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JOBS Creation Project

EVALUATION

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ALERTE	Association pour la Lutte contre l'Erosion et pour la Rehabilitation Totale de l'Environnement
ASMR	L'Amicale des St. Marcois Reunis
ASSODLO	Association Pour La Maitrise de l'Eau et du Sol
BHM	Baptist Haiti Mission
CAMCH	Comité d'Aide a la Mairie du Cap Haitien
CASEC	Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales
CCCPV	Confederation of Community Councils of Petionville
CCDVA	Community Councils for the Development of the Artibonite Valley
CDS	Center for Development and Health
CECI	Canadian Center for International Studies and Cooperation
CEHPAPE	Haitian Center for Agricultural and Environmental Protection
CODEVA	Le Coude à Coude Pour le Development de la Vallée
CSMG	Comite de Support a la Mairie des Gonaives
DA	Development Assistance
DCCH	Développement Communautaire Chrétien Haitien
FAES	World Bank/IBD's Social Investment Fund
FEGA	La Fondation d'Entreaide de la Grand'Anse
GASC	Group d'Appui en Sante Communautaire
Gdes	Haitian Gourdes (US\$1.00 = 14 Gdes)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GOH	Government of Haiti
GRAPES	Group for Action to Protect the Environment in the South
ha	Hectare
HAS	Hôpital Albert Sweitzer
IBD	Inter-American Development Bank
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	Implementing Organizations
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
km	Kilometer
m	Meter
MCC	Mennonite Central Committee
MCEH	Evangelist Crusade Mission of Haiti
MEO	Mission Environmental Officer
MODECOD	Mouvement de Développement Communautaire de Dano
mt	Metric Ton
NPV	Net Present Value
ODEE	Organisation de Développement et d'Education Évangélique
ONG	Non-Governmental Organization
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation
PADF/JOBS	Jobs Creation Project
PDAET	Program for Agricultural Development and Education

PDSC/FAONO	Program de Développement des Section Communales du Far-West du Nord'Ouest
p/m	Person Month
SEPIC	Service Professionnel Intégré de la Croix des Bouquets
SOPABO	Solidarite des Paysan de Bouçan Carré
TA	Technical Assistance
UARADCOME	Union de L'Artibonite Pour La Recherche D'Aide au Développement Communautaire et Educatif
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

PREFACE

During the four week period between April 14, 1995 and May 13, 1995, we evaluated the PADF Jobs Creation Project in Haiti. The evaluation team included a team leader, a social scientist, an agricultural economist, an administrative-financial expert and an engineer. This final report incorporates PADF's and USAID/Haiti's comments on an earlier draft that was discussed before the team left the country.

The team would like to thank Norberto Ambrós, Steve Goodwin and the entire PADF staff in Haiti for their support and guidance. We also thank George Yvon Joseph, Gabriel Jean Charles and Jean-Robert Jean Noel of PADF's engineering staff, who accompanied the evaluation team on its site visits. Their efforts were invaluable for the success of our task. The evaluation took place at a time when PADF was rapidly expanding its job creation efforts to 50,000 people a month. PADF staff gave their support generously in spite of this heavy workload. We would also like to thank Lee Nelson, Abdul Wahab, Jean-Claude Lucas and the Jobs Committee of USAID/Haiti for their encouragement and insights.

The team also thanks Jean Guiders Kernizan who helped us in doing our field visits, interviewing the technical personnel at the sub-projects sites, and drafting the technical and engineering section of the report.

The team used both primary and secondary data for most of its analysis. Any errors or misinterpretation of these data is our responsibility.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An independent evaluation of the PADF Jobs Creation Project in Haiti was undertaken during April and May 1995. USAID and PADF, under a Cooperative Agreement, created this project to provide some 480,000 person/months (p/m) of short-term employment to Haiti's poorest population, to rehabilitate economically productive infrastructure, and to enhance democratic processes in the country. The evaluation found the project successful in meeting all project objectives. The project represents a possible model for further job creation activity in Haiti or in other countries.

The project operated during a period of economic and political upheaval. Implementation was constrained by changing funding sources, difficulty of government clearances, limited liquidity of the banking system, and the high cost and unavailability of essential supplies during the economic embargo. Nevertheless, the project's output is impressive. As of March 1995, 261,895 p/m of work had been created for approximately 175,000 people, each working about one and a half months and earning about \$55. These funds benefited some 846,700 worker family members. In terms of work done, figures available up to January 1995 indicate that, among other things, 1,612 Km of irrigation canals were rehabilitated, opening some 26,745 Ha to full cultivation; 934 Km of road were rehabilitated, providing access to market for 817,000 people; and about 6,440 Ha of land were protected through conservation measures.

Economic benefits of the project are substantial. The activities supported by the project are cost effective and efficient in providing resources to intended beneficiaries. The average cost per day of creating a job in the project was \$2.15. This can be compared with similar projects where the cost was \$3.21 per job in Kenya and \$23.94 in the Eastern Caribbean. Calculation of net present value (NPV) at 15 percent over 15 years indicates a NPV of \$4.88 million for road rehabilitation, \$16.34 million for irrigation and drainage rehabilitation and \$1.05 million for soil conservation work. Garbage collection generated \$1.86 for every \$1.00 spent. Overall project IRR is calculated at 58 percent. The project had significant impact on food security through improved agricultural infrastructure. The result was an additional 21,000 tons of food produced. Soil conservation, and irrigation, drainage, and road rehabilitation were more economically sustainable than was the street cleaning activity.

The evaluation team found that the technical quality of the work done was good and that the technology used was appropriate to local conditions. In general, mandated environmental standards were followed and environmental problems were addressed. Overall management of the project was also of high quality.

Qualitative interviewing revealed that the projects promoted the democratic process by generating solidarity across political lines even in a site that is usually politically hot, such as the Artibonite. With the State no longer the only source of power, prestige, and money, political activity centered on management of local problems. The focus on community

reinforced the strength of local organizations providing services as alternatives to state institutions, thus aiding decentralization. People in the project sites generally agreed that the quality of life has greatly improved, and they expressed confidence in democratic rules.

The following lessons learned from this project could apply to similar activities:

- The project's institutional structure contributed to its success. This structure had four layers — 1) USAID/PL-480 Title III, 2) PADF, 3) local organizations, and 4) community *groupments*. The use of an international PVO like PADF which has working relations with many local organizations provided a politically neutral buffer between funding and local implementing organizations which managed the actual worksites. It also provided strong technical and managerial support and accountability. Alternatives to this structure were explored, including use of agencies of the Government of Haiti (GOH). Local distrust of government and poor history of GOH management precluded this alternative.
- Seventy five percent of project resources went directly to the workforce. These resources increased effective demand in project areas, resulting in substantial local economic activity.
- People in the project area value cash; if required to do so, however, they were willing to accept some food as a supplement to cash wages. Project participants indicated that an assured job was more important to them than higher wages would be with limited and uncertain availability of work.
- Implementing organizations do not want to use food as payment for the workforce because they feel it is too expensive and too complicated to manage.
- Technical prototypes and standards are very useful to project implementation.
- Project design and management need built-in flexibility to deal with external events beyond project management control.

The evaluation team made four recommendations to refine project management. They are related to choice of sub-projects, flexibility in use of funds, management and use of tools, and refinement of prototypes. All recommendations deal with relatively minor issues.

The Jobs Creation Project is at a critical juncture. The evaluation recommends that the successful job creation activities be continued by switching from a stopgap emergency focus to one of long-term institutional development. This process could be initiated through a transitional project aiming to transfer responsibilities for selection, design, documentation, and seeking of funds, both local and external gradually, from PADF to the local implementing organizations. This process should also include both central and local governmental institutions.

1. BACKGROUND

In August 1993 the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) signed a Cooperative Agreement with USAID/Haiti for the Jobs Creation Project (PADF/JOBS). This evaluation examines the project in terms of the objectives set out in the Cooperative Agreement. In addition, it evaluates the project design on its ease and speed of project implementation, on its economic, social and political impact on effected local communities, and on lessons learned to make the activity more developmentally sustainable in the future.

1.1 Background of the Jobs Creation Project

USAID and PADF began the Jobs Creation Project in Haiti at a time of political and economic instability and deterioration. The military coup of 1991, which ousted President Aristide, resulted in an embargo and consequent economic deterioration of the country's economy. This deterioration, in turn, resulted in massive unemployment and loss of hope among the population. The U.S. Government, seeing the need to prepare for Haiti's eventual return to democratic rule, developed the USAID/Haiti Labor-Intensive Infrastructure Rehabilitation Initiative. The PADF/JOBS was the Initiative's largest component. USAID developed this initiative in the early months of 1993 with funding from the Enhancing Food Security Project. The objectives of this initiative were the following:

- a) To provide short-term employment, income and hope to Haiti's most impoverished people, thus creating a sense of confidence that restored democracy could produce tangible benefits to their quality of life, and
- b) To improve the country's deteriorating economically productive infrastructure, thus enhancing the possibilities for grassroots economic recovery and preparing the way for longer-term, more substantial development efforts in the future.

USAID initially designed the Initiative to begin operation following the resolution of the political crisis caused by the coup. The Initiative was intended to be a bridge into the joint World Bank/IBD's Social Investment Fund (FAES) project. The World Bank/IBD were to start the FAES project as soon as possible after political resolution had occurred. USAID approved the Jobs Creation Project under Presidential 614 Determination on the policy grounds that the project would start only after a constitutional government was assured to be in place. When the military government signed the Governor's Island Accord in July 1993, this assurance seemed to be in place. The Accord permitted the return of President Aristide in October. USAID and PADF signed the Coperative Areement and put it into operation on August 5, 1993.

1.1.1 Project Objectives

As seen in Section 1.1.3 below, the objectives of the project have been significantly amended over the course of its operation. At the time of the evaluation, the project's objectives were stated as the following:

- To create 480,000 person months of immediate and useful short-term employment and income to directly benefit approximately 215,000 people over a period of 29 months. Participants in the program will be selected from the ranks of the unemployed, most impoverished Haitians;
- To rehabilitate and reactivate severely deteriorated and crumbling, but potentially economically productive, infrastructure in rural and urban area and communities, contributing to stimulation of economic recovery at the grass roots level;
- To ensure that works are labor intensive and of high quality, and utilize sound technical standards. Activities undertaken will be simple and small, using existing local technologies and know-how; and
- To contribute to restoring hope among the neediest unemployed, helping them to meet their basic needs. The program will also help ease social and political pressures, and build confidence in constitutional government and the democratic process.

1.1.2 Economic, Social and Political Context of Project's Operation

Haiti has gone through four different political phases during the implementation of the Cooperative Agreement. Each phase has had a different impact on the social and economic conditions within the country and on the project's operation.

The first phase began with the *de facto* government in power at the time USAID and PADF signed the Cooperative Agreement. There was hope that the agreements of the Governor's Island Accord would take effect and that democratic government would quickly return to the country. In September 1993 the Malval government came into power as part of the process of the Accord. The U.S. and other countries loosened embargo restrictions and the future initially looked optimistic. It quickly became evident, however, that the military government would not carry out the agreements of the Accord, and the economic and political situation turned darker.

The second political phase began with Aristide's inability to return, the Harlan County incident, and the assassination of Justice Minister Malary. The embargo was tightened. Legal fuel became unavailable and a thriving black market began to fill the marketplace void caused by the embargo. USAID's efforts focused on humanitarian aid to mitigate the pernicious effects on the poor of the embargo. The Malval government ended in May 1994, and the third political phase began.

After the Malval government, the military leadership put into place another *defacto* government. The outside world responded with even tighter economic and trade restrictions. Flights in and out of the country were suspended. Foreign accounts were frozen and repatriated funds were blocked. The economic situation in the country became desperate. The government dried up liquidity in the banks, and it was difficult to get cash. Prices for gasoline and other goods spiraled upward on the black market. Gasoline prices, for example, reached \$15 - 20 per gallon. Living and working conditions became extremely difficult.

The fourth phase began with the agreement worked out in September 1994 by President Carter for the stepping down of the military leaders. This agreement led to intervention of U.S. military forces in the country and the subsequent return of President Aristide. The world community lifted the embargo and Haiti's formal economic activities restarted. U.S. policy directed support to the returned democratic government. The U.S. has shifted the general responsibility for security and order in the country to United Nations forces. The Haitian government will eventually take over this task. Elections are being prepared and the country is beginning the long task of achieving eventual broad-based economic development.

During the evaluation team's stay in Haiti, a potentially serious event affecting the project took place: the government announced that it would more than double the minimum wage. On June 1st the minimum wage is to be increased from 15 Gdes a day to 36 Gdes a day. The project now pays its basic workers 20 Gdes a day.

1.1.3 Evolution of the Jobs Creation Project

Over the course of its operation, PADF has had to modify both the objectives and mode of operation of the Jobs Project. These modifications have responded to the rapidly changing political and economic situation in the country. The project began as a \$13.7 million project to create 200,000 person/months of work over 14 months. Today, after 14 project amendments, the project's funding level is \$30.4 million, partly in U.S. Dollars and partly in local currency through the PL-480 Title III program. The project's target is now to create 480,000 person/months of work over a 29 month period ending in December 1995. USAID's desire to create many jobs quickly and PADF's unique capability to do so have motivated many of these changes. PADF has worked in Haiti for a number of years, mostly in the area of soil conservation. Over that time PADF has worked with over 200 local organizations. A network has thus been developed which provides an opportune mechanism for reaching large numbers of the rural poor, and to a smaller extent, urban poor, with locally based job creation programs.

The U.S. Government has strong long-term political interests in Haiti. These interests have changed as the political situation in the country has changed. USAID initially envisioned the project as preparing the way for the return of democratic government. Later, the policy emphasis changed to mitigating the effect of the embargo on the poor. Now that

President Aristide has returned, the project is creating jobs to provide stability and support for the new government.

The funding for the project has also changed over time. Originally USAID funded the project with dollars under the Enhancing Food Security Project. When dollar funds became short, USAID, with the Government of Haiti, used PL-480 Title III monetized proceeds. The addition of PL-480 funds created administrative problems for PADF (see Section 2.1.2). When the *de facto* government re-emerged after the Malval period, it froze the project's use of all PL-480 funds, and the project went back to strictly dollar funding. After the return of President Aristide, the project again returned to mixed dollar and PL-480 funding.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

This evaluation was undertaken by a five-person evaluation team consisting of two economists, a sociologist, an accountant, and an engineer. These technical experts represented the various needs defined in the scope of work (Annex A). The team leader assigned each member responsibility for specific components of the scope of work. Team members also provided additional comments and data about other team members' assignments. After reviewing the relevant literature and documentation on the project (Annex B) and after discussions with USAID and PADF (Annex C), each team member developed a series of questions related to his assignments. These questions were used to develop a series of questionnaires (Annex E) for use by all team members. Among these questionnaires were a general one on each organization, specific ones on financial and engineering issues, and one for workers and non-workers in the sub-project. The sociologist on the team also developed a separate questionnaire for examining political and social issues raised in the scope of work. These issues were related to increased hope for the future and confidence in constitutional government that may have resulted from sub-project activities.

The team used their questionnaires to examine sub-projects of PADF/JOBS. At the time of the evaluation, 60 sub-projects had been completed (Annex E). Thirty-nine Implementation Organizations (IO) were managing these 60 sub-projects. Because of lack of time and resources, the team selected a sample of these 60 sub-projects for site visits. For the sample, the team selected projects that met conditions of a four-element matrix. The first element was the four activities undertaken by the PADF/JOBS — road rehabilitation, soil conservation, irrigation canal cleaning and garbage collection. The second element was the seven types of organizations used by PADF to do the sub-projects — ONGs (here defined as internationally-based ONGs such as CARE), religious organizations, cooperatives, social associations, community *groupments*, Mayoral support groups, and private organizations. The third element was the location of the sub-project. Selection was done so as to have a sample of sub-projects as widely dispersed throughout the country as possible (see map Annex E). The last element considered was the ability of team members to get to the sub-project. Using an iterative process, 22 IOs' sites were selected that represented 32 sub-projects. Annex E lists the selected IOs and their characteristics.

The team divided into two groups and, over a two-week period, visited 20 of the 22 selected IOs' sites. Each visit lasted from one to six hours. At the project sites the team members divided the work. One team member looked at issues related to organizational, financial, and technical concerns. The other team members looked at issues related to workers and non-workers on the sub-project and at the local population's view of the sub-project activity. The team completed 17 organizational questionnaires and 55 workers/non-workers' questionnaires. At the end of the survey the questionnaires were tabulated for use in the evaluation.

At the end of the two-week survey period the team met together to analyze and review the data and to articulate findings, lessons learned and recommendations. These were presented verbally to a select group of the project management committee from USAID and the PADF staff. The team members then drafted their sections of the report which were then assembled together. This draft was presented to USAID and PADF for review and comments. USAID and PADF's comments were incorporated into this final report.

1.3 Report Structure

This report is divided into five chapters. Chapter One provides the background of the Jobs Creation Project and its history. It also includes discussion of the methodology used in the evaluation. Chapter Two provides the findings of the evaluation team on the relevant questions asked in the scope of work. There are seven sections. Six represent specific concerns in the scope of work, and a seventh covers general project management that relates to the six specific concerns.

Chapter Three presents significant lessons learned that could be relevant for future projects of the same nature, both in Haiti and in other countries. There are seven general lessons learned. In Chapter Four are recommendations for improving the present project. Chapter Five, the final chapter, gives the team's thoughts about the future direction of the project. The report ends with a series of annexes including the terms of reference for the evaluation team, people contacted, reference materials, and a series of technical annexes related to the team's efforts.

2. EVALUATION FINDINGS

2.1 Project Progress

The principal output of the JOBS Project is the creation of short-term work for men and women who are at the bottom of the economic and employment scale. The secondary output of the project is use of this workforce to improve Haiti's economic infrastructure and thus provide greater opportunities for long-term economic growth and employment.

Figure 2.1 graphs the evolution of the targeted person/months (p/m) over the course of the project. The original Cooperative Agreement called for 200,000 p/m of work to be created over a 14 months period. In August 1994 PADF said that they could, within the same budget, raise the target to 230,000 p/m over 21 months. The project was amended with additional funds to reach a target of 280,000 p/m; then it was amended again with a new target of 430,000 p/m created. At the time of the evaluation the targeted output of the project is 480,000 p/m created over 29 months.

Figure 2.1 Person/months PADF/JOBS
Target vs Actual




Figure 2.1 also shows actual and contracted creation of p/m. Contracted amounts are from projections of p/m from sub-projects already contracted with PADF. The figure displays actual p/m created, starting slowly in the first three months of the project with only 3,706 p/m created (see Section 2.1.2 below). The project began to increase p/m created

rapidly with a peak of some 82,248 p/m created between July and September 1994. As of March 31, 1995, the project had created 261,895 p/m of work. This figure represents some 175,000 people working approximately one and a half months, each earning about US \$55 each. Approximately 846,700 family members of the workers in the sub-project used this money for support. Responding to USAID's recent emphasis on expanding job creation to support the new government, job creation will see a sharp rise over the next four months, peaking at 50,000 workers per month. Finally, the project will phase down over the final three months of implementation, ending in October 1995.

Table 2.1 Secondary Outputs of the Jobs Creation Project

As of January 1, 1995

Secondary Output	Unit	Amount
Garbage Collection		
Debris Removed	m ³	131,530
Canals Cleared	Km	43.1
Sediment Removed	m ³	113,603
Streets Cleaned	Km	248.5
Irrigation Rehabilitation		
Canals Rehabilitated	Km	1,612.74
Sediment Removed	m ³	1,539,270
Area Open to Cultivation	Ha	26,745
Road Rehabilitation		
Roads Rehabilitated	Km	933.8
Access to Markets	Person	817,000
Soil and Water Conservation		
Contour Canals Built	Km	626.6
Terraces and Hedgerows	Km	294.8
Drywalls	Km	82.0
Gully Plugs	Km	59.1
Trees Planted	Tree	870,000
Gabions	m ²	2,580
Land Protected	Ha	6,440

Source: Team surveys and PADF data

Besides the primary output of person/months of work created, the workforce created by the PADF/JOBS also improved infrastructure, increased areas of productive land, and enhanced living conditions of Haiti's population through improving health and well being. Table 2.1 is an indication of the quantity of these secondary outputs in the project. Data for this table comes from results of the team's field surveys and data provided by PADF. Complete data for Table 2.1 was available up to January 1, 1995. Table 2.1 groups these secondary outputs of the project by the four activities of the project, namely, garbage collection, irrigation rehabilitation, road rehabilitation, and soil and water conservation.

