertake an activity in which there is a risk that either the work would not be completed or not completed according to the agreed standard. In such a circumstance, the Embassy would have to be prepared to face the charge (however perverse it might be) that the U. S. had not met its commitments and support the USAID in not making a reimbursement of a share of the total fixed cost.

DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL

MEETING NOTES

Date and Place: March 19, 1974
March 28, 1974
Director's Conference Room

Purpose : Review of Proposal: "Drains for the Helmand Valley
Salted Lands"

Participants : DAC Members:
Frederick H. Sligh, DD
Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
Fred W. Miller, A-AD/M
John Standish, CDE
Terrence J. McMahon, CO

Others:
Charles W. Johnson, DP
John R. Wilson* AGR
Raymond W. Hooker, DP
Richard B. Scott* DP
Louis L. Mitchell* RDA
Donald W. Reilly* CDE
James A. Wedberg** DP

* 1st Session only
** 2nd Session only

A project proposal paper was considered by the participants and is attached to these notes.

Opening Remarks:

During the recent Chuck James visit, the President of HAVA requested additional AID assistance including assistance for drainage. A project for Helmand Valley Drains appeared to be of benefit to the poorest farmers and sufficiently sound for inclusion in the Congressional Presentation.

Iou Mitchell opened the discussion by expressing his opinion that consideration of this project is premature and that the project does not merit

discussion on the basis of the information available.

Problems:

John Wilson expressed his serious reservations concerning the advisability of this project as follows:

1. It is not possible to separate drainage from water management. Drains alone will not solve the farmers' problem of salt in the soil.
2. Class IV land cannot be farmed without extensive ditching. There is a long-standing recommendation for not attempting to farm this land.
3. It is doubtful that the Afghans can organize and manage the implementation of this project.
4. Is the first sentence of section VIII (of the Project Proposal) valid? ("We are aware that the GOA is concerned that the U.S. remain in the Helmand Valley for the foreseeable future.")

Don Reilly noted that the project is not yet sufficiently defined for the statement made in part VI of the paper. ("We are advised by BuRec and HAVR Agriculture that the project is technically feasible.")

Dick Scott expressed his view that this is a capital project which does not provide sufficient direct benefit to the poorest people and therefore does not meet legislative requirements. He suggested that we should direct our assistance to restoring and improving the existing drainage system.

Fixed Cost Reimbursement:

This project is suitable for application of the fixed-cost reimbursement technique. The procedure was briefly described with an explanation of how it might be followed for making payments under this project. In general, a fixed direct payment in dollars or Afghanis would be made to the grantee for all or a portion of the predetermined local currency costs of project implementation. Payment would be made after the grantee completed the project in accordance with predetermined specifications and on verification of such satisfactory completion by AID representatives.

Suggestion:

John Wilson suggested that the Mission consider a water management project with emphasis on drainage. The project should be designed to reach

farmers who are attempting to support families on very small plots of Class I and Class II land.

SECOND SESSION

Proposal:

Fred Sligh opened the meeting by noting the policy-level need to find a workable interim project to demonstrate U.S. willingness to help and proposed that a technical task force be asked to study the project, examine the concerns expressed in the first session and advise whether this project or some variation could be mounted without getting into unreasonable technical problems. Frank Denton agreed but noted that these deliberations should lead to discussions with HAVA not later than May if the task force concludes that the project is feasible. Cal Martin added that the task force might find outside assistance useful and suggested that we look into the possibility of obtaining such assistance from Council of U.S. Universities for Soil and Water Development in Arid and Sub-Humid areas (CUSUSWASH) irrigation/soils experts who have been working with USAID/Pakistan. Fred Sligh agreed that such assistance would be useful but should not be sought until the task force makes a preliminary decision to move forward with the project.

The Opposing View:

Chuck Johnson opposes proceeding with this project for the following reasons:

1. The Helmand Valley has received a great amount of AID assistance, and therefore this project will not reach a different group of people. A change in program direction as required by the new legislation would suggest the need for a project directed to poor people who have not been included in prior year assistance.
2. This project is not significant in terms of reaching a great number of poor people, i.e. perhaps only as many as 9000 people (900 farm families).
3. Project approval or implementation may be jeopardized by the "poppy problem."
4. We have no evidence that HAVA is enthusiastically interested in AID assistance.

Frank Denton suggested in response to Chuck's concerns that this project may serve as a good test of HAVA interest and ability to carry out a project which will require total Afghan responsibility.

Recommendation:

The group agreed to recommend to the Director that the Small Farmer Task Force explore this project proposal for the purpose of answering the question: "Is there sufficient land suitable for reclamation and is this project technically feasible?" The task force should report their findings by April 20th.

Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

April 23, 1974

Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan /s/ Vincent W. Brown
Proposed HAV Drains Project

Pending:

- a) more thorough analysis on the technical feasibility of the "drains" project; and**
- b) further indications of HAVA priorities**

further action on the proposed HAV drains project is suspended.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer

AD/DP:FHDenton:gh

REVIEW OF PROJECT 121
HIGHER EDUCATION/KABUL UNIVERSITY

March 30, 1974

Higher Education/Kabul University - Project 121

I. Historical Background

Kabul University (KU) is a young institution that was founded in 1932 with the Faculty of Medicine. In subsequent years, the separate Faculties of Law, Science and Letters were added. By 1947, the Faculties were organized as a single institution operating within the framework of the Ministry of Education. In 1951, the Faculty of Theology was added, and in 1956 the Faculties of Engineering and Agriculture. The Economics Faculty was begun in 1957, Pharmacy in 1959, and the Faculty of Education in 1962.

It was only in 1960 that the first women were included in the KU student body. That was the same year that the cornerstones of KU buildings were first laid at the site of the present campus. Ten years ago, in 1964, all the Faculties were finally brought together on the new campus.

II. Summary of Assistance to KU

In the process of developing KU from a scatteration of independent faculties into a single university, the Government of Afghanistan called upon a considerable amount of foreign aid. Through the years specific Faculties have come to be identified with foreign donors: Medicine--France; Science and Economics--Germany; Theology--Egypt; Agriculture,

Education and Engineering--USA; Polytechnic--USSR. In every instance, the intention of the donor was to develop the individual Faculty that was its concern. The major language of each Faculty was the language of the donor country, and as a natural consequence, books and teaching methods even today vary from Faculty to Faculty. It is no surprise, therefore, that KU has incurred its share of growing pains. In recent years, however, there has been some cooperation among the Faculties and a consequent strengthening of the central administration in coordination and planning.

U.S. assistance to KU began with a Wyoming University contract in 1956. Wyoming was responsible for establishing the Faculties of Agriculture and Engineering. Subsequently, the Faculty of Engineering was assisted by a U.S. Engineer Consortium. In 1962, the Faculty of Education was established with TCCU assistance.

In 1966, an additional U.S. contract team was requested to assist KU Central Administration in university business management, student affairs and planning (Indiana University).

As a result of U.S. grants, the new Faculties were able to occupy well built, modern brick buildings on the campus. In addition, U.S. assistance graced the campus with a new multi-storied library and a

gymnasium. All through the '60s, while Afghan staff was being trained abroad, U.S. advisors developed Faculty curricula and did much of the teaching. By the time the last U.S. contract (Indiana University) was phased out in June 1973, the Faculties were completely operated by Afghan staff members.

III. Description of Current Project

This project is designed as an interim project, one that allows AID to respond to the immediate and priority needs of the Faculties of Agriculture, Education and Engineering. Meeting high priority needs will help those Faculties sustain their quality and continue their development. The Project will keep open the opportunity for continuing dialogue between KU and the U.S. university community and will help the concerned Faculties of KU in their preparation, refinement and implementation of long range development plans.

The Project is approved for implementation beginning in FY 76 and is projected to continue for three years. It has three activity targets: (1) to improve the quality of instruction in selected Faculties; (2) to help KU develop resources for needed applied research in Agriculture, Education and Engineering; and (3) to support the upgrading of academic and administrative services. Briefly, projected inputs are: 9 resident U.S.

advisors (108 man years), 36 man months of short term consultants, 127 man years of participant training, \$168,000 in commodities, and 15 man years of visiting lectureships. (For further details, see Log Frame and ProAg attached.)

IV. Justification of Project

The best justification for assistance to KU rests on the fact that it is the only university in the country. From this institution will come the leadership and motivation for orderly change that is the basis of all social and economic development.

There will be three U.S. professors each in the Faculties of Agriculture, Education and Engineering. Their assignments are of two types. They will either (1) introduce new curricula to the Faculty or (2) concentrate on developing the capacity for applied research in areas vital to Afghan development. Specifically, new curricula will be introduced in: Engineering Management Education, Agricultural Mechanics, Electrical Power Generation and Distribution, and Vocational Teacher Training. Other advisors will be concerned with developing the talent and organization for applied research in Agriculture, Education and Engineering.

While this Project concentrates on three Faculties, it has been agreed by the GOA that during the life of the Project, a long range

all-university development plan will be completed. U.S. assistance in its development is to be made available on request and there will be inputs from the three Faculties into an overall KU plan.

V. Extent to Which Project Meets New Legislation

The new legislation clearly recognizes that assistance to higher education is a legitimate use of USAID funds, with the reservation that such assistance receive lower priority than has been the case in previous programs. A further requirement is that aid to higher education be concerned with those "professional skills that contribute most directly to development and the welfare of the poorest majority".

As described in Section IV, Project Justification (above), this project is designed to provide Afghans with specific professional skills related to economic development through directing and encouraging applied research in Agriculture, Education and Engineering and by the introduction of new curricula related to developmental needs. In the process, U.S. advisors will strengthen KU's capacity to plan for its own future development so that KU will be better able to continue to serve the nation.

The KU/HE Project does fit the new legislation to the extent that it is directed to Afghanistan's developmental needs. However, this Project does not meet the benefit criteria of directly benefiting the "poorest majority".

VI. Extent to Which Project Helps GOA Fulfill its Goals and Priorities

The GOA in the Fourth Plan (and elsewhere) has expressed concern that the need for foreign experts "absorbs significant parts of the foreign loans and grants obtained". It is therefore, a GOA goal to provide professional Afghans to fill the jobs presently held by foreigners. The major source of such personnel is KU and therefore pertinent curricula and applied research and training at KU fit exactly into a GOA priority.

In terms of specific Faculties: The GOA has taken steps to assign students in accordance with national needs and has decided that "75% of the KU students are to be assigned to Medicine, Engineering, Polytechnic, Agriculture and Education with the remaining 25% spread among other faculties". It is clear that the professional areas addressed by this Project (Agriculture, Education, Engineering) are counted among the top priorities of the GOA.

This Project will help to assure that KU graduates who are required for Afghanistan development programs are prepared to undertake professional responsibilities.

This Project directly supports and contributes to GOA goals and priorities.

CONCLUSION:

U.S. assistance to higher education in Afghanistan (KU) has been in process for approximately 18 years. This assistance has made an important contribution in the development of the only institution of higher education in Afghanistan, Kabul University. The current Project (121) was conceived and designed to be an interim project which would probably lead to further assistance to Kabul University. However, now that we have the new legislation which gives us a mandate to fund projects that really benefit the poorest majority, we now have to change our emphasis in our assistance to the education sector in Afghanistan by concentrating on those elements of education that will more directly benefit the poorest majority, elementary and nonformal education.

Recommendations for DAC Consideration

1. The Higher Education - Kabul University project should now be considered a terminal project and not an interim project as is stated in the ProAg.
2. Because of the legislative mandate to assist the poorest majority, we should initiate a dialogue with the GOA to determine their interest in U.S. assistance for elementary and nonformal education that would directly benefit the poorest majority.
3. In view of our long history of assistance to KU and based on the premise that the Higher Education-KU Project is to be a terminal project, the project should be reviewed to determine ways to scale down

the project costs and if possible reduce the funding to two years.

4. If there are positive signs **from** the GOA that U.S. assistance in elementary and nonformal education would be welcomed, the USAID should vigorously explore with the GOA possible projects in these areas.

5. The selection of a U.S. contractor for Project 121 should be delayed pending a reaction from the GOA concerning their desire for U.S. assistance in elementary education. This delay would allow time for the Mission and the GOA to reconsider Project 121 if it is felt that these funds could be more usefully spent in elementary and nonformal education.

PROJECT AGREEMENT

BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID),
AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND

PRO AG

AN AGENCY OF THE ~~GOVERNMENT OF~~ Republic of Afghanistan

The above-named parties hereby mutually agree to carry out a project in accordance with the terms set forth herein and the terms set forth in any annexes attached hereto, as checked below:

- PROJECT DESCRIPTION ANNEX A FOREIGN CURRENCY STANDARD PROVISIONS ANNEX
 STANDARD PROVISIONS ANNEX SPECIAL LOAN PROVISIONS ANNEX

This Project Agreement is further subject to the terms of the following agreement between the two governments, as modified and supplemented:

- GENERAL AGREEMENT FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION DATE 2/7/51
 ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT DATE 6/23/56
 ~~(Other)~~ TC Program Agreement as amended 6/20/53

1. PROJECT/ACTIVITY NO. 306-11-660-121 PAGE 1 OF 10 PAGES

2. AGREEMENT NO. HE/KU #1 3. ORIGINAL OR REVISION NO. 3

4. PROJECT/ACTIVITY TITLE Higher Education - Kabul University

5. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND EXPLANATION (See Annex A attached)

6. AID APPROPRIATION SYMBOL 78-1131004 7. AID ALLOTMENT SYMBOL 354-50-306-00-63-43

| 8. AID FINANCING | PREVIOUS TOTAL (A) | INCREASE (B) | DECREASE (C) | TOTAL TO DATE (D) |
|--|--|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOLLAR <input type="checkbox"/> LOCAL CURRENCY | | | | |
| (a) Total | 897,800 | - | - | 897,800 |
| (b) Contract Services | 657,600 | - | - | 657,600 |
| (c) Commodities | 65,000 | - | - | 65,000 |
| (d) XXXXXX Participants | 175,200 | - | - | 175,200 |
| 9. COOPERATING AGENCY FINANCING - DOLLAR EQUIVALENT \$1.00 = | | | | |
| (a) Total | For Government of the Republic of Afghanistan Contribution See Page 9. | | | |
| (b) Technical and other Services | Item, E. | | | |
| (c) Commodities | | | | |
| (d) Other Costs | | | | |

10. SPECIAL PROVISIONS (Use Additional Continuation Sheets, if Necessary)

This revision Supersedes the original ProAg signed on January 27, 1973.

11. DATE OF ORIGINAL AGREEMENT JANUARY 27, 1973 12. DATE OF THIS REVISION February 9, 1974 13. ESTIMATED FINAL CONTRIBUTION DATE January 27, 1976

14. FOR THE COOPERATING GOVERNMENT OR AGENCY
Signature: *Dr. Mohammed Haidar* DATE: 2/7/74
TITLE: DIRECTOR

15. FOR THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Signature: *Theodore L. Elliot Jr.* DATE: 2/8/74
TITLE: U.S. Ambassador

Vincent W. Brown 2/8/74
Vincent W. Brown, Director

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PRO AG
CONTINUATION
SHEET
ANNEX A

| | | |
|--|---|---|
| PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AND Ministry of Education AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF Republic of Afghanistan | 1. Report Activity No. 506-11-880-121 | 2. Date of Report |
| | 2. Agreement No. HE KU #1 | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Original or Revision No. 3 |
| | 3. Project/Activity Title HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY | |

PREAMBLE

Kabul University stands at the apex of the Republic of Afghanistan's educational system. It constitutes the prime hope of the nation's youth who aspire to local and national service. From the University must come the motivation and responsibility for orderly change in the nation's quest for social and economic modernization. Recognizing Kabul University's unique role in providing Afghanistan's personnel for the professions, government, business, social and economic development, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the United States Agency for International Development Mission in Afghanistan (USAID/A) hereby enter into this Agreement to provide the services enumerated in Article III. Also included in this Agreement are the Course of Action to be followed, the responsibilities agreed to by the two parties and the funding requirements.

ARTICLE I. Activity Targets

This interim project provides the mechanism for AID to respond to the Faculties of Kabul University's immediate and expressed needs in Agriculture, Education and Engineering. This project is designed to meet high priority needs of a selective nature that help sustain the forward motion of the concerned faculties.

Kabul University agrees that during the life of this project, it will endeavor to complete a comprehensive long-range university development plan with the help of various donor countries.

The project intermediary (US contractor) will be expected to provide KU the opportunity for a continuing dialogue with US university administrators and faculty to review priorities and progress of the concerned Faculties of K.U. and to help to respond to issues arising during KU's preparation, refinement and implementation of development plans in the above-mentioned Faculties.

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| For the Cooperating Government or Agency | For the Agency for International Development |
| SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ | SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ |
| TITLE: _____ | TITLE: _____ |

PRO AG
 CONTINUATION
 SHEET
 ANNEX A

PROJECT AGREEMENT
 BETWEEN AID AND
 Ministry of Education
 AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
 Republic of Afghanistan

1. Project/Activity No.
 306-II-660-121
 2. Agreement No.
 HE KU #1
 3. Project/Activity Title
 HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY

PAGE 2 of 10 PAGES
 3. Original or
 Revision No. 3

The Project is designed to furnish the type of selective, interim U.S. assistance that will build strength within the three Faculties for defining and achieving their own objectives in accordance with the long-range goals of the Republic of Afghanistan and the expressed purpose of U.S. foreign assistance. The major focus will be in training selected Afghans, both abroad and on-the-job, for instructional roles. Activity targets involve several components of university activities (A) Academic programs of the Faculties; (B) Research that contributes to the Republic of Afghanistan's development; (C) Academic services.

A. To improve the quality of instruction in the concerned Faculties of KU.

Accomplishment of this target will depend upon increased professional knowledge and competence of instructional staff; use of improved teaching techniques and instructional materials. Participant training is designed to meet requirements for quality instruction. In addition, certain U.S. professors and their counterparts will undertake studies of the balance between theoretical and practical studies and programs of student and staff work experience that will lead to upgraded university curricula.

B. To help KU develop the resources required to serve the Republic of Afghanistan through applied research efforts in Agriculture, Education and Engineering.

The acceptance of KU staff and administration of its "out-reach" responsibilities, e.g., through the newly established center for Engineering Consulting Services and Applied Research is a new phenomenon which is to be stimulated, encouraged and supported by this project.

C. To support the upgrading of academic services in selected faculties.

Project concerns will include improved budget formulation, more effective use of budgets, academic and organizational improvements including better facilities utilization and maintenance, and the installation and maintenance of improved student records.

For the Cooperating Government or Agency
 SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
 TITLE: _____

For the Agency for International Development
 SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
 TITLE: _____

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| PRO AG CONTINUATION SHEET ANNEX A | PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AND AND Ministry of Education AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN | 1. Project/Activity No. 306-11-660-221 | PAGE 2 OF 10 PAGES |
| | | 2. Agreement No. HE KU #1 | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Original or Revision No. 3 |
| | | 3. Project/Activity Title HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY | |

ARTICLE II, Course of Action

The GOA and USAID agree that this project will consist of four distinct but related parts, as follows:

- A. Participant training abroad for promising junior faculty members;
- B. the Visiting Lecturer program to provide refresher study; teaching and research abroad for selected senior faculty members;
- C. essential commodity support; and
- D. counseling and on-the-job training in research, university planning, curriculum development by short and long-term U.S. professors in selected Faculties.

The course of action, designed for project implementation, encompasses the four project components described below.

A. Junior faculty members will be sent abroad under this agreement primarily to the US and/or to other countries when appropriate for participant training at the Master's or Doctor's degree level. To give strength to the basic infrastructure of the undergraduate program, junior faculty members are to be selected for participant training, principally from among the faculties of the University with which USAID has been identified in the past. Selection is to be based on Training and Staff Development Plans developed and approved within each Faculty. U.S. professors and USAID representatives are to assist, as requested in the selection process, but principal responsibility for making training recommendations rests with KU.

Participants also may be drawn from managerial and support staff. The readiness of the individual for training, and his promise of future service to the University will be major consideration in the selection.

Subject to legislative authority, fund availability and GOA/USAID agreement, it is planned to provide funding for participant training for

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| For the Cooperating Government or Agency SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ TITLE: _____ | For the Agency for International Development SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ TITLE: _____ |
|--|--|

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FOR USE BY
PRO AG
COORDINATION
SHEET
ANNEX A

PRO. FRY AGREEMENT
BETWEEN AID AND
Ministry of Education

AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF

REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Project/Activity No.
808-11-660-121
2. Agreement No.
HE KU #1
3. Project/Activity Title

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3. Original or
Revision No. 3

HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY

21 participant years in FY 73; 43 participant years in FY 74 and 75 and 63 participant years in FY 76.

Under this agreement, classes will be set up at the University to help potential participants acquire the necessary language capability.

B. The Visiting Lecturer Program, Selected senior Afghan instructors (15 for 3 years) from the Faculties of Agriculture, Education and Engineering teaching staff members will go to the U.S. for one year programs for teaching experience, research, or study within their own discipline.

KU will review faculty nominations and recommend candidates for visiting lectureship positions. Basic criteria for visiting lecturers will be:

- (1) Qualifications: Minimum of an MA degree or equivalent. Holders of Ph. D. degree will have preference.
- (2) Teaching experience: Minimum of 5 years with at least 3 years following the MA.
- (3) Professional competence: Ability to teach and do research and/or study in a U.S. institution.
- (4) Age: Approximately 35 - 55.
- (5) Previous Training: Must have discharged commitments following previous study abroad approximately two years for each year of GOA or foreign donor paid study abroad. Exceptions to this criterion may be considered.

