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**Angola Community
Revitalization Projects**

**A Review of
Accomplishments & Study
of Impact**

FINAL REPORT

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Other information, including sample composition, description of data sources and terminology, survey instrument and raw statistical results, is presented in the accompanying volume “Angola Community Revitalization Projects - A Review of Accomplishments & Study of Impact – STATISTICAL RESULTS”

Executive Summary

This report is the result of an internal review of impact performed by a two person team from Creative Associates International, Inc. headquarters in Washington DC, visiting CREA Angola's operations in-country. This document attempts to fulfill several objectives:

- Document outputs, immediate results, and impacts of CREA Angola and USAID/OTI interventions through its Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs)
- Provide CREA and OTI with an indication of the specific impacts that CRPs had in selected communities to support their transition from emergency relief to sustainable development.
- Establish and present programming findings and lessons learned derived from the perspective of results achieved in the communities and best practices in project implementation methodology.
- Identify and establish proven models with potential replicability for OTI in other transitional settings, including cost/results analysis and assessment of sustainability.

Over the last two years, Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) has striven to develop a workable Post-conflict Target Area Strategy (TAS) model for the implementation of Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs) to revitalize selected war devastated communities. The field operations reflect an evolution in the TAS and CRPs' conceptual framework and implementation methodology since activities started in early 1996.

The Post-conflict TAS model, fundamentally, is a logical framework wherein the interventions (CRPs) are strategically designed and integrated to move communities toward recovery and self-sufficiency. The model addresses the challenges of post-conflict recovery and reconciliation at a local level and was successful in stabilizing vulnerable areas when political conditions at a national level were stable or moving toward stability under the negotiated peace Lusaka Protocol.

It should be noted that the model is not a universal panacea for all post-conflictive situations. As mentioned previously, programming to mitigate armed violence was not possible; and while conflict prevention was not within the program's purview the events in Angola have been deeply disappointing to staff, particularly in light of the great reconciliation strides taken in Balombo municipality.

The TAS is a rolling, phased approach with clearly defined objectives (in Angola's case, facilitating the resettlement, reintegration and selected development needs of wartorn municipalities). The strategy is based on extensive observation and investigation of socio-economic conditions (both past and present) and entails developing relationships with all stakeholders in a defined geographical region. The TAS is also an outline on how to link opportunistic, catalytic, and cross-sectoral CRPs in such a manner as to outreach different strata

of target communities' populations and create a momentum of activities and behavioral changes that is not possible with isolated, unconnected interventions.

In Angola (particularly Balombo) the model was successful (until the outbreak of renewed hostilities) in achieving an overall impact and positive change in municipalities by establishing durable patterns of participation and sustainable self-help interventions by:

- Unifying fractured social, political and traditional structures
- Moving communities out of paralysis caused by conflict and conflict-related conditions
- Providing start-up capital for communities to begin investing in the future
- Revitalizing municipalities' farm-to-market patterns
- Fostering commerce and freedom of movement
- Formation and training of interested, representative community organizations and associations

In Angola, the model has been highly effective when pursued with a vigorous methodology. This methodology includes appropriate cultural and political principles of intervention when designing and implementing CRPs. These principles of intervention include:

- Strong community investment and participation in the design and implementation of interventions
- Non-payment of salaries or incentives (such as Food for Work) to community participants
- Program and resource accountability (community-determined work schedules, timelines and resource allocation)
- Non-discriminatory inclusion of all sectors of the population
- Political neutrality and even-handedness
- Inclusion of local government structures
- Formalization of community commitment through a ceremonial contract signing
- Clear, enforced penalties for non-compliance with the community / CREA contract

The model could be adapted to other transitional countries when weighing different approaches to bridge programming from relief to development, where populations have become "institutionalized" (i.e., where the delivery of relief and basic social services have effectively become the responsibility of the international community). Activities were successful in laying a substantial foundation for longer-term development interventions. The model has also been successful in effecting reconciliation between opposing *civilian* populations with shared rehabilitation goals and / or mutual economic interests.

The Angolan experience has taught that the model requires a seasoned, well-trained staff, experienced in participatory models of development with a solid understanding of the social, political and military dynamics and rigorous consistence in methodology. A minimum of preconditions is needed before assessing whether the TAS approach should be utilized. Adapting the Post-conflict TAS is possible in other transitional countries where:

- A negotiated settlement between two factions or one clearly victorious faction has resulted in the cessation of armed conflict
- There is, at the national level, political stability or at least a move toward stability
- Socio-economic patterns have been disrupted, but opportunities still exist for revitalizing viable productive sectors
- An acceptable level of security exists
- Communities are beyond emergency conditions and are able to meet their basic food and shelter requirements
- Communities and leaders (political, traditional, and religious) are at least minimally receptive to the program
- The target area is not over-saturated with on-going emergency relief or non-participative development activities (in short, that there is not a glut of organizations whose assistance countermands the principles of intervention)
- A tradition of community and / or collective labor exists
- Cultural and political traditions are open to the requisite methodologies.

Salient findings and lessons learned include:

- If properly implemented with a consistent methodology, community revitalization programs can facilitate the war-to-peace transition process by intervening in various degrees throughout the relief to development continuum.
- Strategic programming – with a regional presence of a year or more – contributes exponentially to greater outreach, improved communication linkages, increased freedom of movement, increased citizen participation, increased productivity, increased reconciliation between targeted communities, and ameliorated living conditions.
- Larger, symbolic infrastructure projects are an effective way to establish presence and initiate activities in a target area. They are generally what are requested by communities (other than free distributions), give staff an opportunity to test the organizational capacities of different communities, understand the power dynamics, filter and identify the effective leaders and workers in a community, and put in place logistics systems.
- In CREA Angola's spheres of influence, programming for reconciliation between civilians in communities is both feasible and sustainable, even in the event of conflict.

- In municipalities where two opposing factions control villages, the implementer must strike a balance along political lines of projects to communities. Emergency assistance does not contribute to a perceived potential for a better quality of life; sustainable projects do.
- A “tough love” attitude on the implementing organization’s part is effective in social mobilization for project identification, implementation and sustainability of interventions.
- Unnecessary payment for services and materials available in the community cheapens the perceived value of the project, encourages corruption and lessens civic pride and feelings of ownership toward a project.
- Community investment, largely through participation, is required if projects are to have a chance at sustainability.
- Communities are more likely to actively participate in projects if they have had an active role in the selection and design of projects.
- Infrastructure CRPs (particularly roads, bridges and schools) were seen to be symbolic of the international community’s belief and willingness to invest in the peace process, in addition to the projects’ obvious impact on beneficiary lives.
- CRPs have assisted in reestablishing links between communities under UNITA and MPLA influence. CRPs targeting shared infrastructure needs catalyzed interaction among communities separated by the war.
- The communities have rehabilitated/opened 396 kms of roads and rehabilitated or constructed 73 bridges under the TAS model.
- An example of labor intensive infrastructure projects implemented without any incentive for community participation beside promotion is the irrigation channels or *valas*. During the life of the project CREA Angola and participating communities opened 412 Kms. of irrigation canals and sources of potable water.
- Schools are indicators of normalcy, and communities are willing and able to work together, contribute all locally available materials and manual labor for school construction.
- Productivity CRPs benefit self-starters in communities, and support them as role models for other community members.
- With the exception of some specific vocational training courses, projects that did not directly or indirectly benefit women were generally not judged by the communities to be in the best interest of the communities.

This report is structured for ease of readership.

- **Section I: Introduction** summarizes the framework for the review, the activities implemented to carry-out our scope of work, the team’s approach, methodology, and sources of data. It also provides a program overview, including strategic objectives, indicators, design assumptions, project components and geographical areas of intervention.

- **Section II: Review findings** summarizes the team’s findings, organized to show findings concerning the environment for reintegration, factors associated with successful resettlement and reintegration, the status of the resettlement, the status of reintegration and other complementary findings.
- **Section III: Lessons Learned** offers the team’s analysis of the resettlement, reintegration and post-conflict development process in two targeted municipalities. The section concludes with additional lessons learned.
- **Section IV: Conclusion** offers a final word on the team’s general impressions of CAII’s Angola Community Revitalization Program and summarizes key conceptual lessons learned.
- **Section VI: Appendices** include a glossary of terms, the program outputs, cost information and a sample project completion report.
- The description of data sources for this report, data analyses, survey instruments and raw statistical information from the team’s survey activities can be found in an accompanying volume.

I. Introduction

Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) has been active in Angola since March 1994, and has been executing small, integrated, quick impact community-based projects in targeted *planalto* areas of Huambo and Benguela provinces since March and November 1996, respectively.

CAII has striven to develop a workable Target Area Strategy (TAS) model for the implementation of Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs) to revitalize selected war devastated communities. The field operations reflect an evolution in the TAS and CRPs' conceptual framework and implementation methodology since activities started in early 1996.

This document examines the TAS/CRP model and its impact in two of the five geographical target areas: Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities.

A. An internal review of impact

This reports is the result of an internal review of impact performed by a two person team from Creative Associates International, Inc. headquarters in Washington DC, visiting CREA Angola's operations in-country. This document attempts to fulfill several objectives:

- Document outputs, immediate results, and impacts of CREA Angola and USAID/OTI interventions through its Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs)
- Provide CREA and OTI with an indication of the specific impacts that CRPs had in selected communities to support their transition from emergency relief to sustainable development.
- Establish and present programming findings and lessons learned derived from the perspective of results achieved in the communities and best practices in project implementation methodology.
- Identify and establish proven models with potential replicability for OTI in other transitional settings, including cost/results analysis and assessment of sustainability.

The team acknowledges that its members' indirect involvement during different phases of the project life and in CREA Angola operations makes this report an internal review of the CRPs' impacts rather than a formal independent final evaluation.

B. Program overview

While there were no overtly stated political objectives, the CRP program was seen by OTI as an important contribution to the Lusaka Protocol, initiated at a time when the peace process was getting underway and UNITA felt marginalized and deeply xenophobic. At the time, NGOs working in UNITA areas were virtually non-existent¹, troops had yet to be quartered, there were very few UNITA representatives in Luanda, and the UN's Humanitarian Assistance coordinating body (UCAH) was just beginning to staff up for the disarmament and demobilization stage. Emergency relief was widespread throughout the country, but barely commencing to penetrate into UNITA areas. Overland security and freedom of movement were episodic, with scarce beginnings in open cross-factional border trading.

The CRP component of CAII's program was expected to address UNITA leadership's transition-to-peace concerns regarding its population's welfare as well as provide the populations tangible peace dividends. CRPs were also launched in the MPLA-affiliated Huambo city and environs and, later, MPLA-affiliated Balombo city and both UNITA- and MPLA-affiliated environs.

Thus, program activities were implemented in the *planalto* region, targeting five mayor municipalities and surrounding communities and villages. The main target areas for program activities were Bailundo, Huambo, Mungo, Londuimbale, and Balombo municipalities. This analysis will focus in the Londuimbale and Balombo municipalities, because these two locations provide for valid comparison of frontline conflictive areas controlled by opposing political administrations. Details of the criteria for selecting target areas for the analysis are provided below.

1. Program terms, strategic objectives and indicators

The overall goal of the CRP component was to facilitate rural populations in their "return to normalcy" after over twenty years of war. Inherent in this normalization was the return of displaced populations, among whom many were expected to be demobilized soldiers and their families.

Program terms, strategic objectives and indicators include:

Normalcy: the context in which an individual or community envisions the present and future with hope, without fear for personal security, and is willing to proactively invest in activities for mid- and long-term solutions to needs.

Resettlement: the return of internally displaced populations (including demobilized and their families) to places where they plan on staying for the long-term. *The program strategic objective of resettlement is to improve community stability.*

¹ With the exception of the ICRC. The International Medical Corps soon thereafter began establishing a presence in Bailundo, UNITA's capital, but the CRP program was considered by OTI to be pivotal in UNITA's perception of international – particularly US - interest and commitment to UNITA's welfare and the peace process.

Improvements in community stability are represented by:

- Improved perception of security
- Increased freedom of movement
- Increasing reconciliation
- Perceived potential for better quality of life
- Improved community spirit

Reintegration: the processes in which individuals or communities re-establish / rehabilitate social patterns and infrastructure and do not perceive the causes of warfare and/or violence as inhibitors to social interaction. *The program strategic objective of reintegration is to rehabilitate community social infrastructure.*

Rehabilitation of community infrastructure is represented by:

- Increased citizen participation
- Local government structures/leadership
- Improved availability of basic services
- Improved community accessibility

Development needs: the range of possible community and individual material needs that go beyond emergency or relief assistance, and address short- and mid-term economic needs. *The program strategic objective for development needs is to revitalize traditional economic² patterns.*

The revitalization of traditional economic patterns is represented by:

- Increased self sufficiency
- Restored market forces
- Restored informal sector

A **success:** staff consider a project successful when an activity:

- Is clearly felt to be owned by the target community;
- Is sustainable and creates opportunities which are taken advantage of by the beneficiaries (spin-off activities either financially supported or not by OTI);
- Contributes to a strategic objective;

² Economic reactivation CRPs are considered to be those activities that generate income or surplus capital goods.

- Is cost-effective.