2.1.2 Constraints to Achievement of Project's Outputs

The achievements of the JOBS project are remarkable given the constraints the project had to overcome. As seen in Section 1.1.2, the project operated within an extremely difficult political and economic environment. The hope that existed when the project started quickly turned sour as the military leadership tried to keep control of the country. These policies compelled the international community to tighten its economic embargo.

There were four major areas of constraint to the achievement of project outputs. These were a) funding sources and flow of funds, b) government clearances for imports and licenses, c) liquidity of the banking system, and d) cost and availability of essential supplies such as gasoline and cement.

The original funding for the Cooperative Agreement came from Development Assistance (DA) dollar funds out of the Enhancing Food Security Project. Soon after the signing of the agreement and the initial obligation of funds, it became apparent that the military leaders were not going to adhere to the Governor's Island Accord. This Accord had been the justification for signing of the agreement. Without adherence to the Accord, USAID had a funding shortfall of DA funds to support the project. After signing seven contracts for sub-projects with implementing organizations (IO), PADF found itself unable to move forward with signature of additional fully prepared contracts because of lack of funds. To fill this gap, USAID, with the GOH, shifted funding for local costs of the sub-project contracts to PL-480 Title III sources. Possible joint use of dollar and PL-480 fund had been envisioned from the start of the project, although it was not planned to substitute PL-480 funds for dollars at such an early stage. The rules and regulations for expenditures and accounting of PL-480 funds are different from those for dollar funds. Differences in regulations required PADF to rewrite the technical, administrative and financial procedures for all of its already prepared contracts. It then had to get USAID's approval and an additional approval from PL-480's Management Office before signing contracts with the IOs. Resolving these funding difficulties led to a four-month hiatus in signing contracts with IOs.

The joint dollar and PL-480 funding of the project continued until the end of the Malval government in May 1994. The *de facto* government that followed did not want PL-480 resources going to PADF/JOBS, but preferred to have its own direct control over use of these resources. The *de facto* government froze further PL-480 funds intended for the

project. In response to this problem, USAID, under humanitarian authority to mitigate the impact of the embargo on the poor, began to increase the flow of dollars to fill the gap left by the loss of PL-480 funds. The project again returned to full dollar operation.

Upon the return of President Aristide in October 1994, USAID with the GOH authorized the project an additional \$10 million in PL-480 funds to expand its job creation activities. The project went back to joint dollar and PL-480 funding.

The shifting back and forth in funding sources means that PADF has had to deal with three sets of books — dollars, PL-480(1) and PL-480(2). In addition, reporting requirements are complicated. PL-480 funds are reported on each month while dollar funds are reported on each quarter. Both sources require different forms and formats. While this shifting in funding sources represents USAID's flexibility and determination to keep the PADF/JOBS going, it also represents additional burdens.

Haiti's governmental bureaucratic structure has always been slow, but the project had particular difficulty in getting clearances on imports of tools and licenses for vehicles and motorcycles. The problem became particularly acute during the *de facto* government's rule as the regime attempted to squeeze the project to show its displeasure in not having access to, or control over, the PADF/JOBS' resources. Using delaying tactics, the government blocked one shipment of tools for over two months. The government also delayed for six months granting license plates for motorcycles needed by PADF and project staff.

A critical problem for the project was obtaining cash for the payment of workers. Prompt and regular payment of workers is essential for project success. During the embargo limits were placed on funds that could move in or out of the country. The government, in response, raised discount rates and put in place other restrictions on the availability of cash from the banking system. Banks restricted withdrawals per transaction to 5,000 Gdes, approximately \$360. The project had funds available in the bank, but it could not get them out. Cash could be obtained if a premium were paid. USAID showed flexibility by amending its regulations to allow up to a five percent service fee for purchase of cash from legitimate financial institutions. Through these efforts, PADF obtained sufficient cash to keep the sub-projects operational, but some project achievements were delayed.

Most of the project's activity took place during the embargo. Essential supplies, particularly gasoline and cement, were difficult to obtain. The only sources of these supplies were the parallel markets. As the grip of the embargo on the economy became tighter and tighter, particularly during the second *de facto* government, in May through September 1994, prices on the parallel market of gasoline and cement rose to ten to twenty times their normal level. PADF severely restricted travel and delayed construction on items such as drains and small bridges. USAID again showed flexibility in allowing for shifts in budget items to cover the increased cost of gasoline and other items. Nevertheless, project achievements during this time were seriously compromised.

2.1.3 Conclusion on Project Progress

The output of the project has been remarkable. At the time of the evaluation, the project is within 95 percent of its targeted person/months. This number of person/months represents total person/months of work actually created through completed sub-projects added to the planned person/months from on-going and contracted sub-projects. The work accomplishment of this workforce in rehabilitating economically important infrastructure and sanitation control is impressive. The evaluation team visited many sub-project sites and can verify the quality and extent of the work done and the impact this work has had on the economic, social, and health conditions of the people related to the sub-projects.

2.2 Project Impact

The project was targeted to help the poorest unemployed people in the Haitian society. From interviews at the work sites, the evaluation team found that these targeted beneficiaries were being reached. All the organizations interviewed said that there were no alternative sources of employment in the sub-project areas. The principal reason they gave for the initiation of the PADF/JOBS was creation of employment. Though most project benefits went to those at the lowest level of subsistence, a wide spectrum of the society also benefited from the project activities, either directly or indirectly. The direct beneficiaries were the workers and their families and the implementing organizations. Individuals benefiting indirectly are school children, area farmers, truck drivers, and small business operators. The amount of money received from the jobs program during a three week period represented 15.3 percent of average household cash expenditure in the urban areas (Romanoff 1995). A large number of individuals were working for the first time. Only 16 percent of those who received jobs with PADF/JOBS had been previously employed in work other than farming. The individuals who worked with PADF/JOBS for an average of six weeks received on the average Gde720 for the period employed. The money earned, with considerable variation, lasted an average of about eight days. Of the individuals interviewed, 54 percent said they had bought food with the money. Twenty-six percent said they had bought a radio, 14 percent had purchased some medicine, 22 percent had invested in animals, and 22 percent said they had spent some of the money to pay for schooling.

Some of the project's indirect benefits went toward improvement of the nutritional status and well being of children in the sub-project areas. The organizational leader in Baintet, for example, said that the school officers in his area reported that parents, for the first time in years, were paying their children's school fees on time. These leaders also revealed that because of easier access due to the roads improved by the sub-project, a vaccination program for children was being launched. The leaders at the IO in St. Marc said that the improved roads in their area had generated interest in a new school building which will house at least 3,000 pupils.

Individuals operating in the informal sector received benefits from increased sales of local and imported goods. In many cases local vendors established themselves along the job

site selling cooked food, drinks and water. The workers revealed that the job allowed them access to credit from the local vendors and business people. The extent of the credit was based on their expected earnings. The small business operators along the job sites said that they knew who was employed and used that information as a criterion for extending credit. They also revealed from informal interviews that once the individuals had jobs they paid their debts readily. Only 16 percent of the individuals used the money to begin small business ventures. The women in particular said that the money earned helped them to buy articles which they could resell.

Rehabilitated roads resulted in reduced travel time and lower vehicle operating costs. The leaders in one area where road rehabilitation was undertaken said they had seen a 300 percent increase in traffic since the road rehabilitation was completed. An individual who had not been successful in obtaining a job with the project said he was happy, nevertheless, with the new improvements in the road because he had seen only half as many vehicles stuck in the mud since the road rehabilitation had been completed a year ago. In addition, in the Saint Marc area 125 small bakers now have access to larger markets due to the rehabilitated road.

Most of the implementing organizations employed additional staff for running their sub-projects, because many of the sub-project activities were additional to their normal operation. Most IOs received no other source of funding for similar projects. They all revealed, however, that the training and skills acquired are transferable to other projects. The organizations were pleased with the training received at the initiation of the program.

2.2.1 Food Security

Though most of the revenue earned by the workers was used for purchasing food, individuals said that the money only served as a stopgap measure. Only about nine percent bought seeds or other inputs for agricultural production. The cash received during this period may seem small, but it represented a tremendous increase in cash liquidity for the rural and urban poor. In addition, the drainage and irrigation activity resulted in increased crop diversity and additional food production as the risk associated with crop failure due to reduced rainfall was minimized. In areas where only sugar cane had been cultivated in the past, for example, farmers now produce corn, beans, yams, bananas, and a wide variety of other crops. Crop yields have increased and farmers are able to plant two to three crops on irrigated lands instead of a single crop under dryland conditions. A farmer who produced sugar cane on his land and received annual net returns of \$1,000 now receives \$4,500 from the production and sale of corn. Another farmer said that banana yields had increased from 4,000 bunches per ha without water to 16,000 bunches per ha with water. It is estimated that from the lands recuperated from project activities, an additional 21,000 tons of food per year will be produced (see Annex D). This significant contribution to food production represents 3.2 kg of food per annum per capita for the nation.

2.3 Project's Economic Benefits

PADF/JOBS was introduced at a time when Haiti's economy was in a state of decadence. The Gross National Product (GDP) experienced drops of ten percent and six percent in 1992 and 1993 respectively (USAID Monitoring Report 1994). Inflation rose from an average of 18 percent a year during 1991-1993 to 52 percent in 1994. A number of trade sanctions from 1992 to 1993 resulted in a decline of exports and imports and a loss of 32,000 jobs in the manufacturing and assembly industries. During the same period real wages fell by 40.2 percent and consumer prices increased by 48 percent (IMF working paper, 1994).

The jobs program was introduced to fill an important gap in the economy. Given the deteriorating economic and social conditions, and the limited alternatives available to planners, job creation was the best use of resources in the constrained Haitian economic situation. Given that the project choice can be considered appropriate, the next question to ask is whether the project was cost effective.

To determine cost effectiveness of PADF/JOBS we compared the cost of creating one person/day of work through the project with that of similar projects in countries of comparable standards of living. There are no recent job creation projects in Haiti which are comparable to PADF/JOBS. There are, however, a number of similar projects which have been carried out in other countries which can be used as a basis of comparison. PADF/JOBS created jobs at an average cost of \$2.15 per person/day. In Table 2.2 the cost of a person/day job ranges from \$1.10 to \$87.18 in adjusted dollars. The two projects most similar to PADF/JOBS were in Kenya and the Eastern Caribbean. Job creation in these countries cost \$3.21 and \$23.94 respectively. This project, therefore, is at least 30 percent more cost-effective in creating jobs than were these previous USAID-funded projects. In addition, PADF/JOBS directed about 66 percent of total project cost towards wages of the workforce. The percentage spent directly on wages by projects in other countries ranged from 12 percent in Jamaica on a feeder road project to 30-90 percent for the projects in the Eastern Caribbean. About 75 percent of the funds contracted with the IO for sub-projects by PADF/JOBS went to wages.

Each project activity had varying economic effects on individual and national income. The economic effect of each activity will, therefore, be examined separately.

Garbage Collection

The garbage collection activity involved four sub activities — debris removal, the clearing of canals, sediment removal, and street cleaning. The amount of each activity performed can be seen in Table 2.1. Each sub-project activity provided a number of jobs at varying costs. The street cleaning activity was most effective in job creation. The least efficient was the clearing of canals, which cost \$1.89 for every job created (see Annex D, Table 1). Garbage collection was concentrated in dense urban areas. It is estimated that

**Table 2.2 Characteristics of Sample Labor-intensive Infrastructure Projects
(All figures based on Life of Project)**

Item	Kenya Vihia	Indonesia Rural Works	Jamaica Feeder Roads	Jamaica IRD	Eastern Caribbean BHN	Haiti PADF/ Jobs
Wage in relation to local wage	Lower	Most lower	Lower	Higher	Lower Average	Higher
Percent of Program Funds Spent on Wages	57	70	12	60	30-90	66
Estimated Person/days of Work Created	29,626	24,840,000	265,020	160,000	75,600	9,428,220
Adjusted cost of job creation \$/p/d	3.21	1.10	87.18	NA	23.94	2.15

PADF/JOBS collected 131,530 m³ of garbage at a unit cost of Gdes 40. The direct benefits of sweeping of streets and debris removal have a short duration. A few days after the street is cleaned it can be filled with debris again as people continue to dispose of garbage. For this reason this type of activity cannot be easily evaluated using standard cost-benefit techniques. The effects of canal clearing and sediment removal have longer term effects and the cost-benefit analysis can be done on a one year basis. It was estimated that every \$1.00 spent on garbage cleaning contributed \$1.86 to the economy (Annex D).

Irrigation Rehabilitation

PADF/JOBS provided for the rehabilitation of irrigation canals which are expected to permit some 27,000 ha of lands to be irrigated. These lands had been either partially irrigated earlier or not irrigated because of lack of access to adequate water. Farmers visited

in the sub-project areas said the restoration of the irrigation canals will result not only in an increase in production, but in an increase in land values. Water availability also encouraged crop diversity. Farmers in the Les Moustique area, for example, said that before the irrigation improvements, 0.25 ha of land was valued at about Gdes 10,000, but with water availability the land is now valued at Gdes 60,000. Production of bananas on 0.25 ha of irrigated land averages about 4,000 bunches. At an average price of Gdes 50 the gross income from 0.25 ha is Gdes 200,000.

The economic analysis of this activity is based on a series of assumptions. Among these assumptions are a) all rehabilitated land is placed in production, with a mixture of crops reflecting the cropping system in the areas irrigated, b) at least two crops per year are expected in most of the forage and vegetable crops, c) the land is placed in production for about 10 years, and d) canal reparation is redone every five years. Under these assumptions the NPV generated by the project's irrigation rehabilitation would be \$16.34 million and the IRR would be 88 percent (see Annex D).

Road Rehabilitation

The rehabilitation of 933.8 km of rural roads provides a wide array of benefits to a large number of people. Though it is hard to quantify the benefits made available, it was estimated that the improvement of the roads increased market access for 817,000 people. The people in the areas visited said that the road improvements allowed them access to schools and clinics and encouraged the implementation of other programs (see Section 2.2). A number of side benefits, including greater access to passable roads, the reduction of transportation costs, increase in market prices, and a reduction of travel time have been realized. The team measured the effect of road quality on travel time. Samples of distances traveled during 15 minute rides on the rehabilitated roads were compared to those on unrehabilitated roads. The road repairs decreased travel time by an average of 32 percent.

One of the costs of road rehabilitation is the opportunity cost of other sub-project activities for which the resources could be used. In terms of alternatives, the resources could have been used for other sub-project activities which would have been more cost-effective than road rehabilitation, but these would not have been on the community's preference list. The roads rehabilitated were important for the community. Road rehabilitation in terms of job creation was not as cost-effective as irrigation and drainage rehabilitation, but it was more cost-effective in job creation than garbage collection, and just as effective as soil conservation (Table 1, Annex D). The benefit/cost analysis for road rehabilitation showed net benefit/cost ratios of 2.0 at a discount rate of ten percent and of 1.3 at a discount rate of 15 percent. The NPV at 15 percent for 15 years was \$6.21 million. It should be noted that benefits such as reduction of accidents were not included in this benefit/cost analysis of road rehabilitation.

Soil Conservation

Soil conservation activities produced a large number of soil conservation structures that provided protection for 6,440 ha of land (see Section 2.1). This activity created 10,000 person/days of jobs at an average unit cost of \$1.82 per job. Job creation for soil conservation activity was more cost-efficient than for other activities, except for irrigation and drainage. On the other hand, the cost per job was less than that of other similar projects implemented in Peru, Jamaica, and the Eastern Caribbean. The project generated a number of benefits including prevention of soil erosion, improvement in soil productivity, and increase in farm revenue. The cost of soil conservation included expenditure for wages and the cost of materials. The NPV of soil conservation is \$1.03 million. This is comparable to that calculated for similar soil conservation projects in Haiti.

In addition to the four sub-project activities, PADF/JOBS also provided direct project benefits through wages for the workforce created. These wages injected funds directly into some of the poorest areas of the county. These funds increased effective demand in the local economy for goods and services. Increased effective demand, in turn, resulted in increased economic growth in these local economies. A number of individuals said they invested part of their wages from the sub-project in the informal sector. One study on the informal sector in Haiti showed that the average capital turnover ratio for \$1.00 generated \$1.86 in the economy (Jolly and Nelta 1993). Based on this study, a dollar in wages would generate an average of \$1.86 in the local economy. While no exact multiplier effect of PADF/JOBS wages could be calculated, estimates of this multiplier range from 1.5 to more than 3.

Combining the data given above provides a global project cost/benefit analysis. Summing the total economic effects of the project against its cost, the IRR for the project is 58 percent (Annex D). This would indicate that the project is having a strong positive impact on the economy.

2.4 Technical and Environmental Quality of Project Activities

This section addresses both engineering standards and prototypes and environmental standards and procedures. The evaluation reviewed the quality and appropriateness of the work and the technology seen in the sub-projects. It also examined how environmental mandates have been met by the project. Relevant information was obtained through review of existing literature on labor-intensive technologies, through field visits and through interviews with project implementors.

2.4.1 Technical and Engineering Standards and Prototypes

Appropriateness of the prototypes

Based on interviews made during field visits to 29 sub-projects, the evaluation team found that 95 percent of IO's technical staff believed the prototypes to be appropriate. The team in its own examination of the prototypes found the following:

- The prototypes were designed to be used in the rehabilitation of severely deteriorated and crumbling but potentially economically productive infrastructure in rural and urban areas and communities. Their purpose was to ensure that work undertaken by the IOs was labor-intensive and of high quality. To meet these standards, the project utilized sound technical engineering standards. The activities undertaken were simple and small, using existing local technologies.
- Design of the prototypes established a system where work, to the extent possible, could be broken into modules or tasks, which made it easier for IO and PADF technical staff to monitor completion of activities within given time frames. The prototypes included the number of workers needed per day or week to complete a given portion of the activity, and the number and kinds of tools and other materials needed for each work crew. While some cases were found — Baie des Moustiques and Gonaïves — where workers asked for more tools than specified in the prototypes, the evaluation team found that those tools called for in the prototypes were generally appropriate to good productivity and efficiency. In the case of hand tampers used for compacting road material thicker than 5cm, however, these tools were found to be inefficient.
- With regard to the replication of the standards and prototypes, the evaluation team was unable to find similar projects in the areas it visited to verify whether the prototypes had been independently replicated. Most project directors interviewed, however, felt that the prototypes should be easily replicable.

Sub-projects' use of the prototypes and standards

Interviews of the implementing organizations found that 95 percent were following the prototypes and standards provided by PADF. There are several reasons for this high acceptance rate. One of these was the training provided. The beginning of the implementation of each contract for a sub-project PADF provides training to the implementing organization's staff on use of the prototypes and standards appropriate to the activity being undertaken.

In addition, a PADF inspector was assigned to each sub-project to guarantee the quality of work. PADF's monitors ensured that work was performed in accordance with the pre-developed model. Further, they verified that workers and squad leaders were on the job

as agreed, that they were working on the task specified, and that the working groups could account for all tools and materials provided to them. Jointly with IOs, PADF had supervisory responsibility in the execution of the sub-project. Wherever it was necessary, problems in implementing the prototypes or standards were brought to the attention of the IO's staff and corrective action was recommended.

PADF supervisors were always available to support the IOs. PADF's engineers had country-wide responsibility for ensuring the quality of the work being done by the implementing organizations, compliance with technical standards and specifications, care of tools and materials, and supervision of works and monitors.

Some IOs complained that at the initiation of the project, the standards and prototypes were inflexible, delaying some sub-projects' progress. A case in point was PADF's standards regarding the kind of soil conservation structure to be adopted. After discussions with the IOs, PADF's engineering staff made some changes in their standards and prototypes, taking into consideration different aspects related to local conditions, human physical limitations, and local technologies and know-how.

Improvement of standards and prototypes

While the standards and prototypes were generally appropriate, they can still be improved. In road rehabilitation and in soil conservation activities, it could be important to provide to workers and team leaders some drawing of typical cross-sections of the work to be done. Additional technical information could also be added. In road rehabilitation, for example, there was no specification about side ditches. The standards and prototypes only specified the longitudinal slope to be used.

An important contribution to improving standards and prototypes would be to allow the senior engineering staff more time to work on the prototypes and on their supervision. With the rapid expansion of PADF/JOBS, much of the engineering staff's time has been spent preparing contracts to be signed by implementing organizations. This has taken them away from their normal work of designing the technical standards and prototypes, ensuring that sub-projects technical staff are qualified, and inspecting the work in progress.