For the Cooperating Government or Agency

For the Agency for International Development

SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
TITLE: _____

SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
TITLE: _____

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|---|---|---|---|
| AID INTD 11 (5-73) PRO AG CONTINUATION SHEET ANNEX A | PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AID AND Ministry of Education | 1. Project/Activity No. 309-11-660-121 | PAGE 2 of 12 PAGES |
| | AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN | 2. Agreement No. HE KU #1 | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Original or Revision No. 3 |
| | HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY | | |

The Afghan Visiting Lecturer going to the U.S. will continue to draw his KU salary according to KU regulations. He will be paid by the host U.S. university at U.S. rates for perhaps 1/4 or 1/3 time teaching or assisting, and receive from AID support for the remaining 3/4 or 2/3 time, averaging perhaps \$10,000 total per man year.

Special funding arrangements will be required to allow extraordinary project grant payment to senior staff who will also be paid for part-time teaching or research in receiving U.S. institutions. A portion of project funding will be earmarked annually from which salaries will be "topped" or special research expenses met. Arrangements for each senior staff member are to be dealt with according to the special circumstances of his training program. A professor may have his family accompany him abroad at his own expense.

The Visiting Lecturer program provides for the upgrading (as described above) of seven senior Afghan professors from the concerned faculties from FY 73 funds. Before selecting a second group of visiting lecturers to be funded with FY 74 funds, progress of the first group will be reviewed. They may not yet have finished their one-year assignments; however, it should be possible to assess the value of the activity to the individuals involved and its ultimate benefit to KU. If the activity is worthwhile, two lectureships may be arranged in FY 74 and six in FY 75 subject to availability of funding.

C. Vital KU commodity requirements are for textbooks, library support, teaching materials and spare parts particularly in those U.S. sponsored faculties where English is the language of instruction and where science, engineering and agricultural laboratories are U.S. equipped.

As indicated in the appended commodity plan, these commodity requirements are to be partially met by FY 73 project funds of \$65,000. However, this amount of U.S. commodity funding is conditioned upon KU's expending from its total, university-wide commodity budget, at

For the Cooperating Government or Agency

For the Agency for International Development

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 TITLE: _____

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 TITLE: _____

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|--|--|---|--|
| PRO AG CONTRIBUTION SHEET A AMEX | PROJECT AGREEMENT BETWEEN AID AND Ministry of Education | 1. Project/Activity No. 308-11-680-121 | PAGE <u>7</u> OF <u>10</u> PAGES |
| | AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN | 2. Agreement No. HE KU #1 | 3. <input type="checkbox"/> Original or Revision No. <u>3</u> |
| | | 3. Project/Activity Title HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY | |

least an equal amount of foreign currency. U.S. commodity input for FY 73 of \$65,000 is to be placed at the disposal of KU through a PIO/C and Letter of Commitment against which Letters of Credit may be drawn by KU. Subsequent commodity funding under this Project may be: FY 75 - \$55,000; FY 76 - \$45,000.

In past projects, AID and its contractors have handled procurement on behalf of KU. AID and KU have now agreed, however, to shift procurement administration responsibilities under this project to appropriate offices within the University. U.S. professors and the USAID Procurement Office will assist KU staff to assume the new responsibilities by working with counterparts on improving procurement procedures.

D. 1. Short Term Professors: To meet special needs, the project provides for short-term U.S. professors to conduct research workshops, seminars, conferences, and on-the-job training of academic staff in areas of curriculum development. The full-time (resident) U.S. professors will assist in identifying the need and readiness for such short-term consultant services.

Subject to legislative authority, availability of funds and mutual agreement as to need, it is planned to provide 36 man months of short-term U.S. professors during the life of the contract.

2. Resident U.S. Professors: This project provides for a limited number of U.S. professors to meet specific priority needs at KU. The professors will be carefully selected to carry out the scopes of work which have been mutually agreed upon by KU, USAID, AID/Washington and the contractor. While the services of professors are projected from two to three years each, it is expected that during the life of the project, some changes will be required. Most professors will be programmed for two years with some extensions for the third year as may be required. Professors may also be requested for one year tours when a one-year assignment is more appropriate.

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| For the Cooperating Government or Agency SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ TITLE: _____ | For the Agency for International Development SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____ TITLE: _____ |
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3-70

PRO AG
CONTINUATION
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ANNEX A

PROJECT AGREEMENT
BETWEEN AID AND
Ministry of Education

AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF:
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Project/Activity No.
305-11-660-121

2. Agreement No.
HE KU #1

3. Project/Activity Title
HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY

PAGE 8 OF 10 PAGES

3. Original or
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ARTICLE III U.S. Contributions

A. In the first year of project implementation, U.S. professors will be provided in the following fields:

1. Professor of Education and Contractor Representative.
2. Professor in Engineering Management Education.
3. Professor with CECSAR (The Center for Engineering Consulting Services and Applied Research) and Supporting Engineering Management Advisor.
4. Professor in Agricultural/Civil Engineering.
5. Electrical Engineer - Professor in Electric Power Generation and Distribution.
6. Professor in Animal Science and the Teaching of Agriculture Research Methodology.
7. Professor in Plant Science Conservation Education.
8. Teacher Education Curriculum Specialist - University level.
9. Vocational Teacher-Training Professor.

The requirement for resident full-time US professors in this project will be subject to change according to KU needs, AID funds and joint KU/Contractor/AID judgments. However, current estimates are for: 9 in FY 74, 9 in FY 75 and 8 in FY 76, a project total of 26 man years.

B. Short-term consultants - twelve man-months will be provided during the first year of the project.

For the Cooperating Government or Agency

SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____

TITLE: _____

For the Agency for International Development

SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____

TITLE: _____

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PROJECT AGREEMENT
BETWEEN AID AND
Ministry of Education

AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN

1. Project/Activity No.
806-11-000-121
2. Agreement No.
HE KU #1
3. Project/Activity Title

PAGE 9 OF 10 PAGES
3. Original or
Revision No. 3

HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY

C. Visiting Lecturers

Funds are included herein for seven Visiting Lecturers of which five will be under the contract to be awarded and two have been programmed directly by USAID.

D. Participants

USAID has funded 21 participants who have been programmed directly by USAID for training in the U.S. Additional program will be funded when appropriate and subject to legislative authority and fund availability.

E. Commodities

Funds are included herein in the amount of \$65,000 for textbooks, library support, teaching materials and spare parts for U.S. equipped laboratories in the faculties as described in the Course of Action above.

ARTICLE V. Government of Afghanistan Contribution

A. Afghan administrators and teaching staff are to be provided as counterparts to U.S. professors.

B. Qualified candidates for participant training and visiting lecturer programs are to be selected by KU.

C. Foreign currency allocations for the purchase of essential commodities for the concerned faculties. At project initiation, KU total foreign exchange commodity funds are to equal at least the U.S. input.

KU agrees to be responsible for commodity procurement under this project.

For the Cooperating Government or Agency
SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
TITLE: _____

For the Agency for International Development
SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
TITLE: _____

AID REF. NO.
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 PRO AG
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 ANNEX A

**PROJECT AGREEMENT
 BETWEEN AID AND
 Ministry of Education
 AN AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
 REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN**

1. Project/Activity No.
 803-11-050-121
 2. Agreement No.
 HE KU #1
 3. Project/Activity Title
 HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY

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 3. Original or
 Revision No. _____

D. Office space and basic equipment and supplies for US professors and counterparts.

E. The Government of Afghanistan agrees that commodities procured under this agreement for university purposes will not be subject to import taxes.

F. KU is also to make provision for reasonable administrative support for the foreign professors and their project activities. KU support will include the training of staff to manage the utilization of all project inputs.

For the Cooperating Government or Agency
 SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
 TITLE: _____

For the Agency for International Development
 SIGNATURE: _____ DATE: _____
 TITLE: _____

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ProAg CLEARANCE RECORD

A. IDENTIFICATION

1. Project Title: Higher Education/Kabul University
2. Project No. 306-11-660-121
3. USAID Project Manager Dr. A.R. LANZA
4. Division Education 5. ProAg No. HE/KU #1, Rev. 3.

B. CLEARANCE

USAID

- Project Manager.....
- Division Chief.....
- DP Liaison Officer.....
- AD/DP.....
- CO (1).....
- CO (2).....
- AD/M.....
- Procurement.....

| SIGNATURE | DATE |
|--------------------|--------|
| <i>[Signature]</i> | 2/4/74 |
| <i>[Signature]</i> | 2/4/74 |
| <i>[Signature]</i> | 2-4-74 |
| <i>[Signature]</i> | 2-5-74 |
| <i>[Signature]</i> | 2/6/74 |

EMENT

Summary of U. S. Assistance to Kabul University
as of 12-31-73

| | <u>Indiana</u> <u>Proj 013</u> | <u>Wyoming</u> <u>Proj 092</u> | <u>Wyoming</u> <u>Proj 092</u> | <u>Fac. of Engr.</u> <u>Proj 093</u> | <u>TCCU</u> <u>Proj 091</u> | <u>KU</u> <u>Proj 121</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------|
| <u>Total</u> | 1,660,285 | 6,253,869 | 1,702,150 | 7,242,000 | 11,094,553 | 924,400 | 28,877,257 |
| U. S. Technicians | - | 183,786 | - | 38,000 | 519,868 | - | 741,654 |
| * Contract Services | 1,563,352 | 5,400,531 | 1,372,000 | 6,801,000 | 9,500,327 | 680,000 | 25,317,210 |
| Participants | 90,449 | 246,706 | 98,650 | 165,000 | 578,582 | 179,400 | 1,358,787 |
| Commodities | 251 | 363,321 | 231,500 | 211,000 | 339,569 | 65,000 | 1,210,641 |
| Other Costs | 6,233 | 59,525 | - | 27,000 | 156,207 | - | 248,965 |
| | | | | | | | |
| <u>*Contract Services</u> | <u>1,563,352</u> | <u>5,400,531</u> | <u>1,372,000</u> | <u>6,801,000</u> | <u>9,500,327</u> | <u>680,000</u> | <u>25,317,210</u> |
| <u>Personnel</u> | <u>1,288,352</u> | <u>4,173,531</u> | <u>1,372,000</u> | <u>5,123,000</u> | <u>8,094,327</u> | <u>680,000</u> | <u>20,731,210</u> |
| <u>Participants</u> | <u>254,000</u> | <u>746,000</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>872,000</u> | <u>1,031,000</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>3,003,000</u> |
| <u>Commodities</u> | <u>21,000</u> | <u>481,000</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>706,000</u> | <u>375,000</u> | <u>-</u> | <u>1,543,000</u> |


PROJECT ADMIN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY 73 to FY 75

Title or Number: Higher Education/Kabul University - 121

PAGE 1

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p><u>USAID</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Nine U.S. Resident Professors, three in each of the Faculties of Agriculture, Education and Engineering. Thirty-six w.m. of short-term U.S. professors as requested. Fifteen visiting lectureships for senior Afghan staff. 127 man years of participant training. \$165,000 commodities. | <p>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</p> | <p>On site inspection KU, USAID and contractor reports and records.</p> | <p>Assumptions for providing inputs:</p> |
| <p><u>GOA</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> Admin., teaching staff and support personnel. Qualified candidates for participant training and lectureships. Foreign currency allocations for commodities equal to U.S. commodity input. Office space and basic equipt & supplies for U.S. resident staff. | | | |




Primary School (1,400)




General Lycee (166)

University



Faculties of
(Eng. &
Poly-
tech. (Medicine)



(2,150)



Academy of Teachers
Educators (1)



- 1 - 6 Primary Level
- 7 - 9 Lower Secondary Level
- 10 - 12 Upper Secondary Level
- 13 - 18 Higher Level

→ Leaving Diploma or Certificate

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Prepared by: USAID/Education
Division

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY 73 FY 75
March 13, 1974

Project Title & Number Higher Education/Kabul University 121

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-------|-------|-----|-----------------|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|--------|-----|-----|--------------|-----|-----|------------|-----|------|----------------|-----|-----|-------------|-----|-----|----------------|-------|------|--------------|-----|------|-------------|-----|------|-----------------------|-----|-----|------------------|-----|-----|--|--|
| <p>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</p> <p>K.U. is to carry out its unique role of preparing Afghan personnel for the professions, government, business, social and economic development.</p> | <p>Measures of Goal Achievement:</p> <p>1. Relevance of the program at K.U. to national development needs by 1977.</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="766 619 1464 1090"> <thead> <tr> <th><u>Colleges</u></th> <th><u>4th Plan</u></th> <th><u>% of Total</u></th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>7,194</td> <td>100</td> </tr> <tr> <td>1. Pharmacology</td> <td>150</td> <td>2.1</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2. Kabul Medical</td> <td>431</td> <td>6.0</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3. Law</td> <td>595</td> <td>8.3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>4. Economics</td> <td>400</td> <td>5.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>5. Letters</td> <td>980</td> <td>13.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>6. Engineering</td> <td>455</td> <td>6.3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>7. Theology</td> <td>320</td> <td>4.4</td> </tr> <tr> <td>8. Agriculture</td> <td>1,120</td> <td>15.6</td> </tr> <tr> <td>9. Education</td> <td>880</td> <td>12.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>10. Science</td> <td>880</td> <td>12.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>11. Nangarhar Medical</td> <td>300</td> <td>4.2</td> </tr> <tr> <td>12. Polytechnics</td> <td>683</td> <td>9.5</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> | <u>Colleges</u> | <u>4th Plan</u> | <u>% of Total</u> | Total | 7,194 | 100 | 1. Pharmacology | 150 | 2.1 | 2. Kabul Medical | 431 | 6.0 | 3. Law | 595 | 8.3 | 4. Economics | 400 | 5.6 | 5. Letters | 980 | 13.6 | 6. Engineering | 455 | 6.3 | 7. Theology | 320 | 4.4 | 8. Agriculture | 1,120 | 15.6 | 9. Education | 880 | 12.2 | 10. Science | 880 | 12.2 | 11. Nangarhar Medical | 300 | 4.2 | 12. Polytechnics | 683 | 9.5 | <p>1. Fifth 5-year plan analysis of 4th plan performance.</p> <p>2. Manpower utilization studies - placement of graduates.</p> | <p>1. GOA will remain committed to the development of KU as one principle university for meeting national development needs.</p> <p>2. The GOA and KU will remain responsive to changing developmental needs and will be flexible enough to meet these needs.</p> <p>3. Under continuing GOA policy toward KU, there should be no strikes or other student unrest during the life of this project.</p> |
| <u>Colleges</u> | <u>4th Plan</u> | <u>% of Total</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 7,194 | 100 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 1. Pharmacology | 150 | 2.1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Kabul Medical | 431 | 6.0 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Law | 595 | 8.3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Economics | 400 | 5.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 5. Letters | 980 | 13.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6. Engineering | 455 | 6.3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 7. Theology | 320 | 4.4 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 8. Agriculture | 1,120 | 15.6 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9. Education | 880 | 12.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 10. Science | 880 | 12.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 11. Nangarhar Medical | 300 | 4.2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 12. Polytechnics | 683 | 9.5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | <p>2. Degree of Utilization of graduates.</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY 73 to FY 75

Project Title & Number: Higher Education/Kabul University - 121

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|--|---|--|
| <p>Project Purpose:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In the Faculties of Agriculture, Education and Engineering to: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. upgrade academic & administrative services b. guide & support applied research c. improve quality of instruction 2. Preparation of a long-range university development plan. | <p>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a. Staff participation in budget preparation with adequate justification and relationship needs. b. Adequate maintenance & utilization of facilities; installation and use of more comprehensive student records. c. Budgetary provision for and application of research findings to national needs of gov't and private sectors. d. Staff members trained <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Agriculture <u>11/1/73-8/1/74</u> -- Education <u>4/1/73-1/1/74</u> -- Engineering <u>7/1/73-1/1/74</u> 2. Existence of a long-range K.U. development plan. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1.a. Analysis & comparison of budgets 1.b. Analysis of curricula, courses of study, instructional programs. 1.c. Published research reports. 1.d. Employment policy, qualifications of staff, its breadth of knowledge & experience. | <p>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</p> <p>MOE and K.U. continuing support for the K.U. Planning Committee established in Jan. 1973.</p> |

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PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY
LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY _____ to FY _____

RE/KU - 121

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p>Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Development of new curricula. 2. Expansion of applied research, organization & capability 3. Trained Participants and returned Visiting lecturers. 4. Collection and Analysis of University Planning Data and Recommendations for the 1970-1975 Five-Year Plan. | <p>Magnitude of Outputs:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. New curricula established on VIT, power Engineering, Agric. Mechanics, Food Processing. 2. Number and character of new research projects. 3. Number returned from participant training and visiting lectureships. 4. Written reports of short term Professors. | <p>On site inspections reports and records of KU, USAID and the U.S. contractor.</p> | <p>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</p> |

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FINANCIAL HISTORY

PROJECT 121, HIGHER EDUCATION/KABUL UNIVERSITY
INCEPTION THROUGH MARCH 31, 1974

| | <u>FY FUNDED</u> | <u>MAN-MONTHS PARTICIPANTS</u> | <u>FUNDING PERIOD</u> | | <u>OBLIGATIONS</u> | <u>DISBURSEMENTS</u> | <u>UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS</u> | <u>DISBURSEMENTS PLUS ACCRUED EXPENDITURES</u> | <u>PIPELINE</u> |
|---|------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|--|--------------------|
| | | | <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u> | <u>(1)</u> | <u>(2)</u> | <u>(3)=(1)-(2)</u> | <u>(4)</u> | <u>(5)=(1)-(4)</u> |
| Technical Services Contracts: | | | | | | | | | |
| PIO/T for assistance to K.U. to develop the resources in reasearch work in Agriculture, Education and Engineering | | | | | | | | | |
| | FY-73 | - | 8/74 | 7/75 | \$ 617,000 | \$ -0- | \$ 617,000 | \$ -0- | \$ 617,000 |
| Dr. Taulman Miller | FY-73 | - | 7/73 | 12/73 | 26,600 | 27,272 | (672) | 26,600 | -0- |
| Contract with Cornell University for a Visiting Lectureship | FY-73 | - | 8/73 | 8/74 | 7,000 | 539 | 6,461 | 4,507 | 2,493 |
| Contract with Carnegie Institute of Technology for a Visiting Lectureship | FY-73 | - | 8/73 | 8/74 | 7,000 | 577 | 6,423 | 4,545 | 2,455 |
| Contract with University of Illinois for a Visiting Lecturship | FY-74 | - | 8/73 | 8/74 | 7,000 | 740 | 6,260 | 4,974 | 2,026 |
| Contract with Washington State University for a visiting Lectureship | FY-74 | - | 4/74 | 3/75 | 7,000 | -0- | 7,000 | -0- | 7,000 |
| Dr. Taulman Miller | FY-74 | - | 1/74 | 4/74 | 30,100 | -0- | 30,100 | 11,550 | 18,550 |
| Total Technical Services Contracts | | | | | 701,700 | 29,128 | 672,572 | 52,176 | 649,524 |
| Participants | | | | | 175,200 | 94,676 | 80,524 | 98,075 | 77,125 |
| | FY-73 | 252 | | | 5,270 | 3,900 | 1,370 | 4,270 | 1,000 |
| | FY-74 | 6 | | | | | | | |
| Total Participants | | | | | 180,470 | 98,576 | 81,894 | 102,345 | 78,125 |
| Commodities (Direct) | | | | | | | | | |
| Professional Scientific and Controlling Instruments, Photographic and Optical Goods | | | | | | | | | |
| Watches and Clocks and Miscellaneous | FY-73 | | | | 65,000 | -0- | 65,000 | -0- | 65,000 |
| Other Costs: | | | | | | | | | |
| Invitational and Operational Travel and Miscellaneous. | | | | | | | | | |
| | FY-74 | | | | 2,000 | -0- | 2,000 | - | 2,000 |
| | | | | | \$ 949,170 | \$ 127,704 | \$ 821,466 | \$ 154,521 | \$ 794,649 |

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Director's Advisory Council
(Meeting Notes)

Date and Place: March 30, 1974 (9:30-11:30 A. M.)
Director's Conference Room

Purpose: Review of Higher Education/Kabul University Project 121

Participants: DAC Members:

- Mr. Frederick H. Sligh, DD
- Dr. Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
- Mr. Fred W. Miller, A-AD/M
- Mr. John Standish, CDE
- Mr. Terrence J. McMahon, CO

Others:

- Dr. Anthony R. Lanza, ED
- Mr. Charles W. Johnson, DP
- Mr. Gary F. Towery, CO

Papers considered by the ~~participants~~ and attached to these notes:

- Staff paper with related PROAG and Logical Framework
- Summary of U.S. Assistance to Kabul University
- Financial History

Comment:

The discussion began with questions and observations concerning the recently drafted log frame and then moved to consideration of the five recommendations included on pages 7 and 8 of the attached staff paper. The meeting concluded with general agreement on a four-step proposal advanced by Fred Sligh and a consensus that project implementation should proceed without further delay.

Discussion of the Log Frame:

Frank Denton raised questions and made observations which may be summarized as follows:

1. The staff paper, PROAG and Log Frame do not explain what is to be accomplished by the project.

2. The Log Frame indicates that PhDs will be trained in (for example) the Faculty of Agriculture. What will occur or change within the Faculty of Agriculture as a result of this training?
3. How will we measure the progress of this project?

