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**AN EVALUATION OF PRIMARY TEACHER EDUCATION
IN AFGHANISTAN
1954-1967**

**A Project of the United States Agency for International Development
through a Contract with Teachers College, Columbia University**

**A.I.D. HISTORICAL AND
TECHNICAL REFERENCE
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by

FINIS E. ENGLEMAN

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By

Finis E. Engleman

Kabul, Afghanistan

May, 1967

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MEMORANDUM

May 18, 1967

TO: Mr. Russell S. McClure, Director, USAID/Afghanistan

THROUGH : Dr. Edwin L. Martin, Chief, Education Division

FROM: Finis E. Engleman, Consultant

SUBJECT: Primary Teacher Education Evaluation Report

Attached you will find my evaluation study of the Primary Teacher Education Project for Afghanistan which has been conducted by USAID through a contract with Teachers College, Columbia University.

I want to express my gratitude to you and other USAID officials for the assistance given me in designing the study, making documents available, arranging for my transportation, introducing me to many Afghan educators and for many thoughtful courtesies.

To the many distinguished Afghan educators in the Ministry, from the Minister to the teachers in primary schools where I was welcomed to visit, I wish to express my thanks. In every case interviews were freely and graciously granted and helpful evidence was the result.

Members of the UNESCO Team concerned with teacher education discussed problems in teacher education and gave many facts concerning early developments.

To Teachers College, Columbia University Contract Team members now serving, without exception, gave immeasurable assistance. They discussed issues and problems frankly and with depth of perception. Furthermore, their guided tours to schools and classrooms which revealed resources, materials of instruction, classroom environments, methods used by teachers, commitments of staff members and, in fact, the status of primary education were exceedingly valuable. I wish to especially recognize the help given by the Chiefs of Party. The Chiefs during the first and second phase wrote detailed memoranda to me and the present Chief of Party gave many hours for serious dialogue on knotty aspects of the project.

To Mr. Mohammed Ayuub who served as my working associate and interpreter during the data gathering period, I am pleased to thank.

I would be ungrateful if I did not mention Miss Evelyn Duggan who assisted with the editing and whose skillful fingers typed the copy.

AN EVALUATION OF PRIMARY TEACHER EDUCATION
IN AFGHANISTAN: 1954-1967

A Project of the United States Agency for
International Development through a Contract
with Teachers College, Columbia University

by

Finis E. Engleman

Introduction

In December of 1966 the officials of USAID/Afghanistan made inquiry relative to the availability of Finis E. Engleman to make a review and evaluation of the work in primary teacher education in Afghanistan which had been conducted by a team of specialists from Teachers College, Columbia University. The correspondence that followed stated that the team had started its work in 1954 and was terminating its relationships with the project in order to participate in major efforts of the Ministry of Education in the field of the primary school curriculum. It was also explained that a UNESCO team would assume a major role in continuing the efforts to improve primary teacher education.

As a result of these communications it was agreed that Finis E. Engleman would undertake the study during March, April, and May, 1967.

The following pages constitute the findings of the study.

Limitations of the Study

In undertaking the evaluation certain limitations and qualifications were recognized which make a scientific research study impossible. In the first place, valid observations, particularly of a qualitative nature, are hard to achieve. The differences in the cultural concepts and values of the American and Afghan are considerable. For an American to make quality judgments on educational goals, teaching methods and instructional materials is to encourage criticism.

Furthermore, many forces play upon a social enterprise such as primary teacher education. Seldom can any change or development be attributed to one force such as the TCCU Team. Consequently, multiple influences in such a project are always at work, though some may not be visible. Almost always there are many variables... some not obvious.

Furthermore, a program designed to improve primary school teaching has many facts. Among them should be listed the quality, strength and resources of the institutions giving the training, the adequacy and consistency of financial support, the selection and guidance of the students, the goals set for the teacher education, the level of teacher competence, the type and scope of in-service educational experiences, the academic and professional curricula and many others.

The study, therefore, undertakes only to identify those elements in the development of primary teacher education where there was influence from the Team. Sometimes the influence was loud and clear; sometimes it was subdued and subtle. Possibly it little matters who gets the plaudits for the advances, nor who gets the blame for failures.

It is to the credit of the Afghans as well as the Americans that neither was jealous, neither sought credit. The leaders from both countries engaged in the enterprise as a team. It was a friendly sharing almost from the beginning.

The writer is aware that some of the observations, some of the conclusions, some of the appraisals may lack solid substantiation. Some are arrived at by clues, some by application of experience and professional background to limited data, some by analyses of historical data and some by weighing opinions of others.

The Techniques of the Study

Data and opinion gathering was confined largely to three methods. First, interviews were conducted with many people who had been associated with the Primary Teacher Education Project. Among those persons who gave testimony willingly were numerous prominent Afghan educators, several UNESCO officials, members of the TCCU Team including Chiefs of Party who submitted detailed memoranda as well as oral evidence, principals of schools, staff members of teacher training institutes called Darul Mo'Allameins (DMAs), administrators in six provinces and classroom teachers.

Second, publications of many types were read and analyzed. Among those of greatest value were the 25 semi-annual reports made by the chiefs of the TCCU Team, various USAID reports, agreements with the Royal Government of Afghanistan (RGA), contracts with TCCU, studies made by individuals and commissions, surveys and research projects published by UNESCO, Afghan statistical reports, numerous memoranda, correspondence with former chiefs of TCCU Team, instruction materials written and published by Team members and their counterparts and assistants.

Third, first-hand visits and inspections were made at educational institutions. Among these were the DMA's, the associated schools, and laboratory schools in Kabul, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat, feeder schools for the Emergency Teacher Training Program, the University of Kabul, The Institute of Education, lycees, middle schools, primary schools, community schools, and village schools.

Criteria Used in Making the Study

The following criteria were used as flexible standards for making limited and over-all evaluation of the work of the Team. These criteria were used as guide lines for gathering and analyzing data rather than weighted measuring sticks for making formal appraisals.

1. Were the objectives clear from year to year?
2. Was the TCCU Team properly constituted in terms of the contract agreements?
 - a. Recruitment procedures guided by job descriptions,
 - b. Title, job roles, terms of tours,
 - c. Temperament of members and commitment to foreign service,
 - d. Background and professional competence.
3. Were favorable working relationships established and maintained with:
 - a. Royal Government of Afghanistan,
 - b. Ministry of Education,
 - c. Teacher Training Institutions,
 - d. Kabul University,
 - e. The primary schools,
 - (1) Provincial directors,

(2) Directors

- f. The Institute of Education,
 - g. UNESCO,
 - h. Other international groups,
 - i. The Afghan public,
 - j. USAID Afghanistan.
4. Were special projects soundly conceived and executed effectively?
 5. Did the TCCU members work as a team?
 6. Did the individual specialist have an agreed-upon role and specific assignment of tasks?
 7. Did the Afghans share in:
 - a. Planning,
 - b. Execution,
 - c. Evaluation,
 - d. In manpower input,
 - e. In costs-budgets.
 8. Do recent graduates of DMA's and teachers who had in-service programs show added competence beyond others without such experience.
 9. Were friendly, respectful relations established and maintained between Afghans and Americans? Was mutual respect a constant factor?
 10. Were both short-term and long-term goals established and maintained?
 11. Did the leaders and institutions of Afghanistan steadily grow in their power to be self-sufficient?

12. Did evaluation take place? Did the Team and associates have systematic and periodic assessments of major activities?
13. Is there evidence that the Team helped bring developmental change in the total structure of education in Afghanistan as related to teacher education?
 - a. The DMA program - (1) instructional techniques and methods; (2) curriculum content and sequence; (3) professional spirit of staff; (4) materials of instruction; (5) buildings and facilities; (6) attitudes of student body.
 - b. The physical plant and material resources of the DMA,
 - c. The competence of administrators and teachers in service,
 - d. The development of the Institute of Education,
 - e. The policies of the Ministry and administrative structure dealing with primary teacher education,
 - f. Increased dedication and commitment to professional responsibilities on part of primary school teachers and administrators.
 - g. The Team members consciously and consistently aided and encouraged Afghans to assume greater leadership roles.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE EVALUATION STUDY

The Eric Hill Study - Auspices UNESCO

In 1949, a team of three headed by an American, Dr. Harold Benjamin, conducted a survey of the education needs of Afghanistan. Soon after this report was published Mr. Eric Hill, a New Zealander, published a study for the RGA. The findings of this

study had a profound effect on the thinking of the leadership in the nation. It set in motion a whole chain of actions to strengthen Afghanistan as a country by improving the educational system.

The report put much faith in education for individual and national effectiveness. Among other things the study urged that attention be given to primary education as the necessary foundation to any educational structure and to the training of primary school teachers as essential elements. A direct quotation from the study clearly sets the priorities: "Among the several possible ways of improving Afghan schools, the most important is the training of good teachers. This is the most crucial, powerful and immediately effective means of raising the standards of education in any country... The primary task for Afghanistan today, tomorrow and for many years to come is to produce more and better education teachers."

The RGA/US Agreement

A few years after the UNESCO report was released an agreement was reached by the Royal Government of Afghanistan and the United States to the effect that the United States operating through the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) would provide professional technical assistance in the development of a program of primary teacher education. The primary schools of Afghanistan cover what in some countries is called the elementary school, grades 1-6.

The U.S. FOA/TCCU Contract - (Later known as AID)

Early in 1954 U.S. FOA requested TCCU to provide specialists on a contract basis to aid in developing a program of primary teacher education. The following constitutes basic provisions written in the contract dated April 5, 1954:

1. "Beginning as soon as practicable after the execution of this agreement, the Contractor (TCCU) will send a staff of professional and technical personnel to Kabul to assist the Teachers Training College, called the Darul Mo'Allamein (DMA of Kabul) and the Ministry of Education of Afghanistan in teacher training. While in Kabul, the Contractor's staff will advise the Faculty of the College and appropriate officials in the MOE on instructional and teaching methods, serve as advisors in the development of teaching programs, assist in the selection and procurement of necessary equipment and books and supplies and will otherwise provide service necessary to improve the teaching program, except those primarily administrative in character (for which the Contractor will have no responsibility) . . .

During the period of this agreement, the Contractor will maintain in residence in Kabul and active in the program provided herein a staff composed of a chief advisor who shall be the representative of the Contractor in Kabul, and who shall be responsible for the supervision of the performance of all duties undertaken by the Contractor hereunder, and three or more other staff members of the rank of assistant professor or higher. The chief advisor shall also be available for the purpose of giving advice to the Afghan MOE and to the Director of U.S. Operations Mission. Each staff member will serve under this agreement for a period of not less than two years. . . . The Contractor will assist the MOE, the College (DMA) and the FOA in the development of trainee projects, including programing and arrangements in the field of teacher training in the U.S. In addition to these services, the Contractor will by supplemental or amendatory agreement with FOA arrange for the training in the U.S. of selected members of the college faculty including administrative officials selected

*Amendment
to
Contract*

for such training by mutual agreement with the MOE, the College, Contractor and FOA. Such training shall be such as to enable the faculty members to gain knowledge and experience which will contribute directly and immediately to the economic development of Afghanistan through teaching and through the rendering of professional services."

Although the original contract contained many details relative to finance, travel and operational procedures, the above constitute the original responsibilities placed on the Team. Many amendments were added to the contract from time to time in the intervening years but with the exception of reference to aid to be given the newly formed Institute of Education, the charge relative to primary teacher education remained basically the same over a twelve-year period. It is to this aspect of the TCCU commitments that this study is restricted. It should be noted, however, that later amendments gave major new over-all responsibilities to the TCCU Team. Some of these, such as aiding in the establishment of a Faculty of Education at the University, had desirable effects on the development of both in-service and pre-service programs of teacher education for primary school teachers. These additional responsibilities have resulted in the Chief's devoting less time to those working directly in primary teacher education. More will be said of the contract arrangements under the final section of this report.

THE FIRST PHASE, THE TCCU TEAM AT WORK

The first chief of the American TCCU Team to arrive was professor Clarence Linton on April 21, 1954, about six weeks before his colleagues on the Team arrived. In writing of his first experience in Afghanistan, Dr. Linton said, "Two of those early

weeks stand out in my memory. First, Mr. Eric Hill, the UNESCO Teacher Education Specialist from New Zealand, took me under his wing and gave me every possible assistance in meeting principals and teachers and in visiting schools. His assistance then and later was invaluable. Second, I took the initiative in obtaining approval to spend much of these first weeks sitting in classrooms and becoming somewhat familiar with school organization, administration and teaching."

Again referring to Mr. Eric Hill, Professor Linton wrote in March, 1967, "Mr. Hill was somewhat disappointed when the other members of the TCCU Team were announced, because two were primarily interested, or he thought they were, in secondary education, whereas his recommendation had been for teacher-training specialists at the elementary level. He, however, joined forces with us and our Afghan counterparts in a weekly workshop which continued to operate on a cooperative basis for more than a year. No one could have done more than Mr. Hill did for us."