2.4.2 Environmental Standards and Procedures.

One requirement of the Cooperative Agreement was that activities undertaken in the sub-projects be environmentally sound. USAID's Mission Environmental Officer (MEO) played an important role in seeing that this requirement was met. The MEO developed environmental standards and procedures for the project. In addition, the MEO reviewed and evaluated the particular site-specific circumstances of each sub-project to ensure that environmental mandates were being followed. Where necessary, the MEO also assisted in developing mitigation measures to address specific environmental concerns at a given sub-project site.

Each sub-project required a simple environmental checklist. This checklist comprised four sections concerning: 1) baseline data on the natural resources; 2) impact areas and sub-areas; 3) mitigation measures for each impact area as needed; 4) monitoring of implementation of mitigation measures. This checklist evaluates both short and long-term environmental impacts, as well as direct, indirect and cumulative impacts of each activity. If any of these impacts were significant, mitigation measures were implemented to minimize their effects.

Before the initiation of field activities, PADF's engineering staff completed the first three sections of the checklist with the concurrence of the MEO. During the implementation period of the sub-projects, the engineers completed the fourth section of the checklist. When completed the checklist was certified by the MEO.

Experts from the WASH program helped in dealing with specific environmental questions related to urban solid waste disposal. These questions included methods of collection, transport, and disposal of waste so as to insure the health of workers involved in the activity and to protect the environment of communities near the disposal site.

In general, most sub-projects followed the mandated environmental procedures and standards. A few implementing organization staff members said they had tried to follow these procedures, even though they did not understand them. While compliance with environmental standards was generally good, the team did find activities that could have some negative environmental effects. These activities included a) placement of the silt and dirt from a canal by the side of a road; b) lack of soil conservation activities along some mountainous roads; c) insufficient availability of masks for workers sweeping streets; and d) lack of appropriate boots to protect the workers cleaning canals from high temperatures and knee injuries.

Even though there was some confusion on environmental questions, most sub-project staff members did not consider the environmental standards too demanding and were able to follow them easily. Furthermore, apart from the few negative environmental effects mentioned above, the team did not find other activities which had had negative impact on the environment. On the contrary, the team thinks that most of the work undertaken by the sub-projects will either make a positive contribution to the local environment or be neutral to it.

2.4.3 Conclusions on Technical Standards

After an initial breaking-in period, the project possesses appropriate standards and prototypes that can be easily and quickly followed by the IO to produce quality work. The direct outcome of these appropriate technical standards is the project's remarkable progress and the impressive work done.

2.5 Social and Political Effects of the Project

Among the objectives of PADF/JOBS were to contribute to the restoration of hope among the neediest unemployed, to ease social and political pressures and to build confidence in constitutional government and the democratic process. To attempt to evaluate the success of the PADF/JOBS in meeting these objectives, the evaluation team developed questionnaires related to these objectives for workers, non-workers, and local officials in the sub-project sites (Annex E). In addition, a series of focus group discussions were held among interested members of the local community in selected sub-project sites. The results of these efforts are reported below.

The evaluation team was able to have in-depth interviews, usually lasting an hour or more, with 55 individuals. About seven focus group discussions were also held with groups ranging from five to six people up to groups of 25 or more. Admittedly, this number represents a small sample of the several hundred thousand people affected by PADF/JOBS. On the other hand, the evaluation team feels quite confident that this sample is a good representation of opinions and attitudes of people affected by the project. This belief is based on several factors. First, the 55 interviewees were chosen at random at the selected project sites. The profile of the questionnaires generally follows what would be expected of the population in the project site in terms of family size, money expenditures, and other variables seen in more detailed studies of the region. Second, the focus groups were also random. They were unannounced and spontaneously put together at the project sites. The discussions in the focus groups were lively. If views put forth in the discussion groups were too much at variance from the opinion of the group, which was representative of the community, it is highly likely that the variance would have been brought to the attention of the interviewer. In addition, the views of the focus groups corresponded closely with those of most of the individual interviews.

Nevertheless, while the evaluation team feels the data collected from the survey is a good representation of what is happening in the sub-project areas, calculation of the statistical significance of this data was not undertaken. The questionnaires were tabulated and frequency tables were generated. Lack of time precluded any additional analysis of the data.

The team found that the various sub-projects had both intended and unintended effects on political democratization in Haiti. Whereas the intended effects were expected to be positive, the unintended effects could be both positive and negative (Merton 1957: 51-66). From a social-political point of view, these effects can be classified as taking place at three levels of action: the contextual, i.e., the global/aggregate level, the relational, i.e., the interaction between sets of actors, and the individual, i.e., the attitudes and/or behavior of the actors. Table 2.2 presents a summary of the main effects found by the evaluation team within this classification structure. The first row represents both qualitative and quantitative observations; the other rows present results that were found qualitatively.

Table 2.2 Effects of the Job Creation Program on the Haitian Process of Democratization

EFFECTS	LEVELS		
	Contextual	Relational	Individual
INTENDED	General improvement of quality of life in communities as indicated by work done with the help of PADF.	Reinforced relationship between leaders and led in local organizations.	Hope and confidence in democratic rule.
UNINTENDED			
Positive	Politics used as management of local problems.	Social articulation between different sets of people which can be a new basis for alliances.	Project seen as an indication that change can take place.
	Diffusion of sources of power, prestige, material gains as opposed to State concentration of these resources.	Legitimate competition between various workers for jobs, regardless of their residence.	Reinforced influence of leaders over their social constituency through the delivery of needed jobs.
	Release of pressure on governmental machinery to deliver jobs.	Reinforced solidarity across political lines due to greater tolerance.	Social basis provides for left solidarity under the repressive military regime.
Negative	Reinforced perception of local associations as substitutes for state institutions.	Potential conflict among leaders to place their followers.	Sense of relative deprivation of non-workers and team leaders.
	Weakening of state institutions through focus on local community.	Reinforcement of clientism.	Loss of concern with state apparatus.
		Social articulation between different sets of people offering possibility of conflict.	Alienation of local political leaders.

2.5.1 Social Effects

The interviews and focus group discussions provided substantial support to the proposition that many of the intended social-political effects of the project were being achieved. It was generally agreed by the beneficiaries that the quality of life in their communities had greatly improved as a result of the PADF/JOBS. In all project sites, a great majority supported the idea that life in general was much better than it had been three years ago (Table 2.3, A- L 27) , and they also thought that they had a good chance of improving their own lives (Table 2.3 A- L 9). The way the project was implemented found wide approval (Table 2.3, A-L 13), although some said that a nepotistic network (*moun pa*) was the main factor, not chance alone, determining who got to work on a team (Table 2.3, C-L 14) and (Table 2.3, C-L 10).

The relation between social leaders and followers was positively valued. Many residents of the various sites declared they would willingly choose community leaders as future heads of any other projects coming into their locality (Table 2.4, L 12). This may have been a reflection of their positive evaluation of the implementing sub-projects.

Almost every informant was optimistic about the future of his or her community of residence (Table 2.3, A-L 4). The implemented projects were generally seen as a concrete manifestation of people's religious faith in their creator. Hope for improvement in their lives was very high; it appeared ultimately grounded in God's good will towards them. Such a belief is congruent with the finding that most people kept thinking that the quality of life was bound to improve even before the implementation of the PADF/JOBS (Table 2.3, A-L 26). Not surprisingly, a significant percentage of respondents declared they were very hopeful when they were certain of the return of the exiled president (Table 2.3, A-L 26).

Confidence in democratic rule was widely shared in all project sites. In spite of the political repression which had occurred during the military regime, the great majority of residents supported the idea that people ought to vote in the coming presidential elections (Table 2.3, B-L 34); they did not foresee any problem with these elections. Just a few expressed their doubt about its 'normal' occurrence (Table 2.3, B-L 38). Democratic rule was generally perceived as a guarantee for the fulfillment of one's material needs (Table 1, B-L 15). The above findings did not change when the work status of the beneficiaries was taken into account. It is unclear from this data, however, what direct impact PADF/JOBS had on the overall effect of creating confidence in democratic rules in the sub-project areas. It would take a comparable survey in non-project areas similar in size and scope to those studied in the survey undertaken by the evaluation team to be able to answer this question. The evaluation team did not have resources necessary to undertake this task.

**Table 2.3. Descriptive Summaries of Social Effects across PADF/JOBS Work Sites
(N=55)**

A. HOPE/OPTIMISM

Percent who said that positive change will take place in their residing communities (L 4)	79	Percent who thought that the rule of law would prevail in spite of the political repression over the last three years (L 29)	80
Percent who felt their life will improve (L 9)	75	Percent who said that people ought to vote in spite of the last three years of political repression (L 34)	85
Percent who said they had chance of getting a job with another project (L 11)	62	Percent who thought that the coming presidential elections would take place without any problem (L 38)	49
Percent who said that they remember keeping "hope alive" during the last three years of political repression (L 25)	69	Percent who said that both rich and poor ought to go to the electoral booth (L 41)	75
Percent who said they had hope: (L 26)			
before PADF/JOBS	32		
with Aristide's return	32		
at the beginning of PADF/JOBS	11		
during PADF/JOBS	8		

C. SATISFACTION with PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Percent who saw life in general as much better than it was three years ago (L 27)	76	Percent who said every one has an equal chance to be hired (L10)	16
Percent who said they thought that during the embargo things were bound to change for the better (L 28)	73	Percent who felt satisfied with the way the project was carried out(L 13)	
		not at all	22
		more or less	33
		very much	45

B. CONFIDENCE IN DEMOCRATIC RULE

Percent who think democratic rule guarantees fulfillment of material needs (L 15)	73	Percent who thought some people more favored over others with respect to PADF/JOBS (L 14)	27
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["L" refers to the questionnaire on "*Lespwa*", i.e. Hope, (see Annex E) and the number refers to the number of the question on this questionnaire.]

Table 2.4 Distribution of Respondents according to Types of Associations They Said They Would Choose to Manage a Project (L 12)

Religious Association (with Priest/Brother)	36
Social Association (such as Community Council)	38
Association based on Election (such as CASEC)	7
Any Other	19

2.5.2 Political Effects

Most political effects observed in the sub-project areas occurred not as a direct result of the PADF/JOBS but rather as a byproduct of the strategy used during its implementation. Two features of this strategy need to be underlined: its political neutrality and the rotational of jobs among a large number of workers.

The political neutrality of PADF/JOBS has been a key to its accomplishments. Neutrality has allowed various participants, regardless of their political allegiances, to coalesce around the project objectives. They seem to have focused more on what took place in their communities than on traditional political issues. Politics became the management of local problems. This was well expressed by a worker in Torbeck who said, "My political party is my job." People usually recognized the contrast between the local organizations which provided jobs to them and the state machinery, both in terms of their readiness to pay and their accountability. Governmental bureaucracies were perceived as largely unable to deliver services and benefits and unable to manage projects of any kind.

Whenever communities can deliver jobs to their residents, one can expect them to take precedence over the State as sources of power, prestige, and material gains. The diffusion of such resources is certainly important in the process of democratization of a society (Lipset 1994: 2-3). "Legitimacy is best gained by prolonged effectiveness, effectiveness being the actual performance of the government and the extent to which it satisfies the basic needs of most of the population and key power groups..." (Lipset 1994: 8). In all the sites visited, people declared a stronger loyalty to the local associations which carried out the needed projects than to the State machinery. While the creation of such projects relieves pressure on the governmental machinery to deliver jobs, it also reinforces the leadership of local leaders over their constituency.

The rotational aspect of the PADF/JOBS, on the other hand, seemed to generate a sense of tolerance among people since they had to adjust their desire to stay on the jobs because of their peers who also wanted to be on the team. In most of the sites visited, competition among workers for jobs was seen as legitimate, regardless of their residence. Although non-workers expressed some complaints about competition, in general they did not question the right of others to search for jobs in their communities. Exceptions to this finding were found in some area such as Les Palmes (Petit Goave) where the road rehabilitation sub-project engaged many workers from Port-au-Prince and in the garbage collection sub-project in Cité Soleil.

Obviously one cannot say that the perceived legitimacy of job competitors who did not reside at the project site was caused by the culture of tolerance derived from the organization of the work process. Rather, it is more likely that such legitimacy has its ultimate root in the common political repression to which the PADF/JOBS beneficiaries had been subjugated over the last three years. This political repression has reinforced solidarity among people. This ideas was well expressed by a female beneficiary in Cherette (near the

St Louis du Sud area) who said that "*Moun yo anba drapo yo, yo nan peyi-o. Sak mete yo deyo-a, se li ki nan ko nou tou ... Nou tout la pou men'm koz*" (translation: The job seekers are under their flag, they are in their country. The adversities that push them to leave their residence also affect us ... We all share a similar fate). Thus, PADF/JOBS was seen in contrast to the previous politically repressive context where associations among people had not been permitted. The "felt solidarity" induced by common experience of a repressive State apparatus found a source of reinforcement in the work process because it required an aggregation of beneficiaries per team.

The solidarity across social/political lines seemed to have been strengthened as a consequence of the tolerance that was experienced by the participants in the project. The great divide between makout/lavalas has receded in many of the sites, even in places that are recognized as politically hot, such as Cité Soleil and the Artibonite. In a planters' meeting at Desarmes one could see representatives of the two camps trying to figure out how to deal with problems of irrigation and drainage. When questions about political conflict came up, one planter declared that both sets of planters were reunited because of PADF/JOBS: "*Men nou genyen'l la-a [lan reinyon sa-a]. Mwen gen dwa di ou mouche se makout, mouche se lavalas tandiske avan pwoje PADF ou pat jwenn sa*" (Translation: "You have it right here [in this meeting]. This one is a makout, this one a lavalas. Before PADF/JOBS, one could not find such a thing"). Such a collaboration was also found in the South in Chérette and Laborde.

In a surprisingly large number of sites visited, the whole social ambiance was geared towards reconciliation and peace, apparently to take advantage of whatever gains PADF/JOBS had to offer. The extent to which such a coalescence will continue remains to be seen. Beneficiaries like the planters of Desarmes in the Artibonite Valley expressed their doubt that the social solidarity that was observed would continue after the withdrawal of PADF/JOBS.

The rotational aspect of PADF/JOBS facilitated articulation between different sets of people, even among those coming from various geographical areas. Such articulation is bound to promote greater acceptance of differences in orientations, perceptions, and behaviors. This meant that a new basis was being created for developing social alliances. The realm of informal credit, for instance, was extended, creating a market for local merchants to sell their goods more rapidly. Since a credit relation is not only an economic relationship but also a social one, new patterns of social relationships could ensue between the local merchants and various categories of workers — mainly agriculturalists, petty artisans, the landless, etc. Thus, the idea of community as a set of social relations instead of a mere geographical boundary (Wellman, Carrington, and Hall 1988: 130-176) is reinforced. And extension of social links beyond one's community boundary through weak contacts among people can facilitate the integration of various communities (Granovetter 1973). Since building and/or reinforcing tolerance is the gist of democratic rule, PADF/JOBS has had a positive impact in this respect.

Negative consequences of PADF/JOBS also exist with respect to the process of democratization. An important element in a democracy is that the State must command enough legitimacy to be able to mediate between various groups or communities in cases of conflict. When local associations are reinforced in a situation where the State is viewed as very weak, these local associations can easily perceive themselves as substitutes to the state institutions. By focusing on the local communities without any reference to them as political units, sub-projects of PADF/JOBS do not further the strengthening of state institutions such as the CASEC (*Conseil d'Administration des Sections Communales*) or the local municipalities. People's lack of concern with the development of those institutions was reinforced and many local political leaders felt somewhat alienated in relation to what took place in their constituencies. The displacement of the locus of legitimacy from the individual-state relation to the individual-local associations relation means that party politics, an important aspect of any democratization, may have greater difficulty in evolving. On the other hand, PADF/JOBS was not intended to promote party politics.

Another negative consequence resulted from the fact that social articulation between different sets of people can lead to conflict. In its site visits, the evaluation team found several such examples. In the Petit Goave area, for example, one local association felt it should have managed the sub-project rather than the organization that did so, which they considered as outsiders. In the same vein, the competition between local leaders to place their followers on work teams created conflict between a religious leader and a project director in Morne l'Hopital (Port-au-Prince).

2.5.3 Conclusion on Achievement of Democratic Objectives

The process of achieving democracy is complex and difficult. PADF/JOBS has supported this process by providing means for local associations of people to strengthen their ability to provide services to themselves and thus empower themselves as a community. This type of empowerment is a danger for any State that wishes to impose its will on the people. In a democracy it is the people who impose their will on the State.

PADF/JOBS has motivated local level social and political participation that are component parts of the democratic process. The prospect of jobs in the local area has also fostered in the local population increased hope for the future. Strengthening local institutional structures, however, can highlight the weakness of local and central governmental apparatus. Full democratization in Haiti cannot be achieved until the State has greater legitimacy granted by its people. To further the legitimacy process, future job creation activities would need to integrate more fully governmental institutions such as the CASEC and municipalities into their operations.

2.6 Sustainability of Project Activities

The project is designed to provide short-term benefits to a large group of people. It has generated over 261,000 person/months of work in a 19 month period. While creating

jobs, the project has also helped to strengthen local organizations. The directors, accountants, controllers, and supervisors have all received from one day to a week of training. The training has been in management, accounting methods, and project management. Most of the managers and accountants said that the training received has helped them in implementing the project. The activity of doing sub-projects had varying effects on the implementing organization. Most organizations said that they carried out the activity with few or no negative effects on their organizational structure, but they all had to employ a number of additional individuals to execute the program. Eleven of 17 IOs interviewed indicated that the management training and experience received from PADF/JOBS will be very helpful for future projects, while the other six responded that the training and experience will be just helpful. Some respondents indicated they have already applied the skills acquired. In one case, a respondent used these skills to seek financing for new projects. Many IOs stated that the detailed review required by the administrative reports enabled them to focus on and tackle problems on a timely basis. The workers and team leaders also received training in road construction, canal maintenance, and irrigation. The workers interviewed said that they had received skills in soil conservation and road maintenance which will help them with future jobs.

Most of these organizations had few other outside sources of funding besides PADF/JOBS. They said that they will not be able to continue employing individuals involved with the project when it ends unless they receive additional outside funding. Except for valuing the learning experience, most of the IOs felt that their activities with PADF/JOBS were not sustainable and that they cannot continue without continuing resources.

All the activities are not equally self-sustaining. The street cleaning and drainage activities, for example, are not self-sustaining activities unless the municipalities decide to assume this responsibility, using taxes or other resources. The individuals employed in street cleaning were not educated on the importance of maintaining the areas cleaned. Very little has been done in terms of transport of residue from the collection areas to dump sites. The team found some local instances where individuals have taken it upon themselves to clean the streets, but they have been doing that in anticipation that there will be future projects. The communities involved in the drainage activities said they will organize themselves and seek funds to keep this activity going. In two cases the workers and the leaders of the community said that the improvement in the drainage system allowed for the free flow of water during floods. They all said that after the drains had been cleaned the flood waters from Hurricane Gordon, which devastated certain areas of the country, had little effect on the people. There were no losses of life reported from flooding in the areas where the canals were maintained. The community groups all stated that with a little help in terms of donated tools they could maintain the canals themselves.

The irrigation and soil conservation activity seem to have long lasting effects on the community. The workers involved in irrigation were already observing some of the positive effects of the improvement of the irrigation canals on crop diversity, production, and land values. The workers and local leaders said they would maintain the local canals for

irrigation if they had the tools. They said they will seek assistance to maintain the canals. The workers participating in the soil conservation techniques said they were familiar with these activities and had learned much from participating in the work process. Many of them had adopted some of the practices of contouring and building gully plug on their own farms. They were aware of the benefits of soil conservation for productivity and are likely to maintain this activity in an effort to increase farm revenue.

2.7 Project Management

Project management is focused on creation of jobs and effective utilization of available resources invested in the sub-projects. Under the Cooperative Agreement, acceptable sub-projects include the rehabilitation of existing but deteriorated infrastructure in:

1. Transportation, including secondary and tertiary roads, culverts, ditches, small bridges;
2. Agriculture, including irrigation canals and systems, retaining walls adjoining rivers and streams, soil and water conservation;
3. Health and environment, including garbage and debris collection and disposal, canal cleaning, soil and water conservation.

New construction work is excluded unless otherwise agreed upon by PADF/JOBS and USAID.

PADF entered into contracts with other private voluntary agencies, non-governmental agencies, and local organizations. These implementing organizations hired workers for the completion of the tasks.

The contracts with the IOs specify the time frame and the tasks to be accomplished by work crews of 20 workers under the supervision of a team leader, using tools provided by PADF/JOBS. In general, workers are rotated after 4-6 weeks in order to extend employment to the largest possible number of people in the target population. At a minimum, 20 percent female participation in the work force is required.