Tony Lanza commented on these questions and observations as follows:

1. The project provides assistance for new curricula and for applied research which are part of the process of improving education. K. U. will also provide better instruction as a result of training if we assume that someone trained to be a better instructor will be a better instructor.
2. To measure progress we may simply establish certain objectives for the development and application of new curricula and research and determine from time to time if the objectives are being achieved. Quality improvements will also result from this assistance. One measure of quality of instruction is a before-and-after comparison of the academic and experiential credentials of instructional staff in the assisted faculties.
3. This project was to be designed as an interim holding action with K. U. rather than as a comprehensive project. AID/W instructed the Mission not to write a PROP or a Log Frame because of the interim nature of this assistance. However, USAID (with close K. U. collaboration) designed as viable a project as AID/W would accept.

Chuck Johnson commented that the Log Frame simply reflects the content of the PROAGS and may therefore not answer questions of project objectives. He also added that specific achievements may be difficult to define because of the remote linkages between (a) advisory assistance for curricula development to (b) the application of education in the country's development process.

Current situation:

There are about 20 PhD and MA candidates currently studying in the U.S. under financing provided by this project. AID/W is now in the process of inviting proposals from prospective university contractors.

Discussion of Staff Paper Recommendations for DAC consideration:

Frank Denton suggested that we eliminate recommendations 2 and 4 from consideration because neither is relevant to consideration of this project. In his

view, the project should stand on its own merits and not be tied to our concerns with new initiatives.

Tony Lanza noted that we can make a self-contained rather than an interim project of this but added that we should determine our intent, i. e. interim, terminal or individual project. (This issue was later considered as step 3 of the Sligh proposal)

John Standish pointed out that although the staff paper did not identify the political importance of the project, it is an important consideration.

There then followed a discussion on forward funding this project through a limited three-year life with '74 or '75 funds. DP will explore the funding issue with AID/W if that seems appropriate. There appeared to be some support for limiting the project to two years, but later discussion centered on the three-year time frame as a positive feature of a time-limited project.

Fred Sligh suggested that recommendation 5 be eliminated from consideration given the lack of alternative proposed projects, the U.S. commitments to proceed with this project and the present, advanced efforts to contract for services.

Proposed Course of Action:

Fred Sligh proposed action as follows, to which there was general agreement:

1. The Mission should not attempt to stop this project or to delay the process of inviting contract proposals.
2. We should attempt to redesign or restate the Log Frame (and PROAG if necessary) to concentrate project assistance on improving Kabul University's role in meeting specific developmental requirements of Afghanistan.
3. We should consider this not as an interim or terminal project but as an individual project with specific objectives.
4. We should proceed in our dialogue with the Afghans on the subject of nonformal education. Discussion of a possible trade-off between non-formal education assistance and further assistance to Kabul University may become appropriate in the future.

Tony Lanza agreed with the proposal, adding that the job descriptions of the contract advisors is sufficient to provide the project objectives as described in step 2 without any project redesign but the Log Frame should be restated. It was then agreed that the contract team should be directed toward the project objectives cited in step 2 by designing specific work plans during the first weeks of contract implementation.

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Dr. Anthony K. Lanza
Chief Education Advisor, USAID/Afghanistan

April 15, 1974

Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan *WB*

Project 121 - Higher Education/Kabul University

After review of the report of DAC examination (March 30, 1974) of subject project, I agree that current actions to obtain a contractor should proceed on course.

The project's design and implementation should be fashioned so as to maximize its support of a strengthened Kabul University role in the specifics of Afghan development; we should view the project as (and attempt to make it) an individual activity -- not an "interim" or "terminal" project. We should consider the project's three-year time frame intact, keeping in mind the possibility that, in the future, Afghan priorities may be such that it may be appropriate to consider some trade-off between (1) continued assistance to KU and (2) assistance in the non-formal education area.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)

DD:FHSligh:gn *FW*

Through this process, our explicit and implicit purposes were reversed: there is barely a mention of University planning in the revised ProAG (though we still think that the U. leadership is very interested). The focus is on our assistance -- resident professors, visiting Afghan lecture-ships, commanderies, and participant training -- which is still directed primarily at gap filling and bridging pending preparation of a comprehensive

the Rector and Ambassador Elliot participating, on February 9, 1974, by the first big post-coup U.S. and C.A. project agreement ceremony, with including the cabinet. This intensive and trusting process was ultimately debated, and frequently changed through several layers of the CIA, leadership was collaborative in the extreme -- every line was scrutinized, negotiation of a restatement of the EX 73 ProAG with the new University was one of the first places in which work resumed, i.e., renegotiation. The relations between donors and the CIA were sharply curtailed but, for us, U.S. which U.S. universities were responding. In the following months, commitments, in the future. The coup in July caused us to cancel the RFF, anything, in a vital Afghan institution until we could decide what we might do. If purpose was to maintain a U.S. presence, protect our investment. If you comprehensive five-year development plan. A secondary and implicit to the U.S. assistance during a period when they would be developing a project spanning three years at the University. The explicit purpose was reached a three-way agreement with AID/W and U.S. on an "interim" first, a paragraph or two on history. Before the coup in July 1973, we had

The purpose of this letter is to start a dialogue through which we can reach a decision on what to do with the Higher Education - Kabul University project. The letter is divided into three parts: history, legislation, and our proposed plan. I hope you will find it a complete statement.

Dear Lou

Mr. Louis C. Stamborg
 Afghanistan Desk Officer
 ASIA/NE - Mail Stop 6921A
 U.S. Agency for International Development
 Washington, D.C. 20523

April 20, 1974

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H-4

APR 22 1974

development plan by the University. Viewed on this level we find ourselves more or less where we wanted to be about a year ago with an interim assistance activity (and the first real demonstration that the GOA wanted continued U. S. assistance in what some might call a "sensitive" area to the new government). A major intervening factor since the original project was formulated is, of course, the new legislation.

Our study and self-education on the content and importance of the new legislation roughly paralleled, but lagged somewhat behind, the process of renegotiating the K. U. ProAg. However, those negotiations were capped off with ProAg signatures before we had reached the conclusion that it is difficult to justify a university project in terms of direct benefits to the poorest majority. We have not concluded that continued growth of K. U. is no longer important, because obviously it is. But we do recognize that U. S. assistance in university development has lower priority than mass educational activities.

We have reviewed this project in detail and concluded the following: (1) we should think of this project in discrete terms (i. e., not as an "interim" project) wherein we will, with the contractor's assistance, develop needs; (2) we should fulfill, as far as possible, our commitments to K. U.; (3) we should complete all funding for this project in FY 1975, if possible, in order that our books will be clear for a complete slate of "new look" projects in FY 1976; and (4) when the opportunity presents itself, we should broach with the GOA the subject of trading off future assistance to K. U. for mass educational activities.

Points 2 and 3, above, require some elaboration and are pertinent to a primary concern of this letter, future programming. The AID/W project approval shows a total of \$2,087,000 for three years with obligations ending FY 1975. Our FY CP submission to you suggested a total of \$3,437,000 with final obligation in FY 76. But, for the reasons stated above, we would like to get back to a final obligation in FY 75 -- even though there has been a year's lag in starting up -- and believe a total project cost of about \$2.6 million will meet our commitments to the GOA. To this end, \$898,000 was obligated in FY 73 and we intend to obligate \$421,000 this fiscal year (for participants and visiting lectureships). This would leave \$1.3 million for obligation in FY 75. We realize that this is a healthy sum, but believe that it could be accommodated (with difficulty) within the tentative control figure given to Art Reich recently for the Education and Human Resource Development sector. If this were agreeable to AID/W, we would still have roughly a three-year project (in fact, implementation would extend over four years).

Moreover, we will have cleared the books for an FY 76 program of projects which have high priority under the new legislation.

The revised FY 1973 ProAg signed in February of this year contains all of the usual caveats on continuing legislative authority, funding availability, and satisfactory performance. With these caveats interspersed throughout, the ProAg speaks of advisors for "two or three years," approximately 40 participant training grants (in one place, it states 127 participant years), 15 visiting Afghan lectureships, and commodity support using a letter of credit at approximately \$155,000. In our proposed restructuring (Table I attached) we have emphasized participant training with 43 participant grants (107 man-years), and all of the 15 lectureships. Concomitantly, we would slightly de-emphasize the advisory services by planning on only two years instead of three and cutting out the third year of commodity support (but since we are skipping commodities in FY 74 we would still make an obligation in FY 75 for same). We judge that, from the Afghan perspective, we would have fulfilled our "commitment" if we do all of this because, in particular, they would be getting the participant training and lectureships they desire as a first priority.

Provided the contractor gets some people on board by September, the funding plan we have put forth would not give us any big pipeline headaches, though there would be a little blast for participants at the end of FY 75 (because we would have to put up two-year funding in some cases). One problem is the RFP: it calls for proposals based upon three years of advisory services. We are certain that neither you nor we want the RFP to be changed or the preparation of proposals delayed. Thus, we suggest that after the proposals are received and the field narrowed, the contracts staff should inform the bidders that the advisory services will have to be reduced from three to two-year tours. It would seem unlikely that any bidder would withdraw his proposal based on this change. In any event, we would like to keep it uppermost in everyone's mind that we cannot afford any more delays in fielding a team.

As I said at the outset of this letter, our purpose is to start a dialogue on what to do with this project. We think that the proposal we have put forward balances as best we can the various conflicting variables in the equation, to wit: commitments to the GOA, our previous decision to have an "interim" project, AID/W concerns as expressed in the PROP approval, the new legislation, and our desire to shift to mass educational activities as soon as possible. But I very well recognize that there may be additional concerns on the AID/W front about which we are not fully aware. Therefore, I would appreciate it if you would take this up with whomever you think might

Mr. Louis C. Stenberg

- 4 -

make a helpful input in order that we may wrap this problem up,
hopefully, before we finalize our FY 76 FBS.

Thanks very much in advance, Lou, for whatever help you can give.

Sincerely,

Vincent W. Brown
Vincent W. Brown
Director

P. S. I have enclosed a couple of copies of this letter for your use.
I regret that I hadn't finished off this letter before Tony Lanza went
on his TDY; one copy is for him. While Tony will not be aware of
the specifics of this letter, he can fill you in on the Mission's review
of the project and our plan to look at some alternative funding schemes
for this project.

Attachments:

Tables I and II

Drafted by: CWJohnson:vt
Apr 27-74

Clearances: AD/DP:FHDenton (1st draft)
DD:FHSligh (1st draft)
PSC/KU:TMiller _____

HIGHER EDUCATION - KABEL UNIVERSITY
 Obligation Plans
 FY 73 - 75

TABLE I

| | FY 1973 | | | FY 1974 | | | FY 1975 | | |
|--|---------|------|------------|---------|------|------------|---------|------|-------------------|
| | No. | (NY) | \$ | No. | (NY) | \$ | No. | (NY) | \$ |
| 1. <u>Personnel Services</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| a. PSC (T. Miller) | 1 | | 27 | 1 | | 20 | | | |
| b. Advisory services (resident) and home office hackstop | 9 | (9) | 543 | - | - | - | 9 | (9) | 570 ^{1/} |
| c. Short term consul- tants | 2-3 | (1) | 24 | | | | 2-3 | (1) | 24 |
| 2. <u>Participants</u> | | | | | | | | | |
| a. New | 21 | (21) | 176 | 25 | (22) | 234 | - | - | - |
| b. Continuing | - | - | - | 13 | (13) | 134 | 26 | (21) | 420 |
| 3. <u>Commodities</u> | XX | XX | 65 | XX | XX | - | XX | XX | 55 |
| 4. <u>Visiting Lectureships</u> | 7 | (7) | 64 | 4 | (4) | 28 | 4 | (4) | 28 |
| 5. <u>Other Costs</u> | XX | XX | - | XX | XX | 5 | XX | XX | 129 |
| | | | <u>598</u> | | | <u>421</u> | | | <u>1,277</u> |

Project Total 2,596

^{1/} Includes an estimated shortfall of \$42,090 for contract services in FY 73 obligation.

HIGHER EDUCATION - KABUL UNIVERSITY
 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
 Calendar Year and Quarter

| | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | | 1977 | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|---|---|---|------|---|---|---|------|---|---|---|------|---|---|---|------|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 1. Personnel Services | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. PSC | <u>73/74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| b. Advisory Services (resident) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (1) | <u>73 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (2) | <u>73 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| c. Short Term Consultants | <u>73 obl. 74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Participants | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| a. Ph.D. | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (1) | <u>73 obl. 74 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (2) | <u>73 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (3) | <u>74 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| b. Masters Degree | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (1) | <u>73 obl. 74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (2) | <u>73 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (3) | <u>74 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| c. Postgrad Programs | <u>74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| d. Committees | <u>73 obl. 75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Note: --- Implementation Indeterminate

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TABLE II (cont'd)

| | 1973 | | | | 1974 | | | | 1975 | | | | 1976 | | | | 1977 | | | |
|--------------------------|------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|----------------|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| 4. Visiting Lectureships | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (3) | | | | | <u>73 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (5) | | | | | | | | | <u>73 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (4) | | | | | | | | | <u>74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (6) | | | | | | | | | | | | | <u>75 obl.</u> | | | | | | | |
| 5. Other Costs | | | | | | | | | <u>74 obl.</u> | | | | | | | | <u>75 obl.</u> | | | |

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STAFF PAPER FOR DAC DISCUSSION - APRIL 8, 1974

SUBJECT: Rural Development

FROM : Louis L. Mitchell, Rural Development Advisor

Introduction

In Afghanistan where 65% of the people are engaged in agriculture and live in 16,000 rural villages, it is impossible to identify one rural development effort. In fact, every Government Ministry is, or could be (involved in rural development. Certainly the activities of every Ministry affect the rural population.

However, because there is no effective central planning capability, programs and projects of Ministries are not coordinated to beneficially affect the population and there is gross misallocation of resources. Further, rather than attempt to coordinate resources for optimum utilization, the Government has established another Department, under the Prime Ministry, known as the Provincial Development Department (PDD); (see below) the Rural Development Department (RDD).

Whereas USAID has been involved for years in rural development (education, health, agriculture, etc.), since the fall of 1971 when 50,000 MT of PL 480 Title II wheat were reallocated to the PDD for the Food for Work Program, USAID has considered its rural development program in the context of RDD. Therefore, it is with sole reference to that Department that this discussion paper is written.

II. Present Status of the RDD

University of Tennessee-trained Engineer M. M. Sediq has been the Acting President of RDD since the departure of A. Tawab Assifle last fall to become the Governor of Herat Province. Sediq has been associated with the Department for approximately 5 years and previously acted as the de facto deputy in his role as chief engineer. As an engineer, he is competent. He lacks the experience and credentials of leadership.

The staff of RDD numbers approximately 650 persons in Kabul and the Provinces. Each province has a local director and staff. There are 17 Afghan engineers and the UNDP supports the Department with 5 UNDTTC engineers. One additional expert is due to arrive this week.

Afghanis 92 million have been budgeted for 1353.

The entire focus of the program is upon rural works construction (small irrigation structures, bridges, culverts and some feeder road maintenance). Work is presently underway in five provinces (Nangrahar, Laghman, Kandahar, Farah and Nimroz).

Evidently by the wish of President Daoud, the name has been changed from PDD to the RDD, which implies, theoretically, that the scope of activity includes public health, education, coops, small industries, women and children's welfare as well as public works. In fact, some months ago an outline for a comprehensive RDD program was drafted. The plan decentralized planning to nine regional levels, utilized village-level workers and suggested ways to mobilize local participation in project identification and implementation. Among the key features of the plan was utilizing local administrative units (wolis walis and alaqadaris) as centers of planning activity for coordination of work within villages of their political jurisdiction.

From time to time this plan has surfaced from the DPM's office and Ministry of Planning whenever rural development is being discussed. USAID officials have been informed that the plan would be initiated in poorer provinces such as Badakshan, Ghor and Badghis. Most recently it appeared as a full proposal (it isn't) and was discussed with the Deputy Minister of Community Development and President of Rural Development Coordination, Government of India, on their study-visit several weeks ago. The Indian Government has proposed modifications and stated their willingness to send an expert team to draft a master rural development plan for RDD and Afghanistan. The DPM will send an official request for this expert team this week (or so it was proposed as of April 7).

Though there is some skepticism among RDD staff about Indian competence and though the Indians' initial report on RDD is shallow at best, it appears that national political priorities will prevail for a time.

Engineer Sediq is aware of the interest of the U.S. in supporting RDD (he has been a participant in all discussions for 18 months) and has passed on this information to the DPM. It is not clear whether or not Dr. Sharq has so advised the President of State.

Future U.S. assistance to RDD could take several forms: fixed-cost reimbursement for public works constructions (labor and/or materials); commodity support (steel, gabion, equipment); and, adult education. The UNDP and Government of India will be involved with engineering technical assistance and planning.

III. Primary Constraints to Rural Development in Afghanistan

There are two primary constraints to effective rural development in the country.

A. Social. Effective rural development can only be accomplished through mobilization of local people in the planning and implementation of projects which affect their lives. In Afghanistan, a traditional society, all developmental decisions are made at the central level with a basic distrust of the integrity and intelligence of the people affected. They are seen as poor, unimaginative and without resources to determine their destinies. The authorities at the Center view themselves as the sole stockholders in developmental processes. It is a paternal benevolence which explicitly dwarfs local people and results in distrust of the Government, whether the King or his relative holds the seat of power.

Further, it stimulates local leadership (in attempts to gain local power) to turn to the Government for favors and investments as distinct from inspiring local initiatives.

In sum, development benevolence is the primary block to national development.

B. Political: Under King Zahir and the new Regime, the highest priority has been and is internal and external political security. Developmental decisions are based first upon political considerations and second upon developmental benefits. The tribal balance within and the nation's balances without are the determinants of policy. Decentralization of planning and project implementation is presently seen as a loss of central control, hence internal security. Coordination and choice of donor assistance is regarded only insofar as external security is enhanced.

IV. Historical Sketch of RDD

Approximately 20 years ago, RDD was formed as a division within the Ministry of Interior. Its activities included comprehensive community development. However, it lacked budget, staff and authority and accomplished little.

In 1970, with a gentle shove from UNDP, the division was elevated to a department under a president, the name was changed to Provincial Development, and the UNDP programmed 12 engineering experts and financial support. The Kunar Regional Development Project was also part of the package. The goal of the Department was to design public works constructions which would be constructed by local voluntary labor under local supervision (usually the Provincial PDD Director).

By the fall of 1971 the Department had designed large numbers of constructions, but few had been constructed. Local voluntary labor was usually unavailable and local supervisory capability was inadequate. At the same time, the effects of two successive years of drought were recognized and a vehicle for food distribution was sought. The German experience in a Food-for-Work program in Paktia was modified for the entire country and the PDD was moved under the Prime Ministry to be the vehicle for food distribution. Labor was paid with wheat for public works constructions. The U.S. provided 50,000 MT and the World Food Program provided 10,000 MT of grant wheat.

An incredible avalanche of activity ensued. Hundreds of thousands of man-days of labor were mobilized and thousands of projects were undertaken and completed, though quality often was lacking.

In December 1972 the Food-for-Work program was officially terminated because the momentum had outstripped managerial capability and corruption had become excessive. Further, the Government wished to redesign the program under PDD to exploit the positive qualities of momentum to effect official public works activity.

The Government changed at the same time and shortly thereafter the Minister in charge was shifted to Agriculture. The President of PDD was changed in April 1973 and the Department came under a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. A new plan was developed and approved by the Cabinet on July 16, 1973.

Then, the coup.

The the President of PDD was appointed as Governor of Herat, Engineer Sediq became Acting Head, the name was changed to RDD, and the cycle was complete.

DISTRIBUTION:

| | |
|--------------|-------------------|
| Mr. Brown | Mr. Wilson/Martin |
| Mr. Sligh | Mr. Hooker/Scott |
| Dr. Denton | Mr. Johnson |
| Mr. Miller | Mr. Mitchell |
| Mr. McMahon | |
| Mr. Standish | |

Director's Advisory Committee
(Meeting Notes)

Date and Place: April 9, 1974, Director's Conference Room
10:30 - 12:30 p.m.

Purpose : Review of Staff Paper "Rural Development"

Participants : DAC Members:

- Mr. Vincent W. Brown, D
- Mr. Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
- Mr. John Standish, CDE
- Mr. Fred W. Miller, AD/M

Others:

- Mr. Calvin Martin, AGR
- Mr. Raymond W. Hooker DP
- Mr. Richard B. Scott, DP
- Mr. Charles Johnson, DP
- Mr. Louis L. Mitchell DP

Paper considered by the participants and attached to these notes: "Rural Development" prepared by Louis L. Mitchell.

Introduction:

Mr. Brown reported that the area of rural development has been given high priority by AID/W and that for FY 75 \$8.0 million of DL and \$400,000 of grant funding has been allocated for this purpose.

Background:

Mr. Mitchell presented his paper reviewing the history of rural development (RD) in Afghanistan and the current GOA interest of mounting an effective RD program. He identified the UNDP and the Government of India (GOI) as being interested in assisting the GOA in developing a RD program. He indicated that the GOI had sent an advance study group to assess and outline a proposed approach to RD and that a report was prepared by the group which suggested the Indian "block system" of RD, be used in Afghanistan.

Current Developments:

Mr. Brown reported that Ambassador Eliot in recent discussion with the Indian Ambassador had indicated the U.S. interest of cooperating with India in a Afghan RD program. Ambassador Eliot was advised that the GOI was assisting the GOA in planning of the RD program and in the eventual staffing of technical advisors in the field.