Supporting a method of work introduced by Mr. Hill, workshops were begun early to include DMA staff members, administrative officers, counterparts and teachers. They were planning sessions; they were problem sessions; they were reappraisal sessions; they were round table, give and take sort of seminars. Herein probably lay one of the most strategic and long-lasting approaches made by the Team at any time. It demonstrated a method which resulted in an effective working relationship of a give and take nature. Since most Afghan educators had grown up in an authoritarian atmosphere where the official at the top made the decisions and pronouncements, this method at first seemed strange and was stiff

and lacking in human dynamics. Since all were recognized as peers by the Americans a spirit of comradeship developed rather quickly. As time went on, more involvement for initiating, analyzing, discussing and deciding spread among teachers, administrators and Ministry officials as well. Furthermore, the record shows that relatively soon the Minister of Education and his deputy attended these weekly workshops and participated freely in discussing the aims of primary education, the ways children learn, and the problems in the primary school classroom. In the second semi-annual report dated May 1955, we find the statement: "Workshops have been one of the principal methods of carrying on our work... Perhaps the most important workshop is the weekly staff conference of members of the team, other FOA education specialists, UNESCO education technicians, our interpreter-counterparts, the President of the Institute of Education, the Director of Darul Mo'Allamein and the Director of Ebni Sina Jr. High. Here plans, problems, goals--individual and professional staff projects were studied, analyzed, explained and discussed."

In the first winter (1954-55) a workshop was held for 150 people including provincial directors, officials of the Ministry, selected teachers and other administrators. Out of it came the winter three-weeks workshop which later came to be known as the Winter Session. It is worthy of note, too, that in the second year special workshops were begun for science and other special teachers.

In the first year, too, field trips to see agricultural projects, to talk with parents, visit schools and teachers went on apace. Since the teachers produced by DMA's were supposed to teach in the village and primary schools in the outer provinces, the Team felt it must know the life and needs in the hinterland. In spite of

poor or no roads, this first group of specialists visited parents and schools far beyond the portals of Kabul. Soon they were concerned with changing the curriculum of the DMA so as to give, in greater degree, the understandings and skills needed by teachers in rural areas. Since one of the major responsibilities of the Team as set forth in the TCCU contract was to work closely with and aid the College (DMA), major effort was made to assist its staff to improve the program of instruction. This involved rethinking the goals and purposes of education, changed methods of teaching and the introduction of new materials and new content in the several courses.

Since the pupils followed two tracks - one for primary school teaching culminating in the 11th grade and the other for abler students who in most cases sought entrance to the University, the TCCU Team at once urged a change. The teaching track so far as subject matter was concerned differed little from the other. It was simply shorter by one year and without prestige and generally attracted the least apt students. Only pressure of one kind or another caused boys to choose it. Within a short time the DMA administration and the Ministry agreed to have a single track with a minimum of professional content and more effective supervised student teaching. This change alone did much to raise the status of those who planned to teach and actually increased the output of regularly trained primary school teachers.

The status of education in Afghanistan when the TCCU Team arrived was very low although the RGA had made the bold and determined decision to improve it. The 1955 spring report by the Team gave the following statistics. There were only 13 city primary schools for girls and no rural ones. The total number of females enrolled in the first six grades was 5,184. On the other hand there were 338 rural and 277 primary schools for boys with a total enrollment in the first six grades of 92,855. In this year

the percentage of primary school age boys attending school was fourteen and the percentage of girls was only three. Of the total population the illiteracy was estimated at 94 per cent.

What must have been a giant step forward was a meeting initiated by the TCCU Team and executed in 1955 called Visiting and Demonstration Day. Twenty-one men from outlying villages together with the staff of DMA's, teachers, the Deputy Minister of Education and the Team observed classes, discussed issues and planned together. Possibly no such meeting had ever before been held in Afghanistan. It may be marked as the very beginning of a tidal wave of public interest in education which was to rise higher and higher during the next dozen years.

New syllabi for DMA in social studies, science and professional content were developed by specialists and counterparts. Special instructional materials were suggested likewise by the Team. Handicraft and garden projects were proposed. It was during this time, too, that the place of the model laboratory school in primary teacher education received emphasis and found firm roots for continued growth.

Dr. Linton got down to brass tacks when he wrote in his fourth semi-annual report: "Development of motivation for education is, therefore, the first major task of the MOE (Ministry of Education) for the next twenty-five years. This is a task for for leaders in the Ministry of Education and in all fields of national endeavor... Responsible leaders should help the people--all the people--to understand that their hope and the hope of their country depends upon the education of their children." Such was the first priority of the chief of the TCCU Team. Such was his faith and commitment to the all importance of education. This goal set by Dr. Linton was and is the foundation on which must rest a strong system of education in Afghanistan. The demand for

universal education, however, became urgent in half the time estimated by the Chief.

The final report of Dr. Linton in 1956 also describes a new and what was to become a major additional project to be undertaken by the TCCU Team--the English Language Program. What effect this additional project had on the primary teacher education program as well as on other contract additions later signed by TCCU is a matter of speculation. Some believe it was supplementary and complementary; others believe it shifted the interest and resources to the detriment of the primary teacher education project. Surely the RGA was wise in selecting English as the official foreign language for Afghanistan. Surely, too, USAID was wise also in giving strong assistance to its development as a tool for scholarship and an added means of communication.

By the end of the second year the Team had:

1. Established itself as a working and growing segment of a larger Afghan team. In large measure the Team members had gained acceptance by Afghan educators as persons as well as professional specialists. Mutual respect prevailed.
2. Discovered and developed a way of working. The best in group dynamics and cooperative action had been introduced and accepted by all concerned. Many illustrations could be given and the following seems noteworthy. Page 15 of the third semi-annual report reads: "It is significant to note that the President of the University of Kabul and the Deans of the Faculties of Literature and Science, with an elected member from each Faculty, serve on the advisory board of the Institute of Education, that the Dean of the Faculty of Literature is principal instructor and

general supervisor of other instructors in psychology at DMA's and that both he and the President of the University have recently requested our assistance in developing a problems course for teachers at the University level."

3. Encouraged many Afghan minds to reexamine old goals of education and moved them toward the acceptance of revised ones. Possibly the Team's fourth report sums it up best; "In all circles we have found a readiness to study the situation and to consider modifications of aims and actual practices. But they are appropriately cautious... Our observations and study suggest that what the people want most can be translated into the aims of education as follows: *aim*

- a. The first and most basic aim of education in Afghanistan at all levels is both material and spiritual...
- b. The second most basic aim of education is necessary to the first and also a product of it, namely, the development of a sense of moral responsibility and social purpose. This is essentially the recreation of the value system of the culture...
- c. The third basic value of all formal education in Afghanistan is knowledge and understanding necessary for information, participation in family, vocational and civic life.
- d. The fourth basic aim is the development of the skills of language, number, arts and bodily movements..."

First-hand observations of Afghan teachers at work in 1967, supported by discussions with Afghan leaders tend to prove that the above aims have gained considerable acceptance though not to the degree believed by the TCCU Team in 1956. Later Teams did not involve so many nor emphasize so firmly the above aims for all education in Afghanistan.

4. The biggest observable change that the Team helped bring about was within the "College" (DMA). The staff, the Team and the counterparts became involved in a careful reappraisal of the needs and program within the school. Self study and specialized assistance brought specific changes. The teacher training track was extended to the twelfth year, content courses and sequences were re-appraised and strengthened; the laboratory school idea was further developed. Sixteen different new teaching and learning materials were prepared, made available to the DMA staff. Examples of these were experimental editions of texts in Child Growth and Development and Science for Richer Living.

5. Evidence abounds to indicate that it was during the early years of the TCCU Team that long-time planning was undertaken for extending primary educational opportunities, for building additional DMA's and for strengthening Kabul University. The statistical projections developed by the Team, undoubtedly, helped the Ministry to plan wisely. A check on schools, DMA's and Primary school enrollments in 1966 show that the Team's projected estimated enrollment was too modest.

6. The design and purposes of the remarkable institution called "The Institute of Education" took form soon after the Team arrived. Afghanistan high officials who for years worked within the Institute give much credit for its development to the TCCU specialists although the idea originated with Dr. Ali Ahmed Popal, Deputy Minister of Education. He did most to secure its establishment. This institution, new in the structure of Afghanistan and free of most of the bureaucratic and traditional entanglements characteristic of older aspects of the educational hierarchy proved to be a veritable workshop for the specialists from the US and for many

brilliant Afghans as well. Talent found itself freed in its environment. Here red tape was at a minimum; here traditional thought and practice could be challenged; here innovations could emerge and grow.

One of the clearest, most precise statements concerning its functions is found on pages 7-8 of the third semi-annual report. In part they read as follows:

"1. The first function is the development and conduct of professional programs to prepare teachers and other educational workers for primary and secondary schools. . .

"2. The second major function of the Institute of Education is to serve as the parent organization for the proposal, study, planning, initiation of new and special aspects of education. . .

"3. A third major function is educational research.

"4. The fourth major function of the Institute of Education is the development of a program of writing and publishing appropriate indigenous teaching and learning materials."

Although most of the early activities of the Institute centered around a program for primary teacher education, it, like the over-all TCCU Team, extended its services and stretched its resources to other fields. As time went on its commitment to activities other than teacher education caused it to strongly tempt the Team to likewise become involved.

The Second Phase or the Middle Years

The second phase of the Columbia Team's work was under the leadership of Dr. Ralph B. Spence and with a new project--the English Program. By October 21,

1956, there were nine full-time members of the staff; however, all nine were new on the job and with no holdover of personnel. Furthermore, their specialized competencies do not appear in some instances to contribute greatly to the activities in primary teacher education then underway. See Appendix #1. However, power of the individual specialist to influence the project and reshape the design is reflected when one looks at the new goals set forth in the fifth semi-annual report. Undoubtedly, the specialist librarian helped set the goal of establishing a demonstration library. Undoubtedly, too, it is a serious error not to have an overlap of terms of service for specialists. Too, it is often a tangible asset to have some specialists serving a second tour of duty.

Wisely, the newly constructed Team spent considerable time in 1956, evaluating previously initiated programs and in outlining quite concrete goals and activities for the future. The evidence seems clear that the newly arrived specialists assigned to the primary teacher education project held the same philosophy of education that had permeated the first group. Their goals, working relations and specialized competencies harmonized with and were complementary to the program the first Team had initiated. Three years after Dr. Spence became chief, he wrote: "From the beginning of the project the Team has emphasized that the responsibility for all decisions relating to educational policy must be with the Afghans. The function of the specialist is to advise--even if he could learn to see, to think, to believe as the Afghans do, we would still insist upon the principle of Afghan responsibility--the difference between assent and whole-hearted compliance is very important in technical assistance."

To illustrate the difficulty of keeping policy and execution or action separate, however, the following incident is described. During the same year the above statement was made the Minister observed certain examination results of 12th grade students in the DMA. He interpreted certain poor student marks to be the result of a somewhat altered curriculum. He ordered the old courses restored, thus cancelling out what many Afghans and the American Team considered advances. The Team, however, requested a stay in the order while a competent committee reviewed all the evidence. The Minister agreed. Once the data and the two programs were carefully reviewed by the committee, they recommended that the new courses and program be retained. The Minister was convinced and cancelled his order.

The above incident serves well to illustrate the need, particularly in the early stages of a technical assistance project, of having a structure or operational framework that permits freedom to experiment, to innovate and to improvise. It also illustrates, however, that any program of assistance in a complex social enterprise as education that divorces itself from the authority where policy decisions are made and where operational rests likely will meet obstacles and ultimate failure.

As stated in various memoranda and reports the new group of specialists proposed to carry on in much the same fashion as their predecessors had done. However, they clearly set to work to plan for the future with imagination tempered by a sense of practicality. It seems clear, too, that the Team developed its plans with full recognition of education's role in the new Five-Year Economic Development Plan and for the recommendations found in special consultant, Dr. William L. Wrinkle's report to USOM/A. Since the work during the middle phase should be measured in part by the achievement of self-set goals, it seems worthwhile to list the goals published on pages 14, 15, and 16 of the fifth semi-annual report: Those directly related to primary school teacher education may be

summarized as follows:

1. A continuing study of Afghanistan, its culture, its people, its educational needs.
2. Develop a five-year plan for the Institute of Education. Specific programs initiated and carried out.
3. Develop and begin executing an over-all in-service program for teachers.
4. Develop a stronger winter session.
5. Continue to develop a stronger program of professional work in the DMA.
6. Extended and more efficient use of the laboratory school.
7. Wider use of modern teaching and learning materials.
8. Establish a demonstration library.
9. Programs for strengthening science teaching and learning.
10. In-service activities for women.
11. Develop new instruction materials for children in laboratory school.