In a typical contract, IOs' direct cost of supervision approximates 15 percent of labor costs. Materials account for 20 percent of labor and direct costs of supervision. Tools were provided to the IOs but had to be returned to PADF/JOBS at the completion of the contract. The role of PADF/JOBS is to identify sub-projects, to establish the scope of work, to select and assist the IOs, and to monitor progress and achievements.

2.7.1 Financial and Audit Systems

Transactions are recorded in separate funds that are related to the source of financing — USAID Washington (US dollars), USAID Haiti (local currency), and PL-480 (local currency). Financial statements for each fund are prepared monthly. These statements are reviewed by PADF/JOBS management and at PADF headquarters in Washington. Quarterly, formal financial status reports are submitted to USAID, as required by the Cooperative Agreement.

The local currency books were audited on a quarterly basis from August 1993 to September 1994 by the auditing firm Mérové-Pierre. Deficiencies noted in the reports have been addressed by project management. In October 1994, USAID/HAITI authorized PADF/JOBS to discontinue the quarterly Mérové-Pierre audits and switch to an annual audit.

Financial statements are well prepared and accurate, with the exception of the tool inventory. The financial statements of PADF/JOBS do not adequately reflect the sizable inventory of tools the project has. Separate manual and computerized stock records showing quantities only are kept at the warehouse and in the accounting department, respectively. These records are reconciled at varying intervals. For accountability purposes, a value is assigned to tools by type. The ensuing valuation is used to calculate IOs' charges for lost items. The value assigned is not necessarily equal to the acquisition cost and is intended mainly as a control mechanism. As the size of the project has expanded, more tools have been acquired, greatly exceeding the original \$300,000 estimate. Since the purchases were not recorded in a fixed asset fund, reliable cost data is not easily available. However, based on the valuation assigned by PADF/JOBS, the tools inventory at March 31, 1995 had a value of about \$1,000,000 of which 20 percent was in the PADF/JOBS warehouse and 80 percent in various sub-project work sites. Although the Cooperative Agreement specified that IOs had a contractual obligation to return all tools and unused materials at the end of a given contract period, this was not always possible due either to logistical constraints or to anticipated need of new sub-projects.

During our field visits, we noted that tool inventory controls varied greatly among IOs. For example, at one sub-project, tools assigned are recorded by workers in the team leader's notebook, while in another IO, incomplete records are kept of items issued to team leaders. The establishment of uniform standard for controls over tools will reduce risks in that area. Prompt action by PADF/JOBS would appear necessary.

2.7.2 PADF's Monitoring of Sub-projects.....

PADF/JOBS consults regularly with USAID/Haiti and coordinates its activities with other agencies involved in jobs program in Haiti, although it decides independently on the work projects to be carried out. Inputs and suggestions from private voluntary agencies, non-governmental agencies, local organizations and the PL-480 office are also sought and are taken into account in the decision making process.

Typically, once a potential sub-project is identified and budget funds are determined to be available, a senior engineer visits the site to ascertain the potential of the IO and community interest in the project. If the visit results are positive, technical studies are conducted using prototypes established by PADF/JOBS to ensure that the project's objectives of labor-intensive, high-quality rehabilitation of existing infrastructure using local technology and know-how can be met. The technical studies may result in modifications to the request received.

Upon approval by USAID, the sub-project contract is signed. Before the work actually starts, IO management — director, engineer, accountant — attend a PADF/JOBS training seminar on administrative and technical matters; in turn, IO management provides training to its supervisory personnel. During the execution of the contract, monitoring is done by on-site inspectors, visiting engineers, and accounting staff:

On-site inspectors

The Cooperative Agreement specified that PADF/JOBS would initially fund nine highly mobile monitoring units and hire field level monitors who would have frequent direct contacts with the IOs, their staff, and work crews. During the execution of the project, it became evident that a permanent on-site PADF/JOBS presence was preferable, and now there are 32 field inspectors. These inspectors receive an initial 2-week training on administrative and technical matters. Then they are sent to reside at a sub-project and are provided with motorcycles to visit all work sites, inspect the work done, make entries in the site book, witness and sign payrolls, evaluate work accomplished, and ensure that IOs provide timely and accurate information to PADF/JOBS. The inspectors visit their unit head in Port-au-Prince at least monthly and attend quarterly meetings of all inspectors .

The role of the field inspectors is crucial for the entire PADF/JOBS, as these inspectors are in the trenches and must take timely and appropriate action to ensure that the work gets done and that sub-projects do not steal or misuse project resources. During our field visits, it was interesting to hear unsolicited comments by IO management — both positive and negative — about on-site inspectors and to note that prompt action had been taken by PADF/JOBS in cases of valid negative feedback.

Visiting Engineers

In October 1994, PADF/JOBS hired four engineers to visit sub-projects to provide additional higher-level assessment of progress and work completion. Under procedures being implemented, the engineers prepare a memorandum that summarizes progress to date and work to be done. That memorandum is signed by both the IO head and the PADF/JOBS inspector; a copy is left with the IO head. If warranted, a letter by the director of PADF/JOBS restating the actions agreed upon is later sent to the IO.

The visiting engineers report to the senior engineers and are independent of the inspectors. Their visits provide much needed direct management oversight of field activities, since with an increasing number of requests to evaluate and analyze, the Senior engineers had less time available to perform on-site inspections.

Upon request from USAID, PADF engineers also accompany USAID staff on its site inspections. USAID has visited over 75 percent of all completed projects. When problems have been identified, PADF has quickly complied with required mitigation measures.

Accounting Staff

PADF/JOBS provides an initial advance to the IOs and requires reports and supporting documentation for expenses incurred before granting additional advances. IOs are required to open separate bank accounts and to report their activities using a set of forms showing the following:

- Work done and inspected by the PADF/JOBS on-site inspector,
- Individual expenditures and related budget line ,
- Budget vs. expenditures,
- Budget for the coming two periods,
- Fund requests based on work progress,
- Payroll list by work crew,
- Bank account reconciliation.

These documents are reviewed by the accounting staff and are approved for processing only after all discrepancies regarding data reported and supporting documentation have been resolved. Letters of recommendations highlighting the problems found and the corrective measures required are sent to IOs. The process takes two weeks on average from the time the documents are received, but it may take longer. Thus, there is sometimes a lag in the financial statements. In October 1994, additional employees were hired to speed up processing of IO reports.

The forms to be completed by the IOs are deliberately kept very simple, and PADF/JOBS has insisted on strict compliance and adequate explanation if the percentages of work realized and expenditures made vary from what is expected by more than ten percentage points. IO officials interviewed have indicated that after completing the initial learning period they did not have any significant problem with the forms. These officials also stated that the required comparison of realization to expenditures helped them to better manage the resources at their disposal and to more effectively monitor the execution of the contract.

2.7.3 Management and reports

Under the terms of the Cooperative Agreement, PADF/JOBS submits formal quarterly financial and progress reports to USAID. Except for the omission on the progress report of total expenditure to date, the quarterly reports are in compliance with the terms of the Cooperative Agreement. The omission on the progress report is partially mitigated by the fact that the data is available in the quarterly financial report and that close contact is also maintained with the USAID mission, which has manifested a keen interest in the project's progress and accomplishments.

As already stated, in October 1994, USAID allowed PADF/JOBS to switch from quarterly to annual audits, thereby expressing confidence in the entity's internal controls. It should be noted that the submission of qualitative end-of-project reports and quarterly progress reports requires a significant amount of time, at least 4-6 weeks, as the information must be compiled at the sub-projects, sent to PADF/JOBS, and reviewed and corroborated before the report is released.

For the projects that it finances, monthly reports are sent to the PL-480 office. The reports are currently being reviewed. PL-480 officials have expressed confidence, based on their past experience with PADF/JOBS, that the reports will be found satisfactory.

2.7.4 Conclusions on Project Management

The project has been well managed and measures are being taken to achieve project objectives under very difficult circumstances and with increasingly larger person/month targets. Improvements are needed in control over tools inventory and in reducing processing delays of progress reports.

The overall project success is attributable in great part to the establishment of, and compliance with, simple but effective systems for monitoring, correcting and reporting field activities. In addition, PADF's 'hands-on' philosophy and the commitment of its management and staff also seem to be significant factors in the project's success.

3. LESSONS LEARNED

As the findings have shown, PADF/JOBS has successfully achieved the following objectives: a) to create a large amount of manual employment, b) to use this workforce to rehabilitate economically enhancing infrastructure and to improve the quality of life of the Haitian people, and c) to lay the groundwork for democratic processes in the country. This chapter deals with lessons learned from this successful activity. These lessons could be used in other similar programs in Haiti or in other countries.

3.1 The Project's Institutional Structures Contribute to Its Success.

An important element of the success of the PADF/JOBS in Haiti is the unique institutional structure of the project. The project has four levels of institutional involvement. Each layer has specific responsibilities and tasks. The four layers are a) an external provider of funds, in this case an international donor, USAID, and the PL-480 Management Office, b) a successful international PVO, PADF, with broad Haitian experience and good working relations with many local organizations within the country, c) interested national organizations with location-specific orientations within the country, and d) a series of social groups, associations and other indigenous organizations to supply workers for the sub-projects. Not all sub-projects had this latter institutional layer, but it was common in most of the sub-projects.

The role of the external provider of funds is to be the source of funds for the activity and to account for the use of these funds. Funds for PADF/JOBS came from several sources including dollars from USAID and local currency from PL-480 Title III monetized proceeds managed by the PL-480 Management Office. An important factor in the achievements made by the project has been the direct involvement of USAID as provider of funds and the flexibility USAID has shown in keeping the project going. Under the Cooperative Agreement, for example, USAID established a collaborative daily working relationship that helped the project to react quickly and efficiently to one shock after another in what was an extremely unstable political and social environment. When it was found that there was a shortfall in funds for the project, both USAID and the PL-480 Management Office reacted rapidly to provide alternate sources of funding.

The international PVO plays several critical roles in the success of this model. To play these roles, the PVO must have contacts and working relationships with many existing local organizations. The PVO uses these contacts to carry out the job creation program. Time and expense precludes the PVO from creating new local organizations to play this role.

The international PVO should be politically neutral in the selection among national organizations and the work these organizations are to do. It can maintain international standards concerning financial and technical accountability and project management, and it can act as a buffer between funding sources and political pressures within the country.

The local implementing organizations at the third layer of institutional involvement are diverse. In the PADF/JOBS, seven different types of these organizations were identified. They include internationally-based ONGs such as CARE, local cooperatives, religious groups, and small local support groups for municipal mayors. These local organizations had several common elements. They are all officially recognized by the Government of Haiti. Local professional people interested in providing services to a specific location or community led many of these organizations. These implementing organizations have a basic level of competency for managing and carrying out the sub-projects.

The last layer in this structure showed the greatest variation. Sometimes the role of social groups, associations and other indigenous organizations was positive, and sometimes it was negative. What is constant is that, for almost all sub-projects, indigenous organizations and groups played an active role in gaining control and use of sub-project resources (see Section 3.3). This often intense activity is indicative of democratic processes in sub-project areas, an important objective of the project.

Interactions among these four layers of institutional involvement is an important part of the success of the project. The implementing organizations viewed the international PVO as a just and neutral provider of funds. These funds were linked to managerial, technical and accounting requirements. The local organizations used these funds to carry out mandates of their own that were consistent with the project objectives.

The evaluation team considered several alternatives to the present project's institutional structure to see if a more cost-effective way could be found to reach the same three project objectives. The alternatives included: a) use of Government of Haiti (GOH) institutions to carry out the project, b) direct management of the activity out of USAID/Haiti, c) use of a large national PVO instead of the international PVO, and d) management by a U.S. contractor or PVO.

Using agencies within the GOH appears at first glance to be a logical option for a massive job creation program. On close examination, however, many problems with this option become evident. While doing its survey work, the evaluation team got a general idea of the attitudes of participants in the sub-projects. When asked about the use of the government to manage the Jobs program, participants expressed strong views against the idea. An important problem noted was political patronage. The government, it was felt, would use the project to support friends and punish perceived enemies. There was also strong doubt that the government could effectively manage the volume of funds used by the project. Some organizations said they would not work with the government because it would destroy their reputation for political neutrality in the area where they work. They did not want to be drawn into national politics. Others said that workers would feel that a program run by the government was a gift for political favors to the local people and workers in the sub-projects. This, they felt, would lead to a situation where workers would not work but would still expect to receive payment. Some indicated that they assumed that discipline and standards of work would fall.

There was a great deal of distrust of the government and local politicians. In one area, for example, the local people called the sub-project a "miracle" because it was the first project the people of the area had seen where local political and social leaders had not stolen most of the resources of the project.

There are other problems as well. Most government offices do not have trained staff, vehicles, computers and other logistical support to manage a program of the scale of PADF/JOBS. These resources would have to be purchased or provided to the government, thus substantially raising overhead costs for carrying out the project. Government agencies also do not use independently audited international standards of accounting and management. Standards that exist in the present project would be hard to enforce. It is also highly unlikely that government employees would have the same motivation and reward system as employees of an international PVO. Output per staff member would be considerably less.

Finally, if the government ran the project, the project would lose one of the most intriguing and important outcomes seen in many sub-project areas. This outcome has been the requirement for local level associations and groups to interact with one another to maximize access to project resources. This cooperative interaction can be the basis of the democratic processes required for true democracy to be established in Haiti. If the project had been run by the government, it is likely that the local organizations would not have interacted with one another, but rather would have directed their attentions toward gaining the favor of government officials and politicians.

Another potential alternative to the present structure would be to have USAID manage the project directly via local grants. In the past USAID has done this type of activity, and some implementing organizations have had experience with USAID in this capacity. The obvious problem with this alternative is that it would require a major increase in management and supervision by USAID. This alternative is unlikely to be more efficient than the use of an international PVO.

A third alternative that could be considered would be to use a larger national PVO instead of an international PVO as PADF. The evaluation team felt that this would be a possible alternative if the following conditions were met: a) the PVO is politically and religiously neutral, b) it maintains international standards of externally audited accountability, c) it has a strong local relationship with other local organizations, d) the PVO is national in scope of operation, and e) its work covers a wide range of sectors. No national PVO in Haiti fits these criteria at this time. Such national PVOs may exist in other countries.

A final alternative would be to contract with a U.S. contractor or PVO to manage the project. These organizations could provide the same neutral buffer between funding and local implementation organizations, and could maintain high standards of accountability and management. The missing element in these organizations is PADF's established network of local organizations. This network allowed PADF to respond quickly and effectively to USAID's request to set up the jobs program. Outside contractors or PVOs would have to

establish the same type of network, and that would take some time to do. Thus project implementation would be delayed.

3.2 The Majority of Project Resources Go Directly to the Workforce

A remarkable element in PADF/JOBS is the large percent of project funds that go directly to the people in the sub-project area. According to PADF figures, the contracts with the IO stipulate that approximately 75 to 80 percent of the dollar and local currency funds should go directly to the manual labor workforce. In addition, about 15 percent of contract funds go to pay the staff of the implementation organizations. Thus, about 90 to 95 percent of resources of each contract for sub-project work goes directly into wages in the sub-project area. When PADF's operating costs are added in, about 67 percent of total project resources goes to the workforce. Compare this with the more normal USAID development project. It is not unusual to see 70 to 80 percent of a typical USAID project's funds paid directly to U.S. suppliers, to American or other expatriate staff, and to U.S. contractors. PADF/JOBS has infused a major flow of cash directly into extremely cash-poor areas of the country. The results have been startling and significant. The evaluation team saw many women selling food and other goods at sub-project work sites and along newly repaired roads. Schools report pre-payment of school fees. Local medical clinics say they are seeing more people. Impact is illustrated by an example described at a work site in central Haiti. After being paid for his two weeks of work, a laborer stood counting and recounting his pay. When the payer asked if something was wrong with his payment, the laborer responded no, that he was just counting the most money he had ever had in his life.

Another important factor in directing resources to the local level was the requirement stipulating that a minimum of 20 percent of the workforce in the sub-projects had to be women. Many IOs reported that after an initial reluctance to carry out this stipulation, they found that women were not only able to do the same work as men but were often chosen by their team to be the team leader (*chef d'equipe*) because of their fairness and incorruptibility. Without the 20 percent stipulation, many IOs would not have hired the number of women they did.

3.3 All Politics Are Local

Former Speaker of the House Tip O'Neil is credited with the line "All politics are local." The evaluation team found intense local level political and social activity in most sub-project sites. This activity was directed toward gaining access to the sub-project's resources. As noted above, PADF/JOBS, through its sub-projects, brought more resources into areas than most had seen in years. This led to intense activity by local groups to gain control of these funds. Some of this activity was good; some of it was bad. Some indigenous groups worked together to maximize their access to resources. Other groups formed alliances against one another (see Section 2.4). What was common among all areas was a local sense of empowerment leading to action. This empowerment encouraged skills

in group interaction, organization and management, all good training for participation in democracy.

3.4 People Want Cash

Workers in all of the work sites visited by the evaluation team expressed a strong desire for cash as compared with other forms of payment. Cash is fungible and can be used at the workers' discretion to fulfil their families' needs. Cash is used to purchase food, schooling, seeds, tools and medical care. Most workers said they would take some food aid in payment, if required, but only as a supplement to payment in cash. Presented the option of food as payment, several workers asked if they could sell the food for cash. The workers complained that in past programs where they were paid with food, they received more food than they could consume or store. Workers sought to convert this food into cash that is easier to store and use as needed.

Prompt and regular payment by the sub-projects has a high value to the workers. Assurance of payment had not been a common practice in other activities in which workers had participated. Some workers said they would take a lower wage rate if they had assurance they were going to be paid regularly. In several sub-projects workers said that they can purchase food on credit from local merchants because of the merchant's confidence that the sub-project was going to pay workers on time.

During the evaluation, the question of an increase in the minimum wage from 15 to 36 Gdes became a national issue. PADF/JOBS pays basic workers 20 Gdes a day. Asked their feeling about a potential increase in the minimum wage, PADF/JOBS workers responded negatively. They like the idea of more money but were concern that the increased minimum wage would mean fewer jobs available to them. Workers want work, even at a lower wage rate. In one site visit, workers said that what they want is to have a job, any job, where they knew they would be paid. Even though this might mean less money, they preferred this to a promise of a potentially higher wage for jobs that are less available and more uncertain. These workers feel that they can more easily supplement their income with other work or activities under the former condition rather than under the latter.

3.5 Implementing Organizations Do Not Want Food

While many workers said they would take a small quantity of food for payment, virtually all of the implementing organizations interviewed (95 percent) adamantly refused to handle food as part of the payment to workers. The IOs gave a number of reasons for not wanting food. These include need for storage, transportation, and security as well as questions on how to value, distribute, and account for the food. The IOs stressed the need for simplicity in the program. The addition of food into the project would make management of the sub-project very complicated.

3.6 Prototypes and Standards Are Very Useful to Project Implementation

All of the IOs interviewed felt that the prototypes and standards developed by PADF on technical, managerial and accounting requirements were very useful. They allowed IOs with less experienced technical staff to produce quality work with the workforce created by PADF/JOBS. The prototypes did not, however, preclude the need for training and supervision of less qualified technical staff. One value of the prototypes noted by both PADF and IO staff was their usefulness in estimating the amount of labor required to complete a given unit of work. This information was used to manage workforce performance by the IOs and to control proper payment by PADF staff. In addition, some local organizations used the standards provided by PADF as models for preparation of credible proposals to other donors and local philanthropic sources of funds.

3.8 The Project Needs Flexibility to Adjust to Unforeseen Events

During the course of the PADF/JOBS many external shocks were felt by the economy and, in turn, by the project. USAID and PADF have both shown great flexibility in responding to these shocks. It is important that this flexibility be incorporated into normal project management. As this evaluation is ending, for example, the minimum wage is going to be more than doubled. This external event will affect the project and the various sub-projects. More funds may be needed, and sub-projects may have to be redesigned. In a developing country such as Haiti, there is little project managers can do to protect themselves from these external shocks. The design of the project needs to incorporate ability to react quickly and appropriately to such unexpected events.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation team has four recommendations that could improve the present project's performance. These recommendations are refinements rather than fundamental changes in project operations. The team feels that the project has been well managed by PADF and USAID.

4.1 Choice of Sub-Projects

PADF should continue to encourage active participation by local people and leaders in the choice of activities being proposed by the implementing organizations to PADF for funding. In areas where the evaluation team observed such participation, there was strong ownership of the activity by the workers and organizations, resulting in the possibility of sustainability through future maintenance and follow-up.