2. Program & design assumptions

The sum of CRP activities in an area was expected to improve economic and social conditions and opportunities in an integrated fashion. Social infrastructure and schools / training projects were seen to be vehicles for fostering community initiative, enabling civilian structures and supporting self-reliance. Agricultural revitalization and micro-enterprise creation were hoped to assist populations dropped from food and non-food item relief rosters. Agricultural CRPs provided crop diversification and improved seed stock, improved farming technologies and tools, and marketable agricultural surplus. Program assumptions were:

- 1) When communities are self-sufficient economically and more cohesive socially they are more apt to demonstrate tolerance and reconciliation.
- 2) A less vulnerable (economically) community with a more robust social fabric is better able, both materially and socially, to absorb an influx of returning populations with less conflict.
- 3) More surplus agriculture and micro-enterprise, and consequently more trade possibilities, promote freedom of movement across opposing politico-military lines.
- 4) Shared rehabilitation goals, such as roads, bridges and schools, bring communities together through sweat equity and create opportunities for reconciliation between villages of opposing factions.
- 5) CREA Angola, working in areas where no (or extremely few) NGOs penetrate, would spearhead presence of other international and national NGOs into the spheres of influence.
- 6) The quartered troops, hearing that activities are ongoing in their home communities, would be more optimistic about returning home and targeted areas would become magnets for their return.

There were several design assumptions thought to be key to achieving program goals and strategic objectives:

- 1) A strategic placement of integrated, complementary community revitalization projects would create a “critical mass” of interventions and have a wider, more sustainable impact on a region than a scattering of unrelated - even if needed – projects.
- 2) The transition from relief assistance to development requires attitudinal and behavioral changes in the beneficiary population. Therefore, the *process* to effect change in people’s lives is as important as the *product*. Projects would therefore be designed for active, rather than passive, involvement of beneficiaries. Projects would emphasize beneficiary discussion, prioritization, decision-making, accountability and responsibility in order for the communities to benefit from a quality product.

- 3) In accordance with the above point, working with and through community associations would emphasize community organization and mutual dependency, rather than competition and individual (or family) survival as manifested during the war.
- 4) Food for work and incentives for involving beneficiary populations in projects is not only unnecessary but also counterproductive to participation. Whereas FFW and incentives guarantee cooperation, they do not promote sustainable participation in community projects, nor do they foster the feeling of ownership or control over a productive future, as they are seen to be wages.

3. Program components

In order to operationalize the above design assumptions, three program components were developed: the Target Area Strategy (TAS), *Grupos de Trabalho* (GdT) and Community Revitalization Projects (CRPs).

The **Target Area Strategy** is a document developed in consultation with local authorities and communities, which outlines the cultural, political and economic history of a targeted region. It further details the current demographics and state of physical infrastructure, social infrastructure and economic productivity. The TAS proposes the most effective placement and phasing of community requested projects in support of the region's three strategic objectives for interventions: increased resettlement and reintegration, rehabilitation of social infrastructure and revitalization of traditional economic patterns. By design, a TAS is shared with authorities, organizations, associations and communities throughout the region, is a consensual and concerted document, and as such gives all involved a vision as to what they are working toward³. A TAS is necessary because it provides a cohesive plan for the revitalization of social patterns and market forces. Cohesiveness is required to create a critical mass of interventions whose impact when taken as a whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

TAS rationale:

- A TAS programmatically implies a series of interconnected activities that take into account, and capitalize on, community initiative, existing (whether active, weak or moribund) productivity and trade patterns, lines of communication, social trends, authority structures, and social infrastructure.
- A TAS makes sense from a logistical point of view. Rather than a series of scattered projects throughout a province, a defined target area enables the Project Manager to concentrate his or her resources within a manageable geographical region. This facilitates logistics and enhances cost-effectiveness.
- Relationships built with communities can evolve, with spin-off CRPs addressing both wider and more specific needs of the target area and its citizens. Capacity building and the

³ Although the program intended to apply this participatory and active involvement of local authorities, there have been isolated episodes (particularly in UNITA areas) where local authorities did not engage in program design.

strengthening of civilian social structures is reinforced over time in a way that is untenable if CRPs are strewn about haphazardly without programmatic or geographic consistency. Given the time constraints and rapid turnover of CRP interventions, a TAS becomes key to a Project Manager's effectiveness and CRP impact.

- Taken as a whole within the continuum of the three program areas of resettlement, reintegration and development needs, a TAS should contribute to a change in social interaction: movement of goods and people, productivity cycles, trading patterns, a shift to more effective, participatory civilian leadership and active community involvement in their future.

The **Grupo de Trabalho (Work Group)** is a representative group formed from local and municipal leaders who initially undertook community-based project identification and then oversaw the implementation of CAII/OTI approved project proposals. *Grupos de Trabalho* are responsible for mobilizing the community, managing resources and addressing grievances within the development of the Community Revitalization Project. To a lesser degree, they represent their communities to Communal and Municipal authorities and, on occasion, successfully lobby government administration for action to be taken in support of their activities.

The **Community Revitalization Projects**, the actual interventions, are developed by the community *Grupos de Trabalho* in conjunction with CAII field staff in support of the TAS. In preliminary stages, proposed interventions that were not clearly in support of the strategic objectives of the TAS, or were plainly in the interest of one individual or a small group of beneficiaries, were filtered out by CREA Angola staff. To ensure that projects were truly desired by the community at large and to encourage a strong sense of ownership and pride in the interventions, all CRPs demanded a minimum community contribution (generally in the form of labor and materials) of 60% of the total project value. CREA promoters endeavored to portray CAII as a partner supporting community initiatives rather than as an authority imposing them. CAII's role was to provide technical and logistical support of community projects. Towards this end, no Food for Work, remuneration or incentives were to be paid by CAII to project workers. In communities where such payment was necessary⁴ to complete a project, the *Grupos de Trabalho* undertook community activities to raise salaries, generally in the form of barter.

4. Geographical areas of intervention

In October 1996, CAII's geographical outreach expanded from Huambo City and Bailundo to Mungo and Londuimbale municipalities in Huambo province and Balombo municipality in Benguela province. This expansion – and the very municipalities selected for program interventions – was based on the premise that a programmatic linkage within and between selected communities in the municipalities would provide for increased productivity,

⁴ Instances where the communities paid for workers included projects requiring technical skills. Doors and windows for schools and community centers, for example, were completed by carpenters who were contracted by the communities either through barter or cash. Masons and plasterers were also at times paid by the community.

communication, contact and / or movement, and shared rehabilitation goals (such as trade possibilities or road and bridge rehabilitation) between Angola's two opposing factions.


In October 1996 three new field bases, or *spheres of influence* were selected for CRP interventions, bringing the total to five CREA Angola bases⁵. Criteria for their selection included:

- 1) projected numbers of returning demobilized troops;
- 2) perceived number of populations displaced from the area due to the war;
- 3) strategic location of the spheres along the most currently viable economic corridor in the Planalto (Huambo - Lobito); and,
- 4) the poles on the eastern and western limits of MPLA control spheres (Balombo and Huambo city), while the interior was UNITA-controlled.

Within each sphere of influence, it was the project manager's task to develop, at a minimum, one Target Area Strategy (TAS). The strategy for each area was to have inherent economic and social goals, buttressed by specific community objectives (to be met through CRPs), with short-term impact in a measurable and visible fashion.

The following chart shows the distribution of CREA Angola spheres of influence and communities directly impacted by the project activities.

⁵ These were Huambo City, Bailundo, Mungo, Londuimbale, and Balombo.



C. Review's approach and methodology

The team relied on the following approach to assess the impact of CREA Angola's CRP program:

- ***The review is driven by data.*** The team was careful to base all of its findings on hard data, and to link all lessons learned and recommendations to these data-driven findings. We did so because we believe that findings and recommendations based on speculation, beliefs or feelings not grounded in verifiable data do not serve USAID in documenting the impact of its activities.
- ***The team focused on results.*** We asked a series of questions that were designed to explore how the respondents perceived their lives; these questions were developed around indicators CREA Angola national staff and beneficiaries felt were salient to resettlement, reintegration and development needs. This information was vital in order to correlate goal achievements with projects.
- ***We assessed how the CRP program was designed, implemented and managed.*** Results begin in the planning stage, when objectives are defined and benchmarks established for achieving these objectives. We therefore examined how CRP objectives were initially defined as well as how programming was implemented in order to derive lessons learned and make recommendations for future design, implementation and management of transitional community revitalization programming.

The team divided the mission into the following stages:

- ***Setting the stage for the evaluation, October 1997:*** a retreat was held with the Program Auditor, Country Director, Program Managers, and field promoters to discuss the review. Given the history of the conflict, the different levels of civilian population control and wariness to written forms in the spheres of influence, and the staff's time, there were many issues⁶ to assess to ensure the consistency and integrity of any evaluation activity. During this retreat, strategic objectives and CRP performance indicators were reviewed. In addition, indicators for "normalcy" within the Angolan context were discussed at length. A preliminary survey questionnaire - designed around the three strategic objectives - was developed, and methods for its implementation considered.
- ***Streamlining and executing the questionnaire, March 1998:*** The Program Auditor returned to Angola, the questionnaire was finalized, translated into Umbundu and the survey implemented by June.

⁶ See also "Evaluation Constraints" below.

- *Data analysis & Luanda visit, July – October 1998:* The data resulting from the survey was tabulated and analyzed by the Evaluation Expert in Washington. In anticipation of the contract's termination, (at that time, December 31st, 1998, subsequently extended to March 31st, 1999 when this report was been written), the Program Auditor (PA) returned to Angola in October, to follow up on salient issues the data revealed. In addition to other program-related tasks, the PA spent a week in Luanda reviewing CRP costs, implementation issues and beneficiary numbers.
- *Qualitative probes, further data analysis and report writing, November 1998:* The month of November was spent by the PA in the field, based out of the Balombo field office. He was joined by the Evaluation Expert in mid-November, when a final review and analysis of all the data and qualitative results were compiled into this report.

1. Review's constraints

Angola presents a challenge to anyone required to utilize formal methodologies to survey the population, particularly in those areas hardest hit by the fighting. Obstacles for the data gathering phase of this activity have included:

- Distrust, fear and suspicion by both factions' administrations of the intents and purposes of formal surveys.
- Distrust, fear and suspicion within the civilian population of the intents and purpose of formal questions and responses registered in questionnaires.
- Physical security and access to some of the communities under study, due to the resumption of armed hostilities between UNITAS and the national government.
- Lack of reliable baseline data, mostly for the reasons expressed above.

a) *Physical security and access*

After years of war, distrust of strangers' and/or organizations' questions and motives are endemic in both MPLA and UNITA regions⁷. At the time of the survey (June 1998), security in the *planalto* was deteriorating. This was the time of the endgame of the Lusaka Protocol, when UNITA was to cede control over three of its strongholds: Inharea, Andulo and Bailundo⁸. UNITA halted government extension of authority, if not by overt force then by their abandonment, in the face of threats, by MPLA administrations. Events made everyone tense and anxious of the future, and the survey was feared by many to be an instrument for espionage or other dark, ulterior motives. These factors ruled Bailundo out of the potential sites for study, although it was previously considered a priority survey area. Survey activities were then implemented in the Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities.

⁷ One example of UNITA's paranoia was their prohibiting CREA Angola staff who worked on the MPLA side of the program from visiting Bailundo after April 1998. Reasons given to the Country Director and Program Auditor were that the two individuals were "spies", and their safety could not be guaranteed.

⁸ As it turned out, state extension of authority to these towns never occurred.

The security situation has gotten worse since the surveying in June. During the month of November, when this report was written, there were attacks daily⁹ throughout the Londuimbale and Balombo municipalities. According to interviewees, these attacks were mostly brigandage and banditry, the attackers elements of the FAA, the *Defesa Civil*, and rogue UNITA units. MPLA administration and victimized populations alike claimed that the attacks were not organized political or military actions. However, the week of November 10th a strong UNITA force under a well-known commander attacked Alto Hama, a major trading center on the Lobito – Huambo corridor. The FAA was sent in and dislodged them. This action made villages throughout the regions fearful of renewed war, with *sobas*¹⁰ arriving in Balombo to request arms to defend themselves.

The violence has had its impact on the evaluators' access to villages in Londuimbale for qualitative probes. It has also restricted access for qualitative interviews to southern Balombo municipality, and east along the Lobito – Balombo road¹¹.

b) *Review constraints in UNITA-controlled areas*

Suspicion and fear has been especially prevalent in those regions under UNITA's control. In most UNITA areas we worked, we found we could not overcome these traits to perform a formal survey. Staff felt that even attempting such might put surveyors in danger in Mungo and Bailundo. Nonetheless, appropriate cultural indicators for resettlement, reintegration and development needs were prepared with staff from these areas since they are also from the Ovimbundo tribe (the culture with which all CRPs were implemented), and they were trained in the methodology in the hopes that the political barriers against surveying would be surmounted. Unfortunately, this was not to be in Bailundo and Mungo municipalities.

Those UNITA areas surveyed in Balombo and Londuimbale had up to nine months' state extension of authority, with many of the hardcore UNITA leaders having withdrawn to other areas. This notwithstanding, the survey questions regarding demobilized caused obvious discomfort among the majority of interviewees.

c) *Review constraints in MPLA areas*

MPLA areas presented different challenges. The foremost of these was the population's notion of the survey's intent, which by and large was believed to indicate where more assistance would be placed. Such notions impelled the Balombo administrative staff to send down the chain of command (i.e., to the *sobas* and their sub-chiefs) that interviewees were to paint as grim a picture as possible in the hopes of more benefits to follow¹². The population as well has been subject to numerous surveys done by relief organizations, and well know that most of these are done with

⁹ During the first week of November alone, when the qualitative probes were to begin, three attacks within 15 kms of Balombo *sede* left 10 dead.

¹⁰ A chief, either traditional through inheritance or a politically-appointed administrative position.

¹¹ See interview maps below.

¹² An ex-official in the Ministry of Agriculture, Balombo, related this to the Program Auditor.

the ultimate objective of deciding whether distribution of relief items such as food, seeds and tools will depend on their response.

d) *Baseline data*

OTT's mandate and directions were to establish a field presence promptly, and start CRPs as quickly as possible. What little baseline data that was available was untrustworthy. For example, both sides' administrations routinely inflate population numbers in the hopes that more assistance will be forthcoming. This strategy has been successful when assistance is for immediate relief. Civilians also put the worst possible light on their situation, in the hope that this would bring more assistance.