Although these eleven objectives appear ambitious for such a small team, the records and opinions of both Americans and Afghans indicate that much progress was made by 1962 toward achieving all of them. Before 1959 came to a close, a major revision of the program of studies in the DMA's had been achieved. Although much of the old was retained, new elements appeared in every grade.

A careful reading of the original contract between USAID/TCCU reveals limited vision concerning adequate facilities for training primary teachers for the nation. The contract placed much emphasis on improving the program at the "College" (DMA in Kabul). It is probable, too, that neither the officials of US FOA nor TCCU understood the nature and limitations of the low status secondary school called "college". However,

both the Ministry and the Team soon realized that if the outer provinces were ever to have enough primary school teachers, a system of DMA's would need to be established. By 1959, such a development attracted the concern of the specialists. There is some evidence to suggest that the Afghan leadership had the vision to see the need first.

Possibly the Team was overly concerned with the "College" (Kabul DMA) as a model pilot enterprise rather than helping the Ministry develop an over-all system of primary teacher education. Perhaps the contracts and amendments should have called for a more comprehensive program of teacher education. Furthermore, the Ministry had the courage to act even before the Americans felt such institutions could be properly financed and staffed. At any rate, TCCU showed its interest and willingness to help as early as 1959. At that time, the Chief of the Team wrote: "The Institute team personnel welcomes the opportunity to assist the Ministry in its program of provincial teacher education. They see in this procedure opportunities to:

"1. Develop Kabul DMA as an institution having as a major function the preparation of staff for other teacher education institutions.

"2. Develop and refine procedures for the support of newly begun teacher education institutions.

"3. Train Afghan colleagues in ways of preparing staff members of teacher preparing institutions--this summer we will assist in the development of the 10th class program; next summer the 11th and the succeeding summer the 12th."

By mid-period of the second phase two additional DMA's were in operation. In 1959 the enrollments at Kandahar reached 186, and at Jalalabad the total was 315. See Appendix #4. But no members of the TCCU Team were in residence in those cities.

to give direct assistance to these institutions which were in such serious need of aid. Explanations such as staff shortage, lack of housing outside of Kabul, absence of medical services, and the like, may be made but AID and the Team missed signal opportunities to give help when and where it was most needed.

It was during the second phase that the winter sessions became firmly fixed. Budgets were more adequate. Precise planning and careful scheduling resulted and successful students received recognition for credit and advances on the salary schedule. It was during this period, also, that in-service education for women teachers received impetus and recognition.

The harvest derived from the participants' program began to be a heartening reality during this time. But possibly a hasty review of the program is desirable. As stated in the 10th semi-annual report, there are three stages to the program.

Stage One: In the first stage qualified individuals are identified, are oriented to the work of the Institute, are introduced to education as a profession, are helped to begin a program of study in a special field and are given preparation for study abroad, particularly in the English language. For the most part during Stage One the individuals work as counterparts. Other individuals, known as associates, also have the opportunity to work with the Institute and specialists and grow in their preparation for foreign study.

Stage Two: Following Stage One, each participant (as part of the contract agreement) is sent abroad to follow a carefully planned program of formal study, visits to educational institutions and travel. The majority of the participants to the U.S. study at TCCU, and their programs are carefully supervised.

Stage Three: Following foreign study, each participant returns to Afghanistan and is assigned to a position with the Institute or to one closely associated with it.

It is worthy of note that the policy had been shifted relative to the clientele from which to draw participants. Originally, candidates for study abroad were to be chosen from the Kabul DMA staff.

By 1959, nineteen participants had completed their study abroad and were assigned to prominent posts in Afghanistan. That the program was popular and growing is proved by the fact that in the one year--1959--fifteen persons were studying abroad. Furthermore, additional steps had been taken to study ways and means for more rigid screening.

During the late fifties and early sixties the Institute grew as a sort of home for all those working in the field of teacher education. It had other functions, but in the early years it concentrated on in-service and pre-service teacher education. It became the workshop where professional human resources, not only of the TCCU group, but for many within the structure of the Afghan system of education were utilized and stimulated. In fact, it was a giant laboratory where many human resources could find outlet. Here, planning was done; here, multiple talents were joined; here, imagination and creativity were released; here, materials were produced; here, proposals and recommendations were made to the Ministry for decision and action and here competencies of leaders were strengthened. More will be said of how the Institute was administered and organized.

Another significant development for which the American Team can claim no credit but which did offer new opportunities was the government's decision to permit

women to unveil. Commenting on this event Dr. Spence wrote in late 1959, "During this six months' period the character of work in process suddenly underwent dynamic change. The cause of this change was the unveiling of the Afghan women which began during Jeshyn holiday...women dedicated to teaching began to examine their careers in a new light and to see possibilities of new and exciting qualities of professional attainment. .two women educators unaccompanied by male relatives went to America to study under the participant program."

In summing up the middle years of the Primary Teacher Education Project, it can be observed that steady but modest gains were made toward the goals set in the first phase and reasserted at the beginning of the second.

The pace seemed to slow down a bit. The flush, the enthusiasm and high expectation for early achievement so prevalent among specialists and Afghans alike during the first phase took on a more realistic and patient quality. As change began to slowly emerge, old securities were disturbed. The status quo became attractive, even though the decision had been made to seek progressive change. So some aspects of the project were reexamined and the pace seemed to slow down. Fortunately, the Ministry remained relatively stable and consistent in its purpose. In reality, the nation's educators were only trying to get firm footing for the next step and specialists were trying to strengthen steps already taken. The situation was the result of the ever recurring question--should Afghans adopt and imitate other cultures or develop a new society based on the Islamic heritage, but with a rethinking and reconstruction of the old culture, the old values, the occupational patterns to fit her people to occupy in the new scientific interrelated and interdependent world. A new equilibrium was sought.

How to hold fiercely with one hand to the old values that seemed essential and reach the new in education with the other was an ever present problem. The Afghan leaders seemed determined to do both.

The Team encouraged Afghans to develop a pattern peculiarly their own even though all knew that was the slower though more permanent plan.

The second observable quality of the middle phase of the teacher education project was an extension of the Team's contractual commitments and interests to areas of education other than the ones found in the first contract. The English Language Program together with new commitments to lycees, the University, and women's education and research added dimensions that in a sense seemed to overshadow the task of primary teacher education.

But another result of the Team's work was clearly discernable. Efforts to improve the laboratory school staffs and the effectiveness of student teaching showed results. The content of professional courses and other academic fields in the DMA became more comprehensive and in better sequence. Instructional materials for laboratory schools and DMA's were produced in quantity. They were developed in large degree by specialists and their counterparts. A new quality worthy of mention was a shift to the use of many indigenous materials.

And finally, sanitary conditions improved in the DMA. This was achieved in large measure by the Team with the help of the World Health Organization.

The Third and Last Phase

The last phase of the TCCU operations in the field of primary school teacher education in Afghanistan roughly covers the period from 1961 to the spring of 1967.

This period opened with what appeared to be renewed enthusiasm relative to primary teacher education, but with considerable emphasis on cooperative planning with the top echelon of the Ministry. Also, the period opened, as discussed in the sixteenth semi-annual TCCU report, with a critical analysis of specific jobs to be done by the Team. For the first time since the original contract was signed six years earlier USAID and TCCU decided that job descriptions were to be written and followed by various specialists in the party. Why this had not been done more precisely and consistently earlier is not clear. Possibly it was felt that the whole operation in the earlier stages demanded flexibility in staff assignment and great independence of individual operation. At any rate this action was overdue.

It was during the winter months of 1961-62 that the Team members gave diligent and wise counsel to the Ministry relative to the development of DMA's at Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat. As background for some of this counsel, representatives of the TCCU Team went to Kandahar and Jalalabad to study the situation first hand. Their report and recommendations undoubtedly helped the Ministry as it planned to provide the material and human resources needed for the two-year old institutions. The growing strength of the winter session in Kabul is proved by a whopping enrollment of 565, of which 395 were men and 170 were women. See Appendix #5.

Documents written in the spring of 1962 indicate a surge of leadership from Afghans in the field. The efforts to generate wide participation which had characterized the work of Linton and Spence, now seemed to be bearing fruits. For the Afghans in the Institute of Education this fact was clear. The leadership of the Team, though concerned with a growing number of different contract amendments, gave every assistance

in releasing the imagination and initiative of Afghans but, at the same time, expressed a determination not to dissipate energies on special interests of the Institute other than teacher education.

In the summer of 1962, the TCCU leadership seemed to realize that the time was past due for a geographical realignment of its specialist resources. Help was needed at other DMA's beyond Kabul. Page 10 of the seventeenth report carries the following, "Connections with the other three DMA's have been much more tenuous. Occasional workshops and sporadic visits form the bulk of the contacts. If these DMA's are to be efficient, a great deal of intensive work on the curriculum and program is necessary."

Surely this was a sound observation and some response to it in the form of action did take place. In 1965-66 a specialist in residence was placed at Jalalabad DMA for most of the year and one was assigned to Kandahar DMA in 1966-67. But to the very end of the primary teacher education contract the vast majority of human resources of the TCCU Team remained concentrated in Kabul.

The pressure to give more attention to primary teacher education in the early sixties arose because of the greatly increased primary school enrollment. The Ministry was hard pressed to provide even the minimum housing, equipment, teachers and materials. To supply teachers for the increasingly overcrowded school rooms became a national emergency. Facing this problem, the President of Vocational Education expressed the problem well when he wrote on August 4, 1962, "One of the most serious obstacles to expanding educational opportunities in Afghanistan is the lack of qualified teachers. The current provisions for providing teachers will not

approach fulfilling the need which is envisioned in connection with making education available to more people. Therefore, if extension of education is to be achieved, new approaches to preparing teachers must be devised." About the same time the provincial directors met and voiced the same conclusions. No better evidence can be found of Afghan imagination, self-reliance and developing leadership than their bold plan to hurry the output of teachers by a bold emergency plan to train teachers.

Since 1945 various emergency teacher education plans and programs had been in operation in the United States. Consequently, the new specialist in emergency teacher training who joined the Team had wide knowledge and experience in this field. Working through the Institute, the provincial directors of education, DMA heads and the Ministry, the Team played a significant role in setting up the whole emergency training program. Once the structure was determined, much help was needed to revise the curriculum in the 7th, 8th, and 9th grades as well as to provide minimum professional experiences in the 10th grade emergency sections in the DMA's. As early as the fall of 1962, specific programs had been developed and adopted by the Ministry. Simply stated, the Ministry designated twenty-six middle schools from which would be selected students to enter the national emergency teacher training program. The curriculum for these students was altered somewhat in grades 7, 8, and 9. Related subjects such as history and geography were combined and taught as core fields.

Grade 9 candidates were then sent to DMA's for the final year's work which terminated upon completing grade 10. The grade 10 program in DMA's for academic

fields was highly concentrated and professional work such as the psychology of learning, materials and methods together with student teaching was added. Possibly no major development in the field of primary teacher education in Afghanistan has had more significance nor given more assistance to relieving the teacher shortage. As it helped immeasurably to solve the immediate problems of teacher shortage, it also created another. Soon it became apparent that this horde of only partially trained teachers needed and wanted more education. In-service programs became imperative. Likewise, the recruiting methods had weaknesses. It was believed that some entering the program did so merely as a way of entering other government service; others because they were drafted, and still others to evade service in the military. As experience with the program accumulated and problems and weaknesses were identified, efforts to perfect the plan were made by both the TCCU Team and others.

Early in the third phase, also, an added emphasis was given to closer cooperative effort between the U.S. Team of experts and the USAID Education Office. Possibly the Team as well as USAID came to the realization that both were parts of the same major enterprise and closer cooperative planning, working and evaluation enhanced the total overseas technical assistance effort.

It was during the early years of the concluding phase of the primary teacher education project of the TCCU contract that the evidence mounted to prove that the primary teacher education problem in Afghanistan had grown in complexity and size. The demand by the people for more primary education and its subsequent impingement of the demand for more teachers presented new and larger challenges to the Team. Instead of having one DMA to help develop strength and quality now there were five.

Instead of facing the problem of improving instruction and materials for the "regular" primary training program, now the national emergency effort demanded attention. Instead of sporadic requests for in-service education as was true during the first phase, the third phase found teachers by the hundreds asking for organized continuing education. And the Ministry was finding ways to encourage them to do so. Indeed, the additional trained Afghan leaders carried additional responsible roles, but the fields of service demanded of them, expanded and multiplied.