Mr. Mitchell explained in detail the USAID assistance to date in planning a RD program with the GOA. A briefing chart was used by Mr. Mitchell showing the organizational structure and staffing pattern of the USAID/GOA approach which was based on 9 regional offices supported from a central Kabul office. After much discussion on the organizational concept, GOA staffing and training requirements Mr. Brown directed that Mr. Mitchell draft a brief paper, with chart, for the Ambassador to use in a possible visit to the Rural Development Department. At this visit the Ambassador would indicate U.S. interest and possible support to a GOA RD program.

Mr. Standish suggested that AID/W be advised of developments to date and that any expertise available in RD programs be invited to work with USAID staff in developing a RD action program. Mr. Brown indicated that he would write to Mr. Charles James ASIA/NE and inquire of possible AID/W input in developing and assisting in an RD program in Afghanistan.

CDE:JStandish:sp
4/10/74

J-1

PROJECT REVIEW

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING - 123.1, 123.2

I. SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT JUSTIFICATION

A major goal of the USAID/GOA joint efforts in Afghanistan has been to encourage and assist mobilization, wise investment and efficient management of public and private resources directed toward achieving an increased rate of economic and social growth. To accomplish this, a large number of Afghans require management training outside of Afghanistan. In addition, the parameters of the present legal institutions of Afghanistan must be expanded to allow the introduction of internationally accepted practices necessary for development as well as the maximum distribution to the socially disadvantaged of those benefits expected to be derived from this development. This second element also requires training outside of Afghanistan.

Afghanistan has a growing body of technically qualified officials in its Civil Service system but few had been exposed to the rudiment of management, budget, policy analysis, legal development or systems analysis. As a result, the effectiveness of men in senior positions is severely limited because of lack of administrative background as well as trained subordinates who are capable of executing decisions. In part this is the result of the Afghan educational system which is more theoretical than pragmatic, and in part is a product of the culture where loyalties tend to be familial and responsibility is something to be shared at all costs. In addition to the formal courses offered by Kabul University, only the Ministry of Mines and Industry provides any training in management practices and this is on a limited scale. The United Nations, IBRD, Nathan Associates and the USAID have all recognized the lack at various times of analytical and managerial skills to be an important constraint on the Afghan government's goal of making itself more responsive to the needs and desires of all the people.

The lack of managerial expertise and the inflexibility of Afghanistan's legal institutions were the primary justifications for the project when it was presented to AID/W for approval. These same deficiencies appear to hold today.

II. PROJECT DESIGN

The project design is summarized in the attached logical framework. The project was designed to select GOA officials of high potential, now in, or shortly

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slated for, responsible managerial, legal or administrative positions and to provide them with analytical skills, and knowledge oriented toward the practical problems of government policy formulation, program analysis, management and administration and other aspects of public leadership, and to train and upgrade legal officials, teachers of law and members of the judiciary in modern legal methodology and procedures. This is to be accomplished in two concurrent streams; the first in economic analysis and management and the second in legal and judicial management. To date, in the first stream, 23 have departed for training in the U. S. and six have returned. The return of the latter has been too recent to determine the effectiveness of either the project or the training received. In the second stream nine are in the U. S. and nine more have been selected for training in legal management.

II I. a. Assessment of Progress

The authors of the original PROP were unable to develop qualitative or quantitative targets at the goal and purpose level which, when assessed during subsequent evaluations, would reveal whether progress toward the project purpose was being achieved or not. The attached logical framework shows that the authors of this staff paper were unable to do any better. Unless indicators can be developed -- and we doubt that they can be -- neither the Mission nor a dispassionate observer will be able to demonstrate in the future that there is a causative relationship between the generation of outputs (i. e. trained Afghans) and the achievement of the project purpose (i. e. some qualitative and quantitative change in the government's management capability and capacity and some undefined improvement in the country's legal system). Since we cannot define with any precision the change we desire and since we cannot develop indicators to measure "it" the causative relationship, whatever it might be, will have to be taken on faith. Given the magnitude of the current and planned U. S. annual input and the inconsequential GOA input (which does not meet the new legislation's 25% requirement) the project is vulnerable to the real criticism that we are heavily financing an activity for which we don't know what the end will be and, if we did, how to prove that we had achieved it.

b. On the surface, the Government of Afghanistan has with one exception, fulfilled its commitments and evinces considerable enthusiasm for this project. It is however difficult to determine whether this enthusiasm is really for the objectives of the project or whether it is for the use of the project as a vehicle for obtaining twenty to thirty overseas grants for the government's management

cadre. Further the different perspectives in interpreting language related to selection poses a few questions. The ProAg would appear to stress selection from "ministries most directly concerned with economic development." The rack-up for this year's nominations is: Education - 7, Commerce - 5, Interior - 4, Prime Ministry - 1, Public Works - 7, Public Health - 4, Justice - 1, Finance - 2, Agriculture - 1. The explanation offered by the GOA is that since Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries, all ministries are directly concerned with economic development and should share in this project.

Further, in a country practicing total democracy, the inherent equality of individuals would appear to preclude one being ranked above or below another of his peers. Thus, selection on the basis of "merit and potential" seems to outsiders to be based more on a GOA timetable of eligibility for foreign grants than the more accepted interpretation of these terms. On the other side of the coin is the GOA hang-up with academic degrees. They point out that the Civil Service system in Afghanistan predicates, to a large degree, the upward mobility of middle and senior level civil servants on the acquisition of successively higher academic degrees. They therefore feel that a program focused on the development of management leadership but which does not enhance it with the necessary academic credentials, is counter-indicated.

IV. The New Legislation and GOA Priorities

The project falls under sector III in the new legislation, "Education and Human Resource Development". Within the sector this kind of fairly broad gauge training activity appears to assume a low priority -- coming below non-formal education, improving the relevance of formal education and higher education. In addition, the project fails to meet the major benefit criterion of the new legislation, that of directly benefiting the "poorest majority." Based upon our reading of the letter and intent of the new legislation we surmise that this is the kind of project which the Congress would prefer to see undertaken by another donor.

Management improvement and the evolutionary development of Afghanistan's legal system are not explicit high priority GOA goals. There is scant evidence, pro or con, in the draft Fourth Five Year Plan and President Daoud's Jeshyn Day speech to indicate what importance the GOA attaches to the project.

V. OPTIONS

The rationale for the existence as well as the continuation of this project is the acknowledged need for improved management practices in the Afghan government. The question is how best this can be achieved. Implementation

is currently through training in academic or other institutions in the United States, partly in a classroom situation and partly on-the-job. Training methodology used is intentionally diverse.

The functions of management are generally agreed to be planning, organizing, staffing, direction, control and coordination. While these functions are universal their application will differ to a considerable extent in relation to the social and cultural surroundings in which they are applied. Ideally, the training of managers should be conducted within their own social and cultural setting to be most effective. This, therefore, should be considered as the best alternative to the present training mode.

A second option that can be considered is the provision of this training in a setting as approximate as possible to Afghanistan and its needs. Third country training potentials in India, Iran and Malaysia should therefore be explored.

A third option is to modify the present mode to emphasize the discipline of project analysis, management and evaluation and use this as the main vehicle to introduce management concepts. This is in line with the PROP and ProAg and would further satisfy the GOA's desire to develop expertise in this area. Superimposed on this "core" program would be exposure to the elements of administration such as personnel, O&M, records, budget, etc. In addition the participants would receive training in modern management theory and practices. All of this would be followed by practical on-the-job training.

The following additional elements are considered necessary to complement all or any of the above options: 1. short intense in-country training, targeted to the highest level government executives to introduce them to the concepts and vernacular of economic analysis, management and legal development, 2. An in-country institution capable of training the administrative technicians necessary for the needed changes and 3. an in-country follow-up institution composed of the participants themselves which can be used to strengthen and maintain their knowledge of their field of study and also used to impart this information to as many of their peers as possible.

The fourth option would be to scale down or terminate the project as quickly as possible without causing undue friction with the GOA.

Director's Advisory Council
Meeting Notes

Date and Place: April 10, 1974
Director's Conference Room

Purpose : Project Review: National Development Training
123.1 and 123.2

Participants : DAC Members:

- Mr. Frederick H. Sligh, ED, Chairman
- Mr. John Standish, CDE
- Mr. Fred W. Miller, AD/M
- Mr. Terrence J. McElabon, CO

Others:

- Mr. Arthur Reich, DP
- Mr. Charles W. Johnson, DP
- Mr. James A. Hedberg, MP
- Mr. Robert W. Landry, TO
- Mr. Ernest J. Barbour, PA

A project review paper, logical framework and financial history were distributed to the meeting participants and are attached to these notes.

Introduction

The meeting opened with a general acknowledgement that the staff paper adequately described the project and that it would not be necessary to review the content of the paper before proceeding with questions and comments. During the course of the meeting, Bob Landry added additional information to clarify the project purpose and to describe implementation in greater detail. These notes are limited to the discussion of issues and proposals.

Issues

Chuck Johnson said that this project is of low priority within the education functional category of the new legislation and that a second problem is the difficulty of achieving

observable results. Ernie Barbour suggested that the training provided through the project would be more acceptable under the legislation if participants were trained for work on Afghanistan projects which fall within the functional categories of agriculture, population and education. A discussion then followed on the advisability of restructuring the project to achieve legislative conformity or, alternatively, including managerial participant training within individual projects which are designed to meet the priority requirements of the new legislation.

Art Reich expressed the opinion that the project does fit the legislation if we accept the fact that our assistance will usually be one step removed from the goal of improving the lives of the poorest people. He added that the legislative intent could be met by structuring the participants training to include instruction in methods of remedying inadequacies in the system of delivering developmental assistance to the poorest majority. He noted that the question of legislative conformity of this project was never discussed during his recent discussions with officers of CIA and the AID/W Asia Bureau.

Fred Miller believed that the project does not fit the legislation because of the time required to affect the lives of the poorest people through the management and legal training provided by the project. John Standish agreed with Fred and added that the legislative conformity of capital projects such as Kajaki power could be similarly rationalized on the premise that the poorest people will eventually benefit from the availability of electricity.

Fred Sligh commented on the apparent dissimilarity of the AID/W and Mission concerns with project legislative conformity by saying that the people who are running the Agency have been talking about a turnaround in our assistance programs and that this intent will have to be demonstrated to the Congress. Fred asked if any participants are now being trained to work in positions which are involved with other AID projects. Bob Landry answered that a participant might assume a position following his return to Afghanistan but

that the selection and training process will not necessarily cause this to occur. Bob added that the selection of candidates for participant training is based on what might be described as a scholarship offer published within Afghan ministries. In his view, the Government of Afghanistan is committed to the project but without an understanding of what the project means in terms of the country's development process.

Jim Hedberg believes that our program under the new legislation requires a different kind of Afghan management. He noted that only a limited number of participants have come from those ministries which will be directly involved in the implementation of new projects.

Fred Sligh said that he sees this project as a general scholarship program directed to the elite. The project should have some developmental effect, and he suspects that there is none.

Proposals

Comment: Nine legal participants will depart in June for an 18 month course. The PROAG has not yet been signed for the management sub-project, but 30 participants, 20 in management and 10 in law, have been included for training under the Agreement.

Chuck Johnson believes that the project should be terminated after providing the currently anticipated training (see comment above). He suggested that we advise the GOA that we will consider including a management component in any individual project.

Bob Landry said that training could be provided for a greater percentage of high level managers if English language proficiency were not required. He said third country training would be advantageous, particularly in Iran.

Art Reich and Bob Landry are in favor of continuing the legal training sub-project. None of the other meeting participants expressed support for this sub-project when Fred Sligh asked for a show of hands. (No similar vote was taken for the management sub-project.)

Conclusion

Fred Sligh expressed the opinion that the project as presently structured should not continue but that management training should be aimed at meeting specific requirements for development. He suggested that we examine the feasibility of an in-country, problem-oriented training effort.

While all agreed the project was not satisfactory in its present form, no clear alternatives were endorsed.

Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

May 5, 1974

Vincent W. Brown /s/ Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan

National Development Training Project Review

I concur with the Director's Advisory Council conclusions that the NDT project is not producing direct benefits commensurate with the large investment being made and that future management training should be largely in direct support of USAID-assisted projects. Pending specific project development, 8 to 10 management training slots should be planned for FY 75 and FY 76.

To permit an orderly phase-out of the legal element of the NDT project one more (three) cycle of participants (perhaps a reduced number) will be funded in FY 76 if funds permit.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sigh, CD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AE/H; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)

AD/DP:FHDenton:gh

FINANCIAL HISTORY

PROJECT 123 NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRAINING (SUMMARY)
Inception through March 31, 1974

| | <u>OBLIGATIONS</u> <u>(1)</u> | <u>DISBURSEMENTS</u> <u>(2)</u> | <u>UNLIQUIDATED</u> <u>OBLIGATIONS</u> <u>(3)=(1)-(2)</u> | <u>DISBURSEMENTS</u> <u>PLUS ACCRUED</u> <u>EXPENDITURES</u> <u>(4)*</u> | <u>PIPELINE</u> <u>(5)=(1)-(4)</u> |
|------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|---|---|---------------------------------------|
| Technical Services Contracts: | \$ 71,000 | \$ 36,022 | \$ 34,978 | \$ 61,000 | \$ 10,000 |
| Participants: | | | | | |
| Direct | 341,010 | 209,626 | 131,384 | 215,404 | 125,606 |
| under Technical Services Contracts | 85,000 | 30,205 | 54,795 | 79,000 | 6,000 |
| Total Participants | 426,010 | 239,831 | 186,179 | 294,404 | 131,606 |
| Other Costs | 10,603 | 3,451 | 7,152 | 10,603 | -0- |
| Project Total | \$ 507,613 | \$ 279,304 | \$ 228,309 | \$ 366,007 | \$ 141,606 |

* The estimated cost of goods and services received.

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY _____ to FY _____
Date Prepared: April 8, 1974

Project Title & Number: National Development Training Program

PAGE 1

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|---|
| <p>Program or Sector Goal: The broader objective to which this project contributes:</p> <p>Mobilization, wise investment and efficient management of public and private resources of Afghanistan.</p> | <p>Measures of Goal Achievement:</p> | | <p>Assumptions for achieving goal targets</p> |

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY _____ to FY _____

Project Title & Number: National Development Training Program

PAGE 2

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|---|--|-----------------------|---|
| <p>Project Purpose:</p> <p>1. To introduce elements of modern management and Economic Analysis into the traditional systems of the GOA's economic development Ministries. The priority areas are policy formulation, economic analysis, budget preparation and execution of institutional management.</p> <p>2. To introduce elements of internationally accepted legal practices into the traditional Shariat system of law in Afghanistan.</p> | <p>Conditions that will indicate purpose has been achieved: End of project status.</p> | | <p>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</p> |

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PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY _____ to FY _____

Project Title & Number: National Development Training Program

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|--|---|-----------------------|--|
| <p>Outputs:</p> <p>1. To develop a cadre of trainer managers and economic analysts for economic development Ministries as well as members of planning and programming staffs of ancillary Ministries.</p> <p>3. To develop a cadre of legalists capable of bridging the gap between accepted international legal practices and the traditional Shariat law of Afghanistan.</p> | <p>Magnitude of Outputs:</p> <p>Total 175 Trained Analysts</p> <p>30 Ministry of Finance</p> <p>30 Ministry of Planning, Budget and Prime Ministry</p> <p>10 Agriculture</p> <p>10 Industry</p> <p>10 Commerce</p> <p>10 Interior</p> <p>10 Information and Culture</p> <p>5 Foreign Affairs</p> <p>Total 60</p> <p>Ministry of Justice (Prosec)</p> <p>Ministry of Justice (Judiciary)</p> <p>Faculty of Law K. U. (Huqoq)</p> <p>Faculty of Law K. U. (Shariat)</p> | | <p>Assumptions for achieving outputs:</p> <p>Conditional of finding sufficient number of qualified candidates on a timely basis.</p> |

PROJECT DESIGN SUMMARY

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

From FY _____ to FY _____

Project Title & Number: National Development Training Program

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS | MEANS OF VERIFICATION | IMPORTANT ASSUMPTIONS |
|--|--|-----------------------|--|
| <p>Inputs:</p> <p><u>USG:</u> Managerial Training - 20-25 participants annually for \$350,000</p> <p>Legal Training - 9 participants annually for \$250,000</p> <p><u>G.O.A.</u> The Government of Afghanistan will nominate candidates who fully meet the requirements for each training position. These candidates will continue to receive their salaries while in training providing the period of training does not exceed twelve months. In addition they will continue to receive their salaries during pre-departure preparation including intensive language training. That portion of international travel to and from the country of training which is on an Ariana air route will be paid for by the GOA.</p> | <p>Implementation Target (Type and Quantity)</p> | | <p>Assumptions for providing inputs:</p> |

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STAFF PAPER
FOR THE
DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL'S REVIEW
OF
POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING
MANAGEMENT SUB-PROJECT (110.3)

APRIL 19, 1974

MANAGEMENT SUB-PROJECT 110.3

I. SUB-PROJECT JUSTIFICATION

The Mission's PROP for the sub-project dated January 1973 states that the key constraints to the delivery of general health and family planning services are: (1) "Poor administrative methods and procedures within the NPH; (2) A serious lack of trained administrative personnel and systems of training; and (3) A lack of basic statistical data, and systems of collection upon which realistic planning can be based." (PROP, p. 3). It was the judgement of the Mission that the GOA would be unable to mount or support the expansion of the basic health system to the woles-wall level unless steps were taken by the Government, with outside assistance, to remove these constraints. AID/W agreed with this judgment and the PROP was approved.

With the Mission's own in-house capability and since the arrival of the Management Science for Health team in the summer of 1973 the above mentioned constraints have been explored and analyzed in greater detail. If anything, the PROP seriously understated the management problems in the Ministry of Public Health particularly as they relate to the development, control, support and backstopping of the Basic Health Centres (BHCs) in the field. The BHCs are understaffed with only partially qualified personnel. Logistics systems either do not exist or operate spasmodically to supply the BHCs with drugs. No contraceptives have been distributed to the field. The BHCs are for all practical purposes unsupervised at either the provincial level or by the MPF. Data concerning the case loads, supply needs and staffing needs of the BHCs is practically non-existent. Communications between the field and the NPH are irregular and fragmentary.

In summary, there appears to be very strong need to address these basic "management" problems if the overall project purpose of delivering family planning services to the country is to be achieved.

II. SUMMARY OF THE SUB-PROJECT DESIGN

Over the past several months the Population Division and the Program Office with the help of the MSH team have been attempting to finalize the sub-project's design. Starting with the original PROP, several logical frameworks have been developed with each succeeding edition becoming gradually more specific. These sporadic deliberations were greatly aided by the recent publication of the draft MSE workplan. Using the workplan as base, the scope of work was narrowed and targets and benchmarks for joint USAID (including MSH) and Ministry progress were established. This scope and

the attendant targets are now being negotiated with the Ministry. Therefore, the statements of the sub-project purpose and outputs, with their complementary indicators, given below are necessarily tentative.

A. Sub-Project Purpose

To create and install effective management, personnel and logistics systems for rural and family health services delivered through the Basic Health System.

B. Conditions that will indicate sub-project purpose has been achieved. End of sub-project status.

1. Trained paramedical personnel staff 95% of the BHCs by the end of 1978.
2. BHCs supervised by regional medical teams.
3. Drugs and contraceptives regularly delivered to 95% of the BHCs by 9/75.
4. Management control and data systems fully operational between 95% of the BHCs and the Ministry by 1/78.

(Note: other indicators may be developed as the result of the current negotiations with the Ministry.)

C. Outputs and Targets

1. Trained staff in place in 95% of BHCs by end of 1976.
 - a. Reports on PHC staffing levels available to MPE by 7/74.
 - b. Personnel locator system installed by 10/74.
 - c. Staff recruited for language competence and geographical affinity by 11/74.
 - d. Female ANMs recruited for service in areas where BHCs established or will be established (11/74).
 - e. MPH training office established for pre and in-service training by June 1975.
 - f. Job descriptions, work programs and simple diagnostic manuals tested by September 1974 and installed in BHCs by May 1975.
2. BHC Supervision
 - a. Regional supervisory teams make regular visits to all BHCs by the end of 1974.
(Note: other indicators to be established).

3. Regular supply of drugs and contraceptives to 95% of PHCs by 9/75.
 - a. Standard stock lists revised by 5/74.
 - b. Trained central warehousemen (6) by 5/74.
 - c. Central warehouse completed and stocked by 10/74.
 - d. Transport system linking MPH to BHCs working by 6/75.
 - e. 30 day turnaround time from BHC requisition of contraceptive supplies to BHCs by 9/75.

4. Management control and data systems operational between 95% of BHCs and MPH by 1/76.
 - a. Collect available BHC data by 6/74.
 - b. Determine Basic Health System data needs by 9/74.
 - c. Design and pretest BHC reports format by 1/75.
 - d. MPH decision to implement format by 3/75.
 - e. Train BHC personnel and MPH statistical personnel in format use by 6/75.
 - f. Full implementation of control/data system by 1/76.

5. Exploration of generic drug procurement
 - a. Select most useful drug in each class for BHC list.
 - b. Develop consolidated bidding procedures for drugs.
 - c. Consider feasibility of in-country production selected generic drugs.

6. Explore use of pharmacies to extend family planning services and develop guidelines for use of drugs and contraceptives.