II. Review Findings

This section presents the review team's findings based on the team's collection of both qualitative as well as quantitative data. These findings are supported by direct results from the community survey activities and in-depth qualitative interviews with project staff, local authorities, other NGOs and community members. Other data sources included CREA Angola project records, completion reports and financial statements.

For detailed information on how to interpret the graphs and boxplots, please refer to the appendix in the accompanying volume.

A. Community resettlement

In the project design, the program strategic objective of resettlement is to improve community stability, as represented by beneficiary security perceptions, increased reconciliation, perceived potential for a better quality of life and improved community spirit.

1. Improved perception of security

The vast majority of Angolans express the heartfelt desire for an end to warfare, adequate health care, schooling for their children and the "return to normalcy". Most beneficiaries have been displaced at least once during the war, although the norm is several times over the years.

CRP implementation did contribute to communities' perception of security, but only in an absence of organized military deployment, action, conscription or recruitment. This perception went hand-in-hand with an international NGO presence in the area.

The following table shows the respondents' opinions about reasons for increased visitors in their communities¹³. Over 19 out of 20 respondents considered the advances in the peace process (increased security) as the most important factor for receiving more visitors. This opinion is closely followed by the improvement in roads and bridges, one of the first activities addressed by CRPs.

¹³ Percentages add to over 100% because they represent the percentage of respondents selecting that particular option in a multiple-choice question. All numbers are based on the number of responses and not on the number of respondents.

		Responses	Col Response %
Reasons for increased visitors	Improved peace situation	271	96.4%
	Improved roads/bridges	266	94.7%
	Increased availability of merchandise	205	73.0%
	Increased availability of ag. products	92	32.7%
	Others	16	5.7%
Total		850	302.5%

Infrastructure CRPs (particularly roads, bridges and schools) were seen to be symbolic of the international community’s belief and willingness to invest in the peace process, in addition to the projects’ obvious impact on beneficiary lives. The CRP model, breaking away from emergency assistance modalities by emphasizing participation and responsibility for the future, brought home to communities the language of the Lusaka Protocol. Since June 1998, when the peace process began to unravel, there has been a shift in attitude toward armed factions; rural dwellers are fed up and just want to get on with their lives.



In the following table, less than 1 of 5 respondents had a family member leaving the community for reasons other than work or studies. This indicates a relatively stable population considering that all respondents were displaced more than once during the previous years.

Has someone from the family left the community during the last year?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	No	64	19.5	31.2	31.2
	Studies	12	3.6	5.9	37.1
	Work	64	19.5	31.2	68.3
	Other reasons	65	19.8	31.7	100.0
	Total	205	62.3	100.0	
Missing	5	2	.6		
	N/A	75	22.8		
	System	47	14.3		
	Total	124	37.7		
Total		329	100.0		

It should be noted that – in Balombo at least – internal displacement due to widespread insecurity is waning. If faced with the choice of banditry or displacement, the rural Balombian today will opt to stay at home¹⁴. There was no evidence that CRPs contributed to this choice or not. Attacks by a UNITA military force on the town of Alto Hama, Huambo, however, did cause displacement even from the next town on the highway, Londuimbale.

The following tables show communities' perceptions about the return of traditional leadership and other community members.

Have the traditional leaders returned to the area?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Many	155	47.1	56.4	56.4
	Some	28	8.5	10.2	66.5
	Little	32	9.7	11.6	78.2
	None	60	18.2	21.8	100.0
	Total	275	83.6	100.0	
Missing	N/A	50	15.2		
	System	4	1.2		
	Total	54	16.4		
Total		329	100.0		

¹⁴ As noted to the CREA Angola team by an older man in November, "You get robbed in the cities just as easily as here, and here is where we live and want to stay."

Have there been new families in the community during the last year?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	More than 20 families	44	13.4	26.5	26.5
	Between 10 and 20 families	73	22.2	44.0	70.5
	A couple of families	44	13.4	26.5	97.0
	None	5	1.5	3.0	100.0
	Total	166	50.5	100.0	
Missing	N/A	151	45.9		
	System	12	3.6		
	Total	163	49.5		
Total		329	100.0		


The Balombo administration is sending IDPs back to their homes, rather than allowing them to resettle in the city. The Administrator claims conditions have changed and that he cannot continue to provide food for IDPs.

2. Increasing reconciliation

Specific CRPs that contributed to this indicator were the rehabilitation of schools and roads / bridges, micro-enterprise and agriculture production.

CRPs have assisted in reestablishing links between communities under UNITA and MPLA influence. CRPs targeting shared infrastructure needs catalyzed interaction among communities separated by the war. The MacaMombolo grinding mill continues to be used, despite high tensions and insecurity, by both Binje and MacaMombolo residents. Prior to CRPs, interaction between the two communities was limited to attacks. Road and bridge rehabilitation was instrumental at getting previously opposed communities to work together on the MacaMombolo road. After the grinding mill project, two bridges between MacaMombolo and Binje were rehabilitated, linking three municipalities. The government has used this road routinely, and its rehabilitation has changed municipal administration patterns. Binje, formerly a UNITA stronghold in Cassongue municipality, Cuanza Sul province, now is administrated by Balombo since the Cuanza Sul MPLA administrative center is so distant.

The following map shows the political control of the communities interviewed in the Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities (at the time of the survey activities).



School rehabilitation CRPs, complemented by road and bridge rehabilitation, successfully managed to reconcile UNITA-area teachers and the MPLA administration. Even before the extension of GURN authority, the education delegate visited Canokela and Chingongo towns – both extremely pro-UNITA. At the time (February 1997), this was unprecedented. UNITA villages Canokela, Chingongo, Cauita, Nhanha, Chindumbo *sede* (city), and Tchicunda all sent their teachers to refresher courses offered by the government; these teachers were then duly registered and put on the state payroll. This too was unprecedented.

Ministries of Education, Agriculture and Health officials were all successfully introduced to UNITA communities. The education sector was the most effective arena for interaction, since the government must certify teachers in order to receive salaries. In Balombo, teachers from UNITA communities attended refresher courses and were put on government rosters with pay PTAs interact with each other regardless of political affiliation. Alternately, UNITA *sobas* (chiefs) were successfully invited to MPLA communities and the municipal administration to discuss development issues.

Another important factor (and programmatic critical assumption for the reconciliation objective of CRPs) was the successful demobilization of UNITA troops and the consequent demilitarization of the communities being served. The actual quartering of UNITA troops and their demobilization is an imperfectly understood process. None of those interviewed (either on this mission or previous ones) are convinced it was transparent on UNITA's side. Two prevailing theories are.

- That the majority of those quartered and “demobilized” were not regular soldiers at all, and that the QAs were either training grounds for recruits and / or a place where younger and

older men could be sent to “comply” with the Lusaka Protocols while UNITA bought time for whatever the next step was;

- That the men demobilized did not in fact return to their places of origin but rather were deployed through the demobilization process to strategic military areas.

The following table shows that about half of the returns in the community during the last year were civilian family members, although the massive demobilization in the close-by Londuimbale quartering area should have influenced a higher proportion of returned demobilized (less than 10%).

Has any family member returned to live in the house in the last year?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Others	3	.9	1.6	1.6
	Civilian	91	27.7	49.2	50.8
	Demobilized	16	4.9	8.6	59.5
	Military	4	1.2	2.2	61.6
	No	71	21.6	38.4	100.0
	Total	185	56.2	100.0	
Missing	NR	91	27.7		
	System	53	16.1		
	Total	144	43.8		
Total		329	100.0		

Villagers were extremely reluctant to talk about demobilized soldiers. In general, the respondents evaded questions related to demobilized soldiers and the military situation and referred the interviewers to the *Soba*. This makes the assessment of CRPs' direct impact vis-a-vis returning demobilized almost not ascertainable. Respondents were more open about the families of the demobilized. The following table shows that even when a significant number of respondents addressed the question, about half of them claimed to have seen no returns of the demobilized families, a fact known to be inaccurate by CREA Angola promoters and interviewers.

Have the families of the demobilized returned?

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Many	37	11.2	15.0	15.0
	Some	68	20.7	27.5	42.5
	Little	28	8.5	11.3	53.8
	None	114	34.7	46.2	100.0
	Total	247	75.1	100.0	
Missing	8	1	.3		
	N/A	78	23.7		
	System	3	.9		
	Total	82	24.9		
Total		329	100.0		

3. Perceived potential for a better quality of life

As with perceptions of security, the very presence of an NGO in an area, and by implication CRPs and the assistance they provide, has contributed to a perceived potential for a better quality of life.

CREA Angola began working in many areas where other NGOs had never been. The majority of beneficiary communities are hours from Balombo *sede*, on paths or roads that require four-wheel drive if accessible at all by vehicle. For example, until CREA arrived, no NGO (international or local) had ventured outside a 10-km. radius of Balombo since the breakdown of the Bicesse Accords.

This presence by CREA Angola spearheaded other NGO involvement with communities, as in SCF-UK in MacaMombolo and Cambanjo, and Oxfam in Canokela and a number of UNITA communities south of Ca'ala. The survey respondents' perceptions also support this team observation. While in control communities (not served through CRPs) 3 out of 5 respondents (60%) declared no presence of NGOs, only 28 % perceived this in beneficiary communities. These survey results are represented in the following table.

**Are there other organizations operating in the area?
* Control community? Crosstabulation**

% within Control community?

		Control community?		Total
		Control	CRPs	
Are there other organizations operating in the area?	No	59.5%	28.1%	35.8%
	One	3.8%	21.9%	17.4%
	Several	36.7%	50.0%	46.7%
Total		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Assistance in any form is attractive to populations. Beneficiaries are willing to go to great lengths to receive benefits. Individuals routinely walk 40 kms to CREA Angola field bases to discuss projects. One association, learning that a bridge was down and their donkeys were on the other side, walked 104 kms round trip to gather the animals and bring them back to Balombo city for quarantine.



4. Improved community spirit

Education is highly prized in Angolan communities. Schools are indicators of normalcy, and communities are willing and able to work together, contribute all locally available materials and manual labor for school construction. They are also willing and able to pay for skilled labor.

Roads and bridges signify for rural populations a sign of stability and normalcy due to the increased traffic¹⁵ and movement of goods and services, and communities are willing and able to contribute all locally available materials and manual labor for their rehabilitation and / or construction.

As the following table shows, the most valued community initiatives are infrastructure projects (church, school, roads and bridges rehabilitation) and land cleaning/opening.

The highest impact of CRPs allowing communities to engage in major infrastructure activities is in school rehabilitation, from 41% to 88%. This increase in the perception of visibility of the community activities shows the importance given by Angolans to education.

		Control community?				Total	
		Control		CRPs		Count	Column %
		Count	Column %	Count	Column %		
Increase in community work? What type?	Church rehabilitation	63	(78%)	193	(86%)	256	(84%)
	School rehabilitation	33	(41%)	196	(88%)	229	(75%)
	Road/Bridge reconstruction	65	(80%)	145	(65%)	210	(69%)
	Opening/cleaning of wells	25	(31%)	40	(18%)	65	(21%)
	Dirt cooperation	1	(1%)	3	(1%)	4	(1%)
	Construction of graneries	8	(10%)	76	(34%)	84	(28%)
	Health post reconstruction	2	(2%)	59	(26%)	61	(20%)
	Land cleaning	64	(79%)	174	(78%)	238	(78%)
	Irrigation channels reopening	8	(10%)	35	(16%)	43	(14%)
	Dams construction			16	(7%)	16	(5%)
	Other activities	1	(1%)	5	(2%)	6	(2%)
Total		81	(100%)	224	(100%)	305	(100%)

Strong traditions of community participation in social projects exist in both the colonial and traditional (Ovimbundu) history of the *planalto* (though such participation was not always

¹⁵ Increased traffic actually means any vehicular traffic at all, since prior to CRP completion roads rehabilitated were completely unused since at least 1992. Many villages had not seen cars go by their homes since colonial times.

voluntary.) Incentives such as Food for Work and cash for work have not been necessary for any interventions, even those projects such as road and bridge rehabilitation that benefit a wider population than the communities doing the work.

An example of labor intensive infrastructure projects implemented without any incentive for community participation beside promotion is that of irrigation channels or *valas*. During the life of the project CREA Angola and participating communities opened 412 Kms. of irrigation canals and sources of potable water.

Another major infrastructure activity is represented by the rehabilitation or opening of secondary roads and the rehabilitation/construction of bridges. With CRPs' involvement, the communities have rehabilitated/opened 396 kms of roads and rehabilitated or constructed 73 bridges.

Other infrastructure works include the construction or rehabilitation of 68 schools, 5 grinding mills, and two major markets, among others¹⁶.




This direct contribution from the communities and project participants, both in the form of labor and available local materials, has a direct implication in project costs and leverage of donor's investment.

As the following chart shows, of the three different implementation modalities utilized by CREA Angola during the life of the activity, CRPs provided for the highest leverage for donor's investment. While grants generated an average of about \$2 of counterpart investment per donor direct dollar investment, CRPs averaged a ratio close to 4 to 1.

CIF's show results close to the CRPs in terms of leverage of donor investments, although the focus in more individualized attention (i.e. support of master farmers vis-à-vis general agriculture) reduces the labor related community contribution.

¹⁶ Programming outcomes are presented in the included appendices.