The sheer size of the operation, together with the growing concern for upgrading curriculum content and methods in the teacher education program resulted in new and increasing demands put upon the Team. These additional demands were met in part by the additional specialists in primary teacher education. In 1962 only four TCCU staff members were assigned to primary teacher education, whereas in January 1967 there were eight. Although it might seem logical that TCCU and USAID/A would tend to neglect primary teacher education because of taking on such additional obligations as the direction of the English program, science and math in the lycees, the development of a strong Faculty of Education in the University and the onrush of the Primary Curriculum and Textbook Project, the evidence in the phasing out years would not support such a conclusion. Although the Chief of Party of the TCCU Team necessarily had to proliferate his energies and give it less of his time the effort to strengthen primary teacher education was not weakened as the program came to a close. In fact, the human resources assigned to the multiple projects often supplemented and complemented each other and some, if not all, had relevance to primary teacher education. Surely the specialists brought in to work on the Primary

Curriculum and Textbook project have competences that would have aided greatly in the teacher education effort had the two projects been merged. As the two projects progress under different sponsorship, every effort should be made to assure complete understanding and cooperation between the Teams from TCCU and UNESCO. Furthermore, the Team working with the Faculty of Education contributed to training personnel which later began teaching in DMA's. But the fact remains that the multiple contract with TCCU forced the University to recruit its specialists more and more, from without its Faculty.

So the question should ever be before USAID and any contracting university: To what extent should a contract permit outside recruitment? The original team of four specialists were 100% from TCCU; those assigned to the primary teacher education project in 1967 with the exception of the Chief, were 100% from without. As a matter of policy is it wise to have a university contract which demands so little of the resources of that university?

Some light is thrown on the effectiveness of the Team when a report was made of a study requested by Dr. Anas, Deputy Minister of Education in 1962. The study designed to compare the programs in the DMA laboratory schools with those in the regular Ministry schools. A short quotation seems pertinent: "This report makes clear that a significant area of difference lies not in the curriculum outlined in schedules and course titles, as it does in the attitudes of teachers and methods they employ."

Incidentally, the efforts to improve the curriculum and methods of the laboratory schools in the fifties persisted and had telling effects, particularly in Kabul

during the sixties. Demonstrations for teachers that reached their height in 1966-67 were most effective in creating new insights and a thirst for change on the part of both teachers and headmasters.

The Team, early in the third phase, made some studies that aided the Ministry immeasurably. Among them was a review of the attrition rate in the DMA's. One DMA started a class of 159 seventh graders and graduated 30 of the twelfth class. Another started with 200 and finished only 15.

Consistent with a long-standing recommendation of the Team, the Ministry of Education, in 1963, authorized a director of teacher education in the Vocational Education Department. A few years later, with the urging of the U.S. specialists a full-blown Department of Teacher Education was established. This new department gave much strength and status to teachers and teacher education. By late 1963, the Chief of Party reported a strengthening of the teacher education team together with increased emphasis on curriculum content materials and methods in science and social science for the training program. Furthermore, science kits were prepared and distributed and other curriculum advances made.

Again the Team reexamined its objectives and established new priorities. The Team expressed itself as follows: "Team efforts should be directed toward developing lasting teacher preparation institutions. For the primary school, it is the DMA's." To achieve this they set four basic goals for the immediate future:

- "1. Design a new sequence of professional courses together with improved materials of instruction.

"2. Perfect laboratory schools for in-service demonstrations and student observation and student teaching.

"3. Experiment with a sequence of selected primary school subjects, together with teaching guides.

"4. Upgrade through new experiences and study the faculties of all DMA's."

The Team was active with the Institute to operate in-service programs-- demonstrations, workshops and vacation sessions but these were not given as high priorities as the above mentioned four.

In spite of other emphases and priorities of goals the enrollments in summer and winter sessions for teacher in-service reached a peak of 848 in 1961-62, lowered to 743 in 1962-63, but again rose to 776 in 1966-67. Appendix #5, a graph made by the Team and the Institute gives a visual image of these data.

It might be observed that to effect programs in five centers where DMA's were located and to help with the growing in-service programs was an overwhelming task. The relatively small number of specialists assigned to the project at that time simply could not spread themselves to assist throughout Afghanistan. The administration of the program sought greater personnel from USAID and received it even though decision was in the making to relinquish to UNESCO responsibility of giving technical assistance in primary teacher education.

By 1964, after careful study of all factors contributing most to the Kabul DMA program for seniors, it was decided to withdraw from the Gulzar Community Development Program which absorbed one-third of the senior year of all students. Since the primary school is recognized as a potentially important factor in community

development and that the teacher should have competences for community leadership the decision to advise the change was made reluctantly. To help in this regard a course called Community Leadership and Fundamental Education was introduced. Probably both the community school development and the rural development program would profit by closer coordination and cooperation with Afghan teacher education.

It was at this time that the general education needs of DMA graduates, particularly during the twelfth class, were again reexamined, particularly with reference to University admission.

The pressure for technical advice on school-building design mounted by the mid-sixties. The modern characteristics of the new laboratory schools and the nearly complete new DMA structures are largely the result of specialists' counsel.

Although authorities in the field of teacher education should have freedom to work and plan, there were times during the 13-year period when it appeared that the continuity, integration, unity and sequence of the Team effort became blurred and reached a slow pace. Beginning with the 100 percent turnover in 1956, this was noticeable from time to time, particularly when there were rapid turnovers of staff, when there was little overlapping of terms of service, when contract obligations were being expanded and put in operation--thus demanding more diverse attention from the Chief of Party and forcing him to give less time to the primary school teacher education project. Likewise, as evidenced by a sub team entirely recruited from outside, the commitment by the University to give of its resources seemed to lessen in the field of primary teacher education.

Although some Afghans in the academic fields were less than enthusiastic, there was considerable curriculum advances made in the DMA's during the past five years in the fields of agriculture, practical arts, health and physical education. It was during this period that the leadership of the TCCU Team gave new impetus to primary teacher education with special concern for having resident specialists or part-time assignments to institutions outside of Kabul. By 1964, a specialist was located in Kandahar. Primary teacher education also had reached a state of sophistication that many Afghan leaders as well as Team specialists realized that progress toward better instruction was being slowed down by antiquated curricula, outdated books, and materials in the primary schools where DMA graduates teach.

Gradually the light had dawned among Afghan leaders that enlightened and competent teachers, striving to make education serve in a changing world and possessing modern concepts and new technical skills were of little avail if they must teach for the goals of yesterday and with the materials and aids of a bygone day. Consequently, it may be reasonably concluded that the whole program of primary teacher education did much to generate the movement of top Afghan officials in the Ministry to reconstruct the primary school curriculum and rewrite the textbooks.

Even as the Ministry pondered the need for a radically revised curriculum for the primary schools, the TCCU specialists became less generalists in primary teacher education and more specialists in the academic fields of the primary school program and more knowledgeable in special methods. The content and

methods of elementary science, social science and mathematics for use in the laboratory schools and DMA's were examined and revised by Team specialists and Afghan associates in the Institute. It is true that these newly developed programs were used almost exclusively in the laboratory schools, yet the demonstration classes using these modern materials reached hundreds of primary teachers as well as the hundreds of students and faculty members of the DMA's. It was during the last half of the third phase of operations that greatest gains were made in developing teaching materials from indigenous raw resources and in creating and using audio-visual aids. Thus, an understanding and a desire for change was slowly seeping into the mainstream of thought within the Afghan teaching profession--from primary school teacher to the Minister of Education. It is not strange then that the Afghan leadership approached USAID with a proposal for technical assistance in the broad field of curriculum and textbook revision for primary education. As previously stated, probably greater success could be predicted had the two major projects been merged and continued side by side under the same auspices and with the same source of support.

The success of the Emergency National Teacher Education Program became evident in 1964 as the Team gave it yeoman support. In 1965, the Emergency Program turned out more teachers than did the regular curriculum and by 1967 the Emergency graduates will have added up to 687 against the regular graduates of 204. It is particularly worthy of note that the graduates of the one (Kabul) program who entered teaching in 1956 were 20, whereas the number for the four schools with twelfth grade graduates in 1967 exceeded 200. See Appendix #4.

*- has
place of women*

Although the Team had shown concern for teacher education for women, particularly in in-service education, the first constructive proposal which gained considerable enthusiastic support was made in April 1965. Since most women primary school teachers begin teaching before or immediately after completing grade 9, a curriculum pattern for the girls in middle schools who plan to teach was developed with Team assistance. Furthermore, another proposal was a pilot program in teacher education in a girls' lycee in Kabul. Four women participants returning from advanced study in the U.S. have been recommended by the Team as curriculum specialists for girls' schools. Two women members of the Institute were teaching professional content courses in two girls' lycees in Kabul in 1966.

By 1965 graduates of the Faculty of Education of Kabul University were being assigned to teaching positions in DMA's. Thus, a dividend to primary teacher education is derived from another enlargement of the USAID contract with TCCU.

Semi-annual reports, from the beginning, emphasized the goal of self adequacy in staff and leadership in the DMA's and laboratory schools. The reports of 1964 and 1965 repeat this goal. Although the DMA's and laboratory schools of Afghanistan differed markedly in faculty proficiency, material resources, quality of instruction and sophistication of educational goals, first-hand observation reveals the continued need of much specific specialist help and for greatly increased budgets. This is particularly true in the schools outside the nation's capital. If estimates of enrollment increases are accurate, still other DMA's will need to be started and specialist assistance will be demanded as they are developed to serve as in-service training centers as well as for pre-service education.

As early as 1965, AID/W became interested in shifting the responsibility for aiding primary school teacher education from USAID over to UNESCO. Evidence was not found by the evaluation to explain why such a transfer was desirable. The task was far from finished. At about the same time USAID was requested by the RGA to provide a TCCU Team to assist the Ministry in revising the primary school curriculum and in writing textbooks to be used in primary schools. Conferences were held between the Ministry, UNESCO officials, USAID/A and the TCCU representatives. Finally a decision was reached whereby the TCCU project in primary teacher education would be discontinued in 1967 but UNESCO would assume the responsibility of giving technical assistance in that field. In turn an agreement was made between USAID and RGA which permitted USAID to contract with TCCU to assume responsibility for aiding the Ministry in revising the primary school curriculum and for writing new textbooks and instructional materials for these schools. As the time approached for UNESCO to assume responsibilities previously carried by the TCCU Team personnel from each group worked in complete harmony. The transition seemed to take place in a spirit of cooperation and good will. Numerous joint meetings were held with Afghan officials, the UNESCO Team, USAID representatives, and the TCCU Team. Again it should be said that the kinship of primary teacher education and the project to revise the primary school curriculum and write new textbooks should command close understanding, cooperation between the two teams--UNESCO and TCCU.

As the technical assistance project in primary teacher education came to a close many Afghans have expressed satisfaction at what the project has achieved. Americans likewise view this cooperative undertaking with a strong conviction that

not only has primary education been strengthened but lasting friendships have been made.

PROGRESS MADE IN PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHER EDUCATION

Substantial quantitative and qualitative advances were made during the twelve years when the TCCU Team assisted. It is not contended that the American specialists by themselves brought about these changes but they were a positive factor, often a very important one. Some quantitative and qualitative advances that were made between 1954 and in the spring of 1967 are described under the next two major headings.

Quantitative Advances

1. The interest in education and general demand for educational opportunity in Afghanistan grew at an amazing rate. Surely, the presence of the American team working with Afghan associates together with USAID gave this spirit considerable stimulation and support.

2. Enrollments in the primary schools rose at an amazing rate. The total enrollments in primary schools jumped from approximately 90,000 in 1954 to an estimated number of 330,972 in 1967. The number of primary school teachers grew correspondingly--and many with greater qualifications. Appendix #3 presents in graphic form the enrollment facts in all types of schools.

3. According to data provided by the TCCU Team on primary teacher education chart, the number of teachers leaving the DMA regular and emergency training program and going into teaching rose from 20 in 1956 to 891 in 1967. See Appendix #4. Of this latter number 687 were emergency trained people and 204 were regular.

4. DMA's spread from Kabul to Jalalabad, to Kandahar, to Herat, and Mazar-i-Sharif and two more are on the drawing boards. In 1954 there were 21 professional staff members in primary teacher training; in 1967 those in all DMA's total 162. The Team members from time to time, recommended establishing additional teacher training schools in the provinces, and the Ministry supported by the people boldly made the hard decisions to expand, build and staff new ones.

5. Although the total number of teachers who received in-service education cannot be accurately determined, a count of those in winter and summer sessions, in workshops and in demonstrations and conferences adds up to a number of nearly 10,000. Many of these, of course, are duplications. Although these courses had the quality of giving practical modern aid to the teachers in attendance, they also attained scholarly status. The teachers were stimulated and helped to do better their daily tasks and the institutions giving credit were not forced to lower standards.

6. Laboratory schools and associated schools have been added in four of the five teacher training centers and plans are complete for achieving the same for Mazar-i-Sharif within a short time. Furthermore, the staffs in these schools have had added training.