III. SUMMARY OF PROJECT PROGRESS

Since this sub-project has only been underway for slightly more than six months there is no hard evidence available against which progress could be assessed. The MSH team has spent these initial months, as was originally planned in the PROP and approved by AID/W, analyzing the Ministry's management, logistical, personnel and data systems and, as importantly, establishing their credentials with the Ministry's leadership. By all accounts, the Ministry appears to have accepted the MSH team quite readily as evidenced by the Ministry's haste in asking for MSH advice on budgetary matters and advice on generic drugs, which are in addition to the key areas mentioned above.

The current MSH team will be strengthened in the near future with the arrival of a Public Health Physician and, at a later date, by another Management Analyst. It is recognized, however, that some fraction of the MSH team's time-- perhaps as much as 15 or 20% -- will be devoted to subject areas which are not directly related to the expansion of the basic health system and the delivery of health and family planning services. Work on the overall organization of the Ministry and the overall formulation of the development and ordinary budgets may fall in this category.

While an evaluation of project progress is not possible at this writing, it will be possible to conduct an evaluation in the coming year by assessing the progress of the Ministry toward the targets established in Section II.

IV. THE NEW LEGISLATION AND GOA PRIORITIES

The Mission's Population/Family Planning project falls within Category II of Development Assistance, "Population Planning and Health." Projects, which aim to deliver family planning services especially through "low-cost" systems to the mass of people in an underdeveloped country, assume a very high priority within the new Congressional mandate. Viewed as a discrete entity (which it is not) the Management sub-project does not in and of itself deliver direct benefits to the "poorest majority". However, as stated in all population documentation, the management sub-project is one component of the whole family planning project (110) which will over time reach the poorest majority. The management project has direct links to 110.4, Auxiliary Nurse Midwives and to 110.1 under which contraceptives and supervisory vehicles are provided. The linkage to 110.2, DEMO/KAP is indeterminate at the moment but sub-projects are complementary in terms of information gathering and utilization.

The Mission has proposed to AID/W assistance to the basic health system in the FY '75 CP -- for which preliminary approval has been received -- but has not, as yet, broached the subject with the Ministry. This proposed project would address the remaining key constraint of the GOA's general lack of budgetary resources for capital investment and staff expansion. If and when the Ministry undertakes the expansion of the basic health system as planned in the draft Fourth Plan, all of the linkages will be in place for the delivery of "direct benefits to the poorest majority."

The draft Fourth Five Year Plan states the GOA's intention to rapidly expand the basic health system, i.e. to construct and staff 178 basic health centers by the end of the Plan. It also incorporates "family health" into the range of services to be provided to the public through the basic health system. The GOA's commitment to these two goals, as articulated by the

present Minister of Health, is equivocal. On the one hand, it seems that the Ministry would like to fulfill the Fourth Plan in terms of construction. On the other, the Minister's commitment to the incorporation of family planning into the basic services is either unclear or perhaps negative. There are indications that the MPH is re-evaluating their capability to implement on the original Fourth Plan time table. The Minister appears to be more committed to the delivery of curative services under the leadership of doctors than he is to preventive services including family planning and to use of paramedicals. In another part of the government, the Ministry of Planning, there appears to be considerable interest in constructing basic health centers. If true, this interest would match national policy as articulated by President Daoud in his Jeshyn Day speech.

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FINANCIAL HISTORY
PROJECT 110, 3. FAMILY PLANNING (MANAGEMENT)
Inception through March 31, 1974

| FY FUNDED | MAN-MONTHS PARTICIPANTS | FUNDING PERIOD | | OBLIGATIONS (1) | DISBURSEMENTS (2) | DISBURSEMENTS PLUS ACCRUED | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|----------------|------|--------------------|----------------------|----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|--|
| | | FROM | TO | | | OBLIGATIONS (3)=(1)-(2) | EXPENDITURES (4) | PIPELINE (5)=(1)-(4) | |
| Technical Services Contracts: | | | | | | | | | |
| | Management Sciences for Health, Inc. Consultants to Ministry of Health | | | | | | | | |
| FY-73 | | 7/73 | 7/74 | \$ 325,000* | \$ 73,864 | \$ 251,136 | \$ 236,122 | \$ 88,878 | |
| Commodities: | | | | | | | | | |
| | Miscellaneous Commodities under MSH contract | | | | | | | | |
| FY-73 | | 7/73 | 7/74 | 78,000* | 4,817 | 73,183 | 15,638 | 62,362 | |
| Sub Project Total | | | | \$ 403,000 | \$ 78,681 | \$ 324,319 | \$ 251,760 | \$ 151,240 | |

* MSH Contract
 Funding \$ 403,000
 Contract 370,000
 Uncommitted \$ 33,000

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DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL
MEETING NOTES

Date and Place: April 23, 1974, Conference Room

Purpose: Project Review: P/FP - Management, project 110.3

Participants: DAC Members:

Mr. Frederick H. Sligh, DD and Chairman
Dr. Frank Denton, AD/DP
Mr. John Standish, CDE
Mr. Gary Towery, (A) CO

Others:

Miss Grace Langley, POP
Mr. Richard Scott, DP
Mr. Charles Johnson, DP

A staff paper on the subject project was distributed prior to the meeting and is attached to these notes.

At Fred Sligh's invitation, Grace Langley made a few introductory remarks: the Ministry of Public Health's (MPH) support systems were and are in such disarray that the USAID felt the overall management problem had to be addressed in the project if we were to succeed in delivering family planning (FP) services to the people. If there is a problem, it is that MPH wants Management Sciences for Health (MSH) to do too much. This is, on the other hand, a fine tribute to the speed with which MSH has become accepted in the Ministry. The Mission has narrowed the scope of work proposed by MSH in its plan and has established

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targets and dates for the installation of support systems in the ProAg now under discussion. MPH wants help with their budget and generic drugs, but it is less clear what they want for training and planning. In any event, Grace Langley thought there was some agreement on the priority areas of developing personnel and logistics systems to support the basic health system.

Grace explained that MSH is a health consulting firm of physicians with business administration experience who service AID projects, primarily. AID/W is also considering MSH for a project to analyze rural health systems in several countries. MSH is small and has a good reputation. Grace said that given the magnitude of work before the contractor, the Mission should support the addition of a fifth member to the team. This person would specialize in developing data/information systems for the basic health system. (Note: currently, there are three analysts in-country and a public health physician is due to arrive shortly.)

Fred Sligh asked if by accelerating the project, i. e., adding another team member, would we not run the risk of overleading the Ministry. Grace thought that this would not be the case since each team member works in a different department, but that it bore watching.

John Standish asked if we were duplicating the work of any other donor. Grace replied that we weren't because we had the specific interest in

population in every sub-project activity whereas other donors, like WHO and UNICEF, were interested in general health assistance.

Gary Towery noted that according to the staff paper 15% of the contractor's time would probably be devoted to monocritical tasks and asked if this wasn't too high. Frank Denton opined that 80-85% efficiency was very high by any standard and in these terms was a small quid pro quo to make the Ministry happy.

Gary Towery asked if MSH had recommended a generic drug scheme to the Ministry. Grace replied that they were working on generic drugs at the Minister's request, but that it was a terribly good idea for the reason that Afghanistan spends about \$6 million a year on drugs that could be purchased for 5 or 600,000.

Fred Sligh asked what was happening with the FY 1974 ProAg. Grace said that she had given a draft to three officials and that they would be consulting on it before they presented it to the Minister. The ProAg is in a new form with specific targets and dates which address basic MPH goals. There are also blank sections left purposely to invite USA contributions in what we hope will be a collaborative contract.

Fred Sligh said it was his view that MSH was doing very well but, he asked, what is the attitude in the Ministry toward FP? Grace said

that she had been feeling shaky about the Minister's attitude for quite a while but on another level (i. e., MPH Nursing Division taking over ANM training, the visit of Dr. Seraz, Chief of Family Health to Mr. Brown, etc.) she thought things were going fairly well. She also said that she had no doubt that the Minister is interested in the management sub-project but he isn't very interested in family planning. Fred Sligh noted that the ProAg's specificity would force both the Minister's attention to FP and commitment, if they signed. Frank Denton said this was the intention and that for FY 1975 we plan to draft one umbrella ProAg covering all sub-projects (except possibly SUNY's Demographic work) with even more explicit targets and commitments.

There ensued a philosophic discussion on the relationships of the Muslim religion, Islamic law, and Afghan culture to FP. Grace noted that success is certainly not guaranteed but that we ought to try as hard as we can. It was noted that we have a Congressional mandate to proceed as best we can: the family planning imperative is the one exception to the collaborative style. Dick Scott said that not all Afghan women want to be perpetually pregnant for 30-35 years for which they are fertile and that, therefore, there is a market for family planning if we can devise ways to break through the cultural and institutional barriers. Grace Langley agreed. She said that we must proceed because Afghanistan's resources

are not expandable and they may be unwittingly practicing murder by breeding, if one considers the very high mother and infant mortality rates.

Gary Towery said that he didn't think Afghans perceive they have a population problem. Afghanistan has wide open spaces; it isn't like India where the crush of people hit one in the face. Therefore, if they don't want family planning we ought to proceed with general health services/even though, Gary said, this would probably cause a population increase. Frank Denton said that population growth is not just a macro problem. It could be the case that individuals desire smaller families but have no means to accomplish this. Furthermore, it is not clear that improved health services without family planning is a social good.

Fred Sligh expressed the consensus of the DAC members present that the project is well designed, the MSH team is doing very well, and that the Mission ought to press on with the ProAg. It was also agreed that there ought to be another DAC review of the project in September - October to assess progress toward the ProAg targets.

STAFF PAPER
FOR THE
DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL'S REVIEW
OF
POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING
AUXILIARY NURSE-MIDWIFE PROJECT (110.4)

APRIL 29, 1974

AUXILIARY NURSE-MIDWIFE PROJECT (110.4)

i. Project Justification

The existing basic health centers (BHC) and their planned expansion over the country has been identified as a health system through which family planning services may be delivered. The BHC system is to include Family Health Services (MCH and FP) in each center. But there is a general absence of female health workers available for the clinics and none trained in MCH and FP functions. Cultural constraints demand that FP services be delivered to Afghan women by female health workers.

Since most BHC's are located in rural areas, there are cultural problems of having female health workers (usually young and single) available for placement unless they have family ties in the immediate area. At first, recruitment focused on women trainees from rural areas to which they would return after attending the ANM school.

There were no training facilities available for this ANM group. It was necessary to develop a physical plant, faculty, curriculum and equipment.

The BHC system and out-patient services of hospitals would need approximately 200 ANM's assuming one ANM per institution. With an increasing work load, two or more might be needed. Attrition among these young women is expected to be high. Plans called for development of three schools (Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif) each with a faculty of 12 and a total output of students set at 125/year.

The development of three schools, widely separated, requires the services of more than one advisor. A contract with a U.S. university for provision of advisors, backstopping services, and some training was agreed upon. This contract is being negotiated.

The logic of recruiting rural women to be trained as ANM's with a strong element of FP, and then returned home to work in area BHCs as a channel for delivery of FP services to the rural women of Afghanistan remains valid. The cultural constraints noted are not likely to change in the foreseeable future.

2. Project Design

The following is the original project design as stated in the logical framework of the PROP which received Washington approval in April, 1973.

| NARRATIVE SUMMARY | OBJECTIVELY VERIFIABLE INDICATORS |
|---|--|
| Program or Sector Goal: | Measures of Goal Achievement: |
| Prevent population growth from outstripping Afghanistan's potential economic development. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. The trend of birth rates as related to death rates.2. The existence of a GOA policy on population/family planning. |
| Project Purposes: | Conditions Expected at End of Project: |
| Develop an institutional capability within the MPH to train auxiliary nurse midwives to provide family planning services in the rural areas of Afghanistan. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Family Planning services available to 178 basic health clinics and 100 health sub-centers by 1976.2. A minimum of one ANM assigned to each basic health clinic and sub-health center.3. Three ANM schools.4. Qualified training staff in the ANM schools with functional curriculum and supporting training materials.5. A functional system of feedback from the field to the training institutions. |
| Output: | Magnitude of Output: |
| <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. 3 training institutions in nurse midwifery.2. Family planning curriculum3. Trained teaching staff4. Trained ANMs in position in basic health clinics. | <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Three ANM regional schools.2. One ANM curriculum with supporting texts.3. 36 trained ANM teachers.4. 500 ANM graduates |

3. Progress

The MPH recognizes the need for different categories of health workers; their recruitment, training, and placement.

In terms of outputs the following are verifiable accomplishments of the ANM project after one year of a planned five year project:

1. One operating school in Kabul with:
 - a. staff
 - b. students
 - c. curriculum
 - d. texts
 - e. teaching equipment
2. One class of 45 students graduated October 1973 of which 28 are in BHCs.
3. Second class of 33 rural students in session
4. New curriculum being developed with widespread participation of interested groups
5. Equipment for additional schools has arrived
6. Three months teacher training workshop conducted in addition to the daily advisor to teacher contact.

Following the early statement that ANM training to get family health services to women and children was GOA priority, every subsequent decision of the Ministry has seemed to disregard that commitment. The MPE and Population Division are engaged in a joint review of the project. Our objective is a re-affirmation of the project purpose and achieving an overview of the basic requirements of the project.

Many of the difficulties encountered in the ANM project are inherent in the GOA bureaucracy. Some of these are: the lack of clearly defined goals (lack of clear definition of jobs of ANM's); lack of planning (for field experience); MPH willingness to alter recruitment and placement policies (present class has some urban students); lack of financial support; and division of responsibility for school among Curative Medicine, Preventive Medicine, Nursing Division, and Public Health Institute.

As noted, most of these problems stem from the bureaucratic structure and administrative problems of the MPH. Elements of the MSH team and UNICEF projects are working directly or indirectly to remedy some of these problems which do not directly come under ANM project responsibility but do directly affect project results.

Undoubtedly, some of the ambivalence of the MPH toward this project relates to the position of women in Afghanistan. A women Director of Nursing or school principal does not get an adequate hearing within the MPH.

4. Legislation and GOA Priorities

(a) The new legislation calls for delivery of benefits to the poor. Probably 70-90% of the population, predominantly rural, would fall into this category. The BFC system is intended to take health and family planning services deep into rural areas which contain the majority of the population and which have until now been generally ignored. These ANM's are essential for the BFC system if the proposed services are to be provided. The ANM project supplies trained female rural workers to

enable the BHC system to provide Family Health services to this group of people. The ANM is basic to any attempt at delivering FP services to Afghan women.

(b) It is in the area of trained female workers for the BHC system that the interests of AID and the GOA are congruent. AID is interested in a system of contraceptive services. The GOA wishes to extend health services but has no trained female workers to reach the female population.

There remains the main question of GOA commitment to a major effort in delivering FP services to the country. All indicators suggest a general lack of such a commitment. While the logic of our support for the ANM school is valid, present GOA implementation of FP produces a gap between trained personnel and the delivery of FP services; between USAID and MPH goals.

The Mission faced this dichotomy before but must address the question periodically. Trained ANMs are a necessity for family planning services. The GOA wants trained ANMs to be able to extend health care to women and children. Our strategy is to assist with the training of female paramedics as one building block to an effective family planning program, knowing full well that we must continue to educate and, indeed, motivate the MPH to want a sturdy contraceptive service as part of their health services.

FINANCIAL HISTORY
PROJECT 110.4, FAMILY PLANNING (AUXILIARY NURSE MIDWIFE TRAINING)
Inception through MARCH 31, 1974

| | FY FUNDED | MAN-MONTHS PARTICIPANTS | FUNDING PERIOD | | OBLIGATION (1) | DISBURSEMENTS (2) | UNLIQUIDATED OBLIGATIONS (3)=(1)-(2) | DISBURSEMENTS PLUS ACCRUED | PIPELINE (5)=(1)-(4) |
|--|-----------|-------------------------|----------------|----|----------------|-------------------|--------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| | | | FROM | TO | | | | EXPENDITURS (4) | |
| U.S. Direct-Hire Personnel Salaries and Support Costs | FY-74 | | | | \$ 30,735 | \$ 19,974 | \$ 10,761 | \$ 29,790 | \$ 945 |
| Technical Services Contracts: PIO/T for advisory Services in midwife training to the Ministry of Health | FY-73 | | | | 122,750 | - | 122,750 | - | 122,750 |
| Participants: To be funded under ANMT contract | FY-73 | 18 | | | 15,000 | - | 15,000 | - | 15,000 |
| Commodities: To be funded under ANMT contract | FY-73 | | | | 1,250 | - | 1,250 | - | 1,250 |
| 6 vehicles and spare parts | FY-73-74 | | | | 41,643 | - | 41,643 | - | 41,643 |
| Construction materials for Nurse-Midwife School | FY-73 | | | | 200,000 | - | 200,000 | - | 200,000 |
| TOTAL | | | | | 242,893 | - | 242,893 | - | 242,893 |
| Other Costs: | FY-74 | | | | 78 | 78 | -0- | 78 | -0- |
| Sub Project Totals | | | | | \$ 411,456 | \$ 20,052 | \$ 391,404 | \$ 29,868 | \$ 381,588 |

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DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL

Meeting Notes

DATE: April 29, 1974

PLACE: Director's Conference Room

PURPOSE: Review of the Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife Project (110.4)

PARTICIPANTS: DAC Members:

Fred H. Sligh, DD, Chairman
 Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
 John Standish, CDE
 F. Gary Towery, A/CO

Others:

Charles W. Johnson, DP
 Richard B. Scott, DP
 Dr. Thomas, POP
 Grace Langley, POP
 Margaret Racz, POP

Papers attached to these notes:

Staff Paper
 Financial History

OPENING REMARKS

Mr. Sligh opened the meeting stating that this review would be primarily for information purposes and that Grace Langley would make pertinent comments concerning the project's activities. The questions, comments and observations are summarized below.

Grace Langley

The purpose of this project is to train sufficient numbers of female paramedicals (Auxiliary Nurse-Midwives) to provide family planning services through the basic health centers. This will be accomplished by the development of an institutional capability which will consist of ANM schools in Kabul, Kandahar (planned) and Mazar-i-Sharif (planned). The MPH is predicting that the construction of the schools will be completed by September 1975. The Kabul ANM school is now operating. The first class of 45 ANMs was graduated in October 1973 and a second class of 44 is now in training. Approximately 10% of the current class consist of students that come from Kabul.

The Kabul school is operating in temporary quarters. Construction of a permanent training facility is underway by the MPH to which AID has agreed to provide \$200,000 for imported building materials, equipment and furnishings used in the building. In addition, AID has also agreed to provide one nurse education advisor and two other advisors who will provide assistance to the ANM schools and develop curriculum and teaching materials.

Responsibility for the recruitment, training and placement of ANMs in the basic health system is diffused within MPH.

PROPOSED USE OF KANDAHAR CAMP AS AN ANM SCHOOL

Since the construction of the ANM school planned for Kandahar has not been proposed USAID might consider the feasibility of using the former Kandahar USAID camp facility which was turned over to UNDP as a facility for the ANM school.

Gary Towery

The Kandahar camp facility was turned over last year by USAID to UNDP. Our agreement transferred responsibility for this facility (except for a small portion retained by USAID) to UNDP with the concurrence of the Government of Afghanistan. Any future use of this facility will have to be decided between UNDP and the Government of Afghanistan.

ANM GRADUATES

Fred Sligh

Will there be a danger of too many ANMs when all three schools start graduating ANMs each year? Is it feasible that such a situation could develop?

Grace Langley

We don't really feel that an over production of ANM graduates will be a problem when all three ANM schools are operational. There will always be a certain amount of attrition in the number of working ANM graduates for various reasons. The problems will be more in the area of trying to find a sufficient number of girls to train and work as ANMs in those areas where there is a shortage of elementary schools that teach up through the sixth standard.

Margaret Racz

When all three schools are operational we can expect approximately 125 graduates each year.

ANM TRAINING COST

Dr. Denton

What does it cost to train each ANM?

Margaret Bacz

Since the Kabul ANM school has never had an approved budget we do not have any figures on training costs.

ANM FIELD PROBLEMS

Chuck Johnson

A report recently published by UNICEF highlighted some of the problems that the ANMs were experiencing in the field. Basically these problems are:

1. The lack of a clear job description for the ANMs.
2. ANMs not being regularly paid.
3. The ANMs lack of status.
4. The ANMs do not have authority to provide the services for which they were trained.
5. The medical kits that were issued to the ANM graduates were incomplete.
6. The ANM graduates have not had access to contraceptives.

The point is that the Mission must focus on "end use" - ways and means to assure proper placement and support of ANMs so they may ultimately provide FP services, rather than on just training. The end use of ANMs is a proper subject for bilateral agreement. This concern dovetails with work which will be done by MSH.

Margaret Racz

Some of the problems described are inherent in the current situation because the ANM graduates are not eligible for civil service status. Their employment status is simply on a contract basis with the Government of Afghanistan. The Ministry of Health has requested the Ministry of Justice to make an exception to the civil service rule for the ANMs.

The problem of not being paid is not just a problem that is limited to ANMs but it is also a problem for the staff employees of the ANM school in Kabul. Many of these employees have not been paid since the first of the year.

New job descriptions for ANM are now being addressed and consequently they should become more defined and clear in the near future.

PROPOSED DIALOGUE WITH MINISTRY OF HEALTH

Fred Sligh

Since there is an apparent lack of understanding in the Ministry of Health of how USAID Family Planning sub-projects are inter-related, maybe, we should initiate talks with the Minister of Health in an effort to gain his understanding of these inter-relationships.