5. General factors contributing to resettlement

After construction of the resettlement index as a compilation of separate indicators of increased community stability¹⁷ a variable reduction process was applied to identify the most significant factors associated with this indication of resettlement, beside those included in the construction of the index. The process utilized (AnswerTree¹⁸) allowed for the analysis of the overall survey dataset joined with CREA’s CRP information for each of the surveyed communities. This process indicates five major parameters closely associated with respondents clustering in higher comparative levels of resettlement. These parameters are increased interest or plans to invest in small animals, increased perceived presence of artisans, increases in trading and commerce, improvements in housing conditions and higher respondent involvement in community infrastructure rehabilitation.


¹⁷ For a detailed explanation of the resettlement, reintegration and development indices please see the appendix “Approach and methodology” in the accompanying statistical volume.

¹⁸ AnswerTree is commercial analysis tool designed to assess variability and relationships in a complex dataset against a target variable. AnswerTree is a trademark of SPSS inc.

a) *Investments in small animals*

Respondents considered investments in small animals a traditional form of saving. After living years displaced from their original communities, only community members showing hope for stability are willing and interested in making small investments in animals.


The following chart shows significantly higher indications of resettlement for respondents who have invested or are planning to invest in small animals. The dashed blue lines represent the median for the reintegration index for the survey respondents. The close association of interest in investment in small animals and higher comparative levels of resettlement is clear.



b) *Increased presence of artisans*


Artisans and traditional crafts tend to disappear in traumatized communities, especially those of the displaced, generally receiving humanitarian relief. The following chart shows the clear correlation between re-emergence of traditional crafts (in the form of the perception of more artisans in the community) and the comparative perceived level of resettlement.

The chart shows how the median grows for the resettlement level in communities with increasing perceived number of artisans.



c) *Increased commerce and trading*


Another factor closely associated with a higher level of resettlement is the perception of increased commerce and trading. When community members perceive the restoration of traditional trading and productive patterns the higher the possibilities for them to invest their scarce resources in longer-term productive activities. This investment increases the resettlement of the population through geographical and economical stabilization. The following chart shows how respondents perceiving higher improvements in the restoration of commerce and trading patterns are associated with the more resettled communities.



d) *Improvement in housing*

Improvements in the housing conditions also contribute directly to resettlement. As in the case of increased trading, investment of resources in physical infrastructure promotes stability and hope. This relationship seems to work both ways, as community members do not start investing in housing improvement until the security and stability conditions improve.


The following chart shows increasing levels of resettlement for communities whose members have invested in the construction of adobe houses.



e) *Reconstruction of community infrastructure*

After the initial stabilization of formerly displaced communities, when villagers have made initial investments in economic ventures or housing, participation in the reconstruction of community owned infrastructure becomes the next factor associated with higher levels of resettlement. Throughout the evaluation survey questions were directed to identify the type of community works that directly contribute to resettlement. Respondents clearly highlighted rehabilitation of churches.

While other community work, as in the case of roads, bridges and schools, directly contributes to reintegration and developmental opportunities, the rehabilitation of churches has a direct impact in more fully resettled communities. The following chart represents how community members that have had a direct participation in reconstruction of their churches belong to more completely resettled communities.



B. Community reintegration

The program strategic objective of reintegration was to rehabilitate community social infrastructure, as represented by increased citizen participation and strengthened local government structures/leadership, improved community accessibility and availability of basic services.

1. Increased citizen participation and strengthened local government structures/leadership

In Balombo, virtually every organization and government agency has been linked with OTI-funded groups and associations. *Grupos de Trabalho* and associations formed through CRPs have become the principal conduit for a variety of goods and services from other organizations, agencies and local authorities. Associations for micro-enterprise, literacy, rural women, PTAs and productivity have organized their communities for interaction with Oxfam, CRS, SFC-UK, the ministries of education, agriculture, women’s development, forestry, health, *serviços comunitários*, and commerce. These entities have been working through the structures created

by CRPs: *Grupos de Trabalho* in an area overseeing the coordination of activities under their purview.

The following table shows that almost half of the survey respondents belong to a vegetable production association, one in every five (20.7%) to a wheat production group, and less than one third of respondents do not belong to any CREA sponsored group or association.

		Cases	Col Response %
Are you member of an assoc. sponsored by CREA?	Potatoes and Hort.	96	44.2%
	None	65	30.0%
	Wheat	45	20.7%
	Grupo de trabalho	41	18.9%
	Mills	8	3.7%
	Rural tree nurseries	7	3.2%
	Others	7	3.2%
	Other comm. organization	4	1.8%
	Agriculture-Farming	2	.9%
Total		217	126.7%

In response to the popularity of the beekeeping CRP, apiculturists attending seminars spread from 2 focal areas to all three *comunas* in Balombo municipality. The *Instituto de Desenvolvimento das Florestas*, the governmental parastatal responsible for forestry, is starting a beekeeper cooperative in 1999. Activities will include a training center (for hive construction and the development of apiculture by-products), subsidized materials and supplies for members, and linkages to Lobito to bolster distribution of honey and wax.



The possibility for the successful integration of civilian and traditional administration and the general populace in areas where the GURN has expanded is greatly increased when free access and a minimum of physical and social infrastructure is existent.

Involvement of the municipal administration has been a slow, educational process. Nonetheless, the Balombo administrator has been politically astute and supportive of CRP activities, even those in UNITA

(and subsequently GURN) areas. Since September 1998, he has himself become one of the CRP methodology's biggest promoters, taking delegations of his workers to associations and underscoring the importance of development and self-reliance through conditioned assistance to beneficiaries and his employees alike¹⁹.

UNITA administrators were supportive as well, but much more controlling of the process and the targeting of beneficiary villages.

Many *Grupos de Trabalho* have become their own advocates in soliciting help from local authorities. Candundo lobbied for and got a health post from CRS. This same group got assistance for a new well from OxFam after health and hygiene promoters identified their existing one as the cause for a gastroenteritis outbreak in the village. *Grupos de Trabalho* from Mbala Kivula, Cayengue, and Chico de Waite have been lobbying for government assistance for road maintenance (this was finally promised by the Administration in late November 1998).

CRP methodologies have been somewhat adopted by other entities. CRS, for example, is now insisting on seed banks when they distribute seeds and tools. The Ministry of Agriculture / Veterinary Services has adopted CRP procedures used for plow exchanges and is now branding oxen when they are vaccinated.

Literacy associations and PTAs have been successfully working with the Ministry of Education on curriculum development and obtaining material, equipment and supplies. The development of responsible associations can be arduous and disappointing to staff. For every example of success, there are those associations that have not lived up to their responsibilities. Animals, seed, agricultural and vocational tools/equipment and supplies have been taken away from communities and given to other newly-forming associations in an attempt – at times successfully – to change these behavior patterns.

There were different modalities in *Grupo de Trabalho* selection between Bailundo, Mungo, and Londuimbale compared with Balombo. Those in the first three municipalities were usually politicians, activist Party members or leaders with other obligations. Their level of control over the beneficiary population was generally greater and more vertical.

Associations are most sustainable when they are mutually dependent at some level and held responsible for future responsibilities to other associations or populations. Examples are:

- small animal husbandry associations who must deliver off-spring to another association;
- farmer associations who have benefited with a cash seed crop that they must deliver (post-harvest) to another association in exchange for that association's cash seed crop;
- blacksmiths or other beneficiaries of vocational training who must deliver a set amount of their services to the community in exchange for training and supplies.


¹⁹ This is the same gentleman who initially threw CREA Angola out of town upon our arrival in 1996.

There is some tergiversation among the beneficiary population when reporting results. In wheat yields and income generated, for example, tonnage harvested is reported as much lower than the actual amount, presumably in the hopes that more seed will be forthcoming. Staff knows this as a result of visiting the fields and the amount of wheat being sold in the Balombo market by those villagers who were beneficiaries. The same can be said for potatoes. On a visit by a team member to MacaMombolo, beneficiaries claimed the potato and wheat harvests were abysmal. On a visit to another (non-beneficiary) village, residents informed him that they bought all their wheat and potato seed from MacaMombolo, which had a bumper crop harvest.

CRPs that assisted in school rehabilitation, training of literacy and health/hygiene promoters, animal husbandry and market rehabilitation all were successful in involving line ministry personnel. CRP activities and accomplishments help them flesh out their monthly reports, and provide technicians with resources to do their jobs. That said, involvement is not consistent and depends on individuals rather than the ministry.

The following chart represents the communities' perception of increased presence of line ministries' personnel in target areas. It is clear that where CRPs were implemented a significant increase in the perceived presence of authorities and line ministries' representatives is noted.

The Balombo Central Market
CRP funded the construction of stalls for women cooking food and merchants. These merchants in turn are beneficiaries (or family of beneficiaries) of productivity and micro-enterprise CRPs. The OTI - funded merchant association, after the life of the project, has organized and paid cleaning crews. Recently there was theft of some roofing sheets from a female beneficiary. When she came to request more sheets, she was referred to the contract, which specifies that the sheets were her's and her responsibility. She went to the police, the thief was apprehended and jailed, and the sheets returned. The association is now trying to organize security guards. These same merchants are duly registered with the municipality and pay fees for the land on which their stalls sit.



2. Improved community accessibility and availability of basic services

OTI funded the organization of eight Parent Teacher Associations in Balombo, yet today there are thirty-five. Even schools not rehabilitated through OTI CRPs have formed PTAs.

The PTAs have organized a municipality-wide umbrella organization to lobby the Ministry of Education. The provincial MoE delegate has proposed that the PTA model be used for national replication. PTAs have assumed the financial responsibilities of school maintenance and teacher incentives through the establishment and marketing of garden vegetables. School curricula have been changed as a result of PTA involvement. New classes include pottery, agriculture, small animal husbandry, carpentry, latrines construction, painting and environmental studies (with spin-off




latrines, rabbit raising and rural nursery CRPs). PTAs have a much wider outreach and significantly lower cost per beneficiary than expected. Also, community contributions to the associations are exceptionally higher than the amount originally anticipated: over six-fold in one instance, and usually about four-fold.

Women’s literacy classes had a wider outreach than expected and have been sustained beyond the project life. The Ministry of Education’s Adult Literacy Department has taken over supervision of the program, and given refresher courses for the literacy trainers. UNICEF donated materials for the whole municipality’s adult literacy classes.

Women’s Literacy CRP	Semesters Taught	Literacy Trainers Trained	Students	Villages Outreached
Proposed*	8	5	600	4
Actual*	17	15	1510	6
After project	Unknown	35	Unknown	16

* During six-month life of the project

Hygiene and health promotion has also had an enormous outreach and sustainability. Extensionist training, outreach activities and bicycles were originally funded by OTI; since the CRPs end of project the Ministry of Health has become actively involved in the program, outreaching villages which prior to the CRPs were not ever visited by them. In short, the health and hygiene promoters have generated an awareness and demand among the rural population, and acted as a catalyst for the MoH and the services of CRS and OxFam.



During the last months, some *Grupo de Trabalho* members have had to drop out of their positions due to recruitment into the *Defesa Civil* due to the increased alert in former conflictive

and frontline communities. *Grupo de Trabalho* members have also dropped out of their positions because their duties conflicted with another CRP. Specifically, in UNITA areas, many participants became paid teachers and could not manage both positions. Still others dropped out due to community pressure. These were individuals whom members of the community felt were inappropriate to represent them, usually due to self-interest or ineffectiveness.

Road and bridge rehabilitation CRPs were an excellent vehicle to initiate community organization and assess the commitment of communities' interest in future projects, since community access was essential to the delivery of materials necessary for other projects. The road and bridge rehabilitation CRPs were also instrumental in reconciliation overtures between opposing villages, later to be reinforced with other joint and mutually-beneficial activities, as well as opening up vast areas which had been isolated for more than twenty years.

The following tables show a higher perceived increase in the traffic of vehicles in beneficiary communities than in control communities. Over 50 percent of respondents in CRP communities (regardless of the type of project implemented) perceived "some" to "a lot" of increase in the traffic of vehicles. This number goes down to 25% for non-beneficiary communities.

Where roads and bridges CRPs were implemented, 57% of respondents deemed the increase in traffic from "some" to "a lot".

	Control community?			
	Control		CRPs	
	Is there been an increase in the traffic of vehicles to the community?		Is there been an increase in the traffic of vehicles to the community?	
	Count	%	Count	%
No	6	(7.5%)	45	(18.8%)
Little	54	(67.5%)	74	(30.8%)
Some	5	(6.3%)	80	(33.3%)
Much	11	(13.8%)	40	(16.7%)
A lot	4	(5.0%)	1	(.4%)
Total	80	(100.0%)	240	(100.0%)

	Control community?			
	Control		CRPs	
	Is there been an increase in the traffic of vehicles to the community?		Is there been an increase in the traffic of vehicles to the community? ^a	
	Count	%	Count	%
No	6	(7.5%)	22	(20.0%)
Little	54	(67.5%)	26	(23.6%)
Some	5	(6.3%)	54	(49.1%)
Much	11	(13.8%)	8	(7.3%)
A lot	4	(5.0%)		
Total	80	(100.0%)	110	(100.0%)

a. Only for communities implementing roads and bridges

C. Development needs

The program strategic objective for development needs is to revitalize traditional economic²⁰ patterns as represented by increased self-sufficiency and the restoration of farm-to-market activities and the informal sector. In this sub-section, findings are not segregated according to indicators.

Projects such as wheat revitalization, blacksmith training, plow exchange, creation of bakeries and women's group organization, were all seen by beneficiaries to complement each other and their cumulative impact noted.



Wheat revitalization spawned bakeries throughout the municipality and created a renewed demand for wheat, and wheat seed is now being sold in the municipal market and the rural areas. Although the CRPs were designed for women, many men have also become involved. In Hanga, Catanga, Valodia, and Amilcar Cabral entrepreneurs without any outside assistance have started bakeries. The renewed demand for bread has resulted in importation of flour from Lobito when the CRP wheat could not satisfy the market. The government, seeing an opportunity, has gotten involved and is licensing the bakeries for municipal fees and tax collection. Over half (60%) the OTI-financed bakeries have expanded their operations with additional ovens financed from their profits.