7. With the support of AID (PL 480 wheat money), new school plants for DMA's and laboratory schools have been built or are under construction. The Team members together with USAID/A officials have played major roles in the layouts and designs of these structures.

8. The American specialists and the primary teacher education project played major roles in selecting and training Afghan leaders. First of these were participants who never could have trained without the AID/TCCU contract and dedication on the part of Team members. Second among the efforts to develop leaders is the counterpart. Although the counterpart in turn helped the Team members to grow and achieve his goals, most of the guidance came from the specialist. In a major sense the counterpart, while serving as interpreter, was also learning as an apprentice. It should not go unnoticed that the Ministry was most generous in helping provide manpower. Good examples of this foresight and sacrifice was in the form of counterparts, associates, members of the Institute, the rapidly expanding staffs of DMA's and laboratory schools and teachers for new schools.

9. Although teachers' salaries remain entirely too low, the annual salary has risen sharply since 1954. For example, in 1954, salaries were: Rank 1 = Afs. 13,500; Rank 6 = Afs. 4,000; Rank 12 = Afs. 1,716; whereas in 1966 salaries were: Rank 1 = Afs. 68,000; Rank 6 = Afs. 26,900; Rank 12 = Afs. 11,520. While the Afghani depreciated considerably, these increases represent a real gain of two or three times the original scale. The Team continually and with insistence pointed out that as preparation standards go up, so should salaries.

10. A systematic program and organized courses for vacation sessions for teachers and administrators have become a fixed part of the Ministry's procedures. Their origin and development is closely associated with the work of the Team.

11. Likewise, workshops and demonstrations have become accepted and supported by the Ministry as on-going activities.

12. The Ministry, acting with the strong endorsement of the Team, has accepted a plan to financially assist teachers who consistently continue a program of in-service education.

13. The Ministry, again with the advice of TCCU officials, has accepted an organized plan for giving scholastic credit to approved programs of in-service education.

14. The Ministry has approved a plan for giving salary increments for post-DMA scholastic achievement in the winter and summer sessions conducted by the Institute. Unquestionably, the over-all effort to improve primary teacher education in the DMA influenced this decision.

15. The equipment (science labs, social studies and English labs) and instructional supplies (particularly those made from indigenous materials) have multiplied greatly, due in no small measure to the work of the TCCU Team. The contribution in American dollars is estimated to be \$200,000.

16. One hundred forty-one additional professional staff members have been added to the DMA's since 1954.

17. A soundly planned program for training emergency teachers; together with 26 middle schools which select and train those entering the tenth grade of the emergency training program in the DMA's is in operation.

Qualitative Advance

It is recognized that some advances are both qualitative and quantitative. Quality and quantity often go hand in hand; often blending into each other. The following may in some instances overlap the preceding section.

1. The public demand and public support gives the Ministry the confidence to greatly increase the budget for education. More than 10% of the national operational budget went for that purpose of 1966-67. Although this is a sizeable proportion of the national budget, there are other developing countries who use a greater percent for education. It would appear that education in Afghanistan might, to advantage, be given a higher budgetary priority.

2. The Minister of Education, on the advice of the TCCU Team, has established a major division in the Ministry devoted to teacher education.

3. Considerable readjustment has been made in the philosophy and practice regarding education's role in a contemporary, scientific world. What is education? What is its function? How is it attained? What is the teacher's role? All these questions and more have been considered and decisions made about them--all with modern implications. Although the Team members participated in the dialogue and deliberations the conclusions, the decisions were peculiarly those of the Afghans.

4. There is evidence to prove a growing awareness and acceptance by many more teachers of a professional role together with commensurate responsibilities and commitments to duty. Although absences and tardiness of teachers continues to be too high, their prevalence is reduced. A study made and presented to the Ministry in 1965 by Charles W. Prewitt of the Team presents the bald facts regarding loss of student and teacher time. Too, teachers in greater numbers accept responsibility for continuing their professional preparation. In this area the specialists have exerted profound influence on teachers, principals and directors in their professional preparation.

5. Teachers, many more as previously indicated, realize that the times demand better professional competence. Workshops, vacation sessions and attendance at demonstrations are tangible proof that the profession of teaching is on the move in Afghanistan.

6. The regular professional preparation program of the DMA's has been extended from 11 to 12 grades and greatly upgraded.

7. The curriculum of DMA's has been overhauled many times and continues to improve in content and quality. At the present time, counting student teaching, 23% can be classified as professional content. Appendix #6 shows the subject distribution in the DMA curriculum.

Today's authorities on teacher education curricula would support this distribution as being well balanced and reasonable although a majority of primary teacher education curricula include a bigger percent given to psychology, methods and materials, philosophy and student teaching.

8. The establishment, growth, and improvement of the laboratory schools unquestionably adds significantly to the teacher education preparation. It is of great value to in-service as well as pre-service teacher education. They provide student teaching facilities as well as the place for innovation and experimentation. Here again, the Team played a signal role.

9. Afghan education leadership is significantly better educated than was true in 1954. Both quality and quantity have advanced at an amazing rate--due in considerable part to the presence of the Team. The development of the Institute and University Faculty of Education played a role. But the work with the counterparts

and associates, together with the plan to select and train participants abroad prepared leaders by the score. Likewise, workshops and other in-service experience have advanced the competence of administrators, inspectors, and others in official positions. A check of the record shows that 825 administrators and 255 supervisors have been in attendance at winter and summer in-service sessions. Some, of course, were repeaters.

10. Greatly widened horizons and increased competences of many teachers who have been involved in demonstrations, workshops and vacation sessions raised the quality of instruction in Afghanistan schools.

11. Unquestionably the Primary Teacher Education Project stimulated thinking in the field of primary school curriculum. Teacher education is related inevitably to the curriculum. So, a great factor in leading the Ministry to set up the new primary curriculum and textbook study was the work done in primary teacher education. The ferment that went on in both the in-service as well as the pre-service program for training primary teacher education finally erupted to produce this significant project to change the curriculum and materials of instruction in all the primary schools.

12. Furthermore, had the primary teacher education team not done a salutary job, the Ministry of Education would not have asked USAID and the same University to provide specialists for the new major project.

13. The work of the Team did much to develop the unique resources of the Institute of Education. As mentioned earlier and will be commented on later, this unusual institution, more than any other, served as an operational vehicle through

which the Team worked. Its unusual growth in services, stature, and influence was due in no small measure to the Team. Always, however, the Ministry was giving it strong backing.

14. The work of the Team had some influence on the leadership of the University of Kabul. They gave a strong assist to the Faculty of Education

SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS, OVER-ALL ANALYSES AND CONCLUSIONS

It seems important to discuss some over-all aspects of the USAID/TCCU project of primary school teacher education in Afghanistan. Possibly these observations may add value to the preceding pages. It is recognized that there may be some disagreement with these inferences, comments and judgments. The observations, however, are the result of many carefully selected impressions gained from many sources. Sometimes the impression was gained by studying objective data, sometimes from reading documents, sometimes from interviews, sometimes from serious dialogue, and sometimes from first-hand observation. Always they were reflected upon in the light of long experience and study.

A General Appraisal

Both USAID and RGA can take great satisfaction in the over-all results of the joint effort to improve primary teacher education in Afghanistan. TCCU, together with the Ministry of Education, too, may justly be proud of their achievements. It is nothing short of amazing that over a twelve-year span the American specialists and their Afghan associates have made so few blunders. Cultural differences were great and value systems were variant. Yet operational procedures and policies were made to harmonize to a high degree.

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The specific qualitative and quantitative gains have already been cited but it should be said again and again that all institutions involved in teacher education are very much stronger and they, together with the professional leadership related to them, show signs of being self sustained. Surely the activities which have permeated primary teacher education during the past twelve years have stimulated fermentation in many minds, stirred imagination, raised the horizons of expectation, developed professional competencies, aroused curiosity, engendered hope, and brought about the acceptance of change--yet neither fear, instability nor violent reaction nor regression have resulted.

But as the TCCU Team shifts its energies to another closely related project and leaves the outside technical assistance in primary teacher education to a team from UNESCO, it should not be assumed that the continuing task is minor. Even as gains in the teacher education are proudly cited a realistic appraisal shows very much yet to be done. The sheer growth in enrollments, the establishment of additional DMA's, with relatively weak staffs and programs, and the increasing demands by teachers for more education continues to throw added burdens on those responsible for teacher education. The many partially trained teachers from the national emergency program must have continued opportunity to grow. The UNESCO Planning Team's supplementary report dated November, 1966, predicts an increase in primary school enrollments by 1971 of 151,000 pupils and this is a modest estimate. Thus, for new pupils alone there should be an annual output of 755 new teachers. But even more pressing is the imperative need to upgrade the hundreds of inadequately prepared persons already teaching and to strengthen the relatively weak DMA's.

✓ There continues to be a pressing need for technical assistance of continuing high quality and of considerable quantity. The new DMA's need expert assistance. For example, in the area of practical training they need help in developing a strong staff for laboratory schools and for specialists of a high quality to supervise student teaching and to help laboratory teachers to know how to direct and assist student teachers. Unless UNESCO can provide exceedingly high quality, well trained and widely experienced specialists for rapidly expanding program of teacher education may falter and fall.

The University Contract and Technical Assistance

The policy of making contracts with universities for teams to give technical assistance has many arguments to support it. In many fields of technical assistance the universities have by far the greatest store house of specialists. Furthermore, the plan decentralizes administration. The plan does not work automatically, however, nor is it fool proof. In the first place, AID officials must have a continuing policy of studying and evaluation the specialized resources of many universities together with valid information concerning the integrity and commitment of the university authorities. Furthermore, AID needs to know the policies and practices the university follows relative to its staff who accept foreign assignments. Unless the university is willing to become seriously involved overseas; unless it accepts whole heartedly the foreign assistance program; unless it strives to make staff members available without penalty in promotion, reassignment, rigidity in tour limits; unless it has deep commitments to render excellent service, then neither it nor AID should negotiate a contract. There is no doubt but that the success of the TCCU project in primary

teacher education can be traced in very great degree to the high quality of the specialists. Without exception the chiefs of party were superior. Many people associated with the program testified to the belief that specialists increased in proficiency over a four-year period of service. After four years an extension of service on a particular project should depend on the character of the individual and the particular hardship of the assignment. The first six months were least productive. A longer orientation period together with concentrated training in Dari would have been exceedingly valuable. Occasionally there were misfits, but most did their work well. A careful review of their specializations together with information supplied by interviews revealed the fact that some were not recruited in terms of job specifications. In fact, some obviously were recruited with titles totally foreign to the tasks they found awaiting them. Obviously it is not an easy task to find a tailor-made specialist, particularly if his task has not been carefully defined. However, it is not amiss to emphasize that much attention should be given by a university to making sure the man on a foreign assignment fits the job he is to fill. Not only should the job specifications be known by the recruiter but the personal characteristics, the commitment to duty, and the special competence should be appraised before a specialist is assigned. Job specifications should precede recruitment.

An analysis of each specialization as shown in Appendix #1 leads one to wonder why certain Team members were selected. On the first team of four one was in art education, another in secondary specialization. Almost every team had specialists whose competencies seemed somewhat unfitted for the task at hand.

In almost all instances the specialist made necessary adjustments and acquitted himself well.

The initial Team members were all from TCCU and, in fact, the agreement specified that half must be from the University and with a minimum rank of assistant professor. This policy was abandoned later. Whether this was by mutual agreement or forced by expediency or convenience was never clearly revealed to the evaluator. It is difficult to believe that a university keeps its deep sense of commitment and close involvement in a technical assistance program when it depends on outside specialists to represent it and keep its obligations.

Likewise, AID should have a deep interest in the caliber of specialists who render the service. AID should give continuing assistance to the universities involved and without overt interference play a cooperating and evaluating role in a friendly partnership and in a climate of mutual respect.

USAID Overseas Staff and University Relations

As stated earlier AID officials have a responsibility to know, work with, assist and hold insights relative to the project operations of any university project. AID cannot maintain its integrity and responsibility by simply signing a contract and waiting with folded hands until the project's end before making judgments concerning its on-going effectiveness. Few public agencies would be willing to allow major operations to go unsupervised. The board of trustees of a university, a local board of education as a matter of policy insist on a construction supervisor when any building under contract is under construction. Therefore, it is imperative that professionally competent personnel in AID and the leadership of university teams

together plan their respective cooperating roles. Thus, each will make a contribution; thus, each will stimulate and aid the other; thus, mutual respect, joint planning and joint assessment will be achieved.

When an AID mission in any country is involved in university contracts related to improving education, it should have an education officer to work with the contract team. It goes without saying that it is not his role to manage the activities of the team. The team must have great freedom to plan, develop, and execute its program. But freedom does not mean absence of responsibility to report progress, make and report periodic evaluations, explain programs and methods and to conform to reasonable policies and regulations which must necessarily be established. Periodic conferences between USAID education officials and team chiefs should be held as a routine policy. The semi-annual reports made by the Team are examples of splendid types of documentation.