Grace Langley

POP now has a number of discussions going simultaneously at the Ministry of Health. Because of these discussions it would not be an appropriate time to undertake such a broad ranging discussion. In any event, the new FY 75 Pro Ag, when negotiated, will cover all of the sub-projects in one coherent document.

IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS

Fred Sligh

What actions could USAID perform to assist in the implementation of this project?

Grace Langley

The basic problem is that we don't really have any leverage which we can use to press for action by the Government of Afghanistan. Thus far, we have not reimbursed MPH for construction they have completed. The ANM school in Kabul is currently under construction but we are faced with a problem because the current Pro Ag requires adherence to Reg. I for procurement (the \$200,000 for help in construction, equipment and furnishing the Kabul school).

John Standish

We have discussed the problems posed by Reg. I with Mr. Hager and he has advised that we should try to handle this project on a reimbursable basis.

CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS

1. CDE: prepare a schedule of construction phases which USAID could use as a basis for release of the \$200,000 on a fixed-cost reimbursement basis.
2. DP: prepare a staff paper for the Director's approval proposing the fixed cost reimbursement method and explaining the procedure for utilizing it in implementing the ANM project using the funds already obligated.
3. DP: request AID/W approval to waive Reg. I requirement now in the Pro Ag and concurrence to use the cost reimbursement method. The staff paper (2, above) will be the Mission's support for the requested AID/W approval.
5. DD: schedule a DAC review for this sub-project in the late Summer or early Fall.

Grace E. Langley, Chief, Population Division
USAID/Afghanistan

May 28, 1974

Vincent W. Brown, Director
USAID/Afghanistan

(s) Vincent W. Brown
Auxiliary Nurse-Midwife (ANM) Project (110.4)

I have reviewed the results of the April 29, 1974 Director's Advisory Council review of this sub-project and concur in the conclusion/recommendations stated on Page 6 of the Meeting Notes.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)

5/1 4-1
2:00

PRELIMINARY PROJECT PROPOSAL (PPP)

Nutrition

I. Background

Nutritional investments have their greatest impact when directed to infants 6-36 months old and their lactating mothers. Between the third trimester of pregnancy and 36 months, the individual's physical and mental potential is set so far as nonhereditary factors are concerned. Severe malnutrition during this period results in irreparable physical and mental damage. Good nutrient intake by this target group will reduce infant mortality and morbidity. We have strong evidence that mortality up to five years of age is at least 80% in Afghanistan. The principal cause of this is malnutrition and filth. A nutrition/personal hygiene program could reduce this death rate substantially.

The lactating mother is included in this target group not only to support the new born, but also to maintain her vitality for subsequent pregnancies. Feeding the lactating mother will reduce infant mortality which ultimately is associated with reduced population growth.

"Reductions in the mortality rate are part of the solution (to the population problem), rather than a cause, of the problem. Mortality rates tend to vary inversely with levels of consumption and production. Moreover, reductions in mortality seem to be prerequisites for compensating reductions in fertility to achieve the desired family size... Of course, the desired demographic changes are no more automatic than the desired economic changes. The systematic extension of information and of facilities favoring the use of acceptable methods of regulating family size is the appropriate response to spontaneous motivation to limit family size.... Health measures and family planning, as integral parts of the complex process of modernization, can accelerate and must complete the economic and demographic transition from low to high levels of production and consumption, and from high to low levels of mortality and fertility." (Frederickson, Harald-
Feedbacks in Economic and Demographic Transition-SCIENCE,
Vol 166, November 14, 1969, p 837)*

*Summaries of this and four other articles on the subject are attached. Seven complete articles on the subject are available in Food for Peace for those interested.

Inevitably, there is a time lag between the commencement of increased infant survival and the population's recognition of the fact. In this context, family planning programs make an additional contribution by encouraging and hastening fewer pregnancies. Nutritional programs are neither a substitute for nor an alternative to family planning programs and Afghanistan's nutrition program should, if possible, be conducted in conjunction with its family planning program.

In Afghanistan, little has been done up to now to improve nutrition of the target group. Exceptions are, an attempted PL 480 Title II feeding program in 1981, and more recently attempts to develop a nutrition recovery unit, the formation of a national high nutrition council and a national nutrition policy. Each of these attempts failed for various reasons which were carefully noted in the course of developing this nutrition proposal.

Very little is known about the nutritional status of Afghanistan's population with the notable exception of the work by Medical Assistance Programs (MAP, Inc.) and particularly a document recently prepared by June-Ann Clarke (PhD) entitled "Nutritional Status in the Hazarajat". Although limited in its geographic coverage, this work clearly documents infant and child mortality to age five exceeding 50% and other indicators of protein/calorie malnutrition among 1000 subjects in the Hazarajat area. Vitamin A highlighted the group's nutritional deficiencies which also included ascorbic acid and calcium.

The single most striking indicator of malnutrition among the target group is the high incidence of mortality. This loss to the nation's development effort applies not only to mortality per se, but also to the inferior health of the survivors. Particularly tragic are the consequences of inferior mental development resulting from malnutrition, the causes for which are set from the third trimester of pregnancy up to age two.

What are the causes of this high infant mortality? The high birth-high infant death pattern is a familiar picture throughout the underdeveloped world. The infant remains generally healthy throughout the first 4-5 months after birth, during which time it is totally dependent upon breast milk, which satisfies its nutritional requirements. Beyond 4-6 months, infant physiology requires supplementation of breast milk. This weaning process is completed at different times according to cultural behavior, but usually by 18 months.

The reduction of breast milk for any reason (and an inadequate substitute for breast milk) leads to a likely two-phased condition generally referred to as protein/calorie malnutrition, the most serious consequences of which are marasmus and kwashiorkor.

Marasmus. The child suffers from a general lack of food; there is not a great imbalance of calories and protein, but with adequate calories the child literally eats up his (protein) muscle tissue (and thereafter other vital organs composed of protein) to provide protein for the brain; the child stays alive but gets smaller and smaller.

Kwashiorkor. Here, infection is superimposed on a marasmic child; the child needs more protein to fight the infection; the ratio of calories (sugar) to protein favors calories (he is also probably on a sugar/water diet), his blood sugar is high; consequently, the child cannot call upon sufficient protein and he quickly perishes.

This brief statement on the interaction of malnutrition and infection, together with a later statement on Vitamin A, is basic to the specific project components which are described hereafter.

II. Project Purposes and Strategy - General

A good beginning to improving the nutritional status of the target group in Afghanistan will have been made if five years from now the following has been accomplished:

A. A nutrition cell perhaps in the form of a nutrition institute or a food certification and testing laboratory is established.

B. The development of a data base collection and interpretation unit is started where the receipt, correlation, and planning on the basis of nationwide vital statistics is begun.

C. A substantial (measurable) reduction in infant mortality has occurred; increased receptivity to family planning and the use of weaning food is apparent.

D. Education about matters related to nutrition is a part of formal and nonformal education systems.

E. Agricultural policies are directed to the qualitative aspects of food production.

The general objectives of this proposed nutrition program are:

A. Affect a substantial (demonstrable) reduction of malnutrition and infection (measured by a reduction in infant mortality) which are the two major infant killers and debilitators in the Afghan village.

B. Achieve this change through fortification programs and increased use of improved weaning foods via intensive, full time, year round, intimate and persistent intervention of a resident, native, village woman turned village health agent; thereby

C. Promote an increased receptivity and acceptance of offers by the village health agent to the practice of family planning.

D. Implement the project through a village by contiguous village implementation of nutrition, personal hygiene, and family planning projects.

E. Develop a market demand for soy and gossypol-free cotton-seed meal.

Specific criteria influencing project design and implementation are:

A. The Republic of Afghanistan desires and will actively support a nutrition program.

B. The research, planning, and implementation phases of such a program will exploit the inherent relationship of nutrition to programs of population, health, and agriculture.

C. The improved nutrition package will be developed from indigenous resources to the extent possible; it will not empty the traditional PL 480 Title II commodity imports.

D. The nutrition program which emerges will be the result of realistic developmental planning. One characteristic of such planning will be to assure, so far as is humanly possible, continuation of the program after withdrawal of foreign assistance.

The strategy to accomplish the following five specific projects is as follows:

A. The projects selected are relatively simple; the managerial resources to staff them are within sight. The required level of managerial talent is not beyond reach for the village health agent to instruct in the use of weaning food and malaria/smallpox control teams to distribute Vitamin A on a semi-annual basis.

B. Responsibility for project implementation falls in more than one Afghan bureaucracy, hence, several projects can proceed concurrently.

C. Weaning food components will come (largely) from indigenous resources.

D. No new physical plant is required; we will rely on existing basic health centers, sub-centers, family planning units, etc.

E. We should go slow, proceed with great care, and avoid a repetition of past failures.

F. Except for weaning food, the projects require little or no change in human behavior (fortification of tea with iodine and Vitamin A; oral administration of semi-annual Vitamin A; use of improved soy and cottonseed).

G. Except for improved cottonseed, the project gestation period is relatively short and the results dramatic -

(elimination of goiter - 3-5 years)

(achieve adequate Vitamin A levels - 6 months to 1 year)

(recovery from severe malnutrition - 6 months)

H. The foregoing adds up to a program which has a reasonable chance of success; will develop GOA confidence and capacity in the nutrition field, and will lay groundwork for GOA to embark on more sophisticated nutrition projects in future years.

PROJECT #1
VITAMIN A SUPPLEMENTATION

I. Background.

How Vitamin A occurs in nature. Food sources of retinol Vitamin A (the most effective form) are scarce and very expensive, and consequently they are not consumed in sufficient amounts by the majority of the population. Green leafy and yellow vegetables, the carotene Vitamin A containing foods are more available and less expensive, but in actual practice their consumption is also very low, perhaps because of cultural reasons.

Metabolism. Carotene is much less effective than retinol in terms of Vitamin A activity. Specifically, the carotene found in leafy and colored vegetables must be changed to retinol by the body (2 carotenes = 1 retinol). Furthermore, the intestine absorbs only one half of the carotene. Hence, a recommended daily allowance of effective Vitamin A (retinol) is achieved by consuming four times the requirement in carotene. Studies by Arroyave* in Central America indicated that more than half of the families of those six Central American countries had an inadequate dietary intake and consequently an inadequate serum level of Vitamin A. In Afghanistan, Juno-Ann Clarke** concludes, "In general, the nutritional status of the people of the Hazarajat was adequate with respect to protein, iron, and the B complex vitamins due to high intake of wheat protein combined with milk products. The diet was almost devoid of sources of Vitamin A and ascorbic acid and was low in calcium and total kcalories. This subalimentation of protective nutrients could have resulted in the understature and slow growth rate evidenced by the children. The levels were sufficient, however, to just allow the residents to usually survive once they had passed five years of age."

*Arroyave, Guillermo. Control of hypovitaminosis A (fortification of sugar with retinol palmitate): Progress Report, Division of Physiological Chemistry, Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP).

** Clarke, Juno-Ann, "Nutritional Status in the Hazarajat", Medical Assistance Programs, Inc. (MAP).

Consequences of Vitamin A deficiency. The consequences of Vitamin A deficiency are dramatic:

A. Growth in general and tissue integrity specifically, (particularly epithelial membranes - the mucous lined tissues of mouth, throat, stomach, intestines, and lungs) is markedly impaired. With improved epithelial tissue, resistance to infection is increased.

B. The body systems suffering most from Vitamin A deficiency are:

1. The visual system leading eventually to eye lesions and ultimate blindness; and most important
2. The physiology of nutrient absorption is affected; with a Vitamin A deficiency the utilization of protein is decreased. Conversely, a high intake of Vitamin A enhances protein utilization,
3. It follows that Vitamin A deficiency usually accompanies protein deficiency.

It has been noted that diets of children with severe manifestations of Vitamin A deficiency, had some carotene. It was suggested that carotene absorption, or its conversion to retinol, could be defective. Arroyave* pursued this question and showed how severe protein deficiency can cause metabolic impairments of Vitamin A.

A. Children suffering from kwashiorkor have a very low concentration of Vitamin A.

B. Many of the kwashiorkor children showed a marked increase of Vitamin A in two weeks after treatment for kwashiorkor, even though no Vitamin A had been given in the treatment (mobilization of Vitamin A from liver stores).

*Interrelations Between Protein and Vitamin A and Metabolism, the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Vol. 22, No. 8, August 1969.

The conclusion by Arroyave to these findings was:

A. In severe protein deficiency, Vitamin A does not reach the liver; whatever Vitamin A is stored in the liver does not reach the tissue. Therefore, it is postulated that independent of Vitamin A intake and independent of liver stores, a functional deficiency of Vitamin A may occur in kwashiorkor and other forms of protein deficiency.

B. Children in developing countries, subsisting on a low intake of protein and Vitamin A, but who are not suffering from gross manifestations of kwashiorkor, have slow growth and marked Vitamin A deficiency, even though no cases of severe Vitamin A deficiency are seen. This suggests that subsistence on a diet limited in protein and Vitamin A hinders the development of gross clinical signs of Vitamin A deficiency by decreasing protein metabolism, growth, and thereby the requirement of Vitamin A.

There are two ways to convey Vitamin A. The first possibility is the direct administration of 200,000 I.U. administered by mouth semi-annually at a product cost of two cents per year. The alternative possibility for conveying Vitamin A is through fortification of tea.

Fortification is the practice of increasing the nutrient level beyond that of the original food, and particularly in the Afghan context with its largely barter economy, adding certain nutrients quite foreign to the original product. A basic principle of fortification is that the nutrient to be "fortified" is centrally produced or centrally procured. A basic principle of the fortification process is that levels of fortification are carefully controlled, hence fortification must occur in one or a very few localities such that the influence of quality control is possible.

Tea is imported into Afghanistan; its import points number only two or three; all Afghans drink tea including our target group of infants six months to three years of age.

The technology for tea fortification has been developed, and the contractor, who visited Afghanistan in December, has indicated that he can fortify tea at little or no additional cost to the retail price of tea.

One disadvantage to tea fortification is that all tea drinkers would receive Vitamin A, while our target group is 0-3 years. (Actually, persons older than 3 years suffering blindness or near blindness may be recovered with doses of Vitamin A.) Before considering tea fortification, therefore, the alternative procedure to convey Vitamin A requires consideration.

Vitamin A capsules with effective retention for six months can be distributed exclusively to the target group by malaria, smallpox, and yaws teams which reach every hamlet of the country.

This procedure has been tried in at least four countries, is advantageous because only the target group is served. We have malaria and smallpox teams in Afghanistan.

Before deciding the mode of conveyance for Vitamin A, the feasibility of fortifying tea also with iodine will be considered (see iodization project).

II. Project Purpose

To raise and maintain the serum availability of Vitamin A to adequate levels for the entire target group within one year from commencement of the Vitamin A program. "Adequate levels" are calculated as an availability of:

- A. 2000 International Units of Vitamin A daily, or
- B. 20 mcg per 100 ml of blood by serum analysis.

III. Outputs

To fortify tea with Vitamin A for the entire Afghan population, or to provide semi-annual doses of orally-administered Vitamin A to the target group estimated at one million to the levels stated in (2) above.

IV. Inputs

Alternative #1 - Oral administration of Vitamin A semi-annually

- A. A quick survey to confirm the extent and degree of Vitamin A deficiency and identify several villages for intense "before and after" studies.

B. A "before and after" survey and report on a few selected villages.

C. Preparation of implementation procedures for malaria/smallpox eradication team administration of semi-annual doses of Vitamin A.

D. Purchase one year supply of Vitamin A @ \$0.02 per year x target population.

E. Administration of two doses of Vitamin A to the target group by the malaria/smallpox teams.

Alternative #2 - Fortification of tea with Vitamin A

A. Quick and dirty survey to confirm the extent and degree of Vitamin A deficiency and identify several villages for intense "before and after" studies.

B. A "before and after" survey and report on a few selected villages.

C. Preparation of implementation procedures for tea fortification with Vitamin A.

D. Purchase one year supply of Vitamin A; purchase and install tea blending and fortification equipment.

V. Project Desirability

From the U.S. point of view, AID/W/TAB/N recognizes the critical role of Vitamin A in infant growth and development and consequently is developing a special capacity in Vitamin A. Present plans call for a survey of six countries and subsequently Vitamin A distribution in two of these countries. Whether or not Afghanistan is selected for the survey and the AID/W-supported project implementation, we are encouraged to pursue Vitamin A projects.

From the Afghan viewpoint - in the absence of any dialogue up to now, we cannot say how the GOA would view this project. Several news articles on nutrition have recently appeared, but whether the GOA would have any interest in this project specifically must be determined.

From the viewpoint of the target group - the previously discussed synergistic effects of improved Vitamin A levels with respect to protein-calorie utilization and the interaction of nutrition and infection indicates an inability to quantify the benefits to the target group. Improved A levels will, however, provide in sequence improved nutrient metabolism, improved epithelial mucosa, reduced infection (particularly bronchial infections) and improved physical/mental development.

VI. Feasibility

The fortification of tea with Vitamin A or the direct administration of oral doses semi-annually require technical and administrative capacities judged to be within the capacity of the GOA. One of several advantages to fortification is that once established, including the training of one or two technical personnel, conveyance of nutrients by fortification is automatic. Regarding direct administration, in semi-annual doses, other countries have employed malaria, smallpox, and yaws teams; others have used the Army. All of these conveyers carry the political advantage of expressing and renewing a government's concern for the well-being of its people, particularly those living in the most remote areas.

VII. Fixed Cost Reimbursement Concept

VIII. How to Proceed

Consult with the GOA on the components of their latest nutrition plan and determine whether they have any interest in Vitamin A.

Develop informal discussion groups on nutrition programming in general and the subject of these project proposals specifically.

Distribute copies of brief articles reproduced from professional journals on the subjects dealt with in these project proposals.

Consult with AID/W on the feasibility of iodizing tea.

Depending upon AID/W's response, schedule the general and specific survey teams described above.

PROJECT #2
IODIZATION OF SALT OR TEA

I. Background

Populations of mountainous countries, including Afghanistan, suffer a condition called goiter, which is an enlargement of the thyroid gland resulting from an over-active thyroid. This is controlled and alleviated by adequate intakes of iodine. Cretinism and deaf-mutism are closely related to goiter. One of the most familiar illustrations of fortification is the iodization of salt, which is a long established and exceedingly inexpensive technique to alleviate goiter.

Much of the world's salt is secured by the evaporation of sea water and the recrystallization of brine. Under these conditions, the addition of iodine into the crystal structure is relatively simple.

Mountainous, and particularly land-locked, countries which produce their own salt secure it from salt quarries. In Afghanistan, discussions about the iodization of salt commenced at least 25 years ago. Salt is mined in about seven locations along the northern frontier, from where it is trucked in blocks to retail shops. Thousands of persons earn their living grinding rock salt to powder in thousands of retail locations throughout Afghanistan. Although the multiplicity of salt production points in Afghanistan presents a problem of quality control which probably could be overcome, attempts to iodize salt in the thousands of retail outlets present problems which appear insurmountable. To effectively enforce iodization of salt at the retail level would require nationalization or government control of salt sales. To iodize rock salt requires further investigation, but a preliminary search indicates no worldwide experience in the iodization of rock salt. For this reason, the possibility of iodization of tea is now under investigation in Washington. We should withhold a decision which opts for the direct (oral) administration of Vitamin A until we determine the feasibility of fortifying tea with iodine.

II. Project Purpose

Provide levels of metabolic iodine sufficient to eliminate goiter and control hyperthyroidism in the entire Afghanistan population. This purpose has been achieved in other countries within three years of project start.

III. Outputs

To provide sufficient metabolic iodine via iodization of salt or tea to the Afghanistan population.

IV. Inputs

A. AID/W technician on TDY to Afghanistan to design a scheme for the iodization of rock salt. Assignment would include thorough prior self-briefing on solutions devised in other countries which have iodized salt, as this solution may be useful to Afghanistan.

B. AID/W/TAB/N study and report on the feasibility of fortifying tea with iodine.

C. Purchase and installation of tea fortification equipment and training of Afghan technicians to operate it.

D. Purchase of one year's supply of metabolic iodine.

V. Project Desirability

From the U.S. viewpoint - the cost would be exceedingly low, the benefits highly visible, and the effort would contribute significantly to the U.S. image.

From the Afghans' viewpoint - a long talked about health problem would be resolved.

From the target group's viewpoint - goiter would be eliminated and related cretinism and deaf-mutism would be controlled.

VI. Feasibility

Following the fortification route, the GOA technical and administrative capacity is judged adequate as described under tea fortification with Vitamin A. Following the iodization of rock salt route, the technical and administrative requirements are presently unknown, and likewise GOA capacities in this respect.

VII. Fixed Cost Reimbursement Concept

VIII. How to Proceed

With respect to the Afghans, proceed as described under Vitamin A fortification of tea.

With respect to AID/W, secure a resolution on the feasibility of iodizing tea. Likewise, secure report on worldwide experience in iodizing rock salt if this exists.

PROJECT # 3
WEANING FOOD

I. Background

Preceding sections described how breast milk was adequate up to 4 or 6 months of age, after which time supplements were required to maintain normal growth. Also described were borderline diets where the body eats its own tissue to provide protein for the brain and how, with increasing age there is little or no gain in weight (marasmus). The third set of relationships described how, with the abrupt termination of breast milk or the onset of infection (more likely in an undernourished child requiring increased quantities of protein) the marasmic starvation is suddenly converted to kwashiorkor where proteins availability is inadequate and rapid ensues death.