In addition, where possible PADF should seek to support complementary adjacent sub-project activities. The most obvious complementary activities are road rehabilitation and soil conservation. In some areas, particularly in the Northwest, the long-term viability of a road depends on the protection of adjacent land near the road from soil erosion. Likewise, the value of rehabilitating an irrigation scheme would increase if the road available to take the agricultural production to markets were also rehabilitated.

4.2 Flexibility in Use of Funds

The evaluation team found several cases where the constraints stipulated in contracts with implementing organizations on keeping direct management costs and material expenditures within a given percent of the sub-project's total cost caused some difficulty in the implementation of the activity. While the team fully supports the basic policy concept of maximizing flow of funds to the workforce, in certain specific cases a greater allocation of resources to materials and management would have improved performance. PADF has shown considerable flexibility in this matter, and the evaluation recommends that flexibility be continued on a case by case basis. If the project moves towards more development-oriented work in the future, even greater flexibility will be required in this area.

4.3 Management and Use of Tools

As noted in Section 2.7, the volume and value of tools in the project have increased substantially over the course of the project. Initially these tools were considered expendable. Only limited effort and expense were allocated to controlling the tool inventory, except to require that implementing organizations return all tools to PADF by at the end of the sub-project. With the present volume of tools being used, additional effort may be required. This might include adding full value of tools to the project's inventory and seeking standard methods for control of the tools.

At a few sites the evaluation team was told by the IOs that they would like to do continual maintenance of the infrastructure they had rehabilitated, but they lack tools to do so. On several selected occasions in the past, PADF, with USAID concurrence, has transferred tools to an IO for maintenance purposes at the completion of the sub-project. As the project implementation nears its scheduled completion in October, PADF should examine how it could facilitate more of these tool transfers to those IOs that can prove they have the capability to use these tools for continual maintenance of sub-project rehabilitated infrastructure. This transfer would improve the prospects of sustainability of work done by the project, and it is in keeping with general USAID policy.

4.4 Refinement of the Prototypes

As noted above, the prototypes have proven to be very useful documents for both the IO and PADF staff. These documents could be further refined with drawings and other details to make them even more useful to the technical staff in the IOs. Many of the technical people at the IOs have limited skills. Continual refinement of the prototypes will aid these technicians to implement sub-project activity.

5. CONCLUSION

The Jobs Creations Project is at a point of decision. What has been a successful stopgap emergency measure to create large numbers of manual labor jobs must now either come to an end or move into a longer term, development-oriented program. PADF/JOBS has worked. The program has achieved all of its objectives. It has proved to be a very cost-effective use of dollar and PL-480 funds. The next, more developmentally-oriented phase would be more expensive. Capital and technical personnel costs which have been kept low up to now would increase.

The Jobs Project's weakness in terms of development was part of its design. USAID designed the project to create short-term jobs and then to leave. Long-term development questions were not part of its objectives. Nevertheless, development occurred. Infrastructure was rehabilitated, secondary markets and jobs were created, and local political participation flourished. The issue at this point is whether job creation activity should be continued, and if so, how?

The project's success is also its greatest danger. People have obtained work in parts of the country where work had not previously been available. Money in substantial amounts has flowed into many of the poorest regions on the country. In the sub-project areas visited by the evaluation team, we found people engaged by and feeling ownership of the sub-project activities. Abrupt ending of the project would stifle hope and would prematurely arrest emerging signs of economic regeneration related to sub-project activities. Expectations in the sub-project areas will be dashed. Such an ending could result in considerable political fall out. No one related to the project wants to create a situation of dependency, a big danger in this type of program. On the other hand, sub-project areas still need jobs and cash. Infrastructure still needs repair and maintenance. It will take time before the local economy and private sector can provide employment to take up the slack of the Jobs Project. There is a need for some form of transition.

The critical question is the form and substance of this transition. This evaluation provides some information on plausible scenarios to explore. The following are some suggestions about the possible future course and transition of this job creation activity.

Project transition will take time. Five to six years seems an appropriate time frame. Two to three years of this effort could be a continuation of activities similar to the present PADF/JOBS, with additional work on institutional development. The latter two to three years could see a gradual phase down and movement of the activities into a more permanent, low level, locally-based public works program. The initial period should have the same scope as the present program, with the creation of about 225,000 person/months of work a year, producing 150,000 jobs. Assuming funds are available, this level of activity could be handled easily with the existing project structure. Given the expected higher cost of this institutional development-oriented program, this level of activity would cost about \$12 million a year in the initial period. As the project moves into phase-over activities, these

costs could gradually be reduced to a much lower level that could be handled through locally mobilized funds and small cash grants.

Both dollar and local currency contributions could cover a transition program's costs. It is likely that funding would have to include other donors besides USAID. The evaluation shows that it is also likely that food aid could play a role, but only if most of it was monetized to create local currency for the project. In very specific and limited areas, a small amount of food aid could be used for direct payment of workers as a supplement to cash payment. Only a few IOs could or would handle this food aid. These IOs may also want extensive logistical support if they agree to handle food aid.

The significant difference between the stopgap orientation of the PADF/JOBS and a more development-oriented transitional program would be the latter's emphasis on institutional development. The aim of this transition would be to move from the present emphasis, on PADF planning and supporting of sub-projects financially and technically, to focus on the local IOs. IOs should eventually be able to select local projects, prepare appropriate documentation and plans, and seek funding to implement them. This process should include participation of local associations, social and political groups. Once prepared, the IOs could seek funding either through locally mobilized funds or through grants from the GOH, donors or other philanthropic organizations. To achieve this aim would require development of governmental and local institutions. A transitional program could provide local organizations support in management, accounting, and technical supervision. The role of government needs to be properly integrated into this activity. Given the distrust and poor history of government actions in local areas, this integration must be done with great care (see Section 3.1).

With a transition program in place, the following could occur: some \$10 million a year over a period of time could be injected into the poorest areas of the country, much of the basic infrastructure of the country could be rehabilitated and maintained, and political and social interaction at local levels could encourage a greater voice in public affairs for the most disenfranchised segments of the country. The infusion of significant amounts of funds directly into the lowest level of the economic structure would encourage spending on local goods, investment in local farms and businesses, and spending on local schools and medical care. The evaluation team has already seen this type of investment take place in sub-project areas. These investments have not taken place for a long enough period, however, to result in significant and permanent economic growth. A transition program could provide that time. Resultant economic growth could provide employment opportunities that would reduce the urgency of the present job situation. For the foreseeable future Haiti will continue to have a large amount of permanent and seasonal unemployment. With continual economic growth, this problem can be solved over time. A transition program would support that economic growth and provide local means to manage and support necessary public works and employment generation.

The evaluation team is aware of at least three proposals to continue some elements of the Jobs Creation Project — the proposed Enhancing Food Security II project, PADF's Proposal for Haiti Jobs Creation: A Community-based, Participatory, Municipal Development Approach, and the developing FAES project funded by the World Bank/IBD. As this evaluation concludes, the World Bank, with GOH concurrence, has pledged up to \$50 million for job creation activities with use of PADF as a major implementor. The evaluation team hopes that the results of this evaluation will be useful in making decisions about these and other related proposals to continue job creation activities in Haiti.

ANNEXES

ANNEX A: TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Purpose of the Evaluation

This evaluation will be conducted to examine whether the PADF Jobs Creation Project is meeting its objectives under the Cooperative Agreement with USAID/Haiti. Another crucial purpose of the evaluation will be to examine issues of project design: Whether the project was well conceived in terms of ease and speed of implementation, whether a similar future program might be made more developmentally sustainable, and other lessons learned. The stated project objectives—which have been significantly amended over the course of the project and must be framed within a historical and political perspective—are as follows:

- To create 430,000 person months of immediate and useful short-term employment and income to directly benefit approximately 215,000 people over a period of two years. Participants in the program will be selected from the ranks of the unemployed, most impoverished Haitians;
- To rehabilitate and reactivate severely deteriorated and crumbling economically productive infrastructure in rural and urban areas and communities, contributing to stimulate economic recovery at the grass roots level;
- To ensure that works are labor intensive and of high quality, and utilize sound technical standards. Activities undertaken will be simple and small, using existing local technologies and know how; and
- To contribute to restoring hope among the neediest unemployed, helping them to meet their basic needs. The program will also help ease social and political pressures, and build confidence in constitutional government and the democratic process.

In addition, the evaluation will assess project impact in terms of geographical coverage, political visibility, economic and social utility to the areas in which projects are implemented, and building institutional capacity of sub-grantee organizations.

2. Statement of Work

The evaluation will address the following themes and respond to the following questions:

1. PROJECT PROGRESS

What is the progress to date towards planned outputs, particularly the numbers of people employed? What are the constraints to the ease and speed of implementation?

Recommendations to improve project progress and any potential follow-on projects are to be included (most likely to be focused in the area of food security).

2. PROJECT IMPACT

Has this program enhanced the food security of its beneficiaries based on the AID definition: When all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food to meet dietary needs for productive and healthy lives? If so, how has it done so? (The evaluators will examine the purchasing power of the program daily wage). Did the program properly target its intended beneficiaries through the use of an adequately minimal, self-selecting "daily support wage"? (Wage surveys and background information will be provided to the evaluators). Did the program reach these beneficiaries? Was the use of PVOs and community organizations to implement sub-projects an appropriate strategy? Was the program properly geographically targeted to reach the poorest sectors? Both a political and economic cost/benefit analysis are to be provided. Has the program impacted women participants differently than men? If so, how?

3. INFRASTRUCTURE REHABILITATION

The evaluation will quantify primary economic benefits of the sub-project works ie. the improvements made to all types of productive infrastructure. While no baseline data was developed for this emergency program, to the extent possible, the evaluation will determine whether measurable economic recovery has occurred in local rural economies? One possibility will be to measure project sites against areas in which the PADF program was not active (maximum of 1 or 2 areas). What types of infrastructure improvements have had the most significant secondary effects with resulting impact on revenue generation? Were there negative effects to infrastructure improvements, e.g. land disputes over newly irrigable plots? Again, a cost/benefit analysis will be prepared. The evaluation will include a statistically significant sample of relevant sub-projects (12-16) according to types of intervention and geographic location.

4. TECHNICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND APPLICATION OF STANDARDS

Were the technical and engineering standards and prototypes utilized appropriate? Were the standards followed? Are the works of high quality and do they use appropriate levels of technology? Recommendations are to be made for improvements as identified. Were environmental standards and procedures followed?

5. DEMOCRATIC OBJECTIVES

a) Social Impact: Has the project had a positive social impact? Did the project contribute to building hope and restoring confidence, and improving the quality of life in the communities it served, and if so, how? Did that contribution lead to restoring confidence in democratic processes e.g. local participation and local governance? Some qualitative methods of measuring hope, confidence, and improvements in the quality of people's lives in those communities in which the project was active versus those in which it was not is required.

The USAID/Haiti CODAQ qualitative monitoring reports may be a valuable source of information. Are the institutional capacities of local democratically organized indigenous organizations being strengthened?

b) Political Impact: Is the program politically visible? Do the participants understand who is sponsoring these projects and why? Are appropriate local and national Government of Haiti representatives and officials aware of the program and its goals? A cost/benefit analysis will be performed. During the initial year of implementation of this program there was often a delicate balance to maintain between coordinating with and seeking the support of the tenuous constitutional government and non recognition of the defacto regime. Consequently, it will be necessary for the evaluators to have a thorough understanding of both the project background and a historical perspective of the Haitian political realities.

6. SUSTAINABILITY

Are administrative capacities of local indigenous organizations being strengthened through training and technical assistance provided through PADF? If so, how? Has the planning and execution of sub-projects contributed to increase or improve community participation in the organizations, leadership within the community, organizational and technical skills to formulate and implement projects, capacity to properly manage funds, self reliance, and capacity to deal with donor institutions?

How could more elements of sustainability be built into this type of program in the future? What would be appropriate follow-up strategies and activities to ensure and enhance the productivity and maintenance of the rehabilitated infrastructure e.g. follow-on projects, focus, technical support to local communities to develop management structures and/or synergism with other USAID projects for follow-up? This section will provide specific recommendations to make this type of program more developmentally sustainable.

5. Methods and Procedures

After an initial briefing, the evaluation team will review all background documentation including the project paper, cooperative agreement and amendments, implementation plan, wage surveys, technical prototypes and standards, quarterly progress reports, trip reports, financial reviews, and have access to all appropriate project files. This initial review will take 3-4 days.

Planning and preparations will take another 2-3 days.

The team will conduct formal and informal interviews with appropriate PADF management and project staff, USAID/Haiti staff, local and national government officials, community leaders, and a wide sample of sub-project management staff and sub-project daily laborers.



Approximately 16 days of field work and site visits outside of Port-au-Prince will be necessary.

After returning from the field, the evaluation team will have two days of synthesizing the findings, analysis, and recommendations. A written outline of the findings/recommendations will be produced for review and will provide the basis of a presentation/debriefing for PADF and the USAID/Haiti Mission.

The draft report will be submitted to the two parties--PADF and USAID--in Haiti three days thereafter, before the evaluation team's departure.

PADF and USAID/Haiti will have 5 working days to submit their comments on the draft report to the evaluation team.

Ten copies of the final report--five for each party--shall be submitted no later than 7 calendar days after receipt of final comments from both parties. The report will be written in English.

The evaluation period will be 30 days total (18 days for the Financial/Administrative expert). The team will be expected to work 6 days/week.

3. Reporting Requirements

The report shall contain the following sections:

A. An EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (no more than 2 pages) that includes the humanitarian and development objectives of the activity evaluated, the purpose of the evaluation, the study methodologies, major findings, conclusions, and recommendations, and any lessons learned about the design and implementation of this type of humanitarian and development activity.

B. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION DATA SHEET

C. TABLE OF CONTENTS

D. The BODY OF THE REPORT that should include (1) relevant background information, (2) the purpose and study questions of the evaluation, (3) the economic, social, and political context of the project, (4) team composition and study methodologies (one page maximum), (5) evidence/findings of the study concerning the evaluation questions, (6) conclusions drawn from the findings, stated in succinct language, and (7) recommendations based on the study findings and conclusions, stated as actions to be taken to improve project performance or actions that could be incorporated into a similar follow-on project. The body of the report should be no longer than 40 pages, with more detailed discussions of methodological or technical issues placed in the appendixes.

E. APPENDIXES should include a copy of the scope of work, the list of documents consulted, and individuals and agencies contacted, and any supporting documents required. If necessary, additional appendixes may include a brief discussion of study methodologies and detailed technical reports (economic, financial, or social analyses) as necessary.

ANNEX B: LIST OF CONTACTS

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ANNEX C: LIST OF REFERENCES

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ANNEX D: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

The project outputs included the creation of 480,000 p/m of employment over 29 months, garbage collection, the rehabilitation of irrigation canals, road rehabilitation and soil and water conservation. The rehabilitation of 1,612.74 km of canals opened up or helped improve 26,745 acres of land for agricultural purposes. The rehabilitation of 933.8 km of roads increased market access for 817,000 individuals. Soil and water conservation activities protected 6,440 ha of lands which will be used for the production of upland crops. The costs of these activities are seen in Table 1. The costs of producing a man day of work range from \$1.64 to \$1.89. This project is very effective when compared to similar projects carried out in developing countries.

Garbage Collection

The garbage collection activity has limited long term direct economic effects other than effects on health which are difficult to quantify. Most of the individuals who earned money from the project used it for immediate consumption. Only a small percentage of those who worked said they invested the money in the informal sector. It cannot be estimated what effect money earned has on the economy, but Jolly and Jean-Louis (1993) found that individual operators of the informal sector earn about \$1.86 for every \$1.00 invested. If it is assumed, then, that \$1.00 earned from PADF/JOBS is reinvested directly or indirectly in the informal sector; then in the absence of a dynamic multiplier for the economy, a proxy of 1.86 will reflect the total effect on the amount of money injected in the local economy by the PADF/JOBS program on the immediate surroundings. The expected effect of the \$1,317,430 invested would generate in the short run \$2,450,419. This calculation is very conservative since other economists have suggested larger multiplier effects for developing economies. Given the economic environment under which the project was implemented (all major businesses were non-operational) it would be difficult to assume that there was much ongoing investment other than at the local level.

Rehabilitation of Irrigation Canals

The rehabilitation of irrigation canals affected some 26,745 ha of land. It is assumed that these lands will now be used intensively for crop production. In most cases farmers will produce two or three crops per year instead of one. Yields per ha will also increase by 30 to 100 percent. Farmers who benefitted from the improvement of the irrigation canals indicated that they had experienced yield increases of 300 percent. A number of scenarios of crop increases due to increased water for irrigation can be used, but, for this evaluation, production increases experienced in Haiti from improved production practices will be used. It is assumed that farmers behave as business people and do not only try to maximize net returns, given a set of constraints and level of resources, but they have a set of objectives which include risk management. In an effort to minimize risk, farmers tend to diversify and produce a variety of crops. On the 26,745 acres of land now under irrigation, farmers

Table 1. Costs of Various Project Activities, 1995

Cnt #	Start	Region	Organization	Type	Activity	Invested Dollars	Planned p/m	Cost p/m	Cost p/d
* 13	94-03-21	Artibonite	ASMR	ONG	Garbage Collection	\$265,609	7,276		
* 25	94-09-25	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	539,867	7,268		
* 11	94-06-01	Artibonite	CSMG	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	129,448	3,470		
10	93-12-03	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	146,002	4,094		
39	94-10-15	Nord	CAMCH II	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	24,342	600		
* 1	93-09-20	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	85,039	3,401		
4	94-07-18	Nord	CAMCH	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	76,961	1,874		
TOTAL						\$1,317,430	29,084	\$45.30	\$1.89
19	94-06-27	Grand Anse	CEDI	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	\$572,194	14,965		
21	94-05-30	Artibonite	UARADCOME	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	487,311	12,452		
* 20	94-06-06	Artibonite	H.A.S.	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	205,516	5,360		
* 45	94-10-10	Artibonite	MCC	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	97,941	2,694		
* 44	94-10-10	Nord-Ouest	PDSC/FAONO	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	264,424	7,273		
30	94-01-08	Sud-Est	ROTARY CLUB	Private	Irr./Drainage Rehab	109,369	3,075		
* 51	94-12-05	Sud	PDAET	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	297,420	5,864		
28	94-08-01	Sud	PDAET	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	67,837	1,866		
* 46	94-10-11	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	39,143	1,151		
* 15	94-04-11	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	879,281	24,909		
* 5	93-11-29	Ouest	SEPIC	Private	Irr./Drainage Rehab	54,679	1,563		
58	94-12-12	Artibonite	UARADCOME	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	416,900	9,849		
* 8	94-03-22	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	76,940	2,080		
59	94-12-05	Ouest	GASC	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	143,504	3,478		
* 60	95-01-13	Sud	DCCH	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	196,741	4,351		
* 2	93-03-11	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	79,364	2,248		
* 54	94-11-28	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	252,380	6,074		
14	94-06-20	Nord-Ouest	ODEE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	40,767	1,133		
57	94-11-21	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	251,161	6,067		
* 6	94-01-10	Nord-Ouest	ASSODLO	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	79,517	2,178		
TOTAL						\$4,685,256	119,395	\$39.24	\$1.54
* 42	94-08-29	Sud	IRD/MEBSH	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	\$283,013	5,396		
* 40	94-08-16	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Road Rehabilitation	97,624	1,870		
* 41	94-08-29	Artibonite	ASMR	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	110,441	2,345		
43	94-10-17	Artibonite	CEDI	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	167,143	3,637		
* 50	94-11-21	Sud	COHAN BAGE	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	114,316	2,314		
49	95-01-03	Ouest	MODECOD	Group. Comm.	Road Rehabilitation	54,013	1,178		
48	94-12-05	Artibonite	H.A.S.	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	140,593	2,879		
* 47	94-12-05	Sud	CODEF	Coop.	Road Rehabilitation	214,745	3,178		
26	94-06-20	Artibonite	H O BREAD	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	231,399	5,479		
* 23	94-05-23	Sud	CODEF	Coop.	Road Rehabilitation	299,621	7,129		
24	94-06-06	Central	SOPABO	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	304,415	7,716		
22	94-06-15	Nord-Est	GLOBAL MIN.	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	309,989	7,200		
* 18	94-05-30	Nord-Ouest	CARE	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	268,371	7,032		
* 17	94-06-13	Ouest	BAPTISE	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	296,033	6,928		
27	94-08-22	Central	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	92,760	2,277		
* 29	94-07-04	Sud-Est	ODEVA	Assoc. Soc.	Road Rehabilitation	133,930	2,807		
7	93-12-06	Central	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	26,700	671		
3	93-12-27	La Gonave	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	70,258	2,012		
* 9	94-05-23	Nord-Ouest	CARE	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	323,356	6,383		
* 12	94-03-31	Ouest	OMS INT	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	138,699	3,164		
31	94-07-25	Grand Anse	FEGA	Assoc. Soc.	Road Rehabilitation	321,284	6,82		
TOTAL						\$3,780,729	85,911	\$44.01	\$1.83
56	94-12-28	Sud-Est	CONS. HAITI	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	\$251,305	5,428		
* 16	94-06-13	Ouest	ALERTE	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	201,235	4,770		
38	94-09-12	Nord-Est	FED MOV COM	Group. Comm.	Soil Conservation	74,504	1,892		
* 34	94-08-15	Sud	GRAPES	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	63,899	1,731		
37	95-01-15	Nord-Ouest	PDSC/FAONO	ONG	Soil Conservation	185,985	4,120		
* 53	94-12-12	Ouest	ALERTE	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	218,130	4,288		
33	94-08-16	Sud-Est	G. C. D'HAITI	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	72,775	,007		
* 32	94-08-08	Ouest	HAITI JARDIN	Private	Soil Conservation	63,720	1,731		
* 52	94-11-21	Ouest	HAITI JARDIN	Private	Soil Conservation	246,934	5,455		
TOTAL						\$1,569,333	35,872	\$43.75	\$1.82

produce a combination of crops representative of crops grown on low lands in Haiti (Table 2). To estimate the long term benefits of the investment in irrigation the following assumptions are made:

- 1) The crops which can be produced on the irrigated lands represent a sample of crops produced on irrigated perimeters in Haiti.
- 2) The crop distribution is similar to that observed in the agricultural census.
- 3) Only one planting per annum is presently practiced on the lands without improvement in irrigation.
- 4) There is no use of modern inputs and farmers' cultural practices are traditional.
- 5) Family labor is responsible for most of the costs.
- 6) Cost and return figures for a production of a ha of crop are based on studies conducted on farmers' fields in Haiti, (Faculte d'Agronomie, Damien, Haiti).
- 7) Crop prices are based on prevailing market prices observed throughout the regions in Haiti.
- 8) The exchange rate is Gde 14 to \$1.00 U.S.