The TCCU/AID Contracts and Amendments

Appendix #2 is a step by step summary of the several contract agreements and many amendments entered into by USAID and the top officials of the TCCU. An analysis of this long series of negotiations would be helpful to those writing future contracts.

In fact USAID would profit by careful and detailed study of each biennial contract rewrite from 1954 to 1966. These contracts with TCCU represent the first and most comprehensive contractual agreements reached between U.S. overseas technical assistance officials and an American university. An appraisal of these documents will give solid guidance for the future. Questionable assumptions, errors made because of lack of understanding of education and culture in Afghanistan, the weakness of

short-range planning, underestimating public demand for education, the danger of spreading team resources too thin, underestimating the cultural lag, the need for flexibility in some areas and the need for firm job assignments in others likely would be revealed by such an evaluation. Guide lines for future contracts could likewise be evolved.

Only a few observations concerning this long list of contracts and amendments will be attempted here. The first observation and possibly the most important is that the writers of the contracts underestimated the complex and comprehensive nature of the task of developing a satisfactory system of pre-service and in-service education for primary school teachers in an underdeveloped country. They underestimated the resources needed but more particularly they expected too much too soon. Long-time goals as well as short-time objectives were not carefully planned and geared together. Almost from the initial year pressure or poor judgment suggested that the project soon should terminate or phase out. Possibly political expediency back in the States, possibly it was impatience, but more likely it was just sheer underestimation of the time necessary to develop leaders, build program and institutions, to change values, and to bring about social change. At any rate the short view, the underestimation of the resources and time needed to achieve the goals set in the first contract of 1954 served as a major handicap to the Team and the Afghan associates. Surely no serious student of education would have expected to achieve in a short time lasting results in as complex an operation as teacher education. To change and significantly develop, particularly when there is hardly any beginning

base, takes time and long-term planning. Everybody including the RGA, the TCCU Team and USAID officials underestimated the complexity of this phenomenon.

The short view, the underestimation of the resources and time needed to achieve a major goal for the whole nation was a major obstacle and a continuing handicap to the Team and its Afghan associates. However, as the amendments were added and the contract extended the parties involved did show flexibility and willingness to extend and enlarge goals.

In the second place, the amendments reflect a tendency to add items that are quite periferal to the main task of teacher education and to give official sanction to aspects of the program that were already under way. As examples of this the following are noted: An expert in women's education, advisor to the Dean of the University. At other times areas of service were added without expanding the Team's resources.

Third, until the sixties some amendments were often written in very general terms that had two results. The first effect was to allow great flexibility in personnel management and in choices of service. When the Team was unified as to goals and blessed with a strong, well-rounded professional team, the results were good. On the other hand, there were times when this lack of definition of roles and job assignments led to a proliferation of energies and to an over-emphasis of pet projects. At other times it encouraged the pursuit of special interest.

About 1962-63 the contracts became more specific as to jobs to be done by specialists and concrete activities to be undertaken. This change probably reflected careful planning on the part of the Team itself. At any rate, it was an advanced step.

Many other observations could be made concerning the contract and amendments. Possibly the readers may wish to study in detail the summary as shown in Appendix #2.

Research

Although provision for research was made within several amendments to the contract and although limited specialist personnel for research were on the Team there is little evidence that basic research took place. No well designed research patterns nor clearly stated hypotheses to be tested were revealed in this study. This can be explained by the solid fact that experimental or historical research is slow, expensive and demanding on personnel.

However, the philosophy which seemed to dominate the leadership of the Team and many specialists at all times reflected the experimental or action research approach to nearly every problem they faced. In other words, supported by a determination to respect the values, the mores of Afghans, the Team usually approached a problem or situation realistically and tested assumptions, practices, techniques, and materials in a pragmatic and empirical fashion. Thus, the day-to-day critical observations and analyses of phenomena about them and of actual experiences while planning and operating was a valuable form of behavior that had the essential elements of action research. Consequently, the whole series of running experiences became an informal and flexible operation which had many qualities of action research. However, the specialist in research who was assigned to the Team probably contributed less to primary teacher education than would another whose competences were more relevant to the project.

Reporting and Evaluation

Twenty-five semi-annual reports were carefully read. Each of these was prepared with care and in considerable detail. Through this medium AID was kept informed of the specific activities in which the Team was engaged. Furthermore, the reports in a sense served as measuring devices. Judgments on the success or failure of operations often were expressed in these reports. Sometimes they were critical; sometimes they expressed satisfaction with progress.

However, there was a lack of systematic, periodic, and over-all evaluation of the total operations in primary teacher education. If this had been done the achievements probably would have been even more pronounced. Such an activity would have resulted in more unified Team effort; it would have prevented the individual Team member from splintering off on a pet project; it would have resulted in clearer goals both short time and long time; it would have concentrated resources on fewer spheres of action.

Relative to proliferation of personnel and the temptation to extend energies it seems pertinent to quote from a special report published and issued as a Team statement in December, 1963, entitled, "The Teachers College, Columbia University Team and The Institute of Education". "One generalization that seems justified is that the Team has been too prone to spread thin its efforts and talents with the result that lasting institutions for the preparation of teachers have gotten less attention than they deserved." Further in this special report is found, "One goal of this statement is to define the objectives of the TCCU Team in such a way that maximum contributions

will be made to the further development of lasting teacher preparation institutions. The second major concern of this statement is to propose a plan for the work of the Team which holds greatest promise of achieving the stated goals."

So in 1963 with the project two-thirds of the way along we see a serious effort to evaluate, to delimit efforts, and then make concrete plans for next steps. Such a procedure, if practiced at regular periods throughout the twelve years would have kept the Team's efforts in more limited areas and probably would have resulted in more lasting gains. Furthermore, relatively frequent evaluations would have kept the attention of the Team, the Afghan authorities and AID more concentrated on the problem of primary teacher education and closely related problems. Too, such evaluations might have resulted in a sounder renewed contracts and wiser amendments.

The Policy of Training Participants

As stated earlier the policy and program of carefully selecting very promising persons and then sending them to universities outside of Afghanistan for further training has proved successful. Much credit is due those who made the first FOA/TCCU contract since this original document outlined the plan. A memorandum from the Chief of Party of the TCCU Team in April of 1967, states that seventy persons have been sent for training in primary teacher education, most of them to the U.S. Although a considerable number did not return to positions in the DMA's as was originally intended, they have returned to Afghanistan. A random check on the leadership roles in the Ministry, the University, and other administrators shows that many officials are people who were selected and trained as participants in the Primary Teacher Education Project.

Furthermore, their training in teacher education, regardless of their present role of leadership, assures their sympathy toward and understanding of primary teacher education.

It is almost universally believed that the following aspects of this program can be strengthened. First of all, no one should be sent to the U.S. as a participant unless or until he has achieved considerable competence in English. Lack of such competence has been a serious obstacle to learning in an American university. Other qualities for leadership demanded attention also. Addressing himself to this topic, Dr. Ralph Spence wrote this memorandum in 1967, "We sent some persons we knew we shouldn't have sent. We were hoping to use the significant incident technique for recording events and then review these in staff conferences. . . Some methods of this kind would give a better basis for evaluating a person's growth and provide a sounder base for deciding fitness for foreign study."

Second, American university authorities should give guidance to the Afghan participants relative to their program of studies and to their extra curricular activities. Unless the program of studies is somewhat tailor-made to the Afghan students background and future role, it will not fully succeed. The Team has a responsibility to select only those colleges or universities which have facilities, personnel and programs suitable for preparing leaders for primary teacher education service in Afghanistan. Third, a policy should be developed with the Ministry which would give greater assurance that the participant, after having completed his study abroad, will serve in the specialized field for which he is trained. The Team, working closely with USAID and the Ministry, have analyzed this problem early and developed realistic

procedures which would have given greater assurance that the participant would return to a job that used his special competence to a greater degree.

Last, participants sent for primary teacher education should have been sent to a greater variety of institutions, particularly in the rural areas. This would have given them experiences a bit more like rural Afghanistan and would have prevented Afghans from forming their own campus "society". It is to the credit of Teachers College that it sent many participants on visits to other college campuses, though a high percentage went to Columbia.

The Institute of Education

The Institute of Education was created by the Ministry to provide a vehicle for hastening progress by giving it freedom beyond that found in the traditionally organized administrative framework. Although from the beginning it was given areas of service beyond primary teacher education, its early concentration centered in this field. In fact, it became the laboratory wherein the Team functioned as materials were prepared for use in the DMA's and the laboratory schools and where objectives, plans, and instructional practices were discussed. It was in the Institute that dialogue of depth and intensity took place. In it controversy, invention, innovation and new insights were every-day occurrences.

Since the major USAID project in education for Afghanistan was that of primary teacher education at the time it was established, this field held the lime light for a number of years. Soon a new major project developed in the Institute. With the help of the Team in-service education for teachers became a major and fruitful activity.

A brief statement relative to its administration and machinery of operation may help interpret the Institute of Education. The over-all budget is approved and allotted by the Ministry. Within the budgetary procedures approved by the Ministry, the President of the Institute had considerable freedom to spend it. Although it utilized an advisory board in its early years of operation, this board came into disuse. The President grew in power and independence. Within the Institute the machinery for determining projects, use of personnel, and work schedules was similar in many ways to the operations of a faculty of the University but perhaps with greater flexibility.

As time went on, however, the Institute, like USAID and the TCCU Team, became involved in many aspects of education. The Ministry gave support to its extended goals and provided considerable budgetary assistance. Neither the Institute nor the Ministry could resist the burgeoning demands and problems of education which permeated Afghanistan. But as the Institute grew so did the Ministry. The Faculty of Education of the University, the Teacher Education Division in the Ministry, and the Higher Teachers College developed rapidly. The Institute has provided the structure, the environment, and the personnel for doing much that was needed to be done. Now, however, its roles and its relationship as related to other Afghan institutions as well as to specialists provided by TCCU needs clarification.

Although the Institute has been of inestimable value to the primary teacher education undertaking by providing a laboratory setting, counterparts, and associates it has also been an inducement for the Team to become engaged in too many tasks. This fact was made evident when the Team concluded in a special report in December, 1963, that, "There is no doubt about the importance of all problems the Institute has

been asked to work on and no question but that roles it has been expected to play are significant. The fact is, however, that the TCCU Team is staffed, budgeted and committed for a clearly and narrowly defined role in teacher education and, in the end, will be judged accordingly."

Had the Team reached such a decision earlier the expansion of its activities as reflected in some of the amendments to the contract might have been more limited. The place of the Institute in the Ministerial hierarchy, both as to function and as to structure, probably needs reexamination. The Ministry has a growing service to perform for the rapidly expanding school system. Some of this service is in over-all planning; some in the field of curriculum change; some of it is in the field of evaluation; some of it is relative to innovative practices, and still others are providing in-service education for teachers and other adults.

Whether the Institute should be authorized to render some or all of these services should be the concern of the Ministry and the Team, too, for that matter. Furthermore, as the establishments for education multiply there is need to coordinate their services and their administration. Should the Institute of Education remain relatively independent in budget and control, should it be placed in the Ministry as a research and field service division or should it be an extension department in the Faculty of Education are questions that require careful examination, dialogue, and solution.

The Next Steps in DMA's

When the two contemplated DMA's have been established, making a total of seven, the system of primary school teacher education for men will be rounded out. Although they may need to be enlarged, these seven schools operating fully and efficiently

should provide a reasonably adequate supply of primary school men teachers. They can and should, however, take on new services and a new dimension.

For the foreseeable future Afghanistan will need an accelerated program of continuing education for teachers. To be of greatest service and with economy these services should be close to where the teachers work. The DMA's are situated admirably to help. Plans should be made at an early date to provide DMA's with staffs to render this in-service education. Furthermore, it was pointed out in a survey by Dr. William Haggerty in the early sixties that there is too great a difference in the length of preparation required of primary teachers and those teaching in lycees. This is a sound observation.

Even while operating a program of emergency teacher training, the Ministry should be looking to the time when all teachers are well trained and when all practicing teachers may continue to add to their professional competencies by further study. Progress toward higher quality need not be stopped while "stop gap" methods are used to get quantity.

It is not too early for the Ministry to consider raising professional requirements for beginning teachers. Within a decade the regular program in DMA's should be extended to the fourteenth class. Furthermore, a comprehensive system for preparing beginning women teachers is needed. The trend suggests that the day is not too far distant when the demand for women primary teachers will equal or exceed the demand for men. Either the DMA's should become coeducational with dormitories for women or parallel DMA's for women should be built.