The following table shows the perceived increase in the cultivated area for beneficiary communities and control communities, regardless of the type of CRP implemented. In CRP

²⁰ Economic reactivation CRPs are considered to be those activities that generate income or surplus capital goods.

communities, 55% of respondents claimed to have increased their cultivated area “much more” or “a lot”. This number reduces to 37% for non-beneficiary communities.

	Control community?			
	Control		CRPs	
	Have you increased your cultivated area?		Have you increased your cultivated area?	
	Count	%	Count	%
Much less	1	(1.2%)	3	(1.2%)
Less	3	(3.7%)	2	(.8%)
Same	47	(58.0%)	105	(43.0%)
More	29	(35.8%)	123	(50.4%)
Much more	1	(1.2%)	11	(4.5%)
Total	81	(100.0%)	244	(100.0%)

The CREA Angola Balombo base became a ready market for some of the goods and services resulting from CRPs (blacksmithing, carpentry, agricultural). For example, after blacksmith trainees completed their course and satisfied the community contribution condition (as in rehabilitating grinding mill turbines), these same individuals were hired by staff to assist other communities in mill rehabilitation. Excess seed after harvest has also been purchased from associations for other communities' CRPs.

Associations are willing and able to pay (in cash or trade) for the goods and services of other associations, as in the cases of donkey transport, donkey cart construction, carpenters for schools and market stalls, blacksmiths, grinding mills, vegetables and cereals producers. Associations also pay CREA Angola for items they need after the end of a project. For example, plows are rented out to associations for a return of seed stock (to be delivered to other associations); the produce warehousing project has bought locks from CREA Angola as well as fencing material for security of their warehouse compound (these are sold for no profit, purchased by CREA from Lobito, and unavailable in Balombo).

The CREA Angola field base has also become a seed exchange, accepting seed produced from one CRP (such as wheat and bean seed stock) and trading these for another seed (i.e., peanut) which the association did not benefit from. The seed in the CREA Angola base is then used for new beneficiaries.

Thus, CRP's sponsored the utilization of alternative seeds. In the following table, it can be seen that 21% of the beneficiary respondents claimed to have planted new types of seeds. This number reduces to 12% for non-beneficiary respondents.

	Control community?			
	Control		CRPs	
	Same crops or different?		Same crops or different?	
	Count	%	Count	%
Same	71	(87.7%)	193	(79.1%)
Different	10	(12.3%)	51	(20.9%)
Total	81	(100.0%)	244	(100.0%)

When pondering how to sustain their activities and maintain schools, PTAs turned to CRP-type projects (nurseries, cereal production and vegetable gardens) and utilized CRP organizational structures to achieve their desired results.

The proper planting techniques for wheat were not followed by all beneficiaries. After two harvests, some sixty percent of wheat growers in the area have adopted proper planting techniques. Potato seed distributed in several CRPs required special storage and was “burnt”, affecting yields.

In the following table, the influence of different types of CRPs in the increase of cultivated area is represented. Clearly, plow exchange CRPs directly contributed to increased cultivated areas. Grinding mill CRPs made another significant contribution.

		Have you increased your cultivated area?					Total
		Much less	Less	Same	More	Much more	Row %
		Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	
Type of CRPs implemented	Primary schools	(1.9%)	(2.5%)	(43.8%)	(48.8%)	(3.1%)	(100.0%)
	Seed distribution	(.8%)		(33.3%)	(60.3%)	(5.6%)	(100.0%)
	Mills	(6.3%)		(21.9%)	(62.5%)	(9.4%)	(100.0%)
	Roads/Bridges	(2.6%)	(1.8%)	(37.7%)	(51.8%)	(6.1%)	(100.0%)
	Training			(27.3%)	(68.2%)	(4.5%)	(100.0%)
	Microenterprise	(2.1%)	(2.1%)	(35.4%)	(60.4%)		(100.0%)
	Wheat	(.7%)		(44.1%)	(50.7%)	(4.4%)	(100.0%)
	Plow exchange			(12.5%)	(62.5%)	(25.0%)	(100.0%)
	Rural women nurseries		(3.0%)	(39.4%)	(54.5%)	(3.0%)	(100.0%)
Overall	(1.2%)	(.8%)	(43.0%)	(50.4%)	(4.5%)	(100.0%)	

Provision of vocational training and tools has revitalized demand in the cases of carpentry, blacksmiths, cobblers, pottery makers, tailors and basket makers. Sewing and knitting circles have erupted and their goods are now for sale in the municipal market (prior to these CRPs, market tablecloths, napkins, shawls, doilies, etc. were manufactured and brought in from Lobito).



Productivity CRPs benefit self-starters in communities, and support them as role models for other community members. Those producing cereals and vegetables are selling seed to others, with technical advice thrown in for free.

Income from micro-enterprises such as tailoring, sewing, knitting, basketry and mat weaving, and pottery has generated interest among community members and a market at the municipal level. Initially, these CRPs attracted older individuals. However, once they started generating some income youth have become heavily involved. Micro-enterprise association meeting places (which vary, sometimes a CRP built a center, such as women's associations, sometimes these are rehabilitated schools or small marketplaces) are used for training and have become a hub of youth social activity.

Sheep restocking CRPs have been successful because:

- 1) They are highly disease resistant.
- 2) They are virtually non-existent except among project beneficiaries and, therefore, not usually targeted for theft since resale is difficult and people know who the real owners are.

- 3) Sheep were bought when pregnant. This has meant that new associations have received their sheep sooner than anticipated, and created a momentum and expectations of other associations. 15 associations originally received sheep; since the project's close in February 1998, 27 associations now have sheep.

Donkey reintroduction CRPs have been successful because:

- 1) They are highly disease resistant.
- 2) They are virtually non-existent except among project beneficiaries and, therefore, not usually targeted for theft since resale is difficult and people know who the real owners are.
- 3) They are able to negotiate the mountains in plowing and freight better than oxen.
- 4) They have income-generating qualities. Beneficiaries have built carts and charge other CRP beneficiaries for services (for example, those building their stalls in the central market hired the associations to bring sand and gravel from the river) as well as farmers bringing their product to market.

There has been a 14% mortality rate among the donkeys and a 3% mortality rate among the sheep. The high incidence of donkey mortality is attributable to overdosage of medicine given by the Ministry of Agriculture's veterinarian.

D. Other programmatic findings

The CRP program and methodology has elicited much interest from other donors, and to date has leveraged \$100,000 of funding for CREA Angola activities in Balombo municipality. A new contract is due to be signed in December of 1998, with \$250,000 projected every six months over the next two years. In February 1998, the World Bank funded CAII to create a *comuna*-level TAS; it has taken the model and is now actively promoting it (the TAS format has been adopted by MINARS for programming and funding) with their GRA partner MINARS through the Post Conflict Social Recovery Fund (PCSRF) project. The projected budget over the next two years is five million dollars for three municipalities. Similarly, the Dutch government has espoused interest, although their funding for Angola has been cut. CAII currently has a proposal in with Amoco Oil and to date all indications are that projects will be funded.

Inter-institutional tensions were created by the different operational philosophies among NGOs. For example, CREA Angola had rehabilitated 9 schools, 57 kms of road and 24 bridges when the German NGO AAA arrived in town and began FFW/free seed distributions for school, bridge and road rehabilitation labor²¹. Similarly, OxFam provides incentives for latrine construction, and has done so since it established presence in the area years ago. Despite this "competition", CRPs have promoted the construction of 360 latrines among its beneficiaries. In the past, CRS

²¹ It should be noted that those working on the schools were not parents or students; rather they were IDP's from the city.

and CREA Angola had difficulties because of CRS' policy of free food and non-food item distributions.

NGO efforts are often not coordinated at the central level, either among donors, the UN or NGO project directors. During the writing of this report, CRS was initiating a child survival program in Chico de Waite, Candundo, Caala, Cahata, all communities where CREA Angola has trained up health and hygiene promoters in many of the technical aspects of child survival. While this will be sorted out, it seems NGO efforts could be maximized through better planning together at a central level.


Community infrastructure projects deepen CAII staff understanding of a community's composition and lay a foundation for further activities. Effective leaders are identified, the "social contract" between CREA Angola / beneficiaries promulgated and promoted, a community-wide momentum created, and candidates for more targeted CRPs identified.

In the second phase of CRPs (beginning October 1996), the pressure to develop projects, write proposals and submit them for approval created a heavy workload for the field teams. This produced a stress on programming and logistics, and possibly detracted from the amount of time available to staff for in-depth community appraisals.

The construction of field bases placed an additional burden on the Program Managers that meant time away from CRP program issues. Base construction was also done at the same time as CRP design and implementation, and put an extra load on base logistics and administration, particularly vehicles and Program Managers' time for requisitions, deliveries, construction planning.

In the first phase of CRPs, timelines for certain projects (particularly infrastructure) were often unrealistically ambitious. There were two primary reasons for this:

- The communities and staff often underestimated the amount of time certain tasks required (such as sand and gravel collection, getting bricks, obtaining wood and constructing doors and windows, etc); and,
- In an effort to deliver the contractually-mandated number of CRPs, and allow for complementarity of projects (as in finishing a school prior to beginning an agricultural project), timeframes often overlapped as opposed to being sequential. In the end, this overlapping did not really matter, since the contractual number of CRPs was delivered within the overall contract dates, but it transpired that the timelines were by and large not useful for logistics and planning, and psychologically staff felt as though they were often playing catch-up. These problems were overcome by the second phase of CRPs.



Logistics negatively impacted on some CRPs; for example, wheat seed had to be imported from South Africa, and the requisite number of sheep and burros for the projects were not available for purchase. As a result, several wheat projects had to be pushed back to the next agricultural cycle, and the number of sheep and burros distributed did not meet the projected number of beneficiaries.

The pattern of CRP interventions has been phased, going from community infrastructure projects (and, as noted in some cases, seed/tool distributions to a wide beneficiary population) to more site- and production-specific and special interest interventions.

With the exception of some specific vocational training courses, projects that did not directly or indirectly benefit women were generally not judged by the communities to be in the best interest of the communities.

As seen in the following table, different types of CRPs favored the participation of different gender and age strata. According to the respondents' perspectives of benefits, micro-enterprise projects were better for young females and males. Schools and road/bridges benefited all populations relatively the same.

		Demographic strata					
		Young male	Young female	Adult male	Adult female	Elder male	Elder female
		Column %	Column %	Column %	Column %	Column %	Column %
Which CRPs did you benefited from?	Schools	(50.9%)	(60.0%)	(60.0%)	(72.7%)	(58.3%)	(100.0%)
	Seed distribution	(39.6%)	(45.0%)	(54.1%)	(36.4%)	(68.8%)	(100.0%)
	Mills	(3.8%)	(10.0%)	(10.6%)	(4.5%)	(6.3%)	
	Roads and bridges	(75.5%)	(75.0%)	(61.2%)	(86.4%)	(77.1%)	(100.0%)
	Training			(1.2%)			
	Micro-enterprise	(17.0%)	(20.0%)	(15.3%)	(9.1%)	(8.3%)	
	Others	(1.9%)					

III. Lessons Learned

The following lessons learned are derived from the analyses of the previously presented findings and CREA Angola staff opinions. They attempt to identify both operational best practices as well as intended and unintended effects of the program interventions.

A. Community resettlement

The program strategic objective of resettlement is to improve community stability represented by improved perception of security, increasing reconciliation, perceived potential for better quality of life, and improved community spirit.

1. Improved perception of security

Community revitalization in transitional environments is a complex process of effecting attitudinal and behavior changes in populations with any or all of the following traits:

- accustomed to emergency relief, free distributions of food and non-food items, or, perceive these benefits as NGOs' sole mission
- have had little positive reinforcement to invest in a future
- have been displaced numerous times over the past twenty years
- live in a society where violence, intimidation and / or affiliation with a politico-military structure brings tangible rewards
- live in a society rife with theft, graft and corruption, where there is little or no rule of law
- have been isolated from opposing political communities for years, except for military confrontation
- have little or no basic services provided by their governing structures.

In CREA Angola's spheres of influence, programming to mitigate violence is impossible if authorities are intent on conflict or lack the skills to guarantee a minimum rule of law for their inhabitants.

Virtually every Angolan community wants peace; it is only the few individuals who are radical ideologues, militants in the governing structures, and the outlaw fringe who are interested in prolonging the war and violence. If there can be claimed to be one overwhelming public sentiment in the Balombo countryside, it is disgust and frustration with all armed men, of any stripe. It should be noted that this sentiment has only become articulated since June 1998; prior to the general breakdown in security (that is, during the give-and-take Lusaka Protocol implementation and before the widespread banditry now afflicting the rural areas), populations

were much more passive and silent about the peace process and its outcome. They are now openly – and often bitterly – critical of all armed action, and will say so in front of authorities. This was unheard of six months ago²².

2. Increased reconciliation

In the *planalto* region, no municipalities were held in their entirety by the MPLA in the last years of the conflict. As a result, the extension of territory was heavily dependent on the reconciliation of structures and populations within all municipalities.

In CREA Angola's spheres of influence, programming for reconciliation between civilians in communities is both feasible and sustainable, even in the event of conflict.

Reconciliation and reintegration in communities occurs most readily when it is in the economic best interest of involved parties.

In municipalities where two opposing factions control villages, the implementer must strike a balance along political lines of projects to communities. Insistence on free access (in the absence of security problems) to all communities by both factions' authorities is essential, as is project-specific dissemination of information equally to both sides (such as types and locations of projects).