Table 2. Costs and Returns, Area and Yields of Crops Produced Without Irrigation Improvement in Haiti, 1995.

Crop	Surface Area	No. Crops	Yield	Unit	Production tons	Price Gde tons	Gross Revenue Gde 000	Cost Gde 000	Net Revenue Gde 000
Maize	7488.5	1	500	kg	3744	3200	11981600	5990.8	11975609
Rice	1069.8	1	1000	kg	1069.8	5100	5455980	1284	5454696
Red Beans	2139.8	1	500	kg	1069.8	7000	7489300	1712	7487588
Peanuts	401.2	1	700	kg	280.8	6000	1685040	320.8	1684712
Cassava	2139.8	1	2000	kg	4279.6	540	2310984	856	2310128
Potato	1604.7	1	2000	kg	3209.4	570	1829358	1284	1828074
Tubers	1604.7	1	2000	kg	3209.4	550	1765170	1284	1763886
Bananas	802.3	1	4000	bunch	3209.2	1500	4813800	641.6	4813158
Plantain	802.3	1	4000	bunch	3209.2	1500	4813800	641.6	4813158
Others	8962.0	1	1000	kg	8962.0	800	7169600	958.1	7168641

With improvement in irrigation, it is expected that farmers will minimize crops lost from drought and will be able to produce several crops per year. A number of assumptions were made in evaluating the effects of increased water supply on output. The assumptions were:

- 1) Farmers produce the same combination of crops as before.
- 2) The level of technology and inputs remains the same.
- 3) Farmers double the number of plantings per year for most crops.
- 4) The increase in production has little or no effect on market prices.

The figures showing the costs and returns from the increase in production are seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Cost and Returns, Area Planted, Yields for Crops Produced With Irrigation.

Crop	Area	No. Crops	Yield	Unit	Production tons	Price Gde tons	Gross Revenue Gde 000	Cost Gde 000	Net Revenue Gde 000
Maize	7488.5	2	1000	kg	14977	3200	47926400	5990.8	47920409
Rice	1069.8	2	2000	kg	4279.2	5100	21823920	1284	21822636
Red Beans	2139.8	3	1000	kg	6419.4	7000	44935800	1712	44934088
Peanuts	401.2	2	1400	kg	1123.3	6000	6740160	320.8	6739839
Cassava	2139.8	1	3000	kg	6419.4	540	3466476	856	3465620
Potatoes	1604.7	2	3000	kg	9628.2	570	5488074	1284	5486790
Tubers	1604.7	2	3000	kg	9628.2	550	5295510	1284	5294226
Bananas	802.3	1	8000	kg	6418.4	1500	9627600	641.6	9626958
Plantain	802.3	1	6000	kg	4813.8	1500	7220700	641.6	7220058
Others	8962.0	1	2000	kg	17924.0	800	14339200	958.1	14338242
Total	26745.0								16684886

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Crops such as bananas, plantain, and cassava will experience an increase in production, but only one crop will be produced per year. Other crops include cow peas, vegetables and spices grown in small quantities in the region.

The annual net revenue from irrigation improvement is obtained by summing the difference of net revenues from Tables 1 and 2. This is used as the annual projected income for a period of 15 years. It is assumed that the canals will be maintained every six years at one third the original clearance cost. With these considerations, the Net Present Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and benefit/cost (B/C) ratios are estimated for 15 years.

The NPV is the discounted value of the incremental flow of net revenues due to the project minus the original project cost. It is used as a means of comparing present investment with future discounted returns. The returns must be discounted by a factor which represent the cost of money, risk and inflation. The IRR is a discounted measure of project value. It is the

discount factor which equates the future flow of funds due to project to project cost. If the NPV is positive the project is acceptable. If the IRR is greater than the required rate of return (RRR) then the project is acceptable. The RRR, is usually the cost of borrowing money plus any amount to cover risk. For this evaluation the RRR is the same as the discount factor of 15 percent.

To evaluate the net benefits of the project, the IRR and NPV of the incremental return due to improvement in irrigation will be calculated.

The figures above are estimated in Haitian dollars which are converted to U.S. dollars at an exchange rate of 2.8. It is assumed that prices of inputs and output will remain constant over the 15 years, or any increase in prices of input will be accompanied by an equal increase in output.

With project cost at \$4,685,276 as seen in Table 3, the NPV, at a discount rate of 15 percent was calculated. The NPV and IRR were calculated when the overhead cost of 25 percent was calculated. These are seen as follows.

Year	Cost		Annual cash Flow				NPV	IRR
	1-6	7	8-12	13	14-15			
-4685256	4198186	2636434	4198186	2636434	4198186	16343236	88.3	
-5856570	4198186	2636434	4198186	2636434	4198186	15324703	70.3	

The benefit to cost ratio can be calculated by comparing the discounted benefits with the costs. In the first case, when overhead is accounted for, the B/C was 2.6 and when overhead was not accounted for the B/C was 3.5.

Road Rehabilitation

It is anticipated that the rural roads will have an effect on the quality of life in the rural areas. The set of benefits to be derived from the rural roads are undetermined, but it is generally thought that rural roads have a tremendous impact on the social and economic life of rural people. Rural road improvement results in the following:

- reduction of costs of inputs
- increased use of inputs
- reduction of transport costs
- increase in net farmgate prices
- increased production
- increased land values

It is too early to assess the effects of rural roads on the surrounding community; therefore, a standard model is used by most transport economists in which the impact is measured by the reduction in motor vehicle operating costs. The increase in market transactions by market participants will justify the use of road improvement. A total of 933.8 km of roads were rehabilitated which gave market access to 817,000 people. The cost of road rehabilitation was U.S. \$3,780,729 without overhead cost of \$4,725,911.

The other costs included annual maintenance costs and repair costs every five years as specified by Anderson, G. W., C. G. Vandervoort, C.M. Smuggs and C. Clapp-Wincek, (1982). The benefits from the roads were obtained by using the formula:

$$B=T(U1-U2)*D$$

where B is the annual benefit from cost reduction of operating a vehicle, T is the amount of traffic now using the roads after the improvement, U1 is user cost of maintenance of a vehicle before improvement, U2 is user cost after improvement, and D the km of road improved.

For this evaluation it is assumed that an additional 25 more trucks will be using the roads due to the improvements. Here we are referring mainly to commercial vehicles. This number is exceedingly conservative, but it is assumed that in the locations where these improvements are made there are alternative modes of transportation. The costs before and after the improvement and road maintenance are seen in Table 4.

It is also believed that additional market access will generate H\$5.00 benefit per individual who visits the market each year. It is assumed that an individual will visit the market at least once a year and that the individual will earn at least the minimum wage by participating in the market activity (see Jolly and Diop 1987). Hence the benefit earned in H\$ from the road improvement is seen in Table 4.

Table 4. Projected Cost and Returns of Road Rehabilitation in Haiti, 1995.

Year	U1	U2	(U1-U2)*T	Income from Market Activity	(U1-U2)*T*D	Reduced Cost in U.S.\$ 000
1	110	83	675	4085000	630450	4715
2	128	83	1125	"	1050750	5135
3	147	83	1600	"	1494400	5579
4	165	83	2050	"	1914700	5999
5	183	83	2500	"	2335000	6420
6	202	83	2975	"	2778650	6863
7	220	83	3425	"	3198950	7283
8	110	83	675	"	630450	4715
9	128	83	1125	"	1050750	5135
10	147	83	1600	"	1494400	5579
11	165	83	2050	"	1914700	5999
12	183	83	2500	"	2335000	6420
13	202	83	2975	"	2778650	6863
14	220	83	3425	"	3198950	7283
15	110	83	675	"	630450	4715

It is assumed that user costs before and after the improvement will increase at the same rate. Though the user cost was calculated in 1982, there was no need to make changes since both U1 and U2 will be increasing at the same rate. At a cost of \$3,780,729, the NPV and IRR were calculated. An overhead of 25 percent was added and the same calculations made.

These figures are converted to U.S. dollars and the NPV and the IRR are determined.

The NPV for 15 years at a discount rate of 15 percent without the overhead accounted for is U.S. \$4,886,353 and the IRR is 40 percent. When overhead is accounted for, the NPV is U.S. \$4,064,455 and the IRR is 32 percent (Table 5).

Table 5. Costs and Cash Inflows and Outflows for Road Rehabilitation from PADF/JOBS, U.S.\$, 1995.

Year	Cost and Cash Inflow Without Overhead	Cash and Cost Inflows With Overhead
0	- 3780729	- 4725911
1	1320200	1320200
2	1437800	1437800
3	1562120	1562120
4	1679720	1679720
5	1797600	1797600
6	1921640	1921640
7	2039240	2039240
8	1320200	1320200
9	1437800	1437800
10	1562120	1562120
11	1679720	1679720
12	1797600	1797600
13	1921640	1921640
14	2039240	2039240
15	1320200	1320200
NPV (15%)	4886353	4064455
IRR	40	32

Soil and Water Conservation

The soil and water conservation activity involved the building of contour canals, establishment of terraces and hedgerows, construction of drywalls, placement of gully plugs, planting of trees, and placement of gabions which together protected about 6440 ha of land (Table 2.1 in the text). Soil conservation techniques, when applied properly, are beneficial to the people who cultivate the lands protected by the soil conservation methods. The planting of trees results in long term benefits to those who own rights to tree harvesting. Some trees in Haiti are known to be harvested as early as six years after planting. For the purpose of this

evaluation it will be assumed that the trees are harvested after 15 years of planting, and hence only the effects of the soil protection will be taken into consideration. Soil conservation as done in Haiti results in a large gamut of crops produced. In areas where dry walls have been used to protect the soil, there has been an average increase of 400 kg of maize and 320 kg of sorghum (Lea 1995). After the placement of gully plugs, up to 20 tons of bananas per ha have been harvested. A number of crops have been harvested with the establishment of the various soil conservation measures. The yield increases have varied widely (Faculte d'Agronomie de l'Univesite d'Haiti,). In order to determine the economic effects of soil conservation measures, the type of soil, the slope of the land and the crops produced must be determined. Since those are unknown, an average increase of 300 kg in crop production will be assumed, and an average price of Gde \$3.50 kg will be used.

A number of assumptions are made:

- 1) The rate of crop yield decline was the same as that of crop improvement. Crop production increased over time.
- 2) Increased output is too small to affect market prices.
- 3) Farmers are using local technology. The dominant cost item is farm labor.
- 4) All protected lands are cropped at least once a year.
- 5) Average annual maintenance cost for soil conservation measures is about 20 Gde per meter of conservation facility per annum.

The additional revenues were calculated in this way:

<u>Crop</u>	<u>Area Planted</u>	<u>Additional Yield</u>	<u>Price</u>	<u>Revenue</u>
Cereals				
Legumes	6440	300	3.5	6762000
Small Grains				
Tubers				
Fruits				

From the above revenue an annual maintenance cost of \$989 was subtracted. This is based on an average cost of 20 Gde per meter of annual maintenance of the conservation activity. Given the total soil conserved and the crop yields obtained from the conservation practices the total annual revenues derived from the soil conservation measures are US \$482,011. It is assumed that there will be a 10 percent crop loss after the first year of installation of the activities then crop loss will be compensated for by crop improvement.

The NPV and IRR are thus calculated as follows:

<u>Cost</u>	<u>Cash Inflow</u>		<u>NPV</u>	<u>IRR</u>	
	<u>Year</u>	<u>1</u>			<u>2-15</u>
<u>Without Overhead</u>					
\$1,569,333		433809	482011	1049782	29
<u>With Overhead</u>					
\$1,961,666		433809	482011	708622	23

At a total cost of \$1,569,333 without overhead the calculated NPV at 15 percent discount rate for 15 years was estimated at \$1,049,782 and the IRR was 29 percent. With a 25 percent overhead added the cost increased to \$1,961,666. The NPV was \$708,622 and the IRR was 23 percent.

Project Economic Analysis

From the analyses provided, it seems that the sub-project activities are very desirable, since the NPV's are all positive at a discount rate of 15 percent which is above the cost of borrowing money and the US government cost of money of five percent (see Lea unpublished document). It must be noted that all IRR's were above 23 percent. Combining all the project inflows and outflows the NPV for the total project is \$2,261,124 and the IRR is 58 percent which is greater than the RRR. The project can, therefore, be considered highly desirable overall.

Table 6. Cash Inflows and Outflows, NPV and IRR for Jobs Project, 1995.

Year	Irrigation	Road	Soil Conservation	Sanitation	Total
0	-5856570	-4725911	-1961666	-1646788	-13000000
1	4198186	132000	433809	3063025	9015220
2	4198186	1437800	482011	0	6117997
3	4198186	1562120	482011	0	6242317
4	4198186	1679720	482011	0	6359917
5	4198186	1797600	482011	0	647797
6	4198186	1921640	482011	0	6601837
7	2636434	2039240	482011	0	5157685
8	4198186	1320200	482011	0	6000397
9	4198186	1437800	482011	0	6117997
10	4198186	1562120	482011	0	6242317
11	4198186	1679720	482011	0	6359917
12	4198186	1797600	482011	0	6477797
13	2636434	1921640	482011	0	5040085
14	4198186	2039240	482011	0	6719437
15	4198186	1320200	482011	0	6000397
NPV(15%)					22611624

ANNEX E: WORK SITE SURVEY

TOTAL SUB-PROJECTS SAMPLED IN THE EVALUATION	E-2
SCHEDULE OF VISITS TO SUB-PROJECT SITES	E-3
LOCATION OF SITES' VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM	E-6
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ORGANIZATIONS	E-7
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WORKERS	E-13
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-WORKERS	E-16
KESYON SOU LESPWA (Creole)	E-18
QUESTIONNAIRE ON HOPE (Translation)	E-22
SELECTED FIELD NOTES OF SITE VISITS	E-26
SOCIAL/POLITICAL EFFECTS BETWEEN WORKERS AND NONWORKERS	E-34

TOTAL SUB-PROJECTS SAMPLED IN THE EVALUATION
Selected Sub-projects is Shown in Bold Italic Type

Cnt #	Start	Region	Organization	Type	Activity	Invested Dollar	Planned p/m
* 1	93-09-20	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	85,039	3,401
* 2	93-03-11	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	79,364	2,248
3	93-12-27	La Gonave	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	70,258	2,012
4	94-07-18	Nord	CAMCH	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	76,961	1,874
* 5	93-11-29	Ouest	SEPIC	Private	Irr./Drainage Rehab	54,679	1,563
* 6	94-01-10	Nord-Ouest	ASSODLO	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	79,517	2,178
7	93-12-06	Central	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	26,700	671
* 8	94-03-22	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	76,940	2,080
* 9	94-05-23	Nord-Ouest	CARE	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	323,356	6,383
10	93-12-03	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	146,002	4,094
* 11	94-06-01	Artibonite	CSMG	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	129,448	3,470
* 12	94-03-31	Ouest	OMS INT	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	138,699	3,164
* 13	94-03-21	Artibonite	ASMR	ONG	Garbage Collection	265,609	7,276
14	94-06-20	Nord-Ouest	ODEE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	40,767	1,133
* 15	94-04-11	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	879,281	24,909
* 16	94-06-13	Ouest	ALERTE	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	201,235	4,770
* 17	94-06-13	Ouest	BAPTISE	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	296,033	6,928
* 18	94-05-30	Nord-Ouest	CARE	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	268,371	7,032
19	94-06-27	Grand Anse	CEDI	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	572,194	14,965
* 20	94-06-06	Artibonite	H.A.S.	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	205,516	5,360
21	94-05-30	Artibonite	UARADCOME	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	487,311	12,452
22	94-06-15	Nord-Est	GLOBAL MIN.	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	309,989	7,200
* 23	94-05-23	Sud	CODEF	Coop	Road Rehabilitation	299,621	7,129
24	94-06-06	Central	SOPABO	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	304,415	7,716
* 25	94-09-25	Ouest	CDS	ONG	Garbage Collection	539,867	7,268
26	94-06-20	Artibonite	H O BREAD	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	231,399	5,479
27	94-08-22	Central	MISS ALLEG	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	92,760	2,277
28	94-08-01	Sud	PDAET	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	67,837	1,866
* 29	94-07-04	Sud-Est	ODEVA	Assoc. Soc.	Road Rehabilitation	133,930	2,807
30	94-01-08	Sud-Est	ROTARY CLUB	Private	Irr./Drainage Rehab	109,369	3,075
31	94-07-25	Grand Anse	FEGA	Assoc. Soc.	Road Rehabilitation	321,284	6,82
* 32	94-08-08	Ouest	HAITI JARDIN	Private	Soil Conservation	63,720	1,731
33	94-08-16	Sud-Est	G. C. D'HAITI	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	72,775	,007
* 34	94-08-15	Sud	GRAPES	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	63,899	1,731
37	95-01-15	Nord-Ouest	PDSC/FAONO	ONG	Soil Conservation	185,985	4,120
38	94-09-12	Nord-Est	FED MOV COM	Group. Comm.	Soil Conservation	74,504	1,892
39	94-10-15	Nord	CAMCH II	Group de Supp.	Garbage Collection	24,342	600
* 40	94-08-16	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Road Rehabilitation	97,624	1,870
* 41	94-08-29	Artibonite	ASMR	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	110,441	2,345
* 42	94-08-29	Sud	IRD/MEBSH	Religious	Road Rehabilitation	283,013	5,396
43	94-10-17	Artibonite	CEDI	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	167,143	3,637
* 44	94-10-10	Nord-Ouest	PDSC/FAONO	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	264,424	7,273
* 45	94-10-10	Artibonite	MCC	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	97,941	2,694
* 46	94-10-11	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	39,143	1,151
* 47	94-12-05	Sud	CODEF	Coop	Road Rehabilitation	214,745	3,178
48	94-12-05	Artibonite	H.A.S.	ONG	Road Rehabilitation	140,593	2,879
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* 51	94-12-05	Sud	PDAET	Religious	Irr./Drainage Rehab	297,420	5,864
* 52	94-11-21	Ouest	HAITI JARDIN	Private	Soil Conservation	246,934	5,455
* 53	94-12-12	Ouest	ALERTE	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	218,130	4,288
* 54	94-11-28	Ouest	CCCPV	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	252,380	6,074
56	94-12-28	Sud-Est	CONS. HAITI	Assoc. Soc.	Soil Conservation	251,305	5,428
57	94-11-21	Artibonite	CARE	ONG	Irr./Drainage Rehab	251,161	6,067
58	94-12-12	Artibonite	UARADCOME	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	416,900	9,849
59	94-12-05	Ouest	GASC	Assoc. Soc.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	143,504	3,478
* 60	95-01-13	Sud	DCCH	Group. Comm.	Irr./Drainage Rehab	196,741	4,351