Lessons Learned from Methods

Although this report makes numerous references to procedures, tactics, and methods further observations seem pertinent. The TCCU Team and their Afghan associates have exercised considerable flexibility and sound judgments in the methods, strategies, and tactics used. Among those that should be evaluated and possibly used in other developing countries are the following:

1. Although it is not clear that the Team ever deliberately developed an overall strategy for bringing about educational change, there is much to support the idea that the Team realized that its influence should play upon many facets of Afghanistan society and upon the whole of the education hierarchy. This consciousness varied in intensity through the years leaving the impression that too often action was the result of intuition and expediency rather than to a comprehensive and carefully thought-out design to utilize a complex of forces. Since the results are good perhaps this elastic free wheeling may have paid the best dividends so long as purposes were clear. Perhaps, too, a fortunate combination of personalities and personal goals made the difference.

However, there is one thing upon which political scientists and social planners seem to agree. Complex social institutions change most readily and with a degree of permanency only when influences and relationships are brought to bear upon many segments of the social or political structure at the same time. Following this theory it would have been wise for USAID and the TCCU Team to plan, think, study, and work cooperatively with the whole structure of education at or near the same time. In other words, while working with teachers in laboratory schools, staffs of DMA's, counterparts, participants, and members of the Institute, it was equally important to plan

with administrators, inspectors, and officials at the top policy-making level. Maybe after all, twelve years is a relatively short time for the Ministry to reach the decision that the curriculum, materials, and methods of the primary schools should undergo radical reconstruction, but had the top officials been more deeply involved at all times the time might have been shorter. All of which was relevant to the major goals of the primary teacher education program.

2. The Team insisted at the beginning and remained quite consistent in the policy that decisions and far reaching value judgments must be made by the Afghans. Whole-hearted acceptance of ideas, proposals, and programs rather than reluctant acquiescence was followed as a matter of principle.

3. The Team often established ways of achieving wide involvement regardless of rank in planning, examining, evaluating on a group basis. Some of the best in group dynamics was displayed--workshops, multiple rank conferences, planning sessions, and seminars were procedures that proved popular and effective and slowly replaced the authoritative approach.

4. Systematic efforts were made, particularly in the opening years, to achieve an accepted synthesis of Afghan theories of education and those which are current in the U.S. and Western Europe. The Team's view was that Afghan education needs to play a more significant role in the total society as well as the life of the individual. To be adequate for the modern interrelated and interdependent world, the Afghan's education needed alteration. Old concepts of what education is for were obsolete. However, the decisions relative to what education and what methods of teaching and learning must be decided at their own pace by the Afghans--not by those of another culture with

differing values. As the project continued, it became more and more clear that such a synthesis would take time and that any synthesis arrived at today should be re-examined tomorrow. On the other hand, it may be well to ponder--must a nation, must a culture accept the fact that it, too, must plunge into the insecurity that seems inevitable once it releases its traditional culture and enters the whirlwind of a scientific age.

5. Study by an informal problem approach of the nature, form, and scope of the education enterprise was an ever present method. The appearance of authority or superiority was shunned by the Team.

6. The Team, as stated earlier, operated within a framework of a newly established and almost totally different institution--the Institute of Education. The Institute was not handicapped by tradition, bureaucratic policy or habits of work. Indeed, it was charged with the responsibility to innovate and to produce acceptable change within the framework of the Institute of Education. Within this structure the Team worked to a considerable degree. Although this plan of operation was successful for the early years, it did have a serious fault. The Team specialists sometimes were too isolated from the authority that made the decisions in the Ministry. This is not to imply that there was no contact with top officials, particularly by the Chief of Party; rather it is to point out the danger of becoming so preoccupied with those at the operational level and, thus, weaken the focus on those who determine policy and make the big decisions.

7. The consistent and continued work with counterparts proved a method of great value. Young Afghans, with considerable facility in English and some experience in teaching were sought to work closely with TCCU Team members. In a sense, they were

the eyes, ears, and hands of the specialist; in a sense, they served as apprentices and translators. In another sense they were team mates and peers. In most instances they were being tried out as potential candidates for further training at a college or university in the U.S. or some other foreign country.

8. Another device referred to several times in this report and found most useful for producing leaders for Afghan education was the scheme of selecting and providing advanced training for participants. In most instances their further education abroad fitted them for taking over major responsibilities upon their return home. In fact, this method may be considered the foundation on which self-dependence rested. This approach was called the participant program. Almost four score of these young men and a few women were selected by the TCCU Team and educated abroad, most of them in American universities.

9. The emergency training program proved unusually successful as a method for providing a maximum number of primary teachers with a sound but minimum education and in a minimum time span. Again attention is called to Appendix #4.

10. Even though the technical assistance Team kept its independence and at the same time worked within the structure of educational institutions such as the Institute of Education and the DMA's, they continually encouraged the top officials in the MOE to join with them and others in DMA's, the Institute and other groups in group activities involving planning, analyzing, evaluating and decision making. Although there were instances where it seemed that such close-working relations seem to falter, in all instances noted the fair mindedness and informal working relations

together with an accepted method of study and decision making resulted in a relatively quick solution. Even so, the writer believes the Team made most positive and lasting gains when they focused considerable attention on working with top officials of the Ministry.

In a letter from the second Chief of Party, dated March 23, 1967, the following is quoted, "We also appreciated our good fortune in the quality and stability of support from the Ministry." This, together with similar assertions from the first and last Chief of Party support the position that the chiefs at least kept relatively close contacts with the Ministry.

II. The method of contracting with university teams to do specific and well-defined educational tasks in developing countries seems to be the most satisfactory way to use the specialized talent in the U.S. However, a careful study should be made of how university teams have operated in order to discover the best procedures and most rewarding design that have been used for such activities as recruitment, length of service, supervision or strategies for stimulation, relationships to USAID personnel, job specifications, degree of independence of operation within a team, etc.

Furthermore, a continuing program of cataloguing or classification should be made of universities relative to their commitments to rendering foreign service; their policies affecting staff members serving overseas; their reserve of specialists together with fields of specializations; their facilities for administration; their cooperative spirit.

A Last Word

Possibly there is no more fitting way of closing this report than by re quoting the excerpt taken from the study made by Mr. Eric Hill of UNESCO, "Among the several ways of improving Afghan schools, the most important is the training of teachers. This is the most crucial, powerful, and immediately effective means of raising the standards

of education in any country... The primary task for Afghanistan today, tomorrow, and for many years to come is to produce more and better educated teachers."

And might it also be said, "Make the rewards of teachers sufficiently attractive to get and hold them in the profession."

The RGA, the USAID and TCCU may take satisfaction in the contributions they have made toward these ends. Together they have made an effective team.

APPENDIX # 1

TCCU TEAM STAFFING IN PRIMARY TEACHER EDUCATION

Following is the staffing pattern of the TCCU Team in support of primary teacher education in Afghanistan. In most cases, the positions indicated were filled for the entire year but if a position were filled for as much as one-half of the year, it is listed as a filled position. Authorized unfilled positions are not listed.

1954	Chief of Party Art Education Science Education Primary Teacher Education
1955	Same as 1954
1956	Chief of Party (1/2 time) Social Studies Education Materials Preparation Science Education Primary Teacher Education (2) Women's Education Librarian
1957	Chief of Party (1/2 time) Social Studies Education Materials Preparation Science Education Primary Teacher Education Women's Education
1958	Chief of Party (1/2 time) Administrative Assistant (1/2 time) Materials Preparation Social Studies Science Education Primary Teacher Education Women's Education (2)
1959	Chief of Party (1/2 time) Administrative Assistant (1/2 time) Materials Preparation Science Education Social Studies Education Primary Teacher Education Women's Education Measurement and Evaluation

1960 Chief of Party (1/2 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/2 time)
Materials Preparation
Social Studies Education
Science Education
Primary Teacher Education
Measurement and Evaluation
Women's Education

1961 Chief of Party (1/2 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/2 time)
Primary Teacher Education
Materials Preparation
Science Education
Measurement and Evaluation
Women's Education (2)

1962 Chief of Party (1/2 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/2 time)
Primary Teacher Education
Science Education
Materials Preparation
Measurement and Evaluation

1963 Chief of Party (1/3 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/3 time)
Primary Teacher Education (3)
Science Education
Social Studies Education
Measurement and Evaluation
Women's Education

1964 Chief of Party (1/3 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/3 time)
Primary Teacher Education (3)
Science Education
Social Studies Education (2)
Mathematics Education
Practical Arts and Agriculture
Women's Education

1965
Chief of Party (1/3 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/3 time)
Primary Teacher Education (4)
Science Education
Social Studies Education (2)
Mathematics Education
Practical Arts and Agriculture
Measurement and Evaluation

1966
Chief of Party (1/3 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/3 time)
Primary Teacher Education (4)
Science Education
Mathematics Education
Social Studies Education
Practical Arts and Agriculture
Measurement and Evaluation

1967
Chief of Party (1/4 time)
Associate Chief of Party (1/4 time)
Administrative Assistant (1/4 time)
Primary Teacher Education
Mathematics Education
Social Studies Education
Practical Arts and Agriculture

APPENDIX #2

DIGEST OF CONTRACTS AND AMENDMENTS
1954-1967

(Digest made by member of TCCU Team in 1967)

- I. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, signed April 5, 1954, to be effective until June 1, 1956. (U. S. Government represented by the Foreign Operations Administration--FOA.)
 - A. Program
 1. Assist the Teacher Training College of Kabul in teacher training.
 - a. Advise the faculty of the college and appropriate officials of the Ministry of Education on instructional and teacher methods.
 - b. Serve as advisors in the development of teaching programs .
 - c. Assist in the selection and procurement of necessary equipment, books, and supplies, and otherwise provide services necessary to improving the teaching program.
 - d. EXCEPT those (services) primarily administrative in character for which the contractor will have no responsibility.
 2. Give advice to the Afghan Ministry of Education and to the Director of the U. S. Operations Mission in developing trainee projects in the field of teacher training in the U. S.
 - B. Personnel
 1. The contractor will maintain in residence in Kabul a staff composed of a Chief Advisor and three or more other staff members of the rank of assistant professor or higher.
 2. Each staff member will serve under this agreement for a period of not less than two years.
 - C. Amendment #1, September 16, 1955
 1. FOA changed to ICA (International Cooperation Administration.)
 2. Contractor is permitted to provide his own clerical or secretarial help under local hire within budget limit set by ICA

D. Amendment #2, October 24, 1955

1. A secretary-administrative assistant to the Chief Advisor is authorized.

E. Amendment #3, February 15, 1956

1. Contract extended as amended to February 28, 1958.

2. Program changes.

- a. The team will assist the Afghan Institute of Education and its English Language Program in assuming the following responsibilities.

- (1) Develop and maintain a professional orientation on the part of school administrators, inspectors, and teachers.
- (2) Improve pre-service and in-service education of education personnel.
- (3) Serve as parent organization for proposal, study and implementation of new and special programs of primary, secondary, and teachers' education.
- (4) Adopt an English language program.
- (5) Undertake educational research designed... for the development of curricula, syllabi, and textbooks... and for educational policies for educational planning.
- (6) Train school administrators, inspectors, and teachers for effective cooperation in such studies.
- (7) Develop appropriate teaching materials for the youth of Afghanistan.

3. Personnel

- a. Resident in Kabul, in addition to the Chief Advisor, shall be a team to consist of not less than ten or more than thirty-five technical, administrative, and clerical personnel.
- b. A Home Staff shall consist of part-time service of one Professional Coordinator and a part-time secretary.
- c. Participants proficient in the use of English and who wish to prepare to teach it (shall be) provided one year of intensive study in the U.S. (Ceiling, \$24,000.)

F. Amendment #4, May 3, 1956 alters a minor procedure for establishing salaries of contract personnel.

G. Amendment #5, February 14, 1957, provides that one senior staff members from the contractor's organization be sent as soon as possible to Kabul to serve as Advisor to the President of the University of Kabul. He will advise upon:

1. Layout of the proposed new university campus.
2. General design of buildings on the new campus.
3. Curriculum revision respecting existing colleges, departments, and
4. The institution of new departments, colleges, and courses.
5. Administrative and organization problems concerning which the President of the University of Kabul desires advice.

H. Amendment #6, April 24, 1957, deletes all portions of the previous contract and amendments dealing with participant training with the intent of bringing all participant training under regular ICA programs rather than under the contract.

II. CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, signed June 22, 1959, to be effective until June 30, 1961.

A. Program ("Operational Plan," Appendix B of the contract.)

1. Advise and work with the Ministry of Education in Afghanistan in the development of an effective program of teacher training.
 - a. Hold workshops, winter and summer sessions, training conferences and seminars.
 - b. Advise on preparation of a basic series of books in primary, secondary, and professional education.
 - c. Use specialists in laboratory and cooperating schools.
 - d. Conduct research in linguistics as applied to curriculum construction, materials production, and training Afghans to teach and train teachers of English.
 - e. Develop teaching programs in the training of Afghan personnel to carry forward programs of teacher education.
2. Advise the faculty of the University of Kabul, through the Institute of Education and appropriate officials in the Ministry of Education, on instructional and teaching methods.