The crossing of politico-military lines by officials comes from fear and suspicion. An international NGO working with both factions provides authorities with opportunities to meet with opposition populations. By justifying interaction on technical grounds under the umbrella of an international NGO, it is possible to involve ministry officials in the development of CRPs in opposing factions' communities.

Rhetoric is lessened and constructive dialog between factions is increased when concrete, material rewards exist for collaboration and partnership.

Honest discourse between factions requires a clear framework, respect and the perception, by all parties, of security and the freedom from fear of reprisals.

3. Perceived potential for a better quality of life

Emergency assistance does not contribute to a perceived potential for a better quality of life; sustainable projects do.

Communities isolated by war and access problems are thirsty for assistance and offer unique opportunities to the implementer that might not exist within a stable, developmental context. The

²² This in no way is meant to imply that the majority of rural Angolans on the *planalto* do not live in fear. But angry voices of public dissent and frustration among civilian populations are new.

challenge is to educate beneficiaries and change their perceptions of what assistance can do for them in the longer term.

Momentum and enthusiasm for self-help and advocacy can be created even in communities that have not benefited directly from CRPs, as in the case of the PTAs and health & hygiene promotion.

4. Improved community spirit

Due to their quick-response modalities, relief organizations virtually always distribute pro forma agricultural packages from a central point without regard to end users' needs, local requirements or results. When organizational assistance actively accompanies the productive cycle, beneficiaries realize the implementing organization is sincerely interested in output / yields and beneficiaries are more forthcoming about true needs and aspirations.

A "tough love" attitude on the implementing organization's part is effective in social mobilization for project identification, implementation and sustainability of interventions. CREA Angola's stance has been that it offers opportunities for Angolans, and opportunities are rare in Angola. Therefore, it is the community's burden to prove itself for assistance, rather than be a passive receiver of benefits as in emergency relief.

Project interventions provide beneficiaries with a framework that rewards hard work, responsibility, transparency and contributions to the common weal – concepts that have generally deteriorated in areas in which we work. CRPs are opportunities that enhance beneficiaries' lives and as such should be implemented with consistent rules and responsibilities for all involved (including the implementing organization). Roles, responsibilities, tasks, and ownership need to be clear and agreed to in a signed document by all parties. Therefore, any noncompliance with the agreement must result in forfeiture of the project and devolution of any material or supplies. In the case of the implementing organization, should any theft by an employee be uncovered, he should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. This might sound extreme, but given the high levels of graft, corruption and theft in Angolan life, zero tolerance for such behavior sends a refreshing, consistent message to beneficiaries.

Moral authority is essential to the implementing organization's credibility and reception by communities. Transparency in operations, honesty in commitments and the consistent delivery of assistance as per agreements reinforces those values, which CRPs are meant to instill in beneficiary populations.

Transparency and neutrality in all aspects of CRP development are requisite. All discussions and decisions surrounding a project must be conducted in a public forum with the maximum number possible of *Grupo de Trabalho* and community residents present.

Communities that start out with motivation or transparency problems should be left out of further interventions. If they come back to the organization on their own accord (they should never be courted) for further assistance, interventions should be considered after a re-engagement process


that includes new appraisals and public airings of grievances. If an agreement can be reached and projects fit into the TAS, the relationship should recommence on a probationary basis. These “problem” communities more often than not develop into strong, self-reliant communities.

Communities become closely aligned with CREA Angola and its methodology, and take pride in their associations’ accomplishments. CREA Angola has traditionally used blue and white colors for the field base offices, vehicle flags and identification stickers, community rehabilitated schools, social centers, mills.

5. General factors for resettlement

Resettlement of target communities is achieved more easily when a “critical mass” of projects is created in any particular region. As the following map shows, areas with higher concentration of target communities, and as such, higher concentration of program interventions, show higher levels of resettlement, represented by greener icons.

Areas with isolated interventions do not show as resettled as others, this being represented in the map by orange and red icons.



According to the previous geographical representation of the resettlement index, the stated TAS concept of creating a critical mass of interventions that will achieved a bigger impact than the sum of its parts seems to have been a success

B. Community reintegration

The program strategic objective of reintegration was to rehabilitate community social infrastructure, as represented by increased citizen participation and strengthened local government structures/leadership, improved community accessibility and availability of basic services.

1. Increased citizen participation

Due to past abuses, negative connotations are still attached to the words “association” or “cooperative” (or any like appearing structures) in the minds of many Angolans. As a result, communities are often pre-disposed not to want to participate in activities or projects involving such terminology. These reservations can be overcome by frequent discussion, explication of project goals, social mobilization and, most effectively, by the successful implementation of a community project, however small.

The vast majority of Angolan communities have, in the course of the past 30 years, received considerable exposure to political structures and are familiar with the protocol involved in organizing groups, running meetings and electing representative local officials.

Organizing benefits around the formation and behavior of associations contributes to reawakening the concept of a common weal. This is a long, educational process fraught with difficulties, many of which revolve around association control and degradation by elite members. Thus the importance of strict adherence to rules, with punitive measures against the entire association in the event of noncompliance.

Formal contracts, which clearly stipulate the responsibilities of implementing partners (CREA Angola, *Grupo de Trabalho* / association, and possibly a ministry) and signed in a public ceremony, greatly reduce misunderstandings surrounding the project.

As community project organizers and advisors, *Grupo de Trabalho* members should be democratically elected after clear explanation of their roles, responsibilities and duties to all members of the community.

Grupos de Trabalho require training, monitoring and support. *Grupos de Trabalho* or community organizations are most effective when duly elected by secret ballot and when clear rules or a constitution governs their actions. Their role and responsibilities must be discussed openly with all community members and community-wide meetings held periodically to review progress. Elections for GdT positions should be held regularly, and voting should stress merit, not prestige. Such processes weed out uncommitted or unconstructive members.

Community organizations also benefit from regular meetings and reviews of membership.

Effective *Grupos de Trabalho* are those which do not include the standard community (politicos, religious leaders, teachers, the wealthier) and Party leaders. A successful approach to discourage these elite from *Grupos de Trabalho* is to discuss with them and the community the heavy workload involved in the GdT, and ask directly if they have the time to assume these new positions. The response is generally negative, and these individuals are given an honorary position of “advisors”. This empowers the GdT, which might ignore that advice which is for the benefit of an individual or group not targeted by the intervention.

Incompetence, fanaticism, and corruption within members of a representative community group and/or political, religious or traditional community leaders are traits that can be compensated for, to a certain degree, by the membership of the *Grupo de Trabalho*. In some cases, however, it may be impossible to work with a given individual and exclusion of that person from the decision making process becomes a necessity.

Violations of community contracts require immediate action on the part of the other signatories. Consequences of contractual violations, if serious, should include project suspension and/or cancellation.

The possibility of corruption or projects which benefit certain special interest groups is reduced to a minimum when all community factions have a voice in both public meetings and enjoy frequent access to a CREA project promoter.

Unnecessary payment for services and materials available in the community cheapens the perceived value of the project, encourages corruption and lessens civic pride and feelings of ownership toward a project.

Community investment, largely through participation, is required if projects are to have a chance at sustainability.

Communities are more likely to actively participate in projects if they have had an active role in the selection and design of projects.

2. Strengthened local government structures/leadership

Exclusion of municipal and communal administrators and ministries from participation in project development is an invitation for obstruction, censure and resentment which only serve in further dividing communities.


Though it is rare for administrative or ministerial departments to have the resources or initiative to undertake development activities, experience has shown that most representatives welcome overtures which include them in the development of projects.

Attempts by political factions to use project interventions for political gain can be curbed by organizational adherence to neutrality, and effective consensus building through representative groups.

3. Improved community accessibility

Community access and visitors are regarded by rural Angolans as a significant indicator of the return to normalcy. They are willing and able, if organized, to contribute labor and even oversee contractors in the rehabilitation of roads and bridges. No incentives are needed.

In the following map, communities in isolated areas and recipient of roads and bridges programs perceive higher increased accessibility than the other interviewed communities. Brighter green icons in the following map represent this.



If properly trained, community members can and have rehabilitated new bridges and maintained existing rehabilitated ones. This resource should be part and parcel of the project design and new communities informed of trained individuals that might be of assistance.

4. Availability of basic services


Services addressing environmental health hazards (latrines, garbage collection, animal corrals, insect and vector control), adult education and literacy, improved quality of education and school maintenance can all be effectively addressed through CRPs. A training of trainers and promoters with some incentives (bicycles, caps, T-shirts, supplies and educational materials) can have enormous outreach and impact.

5. General factors for reintegration

Operational modalities and the delivery mechanism for project interventions have a direct impact in the reintegration of targeted communities. As explained before, operational considerations fomented two different program approaches in the Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities (one of the reasons for selecting these two locations for this study). The team was particularly interested in examining the results achieved by each of the approaches in terms of the project overall strategic results.

The following map summarizes these results in terms of community reintegration. It is clear that a more integrated and strategic approach (Balombo) directly contributes to reintegration much more than more isolated and short interventions (Londuimbale).

Balombo communities show much higher levels of reintegration than Londuimbale's, this being represented in the map by the greener icons. In the map below, the green icons represent more reintegrated communities while more yellow and red icons represent less reintegrated ones according to the reintegration index.



C. Development needs

The program strategic objective for development needs is to revitalize traditional economic patterns as represented by increased self-sufficiency and the restoration of farm-to-market activities and the informal sector. In this sub-section, findings are not segregated according to indicators.

Effective agricultural associations are best formed when membership is left to the community, and association membership along blood and marriage relationships is encouraged.

In order to catalyze or improve a community’s productive capacity, the most effective approach is to identify beneficiaries based on the family’s local renown for agricultural productivity. In effect, CRPs do not target the “poorest of the poor”. The justification is that CRPs are not full-fledged development, but rather a jump-start to revitalize activities in highly insecure and ambiguous environments. As such, activities proposed imply an inherent risk, and only those wealthy or confident enough to take risks will do so according to agreed-upon statutes. The larger portions of the populations benefit from social infrastructure projects and SO1 and 2.

Widespread seed / tool distributions, carried out in first and second CRP phases (1996/7), were then seen to be appropriate entries into areas that had been underserved, and were vehicles to


²³ Economic reactivation CRPs are considered to be those activities that generate income or surplus capital goods.

winning confidence of the UNITA leadership. However, later experimentation has shown that widespread distributions are not as effective for targeting or promoting role models.

Furthermore, concerted CRP development in those areas with rigorous methodological application as opposed to wide-spread distributions earlier employed in other areas revealed that these latter types of distributions contributed little or nothing to community understanding of the underlying precepts of CRPs (as in the case of Londuimbale target area). Widespread distributions cannot be effectively followed up, and are too similar to emergency relief in their distribution methodology. In short, while widespread distributions of wheat, potato and market vegetable seed might have had an impact on local seed availability, they did not affect the changes necessary for an effective transition from emergency to development attitudes and behavior. All assistance should be consistent methodologically from the first entry into a community, and consistent throughout the region.

The following chart shows the difference in the number of CRPs per target community implemented in the Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities. It is clear that two different trends are present. While in Balombo a large number of communities received one CRP only those who “graduated” delivering their part of the project and demonstrating responsibility were engaged in more CRPs.

The case is different in Londuimbale, where most of the communities participated in close to three CRPs, independently of the immediate outcome of these.



To wean beneficiaries away from the (pervasive) attitude of “take what NGO’s offer whenever they offer”, the following lessons apply:

- Crops identified for seed distribution should be those identified by farmers as having a higher profit margin and a known, accessible market. Seed varieties should be proven in the areas distributed; if a newly introduced crop, technical assistance should be sought and trial plots (by the beneficiary farmers) planted.
- If the crop variety or animal distributed requires special treatment (irrigation, compost, planting techniques, vaccinations, dips, corrals, etc.) these should be written into the agreement. In the case of noncompliance, the farmer / association should be dropped from any future CRP beneficiary roster.
- Benefits (seeds, tools, animals) should be distributed *in situ*, after ensuring that preparatory work (land preparation, irrigation, seedbeds, composting, etc.) has been performed. In the cases where this work is not done, the members do not receive the benefit.

- Follow-up visits are necessary to ensure projects are being maintained. This might require kilometers of walking, but elicits both respect for the implementing organization and pride in the work.
- Some CRPs have supported other CRPs or are the evolution of previous activities. In the following table it can be seen how respondents from communities where roads and bridges were implemented claimed more availability of agriculture products to trade than others (green values).

		Do you have more agriculture products to trade this year?				Total
		Much less	Less	Same	More	
		Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %	Row %
Type of CRPs implemented	Seed distribution	(45.1%)	(15.5%)	(23.9%)	(15.5%)	(100.0%)
	Mills	(70.0%)	(25.0%)	(5.0%)		(100.0%)
	Roads/Bridges	(31.3%)	(22.9%)	(14.6%)	(31.3%)	(100.0%)
	Training	(66.7%)	(22.2%)	(11.1%)		(100.0%)
	Microenterprise	(74.3%)	(14.3%)	(8.6%)	(2.9%)	(100.0%)
	Wheat	(41.3%)	(14.3%)	(28.6%)	(15.9%)	(100.0%)
	Plow exchange	(66.7%)	(33.3%)			(100.0%)
	Rural women nurseries	(72.4%)	(20.7%)	(3.4%)	(3.4%)	(100.0%)
Overall		(48.2%)	(16.4%)	(20.0%)	(15.5%)	(100.0%)


Some payment (either in-kind or trading) for inputs by the beneficiary ensures s/he is indeed interested in the benefit and contributes to intervention sustainability. The creation of seed banks (with staff follow-up) has been critical in breaking the relief cycle among populations. This cycle was one where rural populations would not save or plant distributed seeds, using them for food, barter or cash (for reasons of insecurity or knowledge that next season there would be more forthcoming).