In the developing world, the onset of these systems stem fundamentally from a mother's inability to provide the kind and particularly the shape and consistency of food required from age 6 months to three years when child can begin to cope with adult diet prepared in adult fashion. There is a need to teach village mothers how to prepare locally available foods which the baby can handle.

This project proposes to develop the use of weaning foods in Afghanistan to help resolve the malnutrition/mortality problem among the target group. To supply weaning food for the entire Afghan target population, however, would require an estimated US \$2.6 million annually, a cost which Afghanistan cannot bear. The proposed project would provide a nearly ideal weaning food to Basic Health Centers and sub-centers, as a medicinal or recuperative resource to be drawn upon in the treatment of malnourished infants. Conveyance of the weaning food will be by a full time resident village health agent who will, with patience and persistence, instruct mothers in the use of weaning foods, personal hygiene, and family planning. Once the malnourished infant has recovered, it is postulated the mother will wish to continue with weaning food which will not be available to her from the medical facility. Instead, the mother will be instructed by the village health agent how to make in her home a weaning food which approximates that provided to her from the medical locker. The recurring cost of weaning food for such a nationwide program might be \$26,000 annually.

A final major point concerns motivation for acceptance of practices. Witnessing the return to good health of an infant which is nearly dead from malnutrition, and maintaining the child's good health by monitoring its development via weight charts, may provide the mother with sufficiently dramatic experiences in the control of her life circumstances to risk another voluntary submission to experiment—that of accepting family planning. The persistent daily contact of mother with village health agent and resultant building of confidence will encourage acceptance of family planning practices.

II. Project Purpose

A. From a group of selected villages, educate mothers in the preparation and use of weaning foods made from indigenous commodities.

B. Reduce mortality and morbidity in the 0-36 mos target group of assisted villagers.

C. Increase the acceptance of family planning techniques among the families of the assisted villages.

D. Produce an instruction manual for use by village health agents in preparation and use of weaning foods and family planning motivation.

III. Outputs

Over a period of one year and among the subjects of the assisted villages:

A. Demonstrate that mothers of 10% of children 6-36 mos accepted weaning food as a part of the child's regular diet.

B. Demonstrate a 5% reduction in mortality in age group 0-36 mos over the control group.

C. Demonstrate a 5% acceptance of family planning over the control group.

D. Produce in final draft for use by the GOA an instruction manual for village health agents on the subject of weaning food preparation in the village and family planning motivation.

IV. Inputs

A. Provide an 18 month supply of U. S. or third country produced weaning food of same composition, quality, and texture as may subsequently be prepared from indigenous foods by GOA at a central point of production for supplying the medical lockers of health centers.

B. Provide a two year supply of height/weight/age charts for the test and control group of participating villages.

C. Develop a plan for the warehousing, transport, resupply, and other logistical components required to supply weaning food to the selected villages.

D. Identify, select, train, and remunerate one village health agent for each participating village and control village.

E. Select participating and control villages and develop base line data on family planning practices and vital statistics for the participating and control villages.

F. Develop an instruction manual for countrywide instruction of village health agents including "before and after" photographs of malnourished babies.

G. Prepare a final report on the weaning food village trials for participating and control villages.

H. On the basis of conclusions in the final report (G above) and contingent upon GOA desires in the matter, prepare a plan and cost estimate for the indigenous production of weaning food by extrusion or other central mechanical means, sufficient to supply medical lockers with ideal weaning food to replace the 18 month supply previously imported.

V. Project Desirability

From the GOA's viewpoint, the project reduces infant mortality and morbidity, makes a beginning at establishing a confidence base among villages that those born will survive, and consequently inaugurates a sequence of events which ultimately will cause villages to prefer smaller families.

From the U.S. viewpoint, the project provides assistance under the first category "Food and Nutrition" to the poor majority; it provides support to and encourages increased acceptance of family planning which is an on-going USAID project; it encourages utilization of Afghan food resources and a reduced dependency on external food resources; it requires Afghan inputs as well as U.S. inputs; it makes a start at develop a data base and vital statistics reporting system.

Benefits accruing to the recipients include reduced mortality and morbidity; new knowledge about health and infant care practices, encouragement to use the basic health center facilities, instruction in the use of weight chart as a tool to measure infants growth progress.

VI. Feasibility

GOA field capacities in terms of village health agents will have to be developed as part of this project. Likewise, a well disciplined logistical system will have to be installed. In the past, the GOA has demonstrated no great strength in either one of these capacities. Furthermore, this project, unlike the others, requires a significant change in human behavior.

These are, admittedly, negative indicators to the successful completion of this project, but a start must be made. The proposed investment is small, and the proposed project is limited to a few villages.

VII. Fixed Cost Reimbursement Concept

VIII. How-to Proceed

Start a dialogue with the GOA as described for all other proposals in this report.

PROJECT # 4
NEW FOODS DEVELOPMENT
Soybean

I. Background

The world's greatest source of vegetable protein is soy, the amino acid balance of which is quite good, and soy meal is free of toxicants.

Soy seed trials were initiated in Afghanistan several years ago. The results of these trials were favorable. Additional seeds are available for trials.

II. Project Purpose

To develop a market in Afghanistan for soybeans; consequently to encourage Afghan farmers to grow soy.

III. Outputs (John Wilson)

IV. Inputs

- A. One two-year Participant Training on Breeding and Management Culture Practices of Soy Cultivation
- B. One two-year Participant Trainee on Soy Processing
- C. Purchase sufficient soy seed to create supplies sufficient for commercial distribution in _____ years
- D. Three 3-month TDY (total 9 man-months) for U.S. training in soy processing technology

Travel 3 x 1310
Per diem 35 x 270

E. U.S. tour by 6 Afghan oil seed processors
for 6 weeks each

Travel 6 x 1310

Per diem 35 x 6 x 40

V. Project Desirability

Project should be desirable from the GOA viewpoint because it will diversify agriculture, increase and diversify food resources, provide a marketable export prior to the period when Afghans learn to consume soy.

From the U.S. viewpoint - project is desirable because it promotes Afghanistan's self-sufficiency in food and reduces Afghan dependency on external food resources.

VI. Feasibility

Afghanistan has the technical capacity and administrative capacity to undertake new seed development. This has been demonstrated in the past.

VII. Fixed Cost Reimbursement Concept

VIII. How to Proceed

Consult with appropriate officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and determine their interest in the project.

PROJECT # 5.
SEED MODIFICATION - COTTONSEED

I. Background

Afghanistan produces between 80 and 100 thousand metric tons of seed and cotton lint annually. The principal seed variety is AKALA 15/17 and 4/42 which was introduced in 1966.

Cottonseed meal has a total protein content and an amino acid balance superior to soy. Unfortunately, in the glanded state it contains a vegetable gland called gossypol, which is indigestible by humans. Animals with two stomachs are able to digest glanded cottonseed, consequently, the principal food use of cottonseed cake throughout the world is animal fodder.

At Texas A&M, a gossypol-free cottonseed has been developed. The procedure to develop gossypol-free cottonseed involves conversion of the existing countries' stock to a glandless variety which requires 8-10 years. Consequently, it is appropriate to start now in the conversion process. A glandless cottonseed ^{expert} is on the staff of Texas A&M. If Afghanistan has a plant geneticist, he is welcome to come to Texas A&M for a short period and learn to work on gossypol-free cottonseed. Upon receipt of a written request, Texas A&M will provide the names of seed merchants in Texas who can provide seed for field trials in Afghanistan.

II. Project Purpose

A. Develop a new food source in Afghanistan, namely, edible cottonseed meal.

B. Increase the cash value of Afghanistan cottonseed pulp by making it edible for human consumption.

III. Outputs

Install procedures for the conversion of existing cottonseed stock to a gossypol-free variety. The estimated time to accomplish this is 8-10 years.

IV. Inputs

A. Sponsor the training of one Afghan plant geneticist for a period of 12 months at Texas A&M under the sponsorship of Dr. Karl Matill to learn cross-breeding of cottonseed.

B. Procure from Texas seed merchants sufficient gossypol-free cottonseed to carry out cross-breeding project in Afghanistan.

V. Project Desirability

This project is desirable from the GOA and U.S. perspectives for the same reason listed under the soybean project.

VI. Feasibility

The project is feasible in terms of GOA technical and administrative capacity for the same reasons as described under soy project.

VII. Fixed Cost Reimbursement Concept

VIII. How to Proceed

Consult with officials in the Ministry of Agriculture and determine their interest in the project.

**Feedbacks in Economic and Demographic Transition - A neo-Malthusian and an alternative model of development are compared and tested against the real world. By Harald Frederiksen
Science Vol. 166-14 November 1969**

Summary and Conclusions

The feedbacks in a neo-Malthusian and in an alternative model of economic and demographic transition are compared with each other and tested against the real world. On the basis of the empirical evidence, it is postulated that the population problem is not simply a high rate of growth. Nor is its solution simply a low rate of growth, which could be the result of a balance between either high or low rates of mortality and fertility.

Reductions in the mortality rate are part of the solution, rather than the cause, of the problem. Mortality rates tend to vary inversely with levels of consumption and production. Moreover, reductions in mortality seem to be prerequisites for compensating reductions in fertility to achieve the desired family size.

Of course, the desired demographic changes are no more automatic than the desired economic changes. The systematic extension of information and of facilities favoring the use of acceptable methods of regulating family size is the appropriate response to spontaneous motivation to limit family size.

Successful development results in, and from, a balance between mortality and fertility at the lowest mortality rate attainable with the resources available. With improved health and greater longevity increasing the returns from human resources and with decreasing fertility decreasing the burdens of dependency, the maximum improvements in the standard of living and the desired changes in mortality and fertility will result from interplay of efforts in both the demographic and the economic areas.

Strategy and tactics for national development evolve with the needs and resources. "Profiles of relative development" in the multiple sectors of national development may indicate what targets and budgets are necessary or desirable and feasible at successive stages.

Paths of development may be usually and essentially the same for different countries, but the path may be followed with greater or lesser speed. Harmonization of the objectives and wise choice of targets may accelerate the passage from traditional to modern stages of society and economy.

Health measures and family planning, as integral parts of the complex process of modernization, can accelerate and must complete the economic and demographic transition from low to high levels of production and consumption, and from high to low levels of mortality and fertility.

Health, Population, and Economic Development - International health programs have an important role in promoting economic development and population control. By Carl E. Taylor and Marie-Francoise Hall - Science Vol. 157 - 11 August 1967

Summary

Health as a basic human value is particularly important to people in the developing world. Rates of economic development lower than had been hoped for and ever more steeply rising population growth have precipitated a reaction against public health programs. Among economists, agriculturalists, and even health professionals the philosophy arose that one should "hold back" on using modern weapons against disease because they are "too effective." To satisfy the recognized popular demand, simple and relatively ineffective measures of curative medicine could be substituted. It was said that the emture, community development, education, and industrialization and that family planning should be pushed as a separate program. Documentation presented here sharply challenges such a point of view. No segment of the total development process can be effective without the other sectors.

Among the major activities essential to socioeconomic development, the large-scale, effective, and relatively cheap public health programs have contributed and can continue to contribute substantially to human resources. Dramatic thrusts of economic development have occurred when the amount of land available for cultivation or the size of the labor force has been sharply increased by removal of a health bottleneck through a program such as malaria eradication. Even where there is seasonal underemployment, improvements in health and other social and economic changes can be synergistic, so that increased human resources and opportunities for employing these resources can develop together. Successful health programs tend to produce qualitative improvements in general attitudes, such as recognition that change is possible, and the innovative thinking and action that cannot be expected of the sick and debilitated. Such attitudes tend to generate the conditions necessary for economic growth. In many instances, these positive effects of health programs on development have outweighed the much-publicized negative influence of population increase.

Population growth results from the whole complex of modernizing influences. In the past it was caused more by general economic development than by health services. The great advantage of modern health programs is the fact that demographic effects are becoming direct, selective, and measurable rather than being secondary, uncontrollable, and cyclic.

Increasing evidence shows that health service may be indispensable for reducing population growth. A minimum level of health seems to be necessary for acceptance of the idea and practice of limiting or spacing births. Parents need assurance that children already born will have a reasonable chance for survival. In addition, readily accessible minimum health facilities are probably essential for providing modern contraceptive information and materials.

Maintenance of health activities at a high level in developing countries should not be justified only on humanitarian grounds. Sound demographic, economic, and scientific evidence indicates that health programs promote economic development and directly stimulate the demand for, and practice of, family planning.

POPULATION STUDIES

A JOURNAL OF DEMOGRAPHY

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SUMMARIES OF CONTENTS

IRVING FREEDMAN and ARJUN L. ADLAKHA: *Recent Fertility Declines in Hong Kong: The Role of the Changing Age Structure* p. 181

The decline of 27% in the birth rate of Hong Kong between 1961 and 1966 has attracted considerable attention. An analysis indicates that the large decline between 1961 and 1965 (19%) was largely due to a change in the age-sex-marital status distribution. However, the decline of 10% between 1965 and 1966 was not due to such causes to any substantial extent. There appears to be a plausible connection between the decline for 1965-66 and a preceding increase in the activities and IUD promotion programme of the Hong Kong Family Planning Programme. The changing age pattern of fertility decline in the period 1965-66 is plausibly related to the age pattern for IUD acceptances. The present small proportion of women in the prime childbearing years will shortly disappear. Therefore, the age-specific birth rates will have to decline substantially in the coming years if there is to be any continuing decrease in the crude birth rate.

A. MAY and D. M. HEER: *Son Survivorship Motivation and Family Size in India: A Computer Simulation* p. 199

The authors adapted the theoretical computer simulation originally designed by David M. Heer and Dean O. Smith to apply specifically to India. Input to the simulation came from estimated terms of mortality and fertility in India for the 1951-61 decade. The simulation results yield conclusions of great importance for Indian public policy in the sphere of family planning: (1) If parents who attain the number of sons which appears reasonable in the Indian context were then to practise perfectly effective family planning, the maximum possible reduction in the rate of population growth of India would still be only about 2.4%. (2) Indian married couples with wives over thirty years of age probably cannot be persuaded to use family planning. (3) Any governmental programme which is to reduce the population growth rate by more than the 2.4% mentioned above must first reduce the desire for sons by the Indian family; and this - given Indian social and economic conditions - will require selectively introduced, continued, broad scale reduction in birth rates.

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MORTALITY LEVEL, DESIRED FAMILY SIZE,
AND POPULATION INCREASE

DAVID M. HEER AND DEAN O. SMITH*

RESUMEN

Aunque la explosión de la población en el mundo ha sido creada por una disminución en las tasas de mortalidad, paradójicamente una mayor declinación en estas tasas en las naciones menos desarrolladas, Puede ser una ayuda invaluable para reducir la actual tasa de crecimiento poblacional en el mundo.

En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de varios modelos simulados en las computadoras, en los cuales se presume que los padres tienen un método perfecto de control de nacimientos, pero que también desean estar muy seguros de que cuando menos un hijo pueda sobrevivir al padre después que éste ha llegado a los sesenta y cinco años, de modo que pueda sostener a los padres en su vejez.

Bajo estas hipótesis, los resultados de las simulaciones en las computadoras muestran que la tasa de incremento poblacional será elevada cuando el nivel de mortalidad es de magnitud intermedia. Este nivel intermedio de mortalidad es el que actualmente se encuentra en la mayor parte de los países menos desarrollados. Cuando el nivel de mortalidad es muy alto, las parejas son biológicamente incapaces de tener todos los hijos que quisieran. De esto resulta que, por un lado, un alto nivel de mortalidad ocasiona una fecundidad sólo ligeramente más alta que la que originan los niveles intermedios de mortalidad, y consecuentemente, la tasa de crecimiento poblacional es algo menor con altos niveles de mortalidad de lo que lo es con niveles intermedios. Por otro lado, cuando la mortalidad es baja, como en los países desarrollados, el número deseado de nacimientos disminuye en forma brusca, y la tasa de crecimiento poblacional es muy baja.

En las naciones menos desarrolladas, las reducciones en el tamaño deseado de la familia pueden obtenerse ya sea mediante programas que reduzcan la mortalidad infantil y preescolar, o a través de programas de seguridad social que puedan servir para reducir el deseo de los padres de asegurarse que sobreviva cuando menos un hijo para cuando ellos lleguen a la vejez. Sin embargo, es dudoso que un medio perfecto de control de nacimientos pueda, por sí solo, lograr una tasa baja de crecimiento poblacional en el mundo.

SUMMARY

Although the worldwide population explosion has been created by a decline in death rates, paradoxically a further decline in mortality in the less developed nations may be an invaluable aid for curbing the current rate of world population growth.

This paper presents the results of several computer-simulation models in which it is presumed that parents have a perfect method of birth control but also want to be highly certain that at least one son will survive to the father's sixty-fifth birthday, so that he can support his parents in their old age.

Under these assumptions, the results of the computer simulations show that the rate of population increase will be greatest when the level of mortality is of intermediate magnitude. This intermediate level of mortality is the level which now obtains in most of the less developed nations. When the mortality level is very high, couples are biologically incapable of bearing as many children as they would like. Hence, on the one hand, a high mortality level results in only slightly higher fertility than do intermediate levels of mortality, and, consequently, the rate of population growth is somewhat lower at a high level of mortality than at intermediate levels. On the other hand, when mortality is low, as in the developed nations, the desired number of births drops precipitously, and the rate of population increase is very low.

In the less developed nations, reductions in desired family size may be obtained either through programs to reduce infant and child mortality or through social security programs that may serve to reduce parental desire to be highly certain of at least one living son during old age. However, it is doubtful that a perfect means of birth control will of itself achieve a low rate of world population growth.

Many persons are now seeking solution to the worldwide population explosion. One group of experts believes that this problem can be solved by supplying a perfect means of birth control to all areas

where population growth is rapid. According to this theory, the people of the less

*Harvard University. The authors wish to thank Jane Worcester for statistical advice. This is Contribution No. 26 from the Harvard Center for Population Studies.

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SURVIVORSHIP OF SONS UNDER CONDITIONS OF IMPROVING MORTALITY

GEORGE E. IMMERWAHR*

RESUMEN

Con frecuencia, un obstáculo a la restricción en el tamaño de la familia es el marcado deseo de los padres de que cuando menos uno de sus hijos los sobrevivan, unido a la creencia tradicional sobre la gran probabilidad de que los hijos mueran antes que sus padres. Un cálculo de las probabilidades de sobrevivencia de los hijos, basado en las tablas de vida modelo de las Naciones Unidas muestra, sin embargo, que las probabilidades de que un padre sea sobrevivido aunque sólo fuese por un hijo son bastante elevadas, particularmente después de que éste ha pasado los dos primeros años de vida. Cuando se usan tablas generacionales (cohortes), que reflejan mejoras esperadas en la mortalidad, las probabilidades son aún mejores. En general se encuentra que la probabilidad de que un hijo de dos años de edad sobreviva a su padre es de 80 por ciento o más, dependiendo del nivel de mortalidad existente y de la edad del padre.

Finalmente, este trabajo examina (1) las probabilidades de que un padre sea sobrevivido cuando menos por uno de dos o tres hijos; (2) las probabilidades de que una madre o ambos padres sean sobrevividos por un hijo; y (3) la probabilidad de que cuando menos uno de dos hijos sobreviva a su padre, cuando se toma en cuenta el hecho de que las probabilidades de mortalidad de los hijos no son independientes la una de la otra.

SUMMARY

The strong desire of fathers to be assured that at least one son will outlive them, coupled with the traditional belief in a high probability of sons predeceasing their father, is often a deterrent to restriction of family size. A calculation of the probabilities of survivorship of sons on the basis of the United Nations Model Life Tables, however, shows that the probabilities of a father being outlived by even one son are remarkably high, particularly after that son has survived the first two years of life. When cohort tables are used, reflecting expected mortality improvements, the probabilities are even higher. In general, it is found that the probability that a two-year-old son will outlive his father is 80% or better, subject to the current mortality level and the age of the father.

Finally, this paper examines (1) probabilities of a father being outlived by at least one of two or three sons, (2) probabilities of a mother or of both parents being outlived by a son, and (3) the probability that at least one of two sons will outlive a father when allowance is made for the fact that mortality probabilities of the sons are not independent of one another.

Throughout human history, men have often had an intense desire to have sons who would survive them. This desire has been impelled by various motives, such as the hope to have male progeny to carry on the family tradition and name or the need for a son as a companion and a source of support throughout old age. In Asiatic cultures this need for at least one son to outlive the father has been felt with particular intensity, and perhaps most of all in India where extreme importance is attached to the son's participation in the father's funeral rites.

*The Johns Hopkins University. Most of the computations for this paper were carried out in the Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions Computer Center, supported by research grant FR-00004 from the National Institutes of Health.

In nations with traditionally high child mortality, this desire of fathers to have sons who will outlive them acts as a deterrent to restriction of family size. The common belief is that the likelihood of any one son dying before the father's death is so great that to "play it safe" a family should have several sons, perhaps even as many as it can possibly have. In the absence of compelling reasons not to have additional children, a father will naturally choose to have additional children, at least until he has the number of sons which is considered a safe minimum. In the effort to have this number of sons he may well have more than this number of daughters, since, on the average, families

Director's Advisory Committee

(Meeting Note)

Date and Place: May 1, 1974, Director's Conference Room
2:00 to 4:00 p. m.