3. Advise and consult with the Ministry of Education and the staff of the Institute of Education in the development of a program of educational research to provide data necessary for the development of educational policies, plans, curricula, syllabi and textbooks.
4. Advise and consult with appropriate officials in the development of an Afghan-manned program of teaching English using the Institute of Education, Kabul University, as the local agency for pre-service and in-service education of teachers. (Temporarily to provide local-hire English teachers to certain Afghan schools).

B. Personnel

1. Forty-two staff members are authorized.
 - a. Chief of Party
 - b. Administrative assistant
 - c. Ten U.S. technicians
 - d. Twenty English language teaching specialists, including local-hire
 - e. Eight English program specialists
 - f. Four secretaries
 - g. Such locally hired assistants as may be required
2. A U.S. home office administrative staff is authorized with a full-time Campus Coordinator and secretaries as needed.
3. All participant training costs to be handled by ICA but directed through the Campus Coordinator for which the contractor is reimbursed \$25 per semester per participant.

C. AMENDMENT #1, November 1959, authorizes forty-four staff members as listed in Appendix B, June 22, 1959.

D. AMENDMENT #2, June 2, 1960, makes only minor changes in the budget.

E. AMENDMENT #3, August 11, 1961

1. Sets expiration date for the entire contract at June 30, 1964.
2. Program changes (New Operational Plan for Appendix B).
 - a. Objectives and scope of work remain the same ("A" above).
 - b. Three projects are identified by name and number.
 - (1) Institute of Education 306-66-018
 - (2) Kabul University Development 306-69-067
 - (3) English Language Teaching 306-69-067
3. Personnel is listed for the first time by specific job title.

Support to the Institute is beginning to phase out; emphasis put upon Kabul University and English Language teaching.

a. Institute of Education (positions authorized)

- (1) Curriculum and instruction;
- (2) Education administration;
- (3) Emergency teacher training;
- (4) Teacher training, women.

b. Kabul University Development (positions authorized)

- (1) Chief of Party;
- (2) Secondary teacher education and advisor to the dean, Institute of Education;
- (3) Primary teacher education;
- (4) Testing;
- (5) Research and foundations of education;
- (6) English language teacher education, methods;
- (7) English language teacher education, linguistics;
- (8) English language teacher education, materials;
- (9) Clerk-typist .

c. English language teaching (positions authorized)

- (1) Nine teachers (begin July 1961);
- (2) Project advisor and supervisor;
- (3) Administrative assistant;
- (4) English laboratory technician;
- (5) Eight teachers (begin January 1962);
- (6) Four department heads;
- (7) Materials specialist;
- (8) Five local-hire teachers;
- (9) U.S. hire secretary;
- (10) Two local hire secretaries;
- (11) Local hire assistants as needed within budget.

4. Home campus staff.

- a. Coordinator, part-time;
- b. Two administrative assistants;
- c. Director of International Studies, part-time;
- d. Two secretaries, full-time;
- e. One secretary, part-time;
- f. Director, Afghan Educational Materials Center;
- g. Secretary, Afghan Educational Materials Center;
- h. Materials writers, part-time.

F. AMENDMENT #4, February 23, 1962

1. ICA becomes AID (Agency for International Development).
2. Appendix B is modified to add two persons to the staff.
3. Minor budget changes; stipulates no reimbursement after 12/31/63 to English Language Program.

G. AMENDMENT #5, February 4, 1963

1. Budget is adopted, again stipulating English program terminates December 31, 1963.
2. Appendix B is modified to Operation Plan #3 (See A, B, E, above).
 - a. Program changes (dated October, 1962)
 - (1) All references to the Institute of Education are deleted, both for program and personnel and the term, "Public School Education" is used instead of Institute.
 - (2) Additional statement of purpose: "Advisement on the development of teacher education institutions at the secondary and collegiate levels."
 - (3) Rewording of item on research: "... research in teaching methods, learning patterns, and linguistics."
 - b. Personnel: additions authorized
 - (1) Personnel services and advisor to Dean of Men;
 - (2) Science education;
 - (3) Comparative literature;
 - (4) Secretary to Chief of Party (in addition to clerk-typist)
 - c. Personnel: modifications
 - (1) Chief of Party is also "advisor to the President of the Institute of Education".
 - (2) English Language Teacher Education, linguistics, is also "Director of English Program". (Still listed are "Project Advisor or Supervisor", "Administrative Assistant," and "Four Department Heads" under English Language teaching)
 - d. Remainder of Appendix B unchanged.

3. Appendix "D" to the contract, "Special Provisions", is completely revised and replaced by a new statement which purports to be a contract in and of itself, at least to the extent of superceding all previous contracts"...except as specifically stated".

H. AMENDMENT #6, January 9, 1964

1. New financing is provided; all positions are "phased out" as of December 31, 1963, and Appendix B is rewritten in this amendment. (This extends the English program, finished as of 12/31/63 as per financing order, and the total program, finished as of 6/30/64 under Amendment #3.
2. Program changes (Operation Plan #3 deleted entirely)
 - a. The "scope" of work, as defined, remains the same except Women's Education is deleted, advisement of the university on teaching methods is deleted, and mention of research is deleted.
 - b. Three projects are named, but not the same projects. They are:
 - (1) The Faculties of Letters, Science, and Education;
 - (2) The training of Afghan teachers of English in the Faculty of Letters;
 - (3) The training of elementary school teachers in the four existing Afghan primary teacher training schools.
 - c. Specifically phased out are:
 - (1) Local hire English employees;
 - (2) Advisor to the Dean of Men, Kabul University;
 - (3) All of the Public School Education section.
3. Personnel: Authorized positions
 - a. Five Faculty of Education;
 - b. Six Faculty of Letters;
 - c. Five primary teacher education, Kabul;
 - d. One primary teacher education, provincial
 - e. Six English language supervisors;
 - f. One emergency teacher training;
 - g. One Women's Education (although deleted from program).

- I. AMENDMENT #7, January 22, 1964, extends the contract as amended from June 30, 1964, to October 31, 1965
- J. AMENDMENT #8, December 3, 1964
 1. Budget authorized for Fiscal Year 1965, projected through FY 1966 (but not authorized).
 2. Program changes: Appendix B (Operational Plan) altered by extensive deletion of sections and substitutions.
 - a. Three major objectives (substituted for "areas of operation")
 - (1) Pre-service teacher education;
 - (a) Prepare DMA students to become teachers;
 - (b) Experiment with program for developing women teachers;
 - (c) Prepare Faculty of Education students for leadership positions in education;
 - (d) Extend Faculty of Education program to Faculties of Science and Letters students;
 - (e) Prepare English teachers through Department of English in the Faculty of Letters for secondary schools;
 - (f) Prepare primary teachers through emergency program.
 - (2) In-service teacher education;
 - (a) Offer winter and summer vacation schools for teachers;
 - (b) Train Afghan supervisors of English instruction;
 - (c) Provide in-service education for DMA and laboratory school teachers.
 - (3) Other services;
 - (a) Research on problems related to education;
 - (b) Make, administer, and interpret tests considered important to improving Afghan education;
 - (c) Operate participant program to prepare people for strategic positions;
 - (d) Assist Ministry of Education at planning or advisory level in problems relating to teacher education.
 - b. Not mentioned specifically in the objectives, but included in the staffing pattern, are provisions for specific help in science and mathematics teaching in lycees.
 3. Personnel: The contractor shall maintain not to exceed 34 staff members in fields of specialization as follows:

a. Kabul University Development

- (1) Administrative advisor to the President of Kabul University;
- (2) Chief of Party and advisor to the President of the Institute of Education and the Dean of the Faculty of Education;
- (3) Administrative assistant and advisor to the Vice President of the Institute of Education and the Assistant Dean of the Faculty of Education;
- (4) Two U.S. secretaries.

b. Faculty of Education

- (1) Seven positions authorized; up from five in Amendment #6;
- (2) "Primary Teacher Education" added; "science" and "mathematics" separated into two positions: "History" and "geography" combined into "social studies", one position

c. Primary Teacher Education

- (1) Eight positions authorized; up from six in Amendment #6;
- (2) One position added for "provinces", one for "emergency",

d. English language program has twelve positions authorized, one specialist in provincial program eliminated;

e. Science and mathematics in lycees to have two positions.

f. Local hire English teachers limited to six for remained of the contract. (These are in excess of the 34 ceiling.)

III. CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, signed December 1, 1965, with no stipulation as to termination date.

A. Program: The amended Appendix "B" is carried over from the preceding contract with stipulation that, within 120 days, a new detailed work program is to be developed to implement this contract.

B. Personnel: A staff not to exceed 48 members is authorized, including 12 local hire persons all together

1. four English teachers; 2, four secretaries; 3, two material production persons; 4, one test and evaluation technician; 5, one subject matter specialist

C. Significant aspects of the contract:


1. Although the program statement remains essentially unchanged in operational terms, specific quantitative aspects have been added in terms of "numbers to be graduated", "numbers to be served", etc.
2. The Appendix "A" section, "Standard Provisions" (mostly concerning employment, reporting, and procedural matters) has become the major portion of the document, amounting to thirty-two pages.
3. For the first time, no specific time extension is specified and no provision is made for TCCU to cancel the contract, although detailed specification is made of procedure for AID to cancel the contract.
4. In addition to the new, detailed work program to be developed within 120 days, provision is explicitly made for "review from time to time as may be considered necessary by USAID or the contractor..."

TOTAL SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 1965

TOTAL SCHOOL POPULATION (AGES 7-22) 4977,000

ACTUAL ENROLLMENT AT ALL LEVELS 406,000

OVERALL PERCENTAGE IN SCHOOL 8.1%



PERCENTAGE OF AGE GROUPS IN SCHOOL 1965

- 1 PRIMARY (AGES 7-12) 16.1 %
- 2 SECONDARY (AGES 13-18) 2.5 %
- 3 UNIVERSITY (AGES 19-22) .3 %


* INCLUDES VOCATIONAL EDUCATION: HIGH SCHOOLS 2,900; MIDDLE SCHOOLS 8,000

USAID / TCCU

PRIMARY TEACHER EDUCATION

TRAINED PRIMARY SCHOOL TEACHERS 1956-1967

GRADUATES




KABUL
 KANDAHAR
 JALALLABAD
 HERAT
 MAZAR
 EMERGENCY

82

USAID/TCCU

IN-SERVICE EDUCATION

WINTER AND SUMMER SESSION ENROLLMENT




Appendix No. 5 Source of Data: TCCU

USAID/TCCU

PRIMARY TEACHER EDUCATION

D.M.A. CURRICULUM BALANCE



Appendix No. 6 Source of Data: TCCU

84

US AID/TEACHERS COLLEGE, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
CONTRACT TEAM SUPPORT OF

EMERGENCY NATIONAL TEACHER EDUCATION PROGRAM

29 PRE-PROFESSIONAL
TRAINING CENTERS


5 PROFESSIONAL
CENTERS

CONSULTANT
SERVICES
GENERAL
AND
PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION

IN SERVICE
EDUCATION
SCIENCE
AND
SOCIAL
STUDIES
TEACHERS

NEW
CURRICULA
SCIENCE AND
SOCIAL
STUDIES
2500 TEXTS
PERSIAN
PUSHTU

TRAINING
40
TEACHERS
OF
PROFESSIONAL
EDUCATION
SUBJECTS



* FIRST GRADUATES IN 1966

APPENDIX 8

TEXTBOOKS PRODUCED BY TCCU TEAM MEMBERS AND AFGHAN COUNTERPARTS-- CURRENTLY IN USE IN PRIMARY TEACHER TRAINING SCHOOLS (DMA's)

PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION

Introduction to Education	Grade 10
Psychological Foundations of Education	Grade 11
Methods of Teaching:	
Language Arts	
Mathematics	
Social Studies	
Science	Grade 12
Practical Arts and Agriculture	
Physical Education	
Student Teaching Handbook	Grade 12

SCIENCE

General Science	Grade 7
" "	Grade 8
" "	Grade 9
Chemistry	Grades 10, 11, 12
Biology	Grades 11, 12
Physics	Grades 10, 11, 12

SOCIAL STUDIES

General Social Studies	Grade 7
" " "	Grade 8
" " "	Grade 9
Social Studies	Grade 10
" "	Grade 11
" "	Grade 12

ENGLISH

English Textbooks for	Grades 7-12
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IN ADDITION

Many supplementary books and teaching aids which are in use in laboratory schools and are used in connection with the primary teacher education program have been prepared by TCCU Team members and their counterparts (See terminal report of Leon Hood).