Timelines for project implementation must be flexible and realistically based around the village calendar, particularly when projects depend on voluntary labor. Similarly, the implementing agency must have an efficient logistical capacity.

1. General factors for development

As in the case of resettlement, critical mass and complementarity of CRPs (strategically linked through the TAS) can increase development.

The following map shows the results of the development index in targeted communities in the Balombo and Londuimbale municipalities. Communities where projects were clustered are clearly further along in their development stage than isolated interventions. On the map, greener areas represent higher development while red areas represent lower ranks in the development index.



D. Other lessons learned

The TAS-CRP model is only appropriate in communities beyond the relief stage.

Programming can condition behavior to receiving benefits, and enables the implementing organization to nurture the transition process. If properly implemented with a consistent methodology, community revitalization programs can facilitate the war-to-peace transition process by intervening in various degrees throughout the relief to development continuum


Strategic placement and development of CRPs creates a critical mass where activities build on each other and have a greater impact than the sum of the parts. Strategic programming – with a regional presence of a year or more – contributes exponentially to greater outreach, improved communication linkages, increased freedom of movement, increased citizen participation, increased productivity, increased reconciliation between targeted communities, and ameliorated living conditions.

A TAS is a rolling design, based on communities' responses and capacity, security, political leadership in the area, logistics and physical access, and the staff's capacity to absorb new communities while maintaining proper oversight to effect behavioral changes in the beneficiary populations.

A minimum of two months is needed to develop an effective TAS, if the program manager can dedicate full time to the task. If s/he does not have to take primary responsibility for the construction / rehabilitation of a base, and administration / logistics systems are in place, some infrastructure CRP activities such as roads, bridges and schools can begin quickly – as soon as six weeks from the date of arrival.

Larger, symbolic infrastructure projects are an effective way to establish presence and initiate activities in a target area. They are generally what are requested by communities (other than free distributions), give staff an opportunity to test the organizational capacities of different communities, understand the power dynamics, filter and identify the effective leaders and workers in a community, and put in place logistics systems.

The longer the field presence in an area, the more opportunities for effective follow-on activities can be identified and taken advantage of. These new activities are more targeted and cost less money to the donor. As the following map shows, more variation and concentration in the types of CRPs is observed in the Balombo municipality where the CREA Angola team had a longer and more direct involvement with the communities. The information presented in the map is only illustrative - not all the individual CRPs are represented in order to facilitate the reading and to avoid overlapping of icons.



Proper training (after recruitment and through in-service workshops), monitoring and oversight of international and national field staff by an experienced country director are essential. In general, staff (local and international) with experience in development have been more effective than those with humanitarian assistance backgrounds. Guidelines for developing TAS-CRP methodology, design and implementation should be available in a written manual, and updated regularly.

A well-translated TAS-CRP brochure should be made available to officials. This brochure should include program rationale, policies, types of projects, areas of intervention and should be updated regularly.

Progress reports should be translated and distributed to authorities at the appropriate levels.

Field base managers should be expatriates. Nationals can be put under intense pressure to accede to authorities' demands, which are many ("loans" of project resources, payment for services, "donations" of materials, insistence on particular projects in specific areas for political or personal gain), the more so if s/he is from an opposing side's region. An expatriate has more leeway to negotiate with authorities and between factions, to convincingly and objectively propound strategic objectives and to just say no.

National staff should be hired on technical merit, and should not be party activists, nor have held management positions in a governing structure's line ministry.

If possible, the field base should be well-situated for visibility, and it should lead by example. It should have nurseries, trial agricultural plots, an improved latrine, small animal corrals, improved granaries, and other examples of CRP “products” for the general population and beneficiaries to see when they visit the base.

IV. Conclusions

A. The Post-conflict TAS as a model for replication

The Post-conflict TAS model, fundamentally, is a logical framework wherein the interventions (CRPs) are strategically designed and integrated to move communities toward recovery and self-sufficiency. The model addresses the challenges of post-conflict recovery and reconciliation at a local level and was successful in stabilizing vulnerable areas when political conditions at a national level were stable or moving toward stability under the negotiated peace Lusaka Protocol.

It should be noted that the model is not a universal panacea for all post-conflictive situations. As mentioned previously, programming to mitigate armed violence was not possible; and while conflict prevention was not within the program's purview the events in Angola have been deeply disappointing to staff, particularly in light of the great reconciliation strides taken in Balombo municipality.

The TAS is a rolling, phased approach with clearly defined objectives (in Angola's case, facilitating the resettlement, reintegration and selected development needs of war-torn municipalities). The strategy is based on extensive observation and investigation of socioeconomic conditions (both past and present) and entails developing relationships with all stakeholders in a defined geographical region. The TAS is also an outline on how to link opportunistic, catalytic, and cross-sectoral CRPs in such a manner as to outreach different strata of target communities' populations and create a momentum of activities and behavioral changes that is not possible with isolated, unconnected interventions.

In Angola (particularly Balombo) the model was successful (until the outbreak of renewed hostilities) in achieving an overall impact and positive change in municipalities by establishing durable patterns of participation and sustainable self-help interventions by:

- Unifying fractured social, political and traditional structures
- Moving communities out of paralysis caused by conflict and conflict-related conditions
- Providing start-up capital for communities to begin investing in the future
- Revitalizing municipalities' farm-to-market patterns
- Fostering commerce and freedom of movement
- Formation and training of interested, representative community organizations and associations

In Angola, the model has been highly effective when pursued with a vigorous methodology. This methodology includes appropriate cultural and political principles of intervention when designing and implementing CRPs. These principles of intervention include:

- Strong community investment and participation in the design and implementation of interventions
- Non-payment of salaries or incentives (such as Food for Work) to community participants
- Program and resource accountability (community-determined work schedules, timelines and resource allocation)
- Non-discriminatory inclusion of all sectors of the population
- Political neutrality and even-handedness
- Inclusion of local government structures
- Formalization of community commitment through a ceremonial contract signing
- Clear, enforced penalties for non-compliance with the community / CREA contract

The model could be adapted to other transitional countries when weighing different approaches to bridge programming from relief to development, where populations have become “institutionalized” (i.e., where the delivery of relief and basic social services have effectively become the responsibility of the international community). Activities were successful in laying a substantial foundation for longer-term development interventions. The model has also been successful in effecting reconciliation between opposing *civilian* populations with shared rehabilitation goals and / or mutual economic interests.

The Angolan experience has taught that the model requires a seasoned, well-trained staff, experienced in participatory models of development with a solid understanding of the social, political and military dynamics and rigorous consistence in methodology. A minimum of preconditions are needed before assessing whether the TAS approach should be utilized. Adapting the Post-conflict TAS is possible in other transitional countries where:

- A negotiated settlement between two factions or one clearly victorious faction has resulted in the cessation of armed conflict
- There is, at the national level, political stability or at least a move toward stability
- Socioeconomic patterns have been disrupted, but opportunities still exist for revitalizing viable productive sectors
- An acceptable level of security exists
- Communities are beyond emergency conditions and are able to meet their basic food and shelter requirements
- Communities and leaders (political, traditional, and religious) are at least minimally receptive to the program

- The target area is not over-saturated with on-going emergency relief or non-participative development activities (in short, that there is not a glut of organizations whose assistance countermands the principles of intervention)
- A tradition of community and / or collective labor exists
- Cultural and political traditions are open to the requisite methodologies.

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Ap - A. Glossary, acronyms and definitions

1. Acronyms

<i>AAA</i>	Acção Agrária Alemão (German NGO)
<i>CAII</i>	Creative Associates International, Inc.
<i>CIF</i>	Community Initiative Fund
<i>CRP</i>	Community Revitalization Project
<i>CRS</i>	Catholic Relief Services (US NGO)
<i>FAA</i>	Forças Armadas de Angola – Angolan Armed Forces
<i>GdT</i>	<i>Grupo de Trabalho</i> – Working group
<i>GRA</i>	Government of the Republic of Angola
<i>GURN</i>	Governo Unido de Reconciliação Nacional
<i>IOM</i>	International Organization of Migration
<i>MINARS</i>	Ministério de Assistência e Reinserção Social
<i>MoE</i>	Ministry of Health
<i>MONUA</i>	Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola
<i>MPLA</i>	Movimento Popular de Libertação Angolano
<i>NGO</i>	Non-governmental organization
<i>NPA</i>	Norwegian People's Aid
<i>OTI</i>	Office of Transition Initiatives
<i>PTA</i>	Parent-Teacher Association
<i>QAs</i>	Quartering Areas
<i>SCF – UK</i>	Save the Children Fund – United Kingdom
<i>TAS</i>	Target Area Strategy
<i>UCAH</i>	Unidades para coordenação de assistência humanitária
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNITA</i>	União Nacional pela Independência Total de Angola
<i>USAID</i>	United States Agency for International Development

2. Definitions

<i>Aldeia</i>	a village dependent on an <i>mbala</i> , also called a <i>songo</i>
<i>Akokoto</i>	the cemetery of traditional <i>sobas</i> ' skulls; always in an <i>mbala</i>
<i>Kanjango</i>	the MPLA equivalent of a <i>kasongo</i> : a sub-chief responsible for a cluster of 25 houses in an <i>aldeia</i>
<i>Kasongo</i>	the UNITA equivalent of a <i>kanjango</i> : a sub-chief responsible for a cluster of 25 houses in an <i>aldeia</i>
<i>M'bala</i>	a head village with influence over dependent <i>aldeias</i> , where the traditional paramount chief comes from and where the <i>akokoto</i> is sited
<i>Regedor</i>	a politically-appointed <i>soba</i> , a position dating back to the colonial administration

- Sede* seat, as in Balombo *sede*, or central city
- Sekulo* a sub-chief
- Soba* a chief, either traditional through inheritance or a politically-appointed administrative position
- Songo* an *aldeia*

Ap - B. Programming outputs

1. Community participation

Activity	Through 1997	1998	Total
Number of Community Based Organizations formed	105	206	311
Numbers of communities in which CREA has worked	273	257	530
Number of community Work Groups formed	189	271	460
Number of CREA formed Work Group independent (without CREA support) projects completed	38	52	90
Number of CREA formed Work Groups liaisioning with other NGOs	12	65	77
Number of community Sub-Work Groups formed	120	205	325
Number of community family Groups formed	0	161	161
Number of community associations formed	440	222	662
Number of Community Initiated Projects completed by associations	23	37	60
Number of Parents/Teachers association formed	0	35	35
Number of CREA formed associations now independent (without OTI support)	26	37	63
Total community membership in CREA formed associations	4,400	15,925	20,325
Number of cooperatives formed	2	4	6
Number of adult literacy educators	0	19	19
Number of hygiene and sanation Promoters	0	74	74
Number of adult literacy students	0	213	213
Number of Extensionists/Activists trained	15	59	74

2. Seeds

Results	Tons of Seed Distributed	Tons of Produce Harvested	Tons of Seed Banked
Wheat/1997	29.51T	73.1T	5.44T
Wheat/1998	2.897T	0	0
Potato/1997	31.10T	50.74T	11.05T
Potato/1998	21.154T	0	0
Market Vegetable/1997	18.33kg	2.182T	134.00KG
Market Vegetable/1998	22.590KG	0	0
Leucaena (tree)	3055		
Fruit Trees	135		
Tree Nurseries established/1997	6		
Tree Nurseries established/1998	28		
Beans	426kg	0	0

3. Agriculture tools

Tools	Number Distributed	Number Exchanged
Hoes/1997	2983	2983
Hoes/1998	694	694
Plows/1997	45	45
Plows/1998	9	9

Machetes/1997	500	0
Machetes/1998	125	0
Sickles/1997	1200	0
Sickles/1998	39	0
Spades/1997	2665	0
Spades/1998	75	0

4. Microenterprise

Micro-Enterprise	Number through 1997	Number 1998
Ceramic/Pottery cottage industries founded	25	48
Individual recipients of Vocational Training	6987	8040
Tools Distributed	5648	942
Sewing Machine	5	2
Blacksmith's Kit	6	2
Carpenter's Kit	10	18
Radios	0	9
Beekeeping kit	4	16
Shoemaker's Kit	0	3
Kit for adult literacy promoters (bicycles)	0	6
Kit for Community Hygiene and sanitation promotes (bicycles)	0	6

5. Other results

	Number through 1997	1998
Chicken Coops	0	5
Rabbit Hutches	0	22
Corrals	0	43
Schools Constructed or Rehabilitated	45	13
Latrines Constructed (family program)	0	142
Latrines Constructed (school program)	81	20
Water points for human /animal consumption	8	27
Wells Constructed (school program)	1	1
Hectares of wheat planted	479	766
Hectares of Bean/market vegetable planted	430	624
New Teachers in schools	2831	166
New students in schools	12,986	11,761
Animal for Multiplication distributed	0	375
Animal for Multiplication reproduced	0	23
Grinding mill	3	2
Markets	1	1
Social Centers built / organized	164	215
Kms. of irrigation canals and potable water sources rehabilitated or	109.5km	302.1km

opened		
Dip tanks rehabilitated	0	2
Roads rehabilitated or opened (kms)	214km	182km
Fuel saving stoves(family program)	0	318
Beehives (traditional /modern)	210	474
Fish tanks	32	0
Fishing canoes/boat	1	6
Bridges rehabilitated or constructed	48	25

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Ap - C. Cost observations

CRPs were implemented by CREA Angola following three different modalities: direct CRP implementation by project staff, sub-grants to national non-governmental organizations (in some cases including technical assistance to the implementation partner) and finally activities sponsored through the World Bank sponsored Community Initiative Fund (CIF).