Purpose : Staff Paper for DAC Discussion - Nutrition

Participants : DAC Members:

- Mr. Frederick H. Sligh, DD
- Mr. Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
- Mr. John Standish, CDE
- Mr. Gray Towery, CO (Acting)

Others:

- Mr. Arthur Reich, DP
- Mr. Richard Scott, DP
- Mr. Charles Johnson, DP
- Mr. John Wilson, AGR
- Mr. Calvin Martin, AGR
- Mr. Paul Rusby, FFP

Paper considered by the participants and attached to these notes: Nutrition.

Introduction:

Mr. Sligh opened the meeting stating the purpose of the meeting was to review and discuss possible new USAID initiatives in the field of nutrition. Mr. Rusby was than asked to introduce his paper and highlight the areas of project development.

Report:

Mr. Rusby highlighted the inter-relationship of nutrition in the growth and development of the human body and the high infant mortality in Afghanistan.

1. Physical and mental development of the infant between the third trimester of pregnancy and 36 months.

2. The identification of the vulnerable groups and the weaning process 6-36 months.

3. The interaction of infection and malnutrition.

Discussion:

After Mr. Rusby's introduction, discussion centered on the contents of the paper.

Vitamin A Supplementation: Questions were raised on the adequacy of the delivery system for direct semi-annual administration of 200,000 i.u. of vitamin A, through malaria/ small pox control teams. It was the view of group that vitamin A fortification of tea would be a more feasible alternative method of administering vitamin A. Mr. Wilson raised the question whether the GOA would go along with any adulteration of tea by the fortification process. Mr. Rusby pointed out that the GOA view was unknown since no in-depth discussions had been initiated with the GOA. This inturn brought out the point that the nutrition package was deliberately designed to minimize the administrative and managerial demands on any one Ministry or Agency of the GOA. Mr. Sligh directed Messrs. Rusby and Denton to start identifying what GOA offices are involved with the intent of starting a dialogue on possible project development.

Iodization of Salt or Tea:

The question of a delivery system was raised. Mr. Rusby indicated that salt could be iodized but that further inquiry would have to be made on the technical feasibility of iodization of tea. Mr. Rusby advised that iodization of salt would present problems of quality control since the processing system was by many small and scattered suppliers. Mr. Sligh directed that Mr. Rusby follow-up on information regarding the technical feasibility of tea fortification and if feasible start a dialogue with appropriate GOA offices.

Weaning Food: This subject involved the major portion of the meeting. Discussion again centered on the delivery system with identification of the inadequacy of the existing health center system and the possible need and creation of a village health agent system

to distribute weaning food. The need and creation of an institutional capability was identified as one of the major problems with this project. Mr. Denton raised the question on the firmness of data on the extent of infant malnutrition and how such could be measured. In reply Mr. Rusby indicated that the mortality rate and the child's weight were the best indicator of the extent of infant malnutrition. Mr. Denton indicated he would like to see more conclusive data. Additional questions were raised whether, in time of food shortages, the weaning food would not end-up mixed in the family food pot with adult, rather than infant consumption. Mr. Rusby indicated that on times of food shortage this was always a possibility. In normaly times, however, the very physical characteristics which make a weaning food suitable to an infant, make it repugnant to an adult. In general, however, as a component of the medical locker dispersed to families on a basis of need, there was little likelihood of diversion to non target persons to the family. Mr. Sligh indicated that we first find out the GOA policy is on the subject and see what can be developed.

New Food Developments - Soybeans:

Seed Modification - Cottonseed:

Both projects were identified as potential one or two year developmental activities. Mr. Sligh suggested we first determine GOA interest in nutrition before we get further into these projects.

Summary: Mr. Sligh summarized the five projects as follows: First priority, fortification of tea with vitamin A and iodine, second priority, development of soybean and cottonseed and third priority weaning foods. It was the majority view of the group that further review and in-house discussions of nutrition was subject first to some expression from the GOA of its interest in the subject.

CDE:JStandish:sp
5/13/74

Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

May 13, 1974

Vincent W. Brown
Director, USAID/Afghanistan /s/ Vincent W. Brown

Review of Proposed Nutrition Project Activity

Based on the Director's Advisory Council recommendations and further discussions, I conclude we should have the following policy on nutritional development:

- A. Our goal should be to arouse GOA interest in nutrition.
- B. Pilot test nutritional improvement projects which have demonstrable health benefits and have the potential for being institutionalized within Afghan resources and culture.

The most promising areas for pilot testing are:

- A. Vitamin A supplementation through fortification of tea.
- B. Acceptability and use of locally prepared weaning foods.
- C. Iodine supplement, perhaps by tea fortification.

cc: DAC Members (F. H. Stigh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller, A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original of the DAC report)

AD/DP:FHDenton:gh

Memorandum

TO : See below

FROM : Education Division *Pranaya*

SUBJECT: May 18, DAC Meeting to Follow-up on C&T Distribution

There has been considerable activity in connection with book distribution in the Ministry of Education during the past few months:

1. A Distribution Center has been established and a Director named. (Mr. Daud Shah Ayini).
2. ^{1st} Deputy Minister Seddiq has recommended the Distribution Center be made a part of the publications Department of the MOE which would place it under Dr. Entezar along with the C&T activities.
3. The Distribution Center Director (DCD) has already undertaken two field studies and has many more planned.
4. The DCD has presented to the Minister and the Ministry Council a proposal for reorganizing parts of the current distribution system so as to gain immediate improvements. (See attachment 1).
5. The DCD has requested through the Minister that USAID be asked to provide a Distribution Adviser to help with longrange total revamping of the distribution system by winter 1975. MOE approval is expected this month.
6. Textbook life and quantity printed at each run are to be studied in terms of current and projected enrollments.
7. Possibility of nominal charge to students is being discussed. Probability that elementary books will continue to be free but secondary and higher students will be charged.
8. DCD says his view of problems are: A. that no one person or organisation had distribution responsibility so nobody cared. B. there has been little or no communication with Provincial offices. The MOE does not know rural needs and there is no feed-back to the MOE from the provinces. C. there may have been some problems with organizing the available transportation.
9. C&T Afghan and American staff have been collecting distribution data on the fifth and sixth grade health books. Copies of several brief reports are attachments 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Conclusion: The MOE is now well aware of the distribution situation and taking positive action. Dr. Entezar has taken the lead in the campaign to inform MOE officials. He is not interested in seeing the new books rot in warehouses.

In separate conferences with the Minister of Education and his Deputies, Dr. Lanza, Dr. Whittemore and their visitors from TCCU and AID/W have heard the officials declare their recognition of the importance of a good distribution system and of their intention to take action to get books to the students.

The Education Division and TCCU will continue their close cooperation with the MOE to help solve the distribution problem.

Distribution:

| | |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Mr. Sligh, | DD |
| Mr. Denton, | AD/DP |
| Mr. Wedberg, | DP |
| Mr. Johnson, | DP |
| Mr. Towery, | CO (Acting) |
| Mr. Standish, | CD |
| Mr. Miller, | AD/MGT |
| Dr. Whittemore, | TCCU |
| Mr. MacMakin, | TCCU |

SECRET
Ministry of Education

Department of Administration

1. Budget Considerations

PROVINCIAL & DISTRICT OFFICES

Department of Publications

1. Preparation of Manuscripts and Artwork
2. Revision of Previously Printed Books for Reprinting
3. Ordering of Books from Presses
4. Preparation of Printing Specifications, Correcting of Proofs, Monitoring Schedule

Department of Planning

1. Gathering and Processing of School Population Data, Growth Projections

Specimens of manuscripts / PROOFS / BOOKS

ORDERS FOR PRINTING

REQUIREMENTS
PLANS
BOOK REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL POPULATION
GROWTH PROJECTIONS

General-Directorate of Educational Materials Distribution

1. Information Gathering and Processing
2. Warehousing & Inventory Control
3. Delivery of Books and other Educational Materials

DELIVERY OF BOOKS

DISTRIBUTION OF BOOKS

Education Press

1. Printing of Books as Ordered and to Specifications
2. Delivery of Books to Distribution Center

Provincial Centers & All Schools

1. Use of Books in Schools
2. Reports on School Population, Availability of Books, Future Needs

MOVEMENT OF BOOKS

MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION

Draft Proposal for Committee on Distribution

10/15/57

DEC 2 1957

It is proposed that an Educational Materials Distribution Center be established in the Ministry of Education to reorganize, develop, and operate a warehousing and distribution system and facilities. This should be established in the broadest and strongest terms possible, for the work of the Center would be to consolidate the present activities of a number of different departments of the Ministry of Education and will in large part be concerned with effectively conducting those activities in the future.

The Center should be concerned with two general kinds of activities: the handling of information and the physical handling of books and other educational materials. The implementation of a new system will undoubtedly involve the utilization of additional manpower and materials on the part of the Ministry of Education. However, it is expected that the savings in cost of books and other materials made possible by the more effective utilization of those materials will more than offset the cost of such a new system. If fewer copies of all textbooks can be printed because they are more accurately and speedily distributed to the students, very great savings are possible.

The Center should be established under the following program:

1. A detailed study of the present system, its strengths and weaknesses.
2. A plan of reorganization, developed with the cooperation and contribution of all agencies now involved in the warehousing and distribution process.
3. Implementation of the new system. This would involve training, production of necessary forms, records, and materials handling equipment, organization of physical storage and distribution facilities, and introduction of the new procedures and methods throughout the system.
4. The revision of necessary Ministry of Education rules, procedures, and laws to make the revised system workable within the total Ministry organization.
5. Introduction of new equipment and facilities required under the new system to effectively warehouse and distribute materials under a logical and modern system.

The description of the details of operation of this proposed Educational Materials Distribution Center is necessarily in general terms, for the program of development outlined above would be the best way to determine these details. The initial step is to make the decision to establish such a Center, to appoint a competent person to head the Center, and to charge him with the development of a detailed plan of organization and operation.

It is suggested that the Ministry of Education seek advisory assistance in this planning of the new Center, to help the head of the ^{Center} study the needs, the possible solutions, and the problems involved, for it is best to draw on the best of up-to-date knowledge and experience in this field when contemplating such far-reaching changes. An offer of such assistance has been extended by USAID over the past two-and-half years.

The work of the head of the Educational Materials Distribution Center, his staff, and the advisor suggested above would involve but not be limited to the following:

1. Information relating to distribution (and production) of materials ... school populations, language distributions, growth projections, utilization policies, etc.
2. Record keeping procedures for warehousing and distribution.
3. Ordering procedures, forms, records, receipts, etc.
4. Inventory methods and records.
5. Delivery procedures, schedulings, etc.
6. Accountability, depreciation, and write-off procedures.
7. Warehousing facilities, buildings and materials handling equipment.
8. Physical packaging of materials for storage and shipment ... the cost of packaging compared to the cost of damage and loss without proper packaging.
9. Personnel requirements for a reorganized system, both in Kibul and throughout the country. Needs for training of personnel.

10. New rules or regulations required to effect recommended changes in warehousing and distribution systems.

See Attachment A for an abbreviated Flow Chart of the steps required in distribution of educational materials. This could provide a starting point for the study of ways to reorganize and operate the new system.

Note: While the new Center is being planned and established, all possible measures should be taken to accelerate the distribution of textbooks under the present system. Information on what books are available in the Kabul warehouse should be circulated to Provincial Centers and to headmasters and teachers.... by letter, by articles in Erfan magazine, and by regular radio announcements. A complete and current inventory of books in the Kabul Warehouse should be provided immediately to the Administrative Department and the Department of Publications to facilitate distribution of books now on hand and the planning of future printings.

MODEL FLOW CHART FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATIONAL MATERIALS

| <u>Information Processing</u> | <u>Warehousing</u> | <u>Delivery</u> |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Collection of Current Enrollment Data | | |
| 2. Projection of Student Population for Next Year and Next Four Years | | |
| 3. Correlation of Projections with Current Inventory of Kabul Warehouse | | |
| 4. Updating Printing Requirements and Giving Them to Department of Publications | | |
| 5. Breakdown of Local Textbook Requirements into Packing Lists for each School | | |
| 6. | Pickup of Books from Press as Printing is completed | |
| 7. | Physical Arrangement of Books in Kabul Warehouse | |
| 8. | Preparation of Shipping Orders to each Region, Province, School | |
| 9. | | Delivery of Books to Regional or Provincial Warehouse |
| 10. | | Delivery of Books to Schools... and to students |
| 11. | | Confirmation of Delivery, Receipts to Information Section |
| 12. | Perpetual Inventory, Monthly Reports to Information Section | |

Memorandum

To: Richard Whittemore, Chief of Party, TCCU/USAID
From: William C. Sayres
Subject: Spot check on health education materials in Mazar-i-Sharif
Date: April 18, 1974

While in Mazar to distribute copies of the health book questionnaire I previously discussed with you, Aziz Yusofzai had occasion to visit fourteen schools in Balkh province in connection with the language arts testing program. (Copies of the health book questionnaire were to be distributed through the provincial director, so Mr. Yusofzai's school visits were not directly related to the health materials.) In the course of these visits he decided to conduct a spot check to see whether the schools had the published health books or not; obviously if he could not find any of the books in the schools the questionnaire was going to be useless.

He found that all fourteen schools had the fifth grade text, and as far as he could determine in the limited time available it was being used. Only three of the fourteen schools had the sixth grade text, and only one school of the fourteen had a teachers' guide (it was for the fifth grade text).

Since time was short, he did not have much opportunity to explore the reasons for the shortage of available sixth grade texts and of teachers' guides, but he did question officials in four schools that had neither. In all four cases the response was that they simply did not know that there were sixth-grade books and teachers' guides; they had never been notified.

There are, of course, many questions that come to mind, and we hope to get some answers through the surveys discussed with you. On the whole, the result of this spot check is not very surprising in terms of the communication problems found all along the line. It is at least gratifying to know that the schools had and were evidently using the fifth-grade book (and that they could make some use of it even without the teachers' guide), and that at least some schools had the sixth-grade book (which was distributed more than a year after the fifth-grade book). Such information can also help us know where pump-priming is most needed!

Bill

Memorandum

To: Richard Whittenmore
From: William Sayres
Subject: Summary of findings in Laghman (distribution of Health Units)
Date: May 5, 1974

Mr. Yusofzai, Mr. Amouzgar, and Mr. Rlung have reported on the findings of their respective groups during the trip to Laghman (April 27-30). The totals are as follows:

Number of schools visited: 34

Fifth Grade

Number of classes visited: 52

Number of classes with text: 51

Number of classes with teachers' guide: 15

Sixth Grade

Number of classes visited: 51

Number of classes with text: 47

Number of classes with teachers' guide: 21

In classes with the pupil text, all pupils had copies (of those attendance) with the exception of one class in which five of the pupils present did not have copies.

UCS

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A REPORT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF HEALTH V AND VI TEXTBOOKS

The percentage of classroom requirements that has been shipped
from the Kabul Book Warehouse to date

| A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H |
|---|--|-------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|---|--|
| Title/Lang/Grade | Estimated 2 2-year Classroom Requirements | Excess Printed | Total Quantity Printed (B+C) | Quantity on hand in Kabul Book Warehouse | Quantity shipped from Kabul Warehouse (D-F) | Estimated classroom requirements to date | Percent of requirements actually shipped (F+G) |
| Delivered by Education Press - Taus 1350 (December 1972) | | | | | | | |
| Health Dari 7 | 126,000 | 44,000 | 170,000 | 103,116 | 66,884 | 92,000 ¹ | 73% |
| Health Pashto V | 86,000 | 30,000 | 116,000 | 82,159 | 33,841 | 63,000 ¹ | 54% |
| Delivered by Education Press - Lomhola 1351 (August 1972) | | | | | | | |
| Health Dari VI | 101,000 | 27,000 | 128,000 | 95,306 | 32,694 | 46,000 ² | 71% |
| Health Pashto VI | 78,000 | 17,000 | 95,000 | 77,948 | 17,052 | 36,000 ² | 47% |

Notes: 1. Based on two Winter Vacation School distributions (1972, 1974), and one Summer Vacation School distribution (1972), using projected Ministry of Education school population figures plus a 10% reserve.

2. Based on one Winter Vacation School distribution (1973) and one Summer Vacation School distribution (1973), using projected Ministry of Education school population figures plus a 10% reserve.

Sources: Quantity on hand from Depot Department, Ministry of Education, 15 Hamal 1353 (11 April 1974). Quantity printed from Publication Section, Department of Publications. School population figures from Statistics Section, Department of Planning, Ministry of Education.

Compiled by: Robert B. MacIskin, TCCU - 29 Hamal 1353 (11 April 1974)
(Revised from Report of 26 Hamal 1353 -15 April 1974)

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLICATIONS - Primary Textbook Program - 1 Hamal 1553 / 21 March 1974

| Subject | I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | | VI | | Total |
|-----------------------|---|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| | T | TG | T | TG | T | TG | T | TG | T | TG | T | TG | |
| 1. Lang. Arts-Pashto | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| 2. Lang. Arts-Dari | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 9 |
| 3. 2nd Lang.-Pashto/D | | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 4. 2nd Lang.-Dari/P | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 5. Religion | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 12 |
| 6. Mathematics | | 2 | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 7. Health | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 8. Science | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 9. Social Studies | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 10. Prac. Works-Boys | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
| 11. Prac. Works-Girls | | | | | | | | | | | | | 4 |
| 12. Physical Ed. | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| 13. Arts & Crafts | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Total Textbooks | 6 | | 6 | 6 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 14 | 60 |
| Total Teachers Guides | | 6 | | 4 | 10 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 72 |

Total Books in Program = 132

DIRECTOR'S ADVISORY COUNCIL

Meeting Notes

DATE: May 18, 1974

PLACE: Director's Conference Room

PURPOSE: To investigate what if any further action is required in the area of textbook distribution in order to assure success of the C&T project.

PARTICIPANTS: DAC Members

- Frederick H. Sligh, DD, Chairman
- Anthony R. Lanza, EDU
- C. Cary Barton, AD/M
- Frank H. Denton, AD/DP
- Gary F. Towery, A-CO

Paper attached to these notes:

Towery: Supplementary Statement

Since the last DAC meeting, field checks of distribution of the health books for grades 5 and 6 have been made as have checks at the Kabul warehouse. These field checks indicate that distribution is proceeding on these two books -- the only ones available for distribution until very recently. The results of the surveys are very encouraging. See the materials prepared for this meeting for details.

Moreover, contacts with the Ministry of Education indicate a considerable concern about improving distribution effectiveness. Along this line, a new Director responsible for distribution has been appointed and a letter is being forwarded to USAID requesting short-term consultant services in textbook distribution system design.

The utility of providing such services was debated at some length with consideration being given to: (1) the possibility of this enmeshing us in a larger institutional development activity, (2) whether we were doing the Afghans' job for them, (3) whether there is really a need for a consultant, given the relative simplicity of the problem and (4) the "growth" value which would accrue if the Afghans did the job on their own. Debate also was conducted about whether the Ministry of Education could find the requisite services in-country such as with the Ministry of Public Health or the Air Authority.

CONCLUSIONS/ RECOMMENDATIONS

On the basis of a strong recommendation made by Dr. Lanza, it was agreed to recommend to the Mission Director that USAID should respond favorably to a GOA request for a consultant, provided that (1) the distribution center is properly staffed (proper staff to be determined) before the arrival of the consultant and (2) it be made explicit that U.S. advisory assistance beyond the short-term consultant will not be available.

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Supplementary Statement

Submitted by Gary F. Towery

My recollection of this meeting is that, at least on my part, there was concern that the provision of a short-term consultant to design a distribution system would not be adequate. My experience in this country with system design and related implementation is that we would be fooling ourselves and the Director if we recommended bringing in a short-term consultant for three months thinking that would be the end of it.

I have no problem with the Mission telling the Afghans only three months. However, in house, we should at least recognize that his services would probably have to be extended for some months to help in the implementation.

I feel very strongly that system design and implementation are related in this country when you have a foreigner doing the design work. At a minimum, we should at least insure that the system gets going and that those Ministry employees responsible for operating it are able to do so.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

11-3

TO : Frank H. Denton
Assistant Director for Development Planning
USAID/Afghanistan

FROM : Vincent W. Brown, *VB* Director
USAID/Afghanistan

DATE: MAY 29 1974

SUBJECT: Curriculum and Textbook Distribution Follow-up Review

I concur in the Director's Advisory Council recommendation that we should respond positively to a GOA request for short-term consultant assistance in planning textbook distribution (if one should be made), provided the GOA distribution center is properly staffed before the arrival of the consultant.

cc: DAC Members

(F. H. Sligh, DD; F. H. Denton, AD/DP; F. W. Miller,
A-AD/M; J. Standish, CDE; T. J. McMahon, CO)
C. W. Johnson, Program Evaluation Officer (with original
of the DAC report)



Dr. C. Zondag - PE
Mr. Frederick H. Sligh - DD
Dr. Frank H. Denton - AD/DF

Vincent W. Brown - Director

Industrial Development, Project S08-11-910-116

I have noted in Mr. Sligh's memo of March 28, 1974, that a review of the subject project is scheduled for April 27th. My understanding of the need for a DAC review is that AID/W had previously asked that we evaluate the project if it was our intention to extend the project and contract beyond the present termination date of September 29, 1974. The AID/W view was project specific; however, other events have transpired in the past nine months to eliminate the need for such an evaluation. Given the new foreign assistance legislation, the Mission does not intend to extend the project beyond September, 1974.

I would prefer, therefore, that the DAC allocate its time to a fuller consideration of other projects on the rather ambitious schedule and that Dr. Zondag proceed to finalize his descriptive history of and analysis of "lessons learned" in the project which we had discussed earlier.

Drafted by: CWJohnson:DP:vt 1 April 74