SCHEDULE OF VISITS TO SUB-PROJECT SITES (Revised)

Friday April 21

7:30 am

Haiti Jardin Morne l'Hopital Soil and Water Conservation Project # 32, 52

2:00 pm

CDS Household Waste, Garbage, and Street Cleaning Project in Port-au-Prince # 25

Saturday April 22

8:00 am

BHM Fort Jacque Road Rehab. and Soil Conservation Project # 17
Construction of Irrigation and Agricultural roads in Bongard #63

pm. Team reviews data and makes adjustment in survey as needed

Monday April 24

Team 1 (Curtis and Erick) + Claude

CCPV Rehabilitation of the Irrigation Canals in Pernier # 8
Rehabilitation of Roads in Pernier # 40
Clean Irrigation Canals in Cul-de-Sac Plains # 54

Team 2 (Don and Yves-Francois)

ALERTE Rivier Rouyonne Soil and Water Conservation # 16, 53

Tuesday April 25

Team 1

CSMG Clean the Drainage Canals and Street of Gonavies # 11

Team 2

HAS Repair and Clean Irrigation System Aribonite Valley-Left Bank # 20

MCC Irrigation and Drainage of Mory-Desarmes in Artibonite Valley # 45

Wednesday April 26

Team 1

ASMR Clean and Repair Drainage and Irrigation System in St. Marc # 13
Rehabilitation of Roads in St. Marc # 41
Soil Conservation of Petite Riviere of St. Marc # 66

Team 2 + Claude
CARE

Rehabilitate the Fosse Naboth Drainage System # 2
Repair and Clean Irrigation System in Artibonite Valley # 15

Thursday April 27

Team 1

CODEVA Road Rehabilitation in the Vallee-Bainet Area # 29
Road Rehabilitation Vallee de Jacmel # 17

Team 2

CODEF Road Rehabilitation Fonds des Blancs Area # 23, 47

Friday April 28

Team 1

SEPIC Riviere Blanche Irrigation and Drainage # 5

Team 2

OMS Rehabilitation of Roads in St. Medard-Leger # 12

Saturday April 29

Team reviews data and makes adjustments as needed in surveys

Monday May 1 (Labor Day)

Team 1

Travel to Northwest of country (Jean Rabel)

Team 2 + Claude

Travel to Southwest of country (Les Cayes)

Tuesday May 2

Team 1

PDSC/FAONO Irrigation and Drainage Three Regions in Northwest #44

Team 2

GRAPES Soil and Water Conservation in St. Louis du Sud # 34, 72

PDAET Clean and Repair Irrigation System near Torbeck # 29, 71

Wednesday May 3

Team 1

CARE Rehabilitate Roads in Northwest Haiti Region I # 18
 Rehabilitate Roads in Northwest Haiti Region II # 9

Team 2

DCCH Repair Irrigation System in Avezac # 60

IRD/MEBISH Secondary Road Rehabilitation in the Les Cayes Plain # 42

Thursday May 4

Team 1

ASSODLO Rehabilitate Irrigation System in Moustiques # 6

Team 2

COHAN BAGE Road Rehabilitation in Des Palmes # 50

Return to Port-au-Prince

Friday May 5


Team 1

Return to Port-au-Prince

Team 2

Analyze data and start drafting of report

LOCATION OF SITE'S VISITED BY EVALUATION TEAM



Sites visited marked with an X

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR ORGANIZATIONS

I. ORGANIZATIONAL INFORMATION

- 1. Description of implementing organization _____
- 2. Date founded _____
- 3. Project Number /__/_/___/___/
- 4. Project Description _____
- 5. Type _____
- 6. Date of Initiation of completion (Day)/__/_/Month/___/___/
- 7 Date of Completion Day /__/_/ Month /___/___/
- 8. Level of Funding From PADF/USAID (H\$) /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/
- 9. Other Funding - Source _____ Level /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/
- 10. Total Budget of organization U.S.\$ /___/___/___/___/___/___/___/___/
- 11. Total Number of Employees (excluding Jobs) /___/___/___/___/___/

II. JOBS CREATION

12. List of administrative staff associated with the project

Type	No
13.	/___/___/
14.	/___/___/
15.	/___/___/
16.	/___/___/
17.	/___/___/
18.	/___/___/

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19. Number of Administrative staff associated with project / ___ / ___ /

20. Number of daily paid workers employed with the Jobs project

Male / ___ / ___ / ___ / 21. Female ___ / ___ / ___ / 22. Total / ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ /

23. List the estimated numbers of workers from project area

/ ___ / ___ / ___ / ___ / and from other regions 24. / ___ / ___ / ___ /

25. Percent of individual who received on the job training / ___ / ___ / ___ /

26. Were there other employment alternatives in the area for the people employed with the project / ___ /

1. Yes 2. No.

27. If yes, name the alternatives _____

III. PROJECT INFORMATION

28. Who do you think financed the Jobs Project? / ___ /

1. The Haitian Govt. 2. U.S. Govt 3. United Nations 4. French Govt.

5. Other (specify) _____

29. How did you learn about the project? / ___ /

1. Radio 2. Newspaper 3. Word of mouth 4. Visit to PADF 5. Other organization

6. Other(specify) _____

30. Who encouraged the initiation of the project? / ___ /

1. Village workers 2. Staff 3. local authority 4. PADF 5. Other _____

31. What was the main purpose behind the project?

- 1. Improve the quality of life 2. Create employment 3. Reduce starvation
- 4. Maintain morale 5. Other _____

32. What organizational changes were needed for the implementation of the project?

33. How many new staff did you hire for this project? / ___ / ___ /.

34. To what extent were you satisfied with what you wanted to do? / ___ /

- 1. Not satisfied 2. Satisfied 3. Very satisfied 4. No opinion

35. How was your relationship with PADF during the project design? / ___ /

- 1. Poor 2. Good 3. Very Good 4. Excellent

36. How was your relationship with PADF during the implementation of the project? / ___ /

- 1. Poor 2. Good 3. Very Good 4. Excellent

37. Do you think that the supervision by the inspectors were: / ___ /

- 1. Poor 2. Average 3. Above average 4. Excellent

38. Do you think that the planning of the project was: / ___ /

39. Poor 2. Average 3. Above average 4. Excellent.

40. Would you say that project approval was ? / ___ /

- 1. too long 2. just right 3. very quick

41. Were you to implement this project again what are the changes would you make to improve the project?

42. What accounting records did you keep? _____

43. Did you have an independent audit besides that of PADF? / ___ /

1. Yes 2. No

44. If Yes, Name the organization or person who did the auditing _____

IV. PROJECT STANDARDS AND SUSTAINABILITY

45. Did the project staff receive training before the initiation of the project? / ___ /

1. Yes 2. No

46. How long was the training? / _____ / days

47. List the areas in which training was received. _____

48. How do you rate the training received? / ___ /

1. Poor 2. Good 3. Very Good 4. Excellent

49. To what extent will the training received by the staff help with the management of future projects? / _____ /

1. Not at all 2. Will help a little 3. Will be very helpful 4. No opinion

50. To what extent will the experience you received help with future implementation of other projects? / ___ /

1. Not helpful 2. Helpful 3. Very Helpful

51. Were the number of staff hired adequate to manage the project? / ___ /

1. Yes 2. No

52. If no, list the additional staff you would like to have had. _____

53. Were the administrative regulations? / ___ /

1. Demanding 2. Too demanding 3. Reduce project progress

54. If yes specify in what ways. _____

55. How difficult was it to follow the technical specification? / ___ /

1. Not difficult 2. Difficult 3. Very difficult

56. How difficult was it to follow the environmental specification? / ___ /

1. Not difficult 2. Difficult 3. Very difficult

57. If yes, specify in what way. _____

VI. PROJECT ACHIEVEMENT

A. Code	Date Started	Work Planned	Work completed	Expense (to date)
---------	--------------	--------------	----------------	----------------------

74. What do you think were the primary economic benefits of the project?

75. What do you think were the secondary economic benefits of the project?

76. What do you think were the primary social benefits of the project? _____

77. What were the other social benefits of the project? _____

78. If there is a next phase of the Jobs Project, but little money, list in order of importance what you would prefer as a mode of payment: / ___ /

1. 3/4 Cash
2. 1/2 Food + 1/2 Cash
3. 3/4 Food + 1/4 Cash

79. What are the problems do you anticipate with the above options.

List _____

80. Others comments _____

SURVEY OF WORKERS

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR WORKERS

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Day /__ /__ / month /__ /__ / 2. Project Code /__ /__ / 3. IDW. /__ /__ /__ /W /__ /

4. Family status

1. Head of household 2. Family member /__ /

5. Sex 1. men 2. women /__ /

6. Number of dependents /__ /__ /

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

7 How many people live in the household (including yourself) _____ /__ /__ /

8. Age group 9. Male 10. Female 11. Non-Agricultural
Work? 1. Yes 2. No

Less than 15 /__ /__ / /__ /__ / /__ /

15-50 /__ /__ / /__ /__ / /__ /

Above 50 /__ /__ / /__ /__ / /__ /

12. Before working with PADF where were you employed? /__ /

1. Yes 2. No

13. Number of members living in the same house working in other communities? /__ /

14. While working with PADF were you employed somewhere else ? /__ /

1. Yes 2. No

15. How much (H dollars) did you earn fortnightly before working with PADF? (in Haitian dollars)..... /__ /__ /__ /

16. What three other lucrative activities were you engaged in before getting the job with

PADF? _____

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17. Are you actually a member of any organization (gwoupman)? /___/

1. Yes 2. No

18. If yes, which one? /___/

1. gwoupman devlopman (ki pa relijye)
2. gwoupman devlopman (ki relijye)

19. Did the organization help you get the job? /___/

1. Yes 2. No.

III. EMPLOYMENT INFORMATION

20. How long have you been employed with the jobs program? (fortnight) /___/___/

21. Starting date of employment with the Jobs Program. Date day /___/___/ month /___/___/

22. How did you learn of the jobs program? /___/

1. Radio. 3. Local Organizations 2. Word of mouth 4. Other _____

23. Which among these organizations do you think financed the Jobs Project? /___/

1. The Haitian Govt. 2. U.S. Govt 3. United Nations 4. French Govt.
5. Other (Specify)

24. Number of members of your household who live in the same home who have worked or are working with Jobs Project. /___/

25. Because of problems did you have to ask any body to replace you at the jobs program? /___/

1. Yes 2. No

26. If yes, who? /___/

1. immediate family 3. coworkers
2. friends 4. other

IV. INCOME INFORMATION

27. Money earned from the jobs program per day (Haitian dollar.....) /___/___/___/

28. Indicate how you spend the money earned from jobs program (call the alternatives):

1. Food /___/ 2. Clothing /___/ 3. Rent /___/ 4. Medication /___/ 5. Seeds /___/
6. Tools /___/ 7. Livestock /___/ 8. School /___/ 9. Save 10. Other _____

29. Of the ones checked above, list the three on which you spent most of the money in other of importance?

1. /___/ 2. /___/ 3. /___/

30. How long did the last money you received from the jobs program last? (in days)

/ ___ / ___ /

31. Suppose a project is coming to your community, and they can only pay you in food plus cash, how much of each do you think people will accept? / ___ /

- 1. 1/4 money + 3/4 food
- 2. 1/2 money + 1/2 food
- 3. 3/4 money but no food

32. Was there anything you lost during the embargo that you have replaced with the money you got from the project?

- 1. Clothing / ___ /
- 2. Tools / ___ /
- 3. Livestock / ___ /
- 4. Other ___ / ___ /

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NON-WORKERS

I. PERSONAL INFORMATION

1. Day /__ / __ / month / __ / __ / 2. Project Code / __ / __ / 3. IDNW. / __ / __ / __ / N /

4. Family status

1. Head of household 2. Family member / __ /

5. Sex 1. men 2. women / __ /

6. Number of dependents / __ / __ /

HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION

7 How many people live in the household (including yourself) _____ / __ / __ /

8. Age group 9. Male 10. Female 11. Non-Agricultural
Work? 1. Yes 2. No

Less than 15 / __ / __ / / __ / __ / / __ /

15-50 / __ / __ / / __ / __ / / __ /

Above 50 / __ / __ / / __ / __ / / __ /

12. Did you try to get work with the jobs program? / __ /
1. Yes 2. No

13. If Yes, the number of times _____ / __ /

14. Why did you think they did not give you work? / __ /
.....

15. Do you think that you have any chance of working with the program? / __ /
1. yes 2. no

16. Please tell me why?
..... / __ /

17. Number of members living in the same house working else where / __ /

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18. How much money did you make in the last three non-agricultural activities you had? Haitian Dollars..... /over how many days.....
19. Ever worked with an organization for money before? 1 Yes 2. No (Q 21) /___/
20. If yes, which organization /___/___/
21. Are you still employed there?/___/
1. Yes 2. No
22. How did you learn of the jobs program? /___/
1. Radio 2. Local organizations
3. Word of mouth 4. Other_____
23. Who do you think financed the Jobs program?/___/
1. The Haitian Govt. 2. U.S. Govt 3. United Nations 4. French Govt.
5. Other_____
24. How many members of your household worked with Jobs Program./___/
25. Did you see people from other regions who were employed with the Jobs Project?
1. Yes 2. No
26. Do you think that the jobs program should continue or it should be stopped?/___/
1. Yes 2. No
27. What did you do to obtain money during the embargo?
28. Do you have a farm?
1. Yes 2. No (Q 30)
29. Value of farm products sold as of last season Haitian dollars/season...../___/___/___/
30. Other income earning activities_____ /___/___/___/
31. Suppose a project is coming to your community, and they can only pay you in food plus cash, how much of each do you think people will accept? /___/
1. 1/4 money + 3/4 food
2. 1/2 money + 1/2 food
3. 3/4 money but no food

KESYON SOU LESPWA (Creole)

1. Day /__ /__ / month /__ /__ / 2. Project Code/ __ /__ / 3. IDN./ __ /__ /__ /__ /
Worker=W W/N
Non Worker=N

4. Kouman ou we demen pou seksyon kote ou abite-a?
(Fouyel)

1. Sa va chanje pou vin pi bon?

2. Sa va rete menm jan?

3. Sa va vin pimal?

5. Mwen ta renmen ou bam kek detay

6-8 elimine

9. Eske ou santi ou gen yon chans pou vi-ou ta vin gen yon ale mye osinon ou pa gen?

1. gen 2. pa gen

10. Eske ou panse tout moun gen men chans pou jwen yon diob ak PADF osinon yo pa gen men chans?

1. gen menm 2. pa gen menm

11. Eske ou panse ou genyen chans pou jwen diob ak yon lot proje ki ta vin nan kominote la kay ou?

1. gen 2. pa gen

12. Si ta gen yon bagay ki pou fet nan kominote-a, ki oganizasyon ou panse ki ta pi bon pou yo mete a la tet-li?

1. oganization pe ou me

2. oganizasyon kominote

3. oganizasyon ki te pase eleksyon

4. lot repons.....

13. Eske ou pa satisfè osinon ou satisfè ak jan bagay yo pase ak proje-a?

1. pa satisfè ditou

2. satisfè en pe

3. satisfè ampil

14. Eske ou panse gen moun yo te bay avantaj sou-ou osinon sa pat fet?

1. wi genyen 2. non sa pat fet

15. Lè demokrasi gaye nan yon peyi, eske se yon garanti moun ka jwenn sa yo bezwen osinon li pa yon garanti?

1. se yon garanti 2. se pa yon garanti 3. lot repons

16 Si ou konsidere tet ou kounie-a, dim apa de travay, manje ak bwe, kisa ki pi enpotan pou ou?

.....
17. Si yon bagay ap fèt nan lokalite w, eske ou santi pawol ou gen pwa (bagay ge ou ka di) osinon ou pa gen la-vwa?

1. pa gen 2. genyen 3. lot repons

18. Eske ou nan yon gwoupman (asosyasyon) kounye-a?

1. wi 2. non (q 21)

19. Si wi, ki gwoupman? (tann repons pou chak gwoupan yo)

1. developman (ki pa relijje)
2. developman (ki sou kont relijje)
3. relijje men pa devlopman
4. lot.....

20. Depi kile? mwa..... ane.....

21. Eske ou te nan yon gwoupman pandan 3 ane di yo ki sot pase yo ?

1. wi 2. non (q23)

22. Si wi, ki gwoupman? (li yo)

1. developman (ki pa relijje)
2. developman (ki sou kont relijje)
3. relijje men pa devlopman
3. lot.....

23. Eske ou te nan yon gwoupman anvan 3 ane di yo ki sot pase yo ?

1. wi 2. non (q25)

24. Si wi, ki gwoupman?

1. developman (ki pa relijje)
2. developman (ki sou kont relijje)
3. relijje men pa devlopman
4. lot.....

NOU KONNEN KE SA TE DI PANDAN 3 DENYE ANE KI SOT PASE LA-A

25. Nan twa denye ane ki sot pase-a, eske ou te gen moman lan vi-ou kote ou te gen ti moso lespwa osinon ou pat genyen?

1 te genyen 2 pat genyen (q 26a)

26. Si te genyen, ki moman sa-a?.....
pa li repons-lan!

1. avan Pwoje PADF
2. le pwoje-a fek komanse
3. pandan pwoje-a
4. kounye-a
5. retou Aristid
6. lot repons

27. Eske la vi kounye-a pi bon pase jan te ye sa gen 3 an?

1. pi bon
2. men jan
3. pi mal

28. Tout pandan anbago-a, eske ou te panse anyen patap chanje osinon ou te panse sa tap chanje?

1. sa tap chanje
2. patap chanje

29. Pandan twa denye ane ki sot pase yo, eske ou te kwe ke lalwa gen poul tounen dirije sak pral pase nan peyi-a?

1. pat kwe ditou
2. kwe konsa
3. kwe net

ELEKSYON

34. Ou konnen gen eleksyon preziden kap pral fet, apre tou sak sot pase yo eske ou kwe yon moun dwe al vote osinon li pa dwe ale?

1. dwe ale
2. pa dwe ale (q 36)

35. Si ale, kisa vote reprezente pou-ou?

36. Si pa ale, kisa ki fe li pa dwe al vote?

37. Gen moun ki di vote pou yon kandida pap ba-ou chans pou jwen yon diob;gen lot moun ki ke vote yon kandida ba ou chans pou jwen yon diob. Sa ou menm ou panse?

1. bay chans pou job
2. pa bay chans pou job

38. Eske ou panse eleksyon pou prezidan-an ap pase san pwoblem osinon ap gen pwoblem?

1. ak pwoblem
2. san pwoblem
3. lot repons
9. pa konnen

39. Gen moun ki di si yon moun ka manje, li ka bwe, li pa necesse poul li ale vote.

1. Dako
2. pa dako

40. Gen moun ki di si yon moun paka manje, li paka bwe, li necesse poul li ale vote.

1. Dako
2. pa dako

41. Kile li pi necesse pou yon moun al vote: le afel pa bon osinon le afel bon?

1. le afel bon
2. le afel pa bon
3. tou le de
4. lot repons

42-43 elimine

44. Eske ou te gen bagay ou te oblije vann sou ambago-a

1. Wi
2. Non

45. Si wi, kisa

1. Rad / ___ /
2. Zouti / ___ /
3. Bet / ___ /
4. Lot bagay / ___ /

46. Eske ou kwe PADF la poul dire osinon li pap dire?

1. lap dire
2. li pap dire
3. lot repons

KESYON SOU DIOB

POU MOUN KI TE TRAVAY AVEK PADF

47. Ki chans ou panse ou genyen pou ou jwen yon lot diob ak PADF?

0. okin chans
1. chans feb
2. ampil chans

QUESTIONNAIRE ON HOPE (Translation)

1. Day/__/__/ Month 2. Project Code /__/__/ 3 IDN /__/__/__/

4. How do you see the future of your community?

1. Things will change for the better
2. Things will stay even
3. Things will change for the worst

5. I would like you to give me some details

(6-7 eliminated)

9. Do you feel that you have a chance for your life to get better or you don't?

1. Have a chance
2. Don't have a chance

10. Do you think all people stand the same chance to get a job with PADF or they don't?

1. they have the same chance
2. they don't have the same chance

11. Do you think you have a chance to get a job if another project was implemented in your community?

1. have a chance
2. don't have a chance

12. Suppose something was to be done in your community, which organization do you think will be best to be responsible for it?