For the purpose of analyzing the cost implications of different CRP types and implementation modalities, the team gathered data from CRP proposals, completion reports and CREA Angola records, which included activities implemented during the initial and second phases of the program. The data compiled included:

- project type and location,
- projected and actual project cost,
- projected and actual number of direct beneficiaries,
- projected and actual number of indirect beneficiaries,
- projected and actual community contribution in labor and materials,
- total projected and actual project value
- projected start and end dates, and
- actual start and end dates


The following table shows the distribution of the sample data gathered by the team for cost effectiveness analysis.

Type of implementation * PHASE Crosstabulation

			PHASE		Total
			1	2	
Type of implementation	CIF	Count		6	6
		% within Type of implementation		100.0%	100.0%
	CRP	Count	19	237	256
		% within Type of implementation	7.4%	92.6%	100.0%
	Grant	Count	11	18	29
		% within Type of implementation	37.9%	62.1%	100.0%
Total	Count	30	261	291	
	% within Type of implementation	10.3%	89.7%	100.0%	

Based in the previous information the team extrapolated other information to be included in the analysis. These included:

- expected and actual project life span,
- expected and actual cost per direct beneficiary²⁴,
- expected and actual value per direct beneficiary²⁵,
- absolute cost variation (in \$),
- relative cost variation (in %),
- actual leverage of donor investment in terms of dollar of community counterpart per dollar of donor contribution, and
- cumulative trend of direct beneficiaries over the project life, in order to correlate the peaks in time-bound information with CRPs' implementation cycles. These results are presented in the following chart.



²⁴ Cost per beneficiary is defined by the team as the donor capital investment in each activity per each direct beneficiary.

²⁵ Value per beneficiary is defined as the total value of an activity including donor investment and community contribution per direct project beneficiary.

From these sets of information and interviews with project staff, the team derived the following conclusions.



1. Budgeting and cost projections

Most activities were initially budgeted above the actual cost and the CRPs became more cost-effective as time progressed.

The following two charts represent the relationship between projected CRP cost (as per each project proposal) and the actual cost assessed in the completion reports. This information was disaggregated by project type.

The chart on the left represents percent differences, ranging from 10% to 60% savings in the actual activity cost in relation to the expected donor cost. In general terms, projects associated with higher implementation costs show less variation (schools, roads, markets and traction animals), while productivity activities show the highest savings (goats, sheep, microenterprise, wheat production, plow and hoe exchange, etc.)


The chart on the right represents the same information in terms of average actual dollar saving per type of project. In this chart, it is clear that in some instances, plow exchange activities as well as wheat distributions and secondary schools could have been over budgeted.



Although in most types of activities variations are observed in terms of budgeted cost in relation to actual project costs, this situation changes as the project life continues. In the next chart, the average dollar variation in terms of budgeted cost versus actual project cost is plotted along the project life²⁶.

²⁶ For the purpose of these analyses, all data represents activities implemented under phase II and completed at the time of the evaluation activities. Actual data at the end of the project may differ slightly from the trends presented.

It is clear that the CREA Angola’s staff experience in estimating project costs improved over time and cost projections more closely matched actual CRP expenditures.



2. Costs per beneficiary


Projected CRPs’ cost per beneficiary presented a wide range of variations based in the multiplicity of activities financed by the program.

As the following table indicates, close to 50% of all CRPs cost less than \$10 per direct beneficiary, with a significant 23% below \$5 per direct project beneficiary.

Range of cost per beneficiary


		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	0-5	57	21.8	23.2	23.2
	5-10	50	19.2	20.3	43.5
	10-15	17	6.5	6.9	50.4
	15-20	23	8.8	9.3	59.8
	20-25	21	8.0	8.5	68.3
	25-30	8	3.1	3.3	71.5
	30-35	6	2.3	2.4	74.0
	35-40	10	3.8	4.1	78.0
	> 40	54	20.7	22.0	100.0
	Total	246	94.3	100.0	
Missing	System	15	5.7		
Total		261	100.0		

The information from the table above is represented graphically in the following chart.




This trend of varying ranges of cost per beneficiary is directly connected to the types of CRPs financed. As seen in the following chart, most types of activities have a cost per beneficiary in the range below 5 and 10 dollars. Four specific types of activities alter this trend:

- Hoe and plow exchanges, with high-ticket items delivered to beneficiaries (plows) increase the cost of the activity to over \$80 per participant.
- Donkeys projects, because of the reintroduction of highly valued animals and the cost maintain them.
- Grinding mills, usually managed by a group or association, require high investments that although benefit the community as a whole, only “owners” are consider direct beneficiaries.
- Primary schools, where the higher material value invested per direct student is actually reduced over time with the new classes taking advantage of the project sponsored new infrastructure.




In terms of different implementation modalities (CRPs, grants and CIFs), all variations seem to have relatively comparable costs in terms of investment per direct project beneficiary. The chart on the left shows the distribution of actual cost per beneficiary for the three different implementation modalities, while the chart on the right depicts a slightly higher average total

value for CRPs, directly influenced by the higher community counterpart contributions obtained through direct implementation.



Finally, all project types have improved their cost-effectiveness over time. As depicted in the following chart, in spite of the seasonal and programmatic variations (mostly connected to the project approval cycles and different amendments during the project life) the total project value per beneficiary remains close to the \$50 line. Simultaneously, the donor investment per beneficiary served shows a significant reduction.




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
3. Leverage of donor's investment

CRPs have strive to provide the highest possible leverage for donor investment and actively promoted communities' contributions to the activities in terms of locally available materials, non-remunerated labor or mobilization/payment of specialized skilled labor.

Both CIFs and grants provided for an average of 2 to 3 dollars of community investment per dollar directly invested by the project. CRPs provided for an average of almost 4 dollars of community contribution per dollar of direct project investment. As the following chart demonstrates, this value reaches more than 10 dollars of community contribution in many cases.



The following chart demonstrates the variation of average community investment in project activities per dollar of donor investment disaggregated by different project categories.



4. Overall effectiveness

As mentioned before, several trends were observed in terms of the changes in the trends for budgeting, number of direct beneficiaries, cost per beneficiary and donor investment leverage, as project operations advanced. This trends are most noticeable during the second phase of the program, when the Target Area Strategies were developed and CRPs became more strategically designed.


Initial larger, symbolic infrastructure projects became an effective way to establish presence and initiate activities in a target area. They are generally what are requested by communities (other than free distributions), give staff an opportunity to test the organizational capacities of different communities, understand the power dynamics, filter and identify the effective leaders and workers in a community, and put in place logistics systems.

The following chart depicts the trend observed in the evolution of program activities, as the teams in each field base became more experienced and credibility and trust by community members and local leadership was built.

The initial portion of the chart shows larger infrastructure, more massive initial activities, where donor investments were higher, community contributions were proportional to the high investments and therefore the perceived program value is high.

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The second half of the chart shows the project taking advantage of new activities evolving from the initial investments. This shows how significantly smaller investments in terms of project cost motivate the communities to do more on their own (also being more able to do it due to their capitalization in the initial stages) and thus project values remain constant at a lower donor cost.



Thus, the team believes that the longer the field presence in an area, the more opportunities for effective follow-on activities were identified and taken advantage of. These new activities were more targeted and cost less money to the donor and simultaneously increased the community investment and ownership in the project sponsored initiatives.

Ap - D. Sample CRP Completion Report



CREA ANGOLA - COMPLETION REPORT

A PROJECT OF THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)

Title:	<i>Potato and Market Vegetable Reactivation</i>	Implemented by:	CREA ANGOLA
Code:	BAL MM A03 05-01	Location:	Balombo - Maca Mombolo
Anticipated Start Date:	April 14, 1997	Actual Start Date:	July 30, 1997
Anticipated Completion Date:	July 31, 1997	Actual Completion Date:	October 15, 1997
Direct Beneficiaries:	1500	Actual number of Direct Beneficiaries:	667
Indirect Beneficiaries:	36.645	Actual number of indirect beneficiaries:	36.645
Cost per Beneficiary:	\$ 15,12 USD	Actual Cost per Beneficiary:	\$ 28,53 USD
% Anticipated Contribution by the Community	57%	% Actual contribution by the community	62%
% Anticipated Contribution by CREA	43%	% Actual Contribution by CREA	38%
Approved Budget:	\$ 22.675,13 USD	Final Cost for CREA:	\$ 19.031,18 USD
\$ Anticipated Community Contribution:	\$ 30.640,00 USD	\$Actual Community:	\$ 30.640,00 USD

A. Project Objectives:

What are the objectives of this CRP?

- 1) To form a Farmer's Association which will work in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture to oversee the distribution of seeds, monitor growth and harvest of seeds and form a community seed bank for seed replication and future distribution of seeds.
- 2) To reintroduce the improved seeds for the May 1997 planting season for community consumption and trade in August 1997.

Were these objectives met? If no, why not?

- 1) Yes, objectives were met but there was a delay in the distribution because of delay in purchase of seeds. All Target Areas of CREA had to submit their requests for orders before the main order was placed in Luanda. So we had to wait for the other Target Areas.
- 2) The improved seeds were reintroduced for the July 1997 planting season for community consumption and trade in October 1997.

B. Project Impact:**1. What were the anticipated impacts of this project?**

- Associations of farmers will be formed and will have coordinated program activities with local government officials.
- By the end of the project 1,500 farmers will have prepared and planted 100 grams of 5 assorted vegetable seeds and 5 kgs of potatoes.
- There will be greater commerce and travel between UNITA and Government controlled areas.
- There will be more produce available for sale or barter locally.

2. What impact did the project actually have?

- 10 associations of farmers were formed and have coordinated program activities with local government officials.
- We had planned to distribute to 1,500 farmers but we did not distribute to this number (only to 667) because many farmers had not prepared their land, and we decided to double the amount of seed distributed per beneficiary to 10 kgs to boost commerce. There is now greater commerce and travel between UNITA and Government controlled areas.
- There is more produce available for sale or barter locally.

3. Were there unforeseen impacts (include positive as well as negative)?

- Positive. A women's association, already formed in the Rural Women's Nursery Project, prepared and planted one hectare of seed for their association through this project.
- Positive. There was creation of more seed banks (granaries).
- Positive. Field days, which involve marketing, demonstration, and exchange of information on planting, diseases that attack the plants and how to combat them, etc. have become important.

C. Project Implementation:

1. Were all the milestones reached as outlined in the Timeline? Did the project adhere to the Timeline?

- Yes, milestones were reached but later than expected.
- We did not adhere to the Timeline due to the problems mentioned above.

2. How did the *Grupo de Trabalho* develop? What were the successes and failures encountered in the *Grupo de Trabalho*? Did the initial group maintain its composition or change its composition during the course of the project? If the group's composition changed, how did it change?

- The *Grupo* developed well. They organized seminars before planting, identifying farmers and confirming preparation of land.
- They successfully organized the field days.
- They successfully organized the distribution and transport of seeds to the field. Farmers carried seed as much as 18 kilometers.
- They keep on monitoring and reporting on diseases in the plants.
- They assisted in the formation of the associations.
- The *Grupo* did not alter their composition.

3. Is CREA or another organization going to work with the *Grupo de Trabalho* in the future? Would you recommend them for a project in the future? Why? Even without another NGO in the community does the group have plans to function as a group or association in the community?

- Yes, CREA is currently working with them in the ongoing Macao Mombolo projects.
- We would recommend them to other NGOs.
- They will continue working together as a group even without an NGO present. They have been organizing vaccination campaigns of people and cattle. They have built their own church on their own initiative, so we have seen they can function effectively on their own. They hosted a religious Congress of the 7th day Adventist Church for the whole Municipal with visitors from as far as Benguela and Lobito, and organized a tractor to transport of this people.

4. How was the participation of the community? Did the contribution of the community correspond to the foreseen contribution in the proposal? If no, what was the contribution?

- The community participated well. They adhered to their agreed contribution, preparing their land and forming associations.

5. How were the linkages with the local authorities, with other projects mentioned in the project proposal?

- Linkages were good. Local authorities had become familiar with CREA from the previous Wheat Reactivation Project and were supportive.
- The members of the Women's Nursery Project Association who received seed in this project gave 5 kgs of each seed back to their Association. The seed was used for their rural nurseries as indicated in the project proposal.

6. Did you receive sufficient logistical and administrative support from CREA?

- *Yes, we did and there was great logistical need in ordering of the seeds.*
- *Yes, administration did the logistical ordering of the seeds and arranged transportation into the interior.*

7. What were the problems encountered during the implementation of this project? How were they resolved?

- *Because of delay in receiving the seeds, we hurried the distribution and did not accompany some farmers to the field. Luckily, we had experience with the Grupo de Trabalho and during seminars we identified agricultural promoters in the group who accompanied the farmers to the field and successfully filled in our role.*

8. Did the associations, the ministries or other organizations fulfill their obligations to the project?

- *Yes, they did, although the Ministries and other NGOs thought we would give them seed for their own private land.*

9. What were the highlights and pitfalls of this project?

- *Pitfall. We stored seed in the WFP warehouse in Huambo. Some of the seeds became rotten because of improper storage and some seeds were stolen.*
- *Pitfall. Some seed was found being sold in the market which was an indication that some beneficiaries did not have enough land to plant and/or some beneficiaries had been misidentified.*
- *Highlight. 10 associations were formed. One association had 4 hectares of potatoes planted which is a guarantee of more produce for trade. This will also motivate more farmers' associations.*

10. Was this project a success, a failure, or in between? (Distinguish between the process and the product).

- *Up to now it is a success in product and process, but it is not yet complete. We are hopeful for a bumper harvest.*

11. What was learned during the implementation of this project? How did the project affect CREA's ability to work in the focal community?

- *CREA learned the importance of working with associations in seed distribution and reactivation to guarantee seed banks and commercialization of agriculture.*

12. On a scale from one to ten (10 = excellent, 1 = poor), how would you rate this project?

- *9 (Nine)*