1. religious association (such as priest/brother)
2. community organization
3. organization which was generated via election (CASEC, MUNICIPALITY)
4. other.....

13. Are you satisfied or are you not satisfied with the way things went with the project?

1. not at all
2. more or less satisfy
3. very much satisfy

14. Do you think some people were favored by the project or no one was?

1. some were
2. no one was

15. When a country is democratic, do you think this provides a guarantee that people can get what they need or it doesn't?

1. it is a guarantee
2. it is not a guarantee

¹. These questions are referred to as the L questions in the analysis. So question 4 is L-4, and question 10 is L-10.

16. Thinking about yourself now, would you tell what you value the most besides work and food/drink?

17. If something was to happen in your community, do you feel you have much of a say or you don't have any?

1. much of a say
2. no say

18. Are you member of any association (gwoupman) now.

1. Yes
2. No

19. If yes, which one?

1. non religious development association
2. religious development association
3. religious association not engaged in development
4. lot.

20. Since when were you a member?

month / __ / __ / year / __ / __ /

21. Were a member of any association during the last three years?

1. Yes
2. No

22. If yes, which one?

1. non religious development association
2. religious development association
3. religious association not engaged in development
4. lot.

23. Were you member of any association before the last three years?

1. Yes
2. No

24. If yes, which one?

1. non religious development association
2. religious development association
3. religious association not engaged in development
4. lot.

WE ALL KNOW THAT THINGS WERE TOUGH DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS

25. During the last three years, did you experience any hope at any moment or didn't you?

1. I did
2. I didn't

26. If you did, at what moment?

(don't read the answers beforehand)

1. before PADF project move into my community
2. at the beginning of the PADF project
3. during the PADF project
4. now
5. with the return of Aristide
6. other responses.....

26a. If you didn't, how did you keep hope that the rule of law would prevail?

27. Do you find life any better than the way it was three years ago?

1. better
2. the same
3. worse

28. During the embargo, did you think nothing was going to change or did you think they weren't going to change?

1. was going to change
2. was not going to change

29. During the last three years, did you believe that the rule of law would finally prevail or you didn't?

1. did not believe at all
2. believed more or less
3. believed all the way through

(30-33 eliminated)

34. You have probably heard that presidential election was coming soon, after all the unfortunate events that took place, do you think people ought to go to vote or they shouldn't go?

1. ought to go
2. should not

35. If go, what does voting mean for you?

36. If not, why shouldn't people go to vote?

37. Some people say that voting for a candidate increases one's chance of getting a job; some say it does not. What would you say?

1. increase chance
2. does not increase chance
3. other
9. don't know

SELECTED FIELD NOTES OF SITE VISITS

Site: Haiti-Jarden Morne l'Hopital Soil and Water Conservation Project

Date: April 21

Social/Political Observations: Conflict between the Agronomist, head of the Project and a religious Brother who is responsible for another project. He suggested 60 names to the agronomist.; 10 were hired as chefs d'équipe and the father was still not satisfied with the hiring! He felt the project director was trying to dismantle his organization. In fact, the father was involved in his ego and felt that his wishes were not being fulfilled. He wanted to show his power to the members of his organization. Very good impression of the jobs done with the PADF money. The community was very vibrant as opposed to Rouyonne. For example, at the height of the political repression, residents from Cité Soleil went to work there. They were hosted and seen as legitimate competitors!

On Sunday, April the 23, I went to St Rock (a nearby community) with the economist and talk to three people. I tested the questionnaire and at the same time recorded some qualitative information about local politics. I was informed that a women organization was just formed with Madame Merite as head (I had a chance to talk to her: very impressed). People complained about the unfairness of the hiring procedures as practiced by the chefs d'équipe.

Site: CCCPV Curage d'Irrigation a Pernier

Date 4/24/95 Team 1, Project #8

Description of Organization: CCCPV is a multipurpose organization which administers projects in all parts of the country. Activities vary from heath, drainage, road maintenance to agriculture. Project #8 is a canal rehabilitation activity.

Project Progress: A total of 11 km of canal had been rehabilitated.

Impact: According to date of project. Increase in Ag. Production by 300 %. Crop diversification- more food crops, wider variety of foods.

Economic: Reclaimed about 1000 ha of land. Agricultural activity increased; crop diversification; jobs, Increase employment. Increase money circulation

Technical and Environmental: Specifications were adhered to in canal rehabilitation.

Management: Negative--1. The hiring forms are not signed by workers. The forms are being filled in the office, but never signed by the workers. 2. Financial administrator did not receive any training because formal training was not in place when they started doing business. Seminars were started after the projects were started. 3. The tools they received were not appropriate. The machetes were of the wrong type.

Positive-- The financial manager knows about the system; very conversant with the system and provides other reports for checks and balances. For example, for the payroll the controller and team leader made sure that both individuals did the job. There is no independent audit. Great emphasis is placed on securing tools. If individuals are found with tools after hours they are fired.

CCPV does the administrative paper work for PDFCCFAO project 44. All technical and financial reports are prepared by CCCPV by project 44. CCCPV manages projects all over the country.

Roads

22 km of roads were rehabilitated-drained, holes plugged, and the surfaced smoothed.

Observation and Recommendation: Road was very good after the termination of the project. There is need for some repairs. Need more material to meet technical specification; material cost was prohibitive during the embargo. The roads need to be compacted. Lateral canals need to be protected.

Recommendation: Provide tools to local organization to maintenance of the canal.

Road Rehabilitation Positive Impact: Road became accessible to market, health center and other community activities.

Lesson learned: People are conscious and well organized. They know what they want and are very aware of community problems

Site: ALERTE -Rivere Rouyonne Soil and Water Conservation

Date: April 24, Project Code(s): 16, 53

Project Progress: Difficult to see all of project's work. Contour canals, tree plantings and gully plugs were seen but only a small part of the declared 1,900 Ha of work. Told of large work crews but got to the site too late to see any.

Project Impact: Stories of impact of project on area especially after Hurricane Gordon. No other employment in area. Competition among associations to obtain project resources (jobs). Hard to tell if impact on bottom tier of society - Chief d'equip/worker had nice house. Money spent for food and schooling.

Economic Benefit: Flooding in area a major problem that project seems to have helped. Lots of soil loss that has been reduced. Too early to see how effective. Work done in area in previous activities seem to be providing some soil protection.

Technical Quality: Quality of work poorest of three sites seen. Gully plugs made of filled sacks washed out. Spacing of contours seem too wide. PADF should look at. Chief d'équip aware of technical standards.

Democratic Objectives: Rapidly expanded local associations and federations. Food purchased on credit. Struggle of influence between community leaders. Process of reciprocal destruction, envy, jealousy. Example of Diab versus Zetren: Zetren said to me that Diab took all the jobs for his people (followers). He presided over an occasional council of 13 members (who only worked when there was something to do in the community), most of them younger than himself (38-40); he was about 65. Diab did not search for jobs; he was not invited by the Project, he said. Diab declared to me "Si ou pa bay moun lan (chef d'équipe nan) lè, ou ka mouri" (translation: "if you did not let the chef d'équipe do what he wanted you could pay with your life"). The two leaders were conscious of the geographical boundary of their power. After I talked to Diab, I realized he was completely alienated from the project. No one has ever told him anything about the project. He went to work in KABARE, a village nearby. It was to show the *chef d'équipe* he could work if he so wanted because he did not get along with him. Diab was far from being among the neediest of his community. His house was in concrete, with a roof in "tole"; beautiful yard and also a godfather. Once in a while, his daughter will jump into our conversation particularly when I was trying to find out how much money he made as of last agricultural season. People kept an optimistic view about the development of their locality. It was religiously based because the implementation of the PADF/jobs came because God wanted it to happen.

Sustainability: Little information. Farmers in area not replicating or maintaining soil conservation work done three years ago except on private land.

Project Management: Unable to tell. ALERTE management in Port au Prince. Send them organizational questionnaire.

Site: MCC - Rehabilitate Irrigation System Mory-Desarmes, Artibonite Valley

Date: April 25, Project Code(s): 45

Project Progress: Work seems to be well done and after four months still working. Since the project had completed its target with less labor than planned they continued to work within same person/month budget and did extra work.

Project Impact: Project increased land under irrigation by at least 25 percent (800 to 100 Ha). Area under production that were water logged were drained. Multiple cropping became possible in area that had been too dry. Water was saved and reused.

Economic Benefit: Increased production and economic growth. Money salaries to supplement income from farming. More kids in school. Lower level of theft.

Technical Quality: Quality of work appears good. PADF standards were followed with no problem. Standards may have overestimated the manpower needed to do irrigation canal cleaning.

Democratic Objectives: Project may have had a significant, possibly profound, effect on the social and democratic structures in area. From experience local groupment formed itself into registered NGO to repeat the same experience. The stringent rules used by PADF encourage people to believe a project can be undertaken without someone stealing all the resources.

Upon my arrival, there was a planters' meeting. I was introduced by the accountant of the Project. After I presented what I wanted to do, the participants were very happy because they saw an opportunity to express themselves about the project. They insisted on the reconciliation of LAVALAS and MAKOUT people. People from both camps were shaking hand and explained how they organized themselves to take good advantage of the PADF/jobs project. Leaders thought there was a possibility for political conflict to resume if and if the PADF job creation program were to stop.

Sustainability: People feel confident enough to try to replicate the project themselves (see above). Management training very useful.

Project Management: Project is well managed with a staff of nine people (including night guards). Books seem to be complete and well done. Project management likes PADF approach.

Site: CARE Repair and Clean Irrigation System in the Artibonite Valley.

Date: April 26

Social/Political Observations: I went to visit Ti Monette (fifth section), a locality where politics (as a struggle for social influence) was very much the focus. For example, local leaders were accusing one another of being LAVALAS (pro-democracy or FRAPH (against democracy). A group was formed, the CRT (comité de relevement Ti mounette); they chased the old leader out alleging that he was a makout. When contacted, this leader revealed to us that this group was not the real CRT and that he was the one who represented the organization. I had the impression that he was politically grounded in St Marc with the Agronomist responsible of the project. He did not accept to be rejected by the group and accused them of being anti Lavalas.

Site: CODEF Road rehabilitation Fonds des Blancs.

Date: April 27

Social/Political Observations: The local head of the association is a preacher at the Baptist church originally from St Michel in the Artibonite. He said they (he and his wife) selected this site because people were more prone to welcome them than those from other localities.

My impression was that much cohesion existed around the project. I was not struck by him as a domineering figure; rather he was very dedicated to what he was doing. Two effects on the community were identified by him as a result of the job creation project: Commercial traffic coming from Cotes de Fer could use this road; people living in Port-au-Prince visited their family more since the road was rehabilitated.

Site: Citie Soliel Garbage Collection

Date: April 29, 1995 Project CDS 25, 1

Dr. Reginald Baulos, Chairman CDS, "Success is related to his credibility of organization in the area."

Changes for future projects: More funds for other items (materials, administrative support) other than labor. Begin afforestation projects on large parcels of land.

Project Impact: Job creation, Social appeasement. Prevention of deaths from flooding especially from hurricane Gordon. Community involvement resulted in self-confidence and sense of dignity. People have continued the cleaning on their own in the hope that a job might be forthcoming. He would like to get the youngsters involved as part of project group.

Financing recommendation: Prefers all cash, but if food is used he would like to see at least 60% cash and 40% food. Impact on CDS internal organization structure. He added more staff and added to Directorship, 1. Program Sante 2. Development of health programs. He likes the system of reporting in which both financial and technical reports were given at the same time.

Employment Procedure: Employment was representative of: 1. geographical areas 2. political affiliation 3. other community groups Hiring was done by the Team leader.

Control: CDS had regular controls by accounting staff, engineers and supervisors.

The job site was visited. There were signs that some work was performed in the area. The canal was cleaned and a walkway constructed with some of the silt removed from the canal. The dump site where the debris was thrown was visited. The dump site was well designed with drains built at the upper ends and at the sides. The debris was covered up.

Social/Political Observations: People did not trust members of the government to carry out such a project (like the PADF/jobs). They were willing to march if the jobs creation project were to stop. They were very much opposed to a Gde 50 increase per day because for them it meant less jobs, therefore more hardships. Only in this site, I found some frustration of the chef d'équipe about the salary they were getting when they compared themselves to the supervisors. They saw themselves as the bridge over which the project had to pass to enter the community and felt they should be more respected and paid more. They also complained

about the fact they had to fulfill a special role by trying to keep the workers cool whenever problems arose.

Site: PDSC/FAONO - Irrigation and Drainage Project

Date: May 1, 1995, Project 044

The canal was cleaned. The people interviewed and there was free flow of clean water which can be used for drinking, bathing and irrigation. Before the project this was not possible.

The PADF inspector was interviewed since the project director said he refused any interview. Twenty small and irrigation systems. there were three blocks of 5, 12, and 3 perimeters. The engineer said he had not seen block one, but block two had six systems working. The canals were very clean, but there was no water flowing. According to the PADF inspector the pumps were working, but fuel was the major problem. It seems that the system works only for the individuals who can afford individual pumps.

Site: GRAPES Soil and Water Conservation in Cherette (St Louis du Sud)

Date: May 2

Social/Political Observations: The key observation came from a woman there who at a small group meeting declared (with the approbation of the other participants) that people coming from anywhere had the right to work in her community since they were all citizens of their country looking for jobs. This observation was also recorded in other sites such as Desarmes, Haiti-Jarden, which made me think of a social solidarity emerging as a result of the political repression. Some complaints about the money as being too small was voiced, not convincingly. They maintained that whenever someone wanted to work, his political affiliation was not an issue. Lavalas la vini, li pa vin ak pati pri: ni makout, ni lavalas, tout fè yon sèl (Lavalas does not have preference for people according to your political credo: both lavalas and makout are coalesced into one unit)

Site: PDAET Clean and Repair Irrigation System near Torbeck

Date: May 3 (not 2 because our car broke down!)

Social/Political Observations: A religious priest was the effective head of the project. He was in conflict with ti Dim, a FNCD (a political party) representative. During a meeting I had with the population (planters, rice diggers, and so on) he (ti Dim) described the priest as a domineering manipulator. I was not able to confirm his view. Talking with the priest revealed that ti Dim was hired and wanted to get paid without performing his job adequately. Other community members saw him as a hot-headed guy, a trouble maker. He complained that the project did not consider the youth of the community, his group. Since they were politically inclined, maybe this was the reason.

Site: CARE Road Rehabilitation in the Northwest

Date: May 1st, 1995, Project Code: 009, The road is completed, but there is a project amendment.

Technical Quality: There are many areas where there are no drains and the sliding dirt from the sloping upper bank enters the road causing erosion. Where there are drains the dirt fills the canals and this also leads to road deterioration. This condition is present in about 50% of the road visited. The major reason given for this is that the landowners did not allow the roads to encroach on their property. After Mourn Metier there is one area with a more than 12 percent slope, but there was no concrete surfacing. The reason given for this is the pre-specification of the areas where the concrete surfaces should be placed. The engineer said that there should be more flexibility in design. PADF should allow the participation of CAREs engineer and the people in the area in the design. He said that only limited emphasis was placed on the technical aspects at the initial stages of project design. The emphasis was on jobs creation.

Supervision: There seem to be very little supervision. The team leader was not qualified and had no former experience in this type of work. This is manifested in the quality of work. The transverse profiles were either flat or built with a sink in most cases. The excuse given for this type of work by the engineer was that the work was far from the area of work for most people. There are only four supervisors for each section. The supervisors travel by foot and hence are unable to provide the necessary amount of supervision. As soon as the supervisors leave the area the workers do as they want.

May 2nd., 1995, Project 009 and 018

Technical Aspects: The roads were visited. Three workers and three non-workers were interviewed, plus the engineer and the project director interviewed. About 10 % of the workers were women in both cases. The engineer did not seem to understand the technical aspect of the job. The director was new on the job and was not involved in the planning stages of the project. The director said that the planning was done without CAREs participation and without much consideration for local conditions. In some cases the roads were built without drains for water run off. The materials used for surfacing was not lasting especially during rains. The reason given for this is the cost involved in the transport of the gravel or other materials from out of the area. After Jean Rabel there are spots with holes due to lack of compaction. The director suggested that heavy equipment should be used for compacting in future projects. In many instances the drains were not aligned. The major reasons for the problem is the lack of experience of the engineers.

Site: IRD/MEBISH Secondary Road Rehabilitation in the Les Cayes Plain (Laborde)

Date: May 3

Social/Political Observations: Residents of Laborde focused a lot about the political repression they faced under the military regime. Many of the young had to hide in the

mountainous areas to escape from the army's raid. Apparently, army members would come and asked for livestock and money and if they could not deliver them they were thrown in jail. This is maybe the only site where people said that if members of the government were serious they could run a project like the PADF/jobs. In all the other sites, I have found a lot of skepticism about the capacity of the state administration to carry out such projects.

Site: ASSODLO - Les Moustique- Rehabilitation of Irrigation System
May 3rd, 1995, Project 006

The individuals interviewed were Bertral Vincent, foreman and Severe Germane an agricultural agent from the ministry of agriculture. The community participated in project choice and design. CARE wanted to build a water cistern, but the people thought that the rehabilitation of the irrigation canal was more important at the time.

Economic Impact: Increase an maize production from 50/100-500 mamites per 0.25 ha, Increase banana revenue from H\$1000-H\$5000-6000 per 0.25 ha, Increase in land values from H\$2000-H\$6000-7000 per 0.25 ha.

Technical: The drains were not aligned and were clogged with grass. The reason given for this was good soil fertility and siltation of the canals whenever the river flooded.

Site: COHAN BAGE Road Rehabilitation in Les Palmes
Date: May 4

Social/Political Observations: No commercial traffic on the road that was repaired and the merchants complained about it: They still had to walk down to Petit Goave. The users of the road were not aware of who built the road. A CASEC member complained that he was never informed of the project and did not know why. He was also convinced that the mayor from Petit Goave was also not informed. Local residents complained that too many chef d'équipes were recruited from Port au Prince. Social problems with merchants of cooked food who did not get paid because the chefs d'équipe were not mostly from the localities, they said.

SOCIAL/POLITICAL EFFECTS BETWEEN WORKERS AND NONWORKERS

The following tables present the percentage distribution of indicators of hope/optimism, confidence in democratic rule, and satisfaction with PADF/jobs' implementation according to whether or not people in the project sites were working on a team under the supervision of a *chef d'équipe*. The statistical level of significance (Sig.) shows the probability that the responses were not random ($p < .05$) or random ($p = 1.00$). As it can be seen by looking at the levels of significance, the introduction of residents' affiliation with the PADF/jobs did not change anything in the patterns observed when one compared them to the frequency distributions.

Table 1: Social Effects across PADF/jobs by Beneficiaries' Work Status (in percentage; N=55).

A. HOPE/OPTIMISM

	<u>Non-Workers</u>	<u>Workers</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Percent who said that positive change will take place in their residing communities (L 4)	85	74	.65
Percent who felt their life will improve (L 9)	74	77	1.00
Percent who said that they remember keeping "hope alive" during the last three years of political repression (L 25)	68	72	1.00
Percent who saw life in general as much better than three years ago (L 27)	78	75	.94
Percent who said they thought things were bound to change for the better during the embargo (L 28)	86	78	.68

B. CONFIDENCE IN DEMOCRATIC RULE

	<u>Non-Workers</u>	<u>Workers</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Percent who think democratic rule guarantee fulfillment of material needs (L 15)	82	78	.94

Percent who thought that the rule of law would prevail in spite of the political repression over the last three years (L 29)	95	67	.11
Percent who said that people ought to vote in spite of the last three years of political repression (L 34)	91	90	1.00
Percent who thought that the upcoming presidential elections will take place without any problem (L 38)	67	86	.36

C. SATISFACTION WITH PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

		<u>Non-Workers</u>	<u>Workers</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Percent who felt satisfy with the way the project was carried out (L 13)	not at all	30	16	.42
	more or less	30	34	
	very much	39	50	
Percent who thought some were more privileged than others with respect to PADF/jobs (L 14)		42	23	.28

Table 2. Types of Associations People said They Would Choose to Manage a Project (L12) by their Work Status (in percentage; N=55)

<u>Types of Associations</u>	<u>Non-Workers</u>	<u>Workers</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Religious Association (with Priest/Brother)	45	31	.46
Social Association (such as Community Council)	41	38	
Association based on Election (such as CASEC)	5	9	
Any Other	9	22	